

The Complete Philosophical Course of the Scotists

New Philosophical Course of the Scotists

Encompassing Universal Philosophy: *Rational, Natural, Moral, and Transnatural*

Industriously produced, ingeniously elaborated, and most aptly set forth by the
Subtle School.

Authored by

R. P. Bonaventura Columbo, of Nice

Of the Order of Conventual Minors, Doctor of Sacred Theology, and Professor
of the same in the most celebrated city of Aquensis.

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With Approval and Permission.

To the Most Reverend and Most Wise Father, P. Andreas Binus of Hispellum

Doctor of Arts and Sacred Theology, Most Vigilant Minister General of the entire Order of Conventual Minors, and Most Worthy Apostolic Commissioner by the authority of Our Most Holy Lord Pope Clement IX.

**F. Bonaventura Columbus of Nice, alumnus of the same Order, sends
greetings.**

When I was about to bring before the public light and commit to the press a complete and finished Philosophical Course, Most Reverend Father, you presented yourself to me at once — the one chosen from thousands, sought not abroad but found close at hand — as the most distinguished Patron and most illustrious Maecenas. For going forth under your most firm protection and most powerful assistance, I have no doubt that this work will be rightly diffused throughout the whole world and safely distributed. For you are the supreme head of the Seraphic Order and its most diligent General — named, elected, and acclaimed at the most recent General Chapter held in Rome, and willingly and eagerly received and most deeply beloved by all of us — chosen from among so many most upright and most distinguished men, with whom that Order itself most happily abounds and most admirably shines, for governing, ruling, moderating, and illustrating the aforesaid Company; inasmuch as you, endowed with the best character, adorned with exalted goodness and wondrous learning, and renowned for the integrity of your life, are destined to bring to it the greatest increase and growth. Hence it is not without reason that our Philosophy bears your name as its watchword — a name in which the love of wisdom shines and by which sound knowledge is attested, consisting in speculation and action, in virtue and practice, all of which you most ardently study and most deeply love, as you gave immediate signs and foretokens at the very outset of your governance, and have long pursued with distinction, and have followed through with the highest praise and acclaim.

But if true Philosophy not only speaks but also acts — according to that saying of the Master of morals: "Prove your words by deeds, lest your life be at odds with your speech" — then plainly you, like another Most Holy and Most Learned General Bonaventure, acting before speaking and through example rather than precept, aptly and opportunely accomplish, correct, repair, and restore what needs to be built and corrected; you raise up what has collapsed and been scattered, restore it to its former religious state, and bring it back to better fruit — knowing that the voice of deed is stronger and more efficacious than the voice of word. You now cultivate and vigorously build up above all in the Kingdoms of France, willingly assenting to the pious and just desires of the Most Christian King, and likewise precisely executing the commands and mandates of the Supreme Pontiff — by whose authority we hope, desire, and pray that

greater and worthier things may be conferred upon you by the most powerful and most devoted men aforementioned, so that you may more and more illustrate our Seraphic Family and illuminate the whole world.

Receive therefore with a cheerful heart and joyful countenance this work and pledge of my vigils and labors — a certain testimony and true monument of my perpetual veneration and enduring affection for you. Farewell, and farewell again — you who were born for the public good.

To the Reader

I have taken care to fortify and confirm all the assertions with explicit passages and testimonies of Scotus — cited, touched upon, or at least deduced from or presupposed upon his principles — and to corroborate them with the foundations and reasoning of that same Doctor; things long most earnestly desired by all his students, since no one before, as far as I have seen, has achieved this in Philosophy. Vulpes indeed began this labor with industry and ingenuity in his theological volumes, but was overtaken by death and did not complete it. Then two of our recent writers accumulate many things learnedly and copiously from Scotus and others both ancient and modern, and refute objections — though they sometimes scorn the more eminent Scotists, especially the Formalists by name, and favor excessively the Moderns outside Scotus's school. More recently Poncius undertook and encompassed a complete Philosophical Course, but assembles and defends many things not consonant with Scotist doctrine, and sets little store by citations, references, and notable passages of Scotus — thinking himself the very first to complete it; whereas before him, Tataret, John of the Masters, the Parisians, and very many others everywhere — especially in the more celebrated Universities — had set it forth by word and in writing with immense acclaim and published it to the world.

Wherefore, to the best of my ability, I shall bring forward the necessary and profitable citations, quotations of the Doctor, and notable passages, and shall endeavor to lay open what is obscure, to explain what is difficult, to distinguish and illuminate what is confused, and moreover to reduce and arrange everything — in proportion to the slenderness of my modest talent — into correct order and fitting method. But if anything occurs that has not been well said, let it be attributed to me and forgiven. If, however, anything good is found, let it be ascribed to God, the Author and Bestower of all good things. Farewell.

Approbation of the Doctors

We the undersigned Doctors of Sacred Theology have attentively read through and carefully examined the New Philosophical Course of the Scotists, composed with skill and elaborated with elegance in its entirety and in all respects by the Reverend Father Master Bonaventura Columbus, formerly public Professor of Philosophy at Aix and Lecturer in Sacred Theology — a work complete and finished in all its parts: which not only is consonant with Orthodox Faith and good morals, but also expounds the doctrine of Aristotle and of the Subtle Doctor Scotus with great clarity and learning, and defends both most vigorously against their adversaries, both ancient and modern. We therefore judge it worthy of being printed and published as soon as possible for the common benefit of all. Salon, 12 September 1667.

Fr. Jacobus Julianus, Doctor of Theology. Fr. Elzearius Borely, Doctor of Sacred Theology.

Faculty of the Very Reverend Father Provincial of the Province of Saint Louis

I, Fr. Gabriel Taulany, Doctor of Sacred Theology, Conventual Minor, and Provincial of the Province of Saint Louis, grant the faculty that the New Philosophical Course of the Scotists, by Father Master Bonaventura Columbus of our same Order — approved by the judgment of serious Doctors and long desired by us — be committed to the press. Aix, 15 September 1667.

Fr. Gabriel Taulany, Provincial.

Approbation of the Doctors of the Sacred Faculty of Paris

We have found worthy the New Philosophical Course according to the mind of the Subtle Doctor, by Father Bonaventura Colombo of Nice, of the Order of Conventual Minors — inasmuch as there is nothing in it that does not breathe sound doctrine and indeed the acumen of the Subtle Doctor. So we testify, we the undersigned Doctors of Theology of the distinguished Parisian Faculty, on the second day of December in the year 1669.

Fr. Paulus Lombard, Prior of the Carmelites. Fr. Elias Vial, Carmelite.

Consent of the Royal Procurator

Having seen the Approbation of the Doctors of the Parisian Faculty, I on behalf of the King assent that the book entitled *New Philosophical Course according to the mind of the Subtle Doctor*, by the Reverend Father Bonaventura Columbus of Nice, of the Order of Conventual Minors, be committed to the press by Laurentius

Arnaud and Petrus Borde, associate booksellers of Lyon, with the customary prohibitions. Given at Lyon, the second day of December in the year 1669.

Galliat.

Permission

Granted in accordance with the conclusions of the Royal Procurator. Lyon, on
the day and in the year aforesaid.

Dulieu.

Epitome of Dialectic, Divided into Three Books, According to the Mind of the Subtle Doctor

Author: Fr. Bonaventura Columbo of Nice, of the Order of Conventual Minors, Doctor and Professor of Sacred Theology

Prooemium

Aristotle, the head and renowned prince of the Peripatetics, affirms at the beginning of the first book of the *Physics* that in every discipline and faculty, knowledge and science arise from an acquaintance with principles, saying that we consider ourselves to know any given thing when we have come to know its first causes and first principles down to its elements. The author of the *Speculative Grammar* was not unmindful of this precept, and invokes it in his prooemium, aptly applying it to the presentation and clarification of his own subject; and subsequent philosophers have likewise observed it. Moreover, from the same Stagirite (*Text 21 of the first book of the Posterior Analytics*) and from Scotus (*ibid.*, q. 2; in the *Prologue*, q. 1, §. *In ista quaestione, A*; in 4 *Sent.*, d. 47, q. 1, §. *Respondeo, A*; and in other places), we come to know principles insofar as we come to know their terms — and both these texts seem to favor our purpose and to fit our subject exceedingly well, since we are most eager to instruct in the principles and elements of Dialectic, and in the whole discipline of reasoning, taking our starting point from terms, so that once these are known and grasped, its inner recesses may the more easily and conveniently be opened up. For no one can be thoroughly acquainted with the intimate nature of Logic — which is in itself very obscure — unless the process of reasoning, or the syllogism, is made known to him. That Aristotle treated this by design and directed all the works of Dialectic toward it is testified by Scotus (q. 3 of the *Universals*), Zabarella (l. 1, *De natura Logicae*, c. 18), Fonseca (l. 1, *Institutionum dialecticarum*, c. 5; and l. 1, *Met.*, c. 3, q. 1, sect. 3), and is indicated by Aristotle himself at the close of the *Sophistical Refutations*.

For just as Grammar cannot be acquired without letters, Mathematics without points, and Physics without the prior conception of matter and form, so Logic cannot be learned if terms are unknown and neglected. It is in no way possible to proceed without error: no one can compose propositions, form their oppositions, construct their equivalences, produce their conversions, and perceive the nature of the syllogism, its properties, its fallacies, and other matters of this kind, without having first examined and understood terms. The Subtle Doctor teaches this plainly (q. 1 of the *Prologue*, §. *Contra istam rationem, G*), in these words: "The intellect cannot understand a mediated proposition unless

it understands the immediate one, nor that unless it understands its terms." And in (*1 Sent., d. 3, q. 2, §. Ad istud, sub C*): "That knowledge is most perfect which is obtained from terms perfectly known." And in (*q. 4, ante V*): "Pure and genuine truths cannot be grasped without grasping their proper terms." Likewise in (*4 Sent., d. 10, q. 8, §. Respondeo, sub B*): "It is impossible to conceive any complex expression whose extremes are not conceived." Chrysaorius had experienced this: encountering the *Categories* of Aristotle and not then grasping them, he could never have understood them had not his master Porphyry first prefaced and expounded the *Isagoge* of the universals, which contains the principal terms. The Scotist Bonet lends support to this, saying at the beginning of (*l. 1, Met., c. 1*): "Distinct knowledge of a conclusion depends upon knowledge of principles and upon distinct knowledge of terms." Francis Lychetus, the most faithful interpreter of Scotus, also concurs (*in 1 Sent., d. 3, q. 2, §. Contra istud obijcitur*): "In arguing, we first compose the syllogism from propositions, and the propositions from terms, and then we resolve the syllogism into propositions, and the propositions into terms. And so in all of this, knowledge of terms is required." And just as, according to the teaching of the Stagirite (*1 Sophistical Refutations, c. 1*), those who do not know the counters and their values go wrong in calculation, so too those who have not a clear knowledge of words and terms are not infrequently deceived and ensnared in the conduct of debate.

Therefore that custom of philosophical academies is greatly to be praised and celebrated which, before the treatment of Logic, hands on to younger students a brief introduction to its terms — commonly called the *Summulae* — so that they may be rendered readier and more prompt in tracking down the truth of reasoning and detecting its falsehood: especially in the Lyceum and the Scotist school, which, as it stands higher than the rest in subtlety, likewise exists as more difficult in its depth. Not unwillingly concurring with these scholars, I undertake an epitome on terms and on what is terminated — that is, on the syllogism — provided only that I first employ the words of our Doctor and follow his path. For, as is witnessed by William Vorri long, the prince of theologians in his time, near the end of his address on the first book of the *Sentences*, and by James of Bagnacavallo, a most learned and devout man, on page 19 of his *Pastoral Epistle*, the Subtle Doctor, pouring out prayers to God and beginning his Dialectic, says: "O God, who art the term without end, grant me that I may speak of what is determined aright."

Division of This Entire Epitome

This little work is completed in three books. In the first, incomplex terms are treated; in the second, complex terms; and in the third, what is terminated — that is, the syllogism, which is composed from the preceding terms. A not incongruous reason is given for this partition, since the syllogism, which is established as the primary subject of Aristotelian Logic, encompasses two kinds of parts, namely integral and subjective, of which Scotus makes mention (*q. 3 of*

the Universals, §. *Dicendo ergo*, and §. *Ad aliud*; Cardinal Sarnanus on p. 79 of his commentary; and likewise at the beginning of Prologue 3, and 2nd lateral, §. *Ad 1 arg. prima q. R*, and §. *Aliter*, shortly before Q; and 2 Sent., d. 3, q. 4, §. *Contra, ista positio*, G). The integral parts of the syllogism are the incomplex and complex terms, enumerated by the same Doctor (2 Sent., d. 11, q. un., §. *De secundo*, shortly after C), which are called by Scotus himself (q. 2 of the first *Prior Analytics*, at the end; q. 6, §. *Respondetur*) and by other Dialecticians the remote and proximate matter of the same syllogism. The subjective parts are the analytic, topical, sophistical, and pseudo-graphical syllogisms, which the Doctor enumerates at the end of (q. 2 of the first *Prior Analytics*).

Investigating this entire subject matter, we first treat of incomplex terms, from which flow as properties: signification, predication, subjection, supposition, status, distraction, ampliation, restriction, alienation, diminution, and appellation. We then treat of complex terms, from which flow as properties: truth, falsity, opposition, equivalence, and conversion — discussed at length by Scotus in the books on the *Perihermeneias* and the *Prior Analytics*. Thereafter we treat of the syllogism, whose properties are: to consist of three terms, to exist in a mode and figure, and necessarily to infer a conclusion from the premises — as Sarnanus writes in his commentary (q. 3 of the *Universals*, p. 58), following Scotus in the books of the *Prior Analytics* just cited. This distribution is plainly indicated by the Doctor (1 *Perihermeneias*, q. 1; and 1 *Prior Analytics*, q. 2), and is marvelously confirmed by the order of the Philosopher's books in his *Organon*. For he examines incomplex terms in the book of the *Categories*, for the explanation of which the Porphyrian *Isagoge* is prefixed; he surveys complex terms in the books of the *Perihermeneias*; and finally he treats at length the syllogism, its species, and its properties in the books of the *Prior Analytics*, *Posterior Analytics*, *Topics*, and *Sophistical Refutations*.

Book I: On Incomplex Terms

Just as in thoroughly learning Grammar, letters are known before syllables, syllables before words, and words before nouns; so in acquiring Dialectic, incomplex terms are set out before complex ones, and these before the syllogism — as the Subtle Doctor (*q. 19 of the Sophistical Refutations*) and Lychetus (*in 1 Sent., d. 3, q. 2, §. Contra istud*) appear to indicate. The reason for this is that what is simpler and more general is to be placed before and preferred to what is less general and composite. Aristotle prescribes and effects this (*1 Physics, c. 1, Texts 4 and 7; and 3 of the same work, Text 2; and at the end of the Meteorologica*), saying that one must proceed from universals to singulars, and likewise from what is more general to what is less general. This book contains four questions: the first on the divisions and definitions of incomplex terms; the second on their properties; the third on universals; and the fourth on the categories.

Question I: On the Divisions and Definitions of Incomplex Terms

Article I: On the Names of This Discipline

Before we come to the matter we have proposed, the names of this discipline must be set out. For the Stagirite warns (*1 Sophistical Refutations, cited in our preface*) that in the conduct of debate those are easily deceived who do not know the names of things. So that we may not succumb to any error or deception, we have judged it worthwhile to investigate and learn the names of the discipline itself — which the same Philosopher explains more clearly (*1 Posterior Analytics, c. 1, Text 2*) through those prior cognitions: whether it is, and what it is, or what the name is and what the thing is. Nor does Plato dissent, judging in the *Cratylus* that the meaning of words is not to be despised; with whom the Seraphic Doctor agrees (*2 Sent., d. 38, art. 1*), saying that we are frequently led to knowledge of a thing through consideration of its words. And the Doctor (*2 Sent., d. 34, §. Ita qq., ante A*) is of the same mind.

This science is distinguished by many names, some metaphorical — in which sense it is called by Plato (*7 of the Republic*) the apex and end of all disciplines; by Cicero (*De claris Oratoribus*) the light of the sciences; by others it is called the sun of the mind, the eye of reason, the scale of truth, the gateway of the sciences — and by Aristotle it is called an instrument, as is clear from the title of his work; some names are proper — thus by the same Philosopher (*2 Met., c. 3*) it is called the method of knowing, and commonly it is termed Dialectic and Logic. Since these last two names are the more familiar and frequent among philosophers, we must accurately explain their meanings.

Dialectic is equivalent to the doctrine of discourse. For what in Greek is *διαλέγεσθαι* is in Latin *disserere* (to discourse). And therefore, etymologically,

Dialectic is the science of discoursing. Or, if you prefer, the science of disputing, as some more recent authors note from Augustine (*l. 1, Against Cresconius the Grammarian, c. 14*). Logic, however, is derived from the Greek word λόγος, which signifies speech, word, and reason, as Scotus notes (*in 1 Sent., d. 27, q. 3, §. Ad 3 q., circa R; and Quodl. 7, art. 3, sub Q*), following Augustine (*7 De Trinitate, c. 2*) and Jerome (*Ad Paulinum, c. 4*), whom Gadius cites in his commentary on that quodlibetal question just cited by us. Accordingly, by the derivation of the word, Logic is the science of discourse or of reason — or both terms just mentioned come to the same thing, as some more recent authors note from Cicero — and so Logic may be described as the discursive science that distinguishes the true from the false, as the holy Augustine intimates (*ibid., Against Cresconius the Grammarian*); or, as others prefer, Logic is the science of dividing, defining, and arguing well.

One objects, first, against the foregoing definition of Dialectic: Scotus (*q. 1 of the Categories, §. Ad quaestionem*) writes that Logic is neither a real nor a discursive science, because it considers neither speech nor the properties of speech. Therefore in the school of Scotus the preceding description of Logic is not suitable. One replies with Tataretus (*q. 1 of his Logic, on the fourth knowable*) that Logic is called discursive not because it uses speech — since in that case all sciences, which also use speech, would be discursive — but because it judges which speech is true and which is false. Or one may say with Scotus in the cited place that Logic is called discursive because the concept with which Logic is concerned is the immediate significate of a spoken word, and also because the properties of a concept belong to the significative spoken word. Or one may finally say that Logic is discursive — that is, rational and reasoning — which everyone concedes, especially since we are not speaking of external speech but of internal speech, which we showed in our *Treatise on Angels, disp. 7* to belong to Angels as well, and which coincides with discourse and reasoning, as Augustine touches upon (*l. 2, De consensu Evangelistarum, near the end of c. 66*).

One objects, secondly: every science, especially a speculative one, distinguishes the true from the false — for example, Metaphysics, which (*2 Met., c. 1*) is the chief investigator of truth, which cannot be done unless truth is separated from falsehood through it. Therefore distinguishing the true from the false is not to be attributed to Logic alone as its proper function, peculiar end, and mark of distinction from the other disciplines. One replies that Metaphysics and Logic do not contemplate truth in the same way, as the Subtle Doctor notes in his commentary (*4 Met., Text 1; and 6 of the same, q. 3, §. Ad propositum*). For Metaphysics meditates upon transcendental and incomplex truth, while Logic speculates upon complex truth and gathers it by means of the syllogism. That habit which regards truth and by which falsehood is judged — since Scotus affirms (*in 4 Sent., d. 15, q. 3, §. De tertio, X*) that "the straight is the judge of itself and of the crooked" — is therefore rightly described as the discursive science that distinguishes the true from the false.

Article II: What a Term Is

The many acceptations of "term" are to be sought from (*5 Met., c. 17, Text 22*), which Fonseca (*ibid.*), Pelbartus (*vol. 1 of the Theological Rosary, s.v. Elementum*), and Major (*l. 1 and 2 of the Terms*) adduce and explain. Of these, I note only the term — that is, the boundary of the earth, which is named from "terminating" — taken universally, described as the final point or end of any given thing; in this sense death is called the term of life. Hence the Church sings in the Hymn of Compline, *Te lucis ante terminum*, and in the proper Office of Saint Clare, *Post vitae Clarae terminum*, and Augustine (*2 De consensu Evangelistarum, 24*): "Light is the term of all night." Again (*1 Physics, c. 4, Text 36*), it is demonstrated and defended by our Doctor (*in 2 Sent., d. 2, q. 9, §. Ad argumenta, sub N*) that all living things are bounded by definite terms. Moreover, "term" is often used not only for the end but also for the beginning of any thing; in this sense the first and last point of a line are called the terms of that line. Likewise, the extreme parts of a staff, a field, and the sea are called their terms; thus Dan and Beersheba are the terms of Judea, and it is read in (*Exodus 23*): "I will set your terms from the Red Sea to the sea of the Philistines, from the desert to the river."

From this signification, which is the proper one — as Campanella notes (*following Scotus, q. 1 of the Categories*) — "term" is transferred to signify the first and last point of a proposition; and in this acceptation a term may be described as the extreme of a proposition. A proposition is bounded by two terms, namely the subject and the predicate: the subject on the near side, and the predicate on the far side, as is clear in this proposition, "man is an animal," where "man" and "animal" are its terms; "man" is called the subject, and "animal" the predicate. "Is" is called the copula or bond of both, just as the union of matter and form is called the nexus of each.

The foregoing description of a term does not conflict with Aristotle's definition (*1 Prior Analytics, c. 1*): "A term is that into which a proposition is resolved." For that into which something is resolved is also that out of which it is composed, as is clear in the case of a natural body, which, since it is composed of matter and form, is also resolved into matter and form. Since a proposition is composed of terms, it is likewise resolved into terms. And it is perhaps not without reason that in (*1 Topics, c. 4, and in the Metaphysics passage mentioned above*) a definition is called a term, because it does not exceed the bounds of the essence of the thing being defined but is contained, enclosed, and equated to them. Or perhaps the Philosopher supplies such a definition of term because, just as experience confirms that motion ceases once the term is reached, so likewise our mind comes to rest in a proposition once the perfect sense of its terms has been grasped. Or — what pleases us more — Aristotle was there proceeding by the resolute method, since he was writing the books of the *Prior Analytics*, which are called analytic or resolute. Weighing this carefully, the Author of the *Speculative Grammar* adds: "Term expresses the function of terminating the

resolutions of the syllogism, because the dialectician resolves syllogisms into propositions, and propositions into subject and predicate, which are called terms according to the logician."

One objects, first, against the given definition of term: a proposition is resolved not only into subject and predicate but also into the verb, since it is constructed from subject, predicate, and verb. Therefore either the foregoing definition of term is defective, or the verb is a term — but the latter is false; therefore so is the former. The objection is met by saying that a term is that into which a proposition is resolved as into an extreme component part that encloses it. For this reason I noted above that a term is the extreme of a proposition, and Aristotle in the cited place, with Firminus Duraeus as interpreter, says: "I call that the extreme into which the proposition is resolved." Scotus lends support to this (*in 1 Sent., d. 2, q. 4, §. Si tenendo*), calling terms "extremes" in these words: "The necessary connection of extremes argues a necessary connection of the middles." Now the verb is not an extreme but a middle: for it mediates between both extremes and is the bond of each, and therefore does not enter into the definition of term. This can also be shown in the case of a physical composite, which is indeed resolved into matter and form as into its parts, but not into their union, which is the nexus of each — especially in Scotus's position, which holds that union is formally an extrinsic relation supervening upon the parts, as is clear (*in 3 Sent., d. 2, q. 2, art. 3, sub E*). Add to this what I noted above, that "term" in this context is taken for the beginning and end of anything, in which sense only subject and predicate are entitled to the name of term.

One objects, secondly: a definition must not apply to anything other than what is defined, as will be plain in the subsequent book in the article on definition. But the definition of term applies to something other than the term itself — namely, to a hypothetical proposition, which is resolved into propositions, as in "If the sun is shining, it is day." Therefore the foregoing definition of term has not been correctly given. The major being conceded, the minor is to be denied; its proof is dissolved because the ultimate resolution of a hypothetical proposition terminates in terms. The same thing similarly occurs in the resolution of a composite natural living thing, whose ultimate resolution comes to rest in prime matter, as Scotus teaches (*in 4 Sent., d. 11, q. 3*).

One objects, thirdly: a proposition is sometimes resolved into adverbs and prepositions, of which it is composed, as is clear in this: "Aristotle argued well in the first Physics against the early philosophers." Therefore the definition of term has not been correctly assigned by Aristotle. One must distinguish the antecedent: a proposition is resolved into adverbs and prepositions as into its predicate and subject — this is denied; as into additions and modifications of each, which are commonly called syncategoremata — this is conceded.

Article III: On Mental, Spoken, and Written Terms

Among the many distributions of terms, the first we encounter for discussion is the division into mental, spoken, and written terms, which Scotus intimates (*q. 1 of the Categories*). A mental term is the extreme of a mental proposition — or, according to Aristotle, that into which a mental proposition is resolved — such as "man" conceived in the mind. A spoken term is the extreme of a spoken proposition — or according to Aristotle, that into which a spoken proposition is resolved — such as "lion" uttered in voice. A written term is the extreme of a written proposition — or according to the mind of the Philosopher, that into which a written proposition is resolved — such as "God," whether inscribed on papyrus, marble, or other materials.

These three — concept, spoken word, and writing — are marvelously ordered by nature, as the Subtle Doctor notes (*in 1 Sent., d. 27, q. 3, §. Ad argumentum, in Solutione Secundi, ante I*). For since man, according to Aristotle (*1 Politics, c. 2; 9 Ethics*) and the Doctor (*q. 4 of the first Perihermeneias; and q. 13, §. Alii aliter*), is a civil and social animal, and since one person cannot look into another's mind or thoughts, nature has therefore granted spoken words — which, per (*1 Perihermeneias, c. 1*), are signs of those things that lie hidden in the soul, that is, of the concepts that are drawn from the intellect. Hence Plato says in the *Timaeus* — as Vorrilonius witnesses (*in 1 Sent., q. 22, art. 1*) and as Augustine states (*In Ezechiel, c. 13*) — that speech was given to us so that we might be able to express our mutual concepts. Scotus says the same (*in 1 Sent., d. 27, q. 3, §. Ad qq. istas, sub F*): "The spoken word is formed to signify and declare what is understood." And again (*in 2 Sent., d. 42, q. 2; and q. 4, §. Ad q. Q, in solutione primi*), he adds: "According to that work of speech man conducts himself in the most civil and political manner." The same he openly shows (*ibid., §. Ad q. 4, S*): "Locution belongs most of all to man, both as rational and as man, because he is in this way communicative." Augustine says the same (*2 De doctrina Christiana; and 15 De Trinitate, c. 10*). Thereafter, so that things might be recalled to memory, communicated to us more quickly and easily, and so that those who are absent and our posterity — with whom we cannot use spoken words — might participate, letters and writing were invented; and how great a benefit they are to man, especially through the art of printing, daily experience demonstrates.

Dialectic treats of the spoken term rather than the mental term, as Scotus touches upon at the end of the first *Perihermeneias* — though the spoken term derives its force from the mental — both because spoken words are more apparent to us than concepts, and because no man is instructed by another in internal speech, while Dialectic teaches how it should be instructed, judging the true from the false, for which purpose spoken words are necessary; and also because Dialectic is derived from *δια* — that is, two — and *λεξις* — that is, speech: the speech of two persons, namely, one who argues and one who responds. For since, from what was said in Article I, Dialectic is the science of disputation, in order for disputation to take place between two persons it can only be accomplished through spoken words. Much the same reason is given when one

asks why Logic treats of spoken words rather than of written ones. The reply is that spoken words are more manifest than writings, that they receive their force and efficacy from the one who utters them, and that they are more tenaciously impressed upon the memory of the hearer. Hence those who learn sciences from others are called not their readers but their hearers.

When we hear spoken words or read writings, two concepts can be formed in us: one concerns the name or writing only, without knowledge of the thing signified under such a name or writing — and this is called a non-ultimate term, so called because the intellect does not terminate in it but tends further toward the signification of the thing; the other concerns the thing signified, when namely someone knows both the name and the thing signified by the name — and this is called an ultimate concept, so called because, once knowledge of the name and the thing has been obtained, the mind of the one conceiving comes to rest. This interpretation and division appears to be intimated by John Major (*l. 1 of the Terms, fol. 7, col. 4*), and not far from him is the Prince of the Subtiles (*in 1 Sent., d. 3, q. 3, §. Loquendo igitur, L*), saying: "Something is conceived confusedly when it is conceived as it is expressed through a name; and distinctly when it is conceived as it is expressed through a definition." Those who lack ultimate concepts are said to be unlearned; those who possess them are said to be learned.

One objects, first: the members of a good division participate equally in the common character of what is divided, as will be plain in the following book in the article on division. But the written, spoken, and mental terms do not participate equally in the common character of a term: for just as a proposition is formally and intrinsically predicated of a mental proposition, so the formal and intrinsic character of a term is predicated of the mental term. Of the spoken and written, however, only extrinsically — just as truth formally exists in the intellect, but in a spoken word or writing as in a sign. Thus the essential character of term is located in the mental term alone. Therefore the foregoing division is not apt. One replies that this division of term is indeed not wholly exact — that is, it is not the division of a univocal thing into its univocates, or of a genus into its species — yet it is not unlike that which the Philosopher offers (*4 Met., c. 2, Text 2*), dividing health into the health of an animal, of urine, and of medicine. For health formally is in the animal; in urine as in a sign; and in medicine as in an efficient cause. If someone, in speaking of terms, wishes to go beyond the bounds of philosophy, he may compare it with that division by which sin is divided into sin of the heart, of the mouth, and of deed. For sin is formally in the will; materially, however, in speech and deed, as the Doctor excellently expounds (*in 2 Sent., d. 42, q. 4, §. Ad q. 2, N*). Or one may say with Major (*l. 1 of the Terms, fol. 3, col. 4*), admitting the major and denying the minor: for a term, whose genus is "extreme" and whose remaining element holds the place of a difference, is univocally divided into mental, spoken, and written.

One objects, secondly: this is not a sound division whose dividing members exceed the divided, as will be shown plainly in the place cited above. But the foregoing division is of this kind, since there can be a voice even though it is not a term — as Mark I records that John the Baptist was indeed a voice, as he himself admits there, but was not the term, which is the Word. Therefore it is a bad division. One replies: the major being conceded, the minor is to be denied. For its proof, I distinguish: John was a voice absolutely, with no account taken of the preceding and subsequent sense of Scripture — this may be denied; relatively — this is conceded, inasmuch as John was the messenger or forerunner of the incarnate Word. Therefore John says: "I am the voice of one crying in the desert: prepare the way of the Lord."

Article IV: On Significant and Non-Significant Terms, and Other Related Matters

One kind of term is non-significative, described as the extreme of a proposition that represents nothing to the cognitive faculty by human convention; or according to the mind of the Philosopher, a non-significative term is that into which a proposition is resolved by human will while signifying nothing to the cognitive faculty — for example, "blictri." Another is the significative term, defined as the extreme of a proposition that represents something to the cognitive faculty by human institution; or according to Aristotle, a significative term is that into which a proposition is resolved by human convention while signifying something — for example, "lion." The significative term is subdivided into categorematic, syncategorematic, and mixed — which Scotus touches upon (*q. 8 of the first Prior Analytics*, §. *Quantum ad 2*; and *q. 32 of the Sophistical Refutations*, shortly before §. *Ad 1 argumentum*).

A categorematic term is one that signifies something on its own — for example, "lion" signifies "a roaring animal." A syncategorematic, or co-significative term, is one that signifies nothing on its own but, when joined to another, designates something — such as universal signs, prepositions, and adverbs. For example, "learnedly" signifies nothing on its own, but if added to another term it signifies something, as in "he discourses learnedly." This can be further explained by an arithmetical analogy: just as among arithmetical symbols, zero signifies nothing on its own, yet if a 1 is prefixed to it, it makes 10, and if a 2 is prefixed, it makes 20 — so too, as Major says (*loc. cit.*, *fol. 5*), a syncategorema functions like a zero: that is, it signifies nothing on its own, yet joined to another it signifies something, as I was just explaining. A mixed term is one composed of a categorema and a syncategorema — for example, "no-one," that is, "no man," as the Doctor notes (*in 1 Sent.*, *d. 21, q. un.*, ante §. *Ad q. potest fieri, circa A*).

Hurtado (*disp. 1 of the Summulae*, *sect. 10*) and to some extent Arriaga (*ibid.*, *sect. 4*), following Tataretus (*Tract. 1, fol. 3, in solutione primi argumenti*) — from whom Fuentes does not dissent (*parte 2 Summularum*, *art. 7, diff. 2*) — think that substantive nouns are categorematic terms and adjective nouns are

syncategorematic terms. On the contrary: even if the said authors concede that substantive nouns are categorematic terms, they do not seem to me to rightly deny that adjective nouns are categorematic terms, judging them to be syncategorematic. For a categorematic term, by its very nomenclature, is predicable — as Hurtado himself admits there; but adjective nouns are predicable, as in "man is wise." Therefore adjective nouns are categorematic terms. Likewise, a categorematic term is significative, as is clear from its foregoing description; but adjective nouns are significative — for example, "learned" signifies "one having learning" (since it is a concrete noun, which, as will be said in Article VI, signifies a form and one having the form). Therefore adjective nouns are categorematic terms. Furthermore, adjective nouns are properly the extremes of propositions — as in the same example just given, "man is learned," where "learned" is one extreme of the said proposition; but syncategoremata are not properly terms, since they signify nothing on their own unless joined to others, as I showed above. They rather co-terminate than terminate the proposition. Therefore adjective nouns are not to be classed among syncategoremata.

One says: adjectives signify "with another" — that is, something after the manner of something adjacent, as I will show in the place shortly cited — therefore they are syncategorematic terms. Against this: even substantive nouns signify "with another," for it is necessary that in every proposition two extremes be placed explicitly or implicitly, one of which is joined to the other through a verbal copula to express complex truth. Therefore the reply is no answer. Nor does it help to say that a substantive signifies in the manner of something standing on its own and determinate, while an adjective signifies in the manner of something adjacent and indeterminate. For that indicates the proper distinction between a substantive and an adjective, but does not exclude the adjective itself from the category of categorematic terms. This can be urged by analogy: just as, by their own proper and peculiar characters, substance is being through itself and accident is being in another, yet both fall under the common character and concept of being as univocating — as Scotus teaches (*in 1 Sent., d. 39, q. 1*), whom Arriaga follows (*disp. 13, sect. 4, n. 40*) — so, although substantive and adjective differ by their own proper differences already assigned and explained by us, they nonetheless participate in the common character of a categorematic term, which is to be predicative and significative, as I forewarned near the beginning of this article. And so adjective nouns are to be reckoned among categorematic terms.

A categorematic term is divided into incomplex and complex, according to Aristotle (*in the Antepredicaments*) and Scotus (*q. 52 of the Sophistical Refutations, §. Pro solutione*). An incomplex term, according to Tataretus (*Tract. 1 of the Summulae, fol. 1*), is one that is subordinated to an incomplex concept; but it is commonly described as a spoken word signifying on its own, whose parts, when separated, do not retain the same signification they have when joined together

— such as "man," "Lord," and similar terms, whose parts taken separately do not have the same signification they possess when taken conjointly — as is obvious to all — and is indicated by Aristotle (*1 Perihermeneias, c. 1*) and by Scotus (*in 4 Sent., d. 8, q. 2, §. Aliter ergo, sub G*). This term is therefore called incomplex and indivisible on account of the unity and indivisibility of its signification, which its separated parts do not possess. It can be divided into simple — as "lion" — and composite — as "plenipotentiary" — much in the same way as, in the second book, noun and verb will be divided into simple and composite: in both cases the reason and difficulty appear to be the same, and are better to be examined there than in the present place. A complex term, according to the same Tataretus (*ibid.*), is one that is subordinated to a complex concept; and it is commonly said to be one that consists of several words each signifying on its own and aptly arranged. A complex term is of two kinds, as the Doctor touches upon (*1 Posterior Analytics, near the end of q. 34*): one is non-distant and the other is distant. A non-distant complex term is one whose parts are not joined by a verb — as "a white horse"; a distant complex term is one whose parts are joined by a verb — as "the crow is black." Whether a complex term coincides with a speech and a proposition, or not, I defer for examination to the place just cited.

As to why this first book is entitled "On Incomplex Terms" rather than "On Categorematic Terms" — given that we divide a term into categorematic and syncategorematic before dividing it into incomplex and complex — this reason can be offered: incomplex terms are ordered to complex terms as parts to a whole, and as letters to syllables, and syllables to words, about which the second book is aptly composed. But categorematic terms bear no relationship to syncategorematic terms, since, from what has been said, the latter are not properly terms but may be called co-terminal or co-significative and co-predicative — as "alone" is in Scotus (*in 1 Sent., d. 1, q. 21, q. un.*).

One objects, first, against the division of a categorematic term into substantive and adjective: if an adjective is a categorematic term because it is significative and predicative, then everything that signifies a totality and something signifying a partial quantity will be a categorematic term — the consequence being repugnant to all dialecticians who number such terms among syncategoremata. Therefore so is the antecedent. One replies by denying the consequence. The reason for the disparity is that an adjective signifies a form and one having the form, since it is a concrete noun; but "every," and other syncategoremata of that kind, do not do this unless they are joined to a concrete term or to another term. For that reason they have no place among the categorematic terms.

One objects, secondly: a syncategorematic term is not properly a term, as I indicated above. Therefore the division of a term into categorematic and syncategorematic is inept — the consequence holding because what is divided does not belong to the dividing members, which is opposed to the rules of a

good division to be assigned (*l. 2, art. 1, q. 7*). One replies that this is not an exact and adequate division but an improper and inadequate one, as is well deduced in the argument. It may rather be called an enumeration of terms.

One objects, thirdly: a proposition is not resolved into a complex term, because in our opinion a complex term coincides with the proposition itself, and the same thing is resolved not into itself but into something other. Therefore the later division of a term into incomplex and complex is not legitimate. I distinguish the antecedent: concerning a distant complex term — I concede it; concerning a non-distant complex term — I deny it. For example, in "Peter is a good philosopher," "a good philosopher" is a non-distant complex term into which the foregoing proposition is resolved. Or one may say that the foregoing division is improper and inadequate, just as the division of a term into categorematic and syncategorematic is improper.

Article V: On Equivocal and Univocal Terms

An equivocal term is one that belongs to several things having the same name but a different essential character according to that name. Scotus offers an example (*in 1 Sent., d. 25, q. un., §. Respondeo, A*) — namely "dog," which is an equivocal term with respect to the celestial dog, the aquatic dog, and the terrestrial dog. Aristotle (*at the beginning of the book of the Categories; and 6 Topics, c. 2*), and after him Scotus (*q. 13 of the Sophistical Refutations, §. Ad 1, ergo; q. 15 of the same, §. Ad primam rationem*), describe equivocal things as those "whose name is common but whose essential character according to that name is different."

They are divided by the Doctor (*q. 1 of the Categories; and q. 5, §. Ad q.*) into equivocating equivocals — those which are equivocal, meaning things that belong to many under a common name only, which are equivocal names attributed to many things by reason of the very spoken words — and equivocated equivocals, which are called those that enjoy only a common name, and these are the different things that participate in the common name only.

Furthermore, some equivocals are by chance, and others by design. Equivocals by chance are those that arise apart from human intention — that is, with no consideration taken of the things signified — for example, "Gallus" is said both of a man of the French nation and of a rooster; and these are called purely equivocal. Equivocals by design are those that acquire some agreement or similarity in the name from the intention of the one imposing it — for example, when someone gives the name of Saint Francis to his son because he hopes he will be like Saint Francis. This is reported to have been done with the names Abraham, David, and others by Tossignani (*l. 1 of the Seraphic History, near the beginning*); and these are called analogical.

A univocal term is one that belongs to several things having the same name and the same essential character according to that name. And Aristotle (*cited above*) defines univocal things as those "whose name is common and whose essential

character of substance according to that name is the same" — for example, "animal" with respect to man and beast is univocal, since both share the name and the character or essence of animal.

They are divided by the Doctor (*q. 6 of the Categories*, §. *Dicendum*) into univocating univocals — which denote the common name shared by many that participate in the same character — and univocated univocals — which are the many things that agree in a common name and character.

Furthermore, from Siretus (*Tract. Formalizatum*, fol. 7) and Pelbartus (*vol. 1 of his Rosary*, s.v. *ens*, fol. 51), univocals are subdivided into transcendental univocals and predicamental univocals. Transcendental univocals are those that, under the same name, possess the same transcendental character — that is, one included in no predicament — as substance and accident share the character of being in the opinion of the Subtle Doctor. Predicamental univocals are those that enjoy the same name and the same character of some genus, as stone and plant are univocated in the genus of substance, because the name and character of predicamental substance belong to both.

Further, predicamental univocals are subdivided into logical, physical, and metaphysical univocals, as Scotus touches upon (*q. 7 of the Categories*, toward §. *Ad 1*; and *q. 15 of the Sophistical Refutations*, §. *Ad primam rationem*; and in *1 Sent.*, d. 3, q. 3, §. *Contra istam univocationem*, sub *Q*). Logical univocals are those that enjoy a common concept of some reality conceived under a second intention — as is the concept of animal considered as a genus. Physical univocals are those that, under the same name, participate in the same specific nature — as Peter and Paul are physically univocated in human nature. Metaphysical univocals are those that agree under the same name in a nature abstracted by the intellect from its inferiors and stripped of individual differences — although from the side of the thing it is contracted, or contractible, through them.

Finally, some univocals are complete and others diminished, from the same Doctor (*q. 4 of the Prologue*, near the end, *GG*). Complete univocals are those that enjoy the same form and the same mode of being of the form. Diminished univocals are those that have a similarity in form but not a similar mode of being of the form — for example, a house within and outside the mind are univocated in the character of house by a diminished univocation: for the house outside the mind is real, while the house within the mind is ideal and exemplary — a distinction of which the Philosopher makes mention (*7 Met.*, Text 30; and *12 Met.*, Text 13).

One objects, first: in the foregoing definitions of Aristotle, the essential character of substance is posited in equivocals and univocals. Therefore if those definitions are legitimate, equivocation and univocation belong only to substance and not to accident — which savors of falsehood, since in the school of Scotus accident is univocated just as well as substance in the common

character of being. One replies that by "the character of substance" is to be taken the character of essence, which aptly belongs to both substance and accident, as the interpreters of that passage of Aristotle explain it. Therefore the consequence is denied; for "substance" taken broadly is used for the essence of any thing, as will be clear when I dispute about substance itself in proper form. The Doctor clearly transmits this interpretation (*q. 5 of the Categories*), saying that "the character of substance" is the same as the essential intellection, or concept, of any object.

One objects, secondly: one nature has but one definition, because a definition is devised to express the nature of a thing bounded by these or those terms — just as a field is enclosed by definite boundaries beyond which it does not extend, and from which the transfer of meaning is taken (as will be more clearly seen in *l. 1, q. 7, art. ult.*). But in the definition of equivocals a different essential character — that is, nature or essence — is posited. Therefore they do not have a single definition. One replies that the major holds for an essential and quidditative definition of a thing, but not for a nominal and descriptive definition, such as the definition of equivocals is. For this reason the Subtle Doctor rightly adds (*q. 5 of the Categories, in solutione tertii*) that this is not a true definition.

One objects, thirdly: Scotus (*in 1 Sent., d. 3, q. 2, §. Secundo non asserendo, B*) says: "A univocal concept is one sufficient to ground a contradiction by affirming or denying it of the same thing." Therefore, according to Scotus's doctrine, the univocal was poorly defined above. One replies that in that place Scotus is describing the transcendental univocal, for he is there treating of the univocation of being, which is a transcendental. We, however, have collected nearly all the divisions and definitions of equivocals and univocals and have adduced their descriptions as clearly as we could.

Article VI: On Concrete, Abstract, and Other Terms

The celebrated distribution of a term into concrete and abstract is indicated by Augustine (*l. 83 Questions, q. 1, 22*), saying: "Everything true is true by truth" — for "true" is the concrete form and "truth" is the abstract. A concrete term is one that designates a form and that which has the form. From this description one may refute Fonseca (*l. 1, Institutionum Dialecticarum, c. 3*), who thinks that a concrete term is one that has a composite mode of signifying; and Quiedo (*Controv. 1, puncto 3, n. 7*), who says that a concrete term is one called composite in reality or in name. For "God" is a concrete noun from which the mode of signifying composition is entirely alien; and it is a concrete noun involving no composition in reality or name. The concrete term is subdivided into substantial concrete — which signifies what subsists in a form or nature, as "man" signifies what subsists in humanity — and accidental concrete — which designates a form and connotes its subject, as "white" signifies whiteness and connotes the subject in which the whiteness inheres. This entire doctrine is transmitted by the Doctor (*in 1 Sent., d. 26, q. un., at the end, §. Ad argumenta, in*

solutione 2; q. 16 of the Universals, §. Ad primum; and q. 8 of the Categories, §. Ad q.; and q. 17 of the first Prior Analytics, §. Quantum ad 3); by Sarnanus (q. 4 of the Universals, p. 93); and by Pelbartus (vol. 1 of the Theological Rosary, s.v. Abstractum, §. 1 and 2).

Not very different from this appears to be the other partition of a term into substantive and adjective, as Scotus intimates (*in 4 Sent., d. 12, q. 1, at the end*) — which, although it has become somewhat apparent from what was said above in Article IV, I judge it not useless to expound more fully in this place. First of all, dialecticians take and describe the substantive and adjective differently from grammarians: for among grammarians, a substantive is what is declined by one or two articles, and an adjective is what is declined by three articles. But dialecticians define a substantive as what signifies something in the manner of something standing on its own — or, to use the words of Scotus (*in 1 Sent., d. 26, cited above*), "a substantive is what signifies what subsists in a form or nature that is imported through its abstract" — as "lion." An adjective, on the other hand, is what signifies something in the manner of something adjacent — or, as the Doctor says (*in 1 Sent., d. 5, q. 1, §. Quantum autem, C*), "what signifies a form in the manner of something informed": thus "just" designates justice as adjacent to the just man, or justice as informing the man, by reason of which he is called just. An adjective is called *adjectivum* (as Calepino records) as if it were *adiunctivum* — because it is joined to a substantive, or because it depends on a substantive — as Scotus rightly notes (*in 1 Sent., d. 12, q. 2, §. Ad argumenta, CC*), saying: "An adjective is in essential adjacency to the suppositum that terminates its dependence. Therefore it cannot be plurified unless the substantive that ends its dependence is plurified." Thus one who has many arts is called not a manifold but a single craftsman. Perhaps for this reason some call a substantive "fixed" and an adjective "mobile" — although as the Doctor notes (*in 1 Sent., d. 12, q. 1, §. Iuxta q., toward: Sed ista ratio*), their significate is the same, and the difference lies only in their mode of signifying — much in the same way as abstract and concrete differ from one another.

An adjective acquires a double significate, namely primary and secondary, or principal and less principal: its primary significate is the form, and its secondary is the subject in which the form inheres. Thus "just" denotes primarily justice and secondarily the man in whom justice inheres — this same point the Doctor affirms of accidental concrete terms (*q. 4 of the Universals; and in 4 Sent., d. 12, q. 1, §. Ad argumenta principalia, ad 4, T*). Nor is it to be passed over in silence that certain nouns counted as substantives by grammarians are adjectives by the verdict of dialecticians — such as the noun "Lord," which primarily signifies lordship and secondarily the man in whom lordship is adjacent.

Nor does the distribution of a term into connotative and absolute — which the Doctor adduces (*q. 2 and q. 8 of the first Prior Analytics, §. Quantum ad secundum*) — seem very different from this. To begin with, it appears to be established that a

connotative term does not differ from an adjective, both because each signifies something in the manner of something adjacent and enjoys that double significate already explained — as "white" according to everyone is a connotative term that designates whiteness as adjacent to paper or to a wall; and also because "white" is an adjective and a connotative term, as Scotus writes (*in the place just cited*, q. 8; and *intimates in 4 Sent., d. 12, q. 1, toward the end, T*). Nor does what Fonseca adds trouble us (*l. 1, Institutionum, c. 24*): that certain nouns are connotative — such as "father" and "teacher" — which are not adjectives. For since he does not prove this but merely asserts it, it is refuted with equal ease by which it is built up: for this holds in Grammar, not in Logic, as I observed above. For "father," even if he wishes it to be only a substantive noun, is nonetheless also an adjective and is taken adjectively, as may be seen (*in 1 Sent., d. 5, q. 1, A*).

Furthermore, certain nouns are not adjectives grammatically — such as "creation" and "conservation" — yet they are connotative, as is clear (*Quodl. 12, art. 2, F*); and they are concrete in the logical sense — as Gadius (*ibid., in the commentary*) admirably notes: if active creation is taken for its formal element, it signifies a relation of reason founded in the divine will and connotes the act of the divine will; but if passive creation is taken for its formal element, it signifies the real dependence of a creature upon God and connotes the relation to the non-being preceding it. Since these therefore signify something in the manner of something adjacent and possess that double significate already explained by us — namely primary and secondary — just as we affirmed above of adjectives and accidental concrete terms, they do not seem to be removed from the series of adjectives and concrete terms, as Mastrius and Bellutus perform (*parte 1, Institutionum, Tract. 1, c. 3*). As for what they add concerning vital operation — which they say from the Doctor (*Quodl. 13, §. Ad argumentum principale, LL*) is not a concrete noun but a connotative term — I say that Scotus there does not deny that it is a concrete noun in the logical sense, because he expressly holds that vital operation, such as vision, is a quality that is an absolute entity and connotes a relation tending toward the object seen. So its formal significate is an absolute form, and its less principal significate is the relation looking toward the object seen; and since it thereby retains the mode of signifying of concrete terms, it does not appear to be expunged from among concrete nouns — just as the Doctor gives the example of the intelligible species, which is evidently a concrete term, in the same place.

An absolute term is not far removed from a substantive: for the foregoing definition of a substantive can aptly be accommodated to it. It is called "absolute" as if loosened from another, or not depending on another — as "man" and any substantial concrete term. I am not unaware that certain terms are called absolute — such as "intellection" — which in truth are not precisely absolute, since they connote something besides their own entity, as I was explaining above concerning vision. For that reason they are better placed in the catalogue of concrete connotative terms than of absolute ones — as Gadius

(*cited, fol. 142, col. 2*) notes along with Scotus. An absolute term can also be said to be one that is opposed to a relative term. For this reason the division of terms into absolute and relative is celebrated: everything that exists either exists as itself, or as something in relation to another — that is, it is either absolute or relative. Thus "ox" is an absolute term, and "disciple" is a relative term.

An abstract term — concerning which Sarnanus (*q. 1 of the Universals, p. 8, §. Primum*), Siretus (*Tract. Formalitatem, fol. 18, p. 2*), Brulifer, Trombeta, and other Scotists there treat well and at length — is described as what signifies something taken separately; or according to Scotus (*in 1 Sent., d. 26*), an abstract term signifies precisely a form. Since, however, there is a double form — substantial and accidental — there is likewise a double abstract: of substance and of accident. The abstract of substance designates precisely the substantial form, as "humanity"; the abstract of accident denotes precisely the accidental form, as "whiteness."

Moreover, the division of abstract into abstract with ultimate abstraction and abstract with non-ultimate abstraction is not to be despised — whatever Fonseca may object against Scotus (*1 Met., c. 28, q. 13, Sect. 5*). Abstract with ultimate abstraction is that in which no further abstraction remains — which is described by the Doctor (*in 1 Sent., d. 5, q. 1, infra A*) as that by which the formal character of something is considered in itself apart from whatever is not per se included in it. By this single abstraction is substance abstracted from its suppositum, as was explained above by the example of humanity: for it is thus taken most absolutely and precisely from everything that is outside its quiddity — which Avicenna (*5 Met., cc. 1 and 2*), carefully weighing this, expresses: "Equineness is only equineness and nothing else." An abstract with non-ultimate abstraction is one in which room for further abstraction still remains — as is the abstract of accident, whether absolute or relative. For accident involves more than substance, and a relative accident more than an absolute one. In an absolute accident two abstractions can be made: one from subjects, as whiteness is abstracted from this and that white thing; another from inferiors, as whiteness-ness is abstracted from this and that whiteness. But in a relative accident three abstractions can be formed: from subjects, from the foundation, and from inferiors — on which Scotus (*ibid., B*) and John Vallo (*Tract. Formalizatum, fol. 183*) treat most acutely. Since therefore the concretion of accident is multiple, so likewise the abstraction in it is multiple. Hence Fonseca errs in thinking that there is but one abstraction of accident and of substance, since accident involves more than substance, as I showed plainly above — both of absolute accident and of relative.

One objects, first: concrete and abstract signify the same thing, as Scotus writes (*in 1 Sent., d. 27, q. 3, §. Ad 2 q., I*). Therefore there is no division of a term into concrete and abstract. One replies that concrete and abstract do indeed signify the same thing per se, but differ in the mode of signifying — from the same

Doctor (*ibid.*; and *q. ultima of the Universals, at the end, in the solution of the first*) — which suffices for these terms to be distinguished from one another. Therefore in formal response to the argument: the antecedent is conceded, the consequence is denied for the reason given. Augustine does not appear to depart from this (*l. 1 Soliloquia*): "Truth and the true seem to be two things, just as chasteness and chastity."

One objects, secondly: if a concrete term is described as "what signifies a form and one having the form," and an abstract as "what signifies precisely a form," then in spiritual things, which lack form and matter, there would be no concrete term and no abstract term — yet concrete terms, such as "God," and abstract terms, such as "Deity," are commonly conceded in such things. Therefore concrete and abstract were not well described. One replies that form is taken in three ways: first, for pure and simple act — thus God and Angels are called forms, as is clear in Aristotle (*11 Met., Text 51*), Scotus (*Quodl. 9*), and Boethius (*3 De Consolatione, metr. 1*); second, for the essence and quiddity of each thing, according to that of (*Philippians 2*): "Who, being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God, but emptied Himself, taking the form of a servant" — of this Aristotle (*3 Physics, Text 17*) and Scotus (*in 1 Sent., d. 5, q. 1; and frequently elsewhere*) also make mention; third, for the other part of a composite — concerning which the Philosopher (*1 Physics, 7 and 8 Met.*) and the Subtle Doctor (*there; and 2 Sent., d. 2, q. 2*) treat. In the foregoing definitions of concrete and abstract, however, form is taken not in the first or third, but only in the second sense. Therefore the implication of the major is denied.

One objects, thirdly: things that are abstracted with ultimate abstraction have nothing predicated of them except in the first mode of per se predication, from Scotus (*in 1 Sent., d. 5, q. 1, §. Quantum autem, A*). But what is included among the ultimates of abstraction is still predicated of, even if not in the first mode of per se predication — as "humanity is an entity," and likewise "whiteness-ness is whiteness-ness." Therefore the foregoing rule about ultimate abstracts is contrary to truth and reason. One replies that of ultimate abstracts a predication can be made that is not formal but identical, as the objection proves. In response to the argument therefore: the major being conceded, one may say to the minor — with Trombeta (*Tract. Formalizatum, parte 3, fol. 48, p. 2*) — that from that canon are excepted transcendentals that are either actually infinite, as "God is goodness," or permissively so, as is shown in the foregoing proposition, "humanity is an entity." The reason is that the actual or permissive infinity of one or both extremes identifies those extremes with one another. For this reason such propositions are true.

Article VII: On Denominative and Denominating Terms

Denominative and denominating terms do not seem to differ from concrete and abstract, as Scotus indicates (*in 4 Sent., d. 12, q. 3, §. Ad principales rationes, AA*), citing (*1 Sent., d. 5, q. 1*) where he treats abundantly of concretes and abstracts.

Therefore what we showed concerning those in the preceding article need not be repeated here. I only touch upon what requires some explanation, so that the technical terms of the Philosopher may be fully illuminated for us.

Now these three — the denominating, the denominated, and the denominative — are in some way distinguished from one another. For the denominating is the form that denominates the subject in which it is: as whiteness inhering in a wall denominates that wall as white. The denominated is what has the denominating form in itself: as a wall having whiteness is denominated white. The denominative is what is predicated of its subject: as "sweet" is predicated of sugar, for "sugar is sweet" is well said. Bonet and Orbellus add (*3 Met., q. 1*) that the denominating, the denominated, and the denominative are denominated by the same name, yet differ in that the denominative has the name of the formal effect, while the denominating retains for itself the name of the form. A denominative term can be divided into substantial — what is denominated from a substantial form, as "man" from humanity — and accidental denominative — what is denominated from an accidental form, as "white" from whiteness. Scotus intimates this partition of denominatives (*q. 15 of the Categories, §. Per idem ad 2 argumentum; and in 4 Sent., d. 12, q. 1, §. Ad argument. I; and Quodl. 18, §. De primo, sub C*).

Furthermore, three kinds of denominatives are commonly distinguished, excellently explained by Major in the present context, namely: denominatives in name only, denominatives in signification only, and denominatives in name and signification together. Denominatives in name alone are those one of which is derived from the other only according to name, as "study" and "studious" — as the Doctor notes (*q. 36 of the Categories, §. Circa notificationem*). For "study" designates diligence and labor, while "studious" designates a lover of virtue. Denominatives in signification alone are those one of which is derived from the other according to signification alone, as "virtue" and "studious." Denominatives in name and signification together are described by Aristotle (*in the book of the Categories, c. 1*) and by Scotus (*in the place cited above; and q. 8 of the Categories*): "Whatever things have their appellation from something else, differing only in case according to name" — as "Logic" and "logician," "Philosophy" and "philosopher." The parts of this description are explained as follows. "Whatever things from something else" — that is, from an abstract name, as "just" from "justice." "Differing only in case" — that is, in final ending: for they begin with the same syllables and end differently, as "sweetness" and "sweet." Or as Scotus says (*ibid.*), the case of denominatives can be either as accident to subject, or as form to suppositum of the same nature: whence arises a double denominative predication — essential and accidental — to be explained in the following question, a. 1. "Have their appellation according to name" — that is, they are derived, as is abundantly clear in the examples given above.

One objects, first: what is not outside the essence of the thing denominated is not a denominating form, since denominatives are those denominated from some accidental form, as Arriaga thinks (*disp. 10, sect. 2*). But the substantial form is within the essence of the thing denominated — as humanity is within man. Therefore there is no substantial denominative. One replies by denying the major and the alleged description of denominatives: for just as there is a double form — substantial and accidental — and a double denomination — intrinsic and extrinsic — so also there is a double denominative — substantial and accidental, as is clear from the Doctor (*in 1 Sent., d. 32, q. 2, §. Contra, sicut*); and the description of denominatives adduced from Aristotle is adapted to both, since the common character of them prescribes from each.

One objects, secondly: denominatives are those that differ only in case, as is clear from the said definition of them. But, for example, "white" and "whiteness" are denominatives, and yet they differ not only in case but also really. Therefore denominatives are not well described as those that differ only in case. One replies: the major being conceded, the minor is to be denied. For "white" and "whiteness" indeed signify the same thing, but differ in the mode of signifying — as the Subtle Doctor writes of any concrete and abstract term (*in 1 Sent., d. 27, q. 3, §. Ad 2 q., L*).

Article VIII: On Common, Universal, and Singular Terms

A common term, taken universally, is one that is adapted to many — as human nature belongs to many individuals, and the divine nature to three Persons. That one common thing belongs to many is transmitted by the Philosopher (*7 Met., c. 13*) and, following him, Scotus (*in 1 Sent., d. 1, q. 3, §. De secundo principali, B*), with whom agree Saint Bonaventure (*in 1 Sent., d. 5, in dubiis litteralibus*) and Gabriel (*ibid., d. 25, q. un., art. 1*); and it is clear from the very force of the name. A universal term is one apt to be predicated of many — as genus and others, on which see below (*q. 3, art. 1 of this book*). A common term is broader than a universal: for every universal is common, but not conversely. For according to Scotus (*in 2 Sent., d. 3, q. 1, §. Sed contra istud, I; and 7 Met., q. 16*), there are real common natures on the side of the thing that are not formally universal except through the work of the intellect. Likewise the divine essence is indeed common to three Persons, yet is not universal but is of itself singular — as Scotus holds (*in 1 Sent., d. 1, q. 2, §. Per hoc ad argumenta, E*). Furthermore, among common terms some are more common and others less common — namely superiors and inferiors, one of which can be predicated of the other, the more common of the less common. Thus "substance," which is a more common term than "body," is predicated of body itself — as "body is a substance" — but not conversely: "every substance is a body" — for God and Angels are indeed substances but not bodies.

Not far removed from those just enumerated appear to be the exceeding and exceeded terms, one of which can neither be universally affirmed nor universally denied of the other — as "animal" and "white": for not every white

thing is an animal, nor is every animal white; only "some animal is white" and "some white thing is an animal" are true. Nor does the collective term — also called by some the copulative term — appear to be removed from the common term. For it designates many things aggregated together, as "Rome, Avignon, Aix." On the other hand, a non-copulative term is one that does not signify many things aggregated together, as "king," "duke," "soldier."

A singular term — called "individual" by philosophers and "proper" by grammarians, as the Author of the *Speculative Grammar* observes (c. 7) — is one that is predicated of one alone. Four kinds of singular term are enumerated: determinate, vague, demonstrative, and from supposition. A determinate singular is one that signifies some one thing certainly and determinately, as "Peter." A vague singular is one that denotes some one thing indeterminately, as "a certain man" — and the Doctor explains it (*q. 12 of the Categories; and in 3 Sent., d. 24, q. un., §. Alia est opinio, sub A*). A demonstrative singular is one to which a demonstrative pronoun is prefixed, as (*Matthew 21*): "This is Jesus the Prophet from Nazareth." A singular from supposition is one that signifies only one thing hypothetically, as "son of Abraham" is understood of Isaac, and "son of the Blessed Mary" is understood of Christ. Again, if a common noun is taken with a singular, it is rendered singular — whether in the direct case, as "the city of Nice," or in an oblique case, as "the horse of Alexander." More on these things is elegantly and learnedly set out by Titelmanus (*l. 1 of the Dialectical Consideration, through six complete chapters*).

One objects, first: Aristotle (*8 Ethics, c. 10; 3 Politics, c. 1*) writes that the republic is the genus of many species; and (*1 De Caelo*) that the world is the lowest species — yet it is obvious to all that genus and species are universal terms, while the republic and the world are collective terms that receive the character of a common term. Therefore the term is wrongly divided into common and universal. One replies that "universal" is used in two ways: first, broadly, in which sense universal and common do not differ — as the Stagirite intimates (*4 Met., c. 5*), saying that the species of the one are as many as the species of being, since neither being nor its properties are properly universals according to universal doctrine, to be explained more below (*q. 3, art. 1*); and second, narrowly — and in this sense their distinction is clear through their foregoing descriptions, to be examined more accurately in the place just cited.

One objects, secondly: the name "Francis" belongs to many who are distinguished by that name — yet "Francis" is a determinate singular term, as I said above, and the Doctor indicates (*q. 11 of the first Prior Analytics, §. Notandum*). Therefore a common term coincides with a singular one, or its foregoing description is inept. One replies by distinguishing the major: according to the name — I concede; according to the thing signified — I deny. For "Francis" designates determinately this man, to whom plurality is repugnant. Therefore

not without reason could a common term be distinguished into equivocal and univocal, as the foregoing distinction intimates, for dissolving the objection.

One objects, thirdly: if a common term is one that is participated in by many, then "God" would be common, since it is communicated to three Persons. But God is singular, according to (*Deuteronomy 32*): "See that I alone am, and there is no other God beside me" — and it is demonstrated in (*Met., l. 4; and in the Treatise on the One God, q. 1*). Therefore it seems that the common term was not well described above. One replies: the major being conceded, the minor is to be distinguished. "God is singular, insofar as it cannot be divided into subjective parts" — I concede. "God is singular insofar as it cannot be communicated to many supposita" — I deny. For He, though singular, is common to three Persons on account of His infinity, as the Eagle of the Scholastics teaches above all others (*in 1 Sent., d. 2, q. 4*), and from there adducing reasons derived from the principles of Metaphysics and Theology to establish this — which I have expounded abundantly in (*Tract. on the Triune God, disp. 1*).

Article IX: On Convertible and Other Terms

Scotus (*1 Prior Analytics, q. 14, §. Alio modo, toward the second case*) and Major (*l. 1 of the Terms, col. 3*) recount convertible terms — those that can be universally affirmed or denied of one another. For example, "man" and "risible": "every man is risible," and "every risible thing is a man." Likewise the Doctor (*in 4 Sent., d. 8, q. 1, §. Ex his, H*) and Sarnanus (*in his exposition of the Universals, p. 95*) mention synonymous terms, which under different names signify the same thing — as "Peter," "Cephas," "sword," and "blade" — and Augustine touches upon this (*l. 20, Against Faustus, c. 12*). These terms have a great affinity with the convertible ones, in that just as the latter can be mutually predicated of one another, so too can the former — though they differ in that synonyms have the same signification, while convertible terms do not. Nor do those that are called pertinent terms seem to differ much from these — terms of which one implies another, as "man" implies "animal" and "animal" implies "living"; or one is really identified with another, as "risible" and "capable of weeping."

Others are impertinent or disparate terms — those that neither imply each other nor have any affinity with one another — as "white" and "musical," from Aristotle (*4 Met., c. 14*) and Scotus (*q. 10; and in 1 Sent., d. 7, q. un., §. Ad argumenta, Q; and d. 11, q. 2, §. Contra istam opinionem, sub D; and in 4 Sent., d. 12, q. 2, §. Ad argumenta, L*). Some terms are repugnant — those that cannot be simultaneously predicated of the same thing at the same time, as "wise" and "unwise." These are of four kinds: contradictory, contrary, privative, and relative. Contradictory terms are those of which one negates the other, as "man" and "not-man." Contrary terms are those that mutually exclude one another from the same subject, as "heat" and "cold." Privative terms are those of which one designates the absence of the other in a suitable subject, as "seeing" and "blind." Relative terms are those said in conversion, as "teacher" and "disciple."

Since among repugnant terms some are positive, some negative, and others privative, such terms must be explained, as well as the distinction that lies between negation and privation. A positive term — which the Doctor touches upon (*in 1 Sent.*, d. 17, q. 5) — is one that signifies something real that is said to be on the side of the thing, as "stone." A negative term is one that designates a negation in a subject that is not suited to it, as "not-seeing" with respect to a stone — of which Scotus makes mention (q. 8 of the first *Prior Analytics*, §. 2 *conclusio*). A privative term — though it was set out above in general terms — is one that denotes the absence of a form in a suitable subject, as "blind" with respect to a man lacking sight — of which the Doctor also makes mention in the place just cited. From this the distinction emerges between negation and privation, or between a negative and a privative term. For a negative term signifies no capacity for the form in the subject of which it is predicated; a privative term signifies a capacity for the form in the subject of which it is predicated — as the Prince of the Subtiles transmits (*1 Sent.*, d. 23, q. un., §. *Item arguo*, H). This is rendered plain by the examples given above.

Nor are finite and infinite terms to be passed over in silence, of which Scotus makes mention (*1 Prior Analytics*, q. 37, §. *Quantum ad 1*); nor transcendent and non-transcendent terms, which he enumerates (*in 1 Sent.*, d. 3, q. 3). A finite term is one to which no negation is prefixed, or one that determinately affirms something, as "dog." An infinite term, to which a negation is prefixed, is one that determinately denies something but determinately affirms nothing — as "not-dog" can indifferently be said of everything that is not a dog, yet is determinately predicated of none of them — of which Sacred Scripture makes use (*1 Peter 2*): "not a people of God," and (*Romans 9*): "I will call my non-people my people" — and Augustine makes mention of it (*l. 1 Ad Simplicianum*, in the solution of 2 q., at the end). A transcendent term is one that is assigned to no predicament, or — as Trombeta says (*Tract. Formalitatem*, art. 1 *principali*, fol. 9, p. 2) — one that belongs to something outside a genus; and it is deduced from the Doctor (*in 1 Sent.*, d. 8, q. 3). Tataretus adds (q. *de substantia*, dub. 3) that for a term to be transcendent it suffices that it is not a genus and has no genus above it. Six transcendent terms are commonly enumerated: being, one, true, good, something, and thing — indicated by the initial letters of the word "Reuban," as Pelbartus notes (*vol. 1 of the Rosary*, s.v. *unitas*, §. 3). Add to these God and what is predicated of God; and also what belongs to being before it is divided into ten primary genera — as Trombeta (*cited above*) writes following Scotus (*in 1 Sent.*, d. 8, q. 3, §. *Teneo*; and *in 2 Sent.*, d. 1, q. 4, §. *Ad 1 alterius*, F; and §. *Ad argumenta principalia*, sub P). A non-transcendent term is one that is placed in some one of the ten categories, as "ox," "color" — the same authors just named affirming this.

One objects, first: the dividing members do not exhaust the entire range of the divided term in "negative" and "privative": for "absence" is neither a negative nor a privative term, since it is predicated of both — just as negation of negation in general and outside a genus, as Scotus (*in 1 Sent.*, d. 13, q. un.) and Orbellus (4

Met., c. 4, q. Whether there is a return from privation to habit) affirm. Therefore the division of a term into positive, privative, and negative is insufficient. One replies by denying the antecedent, since absence, or negation taken universally, is as a genus prescinding from negation and privation taken strictly, as from its inferiors. Now what is common and superior is not numbered among the enumeration of inferiors — as will be shown in Physics when the whole controversy about motion is raised.

One objects, secondly: a transcendent term is one that wanders through all genera of things, or, more explicitly, one that is imbued in every real concept. Therefore a transcendent term is ineptly described as one that is enclosed in no predicament. One replies by denying the antecedent. For in the school of the Subtle Doctor, being is not formally included in its properties — which are plainly transcendents — nor in the ultimate differences of things, as will be clear in its proper place.

Article X: On Terms of First and Second Intention

A first intention, according to Scotus (*in 1 Sent., d. 23, q. un.*), is a known object as known — as "known man," insofar as he is known, is a first intention. For to intend — as the same Doctor notes (*in 1 Sent., d. 38, q. un., §. Respondeo, A*) — is to tend toward another; for the object tends toward the soul by moving it to knowledge of itself. It is therefore called a first intention because the object moves the intellect before it is known by the intellect itself — as Vorriolus rightly notes (*in 1 Sent., d. 23*), saying: "It is called a first intention because it tends first toward the soul or intellect, by moving it to be understood." For it is necessary, for example, that whiteness be first offered to the intellect and move it to knowledge of itself, before the intellection of that very object is elicited from it — as Scotus indicates (*q. 3 of the Universals; and in 1 Sent., d. 3, q. 7, §. Contra istam opinionem, toward: Item quomodo*). Therefore every concept of which it is natural to be made immediately from the thing, without an act of the intellect in operation, is of first intention — that is, every positive objective concept and also a negative one — as Scotus (*in the place just cited of the first Sent., §. Item arguo sic, sub G*), Gadius (*Quodl. 5, fol. 63, col. 4*), and Aureolus (*in 1 Sent., d. 23, near the end of the second article*) write.

A second intention, from the same Doctor (*ibid.*), Orbellus (*7 Met., c. 7*), and Aureolus (*ibid.*), is a relation of reason caused by a comparative act of the intellect comparing one known object with another known object. For example, if the intellect compares animal with its species, there arises a second intention called "genus"; if it compares man with its individuals, there arises a second intention called "species." It is called a second intention because it is founded upon a known object — which, from what has been said, is called a first intention: for genus is founded upon the known animal, and species is founded upon the known man. For the intellect does not compare objects with one another unless it knows them. Or perhaps because a second intention is

posterior to the first: just as the comparative act by which a second intention is generated follows upon the direct act by which a first intention is generated — this reason can be deduced from Scotus (*in 1 Sent., d. 35, q. un., near the beginning; and §. Contra secundam propositionem, G; and in 1 Sent., d. 6, q. 1, §. Ad argumenta, sub F*) — and it is plainly transmitted by the Most Eminent Cardinal Sarnanus (*Tract. on first and second intentions, art. 1, §. 2*). Perhaps for the same reason, first and second intention acquire the names of first and second imposition, or also first and second consideration, from Scotus (*in 4 Sent., d. 1, q. 2, §. Hic primo, B*): because what we first perceive and perform, we also first name; and what we perceive later, we assign names to later — as Francis Titelmanus elegantly pursues (*l. 1 of the Dialectical Consideration, c. 27*), and John Major explains more plainly (*l. 2 of the Terms, fol. 14, §. Terminus primae intentionis*), in these words: "It seems to me that one must say that terms are called of first imposition because they were imposed first in time: Adam, the first imposer, began his imposition with what was most necessary. Afterward, when the necessities of life had been accumulated, learned men proceeded to terms of the sciences in a different direction. This is clear from the beginnings of Genesis, where the first inventors of the mechanical arts are enumerated, and it squares with Aristotle's view in the first book of the Metaphysics."

One objects, first: a known object is a first intention, as is clear from the beginning of this article. But to be known is a being of reason, because it is had only through an operation of the intellect. Therefore a first intention is a being of reason — which seems to smack of falsehood. One replies to the major: a known object is a first intention fundamentally; but formally it is "as known," as is clear from its description given at the very beginning of the article. Whether a first intention is a being of reason is deferred for discussion to another place. Meanwhile let Sarnanus, recently cited by us, be consulted.

One objects, secondly: Scotus (*1 Sent., d. 23*) writes that a concept, whether positive or negative, is a first intention. But an object is a first intention insofar as it moves the intellect to knowledge of itself; now negation, since it is nothing at all, cannot move the intellect to knowledge of itself. Therefore a negative concept cannot be a first intention. One replies: the major being conceded, the minor is to be distinguished. "Formally" — I concede; "connotatively or subjectively" — I deny. For thus a blind man is known, loved, and walks — not because blindness is the reason for such operations, but because that in which such a privation is located is a subject capable of those operations.

One objects, thirdly: the Subtle Doctor (*Quodl. 1, §. De altero termino, circa K, L*) says: "A second intention is a passive comparison by which two known objects are compared with one another by the intellect." The same thing he states more expressly (*in 4 Sent., d. 1, q. 2*). The Author of the *Formalitates*, Trombeta, and others affirm this same thing in their *Tract*. But the contrary view seems to be held by the same Doctor (*in 4 Sent., d. 12*), where he calls it the active comparison

by which the intellect compares two known objects with one another; and Anthony Andreas likewise affirms this (*7 Met.*, q. 16). One replies that from a different respect the comparison is called active and passive — just as the same motion is called action and passion (*3 Physics*, Text 21). For it is called an active comparison insofar as it proceeds from the intellect comparing one known object to another known object; and a passive comparison insofar as it bears upon the known and compared objects. In the former place cited, Scotus speaks of the passive comparison; in the latter he speaks of the active comparison. Therefore there is no contradiction in Scotus's assertions, since in them he looked to different respects, on account of which the apparent repugnance is removed.

Question II: On the Properties of Incomplex Terms

Article I: On Sign and Signification

Let no ambiguity of name delay us from learning Logic, and so that the properties of terms may not in some way remain hidden from us, it pleases us to adduce a general description of sign, from knowledge of which the divisions and definitions of any signs can be grasped with ease. A sign, taken universally, is whatever represents something to a cognitive faculty — as a spoken word is a sign of a mental concept, from Aristotle (*1 Perihermeneias*, c. 1) and Scotus (*in 1 Sent.*, d. 22, q. un., §. *Potest dici, ante A, toward: Ad propositum*). With an eye to this, the Author of the *Speculative Grammar* (c. 1) adds: "A sign is a reason for signifying or representing." To signify, according to Scotus (*q. 15 of the Sophistical Refutations*), is to represent something to the intellect; and signification is the representation of some thing to the cognitive faculty. Thus Cicero uses "signification" (*De Amicitia*): "If any manifestation of virtue shines forth, to which a kindred soul may apply itself and attach itself." And Caesar (*6 De Bello Gallico*): "Let fires be forbidden, lest any signification of his approach be made from afar." Thus God signified death (*2 Peter 1*): "The putting off of my tabernacle is swift, as our Lord Jesus Christ has signified." And what was to be done (*Apocalypse 1*): "He signified it, sending through His Angel to His servant John the things that must shortly come to pass." The thing signified, or significate, is what is signified through the sign; for a sign and its significate are correlatives — and correlatives mutually regard one another, as the Doctor indicates (*in 4 Sent.*, d. 1, q. 2, §. *Ad 1 argumentum, O*).

A sign can perhaps be divided into spiritual and sensible. A spiritual sign is one that represents something spiritual to the cognitive faculty — and this can happen in two ways. Either the sign is sensible and its significate is spiritual, as (*Matthew 3*) a dove, and (*Acts 2*) a tongue of fire, designated the Holy Spirit. Likewise a Sacrament — described by Augustine (*10 De Trinitate*, c. 5), cited by Scotus (*in 4 Sent.*, d. 1, q. 2, ante §. *Hic 1*); Alensis (*4 p.*, q. 1, m. 1); and other Scholastics — as "a sacred sign" — that is, of grace, which is spiritual. This is also

plainly expressed through the definition of the Master (*1 Sent., d. 1, 4*): "A Sacrament is the visible form of invisible grace" — that is, a sensible sign. Or both the sign and the signified are spiritual — and this can also occur in two ways: either it is a known sign through which another thing is known; or it is a reason for knowing another thing, even though it itself is not known. In the first way, premises can be called a sign of the conclusion, because once they are known as its principles, the conclusion itself is known. Similarly, the rational soul can be called a sign of God (because man is made in the image of God) — knowing which, we are elevated to knowledge of God. In the second way, the intelligible species is a representative sign of the spiritual thing understood or to be understood. Scotus adduces this distinction of sign (*Quodl. 14, §. Ad ista, AA*), which Lychetus and Gadius (*ibid.*) explain excellently.

A sensible sign — from Augustine (*2 De doctrina Christiana, c. 1*), cited by the Doctor (*in 4 Sent., d. 6, q. 10, §. Hic dicitur, sub D*) — is "what, apart from the impression it makes on the senses, causes something else to come into awareness." A sign described in this way is properly called a sign. For since our knowledge originates from sense, a sign taken strictly is adapted only to what is subjected to sense — as Augustine clearly shows (*l. De principiis Dialecticae, c. 5*), saying "a sign is what presents itself to the sense and, besides itself, presents something to the mind." It was later transferred to other things that are remote from the senses — just as the Doctor declares that the name "instrument" was applied and adapted from artificial things to natural and supernatural ones (*in 4 Sent., d. 1, q. 5, §. Ad primam ergo, F*); so "sign" was taken from sensible and material things to represent spiritual and immaterial things.

Again, a sign is subdivided into natural and voluntary. A natural sign is one that signifies something by its own nature and denotes the same thing for everyone — as tears denote grief and laughter denotes joy. A voluntary sign, or sign "by convention," is one that designates something by human will and institution — as the sound of a bell is a sign for hearing Mass, a name is a sign of a thing, and the trumpet call for retreat is a voluntary sign. Scotus makes mention of this distinction of sign (*1 Perihermeneias, q. 4, §. Ad q. dicendum; and in 1 Sent., d. 22, q. un., §. De ratione huius, sub C; and in 4 Sent., d. 11, q. 3, §. Hic duo, A, post*) — following Aristotle (*1 Perihermeneias, c. 1*) and Augustine (*l. 2, De doctrina Christiana, c. 2*).

Further, a sign is subdivided into commemorative — which recalls the past to memory: as a cross is a sign of Christ who suffered, the blossoms of a fruit tree are a sign of the fruit to be born, and a significative spoken word is a commemorative voluntary sign, from Scotus (*in 2 Sent., d. 42, q. 4, §. Ad argumentum, sub O*); demonstrative — which points out what is present and existing: as the needle of a clock is a demonstrative sign of the present hour that it is actually indicating; and the circle covered with ivy leaves posted on a cross before the door of a house is a demonstrative sign of wine for sale, as Scotus

notes (*in 4 Sent., d. 1, q. 2, §. Ad 1 argumentum, O*); and prognostic — which foretells what is future: as redness of the moon foretells wind, and the morning croaking of frogs foretells coming rain. Scotus adduces this partition of sign as well (*ibid., §. De secundo principali, D*); as do Richard (*ibid., q. 3, art. 1*) and Alensis (*cited a little before*).

Finally, a sign is divided into speculative and practical, from the same Doctor (*ibid., q. 3, §. Hic quatuor, A; and §. De secundo, C*). A speculative sign is one through which a concept of the significate can be had — as the spoken word "man" signifies humanity, and smoke signifies fire. A practical sign is one that signifies that the significate is or is being done — as the touch of a hand is a practical sign of peace, and the Sacraments are practical signs of grace. A practical sign can further be distributed into certain and uncertain, or equivocal — as the Doctor just named touches upon (*q. 2*). Finally, there is a division into doctrinal and non-doctrinal sign: the latter is not used by science — such as smoke and an image; the former is very much used by science, and it is threefold: namely concept, spoken word, and writing — about which something was noted in the above.

One objects, first: the definition of sign applies to things other than what is defined. Therefore it is not a good one. The antecedent is proved: a cause known first leads to knowledge of its effect; but a cause is not a sign of its effect. Therefore, etc. One replies by denying the antecedent. For its proof, the major being conceded, the minor is to be distinguished: properly — I concede; improperly — I deny. For water is not properly called a sign of moisture, nor fire of heat, nor fever of death; nor are demonstrations from cause called demonstrations from sign, as demonstrations from effect are. Nor is God called a sign of creatures. The reason for this can be that a sign represents the significate, as is clear from what has been said; but a cause does not represent its effect in the way that an effect represents its cause, of which it is a likeness. Therefore a cause is not properly a sign of its effect — whatever some more recent authors may say. You will insist: Sacraments are signs and causes of grace, as Scholastics transmit (*in 4 Sent., d. 1, with the Master there*); and winds are signs and causes of sea storms. Therefore a cause may be called a sign of its effect. One satisfies the objection by saying with Scotus that Sacraments are moral causes of grace, not physical ones — as the objection proves. To the other point about winds, I say that properly speaking winds are not signs of sea storms, but other things are, to be explained in the *Meteorologica*.

One objects, secondly: all signs are by convention. Therefore sign is badly divided into natural and voluntary. The antecedent is proved: all things were created by the will of God, according to (*Psalm 134*): "Whatever He willed, He made." But every sign is created; therefore it is also voluntary. One replies by denying the antecedent. For its proof, I say that this is true in the order of existence but not in the order of essence and in the objective order. For it

pleased God to produce this or that, at this or that time; yet the essences of things are not changed at His pleasure, since their ideas are in His very divine mind — as the Subtle Doctor writes (*in 1 Sent., d. 35, q. 1*). Even more so, because if the foregoing objection were of any force, no created being would be natural and necessary — which is false and absurd.

One objects, thirdly: the definition of sign given by Augustine applies to every sign, according to Scotus (*in 4 Sent., d. 6, q. 10*). For Scotus there holds that the sense posited in the definition of sign is to be taken not only for corporeal sense but also for incorporeal sense — that is, for any cognitive faculty. Therefore the definition of sign is not to be narrowed to sensible sign alone. One replies that the antecedent is true if sign is taken in a broad and extended signification; but false if it is used in its proper and original institution, as I noted above.

Article II: On Predication

Since universals and the predicaments cannot be grasped without some knowledge of predication — and since in their treatment reference is most often made to predication and subjection, especially in the universals, which dialecticians consider as predicable in what and in what kind — I shall here not improperly treat of predication before I come to universals and the predicaments. This John Major, the disciple of Scotus, does carefully and subtly (*fol. 101*), as do some more recent authors of notable intelligence and learning.

Predication is the assertion of one thing of another. Predication can be divided, from the Doctor (*1 Posterior Analytics, q. 16, §. Ad q. dr.*), into ordered or direct, and disordered or indirect. Ordered predication is when what ought to be predicated is predicated, and what ought to be subjected is subjected — and this occurs when what is superior is predicated of what is inferior, as "man is an animal"; or when what is equal is predicated of what is equal, as "man is risible." Disordered predication is when what ought to be subjected is predicated, and what ought to be predicated is subjected — which occurs when what is superior is subjected and what is inferior is predicated, as "animal is man." There may be added a predication that is beyond all order, which occurs when one extreme is not naturally apt to be predicated of or subjected to the other, as "white is sweet" and "sweet is white."

Next, predication is divided into formal and identical, according to Scotus (*in 1 Sent., d. 5, q. 1, §. Ad argumentum principale, Z; and in 4 Sent., d. 12, q. 2, §. Ad argumenta principalia, O*). Identical predication is of two kinds: one in which the same thing is predicated of itself, as "man is man" and "God is God" — concerning which Scotus treats at length (*q. 8 of the first Perihermeneias; and in 1 Sent., d. 26, q. un., §. Ad 1 tertia via, ante AA, toward: Respondeo*); and Bonet and Orbellus (*3 Met., q. 1*). The other is when one extreme is really identified with the other extreme — either both are finite, as "rational is risible"; or one is infinite while the other is not formally infinite, as "the divine essence is paternity"; or

both are infinite, as "the divine essence is goodness." The Doctor notes that Logic has not been transmitted for creatures with respect to this kind of predication in abstract terms (*1 Sent., d. 8, q. cited*). Formal predication is that in which the predicate designates the form of the subject; and since the form of the subject can be of two kinds — namely essential and accidental — formal predication is likewise of two kinds: essential and accidental, as John Vallo observes among other Formalists (*in his Lectura, fol. 194*). Essential predication — which is also called quidditative — is had when the predicate belongs to the essence of the subject, as "man is rational" — of which Scotus makes mention in the first place just cited. Accidental predication is when the predicate is an accident with respect to the subject, as "man is white" — and this is properly called denominative, as is clear from (*1 Sent., d. 3, q. 3, §. Contra istam univocationem, P*). For in it the predicate is said to be in the subject in a certain adjacency and formal inherence, by reason of which it obtains the name of denominative predication taken strictly — as Bonet notes (*3 Met.*) together with his teacher (*in 2 Sent., d. 1, q. 1, §. Ad argumentum circa I; and Quodl. 3, §. Respondeo, O; and Quodl. 8, §. De 1*).

Denominative predication, however, can be extended and broadened to much more: for denomination can be effected from something like a form in a subject — thus the soul is called human (*Quodl. 18, §. De 1, D*); or from a part of some whole, as from the genus of the species, as "man is an animal"; or from the genus of the difference, as "body is animated" — from the same cited above (*and in 2 Sent., d. 3, q. 6, §. Ad q. E*); or from an action — thus ultimate denomination belongs to the suppositum (*in 1 Sent., d. 12, q. 1, §. Ad argumenta respondetur, AA; and 4 Sent., d. 12, q. 3, §. Ad principales rationes, AA*) — where the Doctor transmits the mode of effecting other denominations besides those given. Nor do I judge to be omitted the partition of denomination into intrinsic and extrinsic, from (*1 Sent., d. 22, q. 2, §. Aliter dicitur; and d. 32, q. 2, §. Contra; and Quodl. 18, §. De tertio principali, R*). Intrinsic denomination is that through which the subject is designated as really affected by the form signified through the predicate, as "man is prudent." Extrinsic denomination is that through which the subject is denoted as not possessing the form signified through the predicate except by reason of its termination of it — as a stone is called "known" not by a knowledge existing in it but by a knowledge inhering in the intellect, terminated to the stone itself — as Sarnanus explains (*q. 9 of the Universals, p. 162*).

Again, from the same (*Quodl. 3, §. Respondeo, O; and 4 Sent., d. 11, q. 3, §. Ad rationes, FF*), there is per se predication — when the subject includes the predicate, or when the subject is per se one as to concept (*Quodl. 3, §. Respondeo, O; and in 2 Sent., d. 3, q. 6, §. Ad q. ergo, E; and in 3 Sent., d. 22, q. un., §. Sed quid Logice, sub M*); and per accidens predication — which occurs when the predicate does not belong to the essence of the subject or does not follow its essence — on which I shall treat at length (*l. 5, art. 6, q. 3*). Nor do I judge anything needs to be added to them, since this division coincides with the division by which

predication is distributed into essential and accidental, which I explained carefully above. Concerning the modes of per se predication, however, I do not here treat, deferring what must be said about them to the place just cited.

One objects, first: every form can denominate the subject in which it is, from (*Quodl. 3, §. Respondeo, sub P; and 1 Sent., d. 11, q. 1, §. Ad argumenta, AA*). But an essential form is in what it essentially constitutes in being. Therefore it can essentially denominate it — and so there seems to be no difference between essential predication and denominative predication. One replies with Scotus (*Quodl. cited*) that denominative predication taken broadly comprehends both essential predication and denominative predication properly so called — although "denominative" is properly said when the predicate is outside the formal and essential character of the subject, as "man is risible," or "wood is white," or "man understands." As to why a relation is in the divine essence but does not denominate it, see Scotus (*cited above*) and Gadius there.

One objects, secondly: an essential form is essentially predicated of that of which it is the form, whether in the direct case — as "man is animated" — or in the oblique case — as "man has a soul." But the soul is the form of the body, described as (*2 De anima, Text 70*): "the first act of an organic body having life in potency." Therefore the soul is essentially predicated of the body. But Scotus in the places cited above in the first objection says this is an accidental and denominative predication — "body is animated" — while he says the following is formal essential and in the first mode of per se predication: "man is animated" — as is also clear (*in 1 Sent., d. 8, q. 4, §. Contra istam solutionem, X*). Therefore either the Doctor is inconsistent with himself, or one of the premises is false. One replies: the major being conceded, the minor is to be denied. "Body" taken in potency is from (*4 Sent., d. 11, q. 3*). The soul, however, constitutes the body in the being of what is animated. Since body taken universally is divided into animated and inanimate as into its proximate differences — and that predication is therefore denominative and accidental, because it is the predication of a difference of the genus not actually and formally including its differences, as Scotus excellently proves (*1 Posterior Analytics, q. 20*) — for this reason, "body is animated" is not essential; but "man is animated" is maximally essential and in the first mode of per se predication, because the soul is an essential constitutive part of man himself.

One objects, thirdly: the common doctrine of the Scotists is that there are only four kinds of predication — namely formal, identical, denominative, and essential — as may be seen in Siretus, Vallo, Brulifer, Mauritius, and other Formalists (*Tract. Formalitatem*). Therefore the division into per se and per accidens predication is not fitting and not in conformity with the Scotist school. One replies: the antecedent being conceded, the consequence is to be denied. For formal predication comprehends per se predication; and denominative predication contains per accidens predication — although, as Brulifer not

negligently observes, each is sometimes used interchangeably by the Philosophers.

One says: essential predication does not differ from predication of the first mode of per se. Therefore there are not four kinds of predication. The antecedent is proved: essential predication is that through which the essential identity of predicate with subject is expressed; but through predication of the first mode of per se such identity is expressed. Therefore, etc. I say that essential predication placed in fourth position belongs to the divine order only, as the Master of the Formalitates rightly notes (*art. 3 partial of the Tract. just named*), in which there is signified consubstantiality and the origin of one Person from another, as "the Son is of the essence of the Father" — that is, the Son originates from the Father and is consubstantial with Him. Essential predication in the strict sense — which is also called quidditative and formal in the first mode of per se — is adapted to both created and uncreated things.

It remains now to treat of subjection, which is the placing of one thing under another extreme. But since subjection and predication are correlatives — and since correlatives are mutually known, so that when one is known the other is also known, according to Aristotle (*1 Categories, c. De ad Aliquid*) — having already obtained knowledge of predication, the knowledge of subjection is obtained with ease. Nor do I judge that anything worthy of note about subjection itself is to be added that cannot conveniently be gathered from what has been said.

Article III: On Supposition

Supposition, as seems to be deduced from Aristotle (*1 Sophistical Refutations*), is the position, or acceptation, of a term — and it is divided into material, which is the acceptation of a term for itself, as "man is a noun"; and formal, which is the use of a term for the thing signified. Hence it is called "supposition" because a term is substituted or subrogated for what has humanity. For just as we use brass counters in place of gold coins to reckon with — in place of the thing signified through a term, as "man" is supposed — so we use terms to signify things, as Aristotle indicates (*ibid.*) and Scotus adds (*q. 52 of the Sophistical Refutations, §. Pro solutione*), saying that a term is placed in place of another. From material supposition to formal there is no valid argument, as: "man is a disyllabic word; but Ludovicus is a man; therefore Ludovicus is a disyllabic word."

Formal supposition is subdivided into improper and proper. Improper supposition is the use of a term for the thing taken improperly — thus Christ the Lord (*Apocalypse 5*) is called "the lion of the tribe of Judah." Proper supposition is the use of a term for its proper significate; in this way "lion" is taken (*Proverbs 30*), when it is said: "the lion is the mightiest of beasts." Further, proper supposition is divided into common — which is the use of a common term, as "being" — and discrete or singular — which is the use of a singular term, as "Francis." Again, common supposition is divided into simple and personal, of

which the Doctor makes mention (*in 1 Sent., d. 21, q. un., §. Ad 1; and q. 13 of the Categories*). Simple supposition is the use of a term for its immediate significate, as "man is a species," where "man" is taken precisely for what has humanity insofar as it prescribes from all its individuals. Personal supposition is the use of a term for its mediate significate, as "man walks," where "man" is taken for some individual of human nature. From simple supposition to personal there is no valid argument, as Scotus exemplifies (*q. 16 of the Universals*): "animal is a genus; but man is an animal; therefore man is a genus."

Finally, supposition is divided into distributive, collective, determinate, and confused. Distributive supposition — also called copulative — is described by the Doctor (*q. 14 of the Sophistical Refutations*) as the acceptance of a common term for any of its supposita, each of which is that term itself — or, as the same Doctor touches upon (*q. 1 of the Prologue, §. In ista q. videtur, ante A*), distributive supposition is the use of a common term for its mediate significates taken separately, as "man is risible" — distributed thus: "Peter is risible, Paul is risible," and so of the remaining individuals of human nature. This supposition can occur in three ways. First, if a generic term is supposed for all species and all individuals of those species — and it is called supposition for the singulars of genera — as "animal is sensitive," which is taken not only for all species of animal but also for each individual animal, as "man is sensitive" and "lion is sensitive"; and likewise "this man is sensitive" and "this lion is sensitive"; and similarly the remaining individuals and species of animal. Second, if a generic term is supposed only for the species — and it is called supposition for the genera of singulars — as "every animal was in Noah's ark," that is, every species of animal was in Noah's ark, but not each and every individual of it; otherwise the individuals that now exist would have been in Noah's ark, which is most plainly false and ridiculous. Third, if a universal term is supposed for many singulars but not for all — and this is called accommodated supposition: thus the statement of Saint Paul (*1 Timothy 1*) is distributed: "God wills all men to be saved" — that is, all who shall be saved, as Scotus intimates (*in 1 Sent., d. 46, §. Ad 1 argumentum, B*). Similarly (*Psalms 18*): "Into all the earth their sound went out" — that is, into the principal regions of the world. From what is non-distributed to what is distributed there is no valid argument — as it does not follow: "every man is an animal; therefore every animal is a man," because "animal" in the antecedent is not distributed as it is in the consequent. Collective supposition is the use of a common term for many taken in aggregate, as "all the Apostles of the Lord are twelve" — that is, Peter, Andrew, and all the rest taken together are twelve. The Doctor makes mention of this (*1 Prior Analytics, q. 4, §. Oppositum; and 2 Sent., d. 2, q. 9, §. Ad argumenta, I*).

Determinate supposition — also called disjunctive — is the use of a common term for its inferiors to be enumerated disjunctively, by conjoining entire propositions: as "every man is just" — descending disjunctively: "John is just, or Ludovicus is just." This appears to be touched upon by Scotus (*q. 10 of the*

Sophistical Refutations, §. *Ad primam q.*). Confused supposition — also called disjunct — is the use of a common term for its inferiors to be referred to confusedly, by conjoining only the terms: as "an eye is necessary for seeing," where "eye" is supposed for some eye, whether right or left — and in this the latter differs principally from the former, because the former supposes one or another determinately, while this latter supposes one or another indifferently. The Doctor cites both suppositions (*in 1 Sent., d. 3, q. 3, §. Contra istam univocationem, S*).

Against this common doctrine, new and recent authors have come forward — by name Hurtado (*disp. 2 of the Summulae, sect. 6*) and Arriaga (*ibid.*), imitating the Nominalists (as Mastrius and Bellutus observe (*1 p., Institutionum, Tract. 1, near the end of c. 10*)) — who affirm that supposition is the position of a spoken word in place of a concept in order to manifest that very concept. But their opinion is neither to be approved nor received. First, it is opposed to Aristotle (*cited at the beginning of this article*), who plainly transmits that we use names in place of things, and who plainly expounds that supposition is the subrogation of a thing. Next, names were invented to signify what the speaker intends to signify to the hearer, as is deduced from (*1 Sent., d. 21, q. un., §. Potest dici, ante A*); but the speaker strives to signify to the hearer the things themselves, and not the concepts, as I will show elsewhere. Therefore supposition is the substitution not of a concept but of a thing.

Hence Arriaga does not appear to speak consistently: for he says there, with Hurtado, that supposition is the subrogation of a concept; yet in (*disp. 13, sect. 2*) he adds that spoken words are chiefly significative of things, not of concepts, since the spoken word "man," for example, is not supposed for the concept of man but for one having humanity, and only the spoken word manifests the concept. But if the name "man" were subrogated in place of the concept of man, and the spoken word "white" in place of the concept of white, this proposition would be false: "man is white," because the concept of man is not the concept of white, and conversely. Add that it is for those things that we debate and reason about that terms are substituted — yet we do not debate about concepts but about things. Again, as Aristotle teaches (*1 Perihermeneias, c. 1*), spoken words are signs of concepts; therefore they are not their suppositions — since signification and supposition differ from one another, as Hurtado himself also notes (*cited above*). Wherefore what the same author heaps up falls apart — those things prove only that spoken words are indeed manifestative signs of concepts, not suppositional ones, as he contends. Further, the partition of supposition into proper and improper clearly makes evident our contention, since each is supposed for a thing, as was shown by examples given near the beginning of this article. Moreover, the same Hurtado (*sect. 3, at the end, §. 16*) says that personal supposition is taken from the person, according to what is in that person. Therefore according to Hurtado, supposition absolutely is not the subrogation of a mental concept. And Arriaga (*n. 46*) adds that "Peter" signifies an entity on

the side of the thing — therefore according to Arriaga himself, supposition is not the substitution of a mental concept.

One objects, first with Hurtado (*sect. 3, §. 14, 15*): in this proposition "Peter is a subjectible individual," the spoken word "Peter" supposes simply; and in the other "Peter runs," the name "Peter" supposes personally. But both have the same immediate significate. Therefore the distinction of simple supposition from personal is not derived from the immediate and mediate significate. The minor is proved: "being an individual subject" does not belong to Peter according to his person, or as others say, from the side of the thing, but through the work of the intellect. The major is denied — which he does not prove; for "Peter" always supposes personally and always obtains only the mediate significate, as Arriaga frankly concedes (*disp. 1 of the Summulae, sect. 6, n. 46*).

One objects, secondly: there is no common, immediate, and proximate significate, since all things are singular and universals exist only through the work of the intellect. Therefore the distinction of supposition into simple and personal must be derived from elsewhere than from the immediate and mediate significate. The antecedent is denied — for in our Logic questions (*l. 2, q. 1*), we clearly and abundantly show that real natures exist without any intellect conceiving them.

Article IV: On the Ascent and Descent of Terms

That supposition and its species may become more evident — especially the last four enumerated in the preceding article — it pleases us to investigate what the ascent and descent of terms is, and how many kinds there are. Ascent, taken universally, is described as a movement from lower to higher things — as when one mounts from the ground to the top of a building; descent, on the other hand, is a progression from higher to lower things — as when one descends from the summit of a house to its lowest foundation. Each is metaphorically applied to terms.

The ascent of terms can be defined as the progression from sufficiently enumerated particular terms to the universal term — or also from less universal to more universal — as "Peter and Andrew, and all the rest together, are the twelve Apostles of the Lord," from which it is rightly deduced: "all the Apostles of the Lord are twelve." This the Doctor touches upon (*in 2 Sent., d. 1, q. 9, §. Ad argumenta, I*). Descent, on the other hand — which the Doctor mentions (*q. 13 of the Categories, §. Sed tunc videtur, toward: Contra*) — is described as the procession from the common or universal term to the particulars, as "every man is risible; therefore Paul is risible, and John is risible," and so of the rest.

According to the four kinds of supposition, there are likewise four kinds of descent: copulative, copulated, disjunctive, and disjunct. Copulative descent is that by which we proceed from the common term to the particular propositions to be enumerated simultaneously through a copulative particle — as "every man

is sensitive," from which distributive descent is effected: "Peter is sensitive, and Andrew is sensitive," and so of the others. Copulated descent is that by which we proceed from a common term to the individual terms to be counted simultaneously through a copulative particle — as "all the predicaments are ten," from which one descends copulately: "substance, and quantity, and quality, and the rest taken together are ten." Disjunctive descent is that by which a transition is made from the common term to the particular propositions to be enumerated through a disjunctive particle by determining their subjects — as "every man is just," from which one descends disjunctively: "John is just, or Francis is just, or Anthony is just," and so of the rest. Disjunct descent is when from the common term one makes a step to the particulars to be referred to confusedly through a disjunctive particle — as "a horse is necessary for riding," from which one descends disjunctly: "this or that horse is necessary for riding," and so on. What I said about the fourfold number of descent is likewise to be affirmed of ascent, since they begin and end from mutually opposed terms — and of opposites there is the same reason and discipline, as Aristotle writes together with the common view of Philosophers (*4 Met., c. 2*).

One objects, first: we descend from a common term to particular terms, as is clear from the description of descent given above; and common terms are distributed for all their inferiors. Therefore, since God and whatever is predicated of God is contained under being, it follows that all proper predicates of God can be naturally known by us — which Scotus denies (*q. 1 of the Prologue*). One replies from the Doctor just cited (§. *Ad 1, ante V*) that this is true of terms common to the subject, but not of proper terms derived from proper principles — as Scotus acutely shows there, and as we have pursued at length (*in the Summa Theologica, tract. 1, disp. 1*).

One objects, secondly: of any given thing, either an affirmation or a negation is true, from (*4 Met., c. 4*). Therefore it is permissible to descend under the predicate and the subject of a universal affirmative proposition — which the Doctor cited above denies. One replies: the antecedent being conceded, the consequence is to be distinguished: under a predicate suppositing by determinate supposition — I concede; under a predicate suppositing by confused supposition — I deny. For it does not follow of any given contradictory that some part is true; it only follows that this or that part is true, as is clear from the confused supposition explained in the preceding article.

Article V: On Status and Distraction

Status is the use of a term for the time signified by the verb, as Scotus touches upon (*1 Perihermeneias, q. 9, toward: Ad oppositum*) — and this occurs when a verb is used for only one difference of time. Three kinds of status are enumerated according to the three differences of time — namely past, present, and future. The first status concerns present time, as is clear in this proposition: "man is learning," where "is learning" is taken only for men existing now. The second

status concerns past time, as "man has learned," where "has learned" is used only for those who in elapsed time were applying themselves to study. The third concerns future time, as "man will learn," where "will learn" is taken only for those who will hereafter apply themselves to study. Scotus enumerates these three states and differences of time (*1 Perihermeneias*, q. 11, §. *Ad quartum*, toward: *Ad 2 propositionem*). And at the beginning of the same paragraph he says: "a common term in any proposition, whether of present, past, or future, supposes for whatever supposita, whether existing or non-existing." To preserve status it is necessary that the verb hold the status of its supposition — otherwise, if something is added, either distraction or other properties of terms explained below arise. Furthermore, status also applies to what is adjacent, provided only that those things are understood which proceed from the action signified by the verb — as "wood is being burned," where "is being burned" is taken only of wood that is undergoing combustion. If it is otherwise, status does not hold — as when the Philosopher treats of natural things, where natural things are not to be taken only for those that now exist but absolutely for all, with no difference of time intervening, as the Doctor indicates (*ibid.*). Note further that every subject of an affirmative and present-tense proposition, whose predicate cannot belong to the subject unless its very existence is presupposed, has the status of present time — of which the Doctor makes mention (*q. ult. of the first Perihermeneias*): as "every man is healthy," where the verb of the said proposition is taken only for men now existing, who alone can enjoy health. But if the predicate does not presuppose the existence of the subject, then not status but distraction — which is opposed to status — is produced.

Distraction is the use of a term for a time other than that signified by the verb — as (*Matthew 11*): "the blind see, the deaf hear," etc. For in these propositions there is distraction, because the sense of these propositions is: "those who were blind see, and those who were deaf hear," and so of the rest — as is clear from (*Romans 4*): "who justifies the impious," where Augustine says: "who makes the impious pious." Some things about the distracting determination are written by the Doctor (*in 1 Sent.*, d. 36, q. un., §. *Contra istud*, E; and *in 3 Sent.*, d. 22, q. un., §. *Ad 1 principale*, R, at the end) and by Anthony Trombeta (*Tract. Formalizatum*, parte 3, fol. 47).

One objects: status is the acceptation of a term for the time signified by the verb; but distraction is also the acceptation of a term for the time signified by the verb. Therefore status and distraction are not distinguished from one another. The major is clear from the definition of status. The minor is urged by persisting in the examples given above to explain distraction — namely "the blind see, the deaf hear." For in these the difference of present time is signified, as the verbs "see" and "hear" denote. One replies: the major being conceded, the minor is to be denied. For its proof, I say that these terms "blind" and "deaf" are not taken for the time which is co-signified by their verbs, since those are taken for past time, while the said verbs designate present time.

Article VI: On Ampliation and Restriction

Ampliation — as Scotus intimates (*in 2 Sent., d. 2, q. 9, sub I*) — is the extension of a term to more differences of time. Four kinds of ampliation are enumerated. The first concerns present and past time — as "one who is disputing walks": the participle "disputing" is amplified, and the sense is "who is disputing or was disputing walks." The second concerns past and future time — as "a living being will die": thus "living" is amplified — namely, "who lives or will live will die." The third concerns past, present, and future — as "one who is born will die" — that is, who was born, or is being born, or will be born, will die. The fourth concerns past, present, future, and possible — as "man is an animal" — that is, man who was, is, will be, or is possible, is an animal. The Doctor treats more on these matters subtly (*1 Prior Analytics, q. 17, §. Quantum ad 3; and §. Quantum ad 4; and in the same work, q. 16*).

Hurtado (*sect. 8, disp. 2 of the Summulae*) writes that ampliation is to be used when the terms of a proposition signify things impossible for the time signified by the verb — as "a just man has sinned," in which proposition there is not this sense — namely, "the just man as just has sinned," because justice and sin cannot simultaneously remain in the same man — but the sense is: "he who is just has sinned." But this, besides being opposed to the current of the Summulists, does not seem to me to conform to truth. For true ampliation is grounded in more times than the truth of the copula requires — as is clear from (*2 Sent., d. 2, q. 9*) cited at the beginning of this article — whereas according to Hurtado the copula is loosened to one time and the predicate to another. Therefore Hurtado's reasoning lacks truth. Moreover, if this were admitted, it would not be ampliation but rather mutation and variation — for a transition is made from one sense to another, and a sophism could be committed from the divided to the composite sense, as Hurtado himself notes (§. 48 of the cited place). Again, restriction is opposed to ampliation, as the Summulists commonly teach — yet according to Hurtado himself, restriction is a narrowing from greater to lesser signification. Therefore, by the opposite, ampliation is a dilation from lesser to greater signification according to more differences of time — and so restriction restrains and ampliation dilates the signification of a term.

Restriction — which Scotus mentions (*at the end of q. 16 of the first Prior Analytics*) — is described as the constraint of a term, and can be effected in many ways: first, by the addition of an adjective, as "a learned man is honored by many"; second, by the apposition of an adverb, as "Scotus disputes subtly"; third, by a broader expression leading to a narrower and less common one, as "the Apostle Paul" and "the city of Rome"; fourth, by oblique cases, as "this is a young man of good character." Two canons of restriction are enumerated: the first is that a restricted term supposes according to the measure of what restricts it — as "a prudent man avoids many evils," where the word "prudent," which is the restricting term, is adapted only to those who shine with prudence and supposes

for them alone. The second is that if the verb designates a contingent connection, the supposition will be only for those to whom the signification can belong — as "a white man walks," where walking is accommodated only to those who are affected by whiteness. But if the verb presents a necessary connection of subject with predicate, the supposition and ampliation will be not only for the present but also for the past, future, and possible, as I was saying above. From a non-restricted term to a restricted one the argument holds affirmatively — as "man is mortal; therefore a just man is mortal." From a restricted term to a non-restricted one the argument holds negatively — as "a prudent man does not speak rashly; therefore not every man speaks rashly."

Alienation and diminution do not seem to differ very greatly from restriction. Alienation is described as the use of a term from its proper to an improper signification — as "a painted man is sold," where "man," by the addition of the word "painted," is transferred from the signification of a living man to the signification of a painted man, who by Aristotle (*1 Categories, c. 1*) and Scotus (*ibid.*) is equivocally a man. In alienated terms, a consequence from one to another does not hold — as "he is a painted man; therefore he is a man," because "man" uttered absolutely supposes for a true man. Diminution is the use of a term to which the expression "in a qualified sense" has been appended — that is, diminution is the acceptance of a term that of itself is indeed supposed absolutely, yet through the addition of another word is supposed in a qualified sense — as "an Ethiopian is white as to his teeth." Scotus makes mention of this (*q. 51 of the Sophistical Refutations; and in 1 Sent., d. 36, q. un., §. Contra istud obijcitur*). In diminished terms, a consequence from one to another does not hold — as "an Ethiopian is white as to his teeth; therefore an Ethiopian is white." Likewise Scotus (*cited, in 1 Sent., sub L*) adds that the consequence does not hold: "Homer is in opinion; therefore Homer is." And Boethius also taught this (*in the book of the Perihermeneias*), saying: "it does not follow: Homer is a poet; therefore Homer is" — as the Doctor also notes (*at the end of q. 23 of the Perihermeneias*).

One objects: a necessary proposition prescribes from all difference of time, as "every man is rational." Therefore in it there is no ampliation — and so the fourth ampliation enumerated at the beginning of this article is removed. The antecedent is clear because a necessary proposition is said to be of everlasting truth, because between its subject and predicate an indissoluble connection intervenes, as we shall say (*in our qq. l. 4, q. 4, art. 2*). One replies that a necessary proposition is indeed not presupposed for any determinate difference of time — yet it can be said to be amplified to every time, even possible time, insofar as it is true both of those who existed, exist, and will exist, and of those who are possible to exist — as Scotus transmits (*1 Prior Analytics, q. 16, §. Notandum igitur*).

Article VII: On Appellation

Appellation is that through which one spoken word denominates another; or, appellation is the application of one significate to the significate of another. The

Subtle Doctor provides an example (*1 Perihermeneias, q. 11, ante §. Ad quartum*): "Peter is a good lutenist," where the word "good" falls not upon Peter but upon "lutenist"; and it is signified that Peter is rightly skilled in the art of playing the lute — just as those are (*Apocalypse 14*): "playing on their harps." Adjective nouns and participles appellate — that is, they are appellative terms; while substantive nouns and their cognates are appellated — that is, they are appellated terms. An appellative term is selected according to its formal significate, and an appellated term is sometimes taken according to its material significate. For this reason a double appellation is established: one according to formal significate — which occurs when one term denominates the formal significate of another, as "man is wise"; and another according to material significate — when namely one term denominates the material significate of another, as "a musician is a builder": in this proposition it is designated that the material subject of music is also the subject of the building art.

In recognizing appellation, a sign and usage are of great assistance. If numeral nouns are joined to substantives, they appellate the material significate — hence in the divine order, the Father and Son are not called "two spirators" but "one spirator," because there is only one formal significate of theirs — namely the one power of spirating in both. But if the same numeral words are appended to adjectives, they appellate the material significate — for which reason the Father and Son are called "two spirating persons," and the three divine Persons are said to be "three creating." All this Scotus teaches more acutely and explicitly than the other Scholastics (*in 1 Sent., d. 12, q. 1, §. Iuxta q. istam, X; and in the Reportata of the first Sent., same dist., q. 2, §. Ad quaestionem dico*).

Whenever adjectives occur in any expression, since they are dependent, and one dependent thing cannot terminate the dependence of another dependent thing, they are terminated to something independent — namely a substantive — which is thereby denominates. For just as on the side of the thing, ultimately an accident requires some subject in which it inheres and which it denominates — as quantity denominates the quantum and quality denominates the quale — so too in speech an adjective, which is dependent, is terminated to the substantive, which is independent. If there are two adjectives, since they are both dependent, neither terminates the dependence of the other. Therefore when we say "two spirating persons," both "two" and "spirating" are adjectives requiring a substantive to terminate their dependence and their signification per se, or in the suppositum — and so they are named "two supposita spirating" and "two persons spirating." But they are not called "two spirators," because "two" is an adjective and "spirator" is a substantive — and duality is placed around the principal significate of "spirator," which is the principle of spirating — and it is signified that the power of spirating is multiplied in the Father and the Son, which is false and erroneous.

One objects: the Father and the Son are two spirating persons; therefore they are two spirators. The antecedent is clear from what was just conceded; the consequence is proved: the singular implies the singular — for it holds: "he is spirating; therefore he is a spirator"; and likewise the plural implies the plural — and so, since "two spirating persons" is conceded, "two spirators" should likewise be conceded. One replies: the antecedent being conceded, the consequence is to be denied. For this follows when the formal significate is plurified in each — as "there are two men; therefore there are two animals." But when it is not, it does not hold — as "there are three divine Persons; therefore there are three Gods" — as the Doctor admirably notes (*in the Reportata cited*, §. *Ad rationem dico*, at the end). Much more on these matters I wrote in (*Tract. on the Triune God*, disp. ultima, on the Holy Spirit).

Question III: On the Universals

To the treatment of simple terms belong the universals, or predicables, which Porphyry carefully examines in his *Isagoge*, enumerating the second predicamental intentions — because he prepared and directed it for the book of Aristotle's *Categories*, as Anthony Trombeta rightly notes (*in his golden Tract. Formalizatum*, art. 1 principali, fol. 9, p. 1). Since, however, the treatise of incomplex terms is expressed in two books — one on the five universals, the other on the ten predicaments — as Francis Titelmanus diligently observes (*in the preface of the first book of the Dialectical Consideration*) — it therefore pleases me to examine them individually in these two final questions.

Article I: What the Common and the Universal Are

What a common term is, what a universal term is, and the distinction between them is clearly established from what was said (art. 8, q. 2). I now adduce two definitions of the universal, of which the first is read (1 *Perihermeneias*, c. 5): "A universal is one apt to be predicated of many" — as "man" with respect to Peter, Paul, and the other individuals of human nature. The second is found (7 *Met.*, q. 15, 1, 45): "A universal is one apt to be in many." The first is called the logical universal; the second is called the metaphysical universal. Both together appear to be indicated by Aristotle (1 *Posterior Analytics*, c. 8, Text 63): "A universal is one in many and of many, not equivocal."

Three conditions a universal requires: the first is that a universal be one — that is, univocal — so that the equivocal is excluded from the character of the universal, as the Philosopher transmits (*in the place just cited*). The second is that it be apt to be predicated of many — for it is not necessary that the things of which the universal is predicated actually exist, but it suffices that they can exist, and that existence is not repugnant to them. The third is that the things of which the universal is predicated be many in the character signified by the name of the universal, and that the universal itself can be predicated of them taken together in the plural number — as "Peter and Paul are men." For this reason

God is not a universal: because although the same God is predicated of three Persons — for the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God — it cannot nonetheless be predicated of the same Persons in the plural; for it is false to say "three Persons are Gods," and true to say "three Persons are God" — as Peter Galatinus shows from Sacred Scripture, no less learnedly than elegantly (*l. 1, De arcanis fidei Catholicae, c. 2*), following Scotus (*in the Reportata cited, at the end of art. 7 of the preceding question*); and Augustine (*in Psalm 68, in the first part of the commentary; and Tract. 39 in Joan*).

One objects: a definition is among the universals, from Aristotle (*7 Met., c. 6*) and Scotus (*ibid.; and in 4 Sent., d. 1, q. 2, §. Hic primo, B*). But equivocal things have a definition, as is clear in the book of the *Categories*, c. 1. Therefore equivocal things are universals — and so the first condition of the universal is worthless. One replies: the major being conceded, the minor is to be distinguished: according to name — I concede; according to name and character — I deny. For properly speaking, only those things are defined that possess the same name and the same character — or that are per se one — as the Doctor (*cited, A*) says from Aristotle also cited (*c. 3, Text 16*) — and this will be clearer in (*l. 2, art. on definition*); and it was already made plain (*q. 2, art. 5, objection 2*). I do not here treat of the individual, which appears to be opposed to the universal, since what I wrote in the place just cited seems to be sufficient for our *Epitome* and our purpose.

Article II: How Many Kinds of Universal There Are

A universal, taken in the broadest sense, is commonly by dialecticians divided into complex — which is a proposition marked with a universal sign, on which Scotus treats (*1 Prior Analytics, q. 4*) — as "every animal is sensitive"; and incomplex — which is one something pertaining to many. This incomplex universal is constituted in five kinds by dialecticians, particularly by Mauritius Hibernicus (*in his exposition of the Universals of Scotus, q. 4*) and Sarnanus (*ibid., q. 2, p. 49*): namely universal in causing, in representing, in signifying, in being, and in predicating.

A universal in causing is described as what is the cause of many effects — as God and the sun. A universal in representing is what represents many things — as the idea of a house in the mind of a craftsman represents to the craftsman himself many houses to be built. A universal in signifying is what signifies many things — as a comet for the most part foretells many adversities for us. Universals in being and in predicating are those very things I described in the preceding article: the former pertains to Metaphysics, the latter to Logic. They are comprehended under five in number — namely genus, species, difference, property, and accident — derived from the five modes of predication, as the Doctor writes (*q. 12 of the Universals, §. Propter istas tres rationes*). For whatever is predicated is predicated either in what or in what kind: if in what, either after the manner of a part — and it is genus — or after the manner of a whole — and

it is species; if in what kind, either in what kind essentially — and it is difference — or in what kind accidentally, and this in two ways: either in what kind convertibly — and it is a property; or in what kind non-convertibly — and it is an accident.

One objects: God, who is called a universal in causing, is singular, as is clear from what was said (*ante objection of the preceding article*); and likewise the sun, which is also called a universal in causing, is numerically one. Therefore the division of the universal into the members enumerated is inept, since the definition of the universal does not fit them in the least. One replies that a universal distributed into a universal in causing and the other members previously enumerated is equivocal — and so it is not surprising if a universal in causing participates only in the name of the universal and is excluded from the proper character of the universal, as the argument rightly proves. And the same seems to have to be affirmed also of the universal in representing and in signifying.

Article III: On Genus

Among the universals, genus first presents itself — broader and more extensively ranging than the others, upon which the remaining universals appear to depend as the members of a body upon the head. Three acceptations of genus are enumerated by Porphyry (*in the Isagoge, c. on Genus*) and four by Aristotle (*5 Met., c. 28, Text 33*) — though in those three the four are comprehended on account of the affinity of one with another, which perhaps I will examine elsewhere. I now adduce the uses of genus as transmitted by Porphyry. The first is for a collection or multitude of certain things somehow related to one and to one another by a certain kind of kinship or common origin — as the race of the Hebrews, which looks back to Abraham, according to (*Acts 13*): "sons, of the race of Abraham," and (*ibid., c. 17*): "He made from one the entire race of men"; and the race of the Romans, which looks back to Romulus, is commonly given as an example. The second is for the principle of any kind of generation, whether that principle is productive or conserving — thus Adam is called the race of men, and Gaul the race of the Gauls. The third is for that under which species are subsumed — as substance is a genus whose species are body and spirit.

The first two uses of genus belong to poets — as Virgil sings: "and may God bring in the Latin race from which the Latin stock derives" — and to historians, as (*Leviticus 23*): "Whoever is of the race of Israel"; (*Numbers 13*): "We saw certain monstrous things of the sons of Enoch, of the race of giants." Pliny similarly says (*De viris illustribus*): "Pyrrhus king of the Epirotes, of maternal origin from Achilles, and paternal origin from Hercules." And orators, as Cicero (*l. 2, De natura Deorum*): "Even if one may contract the universality of the human race." The last use belongs to philosophers, by whom genus is divided into logical, physical, and metaphysical — as the Doctor intimates (*q. 7 of the Categories, §. Ad*

quaestionem dicendum) and Tataretus clearly teaches (*c. de substantia, scibile 2*), whom Sarnanus follows (*q. 1 of the Universals, p. 12*). Physical genus is transmutable matter, as Sarnanus notes there (*at the end of p. 11*). Therefore those things that are mutually transmutable are said to be of the same physical genus; while things devoid of matter are distinct in genus, according to that of the Philosopher (*10 Met., c. 13, Text 26*): "the corruptible and the incorruptible differ by more than genus" — that is, physical genus — as Scotus rightly interprets that passage (*in 4 Sent., d. 6, q. 10, M*). Metaphysical genus is one apt to be in many differing in species, as is clear from the Doctor (*7 Met., q. 18*) and Orbellus (*ibid., c. 7*); and we shall explain it when we treat of the universal in general in (*our questions l. 2, q. 1, art. 6*). Logical genus is what is predicated of many differing in species in what — as "body" is predicated in what of animate and inanimate body. Now, things that differ in physical genus can be under the same logical and metaphysical genus, as I was just noting from Scotus.

Again, from the same Doctor (*q. 24 of the first Posterior Analytics*), genus is divided into supreme, subalternate, and lowest. Supreme genus is one that has no other genus above it — or one that is so genus that it cannot be a species — such as substance, quantity, and the other highest genera. Subalternate genus is one that with respect to what is superior, or more superior, is a species; but with respect to inferiors is a genus — as "body," insofar as it has regard to substance, is a species; but insofar as it has regard to animate and inanimate, it is a genus. Lowest genus is one under which no other genus can be — as "animal." Again, from the same Scotus (*cited above; and in 4 Sent., d. 11, q. 3, §. Ad rationes ergo, CC*), genus is distributed into remote or mediate and proximate or immediate. Remote genus is one that is distant from those of which it is predicated — as "substance" with respect to man, between which many intermediates are interposed. Proximate genus is one that is immediately predicated of some things — as "substance" of body and spirit — all of which can be plainly seen in the Tree of Porphyry.

One objects: for distinct genera to be had, it is necessary that one multitude of men be distinguished from another multitude by order to one principle — as the race of the Gauls from the race of the Spaniards. But some things are called genera that do not possess such a distinction, as is clear (*Genesis 9*): "From these the race of men was spread abroad." And (*Acts 17*): "We are the race of God." And everywhere the entire species of man is called the human race. Therefore genus does not appear to have been aptly described above. One replies that there are other acceptations of genus, which I did not judge it necessary to recount above for our subject: for sometimes genus is taken for some quality — as (*Daniel 3*) it is read: "all kinds of musicians"; and (*1 Corinthians 12*): "other kinds of tongues"; sometimes for different species, as is clear from (*Ecclesiasticus 43*): "various kinds of beasts"; and (*Matthew 13*): "gathering from every kind of fish." Therefore even if the major is true in some cases, it is not in all, as is proved in the minor; and accordingly for distinguishing a common genus it suffices that some things

taken together agree in some one essential or accidental principle and differ from any other thing essentially or accidentally — as the authorities and examples just cited evidently demonstrate.

Article IV: On Species

That species is used in many ways, Vorrilonius (*in 1 Sent., d. 31*), Pelbartus (*vol. 1 of the Rosary, s.v. species*), and Mauritius (*q. 18 of the Universals*) recorded in writing following Scotus (*7 Met., c. 10 and Text 33*). First, species is taken grammatically — as a certain accidental mode of signifying a noun, in which sense species is divided into primitive and derivative, as the Author of the *Speculative Grammar* teaches (*c. 7*). Second, physically — as the likeness of a known thing in the one knowing, which is distributed into sensible and intelligible, of which Aristotle (*3 De anima, Text 18*) makes mention, saying: "not the stone but the species of the stone is in the soul"; and Scotus (*in 1 Sent., d. 3, q. 6, A; and in 4 Sent., d. 45, q. 1; and frequently elsewhere*). Or it is taken for beauty and comeliness, as the same Doctor notes (*q. 36 of the Categories, §. Quod forma habeat; and 2 Sent., d. 40, q. un., §. De 1, dico*); and it is intimated in Sacred Scripture (*Wisdom 5*): "From the greatness of the appearance of these things the Creator of them might be seen." Or for the form that is a part of a composite, as is clear (*5 Met.*) and I observed in the *Physics*, q. on form. Or for the appearance of a thing, according to (*2 Timothy 3*): "men having the appearance of piety." Third, theologically, for the divine essence — as I noted in the preceding question, art. 6, in the first reply to an objection — in which sense the Church speaks in the Prayer of the Epiphany of the Lord: "May we be led to behold the height of thy appearance." The Master (*in 1 Sent., d. 29*) and before him Saint Damascene (*1 Sentences*) plainly teach this, affirming that the divine essence is the species of the three Persons. Or for the sensible accident representing some Sacrament — thus the accidents of the Eucharist are called sacramental species, under which is designated the true and real presence of Christ's body, as is clear from Scotus (*in 4 Sent., d. 10, q. 1, 4*). Logically, species is taken for what is placed under a certain and determinate genus — and it is about species so taken that Porphyry and the other dialecticians speak in the present context.

Species is divided into subalternate — also called intercalary — and lowest — also called atomic. The first is what insofar as it looks to what is superior is called a species — as "body" with respect to "substance"; but insofar as it looks to inferiors it is called a genus — as "body" with respect to "animate" and "inanimate." The latter is so much a species that it cannot be a genus — and is defined as what is predicated of many differing in number in what — as "man" is predicated of Peter, Paul, and the remaining individuals of human nature, which differ from one another in number alone.

That the series of genera, species, and individuals may be plain — or the beginning, middle, and end of the whole edifice of the category of substance,

and by like reasoning of any other highest genus — it pleases me to adduce the Tree of Porphyry, which is as follows.

Article V: On Difference

Difference, taken universally, can be described as that by which one thing is distinguished from another — or, as the distinguished Scotist Mauritius says in his brief *Tract. Formalizatum*, difference is the otherness of extremes, or the reason for differing, by which namely one thing differs from another. In this way difference and distinction are taken indiscriminately — and what Scotus and the Scotists write abundantly and acutely about distinction seems to have to be affirmed also about difference, especially in created things. Porphyry, however, in the present context — whom the Subtle Doctor follows (*q. 23 of the Universals*) — divides difference into common, proper, and most proper. Common difference is that by which one thing differs from another by a separable accident — as Peter sitting differs from Paul standing by sitting, which is called a common accident and one separable from Peter. Proper difference is that by which one thing disagrees with another by an inseparable accident — as a raven differs from a swan by blackness, which is an accident inseparable from it. Most proper difference is that by which certain things differ from one another essentially — as man essentially disagrees with brute by rationality, which is his essential difference.

The first two are accidental differences — and they are said to make another in number (*aliud*) without constituting or distinguishing the essence and substance of the thing. The last is substantial and essential — and is said to make another in kind (*aliud*). For this reason, since the three divine Persons share the same essence in number, they are distinguished personally but not essentially. We rightly say in the divine order that the Father is "another" (*aliud*) from the Son in the masculine gender, but not "something other" (*aliud*) from the Son in the neuter gender — as Augustine notes (*Tract. 37 in Joan.*; and *ibid.*, *Tract. 45*) — for the reason just assigned: namely that the difference which makes something "other in kind" (*aliud*) is essential, and such does not exist between the divine supposita. An essential difference performs a double function — that is, it divides a genus and constitutes a species. From this arises the distribution of difference into divisive and constitutive: although they are entirely one and the same, they are nonetheless called double on account of the double respect they bear to genus and species. For insofar as it divides the genus it is called divisive; insofar as it constitutes the species, it is called constitutive. Thus "rational" is the divisive difference of animal and the constitutive difference of man.

A supreme genus has a divisive difference but not a constitutive one; a lowest species has a constitutive one but not a divisive difference; while an intermediate genus, or subalternate species, possesses both divisive and constitutive — as "animal" has the constitutive difference, which is "sensitive," and the divisive difference, which is "rational" or "irrational." From this is derived

the division of difference into generic — as "sensitive" — and specific — as "rational." And all such differences are essential, quidditative, and formal, as Scotus not obscurely signifies (*in 4 Sent., d. 11, q. 3, §. Alii concedentes, sub duplici CC*). The remaining individual differences, by which individuals are constituted in their individual being — called by the Scotists "haecceities" — are called material differences, because just as matter is more ignoble than form, so individual differences are surpassed in nobility by the aforesaid quidditative and formal forms.

Difference is described by Porphyry in three ways. First: "difference is that by which the species exceeds the genus" — which is to say, difference is that by which a species surpasses its genus — as man surpasses animal, which is his genus, by rationality, which is his difference. Man, indeed, consists of rationality, of which animal does not consist. Second: "difference is that which distinguishes the species subsumed under the same genus" — as was explained abundantly in the above. Third: "difference is that which is predicated of many differing in species in what kind essentially." This last definition is the logical one and is accommodated only to generic difference. We can transmit with Scotus (*q. 27 of the Universals*) a description of difference that befits both generic and specific difference — namely: "difference is that which is predicated of many in what kind essentially."

Why Porphyry assigned only the definition of generic difference, the reason can be given that from the definition of generic difference the definition of specific difference — and also what is common to both — could conveniently be derived, as the Subtle Doctor just cited has done. Just as from what Porphyry had already said about universals, the definitions of property and accident could be gathered — which are the fourth and fifth logical universal — although he did not adduce them. Or perhaps as Zabarella says (*in the Commentaries on 2 Posterior Analytics, Text 70*): the principal consideration of difference belongs not to the logician but to the metaphysician, as may be seen (*7 Metaphysics*).

One objects, first: a good division is binary, because it is through opposites, of which one must be opposed to another and not to two — as is clear in the case of elements and their qualities. But the foregoing division of difference into common, proper, and most proper is tripartite; therefore it is not fitting. One replies with Scotus (*q. 23 of the Universals*) that the major holds formally or reductively; and that division is reduced to binary thus: one difference is most proper, another is not — and this latter is then subdivided into proper and common.

One objects, secondly: a rule of a good division is that one member should not comprehend another, since they are opposed to one another. But in the foregoing division one difference comprehends another — for the most proper contains the proper and the common: for those that differ essentially also differ accidentally, since from the quiddity flow properties and accidents, according to

which there are proper and common differences. One replies from the same place: the major being conceded, the minor is to be distinguished. For if one of those differences is taken without precision, I concede it — since in that in which essential difference is found, the other differences are likewise present, as is well inferred by the argument. But if it is taken with precision, I deny it — since in this way one does not include another difference: for what is distinguished from another by the most proper difference is not distinguished from it, through that very most proper difference, by a proper or common difference; but it is distinguished by proper difference according to a proper accident, and by common difference according to a common accident. And so one and the same thing can disagree with another by these three differences according to distinct entities.

Article VI: On Property

Property is sometimes taken as opposed to what is improper — in which sense "man" properly signifies a living man, but improperly and equivocally a painted man, as is clear from Aristotle (*at the beginning of the book of the Categories, c. 1*) and Scotus (*ibid., q. 5*). Sometimes property is taken as opposed to what is common — as is clear from (*1 Topics, c. 4*): "No one calls something the property of a thing if it could belong to another." It is also used in this way (*2 Chronicles 6*): "From my own substance I will offer holocausts." (*Matthew 25*): "To each according to his own talent." And in Cicero (*Cato maior*): "That is the property peculiar to old age, but one common to illness." And it is enumerated by the Doctor (*q. 30 of the Universals, §. Ad quaestionem*). Sometimes it is taken for the dominion over something — in which sense it is taken by jurists who discuss property and usufruct as opposed to one another. And it is luminously indicated by the Doctor (*in 1 Sent., d. 12, q. 2, §. Per idem patet, B*): "He alone is called a proprietor who in possessing a thing depends in no way on another; while a user who in using a thing depends on another is not properly a proprietor." Moreover, Alvaro Pelayo (*l. 2, De planctu Ecclesiae, art. 56*) notes that on account of iniquity, imperial law was introduced, by which men say "this is mine" and "that is yours" and contend in court — as is found in (*C. Iure*). And Saint John Chrysostom had similarly noted before him (*vol. 1 of his works, oration on St. Philogonius*): "In heaven there shall not be that cold word 'mine' and 'yours'."

Philosophers, however, speak of property insofar as it is a passion, or natural aptitude, flowing from the essence of a thing — as Scotus (*in 2 Sent., d. 16, q. un.; and q. 30 of the Universals*) names it — and thus, following Aristotle (*4 Topics*) and Porphyry (*in the Isagoge, c. 4*), they say there are four modes of property. First, property is taken for what belongs to a species alone but not to every member of it — as being a grammarian belongs to man alone but not to every man, since not every man is a grammarian. Second, for what belongs to every member of a species but not to it alone — as being bipedal belongs indeed to every man but not to man alone, since birds also have two feet. Third, for what belongs to every

member, and to it alone, but not always — as going gray belongs to every man and to man alone, yet not always, since it happens to him only in old age. Though some animals appear to go gray, they do not properly go gray but grow grizzled, as Major (*c. de proprio, Notabile 1*) and Tataretus (*ibid., scibile 1*) affirm. Fourth, for what belongs to every man, always — as risibility, which belongs to every man, to man alone, and always to man. And this is called property in the proper sense in the fourth mode — which is reciprocated with that of which it is the property, as "every man is risible" and "every risible being is a man." Logically, property — as it is the fourth predicable — can be described as "one apt to be predicated of many in what kind convertibly" — as "risible" is predicated of this and that man and the remaining individuals of human nature, as the Doctor writes (*q. 30 of the Universals, §. Ad q.*).

One objects, first: Aristotle (*1 Topics, c. 1*) enumerates only three modes of property — namely property per se, property per accidens, and property sometimes. Therefore the fourth mode of property added by Porphyry is superfluous in the doctrine of the Philosopher. One replies that though Aristotle in the cited place mentioned only three modes of property, he did not therefore deny the fourth mode, which he expressed (*5 Topics*) — where he enumerates all four modes under different words transmitted by Porphyry: namely property per se, per accidens, in relation to another, and sometimes.

One objects, secondly: the second mode of property does not participate in the nature of property itself — for what is common to many is by no means proper, as I showed above. Therefore property is not correctly divided into the four modes named. One replies to the antecedent that the second mode participates in the nature of property not simply and per se, but insofar as it prescribes from property simply and property in a qualified sense, or from property per se and per accidens. Therefore the consequence is denied.

One objects, thirdly: not every man always laughs — for it is said that Christ the Lord never laughed; that Heraclitus wept over everything, Democritus laughed at everything, and Zoroaster was born laughing, as the Author of the *Theatrum mundi* narrates. Likewise not every man is capable of learning, as is clear of infants and imbeciles. Therefore the foregoing description of property is inept. One replies: the antecedent being conceded, the consequence is to be denied. The description of property is derived not from act but from aptitude, as Scotus excellently teaches (*q. 33 of the Universals, §. Ad q.; and Quodl. 11, §. De primo, ante C*), saying that the proposition "man is risible" is necessary and in the second mode of per se predication, while "man laughs" is contingent. The same must also be said about what is added regarding capacity for learning, whose act is impeded by the absence of the use of reason or by a disposition of the organs, as the adduced objection proves.

Article VII: On Accident

Accident, from the Doctor (*q. 34 of the Universals*), admits many acceptations. I select three that are more principal and more fitting for our subject. First, accident is taken for what rarely occurs or comes about by chance — in which sense it is called an accident for one who is digging a vineyard to find a treasure. This bears on what Quintilian says: "not to be easily moved by favorable things, nor to be broken by accidents." Second, for everything that does not belong to the essence of something — of which Aristotle (*in the Sophistical Refutations*) and Scotus (*ibid.*) make mention — and in this way clothing is said to be an accident of a clothed man, the individual of a species, and a species of a genus. According to this acceptation, accident can be divided into proper accident — such as risibility with respect to man — and common accident — such as whiteness with respect to a wall. Third, for what accidentally and contingently belongs to some subject — and it is about this that speech is being made at present. A triple definition of it is transmitted by Porphyry (*c. 6 of his introduction*). The first: "accident is what is present and absent without the corruption of the subject." Accident so described is divided by Porphyry in that place, and by Scotus (*q. 35 of the Universals; and 1 Posterior Analytics, q. 42*), into separable — such as walking for man — and inseparable — such as blackness of an Ethiopian. The second: "accident is what can belong and not belong to the same thing." The third: "accident is what is neither genus, nor species, nor difference, nor property, yet is always in a subject." A fourth may be added, proper to this place: "accident is one apt to be predicated of many in what kind non-convertibly" — as whiteness of milk, sugar, and a wall.

The first description is more celebrated and more difficult to explain — and so it must be carefully examined by us with Scotus (*q. 32 of the Universals*), principally with this distinction: the presence or absence of an accident from the subject without injury and corruption of the subject can be understood in two ways — either according to reality, or according to reason. For experience confirms that some accidents are separated from the subject without any injury to the subject itself — as is clear of whiteness with respect to a whitewashed wall. Other accidents, though they are so connected with the subject that they cannot be separated from it, can nonetheless through the intellect be separated and abstracted without the destruction of the subject itself. For since an accident does not enter into the essence of the subject, it can be understood without it — the essence of the subject remaining intact. For whether you consider blackness joined to the raven or blackness separated from the raven, you posit nothing or subtract nothing from its essence, nor do you admit anything repugnant to it. This cannot apply to property: for although property can be understood by abstractive precision without the subject from which it flows — nonetheless not by divisive abstraction, nor together with its opposite — because it flows necessarily and naturally from the essence of the subject itself. But accident can be understood without its subject by both kinds of abstraction just enumerated, and even together with its opposite, while the subject itself continues unharmed.

One objects, first: Porphyry (*cited above*) affirms that certain accidents are inseparable from the subjects in which they inhere — as is clear of the blackness of an Ethiopian, which cannot be separated from him without his corruption and destruction. Therefore the foregoing definition of accident is not accommodating. One replies by distinguishing the antecedent: some accidents are inseparable really — I concede; by reason — I deny. This distinction remains more than sufficiently explained from what was observed shortly before this objection.

One objects, secondly: a definition must be adequate to what is defined. But that definition of accident is not adequate to what is defined — that is, to accident itself. Therefore it has not been correctly given. The major is known. The minor is proved: the death of an animal and the burning of a house are accidents that cannot be without the destruction of their subjects. The major being conceded, the minor is to be denied. For its proof, I say that those are privative accidents — and the definition just cited is to be understood of positive accidents, of which a definition is properly given, as the Doctor admirably notes (*in 4 Sent., d. 1, q. 2, §. Hic primo, C*).

Question IV: On the Predicaments

Aristotle treats of the predicaments deeply and learnedly — both in the *Logic (1 of the Categories)* and in the *Metaphysics (l. 5, 6, 7, Text 14)* — as does Scotus (*ibid.*). We shall treat of the same matters, with the help of divine grace, first noting that the aforesaid book of the *Categories* is divided into ante-predicaments, predicaments, and post-predicaments — according to the partition of which this present debate of ours is arranged.

Article I: On the Ante-Predicaments

Three ante-predicaments are enumerated — namely equivocal, univocal, and denominative terms, of which I made mention (*l. 1, q. 1, art. 5 of this Epitome*), and denominatives (*ibid., art. 7*). There are furthermore two divisions and equally as many ante-predicamental rules.

The first division is into incomplex, or simple, things — which are possessed neither of truth nor of falsity, as "man," "lion" — and complex things — which admit truth or falsity: as "man is an animal" is called a true complex, and "man is a stone" is called a false complex. I mentioned this division in the place now cited (*art. 4*), and explained it abundantly there. The second division is into accident and substance. Substance is being through itself — or, as Aristotle says (*5 Met., c. 8*): "substance is a being not existing in another." Accident, on the other hand, is being in another, as will be explained below.

Substance is divided into universal and singular — and likewise accident into universal and singular. Universal substances are described by Aristotle in the present place as those "that are said of a subject" — understand, of the subject of

predication — "and are not in a subject" — supply, of the subject of inherence — as "man" is said of Peter, who is its subjective part and something inferior to it; and it is not in a subject, because, being a substance, it does not inhere in any subject. Singular substances neither are said of a subject nor are in a subject — as "Paul" is not said of a subject, since it has nothing inferior to it; for this reason it is also called an individual, because it cannot be divided into other inferiors beneath it; nor is it in a subject, since it is a substance, which, from what has been said, is a being subsisting through itself. Universal accidents are defined as those that are said of a subject and are in a subject — as "color" is predicated of this and that colored thing, and is in a subject — namely in a wall or in other colored subjects. Singular accidents, on the other hand, are described as those that are not said of a subject yet are in a subject — as "this color" is not predicated of a subject, for the same reason as we gave for singular substances; nonetheless it is in a subject, since it is being in another — namely in an apple or in paper. To be said of a subject is the same as to be predicated of a subject, whether essentially — as "man is rational" — or accidentally — as "man is fair-haired."

The first ante-predicamental rule is: whatever is essentially said of the predicate is also said of the subject — as Scotus rightly interprets (*q. 9 of the Categories*, §. *Ad q. dicendum*) — or as others say: whatever is essentially predicated of the superior is also predicated of the inferior. For example, if "sensitive," "living," "body," and "substance" are predicated of "animal," those same predicates are aptly predicated of "man," which is something inferior to "animal" itself. For higher essential predicates are included in the inferiors and are therefore rightly predicated of them. The second rule — which is recounted by the Doctor (*Quodl. 17*, §. *De tertio, sub F*; and *q. 10 of the Categories*) — is as follows: the differences, species, and individuals of genera that are not subalternately ordered are different — as may be seen in every series of any predicament, to be adduced in its proper place below.

One objects, first: certain things are neither substance nor accident. Therefore the division into accident and substance is insufficient and inept. The antecedent is most evident in the doctrine of Scotus, which admits substantial and accidental modes, as well as "thisnesses" (haecceities) and properties, as is clear (*Quodl. 1, art. 3; and elsewhere*). One replies by distinguishing the antecedent: really — I deny; formally — I concede. For in Metaphysics it will be shown that the thisnesses and properties of things are really identified with the natures of which they are properties and affections.

One objects, secondly: a definition is properly of what is positive, as Scotus teaches (*in 4 Sent., d. 1, q. 2, §. Hic primo, C*). But Aristotle here defines substance through negation, saying: "substance is what is not in a subject"; and (*5 Met., cited above*): "substance is a being not existing in another." Therefore the foregoing definition of substance is not fitting. The major being conceded, I say to the

minor that through that negation in the definition of substance is denoted the positive predicate of substance itself — which is being subsisting through itself. Or it may be said that when something is not at all manifest to us — as substance is — it is described through negation, as prime matter is described by the Philosophers (*7 Met.*) and God is described by the theologians (*1 Sentences*) — which I also not negligently noted in my *Physics*, q. on matter.

Article II: What a Predicament Is, and How Many There Are

What the Greeks call *κατηγορία*, the Latins call predicament — derived from predication, its original institution. Hence a predicament, by etymology, is the same as what is predicated of something. Although it has more than one acceptation — as Fonseca (*5 Met., c. 7, q. 1, sect. 2*) and the Conimbricenses (*q. 2 in the Categories, art. 1*) note — the more frequent use is found in Porphyry (*6 de specie*) and Scotus (*in 2 Sent., d. 3, q. 3, §. Contra istud, ante B; and q. 4, §. Contra istam conclusionem, post D, toward: ex tertia via*) — for a natural coordination of predicates and subjects of some highest genus. Thus a predicament can be described as the natural series of a highest genus, of subalternate and lowest species, and of the individuals that are under it. This is clearly seen in the predicament of substance and of the others, for which I constructed and distinguished their proper categories in their places below. Just as in the supreme court of the Gallo-Provençal province the Most Illustrious Lord de Seguiran, the most deserving First President, shines and stands out in the brilliance of the good arts, the light of outstanding sciences, and the splendor of conspicuous virtues — whom the other most distinguished Presidents and Senators, most renowned for integrity of character, learning, and wisdom, succeed in wonderful order — so in each predicament there is given a highest genus under which the remaining subalternate genera, species, and individuals pertaining to it are ordered and arranged.

Three orders are noted as being in a predicament above the others by Tataretus (*q. 1 of the Categories, dubitation 2*) — namely the direct, the lateral, and the reductive — of which Scotus enumerates the first and third (*3 Sent., d. 22, q. un., B*) and posits the second (*1 Posterior Analytics, q. 24, §. Item si rationale*). In the direct or straight predicamental line and per se reside genera, species, and individuals. In the indirect or lateral line, divisive differences have their seat. In the reductive order are placed the essential physical parts — namely matter and form — and integral parts, such as head and feet; the modes of things, such as existence; and the acquisition of a thing, and other such matters, which have no place in either the direct or indirect line.

Ten predicaments are enumerated by Aristotle, Scotus, and other philosophers — namely substance, quantity, quality, relation, action, passion, where, when, position, and habit — which are indicated by these words: "Aristotle the great, Prince of Philosophers, fatigued teaches today seated in the school crowned." The first word "Aristotle" designates substance; the second word "great"

designates quantity; and so of the rest in succession — on each of which separately there is to be discourse.

One objects: Aristotle sometimes enumerates ten categories, sometimes three, sometimes six, sometimes eight — as Peter Gassendi objects against him (*l. 1, Adversus Aristoteleos, exercitatio 8*); and what the Doctor touches upon (*1 Posterior Analytics, q. 24, §. Item si rationale; and §. Contra*). Therefore either there are not ten categories, or Aristotle involves contradictions. One replies: the antecedent being conceded, the consequence is denied — since the Philosopher in the proper places cited at the beginning of this question adduces neither more nor fewer than ten predicaments. If elsewhere he does not retain the said number, that perhaps occurs because the matter about which he was treating did not require it, and he only made mention of those that pertained to the matter under dispute — just as in the *Topics* he treats now three, now only two universals, although according to his opinion and the common opinion of the rest, five universals are conceded.

Article III: On Substance

Substance is taken in many ways from (*5 Met., c. 8, Text 14*). First, for the foundation of any thing — thus "surface" is called the substance of whiteness, because whiteness is founded and underlies in it; and faith (*Hebrews 11*), cited by the Doctor (*in 3 Sent., d. 31, q. un., §. Respondeo, A*), is called "the substance of things hoped for," because Christian religion is founded in it; and riches are called a man's substance, as (*Canticles 8*): "If a man were to give all the substance of his house," and (*Luke 15*): "dissipating his substance" — and Augustine makes mention of it (*in Psalm 68, in the first part of the commentary*) — because those things are subjected for the necessities of his body's sustenance. Second, for the essence of any thing, whether it be substance or accident — a use favored by Aristotle (*both in the place cited and also in the book of the Categories, c. 1*), where defining univocals he says: "univocal things are those whose name is common and whose character of substance according to name is the same"; and: "equivocal things are those whose name is common and whose character of substance according to name is different." And Augustine (*l. De immortalitate animae, c. 12*) intimates this. So since in that place the Philosopher speaks of univocals and equivocals insofar as they prescind from the univocation of substance and accident, it is perspicuous that the name "substance" is used there for the essence of any thing. Even more so, because in the *Metaphysics* passage cited he explicitly posits this usage of substance — which Scotus also intimates (*both there, and also in q. 5 and 6 of the Categories; and in 1 Sent., d. 8, q. 3, §. Alii probant, ante S*). Third, for what is from itself, of itself, and through itself — as God alone is, who is His own being, according to (*Exodus 3*): "Who is, has sent me to you." God alone has being through essence; all other things by participation. Thus Aristotle (*12 Met., Text 29*) and the Subtle Doctor (*Quodl. 1*) took "substance" in this way. Fourth, for what is indeed of itself and through

itself but not from itself — as is every created substance, from the highest genus of the category of substance down to its individuals inclusive. Aristotle (*1 Categories, c. 5*) and Scotus (*ibid., q. 12 G; and in 1 Sent., cited above*) treat of substance so taken. Fifth, for what is not an accident — or, as our Formalists speak, for what is not in another through information — such as the parts of a perfect and composite substance, both essential parts as matter and form, and integral parts as head and feet. Aristotle (*1 Physics, Text 12; and 8 Met., c. 1, Text 3*) and Scotus (*2 Sent., d. 12, q. 1*) treat of substance so accepted.

A double etymology of substance can be given, as Isidore (*l. 2 of the Etymologies*), Vorriolus (*in 1 Sent., d. 5*), and Pelbartus (*vol. 1, s.v. substantia, §. 1*) note. One from "sub-standing" — which Aristotle (*5 Met., c. 8*) and Scotus (*2 Sent., d. 8, q. 3, §. Teneo opinionem meam, F*) adduce — for the reason that it underlies accidents as their foundation, and accidents cannot exist without it. Hence since primary substance underlies all accidents, it is rightly called by the Philosopher "most of all substance." Since God, however, is entirely alien from the reception of any accident — as Scotus (*cited above*) writes following Augustine (*7 De Trinitate, c. 5*) — He is therefore not properly substance in this sense, since the meaning of substance so called belongs only to created substance, which is capable of accidents. The other etymology is from "sub-sisting" — because it subsists through itself — as Saint Bonaventure (*in 1 Sent., d. 23, q. 2*) and the Scotists (*Tract. Formalizatum*) hold; and it is intimated by the Doctor (*in the Reportata of 1 Sent., d. 26, q. 1*). And in terms of this nomenclature, "substance" is attributed both to created and uncreated substance, because each subsists through itself.

Substance is divided into primary and secondary — or into universal and singular — from Aristotle (*c. de substantia*) and Scotus (*ibid., q. 12; and Quodl. 3, §. Respondeo, ante Q*). Again, into celestial and sublunary — and such others — on which see below (*art. 5*).

One objects: if substance is distributed by Aristotle into primary and secondary, then by parity of reasoning quantity should be divided into primary and secondary — and likewise quality and the other predicaments. But the division of quantity into primary and secondary is ridiculous. Therefore the division of substance into primary and secondary is also inept. One replies by denying the subsumption — for a universal and singular quantity is given, and in this way quantity can be said to be divided into primary and secondary. As to why Aristotle did not distribute quantity in that way, he perhaps did so because the foregoing division of substance is derived from the modes of subsisting through itself and of underlining accidents — as the Doctor intimates (*at the end of q. 12 of the Categories*). For primary substance primarily underlies accidents, while secondary substance does so only secondarily — and so Aristotle adds: "when primary substances are destroyed, it is impossible for anything else to remain."

Article IV: On the Properties of Substance

Six properties of substance are enumerated by Aristotle (*c. de substantia*) and presupposed by our Doctor (*ibid.*). The first is not to be in a subject — and this appears to be a property of substance in the fourth mode, as Scotus indicates (*in 3 Sent., d. 1, art. 3, sub D*). For it belongs to every substance, both primary and secondary, both complete and incomplete, to substance alone, and always — whether it resides directly or indirectly in the category — as is clear from what was said above — whatever the Conimbricenses may say in their commentary on this chapter.

The second property is to be predicated univocally — that is, under the same name and the same character. This property, however, belongs not to primary but only to secondary substances — as "man" is univocally predicated of its individuals. The same property appears to be adapted to universal accidents, which, although they are denominated of the substance in which they inhere, are nonetheless univocally and essentially predicated of their inferiors — for example, "color" of whiteness and blackness — since the genus is the same for each.

The third is to signify "this something" (*hoc aliquid*) — and this belongs only to primary substance. For it is properly "this something" — that is, an individual, a singular, and a numerically single substance. But to signify "what kind of thing" (*quale quid*) belongs only to secondary substance — since secondary substances are the quiddities of primary substances. For just as an accidental form qualifies its subject accidentally, so the essential form or substantial quiddity qualifies primary substance essentially, in which it resides. In what sense a substantial difference has the mode of quality the Doctor explains (*in 3 Sent., cited above*), adducing the place of the Philosopher (*5 Met., Text 19, C*).

The fourth — as Augustine (*l. De immortalitate animae, c. 11*) likewise notes — is that nothing is contrary to substance — which is to say, one substance is not opposed to another; for those things that are opposed to one another by proper contrary opposition are in a subject and mutually expel one another from the same subject — as heat and cold mutually drive each other out from the same water in which they inhere, on account of their repugnance, as the Doctor explains (*4 Met., commentary on Texts 9, 27, 37; in 1 Sent., d. 1, q. 1, infra L*). Yet the property of substance, as I noted at the beginning of this article, is not to be in a subject.

The fifth is that substance does not admit of more and less — that is, substance is not intensified or remitted. For Paul is not more a man now than before; and likewise Paul is not more a man than Andrew. But one wall is whiter than another, because whiteness, which is a quality, admits of more and less. Whether substance admits individual degrees, see Scotus (*8 Met.; and 1 Sent., d. 17, q. 3*) and ourselves in the proper question on this matter.

The sixth is that substance admits contraries — which can be understood of one and the same substance in number, which is changed over the course of time by the reception of contraries. For the same man is sometimes healthy and sometimes ill; and one and the same wall is now white and now black, as is clear from the Doctor (*in 4 Sent., d. 49, q. 13, §. Respondeo, B*). Although quantity also receives contraries — as a surface that is whitened or darkened — nonetheless there is a distinction between surface and substance in terms of the reception of contraries: because surface is their subject *quo*, while substance is their ultimate subject *quod* — as Scotus excellently teaches (*in 4 Sent., d. 12, q. 2, §. Ad quaestionem, H*).

One objects, first: not to be in a subject is the essence of substance. Therefore it is not its property. The antecedent is clear from Aristotle (*c. 2 and 5 of the book of the Categories*); the consequence holds because a property follows from the thing of which it is the property — as the Doctor writes (*in 1 Sent., d. 8, q. 4, §. Ista tamen, M*) — and flows from it; and the same thing cannot be cause and effect of the same thing with respect to the same thing, whether through emanation or through transmutation. One replies by distinguishing the antecedent: not to be in a subject can be taken in two ways — one way as signifying the very substance itself, which has no capacity for inhering in a subject, and I concede that through "not being in a subject" the positive predicate of substance is denoted; the other way as signifying the aptitude for existing through itself, and in this way "not being in a subject" is a property of substance. This distinction is clear by analogy with "sensitive" — which, as I noted (*1 Sent. 2, De anima*), can be taken in two ways: either for the essential constitutive difference of an animal, or for the faculty of sensing of that same animal, which is its faculty and property.

One objects, secondly: Aristotle (*ibid., c. 5*) writes that primary substance is more of a substance than secondary substance; and shortly after he adds that substance does not admit of more and less. Therefore either one is false, or Aristotle contradicts himself. One replies by distinguishing the antecedent: primary substance is more of a substance than secondary substance as to mode — I concede; since primary substance, including more, underlies more than secondary substance; as to essence — I deny. Thus the apparent contradiction in the words of the Philosopher is resolved. Or, if you prefer, in the school of Scotus, say that substance does not admit of more and less according to specific being — yet it does according to individual being, as is clear from the Doctor (*8 Met., q. 3; and 1 Sent., d. 17, q. 3*).

One objects, thirdly: the same proposition is made false from a true one — as with Peter seated, this proposition "Peter is seated" is true; but with him standing or walking, it is false. But truth and falsity are contraries. Therefore admitting contraries is not a property of substance alone. The Stagirite replies that a proposition is true or false not through its own change but only through the change of its object; whereas substance admits contraries through a change

existing in the substance itself and not in something distinct from it. Or it may be said with Scotus that truth and falsity are not properly contraries but relations of conformity and disformity with respect to the object of which they are predicated — as will be clear (*l. 4, q. 4, art. 2*).

Article V: In Which the Series of Predicamental Substance Is Examined

Predicamental substance is divided into incorporeal and corporeal, as Augustine intimates (*l. 83 Questions, q. 6*). Incorporeal substance is subdivided into three Hierarchies and nine Orders, which are called Seraphim, Cherubim, Thrones, Dominations, Virtues, Powers, Principalities, Archangels, and Angels. Corporeal substance is divided into inanimate and animate. Inanimate into simple and mixed. Simple is either celestial — and it contains eleven heavens: the Empyrean heaven, the Primum Mobile, the aqueous or crystalline heaven, the heaven of stars, the heavens of Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, the Sun, Venus, Mercury, and the Moon — or it is sublunary, and comprises the four elements: fire, air, water, and earth. Mixed is divided into imperfectly mixed and perfectly mixed. Imperfectly mixed comprises all meteorological phenomena, which are of two kinds — some arise from moist matter, or from vapor: clouds, rains, snow, dew, frost, and ice; others are fashioned from dry matter, or from exhalation: thunder, lightning, thunderbolts, wind, comets, and the like. Perfectly mixed comprises three genera: one is the genus of stones, whose various species are marble, whetstone, flint, and rock; another is the genus of metals, whose species are gold, silver, tin, lead, bronze, and iron; the third is the genus of liquids, whose species include sulphur, bitumen, etc.

Animate substance is either sentient or non-sentient. Non-sentient obtains many genera: the genus of trees, shrubs, plants, herbs, and roots. Sentient is either devoid of reason or possessed of reason. Devoid of reason is either aerial — as a bird — or aquatic — as a fish — or terrestrial — as a quadruped. Possessed of reason is man — as Peter. If you desire a shorter line of the category of substance, see (*Article 4 of Question III*).

One objects: Porphyry, in the range of the predicament of substance (*c. de specie*), places "rational animal" as the genus of man. Therefore possessed-of-reason substance must again be divided. One replies: the antecedent being conceded, the consequence is to be denied. The reason is that Porphyry, with Plato whose student he was, thought that Angels are rational animals — and so in his view "rational animal" is posited as the genus; which orthodox faith does not admit, and which we have fully rejected in (*Tract. on Angels, disputation I*).

Article VI: On Quantity

Quantity is used in two senses. First, for quantity of power or perfection — in which sense, from Augustine (*6 De Trinitate, c. 7*), Scotus (*in 1 Sent., d. 17, q. 3, §*.

Supposito caritatem, sub FT; d. 19, q. 1, §. De 2, B; Quodl. 6, §. Ad primum principale, sub MM), Bonet (*little book on quantity, at the beginning*), and Orbellus (*4 Met., q. 2*) write: "In things that are not great in bulk, to be greater is to be better." Thus God is called "great" in Sacred Scripture, especially (*Psalms 16*); and (*Luke 1*) is read of Christ: "He shall be great before the Lord." Second, for quantity of bulk — which is adapted only to corporeal things, and it is of quantity so taken that the Philosophers speak in the present context. The common description of quantity pleases me — namely that quantity is being extended through itself, or the position of part outside part (*as the Doctor affirms in 4 Sent., d. 10, q. 1, art. 2*) — as the surface of a wall.

Quantity, from Aristotle (*c. 6 of the book of the Categories*) and Scotus (*ibid., q. 16*), is divided into continuous — whose parts are joined by a common boundary — and discrete — whose parts are not joined by a common boundary: as if there were two pairs, nothing common is found between them by which they could be joined to one another. Continuous is subdivided into permanent and successive. Permanent is what has its parts existing simultaneously — as a table. Successive is what has parts that continuously flow — as an hour. Three species of permanent quantity are: line, surface, and body. A line is a magnitude long only, whose parts are joined by a point. A surface is a magnitude long and wide without depth, whose parts are joined by lines. A body (as taken here) is a three-dimensional extension, or a magnitude long, wide, and deep, whose parts are joined by surfaces. Successive quantity has two species — motion and time. Motion is the act of being in potency insofar as it is in potency. Time, on the other hand, is the measure of motion according to before and after — on which see the *Physics* for an abundant treatment. Discrete quantity likewise contains two species — number and speech. Number is a multitude of units; and speech is a discrete quantity consisting in the long or short pronunciation of syllables — as "Francis is disputing."

Three properties of quantity are enumerated by Aristotle (*in the same chapter*) and Scotus (*ibid., q. 24*). The first: nothing is contrary to quantity (understand, in the sense of proper contrariety) — for one line is not properly opposed to another line. The second: quantity does not admit of more and less — for one bicubital thing is not more a bicubital thing than another, although one can be greater or more extensive than another. The third: in terms of quantity, things are said to be equal or unequal. Those are called equal whose quantity is one and the same; and those are unequal whose quantity is different. And this is said to be its property in the fourth mode. Other properties of quantity may be added — namely divisibility, finitude, infinity, and measurability — on which a more proper discussion will be held elsewhere.

One objects, first: great and small, much and little, above and below are contraries among themselves — and they are quantities. Therefore one quantity is contrary to another quantity — and so something is contrary to quantity.

Aristotle (*cited*) and Scotus (*q. 24 of the Categories*, §. *Ad quaestionem dicendum, in the solution of the fifth*) reply that those things of which we have been speaking above in relation to the first property are not properly contraries but are relatives: for "mountain" is called great by comparison with a small mountain, and so of the rest — as the aforesaid authors sufficiently explain, and Titelmanus elegantly (*l. 2, c. 30*).

One objects, secondly: quality admits of more and less, as Aristotle transmits (*c. de qualitate*). Therefore the same is to be affirmed of quantity. The consequence is proved: just as quality — for example heat — is said to be greater or less, so a fortiori quantity — for example a table — will be said to be greater or less; and so it should not be denied that quantity admits of more and less. One replies: the antecedent being conceded, the consequence is to be denied. For its proof, I say that one quantity is indeed greater or less than another quantity, yet it is not more or less a quantity. The reason is that, as Aristotle writes (*8 Met.; and 1 De Generatione*), more and less presuppose the intensification or remission of the same form in the same subject — which Scotus proves at length and effectively (*in 1 Sent., d. 17, q. 3*). Greater and less, on the other hand, designate the extension or restriction of the same form in the same subject — for it is valid to say "this man is greater than another man," but not "this man is more of a man than another man" — which will be clearly established in our questions on the universals. For now it only remains to adduce and clearly set out the catalogue of this predicament — which Major (*in the present*) and more clearly Gadius of Bologna (*Quodl. 7, fol. 70, col. 3*) set out.

Article VII: On Quality

Aristotle (*1 Categories, c. 8*) describes quality in this way: "quality is that according to which certain things are said to be of a certain kind." More clearly, according to the principal Scotists: quality is an absolute accident determining or qualifying the subject in which it is, according to which it is denominated as of a certain kind — as whiteness is a quality according to which a wall is denominated white. For if one asks what kind of thing the wall is, the correct reply is: "it is white." Hence (*Matthew 8*), when the sailors asked about Christ the Lord: "what kind of man is this, for the winds and the sea obey him?" — the reply is: "this is the Prophet from Nazareth."

Quality is divided into four modes or species, each of which is called by two names. The first is habit and disposition. Habit is an adventitious quality difficult to remove — as one who is skilled in Logic and has long been exercised in it has the habit of Logic. Disposition is an adventitious quality easy to remove — as if someone has a knowledge of some part of Logic quickly acquired, he is said to have a disposition toward acquiring Logic, since he can lose that knowledge easily. The Doctor makes mention of this (*4 Sent., d. 6, q. 10, O*). The second is natural potency and impotency. Natural potency, according to Scotus, is a natural facility for acting — as the Philosopher exemplifies with runners and

boxers. Natural impotency is a difficulty or weakness in acting — as a natural difficulty in seeing or hearing that someone has from birth. Scotus touches upon this (*2 Sent., d. 16, q. un., §. Ad primum, P*). The third is passion and passible quality. Passion in this context is a quality of short duration that moves the sense, or arising from the movement of sense — as the redness of a face arising from shame. Passible quality is a lasting quality that moves the sense or arises from the movement of sense — as a lasting pallor of face arising from an interior and long-lasting illness. This is remembered by Scotus (*q. 36 of the Categories, §. Ad quaestionem*). The fourth is form and figure. Form — as the Doctor notes (*q. 36 of the Categories, §. Ad dicendum*) — is a quality arising from the natural delineation of a body, following upon determinate quantity — in which sense small men are said to be well-formed but not beautiful. Figure is a quality following upon quantity taken precisely — as the figure of a triangle or quadrangle. From which some affirm that form is to be considered in natural things and figure in mathematics. But Scotus describes figure differently (*in 4 Sent., d. 10, q. 1*) — as we shall investigate in our questions, where we shall examine more exactly and subtly what figure is.

Three properties of quality are enumerated: the first is to have a contrary — for one quality is opposed to another — as heat to cold, dryness to humidity. The second is to admit of more and less — for quality is intensified and remitted, by reason of which one white thing is said to be more or less white than another white thing. The third is that in terms of quality things are said to be similar or dissimilar: those things are similar whose quality is the same, and dissimilar those whose quality is different — as two white walls are called similar on account of the whiteness they share, and dissimilar to a black wall on account of the blackness they do not both possess. And this last affection belongs to quality in the fourth mode.

One objects, first: Aristotle (*cited above*) makes habit and disposition the same species of quality — and shortly after he holds that disposition is the genus of habit. Therefore either what was said above is false, or Aristotle is not consistent with himself. One replies that disposition is taken in two ways: in one way generically — as a quality easy or difficult to remove from the subject in which it inheres, and in this way Aristotle takes it when he says that disposition is the genus; in the other way specifically — as a quality easy to remove, and in this way disposition and habit are one species of quality.

One objects, secondly: the same Philosopher adds that it is proper to quality for things to be said similar or dissimilar on account of it — yet (*2 and 4 Met.*) he establishes similarity and dissimilarity as the primary differences of being. Therefore the foregoing property does not belong to quality alone. One replies that I have diligently and fully read and re-read the books of the Philosopher cited by Peter Gassendi (*l. 1, exercitation eighth*) and have by no means found what Gassendi adduces — and so he falsely attributes that and much else to him,

so that the common master may be deserted and new or obsolete doctrine introduced: which he has not yet achieved, and indeed has been compelled for good reasons to desist from his undertaking. Or one may say that the Philosopher in those passages took similarity and dissimilarity in the broadest sense — just as he sometimes took quality for substantial and essential difference, as I noted elsewhere together with Scotus.

Article VIII: On Relation

Relation, from the Doctor (*q. 25 of the Categories*, §. *Dicendum*; and *ibid.*, §. *Ad 3*), is the bearing of one thing toward another — or the reason for relating and the respect by which a relative is referred to another. A relative is what is referred to another. Correlatives are those that mutually regard one another. Relatives are defined by Aristotle (*in the present chapter*) and Scotus (*in 2 Sent.*, *d. 1, q. 4*, §. *Contra, sub B*): "those whose entire being is to be referred to another."

For a relation, from the same Doctor (*in 1 Sent.*, *d. 31, q. 1*, §. *Ad quaestionem, A*; and *Quodl. 6*), three things are required: first, the foundation and the term must be real; between the foundation and the term there must be a real distinction; and third, from the nature of the extremes, without any intellect conceiving, a relation must necessarily arise.

Many divisions of relations and relatives are adduced throughout by Philosophers and Theologians. The principal ones are as follows. The first is into real relation — which has being on the side of the thing, as paternity — and relation of reason — which depends in its being and coming-to-be upon the work of the intellect, as the relation of genus. This division is intimated by the Doctor (*in 1 Sent.*, *d. 30, q. 2*; and *in the Reportata of 2 Sent.*, *d. 1, q. 7*). The second, from (*2 Sent.*, *d. 1, q. 5*, §. *Ad primum alterius opinionis, F*), is into transcendental relation — which has no seat in any predicament, as the relation of substance and accident belonging to them before they are divided into their modes — and predicamental relation — which is located in some category, as filiation. The third, from Aristotle (*c. de ad Aliquid*) and others, among whom is Orbellus (*5 Met.*), is into relatives according to being — which essentially include a respect toward another, as double and half — and relatives according to being said — which together with an adjoined relation import something absolute, as science and the knowable. This division does not appear to be received by Scotus (*q. 26 of the Categories*, §. *Dicitur ad q.*). He, however, adds another (*q. 36 of the Universals*; and also *q. 27, 28 of the Categories*) — into relatives per se and per accidens; and he appears to perceive the former (*Quodl. 13*), as elsewhere. The fourth, from the same (*q. 27 cited*, §. *Dicendum*), is into mutual relatives — which are referred to one another by a real relation, as Father and Son — and non-mutual relatives — of which one regards another by a real relation but not conversely, as God and creature, science and the knowable. The fifth, from (*1 Sent.*, *d. 30, q. 2*, §. *Contra 1, at the end, E*), is into relations of equiparation — which are of the same name and character, as all relations of similarity — and relations of disparation — which

are of a different name and character, as all relations of dissimilarity. The sixth, from (2 *Sent.*, d. 1, q. 5), is into relations of superposition — which are relations of greater dignity, as the relation of teacher — and relations of subposition — which are of lesser dignity, as the relation of disciple. The seventh, from (1 *Sent.*, d. 19, q. 2, §. *Ad argumenta*; and 4 *Sent.*, d. 13, q. 1, §. *Ad huius autem, D*), is into intrinsically supervening relations — which necessarily arise once the extremes are posited, as once the Father and Son are posited the relations of paternity and filiation necessarily arise — and extrinsically supervening relations — which do not arise from the positing of extremes alone unless some condition is added, as once Peter and the street are posited, the relation of Peter's presence to the street does not arise unless Peter is placed in the street.

Three properties of relatives are especially enumerated by Aristotle (*ibid.*) and Scotus (q. 17 of the *Categories*). The first is to be said in conversion — as the Father is the Father of the Son, and the Son is the Son of the Father. The second is to be simultaneous by nature — for once one of the relatives is posited, the other is simultaneously posited; and once one is removed, the other is also removed: as once the Father is posited, the Son is posited; and the Father being removed, the Son is removed — for they mutually destroy one another. The third is to be simultaneously known — for once one relative is determinately known, the other is also known: as if someone knows that Plato was the teacher of Aristotle, he also knows that Aristotle was the disciple of Plato.

One objects, first: Aristotle in this chapter makes relation a highest genus; and in the post-predicaments he places relation among the species of opposition. But nothing can be both a highest genus and a species of another genus. Therefore, etc. One replies that opposition is not properly a genus: for some opposition is real and some is of reason; and of real being and being of reason there is nothing univocal in common that could be a genus, from Scotus (1 *Sent.*, d. 29, q. un.). For this reason Aristotle rightly establishes opposition among the post-predicaments.

One objects, secondly: among relatives, the knowable and knowledge are improperly conjoined, since the former signifies potency and the latter act. It would be better to say "the known" and "knowledge" than "the knowable" and "knowledge." The antecedent is to be denied — because the knowable and knowledge are non-mutual relatives; therefore it is not necessary to posit knowledge and the known, but "knowledge" and "the knowable" are rightly said.

Article IX: On Action and Passion

I do not recount the multiple acceptations of action and passion, because they are difficult to grasp, and also because they will be more conveniently explained elsewhere. And so here I treat only of action and passion insofar as they constitute these two predicaments. Action is described by Gilbert of Poitiers (*l. Sex principiorum*, c. 2) as that according to which we are said to act upon what is

subjected. And in accordance with this definition of action, passion can be defined as that according to which we are said to be acted upon in what is subjected — as one cutting wood is said to act upon the wood, and the wood itself, insofar as it is being cut, is said to be acted upon. Hence the cutting, insofar as it is from the one cutting, is called action — according to which the agent is denominated as cutting; but insofar as it is in the cut wood, it is called passion — according to which the wood is denominated as cut. Thus under the one name of "cutting," the said action and passion are signified; yet for the sake of distinction we can use the expressions "active cutting" and "passive cutting" — just as we use the names of "active heating" and "passive heating."

Not unlike these are the definitions of action and passion given by Aristotle (*3 Physics, c. 3*): "action is the act of the agent as agent"; and "passion is the act of the patient as patient." And more clearly by Scotus (*in 4 Sent., d. 13, q. 1, §. Ad huius autem difficultatis intellectum, sub H*): "action is a respect extrinsically supervening upon the transmuting toward the transmuted"; and "passion is a respect extrinsically supervening upon the transmuted toward the transmuting." I confess that these matters require a long examination and diligent inquiry to be held elsewhere. For now I only recount two properties of each adduced by Aristotle. One is to have contraries — as heating is opposed to cooling. The other is to admit of more and less — which is to be understood not of the abstracts but of the concrete terms of action and passion: for one agent is said to act more than another, just as one patient is said to be acted upon more than another — as a greater fire heats more than a lesser fire; and wood placed closer to a more ardent fire is more burned and consumed than wood placed near a less ardent fire. Since, moreover, action and passion mutually imply one another and appear to be really the same (*3 Physics, Text 21*), I therefore set out the series of action, which with changed words can be adapted to passion.

Article X. On *Ubi* (Whereness)

Ubi is described by Gilbert in the booklet cited above as the circumscription of a located body arising from the circumscription of its place. The Doctor hints at this description at (*4.d.10.q.1. §. Dico ergo, sub O.*), where he says that *ubi* is the relation of a circumscribed whole to its circumscribing whole. It is divided into active *ubi* and passive *ubi*: for from the application of a place to the body located there arises an extrinsically accruing relation called active *ubi*, and from the application of the located body to the place there arises an extrinsically accruing relation called passive *ubi*. Gilbert, in the cited work at chapter 5, defines only the passive *ubi*, yet what is needed is an account of what is common to both, together with a description of it, as Scotus indicates (*4.d.10.q.1.K.; Quol. 11, sub C.*). *Ubi* may be described as the presence or containment of a thing in a place — as in "to be in the heavens" — and it can be divided into definitive *ubi*, by which something is here in such a way that it is not elsewhere (an angel, for example, is in the heavens in such a way that it cannot simultaneously be on earth), and

circumscriptive *ubi*, by which something — say, a body — is commensurate with and adequately fitted to its place. Furthermore, circumscriptive *ubi* is subdivided into active and passive *ubi*, which were described at the beginning of this article and are to be treated at length in Physics. Two properties of *ubi* are enumerated: the first is that it has no contraries, for nothing is opposed to *ubi* as such; the second is that it does not admit of more and less — that is, it cannot be intensified or diminished — for although one instance of *ubi* may be more extensive than another, it is not thereby more or less intense.

Objection. The description of *ubi* given above applies only to *ubi* taken as local presence; yet a body can have a true *ubi* without local presence; therefore, etc.

Reply. The major premiss is granted; the minor is denied, since it is not proved by Ruuio, who raises this objection. For nothing is anywhere unless it has local presence, as is clearly demonstrated by the description of *ubi* given above.

Article XI. On Situs (Position)

Gilbert at chapter 6 affirms that *situs* is the same as — and this brings us back to — the definition of *situs* given by Scotus at (4.d.10.q.1.§. *Dico ergo, sub M.*), namely, the co-extension of the parts of a body to the parts of its place. Aristotle likewise states (1.Met., c.19.): "Position is the disposition of parts in a place, as standing or sitting." This is explained in the same way as the description of the preceding category. For from the application of the place to the parts of the body existing within it there arises an extrinsically accruing relation called passive position. The properties of *situs* are the same in number as those of the category of *ubi*, namely, having no contraries and not admitting of more and less — with the addition that it directly attends substance.

Article XII. On Quando (Whenness)

Quando is the adjacency of time remaining in a temporal thing, or the containment of a thing in time — as in "to have been once," "to be now," or "to be in the future." Thus it is found in *Tobias 12*: "When you were praying with tears"; and in *Matthew 24*: "Tell us when these things shall be." The description given above is explained in much the same way as the descriptions of the two preceding categories were explained. For from the application of time to the temporal thing measured by it there arises an extrinsically accruing relation called active *quando*; and from the application of the temporal thing measured to the measuring time there arises an extrinsically accruing relation called passive *quando*. The properties of this category are three: first, it has no contrary; second, it does not admit of more and less; third, it belongs to those things that endure through time.

Objection. *Quando* does not appear to have several genera and subaltern species under it — which is also said of *ubi*. Therefore *quando* does not appear to be one of the supreme genera.

Reply. Scotus answers (1.d.8.q.3.§. *Teneo opinionem meam, O.*): it is not of the nature of a supreme genus to have several subaltern species beneath it, but rather to have no further genus above it. Moreover, certain subaltern genera can in fact be assigned to this category as well, as appears in the synopsis below.

Article XIII. On Habitus (Vestiture)

Habitus, according to the author cited at chapter 7, is the adjacency of garments and such things as are about the body. Scotus agrees (q.36, *predicamentali*, §. *Ad 2.q.*), or, as others prefer, *habitus* is the application of a garment or ornament to the body. Thus *James 3*: "A poor man in filthy clothing"; and *1 Timothy 2*: "Women in seemly attire." For from the application of a garment to the body there arises an extrinsically accruing relation called active *habitus*; and from the application of the body to the garment there proceeds an extrinsically accruing relation called passive *habitus*. Moreover, there can and ought to be assigned a common and supreme account of this category, which is possession abstracting from active and passive — and this must likewise be done for the three immediately preceding categories, as the Doctor notes (4.d.10.q.1.K.). Thus the union of a subject to any form whatsoever belongs to this category, as John of Bassolis teaches above others (4.d.12.q.1.art.1.), and Gilbert in the cited work is in agreement, placing in this category the being-quantified and the being-white — that is, the relation of the subject to quantity and whiteness — as our younger contemporaries note in the present context. The reason can be given that such a respect is in some manner left behind from the adjacency and adherence of a form to its subject. The properties of this category are three: first, it has no contrary; second, it admits of more and less; third, it always exists in more than one thing — that is, in both the possessor and the thing possessed.

Objection. Aristotle (5.*Met.*, c.20.) says that *habitus* is a medium between the possessor and the thing possessed, just as action mediates between agent and patient; but action is something absolute, residing in the category of quality; therefore *habitus* is as well.

Reply. The major premiss is granted; the minor is denied, as is clear from what was said above in Article IX.

Article XIV. On the Post-predicaments

The post-predicaments are five, as the Doctor writes after Aristotle (q.37 and 38, *predicamentali*), namely: opposites, modes of prior, modes of simultaneous, the six species of motion, and the modes of having.

Opposites are those things that involve mutual repugnance. They are found in a fourfold distinction: contradictories, contraries, privatives, and relatives. Contradictories are those of which one negates the other, one being positive and the other negative — as *being* and *non-being*, *man* and *non-man*. They are immediate, as the Doctor states (2.d.2.q.2.§. *Ostenso proposito, sub Y.*; and q.7.§. *Ad*

1.q.dico.CC.). For this same reason the Doctor (q.25, *predicamentali*), following Aristotle (1.Post., Tex.5.), defined contradiction as an opposition that has no medium in itself. Contradictories are further divided by the same authority (1.d.4.q.1.Ad 5, *sub D.*) into incomplex — of which we now speak — and complex — of which we shall speak in the following book.

Contraries are those that are maximally distant under the same genus and mutually expel one another from the same subject — as heat and cold. They are subdivided into immediate contraries, between which no medium falls — as even and odd — and mediate contraries, between which a medium intervenes — as between whiteness and blackness, where redness is the medium.

Privatives are those of which one is positive and the other signifies the absence of the first in a subject capable of receiving it; these are called a habit or form and its privation — as light and darkness, sight and blindness — and such opposites are immediate, according to Scotus (1.d.17.q.2.§. *Contra istam conclusionem, infra DD.*). Relatives are those that mutually regard one another, of which Scotus treats (q.39, *predicamentali*) and of which we spoke above in Article VIII.

Aristotle sets out five modes of prior, and Scotus adds a sixth (1.d.5.q.2; *Quol. 12, q.2; 2.d.1.q.1*; and elsewhere). First, something is said to be prior to another in time or duration — such as those things that are generated earlier: Adam, for instance, was prior to Noah in time. Second, prior in nature: that which does not convert the consequence of subsistence — that is, what is pre-required and presupposed for the being of another. Thus one is prior in nature to two: "there are two" follows from "there is one," but not conversely. For this reason Scotus (2.d.3.q.4.§. *Contra istam conclusionem, D.*), following Aristotle (5.Met., c. *de Priori, Tex.16.*), adds that what is prior in nature can, without contradiction, exist without what is posterior to it. For the several modes in which something is said to be prior in nature, see the Doctor (2.d.1.q.1.§. *Respondeo.A.*; q.3.§. *Tenentes autem ante H.*), and Mastrius and Bellutus (*disp.9.q.2.Art.1.*). Third, prior in dignity or perfection — as gold is prior to the other metals because it is nobler than they are. The Philosopher accordingly adds (10.Met., Tex.22.) that in every genus there is one thing that is the measure and standard of the rest. Fourth, prior in order — which belongs to those things that precede others according to the disposition of things: thus letters precede syllables, and syllables precede words. Fifth, prior in causality — in which sense that which is the cause of another is said to be prior to it in this way: as the sun is prior to illumination, and fire to heating. These five modes of prior are contained in this verse:

In time, in nature, prior in order, and in honor we say; we say a cause is prior to its effect.

The sixth mode of prior, which the Subtle Doctor introduced into his school — as appears from (1.d.5.q.2; *Quol.12.q.2; 2.d.1.q.1*; and elsewhere) — is priority of origin: that from which something originates or is produced. Thus in the

Trinity, the Father is prior in origin to the Son, and the Son is prior in origin to the Holy Spirit.

Although there are as many modes of simultaneous as there are modes of prior, as the philosophical commentators note here — Aristotle nevertheless adduces only three modes of simultaneous, perhaps because the others can be easily understood, as Scotus observes (*q.43, predicamentali*). These are simultaneous in time, in nature, and by division. Those things are simultaneous in time that are born at the same time, as Esau and Jacob. And Christ and John were contemporaries, as Augustine notes (*62 de consensu Evang., c.6.*). Simultaneous in nature are those things said to be convertible — as correlatives. Simultaneous by division are those things that immediately divide the same genus and participate in it equally — as man and brute, which immediately divide animal and receive its account in equal measure. The modes of simultaneous listed above are contained in the following four verses:

I say those are simultaneous in time whose generation is now. Those that convert with one another we say are simultaneous. And those species are simultaneous that distribute a single genus. But not by reason of the genus itself.

The species of motion, which are reckoned at six, are: generation, corruption, augmentation, diminution, alteration, and local change. Generation is a substantial change from substantial non-being to substantial being — as when a man is generated, there is a passage from not-being a man to being a man. Corruption is a substantial change from substantial being to substantial non-being — as when a man dies, he passes from being a man to not-being a man. Augmentation is the increase of pre-existing quantity — as when water is added to water, the water itself is said to be augmented. Diminution is the decrease of pre-existing quantity — as if water is taken from water, the water itself is said to diminish. Alteration is the change of one contrary quality into its contrary — as from cold into heat — or of a medium quality into an extreme, as from redness into blackness, or of one medium into another, as from green into red. Local change is the transition from one place to another — as when Peter, departing from Aix, makes for Rome, he is said to change locally.

Having is contained under eight modes, which Scotus mentions (*q.36, predicamentali, §. Ad 2.q.*). The first is to have a quantity — as to have a body two cubits long. The second is to have a quality — as to have learning. The third is to have something around the body — as to have a tunic. The fourth is to have something on a part of the body — as to have a crown on the head. The fifth is to have a part of the body — as to have a hand. The sixth is to have something contained in a container — as to have money in a purse. The seventh is to have something for the purpose of possessing it — as to have a field. The eighth is to have something for the purpose of cohabitation — as to have a wife.

First Objection. *Man* and *non-man* are contradictories; yet there is some medium between man and non-man. Therefore a medium is given between contradictories. The major is evident. The minor is proved: insofar as he is a man, a man is not white; nor, insofar as he is not-a-man, is not-a-man white.

Reply. The major is granted; the minor must be denied. In reply to its proof — apart from the fact that it involves a passage from incomplex to complex contradictories — I say that a medium is found between contradictories when the reduplicative particle *insofar as* is used, as Scotus notes (*1.d.5.q.1. §. Ad argumenta Logica, sub L.*).

Second Objection. There are as many modes of posterior as there are modes of prior, since they mutually regard one another; and one of a pair of opposites is spoken of in as many ways as the other. Yet Aristotle does not enumerate the modes of posterior. Likewise, there should be as many modes of simultaneous as there are modes of prior and posterior together, for the same reason — which Aristotle does not provide.

Reply. The modes of posterior are easily gathered from the modes of prior; hence Aristotle does not expressly enumerate them, though there are indeed as many modes of posterior as of prior, as is correctly inferred in the argument. Nor did Aristotle wish to set out all the modes of simultaneous — partly for the reason drawn from Scotus above, partly because he wished to enumerate only those that required some explanation, and partly because the others can be reduced to those three.

Book II. On Complex Terms

A well-ordered method requires that, having examined the incomplex terms in the first book of this work, we examine in the second book the complex terms, which are propositions. The reason for this is that, once knowledge of simple things has been acquired, we must seek — in the order of nature — knowledge of composites, such as the proposition, which is constructed from incomplex terms. This book comprises seven questions. The first concerns the parts of the complex term; the second, its essence and division; the third, the matter, form, quantity, and quality of the proposition; the fourth, the opposition, equipollence, and conversion of simple propositions; the fifth, the modal proposition; the sixth, the exponible proposition; and the seventh, division and definition.

Question I. On the Parts of the Complex Term

It is the unanimous view — which Scotus indicates (*q.1 of the first Perihermeneias, Ad 3.*) — that every complex term or proposition is composed of a noun and a verb. Therefore, in my treatment of the proposition, I begin with the noun and

verb, mindful of the precept stated at the beginning of the preceding book regarding the order of nature — namely, that parts are to be treated before the whole constructed from them.

Article I. On the Noun

The grammarian and the dialectician define the noun differently. The grammarian says that a noun is a part of speech in the mode of a being and of a determinate apprehension, as may be seen in the *Grammatica Speculativa*, chapter 7. The dialectician says that a noun is a conventionally significative utterance, without tense, no separate part of which signifies anything, finite and in the nominative case — as Aristotle shows (*1.Periherm., c.2.*) and Scotus confirms (*ibid., q.4, in fine.*). The parts of this description are now explained. It is called an utterance — that is, an articulate sound — for although every utterance is a sound, not every sound is an utterance, as the crash of two bodies or the sound of footsteps. Significative excludes utterances that signify nothing, such as *bus*. Conventionally excludes natural utterances, such as weeping. For nouns are imposed by convention, as the Doctor notes (*3.d.26.q.un.§. Ad proprium principale.M.*), and as Augustine observes concerning human languages (*1.qq.in Matt., q.17.*). Without tense distinguishes the noun from the verb, which co-signifies time — that is, it designates some difference of past, present, or future time — as Scotus indicates (*q.d.12.q.1.§. Iuxta quaestionem istam; and q. Priorum, q.19.§. Tertio.*). No separate part of which signifies anything distinguishes it from the sentence, whose separate parts do signify — as in "the tree is green." Finite means that it is not preceded by negation, as in "lion." In the nominative case excludes oblique cases, such as "of a man" — because oblique cases do not by themselves generate a complete enunciation: "of a man is" and "to a man is" are not complete, whereas "a man is" is. Some recent authors, notably Hurtado (*in Summis, disp.3.sect.1.*) and Arriaga (*ibid., Disp.2.sect.1.*), wish to depart from the description of the noun given above and consequently from Aristotle.

First Objection. It is not correctly said that no separate part of it signifies, for while this may apply to simple nouns, it does not apply to compound nouns, whose separate parts are significative — as is evident in the nouns *senatus consultum*, *res publica*, and *pro legatus*.

Reply. The parts of a compound noun, even if they retain some signification, do not retain the signification they have within the compound. The recent authors named press the point, saying that the parts of a compound noun have their own quasi-heterogeneous significations from which the whole signification of the noun is composed, a signification that does not differ from that of each part taken separately. This objection must be answered: the instance is demonstrably false in some compound nouns. The word *dominus* is composed of *do* and *minus*; but *do* separately is a verb and *minus* an adverb or comparative adjective, and no one fails to see that, separated thus, they have significations quite different from the signification they have when joined together. Moreover, the parts of a

compound word appear to function like letters and syllables, which, detached from the word, signify nothing — as if one were to separate the parts of *homo* into *ho* and *mo*: these syllables so separated either signify nothing at all, or if they signify something, it is alien to the signification they retain when joined. Furthermore, the formal character of a noun, as a significative utterance, is its signification, as stated in the *Grammatica Speculativa*, chapter 5; but the signification of a compound noun is one, because the thing signified by it is one. Therefore the parts, detached from it, do not preserve their own proper significations. For just as, when the union of a whole is removed, the whole and the mutual relation of the parts to it are also removed — as is universally conceded — so likewise when the union of the parts of a compound noun from the noun itself is removed, their significations in relation to the whole cease. For it is impossible that a relation should persist once its foundation and term are removed. Therefore, once the parts are separated from one another, the relation of union and the ordering of the parts to the whole must necessarily perish, and with it the signification those parts possessed when they were joined to the said noun. Again, if a compound noun is divided, either two simple nouns will result, as *res* and *publica*, or one noun and one preposition, as *pro* and *consul*; and to each noun thus divided there correspond in us two concepts, as is clear from what has been said. But it has now been established that through a compound noun only one concept is produced in us, corresponding to one signification.

Second Objection. Against another clause of the definition of the noun, namely *finite*: an infinite noun signifies something and is declined through cases; therefore it ought not to be excluded from the account of a noun. The antecedent is proved: *non homo* is an infinite noun signifying determinately everything that is not a man. This is confirmed first: *being* is predicated of more things than *non-man*, yet *being* is not excluded from the class of nouns. It is confirmed second: just as a finite utterance signifies something finite, so an infinite utterance denotes something infinite; therefore the account of a noun abstracts from finite and infinite, and should not be restricted to being finite alone.

Reply. *Non homo* and similar terms, which Aristotle does not call nouns absolutely but nouns with an addition — that is, infinite nouns — do not supply us with a determinate signification of any thing: they are applied both to things that exist and to things that do not exist. But dialectic uses the noun so that, together with the verb, it forms a definite and absolute proposition. Therefore, since an infinite noun presents us with no determinate signification of any real or fictitious being, it follows that it is to be banished from the account of the logical noun, even though it is declined through cases and designates something indeterminately. This is wonderfully confirmed by the grammatical definition of the noun adduced at the beginning of this article, in which the noun is said to signify something in the mode of a being and of a determinate apprehension: an infinite utterance, however, signifies in the mode of a non-being and of an

indeterminate apprehension, and is accordingly rightly removed from the class of the logical noun. To the first confirmation I say that *being* is of a determinate apprehension and is therefore rightly placed among nouns. To the second confirmation I say that in logic an infinite noun is taken negatively, whereas in the argument it is taken positively, insofar as it denotes an infinitely perfect being; and so the instance cited carries no force.

Third Objection. Oblique cases are properly nouns, since they signify together with one verb in the nominative and with another in the genitive or another case — as when one says "it repents me of my sin," which is the same as "I perform penance for my sin." Therefore, since only the phrasing differs and not the signification, oblique cases should not be removed from the number of nouns.

Reply. The Philosopher does not include oblique cases among nouns, because they cannot together with a verb produce a complete enunciation, as I stated just before the first objection. Moreover, the nominative is the mode of signifying as a what — as a subject — as is clear in the *Grammatica Speculativa* at the place cited; whereas oblique cases are modes of signifying a thing as *of which* — as in the genitive — or as *to which* — as in the dative. Logic investigates what is a *what* — that is, the truth of an enunciation, which is seen most clearly in the nominative: "a man is rational," "an animal is sensitive." Although, by changing the words while retaining the same signification of the thing, an oblique case can be made into a nominative — as is shown in the argument — this nevertheless belongs to grammar, not to dialectic. For the end of grammar is the integrity of speech, whereas the end of dialectic is the truth of the syllogism, which is perfectly expressed in the nominative.

Fourth Objection. From Nebrija and other grammarians: a noun is an utterance declined through cases, because nearly every noun is inflected through cases. Therefore this definition of the noun, and not that of Aristotle, is to be approved.

Reply. Even if the said definition of the noun is accepted by grammarians, it does not follow that it should be accepted by dialecticians. For grammar and dialectic make use of utterances in different ways, as Zabarella correctly notes (1. *de natura Logica*, c.10.): grammar employs utterances insofar as they are parts of discourse, whereas dialectic employs them insofar as they are signs of what lies within the soul — that is, for manifesting our concepts — from which enunciations and syllogisms are constructed, through which truth is made known and falsity is driven out, as Scotus indicates (1. *Priorum*, q.19.). Again, the grammatical concept is different — as *homo*, *hominis* — from the logical concept — as *homo*, *humanitas* — from Scotus (1. *d.2.q.7.¶. Sed hic restat, sub FF.*), Brulifer (in *Epitome Formalitatum*, fol.57, pag.2.), and Sirrectus (fol.26, pag.1.). Furthermore, pronouns and participles are utterances declined through cases, yet in the view of grammarians they are not nouns — for grammarians enumerate eight parts

of speech, among which these are placed as distinct from nouns. Add that a non-significative utterance can be declined through cases, and everyone, including the authors cited, admits that it is not properly a noun. Nor does it seem improbable that some nouns are indeclinable — as *cachoëtes* — and it seems that one must add: signifying some thing, as is found in the *Rudiments of Grammar*. Finally, declension is not the quiddity of the noun but seems to be accidental to it, as the grammarians themselves concede when they say that seven things are accidental to the noun, among which declension and case are enumerated.

Article II. On the Verb

A verb is a conventionally significative utterance, with tense, no separate part of which signifies anything, finite and in the indicative mood; and it is the mark of those things predicated of another. This definition of the verb coincides with the definition of the noun explained in the preceding article except in two respects. The first is that it co-signifies time; the second is that it is the mark of those things predicated of another. Regarding the first: the mode of signifying of the verb is to co-signify time, as the Doctor states (*1.d.12.q.1. §. Iuxta quaestionem*; and *3.d.25.q.1. §. Ultimo sub H.*; or an instant of time, as the same Doctor notes (*4.d.8.q.2. §. Aliter ergo, sub M. and S.*). To co-signify time means nothing other than to signify some difference of time — either past, present, or future. For although some noun signifies time — as *day* — and some noun signifies a thing as coming to be in a certain temporal difference — as *lunch* around midday — nevertheless the word *lunch* signifies the act of dining, or the refreshment of the body, as occurring around midday, yet it designates no difference of past, present, or future time, as does the verb *I lunch*, which denotes the present time of dining. For this reason it is rightly said that a noun signifies without time and a verb with time. Regarding the second — that the verb is the mark of those things predicated of another — this is aptly explained as follows: the verb is the copula or union of subject with predicate; it joins one extreme of a proposition to the other, whether the verb stands for itself — as in "dispute is a verb" — or for its significate — as in "a man is rational." Or, with John of Magistris (*q.3, scibili 3.*), say that the verb is the mark — that is, the sign — of the union of predicate with subject. Scotus indicates this (*6.Met., q.3. §. Sed quid.*). Dialectic makes use chiefly of only one verb — *sum*, which is called the substantive verb, perhaps so named because it underlies every predicate, so that it is understood in adjectival verbs as well — as "Peter disputes" is the same as "Peter is disputing." At times it is used adjectivally, as "he who walks is" — meaning, exists. Those who resist Aristotle's definition of the noun above equally resist the description of the verb here.

First Objection. The parts of a compound verb, taken separately, signify something — as is evident in the verb *circumeo*, which is composed of the adverb *circum* and the verb *eo*. Therefore the given description of the verb is not legitimate.

Reply. This instance is easily dissolved from what was said in the parallel case of the compound noun. For if the parts of a compound verb are disjoined from one another, they do not retain the same signification they had when joined together — as is conspicuous in some compound verbs, such as *circumdo*, whose parts are *circum* and *do*, and which manifestly do not retain the signification they had when previously joined once they are separated. This was pursued at length in the treatment of the noun, and it is equally applicable to the verb.

Second Objection. From infinite verbs, and likewise from verbs of past and future tense, propositions are constructed — for this is true: "Alexander heard Aristotle," and this: "Antichrist will be born." Moreover, some nouns lack the present tense, as *memini* (I remember). Therefore it is not necessary for the verb to be in the present tense of the indicative mood.

Reply. Infinite, oblique, and tense-deficient verbs belong to grammar; only the verb in the present tense of the indicative mood is proper to dialectic, as Peter of Spain teaches (*Tractatus de Enunciatione*, c.4.), along with other summulists. The authors cited adduce the grammatical description of the verb — namely, that a verb is an utterance conjugated through tenses — and attempt to import it into dialectic; but improperly, since these are essentially distinct faculties with distinct ends. For dialectic treats the verb and noun in order that from them the truth or falsity of an enunciation may be made manifest, and these properties of an enunciation depend on the present tense of the verb and the nominative case of the noun. Thus "Christ was born" is true, because at some time it was true to say "Christ is being born"; and "Antichrist will not be born" is false, because at some time it will be false to say "Antichrist is not being born." Add that even grammatically the said definition does not appear to be the genuine definition of the verb, because conjugation is accidental to the verb just as declension is to the noun, and nothing is properly defined through its accidental act but rather through its essence, as is universally conceded among philosophers. Hence the grammatical definition of the verb given by the author of the *Grammatica Speculativa*, chapter 10, is more apt: a verb is a part of speech signifying in the mode of being as distant from substance.

Question II. On the Essence of the Complex Term

Having explained the parts of the complex term, its entire essence is now to be examined, following the order we proposed above and which the Subtle Doctor indicates (*q.2 primi Post.*, §. *Ad primum.*).

Article I. Whether the Complex Term is Distinguished from the Sentence, the Proposition, and the Enunciation

A complex term, according to the force of the word, is the connection of one simple term with another, or that which embraces several simple terms — or, as others prefer, a complex term consists of several expressions standing in proper

relation to one another, as "a white man" or "a man is risible." Three questions arise. First, whether a sentence and a complex term coincide. Second, whether a sentence and a proposition are really the same. Third, whether a proposition and an enunciation differ from one another.

As to the first, to make the resolution clear, several senses of the word *sentence* must be introduced, followed by its definition. For *oratio* — sentence — as Vorrillongus notes (*q.4.d.22; 3.d.17.*), is said to be, as it were, the reason of the mouth; for a theologian it is the same as a devout disposition of the mind directed toward God, or, as Damascene teaches, an ascent of the mind to God. Thus it is found in *Psalm 87*: "Let my prayer enter before you"; and in *Psalm 34*: "My prayer in my bosom." For the rhetorician, a sentence is a persuasive proposition; hence the rhetorician is called an orator. For the dialectician, however, a sentence is described as a conventionally significative utterance some separate part of which signifies something, as found in *1.Periherm., c.4.* The earlier clauses of this coincide with those we adapted and explained above for the noun and verb. The later clauses are placed there to distinguish it from them. That the said definition of the sentence applies to the complex term is not denied by Arriaga (*disp.1.sect.5.*), though at (*disp.2.sect.1.n.7.*) he appears to think differently with Hurtado. Nor does it conflict with Aristotle (*1.Priorum, c.1.*), who in defining the syllogism says "a syllogism is a sentence, etc.," and at (*8.Met., Tex.9., cited by Scotus, 1.d.8.q.3, ante S.*) adds that a definition is a term or complex and is called a long sentence. The Doctor also accepts this (*Quol.13, in fine, sub NN.*; and *3.d.22.q.un. §. Rationes, sub C.*), and not in disagreement are the Conimbricenses (*1. de interpretatione, c.4.q.3.art.1.*) and several others. This can be seen from the fact that in a complex term either there are two simple terms without any bond — as "a white man" — and it is an imperfect sentence, as Fontanus notes (*c.1.prodig.*) and I indicated (*l.1.q.1.art.4.*); or there are two simple terms joined by a copula — as "a man is an animal" — and it is a perfect sentence, as no one denies. Hurtado at the place cited (*in 1.art. huius q., Sect.3.*) and Arriaga near the end of the first section do not agree with this; they define a sentence as a significative utterance composed of a noun and verb standing in proper relation to one another. This description is good grammatically but not logically; for propriety or impropriety of a sentence belongs to the grammarian, while it is the logician who attends to agreement or repugnance — that is, truth or falsity — as the author of the *Grammatica Speculativa*, chapter 18, teaches. For even if dialectic presupposes grammar and borrows proper speech from it, it should not be thought that both enjoy the same definitions of noun, verb, and sentence. And if the other real sciences presuppose dialectic, they do not for that reason employ, in setting out their own subject matter, the very same definitions — as is clear of the universal, which is defined differently by logic and by metaphysics, as may be seen at the place just cited (*q.3.art.1.*); and likewise of body, which is considered differently by physics and by medicine. Therefore the

definition of a sentence is not one and the same for the logician and the grammarian.

As to the second: Zabarella (*1.Post., circa textum 13.*) writes that a proposition regards the syllogism and is one of the premisses, but never the conclusion. Some, with Cicero, think that a proposition is that which holds the principal place in the syllogism. Philosophers commonly, however, use *proposition* for any enunciation, whether within or outside the syllogism — more frequently for the major, minor, or conclusion, as the Doctor indicates (*4.d.3.q.2.¶. Ad 1.arg., in fine;* and *d.8.q.2.¶. Aliter.H.I.K.*). For this reason we assert that a syllogism consists of three propositions. A sentence, however, seems to extend more broadly than a proposition: a syllogism, as the Philosopher testifies (*1.Priorum, c.1.*), is a sentence, yet it cannot be called a proposition, since it is constituted from propositions — for the same thing cannot be both constituting and constituted, both part and whole. A sentence also applies to more things than a proposition: every proposition is a sentence, but not conversely — every sentence is a proposition — as is clear from what was said above. And thus a proposition seems to differ from a sentence as the less common from the more common, or as a species differs from a genus, as Aristotle indicates (*1.Periherm., c.4.*; and *1.Praedicamentorum, c. de Substantia.*).

As to the third: some expositors of the Stagirite (as reported by Zabarella in the place cited above) establish a distinction between proposition and enunciation, saying that an enunciation is broader than a proposition — being simply an expression taken absolutely without regard to the syllogism — whereas a proposition is so called insofar as it is placed within the syllogism. Yet although this distinction was once acknowledged by some dialecticians, usage has prevailed such that one is used interchangeably for the other, as can be deduced from Scotus (*1.d.2.q.2.F.*; *d.40.q.un.B.*; and *4.d.8.q.2.N.*), and from Major (*in Logica, Tract. de propositione, fol.37, pag.2.*). Hence perhaps Aristotle's two books *On Interpretation* are entitled both *On Proposition* and *On Enunciation*, since proposition and enunciation coincide — which can be gathered from Aristotle himself, both in the books mentioned and in (*1.1.Priorum, c.1.*) and his commentators there.

First Objection. If the definition of the sentence given by Aristotle is admitted, a compound noun will plainly be a sentence, because its parts taken separately are significative — as if from the noun *circumsessio* one separates its parts *circum* and *sessio*, these utterances, separated from one another, still retain their signification, which they had when joined together. Therefore the definition of the sentence given by Aristotle is not properly assigned.

Reply. A similar instance was already dissolved above (*q.1.Art.1 and Art.2 of this book*) regarding the compound noun and verb. To avoid repeating what has been done, I pass over it here.

Second Objection. A complex term is one that consists of two expressions standing in proper relation to one another without a verb; but a sentence includes a verb; therefore a complex term and a sentence are not the same.

Reply. I distinguish the major: of a complex term taken absolutely, I deny it; of an indistant complex term, I grant it, as is clear from (*l.1.q.1.Art.4.*). To the minor I say it is to be granted of the perfect sentence, but not of the imperfect.

Third Objection. From the book cited above, a term is that into which a proposition is resolved; therefore a complex term and a proposition are not the same, since a proposition is composed of and resolved into terms as its parts, and — from Scotus (*3.d.2.q.2.art.1.C.*) — the whole is distinguished from its parts taken together.

Reply. The antecedent is true of the incomplex term, to which that definition belongs, not of the complex term of which we are speaking in the present context.

Article II. What the Complex Term Is

Two definitions of the complex term — or rather of the proposition — are given by Aristotle. The first is found at (*1.Periherm., c.4.*): a proposition is a sentence signifying something true or false. The second is had at (*1.Priorum, c.1., near the beginning*), and is derived from (*1.Post., c.1., Tex.13.*): a proposition is a sentence affirming something of something or denying something of something. The first definition is considered descriptive, because it is given through a property — namely, truth or falsity — which is a property of the proposition, just as even or odd is a property of number, as Scotus teaches (*q.1, predicamentali, ad finem*; and *1.Post., q.6, in calce.*). The second is called essential, because the essence of the proposition seems to consist in affirmation or negation. Yet since even this definition is not considered exact by many — as will be apparent from the objections raised and to be raised below — in order to remove all difficulty and explain the whole matter, a proposition taken universally can be described as a sentence of something about something. In this way it abstracts from affirmation and negation as a genus abstracts from its species, and from truth and falsity as an essence abstracts from its properties; and it is rightly divided into affirmative and negative as a genus into its species. This doctrine is touched upon by Aristotle (*1.Post., c.2., Tex.13.*; and *3. de anima, Tex.26.*), where he says a proposition is a sentence of something about something. Scotus (*q.52.Elench., §. pro solutione*; and *4.d.3.q.1.§. Aliter ergo, sub V.*) adds that a proposition abstracts from truth and falsity, and proves this on the grounds that every foundation is naturally prior to its accidental relation; but a proposition is the foundation of truth, which is an accidental relation, since it can be present or absent — just as the proposition can be conformable or disconformable to the thing. The Conimbricenses (*c.4.primi de Interpretatione, q.1.art.3.*) appear to favor the opposite view. The same is implied by Mastrius and Bellutus (*1. parte Inst.,*

Tract.2.c.3.), who defend the Conimbricenses' position, following Tataretus (*1.Perih., q.3.Scibili 3.*).

First Objection. From Hurtado (*disp.4.Sect.1.*): a definition explains not the property but the essence of a thing, as is clear; but the first definition of the proposition explains its property, as I said at the beginning of this article; therefore, etc.

Reply. I distinguish the antecedent: of an essential definition, I grant it; of a descriptive definition, I deny it. This was explained at the place just cited. And this is perhaps what Aristotle did, because truth and falsity are better known than affirmation and negation, especially to novice dialecticians, for whom easier things to know are to be proposed.

Second Objection. One of the laws of a good definition is that the definition converts with the defined, as we shall say at the end of this book; but truth or falsity does not reciprocate with the defined — for truth belongs to simple apprehension, which is not a proposition; therefore, etc.

Reply. The major is granted; the minor must be distinguished: of complex truth, I deny it; of incomplex truth, I grant it. For complex truth reciprocates with the proposition, just as risibility reciprocates with man.

Third Objection. A definition is not given through disjunction, nor is a genus defined through its species, according to the canons of good definition; but the said definitions are assigned through disjunction, as is evident on inspection, and the last definition is given through species, which we stated to be affirmation and negation; therefore, etc.

Reply. The major holds when the proper difference of the defined is known and named; but not when it is unnamed and almost unknown, as in the present case.

Fourth Objection. The mental proposition is a judgment by which we affirm or deny something of something; and to judge is to affirm or deny something of something. Therefore the vocal proposition corresponding to it is a sentence affirming or denying something of something, and not something abstracting from both — which Hurtado himself does not dare to deny at the end of the section cited.

Reply. I distinguish the antecedent: taken precisely and generically, I deny it; taken specifically, I grant it — as I noted above and explained not far before the first objection.

Article III. How Many Kinds of Complex Term There Are

The complex term — which, from what has been said, may rightly be called a sentence, proposition, and enunciation — admits of many divisions, which the Doctor recounts (*q.8.primi Priorum, §. Quantum ad 2.*). In the first place, a complex term can be divided according to the partition of the sentence. A sentence is

divided into perfect and imperfect. A perfect sentence is one that produces a complete sense in the hearer's mind — as "a man is an animal"; an imperfect one is that which produces an incomplete sense in the hearer's mind — as "a learned man." All of this regarding perfect and imperfect construction is taught by the author of the *Grammatica Speculativa*, chapter 19. Again, one sentence is interrogative — as *Matthew* 22: "Is it lawful to give tribute to Caesar?" — another imperative, as *Matthew* 11: "Learn from me, for I am meek and humble of heart." Another is optative — as *Isaiah* 64: "O that you would rend the heavens and come down." Another deprecativum — as *Isaiah* 45: "Drop down dew, ye heavens, from above." Another vocative — as *John* 7: "If any man thirst, let him come to me and drink." These kinds of sentences are used more by rhetoricians and poets than by dialecticians, who make principal use of sentences containing a verb in the indicative mood.

The first division of the proposition by species is into affirmative and negative, which the Doctor records (*1.d.4.q.2.§.1.Ad 1.arg.*). An affirmative is one in which the predicate is affirmed of the subject — as "a stone is a body." A negative is one in which the predicate is denied of the subject — as "a stone is not animate."

The second division, by parts, is into categorical or simple, and hypothetical or composite — which Scotus recounts (*q.3.primi Priorum*; and *1.d.39.§. Sed contra, infra I.*). A simple proposition is one that consists solely of one subject, one predicate, and a verbal copula — as "body is substance." A composite is one that is constructed from two simple enunciations — as "a man is risible, is teachable." More will be said about this in the following chapter.

The third division, by quality, is into true and false, of which the Doctor makes mention (*q.9.Secundi Perih.*; and *1.d.4.q.2.§. Respondeo*; and *Ad 1.arg.A.and D.*). A true proposition is one that conforms to the thing signified by it — as "a tree is animate." A false proposition is one that is disconformable to the thing signified by it — as "a stone is animate."

The fourth division, by essence and its mode, is into absolute and modal, which Scotus presents (*q.3.primi Priorum, vers. unde.*). This is rather a subdivision of the simple proposition, as is gathered from Aristotle (*1.Periherm., c.4.*), whom Fontanus follows (*l.3.Inst.Dialecticarum, c.3.*). An absolute proposition — also called by some a proposition *de inesse* (of inherence) — is described as one that designates something as belonging or not belonging to something — as "an animal is sensitive." A modal proposition is one that enunciates in what mode something belongs or does not belong to something; and this can be done adverbially — as "necessarily a man is an animal" — or nominally — as "it is necessary that a man be an animal."

The fifth division, by quantity, is into universal, particular, indefinite, and singular — which Aristotle recounts (*1.Periherm., c.5.*; and *1.Priorum, c.1.*) and Scotus at (*in fine, q.4.primi Priorum.*). A universal proposition is one whose subject

is qualified by a universal sign — such as *all* or *none* — as "every animal is sensitive," "no animal is a stone." A particular proposition is one whose subject is qualified by a particular sign — as "some animal is irrational." An indefinite proposition is one whose subject, though a common term, is not prefixed by any sign — as "a man is rational." A singular proposition is one whose subject is singular — as "Peter is a philosopher."

The sixth division, by matter, is into necessary, contingent, and impossible, as derived from Scotus (*1.d.39.*), following Aristotle (*1.Periherm., c.1.*). A necessary proposition is one in which there is an indissoluble bond between subject and predicate — as "an animal is sensitive." A contingent proposition is one in which the bond between subject and predicate is dissoluble — as "a man is white." An impossible proposition is one in which the subject and predicate are impossible with one another — as "a man is a stone."

The seventh division, into infinite and finite, is described by the Stagirite (*2.Periherm., c.1.*) and touched upon by the Doctor (*1.d.28.q.2.¶. Ad arg.G.*). A finite proposition is one whose subject or predicate receives no negation — as "a lion is capable of roaring." An infinite proposition is one some extreme of which is qualified by negation — as "a man is not-just."

The eighth division — from the Doctor (*1.d.2.q.2.¶. Ex his, sub D.; d.30.q.2.¶. Ad argumenta 1.q.; and 3.d.7.q.2.¶. Sed tantum.A.and C.*) — is into a proposition of two terms (*de secundo adiacente*), in which only a subject and verb are present — as "a man is" — and a proposition of three terms (*de tertio adiacente*), in which subject, predicate, and verb are all explicitly present — as "a man is prudent." This division is made by reason of the implicit or explicit predicate: for in the proposition of two terms, the predicate is suppressed — "a man is" being equivalent to "a man is existing" — whereas the proposition of three terms explicitly has a predicate, as is clear from the example.

First Objection. The species of a positive genus ought to be positive, since a species is constituted from genus and difference; but a proposition is a positive genus of affirmation and negation, being in the category of quality. Therefore its species — affirmation and negation — ought to be positive beings; but negation, as the very word indicates, is not a positive being; therefore, etc.

Reply. The major is granted; the minor may be distinguished: formally, I deny it — for in that sense it is a being of reason; materially, I grant it. This distinction is to be explained elsewhere. To the subsumption it may be said that under the name of negation a positive entity is understood, if it is taken materially — just as under the name of *irrational* a real positive entity is understood, which is held to be the essential constitutive difference of the brute.

Second Objection. Many more divisions of the proposition are enumerated than those we have recounted. Therefore the number of divisions given above is insufficient. The antecedent is proved: Scotus (*1.d.26.q.un.¶. Ad 1.tertia vie.Z., vers.*

Ad illud de supposito) offers a distribution into a proposition *per se* and *per accidens*; and (2.d.1.q.3., *circa D.*) into apprehensive and judicative; and all dialecticians commonly divide the proposition into natural, innatural, exceptive, exclusive, and reduplicative, and similar kinds, which will be explained more conveniently below.

Reply. The divisions we have adduced are the principal divisions of the proposition. Nor do we deny that others can be offered, as is inferred in the argument.

Article IV. On the Hypothetical Proposition

The hypothetical proposition, as I said in the preceding article, and as Peter of Spain teaches (l.1.c.15.), consists of two categorical propositions as its principal parts. The word *hypothetical* is derived from *ὑπό* — that is, *under* — and *θέσις* — that is, *position* — meaning, as it were, supposition, as Scotus notes (q.1.secundi Priorum, §. De 2.): because one of its parts is supposed under the other — or, what amounts to the same thing, one categorical proposition is supposed under another categorical proposition, as Fontanus touches upon (l.3.c.14.) and Peter of Spain expressly states at the place cited, with which the Doctor agrees (1.Priorum, q.3.§. Quantum ad 2.). According to this etymology, the hypothetical proposition is rightly distributed into conditional, copulative, and disjunctive; for in each of these three, one is presupposed to the other, as will be more clearly apparent through the examples given in the explanation of each hypothetical type. Hurtado (*disp.4.Sect.3.*) and Oviedo (*Controversia 3, puncto 3.*) — not having attended to this — hold that a hypothetical is a conditional that judges its object dependently on some hypothesis or supposition. For though every conditional is hypothetical, not every hypothetical is conditional; for *hypothesis* indeed denotes a condition, yet as Hurtado himself does not deny, it also denotes a supposition — and thus, according to this interpretation of the name *hypothesis*, all dialecticians rightly affirm that the hypothetical, taken generally, is a proposition composed of two simple ones. Moreover, a categorical and a simple proposition are the same, against Hurtado at the place cited. For from Aristotle and other dialecticians, a proposition is aptly divided into categorical and hypothetical; and according to the laws of good division, the dividing members are distinguished from one another. Therefore a hypothetical proposition cannot be categorical, just as a rational animal cannot be irrational, on account of their opposite differences dividing animal equally. It follows moreover that in Hurtado's view no other hypothetical would exist besides the conditional, which is false. Furthermore, *categorical* and *simple* mean the same among dialecticians: *κατηγορεῖν* is the same as demonstrating plainly or signifying openly. Therefore no distinction is to be established between a categorical and a simple proposition. And more so because dialecticians in using the words *categorical* and *categorematic* do not appear to be so scrupulous as not to apply them to any other sense than the predicative and enunciative, from itself and absolutely —

even if the literal meaning of those words indicates this, as Fontanus rightly observes (*l. de terminis Philosophicis*). Now, the threefold number of species of the hypothetical proposition is to be explained; their sufficiency arises from the threefold comparison of a conjunction with simple enunciations. If the hypothetical consists of two simple propositions, and the first is marked by the conditional particle *if*, with one derived from the other in an illative order, it is called a conditional hypothetical proposition — which Scotus mentions (*1.Periherm., q.8.*): as "if the sun shines, it is day"; and *Matthew 4*: "If you are the Son of God, command these stones to become bread." But if there are two categories united by the copulative particle *and*, a copulative hypothetical is obtained — as *Genesis 17*: "Walk before me and be perfect"; and *Exodus 3*: "I will be with you, and you shall have this sign." But if one simple enunciation is disjoined from another by the disjunctive particle *or*, a disjunctive hypothetical arises — as *Matthew 18*: "Where there are two or three gathered in my name, I am in their midst." The Doctor observes (*4.d.3.q.2. §. De secunda, sub M.; d.8.q.2., ante §. Aliter B.; q.10.Elench.; and 1.Priorum, q.10, in fine*) that the disjunctive does not posit determinately and indifferently one or the other — as "an animal is either rational or irrational." To the conditional are reduced the causal — as "because a mixture is composed of four elements, it is corruptible" — the temporal — as "when the soul informs the body, the body itself is animated" — and the local — as "where there is sensation, there is sense." A conditional can be formed in two ways: in one way from necessary matter, in which the consequent necessarily follows from the antecedent — as "if a man runs, he necessarily moves"; in this sense, dialecticians say that all true conditionals are necessary, and all false ones are impossible. In another way from contingent matter, in which the consequent follows contingently from the antecedent, such that it can fail to follow — or even the contrary of the predicate with the subject can occur — as "if you come to me tomorrow, I shall read," where tomorrow's lecture is not necessarily going to happen, but is only according to the decree of my will, which has freely so determined, if you come to me tomorrow, though I can choose not to read tomorrow if I wish. Whether the consequent is inferred from the antecedent on account of conditions to be laid down, and such an order of things to be provided — and whether God has conditional knowledge of conditionals, distinct from natural and free knowledge — is not a matter for the present inquiry. I have argued about it at length in my *Treatise on the Knowledge of God*, where I defend neither the Thomistic nor the Jesuit positions, but follow the way of the Subtle Doctor, which is partly favorable and partly opposed to both sides, as seems to me to be the view more conformable to the harmony of free will with the efficacy of divine grace.

First Objection. *Categorical* is the same as predication, and a categorical term is absolutely and through itself significative; therefore a categorical proposition does not convert with a simple proposition. The consequence is proved: a

composite proposition can be categorical — as "Peter reads and John writes," which is an absolute and perfectly significative enunciation.

Reply. The consequence is denied; in reply to its proof, I say that proposition is a copulative hypothetical, as I showed above.

Second Objection. A copulative proposition is not conditional, nor can any conditional be formed from it. Therefore a copulative cannot be hypothetical, for *hypothesis* means the same as *condition*, and *hypothetical* coincides with *conditional*.

Reply. The antecedent is granted; the consequence is denied; the reason for this denial was given at the beginning of the present article.

Question III. On the Matter, Form, Quality, and Quantity of the Proposition

We must deal first with the matter and form, as well as the quality and quantity, of the categorical proposition; and afterwards with the same as they pertain to the hypothetical.

Article I. On the Matter, Form, Quantity, and Quality of the Categorical Proposition

Most dialecticians have made no mention of the form of the categorical proposition — perhaps because, since a proposition is not a physical whole, it is not composed from a form as one of its parts. Hence, supposing that it has neither form nor matter, they consequently did not treat them. Although above we made mention of its matter, which cannot appear to exist without a form, nevertheless the matter we referred to there is not material cause — *materia ex qua* — but the matter with respect to which — *materia circa quam* — which belongs to anything that is presented to, or made subject to, the judgment of the intellect. For this reason it is called by some the subject matter. Those who admit matter and form taken metaphorically — among them Mastrius and Bellutus (*1.p.Inst., Tract.2.c.4.*) — hold that the matter of the proposition is the objects about which the proposition is formed, and the form is the copula — affirmation or negation. But these do not satisfy: first, because they do not assign the material cause — *materia ex qua* — which they are obliged to give, but rather the material with respect to which, of which I made mention in the preceding question, article 3, and about which there is no doubt at this point, as I indicated just before. Then, because the verb, being the copula or union of subject with predicate, does not appear to be the form but rather the bond between the two. Likewise, the philosophers' commentators on (*2.Phys.*) affirm — and Scotus agrees (*3.d.2.q.2.art.3, sub E.*) — that the union of matter and form properly speaking is not itself the form. It may however be said that the predicate is the form of the simple proposition, and the subject its matter, and the verb the link

of both. For the account of being a subject is called material, since it is proper to matter to be subject or to underlie form — hence in (*1.Phys., Tex.82.*) matter is defined as the primary subject of each thing, from which it comes to be. And the account of being a predicate is called formal, since what inheres in another and informs or constitutes it is predicated of the very thing it constitutes. From this arises the logical distinction between material being and formal being: an entity called material is one capable of being a subject, and an entity called formal is one capable of being a predicate. This doctrine is taught by Scotus (*2.d.3.q.6.§. Ad q. respondeo, sub H.*), indicated in (*q.11.Universalium, §. Ad 1.q.*) and explained there by Sarnanus (*q.9, pag.163.*), whom Trombetta (*in Met., q.19, fol.39.*) and Raconius (*q.3. de Enunciatione, parte 2.*) follow.

Quantity — which the Philosopher defines in the Categories as that according to which something is said to be *how much*, and which we described in (*q.4.libri primi, art.6.*) as a being extended through itself — is, in our consequent treatment of the quantity of the proposition, the extension of the subject, not of the predicate. For even if the predicate is singular, so long as the subject is universal, the proposition will be universal — as in "every creator is God," where *God*, which is the predicate, is singular, and *every creator*, which is the subject, is universal. Thus the proposition draws its universality, or particularity, or singularity from the subject that is found in it. Since the subject can be extended in four ways, a fourfold quantity is accordingly enumerated. For either the subject is extended to all those things to which it can pertain with respect to the predicate by which it is characterized — and if it is marked by a universal sign, the proposition is universal, as "every man is rational" — or it is extended to only one particular, and if it is prefixed by a particular sign, the proposition becomes particular, as "some man is learned" — or the subject, though common to many, is nevertheless qualified by no sign, and it is an indefinite proposition, as "a man is an animal" — or the subject is a determinate singular, and it becomes a singular proposition, as "Paul is a Tarsian."

The quality of a proposition can be assigned as twofold: one essential — in which case affirmation or negation can be called its essential quality, according to its definition given and explained in (*art.2.q.2 of this book*). For the essential difference of a thing is called its quality by Aristotle (*5.Met., Tex.19.*); and Porphyry in the *Isagoge* (*c. de differentia*) and the other dialecticians affirm that an essential difference is predicated of its inferiors *in quale quid* — in essential quality. The other quality is accidental — such as truth or falsity — as Aristotle (*c. de substantia*) and Scotus indicate (*4.d.8.q.2., sub*; and expressing this distinction at *3.q.1.d.1.art.3, sub D.*), where he says that *quale* taken generally is divided into substantial *quale* and accidental *quale*. The first does not belong to any species of quality insofar as quality is a supreme genus, for it is not called quality absolutely but with an addition — that is, essential quality. The second, however, especially does belong to it, since there is one category in which all accidental qualities are placed, as may be seen in (*l.1.q.4.art.7*). Therefore the division of

quality given above should not be criticized, as Hurtado does (*disp.4.Sect.2.*), for it is quite familiar to philosophers and plainly appropriate, as I showed in (*lib.1.q.3.art.5*; and *q.4.art.4.*). And Hurtado himself appears to sense this (*sect.6.7. of the cited disp.*); and at (*sect.5*) he had shown that conversion is sometimes in quantity and sometimes in quality — but that quality is what makes one true or false, affirmative or negative, as Hurtado himself objects. Therefore, unwillingly, he falls into the very distinction he attempts to reject.

First Objection. A proposition is of necessary matter when between its subject and predicate there is a necessary relationship, and it is of contingent matter when between subject and predicate there is a contingent relationship; likewise a proposition is said to be of impossible matter when between its subject and predicate there is a repugnant and impossible bond. Therefore the relationship of subject to predicate should be called the matter of the proposition, not the subject itself.

Reply. The antecedent is granted; the consequence is denied. For since a relationship is formally a relation, it cannot in any way be matter. Therefore the subject is held to be the matter of the proposition — and if the predicate flows necessarily from it, the subject is called necessary matter; if contingently, contingent matter; and if it is repugnant for the predicate to flow from it, impossible matter.

Second Objection. It is proper to matter to be determined, and it is proper to form to determine, as all concede; but the subject is not determined by the predicate, nor does the predicate determine the subject, because the subject is the cause of the predicate, and a cause is not determined by its effect, since it is prior to it. Therefore the subject cannot be the matter of the proposition, nor the predicate its form.

Reply. The major is granted; the minor is denied. For although a cause is prior to its effect, it can nevertheless be in some manner determined by its effect — just as matter is prior to form, which nevertheless determines it, because form is matter's formal act.

Article II. On the Matter, Form, Quantity, and Quality of the Hypothetical Proposition

Just as the matter of the categorical proposition is one subject and one predicate, so the matter of the hypothetical proposition is the twofold subject of its two simple propositions, and its form is the twofold predicate of those same two categorical propositions. For the hypothetical is composed of two categoricals, as I said in (*q. preceding, art.3.4.*). Therefore it must necessarily consist of their subjects and predicates as form and matter. Among hypothetical propositions, some are necessary, some contingent, some impossible, and some possible — just as was said above of categoricals. A hypothetical proposition

does not possess a different quantity from that of the categorical: a hypothetical is universal if both categoricals are universal — as "every lion is sensitive, and every lion is capable of roaring." A hypothetical is particular if the categoricals are particular — as "some man is learned, and some man is prudent." If one categorical is particular and the other universal, the proposition may be called mixed — as "some man is modest, every man is teachable." The case of affirmation and negation is not the same for a categorical and a hypothetical: a categorical is affirmative when the predicate is affirmed of the subject, and negative when the predicate is removed from the subject. But since the hypothetical involves a conjunction or condition, it is affirmative when its conjunction or principal copula is affirmative — as "Peter is risible, Bucephalus is capable of neighing" — and negative when its conjunction is negative — as "Peter is not a stone and a lion is not a tree." The quality of a hypothetical is not unlike that of a categorical: the quality of both is the same — that is, truth or falsity. For a copulative is true when both categoricals are true; false when both categoricals are false, or when either one is false. The reason why truth in a hypothetical requires both categoricals to be true, while for its falsity one false categorical suffices, can be given from Dionysius (*l. de Divinis nominibus, parte 4.*): because good is from one and complete cause — that is, from an integral cause possessed of all its circumstances — as the Doctor expounds (*Quol.18. §. De 1. sub H.*); but evil is from particular defects or from any defect whatsoever. This is perhaps better illuminated by the common saying: to construct requires many things; to destroy it suffices to have one. For a disjunctive to be true, only one of its parts need be true — as "an astrologer either is or is not an astrologer"; the reason is that — as Boethius, cited by the author of the *Grammatica Speculativa*, chapter 13, states — a disjunctive conjunction does not permit both to exist simultaneously; and it is further said there that a disjunctive conjunction joins two extremes, distinguishing them from a third. If sometimes the disjunction does not appear to separate one part from the other, this perhaps occurs because we use that mode of speaking to declare that at least one need not be the case, or that the other suffices. Our Lord Christ uses this formula in *Matthew 18*, saying: "Where there are two or three gathered in my name, I am in their midst." And in *Luke 2* it is read: "They offered for him to the Lord a pair of turtledoves, or two young pigeons." Nor do the arguments that Arriaga (*disp.secunda, sect.tertia, n.15.*) marshals against this teaching prove anything more.

Objection. A conjunction contributes nothing to affirmation or negation. Therefore the affirmation or negation of a hypothetical proposition is not to be sought from the affirmative or negative conjunction.

Reply. The antecedent is proved: affirmation or negation is taken from the agreement or disagreement of subject with predicate. I deny the antecedent; to its proof I say this holds for the categorical, but not for the hypothetical proposition.

Question IV. On the Opposition, Equipollence, and Conversion of Simple Propositions

Three things are proposed for examination in the present question, which will be briefly and clearly handled and resolved through the four following articles.

Article I. What Opposition of Simple Propositions Is, and How Many Kinds There Are

Opposition is described by Aristotle (*1.Periherm., c.4.*) as the affirmation or negation of the same thing about the same thing, not equivocally. Which is to say: opposition is the repugnance of two propositions having the same subject and the same predicate, taken in a univocal signification, by reason of affirmation and negation. Most add — and rightly — also by reason of quantity and quality, because subalterns, as will be said below, agree in quality and differ only in quantity; for one is universal and the other particular, though both are affirmative or both negative. From the description of opposition given above, several conditions required for it can be gathered. First, both opposed propositions must consist of the same subject and predicate — for lack of which these do not stand opposed: "every lion is capable of roaring, no man is capable of neighing," since they have different subjects and predicates. Second, the same verb must be retained in both — for which reason these do not mutually conflict: "Peter reads, Peter does not walk," since each has its own verb. Third, univocal signification is required — and so these are not opposed: "a lion is capable of roaring, a lion is not capable of roaring," if the first is understood of a living lion and the second of a painted lion. Fourth, the same time and place are required — and so these are not opposed: "Peter loves God, Peter loved God," or "the air is healthful in the fields, the air is not healthful in the squares." This last condition, however, holds only in contingent matters, not in necessary matters, which abstract from all time, place, and existence — and concerning these, there are propositions of everlasting truth, of which I shall treat at length in our fuller questions in this work, (*l.4.*).

A fourfold opposition is enumerated by Aristotle at this point (*c.11.*), Scotus (*q.38, predicamentali, Ad 2.q. dicendum*), and the summulists commonly: contrary, subcontrary, contradictory, and subaltern. Its sufficiency can be gathered as follows. Either we enunciate of a universal universally, affirmatively and negatively — and contrary propositions arise, as "every man is just, no man is just." Or we enunciate of a universal not universally, affirmatively and negatively — and subcontraries arise, as "some man is just, some man is not just." Or we enunciate of one universal universally, and of the other not universally — and contradictories result, as "every man is just, some man is not just." Or we affirm or deny something universally of something, and affirm or deny it particularly of the same thing — and subalterns emerge, as "every man is just, some man is just."

The quantity of a proposition, broadly speaking — since it is its extension, as I said in (*q.3.art.1 of this book*) — can be a ground of opposition: for just as great and small are said to be opposites, as Aristotle seems to concede (*c. de quantitate*), so a proposition, since by reason of its quantity it can be called large or small, or more or less extended, as more or less universal — those that differ only in quantity, as subalterns, are not wholly to be excluded from the category of opposites. Especially since subcontraries differ from one another only in quality: for both are particular — one affirmative, the other negative. And this is consistent with Aristotle, who in defining the propositions enumerated above makes clear mention of their quantity: he says of contraries that we enunciate universally; of contradictories, universally with respect to one and particularly with respect to the other; but the quantity of a proposition consists in universality or particularity, even in the view of those who strive to eliminate the opposition of subcontraries and subalterns. Accordingly, propositions are either opposed in quantity and quality, or in quality alone, or in quantity alone, as may be seen in the present table, indicated by Scotus (*1.2.Perih., q.6., vers. Item hac est una.*).

First Objection. From Fontanus (*l.1.Inst., c.6.*) and Arriaga (*disp.2.Sect.2.subsect.1.*): Aristotle does not enumerate subcontraries; therefore they should not be classed among the opposites. It is confirmed: they are not opposed in respect of truth; therefore they have no place among the opposites. It is confirmed again: they do not share the same subject; therefore they lack one of the conditions required for opposition. It is confirmed a third time: subcontraries can both be true simultaneously, and truth is not opposed to truth; therefore, etc.

Reply. Aristotle made mention of subcontraries in two places: namely, (*1.Periherm., c.5.*), where, according to Toletus, he understands subcontraries by *non-contraries*; and (*2.Priorum, c.13.*), where he expressly treats subcontraries. Even if Aristotle had not taught this, it would not follow that they are not to be admitted — an argument drawn from negative authority does not conclude. Add that subcontraries are opposed in quality; and if in them there is no truth, at least falsity is found in them, as all acknowledge: therefore such propositions are not exempt from opposition. To the first confirmation: it suffices if they are opposed according to some species of quality, as falsity is. To the second confirmation: the antecedent is denied — for man, for example, under the particular sign is the same subject of both subcontraries, just as in contraries man under the universal sign is the same subject of both. To the third: though both can be simultaneously true, they cannot both be simultaneously false — just as contraries are excluded from being simultaneously true — and for this reason they are not exempt from the opposites, as Tataretus (*1.Perih., q.4.Scibili.*) and Mastrius and Bellutus (*Tract.2.Inst., c.8.*) imply.

Second Objection. In subcontraries, the running of one subject — say Peter — is affirmed thus: "Peter runs"; and of another — say Anthony — the running is

denied thus: "Anthony does not run." Therefore, since there is no repugnance with respect to the same thing in the same regard, no opposition is involved in subcontraries.

Reply. Opposed propositions require the same subject; and if the subject is changed, there will be no opposition, as the argument proves — and this was noted near the beginning of the present article.

Third Objection. Hurtado (*disp.4.sect.7.*) attempts to defend only one opposition — namely, contradictory — arguing that formal opposition with respect to quality is obtained on account of two singular propositions mutually contradicting one another. Therefore only contradictory opposition is to be admitted.

Reply. The antecedent is denied. For as Hurtado himself frankly admits there, oppositions are required in proportion to their opposed objects, and thus there will be as many distinct oppositions as there are distinct opposed objects. Now besides determinate singular contradicting objects, there are given universal contradicting and contrary objects, as well as particular ones. Therefore more than one opposition must be posited. The major is at hand. The minor is urged from the descriptions of contraries, contradictories, and subcontraries given above, and from the division of things into universals and singulars, which the Philosopher presents at the beginning of the cited chapter, and also from the definition of opposition given there, which belongs formally to others besides contradictories, as I brought out and deduced above. For it consists in affirmation and negation, or in truth and falsity, as Hurtado himself maintains. But affirmation and negation, truth and falsity, apply not only to contradictories but also to contraries and subcontraries. Hurtado's foundation therefore collapses — especially because opposed universal propositions enjoy their own proper opposition distinct from singulars, just as they have their own distinct entity from them. I would note here that in the view of many, the truth of a universal proposition depends almost entirely on the truth of a particular; for given any particular false instance, the whole proposition is false. If this singular is false — "Peter is a stone" — then the universal is false — "every man is a stone."

Article II. On the Canons of Opposed Propositions

Among contrary opposites, this canon is observed: if one contrary is true, the other is false — but not conversely. Both moreover cannot be simultaneously true. The reason is that if two contraries were simultaneously true, then contradictories would be simultaneously true, which is impossible: for if two contraries are both true — both being universal — say "every dog is capable of barking, no dog is capable of barking" — it correctly follows that two particular propositions are true, the negative of which contradicts the universal affirmative — as "some dog is not capable of barking: every dog is capable of barking" — and the affirmative of which contradicts the universal negative — as "no dog is

capable of barking: some dog is capable of barking." But from the falsity of contraries, the falsity of particulars does not follow — just as from the falsity of a subalternating proposition the falsity of the subalternated does not follow: even if this is false — "every man is learned" — it does not therefore follow that this is also false: "some man is learned." Therefore concerning necessary contraries this rule is always to be observed: of the two, one is always true and the other false. Concerning contingent contraries, however, both can be simultaneously false — as "every man is just, no man is just."

The canon of subcontraries is this: in necessary matters, if one is true the other is false — as "some man is an animal, some man is not an animal." In contingent matters, both can be simultaneously true — as "some man is learned, some man is not learned."

Concerning contradictories, this canon is transmitted: two contradictories can be neither simultaneously true nor simultaneously false. The reason is that for the same thing to be and not to be simultaneously is repugnant; for everything either is or is not, and of everything it is true to affirm or deny — which is the most known and most universal principle of metaphysics.

The canon of subalterns is that if the subalternating proposition is true, the subalternated is likewise true — as "every man is an animal, some man is an animal." But if the subalternating is false, it does not correctly follow that the subalternated is false in contingent matters — as if this is false, "every man is just," it does not therefore follow that this is false, "some man is just." The reason is that the subalternating extends more broadly than the subalternated: hence for its truth more is required. But from the falsity of the subalternated, the falsity of the subalternating follows — as if this is false, "some man is just," the following will certainly be false: "every man is just." The reason is that for falsity less is required than for truth — as is clear from a parallel with the copulative proposition in (*q.3.art.2 of this book*).

Objection. These are contradictories: "only a man runs, not only a man runs," and yet both can be simultaneously false. Therefore the canon of contradictories is not always true. The antecedent is proved: the particle *not* falling over the whole proposition renders it contradictory to the affirmative. The consequence is drawn: if no one runs, this is false — "only a man runs." And likewise this is false — "not only a man runs" — given that neither a man nor anything other than a man runs.

Reply. Whatever others say, the antecedent must be denied. In reply to its proof I say that of mutually contradictory propositions, one is universal and the other particular — which the propositions cited are not; for they are explicable and are expounded thus: "only a man runs" — "a man runs and nothing other than a man runs." "Not only a man runs" — "a man runs and something other than a

man runs." This I explained at length in a parallel case in (*Tract. de Deo uno, disp.6.q.3.*) with Scotus (*1.d.21.l.1.S.Bon.*) and other scholastics there.

Article III. On the Equipollence of Simple Propositions

Equipollence — of which the Subtle Doctor makes mention (*q.5.primi Priorum*; and *q.13, ad finem*; and *q.14.§. Notandum*) — is the equal force and value of two simple propositions consisting of the same subject and predicate, with negation prefixed or postfixed to their universal or particular signs. Thus "every man is a liar": its contradictory is "some man is not a liar," and its equipollent is "not-some man is not a liar." For two negations affirm, and one alone negates — being of a destructive nature, it destroys what follows it; for if placed with a universal, it makes it particular, and if prefixed to an affirmative, it renders it negative — according to which rule these are equipollent: "some man is not a liar, not-every man is a liar." To correctly form equipollents, the following canons are to be observed. The first: in contradictories, for equipollents to be formed, negation is to be prefixed to the sign, as is clearly evident from the examples just given. The second: in contraries, for equipollence, negation is to be postfixed to the signs and subjects — as "every man is a liar: no man is not a liar"; and likewise "no man is a liar: every man is not a liar" are equipollent. The third: in subalterns, for equipollence, negation is both prefixed and postfixed — as "every man is a liar: not-some man is not a liar." Similarly, "some man is a liar" and "not-every man is not a liar." And finally, "no man is a liar" and "not-some man is a liar" are equipollent. The canons named above are indicated by this verse:

Prefix for contradictories, postfix for contraries, both prefix and postfix for subalterns.

The explanation of these words, so that every equipollence of opposed propositions may be achieved, is as follows. *Prefix for contradictories* — that is, so that two contradictories become equipollent, negation is to be prefixed. *Postfix for contraries* — that is, in contraries, negation is to be postfixed, so that they become equipollent. *Both prefix and postfix for subalterns* — that is, for opposed subalterns, negation is to be both prefixed and postfixed, so that they become equivalent. So that this may be better understood and more easily performed, the signs by which — with negation prefixed or postfixed — universals are rendered particulars and particulars are rendered universal must be distinguished. For this reason dialecticians composed the following verses:

Not-every, some; not-every-not, as-it-were-none. Not-none, some; but none-not amounts to every. Not-some, none; not-some-not amounts to every. Not-the-other, neither; neither-not yields both.

First Objection. If several propositions were equipollent, several propositions would contradict one and the same proposition; but this seems to be false, because only one thing is contrary to one thing, according to the scriptural saying: "God made all things in pairs, one against one, and two against two." Therefore the equipollence of propositions does not appear to be admissible.

Reply. It may be said that several non-equipollent propositions do not contradict one proposition; yet several equipollent ones can contradict one. Nor does the scriptural saying conflict with this, because there it speaks of simple and incomplex physical opposites, not of complex ones such as propositions.

Second Objection. No law, norm, or mention has been made of the equipollence of subcontraries. Therefore the rules given above for the equipollence of propositions are deficient and insufficient. The antecedent is clear from the verse given above. The consequence holds: equipollence is a property of propositions, therefore a canon of equipollence should be assigned to opposed subcontraries as well.

Some reply that the canon in subcontraries is exactly the same as in contraries, and hence no special mention was made of them above. Against this: the law of equipollence in contraries is that negation be postfixed, as I observed above; but a postfixed negation does not make subcontraries equipollent, as is evident in these: "some man writes, some man does not write" — if you add a negation to the first, you get "some man does not write," which is not distinct from the second; and if you join a negation to the second — "some man not, does not write" — the negation is uselessly repeated; and if you prefix a negation to either — "not-some man does not write" — this will not be a subcontrary, for *not-some* is equivalent to *every*, as is clear from what was said. Therefore that mode of making subcontraries equipollent is void. Others, to whom Mastrius and Bellutus (*c.8.Tract.2.*) give their assent, say that the negation is to be postfixed not adverbially but nominally — as in *nullum* (no) — as may be seen in these: "some man is white, some man is not white"; the equipollent of the latter is "some man is white-of-nothing." Against this: *nullum* is not properly a negation but a universal negative sign. And likewise it is neither a noun nor an adverb, as is clear from what was said; therefore it can be taken neither nominally nor adverbially; nor is this a proper but an unusual locution. Therefore the said mode of rendering subcontrary propositions equipollent is invalid, and accordingly the common view of the summulists is to be followed: that no equipollence is to be admitted in subcontraries. This is no surprise, for just as not all modes of the figures can be reduced by the ostensive path to the four modes of the first figure, as will be said in the following book, so among opposed propositions, subcontraries cannot become equipollent. This can also be shown and illustrated in the case of nouns, some of which are indeclinable, and in the case of verbs, some of which lack past tenses and supines. Thus there is no inconvenience in subcontraries being unable to participate in equipollence.

Article IV. On the Conversion of Simple Propositions

Conversion is the transposition of extremes, which occurs when what was the subject in one proposition becomes the predicate in another, and the predicate becomes the subject, with quantity and quality either remaining or being

changed — as "a place is not a body; therefore a body is not a place." The first proposition is called the *conversa* (converted), because its terms are transposed; the second is called the *convertens* (converting), because it is formed from the transposed terms. And from one the other is inferred — that is, from the converted the converting is deduced, as is clear from the example given. Scotus indicates this (*1.Priorum*, q.5; q.9; q.10; q.12; q.13; q.14.).

Three kinds of conversion are enumerated: simple, per accidens, and by contraposition. Simple conversion — also called conversion in terms — is effected by transposing only the terms, namely, the subject into the predicate and the predicate into the subject, retaining the same quantity and quality. This conversion is accomplished in two ways: in one way through universal negative enunciations — as "no fish is a tree; therefore no tree is a fish"; in the other way through particular affirmatives — as "some fish is living; therefore some living thing is a fish." Conversion per accidens occurs when the terms are transposed and the quantity changes while the same quality persists. It happens in two ways: either when both propositions are negative — one universal and the other particular — as "no stone is animate; therefore some animate thing is not a stone"; or because one is universal and the other particular, both affirmative — as "every body is substance; therefore some substance is a body."

Conversion by contraposition occurs when, with the same quantity and quality persisting, the finite terms become infinite. It can be done in two ways. First, when a universal affirmative of finite terms is changed into a universal affirmative of infinite terms — as "every man is an animal; therefore every non-animal is a non-man." Second, when a particular negative of finite extremes is converted into a particular negative of infinite extremes — as "some substance is not a body; therefore some non-body is not a non-substance." Scotus makes mention of this (*1.Priorum*, q.15. §. *Quantum ad 2.*).

Some moderns, including Arriaga, ask whether only the subject is to be made infinite, or both the subject and predicate simultaneously. This difficulty is resolved from the description of conversion given above. For it was said that this third conversion occurs when its terms go from finite to infinite through the addition of negations; and if only the subject were to be made infinite, only the subject should be mentioned in the said definition as going from finite to infinite. Moreover, unless both terms were to be made infinite in this conversion, the same quality would not be preserved in the converted and converting propositions — for one would be affirmative and the other negative, as is seen in these: "every man is an animal; therefore every non-animal is not a man." But if the predicate is made infinite along with the subject, both are affirmative — because every infinite is affirmative, as Arriaga concedes (*d.2.subsect.5.*). Furthermore, since a negation falling on a noun makes it infinite — and does not negate, as the same Arriaga does not deny (*disp.1.*) and repeats (*disp.2.subsect.4.*) — but if negation is added to the verb, as "Peter does not run," it

is opposed to "Peter runs" — therefore, unless the predicate is made infinite, the proposition is in no way affirmative. This is further clarified in the propositions of the second mode pertaining to this last conversion: both are particular negatives, and the converting cannot be formed unless both the predicate and the subject are made infinite, as is clear from the example cited. Nor should any condition or existence of a thing be appended here, as Hurtado thinks (*disp.1.sect.5.n.17*): since all necessary propositions, of which we gave examples above, abstract from all existence of a thing. Therefore no condition or existence of the thing is necessary.

So that the method of constructing these three conversions may be committed to memory, dialecticians composed these verses:

FE is simply converted, EU per accidens. AS by contraposition — so the whole conversion is effected. A affirms, E negates — both universally. I affirms, O negates — both particularly.

In these verses four letters are noted — A, E, I, O. A denotes the universal affirmative; E, the universal negative; I, the particular affirmative; and O, the particular negative. And in the first two verses there are three expressions — *Feci*, *Eua*, and *Asto* — which represent the three conversions enumerated above. *Feci* refers to the first conversion, in which are found E — denoting the universal negative — and I — the particular affirmative — both to be converted by it in the manner explained above. *Eua* refers to the second conversion, which applies to E and A, denoting the universal negative and universal affirmative to be converted by it, as I showed through examples. *Asto* is composed of A and O, which signify the universal affirmative and particular negative to be transposed by this conversion, as I made clear above.

First Objection. "No animal is falsely a body; therefore no body is falsely an animal." This conversion is not valid, since the antecedent is true and the consequent false; and thus the universal negative is not converted by simple conversion.

Reply. Conversion is not to be performed in the manner found in the objection, but rather thus: "nothing that is falsely a body is an animal."

Second Objection. If the universal negative is converted per accidens, this — "no man is a woman" — would have to be converted into this — "some woman is not a man" — which is false. Therefore the canon of the second conversion is not correctly assigned.

Reply. The said universal negative is to be converted as follows: "some woman is not some man" — which is true and legitimate.

Question V. On the Modal Proposition

Nearly the same things are investigated in the modal proposition as in the absolute, as the Subtle Doctor indicates (*1.Priorum*, q.3.§. *Quantum ad 2.*; q.48, *ad finem.*). Therefore from what has been said about the absolute, what we are about to say about the modal can easily be understood.

Article I. What the Modal Proposition Is, and How Many Kinds There Are

The modal proposition — which Scotus mentions (q.25.m.§. *Quantum ad 1.*; and 2.d.3.q.9.) — is described as one that is qualified by some mode — as "it is necessary that a man be an animal," where *necessary* is the mode, by reason of which the proposition is called modal. A mode can be defined as that which modifies a proposition, or restricts its signification to a certain and determinate thing — as Scotus notes (*cit.* q.26.§. *Quantum ad 1.*); or, as Peter of Spain teaches: a mode is the determination of an adjacent thing. Thus *necessary* determines only those things that are bound together by an indissoluble bond, as is evident from the example given above. *Contingent* is the mode that limits those things that are joined by a dissoluble bond, such that they can be either conjoined or disjoined — as "it is contingent that a man be white." *Possible* is the mode that determines those things that exhibit no mutual repugnance — as "it is possible that a man be blessed." Now *possible* extends more broadly than *contingent*: for what is necessary is indeed possible, but it is not contingent; hence *possible* appears to abstract from necessary and contingent. *Impossible* is said of those things that are mutually repugnant — as "it is impossible that a man be a stone," since man and stone are mutually impossible terms. The description of mode given by the Scotists (*Tract. Formalitatum*, art.1.partiali), from Scotus (1.d.8.q.3.) — a mode is that which, added to a thing, does not change the thing — does not appear to be at odds with the description of mode given above: for when any of the said modes is added to a categorical proposition, the proposition itself is not changed but only modified.

In proportion to the four modes named above, a fourfold modal proposition is enumerated by Aristotle (2.*Periherm.*, c.2.) and Scotus (q.26.*primi Priorum*, §. *Quantum ad 2.*). The first is called the modal of necessity, which enunciates something as necessarily belonging to something. The second is the modal of contingency, which enunciates something as contingently belonging to something. The third is the modal of possibility, which enunciates something as able to belong to something. The fourth is the modal of impossibility, which enunciates something as repugnant to something. All these have been illustrated and confirmed by examples above; and they can be formed either nominally — when the mode is a noun, as "it is necessary that a tree be a body" — or adverbially — when the mode is an adverb, which among logicians is called a syncategoreme, as "a man is necessarily rational." Furthermore, as the same Doctor notes (*ibid.*, q.27.§. *Quantum ad 1.*; and §. *Quantum ad 2.*): in a modal proposition two things are found — the mode and the dictum. The mode has

already been explained by us; the dictum is everything placed in the modal besides the mode — perhaps so named because the mode is said of it.

First Objection. The definition of mode given by Peter of Spain belongs to an accident, which is adjacent and inheres in a subject; but an accident is not a mode, as is evident in itself. Therefore the definition of mode is not adequate and correct.

Reply. The major is to be taken of adjacency taken in a first-intentional, not a second-intentional, sense: for the mode of which we speak is adjacent to a proposition insofar as the latter is taken in a second-intentional sense.

Second Objection. No subject and no predicate is the determination of the copula; but the mode regards the subject or the predicate; therefore the mode is not the determination of an adjacent thing.

Reply. This instance is to be dissolved by the same distinction by which the preceding was dissolved. Thus the major is true taken in a first-intentional sense, but not in a second-intentional sense.

Article II. On the Matter, Form, Quantity, and Quality of the Modal Proposition

Just as in the hypothetical proposition the twofold subject of two simple propositions is its matter, and the twofold predicate of the same is its form — as is clear from (*q.3.art.3 of this book*) — so, since in the modal we discern a twofold subject — one of the mode and one of the dictum — and likewise a twofold predicate — of the mode and of the dictum — first, both subjects of the mode and dictum receive the name of matter; and second, both predicates of the dictum and mode receive the name of form — as I made clear at the cited place in a parallel case.

The quality of the modal is twofold: one arising from the mode, the other from the dictum. It can happen that on the part of both it is affirmative and true — as "that a man be an animal is necessary." Or that on the part of both it is negative and false — as "that a man not be a stone is not possible." Or that on the part of the mode it is negative, and on the part of the dictum affirmative — as "that a man be rational is not contingent." A modal proposition is said to be absolutely affirmative when it has an affirmative mode, even if the dictum is negative; and it is called absolutely negative when it has a negative mode, even if the dictum is affirmative. Furthermore, in a modal proposition there is a twofold quantity — in the dictum and in the mode. In the dictum, the quantity of the absolute proposition is found; in the mode, the quantity of the modal proposition itself. Now *necessary*, since it is a universal mode, always posits the thing in being; but *impossible* always removes it; *contingent* sometimes posits it, sometimes removes it; *possible* denotes that the thing can be. But absolutely the quantity of a modal enunciation is taken from the mode. If the mode is universal, the modal will be

universal; if the mode is particular, the modal will likewise be particular. There are two universal modes — namely *necessary* and *impossible* — and two particular modes — namely *possible* and *contingent*. If negation is prefixed to universal modes, they become particular — as *not-necessary*, *not-impossible*. But if negation is prefixed to particular modes, they become universal — as *not-possible*, *not-contingent*.

Objection. In the proposition "it is possible that every man sit," a common term is made the subject with a universal sign. Therefore the said proposition is universal — which conflicts with what we asserted above.

Reply. Such a universal sign does not determine the whole subject but only a part of the subject; therefore it is not to be considered a universal proposition — and the mode of the proposition named does not function in that way.

Article III. On the Opposition and Equipollence of Modals

The opposition and equipollence of modals can be perceived from the opposition of absolutes — just as the latter is achieved by adding or removing negations, so too is the former constituted by the addition or removal of negations. Yet since there are certain peculiarities in the opposition of modals that do not apply to the opposition of absolutes, these must be briefly and clearly set out and elucidated by us, lest the minds of beginners be dulled by a multitude of laws and obscurity of subject matter.

It must first be known that *possible* and *impossible*, and likewise *contingent* and *necessary*, are opposed modes. Moreover, propositions can be opposed and equipollent in two ways: either with respect to a mode of the same name — as "it is possible for Peter to run, it is possible for Peter not to run" — or with respect to a mode of a different name — as "it is possible for Peter to run, it is contingent for Peter to run." Next: propositions consisting of the same universal affirmative mode — if a negation is added to the dictum of one — are contraries, as "it is necessary that a man die, it is necessary that a man not die." But if negation is added to the mode alone, they are contradictories — as "it is necessary for Peter to run, it is not necessary for Peter to run." But if both propositions have a particular mode, and a negation is joined to the dictum of one, they become subcontraries — as "it is necessary for Peter to move when he runs, it is not necessary for Peter not to move when he runs." In any mode whatsoever, four modal propositions can be formed. The first is formed when the dictum and mode lack negation — as "it is possible for Peter to sit." The second, when negation is joined to the verb — as "it is possible for Peter not to eat." The third, when negation is added to the mode — as "it is not possible for Peter to sit." The fourth, when negation is joined to both — as "it is not possible for Peter not to sit."

Now, so that every opposition and equipollence of modals may be made clear, four letters are noted — A, E, I, V — which designate four different modal

propositions. A: affirmative with respect to mode and dictum — as "that a man be an animal is necessary." E: affirmative with respect to mode and negative with respect to dictum — as "that a man not be a stone is necessary." I: negative with respect to mode and affirmative with respect to dictum — as "it is not possible that a man be a stone." V: negative with respect to both — as "it is not necessary that a man not sit." All of this dialecticians indicate and comprehend in this verse:

E negates the dictum, I the mode; A nothing, but V the whole.

Furthermore, four orders were devised in which all opposed and equipollent modals are visible, signified by these four expressions: *Amabimus*, *Edentuli*, *Illiace*, *Purpurea* — which are read in these verses:

The first is Amabimus, the second Edentuli. The third Illiace, the remaining Purpurea.

For the sake of distinction and clarity, these expressions — together with all the opposed and equipollent propositions — are arranged as follows. The four syllables of each expression represent four equipollents, and the four letters represent affirmative or negative, universal or particular propositions, as I noted just above; and they are visible in the table below.

Explanation of the four orders given above: propositions residing in the third and fourth orders are contraries; those in the first and second are subcontraries; those in the first and third, and likewise in the second and fourth, are contradictories; those in the first and fourth, and likewise in the second and third, are subalterns. All of this is contained in these verses:

The third is always contrary to the fourth in order. Let the first and second line be subcontrary to you. The third is contradictory to the first. The second conflicts with the fourth by contradicting. The first is subaltern to the fourth, taking the role of particular. The second has itself following this same rule in the series.

Furthermore, observe that all enunciations of any of the four orders named are indeed equipollent to one another, as is evident upon inspection; and they are opposed insofar as those in one order regard those placed in the remaining lines — as is clearly shown in the table above. Finally, there remains the conversion of modals to be explained: this is derived with respect to the dictum, not the mode — as Scotus teaches (*1.Priorum*, q.25.) — as "that Paul sit is possible." The conversion of this is thus effected: "that some sitting person is Paul is possible." Therefore in the conversion of a modal, the principles of the absolute enunciation are observed; and thus nothing more seems to need to be added here that was not already noted at the place cited. I found only one among the moderns — Arriaga (*disp.2.sect.5.*) — who despises the letters and expressions enumerated above; indeed, in the section just cited he rejects the letters that along with expressions pertain to the conversion of simple enunciations. But unjustly: for they greatly assist the memory, and from inspection of them one

more easily calls to mind what is to be done in these matters — as, besides Arriaga, all dialecticians confess with one voice. Otherwise he would necessarily despise those that designate the useful modes of syllogisms in any figure — which he did not dare to deny; on the contrary, he adduces, explains, and uses them. Therefore, since the reason and use of the former are the same as those of the latter, he doubtless despises the former without cause while accepting the latter. Hence, if they are supported by some foundation and reason — either he must reject all or accept all.

First Objection. These two propositions are in the same order: "it is not possible for a man to run" and "it is impossible for every man to run," and yet they are not equipollent. Therefore propositions of the same order need not be equipollent.

Reply. The reason why they are not equipollent is that their subjects are not arranged uniformly.

Second Objection. "Every man possibly runs, some man impossibly runs" — these are propositions of the same line, yet they are not equipollent. Therefore, etc.

Reply. They are equipollent on the part of the subject, but not on the part of the mode, by reference to which the equipollence of a modal is derived.

Question VI. On the Exponible Proposition

An exponible proposition — from Scotus (*1.Priorum*, q.5.) — is one that needs exposition or clarification on account of some particle that renders it obscure. A proposition that is obscure is called exponible; those that expound or clarify it are called exponentes. Three principal species of exponible propositions are enumerated: exclusive, exceptive, and reduplicative — of which we must now treat in the two following articles.

Article I. On Exclusives

An exclusive proposition is one qualified by some exclusive syncategoreme — as Scotus states (*1.Priorum*, q.4.§. *oppositum*; and q.14, *in fine*) — as "only a man is rational." The exclusive syncategoremes are *tantum*, *solum*, *solummodo*, *duntaxat*, and similar expressions. An exclusive proposition can be spoken of in two ways: either as having an excluded predicate, or as having an excluded subject. In the first way it is formed when the exclusion excludes other predicates from the same subject — as "only a man is rational." In the second way it occurs when the exclusion excludes other subjects from the same predicate — that is, other subjects do not share the same predicate — as "only an animal is sensitive." In exclusive propositions this canon is noted: the excluding particle does not exclude those things that necessarily or contingently belong to the subject. For when one says "only a man is rational," *animal* and the rest that are necessarily or

contingently predicated of man are not excluded — such as whiteness, which contingently belongs to man and by reason of which he is called white — but only what is repugnant to man, as being a lion or a stone.

Four exclusive enunciations are presented by reason of the affirmation or negation of the exclusive syncategoreme and the verb. If no negation is prefixed to the exclusive particle and the verb, the first exclusive arises — as "only a man is risible." But if negation is placed above the exclusive sign, the second is formed — as "not only a man is white." If negation is added to the verb, the third is formed — as "only the rational soul is not immortal." But if one negation is joined to the exclusive expression and another to the verb, the fourth results — as "not only a man is not immortal." The aforesaid exponibles are explained through their exponentes by removing the exclusive syncategoreme while retaining the same subject. The first exclusive is expounded through a copulative hypothetical containing — from what was said above — two categoricals, of which the first must be a particular affirmative and the second a universal negative, as "only a man runs" is thus expounded: "some man runs, and nothing that is not a man runs." The second is explained through a disjunctive hypothetical containing two simple disjunct propositions, of which the first must be a universal negative and the second a particular affirmative — as "not only a man runs" is thus expounded: "no man runs, or some non-man runs." The third is expounded through a copulative hypothetical having a first particular negative categorical and a second universal affirmative categorical — as "only a man does not run" is thus expounded: "some man does not run, and everything other than man runs." The fourth: through a disjunctive hypothetical comprising two simples — the first universal affirmative and the second particular negative — as "not only a man does not run" is thus expounded: "every man runs, or some man does not run." So that the method of resolving these exclusives may be more firmly retained in memory, four expressions are to be taken — namely *Dives*, *Orat*, *Amo*, *Hely* — in which the four letters A, E, I, O are noted according to the signification we assigned above in the treatment of the conversion of absolute propositions; and the exclusives are to be resolved in the order we showed through these expressions with their letters, as may be seen in the present synopsis.

Some recent authors resist this common teaching of the summulists — especially Hurtado (*disp.4.sect.14.*), who says that a proposition of the first mode — such as "only a man runs" — cannot at all be resolved through a first universal affirmative and a second universal negative, as "every man runs and nothing other than a man runs." Likewise, in necessary matter one would badly resolve an indefinite proposition — such as "only a man is rational" — into these two: "some man is rational, and nothing other than man is rational," because besides some man, something else is rational — namely, two, and all men are rational.

Against this: first, the subject of an exclusive is not marked by a universal sign but must be indefinite — and if an indefinite proposition is equivalent to a universal, not however in contingent matter, of which Hurtado himself gives the example. Furthermore, the intention of the summulists is not to convert or transpose exponible propositions. For it is not in doubt that an exclusive — with verb and sign affirmed — is convertible into a universal affirmative: as "only a man is rational; therefore every rational thing is a man." But rather to explain them and render obscure things clear — not to resolve the obscure through the obscure; but to convert said propositions, as Hurtado does, is rather to obscure than to clarify them. For it is at least as difficult, or equally difficult, to grasp "nothing other than a man runs" as "only a man runs," since one is an exclusive and the other an exceptive — both exponibles. But an exponible is not expounded through an exponible, but through two exponentes that are not in turn exponible — as Hurtado himself does not deny, and Scotus indicates (*1.d.21.q.un.sub A.*). Therefore the summulists rightly expound this — "only a man is rational" — as follows: "a man is rational, and nothing that is not a man is rational."

The recent authors press further: these are contradictories — according to the summulists — "only a man runs: not only a man runs," because the negative particle making the whole proposition negative renders it contradictory to the affirmative, and they cannot be simultaneously false — which conflicts with the law of contradictories. For if no one runs, this is false: "only a man runs," since neither man alone nor any companion of man runs. Likewise this is false: "not only a man runs," since neither man alone nor anything other than man runs — so that two contradictories would be simultaneously false. But these and similar arguments that the authors cited adduce against us are of no moment. For if in absolute contradictories this gives rise to no difficulty, neither does it in these exclusives. For these exclusives — "only a man runs, not only a man runs" — are pronounced absolutely and not from a hypothesis. For this rule is correctly established: a negation prefixed to an entire proposition renders it contradictory to the preceding proposition. Nor from this are propositions granted that offend pious ears, as Arriaga deduces (*subsect.3.*): as "not only God is blasphemous" — because its contradictory, "God is blasphemous," is false; therefore the former must be true. To dissolve this I note with Scotus (*1.d.11.q.un.¶. Ad g.A.*), after Aristotle (*1.Elench., c.4.*), that the word *solus* (only, alone) can be taken in two ways — categorematically and syncategorematically. *Solus* categorematically is the same as *solitary* — as is found in *Matthew 14*: "He went up into the mountain alone"; and *Mark 6*: "The ship was in the midst of the sea, and he alone on land." But *solus* syncategorematically is taken in relation to another, whose company is denied — as in *Psalms 71*: "Who alone does wonderful things"; and *Psalms 85*: "You are God alone." From these it is clear that if *solus* is taken syncategorematically, the said proposition is false — for the sense would be that God and others are blasphemous — unless the explanation is immediately added: either "God is not

blasphemous" or "another is blasphemous" — which does not seem to square with its proper sense. For its sense is that God is blasphemous, along with others associated with him — as when Christ said "I am not alone." Accordingly I judge the response to be: that the aforesaid rule does not hold when the subject of the proposition is incapable of its predicate, for in that case the extremes cannot be joined and hence cannot be associated or dissociated. This can be deduced from other parallel cases — such as "not only God is infinite, not only God is immense," and so on. The reason why, when negation is prefixed to an exclusive expression, the exposition is through a disjunction is that it is proper to signs of distribution, when they are prevented by others, not to distribute; and accordingly, just as the supposition is not distributive, so those propositions that are qualified by these signs are not to be explained copulatively.

Article II. On Exceptive and Reduplicative Propositions

An exceptive proposition — from Pelbartus (*Tomo 2. Rosarii, ante §.1.*) — is one that is qualified by some exceptive sign by reason of which it is rendered obscure and hence exponible — as "every animal except man is irrational." The exceptive signs are *praeter* (except), *praeterquam* (save that), *nisi* (unless), and similar expressions, which make propositions obscure and exponible through others equivalent to them — as "no animal except man is rational" is expounded thus: "among animals, man is rational, and nothing else." As many exceptive propositions can be formed as exclusive ones; their number, opposition, and other details, which the older dialecticians treat at length, I do not judge it opportune or necessary to adduce and examine.

A reduplicative proposition — from Scotus (*1.Priorum, q.35. §. Quantum ad 1.*) — is one that is qualified by some reduplicative sign, by reason of which it is obscure and therefore exponible. The reduplicative signs are *quatenus* (insofar as), *inquantum* (inasmuch as), *prout* (as), and other expressions of this form, which make propositions obscure and exponible through others equivalent to them — as "a man insofar as he is a man is capable of reason" is expounded thus: "a man, because he is rational, is capable of reason" — as is clear from (*Quol.3.H. d.11.q.2.*). For the reduplicating sign denotes that the cause of something is the formal reason upon which it reduplicates, as the Doctor indicates (*q.7.Universalium, §. Ad 1.*). As many reduplicatives are enumerated as there are exceptives and exclusives — about which and similar matters I shall not discourse further, but they can be seen at length in Major and Tatarctus, who discuss them abundantly.

Objection. This is not a reduplicative proposition: "Peter drinks as much as he can," even though it contains the reduplicative sign *inquantum*; therefore the reduplicative enunciation was not aptly described.

Reply. A reduplicative sign does not constitute a reduplicative proposition if it is taken adverbially — as it is taken in the argument; it does constitute one if it is

taken conjunctionally, as it is taken in the present context, whether the reduplication is with respect to the subject or the predicate.

Question VII. On Division and Definition

Three instruments — or modes of knowing — are enumerated in logic, as Tataretus notes near the beginning of his exposition of the *Summulae*, together with other dialecticians: division, definition, and argumentation. Of the first two we shall treat in the present question; of the third in the following book. It is not inappropriate to join a question on division and definition to this book, since they are either perfect or at least imperfect sentences and propositions.

Article I. On Division

Scotus notes (*1.d.3.q.1.¶. Loquendo igitur, N.*) that through definition we obtain distinct knowledge of the thing being sought; hence he says that division should precede definition — unless circumstances require otherwise — as Antonius Andreas indicates in his exposition of Boethius's little book on division. Division is described as a sentence by which a whole is distributed into its parts — as "a lion is divided into body and soul." The whole that is divided is called the *divisum* (the divided), and the parts into which the whole is separated are called the *dividing members*. There is a twofold division — from the Doctor (*q.23.Universalium*; and *1.d.3.q.1., ante F.; and infra N.*): one of the name and the other of the thing. For the whole that is divided is either a name having several significations, or a thing having several parts. In the first case the former division is had — as when *dog* is divided into terrestrial, marine, and celestial. In the second case the latter division is had — as when *living* is divided into vegetating, sensing, and understanding. Moreover, since one whole is real and another rational, it follows that one division is real — whereby a real whole is divided into its real parts — and another is of reason — whereby a whole of reason is distributed into its parts of reason, as a proposition into subject and predicate. Real division is fourfold, corresponding to the fourfold nature of the whole: integral, universal, essential, and accidental. Integral division is that by which an integral whole is divided into its parts — which is either homogeneous, that is, having parts of the same account, as flesh is divided into parts that share the same name and account of flesh; or heterogeneous, that is, having parts of different accounts, as of man one part is the head, another the heart, another the feet. Opposed to this is entitative division, by which an entitative whole is divided into its entitative parts — as the whole of matter into its material parts, of which in *Physics*. The division of the universal whole is into its subjective parts, which occurs when the more universal is divided into the less universal — as animal into man and brute. This is called logical division, which is either of a genus into its species — as color into whiteness and blackness — or of a species into its individuals, or of a genus into its differences, or of a difference into differences — as rational into this or that rational. The division of the essential

whole is into essential parts, and is twofold according to the twofold nature of the essential whole: either it is the division of the physical essential whole into physical parts — as body is divided into matter and form — or of the metaphysical essential whole into metaphysical parts, which are genus and difference. The former is called by Scotus (*1.d.3 and 8.*) the division into thing and thing; the latter, into reality and reality. One may add the division of a thing into its modes — whereby being is distributed into infinite and finite — and likewise the division of the potential whole into its powers and potencies — as one part of the soul is intellective, another appetitive — as is clear from the Doctor (*2.d.16.q.un.*), following Aristotle (*1.Praedicamentorum, c.5.*). The accidental division of the total accidental whole into its parts is threefold — which Scotus intimates (*1.Post., q.18., near the beginning*). The first is the division of an accident into its subjects, which occurs when the divided is an accident of the dividing members — as "of colored things, some are men, some are lions, some are stones." The second is the division of the subject into accidents, which occurs when the dividing members are accidents of the divided — as "of stones, some are white, some are black." The third is the division of accident into accidents, which occurs when both the divided and the dividing members are accidents of the same subject — as "of sweet things, some are white, some are yellow."

Four rules of good division are transmitted, of which the first is drawn from (*2.Post., c.5.*): the divided and the dividing members taken together must be adequate — as when animal is divided into rational and irrational, *animal* is the divided, *rational* and *irrational* are the dividing members, which are mutually adequate, for *animal* extends as broadly as *rational and irrational* together. The second: division must be made into members that are more proximate and immediate — as *substance* is correctly distributed into incorporeal and corporeal, not into inanimate and animate. The third: the dividing members must not coincide, but must be mutually opposed — as "of animals, some are men, some are brutes." Lacking this, this division is defective: "of animals, some are living, some are sensing," because *sensing* includes *living*, and the same thing can be both living and sensing simultaneously. The fourth: division should be made through as few members as possible — as "of sensing things, some are capable of reason, some lack reason." Hence, to avoid excessive multiplication of dividing members, a negation is sometimes added to one extreme — as "bodies are either living or non-living." The Philosopher hints at this (*6.Top., c.3.*; and *1.de partibus, c.3.*), using this example: "of magnitudes, some are lines, some are non-lines."

Objection. Only three conditions of division are commonly enumerated by Scotists, as may be seen in Tataretus (*in expositione Petri Hispani, fol.1.nota.3.*). Therefore four are incorrectly enumerated by us.

Reply. Those four are contained in the three; for the fourth was added so that the nature of division might be more clearly known to us — since division was devised to clarify an entire thing in its parts. A parallel holds for definition, of

which three conditions are recounted by Scotus (*1.Priorum, q.5.*) and five by the same author (*4.d.1.q.2.*) — which five are comprehended in those three. The same was done by him regarding the subject of a science, as we noted (*l.1.q.3.art.1 of Scotian Logic*).

Article II. On Definition

Much has been said about definition by John Major (*c. de genere*), Briansonius (*4.q.3.conclusionem 2.corollario 3.*), the twin Scotists (*disp.1.q.2.art.1, 2, 3.*), and not a few others; we shall briefly set out what is most necessary and pertinent. A definition is a sentence explaining the nature of a thing, as Scotus writes (*2.d.1.q.5.¶. Contra ista.1.*; and *3.d.22.q.un.¶. Rationes, sub C.*), following Aristotle (*1.Top., c.4.*; and *6. of the same work, c.1.*; and *7.Met., Tex.41 and 42.*). That whose nature is explained is called the *definitum* (defined), and that which explains the nature of the defined is called the *definitio* (definition). For what the defined designates implicitly and confusedly, the definition declares explicitly and perspicuously — as "a man is a rational animal." *Man* is the defined, and *rational animal* is the definition, though not infrequently the whole sentence is used in this way. A twofold definition is assigned by philosophers — especially Scotus (*2.Post., q.6.*; *1.Priorum, q.5.*; and *4.d.1.q.2.*). One is a definition of the name, the other of the thing. The definition of a name — from the same Doctor in the fourth cited and (*q.d.22.q.1.¶. Potest dici*) — is a sentence that explains the origin, interpretation, or etymology of the name — as "dialectic is the science of disputation," "logic is the science of discourse," "rock is that which wears down feet." The definition of a thing is a sentence declaring the nature of a thing — as "a man is a rational animal." This is in turn twofold: essential and descriptive. An essential definition is one that distinctly expresses the essence or quiddity of a thing — and is subdivided into physical and metaphysical or logical. The physical expresses the nature of a thing through matter and form — as "a man is a whole composed of body and rational soul." The metaphysical declares the nature of a thing through genus and difference — as "an animal is an animated sensitive being." A descriptive definition — also called a definition by addition — is a sentence explaining something extrinsic to the nature of the thing. This can be done in three ways: first, through genus and a proper property of the thing — as "a lion is a roaring animal"; second, through an extrinsic cause — as "a man is conditioned for attaining beatitude"; third, through common accidents — as "a man is a featherless two-footed animal." I note moreover that properly speaking there is no definition of non-being, the impossible, the negative, and the privative — because just as these do not possess a proper essence and quiddity, so neither do they have a definition. Hence Scotus adds (*4. already cited, ¶. Hic primo.A.*) that properly defined are positive being, a being that is one through itself, real, composite, and universal.

Four principal rules of good definition are observed. The first: a definition must distinctly explain what the defined designates confusedly; the reason is that a

definition ought to be clearer than the defined, since it was devised so that things might be clearly known to us — as the Stagirite notes (6.*Top.*, c.1.) and Scotus confirms (1.*Priorum*, q.5.). The second: a definition must convert with the defined. For this reason it is perhaps called by philosophers a *term*, because it is terminated at the essence it defines and does not go beyond it — as Briansonius especially observes at the place recently cited. The third: a definition must contain nothing superfluous and nothing deficient. Hence this is not a correct definition: "a man is a rational, mortal, and teachable animal," because the last two expressions are superfluous. Whether one name corresponds to one definition, see Scotus (*Quol.*13.), Lychetus, and Gadius there. The fourth: from Scotus (1.*Post.*, q.24.§. *Ad q. dicitur*; and 4.d.11.q.3., *infra CC.*) a definition is not to be given through a remote genus and remote difference — since a species, which is properly what is defined, is not constituted from remote genus and difference; and therefore this is not a good definition: "a man is a living substance" — because in it are found neither the proximate genus nor the proximate difference.

First Objection. If a definition is had only of a real positive being, then there will be no definition of a being of reason; but since a definition is the middle term of demonstration and the science of the same effect, it follows that logic — which considers second intentions, which are beings of reason — is not a science, which conflicts with Scotus (q. *Suae Dialecticae*).

Reply. I distinguish the consequence: of a being of reason there is no definition in the strict sense, I grant; there is no definition in the broad sense, I deny. For just as a being of reason has its own essence, so likewise it has a definition that explains that essence. And such a definition suffices for acquiring demonstration and causing science, as the Doctor notes (4.d.1.q.2.§. *De secundo principali*, I.) and Aristotle indicates (2.*Post.*, c.7.).

Second Objection. It is easier to define the singular than the universal. Therefore there is a definition of singulars, and accordingly it is not necessary that what is defined be universal. The antecedent is from Aristotle (2.*Post.*, c.15.).

Reply. Toletus, commenting there, explains that by *singular* in that place the less universal is meant, because the more universal are more abstract and more difficult to know. Whether there is definition and demonstration of singulars will be examined in our questions of Scotian Logic against Bonetus in the Metaphysics and Arriaga (*disp.*3.*Summularum*, n.7.sect.1.).

Book III. On the Terminated

The terminated — or composite from both incomplex and complex terms — is without doubt the syllogism, to be treated in this last book. For the terminated is always defined and explained through the terminating — as the Subtle Doctor

correctly notes (2.d.3.q.9.§. *Ad argumenta, sub L.*). Knowledge of this structure is what dialectic chiefly looks to, and Aristotle testifies that he labored long in its discovery — hence he rightly demands that thanks be rendered to him at the close of the *Elenchi*. For the syllogism is the object and end of the whole of Aristotelian dialectic, as I touched upon in the preface to this little work. Therefore thanks are rightly owed to the Stagirite himself, who both discovered it and treated it thoroughly. In this book four questions are raised: the first on the syllogism taken generally; the second on the same taken specifically; the third on dialectical topics; and the fourth on the sophistical syllogism.

Question I. On the Syllogism in General

Since in every discipline the more general precedes the less general — just as a genus precedes its species — which we observed Aristotle to have followed at the very beginning of the first book — it is not inappropriate that we premise a question on the syllogism in general, so that we may afterward treat of it in particular.

Article I. How Many Things Are Required to Constitute a Syllogism

A syllogism is constructed from three terms — as Scotus notes along with the other dialecticians (1.*Elench.*, q.4.§. *Ad 1.arg.*; and 1.*Priorum*, q.1.) — and from three propositions and an inferential particle, *ergo* (therefore) or *igitur* (hence). Of the terms, one is called the major extreme, another the minor extreme, and the third the middle term or medium — as Scotus indicates (q.11.*Praedicamentali*). Of the propositions, one is called the major, another the minor, and the third the conclusion. For the proposition in which the major extreme resides — or in which the greater force of the syllogism is found — is called the major; the one in which the minor extreme resides — or in which the lesser force of the syllogism is found — is called the minor; and the one that is gathered from those two is called the conclusion — though the one placed first is called the major, the one second the minor, and the one third the conclusion. All of this may be illustrated in this syllogism: "every animal is living; every lion is an animal; therefore every lion is living." The first two propositions are called the premisses, because they are put before the conclusion; and the last — which is derived from those two — receives the name of conclusion, as I was just saying. The major extreme in directly concluding syllogisms is called the predicate; the minor extreme, the subject; and the third term, the middle — because it mediates between those two said extremes and is never placed in the conclusion. The inferential word *therefore* or *hence* is the sign by which the conclusion is inferred from the premisses.

Objection. "If every man were running, and Paul were a man, Paul would be running." In this discourse "Paul would be running" is the conclusion; "every man were running" is the major; "Paul were a man" is the minor — yet there is a kind of complex in which neither major nor minor nor inferential word is

evident. Therefore not every syllogism consists of three propositions and an inferential particle as explained.

Reply. Although in the said argument the three propositions with the inferential sign are not formally found, they are nevertheless virtually and equivalently present — which suffices for it to be counted as a syllogism.

Article II. From What the Syllogism Is Composed

Since the syllogism is a certain whole, it must necessarily be composed of parts, some of which among dialecticians are called material and some formal. The material parts are either remote — namely the incomplex terms — or proximate — namely the complex terms, or propositions. The formal parts are figure and mode, of which Scotus makes mention (*q.45.Elench.*; and *q.34.primi Priorum.*). Figure is the correct ordering of the middle term with the extremes by reason of due predication and subjecthood. Mode is the correct ordering of the three said propositions by reason of due quantity and quality. Due quantity is observed when at least one of the premisses is universal; and due quality, when at least one of the premisses is affirmative. Thus the matter of a syllogism is the incomplex and complex terms; and the form of the same is the correct ordering of the terms and premisses for inferring a good conclusion. I know that dialecticians distinguish another extrinsic matter of the syllogism — concerning necessary, possible, contingent, and impossible subject matter — of which I made mention (*l.2.q.2.art.3.divisione 6.*). Hence we sometimes say a syllogism concludes by reason of matter, sometimes by reason of form, and sometimes by reason of both.

Objection. In spiritual things matter and form are not found — for in this it differs from the material, that the material is capable of matter while the spiritual is devoid of it; but the syllogism is something spiritual, being an operation of the intellect stripped of all matter. Therefore material and formal parts of the syllogism are assigned incorrectly.

Reply. I distinguish the major: of proper matter and form, which is physical, I grant; of improper and analogical matter and form, which is logical or metaphysical, I deny. To the clarification of the major, the proof of the minor is to be correspondingly distinguished.

Article III. What the Syllogism Is, and How Many Kinds There Are

A syllogism — called by Aristotle a reasoning, discourse, and argumentation (*1.Priorum, c.3.*; *1.Top., c.1.*; and *1.Elench., c.1.*) — is defined as a sentence in which, when certain things are posited, something else necessarily follows from them, because they are what they are. It is explained as follows: *sentence* is said — that is, argumentation — as Scotus interprets it (*q.3.Universalium, §. Ad rationem positionis*). Or, as Tataretus says in his *Summulae (Tract.4)*, following Scotus (*q.5.primi Priorum, §. Quantum ad 2.*), *sentence* is placed in the role of genus, and is

understood of a composite sentence, not a simple one; for a proposition is indeed a sentence, but not a syllogism. And *sentence* is also placed so as to differ from incomplex terms. *When certain things are posited* — that is, when two premisses are arranged in due mode and figure. *Something else* — that is, the conclusion, which proceeds from both premisses and is different from them. *Necessarily follows* — because of the things posited — supplement: by the power of the syllogistic form the conclusion is necessarily deduced. For through the power of the medium duly united with the extremes in the premisses, one extreme is concluded to be enunciated of the other — as is clear in this syllogism: "every animal is sensitive; every man is an animal; therefore every man is sensitive."

First and principally, a syllogism is divided by John Major into syllogisms of the first, second, and third figure, as will be shown below and illustrated with examples in Article V. Second, into simple, hypothetical, and modal — whose explanation is roughly the same as that given for simple, hypothetical, and modal propositions in the preceding book. For a simple or categorical syllogism is one consisting of three categorical propositions — as "every body is substance; the sky is a body; therefore the sky is substance." A hypothetical syllogism is one that, besides three propositions, contains some conditional, copulative, or disjunctive particle — as is clear from what was said in (*l. cited, art.4.q.2.*). A modal syllogism is one that participates in some of the modes enumerated in (*q.5.art.2.*) — as "an animal is necessarily a body; a man is an animal; therefore a man is necessarily a body." Third, into demonstrative, dialectical, sophistical, and pseudographic — which the Doctor mentions (*1.Post., ad finem, q.1.; q.44, vers. Ad oppositum; and 1.Priorum, q.2.*). A demonstrative syllogism is one that proceeds from first, true, necessary premisses that are causes of the conclusion — as "every rational being is risible; every man is rational; therefore every man is risible." A dialectical syllogism is one formed from probables — and probables are those things that seem so to all, or to most, or to the wise, or to the most approved — as "every mother loves her child; Olympia is a mother; therefore Olympia loves her child." A sophistical syllogism is one that proceeds from apparent things — or from those that seem necessary, probable, and true, but are not — as "whatever you have not lost, you have; you have not lost a treasure; therefore you have a treasure." A pseudographic syllogism is one formed from the proper principles of a discipline taken with a misunderstanding — as "all semicircles are equal; but larger and smaller semicircles are semicircles; therefore larger and smaller circles are equal." The major is understood by mathematicians of semicircles of the same circle, not of different circles — as is deduced in the argument. The first syllogism generates science; the second, opinion; the third, deception; and the fourth, error. Whether these four are species of the syllogism, see Scotus (*1.Priorum, q.6.*), Major (*Tract. de syllogismo* in the exposition of the first chapter), and what I wrote in (*l.5.q.1.art.3.*). Fourth, into a syllogism consisting of a common middle — as nearly all the syllogisms

enumerated above — and one consisting of a singular middle, such as the expository syllogism, which clearly presents a thing and is formed in the third figure, where the middle term — which is singular — is always aptly subjected — as "this man is wise; this man is Socrates; therefore Socrates is wise." And also into a syllogism from obliques, mentioned by the Doctor (*1.Priorum*, q.34.), which consists of some oblique term or grammatical case — as "of opposites there is the same discipline; heat and cold are opposites; therefore of heat and cold there is the same discipline." Fifth, into formal and objective. The formal is the act of the intellect by which we reason about objects capable of being reasoned about. The objective is the reasoned-about object itself, about which the intellect reasons and syllogizes — as Scotus indicates (*1.Post.*, q.22.§. *Contra.*). Sixth, into affirmative — which by the force of affirming premisses affirms something of something in the conclusion — and negative — which from premisses, or from a negative premiss, denies something of something in the conclusion. Seventh, from (*1.Priorum*, c.2., cited by Scotus q.3.*Universalium*, §. *Ad 1.*), into perfect and imperfect. A perfect syllogism is one that needs nothing more for the necessity and evidence of its inference to be gathered, beyond what has been presented to it. It relies on the principles *of every* or *of none*, which are naturally known. An imperfect syllogism is one that needs one or more things for its necessity and evidence to become apparent. These and the preceding divisions will become better known from the following articles, in which all the modes of syllogizing, both perfect and imperfect, will be presented and discussed. Add the division of the syllogism into ostensive and leading to the impossible, which the Doctor presents (*2.Priorum*, q.1.); and also into converse, of which he makes mention (*ibid.*, q.5.); and circular — the same place, q.4.; and from appended terms, as he writes (*1.Priorum*, q.34.); and similar ones, which will be explained in their proper place.

The four modes of argumentation are not to be passed over; these the Doctor presents (*q.Priorum*, q.2.) and calls the syllogism, enthymeme, induction, and example. Since I have already explained the syllogism above, only the remaining three forms of argumentation remain to be explained. An enthymeme is a truncated or imperfect syllogism consisting of only two propositions, of which the first is called the antecedent and the second the consequent — as "a man is an animal; therefore a man is sensitive." Induction is an argumentation from singulars sufficiently enumerated to universals — as "fire, air, water, and earth are simple bodies; therefore every element is a simple body." Scotus makes mention of this (*2.Priorum*, q.ult.; and *2.d.29.q.K.*). An example is a reasoning from one singular to another singular — as "God spared Peter when he did penance; therefore he will also spare me if I do penance." These last three modes of syllogizing are reduced to the syllogism as imperfect to perfect — they derive their force and perfection from it. Moreover, induction is sometimes a conjoined syllogism, which is reduced to the simple categorical one; and sometimes an enthymeme, as is clear from the example of induction

given above. An example, however, is an imperfect induction, as was just declared by the argument of the example given.

First Objection. Scotus (*1.Post., q.f.*) denies that the syllogism can be defined. Therefore in his school the definition of the syllogism given above is vain and the explanation pointless.

Reply. Scotus is to be interpreted as speaking of definition in the strict sense, which is had only of a real positive and incomplex being — as the Doctor notes (*4.d.1.q.1.*) — not of definition in the broad sense, which belongs to a being of reason such as the syllogism. And he discusses and clearly declares this at the place now cited.

Second Objection. Some syllogisms exist in which the premisses are not conceded. Therefore the syllogism is not correctly defined as a sentence in which certain things are posited — that is, conceded.

The antecedent is proved: "every man is a dog; Brunellus is a man; therefore Brunellus is a dog." This syllogism is false, and in it the premisses are not conceded, because they are false and impossible.

Reply. It may be said that *posited* is not well expounded as *conceded*, but as *arranged and correctly ordered in mode and figure* — as our nonseparated contemporaries observe (*Tract.3.c.5.*), with Tataretus. Or, if the clause *conceded* is admitted, it is to be understood not absolutely but conditionally — namely, if the premisses are conceded, the conclusion must also be conceded.

Pressing further: given the premisses as conceded, it is not necessary that the conclusion be conceded; therefore the reply is null.

Reply. Given the premisses as conceded, the conclusion must certainly be conceded — with the necessity not of the consequent but of the consequence.

Third Objection. The conclusion is not a part of the syllogism. Therefore the syllogism is falsely described as a sentence in which certain things are posited, etc.

The antecedent is proved: the syllogism is said to produce science or opinion; but science and opinion are about the conclusion itself, or rather concern the conclusion itself.

Reply. The antecedent is denied. In reply to its proof, a distinction is drawn: if the syllogism is taken for the premisses alone — as the Philosopher took it in (*2.Priorum*) — it is granted; but if it is taken for the composite of three propositions duly ordered — as the same Aristotle took it in defining the syllogism itself — it is denied. But more on this elsewhere.

Article IV. On the Regulative Principles of the Syllogism

The two principles directing the syllogism are the *dictum de omni* (said of every) and the *dictum de nullo* (said of none), as Aristotle establishes (*1.Priorum*, at the end of the first chapter) and Scotus confirms (*ibid.*, *1.Priorum*, q.7.; *1.Elench.*, q.7.; q.36; and *q.ultima.*). The *dictum de omni* is described and explained thus: whatever is generally affirmed of some subject is also affirmed of all things contained under that very subject — as if *body* is universally affirmed of *animal*, it will likewise be affirmed of *lion*, which is comprehended under *animal* — as is clear in this syllogism: "every animal is a body; a lion is an animal; therefore a lion is a body." This principle rests on the very firm foundation that those things that are the same as some one third thing are the same as one another — which the Philosopher states at the cited place and in (*1.Phys.*; *7.Top.*), and which Gadius adduces (*Quol.11.fol.123.column*) and Scotus explains (*1.d.2.q.7.§.d.1.argumentum principale II.*; and *4.d.10.q.1.§. Ad in contrarium D.*): whatever things are the same to something by some identity, those things are the same to one another by that same identity, because no identity of extremes with one another can be concluded except according to that identity by which they are the same as the middle, and the middle is itself the same in this way; and through this proposition, so understood, every syllogistic form holds. The *dictum de nullo* is explained thus: whatever is universally denied of some subject is also denied of all things contained under that same subject — as if *spirit* is denied of *animal*, it will certainly be denied of *dog*, which is contained under *animal*. This is plainly evident in this syllogism: "no animal is a spirit; every dog is an animal; therefore no dog is a spirit." This principle rests on that most stable foundation: those things that are not the same as some one third thing are not the same as one another; for the opposite of the predicate destroys the subject, and if the premisses are not conjoined in the middle, neither will they be conjoined with one another in the conclusion — as Scotus indicates (*in 1. cit.*, q.4.; and *1.Priorum*, q.10.§. *secundo notandum.*). It must moreover be known that a consequence is the deduction or relation of the following of an antecedent to a consequent, and it is twofold: material and formal. A material consequence is the relation of the necessary conjunction of antecedent with consequent — as "it is a man; therefore it is risible." A formal consequence is the relation of premisses ordered in due mode and figure to inferring the conclusion — as "every good is to be embraced; every justice is good; therefore every justice is to be embraced." Furthermore, note that there is a difference between a consequence and a consequent. For a consequence is what was just described; the consequent, however, is the proposition placed after the inferential mark. Hence dialecticians deny the consequence of the proposed enthymeme, but not the consequent; and they distinguish the consequent, but never the consequence.

Objection. If the aforesaid proposition were always a true and firm foundation, this syllogism would be legitimate: "those things that are the same as some one third thing are the same as one another; but the divine persons are entirely the

same as the divine essence; therefore the divine persons are the same as one another" — which is false and heretical, as Scotus argues (*1.Priorum*, q.9.).

Reply. From Scotus in the first work cited, that holds in limited and finite things, but not in unlimited and infinite things. For this does not follow well: "Peter is simultaneously with God in Avignon, and the Supreme Pontiff is also simultaneously with that same God in Rome; therefore Peter and the Supreme Pontiff are simultaneous." By this, other sophisms are dissolved, Scotus says — especially this one: "this God is the Father; but the Son is this God; therefore the Son is the Father." Or, if it is granted absolutely — as Scotus at the cited first place does — it is to be expounded in the way expounded above; nor from this does any error or heresy follow. For it is correctly said that the three persons are the same as one another by essential identity, though not by personal identity — whatever some recent authors may say, who are to be refuted in (*l.4 of our questions*).

Second Objection. When the major is in the present tense and the minor is in the past or future, the conclusion does not follow — as "every man is an animal; Adam was a man; therefore Adam is an animal." And thus the *dictum de omni* does not always hold with truth.

Reply. The said discourse is not governed by that principle; hence it is no wonder that the argument does not hold. The major is indeed founded on the principle *de omni*; but not the minor — for it has a different sense, because it regards the past existence of Adam, while the *dictum de omni* placed in the major abstracts from all existence — as is clearly established from the explanation given above.

Article V. On the Figures and Modes of the Syllogism

Since the syllogistic figure is described as the correct positioning of the middle term with the extremes by reason of due predication and subjecthood — as I said in Article II of this question — as many different figures will be constituted as there are different correct dispositions of the middle with the extremes. And with Aristotle in the present work and Scotus in the same (*q.22, 23, 24*; and elsewhere), I find three correct and natural orderings of this kind, and therefore only three syllogistic figures. If the middle is subjected in the major and predicated in the minor, the first figure arises — as "every substance is a being; every stone is a substance; therefore every stone is a being." If in both premisses the middle is predicated, the second figure is born — as "no stone is rational; every man is rational; therefore no man is a stone." But if in both premisses the middle is subjected, the third figure is formed — as "every stone is a substance; every stone is a body; therefore some body is a substance." The syllogistic mode — which from what has been said is the correct ordering of premisses by reason of due quantity and quality — is twofold: direct and indirect. Direct is when in the conclusion the major extreme is predicated of the minor extreme — as

"every body is substance; every tree is a body; therefore every tree is substance." Indirect is when in the conclusion the minor extreme is predicated of the major extreme — as if from the said syllogism this conclusion were inferred: "therefore some substance is a tree."

All the useful modes of the said figures suitable for concluding are nineteen: nine of the first figure — four of them directly concluding and perfect, the remaining five indirectly concluding and imperfect, reducible to the four prior perfect ones. Four following belong to the second figure, and the last six to the third figure. All of these, so that they may be more easily recalled to memory, are clearly set out in the following verses:

Barbara, Celarent, Darii, Ferio, Baralipon. Celantes, Dabitis, Fapesmo, Frisesomorum. Cesare, Camestres, Festino, Baroco, Darapti. Felapton, Disamis, Datisi, Bocardo, Ferison.

In these verses there are as many modes of the figures as there are expressions aptly placed; and in each expression three syllables are noted, signifying the three propositions from which the syllogism is constructed: the first syllable designates the major, the second the minor, and the third the conclusion. The four letters A, E, I, O indicate what the propositions must be like in quality and quantity — they are explained in much the same way as they were explained in (*l.2.q.4.art.4.*). If in the said expressions anything more is present — as in *Baralipon* — it is placed for the sake of meter. The remaining consonant letters C, M, S, and P, which appear in some of the said names, stand for the reduction of imperfect syllogisms to perfect ones, as will be clear below.

Objection. Some syllogisms are held to be good even though they are not placed in any of the figures named above. Therefore more than three syllogistic figures are to be admitted. The antecedent is proved: this syllogism is good, though it does not reside in any of the three figures — "every man is an animal; no animal is a stone; therefore no stone is a man."

Reply. This argument asks whether a fourth syllogistic figure is given — which we refer to its proper place, namely (*l. quaestionum, q.1.art.6, Logicae Scoticae*).

Article VI. On the Modes of the First Figure

The modes of the first figure are presented with examples, supplied to us so that each person may more correctly and readily compose good reasonings — of which Scotus treats (*1.Priorum, q.22.*).

The first mode of the first figure is called Barbara, consisting of three universal affirmative propositions, an example of which I give immediately below.

Bar: Every body is substance. *ba:* Every tree is a body. *ra:* Therefore, every tree is substance.

The second mode is called Celarent, consisting of a universal negative major, a universal affirmative minor, and a universal negative conclusion. Example:

Cæ: No stone is animate. *rent*: Every diamond is a stone. Therefore, no diamond is animate.

The third mode is *Darii*, which is formed from a universal affirmative major, a particular affirmative minor, and a particular affirmative conclusion. Example:

Da: Every animal is living. *ri*: Some horse is an animal. *i*: Therefore, some horse is living.

The fourth mode is *Ferio*, having a universal negative major, a particular affirmative minor, and a particular negative conclusion. Example:

Fe: No animal is devoid of life. *ri*: Some dog is an animal. *o*: Therefore, some dog is not devoid of life.

The fifth mode *Baralippton* is formed from two universal affirmative premisses, with a third particular affirmative indirectly concluding. Example:

Bara: Every animated thing is a body. *li*: Every cherry is animated. *pton*: Therefore, some body is a cherry.

The sixth mode, *Celantes*, is composed of a universal negative major, a universal affirmative minor, and a universal negative indirect conclusion. Example:

Cæ: No animal is insensible. *lan*: Every man is an animal. *tes*: Therefore, no insensible thing is a man.

The seventh mode, *Dabitis*, is constructed from a universal affirmative major, a particular affirmative minor, and a particular affirmative indirect conclusion. Example:

Da: Every substance is a being. *bi*: Some man is a substance. *tis*: Therefore, some being is a man.

The eighth mode, *Fapesmo*, is formed from a universal affirmative major, a universal negative minor, and a particular negative indirect conclusion. Example:

Fa: Every body is substance. *pes*: No whiteness is a body. *mo*: Therefore, some substance is not whiteness.

The ninth mode, *Frisesomorum*, is formed from a particular affirmative major, a universal negative minor, and a particular negative indirect conclusion. Example:

Frise: Some animal is substance. *No color is an animal*. *somorum*: Therefore, some substance is not a color.

First Objection. "Every running thing is a horse; every man is running; therefore every man is a horse." This syllogism is in *Barbara*, yet its consequence is false. Therefore not every syllogism in *Barbara* is legitimate.

Reply. The parts of the said syllogism are impossible — for it cannot be that every running thing is a horse and every man is running. Therefore from their impossibility a true and formal consequence cannot be gathered.

Second Objection. "No frog is stronger than a dog; every man is stronger than a frog; therefore no man is stronger than a frog." This syllogism is in Celarent, yet its consequence is bad. Therefore not every consequence in Celarent is good and formal.

Reply. The antecedent is denied — that this argument is in Celarent — for besides the fact that the predicate of the major is posited three times in it, more is predicated in the minor than is the distributed subject in the major. For if *frog* ought to be the subject of distribution in the major, in the minor one should say "every man is a frog," which, being false, certainly yields a false conclusion. For more see Major, Tataretus, and other dialecticians.

Article VII. On the Modes of the Second Figure

The four modes of the second figure, concluding negatively and directly, are: Cesare, Camestres, Festino, Baroco — examples of each of which I give for the sake of greater clarity.

The first mode, Cesare, is woven from a universal negative major, a universal affirmative minor, from which is deduced a universal negative conclusion.

Example:

Cæ: No stone is living. *fa*: Every tree is living. *re*: Therefore, no tree is a stone.

The second mode, Camestres, is formed from a universal affirmative major, a universal negative minor, and a universal negative conclusion. Example:

Camestres: Every substance is subsistent. No accident is subsistent. Therefore, no accident is substance.

The third mode, Festino, takes a universal negative major and a particular affirmative minor, from which is inferred a particular negative conclusion.

Example:

Festi: No tree is sentient. *no*: Some animal is sentient. Therefore, some animal is not a tree.

The fourth mode, Baroco, is built from a universal affirmative major, a particular negative minor, and a particular negative conclusion. Example:

Ba: Every body is substance. *ro*: Some whiteness is not substance. *co*: Therefore, some whiteness is not a body.

Objection. In Cesare, this argument does not hold: "every man is not an animal; every risible is an animal; therefore every risible is not a man." It is confirmed: "no false thing is true; but of any contradictory pair, one part is true; therefore

no contradictory pair has one part false." This syllogism is in Cesare, yet the consequence is false.

Reply. The said syllogism is denied to be in Cesare. For the argument proceeds from the undistributed to the distributed — since in the premisses *animal* is held confusedly, for it is not explained whether every animal is a man, which it would be false to affirm, or whether every man is an animal, which it is true to assert. By the same token the confirmation is answered: for the argument proceeds from the undistributed to the distributed. For in the minor the other part is held confusedly, and in the conclusion it is distributed — as the Doctor indicates (*1.Priorum*, q.15. §. *Notandum.*).

Article VIII. On the Modes of the Third Figure

The last six modes pertaining to the third figure are: Darapti, Felapton, Disamis, Datisi, Bocardo, Ferison. I give examples of each individually.

The first mode, Darapti, uses a universal affirmative major and likewise a universal affirmative minor, from which follows a particular affirmative conclusion:

Da: Every lion is capable of roaring. *rap*: Every lion is an animal. *ti*: Therefore, some animal is capable of roaring.

The second mode, Felapton, is constructed from a universal negative major and a universal affirmative minor, from which is gathered a particular affirmative conclusion:

Felap: No man is immortal. *Ton*: Every man is rational. Therefore, some rational thing is not immortal.

The third mode, Disamis, has a particular affirmative major and a universal affirmative minor concluding a particular affirmative:

Disa: Some animal is a body. *Every animal is substance*. *mis*: Therefore, some substance is a body.

The fourth mode, Datisi, is composed of a universal affirmative major and a particular affirmative minor inferring a particular affirmative:

Da: Every stone is a body. *ti*: Some stone is a diamond. *fi*: Therefore, some body is a diamond.

The fifth mode, Bocardo, is composed of a particular negative major, a universal affirmative minor, and a particular negative conclusion:

Bo: Some man is not incorruptible. *car*: Every man is rational. *do*: Therefore, some rational thing is not incorruptible.

The sixth mode, Ferison, coalesces from a universal negative major and a particular affirmative minor, from which is deduced a particular negative conclusion:

Ferison: No substance is inherent. Some substance is a being. Therefore, some being is not inherent.

Objection. This syllogism in Darapti does not conclude: "every man is suspended; but every man is to be beheaded; therefore a man to be beheaded is suspended." It is confirmed: this argument in Darapti is not valid — "every man and two men are three men; but every man and two men are two men; therefore two men are three men."

Reply. The said syllogism is by no means in Darapti, since both premisses are particular. And more so because the premisses are not suitable for concluding — for they suppose for different things: the major for thieves in the past, the minor for thieves in the future. To the confirmation I say that the common and universal is not numbered in the enumeration of its singulars, because it is identified with them; otherwise the binary number would be the ternary, and two men would be three men — as is argued above, which is manifestly false — and is treated by Mauritius (*q.24.Universalium*, §. *de tertio*, fol.41.), following Scotus (*1.d.24.q.un. §. Circa illud, sub D.*).

Article IX. On the Common Rules of the Syllogistic Figures

Four common rules are observed for the three figures named above, as Scotus teaches along with the other dialecticians (*1.Priorum*, q.20., near the beginning).

The first: from pure particulars, by the power of the syllogistic form, nothing is correctly concluded — as "some body is living; some stone is a body; therefore some stone is living." The reason is that although two extremes may agree in a common term, they need not agree with one another by reason of their peculiar accounts.

The second rule — touched upon by Scotus (*1.Priorum*, q.21.): from pure negatives, by the power of the syllogistic form, nothing is correctly gathered — as "no tree is sentient; no man is a tree; therefore no man is sentient." The reason is that a syllogism composed entirely of negatives is opposed to the *dicta de omni* and *de nullo*, one of which is the principle of all affirming syllogisms and the other is the foundation of all negating syllogisms — in which it is noted that the middle must be conjoined with at least one of the extremes.

The third — hinted at by Scotus (*4.d.17.q.un. §. Ad argumenta, sub Y.*): if either premiss is particular, the conclusion is likewise inferred as particular. And likewise, if either premiss is negative, the conclusion will certainly be negative. The reason given is that the conclusion always follows the weaker part, and because the premisses are the cause of the conclusion — and an effect follows its weaker or inferior cause — as is clear in the case of natural agents concurring for

the production of the same numerical effect: the effect resembles the particular and inferior agent, not the more universal and perfect one — as a man generated resembles the generating man, not the sun or God co-operating in his generation — as the Doctor observes (*1.d.3.q.7., infra AA.*).

The fourth: the middle must not be placed in the conclusion. The reason is that the office of the middle is to conjoin the extremes in the premisses; hence it is placed twice in them, so that afterward in the conclusion the extremes themselves may be connected with one another. And moreover, if the middle were in the conclusion, that conclusion would not differ from one of the premisses, so that the cause would not be distinguished from the effect — which is absurd.

First Objection. Against the first rule, from Scotus (*1.Priorum, q.20.*): "an animal is Peter; a man is Peter; therefore a man is an animal." This consequence is good, though derived from pure particulars — and thus the first rule does not hold. It is confirmed: "an animal is the running thing; a man is the same animal; therefore a man is an animal." The consequence is valid, though gathered from pure particulars.

Reply. That rule is to be understood as follows: nothing follows from pure particulars by particularity of the middle — or, as the Philosopher says, when the middle is not distributed in the premisses — which does not occur in the syllogisms given above.

Second Objection. Against the second rule: from pure negatives a true conclusion is had — as is clear in this syllogism: "everything that is not an animal is not a man; a stone is not an animal; therefore a stone is not a man."

Reply. The major is truly not a negative proposition: in it the predicate is not removed from the subject — as is done in a negative proposition — especially since it appears to consist of a subject and infinite predicate; and in this case the aforesaid rule does not hold, as our recent contemporaries note and illustrate with the example of the Philosopher (*2.Caeli, c.4.*): "all stars that do not twinkle are near; planets do not twinkle; therefore they are near" — where the conclusion is affirmative, even though the minor is negative, and the conclusion is valid by reason of the infinite verb in the premisses — which the same authors (*1.p.Inst., Tract.2.c.1.*) defend as not conflicting with Scotus (*2.Periherm., q.1.*).

Third Objection. Some syllogisms are valid even though the middle has a place in the conclusion; therefore the third rule is not universally true. The antecedent is shown: "every lion is an animal; every lion is a lion; therefore every lion is an animal." Here the middle is seen in the conclusion, and the whole said syllogism is good.

Reply. In this syllogism the middle is placed in the conclusion — not indeed under the account of a middle, but under the account of one of the extremes; and this perhaps occurs because of the minor premiss, which is an identity.

Article X. On the Particular Rules of the Three Figures

Two peculiar rules are noted for the first figure, and the same number for the second; for the third figure, only one.

The prior rule of the first figure: from a particular major in directly concluding modes, no conclusion is inferred — as "some living thing is devoid of sense; every man is living; therefore every man is devoid of sense." The posterior rule: from a negative minor, no conclusion is reached in directly concluding modes; but in indirectly concluding modes — namely in *Fapesmo* and *Frisosomorum* — it follows well, as "every animal is sentient; no plant is an animal; therefore some sentient thing is not a plant." The reason for both rules is that the middle is not distributed in the premisses — that is, one proceeds from the undistributed to the distributed.

The first rule of the second figure — which Scotus touches upon (*4.d.1.q.1., ante §. Ratio 2., circa F.*): if the major is particular, nothing is concluded — as "some living thing is not sentient; every animal is sentient; therefore some animal is not living." The second rule: from pure affirmatives nothing is inferred — as "every sentient is an animal; every living is an animal; therefore every living is sentient." The reason for both is the same as that given in the rules of the first figure. Scotus makes mention of this (*1.Priorum, q.23. §. Tunc ponuntur.*).

The rule of the third figure: from a negative minor, an invalid conclusion results, for the same reason assigned in the other preceding rules — as "every animal is a body; no animal is insensible; therefore some insensible is not a body." Scotus makes mention of this (*1.Priorum, q.24. §. Quantum ad 1.*).

Objection. Against the first rule of the first figure: "some animal is rational; every man is rational; therefore some man is rational." This conclusion is correctly deduced from premisses of which the major is particular. Therefore the first rule of the first figure is not certain.

Reply. The aforesaid rule is to be understood as follows: nothing follows from a particular major — supplement: by the power of the form — not however by reason of matter, as is deduced in the argument.

Article XI. On the Reduction of Imperfect Syllogisms to Perfect Ones

Since a syllogism is distributed — from what has been said — into perfect and imperfect, and every imperfect can be reduced to a perfect — as Sarnanus the Cardinal especially observes (*q.3.Universalium, p.74, 81.*) — and since all the modes of the figures (except the first four of the first figure, which are plainly

exemplary of the most perfect kind of reasoning) are imperfect, it is therefore necessary to find a method of reducing imperfect syllogisms to perfect ones, so that those who are unwilling to assent to a consequence unless they clearly see its goodness may be convinced. So that this may be done more conveniently, we observe that the words of the verses enumerated in Article V of this question were ingeniously devised. For all the modes of the figures — both perfect and imperfect — have only four initial letters — B, C, D, F — which designate: all imperfect modes beginning with B are to be reduced to Barbara; with C, to Celarent; with D, to Darii; and with F, to Ferio. The reduction of a syllogism is the recalling of an imperfect syllogism to a perfect one, so that the imperfect syllogism may be seen to have been correct and may be clearly shown. There are two kinds of reduction of a syllogism, according to Aristotle and Scotus (*Quol.2.¶. De 2.H.*; and *q.12.Praedicamentali, §. Quia ista.*): one is called ostensive and the other leading to the impossible. Ostensive reduction is the recalling of some imperfect syllogism to one of the perfect ones of the first figure — on account of the denied conclusion of the said imperfect syllogism — and it is accomplished either through conversion of the said denied conclusion, or through transposition of the premisses. For example, if the indirect conclusion in Baralipson is denied — "every tree is animated; every cherry is a tree; therefore some animated thing is a cherry" — this syllogism is to be reduced to Barbara, because Baralipson begins with B, and through simple conversion of the denied conclusion a perfect syllogism is obtained, thus: "every tree is animated; every cherry is a tree; therefore every cherry is animated." And if every cherry is animated, it follows that some animated thing is a cherry — which was denied — just as if every man is rational, it correctly follows that some rational thing is a man, by the *dictum de omni* and by the ante-predicamental rule: whatever belongs essentially to the superior belongs also to the inferior. Reduction to the impossible is the recalling of an imperfect syllogism to a perfect one, on account of the denied conclusion of such an imperfect syllogism — when the respondent is brought to conceding something impossible, such as two contraries simultaneously, or two contradictories. And such a reduction is had through taking the contrary or contradictory of the denied conclusion. So that these two modes of reducing may be more easily perceived, it is useful to note the four consonants S, P, M, C, which appear in some of the said imperfect modes. S indicates that the reduction is to be made through simple conversion — meaning that the preceding proposition is to be converted by simple conversion. P: by conversion per accidens. M: the major is to be made the minor. C: such a mode — such as Baroco — is to be reduced only by the path to the impossible. Moreover, so that one may more conveniently commit to memory the method by which reduction is to be made in any imperfect mode, dialecticians set down this verse:

Phabifer circles the earth and the sphere through the years.

In this verse two expressions are noted, each consisting of five syllables, corresponding to the five imperfect modes of the first figure. The next two following expressions, each consisting of four syllables, correspond to the four modes of the second figure; and the last two expressions, each consisting of six syllables, correspond to the six imperfect modes of the third figure. And in all of these the four vowels A, E, I, O are placed, which show the four modes of the first figure: A designates Barbara, E Celarent, I Darii, and O Ferio. For through this kind of proof the said imperfect modes are confirmed, as is clear from the present example in Baralip-ton:

Every animal is sentient. Every man is an animal. Therefore, some sentient is a man.

If the respondent denies the conclusion posited, the arguer takes the contradictory of the denied conclusion — say, "no sentient is a man" — and because Baralip-ton is reduced to Celarent, according to the rule prescribed for the first figure, the said contradictory of the denied conclusion is put as the major, and the major becomes the minor, from which is inferred the contrary of the conceded minor of the reduced syllogism by converting it per accidens — thus in Celarent:

No sentient is a man. Every animal is sentient. Therefore, no animal is a man.

"No animal is a man; therefore no man is an animal." But every man is an animal — as the respondent conceded — therefore no man is an animal and every man is an animal; and thus the respondent admits two contrary propositions as simultaneously true.

Objection. From Aristotle (*1.Priorum*, c.6.): besides the two reductions assigned, there is another reduction through exposition — when, with a singular middle substituted in place of the common middle, the same conclusion is deduced as was inferred in the syllogism having a common middle. For example, if the respondent denies this conclusion in Darapti:

Every tree is animated. Every tree is a body. Therefore, some body is animated.

The arguer takes a singular middle placed under *tree* and puts it in place of the common middle — thus: "this cherry is animated; this cherry is a tree; therefore some tree is animated, and this tree is a body; therefore some body is animated" — because whatever follows from the consequent follows from the antecedent. Therefore there are three reductions of an imperfect syllogism to a perfect one.

Reply. There are only two common reductions to all figures. For the reduction through exposition is peculiar and proper to the third figure. Or it may be said that through this reduction, a change is made only by reason of the common middle exchanged for a singular one; whereas in the two said reductions the same middle remains, and conversion and transposition of propositions take place with the same middle persisting.

Article XII. On the Powers of the Syllogism

Nine powers of the syllogism are comprehended in a ninefold number, as examined by Aristotle in (*2.Priorum*). The first is the power of concluding several things. For from the subalternating, the subalternated can be concluded — as "if arithmetic is a science, then music, which is subalternated to it, is also a science." Likewise, "if man is rational, then Peter is rational." Moreover, from the converted, the converting can be concluded — as "no fish is a tree; therefore no tree is a fish." And this can occur through the taking of several minor extremes. The second is the power of gathering true things from false ones — as "every animal is white; a swan is an animal; therefore a swan is white." This occurs when, from both false premisses, or from one premiss false in whole or in part, we conclude something true. But a false thing can by no means be inferred from true things — otherwise the antecedent would be true and the consequent false, which cannot occur. The third is the power of syllogizing circularly, and it is effected when, through the conclusion and the converse of one of the premisses, we deduce the other premiss of the first syllogism — as "every rational is risible; every man is rational; therefore every man is risible." The minor is inferred from the same conclusion with the converse of the minor, and holds only in convertible terms — thus: "every man is rational; every rational is risible; therefore every man is risible." Likewise, from the same conclusion with the converse of the major, the major is inferred — thus: "every risible is rational; every man is risible; therefore every rational is risible." The fourth is the power of syllogizing conversively. This occurs when, from the contradictory of the conclusion together with one of the premisses, the contradictory or contrary of the other premiss is inferred — whereby we showed in the preceding article that all imperfect syllogisms are reduced to perfect ones. The fifth is the power of syllogizing to the impossible, which we declared sufficiently at the place now cited. The sixth is the power of syllogizing from opposites. This occurs when from contradictory or contrary premisses a conclusion is gathered in which the same thing is denied of itself. This is done to convict those who obstinately would concede or deny contradictories or contraries simultaneously — as "every tree is animated; no tree is animated; therefore no tree is a tree."

Objection. Aristotle (*1.Post., c.3.*), along with the other philosophers, admits regress in argumentation and rejects circularity. Therefore to syllogize circularly is not a power of the syllogism.

Reply. The antecedent is granted; the consequence is denied. For it is one thing to have the power to do something, another to do it usefully or uselessly. The first is indeed possible without the second. Therefore we admit the power of syllogizing circularly; but whether it is profitable to syllogize circularly will be examined elsewhere.

Question II. On the Syllogism Taken Specifically

We adduced and explained many divisions of syllogisms and gave their definitions in the preceding question, Article III. Therefore, since nothing else pertaining to them worthy of note for beginners occurs to us, we have taken care to add only a few things here.

Article I. On the Expository Syllogism

The expository syllogism — from Scotus (*1.d.2.q.7.Ad 1.principale II.*; *q.10.Praedicamentali*; and *1.Priorum, q.11.*) — is described as one whose middle term is a singular term held singularly and univocally. It is called expository either because it clearly sets the thing before one's eyes, or because it expounds a common middle through a singular middle — as "Paul is an Apostle; Paul is a Tarsian; therefore some Tarsian is an Apostle." This syllogism relies principally on that principle — those things that are the same as some one third thing are the same as one another — which was already explained by us in Article IV of the preceding question. For the said syllogism to appear correct, three conditions are required. The first is that the middle hold singularly — lacking which this syllogism is not valid: "Plato is a singular term; Plato is a being; therefore a being is a singular term." The second: the middle must be the total extreme in one of the premisses. Hence this does not follow: "Plato is in this temple; Socrates is in this temple; therefore Plato is Socrates." The third: in affirmatives, such an identity as is had in the premisses must be concluded; and conversely, such a diversity must be concluded in negatives as is present in the premisses. Hence this syllogism is not valid: "this divine essence is the Father; this divine essence is the Son; therefore the Son is the Father." For the Father and Son are the same in the divine essence, but not in person. For the person of the Father is different, the person of the Son different, and the person of the Holy Spirit different — as Athanasius states in the Creed.

First Objection. This expository syllogism is not valid: "this God is everywhere; this God is some man; therefore some man is everywhere."

Reply. It may be said that it is not valid concerning an infinite and singularly held term in a common way — as is clear from Scotus cited above; and we treated this at length in (*Tract. de Trin., disp.3.q.4.*). Or say that it concludes only with respect to divinity, not with respect to humanity.

Second Objection. Nor is this expository syllogism good: "this being preceded its mother; but this being is some man — according to *John 8*: 'Before Abraham was made, I am'; therefore some man preceded his mother."

Reply. The argument concludes by reason of divinity, not by reason of humanity. For God is man through the assumption of humanity; hence it is not correctly inferred that some man preceded his mother, because the Son of God did not assume humanity before his mother.

Article II. On the Syllogism from Obliques

A syllogism from obliques is one composed of some oblique term — as "every good is from God; salvation is some good; therefore salvation is from God." Aristotle treats this (*2.Priorum*, c.37.) and Scotus (*1.Priorum*, q.18., *ante* §. *Tunc sunt*; q.39. §. *Quantum ad* 1.; and *1.d.2.q.2. §. Ad argumenta principalia, sub E.O., and thence*). For its correctness and the goodness of its consequence, several things are to be observed: first, in an affirmative, if one of the premisses is oblique, the conclusion must be constructed with obliques or an oblique — as is clear from the example given above. Next, in a negative, if one of the premisses formed with obliques is affirmative, nothing is concluded. Furthermore, Aristotle at the cited place notes that these syllogisms from obliques, in order to be correctly formed, are to be reduced to direct ones — as "of opposites there is the same discipline; virtue and vice are opposites; therefore of virtue and vice there is the same discipline." This is reduced thus: "opposites are those of which the discipline is the same; virtue and vice are opposites; therefore virtue and vice are those of which the discipline is the same."

Objection. This syllogism from obliques is good, though formed from one affirmative premiss — namely: "no sin is in God; but every acceptance of persons is a sin; therefore no acceptance of persons is in God" — as is clear from the scriptural passage, *Acts 10*: "In truth I have found that God is not an acceptor of persons."

Reply. It may be said that the said syllogism is indeed composed of an affirmative minor and a negative major — since from pure negatives in any figure nothing is concluded, as we said above — yet it is not composed of an affirmative consisting of several obliques; and therefore it seems to be good. Some recent authors respond in this way — though the description of this syllogism given at the beginning of this article is opposed to them. Nor does there seem to be any better reason for a syllogism consisting of obliques than for one composed with a single oblique. It may perhaps be said with others that the aforesaid rule is not universally true — but holds in some cases and fails in others — just as in the ostensive reduction of syllogisms we excepted certain modes — Baroco and Bocardo — as we noted above. And the agreed view of dialecticians is that the reduction of the mode Celantes is not to be carried out in the same way as the other modes. As for what else can be said about the demonstrative and dialectical syllogisms — either it is clear from what has been said, or it is to be examined elsewhere.

Question III. On Dialectical Topics

No one denies that the whole of logic is situated in judgment and invention, as in its two principal parts. Since we treated of judgment above, there now remains a discussion of invention — which is held to consist principally in knowing the dialectical topics.

Article I. What the Dialectical Topic Is, and How Many Kinds There Are

A topic is the seat of an argument — or that from which a suitable argument is drawn. For just as a natural place is said to conserve a thing in its being, surrounding, containing, and fostering it, so a dialectical topic provides force and strength to the argument drawn from it. An argument — though it is not infrequently used for the syllogism, as Scotus says (*q.1.Universalium*, §. *Dicendum*) — is properly the proving middle of a conclusion, and is commonly described as follows: an argument is that which makes credible a doubtful thing, as is clear from (*1.Elench.*, *q.4.*). A topic, taken in its most common sense, is twofold: one is called the *maxima* — a self-evident proposition for which no other is prior or better known in the same genus, as "of whatever the definition is predicated, of that the defined is also predicated" — the other is called the *differentia maximae* (difference of the maxima), which consists of the terms from which the maxima are composed and by which they differ from one another, such as definition and defined. The *differentia maximae* is in turn subdivided into intrinsic, extrinsic, and middle. Intrinsic is when the argument is drawn from those things that enter into the substance or nature of the thing; extrinsic is when the argument is drawn from those things that are separated from the substance or essence of the thing; middle is when the argument is drawn from those things that partly agree with the terms in question and partly differ from them. In general, twenty-eight topics can be enumerated: eighteen intrinsic, seven extrinsic, and three middle — about each of which we must treat individually in the three following articles.

First Objection. If the definition of a topic were good, these two terms *man* and *animal* would be topics, because an argument is drawn from them — "it is a man; therefore it is also an animal"; but they cannot be topics, since they can be neither maxima nor difference of a maxima. Therefore the definition of a topic is not correctly given.

Reply. The inference from the major is denied: even if an argument is drawn from them, it is not drawn from them as a maxima or as a difference of a maxima.

Second Objection. The difference of a maxima is the relation of the terms from which a maxima is constructed; but a relation is not a term but a relation. Therefore the topic of the difference of a maxima is not correctly described.

Reply. The difference of a maxima is formally a relation; but fundamentally it is the said terms — as some Scotists aptly observe.

Article II. On Intrinsic Loci Drawn from the Substance of a Thing

An intrinsic locus is derived either from the substance and essence of a thing — in which case an argument is drawn from what belongs to the substance of the terms under examination — or from what accompanies the very substance and

nature of the thing, in which case an argument is deduced from what follows upon the terms under examination. The loci taken in the first manner number six: from definition, from the defined, from description, from the described, from interpretation, and from the interpreted. The loci taken in the second manner number twelve: from the universal whole, from the integral whole, from the whole in quantity, from the whole in mode, from the whole in place, from the whole in time, from cause, from effect, from generation, from corruption, from use, and from what commonly accompanies a subject. In accordance with the order of loci set out above, each individual locus is to be carefully explained and illustrated with examples — the former class in the present article, the latter in the following one.

The locus from definition is the relation of a definition to what it defines, from which four arguments are drawn: two affirmative and two negative. The first: whatever is affirmed of the definition is likewise affirmed of the defined — as, "a rational animal is capable of laughter; therefore, a human being is capable of laughter." The second: whatever the definition is affirmed of, the defined is equally affirmed of — as, "substance is a self-subsisting being; therefore, a body is a self-subsisting being." The third: whatever is denied of the definition is also denied of the defined — as, "no rational animal is inanimate; therefore, no human being is inanimate." The fourth: whatever the definition is denied of, the defined is likewise denied of — as, "a plant is not a rational animal; therefore, a plant is not a human being." We argue in essentially the same manner from the defined as from the definition, changing only the name of the definition to that of the defined, since the locus from the defined is the relation of the defined to its definition.

The locus from description is the relation of a description to the thing described — as, "Logic is the investigator of truth and falsehood; therefore, it is necessary for the pursuit of the sciences." Arguments are drawn from description to the described, and vice versa, in the same number as from definition to the defined. To this locus belongs the locus from a species to its proper attribute — as, "a human being is sentient; therefore, the capacity for laughter is a sentient capacity" — as well as the locus from individuals to their attribute — as, "Peter runs; therefore, something capable of laughter runs."

The locus from interpretation is the relation of an interpretation to the thing interpreted — as, "a lover of wisdom goes for a walk; therefore, a philosopher goes for a walk." Much the same kinds of arguments are produced in these cases as in the foregoing loci.

One may object that the following does not hold: "A just person is a lover of wisdom; therefore, a just person is a philosopher" — and thus that the locus from interpretation to the interpreted is not reliable. In reply: if the just person loves wisdom already possessed, or is at least in the act of possessing it, the inference must be denied; but if he lacks it and is not in the act of attaining it,

the inference must be granted — for love is directed toward what is already had, while desire is directed toward what is yet to be had, as will be clear in Ethics.

Article III. On Intrinsic Loci Drawn from What Accompanies the Substance

The loci drawn from what accompanies the substance — or the quiddity — of a thing, twelve in number as listed in the previous article, must now be briefly expounded and confirmed with examples.

The locus from the universal whole — that is, from genus to species — is the relation of the universal itself to its subjective part, and it holds negatively: as, "a stone is not an animal; therefore, it is not a human being" — for whatever the universal whole is removed from, its part is equally removed. Conversely, the locus from the subjective part is the relation of the subjective part itself to its universal whole, and it holds affirmatively: as, "a human being runs; therefore, an animal runs."

The locus from the integral whole — mentioned by Scotus (9.43. *Praedicamentali*. §. *Ad q.*) — is the relation of the integral whole to its integral part, and it holds affirmatively: as, "the house exists; therefore, the wall exists." The locus from the integral part, conversely, is the relation of the part to its whole, and it holds negatively: as, "the wall does not exist; therefore, the house does not exist."

The locus from the whole in quantity — indicated by Scotus (1. *Priorum* q.2. and *Quol.* 7. §. *Ad primum argumentum, sub BB.*) — is the relation of the whole to its part, and it holds affirmatively: as, "every horse runs; therefore, Bucephalus runs," and negatively: "no horse runs; therefore, Bucephalus does not run." The locus from the parts in quantity is the relation of all the parts taken together to their whole, and it holds affirmatively: as, "Peter runs, Paul runs, and so do the rest; therefore, every human being runs," and negatively: "Peter does not run, Paul does not run, nor do the rest; therefore, no human being runs."

The locus from the whole in mode — reported by Scotus (1. *Priorum* q.6. and *Sirectus* art. 3. *partiali Form.*) — is the relation of a common term taken without any qualification to that same whole taken with a qualification: as, "Peter is not a geometer; therefore, he is not a distinguished geometer." The locus from the part in mode is the relation of the part to its whole: as, "Euclid is an exceptional mathematician; therefore, Euclid is a mathematician."

The locus from the whole in place is the relation of the whole itself to its part, and it holds affirmatively: as, "God is everywhere; therefore, God is here," and negatively: "the Antichrist is nowhere; therefore, the Antichrist is not here." The locus from the part in place is the relation of the part itself to its whole, and it holds negatively: as, "Adam is not here, nor anywhere else; therefore, he is nowhere."

The locus from the whole in time is the relation of the whole itself to its part, and reasoning proceeds in essentially the same way as for the whole in place. It

holds affirmatively: as, "God exists at every time; therefore, God exists at the present time," and negatively: "the Antichrist has existed at no time; therefore, the Antichrist does not exist at the present time." The locus from a part of time to its whole is the relation of the part itself to its whole: as, "God exists in the present, the past, and the future; therefore, he exists at all times."

The locus from cause — suggested by Scotus (*Quol. 17. §. Contra conclusionem, ante L.*) — is the relation of a cause to its effect, and is fourfold, corresponding to the four kinds of causes, from each of which we draw both affirmative and negative arguments, as will be clear in the examples that follow when each kind of cause is explained.

The locus from the efficient cause — mentioned by Scotus (*Quol. 13. §. Ad ista*) — is the relation of the efficient cause itself to its effect, and it holds affirmatively: as, "the tree is good; therefore, it bears good fruit," and negatively: "the tree is bad; therefore, it bears bad fruit" — as Christ the Lord teaches, *Matt. 7*.

The locus from the material cause is the relation of matter itself to its effect, and it holds affirmatively: as, "iron exists; therefore, iron weapons can be made from it," and negatively: "iron does not exist; therefore, iron weapons cannot be made from it."

The locus from the formal cause is the relation of the formal cause to its effect, and it holds affirmatively: as, "whiteness exists; therefore, something white exists," and negatively: "whiteness does not exist; therefore, nothing white exists."

The locus from the final cause is the relation of the final cause to its effect, and it holds affirmatively: as, "happiness is good; therefore, virtue is good," and negatively: "punishment is not good; therefore, sin is not good." We argue in exactly the same manner from effect to cause, merely substituting the name of the effect for that of the cause; for if the effect is good, the cause is likewise good, and vice versa. This is what Christ the Lord argued and taught when he said: "By their fruits you will know them," *Matt. 7*.

The locus from generation is the relation of generation to the thing generated. The following axiom governs the arguments drawn from it: that whose generation is good is itself good — as, "the generation of something is good; therefore, that something is good" — and that whose generation is bad is itself bad — as, "the generation of a disease is bad; therefore, the disease is bad." The reason is that generation, being the production of anything whether substantial or accidental, tends toward the existence of the thing; therefore, if the thing produced is good, its production is called good, and if the thing produced is bad, its production is likewise bad.

The locus from corruption is the relation of corruption to the thing corrupted. The following axiom applies: that whose corruption is good is itself bad — as, "the corruption or destruction of a thief is good; therefore, the thief is bad" —

and that whose corruption is bad is itself good — as, "the destruction of a house is bad; therefore, the house is good."

The locus from use is the relation of use to that of which it is the use: as, "riding is good; therefore, the horse is good." Likewise, "killing one's neighbor is evil; therefore, the killer of one's neighbor is evil."

The locus from what commonly accompanies a subject is the relation of one common accompaniment to another, and it holds affirmatively: as, "the woman has milk; therefore, she has given birth," and negatively: "the woman does not have milk; therefore, she has not given birth."

One may object, first, that the following does not hold well: "An image is a painted man; therefore, an image is a man" — and yet it argues from the whole in mode. Thus the locus from the whole in mode does not always yield a valid argument. In reply: the inference does not hold because the argument proceeds from a restricting qualification — just as the inference from the qualified to the unqualified does not hold, as in: "the Ethiopian is white with respect to his teeth; therefore, the Ethiopian is white."

One may object, second, that the following does not follow correctly: "Whiteness exists; therefore, the wall exists" — even though it argues from formal cause to its formal effect. Thus the locus from formal cause to effect is not certain and infallible. In reply: the inference is invalid because a wall is not the concrete instantiation of whiteness; the concrete instantiation of whiteness is rather "something white." Thus the valid argument is: "Whiteness exists; therefore, something white exists."

One may object, third, that the following is not a valid inference: "The death of Christ was good, since through it we were saved; therefore, Christ was evil" — even though the argument proceeds through the locus from corruption to the thing corrupted. Thus this locus departs from correctness. In reply: the death of Christ was indeed good for us, for the reason given, but not for Christ himself with respect to his natural composite — for since he truly died, his humanity was destroyed through his death, as can be seen in Scotus (8.d.22., Orbellus, and other Scholastics there).

One may object, fourth, that the following does not hold: "God repented, according to Genesis 5, 'I repent having made them,' that is, human beings; therefore, God sinned" — even though it argues through the locus from what commonly accompanies a subject. In reply: such repentance, in relation to God, is understood metaphorically, like anger, mercy, and similar expressions, as will be discussed in the appropriate place; therefore, the inference has no force.

Article IV. On Extrinsic Loci

The extrinsic loci, which, as was stated in Article I of this question, are seven in number, and which the Doctor mentions (1.d.1.q.5. §. *Ad primum argumentum* 3.q.

and d.11.q.2. §. Contra istam positionem. A. and d.10.q.un. §. Ad argumenta principalia. F.), are as follows: from opposites, from greater to lesser, from lesser to greater, from similarity, from proportion, from transference, and from authority. I shall now run through all of these briefly, lest this little work grow into something unwieldy.

The locus from opposites is fourfold, corresponding to the four kinds of opposition already enumerated elsewhere: there are relative, contrary, privative, and contradictory opposites.

The locus from relatives is the relation of one relative to another, and it holds affirmatively: as, "there is a father; therefore, there is a son," and negatively: "there is no father; therefore, there is no son." For positing one relative posits the other, and removing it removes the other.

The locus from contraries is the relation of one contrary to another. It holds affirmatively in the case of immediate contraries: as, "it is even; therefore, it is not odd," and negatively: "it is not even; therefore, it is odd." I say in immediate contraries, because in mediate contraries the inference does not hold — as, "it is not white; therefore, it is black" does not follow, since it could be red or some other intermediate color.

The locus from privatively opposed terms is the relation of a privation to a habit, or of a habit to a privation, and it holds affirmatively: as, "this man is sighted; therefore, he is not blind," and negatively with the constancy of the subject and at a time determined by nature alone — for a puppy before the ninth day is said to be neither sighted nor blind, nor is a boy said to be toothless before the time fixed by nature.

The locus from contradictories is the relation of one contradictory to another: if one contradictory is true, the other is false — as, "it is true that Peter is sitting; therefore, it is false that Peter is not sitting."

The locus from greater to lesser is the relation of the greater itself to the lesser, and it holds negatively: as, "a general cannot take the fortress; therefore, neither can a soldier." Consonant with this is the axiom: if that which seems more likely to be present is not present, neither will that which seems less likely to be present be present — as Scotus writes (*q.25. Praedicam. §. Dicendum*).

The locus from lesser is the relation of the lesser itself to the greater, and it holds affirmatively: as, "a soldier can take the fortress; therefore, so can a general." Consonant with this is the axiom: if that which seems less likely to be present is present, that which seems more likely to be present will also be present — as the Doctor indicates (*ibid. and 1. Post. q.23.*) and *Aug. expositio 2. in Psal. 21. Isa. 32. in fine*.

The locus from similarity is the relation of one similar thing to another similar thing, and it holds affirmatively: as, "the capacity for laughter is proper to a

human being; therefore, the capacity to neigh is proper to a horse," and negatively: "the capacity for laughter is not the genus of a human being; therefore, the capacity to neigh is not the genus of a horse."

The locus from proportion is the relation of one proportionate thing to another proportionate thing: as, "as a sailor is to a ship, so a driver is to a carriage; but a sailor steers the ship; therefore, a driver steers the carriage." Both this and the preceding locus are mentioned by Scotus (*2.d.3.q.1. and 4.d.49.q.11.B.*)

The locus from transference is the relation of a transferred expression to the thing to which it is transferred: as, "when a human being is cheerful he smiles; therefore, when the meadows are in bloom, they smile."

The locus from authority is the relation of an authority to what is proved by it. Authority is the judgment of a person experienced in some science, concerning matters belonging to that science; for one must trust each expert in his own art — as, "Aristotle affirms that the earth is at rest; therefore, the earth is at rest." It holds only affirmatively, not negatively. For this reason it is commonly received that an argument drawn from negative authority is inconclusive — as, "Aristotle does not say this; therefore, it is not to be admitted." This is noted by Scotus (*1.d.3.q.7. §. Ad auctoritatem Philosophi, sub Y.*)

One may object, first, that the following does not hold: "The rational soul is moved; therefore, the rational soul is not at rest" — because Peter's hand can be moving and his foot at rest at the same moment. Thus the locus from privatively opposed terms does not hold. In reply: this is true with respect to different things, but not with respect to the same thing, as is inferred in the objection just cited.

One may object, second, that the following is not a valid inference: "The king cannot bear a weight of one hundred pounds; therefore, neither can the soldier" — even though it argues from greater to lesser; and thus the locus from greater to lesser is not always certain. In reply: the argument is not from greater to lesser with respect to the proper strength of either the king or the soldier, as it is framed in the objection — for understood that way it would rather be an argument from lesser to greater. The example adduced must be understood not of the king alone, but of those who attend and accompany the king.

One may object, third, that the following does not hold by way of similarity: "As a negative relates to a negative, so an affirmative relates to an affirmative; but a universal negative entails a universal negative in simple conversion; therefore, a universal affirmative likewise entails a universal affirmative in simple conversion." In reply: the argument is poorly formed and the inference does not follow — precisely because the things in question are not similar in the relevant respect. This objection therefore has no force.

Article V. On Middle Loci

The middle loci are three in number, as was stated, and they are called the locus from conjugates, from cases, and from division. These remain to be described and illustrated with examples, as was done for the foregoing ones.

The locus from conjugates is the relation of one conjugate to another. Among dialecticians, conjugates are concrete and abstract terms — such as "white" and "whiteness." It holds affirmatively: as, "the logician is knowing; therefore, logic is a science" — as the Subtle Doctor argues (*q.1. Universalium*) — and it also appears to be exemplified by Antonius Andreas (*q.9. in lib. sex principiorum*), who says: "the principles of action and passion belong to the same genus; therefore, so do action and passion." It also holds negatively: as, "avarice is not praiseworthy; therefore, a miser is not praiseworthy." This locus is, however, restricted in multiple ways. First, by the Doctor (*1.d.5.q.1.*) in the case of ultimate abstracts, where the following does not hold: "a horse is an animal; therefore, horseness is animality." Second, in the case of per se predicates, so that the following does not hold: "the white is sweet; therefore, whiteness is sweetness." Third, in the case of distinct predicates and terms, so that the following does not hold: "the white is colored; therefore, whiteness is colored."

The locus from cases is the relation of one case to another. Among dialecticians, cases are an adjective and its corresponding adverb — such as "just" and "justly." It holds affirmatively: as, "the just is good; therefore, what is done justly is done well," and negatively: "the unjust is not good; therefore, what is done unjustly is not done well."

The locus from division is the relation of one dividing member to another. We argue from division in two ways. First, by denying all the other dividing members except one, the remaining one is concluded: as, "a human being is an animal and is not irrational; therefore, it is rational." Second, if all the dividing members are removed from something, the divided whole is likewise removed from it: as, "a tree is not a brute animal, nor is it a human being; therefore, a tree is not an animal." One should review what was said at (*1.2.q.7.art.1.*) on the precepts of good division.

One may object that the following does not hold by way of the locus from division: "Plato is colored and is not black; therefore, he is white." I grant that the inference is flawed, because the rule given above is not observed — namely, that all the other dividing members except one must be denied.

Question IV. On the Sophistic Syllogism

Last of all, we must treat the sophistic syllogism, the purposes of the Sophists, and their loci. We offer this account not in order to deceive others, to defend falsehood, or to attack truth, but in order to draw truth itself out of the darkness and embrace it, and to repel falsehood proposed in the guise of apparent truth.

The sophistic syllogism is defined by Aristotle (8. *Top. c.4.*) as one that draws its conclusion from premises that appear probable but are not; and it is described by Scotus (*q.3. Universalium*) as the privation of a true syllogism, just as darkness is the privation of light. The same Doctor (*1.d.42.q.un. §. Ad auctoritatem, sub D.*) also calls it a defective, apparent, and deformed syllogism. This can be clearly illustrated from natural philosophy, which teaches that birds and beasts are painted with real colors, while the rainbow, the neck of a dove, and the rays of the sun are adorned with merely apparent colors.

Article I. On the Purposes of the Sophists

Two ends may be assigned to the Sophists. One is the principal end, which is vain or merely apparent wisdom displayed before an audience — something the Sophists endeavor to win, as Aristotle (4. *Met. 6.2. Tex.5.*) and Scotus (1. *Elench. in fine q.7.*) note. The other is a less principal end, namely the drawing of one's opponent into some inconvenience, which the Sophist strives to force upon the one who responds; and this is fivefold: refutation, falsehood, the paradoxical, solecism, and tautology.

Refutation — mentioned by the Doctor (*q.11. Elench. and 4.d.12.q.1. §. Ad q. sub E. versu. Ex ista ratione*) — is the denial of what was previously conceded and the concession of what was previously denied. That is, it occurs when the respondent is compelled to concede the opposite of what he had denied. For example, if someone denies the conclusion "some man flies," the Sophist will syllogize so as to compel the respondent to accept it: "Every rooster flies; some man is a rooster; therefore, some man flies." This sophism is dissolved by distinguishing the major premise, which is true of the barnyard rooster but not of a man of the French nation.

Falsehood is the concession of what is evidently false, or the denial of what is evidently true — that is, when the respondent is driven by the Sophist to concede something that is manifestly false: as, "whatever you have not lost, you have; you have not lost a treasure; therefore, you have a treasure." This sophism is dissolved by absolutely denying the major, or by distinguishing it. Regarding things you truly possessed and did not lose, it is conceded; regarding things you never possessed, it is denied. Chrysippus records something similar in *Teatro vitae humanae, p.197. col. 1.*

The paradoxical occurs when something is conceded that contradicts the common judgment of all — that is, when the respondent admits what is considered improbable by the audience: as, "not every cause loves its work; a mother is the cause of her son; therefore, a mother does not love her son."

Tautology is the pointless and useless repetition of one and the same thing: as, "every lion is an animal; this lion is a lion; therefore, this lion is an animal."

Solecism is an error of incongruous speech, contrary to the rules of grammar, which the Sophist endeavors to induce: as, "every human being is capable of knowing; every woman is a human being; therefore, every woman is capable-of-knowing" — where the grammatical form is incorrect.

One may object that Scotus (*2.d.42.q.4. §. sequitur sub L.*) writes that to recognize and define a solecism belongs to the art of speaking, while to commit one is a fault reproved in that art. Therefore, according to Scotus, solecism does not belong to the sophistical and deceptive art. In reply: it is true that discussion of solecism belongs to grammar; but it is the task of sophistry to impel someone toward committing a solecism. This is how the passage of Scotus just cited is to be interpreted.

Article II. What a Fallacy Is and How It Is Divided

A fallacy, according to Scotus (*q.5. Praedicamentali §. Ad quaestionem dicendum*), is a locus suited to deceiving the respondent through sophistic arguments. A sophistic locus is the seat of an argument from which the Sophist draws his sophistic arguments. Two causes are noted in a fallacy: one is apparent truth, which moves the respondent to assent to it — by reason of which it is called an apparent syllogism; the other is the deficiency of truth, which moves the respondent to reject it — by reason of which it is called a defective syllogism. All deceptive syllogisms either err in matter or in form, as the Doctor writes (*1.d.41.q.un. §. Ad auctoritatem, infra D.*)

To err in matter occurs when one or both of the premises appear to be true and sufficient for inferring a good conclusion, but are in fact false: as, "whatever you have not lost, you have; you have not lost a treasure; therefore, you have a treasure." The sophism is dissolved in the manner explained in the preceding article: the major is denied, since it appears true but is not.

To err in form occurs when the conclusion appears to follow from the premises but in fact does not: as, "an animal runs; therefore, a human being runs." For there may be some animal other than a human being that runs — a lion or a horse, for instance. The sophism is therefore dissolved by denying the consequence. Fallacies are, moreover, of two kinds — as the Doctor notes (*q.5. praedicamentali and 1. Elench. q.7.*) — some in speech, or in the word, and some outside speech, or in the thing. All together they are reckoned to number thirteen: six in speech and seven outside speech, as indicated by Scotus (*1. Elench. q.7.*), which will be treated in the two following articles.

One may object that every fallacy occurs through speech, as is evident; therefore, no fallacy exists outside speech, and thus the division into fallacies in speech and outside speech is incorrect. In reply: what is called a fallacy outside speech is so named not because it occurs without speech, but because its appearance of truth derives not from the word but from the thing, as the Doctor suggests (*q.5. Elench. §. Ad q.*)

Article III. On Fallacies in Speech

The fallacies in speech are equivocation, amphiboly, the fallacy of composition, of division, of accent, and of figure of speech — as Scotus indicates (*1. Elench. q.7. §. Verumtamen*). This sixfold number of fallacies is established by the Doctor (*q.19. Elench. §. Ad aliud*) by the following reasoning: every sophism arises either through the multiple sense of a single word — and this is equivocation; or through the ambiguous sense of a phrase — and this is amphiboly; or through a false composite sense — and this is the fallacy of composition; or through a false divided sense — and this is the fallacy of division; or through the resemblance of one word to another — and this is the fallacy of figure of speech; or through the quantity, aspiration, and manner of pronouncing a word — and this gives the fallacy of accent.

The fallacy of equivocation is deception arising from the unity of a name that has multiple meanings, as the Doctor writes (*1. Perihermenias q.f. and indicates 1.d.9.q.un. §. Ad quaestionem dico, and d.26.q.un. §. Ad rationes sub N.*). It occurs in three ways. First, when a name signifies several things equally and principally — and this is called equivocation by chance, or, as others prefer, pure equivocation: as, "every rooster has wings; but this man is a Gaul; therefore, this man has wings." This sophism is dissolved by distinguishing the major: it is conceded of the barnyard rooster but denied of the man of the French nation, as already stated in the preceding article. Second, when a name has one proper and one metaphorical meaning — and this is called equivocation by design, which others call analogy: as, "whatever has feet can run; a mountain has feet; therefore, a mountain can run." This is mentioned by Scotus (*q.14. Elench.*). The sophism is dissolved by distinguishing the major: what properly has feet is granted; what improperly has feet, as a mountain does, is denied. Third, from Scotus (*q.22. Elench.*): when a name taken conjointly signifies several things, but taken separately signifies only one: as, "everything incorruptible is permanent; everything capable of not being corrupted is incorruptible; therefore, whatever is capable of not being corrupted is permanent." To resolve this sophism one must distinguish the major: if "incorruptible" is taken to mean the same as "capable of not being corrupted," the major is denied — for Adam in the state of innocence was capable of not being corrupted and yet was not permanent. If "incorruptible" is taken to mean "incapable of being corrupted," the major is conceded.

The fallacy of amphiboly is a locus suited to deceiving, arising from a phrase having multiple senses. This is treated by the Doctor (*q.18. Elench. and 2.d.16.q.un. §. Rationes ista. C. Quol. 2. §. Ad 1. sub R.*). It differs from equivocation in that equivocation occurs in simple terms, while amphiboly occurs in complex terms. Just as there are three modes of equivocation suited to deception, so there are three modes of amphiboly suited to misleading. The first mode arises when a phrase equally and primarily has multiple senses, so that in one of the premises

it is taken in one sense and in the conclusion in another: as, "whatever belongs to Aristotle is possessed by Aristotle; this book belongs to Aristotle; therefore, this book is possessed by Aristotle." The sophism is exposed — following Scotus (*in Reportatis 4.d.13.q.1. §. Item formalius*) — because it is ambiguous whether "Aristotle's book" means a book composed by Aristotle or a book owned by Aristotle; if the major is understood in the first sense, the conclusion is false; if the major is understood in the second sense, the conclusion is true. The second mode arises when a phrase bears multiple senses, one principal and one less principal, and has one sense in one of the premises and another sense in the conclusion: as, "whoever ploughs the seashore turns the earth; but whoever wastes his effort ploughs the seashore; therefore, whoever wastes his effort turns the earth." For the phrase "ploughs the seashore," if taken in its proper sense, makes the major true and the minor false; if taken in its metaphorical sense, the major is false and the conclusion is true. The third mode occurs when a phrase taken by itself has only one meaning, but when joined to another it takes on a different meaning: as, "whatever someone sees, this sees; but someone sees a column; therefore, the column sees." The paralogism is dissolved by distinguishing the phrase "this sees" — for "this" may be taken in the nominative case, giving the sense that whatever someone sees, that thing itself sees, i.e., has the power and act of seeing; in which case the major is false and the conclusion absurd. Or "this" may be taken in the accusative case, giving the sense that whatever someone sees, he sees that thing; and in this way the major is also false.

The fallacy of composition is committed when one proceeds from a true divided sense to a false composite sense. Or: the fallacy of composition is a locus suited to deceiving, arising from the sameness of a false composite expression and a true divided one: as, "the white can be black; this wall is white; therefore, this wall can be black." The major in the composite sense is false: for what is white, insofar as it is white — that is, insofar as it is determined and contracted by the form of whiteness and remains under it — cannot be black, since otherwise two opposed forms would simultaneously exist in the same subject. But in the divided sense it is true: for what is affected by whiteness can in principle be affected by blackness.

The fallacy of division is a locus suited to deceiving, arising from the sameness of a false divided expression and a true composite one. This sophism is committed when one argues from a true composite sense to a false divided sense: as, "the white cannot be black; this wall is white; therefore, this wall cannot be black." The major in the composite sense is conceded, as just explained; but in the divided sense it is denied. For there is no contradiction in the fact that what is white can be made black: what is absolutely determined by whiteness can simply be determined by blackness, and vice versa, since there is no necessity except in a qualified sense and from a supposition. These two fallacies are mentioned and discussed by Scotus (*1.d.21.q.un. §. Ad 1.arg. sub A. and*

d.39. §. Quantum ad 1. sub G. and d.40. §. Ad istam quaestionem. A. and 2.d.2.q.1. §. Ad argumenta pro prima opinione, sub E. d.7.q.un. §. De 2. sub G. Quol. 18. §. De 2.M. and 4.d.49.q.6. §. Dico G. and ante q.25. 26. Elench.)

The fallacy of accent is a locus suited to deceiving, arising from the material sameness of a word that signifies differently according to its different manner of pronunciation. Three deceptive modes of this fallacy are described. The first occurs when a word can receive different accents, whether grave, acute, or circumflex: as, "every poplar is a tree; a people is a poplar; therefore, a people is a tree." The major is conceded if the first syllable of the word *populus* is long, but denied if it is short, and thus the conclusion does not follow. The second mode arises when a word can be either a term or a phrase: as, "you are rest; but rest is repose; therefore, you are repose." The quibble is dissolved by noting that *quies* can be either a noun or a phrase composed of the relative *qui* and the verb *est*. The third mode arises from the different pronunciation of serious and ironic speech, or of interrogative and assertive speech: as, "a good servant deserves to be rewarded by his master; but the master, when rebuking his servant, said, 'he is a good servant'; therefore, the servant when rebuked by his master deserves to be rewarded." This sophism is dissolved by noting that the phrase is pronounced sometimes seriously and sometimes ironically — as is evident in Virgil: *Arguetur Drance*.

The fallacy of figure of speech is deception arising from the resemblance of words — that is, as Gadius notes (*Quol. 2. fol. 32. col. 1.*) — from a similar ending of terms that do not in fact signify the same thing. This fallacy is committed in three ways. First, from the same ending of two words: as, "Muse is of feminine gender; therefore, the Pope too is of feminine gender." Second, when a transition is made from one category to another: as, "as many times as you were in Rome, you were a human being; but you were in Rome twice; therefore, you were a human being twice." This paralogism is dissolved because a transition is made from the category of When to the category of Quantity. Third, from a change of supposition: as, "man is a species; Peter is a man; therefore, Peter is a species." The quibble is dissolved because the argument proceeds from simple supposition to personal supposition. This form of deception is mentioned by Scotus (*1.d.2.q.7. §. Ad argumenta principalia sub AA. d.18.q.un. §. Respondeo, sub K. in solutione quinti 3.d.1.q.5. ante §. In ista and 4.d.12.q.2. §. Ad argumenta. O. and d.13.q.1. infra P. and ex instituto q.35. Elench.*)

One may object, first, that no word signifies more than one thing; therefore, there is no fallacy of equivocation. The antecedent is proved: a single sign has only one thing signified; therefore, a single word has only one meaning. The antecedent is denied. To its proof I distinguish: a single sign taken formally has only one thing signified — this I concede; taken materially, I deny it. For the same sound of a bell can signify both Mass and the call to a lecture.

One may object, second, that every phrase signifies only one thing — namely, the composition of predicate with subject. Therefore, there is no fallacy of amphiboly. In reply: a phrase does not signify the composition of predicate with subject; rather, that composition is designated by the copula *est*.

One may object, third, that if there were any fallacy of accent, it would above all be this one: "Every evil is an apple; but sin is an evil; therefore, sin is an apple." Yet this is a fallacy of equivocation. Therefore, there is no fallacy of accent. The minor premise is denied: since *malum* does not signify different things by virtue of its matter, form, and manner of pronunciation, it cannot be a sophism of equivocation.

Article IV. On Fallacies Outside Speech

The sophisms outside speech are more numerous and more dangerous than those in speech, as Aristotle indicates (*1. Elench. c.5.*). These are called the fallacies of accident, of the qualified to the unqualified, of the consequent, of ignorance of the elenchus, of *petitio principii*, of non-cause as cause, and of many questions as one.

The fallacy of accident is deception arising from the fact that, because two extremes are connected with a middle term in the premises, they are thought to be connected with one another in the conclusion, when in fact they are not. Note that "accident" here is taken to mean something extraneous — that is, something outside the essence or formal character of another thing — as the Philosopher uses it (*1. Top. and 1. Elench.*) and indicates (*1. Met. c.1.*), as Fomesca observes in his commentary there. The Doctor uses "accident" in this same sense (*q.43. 44. Elench. and 3.d.8.q.un. §. Ad argumenta. sub H. and elsewhere*). The source of the appearance in this fallacy is the partial identity of the two extremes with the middle; the source of its defect is their diversity with respect to a third, as Scotus exemplifies (*1. Post. q.34. ante §. Ad rationes*). Three modes of this fallacy are commonly assigned. The first occurs when something is predicated of some whole and is thought to be predicated of its subjective parts as well; an example is given by the Doctor (*q.16. Universalium, ante §. Dicitur hic*): "A human being is an animal; an animal is a genus; therefore, a human being is a genus." The second occurs when, from the identity of two extremes with a third, those two extremes are thought to be completely identical: as, "Peter is a man; Paul is a man; therefore, Paul is Peter." The third occurs when, from two things taken separately, something is inferred to belong to them conjointly as a matter of accident: as, "Andrew is white and is a monk; therefore, Andrew is a white monk."

The fallacy of the qualified to the unqualified is deception arising from the fact that something is asserted with a qualification, but is concluded absolutely and without any qualification: as, "an image is a painted man; therefore, an image is a man." Likewise: "Christians are not permitted to eat meat on Friday; therefore, Christians are not permitted to eat meat." Conversely, the same paralogism

occurs when one argues from the unqualified to the qualified: as, "this is a man; therefore, this is a dead man." Likewise: "this is a good person; therefore, this is a good gambler." The Doctor provides an example of this fallacy (*1.d.36.q.un. §. Contra istud, sub E.*) and makes mention of it (*d.39. §. Sed contra istam distinctionem. 1. and 2.d.1.q.2. §. Ad 1. argumentum, infra G.*); multiple modes of it are also adduced and discussed at length with examples by Mastrius and Bellutus (*parte 2. Tract. 3. c.3.*)

The fallacy of the consequent — noted by Scotus (*q.3. Universalium §. Dicitur. and ibid. q.8. §. Ad 1.q. and 1.d.35.q.un. §. Et quod arguitur. O. and 3.d.8.q.un. §. Ad argumenta, sub F.*) — is a locus suited to deceiving that arises from the apparent validity of the posterior consequence combined with the genuine validity of the prior consequence. That is, when a consequent proposition does indeed entail the antecedent proposition, but the antecedent does not entail the consequent: for the argument from lower to higher holds — as, "it is a human being; therefore, it is an animal" — but not the argument from higher to lower affirmatively — as, "it is an animal; therefore, it is a human being." I say affirmatively, because negatively the inference holds: "it is not an animal; therefore, it is not a human being."

The fallacy of ignorance of the elenchus — on which the Doctor expressly dissertates (*q.55. Elench.*) and touches (*2.d.2.q.7. §. Et ideo ad 4. infra C. and 4.d.11.q.3. §. Hic duo, sub D.*) — is deception arising from the apparent observance of the conditions required for a true contradiction, by reason of which appearance the inference seems sound and probative, when in fact it is neither. Or: the fallacy of ignorance of the elenchus is one in which what appears to be the contradictory of what has been conceded is concluded, even though it is not truly contradictory, owing to the absence of the conditions required in a contradiction — which are: with respect to the same thing, in the same respect, in the same manner, at the same time — to which one should add: in the same place. By reason of the first condition — same thing — the following paralogism arises: "Two is double of one, and is not double of three; therefore, it is both double and not double." By reason of the second condition — same respect — a sophism arises thus: "This is double of that with respect to breadth, and is not double with respect to length; therefore, it is both double and not double." By reason of the third condition — same manner — the following sophism is committed: "Man is a species; no man is a species; therefore, the same is both a species and not a species." This is dissolved because the argument moves from simple supposition to personal supposition. Owing to the absence of the fourth condition, a sophism arises: "Peter was healthy at that hour, and was sick at that hour; therefore, he is both healthy and sick." This is dissolved because Peter is not healthy and sick at the same hour. The condition of place seems reducible to this: "Paul lectures in Paris and sleeps in Rome; therefore, Paul both lectures and sleeps." This is dissolved because it is with respect to different places, and thus no contradiction follows. Nor should the definition of the elenchus be omitted,

so that this fallacy may be made clearer: the elenchus is a contradictory syllogism by which the contradictory of a proposition conceded by the respondent is concluded, as is clearly evident from the examples just given.

The fallacy of *petitio principii* — noted by the Doctor (*1. Elench. q.4.*) — is deception arising from the assumption of what is to be proved. It occurs when the same thing is proved by itself with only the words changed, or by something less known or equally unknown: as when someone proves that a human being has a large brain because a rational animal has a large brain; or that contrary subjects fall under the same science because opposed subjects fall under the same science.

The fallacy of non-cause as cause — adduced by Scotus and Lychetus (*1.d.3.q.7. Ad argumenta pro 2. opinione sub R.*) — is deception that occurs when the falsity of a derived conclusion is attributed to one of the premises that is in fact not the cause of that falsity: as when someone argues that philosophy is to be condemned because certain philosophers have invented and defended heresies — for philosophy is not the cause of heresies, but rather the wickedness of those men, their corrupt interpretation of Scripture, and their stubbornness in error. Similarly, if someone were to censure the Catholic faith on the grounds that certain Catholics are wicked — for it is not the orthodox faith but rather their depraved lives that is to be blamed.

The fallacy of many questions as one is deception arising from the resemblance of multiple questions to a single question. This quibble arises when a single answer is given to a question that in fact contains multiple questions: as, if a blind man and a sighted man are pointed out together and it is asked of them both "Are they blind or sighted?" — if the answer is "they are sighted," the Sophist infers "therefore, the blind man is sighted"; if the answer is "they are blind," the Sophist infers "therefore, the sighted man is blind"; and if the answer is negative, the Sophist infers "therefore, the sighted are not sighted." This sophism is dissolved by giving a double answer to the double question — namely, "one is blind, but the other is sighted." This fallacy is mentioned by Scotus (*q.9. Praedicamentali and ibid. q.38. §. Ad 2.q.*) and by Saranus (*in expositione q.3. p.76.*), as well as by the Doctor (*1.d.2.q.2. ante §. Ad 1.q. paulo post F.*)

One may object, first, that there is no fallacy of substance; therefore, there is no fallacy of accident. The antecedent is conceded by all. The consequence appears evident, since the same reasoning applies to both. The antecedent being conceded, the consequence is denied: because in the present context "accident" is not taken in the proper sense of the fifth predicable, but in the sense of something extraneous, as was noted above.

One may object, second, that one who does not know the elenchus is not deceived with respect to the elenchus. Therefore, there is no fallacy of ignorance of the elenchus. In reply: there are two kinds of ignorance — pure

negation, and corrupt disposition. With regard to the first, there is no fallacy; but there is with regard to the second, which consists in assenting to a false proposition with some prior knowledge of it presupposed. For this reason the fallacy is not taken up but rejected as worthless and empty; and the Sophist is not to be embraced but avoided. It is for this reason that the Sophists are rightly mocked in numerous passages by Cicero and Seneca. There is the well-known remark attributed to Diogenes, who, when a dialectician accosted him with insulting words in this manner — "What I am, you are not; but I am a man; therefore, you are not a man" — replied: "This last is false; if you would make it true, begin with me." So much concerning fallacies — to the praise of him who, as the Doctor testifies (*4.d.14.q.3. §. Hic dicitur, ante F.*) and Augustine (*Serm. 30. de verbis Apostoli*), neither deceives, nor wishes to deceive, nor can be deceived.

Rational Philosophy of Fr. Bonaventure Colombi of Nice, Minor Conventual, Doctor and Professor of Sacred Theology

*According to the Mind of the Subtle Doctor, Aptly
Distributed into Five Books and Brought to Full Completion*

Preface and Commendation of the Subtle Doctor

Having established in the three books of our *Dialectical Epitome* a knowledge of terms — which opens for us a clear and illuminated entrance to the whole of Logic — we now propose, God willing, to submit to examination the more celebrated questions, the more difficult articles, and the subtler points of dispute that are agitated both by the ancient and by the modern philosophers. We shall dispatch the easier matters quickly, cut away the useless entirely, and, with all the brevity and accessibility that is possible, scrutinize above all the weightier and more worthy topics and decide them as best we can. We undertake this labor willingly and diligently, both on account of our long exercise in these matters and on account of the benefit we hope to bring — and it is no small benefit — to students of Scotist and Thomist doctrine, and to all others devoted to letters outside either school, through the simplicity and clarity of our style. For we have taken up this province not out of vanity but led by truth, not for the sake of contention or provocation, but for the sake of knowledge and assistance.

Now, since the Stagirite affirms (*Metaphysics* I.1) that the human race lives by art and reason, we ought indeed to live gladly and pleasantly in pursuing Logic, which is the art of arts and the science of sciences, as Peter of Spain writes at the opening of his *Summulae*. Logic flows from reason, resides in reason, and treats of the operations of reason or intellect together with their consequences. It is therefore rightly called rational science. No one should be called away from the study of Logic or deterred by its obscurity and great difficulty. For the more obscure and difficult it is, the more excellent and eminent it is; it has placed its seat in high and arduous things, so that once this seat is attained, a more convenient and readier path may be prepared for us to take up the remaining sciences. I add the saying of Plato: difficult things are beautiful. And Aristotle (*Metaphysics* I, at the passage cited): we consider that man wise who is able to attain to difficult things and things not easily known by a man of slight capacity.

Nor likewise should the wit and the name of Scotus deter anyone from this inquiry and examination. The name Scotus means in Greek "darkness," as Tossignanum notes in *Book III of the Seraphic History*. Yet although that name clung to him more by reason of the subtlety and profundity of his excellent genius and intellect, and the obscurity of his manner of disputation, than by derivation

from his region of origin, there is nonetheless nothing so seized upon by difficulty or wrapped in dense shadow that the aforesaid Doctor cannot lucidly explain and clearly illuminate.

Who among us would reproach St. Paul? As is read in *2 Peter* I, and cited by Augustine (*On Faith and Works*, ch. 16), he has certain things difficult to understand, which the unlearned and unstable distort. And who would accuse Aristotle, who communicates his doctrine wrapped in many veils and circuitous expressions? For truth lifts itself up to the clouds (*Psalms* III). Or it lowers itself to the depth of Democritus's well (*4 Esdras*). The way of truth is hidden, and its parent is the hidden God. This seems to have been signified to the holy Apostles when at Christ the Lord's ascension a cloud received him from their sight. And before that, it had been shown to three of them, whom Christ himself had taken up, at his transfiguration, when a bright cloud overshadowed them.

Concerning our Doctor, St. Bernardino of Siena reports (*Sermons*, vol. IV): not rarely was Scotus himself carried into ecstasy and very frequently elevated above sensible and material things, so that with the senses at rest he might contemplate heavenly things, just as St. Francis our Father was sometimes seen to transcend himself in ecstasy, meditating with a pure mind on the divine mysteries. Therefore Scotus is not to be reproached or refuted, since, as a master of truth — as Maurice testifies (*On the Universals*, fol. 47), and as Scaliger confirms (*Exercises*, 324), and as Sarnanus judges (*Epistle before Anthony Andrew*) — he is like the sun among the stars among philosophers and theologians, and though subtle, obscure, and nebulous in his arduous pursuit of truth, he is rather to be admired and marveled at. For though he was most subtle and most gifted by nature with great boldness, he could never be convicted of any error, nor could any of his writings be overturned in the smallest part, as Tossignanum (cited above) and Vorrelog (*Peroration of his Theological Course*) note. Moreover, the Sacred Congregation of Cardinals decreed in the year 1610 that whatever is established to be Scotus's should be admitted and printed intact and inviolate by the censors of doctrines and books, as Cavellus (*Life of Scotus*, ch. 5) and Wadding (*Annals of the Minors*, vol. III) report.

What Averroes proclaims as something divine and miraculous concerning Aristotle (*Commentary on Physics* I, and *On the Soul* III, comment 14) is clearly a miraculous and prodigious thing to say of Scotus. He was taught fully and completely by his holy Mother the Church and her most holy Son; within a short time he had perfect mastery of all knowable things, and by the unanimous voice of all philosophers and theologians he is proclaimed their prince, celebrated as the phoenix of intellects and the prodigy of nearly the whole world, as Vernulaeus reports in his *Panegyric*. This is indeed Scotus, whose mind was opened by the prayers of the Mother of God, whose intellect God illuminated and adorned with the light of all the sciences, as Cavellus writes (*Life*, ch. 1). This is Scotus, who at *Sentences* III, d. 20, q. un., §*Tunc D.*, exhorts

men to contend without ceasing for justice and to die with alacrity for truth, just as Christ died for justice and truth, according to Bagnacaballensis (*On the Passion*, p. 21). This is Scotus whom God chose and pre-elected as the primary author and most vigorous defender of the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin, as Salazar affirms (*On the Immaculate Conception*, I, ch. 13). This is Scotus whose fame and memory are held in blessing, as Anthony Andrew states (*At the end of Metaphysics* XII). For as St. Bernard says, blessed is he upon whom the holy Mother looks with favor. Indeed, Scotus seems to be numbered among the blessed, upon whom the Blessed Virgin looked with a kindly countenance when, as he knelt in prayer before her marble image in Paris and recited the verse which the holy mother Church so frequently sings, especially after the Purification — *Dignare me laudare te, Virgo sacrata; da mihi virtutem contra hostes tuos* ("Deign to let me praise thee, O sacred Virgin; give me strength against thy enemies") — the Virgin herself nodded assent and inclined her head, pledging to him a glorious victory in the very cause for which the Doctor was praying. So Pineda reports in his *Observations*. Wherefore he carried off a splendid palm in the most celebrated disputation held in that city on behalf of the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin, where he brilliantly refuted two hundred arguments on the opposing side and answered them sharply and fully, as Pelbartus (*Stellarium*, IV, art. 3), Bernardino de Bustis (*In the Office Approved by Sixtus IV*, lect. 4), and Genebrard (*At the year of Christ 1484*) report. Moved and amazed by this, one of his opponents exclaimed and said to him: You are one of three — an angel from heaven, a devil from hell, or Scotus from Duns. So the Irish say, as cited by Cavellus in the passage noted above.

For this reason, Cardanus (*Subtleties*, 16) not unreasonably doubts which was the more subtle: Aristotle, Euclid, or Scotus. Nor do I pass over in silence that on the night of the Lord's Nativity, while he was devoutly meditating on the most sacred Incarnation of the divine Word, the Savior himself, with particular love and singular favor, showed affection to Scotus, in that he appeared to him in the likeness of a little child and offered himself to him to be touched with his eyes, his lips, and his embrace, as Paulino Berto affirms at the beginning of his works.

Scotus was endowed and loaded with all the virtues, and most especially with obedience, which God wills more than sacrifice. In testimony of his obedience, I record this outstanding monument. One day, as he was walking outside the city of Paris to refresh his spirit, a messenger met him bearing letters sent by our Minister General and entrusted to him with a mandate requesting that he proceed to Cologne. As soon as he saw and read this, he set out at once. He did not return to the Parisian friary where he resided, nor to the Sorbonne where he was teaching; he did not bid farewell to his dearest friends, nor take up his writings, nor seek and carry with him any of the things he needed, but departed immediately without any delay in order to obey the supreme superior of the Seraphic Order and to fulfill his commands. O man worthy of wonder, to be celebrated with all praise and proclamation — so much so that John Mair, a

most trustworthy witness, judged him worthy of the Supreme Pontificate. And entire kingdoms and not a few regions proclaim and declare him as though born from their own throne. For just as the seven cities of Greece contend over Homer's birthplace and each of them claims and asserts him as its own citizen, so England, Scotland, and Ireland claim Scotus as their own, and follow and embrace him as the chief and guide of all philosophers and theologians. And rightly so, for he is to be followed, read, and trusted in all things in whom nearly all excellences are supremely found — who flourished throughout the world like another Apollo, and happy was every man who honored him as master and who, with Mercury going before as guide, could penetrate the inmost recesses of philosophy and theology, as is read in the *Franciscan Martyrology* on the eighth of November.

For since he directed the keenness of his mind somewhat higher than others and elevated it in the pursuit of truth, he discovered new arguments, devised hidden difficulties, and most eloquently and keenly defended singular opinions beyond the common ones. By the great subtlety of his great intellect he refuted opposing views in a remarkable manner, so that lovers of truth and experts in disputation had in him material for the most fruitful exercise. If you were to remove from the schools the proper opinions of Scotus and his own peculiar controversies, the practice of disputing and debating would necessarily languish.

Nor let you be frightened by the opinion of those who prefer to err with others rather than to think aright with Scotus. For the entire university of Paris, the most celebrated in the city and in the world, firmly follows and steadfastly embraces his doctrine. The most distinguished academies of the world — especially those of Rome, Padua, Bologna, and Salamanca — along with the most learned men in every branch of learning, publicly teach and vigorously defend it. So many purple-robed Fathers, by whom the whole world of lands is adorned. So many supreme Pontiffs, who have held most rightly and most holily the helm and rudder of the Church, have adhered to it. Finally, the entire Minorite family, which perhaps abounds in as many and as great Doctors as shine forth in all the rest, gladly acknowledges him as common Master and defends him with alacrity. And of the weighty and sublime things that are read in all the other scholastics within living memory, scarcely as many are to be found as are stored up in this one Scotus alone.

I shall say this much briefly: perhaps no one has ever been so presumptuous as to dare to wish silently, from immortal God, so great a knowledge of things and so great an excellence of virtues as the all-powerful God bestowed upon Scotus. Therefore, by the light of divine grace, by the splendor of truth, and by the brilliance of the doctrine of the Subtle Doctor, we shall dispel the darkneses of philosophical difficulties, the obscurities of questions and articles, as we study his books and works without any suspicion of error, running without stumbling through the entire Scotist curriculum — as St. Jerome asserts concerning the

doctrine of St. Hilary, writing to Laeta, and as Bagnacaballensis confirms in the passage cited above, p. 19.

Book I: On the Prolegomena of Rational Philosophy, Which Is Called Logic

Nearly all philosophers, theologians, and the holy Fathers — most notably Augustine in many of his works — are accustomed to set down at the beginning of each treatise, faculty, or science they take up certain preliminary matters called by the Greeks *prolegomena* and by the Latins *praeludia* (prolegomena: preliminary discussions; praeludia: preludes), so that once students have come to know the utility, necessity, and excellence of the subject and science to be learned, they may be more easily, readily, and forcefully attracted and moved toward attaining it. The Subtle Doctor performs this with particular diligence in the first three questions of the universals, as the most eminent Cardinal Sarnanus rightly notes in the proem of his commentary on them.

Question I: On the Existence and Discovery of Logic

Article I: Whether Logic Exists

Some men, cited by Cicero (*Academic Questions*, I.1) and by Zwinger (*Theater of Human Life*, vol. II, near the end of bk. 4), suspect that no discipline of disputation exists, and no art of reasoning. All philosophers oppose them with one voice and one cry, affirming both natural logic and artificial logic, as will be plainly shown by what we shall presently set down and establish.

Note, from Sarnanus (just cited, near the beginning of q. 1), Tataretus (ibid.), Scibilis (I), Fuentes (art. 1), and the Conimbricenses (*Commentary on the Physics*, 9.6, art. 2), following Aristotle (*Rhetoric* I.1), that Logic is divided into natural and artificial. Against the protests of Rubius (*Logic*, q. 1), natural logic is the natural inclination or natural ability of the intellect by which the intellect itself naturally inclines and is rendered capable of assenting more readily to what is true than to what is false, and by which, from this assent, it proceeds from knowledge of the known to knowledge of the unknown. Every human being possesses this logic by his very nature, without any labor or study, inasmuch as he is by nature intellectual and capable of reasoning. Artificial logic, on the other hand, is that which, through the help of a master or by one's own industry, hands down the method of reasoning well. It is divided into the teaching part and the using part. The teaching part (*logica docens*) provides the norm for dividing, defining, and arguing well. The using part (*logica utens*) treats of probable matters, or serves other disciplines, or arises from use and practice — concerning which, see below at length, q. 2.

First assertion: natural logic exists. Scotus presupposes this at q. 1 of the universals, where he asks whether Logic is a science; since this question is raised by the Doctor concerning artificial logic, natural logic is already presupposed, because the artificial presupposes the natural, just as art presupposes nature — from which art is said by Aristotle (*Physics* II.1) to differ. The foregoing assertion is proved first from Aristotle himself (*Rhetoric* I.1, cited), who says that men are by nature rhetoricians and dialecticians. Before him, Socrates and Plato taught this, as is found in Plato's *Philebus*. Second: the intellect takes pleasure in the natural inclination and capacity for proceeding from what is known to what is unknown, as is clear from *Metaphysics* I.2; for it is naturally discursive and rational. Now this natural propensity and capacity for reasoning is called natural logic, as has been set out in the note given above. Natural logic is therefore not to be denied. Third: each and every thing possesses an inclination and capacity for acquiring its operations and perfections. Thus Aristotle (*Metaphysics* I.1) reports that men are naturally inclined toward knowing and brutes toward sensing. Now a man, with no previous master and with no undertaking of labor, reasons and argues about many things, as the same philosopher states (*Sophistical Refutations* I.11). Hugh of Saint Victor (*Didascalicon* I) notes this well, and Augustine (*On Eighty-Three Questions*, q. 80, and *Part II of the same*, q. 41) confirms it. Natural logic is therefore to be established — and indeed to be supposed rather than proved, as the Stagirite shows by analogy in *Physics* II.

Fourth assertion: artificial logic is also to be admitted. Scotus presupposes this in the place to be cited below, and it is proved: first, from Aristotle (*Rhetoric* I.1, cited), where he recalls the origin of dialectic, saying that when men observed themselves sometimes reasoning well and sometimes poorly, they noted down certain rules and precepts, by the observance of which a good and legitimate syllogism and discourse is always produced. Moreover, Aristotle himself composed an artificial logic that is perfect and complete in all respects, in the manner of syllogizing, which he distinguished under the name of the *Organon* and which the Subtle Doctor enriched and expanded with most subtle questions in his noble work on Logic. And many others have shed great light on this doctrine of disputation, among whom are Plato, Augustine, and others cited by Titelmans in his *Apologetic Prologue to the Dialectic*. Second: among us there exist the art of speaking well, which is Grammar, the art of speaking eloquently, which is Rhetoric, and other arts discovered as useful and necessary for conducting the works of human life. And that Logic is not merely useful but indeed necessary for acquiring the other sciences will be plainly shown in q. 4 of this book. Moreover, just as Ethics is conceded by no one's denial to be granted for the purpose of regulating and perfecting the will, so for the purpose of adorning and perfecting the intellect — lest it stumble in its reasonings — artificial logic should by common reckoning be received, committed to letters, and celebrated with praise.

You will object first, against the first assertion: if natural logic exists, it is either the natural inclination of the intellect for reasoning from what is known to what is unknown, or the intellect itself, which can reason without rules and precepts, or it is the natural light by which the intellect reasons without any art and order. But none of these can be said. Therefore there is no natural logic. The major is evident from a sufficient enumeration of what can be adduced to introduce natural logic. The minor is proved: it is not the aforesaid natural inclination, which is a property of nature — which, being a relation according to Scotus (*Sentences* I, d. 3, q. 4, near the end, §*On the second knowables*; *ibid.* d. 30, q. 2, *before Q.*; and *ibid.* III, d. 17, q. un., C.), is not of the genus of active things. Nor is it the intellect, which is really a substance (*Sentences* II, d. 16, q. un.). For natural logic, being a natural capacity for reasoning, is an accident, namely a quality — as Scotus holds concerning every natural potency so taken (*Quaestio* 32 on the *Predicaments*, together with Aristotle, *Categories*, ch. on quality). Nor is it the aforesaid light, for that is common to all doctrines by which our intellect is illuminated and enlightened. Fuentes (just cited) responds that natural logic is reason, that is, discourse instilled by nature, acquired without any art or labor, such as is seen in rustics recognizing that the whole is greater than its part and that the sky is greater than the earth. This response does not please me, since natural logic is the principle of discourse, as is clear from its description given above in the note. Therefore it cannot be the discourse and intellect themselves; for the same thing with respect to the same cannot be both principle and product, cause and effect. And Fuentes himself seems to catch a scent of this shortly afterward, saying that natural logic can be taken for the intellective power insofar as it is a sufficient principle for eliciting such acts. Moreover, the same author adduces examples to confirm his doctrine: of the whole, which is greater than its part, and of the sky, which is greater than the earth. But these examples belong not to dialectic but to the habit of first principles, which consists, by common assertion, not in discourse but in the mere explanation of terms.

I respond: granting the major and denying the minor, one may say in answer to its proof that natural logic is formally the aforementioned inclination, which is a property of the intellectual nature, and radically the intellect of that nature. Or it should be said that it is formally the capacity for reasoning, and fundamentally the intellect, as Tataretus intimates (*Logic*, q. 1).

You will press further: natural logic cannot be separated from the intellect from which it flows by any power, even divine, since it is its property — which, according to Scotus (*Sentences* II, d. 16, q. un.), is really identical with the thing of which it is a property. But the capacity for reasoning, being a quality belonging to the genus of absolute things, can at least be separated by divine power from the subject in which it inheres. Therefore natural logic is in no way a capacity or natural power for reasoning. One must respond, in accordance with the two opinions on natural logic intimated above, by saying that the major is true of

natural logic taken as a natural inclination for reasoning, but false of natural logic taken as a capacity and natural power for reasoning. To argue from one to the other is an invalid inference. Just as it does not follow, "the natural inclination is a relation; therefore the natural capacity and power is likewise a relation" — since the latter belongs to the second species of quality while the former does not.

You will press further: if the natural capacity and power for reasoning can be separated from that of which it is a capacity, then at least by the power of God the intellect could exist without this capacity, which is impossible — just as it is impossible for the intellect to exist and not be discursive and capable of reasoning. And thus natural logic does not seem to be the aforesaid natural capacity. The objection is met if one says, given the hypothesis, that the intellect is always radically discursive even if that capacity is removed from it, since the root and principle of reasoning is the intellect itself, which is followed by the aforesaid capacity and natural power of reasoning.

You will object secondly, against the second assertion: every science is about a thing, because the sciences are divided according to things (*On the Soul* III.8, T. 38). This is implied by the Doctor (*Logic*, q. 3 on the universals, before §*Ad rationem positionis tertiae*). But Logic is about no thing; otherwise it would be a real science, which contradicts the Doctor (*ibid.*, q. 1, in the solution to the second argument). Therefore there seems to be no artificial logic. I distinguish the major: every real science is about a thing — granted; a rational science, such as Logic — denied. The saying of Aristotle thus cited is interpreted accordingly. Or say that every science treats of a thing taken broadly, not strictly as signifying a real being existing or capable of existing outside the operation of the intellect, as Scotus excellently deduces (*Quodlibet* 3, §*De primo*), which Siretus and other Scotists pursue at length (*Tract on the Formalities*, fol. 12, p. 2). All the more so, since the argument does not prove that Logic does not exist, but that it is not a science — which I shall examine in q. 2.

Article II: How Logic Is Named and What It Is

This article has already been worked through and nearly resolved by what was said in the *Summulae*, Book I, q. 1, art. 1, where the proper and improper names of this discipline and their etymologies, as well as descriptions of it, were set out. All of that is to be reviewed there, so as not to carry water to the sea; here I shall only add what seems to be missing in that place.

Note that the noun *Logica* is not found substantively in Aristotle, as the Conimbricenses (*On Metaphysics*, q. 4 proem., a. 1) and Fonseca (*Metaphysics* II, q. 1, sect. 2) observe, against Fuentes (near the end of the second article cited), who asserts that Aristotle uses this word more frequently to signify the whole art of reasoning. I find, however, that Aristotle uses the word *logica* in an adjectival or adverbial sense, as at *Posterior Analytics* I.43 and I.18, T. 39; at *Topics* I.16, T. 36,

and at its end; at *Posterior Analytics* II.5; at *Topics* V.1; and at *Metaphysics* VII.17 and XII.1, T. 4. And at *On the Generation of Animals* I, the Philosopher calls arguments "logical" which consist of logical terms. Orbellus adds (*Metaphysics* VII, ch. 2) that the Philosopher treats of the quiddities of sensible things through logical arguments. Nor is Scotus unaware of this (*Metaphysics* III, commentary on the text, p. 63; and *Metaphysics* IV, p. 100, according to the recent edition of Cavellus). But nearly all the later dialecticians use it substantively, establishing this distinction between *Logica* and *Dialectica*: that *Logica* is taken only for Analytics, that is, for the part that teaches the mode of demonstration, as Alexander notes (*Topics* I.1 and *Posterior Analytics* II.1) — a distinction elicited from Aristotle (ibid., I.1 and 2) — while *Dialectica* refers only to Topica, which treats of probable matters only, as is found in Ammonius (*On Interpretation*, I.1) and other ancient Peripatetics, as Scotus indicates (*Logic*, qq. 1 and 2, *Sophistical Refutations*).

First assertion: the whole of this doctrine is conveniently called Dialectic. The Doctor indicates this (*Logic*, q. 2, *Sophistical Refutations*, §*Ad 1. q.*). Proved first from Aristotle (*Rhetoric* I.1), who says that every syllogism belongs either to universal Dialectic or to some part of it, as Aureolus correctly notes (*Sentences* I, d. 33, a. 2, defect 94). And this is derived from *Topics* I.2, whose words Fuentes cites in the passage just cited. Augustine supports it (*Against Cresconius* I; *Against Julian* III.7), and Cicero agrees (*On Fate*), along with the whole modern school. Second: Dialectic, according to the interpretation of its name, is the same as the doctrine of disputation, as St. Basil indicates (*Commentary on Isaiah*, ch. 5). But this whole discipline considers discourse taken precisely, abstracting from both topical and analytical discourse; hence it is called by Cicero (*On Ends* III), Quintilian (*Oratorical Institutions* XII), and Augustine (*Against Cresconius* I.13; *On Dialectic*, ch. 1) the art of disputation. And disputation is carried out both by the topical and by the demonstrative syllogism. Likewise, every science takes its name from its end or from the object with which it is concerned (*On the Soul* III.4). But this discipline is concerned with the discourse of anything whatsoever, whether probable or necessary. Therefore the name "Dialectic" is not unfittingly adapted to the whole of this doctrine.

Second assertion: the whole of this discipline is rightly called Logic. The Doctor holds this in the place to be cited below. Proved first: words are to be used in accordance with the usage of authors, as Scotus notes (*Sentences* I, d. 14–15, q. un., under *E*; and IV, d. 1, q. 2, §*De secundo infra F.*). But among the philosophers, usage has now prevailed that the name "Logic" is employed for the whole of this science, as we hear in daily disputations and find written everywhere in books — especially in Cicero (*On Fate*), Diogenes (*Life of Aristotle*), Boethius, Scotus, and others who have published useful and subtle questions on the whole discipline of reasoning, as is clearly evident from the inscription of our Doctor's work according to the edition of Cardinal Sarnanus. And Scotus himself uses this word (*Logic*, q. 4, under *H*; and q. 4, *Prologue*, §*Dico igitur A.*). The whole of this

doctrine is therefore rightly called Logic. Second: Logic, according to the interpretation of its name, is the same as "rational," as Scotus touches upon in the *Epitome*. But this discipline is rational, or a discipline of reasoning, since it teaches the method of reasoning. It is therefore rightly designated by the aforesaid name.

Third assertion: Logic is properly defined as rational science. This is stated explicitly by the Doctor (q. 1 of the universals, near the end; and *Metaphysics* VI, q. 1, §*Inter dictas*). Faber (*Theorems*, 16, ch. 1) and Zabarella (*On Methods*, III.13) agree. Proved first: a good definition is one composed of genus and difference, as is clear in the *Epitome*, Book II, q. 7, art. 2. But the aforesaid definition is composed of genus and difference. For its genus is "science," in whose nature Logic agrees with the other sciences, and its difference is "rational," by which it differs from the remaining sciences. Therefore it is an apt definition. Second: all the laws of a good definition, enumerated in the place cited above, are properly applicable to it. For it distinctly explains the nature of Logic, is adequate to it, and contains nothing deficient or superfluous, as is evident to anyone who runs through each of its parts. Moreover, Physics is defined as natural science because it treats of natural things, and Ethics is moral science because it is concerned with moral matters. Therefore Logic is aptly defined as rational science, since it is concerned with the syllogism, which is the work of reason.

You will object first, against the first assertion: Aristotle (*Posterior Analytics* I.2, T. 5; *Sophistical Refutations* II.8; and *Topics* I.2) takes Dialectic as only that part which treats of probable matters, and Logic as that part which treats only of demonstration. Cicero (*On the Nature of the Gods* III) thinks the same, and Scotus inclines to this view (*Prior Analytics* II, last q., §*Ad q.*; and *Sophistical Refutations* I, q. 1), as does Trombetta (*On Formalities*, fol. 13, p. 1). Therefore by "Dialectic" one does not understand the whole discipline of reasoning. I respond that Aristotle indeed more frequently uses "Dialectic" for Topica alone, and that the ancient Peripatetics followed this sense. Yet by the judgment of later philosophers, Dialectic should not be restricted to Topica alone, nor Logic to Analytics alone, as Orbellus notes above all others at the beginning of his commentary on Peter of Spain. All the more so, since as the Philosopher testifies (*Topics* VI.1) and Augustine confirms (*Music* III.1): when the thing is established, no great stress is to be placed on the name, which is invented by human convention. Scotus accepts this (*Sentences* I, d. 1, q. 3, §*Quod autem frui.*; and III, d. 6, q. 1, §*Concedo sub D.*). Gregory Nazianzen adds (*Oration on the Holy Lights*): names should not be made a subject of contentious controversy so long as the syllables convey the same meaning. There was once a dispute among the Greeks and Latins distinguishing the names *hypostasis* and *person*, and *ousia* and *substance*, which was resolved and brought to concordance in certain Councils that we adduced in the *Treatise on the Triune God*, disp. 4, q. 1, so that *hypostasis* and *person* are taken for the same thing, and likewise *ousia* and *substance*. The same holds in our matter concerning the said terms "Dialectic" and "Logic."

You will object secondly, against the third assertion: Logic is called "rational" on account of its object, which is the syllogism, which is a being of reason, as Tataretus affirms in the place cited (*Scibilis* 4). But the designation and distinction of an object is extrinsic and *a posteriori* for a science, just as it is for a power and an act, as the Duke of the subtle ones proves (*Quodlibet* 13, §*Sed ista*, after *HH*; and *Sentences* II, d. 16, q. un.). But an absolute thing is not distinguished by a relation or by something extrinsic, as the same Doctor forewarned (ibid., §*Tertio sub CC.*). Now a definition is assigned through intrinsic and intimate principles of a thing; and a science is something absolute, residing in the category of quality. Therefore the said definition of Logic is not adequate. I respond: sometimes a definition is given through things more known and more evident to us, because the essential difference of the thing escapes us; in this way Aristotle (*On the Soul* II, T. 22–23) seems to define powers through acts and acts through objects. And in *Metaphysics* V, *ch. on quantity*, T. 18, he defines quantity through divisibility, which is its property. And Aristotle states this explicitly (*Metaphysics* VII.6), saying: when the *per se* and essential differences cannot be assigned because they are hidden from us, accidental differences are given. And he does this in *On Generation* I, T. 7, affirming that qualities are the first principles and first differences of the elements, which are established to be their properties and passions only.

Article III: How Logic Was Discovered

Three things are to be investigated by us concerning the discovery of Logic: namely, by what act of the intellect was Logic itself discovered? Who is its discoverer? And was it discovered after the other sciences? The first is examined in this article; the second and third will be discussed in the next two articles.

Note first that although a man is by his very nature discursive and capable of knowing all things, his intellect nevertheless possesses no knowledge of anything that is innate to it. For it is like a blank tablet on which nothing is painted, as Aristotle says (*On the Soul* III.4, T. 14). And there is that familiar saying: all our knowledge has its origin from the senses, as Orbellus notes (*Metaphysics* II, ch. 1). The intellect possesses only the aptitude and power of knowing all things gradually, with the passage of time, labor, and study. Aristotle shows the same thing (*Ethics* I.5) concerning the sensitive powers, specifically sight: as sight inheres in the pupil, so intellect inheres in the soul. That is to say, just as sight by nature has no actual vision but only the capacity for seeing any visible thing, so likewise the intellect by nature acquires no innate knowledge but only enjoys an aptitude and power by which, over the course of time, it can acquire knowledge of any thing whatsoever. Thus a man is indeed capable, guided by nature, of knowing any being whatsoever and of proceeding from knowledge of what is known to knowledge of what is unknown; nonetheless, he does not possess a certain and always reliable way and rule of knowing well and reasoning rightly, but reasons sometimes well and sometimes poorly — on

which topic Hugh of Saint Victor (*Didascalicon* I) and Rudolf Agricola (*On Discovery*, II.5) treat at length. Observing this, men, lest they fall into bad reasoning henceforth and lest they further deviate from the right path of truth, prescribed for themselves and gathered into one body certain rules and indubitable canons by which a true and certain mode and method of reasoning well is provided — and this is Logic. All of this is plainly shown and explained by Maximus of Tyre and by the Stagirite (*Rhetoric* I.1): many do these things rashly and by chance; some, however, do them by practice and habit. And this can be illustrated by the following comparison. Just as the intellect devised certain means for avoiding the deceptions that occur in things perceived by the senses — namely, external measures, like the balance, the ell, and other things of the sort, by which the quantity of a bodily thing is known definitively by the senses, even though the senses often judge poorly about this — so it is fitting that the intellect, which corrects the errors of the other powers, should also take counsel for itself and lay down certain laws by whose help it attains an undoubted knowledge of truth; and it is for the purpose of fulfilling this function that Logic was discovered.

Note secondly, from Aristotle (*Metaphysics* I.1), Scotus (ibid. and *Quodlibet* 7, §*Hic praemittenda*, before *B.*): a man acquires art and science for himself through experience. Since our knowledge draws its origin from the senses, as Scotus writes after Aristotle (*Posterior Analytics* I, q. 46, §*Ad q.*; and *Sentences* I, d. 3, q. 4, §*ult. de 2. cognoscibilibus*) — the senses perceiving only singulars — and since experience is the collection of many remembered singulars (as is gathered from the *Quodlibet* cited), from these the intellect collects universal precepts, certain and determinate, from which art and science are generated. Thus, because by the ministry of sense we have experienced that this fire heats and that fire heats, and so on for the rest, we infer the universal proposition: every fire heats. And those who deny this need sense and punishment, and are to be exposed to fire until they confess that fire heats — as Avicenna (*Metaphysics* I, near the end) warns, and the Doctor (*Sentences* I, d. 39) and Faber (*Theorems*, 93.6.1) note. Moreover, the admonition of Zabarella is not to be despised (*On the Nature of Logic*, I.10): so great is the weakness of man that he is scarcely capable of making any progress by himself, without external help, either in contemplation or in action. No one has yet been found who, thinking and reasoning alone, attained full and complete knowledge of things to be known and things to be done. Rather, all arts and sciences have been discovered and perfected by addition. One person, instructed in some science, discovered something — but something rough and imperfect; another, aided by that beginning, found something else; then another added still something else — until through the labor of many, the science was produced. Nor is the same mode and norm followed in acquiring the sciences: the first authors of sciences and arts follow one path and norm in acquiring real disciplines and another in acquiring rational ones. To make this more conveniently understood,

Note thirdly, from Scotus (*Quodlibet* 13, §*Nunc 3. P.*), Trombetta (*On Formalities*, Part 2, fol. 19), and Sarnanus (q. 6 of the universals), that there is a triple act of the intellect: direct, collative, and reflexive. The direct act is one by which the intellect is carried directly toward an object outside the intellect itself and tends toward it as its terminus — as the act by which I conceive a rose. The collative act is one by which the intellect compares one known object to another known object, as when it compares the superior to its inferiors — for instance, genus to its species, and species to its individuals. The reflexive act is one by which the intellect reflects upon itself; and this act can be performed in many ways according to the Doctor (*Commentary on Peri Hermeneias* I, q. 2, §*Ad 9.*). For the intellect may reflect upon itself as knowing, because it understands itself understanding and knows itself knowing; or it may reflect upon its own act, which is the intellection itself — that is, it understands its own intellection, by which it is formally called "understanding," and tends toward that intellection as its terminus; or it reflects upon the known object, as when I understand myself understanding a rose, and the intellection tends toward the rose insofar as it has already been known and understood by me; or it reflects upon the manner in which it understands, observing all those things that are required for a true discourse — as when the intellect syllogizes in this way: every whole is greater than its part; every human body is a whole; therefore every human body is greater than its part. The intellect, reflecting upon itself, observes the mode it has maintained in that true and legitimate reasoning, and notices that it has disposed the terms in a mode and figure such that the middle term is subjected in the major and predicated in the minor, and that from two universal affirmative premises a universal affirmative conclusion is drawn in Barbara. Thus is obtained, by reflexive act, the scientific rule of Logic concerning any matter whatsoever. Nearly the same is noted concerning the other precepts of Dialectic, as Sarnanus intimates (q. 1 of the universals, p. 1) after Scotus (*ibid.*, q. 3, in the solution to the second argument). From all this it is inferred that rational science was discovered through the reflexive act, and real science through the direct act.

Assertion: Logic was discovered through the reflexive act of the intellect. This is derived from Aristotle (*Rhetoric* I.1), Scotus (place cited), and *Posterior Analytics* I, q. 46; Bonetus (*Metaphysics* I, ch. 4, §*Est autem*); Toletus (q. 1, fundament. 3); as well as Racon (Sect. 1, *Praeludia*, ch. 3, prop. 2). Proved first: Logic treats of second intentions applied to first ones, as the Doctor writes (*Sophistical Refutations* I, q. 1, near the end). But second intentions, of which the syllogism is one, were discovered through the reflexive act, as the same Doctor asserts (q. 3 of the universals), and as the reasoning offered in the third note confirms. Therefore Logic was discovered through the reflexive act of the intellect. Second: one who understands himself understanding and knows himself knowing elicits a reflexive act, as is clear from the description of the reflexive act given above. But whoever has acquired Logic understands himself

understanding and knows himself knowing; he lays down certain rules and canons, and distinguishes and separates true argumentation and right reasoning from bad reasoning. Therefore the discovery of Logic was accomplished through the reflexive act.

You will object first: what receives its being through experience is discovered through a direct act, because experience consists of many singulars whose knowledge is produced by a direct act. But Dialectic received its being through experience, just as every art and science does, as is clear from the second note. Therefore it was discovered through a direct act. I deny the major. For although that act is direct by which the intellect experiences the action of this and that singular, nonetheless, once that act has been performed, the intellect reflects upon its own intellection before it acquires the science — reasoning thus: whatever occurs in the majority of cases from some cause that is not free is the natural effect of that cause; but, for example, the eclipse of the moon from the interposition of the earth between the moon and the sun occurs in the majority of cases; therefore the eclipse occurs as many times as this interposition takes place. The intellect, moreover, notices that the discourse is good, ordered in mode and figure, with the rules of good discourse observed as handed down by Logic, and of this it has true science through the reflexive act. This doctrine is drawn almost entirely from Scotus (*Sentences* I, d. 3, q. 4, §*De secundis, E.*).

You will object secondly: Philosophy was discovered through wonder, which arises from ignorance of the causes of effects known to men, as is stated in *Metaphysics* I.2, where that familiar saying is found: men began to philosophize from wondering. But wonder is a direct act by which the intellect knows an effect while its cause is still unknown. Therefore, since Logic is a part of Philosophy — as will be said below — its discovery was made through a direct act. I respond through a distinction in the major and an explanation of Aristotle's testimony: of the remote starting-point of Philosophy — granted; of the proximate starting-point — denied. For the wonder at some newly known effect does not generate science, but stimulates the intellect of the beholder of that effect to pursue and know its cause. Rustics indeed have wonder at such an effect, but they do not attain science. Therefore it must be admitted that wonder at such an effect is not the proximate cause of science. Repeated experience of such an effect proceeding from such a natural cause, on the other hand, is the proximate origin of science, as I indicated in the solution to the preceding objection and as the Doctor intimates in the passage cited. Or say that that saying is to be understood of real Philosophy — specifically of Astronomy, whose example Aristotle adduces there concerning the properties and effects of the moon, the sun, and the stars — but not of rational philosophy, such as Logic.

Article IV: Who Is the Discoverer of Logic

Just as no one doubts that certain men in earlier ages were the discoverers of many arts and sciences (as Sacred Scripture, *Genesis* 47, Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I.1

and 2, Scotus (ibid.), and very many others testify), and that in later times the arts of printing, gunpowder, and artillery were found by some — so it is established that the earlier philosophers were without Dialectic, as Aristotle himself reports (*Metaphysics* I, ch. 6, T. 8), and that by ignorance of it they fell into many errors, as he writes (*On the Parts of Animals* I.1). But concerning the discovery of Logic itself, there is not one universal opinion. Some think its discoverer was Parmenides, who devised it on the summit of Mount Caucasus, according to Genebrard (*Chronology* II, p. 133). Others hold it was Zeno of Elea, as Laertius (I.1), Zabarella (*On the Nature of Logic*, II.17), and Cicero (*On Ends* II) report — Zeno being accustomed to indicate the difference between Rhetoric and Dialectic by the hand. Contracting the hand and making a fist, he signified Dialectic; stretching the hand wide, he indicated Rhetoric. The Philosopher also explains this not obscurely at the beginning of the *Rhetoric*, offering these words concerning both: that mode of speaking is broader, this mode of speaking is more contracted. Others make Trismegistus its author, who, as Strabo reports, painted two dragons looking at each other, which is a symbol of Dialectic — which disputes on both sides and is exercised between two, namely an objector and a respondent. Many freely and forcefully proclaim and defend Plato as the discoverer of Logic, and the rest Aristotle.

Note that the discoverer of any art or science can be twofold: primary and secondary. The primary discoverer is one who finds the art or science by himself and through himself, such as God, the origin and source of all arts and sciences. The secondary discoverer is one who by his own genius and labor perfects and completes an art or science still imperfect, or restores and rescues from ruin one nearly extinguished by the injury of time. Furthermore, three categories of philosophers are not to be forgotten: for some put forward demonstrations concerning things proposed for inquiry and were called philosophers; others disputed about things on both sides and were called dialecticians; and others reasoned about apparently true things and were called sophists, against whom Aristotle testifies, in the work now under review, that he had written his books on the *Sophistical Refutations*.

First assertion: the primary discoverer of Logic, and of every science, is God, most good and most great. So Scotus (*Prologue to the Metaphysics*, near the end, p. 2) and Sarnanus (q. 7 of the universals, p. 133). Proved first from Sacred Scripture: *1 Kings* 2: God is the Lord of sciences. *Psalms* 92: who teaches man science. And *Ecclesiasticus* 38: he gave men science. But Logic, from what will be said in the next question, is a science. Therefore its primary discoverer is God. Plato adds to this, making the first masters of Logic to be the gods and their messenger and interpreter to be Prometheus. Augustine agrees (*On Eighty-Three Questions*, q. 1; and *City of God* VII.29): God, who created human intellects, also granted them the sciences of the various arts as aids to life and nature. Second: every good flows from God, according to James 1: every excellent gift and every perfect endowment is from above, descending from the Father of lights. But

Logic is some perfect good of our intellect, for it distinguishes truth from falsehood and prepares the way for learning every other science. Therefore its primary parent is God. Third: Adam was endowed with the sciences. For he assigned names to things, as is clear from *Genesis* 2: whatever Adam called each living creature, that was its name — which cannot be accomplished without knowledge of things, as Lyra correctly deduces there. And it was fitting that the first man created by God should be adorned with the knowledge of things, since in a work the power of the workman shines forth. But any other science without Logic is imperfect, as will be shown in q. 4 of this book. Therefore Logic was instilled in Adam by God along with the other sciences, and consequently God is its primary Author.

Second assertion: whether Logic perished through human negligence or through the injury of time, certain outstanding men named above recalled it from ruin by their own industry and art; among these, the chief restorer and secondary discoverer is to be considered Aristotle. This assertion contains two parts, which are gathered from Scotus in the place cited. The first part is evident from what was said at the beginning of this article, where I reported that the earlier philosophers were entirely unarmed and naked of the art of reasoning, and where I also enumerated the first leaders and parents of Logic; concerning whom Rudolf Agricola (*On Discovery*, II.5) adds beautifully: eminent intellects arose who gathered what was scattered, ordered what was confused, completed what was imperfect, polished what was rough, and embraced everything — not only what had been done but what could also be done; and so what had previously been a matter of chance began thenceforth to be a matter of reason. The second part is proved first from Cicero (*Topics*), who calls Aristotle the prince of Dialectic; to whom St. Isidore (*Origins* II.22), Zabarella (*On the Nature of Logic*, II.1 and *On the Four Figures*, ch. 5), and Toletus (*Preface to Logic*) agree, asserting that Logic written by Aristotle is not only perfect and complete in all respects, but also arranged in admirable order. Second: one who orders and arranges something disordered and unstructured can rightly be called its secondary author and maker, as is clear in the case of a house-builder and other craftsmen who bring unstructured materials into order. And this is how Aristotle proceeded in constructing Logic, which before him was imperfect and disordered, as Plotinus (*Enneads* III.1, cc. 4–6) affirms of Plato, who did not distinguish it from Metaphysics — a distinction which Aristotle made first. Therefore he can rightly be called its restorer. Third: one who discovers the subject-matter with which a science is concerned can justly be called its author, since it is a celebrated saying of the philosophers that science is generated from object and power. Now Aristotle discovered the subject-matter with which Logic is concerned, namely the syllogism, of whose discovery he himself boasts at the end of the *Sophistical Refutations* I.2. Aristotle can therefore justly be called the discoverer of Logic and its restorer.

You will object first, against the first assertion: Logic was discovered through the reflexive act, from what was said above in art. 3. But God, being without discourse, is not capable of a reflexive act. For he sees all things in a single most simple act; *Hebrews* 4: all things are naked and open to his eyes. Therefore God is not the discoverer of Logic. I respond that the major holds of Logic discovered and restored by man, but not of Logic infused and bestowed upon Adam. You will press: the Logic of Adam and our Logic are of the same intelligible character and nature. Therefore if ours is obtained through the reflexive act, the same must be asserted of the Logic of Adam. The antecedent is granted; the consequence is denied. For both are of the same nature, yet obtained by different modes: one is infused, the other acquired. The example is ready at hand from fire, which is of the same species whether produced by fire, by the sun, or by two bodies colliding with each other.

You will object secondly, against the second assertion: before Aristotle, Logic was already perfect — therefore Aristotle is not to be considered its maker. The antecedent is proved. Cleanthes, who was older than Aristotle, treated of Dialectic and the Categories, as Laertius reports (VII.1), and Archytas of Tarentum also discussed these, and it is clear from *Metaphysics* VIII.6 that he had also mastered the art of defining. Some ancient writer indicates that Socrates was instructed in Dialectic by Zeno. Further, Plato treated of division, as is read in *Prior Analytics* I.33 and *Posterior Analytics* II, T. 4; and Plato's imbuing in Dialectic is found in *Metaphysics* I.6. Moreover, Zeno and Euclid taught demonstration. Finally, Zwinger (*Theater of Human Life*) testifies that Protagoras practiced sophistic. Therefore, since all parts of Logic were found before Aristotle, he does not appear to be its discoverer. I deny the antecedent. In response to its proof, I say that although parts of Logic preceded Aristotle, they were scattered and unordered; but he was the first who brought them together into one, taught the whole of this discipline as distinct from the others, handed down the mode and rules of reasoning well, and marked it with the name *Organon*, as is clear from its inscription. This Aristotle himself implies, adding at the end of the *Sophistical Refutations* II: the same thing has happened to the earlier philosophers as to someone who promises that he will give a certain faculty so that one's feet will not hurt when walking, but who does not provide the cobbler's art by which shoes are made. Add that the earlier philosophers, in their philosophizing, still seemed to be stammering, as is written in *Metaphysics* I.6, and to be defining in a superficial way (ibid., T. 4).

Article V: Whether Logic Was Discovered After the Other Sciences

To flee ignorance and on account of wonder, men in their philosophizing have proceeded from the easier to the more difficult, from the lesser to the greater, from the more necessary and useful to the less necessary and less profitable, which things are for their own sake — as Aristotle reports (*Metaphysics* I, chs. 1–2). Hence the practical arts and sciences, which pertain to the conduct and

cultivation of life, were discovered before the speculative ones, which were sought and found by men of leisure — as is evident from the Egyptian priests who obtained the mathematical disciplines, and especially astronomy, as the same philosopher testifies in the passage cited above.

Assertion: Logic was discovered after the other sciences. So Scotus (*Posterior Analytics* I, q. 46, ver. *Item 2. intentiones*), and this is derived from Aristotle in the passage just mentioned. Hugh of Saint Victor (*Didascalicon* I) also states it clearly: the other arts were found first, but it was necessary for Logic also to be discovered, since no one can fittingly discuss things unless he has first come to know the method of speaking. Zabarella agrees (*On the Nature of Logic*, I.12): from these considerations it is evident that artificial Logic, of which we now speak, is a certain work and offspring of Philosophy. For it could be produced and generated by no one except philosophers alone and through the habit of philosophy — and most of all it drew its origin from contemplative philosophy, whose aim is knowledge. The assertion is now proved. First: what is acquired through a reflexive act and second intention is found later than what is generated through a direct act, just as second intention presupposes first — as is clear in natural things from the light of the sun, which is first directed at a wall before it is reflected, and from a ball projected, which first tends directly toward a rock before it rebounds from it. But Logic was discovered through the reflexive act, as shown above in art. 3, while the other sciences were obtained through the direct act, as asserted there. Therefore the discovery of Logic is later than the others. Second: what is more difficult is more laboriously investigated and found later, since nature begins from the easier (*Physics* I.4 and *Ethics* I.4). But Logic is more difficult than the other sciences, being about second intentions, which — just as they have minimal entity — have minimal intelligibility. Therefore the discovery of Logic presupposes the discovery of the other sciences. Third: things that are more remote and abstract from our senses are known by us later than those that are closer to the senses, since the senses are the first guides of our knowledge. But the object of Logic is more remote and distant from the senses than the object of any other science; indeed, the very object of Dialectic does not fall under the senses, as will be clear in q. 3 of this book. I add that Logic is speculative, as will be proved in the next question — and speculative science is discovered later than practical science, as I indicated with Aristotle at the beginning of this article.

You will object first: St. Augustine (*On Order*, II.12) says that Grammar was discovered first, then History, then Dialectic, and that after these men proceeded to the other sciences. Therefore, according to Augustine, Logic was discovered before the other sciences. Some respond that Augustine's words concern Logic in a rough and imperfect state, not Logic perfected and reduced to rules and art, as Rudolf Agricola writes elegantly (*On Discovery*, II). But against this: the other sciences without Logic are imperfect, as will be said below (q. 4). Therefore, just as imperfect Logic precedes the other imperfect sciences, so

equally perfect Logic precedes the other perfect disciplines in the order of discovery. One may say that, although before Logic there were other sciences in an imperfect state and men guided by natural instinct maintained a certain method in contemplating things, proceeding from some known principles proposed to themselves toward the unknown — nevertheless at that time the precepts and rules had not yet been collected from which later philosophers subsequently composed artificial Logic. Therefore Logic is placed after those sciences in the order of discovery. Augustine in the passage cited can be interpreted accordingly. If someone says this interpretation cannot be sustained, in this and in certain other matters he is not to be heeded, inasmuch as he is speaking as a philosopher and not as a saint treating matters of faith, as Trombetta rightly notes (*On Formalities*, fol. 12, p. 1) — which Durandus also warns of in a similar case near the end of his preface. Otherwise one would have to hold that vision is achieved through extramission, which contradicts Aristotle (*On the Soul* II, T. 74); that angels are corporeal; that the heavens are made of fire; and similar things that Augustine taught as a devotee of the Platonic sect, as he himself declares (*City of God* VIII, near the end of ch. 12). I add that the holy Doctor does not always defend everything he once asserted. For in the prologue to the *Retractions* he writes: therefore let those who shall read these works not imitate me when I err but rather when I make progress toward what is better. If therefore he himself frankly confesses that he sometimes thought poorly, we ought not to suppose that he himself always thought and spoke rightly. The same Doctor adds (*On the Literal Meaning of Genesis* XII.8, concerning Paul caught up to the third heaven): who dare say he knows what the Apostle says he does not know? And (*On the Gift of Perseverance*, II.21): I do not wish anyone to embrace all my views in such a way as to follow me except in those things where he has seen that I do not err. For that is the reason I am now producing books in which I have undertaken to reconsider my smaller works, in order to show that even I myself was not secure in all things. Again (*Letter to Vincentius Victor*, II): I cannot and should not deny — just as in major matters — that there are many things in my smaller works that can justly and without rashness be criticized. From all this it is evident that Augustine and any other man great in talent and learning is liable to error and censure, and that human authority should not always and without reservation be relied upon. God alone is impeccable and incapable of failing, and to him and to truth we must firmly and constantly adhere.

You will object secondly: an instrument precedes what is to be made by it, as is clear from a hammer, a saw, an axe, and other instruments that precede, for example, a ship or house to be constructed. But Logic is an instrument of the other sciences and is necessary for their attainment, as will be shown in q. 4, art. 1. Therefore Logic precedes the other disciplines in the order of discovery. I distinguish the major: with respect to an instrument absolutely necessary for making something — granted; thus without a hand and a pen, characters cannot

be formed on paper or marble, and without the organ of sight no vision can take place. With respect to an instrument necessary only in a qualified sense, that is, for perfecting something — denied. For something can indeed be accomplished without it, though not as well. In this way bread can be broken and eaten without a knife, and wine can be drunk without a cup. But Logic is not an instrument of the first kind but of the second. Accordingly, the other sciences preceded it in an imperfect state and afterward, with its assistance as a means, attained a perfect state.

Article VI: Whether Logic Is to Be Learned Before the Other Sciences

Plato (*Republic* VII) thinks that one should begin from mathematics, and does not want dialectic to be learned by the young before the age of thirty. Hence it is reported that above the doors of his Academy he had inscribed: let no one ignorant of mathematics enter here. Some, like Panzano, hold that one should begin from Physics. Others, like Diogenes, from Ethics. Still others are of the opinion that one should begin from Dialectic.

Note that order is twofold: the order of nature and the order of teaching. The order of nature is the series that things observe among themselves — thus in the order of nature "animal" precedes "man," and "man" precedes "Peter." The order of teaching, on the other hand, is the series that men maintain in teaching and learning, which appears to correspond to what is easier for our cognition. Therefore Aristotle (*Physics* I, T. 4) directs that one begin from the more sensible and composite things, since these are easier for us to know.

Assertion: in the order of teaching, Logic is to be placed before the other sciences. So Scotus (*Posterior Analytics* I, q. 46, ver. *Tertia*; and *Metaphysics* II, ch. 3, in the exposition of the text); whom follow Tataretus (*Summulae*, tract. 1, *Scibilis* 3, fol. 1), Sarnanus (q. 1 of the universals, p. 29), and Hurtado (*Summulae*, disp. 5, sect. 1). Hugh of Saint Victor (cited above) is in favor of this view. Proved first from Aristotle (*Rhetoric* I.1 and *Metaphysics* II, T. 15): it is absurd to seek science and the mode of knowing at the same time. That is to say, Logic must be learned before any other science, because it is the mode of knowing; otherwise the situation would arise that is described in the case of one who wants to teach the way to travelers while simultaneously learning it himself, or the one who wants to treat a sick man while simultaneously learning medicine — as Averroes, cited by Sarnanus (in the passage cited), reports of a certain man: summoned to a patient, he administered medicine; returning home, he consulted Avicenna's book. Meanwhile the patient died. Cicero (*On the Orator* I and *On Famous Orators*), Augustine (*Against the Academics* III and *On Order* II) agree, the latter calling Logic the discipline of disciplines because it is preferred to the other doctrines. Fonseca confirms this (*Metaphysics* II, q. 1, sect. 7). Second: the order of teaching demands that what cannot be perfectly possessed without prior knowledge should be treated first. But the other sciences cannot be perfectly

acquired without Logic, since it is the instrument of knowing, without which science is not perfectly generated — science being the effect of the demonstrative syllogism, as the Philosopher states (*Posterior Analytics* I.2). Therefore Logic in the order of teaching is to be placed before the other sciences.

You will object first: in the method of teaching, Rhetoric precedes Dialectic, as the usage of every school teaches us. Therefore Dialectic is not to be taught before the other sciences. I grant the antecedent and deny the consequence, because Rhetoric is an art while Logic, being a science and a mode of knowing, is therefore to be taught before the other sciences — but not before the arts, otherwise it would precede Grammar, which no one suspects. I add that Scotus (*Prior Analytics* I, q. 2) seems to include Rhetoric among the parts of Logic; and thus there would be no difficulty, because Rhetoric as one part of the doctrine of Logic would precede another part in the order of teaching, just as the analytics precedes the posterior analytics. The Stagirite also suggests this (*Rhetoric* I) by calling Rhetoric an offshoot of Dialectic.

You will object secondly: in the order of teaching, one should begin from the easier things (*Physics* I.1; *Metaphysics* IX.1; and Scotus on the latter, note, p. 270). But Logic is more difficult and more obscure than the other disciplines, since it treats of second intentions, which are far removed from sense. Therefore Logic does not excel the other disciplines in the order of teaching. I respond that the major holds unless necessity from another quarter demands teaching the difficult things first, as is the case in our matter. We place Logic before the other sciences precisely because, although it is harder and thornier, nonetheless without it the other disciplines cannot be perfectly acquired. And the Philosopher does the same in *Physics* I, treating first of the parts of natural body before treating of natural body itself, even though the natural composite is more sensible and accordingly more easily known than its parts.

Question II: On the Nature and Quality of Logic

Article I: Whether Logic Is an Art

Some of the ancient and modern philosophers, among whom Cajetan (*Proem to the Categories*), Scaliger (*Exercises*, 3), and Flamminius are cited, place Logic in the ranks of the arts. But nearly all the Latins hold the opposite, especially Scotus (q. 1 of the universals), the Angelic Maurice, and the other Scotists in the same place — from whom the Thomists do not dissent, removing Dialectic from the catalog of the arts. Note, from Gerard of Odo (*Ethics* VI, q. 8) and Tataretus (*Summulae*, tract. 1, *Scibilis* 2, fol. 1), that "art" is used in two ways. First, broadly and improperly, for any true habit whether practical or speculative; in this sense Aristotle takes "art" (*Rhetoric* I.1; *Posterior Analytics* I.1; and *Metaphysics* I.1) where he calls the mathematical disciplines "arts," which in *Metaphysics* XII, T. 44, he calls "sciences" — and rightly so, since it is established by all that they are

properly and truly sciences. Augustine (*On the Trinity* IX.10) recalls this sense of "art," saying that ethics is an art, which all admit to be a practical science. And Scotus uses it similarly (*Sentences* II, d. 1, q. 4, before §*Quod si adhuc, sub C*; and d. 42, q. 4, §*Sequitur, infra L.*). Second, strictly and properly, for a productive habit (*habitus factivus*) whose work passes into external matter and is exercised by some bodily instrument; in this sense it is taken by Aristotle (*Ethics* VI.3) and Scotus (*Sentences* I, d. 3, q. 7, §*Contra istam ante F.*). Every habit that can rightly bear the name of art is indicated by the following couplet: tongue, trope, reason, number, tone, angle, stars; field, grove, arms, ships, wounds, wool, the craftsman.

Note secondly that a habit is a quality rooted in a power, inclining that power to operate easily, promptly, and with pleasure. Habit is divided into intellectual and moral. A moral habit is one that resides in the will or in another power subject to the will, for regulating the acts of the will — such as the virtues called moral. An intellectual habit, from the same Aristotle (just cited), is one that is grounded in the intellect and facilitates it in performing its acts. It is of five kinds: understanding (*intellectus*), wisdom (*sapientia*), prudence (*prudentia*), art (*ars*), and science (*scientia*). Understanding is the habit of first principles, which are known from the mere explanation of their terms — as "every whole is greater than its part": as soon as it is explained what a whole is and what its parts are, the intellect gives assent to this. Science, on the other hand, is a habit acquired through demonstration; hence the Doctor adds (*Posterior Analytics* I, q. 2, §*Ad 1.*): understanding is of principles and science is of the conclusion. Prudence is a habit of acting with right reason, or a habit of deliberating, as Scotus states (*Sentences* III, d. 34, q. un., §*His suppositis, O.*; and implied already in the *Prologue*, q. 4, §*Ad argumenta principalia, AA.*). Wisdom is the habit of the highest and most universal things. Art is a productive habit with right reason, as the Doctor explains (*Sentences* I, d. 38, q. un., §*Ad auctoritatem F.*). The right reason posited in the definition of art is the same as what is directive, or what rectifies the other power whose function it is to operate according to the art. Art in a diminished sense, however, is a habit with true reason, when it is only an apprehensive habit of the rectitude of things to be done but not a directive or rectifying habit in the doing — in which sense art can be attributed to God, as the same Scotus affirms in the same place and at *Sentences* III, d. 8, q. un., §*Ad argumenta A.*: insofar as his intellect knows the rectitude and order of things to be done, but not insofar as it directs a power toward operating, since his will — which is most right, or rather is the first rule that cannot deviate from rightness — is the power and principle of all things ad extra.

Assertion: Logic is not properly an art. This is derived from Scotus (q. 1 of the universals), where he shows at length that Logic is a science, which is a habit distinct from art, as is clear from the second note and will be proved in the next article. The foregoing assertion is argued as follows: art is a productive habit with right reason, as is established from the place just cited. But Logic is not of this kind, for it is concerned with the syllogism, which is not an external work

and is not administered by any bodily instrument. Therefore Logic is not properly an art. For this reason, the same conclusion seems to follow. *Physics* II, T. 3 and *Metaphysics* XII, T. 13: art is a principle of operating in another, and the act of art extends to production, as the Doctor asserts (*Sentences* I, d. 3, q. 7, §*Tertia opinio*). And in this it differs from nature, whose principle is in that which participates in nature. But Logic does not operate in another — that is, its work is not received in another, namely a material and corporeal subject — since, as is clear from *On the Soul* III, T. 38, every intellection resides only in the intellect. Therefore Logic is truly not an art.

You will object first, from *Topics* I.1: Logic is defined as a method or art of reasoning about any question proposed from probable premises. And by Cicero (*On Famous Orators*) it is called the greatest of arts. And in *Academic Questions* I it is called the art of disputing. Jerome, Augustine (*Against Cresconius* III.20; and *On Order* II.12), and Peter of Spain (*Summulae*, beginning) agree. And the common run of philosophers place it among the liberal arts, which are comprehended under the number seven, among which Logic itself stands. Confirm: the logician is an artist, for he has artificial logic. Therefore Logic is an art — the consequence holds by the place of conjugates, and Scotus uses a similar form of argument (q. 1 of the universals, ver. *Item haec est*). I respond: the authorities cited and similar ones that can be adduced are to be interpreted of art taken in the first sense, not of art taken in the second sense, of which we are speaking in the foregoing assertion. And Aristotle openly intimates this (*Metaphysics* IV, ch. 3, T. 8), where he calls Analytics an "art," which is established to be a science. By the same distinction the confirmation is met. Or say that these are to be interpreted of the Logic that uses (*logica utens*), which is Topica, as is clear from the words of Aristotle cited above; but not of the Logic that teaches (*logica docens*), which I shall show to be a science in the following article.

You will object secondly: art is a productive habit with right reason. But Logic is of this kind. Therefore Logic is an art. The major is known from the definition of art given in the second note. The minor is shown: at *Prior Analytics* I.1, sects. 2 and 3, q. 1, Aristotle writes that he is handing down the generation of syllogisms — that is, how syllogisms are to be made, and how men are rendered apt to construct them correctly. But to teach how something is to be made pertains to art, as is clear from the art of house-building, which gives the mode of constructing a house. Moreover, *Posterior Analytics* II, at the relevant passage, it is read that science is of being and art is of generation. That is, science is had concerning things that already are; art, however, concerning things that are being made. Hence the Stagirite adds (*Ethics* VI.4): art is concerned with generation — that is, with the making of an artificial thing. Therefore, since Logic structures divisions, definitions, and argumentations, it is clearly established that it is to be referred to the number of the arts. I grant the major and deny the minor, since the production of art passes into external matter and is exercised by a bodily instrument, as is clear from the foundations and proofs

already given — by which the testimonies of the Philosopher just adduced are also illuminated and dissolved. For the production of a syllogism, and of any other second logical intention, is exercised by the intellect alone and resides in the intellect alone, and therefore does not share in the proper nature of art.

Article II: Whether Logic Is a Science

Some, cited without name by Zabarella (*On the Nature of Logic*, I.9), think that Logic is a faculty that does not coincide with art and science. Others — Themistius and nearly all the Greek commentators, to whom Zabarella (*ibid.*, ch. 10) adheres — hold that Logic is an instrument, constituting an "instrumental discipline" distinct from art and science. Nor are there wanting those who, while admitting Logic to be a science, do not distinguish it from the other sciences, as Abbate (*On the Predicaments*, tract. 1, ch. 1) testifies. And this opinion perhaps draws its origin from Plato, who in *Republic* VII confounds Dialectic with Metaphysics, as his followers do not deny — namely Plotinus (*Enneads* I.2, c. 4) and the rest. The common view, however, is that of Scotus (q. 1 of the universals; and *Sentences* IV, d. 1, q. 2, §*De 2. principali*, shortly before I.), Sarnanus, Maurice (*ibid.*), Odo (*Ethics* VI, q. 8), and many others — from whom the Thomists with St. Thomas (*Metaphysics* IV, lect. 4) do not dissent — all teaching that Logic is a science.

Note first that the division of Logic into the teaching part and the using part is celebrated, from Scotus just cited (§*Dicendum*; *Sophistical Refutations* I, q. 1; and II, q. *Ad 1. q.*), which Aristotle touches upon (*Metaphysics* VII, T. 13): of any art, one part teaches and the other uses. The Greeks approve this, calling the teaching Logic something removed from things and the using Logic something concrete with things. The teaching Logic (*logica docens*) is described as that which provides the mode of dividing, defining, and arguing well. The using Logic (*logica utens*) is taken in three ways: either for the same teaching Logic as applied to other sciences and serving them — in which sense it can more fittingly be called the "used" than the "using," as the Angelic Maurice, the aforesaid Angelic writer, and the most eminent Sarnanus (*ibid.*, p. 25) note, and Orbellus also mentions (*Metaphysics* I, near the end of q. 2) after Scotus (q. 2 of the universals), where he gives the reason why Logic is called a common science: its subject falls under the use of the other sciences; or for the habit acquired through frequent use and practice of arguing — those endowed with this being called good logicians, as I noted above; or for the habit that treats of probable matters alone, which is called simply Topica by all.

Note secondly, from Scotus (q. 1 of the *Posterior Analytics* and *Sentences* III, d. 24, q. un., §*Ad q. igitur, D.*; and in the Parisian reading on the present question and also on *Physics* I, q. 1), that "science" has many accepted senses. First, it is taken for knowledge with firm adherence; in this sense we are said to know things we have heard narrated to us by others. Augustine (*City of God* XI.2) recalls this sense of "science": since those things that are remote from our senses we cannot know

by our own testimony, we seek other witnesses for them. Perhaps the text of St. Paul (*1 Corinthians* 8) belongs here: we all have science — that is, we all know things that we have learned from others reporting them to us. Second, it is taken for certain though not evident knowledge — which our men call science from *Ethics* VI, since in that book (chs. 4 and 7) the Philosopher speaks of science insofar as it is only a certain habit by which we speak the truth, as the Doctor adds (q. 3 of the *Prologue*, §*Ad aliud*, D.). It is distinguished from opinion and suspicion. In this sense Grammar is called a science at *Predicaments* I, ch. 2 and *Topics* VI, ch. 1. *Luke* 1 recalls it: to give knowledge of salvation to his people. And Job professed it (*Job* 19): I know that my redeemer lives. Third, science is taken in the strict sense of *Posterior Analytics* I, T. 5, ch. 2, described as certain and evident knowledge of a necessary thing, acquired through its proper cause by syllogistic discourse. Four conditions required for science thus taken are noted by the Doctor (ibid. and q. 4 of the *Prologue*, near the beginning), and are explained by Pelbartus (*Rosarium*, vol. I, ver. scientia, §1) and Vulpes (*Summulae*, vol. I, disp. 2, §7). The first condition is that it be certain, to exclude doubt and suspicion. The second, that it be about a necessary object, to distinguish it from art, which is about contingent things. The third, that it be through an evident cause to the intellect — to exclude faith, which is obscure and enigmatic, and also to exclude the habit of first principles, which is acquired by the mere explanation of terms alone. The fourth, that it be generated through syllogistic discourse, to exclude the science of God, which is without discourse, as is clear from Scotus (cited). And I showed this at length in the *Treatise on the Science of God*, disp. 1 and 10.

Note thirdly, from Aristotle (*Metaphysics* I.2) and Scotus (ibid., in the exposition of the text, p. 11): one science is for its own sake — or what serves nothing else — such as Physics and Metaphysics. Another is instrumental (*instrumentaria*), which assists the other sciences, such as Dialectic, which supplies to the other disciplines the instruments of dividing, defining, and syllogizing. Hence Aristotle (*Topics* I.9) enumerates three kinds of problems: active, contemplative, and logical. And he adds there: the active is that which in itself respects avoidance and choice; the contemplative, knowledge alone; the logical, however, assists both. That is, the logical is not for its own sake but for the sake of the other sciences, both speculative and practical. Hence it does not follow well, as Zabarella thinks (ibid., ch. 6), that Logic is not a science, but only that Logic is an instrumental science, the administrator of the other sciences, and therefore not as noble and excellent as the others, which are for their own sake. Accordingly, that condition which some attribute to science — that it be for its own sake — is vacuous. Otherwise beyond the speculative there would be no practical science. This contradicts Scotus (q. 3 of the *Prologue*, §*Ad 1. arg. sub s.*), where he mentions moral science and medicine, which are practical. And Aristotle (*Metaphysics* VI, ch. 1, and ibid. XI, ch. 1) distributes science into practical and speculative. The reason is that both objects — speculative and practical alike — possess

properties that are knowable and demonstrable. Therefore, just as about a speculative object there is speculative science, so equally about a practical object there is practical science.

Note fourthly, from *Posterior Analytics* I, ch. 6: science is about necessities and eternal things — which is not to be interpreted in terms of the entity of the science, because science can be lost either by forgetting or by other causes to be stated elsewhere; nor in terms of the existence of the knowable object, since science abstracts from the existence of the object, as the Doctor writes (*Sentences* I, d. 13, q. un., §*Aliter ponitur, ver. si dicatur*, where he says: there is knowledge of a rose that does not exist; and d. 36, q. un., §*Ad 1. sub H.*; and II, d. 3, q. 6, §*Ad q. igitur, B.*; to whom Odo (*Ethics* VI, q. 7, lect. 5) adheres). Rather it is to be interpreted in terms of quidditative and objective being, insofar as it concerns things that are necessarily connected with each other and perpetually united by a bond, whether they exist or not, whether they are present or absent. Hence, to defend the claim that Logic is about a necessary object, one need not devise three degrees of necessity — of substance, accident, and second intention — as Faber (*Theorems* I.3) handed down and Sarnanus touched upon (q. 1 of the universals, p. 47). For apart from God, nothing is necessary in terms of entity, but only in terms of objectivity — that is, the object of science is necessary not with the necessity of an incomplex term but of a complex one, insofar as between the subject and its knowable properties there obtains a perpetual and indissoluble connection, as is clear from *Sentences* I, d. 3, q. 4. Now since a being of reason possesses its own rational properties, just as a real being enjoys real properties (which Scotus proves explicitly concerning the universals, q. 6 of the universals), it is plainly deduced that the habit concerned with it is scientific. Therefore it is required only for science that it proceed from true and necessary premises as its principles and causes, as is clear from *Posterior Analytics* I, chs. 2, 7–8. But Logic proceeds from true and necessary principles, as may be observed in the modes of the three useful figures enumerated in the *Epitome*. For this logical proposition is as necessary as a proposition of Physics: the syllogism consists of three terms and three propositions, just as the physical proposition: a natural body consists of matter and form. The necessity of the object of Logic, therefore, is not derived from necessary things — both because Logic properly is not about things, and also because no science consists in the connection of a first and second intention, but rather in the connection that formally obtains between the second intention itself and its knowable properties. Moreover, a second intention has only objective being in the intellect, and ceasing with its operation, its being likewise ceases; but science is about perpetual things that cannot be separated from each other. But between a first and a second intention there is no perpetuity and inseparability, because between a real being and a being of reason there is no necessity. Therefore the necessity of the object of Logic is not derived from the real and fundamental being of secondary intentions.

First assertion: natural logic is not a science. Scotus presupposes this (q. 1 of the universals), raising the question only about artificial logic, as Cardinal Sarnanus explicitly holds in that place (p. 5). Proved first: no one is properly knowing (i.e., a scientist in the strict sense) except through his own industry or with the help of a master; otherwise rustics would be scientists because they possess natural logic. Therefore natural logic is not a science. Second: nothing natural is artificial (*Physics* II, T. 2, where the Philosopher distinguishes natural things from artificial ones). But every science apart from the infused is artificial, being acquired through study and labor. Therefore natural logic is not a science. Third: from the double opinion about natural logic recounted in q. 1 of this book, art. 1 — if natural logic is taken for the natural capacity for reasoning, it is placed in the second species of quality; if it is taken for the natural property of reasoning, it is really identified with the intellect and resides in the predicament of substance, as will be stated elsewhere. But science is in the first species of quality. Therefore in whatever way natural logic is taken, it is to be excluded from the ranks of the sciences.

Second assertion: artificial logic is not properly a faculty, nor an instrument distinct from art and science. This too is presupposed by the Doctor in the passage above, and is divided into two parts. The first part is proved first: a faculty, properly speaking, according to Alexander (*Preface to Topics* I) and as Aristotle touches upon (*Sophistical Refutations* II, ch. 8), is a habit by which one, being endowed with it, can dispute on both sides of any matter. But Logic treats of necessities, as is clear in the *Posterior Analytics*. Therefore Logic is not properly a faculty. Second: Topica alone is a faculty, from *Rhetoric* I.1.4 and *Metaphysics* I, ch. 6, and the same work IV, ch. 2 — Topica being called the using Logic, as I indicated above and will show more clearly below. Therefore artificial logic is not to be classified among the faculties. The second part is argued as follows: first, every true intellectual habit is contained under one of those five enumerated by Aristotle (*Ethics* VI.4); otherwise that philosopher would have been defective and incomplete in enumerating them. But Logic is a true intellectual habit, as is evident to anyone. Therefore, since it cannot be wisdom, prudence, or understanding, it follows that it is not distinct from art or science. Second: Grammar, according to Zabarella (against whom we now argue), is properly an art, although it is an instrumental habit. Therefore even though Logic is instrumental, it does not follow properly that it is distinguished from art and science. Moreover, Logic is not an instrument in the straight sense but in the oblique — which is to say: Logic treats of the instrument of knowing, which is the mode of knowing or the syllogism. Hence the Doctor adds that Logic is not the mode of knowing formally but only materially.

Third assertion: the teaching Logic is properly a science. So Scotus (in the passage above, §*Dicendum*), and this is derived from Aristotle (*Prior Analytics* I.1), who promises to treat of demonstration and demonstrative science, which is Logic itself. Augustine (*City of God* VIII.4) and Cicero (*On the Orator*) expressly call

it a science. Proved first: science is a demonstrative habit; and Logic is a demonstrative habit. Therefore Logic is a science. The major is Aristotle (*Posterior Analytics* I, ch. 2 and II, ch. 3; *Ethics* VI.3; and *Metaphysics* I.7, T. 48). The minor is shown: Logic makes demonstrations, as in: every discourse in which, certain things being posited, something else necessarily follows from what has been posited, is a syllogism; but a demonstration is of this kind; therefore a demonstration is a syllogism. The major is the definition of a syllogism; the minor is clear from the definition of a demonstration, which is a syllogism producing knowledge. Again: principles are more known than the conclusion. Further: a universal affirmative is drawn from two universal affirmative premises disposed in mode and figure. Moreover: a necessary conclusion follows from necessary premises. The definition is clearer than the defined. Finally: all syllogisms that are in the first figure, especially in its four primary modes, and are supported by the principles "said of all" and "said of none," evidently conclude and produce science — just as other physical and mathematical demonstrations.

Zabarella responds (in the place cited, ch. 6), denying the minor: the object of science is necessary and eternal, but the subject of Logic — which is the syllogism or something else to be assigned in q. 3 — is contingent, a work and fiction of our own; and therefore it is not a fitting object of science. All the more so, if Scotus's argument holds, all productive arts would be sciences — as if some art were constituted for teaching, such as the art of building, providing the norm for how a house is to be constructed so as to be useful for habitation and for protecting us from the inclemencies of the weather, and specifying that it must be made in this or that way and composed of this or that material. No one up to now, however, has placed arts of this kind in the number of the sciences. Therefore Logic is not to be placed among the sciences either. Against this: in the fourth note I made clear what necessity the scientific object requires. The syllogism, however, although it is our work, is nonetheless not a fiction, but has a foundation in reality, as the Doctor writes (q. 4 of the universals, near the end). Nor does it follow correctly that all productive arts are sciences through Scotus's argument; for science proceeds demonstratively, but arts do not; and if at times by them some reasoning is brought forward, that is accidental. For the arts only provide the mode by which artifacts are made.

Second: the logician is one who knows. Therefore Logic is a science. This form of argument is used by Aristotle (*Topics* IV, last ch.): the musician is one who knows; therefore music is a science. Scotus also argues this way (q. 2, *Sophistical Refutations*), and Gadius defends it (*Quodlibet* 13, fol. 131, p. 2, cols. 3–4). The antecedent is proved: whoever knows demonstratively is truly a scientist; but the logician knows demonstratively, as is proved by the first argument. Therefore the logician is one who knows. The first consequence holds by the place of conjugates: white is colored; therefore whiteness is a color.

Third: every true intellectual habit, from Aristotle (*Ethics* VI.3) and Scotus (*Metaphysics* I, exposition of the text, p. 8), is wisdom, science, prudence, understanding, or art. But Logic is one true intellectual habit, as all concede. And it is not wisdom, prudence, art, or understanding, as is clear from their definitions given in the preceding article, note 2. Therefore, from a sufficient enumeration of these, it is a science. Finally, all the conditions of science set down and explained in the second note apply to Logic, as is evident to anyone who runs through them and applies them. It is therefore to be placed in the number of the sciences.

Fourth assertion: Logic is a science distinct from the others. Proved first by the authority of Aristotle, Scotus, and others, who in their works distinguish and teach Logic apart from the other disciplines. Second: from a distinct object a distinct science is obtained, since the sciences are distinguished according to the distinction of objects (*On the Soul* III.8, T. 38). But the object of Logic differs from the objects of the other sciences, as Scotus affirms (q. 2 of the universals). Therefore Logic is distinguished from them. Add the division of science into real and rational, which would be vacuous if Dialectic — which is a rational science — were not distinguished from the others, which are real sciences. Moreover, Logic is an instrumental science while the others are principal sciences. Therefore Logic is distinguished from them.

You will object first: Aristotle (*Rhetoric* I.4) says that if anyone tries to instruct and teach both Rhetoric and Dialectic not as faculties but as sciences, he destroys their very nature in this transition. And he gives the reason there: neither of them is a science of how anything determinate is the case. Nor is it valid to say that the Philosopher is speaking there of the using Logic, since he expressly says "tries to instruct and teach." Confirmation first, from *Topics* I.1: the function of Dialectic is to dispute about probable matters; but what treats of probable matters is not truly a science, which is had about necessities. Confirmation second, from *Topics* I.9: three kinds of problems are enumerated — contemplative (such as whether the world is eternal), active (such as whether pleasure is a good), and logical (such as whether there is a fourth figure). But the logical problem is said to assist both. Therefore if it only aids and serves the other sciences, it follows that it is not itself a science. I respond: that passage is aptly interpreted of the using Logic, which is called Topica, as the reason adduced there makes clear. Nor do the words "to instruct and teach" prevent this, since Topica itself is also instructed and taught in schools. Why it should be called "using" rather than "teaching" seems to be a verbal dispute to be settled in the next article. The same must be said to the first confirmation. To the second: I answered in the second note. For by those words Aristotle does not wish to exclude Logic from the series of sciences, but only to denote that it is the servant and handmaid of the other sciences.

You will object secondly: no mode of knowing is a science; but Logic is a mode of knowing; therefore it is not a science. The major is argued by analogy: no mode of seeing is sight or vision. The minor is supported by the testimony of Aristotle (*Metaphysics* II, ch. 3, T. 15), which Scotus cites (*Sentences* I, d. 29, q. 1, §*Quoniam, before A.*): it is absurd to seek science and the mode of knowing at the same time — where by "mode of knowing," Averroes and the other commentators understand Logic. Confirmation first, from *Posterior Analytics* I.23: science is concerned with a proper and determinate object. But Logic has no determinate object, from the same work I.8 and *Metaphysics* IV, ch. 3, T. 7. Confirmation second, from *Metaphysics* II.1 and the same work VI.2: every science is either speculative or practical; and there the speculative sciences are enumerated, among which Logic is not placed — which it would be, if it were a science, since it is speculative, from what will be said in art. 5.

I grant the major together with Scotus, and distinguish the minor: Logic is the mode of knowing formally — denied; materially — granted. That is to say: Logic is about the mode of knowing, which is the syllogism. Or I say with John of the Masters (q. 1, *Logic*) that Logic is the directive mode of knowing — not the objective one. Or with Tataretus (*ibid.*, dub. 1): Logic is the mode of knowing acquired through demonstration, but not the one produced through use and practice. And Aristotle in the passage cited is arguing against those who wish to learn Logic and the other sciences simultaneously — just as those are reproached who wish to treat a sick man and learn medicine simultaneously, as I noted above, q. 1, art. 6. You will press against the first response: neither materials nor material things are predicated in the straight sense; but formal things and what is formal are, as is clear (*Metaphysics* VII, T. 34). But the mode of knowing is predicated in the straight sense of Logic — indeed, it is placed in its definition, as is clear from *Topics* I.1 and II.1. Therefore Dialectic is not only materially but also formally the mode of knowing. I say: the passage of the Philosopher adduced is to be interpreted not essentially but denominatively, just as a chest is called wooden and a man fleshly. Through this distinction the argument is dissolved. For in truth Logic is called the mode of knowing extrinsically and objectively, just as Physics is called natural because it concerns natural body, as Fonseca well notes (*Metaphysics* II, q. 1, sect. 8).

To the first confirmation: I grant the major and deny the minor; in response to Aristotle, I say he is to be interpreted of the remote object, not the proximate. Or of the using Logic and not the teaching. To the second confirmation: I say with Scotus (at the end of q. 1 of the universals; and q. 3, *Prologue*, §*Contra istas*, 1.) that Aristotle is speaking of real sciences and not of rational ones such as Logic. Zabarella presses (*ibid.*, ch. 3): it is ridiculous to say that Logic is rational, for this amounts to saying that Logic is not a science; therefore that distinction of science into real and rational is worthless. The antecedent is shown: it is futile to demonstrate that a dead man is a man; therefore it is equally futile to say that Logic is a rational science. The consequence is derived: the being of reason

about which Logic is concerned is not knowable; it is our work, which can be made or not made at our pleasure. I say that the division is legitimate, just as the division of being into real and being of reason is good, as the Doctor writes (*Sentences* I, d. 36, q. un., §*Contra istud, F.*), to which Siretus adheres (*On Formalities*, art. 2, main point). Accordingly, in the formal argument I deny the antecedent. To its proof I grant the antecedent and deny the consequence, as is clear from the fourth note. Nor does it matter that a being of reason is our work, since a moral act is our work and yet there is Ethics about it, which is a true science. Similarly, every practical science has some object of operation for its concern and yet is properly a science — unless someone wishes to reject the division of science into speculative and practical, which all confess with one voice.

You will object thirdly: if Logic were a science, it would be acquired through demonstration, since science is generated through demonstration. But it cannot be acquired through demonstration; otherwise demonstration would be presupposed before demonstration, and Logic would be presupposed before Logic, leading to an infinite regress. Therefore, to avoid falling into this absurdity, it is better to exclude Logic from the list of sciences. Confirmation: if there were some art that produced all hammers, it could not use a hammer to make all hammers, otherwise it would use the same to make the same and to make itself — which is impossible. Therefore, since Logic composes all demonstrations, it cannot use a demonstration to make a demonstration, and accordingly is not a science. Granting the major, I say in response to the minor that natural logic is presupposed to artificial logic, and imperfect artificial logic is required before perfect artificial logic, and that the latter is generated through habitual use; for everything natural is presupposed to the artificial, since art perfects nature (*Physics* II, T. 9). And one proceeds gradually from imperfect to perfect. In response to the confirmation: the parity is to be denied, since the art of hammering is not reflexive of itself, as Logic is. Therefore if it is to produce all hammers, to forge a particular hammer — the first one, for instance — it must use another instrument that is not a hammer.

You will object fourthly: Dialectic is situated in the various opinions of men, and so one person can use the aforesaid mode of argument of the Subtle Doctor: the logician is one who holds opinions; therefore Logic is opinion. The antecedent is evident. For in former times the Academics followed Plato, the Peripatetics Aristotle, the Stoics Xenocrates and Aristippus; now the Thomists follow Thomas, the Scotists Scotus, and the Nominalists Ockham, defending their respective positions most keenly. I respond: although in every science there are many things that depend on the will and judgment of men, science is nonetheless not had of these but only of those things that have among themselves a necessary connection. Therefore, even if some part of Logic is situated in the opinion of men and is contingent, there is nonetheless a greater part that is necessary and about which demonstrations are made whose effect is

science. And since the denomination is taken from the nobler part, Logic is consequently called a science.

Article III: On the Using Logic

Five things can be investigated in this article: (I) whether the using Logic is said to belong to the whole discipline of reasoning; (II) whether the using Logic is a science; (III) whether it is a habit distinct from the teaching Logic; (IV) whether it is distinguished from the other sciences to which it is applied; and (V) whether Topica and Sophistica are sciences — all of which are divided into the five following points of debate for the sake of distinction and clarity.

Point of Debate I: Whether the Using Logic Can Be Said to Belong to the Whole Discipline of Reasoning

Fonseca (*Metaphysics* II, ch. 3, q. 1, sect. 6) and the Conimbricenses (q. 4 proem., art. 2), following St. Thomas (*Metaphysics* IV, lect. 4), to whom Maurice (q. 1 of the universals) seems to agree, think that the using Logic is only one part called Topica; the remaining parts are in no way the using Logic. Others, however — among whom are Scotus (to be cited below), the Angelic writer (q. 1 of the universals), Mastrius and Bellutus (q. proem.), and Fuentes (*ibid.*, q. 1, arts. 3–4) — assert that the whole discipline of reasoning is divided into teaching and using. Note and remember from what was said that the using Logic can be considered in three ways. First, insofar as it is applied to other sciences, or insofar as the other sciences use it — in which sense it can more fittingly be called the "used" (*usa*) than the "using" (*utens*), as the aforesaid Angelic writer, Maurice, and the most eminent Sarnanus (*ibid.*, p. 25) note; Orbellus also mentions this (*Metaphysics* I, near the end of q. 2) after Scotus (q. 2 of the universals), giving the reason why Logic is called a common science: its subject falls under the use of the other sciences. Therefore according to Scotus, Logic serves the other sciences by reason of its subject, which those others use. Second, for the habit acquired through frequent use and practice of arguing — those endowed with this being called good logicians, as I noted above. This Scotus recalls (q. 1 of the universals and q. 3, *Sophistical Refutations*, §*Ad 1. q.*), as do Tataretus (q. 1, *Scibilis* 1) and Faber (*Theorems* I, ch. 1). Third, for the habit that treats of probable matters alone, which is absolutely called Topica by all.

Assertion: the using Logic is diffused throughout the whole discipline of reasoning. This is gathered from Scotus (q. 1 and 2, *Sophistical Refutations*), and proved first: Logic supplies to all sciences the topical and analytical syllogism, as Scotus correctly notes (*ibid.*, q. 1). Therefore the using Logic extends through the whole of rational doctrine. Second: what is handed down by the teaching Logic is exercised, or at least can be exercised, by the using Logic; for the precepts and laws of the teaching Logic are directed toward use and practice. Therefore the scope of the teaching and of the using Logic is equal. All the more so, since Logic is a science common by the commonality of use and application,

as — following Scotus (q. 2 of the universals and *Metaphysics* II, com. 15) — we shall show below in art. 6.

You will object: Aristotle (*Topics* I.1 and elsewhere) and his principal commentators openly assert that the using Logic is employed only for Topica. Therefore whoever takes the using Logic as another part of Logic does not use it but abuses it. For words are to be received in accordance with the usage of authors, as the Doctor warns (*Sentences* I, d. 14–15, q. un., under C.). Confirmation: no other science is divided into teaching and using; therefore Logic is not to be divided in this way either. And if it is ever called "using," it should be understood only of Topica, as the Doctor explains (q. 1 of the universals, *R.*).

I say it is true — in the antecedent — according to the older Peripatetics, who spoke of the using Logic too narrowly; the reason for which can be adduced, because the function of Dialectic is to dispute on both sides of probable matters — which, being uncertain and contingent, generate no science. And therefore although it is applied about other things, it nevertheless retains the name "Dialectic," which can demonstrate one and another conclusion in one and another science through the same medium, as Scotus observes (q. 1, *Sophistical Refutations*), since we very often use probabilities whose arrangement pertains to Dialectic. But absolutely and in the broad sense, there seems to be no reason to prevent the other parts of this doctrine — insofar as they assist other disciplines — from deserving the name of using Logic. Nor is it incongruous to apply it to the whole expertise in reasoning, just as it is not incongruous to employ "Dialectic" for the whole discipline of reasoning, as was proved above (q. 1, art. 2). To the confirmation: I grant the antecedent and deny the consequence. The reason is that the other sciences are not instrumental in the way that Logic is — whose instruments serve both itself and the other disciplines. To Scotus: I say he is speaking there in the sense of the old Dialecticians, as I touched upon above.

Point of Debate II: Whether the Using Logic Is a Science

Very many moderns — notably Rubius (q. 3 proem.), Hurtado (*Logic*, disp. 2, sect. 1), and Arriaga (disp. 3, sect. 2) — deny that the using Logic is a science. On the other side, others who do not distinguish the using from the teaching Logic do not remove it from the number of sciences. For our part, to resolve this point of debate, we must make a distinction in accordance with the triple sense of the using Logic set out in the note of the preceding point of debate.

First assertion: the using Logic taken for Topica, and also taken for the habit acquired through frequent use and practice of arguing, is not a science. So Scotus (q. 1 of the universals). The first part is proved first from Aristotle (*Rhetoric* I.4 and other places), who separates Dialectic — which he more frequently takes for Topica — from the sciences and places it among the arts and faculties, especially at *Sophistical Refutations* II, ch. 8, saying: we therefore

premise the faculty of discovery. And all the Peripatetics with one voice proclaim that by "Dialectic" in this context the using Logic is to be understood. Second: science is not from common and contingent things but from proper and necessary ones (*Posterior Analytics* I.1). But Topica proceeds from common and probable matters. Hence Aristotle (*Topics* I.1) adds that the function of Dialectic is to dispute about any probable matter whatsoever — which Scotus equally confirms at the end of q. 1, *Sophistical Refutations*. Third: science has a determinate object (*Posterior Analytics* I.8). But Topica is not restricted to any determinate object, as is stated there and in *Metaphysics* IV, ch. 2; and Scotus gives the reason with Aristotle there: if Dialectic were of some determinate genus, it would not raise questions. Therefore the using Logic taken for Topica is not a science. The second part is proved first: use and practice do not make a man knowing but only easy and prompt in acting. Therefore the using Logic taken for the habit produced through use and practice is not a science. Second: use and practice are required for all arts, even the servile ones, as experience confirms — and that these are far removed from science is plain to all, as the twin Scotists well and at length show (q. proem., art. 1). Thus accepted, the using Logic is therefore not a science.

Second assertion: the using Logic taken for the knowledge acquired through demonstration by which we make use of it in other sciences is a science. This assertion is opposed to Faber (cited), whom Tataretus (in the passage above) supports. Proved first from Scotus (q. 2 of the universals), who calls Logic a common science, implying that its use and commonality do not take away from it the character of science. Therefore Logic, insofar as it serves the other sciences, is a science. Second: Logic, insofar as it expends its care on the other sciences, is not essentially changed; rather the same habit persists and there only accrues to it the relation of use and application, which follows upon Logic itself. But a relation accruing to an absolute being does not essentially change it, as is self-evident. Now Logic is an absolute being, being of the genus of quality. Therefore as applied to the other doctrines, it is not to be removed from the list of sciences. Third: according to Faber at the beginning of the first chapter, the using Logic insofar as it is concerned with the other disciplines is the whole teaching Logic; but the teaching Logic is a science, as Faber himself affirms (*ibid.*, concl. 1). Therefore the using Logic so accepted also partakes of the character of science.

Faber responds: the using Logic as such is nothing other than use and application; and that this application is not a science is evident, because it is a relation, as I taught in the *Treatise on Augustine*, disp. 4, q. 2. And Faber himself does not deny (*ibid.*) that science, as I was just saying, is an absolute being. Therefore Logic limited by use and application is not a science. The consequence is shown: a condition specifying something restricts it under such a consideration — as a man insofar as he is a fisherman is not a rational being. Therefore Logic under the character of use and application is not a science.

Against this: Logic through use and practice does not lose its essential and quidditative being but retains it fully, as I was just arguing. Therefore it is not formally use and application. Nor does just any condition that determines something specify it in such essential being, unless it is a constitutive principle and essential ground — not an adventitious and accidental condition such as application is. For a thing is first what it is in its own being before it is applied to another. Therefore the relation of application accruing to Logic, insofar as it assists the other sciences, does not take away its essential being, just as the relation of fatherhood accruing to Peter does not remove his substantial and suppositional being.

You will object first, against the second assertion: the object is not a science, since the object is that about which science labors. But the using Logic has the character of an object, as some modern author suspects. Therefore the using Logic is in no sense a science. I grant the major and deny the minor. For a habit is one thing and the object about which the habit labors is another, as is evident to anyone. Therefore even though the using Logic is exercised about an object, it does not on that account acquire the character of an object.

You will object secondly: the using Logic is not formally knowing but acting and operating. Therefore the using Logic is not formally a science. The antecedent is proved: the using Logic is acquired through work and not through demonstration. Confirmation: science is about universals while the using Logic is about singulars. Therefore it does not partake of the character of science. The antecedent may be denied. For the intellect and its act is both cognitive and productive. Likewise, the practical sciences are both cognitive and operative. Most of all because demonstration, through which science is generated, is a work — not external, to be sure, but internal, remaining within the limits of the intellect. To the confirmation: I grant the first part of the antecedent and deny its second part. For the using Logic is applied to universals in much the way that the teaching Logic hands down universal precepts — the using Logic exercises those precepts, even though it also touches singulars; and in respect of these latter it falls short of the character of science.

Point of Debate III: Whether the Using Logic Is Distinguished from the Teaching Logic

Faber (*Theorems* I, ch. 1), Fuentes (q. 4, diff. 2, art. 1), the Conimbricenses, Fonseca, and the aforesaid Thomists cited by our moderns (q. proem., art. 1) affirm that the teaching and using Logic are one and the same habit. But Cardinal Sarnanus (q. 1 of the universals, p. 44), Maurice (*ibid.*, cited), and other students of Scotist doctrine assert that the teaching and using Logic are distinct habits.

First assertion: the using Logic taken for Topica is not the same habit as the teaching Logic but appears to differ from it really. This assertion has two parts

and is gathered from the Doctors (q. 1 of the point of debate) and from the places cited, as well as from *Prologue*, q. 4, in the solution of arguments 1–3, *BB*. The first part is argued as follows: science and art are two distinct habits (*Ethics* VI.4). But the teaching Logic is a science, as is established from art. 2 of this question; while the using Logic taken for Topica is not a science, as I showed in the first assertion of the second point of debate. Therefore the teaching Logic and the using Logic so accepted are not the same habit. Second: things that have distinct objects are not the same habit, since from the distinction of objects the distinction of habits is inferred, as Scotus and Gadius say (*Quodlibet* 13, fol. 14.1, col. 3). But the teaching and using Logic have distinct objects. For the object of the teaching Logic is proper, determinate, and necessary; while that of the using Logic is common, indeterminate, and contingent. Hence Rubius is not to be heeded when he says that the teaching and using Logic are the same habit even if the teaching is a science and the using is an art. For science and art are narrated by Aristotle (just cited) as distinct habits. Nor does it help him to say that the character of science in the same habit of Logic is primary and the character of art is secondary. For a primary character differs from a secondary one as the first differs from the second, or as substance from accident, or subject from property. Therefore since, according to Rubius, the primary and secondary characters in the teaching and using Logic differ, it is perspicuously established that the teaching Logic does not coincide with the using Logic. The second part is proved first: between things of which one can exist without the other there falls a real distinction, as will be shown in the following book (q. 1, art. last). But Topica can exist without Analytics; for a person can learn Topica without Analytics. Therefore Topica is really distinguished from Analytics. Second: a person can be an expert in the teaching Logic even if he does not apply it to the other sciences or practice it, as is evident in the case of one who is without experience in the practice of Logic. But this is a clear indication of real distinction. It is therefore plausible that these habits really differ from each other, notwithstanding the objection of Poncius (disp. 4, q. 6, n. 59).

Second assertion: the using Logic insofar as it is applied to other disciplines is the same habit as the teaching Logic, but differs from it in some respect. This is also gathered from Scotus (in the passage above). The first part follows from what was said in the second assertion of the preceding point of debate: for the using Logic so accepted is a science just as the teaching Logic is, as was proved there. Therefore it is the same habit. Moreover, Logic is one science by the unity of its subject, from what will be said in art. 4. Therefore it is one habit of both the teaching and using Logic. The second part is proved: to the using Logic there is added use and application, which is a relation, as I noted in that passage. Therefore the teaching and using Logic so taken differ from each other by some relation. Again: the same habit is taught and is exercised through application to an object. But the teaching Logic hands down precepts of reasoning, while the

using Logic applies those same precepts to the other sciences. Therefore they differ by a different relation.

You will object first: the multiplication of beings without necessity is to be avoided (*Physics* I, T. 41 and 50). But if the using and teaching Logic were distinct habits, there would be a multiplication of beings without necessity. Therefore they are not distinct habits. The major is evident; the minor is proved: the same habit can both teach the rules and use them. I grant the major and deny the minor. In response to its proof, I say that beyond the teaching habit — which is from necessities — there is given a using habit that proceeds from probable matters, which makes us easy and prompt for syllogizing; and that these are distinguished from each other our recent authors (cited in the preceding point of debate) pursue at length.

You will object secondly: the using Logic draws its form from the teaching Logic; and the unity of form is the cause of identity of a thing, while its diversity is the cause of its distinction. Therefore, since the scientific form of both is one, there is no distinction of habit. The antecedent is denied: for the using Logic (*Topica*), being a certain faculty, enjoys a distinct form from the teaching Logic, as will be clear below in point of debate V.

You will object thirdly: Scotus (*Sentences* II, d. 27, q. un., §*Ideo alia, sub B.*) distinguishes charity from grace by their diverse connotes and denominated things; and he asserts the same of the intellect and intellectual memory. Therefore the same judgment is to be passed concerning the teaching and using Logic, as the Doctor implies (q. 1 of the universals, *R.*). The argument concludes concerning the using Logic according to the second assertion, not according to the first assertion. In this way Scotus is to be interpreted in both places just named.

Point of Debate IV: Whether the Using Logic Is Distinguished from the Other Sciences It Serves

Zabarella (*On the Nature of Logic*, I.1), Vasquez (*Summa Theologiae* I, disp. 8, n. 19), and not a few moderns, not distinguishing the using Logic from the other disciplines to which it ministers, think that it becomes the very science it serves — so that if it assists Physics it becomes Physics, and if it is applied to Metaphysics it becomes Metaphysics. Faber (*Theorems* I), Rubius (near the end of q. 3), and other moderns openly deny that the using Logic becomes the science to which it is applied.

Note that an instrument does not become the thing of which it is an instrument: a saw is indeed a suitable instrument for cutting wood, but in cutting wood it does not become wood. And if at times the instrument itself can be materially the same as the thing it serves — as when iron hammers are used by blacksmiths to produce their iron works — it nevertheless cannot formally become numerically the same. For an instrument is something extrinsic assisting the

craftsman in making the work he intends to produce. Therefore if someone uses one hammer to forge another, the hammer that is the instrument does not become the hammer that has been produced, but remains distinct from that hammer.

Assertion: the using Logic does not become the science to which it is applied. This is drawn from Scotus, who writes (q. 2 of the universals and elsewhere) that Logic is a common science through the application of its subject, because its subject is applied to the other sciences. But what is applied to another is not changed into the nature of that to which it is applied, as is clear from the hand applied to the head to support it, and from medicines applied to sick bodies, without being converted into their substance. The assertion is argued from the foregoing note: the instrument is not converted into the thing of which it is an instrument, as was explained there. But the using Logic is an instrument of the science to which it assists. Therefore it does not become the science it serves. Moreover: the other sciences use Logic or Logic's instruments. Therefore Logic remains in itself according to its essential being, and only its instruments are employed by the other sciences for drawing their conclusions — and accordingly Logic does not pass into their essence. Furthermore: in a physical demonstration, for example, two things are considered — the matter about which physical science is had, and the syllogistic form by which the demonstration is constructed in the proper mode and figure; and the latter is distinguished from Physics, which borrows it from Logic. Therefore: it must be concluded that the using Logic does not penetrate into the nature of the science it serves.

You will object: the science to which the using Logic gives assistance is nothing other than a collection of syllogisms of the science to which Logic itself ministers. Therefore the using Logic coincides with the science it serves. Granting the antecedent, I distinguish the consequent: materially and objectively — granted; formally and essentially — denied. For the syllogistic form is derived from Logic, while the object or matter to which it is applied belongs to the science it serves.

Point of Debate V: Whether Topica and Sophistica Are Sciences

The Subtle Doctor (q. 3, *Sophistical Refutations*) investigates this difficulty by design and resolves it, noting there (§*Ad 1. q.*) that Dialectic can be considered in two ways. First, insofar as it provides a norm for proceeding from certain principles to certain conclusions — and this is called the teaching Topica. Second, insofar as it uses that same norm in itself and in the other sciences — and this is called by the earlier philosophers simply "Dialectic," and by later ones the using Logic. The same is noted equally of Sophistica, which can be viewed insofar as it proceeds from certain sophistic principles to certain sophistic conclusions, in which way it can be called the teaching Sophistica; or insofar as it

employs those principles to conclude falsely through a sophistic syllogism — in which way it can be called the using Sophistica.

First assertion: the teaching Topica is a science. Scotus holds this (cited), saying that the science of Dialectic is handed down through demonstration, though its use consists in probable matters. Sarnanus (q. 1 of the universals, p. 26), Toletus (q. 2 proem.), and the cited moderns in the preceding points of debate agree. Proved first from *Posterior Analytics* I, T. 5: a habit caused from determinate principles to determinate conclusions through a proper medium is a science. But the teaching Topica is of this kind; for it has proper principles from which, through a proper medium, it descends to proper conclusions. Therefore it is a science. Second: just as through an analytical syllogism necessity is demonstrated, so through a topical syllogism probability is shown, and through a syllogism taken in general the necessity of inference (*necessitas illativa*) is shown, as is clear (*Sophistical Refutations* I, ch. 2). But science is generated through the analytical syllogism. Therefore science is also produced through the topical syllogism — and accordingly the teaching Topica is a science.

Second assertion: the teaching Sophistica is likewise a science. So Scotus (in the passage above). Proved first from Aristotle, who at the end of the *Sophistical Refutations* II expressly says that he himself discovered the science of Sophistica. Second: the subject of Sophistica is knowable; it has knowable and demonstrable properties, as the Philosopher affirms (*Sophistical Refutations* I.1). Therefore of it there is sophistic science. I add that just as through a Dialectical syllogism probability is demonstrated, so through a captious syllogism appearance is shown — especially through unity as its proper medium — just as of a triangle it is demonstrated, through its definition, that it has three angles.

You will object first, against the first assertion: science is about necessary and eternal things, as I have frequently insisted above. But Topica is about probable and contingent matters, as is clear from its definition. Therefore Topica is not a science. I grant the major and distinguish the minor with Scotus (q. 3 of the *Prologue* and *Sentences* I, d. 3, q. 4, §*Quantum ad 1., I.*): as regards existence — denied; as regards the necessary connection of predicate with subject — granted. In this sense, contingent and probable things so viewed can be said to be necessary and eternal, as the undivided Scotists observe (q. proem. of *Physics*) and Vulpes (*Summa* I, disp. 2, §8).

You will object secondly, against the second assertion: Sophistica is not true but only apparent wisdom (*Sophistical Refutations* I.1; and *Metaphysics* IV, T. 5). Hence it is called an "art" at *Sophistical Refutations* I.13. Therefore it is not rightly placed among the sciences. Confirmation: no science tends to deception, since it is a true intellectual habit (*Ethics* VI.4). But Sophistica tends to deception; for it aims at the fallacious and captious syllogism. Therefore it does not merit the name of science.

I grant the antecedent and deny the consequence: for the teaching *Sophistica* proceeds after its own fashion from certain and necessary principles to certain and necessary conclusions, as I declared in the foregoing note. The testimony of Aristotle is interpreted of the using *Sophistica*, not the teaching. And Scotus implies this through the following words: if *Sophistica* is taken for false credulity engendered by a sophistic syllogism, the argument holds — but not if it is taken for *Sophistica* handed down through demonstration. To the confirmation: I distinguish the major: *per se* — denied; *per accidens* — granted. For *Sophistica* was not discovered in order that we may deceive or be deceived, but that we may avoid deception.

You will object thirdly: the obliquity of something right is not known except through knowledge of what is right, since the right is the standard of itself and of the oblique, as Scotus notes (*Sentences* IV, d. 15, q. 2, §*De tertio* X.). But the sophistic syllogism is essentially the obliquity of the Dialectical syllogism. Therefore there is no science *per se* of the sophistic syllogism. Confirmation: there is no science of non-being, since science is a real and true habit — and being and truth are convertible (*Metaphysics* IV, T. 28). But the sophistic syllogism is non-being (*Metaphysics* VI, T. 14), where Aristotle says that Plato did not act badly in placing *Sophistica* under non-being.

The Doctor responds (in the passage cited, §*Ad aliam* q.): granting the major and denying the minor. The reason is that the obliquity of a certain nature is constituted in being through the mere negation of what is right; but the sophistic syllogism is not constituted in being through the negation of the Dialectical syllogism, but through the appearance of truth, which pertains to its own right and essential being. You will press: the Doctor (q. 3 of the universals, before §*Ad 1. arg.*) affirms that the sophistic syllogism is a privation of the true and perfect syllogism, and accordingly it belongs to the same science to know a habit and its privation — for of opposites there is the same discipline (*Post-Predicaments*, ch. on opposites). Therefore the foregoing response is worthless. I say indeed that the privation of true science accompanies the sophistic syllogism, but that it is essentially constituted through the said appearance — and in this way the two passages of Scotus that seem to conflict with each other are reconciled.

To the confirmation: the Scotists also distinguish the minor: if the sophistic syllogism is considered insofar as it falls into the use of arguing sophistically, it proceeds from falsehoods, and of it so viewed there is no science. But if it is examined insofar as it is handed down from determinate principles and media to determinate conclusions, then especially of it there is science.

Article IV: Whether Logic Is One Science

I encounter principally two opinions in this article. The prior is that of St. Thomas (*Posterior Analytics* I, ch. 22, q. 24, art. 3), Cajetan (*ibid.*), Capreolus (q. 3,

Prologue), and Rubius (q. 4 proem.), affirming that Logic is one in species, or one simple quality, diffused through all its parts and all its conclusions — just as the heat of fire is one simple thing extending to kindle the distinct pieces of wood placed next to it. The latter is defended by the Scotists: Tataretus (*Logic*, q. 1, dub. 3), John of the Masters (*ibid.*), and very many others, from Scotus (q. 3 of the *Prologue*; and q. 2, *Posterior Analytics*, §*Contra istud arguitur, sub D.*; and *Sentences* III, d. 23, q. 2, §*Ad 2. quaesitum*, 6.; and d. 36, q. un., §*Quantum ergo.*; and *Metaphysics* VI, q. 1) — to whom the Nominalists agree (in the *Prologue* cited), who deny that any total and habitual science is one simple quality, affirming that it is one by the unity of its subject about which Logic, or any other science, is concerned.

Note, from Scotus (just cited in the *Metaphysics*), that the unity of a science is twofold: intrinsic and extrinsic. Intrinsic unity is that which follows upon the very entity of the science, which is of the first species of quality, really distinct from the object about which it is science. Now since there is principally a triple object — individual, specific, and generic — there is also a triple unity of science, corresponding to the triple formal, virtual, and potential habit, as the Doctor notes (*Sentences* III, d. 25, q. 2, §*Ad 2. quaesitum*). The formal habit is the particular habit of a demonstrated conclusion, inclining precisely toward the evident knowledge of that conclusion — such as the knowledge that is had of the lunar eclipse from the interposition of the earth between the moon and the sun, as of the year 1643 at the seventh hour of the afternoon. The virtual habit is the habit of the first and adequate specific object, containing in itself virtually all the knowable conclusions concerning that object, inclining formally toward knowledge of it and virtually toward knowledge of all things virtually contained in it — such as the science generated of man and of all things pertaining to him. The potential habit is the habit of the generic object and of all things potentially contained in it — such as the science of animal and of all things pertaining to it in any way.

First assertion: Logic is not one simple quality. This is derived from the principles of Scotus (cited at the beginning of this article). Proved first: objects distinct in species cause habits distinct in species, according to Scotus (*Sentences* I, d. 3, q. 7, §*Ad 1. arg. DD.*; and III, d. 31, q. un., §*Respondeo, D.*). But the objects of Logic are distinct in species — namely the three instruments of knowing: definition, division, and argumentation, or rather the syllogisms of the first, second, and third figures. For who can be expert in arguments made in the first figure while not knowing the syllogisms constructed in the second or third? And likewise someone can master the mode of defining while being ignorant of the mode of arguing. Therefore Logic is not a simple quality. Second: a habit is posited in order that the power may operate easily, promptly, and with pleasure, as the Doctor teaches (*Sentences* I, cited). But one can have a habit concerning incomplete terms without having one concerning complete terms. Again: one can know what belongs to the *Prior Analytics* without knowing what belongs to

the *Posterior Analytics*. Therefore since Logic comprises all of these, it is clearly gathered that it is not a simple quality, which is acquired all at once in its entirety. Moreover: things that are compatible with some but not with others are not of the same species and one simple quality, as is clear from fire, water, and other contraries and impossibles. But certain things treated in Logic are compatible with some and not with others, as is clear from the analytic, topical, and sophistic. Therefore Logic is not one simple quality.

Second assertion: Logic is one science by the unity of its subject that potentially contains all things comprehended in it. So Scotus (q. 4 of the universals, near the end, §*Ad rationem positionis*), and this is derived from the first already recounted, from *Sentences* III, d. 36, q. un., §; and from *Against Pompanatius*, disp. 2, q. 9, concl. 3. Proved first from Aristotle (*Posterior Analytics* I.23, T. 43), who speaking universally of science writes: science is one of one generic subject. But the subject of Logic is one in genus — namely the syllogism, or mode of knowing, which is divided into definition, division, and argumentation as its species. Therefore Logic is one by the unity of its subject. Second: acts and habits are distinguished by the distinction of objects (*On the Soul* II, T. 33 and 36; and *Quodlibet* 13, §*Ad ista HH.*), and they have that unity which their objects have. But the object of Logic is one in genus — namely the syllogism or mode of knowing. Therefore Logic is also one in genus. Third, from *Sentences* I, d. 3, q. 9, §*Ad 1.*, near the end of that question: an act is generative of a habit, as cause produces effect; and an act takes its unity and distinction from the object, which is the proper terminus of its dependence. Therefore the habit that arises from the act — and thus Logic — is one by the generic unity of its subject. More will be said in *Physics* I, q. 2, art. 3.

You will object first: a power respecting objects distinct in species is one simple quality — as the visual power, which is carried toward colors distinct in species, such as white and black. Therefore Logic is also one simple quality, even though it regards objects differing in species. Granting the antecedent, the consequence is denied. For a power emanates from the soul or from the whole compound; but a habit is partially caused by the object. Therefore a habit is determined by that object by which it is produced; not so with a power, which by its very nature is indifferent and undetermined with respect to any object contained under it.

You will object secondly: an infused habit is a simple quality — such as faith, hope, and charity, which are concerned with many objects distinct in species; for charity regards God and neighbor. Therefore an acquired habit, such as Logic is, is also a simple quality. Granting the antecedent, the consequence is denied. The reason for the difference is that an infused habit has its unity from itself and in itself formally, and effectively from God. But an acquired habit draws its unity from the object by which it is partially produced, as the Doctor rightly observes (*Sentences* III, d. 25, near the end of q. 2). Or it can be said that the difference lies in the fact that the infused habit is supported only by the faith

of God revealing, as the same Doctor affirms (*Sentences* III, d. 23, q. un.; and IV, d. 14, q. 2, §*Hic dicitur, F.*). But the acquired habit rests on formal, specific, and generic motives and principles. Therefore the former, but not the latter, is a simple quality.

Article V: Whether Logic Is a Speculative Science

This difficulty seems to rest on the acceptance and explanation of the name "praxis," through which a science is called practical. For some employ that word more broadly and others more strictly — from which a controversy arises among them, not easy to explain, especially on account of many other considerations of no small weight that are introduced into it. Therefore, so that this article may be more conveniently resolved, I divide it into the two following points of debate. This is consonant with the style and method of the Subtle Doctor, who — as Vigerius carefully notes in his exposition (§*Ad istas qq. solvendas, q. 4 of the Prologue*) — when some very arduous and difficult question arises, divides it into collateral questions and articles.

Point of Debate I: What Praxis Is

Since — by the common judgment of philosophers — that science is called practical which directs praxis, and conversely that is speculative which does not direct praxis but rests in the mere contemplation of a thing, we have rightly undertaken first to define and explain praxis itself, so that from this we may distinguish which science is practical and which is speculative.

The Subtle Doctor (q. 4 of the *Prologue*, §*Dico igitur, A.*), defining praxis properly so taken, says: praxis is an act of a power other than the intellect, naturally posterior to intellection, apt to be elicited in conformity with right reason, so that it may be a right act. This definition of praxis is attacked by many — Ockham (q. 5 of the *Prologue*), Aureolus (ibid., art. 2, §*Quamvis autem, p. 37*), Gregory, Vasquez (*Summa Theologiae* I, disp. 8), Suárez (*Metaphysics*, disp. 44, n. 20), and very many others — who affirm that praxis is an operation of the intellect, will, or other power that is directable. In order that the truth and probability of the Scotist position may appear and be defended against the weapons of the opponents' arguments:

Note first that praxis, as Pelbartus notes from Major (*Sentences* I, d. 48) (*Rosarium*, vol. I, ver. praxis, §1), is a Greek word, which in Latin is the same as "operation," as Scotus indicates (*Sentences* I, d. 28, q. un., §*Quamvis, A.*), and Bonetus (*Metaphysics* II, ch. 4) and Orbellus (*Metaphysics* I, ch. 4, q. 2) explicitly hold. For it derives from the Greek verb *prattō*, which is the same as "I operate, I make, I act," as is read in the lexicon. Hence by the force of the word *praxis* it signifies the operation, making, or action of any natural or free power. But the Scotists — notably the aforesaid Vigerius and Tataretus (q. 2, *Scibilis* 2) — following the commentator Eustratius (*Ethics* I, com. 1) observe that praxis is employed in four ways. First, for the activity (*energia*) that consists of the operation of any power

whatsoever — and this acceptance is derived from the etymology of the word *praxis*, as I noted above. Second, for the operation of the power of knowing or desiring alone — in which sense the operation of the intellect and also the affections of the soul can be called praxes, about which the Philosopher speaks (*On the Soul* I.1, T. 12). Third, for the operation of the will alone, whether good or bad — in which sense Eustratius and Odo (in the passage above) take it. Fourth, for the right operation of the will — and in this sense Eustratius describes it as the work of virtue; and in this sense Scotus and his disciples take it (q. 4 of the *Prologue*, §*Secunda via*), affirming that *praxis* is the operation according to choice. Therefore Scotus, taking *praxis* in this way, speaks according to the mind of Eustratius and the Greeks — as Vulpes (*Summa Theologiae* I, disp. 4, q. 1, n. 9) correctly notes against Molina (*Summa Theologiae* I, disp. 1, art. 4, q. 1), and as is clear from the lexicon cited above. Nor should this multiple acceptance of *praxis* seem strange to anyone. For it is common among authors for words to admit of many senses, as is clear from Dialectic (q. 1, this book, art. 2); from science (q. 2, this book, note 2); and from what is most immediately relevant to our matter, from "action" and "production" in the writings of Aristotle. For sometimes "action" is used for operation both immanent and transient (*Metaphysics* VI, ch. 1); sometimes through "action" immanent operation is meant and through "production" transient operation (*Metaphysics* IX, ch. 9); sometimes through "action" is understood that which leaves no work after it, and through "production" that which leaves a work after it (*Magna Moralia* I, last ch.). And the most proper usage of "action" is for moral action, and of "production" for manual operation. Hence it is said that action belongs to the domain of the "doable" (*agibilia*) and production to the domain of the "makeable" (*factibilia*). That is, action is concerned with moral matters and production with manual or mechanical ones. Hence Aristotle (*Ethics* VI.4) defines art as a productive habit with right reason, and prudence as an active habit with right reason. And therefore the "doable" and the "makeable" are the objects of the practical sciences — by reason of which the practical habit taken in general is divided into active and productive, as the Doctor teaches (*Sentences* III, d. 34, q. un., §*Notandum ulterius, D.*), and as Aristotle shows in the place just cited. But to make clearer to ourselves what we are investigating, we must work out whether *praxis* strictly taken is concerned with the "doable" or the "makeable." For if we shall find that it is concerned only with the "doable," then what the Doctor and his disciples say about *praxis* will be true — and the Thomists agree with them, among whom are the Complutenses (disp. 1, q. 6, §1).

That the name of *praxis* properly speaking should be used as Aristotle, the common master of all, took it is found and drawn from *On the Soul* III.10, T. 49: the intellect becomes practical through extension — the general axiom. And the reason is rendered: because the speculative intellect is that which rests in the mere contemplation of a thing; therefore the practical intellect, insofar as it is distinguished from the speculative, extends itself to regulating *praxis* — and

from this relation it is formally denominated "practical." The same must be said of science, which regulates a work that is formally practical. Hence the Philosopher adds (*Ethics* I.3): the end of speculative science is truth, while the end of practical is the work. Therefore in the view of Aristotle, that doctrine is formally speculative which is placed solely in the speculation of truth, and practical which regulates praxis or the work. For this reason the same Aristotle had previously stated (*Ethics* I.3): the end of practical science is not cognition but action. Although this saying is not found expressly in the text cited, it is nonetheless gathered from it; for there these words are read: the practical intellect is that which reasons on behalf of something. For it is the principle of action, and this differs from the contemplative intellect by its end, since the speculative contemplates truth for its own sake while the practical does so for the sake of the work; for every appetite tends toward something to be acquired, and the practical intellect is that which moves the will, which is a certain appetite. And T. 51 is added: the appetible is its end, from which the consideration of the practical intellect arises. I have adduced these texts on account of Baccon (q. 4 of the *Prologue*), Fonseca (*Metaphysics* III, q. 2, sect. 4, c. 2), and Molina (in the passage cited), who say that this saying is not Aristotle's and can be denied, and that it is supported by no foundation. Arriaga adds (disp. 1, sect. 4, n. 5). Finally Hurtado (disp. 2, sect. 2, §14) thinks it is not from any proven author — yet Hurtado himself (disp. 1 *On the Soul*, sect. 3, §15) falls into the same position. And Abbate (*Commentary on the Soul* IV, tract. 4, lib. 3), Aureolus, Toletus (q. 4 proem., near end of note 2), following Augustine (*On the Trinity* XV.1), receive and defend this. And the Thomists agree with St. Thomas (*Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 17, art. 1, ad 2), along with Eustratius, Odo, and very many other most approved authors, using the name "praxis" as we do. From this it is clear that Vasquez, Suárez, and others to be cited below in the third assertion are not thinking correctly when they suppose this to be a verbal dispute and that the description of praxis handed down by the Doctor is voluntary and gratuitous.

That praxis properly speaking is not an act of the intellect but of the will is more expressly found in *Metaphysics* I.2 and *Ethics* I.1: speculative science was discovered for the sake of fleeing ignorance; practical science was discovered not that we may know but that we may become good. The same is indicated at *Topics* I.9. Therefore, according to the Philosopher, that science is properly practical which precisely regulates praxis — by reason of which we are named and are good. But the operation according to which we are called good is not the operation of the intellect — which is indeed called "true," but not "good." Whence the Doctor rightly says that praxis properly speaking is the operation of a power other than the intellect, namely the will. And praxis itself requires three conditions. The first is that it be an act of a power other than the intellect. For only that operation is called praxis toward which the intellect extending itself becomes practical. But toward no operation of itself does the intellect extend itself, because to extend is to tend outside oneself, as the verb *extendo* implies;

and so praxis is not an operation of the intellect, which does not go beyond its own limits. Second, that it be naturally posterior to intellection. Hence the operations of the vegetative and sensitive powers of souls are not properly praxes, because they do not naturally follow intellection, nor are they subject to its direction; for they are common to us and to the brutes. Even if in some way they are directed by us and accompany intellection, just as the acts of the intellect that are commanded and governed by the will, they can in that sense be called praxes — since both the elicited and the commanded act of the will are praxes, as is clear from q. 4 of the *Prologue*. The third condition, which Vulpes (in the passage cited) admits, is that it be in conformity with right reason, which Aristotle posits (*Ethics* VI.2): right choice necessarily requires right reason, to which it must conform — where the Philosopher by "choice" understands the elicited act of the will, and by "right reason," the right dictate of the intellect.

Note thirdly, from the same Doctor (*Prologue*, §*Contra de necessitate, sub D.*; and also q. 1, *A.*): that speculation, as it is distinguished from practical knowledge, is an operation of the intellect remaining within its own limits and not ordered to the operation of another power distinct from the intellect, as the Doctor intimates (*Sentences* I, d. 38, q. un., §*Quamvis, A.*). "Speculation" derives from the Greek verb *skopeo*, which is the same as "I consider" or "I contemplate." Hence that is speculative science which is placed in the contemplation of the thing, and that is practical which directs praxis. Two conditions accord with this: the first, that it be an operation of the intellect — from the defect of which sight, hearing, or the operation of another power distinct from the intellect is not speculation, nor is science denominated speculative through it. The second, that it remain within the limits of the intellect — namely, that it be for its own sake, or that it not direct another operation of a power distinct from the intellect. Whence it comes about that although every speculation is an act of the intellect, not every act of the intellect is speculation — as Hurtado and Arriaga (aforesaid) do not correctly impute to us. For besides speculative knowledge, there is practical knowledge, as the Stagirite teaches (*Metaphysics* I.2), where he places speculative before practical, since the former is sought for the sake of knowing and the latter for the sake of the work, as the same Philosopher forewarns (*On the Soul* III, T. 50), to whom the Doctor (in q. 1 cited) agrees.

Assertion: praxis broadly taken is a directable operation. This assertion counters Arriaga (disp. 1, sect. 4, subsect. 2, n. 49), who thinks Scotus denies this; but as often happens, Arriaga and some others argue against Scotus without reading or understanding him, as Oviedo similarly notes in a comparable case (*Controversies* I, Meta., point 2). Arriaga is therefore mistaken, as is clear from the *Prologue* cited (§*Dico igitur, sub A.*, ver. *Respondeo licet*), and this is derived from what was said in note 1. For praxis, as its name indicates, is an operation, but an operation of any power whatsoever is in some way directable — most especially the operation of the intellect, as even the opponents admit. Therefore praxis so accepted is a directable operation. The cognition of the intellect that is had of

principles is ordered to the knowledge of the conclusion as cause to effect; and such cognition is a directable operation. Therefore it is also praxis broadly taken. Moreover, speculation is an operation of the intellect that is not directable, as Odo says (*Ethics* VI, q. 9, lect. 1). Therefore on the other side, praxis is a directable operation — the consequence holds because speculative is that which does not direct praxis; therefore practical is that which directs praxis; and thus just as every undirectable operation is speculation, so a directable operation is praxis broadly taken.

Second assertion: praxis properly is an operation of the will. So Scotus (cited), whom Odo (*Ethics* VI, in the passage above), Orbellus (*Metaphysics* I, q. 1), and Fuentes (*Physics* proem., diff. 2, art. 1) follow. Proved first: praxis presents extension toward work, as I observed in the second note. But the intellect resting in its acts does not extend itself to work, because it does not tend outside itself. Therefore it extends itself to the act of another power, naturally posterior to intellection, which is the act of the will. Second, from *Metaphysics* II: the end of practical science is that we may become good. But goodness pertains to the will and truth to the intellect. Therefore praxis is an act of the will. Third: the practical act is a principle of action (*On the Soul* III, T. 50, and *Metaphysics* I, just cited). But nothing is more in the power of an agent than the act of the will, according to Scotus (*Sentences* I, d. 1, q. 4, §*Ad argumenta*). For the craftsman (*Ethics* VI.5) needs virtue or art to operate rightly; but does not need virtue with respect to what is not in his power. Moreover, every operation to which prudence extends itself is praxis, because prudence is an active habit that regards "doable" things (*Ethics* VI.6); and prudence extends itself to things in our hand, as is found there, and as Odo (aforesaid) pursues excellently. Furthermore: the practical work is either active or productive, and every practical science is either active or productive; but both the active and the productive are in the power and will of the one practicing. Therefore praxis strictly taken is the operation of the will.

Third assertion: praxis is properly defined as an act of a power other than the intellect, naturally posterior to intellection. This assertion is maintained by Scotus and Odo, and is opposed to the Nominalists and to most moderns, notably Vasquez, Suárez, Arriaga, Hurtado, and others who think this dispute between the Scotists and the Nominalists is merely verbal — to whom the twin Scotists agree (disp. 12, q. 5, art. 1) and Oviedo (*Controversies*, I, p. 2). The foregoing assertion is proved: a definition is right that consists of genus and difference, as is clear in the *Epitome*, Book II, q. 7, art. 2. But the aforesaid definition is of this kind. Therefore it is legitimate. The major is known. The minor is also evident: for "act" is placed in the role of genus, and the remaining particles are added in the role of difference, as is clear to anyone who runs through them.

You will say: Scotus adds to the definition of praxis other particles, namely "apt to be elicited in conformity with right reason, so that it may be a right act." Therefore the foregoing definition is insufficient, or Scotus fails in not giving a definition comprehending all praxis — both good and bad — or rather one that abstracts from good and bad praxis. I say that Scotus defined only good praxis; for evil is not known except through the good — just as the oblique is not known except through the right, according to the saying: the right is the standard of itself and of the oblique. The Doctor cites this (q. 3, *Sophistical Refutations*, near the beginning; and *Sentences* III, d. 28, q. un., §*In ista q. ante A.*; and d. 4.11, q. 3, §*De tertio*, X.) after Aristotle (*On the Soul* I, T. 85, ch. 5; and *Metaphysics* VII, T. 23, cited by Scotus, *Metaphysics* VI, q. 2). Moreover, from the Doctor's definition it is easy to abstract the common definition of praxis, leaving aside the last few words, as I did in the foregoing assertion. And sometimes the Philosopher appears to do the same — as at *Peri Hermeneias* I.4 and *Prior Analytics* I.1, defining enunciation through affirmation and negation, which are its species; and *Posterior Analytics* I.2, giving the most strict definition of science; and also *Metaphysics* V, ch. on quantity, describing quantity through divisibility, which is its property. Vulpes adds (disp. 4, q. 1, near the end): Scotus therefore defines only good praxis because this is properly called *praxis* in Greek — although in fact praxis comprehends every free operation, whether good or bad, abstracting from both, as Odo the moral Doctor well and at length shows, to whom Veglia (*Vestibule* II, q. 13, n. 58) seems to agree. Moreover, by defining good praxis, he also defines evil, just as *Topics* VI.2, which defines science, also in a certain sense defines ignorance.

You will object first, against the second assertion, with Hurtado (cited, §15): the act of the intellect can be a directable object through another act of the same intellect, so that it may be done rightly. Therefore the act of the intellect can be praxis. The antecedent is at hand: just as the intellect can err, so it can be directed and corrected. The consequence is evident: for praxis is a directable object through an act of the intellect, so that it may be done rightly. Confirmation: that act which directs another act does not rest in the mere contemplation of it but proceeds further to rectifying it. Therefore such an act is practical. The antecedent seems evident: such an act indeed teaches the "makeability" (*factibilitas*) of the object, just as architecture the makeability of a house. The consequence is derived because the speculative act remains only in the speculation of its object. I grant the antecedent and deny the consequence and its proof, unless it is understood of praxis broadly taken, according to the first assertion. To the confirmation: I similarly grant the antecedent and deny the consequence. For this is not sufficient for praxis properly speaking, but it is required that such an act be an act of the will. To its proof I say there is a difference, since the intellect remaining in its acts does not extend itself but dwells within its own limits, as Odo notes after Scotus (cited, reason 6 against the

opposite) — just as happens in constructing a house: then it goes outside itself and tends to regulating the act of the exterior power.

You will object secondly, with Arriaga (disp. 1, sect. 4, subsect. 2, n. 49): a reflexive act does not rest in the mere contemplation of the thing but tends toward producing it. Therefore it is practical. Confirmation first: just as the intellect providing the rule and mode for making an act of the will is practical, so the act of the intellect that teaches the mode in which another act of that same intellect is to be made ought to be practical. Confirmation second: every act of moral virtue is praxis; but certain acts of moral virtue are intellectual — such as acts of faith and prudence. Therefore the act of the intellect can be called praxis. Granting the antecedent, the consequence is denied. For from q. 4 of the *Prologue* (§*Ad argumenta, AA.*): every act of the intellect is either productive or operative; yet no one concedes that every act of it is praxis — but only that act which is regulative of the act of a power other than the intellect. To the first confirmation: the parity is to be denied, for the same reason, because the former regulates the act of the will, and therefore is practical; but not the latter, which does not transgress the boundaries of the intellect. To the major of the second confirmation: I say that every act of moral virtue is indeed praxis or practical; nonetheless that act which is denominated "practical" is not praxis. The reason is given by the Doctor: because the act of the intellect is apt to be denominated quasi-accidentally from the praxis toward which it extends itself, although it is not the terminus of this extension. Suárez and Hurtado (aforesaid) press, contending that these responses are petitions of the principle. For why (they ask) is an intellectual work not praxis just as a work of the will is? To these and similar objections I gave abundant answer above through authorities and arguments, which are not to be repeated here.

Point of Debate II: In Which the Chief Difficulty Is Weighed — Whether Logic Is Speculative

There are four different opinions on this point of debate. The first is that of Godfrey (*Prologue*), Niger (*Clypeus*, q. 14), and others who think that Logic is neither practical nor speculative — to whom the Greeks seem to agree, who deny that Logic is a science and a part of philosophy, asserting only that it is its instrument. The second is that of certain moderns — Suárez (*Metaphysics*, disp. 44, sect. 13, n. 54), Vasquez (*Summa Theologiae* I, disp. 9, n. 2), and Rubius (q. 5, n. 14) — who think that Logic is partly practical and partly speculative; they seem to have derived this from Godfrey (*Quodlibet* 12, q. 1) and others who hold that Theology is simultaneously practical and speculative. The third is that of Ockham (q. penult. of the *Prologue*), Aureolus (ibid., art. 2, §*Quamvis autem*, p. 37), and the Conimbricenses (q. 4, art. univ.), who assert that Logic is practical. The fourth is handed down by Scotus (q. 4 of the *Prologue*, §*Dico igitur, A.*), Anthony Andrew (ibid.), Faber (disp. 9, ch. 1), Odo (*Ethics* VI, lect. 3), Merinero (*Unitary*

Disputation, proem., q. 6, sect. 2), and other Scotists, to whom the Thomists and Bacon (q. 4 of the *Prologue*) agree — all affirming that Logic is speculative.

Note first, from *On the Soul* III.8, T. 38: since the sciences are divided according to the division of things or objects — some objects being speculative and others operable — it follows that science taken in general (despite the protest of Ferch, *Vestiges* q.) is divided into practical and speculative, from Scotus (cited, §*Ad argumenta principalia*, BB.; and *Sentences* I, d. 38, q. un.; and *ibid.* d. 34, third q., q. un., §*Ad istam q.*, B.; and IV, d. 14, q. 3, §*Hic dicitur*, D.) after Aristotle (*Metaphysics* II and VI, T. 2). Speculative science is subdivided into real speculative and rational speculative, as the Doctor writes (cited, D.): real speculative is threefold — Physics, Mathematics, and Metaphysics. Rational speculative is distributed into Dialectic, Rhetoric, and Grammar. And practical is divided into active, which is concerned with the "doable" such as Ethics, and productive, which labors over the "makeable" such as Medicine — hence those who work with their hands are called practical (*Metaphysics* I.1).

Note secondly, from the same Doctor (*Prologue*, §*Contra de necessitate*, sub D.; and also q. 1, A.): that practical science includes a twofold respect of priority and conformity to praxis — not actual but aptitudinal, of which speculative science is devoid. For practical science regulates praxis, endowing the practically operating power with the norm of operating well. Hence it is prior to praxis, since a rule naturally precedes its regulated object and is conformed to it (*Ethics* VI.3). Priority belongs to it from the order of powers so disposed in being and operating; conformity, however, belongs to it from the side of the object. Furthermore, the Doctor notes (in the distinction cited, §*Ad auctoritatem*, F.): the right reason placed in the definition of art is nothing other than the directive reason, or the one rectifying another power whose function it is to operate according to art. So that art properly is the directive and rectifying habit of the "makeable," just as Ethics is the directive habit of the "doable." Now since a knowledge can extend itself to praxis by formal and virtual extension, and likewise by formally actual and most formally actual extension, from this arises a twofold practical — formal and virtual. Formal practical is again divided into actual and most actual, concerning which the Doctor treats in the *Prologue* cited (§*Ex hoc patet*, A.). That is formally practical which formally dictates concerning the praxis to be chosen or avoided, according to formally practical principles and conclusions. But the virtually practical is the simple knowledge of an object virtually containing the knowledge of practical principles and conclusion — such as the knowledge that is had of God, of whom this practical syllogism can be formed: everything supremely good is to be loved; but God is supremely good; therefore God is to be loved. The rest that can be said here is relegated to its proper place for examination.

Note thirdly, from the same Doctor (*ibid.*, §*Ad rationes pro opinione opposita*, sub EE.): when two opposing extremes exist, the more something recedes from one

of the opposites, the more it approaches the other. Now the most actually practical cognition is that which is immediately conformed to the praxis to be formally elicited — and the more distant something is from this, the more it approaches the speculative habit. Hence the universal habit that is not immediately conformed to the praxis to be elicited can be called speculative with respect to the habit that is immediately conformed to the praxis to be elicited. Whence art can be called speculative with respect to the experienced habit, since art is a more universal habit and not so immediately directive. And the Philosopher implies this at the beginning of the *Metaphysics*: the craftsman will frequently err; but the experienced one will not err in the same way. In this manner Medicine can be distinguished into speculative and practical: the former concerns the more universal causes and treatments and is the cognition more remote from the praxis to be elicited, while the latter regards particulars and those more immediate to praxis — even though that universal one, which is relatively called speculative, is absolutely practical, since it proceeds from practical principles and virtually includes the particular one formally conformed to praxis. From this it is inferred, against Arriaga (disp. 1, sect. 4, subsect. 2, near the end) and Hurtado (ibid.), who contend that the same act about the same object can be both speculation and praxis — that the same act of the same object cannot be both speculation and praxis, but is simply either praxis or speculation; unless it is called speculation or praxis relatively, in approximately the way I was just now saying about Medicine. For every act is derived either from speculative or practical principles. Likewise, every speculative or practical conclusion is resolved into speculative or practical principles, from the Doctor (cited, §*Contra haec, sub R.*). Similarly every cognition is either about a speculative or an operable object, and thus is formally or virtually speculative, or formally or virtually practical, as the Doctor indicates (in the passage above, §*Secundus art.*): "and this, that man should sometimes fast, is not only practically known to a man who knows, but also to an angel and to God. Likewise: that the heaven is to be moved by an angel is practical knowledge for man and for God." Nor is the argument valid that Hurtado adduces about a house to be constructed, saying: the architect has a practical cognition and the angel a speculative one. For that cognition of a house to be built, whether in the builder or in the angel, is practical, because it is about an operable thing and a practical object — though the Doctor seems to be undecided on this matter, both here and at *Sentences* I, d. 38, q. un. See my *Treatise on the Science of God*, disp. 1.

First assertion: Logic is either speculative or practical. This assertion is opposed to the authors of the first opinion, and is favored by Scotus (cited), who approves the division of science into speculative and practical. For if every science is either speculative or practical, as is clear from the first note, then since Logic is a science — from what has been said — it is clearly inferred to be speculative or practical. Moreover, every habit with a speculative or operable object is

speculative or practical. But Logic is a habit with a speculative or operable object. Again: what is under some genus participates in some difference of that genus and is some species of that very genus, since inferiors participate in the common character of their superior. But Logic is under the genus of science, as I proved in art. 2 of this question. Therefore it is either speculative or practical.

Second assertion: Logic is neither partly speculative nor partly practical. This is gathered from Scotus (ibid., §*Contra de necessitate*; and §*Alia opinio ante O.*; and §*Ad rationes pro opinione, EE.*). Proved from Aristotle (*Metaphysics* VI, ch. 1), who divides science into speculative and practical. But the members of a good division must be opposed, from what was said in the *Epitome* (q. 7, art. 1, §2). Second: one and the same species cannot participate in two opposed differences of its proximate genus. For each difference of a genus constitutes one species essentially distinct from another species, as is clear from "rational" and "irrational," of which one constitutes man and the other brute. But "speculative" and "practical" are two opposed differences of science in general, from what will be proved elsewhere. Therefore Logic, which is one species of science taken in general, cannot be simultaneously speculative and practical. Third: two contradictories cannot be simultaneously affirmed of the same thing; but if Logic were simultaneously speculative and practical, two contradictories would be simultaneously affirmed of it. For it would extend to praxis and not extend to praxis — it would extend, because it would be practical; it would not extend, because it would be speculative. Whatever Hurtado (*On the Soul*, disp. 11, sect. 3 and 4) and Arriaga (*Logic*, disp. 1, subsect. 4, near the end) may say in the opposite direction, asserting that the same act can be simultaneously practical and speculative.

Third assertion: Logic is not practical. So Scotus in the *Prologue* cited. Proved first: every practical science is either active or productive (*Topics* VIII.2 and *Metaphysics* VI.1). But Logic is not productive, being concerned with operations that pass into external matter; nor is it active, being concerned with moral operations. For *Ethics* II.2: the doable and the choosable are the same, and the principle of action is choice. Hence Hurtado (disp. 2, sect. 2, near end, §22), Fonseca (*Metaphysics* II, q. 2, sect. 4), and other moderns who assert that Logic is practical are without doubt departing from the doctrine of Aristotle. Second: the end of practical science is a work or something outside the intellect; but the aim of speculative science is truth (*Metaphysics* II.2), where Averroes (com. 3) adds: through speculative science we know; through practical science, however, we are knowing so that we may operate, because the end of practical science is the work. But Logic we know in order to know; for its end is the pursuit of truth in the works of the intellect, as Scotus intimates (q. 2, *Prior Analytics*, §*Quantum ad* 3.). And there is also the doctrine of discerning truth from falsehood, from what has been asserted elsewhere. Nor is the instrument and mode of knowing operable, as Arriaga himself admits (disp. 2, n. 56). Therefore Logic is not found in the number of the practical sciences.

Fourth assertion: Logic is speculative. This is expressly handed down by Scotus (cited) and (*Metaphysics* VI, q. 1), and by his disciples there. That the Philosopher held this, Laertius testifies (*Life of Aristotle*); Augustine (*City of God* VIII.4) indicates it; and Zabarella (*On the Nature of Logic*, II.17) agrees. And it follows from the three foregoing assertions. Proved first: that science is speculative which does not direct praxis, as I have noted not once above. But Logic does not direct praxis, which properly and primarily is an elicited act of the will and secondarily a commanded act of it. Therefore Logic is speculative. Second: that which proceeds after the speculative manner is speculative, as is clear. But Logic proceeds after the speculative manner: for it contemplates division, definition, and argumentation, investigating their principles, "said of all" and "said of none," the parts and all the properties of the syllogism. Therefore Logic is to be classified among the speculative sciences. To this all the authorities and arguments of the three foregoing assertions pertain. I add: *Metaphysics* I.4: it belongs to the dialectician to speculate about definitions and universals.

You will object first, on behalf of the first opinion, from three passages of Aristotle. First, from *Rhetoric* I.1: Dialectic was discovered to direct the operations of the intellect, which taken precisely are neither speculative nor practical, just as the intellect in itself is neither speculative nor practical. Second, from *Topics* I.9: three problems are enumerated — speculative, practical, and those assisting both; and these last are logical. Third, from *Metaphysics* VI.1: Logic is not placed among the speculative or practical sciences. Therefore this is a clear indication that in the Peripatetic school Dialectic is neither speculative nor practical, but only the instrument of both. To the first passage: I deny that the operations of the intellect that do not direct praxis are not speculative properly speaking, as is clearly established from the first assertion — though they can improperly be called practical, as is clear there, and as the Doctor signals (*Metaphysics* VI, q. 1, §*Ad 1. principale*). But the intellect through the reception of a practical or speculative cognition is denominated practical or speculative — just as a wall is called white or black through the reception of whiteness or blackness, although the wall in itself is neither white nor black. To the second: I say Aristotle only wishes to indicate there that Logic is an instrumental science; and by reason of this, just as it is not excluded from the character of science, so it is not excluded from the character of a speculative or practical habit. To the third: I say that Aristotle there recounts only the real speculative sciences, from whose list Logic is removed since it is rational, as I shall show in the next article.

You will object secondly, on behalf of the second opinion: practical science proceeds in the practical or compositive manner, and speculative science in the speculative or resolute manner. But Logic proceeds in both manners. Therefore it is simultaneously practical and speculative. The major is evident; the minor is shown with respect to the first part: Dialectic treats of the operations of the intellect, which are operable and directable. With respect to the second part: the mode of knowing, which is the object of Dialectic, is

speculable, and the resolution of the syllogism — most especially of the demonstrative — is handed down all the way to its principles and terms. I grant the major and deny the minor. To its proof: I grant the first part and deny the second; for such operations do not properly direct praxis, and therefore are not properly practical, as Aristotle implies (*Metaphysics* I.4) and Scotus (*Metaphysics* VI, q. 1, ad 1).

You will object thirdly: whose end is a work, it is a practical habit (*Metaphysics* II.2). But the end of Dialectic is a work — namely the syllogism, which is constructed by Logic. Therefore Logic is practical. Confirmation first: practical science provides the precepts of dividing, defining, and arguing well; therefore it is practical. Confirmation second: Logic is for the sake of the other sciences; for it is the organon and minister of the disciplines. But an instrument is directed toward operating and not toward speculating. Confirmation third: Logic is divided into teaching and using, and makes its object. But no speculative science makes its object — as is clear from Physics, which does not make a natural body, and from Astronomy, which does not create the heavens and the stars but only contemplates them. I respond through an explanation and distinction of the major: of the proximate end — granted; of the remote end — denied. To the distinction of the major, the minor is to be distinguished: for the proximate end of Logic is not the making of the syllogism but its knowledge and truth; and from this knowledge its construction consequently follows — just as from knowledge of a triangle there follows its construction, even though the triangle belongs to Geometry and the astrolabe to Astronomy, which are speculative sciences. Or it can be said that the major holds of the operation of a power other than the intellect, as St. Thomas teaches (*Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 17, art. 1, ad 1) beyond Scotus. To the first confirmation: in accordance with the distinction given above, I say that practical science provides the norm of operating well in the operation of a power distinct from the intellect, which Logic does not do. To the second confirmation: I grant the antecedent and deny the consequence. For even though Dialectic serves the other sciences, it is nonetheless not practical, since it does not regulate the operations of the will or of another power subject to the command of the will. To the third confirmation: I similarly deny the consequence, for this is not a sufficient reason for establishing a practical science, as is sufficiently clear from what has gone before.

You will object fourthly: a science that directs praxis is considered practical by all. Therefore equally a science that directs the operations of the intellect is practical — and Logic is of this kind, since absolutely that is to be considered practical which directs an operation, which then can be divided into that which directs the operations of the will and that which directs the operations of the intellect. I grant the antecedent and deny the consequence. For only that is properly and strictly practical which directs moral or manual operations; hence practical is well divided into active and productive alone. I add that just as

Metaphysics — as Baccon (q. 4 of the *Prologue*) and Suárez (*Metaphysics*, disp. 1, sect. 4) testify — directs the other sciences with a speculative direction, so Logic directs the operations of the intellect with a speculative direction. Finally: Geometry measures and Arithmetic numbers, yet no one has ever dared to remove them from the seat of the speculative sciences.

Article VI: Whether Logic Is a Real Science

The present difficulty is treated clearly and at length by Tataretus (q. 1, *Scibilis* 4), John of the Masters (ibid.), and Fuentes (q. 5, diff. un., art. 4). For its explanation and resolution:

Note, from the Doctor (*Metaphysics* VI, q. 1; *Quodlibet* 3, §*De* 1.; and *Sentences* III, d. 34, q. un.): science is divided into real and rational. Science is called "rational" in four ways. First, subjectively, because it is in reason or the intellect as in its subject; in which way, since every science resides in the intellect, every science can consequently be called rational. Second, comparatively, because it is obtained through an act of reason or intellect pursuing what is unknown from what is known; in which way also, since every science is acquired through an act of reason, it can equally be called rational. Third, directly, because it directs the operations of reason — in which sense too Logic is called rational; but this sense is not what is under investigation here. Fourth, objectively, because it is about an object that is a being of reason (*ens rationis*); and it is chiefly this sense that is the subject of the present discussion. Conversely, that science is real whose object is a real being. Science can also be called real formally and in terms of entity (*entitatively*), since it possesses real entity. Thus science can be called real in two ways — entitatively and objectively — and likewise science can be called rational both in terms of its entity and in terms of its object. And both senses are investigated and touched upon here by the Doctor (q. 3 of the *Prologue*, I, §*Contra istas*).

Assertion: Logic intrinsically and entitatively is a real science; extrinsically and objectively, however, it is rational. This assertion has two parts and is defended by Lychetus (*Sentences* II, d. 16, q. un., before §*Ad arg. principalia*), Bonetus (*Metaphysics* I, ch. 3, near the end, §*Quarta prop.*), the Parisians (*Physics* I, q. 3), and Zabarella (*On the Nature of Logic*, II.13). The first part is gathered and argued from Scotus, who in the places cited places Logic among the sciences; but science formally is a real being residing in the category of quality. Moreover, every habit immediately caused through the real acts of the intellect is real, since a real cause *per se* has a real effect. But Logic is a habit generated through the real acts of the intellect, as is evident. Therefore it is formally and entitatively real. The second part is found everywhere in Scotus, especially here (q. 1, near the end; and q. 7, §*Ad* 1. q.; and *Sentences* I, d. 36, q. un., §*Ad* 1. princ.; and IV, d. 1, q. 2, §*Hic sub R.*). Proved: a science is denominated from the object it considers, as is clear from Physics which is called natural from the natural body with which it is concerned. But the object of Logic, which is the syllogism, is a being of reason.

Therefore Logic is rational. Moreover: that which is concerned with a real being is a real science, as is clear from *Metaphysics*. Therefore, on the opposite side, that which labors about a being of reason — such as Logic — is rational, from Scotus (q. 3 of the *Prologue*, I). Nor is it valid to say with Mastrius and Bellutus (q. proem., art. 5) that Logic is real in itself and by its nature, but is rational insofar as it is handed down and elaborated by Aristotle. For its object — since the syllogism is a being of reason — is a being of reason, and what is treated in Logic consists of beings of reason, as the aforesaid moderns themselves admit (art. 3 of the same question). Moreover, the members of a good division do not coincide but are opposed; but Logic, from Scotus (cited), is classified under the member of rational science. Again: Logic does not treat of the active but of the passive acts of the intellect, from what will be said elsewhere. Furthermore, since Logic is a science about eternal and immutable things, as will be clear in art. 5 — to the pleasure of Aristotle or of any other author it cannot be changed from real to rational. Finally, the things that are in Logic are beings of reason, such as predicate, subject, major, minor, and other things of this form. Therefore, at the pleasure of Aristotle, Logic is not called rational — but for the reason given above.

You will object first, against the first part of the assertion: from object and power knowledge is generated, as the common opinion of the philosophers holds, and as Augustine (*On the Trinity* IX.12) teaches. But the object of Logic — which is the syllogism, being a being of reason — cannot be the cause of a real being, as the Doctor writes (*Sentences* I, d. 13, q. un., §*Aliter, sub a.*; and III, d. 8, q. un., §*Ad argumenta, H.*). Therefore Logic formally and entitatively is not real. And likewise from *Sentences* III, d. 23, q. un., sub *E.*: a real habit has a real formal object. Therefore since the object of Logic is not real, it is deduced that it is not entitatively real. I respond: the major holds for a real science, but not for a rational science such as Logic — and this is gathered from the Doctor (*Sentences* IV, d. 1, q. 1, sub 5). Or the major is to be taken of the moving object and not the terminating object, as Fuentes (q. 3, diff. 3, art. 1, near the end) explains from Scotus — though Fuentes himself (q. 5, near the end of art. 3) says that a being of reason known through reflexive cognition can cause a real cognition; whether this is rightly said is to be weighed elsewhere.

You will object secondly: to generate science, a definition must be taken as a medium to demonstrate a property of a subject, as will be clear in art. 5. But of a being of reason there is no true definition, as Scotus affirms (*Prior Analytics* I, q. 5; and *Sentences* IV, d. 1, q. 2, §*Hic primo videndum, B.*). Therefore Logic is not a true and real science. Confirmation: science demonstrates properties of its subject. But a being of reason does not have proper properties, since it is not properly a being, as the Doctor adds (in *Sentences* IV, cited), after Aristotle (*Metaphysics* V, T. 14; and *ibid.*, VI, T. 8). The major is known; the minor is from Scotus (q. 15 of the universals, §*Ad 1. arg.*), who says: the properties of a being of reason are produced by the intellect, while the properties of a real being

proceed from its nature. I grant the major. To the minor I say that, according to the diminished being of a being of reason, there is a definition of it, and in its own way it is a true definition — just as the definition of accident, even though it is not simply quidditative, is nevertheless a true definition. Scotus notes this concerning the definition of the syllogism (*Prior Analytics* I, cited, §*Quantum ad* 2.; and q. 1, *Sophistical Refutations*, near the end). To the confirmation: the major is to be granted and the minor denied, as is clear from the same Doctor (qq. 2, 3, 7 of the universals), where he assigns the properties of the syllogism.

You will object thirdly: no relation is a cause, since it is not of the genus of active things. But a logical demonstration is a relation, because it is formally a being of reason. Therefore Logic formally is not real. Confirmation first: nothing more noble is produced by something less noble, since an effect does not exceed its cause. But science, being real, is nobler than a second intention, which is a being of reason. Therefore, etc. Confirmation second: between the subject, predicate, and medium of a demonstration there is a formal distinction; but between relational intentions (*respectus intentionales*) there is no formal distinction, since they are not without the operation of the intellect, unlike a formal distinction. I distinguish the major: of a cause acting through motion and mutation — granted; of a cause operating through emanation — denied. This distinction is to be explained in the book on causes and in the book on the soul. Better: the major is true of cause taken materially, false of cause taken formally, as will be clear in the place just cited. To the first confirmation: I grant the major and distinguish the minor: science considered absolutely excels second intentions in nobility — granted; science considered under the character of what can be produced and of an effect — denied. For in this respect the character of producer is nobler than the character of what is produced. Or: this is true of a total cause, but not of a partial cause. To the second confirmation: the major is understood of material demonstration, or of demonstration taken in a first-intentional sense; but not of formal demonstration, or of demonstration taken in a second-intentional sense, as a logical demonstration is.

You will object fourthly: with second intentions and other beings of reason removed, Logic would still remain, because a man could still reason and operate with his mind; since in operating he does not depend on a being of reason, and his operation could be directed and regulated according to the precepts of Logic. Therefore Logic is not a rational science. I deny the antecedent. For this would happen by chance and not without error; hence Logic is required, resting on certain rules and precepts, which cannot be established without second intentions, as is clear from what was said in q. 1, art. 3 of this book — and the aforesaid moderns themselves catch a scent of this at the beginning of disp. 4, saying that Logic per se considers second intentions.

Noted — no numbers in front of paragraphs. Here is the translation from the beginning, corrected throughout:

Article VII. Whether Logic is a Universal Science.

Our Doctor appears to touch upon and resolve this difficulty in three places, namely in *q. 2 univers.*, *q. 1 Elench.*, and *1 post. q. 43*, though he proceeds differently in each. For in *q. 2 univers.* he treats of Logic taken absolutely; in *q. 1 Elench.* of Logic as compared with Metaphysics; and in *1 post. q. cit.* of Dialectic insofar as it is distinguished from Analytics. Setting aside the other senses of the term "universal" reported by Tataretus in *q. 1 scibili 4* and Sarnanus in *q. 1 univers.*, I observe with Scotus in the same place that a science is called universal in two ways: first, by universality of predication, because its subject can be predicated of the subjects of other sciences — and in this sense Metaphysics is universal, since its subject is being, which is predicated of the subjects of the other disciplines. Second, by universality of application, because its subject is applied to the other sciences and falls within their use. It is this second kind of universality that is at issue in the present discussion, as Tataretus also notes in *1 Phys. q. 2 scib. 1*.

Thesis. Logic is a universal science by universality of application of its subject. So holds Scotus in the places cited above, whom his disciples follow. This is proved: first, from Aristotle in *1 Elench. c. 11* and Scotus in *q. 1 §. Ad q. dicendum* — if Logic belonged to some determinate genus, it would not pose questions across all fields. Boethius and Avicenna concur, along with the common adage of the dialecticians: Logic is concerned with second intentions applied to first intentions. Therefore Logic is universal by universality of its subject through its own application. Second, Logic is concerned with the syllogism as its subject; and the syllogism is universal by universality of application, for it can be applied to any science, since every science is set out by means of syllogisms. Hence Aristotle adds in *1 Top. 2* that Dialectic, being investigative, prepares the way to the principles of all methods. It is therefore concluded that Logic is a universal science.

First Objection. A science is universal whose subject is universal, since the universality or particularity of a science is derived from its universal or particular subject — from which it is likewise specified, as stated in *2 de anima T. 33*. But the subject of Logic is not universal. For since Logic is a science distinct from the others, it plainly has a subject distinct from their subjects. Therefore Logic is not a universal science. *Reply.* I grant the major. I distinguish the minor: by universality of predication, I grant; by universality of application, I deny, as I explained in the preceding note.

Second Objection. Metaphysics is a universal science, having as its subject being, which is common to all things that have existence. Therefore Logic is not a universal science; otherwise there would be two universal sciences, which does not seem consonant with reason. *Reply.* By the same distinction. Metaphysics is a universal science by universality of predication of its subject — I grant; by universality of application of its subject — I deny. Accordingly, it is not

incongruous that both sciences should be called universal, albeit in different respects and under different considerations.

Article VIII. Whether Logic is Distinguished from Metaphysics.

This question draws its origin from the preceding article. For having said there that both Logic and Metaphysics are universal sciences by universality of subject, it remains to inquire in what they differ from one another. This is especially so because Aristotle in *4 Met. T. 5. 6. 2* adds that each is concerned with being that is common to all things. And although we showed above that Metaphysics is universal by universality of predication of its subject, it still remains to be examined how both sciences contemplate the same subject — which Aristotle in the cited place acknowledges to be being. This is investigated by Scotus in *q. 1 Elench.* and by Fuentes in *q. 4 proaem. diff. 1. q. 1.*

Note, from the Doctor just cited, that being is twofold: the being of nature and the being of reason. The being of nature is real being, whose existence does not depend upon the soul or the intellect. The being of reason, however, is that whose existence depends solely upon the operation of the intellect — such as genus, species, and the other second intentions. Both kinds of being enjoy equal breadth and universality; for there is no real being upon which some second intention of genus, species, or some other logical relation cannot be founded.

Thesis. Logic differs from Metaphysics in this: that Metaphysics considers real being, while Logic considers a certain being of reason. Or more explicitly: Metaphysics contemplates the common quiddities of things, while Logic considers second intentions. So holds Scotus in the place cited above, §. *Ad q. and q. 8 univers.* §. *cum autem obiicitur*, near the end — and this view appears to run counter to Plato and others who, as reported by Plotinus in a passage cited by us elsewhere, confuse Logic with Metaphysics. The stated thesis is proved as follows. Metaphysics is real science and first philosophy, whose proper task is to contemplate being, its attributes, and the common essences and natures of things taken universally. Logic, on the other hand, is a science whose function is to contemplate second intentions applicable to first intentions, as Aristotle indicates in *1 Met. c. 4*. The distinction between the two disciplines that has been assigned above is therefore established.

Objection. One power or science has one per se object, as is inferred from *2 animae T. 33*. But being taken in its general sense is the subject of Metaphysics. Therefore it is not the subject of Logic. *Reply.* I grant the major. I distinguish the minor: real being taken in its first-intentional sense is the subject of Metaphysics — I grant; being of reason taken in its second-intentional sense — I deny. You will press further: to whomever it belongs to consider real being, to that same one it belongs to contemplate being of reason, which is as it were an image or shadow of real being; but Metaphysics, by concession, meditates upon real being — therefore it also contemplates being of reason, such as being taken in its

second-intentional sense. I reply that Metaphysics and Dialectic contemplate being of reason in different ways. For Metaphysics considers being of reason as a common and general quiddity reducible to real being, while Logic regards being of reason insofar as it is a second intention applicable to things, as the Doctor rightly notes at the end of the question cited above and in *q. 8 univers. in respons. 1. 2. arg.*

Article IX. How Logic Differs from Rhetoric.

On the agreements and differences between Rhetoric and Dialectic, Zabarella in *2 de natura Log. c. 17* and Toledo in *q. 5 proaem. fund. 1 post Arist. 1 Rhet. 1* reason learnedly and at length, noting their similarity and dissimilarity with respect to subject-matter, and saying that both treat of every proposed subject and dispute on either side of it. They then add that Rhetoric is occupied with matters of action, while Dialectic is occupied with reasoning about any proposed subject. From this it can be gathered that the primary difference between them consists in the fact that Dialectic aims at knowledge, while Rhetoric aims at action. For the dialectician argues not in order that the listener may act, but in order that he may know and judge truth from falsehood. Rhetoric, on the other hand, frames its discourse so that listeners may act and their minds may be moved to agree with and to do what the discourse intends them to do — as Zabarella excellently pursues in the passage cited and as I indicated above in *q. 1 art. 4*. Moreover, both are called discursive sciences because they make use of language, though in different ways. For Rhetoric uses ornate language — just as Grammar uses grammatically correct language — while Dialectic uses syllogistic language, by which true or false conceptions of the mind are made manifest to listeners. The question may be raised, however, whether Rhetoric is a part of Dialectic — on which Zabarella treats at length in the same place, and concerning which we briefly determine the following thesis.

Thesis. Rhetoric is not properly a part of Dialectic. This is gathered from Scotus in *q. 3 univers. §. dicendum ergo*, where, enumerating all the parts of Logic, he makes no mention of Rhetoric — which would be a defect if Rhetoric were one of its parts. The same is inferred from Aristotle, who in his *Organon*, in which he undertakes to set forth all its parts, does not include Rhetoric but treats it in a separate volume; and it is commonly taught by masters as a distinct subject. Moreover, the same Philosopher in *1 Rhet. 1* calls Rhetoric an offshoot of Dialectic — or its scion, as Zabarella says in the passage cited. But an offshoot or scion grafted onto a tree is not a part of that tree but something distinct from it. Furthermore, an art is not a part of a science, since they are distinct habits, as stated in *6 Eth. 4*; and Rhetoric is an art while Logic is a science. Again, the end of Rhetoric is action or persuasion, while the end of Dialectic is the cognition of truth, in the manner explained elsewhere. Rhetoric is therefore not to be numbered among the parts of Logic. The same reasoning plainly applies to Poetics and History as applies to Rhetoric, as Fonseca asserts from Cicero in *1. 2.*

de orat. in 2 *Met.* q. 2 sect. 4, and as Toledo holds in *praef. Log.* c. 2. The reason is that both History and Poetry employ a certain ornament to please the minds of listeners, and must therefore be reduced to oratory — whatever Zabarella may say in the chapter cited above.

First Objection. Aristotle in 1 *Rhet.* c. 2 defines Rhetoric as follows: "Rhetoric is a certain faculty of discerning in any subject what is conducive to persuasion." But this definition seems to apply to Dialectic as well, as the same Philosopher hints in that place. Therefore Rhetoric is not a distinct part separate from the parts of Dialectic. *Confirmation I.* From the same Philosopher who in the same place calls Rhetoric a part of Dialectic. *Confirmation II.* Scotus in 1 *prior.* q. 2 mentions Rhetoric and Poetics among the parts of Dialectic. *Reply.* I grant the major; I deny the minor. In reply to Aristotle, I say that he there merely indicates a similarity that exists between the two. For he always speaks of them as distinct habits, as Zabarella notes in *l. cit. cap.* 18. In reply to *Confirmation I*, I say that the very passage carries its own solution, for it is added there that Rhetoric is an offshoot of Dialectic; but just as an offshoot is not a part of the tree from which it has grown, so neither is Rhetoric a part of Dialectic — unless we say that Rhetoric is a part of Dialectic only in a likeness-based sense. Or Rhetoric may be called a part of Dialectic in a loose sense, because it makes use of the syllogism and especially the enthymeme, as Toledo notes in q. 5 *proaem. in fine 1. fundamenti*. In reply to *Confirmation II*, I say that Scotus must be understood as speaking of a remote part, insofar as Rhetoric, by the act of persuasion, directs its care to human practical affairs, and for that purpose employs the instruments of Dialectic.

Second Objection. Rhetoric treats of the construction of the syllogism, the enthymeme, and other logical instruments. Therefore Rhetoric is a part of Dialectic. *Reply.* Rhetoric treats of these matters only incidentally, whereas Logic treats of them by design — especially because the end and object of Rhetoric is not the syllogism, since it is entirely devoted to persuading in matters of human practical action, as the Doctor sets out in the place cited above.

Article X. Whether Logic is a Part of Philosophy.

No slight controversy exists among the ancient Peripatetics as to whether Logic is to be counted among the parts of Philosophy. For Philoponus at the beginning of the *Prior Analytics* and Ammonius at the beginning of the *Categories* remove Dialectic from the parts of Philosophy and consider it only its instrument — among whom is Zabarella in 2 *de natura Log.* cap. 10. On the other side, Simplicius at the beginning of the *Predicamenta* and Boethius in his commentary on Porphyry vigorously maintain that Logic is a part of Philosophy, and the greater part of more recent authors agree with them. Avicenna, however, at the beginning of his Logic holds that this dispute is grounded merely in a different understanding of the name "Philosophy." For

some use the term more broadly, others more narrowly — as Tataretus observes with some care in *q. 3 scib. 1*.

Note I. The Greek word *philosophia* means in Latin "love of wisdom," and *philosophos* means "lover of wisdom," as Augustine notes among others in *8 Civ. c. 1* and *13 Trin. c. 1*. This term was invented by Pythagoras in order to avoid the charge of arrogance, since previously thinkers had been called *sophoi* (wise men) and what is now called philosophy had been called *sophia* (wisdom), as Scotus notes in *1 Met. in exp. Tex. c. 2*. Wisdom, moreover, is knowledge of the causes of things, and the wise man is one who knows the causes of things, as Aristotle clearly teaches in the work just cited: "We esteem master craftsmen in any art more honorable, more learned, and wiser than workmen, because they grasp the causes of the things that are made; whereas the workmen are like certain inanimate things that act, but act without any knowledge of what they do — just as fire burns, and inanimate things each produce their effects by a certain nature, whereas craftsmen act by habit — so that men are not wiser on account of being capable of acting, but because they hold the account and know the causes." And a little further on he adds: "No sense-perception is wisdom, since from sense-perception no cause is assigned — for example, why fire is hot — but only that it is hot." And in 2 of the same book: "We consider that man wise who is able to grasp difficult things and those not easily known by a human being." And he adds: "The man who is more exact, and who is better able to teach the causes of things, we judge wiser in any science whatsoever. And we consider that science which is to be sought for its own sake and for the sake of knowing to be more truly wisdom than that which is sought for its results; and that which presides over others, rather than that which serves." From all this it is plainly gathered that wisdom taken universally is knowledge of causes; and since this kind of knowledge is partly speculative and partly practical, a twofold wisdom is accordingly established in *2 Met. c. 1 T. 3*: speculative and practical — and that which is speculative is more truly wisdom than the practical, and among the speculative sciences the highest place is held by that which investigates the first causes. And since the causes of things were unknown to the ancients, their philosophy is called stammering by Aristotle in *1 Met. c. 1 T. 51*. That philosophy had its origin in the inquiry into unknown causes is attested in the same work, *c. 2*. Thus, since wisdom and philosophy entirely coincide, that will be a part of philosophy which is cognitive of the causes of things, and conversely, that which is ignorant of the causes of things is to be expelled from the parts of philosophy.

Note II. Philosophy can be understood in two ways: first, broadly, as knowledge of the truth of every entity, whether real or rational — and philosophy taken in this sense encompasses every science, both real and rational, and under this division Logic is contained, since, as has been established, it is a rational science. Second, strictly, as knowledge of the truth of every real entity only — and this encompasses only every real science. From this broad and narrow

understanding of philosophy, different descriptions of philosophy have arisen, of which two are drawn from Aristotle. The first comes from *1 Met.* in the place cited: *Philosophy is knowledge of things through causes* — which coincides with the description offered by Ammonius at the beginning of the *Predicabilia*: *Philosophy is knowledge of things as they are*. The second comes from *2 Met. c. 1 T. 3*: *Philosophy is the contemplative science of truth*. A third may be added from Plato, as attested by Plutarch in *1 de placitis c. 1* and Augustine in *13 Trinit. c. 1*: *Philosophy is knowledge of divine and human things*. Philosophy may moreover be divided into speculative and practical, and likewise into principal and instrumental, as I touched upon above.

Thesis. Logic is a part of Philosophy. This is gathered from the Doctor, who in *q. 1 univers.* places all of Logic among the sciences; and who in *Quol. 3 §. de 1. d.* and elsewhere accepts the division of science into real and rational, under which Logic falls. This is proved: first, from Aristotle in *1 Top. 12*, who, after enumerating three kinds of problems — natural, moral, and rational — adds that the Philosopher deals with all of them; and the rational problem is a logical one, about which Aristotle treats, as all authors unanimously confirm. And in *1 Met. c. 2 T. 6* he says that the ancient philosophers, lacking Dialectic, fell into many errors. Therefore, since Logic is the norm and mistress of truth, it is not to be banished from the parts of philosophy. Cicero adds in *1 Academ. qq.* that he recalls the celebrated and ancient division of philosophy into natural, moral, and rational, which was handed down by Aristotle in the place cited, by Augustine in *8 Civ. 4*, by Plato, and by other most distinguished men. Second, Philosophy, as has been noted above, is knowledge of things through causes. For wonder arising from ignorance of causes and knowledge of effects impelled men to philosophize, as the same Aristotle attests in the passage cited and Damascene in *Dialogus c. 49*. But Logic is of this character, since we assent to the conclusion through assent to the premises, and we know many things through their cause, as I said in *2 art. q. 2*. Therefore Logic is a part of Philosophy. Third, Philosophy, as Aristotle states in the second note above, is the contemplative science of truth; and Logic contemplates truth and distinguishes it from falsehood, as is clear from its definition. Moreover, Ethics, which is concerned with the goodness or badness of the will, is a part of Philosophy — as no one at all disputes. Therefore Logic, which judges truth from the falsity of acts of the intellect, is likewise to be inscribed among the parts of Philosophy, with the agreement of Scotus in *4 Met. in expositione Tex. 5*.

First Objection. Four passages of Aristotle: first, in *1 Top. 2*: "Dialectic is useful for the philosophical disciplines." Second, in *ibid. c. 12*: "Those matters that are brought into question are treated differently by the Philosopher and differently by the Logician." Third, in *Top. 8. 6. 1*: "As regards the discovery of topics, this is common to the Philosopher and the Dialectician." Fourth, in *q. 2. 7. 4 quarti Met.*: "There are as many parts of Philosophy as there are substances." And in the same place: "One who approaches philosophy ought to be instructed in Analytics."

Therefore, according to Aristotle, Logic has no place among the parts of Philosophy. *Reply.* In those passages Aristotle speaks of philosophy taken strictly, which encompasses only the real sciences, or only the principal, more dignified, and more excellent sciences that exist for their own sake. Or by "philosophy" he means Metaphysics, which is called philosophy par excellence and is termed by the Doctor in *q. 1 Elench.*, following Aristotle in *6 Met. T. 2*, "first philosophy." He does not speak of philosophy taken broadly, under which Logic is contained. Or "Dialectic" in those passages is to be understood as Logic in use, which, as has been said, is excluded from the number of sciences, and is likewise excluded from the parts of philosophy.

Second Objection. Logic is a rational science, as established in *art. 6 of this q.* But Philosophy is knowledge of things through causes, as is clear from *Note I.* Now, "thing," since it is transcendent, is independent of the work of the intellect. Therefore Logic is not a part of Philosophy. *Reply.* From Scotus in *Quol. cit.*: being and thing are taken in two ways — first, for the real and real being, which Aristotle calls "being outside the soul"; and in this sense being and thing are transcendentals, real, and positive. Second, for the thing and being fashioned by the intellect, which has its being only objectively from the intellect; and in this way thing and being are beings of reason, called by Aristotle "beings in the soul." Logic is said to be about thing and being taken in this second sense.

Third Objection. Nothing can be both a part and an instrument of one and the same thing. But Logic is an instrument of Philosophy — whence it is called an Organon by Aristotle. Therefore it is not itself a part of that same philosophy. *Reply.* I deny the major, as is clear from the hand, which is both a part of the craftsman and his instrument, as stated in *3 animae c. 8 T. 38* and Galen in *1 de usu partium*.

Fourth Objection. The definition of wisdom as knowledge of the highest things does not apply to Logic, which is concerned with diminished and minimal being. Therefore, since wisdom is identified with philosophy, it follows that Logic is not a part of philosophy. *Reply.* That definition is given of wisdom taken strictly, not of wisdom or philosophy taken broadly — and it is to the latter that we affirm Logic rightly belongs.

Question III. On the Object of Logic.

Article I. What the Object Is in Its Several Kinds and What Is Required for It.

That any science derives its unity and distinction from its object is clearly apparent from *1 post. c. 23* and *2 animae 6. 2*. It is now our pleasure to set forth the definition, division, and conditions of the object, from which it will be quite easy to grasp all that is necessarily required for the object of any discipline. First, following Sarnanus in *q. 3 univers. pag. 56*, I observe that the word "object" is

derived from the verb *obiicio*, meaning to place before, to offer, and to present. For that which is considered by a science is placed before it, offered to it, and presented to it as something to be examined and surveyed — like a term attainable through its operation. And just as what is attained by a knowing power is called its object — as color is the object of sight and sound the object of hearing — so likewise what is weighed by a science is rightly called its object. Thus by the force of the word, the object is what is placed before or presented to a power in operation, as Vorrillon notes in *2 d. 35*. Moreover, although there is some difference between "object" and "subject," as Durandus, Ockham in *prol. q. 9*, and Raconis in *praeludio postr. Log. sect. 1* maintain, among philosophers both old and recent the terms are used interchangeably. Therefore, according to Scotus in *q. 3 prol. §. Ad 1. arg. 1. q. R., q. 4 §. Ad arg. principalia 1. q.*, and other authors, what a science labors about is called object, subject, and the matter about which it is concerned — under different respects, however. The same Doctor notes in *q. 2 primi Prio. §. Quantum ad 1* that the word "subject" is equivocal, and he gives six senses of it there; and his disciple Maior adds many more in *l. praedicabilium q. 3*. Following Bonaventure in *1 Met. c. 3*, we will report four principal ones. One is called the subject of inherence or the subject of an accident, from *q. 3 prol. §. Ad idem arg. prima q. R.*, in which accidents inhere — as a wall is called the subject of whiteness in which whiteness itself inheres. A second is called the subject of transformation, in which substantial or accidental transformations take place — as matter is the subject of form, *1 Phys. T. 82*. The third is the subject of predication, of which something else is predicated — and this is called the logical subject, treated in the *Epitome*. The fourth is the subject of consideration or attribution, from *prol. cit.*, whose knowable attributes are considered, demonstrated of it, and assigned to it in the treatment — and this is called the subject of science by Aristotle in *1 post. 6. 23* and *4 Met. 1*. And it is this last of which we treat in the present discussion.

The subject is first divided into material and formal, from *q. 3 prol. §. Ad 1* and *1 d. 8 q. 4 §. Contra. sub E.* and *2 d. 24 q. vn*. The material subject is what is considered by a science; and since it is very diffuse and broad, several sciences regard it, and it is not determined by any one of them. It is therefore called material, because just as matter is indifferent and undetermined to receiving this or that form, so this kind of object is undetermined as to belonging to this or that science — in this sense God is the material object of both Theology and Metaphysics, since he is examined and considered by both. The formal object, on the other hand, is that which belongs to one science only, from which the science derives its unity and distinction. It is called formal because just as form determines and specifies matter, so the formal aspect of the object determines and specifies the science of which it is the object — as God as God is the formal object of Theology, and being as being is the formal object of Metaphysics.

The subject is divided second into proximate and remote — and this division seems to coincide with the prior one, which is why the Doctor does not

expressly state it. For the proximate object is what is considered immediately and per se by the science, as grammatically correct speech is the proximate object in Grammar. The remote object is what is considered by the science only mediately and by reason of something else — as letters are the remote object in that same Grammar.

Third, it is divided into adequate and inadequate, from Scotus in *1 d. 3 q. 3 §. Ad q. igitur* and *quol. 5 §. circa 3*. The adequate or total object is that which neither exceeds the science nor is exceeded by it. Or, as Scotus says in *q. 3 prol.* and *2 later. §. de 2. sub A.*, the adequate object is that which primarily contains in itself all the truths of the habit of which it is the object. To this belong community and virtuality, of which the same Doctor treats in *1 d. 3 q. 3 §. Ad q. igitur*. An example may be given for clarification: the natural body is the adequate object of Physics. The inadequate or partial object, however, is that which is exceeded by the science and is regarded by it as a part — as the animate body is the inadequate object of the same Physics.

Fourth, it is divided into principal, which is the preeminent part of the science — as demonstration is in Logic — and less principal, which is its less preeminent part — as Topics in that same Logic. This is mentioned by Scotus in *1 Met. q. 1*.

Fifth, from *2 d. 9 §. Ad arg. pro 1. opinione T.*, into the motive object, which moves the power to knowledge of itself — as color is the motive object of sight — and the terminative object, which terminates its act — as the white wall terminates the act of the power of sight. Likewise, the creature is the terminative object of God's science, *1. 2. 33 q. vn. M*. This division of object is treated at length in the treatise on the science of God, *disp. 1* and following.

Sixth, from *ibid. d. 3 E.*, into the object of natural attainment, which is known by us by our natural power — as the quiddity of a sensible thing — and the object of natural inclination, to which the intellect tends by its very nature — as being in its full height. This is signified by Aristotle at the beginning of *1 Met. 1* when he says that all men by nature desire to know — which, according to Scotus in the same place, is to be taken of the natural appetite by which man naturally tends toward knowledge of every being. The reason is that the intellect is perfected by the knowledge of any being whatsoever. These matters are treated in the cited treatise on the knowability of God, *disp. 1*.

Three principal conditions are enumerated by the Doctor in *q. 3 univers.* as required for the adequate object of any scientific habit. First, it is presupposed of the object whether it exists and what it is, as stated in *1 post. 7. 2*. For since demonstrations are to be constructed about it, it must be known in advance whether it exists or whether existence is repugnant to it, and what it is — that is, its essence, definition, or quidditative concept — as we will show at length in *1. 5*. Second, that through the definition of the subject the properties of that subject be demonstrated — since it is through the middle term, which is the

definition of the subject, that its properties are demonstrated. Third, that everything treated in the science be referred back to the subject itself, either as to a principle, or as a part of it, or as properties of the same, or in whatever other way one thing is reduced to another.

Objection. Scotus in *1 prio. q. 2 §. quantum ad 1* establishes six necessary conditions for a scientific object. Therefore either Scotus contradicts himself, or more than three conditions of the object must be enumerated. *Reply.* Scotus explains himself, for he says in *q. 3 univers.* that there are three principal conditions of the object, which he repeats again in *ibid. q. 8 §. Ad q.* — and to these the remaining less principal conditions are reduced.

Second Objection. Only two conditions of the object appear to be given by the Doctor in *q. 3 prol.* and *1 d. 3 q. 3 §. Ad q. igitur E.:* community and virtuality, which Vulpes observes in *Tom. 1 primae partis, disp. 3 a.* For the object must be universal and virtually contain everything that is treated in the science. Therefore the Doctor does not seem to have spoken consistently, assigning now two, now three, and also six conditions of the scientific object. *Reply.* These are not properly conditions of the object but pertain rather to its essence and definition, as is clear from its definition given above.

Nor does the objection of the Conimbricenses carry any weight — who in *q. 5. 4. 1* say that it is not necessary for the subject to be univocal, but that it suffices if it is analogical, as is evident from Metaphysics, whose subject — being — is analogical, and from Perspective, whose subject is the visual line, which is a being per accidens. For they prove nothing against us, who, following Scotus, affirm that being is univocal, and that Perspective is a subalternate science whose subject always has an accidental difference added above the subject of the subalternating science, which is Geometry. As for their further claim that it does not belong to practical science to explain the essence of its subject — this they assert gratuitously, since a scientific craftsman must know the matter upon which he acts; otherwise he would not be operating. For who could act correctly if he did not know what he was to do and upon what? All the more so because Logic, according to Scotus, is a speculative science, as discussed in the preceding question, *a. 5 dub.* Nor does Scotus maintain that everything known in a science must necessarily be connected with its object. For he makes himself clear enough in many places, especially in *6 Met. c. 1*, and only wishes that everything treated in a science be in some way referred back to its subject — as may be seen in *1 prio. q. 2* with these words: "And so with the other ways in which a reduction of one thing to another takes place."

Article II. Whether All Things Are the Object of Logic.

It is so difficult to determine the subject of Logic, on account of the variety and diversity of opinion about it and the fierce contention among dialecticians in deciding it, that Zabarella in *1 de natura Log. c. 14* judged their dispute to be vain

and like the quarrel of the blind. I shall proceed in its investigation by first reporting and refuting the views of others, and then setting forth and defending the Scotist position. There is an opinion of Rudolph Agricola in *2 de inventione c. 3* and of certain others who hold that the subject of Rhetoric and Dialectic is entirely the same, namely all things — from which Scotus dissents in *q. 3 univers.* and *1 d. 2 q. 3 §. Ad illa. C.* and elsewhere, distinguishing science into real and rational; as do the remaining philosophers who deny that Logic directs its care toward all things.

Thesis. All things are not the proximate and immediate object of Logic. This is inferred from Scotus just cited, and more clearly from *q. 1 praedicam. §. Ad q. dici potest.* This is proved: first, Logic is a single science distinct from the others by the unity of its subject, as established above. But if all things were the proximate object of Logic, it would not be a single science distinct from the others — since sciences differ by differences of things, *2 animae c. 4.* Therefore its immediate object is not all things. Second, Logic is about second intentions applied to first intentions, according to Avicenna in *1 Met.*, Boethius, and the other philosophers. But second intentions properly are not things but rather constructions and works of the intellect. Third, Logic is a rational science, as established above in *q. a. 6.* But if Logic attended to all things, it would be a real science — which Scotus infers as absurd in *q. 3 univers.* Therefore Logic does not consider all things. Nor is the response of Fonseca in *2 Met. q. 1 in fine sect. 3. 6. 3* and the Conimbricenses in this place *q. 5 a. 2 in solut. 1* satisfactory — who say that those sciences are called real because they deal with things as distinguished from words, and that those which treat only of words and speech are called discursive and rational insofar as they direct the acts of the intellect. On the contrary, if their reasoning were valid, the science of the soul — which treats of the operations of the intellect — would be rational, as would other sciences that are taught by reason. Scotus objects to this in *q. 1 praedicament.*, which is seen to be false. For sciences are called real on account of the real objects upon which they bear; therefore sciences are called rational on account of the works of reason, which are second intentions — or, as the Doctor says in the cited place, on account of the concepts formed by the act of reason. Furthermore, in their view, Logic is directive not of things; for it does not direct animate or inanimate, corporeal or incorporeal things, as Arriaga shows at length in *disp. 2 Subf. 2.* Finally, it remains to be proved in the following article that Dialectic is concerned not with the active acts of the intellect but with the passive ones, which pertain to beings of reason. Therefore the object of Logic is not all things.

First Objection. Aristotle in *1 Rhet.* writes that Rhetoric and Dialectic are concerned with the same object, and the object of Rhetoric is all things, as the same Philosopher attests there. Therefore this is also the object of Dialectic.

Confirmation, from *4 Met. 2:* dialecticians and sophists dispute about everything. I add that Scotus in *6 Met. q. 3 §. Ad propositum* says: the Logician considers all things just as the Metaphysician does. *Reply.* The Philosopher in both passages is

to be interpreted as speaking of the remote object, not the proximate and immediate one about which we are speaking here. This response is drawn from Scotus in *q. 3 prol.*, where he says: Logic is about things insofar as second intentions are attributed to them. The same is to be said in reply to the confirmation and to Scotus's passage.

Second Objection. Dialectic provides rules for dividing and defining well, as all agree. But definition applies to a thing, since it is a discourse distinctly explaining the nature of a thing; and likewise division is adapted to a thing, since it is a discourse distributing a whole into its parts. Therefore Logic is about things. *Reply.* I grant the major. As for the minor, I say that Logic treats of those instruments which are not formally things but are declarative of things. For Logic does not treat of rational animal but of its definition, which declares what a rational animal is. Hence Lychetus in *2 d. 3 q. 1*, following Scotus in *q. 8 univers. in fine*, adds that Logic does not regard things per se except insofar as they are the foundations of second intentions, which the Logician considers per se. This Aristotle already indicated at the end of *6 Met.*: combination and division are in the mind and not in things.

Article III. Whether Logic Is Concerned with the Active or Passive Acts of the Intellect.

That Dialectic treats of the active acts of the intellect as its material object is defended by Hurtado in *disp. 1 sect. 5* and Arriaga in *disp. 2 sect. 2*, following Suárez in *1 Met. disp. 1 sect. 4* and Fonseca in *2 Met. c. 3 q. 1 sect. 5*; and Ponce in *disp. 2 q. 5 concl. 1* leans in their favor. Against them stand the other philosophers, especially Scotus in *q. 1 praedicam.* §. cited in the preceding article; Aureolus in *1 d. 23 q. 2*, citing in support of this view Averroes in *3 animae com. 18. 43*; Sarnanus in *tract. de 1. 2. intentionibus*; and Fuentes in *q. 2 q. 2* — all of whom defend the view that Logic is concerned with the passive acts of the intellect, which Scotus in the cited place calls concepts formed by the act of reason, and Aureolus calls objective concepts.

Note I. Just as in corporeal things an agent never acts without a patient undergoing something, and consequently there is never action without passion, so too in spiritual things the intellect is never understanding unless something is understood — so that there are both an active and a passive act of the intellect. The active act is that by which the intellect understands; the passive act is that by which the object is understood. In somewhat the same way as sight sees by an active vision and the wall is seen by a passive vision. The former is called the formal act, the latter the objective act. The former is real being residing in the predicament of quality and pertaining to the science of the soul; the latter is a being of reason pertaining to Dialectic. For it is a rational respect left behind in the object by the application of the intellect to that object, and it is described by the Doctor in *4 d. 1 q. 2 §. Hic primo. sub B.* as the passive comparison of one

known object to another known object. It is called a second intention, which depends upon the act of the intellect, and without which it has no being.

Note II. In every real object — take a stone, for example — two things can be considered: the nature of the stone, which is understood, and the very fact of its being understood, which the stone receives from the intellect. The nature of the stone that is understood is real being; but the fact of its being understood is a being of reason. Moreover, each being has its own properties: from the nature of the stone real properties flow, and from the fact of its being understood there follow rational properties — as Sarnanus notes in *q. 3 univers. pag. 61*, following Trombetta in *tract. form. parte 2 fol. 20 pag. 2 in fine*. The first consideration of the stone pertains to Physics; the second pertains to Logic. The former is real, the latter is rational.

Thesis. Logic is concerned with the acts of the intellect — not the active but the passive ones. So holds the Doctor in the place cited at the beginning of this article, in *q. 3 univers.*, Lychetus in *1 d. 8 q. 3 §. In ista ratione*, and the other philosophers commonly who teach that Logic treats of second intentions — nor does Hurtado deny this in §. 93. But second intentions are passive acts of the intellect, as is clear from the definition of being of reason given at the end of *Note I*, which plainly fits second intentions. This is also consistently held by those who establish being of reason as the object of Logic, and it is gathered from *4 Met. 2*. Therefore Logic directs its care to the passive and objective acts of the intellect. Furthermore, knowable properties are demonstrated of the object that a science examines, as I noted in *art. 1 of this q.* before the first objection; but knowable properties are demonstrated only of the passive acts of the intellect — as it is demonstrated of the syllogism that it consists of three terms, is in mode and figure, and necessarily infers the conclusion. Again, Logic treats of predicate, subject, and the like; but these are not active and formal acts of the intellect — since one active act of the intellect is not predicated of another. For the concept of animal is not affirmed of the concept of man; but animal is rightly predicated of man as the superior of its inferior. Nor does Logic anywhere treat of the formal acts of the intellect, but only of those formed by the intellect. Aureolus therefore concludes in the passage cited: "It is remarkable that it should enter the mind of anyone philosophically wise that second intentions are formal acts of the intellect, rather than formed concepts." Finally, the active acts of the intellect are real, pertaining to the science of the soul, which, treating ex professo of the soul, its powers, and faculties, must consequently treat of their formal acts. Hurtado replies in *cit. §. 83* that considering the acts of the intellect in themselves and precisely — whether they are of the genus of quality or action, and the like — pertains to the science of the soul; but that considering the acts of the same intellect insofar as they are affected by some accidental aspect, namely how they are to be arranged in mode and figure for inferring a conclusion, is the function of Logic. On the contrary: that collocation and arrangement which by Hurtado belongs to Dialectic alone is

found in the extremes of the proposition and syllogism, because it is the terms and propositions that are collocated and arranged for the construction of the syllogism. Therefore the consideration of Logic regards the passive acts of the intellect. The consequence holds, because the object of a craftsman is not that by which he operates but what he operates upon or in. For the object of the builder is not the act of his intellect or will by which he intends to build a house, but the house itself to be built. Therefore the object of Logic is not the act of the intellect by which it syllogizes, but the syllogism itself, which is the whole of its labor. Again, Hurtado adds in §. 96 that the active act is ordered to the passive, and the ultimate thing attained by a science is its object, since it is the terminus beyond which it proceeds no further. Therefore it is not the active but the passive act that Logic weighs. Nor is it helpful to say that both are the adequate object of Logic, since the properties of neither are considered by it, nor do the conditions of the object appear to fit either of them.

First Objection. St. Augustine in *1 contra Cresconium c. 13. 14* calls Dialectic the art of disputing, because it teaches how to dispute, divide, define, and argue. But disputation is an act of the intellect, as are also division, definition, and argumentation. Therefore Logic is concerned with the formal and active act of the intellect, not the passive one. *Reply.* I grant the major. I distinguish the minor: disputation and the rest of what has been enumerated pertain to Logic as that by which it proceeds — I grant; as that about which it is concerned — I deny. And thus it is not the active but the passive act of the intellect that Logic regards. In this way Augustine in the cited place is to be explained.

Second Objection. The passive and objective acts derive their being from the active and formal acts. Therefore Logic is occupied with the formal acts rather than the objective ones. *Reply.* I grant the antecedent; I deny the consequence. For although Logic derives its being from the intellect, no one has ever ventured to say that the intellect is its object.

Third Objection. Truth is the adequation or conformity of the intellect with the thing understood. But Logic treats of the truth and falsity of propositions and argumentations. Therefore the labor of Logic bears upon the active and formal acts of the intellect. *Reply.* I grant the major. I distinguish the minor: Logic treats of truth taken actively — I deny; taken passively — I grant, as will be made clear in *1. 4 of this work*.

Article IV. Whether Spoken Words Are the Object of Logic.

An opinion of certain ancient thinkers is reported by recent philosophers — namely that the matter with which Dialectic is concerned is spoken words. This view is said to have been held by Roscelin, who was refuted by St. Anselm in the *Epistle on the Incarnation of the Word*, as reported by Zwinger in *vol. 2 l. 4 Theatri* and Fuentes in *q. 3 diff. 3 art. 2*. And this view is commonly attributed to Ockham and his followers, as Hurtado in *disp. 1 sect. 3 Subf. 1* and Arriaga in *disp.*

2 sect. 3 observe — though that these authors held otherwise is clear to anyone who reads their works, especially Ockham in his Logic and in *1 d. 2 q. 8*, where he asserts that the mental concept, and not spoken words, is the subject of Dialectic — as he had learned from the Doctor in *q. 1 praedicam. §. Ad q. dici potest*, where he explicitly maintains that no part of Logic is about spoken words. Whatever the opinion of the Nominalists may be — and it appears to be a matter open to debate, as may be seen from Ockham in the cited place and Gabriel in the same — the matter will become clearer and more explicit in the following book, *q. 1*.

Thesis. Spoken words are not the object of Logic. So holds Scotus in the place just cited and in *1 perih. q. 1*. What is the formal object of one science is not the formal object of another discipline, as is clear from *2 animae c. 4* — since by distinct objects distinct sciences are constituted. But spoken words are the formal object of Grammar, as Aristotle acknowledges in *4 Met. c. 2*, whose function is to examine their significations, declensions, syntax, and the correctness of speech. Therefore, etc. Second, spoken words lack the conditions required for the proper subject of Logic. For it is not presupposed of them whether they exist and what they are, nor are their properties demonstrated, nor is what is treated in Logic held on their account — as is clear to anyone reading the books of Logic. Third, the object of a science always persists the same, since science deals with necessary and eternal things, *1 post. 6*; but spoken words and names vary according to the variety and diversity of nations and change with the vicissitudes of time and the judgment and pleasure of distinguished men. Fourth, a person unacquainted with spoken words can be a logician, since words are only signs and instruments for expressing the concepts of the mind that lie hidden in the soul, *1 Perih. 1 A*. For division, definition, and argumentation can be performed by the intellect alone. Therefore spoken words are not established as the object of Logic.

First Objection. Aristotle in his Organon very frequently uses non-significant words and letters in constructing his reasonings, as is clear in the books of the *Prior Analytics*, *Posterior Analytics*, *Topics*, and *Sophistical Refutations*. Therefore according to Aristotle, spoken words are reckoned the object of Dialectic.

Confirmation I. The same Philosopher in *1 praedicam.* hands down the antepredicamental divisions and definitions — and these are expressed and signified by words. But to be expressed and to be signified pertains to spoken words and names. *Confirmation II.* The *Isagoge* of Porphyry is entitled "On the Five Words," and according to Boethius in *1 praedicam.* it treats of "the ten words." Therefore the object of Logic consists of spoken words. *Reply.* Aristotle did this not because he considered words to be the subject of Dialectic, but in order to show that the syllogistic form is valid in non-significant words no less than in significant ones, and in letters and syllables — as his expositors note in that place. In reply to *Confirmation I* and *Confirmation II*, I say, following Scotus in the *praedicam.* cited, that both Aristotle and Porphyry used the passive in place of the active — "on

the five words" meaning "on the five universals signified by five words," and "the ten words" meaning "the ten predicaments expressed by ten words." More briefly it may be said that the said authors used metonymy, taking words for concepts and second intentions, for which they stand.

Second Objection. Logic, from the interpretation of its name, is a discursive science, as I made clear in *Epit. l. 1 q. 1 art. 1*. Therefore its object consists of spoken words — for Logic treats of the simple word signifying a simple concept in *l. praedicam.*, and of the complex word signifying a complex concept in *l. Perih.* Scotus replies in the same place that Logic is called discursive for two reasons: first, because the concept is the immediate significate of the word, and it is of this concept — or second intention — that Logic is concerned. Second, because the properties of the concept are present in the significant word — just as the incomplexum and complexum signify truth or falsity as a sign, through the nature of what is signified.

Third Objection. Logic makes the unknown known from the known, since it is a discursive science proceeding from the known to the unknown. But spoken words make concepts known, since they are signs of those concepts, *1 Perih. 1*. Therefore it cannot be denied that Logic labors about spoken words. *Reply.* I grant the major. I distinguish the minor: with respect to external manifestation — I grant; with respect to internal manifestation — I deny. For spoken words are external signs manifesting the internal concept that lies hidden in the mind, as I was just saying with Aristotle. In reply to the confirmation, given the hypothesis, I say that vocal definition pertains to Logic not per se but per accidens, as Mauritius notes in *expost. q. 1 univers.*, insofar as Logic itself uses spoken words as significative instruments. And the other sciences do the same. For since things cannot be brought directly into dispute, we employ words to represent those things and to offer them to the minds of listeners — as I observed from Aristotle in *Epit. 1. 2 q. 2 art. 3*.

Article V. Whether Being of Reason Is the Object of Logic.

Several ancient and recent dialecticians maintain that the object of Logic is being of reason, and they are divided into two groups. Some, such as Jandun in *2 Met. q. 12* and Averroes in *4 Met. com. 2*, appear to hold that being of reason taken in its full breadth is the subject of Dialectic. Others, such as Thomas Aquinas in *4 Met. lect. 4*, Toledo in *Log. q. 5 proaem. concl. 4*, and Rubius in *ibid. q. 6* — among whom Scotus is cited by Fuentes in *q. 3 diff. 3 art. 1* — affirm that being of reason produced indirectly by the intellect is the formal and adequate object of Logic. Against these stand Fonseca in *2 Met. q. 1 sect. 3*, Hurtado in *this disp. 1 sect. 4 subf. 2*, and Arriaga in *disp. 2 sect. 2*, who deny that being of reason taken in any way whatsoever is the formal object of Logic and assert that real being is its subject.

Note I. "Being" is derived from the verb *sum, es, est*, which taken in its broadest sense signifies "that which has being," a description common to both real being and being of reason. Being is first divided into real being and being of reason, 4 *Met. T. 4*, as Scotus notes there in *q. 1 Elench.* and *1 post. q. 11* and *1 d. 36 q. vn. F.*, and as do Antonius Sirectus in *Tract. form. art. 1*, Trombetta, and others in the same place. Real being is that which has being without the work of the intellect, or to which being is not repugnant, from *1 d. 8 q. 4 §. contra istam opinionem F.* and *q. 2 praedicam.* and *q. 1 Elench.* and *quol. 1*. Being of reason, on the other hand, from the places just cited, is that which has being from the intellect alone. For "reason" and "intellect" are here taken as the same thing, as Sarnanus rightly notes in *q. 3 univers. pag. 63* and Pelbartus in *tom. 1 Rosarij, ver. voluntas, §. 7*. Being of reason can moreover be used in three ways according to Scotus in *4 d. 1 q. 2 §. Hic primo videndum B.*: objectively, subjectively, and comparatively. Being of reason objectively is what is placed before and presented to the intellect as an object of consideration — such as a common nature offered to the intellect in order to become formally a universal, as will be made clear in *1. 2 q. 1*. And any other being that moves the intellect to its cognition can in this way be called a being of reason. Being of reason subjectively, on the other hand, is that which is subject to and inheres in the intellect as in its subject. In this sense any science whatsoever can be called a being of reason, since it resides in the intellect — as Scotus notes in *q. 25 praedicam.* — even though it is real being situated in the genus of quality. This sense of being of reason is indicated by Aristotle in *7 pol. c. 14* when he calls the intellectual arts beings of reason. Finally, being of reason comparatively is the passive comparison of one known object to another known object. This is called a second intention, a diminished being, a qualified being, and a thing in the soul, by Briançon in *4 q. 3 coroll. 3*, following Scotus in the place cited — as Vulpes notes in *1 tom. 1 p. disp. 28 art. ult.* What some others call "logical being of reason" — that which has being only objectively in the intellect. Its formation is explained thus: the intellect knows animal, and animal thus known is called a first intention. Likewise it knows man and lion, and these thus known are called two first intentions, as I set out in *Epit. l. 1 q. 1 art. 10*. Thereupon it compares the known animal to man and lion, insofar as animal is something common to both, since man and lion share the common account of animal. This comparison of animal to man and lion and to the other species is a second intention, which is called genus. The comparison by which man is compared to his individuals — say, Francis and Louis — is called species. The same judgment is to be made about the other logical beings of reason: predicate, subject, antecedent, consequent, and others, whose explanation is given by Sarnanus in *Tract. de 2. intentionibus cap. 2* and *q. 3 univers. pag. 67*.

Note II. Being of reason does not flow from real being the way a real property follows from the nature of its subject — as Scotus acknowledges in *1 d. 8 q. 4 §. Ista tamen sub M.*: because in no way is being of reason caused by the object. For over and above the said passive comparison, nothing precisely is found in the

object considered; and that comparison depends entirely upon the intellect, which produces it — or rather leaves it behind — in the object considered and compared, as the Scotists write among others: Sarnanus in the cited place and Lychetus in *1 d. 3 q. 7 ante §. Alia est opinio* and *2 d. 1 q. 1 §. secundo principaliter* — who affirm that second intentions, or logical beings of reason, are not properly caused but left behind, in somewhat the same way as colors are left behind on a wall or other surface by the brush of a painter and the movement of his hand, as I explained at the end of *Note I* through the examples given there. Nor is the distinction of being of reason established by the Doctor in *1 d. 36 q. vn. §. per idem circa M.* to be omitted: namely into the chimerical or fictitious — which is entirely useless, as a golden mountain or a hippogriff, what is commonly called a being of reason having no foundation in reality — and the logical being of reason, which is founded upon a real object. For a second intention does not exist without a first intention, since a relation presupposes its foundation. And since a second intention is a rational relation, it is plainly inferred that the second intention presupposes the first, which is the object first known and considered, from the Doctor in *4 cit. and q. 1 Elench. §. Ad q.*

Note III. By "being of reason" — which Thomas Aquinas and his followers establish as the object of Dialectic — Hurtado in *subf. 1 §. 46* and other recent authors endeavor to interpret an extrinsic denomination, that is, being of reason denominatively, or the act of the intellect as the denominating object. But since an extrinsic denomination designates a form adjacent to another, it exists outside the denominated thing — as the very name indicates — and can therefore exist without anyone thinking of it, as Vulpes asserts in *disp. 17 art. 9. 1. 6 tom. 1 primae partis* and the united Scotists in *disp. 3 art. 1 q. 2* — though Orbellus in *4 Met. q. 1* and Smiling in *Tract. 3 de Deo uno n. 184* hold the opposite. For the same form denominates a subject in which it is not present — as a bench is called human not through humanity in itself but through humanity existing in the man by whose skill and labor it was fashioned. And the wall is denominated "seen" through the vision existing in the eye and terminated to that wall — as Scotus writes in *Quol. 12* and *3 d. 8 q. vn. §. Ad 4.* For the vision is in the eye, and it denominates the eye by an intrinsic denomination. But the being of reason about which the Thomists and Scotists speak depends for its existence and production upon the work of the intellect. Therefore being of reason taken in this sense is not an extrinsic denomination, which according to the younger authors cited is real, since they do not distinguish it from the act of the intellect, which is real. The antecedent is clear from Thomas Aquinas in *opusc. 43 c. 4*, where he says: "The intentions of genus and species are not found in the nature of things, but follow upon the actions of the intellect, and a being of this kind is the subject of Logic." Likewise, according to the Thomists, the being of reason which they consider to be the object of Logic is that which has being only objectively in the intellect — as Hurtado does not deny in *disp. 1 sect. 5 §. 85. 86* — or that which results from the work of the explicating intellect, as Rubius

expounds in *q. 6*. But extrinsic denominations exist independently of the work of the intellect — as "being seen," "being heard," and "being known."

Furthermore, what follows upon an operation of the intellect is not the operation of the intellect itself. Therefore it is not an act of the intellect, contrary to Arriaga in *disp. 3 sect. 2 n. 20* and Hurtado above in *art. 3*, who have been rejected.

First Thesis. Being of reason taken universally cannot be the formal and adequate object of Logic. This is inferred from Scotus in *q. 3 univers. §. dicitur verf. due 1. conditiones*, where he denies that the concept taken broadly is established as the object of Dialectic. This is proved: first, the adequate object of a science does not extend further than the science, as is clear from its definition given in *art. 1 of this q.* But being of reason in its full breadth extends further than Logic, for it encompasses the beings of reason of Grammar and Rhetoric — namely the significations of nouns, declensions, conjugations of verbs, figures, tropes, and similar things, the consideration of which is foreign to Logic. Second, Logic does not explain the principles, nature, and properties of being of reason taken broadly, as is clear to anyone reading the books of Aristotle's Logic. Therefore being of reason taken broadly is not the adequate object of Logic. The consequence holds, and the antecedent is plain from the conditions reported in the place cited.

Second Thesis. Being of reason that follows from the operations of the intellect, or that is produced indirectly by the intellect, is not the formal object of Logic. This is gathered from Scotus in the same place and is opposed to virtually all the Thomists who profess the genuine doctrine of Thomas. This is proved: first, to being of reason taken in this way the first condition of the scientific object is lacking, which is that of the object itself it must be presupposed whether it exists and what it is. Therefore being of reason proposed with this qualification is not established as the formal object of Logic. The antecedent is at hand: for in no part of Aristotle's Logic is a definition of being of reason given, as Scotus warns in the cited place, nor are its principles and properties explained anywhere. Second, the subject of predication is not the object of attribution, as is clear from *art. 1 of this q.*, and can be shown of the individual subjects of whatever science about which being is predicated. But being of reason in Logic is the subject of predication: for it is predicated of the proposition, argumentation, and the other logical entities, as Mauritius attests in *q. 3 univers.* Third, what directly directs a directive science is not that by which something is directed, but that which is directed. But Logic is a directive science — even according to its adversaries. Therefore the major is shown by induction: from Grammar, whose proximate object is not the noun and the verb from which grammatically correct speech is formed, but that grammatically correct speech itself; and from Rhetoric, whose object is not well-arranged words but the ornate discourse made from them. The same can be induced from Ethics and the other directive disciplines. But being of reason is the that-by-which or the from-which intellect

operations are directed — namely from the subject, predicate, propositions, and the rest — and not the that-which is directed. Therefore being of reason taken in any sense whatsoever is not the object of attribution of Logic.

First Objection. Aristotle in 4 *Met. c. 2* *Tom. 5* writes that Metaphysics and Logic labor about the same object, but with this difference — Scotus adds in *q. 1 Elench. §. Ad q. dicendum* — that Metaphysics treats of real being and Logic of being of reason. The same is handed down in *q. 15 §. Ad 1. rationem* and *q. 2 praedicam.* Therefore being of reason is the subject of Logic. *Confirmation:* being of reason is knowable in its own way; for it has properties demonstrable of it, several of which Scotus presents in *q. 2 praedicam.* And it does not appear to be considered by any other science than by Logic, which for this reason is called rational — because it treats of being of reason. Therefore being of reason is the object of Logic. *Reply.* Even if that distinction is granted, I say that being of reason is the subject of predication in Logic, not the subject of attribution — about which the whole dispute turns, as Sarnanus rightly saw in *q. 3 univers. pag. 56*, and before him Scotus in *1 post. q. 27 ante §. Ad q.* The same is to be said in reply to the confirmation. Or say that Aristotle and Scotus are speaking of Logic in use, not Logic as a teaching science. Or alternatively it may be replied that Dialectic treats of every being by reason of its subject, which is applied to all things. This is why I said Logic is a universal science in *q. 2 art. 7.*

Second Objection. Everything treated in Logic is a being of reason or is reducible to being of reason. Therefore the formal object of Logic is being of reason. The antecedent is conceded: for what is found in Logic are subject, predicate, genus, species, proposition, syllogism, and the like — all of which, even according to the Scotists, and expressly according to Maior in *1 d. 2 q. 13 §. ideo propter*, are beings of reason. *Confirmation I:* a science derives its denomination from its object; but Logic is denominated rational. Therefore it derives this from being of reason, which is its object. *Confirmation II:* the object distinguishes the science; and being of reason distinguishes Logic from other sciences. Therefore it is its object. *Reply.* The argument proceeds from an insufficient enumeration — namely from one condition of the subject to all of them. Therefore, granting the antecedent, the consequence is denied. For the fallacy of accident is committed: it is no better argued that matter is being, form is being, and everything in Physics is a being — therefore being is the formal object of Physics. The same happens in our case: although everything contained in Logic is a being of reason, nonetheless, because all these things are treated on behalf of the syllogism, therefore not being of reason but the syllogism is established as the object of Logic. In reply to *Confirmation I*, I say that a science can be denominated from its object in multiple ways: sometimes from the principal part of the subject — as Metaphysics is called divine because it treats of God as its principal object, and the science of the heavens is called Astrology because its principal part is the stars; hence the common saying that denomination is made from the nobler part. Sometimes from the total and adequate subject — as

Physics is called natural because it contemplates the natural body, which is its adequate subject. Sometimes from the subject of predication — as Metaphysics is called real because it contemplates real being, which is common to the other real disciplines. And it is in this sense that Logic is denominated rational, because it considers being of reason, which is its subject of predication. In reply to *Confirmation II*, the major holds of the subject of attribution, not of the subject of predication — and it is being of reason that is the subject of predication.

Third Objection. The adequate subject of Dialectic is either real or rational, since between real being and being of reason no middle term intervenes — as is clear from the Formalists. But the subject of Logic is not real, as I proved above in *art. 2* and *3 of this q.* Therefore it is being of reason. *Reply.* The argument does not conclude. For as I noted in *Epit. l. 3 q. 1 art. 10*, when the minor is negative in the third figure, the syllogism does not hold. The reason is that the middle term is not distributed in the premises — that is, the argument proceeds from the non-distributed to the distributed. But if the subject is supposed only for the subject of predication, the entire inference is good; whereas if it is taken for the subject of attribution, the reasoning is faulty. For Logic does not inquire into just any being of reason, but only that being of reason which is the syllogism or the mode of knowing, as will be made clear in *art. 7*.

Article VI. Whether the Three Operations of the Intellect Are the Object of Logic.

Scotus in *q. 3 univers.* and Antonius Andreas in a certain question after the exposition of the old Logic report the opinion of certain thinkers who hold that the concept formed by the act of reason is the subject of Dialectic. From this some perhaps took occasion to suspect that the operation of the intellect is the object of Logic, among whom Raconis is listed in *praeludio postr. art. 4 sect. ult.* Most recent authors, however, hold that there are three operations of the mind, and they dispute among themselves. Some, such as Suárez in *disp. 1 Met. Sect. 4*, establish these as the things to be directed; others establish them as directive; and still others as directed. The opposing view is held by Scotus in the place cited above, §. *Ad oppositum*; Joannes de Magistris in *q. 1 dub. 2*; Zabarella in *2 de natura Log. c. 3*; Fuentes in *q. 3 art. 3*; and the other Scotists — all of whom deny that the operations of the intellect taken in any way whatsoever are the formal subject of Dialectic.

Note, from Aristotle in *3 animae T. 13* and Scotus in *q. 28 praedicam. §. Ad 2, q. 1 perih. q. 1, 1 post. q. 46, 1 Met. q. 4 §. ubi sciendum*, and Maior in *tract. de syllogismis c. 1 fol. 140*, that there are three operations of the intellect. The first is called the apprehension of simple terms — as "man" apprehended. The second is called enunciation, or composition or division of those incomplex terms — that is, the affirmation of one of another, as "man is an animal," or the negation of one from another, as "man is not a stone." The third is called discourse, which is the progression from the known to the unknown — that is, from premises to

conclusion — as "man is an animal; Peter is a man; therefore Peter is an animal." These operations can be considered in two ways, as Zabarella notes in *1 de natura Log. c. 3* and *2 of the same book, 6. 3* — which Scotus also signals in *q. 3 univers. ver. si 1. modo*: first, with respect to their proper nature and as proceeding from the soul and intellect — which are their principles — in which case they pertain to the science of the soul. Second, with respect to the three degrees of second intentions that result from them, or with respect to the intentional being caused by the intellect alone or left behind by it, by reason of which they are ordered and directed toward the good syllogism — and in this respect they are objects of logical consideration. This can be illustrated by the example of iron: considered absolutely, iron pertains to Physics, since it is a natural body and of the genus of metal; but if it is examined as capable of being shaped in this or that way, it pertains to the art of the smith.

First Thesis. The operation of the intellect insofar as it is directable is not the formal and adequate object of Logic. This seems to be the view of Scotus just cited, *ver. due similitudines*. This is proved: first, in no part of Logic is the operation of the intellect defined, nor are its principles and properties shown according to its general account — which is required for the formal object of a science, as I noted above. Therefore the directable operation of the intellect cannot be the formal object of Logic. The consequence is clear; the antecedent is plain to anyone who reads all the works of Dialectic. Second, either the operation of the intellect is established as the object of Logic according to its quidditative being — and this is not the case, because as such it pertains to the science of the soul, as is clear from the end of the preceding note — or as invested with the second intention of directability, and this is in no way admissible. For thus it is nothing other than a being of reason — which Raconis refuted in *art. 4 sect. 2*, and against whom this thesis is directed. Again, action is not aimed at per se by Logic but for the sake of the syllogism. It is therefore established that the operation of the intellect is not the proximate and formal object of Logic.

Second Thesis. The operations of the intellect cannot be established as the proximate and formal object of Logic — neither as directable, nor as directive, nor as directed. This three-part thesis is signaled by Scotus in the place cited above. The first part is proved: first, one science, being one, has only one formal and adequate object, *1 post. T. 43*; but Logic is a single science, as established above; and there are three operations of the intellect. Again, one science must have one middle term for demonstration, which is the definition of the subject — since all its knowable and demonstrable properties are demonstrated of that subject. But since there are three operations of the intellect, it is plainly shown that they are not the formal object of Logic. You will say that they are the formal object of Logic under the aspect of directability, as Antonius Andreas signals in *1 Met. q. 1 art. 2 ver. contra 3. dictum*. On the contrary: each operation possesses its own directability just as it has its own entity. Therefore just as there are three

directable operations, so there are three directable aspects — and so those operations are not the object of Logic under the aspect of directability. Second, the directability of any operation is either a natural aptitude or a natural or obediential potency. Not the first: because such a natural potency pertains to the science that contemplates the nature from which it flows — as is the case with the science of the soul. Nor the second: because obediential potency is passive with respect to the ordering and directivity that is a being of reason fashioned by the intellect — which the adversaries themselves remove from the object of Logic. Furthermore, the operations of the intellect are real; but Logic is rational. Moreover, it would be subalternate to the science of the soul, for it would add an accidental difference above the object of that science — namely directability. It must therefore rather be concluded that such operations are not the proximate object of Logic. The second part remains proved from *art. 3 of the present q.*, where we showed that the active acts of the intellect do not fall under the formal object of Logic. The third part is argued thus: a directive science does not presuppose a directed object; otherwise it would not be directive, since it would not direct it, nor could it — just as a productive habit does not presuppose an already produced object but one producible, as is clear by induction through all the mechanical arts. But Logic, by the common consent of dialecticians, is directive. Therefore its formal object cannot be the operations of the mind as directed.

First Objection against the First Thesis. Scotus in *q. 1 praedicam. §. Ad q.* says that Logic is about the concept; but a concept is an operation of the intellect. Indeed, in *Epit. l. 3 q. 1 art. 2* it is granted that the syllogism is an operation of the intellect. Therefore the operation of the intellect is the object of Logic. *Reply.* The Doctor explains himself there. For he says that Logic is about the concept formed by the act of reason — and this concept coincides with being of reason and with the second intention, which I indicated above to be the subject of predication in Logic, not its subject of attribution. By this distinction the apparent contradiction in the Doctor's writings is resolved. For in *q. 3 univers.* he denies that the formed concept is the subject of Logic, while later in *praedicam. q. cit.* he establishes it as the object of Logic itself — as is clear from *ver. Ad aliud dico*, where he proves that Logic is not a real science nor a discursive one, because it is not about a thing or about a word but about the concept. The apparent contradiction is resolved, I say, because in *q. univers.* Scotus speaks of the subject of attribution, while in the said *q. praedicam.* he treats of the subject of predication, which he rightly asserts to be the proper subject of Dialectic — namely as being of reason and second intention, which the three questions cited in *univers.* he takes to coincide.

Second Objection. Everything treated in Logic is referred back to the three operations of the mind as directable. Therefore the three directable operations of the mind are the object of Logic. The antecedent is established from the distribution of the books of Aristotle's Logic, received from Scotus in the places

cited above and in *1 perih. q. 1*. For concerning the first operation of the intellect there is *1 praedicam.*, in which incomplete terms are set out. Concerning the second operation there are the books of the *Perihermeneias*, in which complex terms are handed down. And concerning the third, in the books of the *Prior Analytics*, *Posterior Analytics*, *Topics*, and *Sophistical Refutations*, in which the syllogism, its subjective parts, and its properties are accurately taught. *Reply*. I grant the antecedent; I deny the consequence. For the argument proceeds from an insufficient enumeration of the conditions of the subject, and the fallacy of the consequent is committed. For the two prior conditions required for the formal object are lacking in them. Or it may be said that the argument concludes about the remote and material object, not the proximate and formal one — about which the present controversy turns.

Third Objection. The operations of the intellect insofar as they are directable are knowable and demonstrable. Therefore they fall under the object of some science. But they cannot be considered by any other science than by Logic, which alone provides the rules and precepts for rightly directing them, as is clear from its nature and purpose. Therefore such operations are the formal object of Logic. *Reply*. I distinguish the minor taken in its second premise: if it concerns natural and real directability — I deny it. But if the discourse concerns artificial and rational directability caused — or rather left behind — by the intellect, I grant that this is regarded by Logic. But since this ordering and direction does not stop there but tends to the syllogism or mode of knowing, consequently not the operations of the intellect but the syllogism is established as the proximate and formal subject of Dialectic.

Article VII. Whether the Syllogism Is the Object of Logic.

Algazel in his *Logic c. 3* and Avicenna in the same place make argumentation the subject of Logic. Simplicius in *prol. praedicabilium* and other ancient Peripatetics, whom Hurtado in *disp. 1 sect. 8 subf. 4* and Arriaga in *disp. 2 sect. 5 subf. 3* follow, hold that it is demonstration. Among the Scotists there are two positions: one defended by Faber in *Theor. 6*, Orbellus in *q. 1*, Mauritius, and Sarnanus in *q. 3 univers.* from Scotus in the same place, asserting that the syllogism is the adequate object of the whole of Logic; the other held by Tataretus in *q. 3 art. 2*, Joannes de Magistris, Fonseca in *2 Met. q. 1 sect. 5*, and the Complutenses in *Log. disp. 1 q. 3* from Scotus in *1 Prio. q. 2*, who affirm that the total subject of Logic is the mode of knowing.

Note I, from Sarnanus *pag. 77* and the other Scotists cited: that the syllogism is here taken in common, as it abstracts from every kind of syllogism — dialectical, demonstrative, and sophistical — or, as others say, as the syllogism is supposed simply and not personally, completing the integral subjective parts, the principles and properties of the syllogism, of which there is abundant treatment in *Epit. l. 3*. The syllogism can moreover be taken in a first-intentional sense — which is a mental, vocal, or written discourse composed of three

propositions — and in a second-intentional sense — which is the rational relation of the premises to the conclusion. Note also that the mode of knowing is twofold: formal and objective. The formal mode is the act of the intellect by which we divide, define, and argue. The objective mode is the object or objects about which there are divisions and argumentations. The mode of knowing can indeed be described as the instrument by which one arrives from knowledge of the known to knowledge of the unknown — or more briefly, the progression from the known to the unknown.

Note II, from the same authors: that Logic can be examined in two ways. One way is according to itself and in its full breadth, insofar as it encompasses *1 Porph.*, the book of the six principles, the book on division, and whatever else has been added and enriched by other dialecticians. The other way is insofar as it was handed down by Aristotle in at least those books that have come down to us. Now, to Logic taken in the first way the mode of knowing is assigned as its object; to Logic considered in the second way the syllogism is established — as Sarnanus rightly notes *pag. 78*, Toledo in *q. 5 fund. 2*, the Conimbricenses in *ibid. art. 3*, and Fonseca in the place cited. Much as certain Scotists philosophize about the subject of Physics, which considered in its whole range they say has finite being as its object, or as written by Aristotle — and then they hold its object to be the natural body, as may be seen from the twin Scotists in *q. proaem. in phys.* a little before *art. 1*.

First Thesis. Argumentation is not the total subject of Logic. So holds Scotus in *q. univers. §. Ad rationem positionis 3*. And this is proved by him there. First, argumentation lacks the first condition required for the subject: for argumentation in general is never defined by Aristotle, nor is its definition posited as a principle of the science. Therefore argumentation is not the adequate subject of Dialectic. Second, argumentation does not have properties demonstrable of it, as the second condition of the subject requires, since it has no definition. Third, the third condition is likewise lacking to it: for either argumentation is something equivocal or something analogical. If it is equivocal, since it lacks unity, the unity of Logic cannot be derived from it — since the equivocal is not knowable or demonstrable. Or it is analogical with respect to what is contained under it; in which case Logic will not be one from that analogue itself, but from the unity of its principal analogue to which all the rest are referred — and this is the syllogism, as is clear from the unity of Metaphysics, whose unity derives from the unity of substance to which the other beings are referred. Hence argumentation is not the total subject of Logic — unless we say that it coincides with the syllogism, as I noted from Aristotle in *1 prio. 1, 1 Top. 1, 1 Elench. 2* in *Epit. l. 3 q. 1 art. 3*.

Second Thesis. Demonstration is only a partial subject of Logic, though the principal one. This is touched upon by the Doctor in *1 Prio. q. 2* near the end, where he brings in the division of all the parts of Logic, among which he places

demonstration as most preeminent. Aristotle supports this in *1 post. T. 21*, treating of Demonstration as a partial subject of Dialectic and presenting its principles, species, and properties. This is proved: first, the adequate object of a science encompasses everything treated in the science of which it is the object, as is clear from the very notion of the word "adequate"; and the inadequate object contains only a part of the science, as the word "inadequate" itself indicates. But demonstration does not encompass the topical, sophistical, and paralogistic syllogism. For these differ from demonstration, as is clear from their definitions. Therefore demonstration is only a partial and inadequate subject of Dialectic — though the principal one, since it is its principal part and the instrument that generates science. Second, of one science in genus there is one subject in genus, *1 post. T. 43*. But Logic is one science in genus, as established above. Therefore its subject is one in genus — which demonstration is not, since it is contained under the mode of knowing and the syllogism taken generally. Hence demonstration is only a partial object of Logic.

Third Thesis. The syllogism is the adequate object of the Logic as written by Aristotle. Scotus doubtless holds this in the place just cited, *q. 3 univers. §. dicendum ergo*, which he proves from the partition of the books of Aristotle's Organon. Zabarella agrees in *1 de natura Log. c. 18*, saying that those who hold the syllogism to be the object of Logic are to be preferred to others. This is proved: first, from Aristotle in *1 Prio. 1 in initio* and at the end of *2 Elench.*, where he asks to be credited because he discovered the syllogism, invested great labor in it, and directed all the works of Dialectic toward it — as the Doctor attests in the place cited, and Fonseca confirms in *1 Met. cap. 3 q. 1 sect. 3*. Second, the syllogism possesses all the conditions required for the adequate subject of Logic. Therefore it is its adequate object. The antecedent is proved: of the syllogism it is presupposed whether it exists and what it is, as is clear at the beginning of *1 prio.*, where its definition is given. Likewise its demonstrable principles and properties are given — both in the books of the *Prior Analytics* and in the remaining books. And everything treated in Logic is referred back to it in some way — either as administering to it, such as definition in *6. 7 Top.* and *2 post. 2*, and division in *8 Top. 1* and *2 prio. sect. 2 c. 3*; or as the imperfect to the perfect, such as the enthymeme, example, and induction in *2 prio.*; or as integral parts or remote matter in *1 praedicam.*; or as proximate matter in *l. perih.*; or as subjective parts in *l. post. Top.* Again, the syllogism contains all the truths that can be had in Logic and provides it with unity and distinction, just as any object provides unity and distinction to its science. Therefore the syllogism is the total and adequate subject of Aristotelian Logic.

Fourth Thesis. The mode of knowing is the total object of Logic considered in itself. So Scotus holds in *1 Prio. quest. 2 §. Quantum ad 3. concluf. 2*. This is proved: first, from Aristotle in *2 Met. 6. 3. 7. 15*, where Logic is called by the Philosopher himself "the mode of knowing" — because it is entirely devoted to the objective mode of knowing as its proper object, as distinguished Scotists expound that

passage. Therefore it is consonant with Aristotle's mind that the mode of knowing is the adequate object of Logic in its full breadth. Second, from the refutation of the other opinions: for every science must be assigned an adequate subject from which it derives its unity and distinction from other disciplines, *1 post. T. 43*. But Logic is a single science distinct from the others, as established above. Therefore it must be granted one adequate subject — which is not spoken words, nor all things, nor being of reason, nor the operations of the intellect, nor demonstration, nor the syllogism, since division and definition are modes of knowing distinct from the syllogism. Therefore it is evidently and sufficiently concluded that the adequate object is the mode of knowing. Third, all the conditions necessary for the total subject of Logic are rightly adapted to the mode of knowing. Therefore the mode of knowing is established as the total object of Logic taken absolutely. The antecedent is clear to one who runs through those conditions one by one. For it is presupposed of the mode of knowing whether it exists and what it is; knowable properties are demonstrated of it; it does not overstep its bounds. For every mode of knowing is either division, definition, or syllogism. Likewise it either is a remote part — such as a term — or a proximate part — such as a proposition — and if anything else is considered in Logic, it is aptly reduced to the mode of knowing, as Scotus shows at length at the end of the cited question.

First Objection. Aristotle in *1 prio. in principio* proposes to treat of demonstration, and in *2 of the same work c. 17* adds that he has treated of demonstration itself. But what a scientific craftsman devotes his care to is its object. Therefore, since Logic cultivates demonstration, it is inferred that demonstration is its adequate object. *Confirmation I.* Logic provides the mode of knowing; but the mode of knowing is demonstration, which is defined in *1 post. T. 1* as "a syllogism that produces knowledge." *Confirmation II.* The intellect is adequately perfected by demonstration alone, since through it the object and its demonstrable properties are known. Therefore demonstration is the total object of Logic. *Reply.* Those and similar passages are to be understood of the principal partial object, not of the total object. For in the first cited passage Aristotle expressly adds that he wishes to inquire what a ratiocination is, and which are perfect and which imperfect. And shortly after he presents the definition of the syllogism in general, insofar as it encompasses the topical and analytic syllogism. In the second cited passage he openly acknowledges that he has treated of ratiocination and demonstration; but ratiocination is broader than demonstration. Moreover, in *1 post.* he treats ex professo only of demonstration, its principles, species, properties, and effects — from which it follows that Aristotle by no means placed the adequate object of Logic there, just as he did not place the animate body in Physics or God in Metaphysics. In reply to *Confirmation I*, I grant the major. As for the minor, I say that demonstration is indeed a mode of knowing, but not every and total mode of knowing — only the

principal partial one. In reply to *Confirmation II*, I deny the antecedent: for what is required for a thing are not only necessary means but also probable ones.

Second Objection. All the conditions for the total object of Logic are present in the syllogism. Therefore the syllogism is its total object. The antecedent is proved: if any condition were lacking to it, it would above all be because not everything treated in Logic is referred back to it — such as division and definition. But such instruments are indeed reduced to the syllogism itself, as things administering to it; and not rarely from them are premises formed. The remaining things are likewise reduced to that same syllogism as the imperfect to the perfect. And the other species of argumentation derive their inferring force from it — as Aristotle openly acknowledges for the example and induction in *2 prio.* and Scotus in *ibid. q. 8* and *1 prio. q. 2*. Therefore that distinction of the subject of Logic in itself and the subject of Logic as left by Aristotle is pointless, since the same object is to be assigned to Logic whether considered in itself or as handed down by Aristotle. *Reply.* I deny the antecedent. In reply to its proof I say that division and definition are distinct modes of knowing from the syllogism, and are partial objects of Logic, about which several demonstrations can be made. Therefore if they are taken precisely, they do not belong to the syllogism per se but only per accidens, insofar as they in some way serve the syllogism. Nor does it stand in the way that Aristotle in *1 Met. c. 7* mentions definition and demonstration while omitting division: for there he enumerates those two modes of knowing as the principal ones, without thereby excluding the third — namely division — which is a less principal instrument of knowing, as Aristotle attests in *2 Prio. sect. 2 c. 3* and Scotus agrees in the place cited, *ver. undequia*. You will press further: definition is reduced to demonstration as terms are to the proposition; but terms per se belong to the proposition, since they are its per se parts. Therefore definition too belongs to demonstration. *Reply.* I deny the parity of the major. For a demonstration can exist — at least a demonstration that is not the most perfect kind — without a definition, whereas a proposition cannot exist without terms. You will urge further: the essence, once known through its definition, naturally leads to knowledge of its property, and is therefore per se inferential — and hence pertains to demonstration as its per se part. *Reply.* Although once the knowledge of an essence is had one can arrive at knowledge of its property and infer a conclusion, this is nonetheless not necessary nor required for the nature of a definition. For God, once the definition of an essence is had, elicits no inference from it — and the same is common to the angel according to Thomistic doctrine. Therefore definition by its own nature and intrinsically claims no inference whatsoever and no discursive function.

Third Objection. Scotus in *q. 3 univers.* affirms and proves that the syllogism is the total object of Logic. Yet in *1 Prio. q. 2 concl. 1* he expressly denies that the syllogism is established as the adequate object of Dialectic, and wishes in that place in *concl. 2* that it is the instrument or mode of knowing. Therefore Scotus

plainly contradicts himself. Faber replies in *cap. 3 Theor. 6* that those books are not Scotus's, since they contain many things not in conformity with his doctrine. But this response is unsatisfactory, since in *qq. univers.* he equally puts forward things that conflict with what he wrote in the *Sentences* — such as that being is equivocal, that the subject of accidents is matter, and the like. All the Scotists nonetheless concede that those questions belong to the Subtle Doctor, as indeed they do. Therefore those books are not to be denied but explained if anything in them appears to conflict with Scotus himself. Hence Veglia in *vestig. 1 q. 6 n. 16* aptly adds that it is the refuge of the wretched to deny either the author of the book or the book of the author when they cannot otherwise escape the force of an argument. Fuentes in *q. 3 art. 5* addresses the matter by explaining Scotus in *1 prio. cit.* as speaking of the subject of predication, and *3 q. univers.* as speaking of the subject of attribution. And he says that therefore there is no contradiction in what the Doctor has said, since the mode of knowing is the subject of predication and the syllogism the subject of attribution. But this response does not resolve the difficulty either. For the mode of knowing is not the total subject of predication in Logic, since the mode of knowing itself cannot be predicated of many things treated in Logic. For a term is not a mode of knowing, nor is a proposition a mode of knowing. Moreover, the subject of predication for the most part transcends the limits of the science of which it is the subject, as is clear from being of reason, which I asserted above in *art. 5* to be the subject of predication of Logic. Again, I proved in the last thesis that division and definition are not reduced to the syllogism. Therefore that distinction of subject of predication and subject of attribution does not resolve the stated apparent repugnance. Cardinal Sarnanus at the end of the question attempts to remove that contradiction by the following distinction — namely that Scotus in the first passage treats of the principal object, and in the second of the total object. But this response plainly conflicts with Scotus's text: for in both passages the Doctor reasons about the total and adequate object, as is clear to one who examines *q. 3 univers. §. Dicendum ergo, quod subiectum primum, idest, adequatum*, as the said Sarnanus declares at *pag. 78*. This is also established from *1 Prio. q. 2*: "Then the first conclusion is formed: that this term 'syllogism' is not the subject in the whole of Logic." And a little after: "The second conclusion is that this term 'instrument of knowing' is the subject in the whole of Logic." To me it seems that the apparent contradiction is entirely dissolved if it is said that in *q. 3 cit.* Scotus is speaking of the subject of Logic as handed down by Aristotle — at least according to the books of his that have come down to us — while in *q. 2 alleg.* he speaks of the subject of Logic considered in itself. This response would not have been rejected by Sarnanus, had he remembered what he said at *pag. 78* — that the question cited above is moved about Logic as given by Aristotle — nor would it have been alien to Faber in *sit. in sol. 3. 4. rationis*, had he not reduced division and definition to the syllogism in resolving the first argument and not repeated below in *cap. 4* what he said there. Or it may be said that Scotus in that volume of Logic said many things according to the common opinion, as Bargius

notes in *q. 3 prol.* as reported by Sarnanus in the margin of *q. 34 univers.* — things that he plainly refutes elsewhere in his writings. And Aristotle too does this in the chapter on quantity, enumerating certain species of quantity which he entirely omits in *5 Met. c. de quanto.*

Fourth Objection. Nothing can be the adequate subject of both the whole and a part, as is clear from the terms. But the syllogism is the adequate subject of the books of the *Prior Analytics*, which are only one part of Logic. Therefore the syllogism is not the total subject of Logic even as elaborated by Aristotle. *Reply.* I grant the major. I distinguish the minor: with respect to its inferential form — I grant; with respect to all its properties in itself, or in its subjective and integral parts and in what is reducible to it — I deny.

Fifth Objection. No science forms its own object: for the object is presupposed to it as the cause is to its effect. For science is produced in part from the object, according to that dictum of Augustine in *11 Trin. c. 12*: "From the knower and the known, knowledge is born." Therefore, since the syllogism is made by Logic, it is inferred that it is not the subject of Aristotelian Logic. *Reply.* I distinguish the major: of real speculative science — I grant; of a rational and directive science such as Logic — I deny. So Mauritius and other commentators on Scotus in the present question. You will ask whether the syllogism is the formal object of Aristotelian Logic. Faber in the passage cited replies affirmatively, before the resolution of the arguments. For a formal aspect is added only to that object which extends more broadly than the science of which it is the object, and is thereby narrowed and limited by the formal aspect added to it so as to fall under this rather than that consideration — as the natural body, through healability, which is one of its formal aspects, fits Medicine alone and is adequate to it. But when the object is of itself equal to the science, Faber says, no formal aspect need be added to it. So the syllogism in every way in which it is to be considered is weighed by Peripatetic Logic, and requires no formal aspect restricting it. It may better be said that the syllogism as an instrument of knowing is the formal object of Aristotelian Logic — but not absolutely. For if it is examined as a being of reason, it pertains to Metaphysics, as Aureolus notes among others in *1 dist. 23 art. 2*, and Sarnanus in *q. 8 univers. pag. 154*, and Scotus and Anglitus agree in *ibid. q. 7 fol. 74 col. 2 in fine*. And if it is considered as an act of the intellect, it pertains to the science of the soul. But if it is examined as a grammatically correct discourse, it is treated by Grammar.

Question IV. On the Utility and Necessity of Logic.

Article I. Whether Logic Is Useful.

That Epicurus and his followers despised Logic as vain and useless is reported by Cicero in *2 de finibus*, Diogenes Laertius in *l. 10*, and Lactantius in *3 Instit.* Their errors are recounted and brilliantly refuted by Lactantius there, and Augustine hints at the same in *1 contra Cresconium cap. 13*. The Cyrenaic followers

of Aristippus agree with them, as attested by Clitomachos and Meleager in Diogenes Laertius, *l. 1*. So too do the sectarians who attack the liberal arts and pursue them with great hatred — because good dialecticians expose their tricks, break their knots, shatter their snares, mock their sophisms, and reduce them to nothing. All these are rightly condemned by orthodox Doctors, who determine and proclaim that Logic is most useful and profitable to us, and cultivate it as the mistress of discourse.

Thesis. Logic is to be extolled with praises and studied by us as a useful discipline. This is presupposed by the Doctor in the volume he edited and completed on Logic. This is proved: first, from Aristotle in *1 Top. 2*: "Dialectic prepares the way to the principles of all methods." In *1 Met. cap. 1* and *2*: through inexperience in Dialectic, the ancient philosophers fell into many errors. And in *2 Met. cap. 3 T. 15*: Dialectic is called the mode of knowing. But the norm of knowing, the rule for avoiding errors, and the instrument for acquiring other sciences is useful and profitable. Plato in the *Phaedrus* and *7 de Rep.*, Augustine in *3 contra Academicos c. 17*, Boethius in *Top.*, Cicero, and Hugh of Saint Victor in *1 Didascalice eruditionis* and others greatly commend Dialectic and bestow great encomia upon it to make known to us its dignity and utility. Hence Augustine in *3 contra Cresconium* shows that Christ the Lord and St. Paul used Dialectic in their preaching and argumentation. And in *2 de doctrina Christiana cap. 31* he adds that it contributes greatly to penetrating and resolving all the kinds of questions found in sacred scripture — and warns there that the lust for wrangling and the puerile vanity of deceiving an adversary must be carefully avoided. Second, what is sought for the sake of acquiring something else is useful. But Logic contributes to the acquisition of the other sciences, since it is the mode and instrument of knowing. Therefore Logic is useful. Third, what adorns and perfects our mind and labors for the sake of something else is useful. But Logic adorns and illuminates our intellect and devotes its labor for the sake of the other disciplines. Therefore it is to be cultivated by us as useful and profitable. Four utilities of Logic are enumerated by Tataretus in *q. 3 dub. 3*: the first is facility in dividing, defining, and arguing; the second is facility in distinguishing truth from falsehood; the third is facility in arguing and responding in every kind of matter; the fourth is facility in resolving paralogisms defective in form.

Objection. What is harmful to the Christian religion is vain and useless. But Logic is harmful to the Christian family. For *1 Cor. 8*: "Knowledge puffs up, charity edifies." And Logic, as has been established, is a science that appears to oppose our salvation, as may be inferred from *Ps. 70*: "Since I have not known the art of letters, I shall enter into your power" — where the Gloss has "into the Christian religion." Therefore Dialectic is not profitable to us. *Confirmation:* from Arius, whose heresies were bolstered by Dialectic, as Jerome writes in his work against the Luciferians. And likewise from Matthew, Luther, Calvin, and many others who construct knotted syllogisms to lead men into error. *Reply.* I grant the

major; I deny the minor. In reply to its proof I explain that testimony with Augustine in *9 Civ. 20* as speaking of knowledge without charity, not of knowledge joined with charity. The same Doctor writes in *In Ps. 118 Con. 17, tract. 27 in Ioan.*: "What is 'knowledge puffs up'? Knowledge alone without charity. This is why evil angels are called demons — because puffed up with knowledge they are proud, perversely presuming, like frenzied men who are rejected lest they enter into the power of the Lord." Thus the cited passage of the Psalm is explained by the same Augustine there, who says that by "letters" are to be understood those who glory in the earth and presume on their own powers. This response is plainly gathered from the Apostle in the same place, who adds: "If I should know all mysteries but have not charity, it profits me nothing." In reply to the confirmation, I say this is per accidens. For it is not bad Dialectic but bad men who use it badly that are at fault — and it is not the use but the abuse that is condemned. This is what Scotus hints at in *2 d. 42 q. 4 §. sequitur ante M.* following Augustine in *9 Trin. 10*: "To define intemperance pertains to the moral art; to be intemperate pertains to what is blamed in that art. Just as to know and define a solecism pertains to the art of speaking, but to commit one is a fault comprehended in that art." Rudolph Agricola also shows this elegantly: "It is not the fault of the art but of wickedness to embrace what should be fled and to pursue what should be embraced." Nor should Augustine be omitted, who in *1 contra Cresconium cap. 1* declares our case with excellent examples: "A soldier should not go unarmed for his country because some have taken up arms against their country; nor should good and learned physicians refuse to use medicinal instruments for the preservation of health just because uneducated and wicked men abuse them for destruction."

Second Objection. St. Jerome, writing to Pope Damasus, leaves this: "Does it not seem to us that one who is tormented day and night in the art of Dialectic enters into vanity of sense and obscurity of mind?" And this is inscribed in *Canon. d. 37 c. Nonne*. And in the same place, *c. Omne vim*: "Heretics put all the force of their inventions in dialectical disputation — which, in the judgment of the philosophers, is defined not as building up but as tearing down; but it was not in Dialectic that it pleased God to save his people." Here too belongs the statement of the same Jerome who, when reading the books of Cicero, was corrected by an Angel for devoting himself to the fictions of pagans as a Christian man. Origen agrees, explaining through the frogs and flies by which the Egyptians were struck, the vain garrulity of the dialecticians and their sophisms. *Reply.* In all these authorities only those are reproved who devote all their care and solicitude to acquiring Dialectic while abandoning the precepts of Christ, as if eternal salvation consisted in the acquisition of Dialectic. This solution and explanation is plainly gathered from the very words prefaced — "it was not in Dialectic that it pleased God to save his people." In reply to St. Jerome, I say that he was not corrected by the Angel for perusing the volumes of Cicero, but for caring too much for them and reading them more than the sacred scriptures,

that his speech might be more ornate and polished. Origen, moreover, is to be interpreted as speaking of the sophistical and counterfeit Logic — as his words cited above plainly demonstrate — and this is confirmed by Augustine in 9. 100 *novi et veteris testamenti*.

Third Objection. Logic either profits itself or profits other sciences. But in neither way does it profit. Therefore as useless it is to be despised. The major is clear. The minor is argued: it is not profitable to itself, since it contains many superfluous things — such as insolubles, obligations, the method of finding the middle term, captious objections and responses. Nor does it profit other disciplines, because expert logicians try to teach the true as false and the false as true. *Reply.* I grant the major; I deny the minor. In reply to the first proof I deny those things to be superfluous; for they greatly assist the sciences, and those who are ignorant of them frequently go astray. In reply to the second proof I say this happens not per se but per accidens — just as a helmsman sometimes capsizes the ship and a physician kills the patient. These are the faults of men, not of arts. Hence Augustine in 2 *de doctrina Christiana* c. 36 says: "It is not the faculty that is to be faulted but the perversity of those who use it badly."

Article II. Whether Logic Is Necessary for Acquiring the Other Sciences.

Three opinions are reported in this article: two extreme and a third intermediate. The first is that of Avicenna in c. 2 of his *Logic*, Algazel in *ibid.* c. 3, and Burleigh in q. 3 *praedicabilium*, who hold that Logic is simply necessary for undertaking the other sciences. The second is that of Jandun in 2 *Met.* q. 12 and Javelli in *Log. Tract.* 1 q. 4, who hold that Dialectic is only useful and profitable for acquiring the other doctrines. The third is handed down by Gadius in *quol.* 16 fol. 165 col. 3, Fuentes in q. 1 *dif.* 2 art. 2, and Fonseca in 2 *Met.* q. 4 sect. 2, toward which Tataretus inclines in q. 3 *dub.* 3; and Scotus is cited for this view in 2 *Met.* q. 12 by the Conimbricenses in q. 6 art. 2 (though Scotus there says nothing about the necessity of Logic). These authors teach that the other disciplines can be acquired by us imperfectly without Logic, but that Logic itself is necessary for acquiring the other sciences perfectly.

Note I, and recall from what was said in q. 2 art. 2 *not.* 1, that Logic is twofold: natural and artificial. Artificial Logic, according to the Doctor in q. 3 *univers.* and Sarnanus in *ibid.* pag. 65 and q. 3 *Prol.* §. *Dicendum ergo*, is divided into old and new. Old Logic encompasses the integral parts of the syllogism, which are given in the books of the *Predicamenta* and *Perihermeneias*, and is called old insofar as it precedes the other subjective parts in time. New Logic contains the subjective parts of the syllogism, which are handed down in the books of the *Prior Analytics*, *Posterior Analytics*, *Topics*, and *Sophistical Refutations*, and is called new insofar as it comes after the aforesaid integral parts, with respect to which it is called old Logic. Moreover, Logic is divided into total and partial. Total Logic is

that which encompasses the whole doctrine of discourse; partial Logic is that which takes in only one part of it.

Note II, from Aristotle in *5 Met. c. 5 T. 6*, Orbellus in *ibid. q. 1*, and Scotus in *1 d. 39 §. Ad arg. 1 q. v.* and *4 d. 10 q. 4 §. Hic duo sunt ante C.*: that the necessary is twofold — absolutely and conditionally. The absolutely necessary is that which according to itself cannot be otherwise — such as God, who is the first existing being and wholly independent; and besides God himself there is nothing else absolutely necessary, according to Scotus in *1 d. 8 q. 5 §. Ad q. Y*. The conditionally or hypothetically necessary is that which is necessary from some cause, and it is fourfold according to the fourfold genus of causes. Necessary from an efficient cause is that which, given the efficient cause, cannot fail to be produced — as given fire, heat is posited. Necessary from a material cause is that which, given that cause, its effect cannot fail to come about — as a body composed of matter and form is corruptible. Necessary from a formal cause is that which, given the formal cause, its formal effect follows — as given the soul in a suitably organized body, its animation follows. Necessary from a final cause is twofold: one is that without which the end can in no way be obtained — as without respiration and food an animal cannot live, and this is called simply necessary. The other is that without which the end can be acquired but not as conveniently, and this is called necessary in a qualified sense — as a horse is necessary for a man making a journey. Aristotle mentions both of these necessities in *1 de partibus c. 1*. The question in the present discussion is whether Logic is necessary for acquiring the other sciences — with the necessity of a final cause only simply, or in a qualified sense.

First Thesis. Natural Logic is simply necessary for the acquisition of any science whatsoever. This thesis is presupposed by the Doctor and denied by no one I have seen. This is proved: first, that is simply necessary to someone without which it cannot be acquired; but without natural Logic no science can be had. Therefore Logic is simply necessary for acquiring any science. The major is clear. The minor is argued: without capacity and natural aptitude nothing is produced by a natural agent — as a stone does not see, because it is not capable of vision. Therefore since natural Logic is the natural inclination or aptitude for discoursing, as is established from *1 q. art. 1*, it is plainly inferred that without it no scientific habit can be acquired. Second, art does not operate where nature does not operate, for art presupposes nature, as we observe in all the works of art. But every science acquired by human effort is an artificial work. Therefore it necessarily presupposes natural Logic as the natural inclination, aptitude, and capacity for knowing and inferring one thing from another — and is therefore simply necessary to it.

Second Thesis. One part of artificial Logic is simply necessary to another part of that same artificial Logic. This too is presupposed by the Doctor in his volume of Logic. This is proved: first, the knowledge had of incomplete terms is simply

necessary for the part that treats of complex terms. For, as stated in *1 post. T. 21*: "We know principles insofar as we know their terms." And what follows from principles cannot be known without knowledge of those principles. For the second operation of the intellect presupposes the first, just as the third presupposes the second. Therefore one part of artificial Logic is simply necessary to another. Second, in order to know a whole distinctly, it is necessary to know its parts — since with the parts unknown, the whole must likewise be unknown, just as one who does not know letters will not know syllables or words either. But the syllogism is a kind of whole composed of parts — namely terms and propositions. Likewise the syllogism in its own way participates matter and form: its form is treated in the books of the *Prior Analytics* and its matter in the books of the *Posterior Analytics* and the rest. Therefore to know it one must know its matter and form. And thus one part of artificial Logic is simply necessary to another.

Third Thesis. Total artificial Logic is not necessary for acquiring the other sciences imperfectly, but it is necessary in a qualified sense for acquiring them perfectly. This thesis is divided into two parts. The first part is gathered from Scotus in *1 Prio. q. 46 §. Ad 1. arg.* and is proved by him thus: first, what is prior does not depend in its existence on its posterior, as is clear; but the other sciences are prior to Logic in priority of time, as was seen in *1 q. art. 5*. Therefore Logic is not necessary for their imperfect acquisition. Second, the other sciences have their own proper principles, divisions, and definitions independent of Logic, as may be seen in any science. Moreover, many men have excelled in the sciences and doctrines — notably Thales of Miletus in Physics, Hippocrates in Medicine, and not a few in Mathematics and Jurisprudence — who never so much as greeted Dialectic at its threshold. Therefore for their imperfect acquisition, Dialectic is not necessary. The second part, which is inferred from the Doctor in *q. 1 univers.* and *Met. c. 3 in expof. T. 15*, is argued: first, from Plato in *7 de Rep.*: "It is impossible for the intellect to attain anything exactly without Dialectic." And Aristotle in *2 Met. T. 15*: "It is absurd to seek science and the mode of knowing at the same time" — where Averroes in *com.* there and Scotus in that place and the cited *q. univers.* take "mode of knowing" to mean Logic. Therefore, in order that no one fall into absurdity and error — that is, in order to know the other disciplines perfectly — Logic is necessary to him. All the more so since *1 Top. 1*: Logic prepares the way to the principles of all methods, for it hands down the mode of dividing, defining, and reasoning. It is therefore necessary for acquiring the other sciences. Second, Augustine in *1. 2 de ordine c. 13* writes: "When reason has proceeded to fabricating other things, unless it itself distinguished, noted, arranged, and set forth those very mechanisms and instruments of its own, it would produce that discipline they call Dialectic." Cicero in *2 de finibus*: "Epicurus despises Dialectic, which alone contains the entire science of discerning what is in each thing, and of judging what each thing is." The same is handed down by Augustine in *1 Civ. c.* Lactantius in *3 Inst.*

adds that through ignorance of Logic, Epicurus fell into absurd errors. Hugh of Saint Victor in *1 Didascalice eruditionis*: "The other arts were discovered first, but it was necessary that Logic also be discovered, since no one can treat of things suitably unless he has first known the right mode of speaking." Vives reports the same in *com. 8 Civ. c. 7*. Third, a thing is not perfectly known unless it is known that it cannot be otherwise, *1 post. c. 2*. But this is provided by Logic alone, which gives the norm for syllogizing in the proper mode and figure. Again, we cannot know a thing except by discovering and judging; but Logic alone teaches the mode of discovering and judging, and also of drawing true conclusions from true premises. Furthermore, without the instrument of knowing, science is not acquired — since science is generated through demonstration, and Logic, as has been established, is the instrument of knowing and the instrumental science. Therefore it is necessary for acquiring the other sciences perfectly.

First Objection. The works of nature are more certain and more perfect than the works of art, *2 Phys. c. 2*. Therefore since we have natural Logic, it suffices for us to acquire the other sciences without learning artificial Logic. *Reply.* The effects of nature are of two kinds. Some are so certain and determinate that they always come about in the same way — as heavy things tend downward, light things upward; fire heats and water cools. For producing these aptly no art is necessary. Others, however, do not have a certain and determinate mode but can come about well or badly, and for directing these correctly some doctrine is necessary. Plato hints at this in the *Philebus*, where Socrates teaches that all men are by nature logical, but that this natural ardor of human reason is rash unless regulated by counsel. By the distinction given above the response to the objection posed is readily rendered: for the antecedent is true of the works of nature of the first kind, but not of the natural effects of the second kind, with respect to which art is said to be more perfect than nature. And from the same author in *4 de finibus*: "Art is a more certain guide than nature." This is the way Aristotle — adduced by Raconis — is to be explained, though I have not found this in the cited text.

Second Objection. If Logic were necessary to the other sciences, it would be necessary to itself, since it is itself a science, as I showed in *q. 2 art. 2*. But one and the same thing does not appear to be necessary to itself — otherwise the same thing would be both prior and posterior, presupposing and presupposed with respect to the same. Therefore Logic is not necessary to the others either. *Reply.* I grant the consequence of the major; I deny the minor. For natural Logic is necessary to artificial Logic, and one partial artificial Logic assists another partial Logic — just as the partial Logic given in the books of the *Predicabilia* and *Predicamenta* assists the one given in the books of the *Perihermeneias*, and this assists the next in sequence, and the whole imperfect Logic serves the whole perfect Logic, and thus serves the other disciplines — as is clear from the hand, which is of assistance both to itself and to the other members of the body.

Third Objection. Logic is considered necessary to the other doctrines for no other reason than the instruments of knowing that it furnishes. But the other sciences possess their own instruments — namely divisions, definitions, and argumentations — as is clear to anyone running through the individual sciences. Therefore Logic need not necessarily be studied in order to acquire the other disciplines. *Reply.* I grant the major. I distinguish the minor: as to form — I deny; as to matter — I grant. For although each science possesses its own material for elaborating the aforesaid instruments of knowing, nonetheless the form and mode of these instruments is derived from Logic — as Bassolis rightly notes in *q. 8 prol. art. 2*, and after him Toledo in *q. 1 in solutione 2*, and as I already explained in *q. 2 art. 3 dub. 4*.

First Query. What is the function of Logic? *Reply.* It is to discern truth from falsehood through the mode of knowing, as Augustine indicates in *1 contra Cresconium c. 15*.

Second Query. What is the end of Logic? *Reply.* Following the twofold end — formal and objective — to be explained elsewhere, the formal end of Logic is the perfect knowledge of the mode of knowing, or of the syllogism, as Tataretus indicates in *q. 2 dub. 2*. The objective end is the mode of knowing, or the syllogism, with which it is entirely occupied. And since the intrinsic end of a science coincides with its object — as Faber observes at the end of *Theor. 1* from Scotus in *q. 3 prol. ante T.* — nothing else need be investigated beyond what I have already handed down above on the object.

Book II: On Universals

Aristotle warns in *On the Parts of Animals*, I.1, that the investigation of universals should precede the investigation of particulars. Following in his footsteps and carrying out his directive, I shall treat first of universals taken generally, and then of each one in particular — so that, once the universal is known in common, each particular may be understood more conveniently. Although an ample and extended treatment of these matters pertains more properly to Metaphysics than to Logic, as Hurt. objects at *disp.* 3, §. 1, and although he censures this as an abuse in the schools and endeavors to remove it entirely: nevertheless, because many things in Dialectics as well as in the remaining sciences cannot be grasped by beginners without knowledge of universals, we are compelled to set forth their treatment here, together with Scotus and the other philosophers — especially since Logic treats universals according to intentional being and Metaphysics treats them according to real being. As Joannes Anglicus notes at 9.24, there is nothing logical that cannot be investigated metaphysically, and nothing metaphysical that cannot in its own way be examined logically, on account of the agreement and affinity between the two disciplines, concerning which see above, *q.* 2, *art.* 7 of the preceding book. All the more so because the aforesaid Hurt., unwilling to do so, nevertheless falls into metaphysical questions from which he had resolved to abstain, as though he had corrected a common error. For this author, at the very beginning of *sect.* 1, inquires whether the higher degrees are formally distinguished from the lower ones. And at *disp.* 6, *sect.* 3, he investigates whether the concept of the subaltern difference belongs to the formal concept of the ultimate difference. These and similar matters are considerations proper to Metaphysics, and so Hurt. is caught in his own net, the very one he wove for others. Accordingly, I have resolved to discuss and settle here whatever of the matters to be transmitted in the course of this work must be known before we reach Metaphysics.

Question I: On Universals in Common

Article I: Whether Universals Exist

The Subtle Doctor at *1.d.3.q.4*, §. *quantum ad 3, art.*, shortly before I, together with Lych., Vigerius there, and Aur. *d.* 36, *art.* 1, records the opinion of the Heracliteans, whose foremost leaders are Heraclitus and Cratylus. These men, as Aristotle testifies at *3 Caeli*, T.3, *1 Met.* T.5, and 4 of the same work at T.22, perceiving that all things are in perpetual flux and subject to corruption, deny that there are any universals in things and abolish entirely all science that is had of universals. But they are sharply attacked and vigorously refuted by the Stagirite and Scotus in the cited passages, together with Socrates and the other philosophers, all of whom write with one pen that universals are given. With the various accepted senses of the universal presupposed — senses which Maior sets

out at *1 praedicabiliū*, q. 3, not. 1 — and with what I have gathered and explained in the *Epitome*, l. 1, q. 3, art. 1 and 2 regarding the division and definition of the universal and its conditions recognized, the following assertion is made.

Assertion: Universals exist. So Scotus in the cited passage and at q. 4 *univers.*, where he proves that the universal is a being. And at *2.d.3.q.1*, it is argued: first, from Aristotle at *1 Perih.* c. 5, where he divides things into universals and singulars; and at *1 Phys.* T. 49; and at *2 De Anima*, q. 5, T. 60; and at 3 of the same work, T. 58: intellect is of universals and sense is of singulars. Second, those things ought to be admitted for which there is a definition, *7 Met.* T. 14 and 29 — for of what is not a being, no definition is given, as the Doctor notes at *4.d.1.q.2*. But universals are defined at *1 Perih.* 5 and *1 Post.* 25; universals must therefore be conceded. Third, the objects of the sciences, with which the sciences are occupied, cannot be denied, as Scotus touches upon at q. 3, *prol.* 5, *Ad 1, arg.* 1, q. But the objects of the sciences are universals, *7 Met.*, cited by the Doctor at *coll.* 76, §. *Ad 1 istorum*. And of singulars there is no science: *1 Post.* T. 62 and *7 Met.* T. 53. The reason is given by Scotus at *2.d.9.q.2*, §. *Ad arg. pro 1 opinione in solut.* 4, namely, because singulars do not have proper knowable and demonstrable attributes. This is confirmed by the same author at *3.d.22*, sub F. 4, from Aristotle's chapter on relation: when one relative is posited, the other is also posited, since correlatives are simultaneous by nature. But singulars are given, as is plain to all; therefore universals must be established as their correlatives.

Fourth objection. First: Everything that exists in the world is singular; therefore no universal is given. The antecedent is proved: everything that exists is either created or uncreated; but both the created and the uncreated are singular. For God alone is uncreated, and he is singular; and everything created is likewise singular, for creation and every kind of production is of singulars, *1 Met.* c. 1. Confirmation from Boethius: everything that exists, exists precisely because it is numerically one. But the universal is not numerically one, which is what is singular; therefore no universal is given. I distinguish the antecedent with Tatar. q. 1 *Praedicabiliū dub.* 3 and Orbel. *1 Met.* q. 1 in fine 2.2: through itself, I concede; through accident, denominatively and really, I deny. This distinction is derived from *1 Met.* c. 1, where Aristotle, asserting that experience is of singulars and art is of universals, adds: for the physician does not cure a man except per accidens, but Callias or Socrates, to whom it is an accident to be a man. Or — which comes to nearly the same thing — the antecedent may be distinguished: primarily and immediately, I concede; secondarily and mediately, I deny. This response is drawn from Aristotle in the *Praedicamenta*, chapter on substance: when primary substances are destroyed, the secondary substances are destroyed also. Now primary substances are singulars, and secondary substances are universals. Therefore production and destruction touch singulars immediately and universals only mediately. Thus when Peter is born or dies, this man who is called Peter is immediately born or dies; but man is born or dies only mediately.

Scotus responds the same way at *2.d.3.q.6*, §. *Ad q. D.*, and at *3.d.22, q. un.*, §. *Ad 1*, G.

You will press the point: at *q. 4 univers.*, Scotus argues that Boethius must be interpreted as speaking of what exists apart from the operation of the intellect, which is not the case with the universal, which has its being through the work of the intellect; therefore the foregoing distinction is worthless. Moreover, the argument from the negation of the inferior to the negation of the superior does not hold. For it does not follow: man does not exist; therefore animal does not exist. Nor: animal does not exist; therefore body does not exist. It is therefore not well argued that when singulars are removed, universals are removed as well. And Porphyry expressly teaches this in the last chapter of the *Isagoge*, saying that when all individuals are removed, the species is not removed; and when all species are removed, the genus is not removed — since the prior can exist without the posterior. Therefore the genus can exist without the species, and the species without the individuals.

I reply that Scotus in that passage speaks of the logical universal, not of the metaphysical universal, for which the aforesaid response stands. To the other inference I say that the argument is not from the negation of the inferior to the negation of the superior, but from a sufficient enumeration of the parts: when all the parts of some whole are removed, the whole must necessarily be removed. As for Porphyry, I say that he must be interpreted as speaking of objective and cognized being, not of the being of real existence, as Aristotle says in the passage cited.

Fifth objection. Second: Everything other than primary substance is either predicated of primary substance or is in primary substance. But the universal is other than primary substance and is neither in primary substance nor predicated of primary substance — for only secondary substances are predicated of primary substances; and if it were in primary substance, it would be an accident, like whiteness which is in the wall. I concede the major. I distinguish the minor: the universal taken precisely, I concede — for so taken it abstracts from substance and accident, just as being taken precisely abstracts from finite and infinite. But if the universal is taken specifically, as a per se subsisting being, then secondary substances are universals, and they exist in primary substances by inexistence and not by inherence as accidents do, and are predicated of them, as: Peter is a man.

Sixth objection. Third: Whatever exists either comes from nature or from intellect. But the universal does not come from nature, since nature regards only the singular; therefore the universal comes from the intellect, and is hence a fiction. I concede the major. I distinguish the minor: that the metaphysical universal exists on the part of the thing, I concede; the logical universal, I deny — for it comes from the intellect, yet is not a fiction because it has a foundation

in the thing, as the Doctor intimates at *q. 4 univers.* and *Theor. 4*. This will be explained below.

You will press: if the logical universal comes through the intellect, as is conceded, then it is poorly investigated whether universals exist. The consequence is argued: a proposition with two terms signifies real existence, as "man exists," in which what exists only through the intellect cannot participate — as is the case with the logical universal. I concede the antecedent and deny the consequence. To the proof I say that the proposition is not an absolute proposition with two terms, but is a dubitable proposition, or a dialectical problem, as may be seen at *1 Top. 1*. Or one may say that there is a twofold existence: real, which a real being possesses; and intentional, which a being of reason enjoys — such as the logical universal.

Article II: Whether Universals Are Spoken Words or Concepts

The Nominalists, whose prince or rather restorer is Ockham in the *Logic* c. 14, *1.d.2.q.4*, and *Quel. 4* and *5* — his faithful companion Gabriel in the same places, and Greg. at *1.d.3.q.1, art. 2*, to whom Aur. seems to assent at *1 dist. 33, art. 2* — hold that universals are nothing other than spoken words or concepts. They think that the universal in predication coincides with the universal in signification, not in the sense that the universal in signification signifies a common nature — since every nature is singular — but because it immediately signifies several singulars: thus the word "man," by its primary and immediate signification, designates all and each individual man. These thinkers are called Nominalists because they attribute much to names, as may be seen in the cited passages. They are indeed very learned and ingenious men, though accepted and received by few; they are graduates of the Scotist school, praised and defended by Hurt. at *disp. 1, sect. 3* and *disp. 5, Met. sect. 10, subsect. 2*. Although the said Hurt. endeavors to draw and reduce them to the Thomist position, they are perhaps unwilling to embrace it, since they constitute and advance a third class differing in every way from both the Thomist and the Scotist positions. But whatever may be said of this, all the realist philosophers defend the opposing opinion, categorically denying that universals are spoken words or concepts.

Assertion: Universals are neither names nor concepts. This assertion is twofold and is drawn from Scotus at *q. 4 univers.*, where he proves that universals are beings, and at *q. 1 praedicam.*, §. *Ad q.*, and *7 Met. q. 18* after Scholium I of Canellus. Hence the same Doctor at *1.d.26.q.un.*, §. *Quantum ad 3 viam*, G, adds that problems that are merely about spoken words are vain.

The first part is argued: first, from Aristotle at *1 Perih. c. 5*, who calls things universal, not spoken words and names. At *1 Post. c. 2*, universals are better known than singulars. At *7 Met. T. 4* and *45*, the universal is one in many. And there at *T. 24* and *51*, disputing against Plato, he does not contend that universals are names, nor does he reproach Plato on this account; rather, presupposing

that universals are beings, he vehemently refutes and sharply rebukes him precisely because Plato placed them outside and really separated and abstracted from singulars. Second, from St. Anselm, *l. de Incarnatione Verbi*, c. 2: "Those dialecticians of our time who think that universal substances are nothing but the blowing of a voice ought certainly to be warned." And shortly after: "For one who understands the world — how several men are one man in species — how will he comprehend in that most secret and most lofty nature how several persons, each of whom is perfect God, are one God?" Third, no science is about spoken words and names, as is plain to anyone who runs through the individual objects of any science. A dispute about a name is considered trivial by all. Hence Augustine at *1 Retract.* c. 15 says: when the matter is settled, undue force should not be applied to the name. And Scotus at *1.d.8.q.1*, E, calls an objection about a name childish. But science is about universals, from Aristotle at *2 Met.* T. 10 and Scotus there, and at 3 of the same work toward the end; therefore universals are not spoken words. Further, definition is of universals, from the same authors at *7 Met.* T. 35, which properly explains not the nature of a name but the nature of the thing. Again, when "animal" is divided into rational and irrational, it is not the spoken word "animal" that is divided, but something distinct from the word itself and signified by it. Moreover, universals are said to be eternal, to abstract from singulars, and to be predicated of them as superiors of inferiors — as Lych. argues acutely against Ockham at *2.d.3.q.1*. These and similar properties are appropriately applied not to spoken words but to things. It must therefore be denied that universals are spoken words.

The second part is proved: first, every concept is either formal or objective. But universals are not objective concepts, as the adversaries themselves admit — for objective concepts are things known and understood, which they do not allow. Nor are they formal concepts, since formal concepts, being entirely acts of intellection residing in the category of quality, while some universals are substances and some are accidents — as is plain in Porphyry's *Isagoge* and Aristotle's *Praedicamenta* — it clearly follows that universals are not formal concepts. Second, universals enter into the essence of singulars, as "rational" belongs to the essence of Peter and "irrational" to the essence of Bucephalus; but formal concepts are outside the essence of singulars, for they reside in and perfect the intellect, *9 Met.* 16. Therefore universals are not formal concepts. Third, these propositions are true: "Peter is a man," "Bucephalus is a horse"; but these are false: "Peter is a concept," "Bucephalus is a concept." Since universals are therefore predicated essentially of singulars, but concepts are not, as the cited propositions make plain, it is evidently concluded that universals are in no way concepts.

You will say that universals are concepts that suppose not simply or for themselves but personally — that is, for the things they signify — just as spoken words stand proxy for things. Against this: if concepts suppose for things, and if all things, according to the opponents, are singular, then the aforesaid

propositions would also be false: "Peter is a man," "Bucephalus is a horse." For the sense would be that Peter is every man, since "man" is a common term and would suppose for each individual of human nature. Likewise, in "Bucephalus is a horse," the term "horse" would suppose for all and each individual horse — and these and similar conclusions are redolent of absurdity and falsity.

Thirteenth objection. First: Universals are not confined to a particular place and time, because they are said to be eternal and everywhere. But all things except God are confined to a particular place and time; therefore no universals exist besides spoken words and concepts. I concede the major. I distinguish the minor: singular things, I concede; universal things, I deny. For the division of things is into singulars and universals, *1 Perih.* 5. And universals are said to abstract from place and time and to be everywhere, not positively but negatively, as will plainly appear from what is to be explained below.

Fourteenth objection. Second: To signify belongs to names; but universals signify; therefore universals are names. The major is known from the *Epitome*, where I presented and explained the definition of a name as a spoken word signifying by convention. The minor is supported by the authority of Aristotle in the chapter on substance: secondary substances, which are counted among universals, signify a kind of what. And at *4 Pol.* 2: to dispute about the best constitution of a state is nothing other than to discuss these names — where he had just mentioned kingship, aristocracy, and democracy; therefore the Nominalist opinion is true and Peripatetic. I reply that the Philosopher used metonymy, taking names for things, which he explains at *1 Elench.* 1 by the likeness of counting-tokens used in place of money. And this is plainly demonstrated in the passage cited in the objection, where he says that primary substances signify this individual thing. But it is certain to all that primary substances are not names but true singular things subsisting per se. This manner of speaking is found at times in sacred scripture, as at *2 Reg.* 1: "What is the word? Tell me" — that is, show me what has been done. And more clearly at *Luke* 2: "Let us see the word that has come to pass" — that is, the thing that has come to pass. The Doctor intimates the same at *q. 1 praedicam.*, §. *Ad q. dici potest*, toward the authority of Boethius. And earlier, Aug. *q. 19 in Indic.*

Fifteenth objection. Third: From Scotus now cited, toward *Ad aliud dico*: Logic is about the concept; thus the Nominalists seem to wish universals to be concepts signified by spoken words, in which sense Hurt. in the cited passage interprets them and Tol. *q. 2 in Porph.* indicates the same exposition. Therefore the Nominalists do not depart from Scotus's teaching. The response to this objection is to be found at *l. 1, q. 3, art. 6*, where it is said that Scotus holds Logic to be about the concept formed by the act of reason, which coincides with the being of reason and the second intention, which I have established as the subject of Logic according to predication, not according to attribution — from which the Nominalists appear to differ greatly.

Article III: Whether Universals Are Platonic Ideas

The opinion of Plato, who supposed universals to be ideas of things — that is, common specific natures existing per se, really separated from singulars, necessary, eternal, incorruptible, principles and efficient causes of singulars — is recited and refuted by Aristotle at *1 Met.* c. 7, T. 15, and at 7 of the same work, c. 6, T. 28, 44, and elsewhere throughout. This seems to be Plato's view in the *Timaeus*, the *Theaetetus*, and *10 de Rep.* This position is recalled by Scotus at *1 post. q.* 31, §. *Ad probationes contra hoc*, and at *1.d.35, q. un.*, §. *Ad ista sub J*, and at *2.d.3.q.6*, §. *Ista positio*, sub A, and in the same distinction at *q. 1*, §. *sed contra istud.* Maior calls it a fiction at *l. praedicabilium, q. 3, Not.* 1. Orbel. at *7 Met.* c. 7, Pelbar. *Tom. 1 Rosar.* ver. *Idea* §. 5, and others likewise. Bonet, however, at *7 Met.* c. 2 and 3, expresses and defends it plainly and fully in ten assertions as a problem. The rest, perceiving its falsity and absurdity, attempt to repel this alleged calumny imposed on Plato by Aristotle and to defend Plato himself against it — among these are Aug. *22 Civ.* c. 26, and *3 contra Acad.*, and *7 Conf.*, Jambl. in his commentary on Plato, Bessarion, *l. 2*, Mayr. *1.d.47*, Rich. *d. 36*, and Vulpes *disp.* 29, *art.* 1. With these seems to agree Scotus at *4.d.50.q.3*, §. *Respondeo*, D, and at *1.d.35.q.un.*, §. *Ad ista sub I*, and Antonius Andreas at *7 Met. quest.* 16 — interpreting Plato charitably as speaking of ideas of things existing in the divine mind, roughly in the way theologians admit them; and so the divine Plato spoke divinely. But Aristotle rightly attacked Plato, as Aur. *1.d.36.art.1*, fol. 843, and Cyril *2 contra Julianum* demonstrate. Nor does it seem probable that all Plato's disciples, living in the same city, would attribute to him a position that is false and absurd. For Aristotle is not unaware that Plato established an eternal exemplar of the world, as is plain from *1 Caeli* — but Plato does not place the ideas of things in the divine mind as theologians do; rather, he places them as subsisting in themselves and as something really distinct and separate from and subsistent apart from singulars. Whatever Plato's meaning, what we must attack is this — whether it was taught by Plato, or by Xenocrates, or affirmed as a Platonic doctrine by other philosophers of the same period, as August. indicates at *7 Civ.* c. 28 — moved by the triple cause recounted by Aristotle in the cited passage, Scotus at *7 Met.* p. 216 in the note on the text, and Gadius *quol.* 7, fol. 85. The first is on account of the formal entity of things, since singulars are beings by participation. The second is on account of science, which is of necessary universals — for singulars are contingent and corruptible. The third is on account of the perpetual generation of things, for which singular agents do not seem adequate and sufficient.

Assertion: Universals are not Platonic ideas. This is pursued sharply against the afore-named Plato by Aristotle and Scotus in the cited passages, and by the remaining philosophers, both realists and nominalists. Proved: first, from *1 Met.* c. 7, T. 34: what belongs to the essence and quiddity of something is not really separated from it, for nothing is more intimate to a thing than its essence and quiddity. Or, as Scotus says at *2.d.3.q.1*, §. *sed contra L*: every substance existing

per se is proper to that whose substance or essence it is. But universals are the essences of singulars — the essence of Peter is to be rational, animal, body, etc., which are universals. Universals cannot therefore be Platonic ideas. Second, those Platonic ideas, or specific natures subsisting per se, are of the same nature as their singulars, and are themselves incorruptible, immaterial, and eternal; but their singulars are corruptible, material, and temporal according to Plato. Yet, as Aristotle argues at *3 Met.* c. 2, T. 6, it involves a contradiction to establish, among things of the same nature and kind, some as incorruptible and others as corruptible — since, as he says at *13 Met.* 6.9, T. 25, the corruptible and the incorruptible differ in genus. Third, a specific nature really separated from its singulars would both be common to many and not common to them. It would indeed be common, as Plato concedes — for what is participated in by many is common. But it would not be common, because what exists per se and immediately on the part of the thing is singular and incommunicable, which is opposed to the communicable and common; for only the singular exists per se and primarily, as I said in the first article of this question. Fourth, the universal is univocally predicated of its inferiors — as "Peter is a man," "Bucephalus is a horse." But the Platonic idea is not predicated univocally of its inferiors and singulars. For it is not well said: "Peter is the idea," "Bucephalus is the idea." Furthermore, if Platonic ideas were to be posited, it would be principally on account of the three aforesaid motives advanced before the asserted proposition; but these do not compel us to admit them in that way. And indeed not because of the first — for this man, for example, is truly a man, not by participation in a separated man, but by participation in human nature, which is common to individual men. Nor because of the second — for of mutable and corruptible things, science is had in view of the necessary connection between subject and predicate. Nor because of the third — for generation is of singulars, as is every other action; following that dictum of *1 Met.* c. 1: actions are of singulars. Therefore universals are not the afore-named ideas, but must be consigned, with Aristotle cited just below at T. 32, among empty verbiages and poetic metaphors.

Eighteenth objection. First: What is immutable and incorruptible cannot exist in what is mutable and corruptible; otherwise it would be changed and corrupted along with the latter's change and corruption. But universals are immutable and incorruptible, while their singulars are mutable and corruptible, as we experience daily. Therefore universals do not exist in singulars but remain separated from them — and these are what Plato calls the ideas of things. I reply that the major may be denied: for the rational soul, immortal and incorruptible, exists in the mortal and corruptible body. Likewise God, eternal and immortal, exists in things subject to time and change. As for our question, universals are in singulars, as is plain from the definition of the metaphysical universal — that is, one in many — just as superiors are in inferiors and quiddities in those whose quiddities they are. They may be said to be mutable, generable, and corruptible

not per se but per accidens, as I explained in the first article in response to the first objection. By this distinction the minor is answered: universals are immutable and incorruptible not simply and in an unqualified sense — for they are generated with the generation of singulars and corrupted with their corruption — but in a qualified and compound sense, as Scotus notes at *3.d.22, q. un.*, G.

Nineteenth objection. Second: Everything one thing that is participated in by many necessarily exists separately from them; otherwise it would not be one but many. But "man," for example, is something one and is participated in by many and univocally predicated of them; therefore a specific man must be granted as really separated from his singulars, and this is what is called the Platonic idea. And the same must be affirmed of the remaining specific natures. I deny the major, if that one thing is quidditative and essential common to many, as will be plain in the two following articles, in which it will be shown that common natures are given which enjoy unities lesser than numerical unity.

You will press: if we concede real common natures, we equally admit Platonic ideas, which mean nothing other than common specific natures participated in by many individuals, as may be seen in Maior at *1 praedicabilium, q. 30, not. 1*. And so, unwilling though we are, we fall into Platonic ideas, as some object to us. I deny the inference. For, as the Doctor says at *1 post. quest. 21* toward the end, there is no small difference between us and Plato. Because Plato placed common specific natures as really separated from singulars — as certain intelligences and minor gods, as Bonet, his auditor, notes after him at *8 Met. c. 1*, eighth statement. We, on the other hand, hold that common natures exist in singulars and have no existence distinct from the existence of singulars, as Aristotle intimates at *6 Eth. 11*: from singulars, universals arise.

Twenty-first objection. Third: Without any singular man being understood through the species of man, we understand man. But man as understood through such a species is not joined to individual men; otherwise he could not be understood without them. Therefore he is really separated from them. I reply that man is understood precisely without his singulars through abstraction of the intellect, not through real separation from singular men. For abstraction does not involve falsehood, *2 Phys. 12*. And thus it does not follow that a specific man separated really from his singulars is given; it only follows that man in himself is understood with singulars excluded — that is, without them being understood — for the superior can be understood without the inferiors on which it does not depend.

Article IV: Whether Real Common Natures Exist

Two highly celebrated and diametrically opposed opinions of the philosophers shine forth in this article. The first is that of St. Thomas in the opusculum *De Ente et Essentia*, c. 4, Cajetanus there, Ockham *1.d.2.q.6*, Gabriel in the same

place, and many others who deny that real common natures are given; Ponc. *disp.* 3, q. 2 lends his support to this view. The latter opinion belongs to Scotus at 7 *Met.* q. 16, 2.d.3.q.1, §. *Ad q.*, E and F, Antonius Andreas, Gratianus Brixienis there, Raconius *Tract.* 1 *de univers.* q. 2, Fons. 5 *Met.* c. 28, q. 4, and all the Scotists, who affirm that real common natures exist on the part of the thing.

Note I, from Scotus at q. 11 *univers.*, §. *Ad 1 q.*, and Vallo *Tract. form.* fol. 139 and 140, that a common nature can be considered in three ways. First, as it has being in its singulars — in which case it is determined, contracted, and singular through individual differences, which the Scotists call haecceities. This is called its material and fundamental being, in which common accidents inhere, such as whiteness, blackness, and the like. Second, in itself or according to its quidditative and essential being, to which only essential predicates belong — such as, for human nature, "sentient," "rational," and the like — and to which proper accidents belong, such as for said humanity, "risibility" and "teachability." Third, in known being, insofar as it is apprehended through an intelligible species by the intellect — as when the intellect perceives human nature as communicable and predicable of many, and moved by this attribute causes or leaves behind in the nature thus known a second intention, which is called a species. This distinction is commended as golden by Joannes Anglicus and Sarn. at q. 9 *univers.* p. 163, and is also indicated by the Doctor at 2 of the cited passage, and at 1 *Perih.* and 1.d.25.q.un., §. *Et relatio* sub G.

Note II: Although a common nature cannot exist without its singulars, as the Philosopher demonstrates against Plato in the preceding article, it is not on that account singular of itself — since the singular is incommunicable and indivisible into subjective parts, whereas the common nature can be participated in by many and is divisible into subjective parts. Rather, it is prior by priority of nature to all singulars. For common things naturally precede singulars, and the more common precede the less common — thus being precedes substance, substance precedes body, and so on for the rest of the quidditative and essential predicates. In this prior state, Scotus adds at 2 of the cited passage, before F, that the nature is whatness, or essence, or quiddity, and is the per se object of the intellect pertaining to Metaphysics, whose consideration concerns every nature and quiddity in light of its essential predicates, which are enclosed in its definition; and the propositions formed of it thus taken are called propositions of the first mode of per se predication. The nature is then followed by its modes and attributes — principally unity, intelligibility, and the like. And since, in accordance with a thing's entity, there is a unity of being proportional to it, a unity lesser than numerical unity arises from the common nature. The nature itself, possessing the aforesaid attributes, is still indifferent to singular and universal being. For it receives the character of each in different ways, and is determined by haecceity to singular being and by the operation of the intellect to universal being, as will be made plain below. The remaining things that might be added here I leave to Metaphysics.

Assertion: Real common natures exist. So Scotus in the cited passages and at *10 Met. in exp.* T. p. 301. *Gadius quol.* 2, Vallo fol. 22, and Tatar. *q. 1 univers. dub.* 1. Proved from Aristotle at *1 Perih.* c. 5, where he divides things into universals and singulars; at *1 Eth.* 6: the nature of whiteness is the same in snow and in lead-white; and at *7 Met.* T. 45: "the universal is what is common; for that is called universal which by nature is apt to be in several things." And at T. 46: "the essence of animal is common to man and horse." From these and from the six hundred other passages one plainly gathers through Aristotle that real common natures exist, without anyone having to think further. Moreover, Aristotle himself pursues the Heracliteans, who admit only singular natures; therefore, unless common natures are conceded, he would attack them without reason. And I press the same point against the Nominalists and Thomists who teach that all real natures are entirely singular.

Second, against Masius *sect. de univers. q. 3, concl.* 8, the authority of August. *19 Civ.* c. 12 arises to meet and aid us: "Whoever contemplates with me human affairs and common nature, however partially, recognizes..." And in *Ps.* 118, *conc.* 8: "No remoteness of genus need be thought of where there is a common nature." The same is intimated by Damasc. *1 Fidei* c. 11 and 2 of the same work c. 22, and *1.3.6.3*, and Chrysost. *Hom.* 3 in *1 Cor.* 3. If every nature is singular of itself, there is no common nature — for singular and common are opposed; the singular is incommunicable, while the common is communicable to many. But it is established that human nature is common to many individuals of that nature — to Peter and Paul and the other singulars of that nature. Therefore real common natures must be admitted.

The adversaries respond that such commonality of nature is through the intellect, which abstracts the nature from its singulars, not on the part of the thing; and individuals of the same species are said to be such not formally but only fundamentally, as may be seen in Hurt. *disp.* 5, *Met. sect.* 2, §. 11. Against this: those that formally have the same essence on the part of the thing participate in the same common nature formally on the part of the thing. But the individuals of human nature formally have the same essence on the part of the thing — namely, the same humanity formally — for they are univocals, those whose essence is one and the same common to many, without anyone having to think further; otherwise their natures would be as distinct as their haecceities, as Hurt. contends in the cited passage. But in the common opinion they differ numerically in their haecceities and are the same in species according to the same specific nature formally — because they formally and really possess human nature, because they are really and formally men by participation in humanity that is not singular (which would be incommunicable to several) but rather common (which is communicable to several). Fourth, nature is understood as common; therefore it is truly really common. The antecedent is conceded by the opponents. The consequence is proved: if nature were not common and were understood as common, the understanding would be false —

for that understanding is false by which a thing is understood otherwise than it is, and the intellect understanding a thing otherwise than it is errs, as St. August. notes at *1.83.qq.32*. And that understanding is true by which a thing is understood as it is. Hence Aristotle adds at *1 Perih.* c. 3: because a thing is or is not, a proposition is true or false. Fourth, without any work of the intellect, Francis and Anthony agree more with each other than Francis and Bucephalus — because the former are of the same species, while the latter are of different species. But that in which they agree is not singular, because the singular is incommunicable to many; therefore it is common to many, which is what we call a specific common nature. Again, the definition explains the nature of the thing, as every school holds; but the nature which the definition expresses is not singular, because *7 Met.* T. 35: definition is of universals. Therefore it is a common nature. The formal distinction between higher and lower grades, which is introduced in *Metaphysics*, and many other things supposed here, powerfully and effectively establish common natures.

Twenty-seventh objection. First: Entities should not be multiplied without necessity, as Scotus teaches at *2.d.2.q.2*, §. *Ad 2 partem q. 7*, following Aristotle at *1 Phys.* T. 1. But if real common natures are admitted, entities are multiplied without necessity — for singular natures suffice, of which all actions are, *1 Met.* 1. Therefore, since being is for the sake of acting and actions belong to singulars, it is clearly concluded that there are no real common natures. I concede the major and deny the minor. For the reasons given and to be given in the following article amply and plainly show that such common natures must be conceded. As for how actions are said to belong to singulars, I made this plain in response to the first objection of art. 1 of this question.

Twenty-eighth objection. Second: Given a real common nature in many singulars, the singulars themselves would not differ from one another but would be entirely the same, according to the axiom of *1 Priora*: things that are the same as a third thing are the same as each other. But it is absurd for singulars not to be distinguished from one another; therefore it is absurd to introduce a real common nature into them. I deny that the inference of the major holds. That axiom is explained by the Doctor at *1 Prior.* q. 9, *1.d.2.q.7*, §. *Ad 1 arg.* II: things that are the same as a third are the same as each other in that identity in which they agree. In this way singulars are identified in the common nature they participate in, but not in their singularities, in which they differ from one another.

You will press, with Suarez *1.4. de Trin. Tract.* 3, q. 3, and Vasquez *disp.* 123, c. 2: once Scotus's explanation is admitted, the fallacy of *petitio principii* is committed. For the meaning would be: things that are the same as a third are the same in it, or are united in it — which is to beg the question. But that axiom has an inferential force: from the fact that certain things are the same in a third, it is inferred that they are the same as each other in the same identity — just as they are the same in the third formally, so they are the same as each other

formally. It may be said, with Faber *1. disp.* 19, that although that general principle admits the aforesaid sense, nevertheless the question is not begged — for someone might know two extremes and be ignorant of whether they agree in a third. From knowledge of the third in which they agree, one can rightly conclude that they also agree with each other in the manner in which they agree in the third, which was previously unknown. And through this proposition thus understood every formal syllogistic form holds, Scotus adds there; with the other condition omitted — either the unity of the middle term between itself, or of the extremes with the middle — it is not a syllogism but a parallogism of accident. Or it may be said, with the same Doctor there, toward *Alia responsio*, that the axiom holds for finite and limited things but not for infinite and unlimited ones, as I explained in the *Epitome*, *l.* 3, *q.* 1, *art.* 4. Now a common nature is in some way unlimited, because it is of itself indifferent to being contracted by this or that singularity; and when it has been contracted through one haecceity, it does not repugn that it be contracted through another haecceity, as Scotus notes at *2.d.3.q.1*, §. *sed contra istud* L.

Thirtieth objection. Third, with Ockham *1.d.2.q.6*: one and the same thing cannot be divided into several things that are adequately identified with it. But nature existing in singulars is not one but multiple, in accordance with the multiplicity of haecceities. Therefore no nature is really common. The major is plain: one is undivided in itself and divided from everything else. The minor is obvious: for Francis, Anthony, and John, for example, are three men, not one man. You reply that the argument concludes about a thing that is one in number, not about a thing that is one with a unity less than numerical unity — such as is the common nature. From this, that proposition of Porphyry, examined by the Doctor at *q.* 21 *univers.*, §. *Ad q.*, and by Tatar. in the chapter on species, appears true: several men by participation in the species are one man.

Thirty-first objection. Fourth: If the same created nature is communicated to many singulars, it follows that in created things there is a mystery analogous to the Trinity — just as in divine things — because the same created nature is really identified with its singulars, just as the divine nature is really the same as the three divine persons. Nor does it help to say that the created common nature is formally distinguished from the singularities, since, even according to Scotus, the divine nature formally differs from the three divine personalities. I deny the inference — because created nature is not of itself singular but indifferent to singularity and universality. But divine nature is of itself singular and is incompatible with being determined through several haecceities. It is therefore wrongly inferred that the mystery of the Trinity exists in created things from the fact that a common nature is given to many singulars. As for what is added about the formal distinction of the nature from the singularities, it is indeed true, but nothing is inferred against us who have assigned the difference and disparity between the divine and created nature, which Scotus likewise intimates at 2 in the cited passage, §. *sed contra*, around H.

Thirty-second objection. Fifth: Scotus at *quol.* 3, §. *Respondeo Q*, says that in created nature there is a commonality of reason; therefore, according to the Doctor, the real commonality of the common nature is not to be admitted — or else the Doctor plainly contradicts himself. Lych. and Gadius reply there that Scotus speaks in the aforesaid *Quodlibet* of commonality and universality in act and in the logical sense, which is effected by the intellect; not of the metaphysical commonality and universality which exists on the part of the thing independently of the intellect, and which the same author evidently taught and vigorously defended in the cited passages.

Article V: Whether a Common Nature Is in Many Things Through Inexistence or Through Indifference

Although all Scotists subscribe with one pen to the view that there is a real common nature in many things without any work of the intellect, they nevertheless disagree among themselves: some, like Lych. *2.d.3.q.1* and Tatar. *q. 1 praedicab. dub. 3*, to whom Fuentes *q. 6, dif. 2, art. 2* and two younger authors at *disp. 4, q. 1, art. 1* assent, hold that the real nature is common to many through indifference. Others, such as Bonet *1 Met. c. 2* and *3* of the same work *c. 1*, and Canonicus *1 phys. q. 6*, hold that the common nature is common to many through inexistence — that is, through actually residing in them. Faber *Theor. 93* strikes the same anvil. For a more convenient grasp of this:

Note: for a nature to be common through inexistence means nothing other than that it exists in many inferiors and singulars and is really participated in by them — so that humanity, for example, is truly and really found in Peter, Paul, and the other individuals of that nature, contracted through their individual differences, in such a way that these individuals are distinguished from one another only by numerical differences. For a nature to be common through indifference, on the other hand, means that each individual possesses its own proper nature, so that the humanity of Peter is different from the humanity of Paul, prior to being conceived as contracted through their haecceities. It is nevertheless called a common nature because, although it is contracted and determined through its individual differences, it is still indeterminate and indifferent — not being determined or contracted more to one individual difference than to another of itself, but always being indifferent and indeterminate to any of them, to whichever of them the generating agent determines it. What indetermination and indifference are, and how many kinds there are, will be shown below in art. 7, not. 4.

Assertion: It is probable that the common nature is in its inferiors through inexistence. Proved: first, from Scotus *2.d.3.q.1*, §. *sed contra*, and there at *q. 6*, sub D, asserting and saying that a unity less than numerical unity belongs to the common nature insofar as it abstracts from individuals, and he gives the example of the specific nature which is found in its singulars. For he has these explicit words in the afore-named passage, sub I: "Therefore there is something

common in the thing, which is not of itself this." Thus, since, according to the same Doctor, a real unity distinct from numerical unity belongs to the common nature insofar as it abstracts from the universal and the singular — and it is the object of the intellect and the ground of acting, while singularity is the ground of the agent — it plainly follows according to Scotus that the common nature is in many through inexistence. Second, the whole exists in its parts and the superior in its inferiors; but the common nature is a kind of whole and something superior with respect to singulars, and is their essence and quiddity. Therefore the common nature is in them through inexistence, as Aristotle argues against Plato in the cited passages of art. 3 of this question. As for what the advocates of the opposing position press — especially the two more recent authors — one can satisfy them without difficulty. First, Scotus does not much favor them, as is plain to anyone who reads his passages cited by them. For the Doctor does not assert what the afore-named recent authors impute to him. *2.d.3.q.7, d. 3, d.8.q. un.* in fine, as is plain to one who examines his text. Although at *d. 3, q. 6* of the second book cited, §. *Ad q. sub D*, he expressly says these words: "I therefore concede that a real unity is not of anything existing in two individuals, but in one." Yet a little later he excellently explains and illustrates this by a distinction, saying: "I concede that whatever is in this stone is numerically one — either primarily, or per se, or denominatively. Primarily, perhaps, as that by which such unity belongs to this composite per se, as this stone, of which that which is primarily one with this unity is a part per se. And denominatively only, as that potential element which is perfected by the actual element, which as it were denominatively regards the latter's actuality and unity." He then adds, further explaining this solution, as follows: "This entity, from which this perfect unity arises, can be explained by analogy with the entity from which the specific difference is derived. For the specific difference can be compared to what is below it, to what is above it, and to what is alongside it." See more there and in Ockham *1.d.3.q.6*. From this it is plainly derived that Scotus wishes the common nature to inexist in its singulars — not primarily, indeed, but secondarily, as I explained in art. 1 of this question in response to the first objection. The same Doctor adds in that place that the singular entity is indivisible into subjective parts, while it does not repugn the common nature — which has a unity less than numerical — to be divisible into subjective parts. And this he states more clearly there sub K: "Whatever is common and yet determinable can still be distinguished, however much it is one thing, into several formally distinct realities, of which this is formally not that — but this is formally a singular entity, and that is formally the entity of the nature. Nor can these two realities be thing and thing, as they can be reality and reality; whence the genus is derived, and the reality whence the difference is derived, from which the specific reality is derived — but they are always in the same thing, whether part or whole, as formally distinct realities of the same thing." Again, the reasons the Doctor adduces to establish the aforesaid common nature effectively corroborate and evidently confirm its inexistence in singulars. And

the formal distinction which the same Doctor introduces among the metaphysical grades or essential predicates does not obscurely intimate this inexistence. The same is illustrated by the example of specific and generic nature, which would be to no point if the common nature were in its inferiors through indifference only — for then every nature would plainly be singular, as those earlier philosophers cited in art. 1 of this question maintain, and there would be no difference or disagreement between them and Aristotle, nor among Thomas, Scotus, Ockham, and their respective followers — whom, however, their own minds and writings clearly show to differ from one another and to arrive at no agreement. Likewise the solutions to the objections now to be adduced will make the same thing plainly manifest.

Thirty-sixth objection. First: One and the same nature cannot simultaneously be wretched and damned, and blessed and glorious — for this involves a contradiction. But if a common nature in many through inexistence is conceded, that very same nature would be both reprobate and elect, simultaneously wretched and blessed — wretched and damned in Judas, blessed and glorious in Christ the Lord. Therefore a common nature through inexistence in many does not seem to be conceded. I reply by conceding the major and denying the minor. For none of the aforesaid inconveniences is inferred — since actions and passions are of singulars, *1 Met.* 1, as Scotus notes at *4.d.8.q.2*, §. *Istas omnes*, and at *d. 12, q. 3*, and Bonet at *1 Met.* c. 2 and 8 of the same work, c. 1. For the common nature is not said to vegetate, sense, or understand, or to perform other actions, since all of these are effected only by singulars. Nor is it inconvenient that certain individuals of the same species should suffer perpetual punishment on account of their demerits — as Judas — while others enjoy eternal glory on account of their merits — as Christ the Lord. For individuals of the same species have singular natures through the contraction of individual differences, from which distinct actions arise; if these are good and meritorious, they deserve reward; if evil and demeritorious, they deserve punishment. Therefore the objection of Ockham and the afore-named recent authors — claiming it is absurd for one and the same nature to be affected with the afore-listed predicates — is of no force. For this holds of one and the same numerically identical nature, not of a nature numerically distinct from another, as is shown in the case of the nature of Christ and of Judas. The Doctor asserts this against those recent authors cited by them. Nor does Aristotle dissent at *12 Met.* T. 12, saying: "For singulars there is a different matter, and a different mover, and species; but by universal reason, the same."

You will say: either the humanity of Christ is the same as the humanity of Judas, or it is different — for between the same and the different there is no mean, *10 Met.* 12. But it is not the same; otherwise the same nature would participate in the aforesaid opposite predicates. Nor is it different — since it is only diverse haecceities that come to the nature; rather, the haecceities are different rather than the nature determined and contracted through such haecceities. I reply

that the nature is the same in species but not the same in number. For the specific nature is divided into subjective parts and multiplied numerically in accordance with haecceities — just as the generic nature is contracted and determined to species through specific differences, so the specific nature is determined and contracted to individuals through individual differences, as Scotus subtly notes at 2.d.3.q.6, §. *Ista positio*. These individual differences are neither singular natures nor singulars, but singularities, or grounds and constitutive principles of singulars. Hurt., not properly weighing these and similar points at *disp.* 5, *Met. sect.*, thinks himself to be demonstrating something against the Scotist school. But what he advances is entirely without force for us, who distinguish specific nature, singularities, and singulars. For the specific nature is communicable to many individuals; singularities are the constitutive differences of singulars that are primarily diverse; and singulars are constituted, incommunicable, and indivisible through the aforesaid haecceities and singularities, as the Doctor teaches learnedly and eloquently in the cited passage.

Thirty-eighth objection. Second: If a common nature inexisted in many singulars, God could neither create nor annihilate any individual of that nature, as the authors of the first opinion argue. But this conflicts with orthodox faith, as is plain from *Gen.* 1 and proved in Scotus at 2.d.1.q.2 and 4.d.1.q.1. Therefore the aforesaid common nature through inexistence in many is not to be admitted. The consequent of the major is argued: creation is the production of a thing from nothing — that is, with no presupposition of it — from the Doctor there and 2 *Report. d.* 1, *q.* 3. And annihilation is the destruction of a thing into nothing — that is, with nothing of it remaining. But if God were to create Francis, the common human nature already pre-exists in Peter and Paul; therefore God could not create the said Francis, nor annihilate him, because the same common nature would persist in the afore-named Peter and Paul. Confirmation: in the Eucharist there would not be a total transmutation of bread and wine into the body of Christ, because the common nature of substance and body would still persist in the body of Christ himself — which is redolent of heresy and conflicts with Scotus at 4.d.10.q.1. The consequent of the major is to be denied. To its proof I say that creation and annihilation touch not the common nature but singulars — as I was just saying about any action and passion in response to the preceding objection. The same is to be said for the confirmation.

You will say: Scotus in the second cited passage, §. *quantum ad istum art.* C, explaining how God can create something from nothing, says: "from nothing, that is, not from anything according to its being of existence, nor from anything according to its being of essence — because the being of essence is never really separated from the being of existence." But if the common nature were presupposed to already exist in certain individuals, the newly produced individual would be produced from that quidditative being and the being of the

essence and nature pre-existing in the other individuals; and therefore God could in no way create another individual of the same nature.

I reply that Scotus there, and at *Report. 2, dist. 12, quest. S*, teaches only that the being of essence is not really distinguished and separated from the being of existence — against Henry and others who think the essences of things exist from eternity, as is plain at *1 dist. 36, q. un.* But that the common nature and its quidditative being do not fall under creation, I showed and made evident sufficiently above. All the more so because, just as the possible and cognized being of things in the divine mind from eternity does not impede their creation in time, so the common nature pre-existing in certain individuals does not prevent other individuals from being created — since creation is of singulars alone. Finally, by the admission of the inexistence of the common nature in singulars, no universal is formally conceded on the part of the thing, as will be shown below in art. 7.

Article VI: Whether a Common Nature Has Its Own Unity Distinct from Numerical Unity

The opinions entirely opposed to each other, and the same authors holding different views, recounted in the fourth preceding article, are found here as well. And the dissolution of this question appears without doubt to depend on the solution of that one. Therefore, for its grasp and explanation:

Note: unity is convertible with being as a property that follows from it, *4 Met. c. 2, T. 3*. Unity is said in as many ways as being, *1 Top. 5*. And the Doctor receives this at *q. 10 praedicam., §. Ad q. dicitur*. Now, in accordance with the entity of each thing, a unity proportional to it accompanies it — if the being is singular, its unity is numerical; but if the being is common, its unity is likewise common. Since therefore the nature is not of itself this or singular, as I showed in the preceding article, it follows that it is one with a common unity, which is called by Scotus and his disciples a unity less than numerical unity — so called in relation to numerical unity, which is the greatest unity — as Sirect affirms at *Tract. form. fol. 9, in fine 1, pag. art. 1 principal*. For the higher the unity, the less it is, according to Scotus — because inferiors are more undivided, and greater unity entails less unity, but not conversely, less unity entails greater. Hence that celebrated canon: from inferior to superior the inference holds, but not conversely. The remaining things that might be said about unity properly claim their place in Metaphysics.

Assertion: The common nature is one with a unity less than numerical unity. So Scotus in the above-cited passages and at *10 Met. in exp. tex. p. 106, in the note*. And this is indicated by Aristotle at *5 Met.* Proved: first, unity is a property of being, and a property is convertible with that of which it is the property, from what was said in the preceding note — for each thing has its own proper unity in accordance with its proper entity. But the common nature is a being; for it has

true and real being on the part of the thing, as is plain from art. 4. Therefore the common nature enjoys the aforesaid unity. Second, either only numerical unity is given, or another unity distinct from numerical unity is conceded. If the second, the intended conclusion is had. If the first — with only numerical unity admitted — only a singular nature is admitted; and thus the opinion of Heraclitus and Cratylus is true, which Aristotle, the Thomists, the Scotists, and the Nominalists cited in art. 1 of this question all strive with all their strength to destroy. From this it follows that Fuentes does not seem to speak consistently with the Doctor's mind when he says at *q. 6, art. 2, dif. 2, ob. 1*, that there are as many common natures as there are singular natures. For many things are predicated of the common nature that cannot be said of singular natures — such as: the common nature is communicable to many and divisible into subjective parts; it enjoys a common unity; it is not of itself this; it is prior by nature to singulars — and similar things which the Doctor infers in the second cited passage. Third, in every genus there is one which is the measure and standard of the others, *10 Met. T. 22*. But that one is not one with numerical unity, which belongs to singular nature alone; therefore it is one with another unity — the unity of commonality. Again, at *7 Met. T. 29*, in the lowest or infima species a comparison is made because the nature is one; but that nature of which the Philosopher speaks there is not numerical, as is plainly clear from his text. Therefore its unity is not numerical. Added to this: in the *Praedicamenta*, chapter on relation, and *5 Met.*, chapter on relation, the relations of identity, equality, and similarity are founded upon a real one — because they are real relations, as August. teaches at *1 de vera religione*, c. 31 and 36. But that one upon which the afore-named relations are founded is not one with numerical unity, because it is communicated and adapted to many; therefore it is one with the unity of commonality.

Forty-fourth objection. First: Either the whole common nature, with its unity, is found in one singular or not. If not, then that singular is not perfect, because it does not participate in the whole nature. If yes, then the common nature is not in another singular — because the whole is that outside of which nothing exists, *3 Phys. 68*. And so there would be only a singular nature with its numerical unity. I reply that the whole common nature with its unity inexists in one individual inadequately, but in all its individuals adequately. Let the example be the rational soul, which adequately exists in the whole human body it informs, but inadequately in each of its individual parts.

Forty-fifth objection. Second: What is in another denominates that in which it is, by what it is — as is plain of whiteness existing in Peter, which denominates Peter himself as white, and of humanity existing in Paul, which denominates Paul himself as a man. Therefore if the common nature together with its unity exists in a singular, the singular will be common and will be one with a unity other than numerical. But it is absurd for the singular to be common, since in created things these seem to be mutually opposed; and it is inconvenient for the

singular to be one with a unity other than numerical. Therefore it is equally inconvenient to admit a common nature with common unity. I reply that the antecedent admits of many counter-instances: for matter is in man, yet man is not matter; likewise water is in a vessel, yet the vessel is not water. Moreover, the stated antecedent holds where there is a univocal predicate, as "man is white" — as Vallo observes after Scotus at *3.d.7.q.3*, in *Tract. form.* fol. 64. But not where there is a determination and contraction of the common to the particular; for it does not follow: "form is in matter; therefore form is matter." And attributes that belong to the nature considered in itself and precisely do not get predicated of the nature as contracted through individual differences — just as if someone argued: "matter is indifferent and communicable to all forms; the matter of wood is per se matter; therefore the matter of wood is indifferent and communicable to all forms." The syllogism holds of matter taken from itself and precisely, not of matter as contracted to the form of wood or of another thing. For thus it is determined to one form, even though it does not repugn it to be determined through other forms. This can also be illustrated by the wall, which is in a neutral potency to receiving whiteness and blackness; nonetheless when it has whiteness, it is determined to that, though it has the potency to receive blackness — as is said in the divided but not in the composite sense. Therefore the consequence of the adduced objection is denied, because the nature in the individual is contracted; and therefore, as it is contracted through singularity, it is not denominated common — as Bonet excellently shows at *1 Met.* c. 5.

You will press: where the nature is, there too is its attribute — for these two are inseparable from each other according to Scotus. But the common nature is in a singular; therefore its attribute — common unity — is there too. But through the inexistent human nature, Peter is denominated a man; therefore through the unity of that very nature he is denominated common. But this conclusion is false; therefore one of the premises is also false. Not the major; therefore the minor — which is Scotus's proposition. I reply that although the common nature with its unity exists in the singular, it does not denominate the singular as common — because it is not predicated univocally of the singular, nor is it its univocal predicate, as is plain from the response to this objection. Hence Bonet's commentator at the cited passage writes that the singular is the subject of the common unity's inherence, but not of its denomination.

You will press further: either the nature, through individual contraction, loses its unity, or retains it. If the second, then the nature is common even as contracted. If the first, then the attribute really differs from the thing of which it is the attribute — which conflicts with Scotus's assertion that the attribute differs only formally from the thing of which it is an attribute. Fons. *5 Met.* c. 28, q. 3, sect. 4 replies that that unity belongs to the nature only in itself and in the state of precision; and that upon existing in singulars it is divested of it. Against this: the attribute accompanies the nature of which it is an attribute wherever and in whatever state it is; for it is reciprocally convertible with it per se and

necessarily, belongs to the same thing, and is really identified with it. Therefore, since the aforesaid unity is an attribute of the common nature, even as the nature is in singulars and as contracted, the nature does not lack such unity. I reply that the common nature indeed does not put away its proper unity insofar as it is contracted through the individual difference; nonetheless the individual is not denominated common, for the reason already assigned and illustrated by examples. But it can only be deduced and inferred that the individual has a common nature with the said unity — just as the transcendental and predicamental predicates exist in the individual with their attributes, as Bonet rightly notes in the afore-named passage.

Article VII: Whether Universals Exist Prior to the Operation of the Intellect

Although Arr. at *disp.* 4, *sect.* 4 thinks this difficulty and controversy is merely about a name, I see that the realist philosophers are sharply divided on this article, disputing most keenly about the matter itself. On one side, some — to whom Fons. 5 *Met.* c. 28, *q.* 5, *sect.* 3 and Racon. *Tract. univers.* *q.* 2 firmly adhere — maintain that universals exist prior to the operation of the intellect; Scotus and nearly the whole of his school are cited in support of this position, but undeservedly, as will appear below. On the other side, many defend with all the strength of their mind that universals exist after the operation of the intellect — the chief champions of this being: Scotus at *q.* 4 *univers.*, §. *Dicendum in solutione* 1, 3, and 7, and 7 *Met.* *q.* 18, and 2.d.3.q.1, §. *sed contra*, H; Mag. Thomas in 1 *de ente et essentia*, c. 4; Antonius Andreas 1 *sexprincip.* *q.* 5; Tromb. 7 *Met.* *q.* 9; Ferch. *vestig.* 1, num. 61; and nearly all the disciples of both groups.

Note I and recall from what was said in the *Epitome*, l. 1, *q.* 1, *art.* 10, that intention is twofold: first and second. The first intention is a known object — such as man as known. The second intention is a passive comparison of one known object to another known object. That is to say: the second intention is a relation of reason caused or left behind by the comparative act of the intellect comparing one known object to another known object — such as the comparison of species to its individuals, and of genus to its species, as was explained there with examples. Next, the division of the universal into logical and metaphysical, and the definition of each, given in the afore-named *Epitome*, *q.* 3, *art.* 1, are to be recalled: the metaphysical universal is one apt to be in many; the logical universal is one apt to be predicated of many.

Note II, from Scotus before *q.* 4 *univers.*, and at 7 *Met.* *q.* 18, and Orbel. there, c. 2, that the universal is a concrete name, the abstract of which is universality. A concrete accidental term, from what was said in the now-cited passage, *art.* 6, presents two things: form and the subject of it. The first, called formal, is its primary signification. The second, called material, is its secondary signification. Thus, since the universal is a concrete term, it can be taken in two ways: for its formal and for its material element. The universal taken for its formal element

is the same as the second intention, or the relation of reason of the predicable to that of which it is predicable — whose investigation per se pertains to Logic; and about this Scotus proposes to treat hereafter in the afore-cited passage. The universal taken for its material element, which amounts to the same as the universal taken for the denominated and the substrate, is a real being pertaining per se to Metaphysics. This material universal is further taken in two ways: for the remote denominate — called the universal in remote potency — which is the common nature existing in singulars, as Aver. writes at *1 Caeli comment.* 92; or for the proximate denominate — called the universal in proximate potency, or that which has the proximate potency to be predicated of several — which is the same common nature abstracted from its singulars by the intellect and divested of individual differences, shining forth in the intelligible species. The universal in act is that which is actually predicated of several and is actually known by the intellect as one predicable of many, by predication that says "this is this," or formal predication, as: "Peter is a man," "Bucephalus is a horse." All of this the Doctor expresses at 2 of the cited passage, H, toward *Ad 1 dico*.

Note III: that the nature from itself — that is, according to its proper and intrinsic entity and quiditative predicates — is neither one nor many, neither singular nor universal, as the Doctor notes in the just-cited passage, §. *Ad q. sub F*, from Avicenna *5 Met.* c. 1, who says: "horseness is only horseness." But the nature is followed by unity and plurality, singularity and universality. And common unity arises from the very nature itself as its attribute, insofar as it naturally precedes every singularity and universality. The nature, so indifferent, is determined to singularity through contraction and becomes numerically multiple in accordance with the multiplicity of individual differences. Through the operation of the intellect it is determined to universality — as, beyond the passage now recounted, Scotus asserts at *7 Met. q. 18* and *1.d.25.q.un.* in fine. But for such a nature to have actual and complete universality, it must possess an indifferent unity — one contrary to the contrariety of determination — by reason of which it is in proximate potency to be predicated of any of its inferiors. For this to be better and more clearly grasped:

Note IV, from Scotus *1.d.3.q.2*, §. *Quod autem dicit*, around Y, that the indeterminate is twofold: the privatively or negatively indeterminate — which is the singular — and the positively contrarily indeterminate — which is the universal. And there is likewise a twofold indetermination: privative or negative, and positive contrary. Privative indetermination, from the Doctor at *1 Met. q. 6*, 7 of the same work, *q. 18*, is the non-repugnance to being determined — belonging to a nature existing in one individual, by reason of which it does not repugn it to exist in others, though it is actually determined to this or that individual through the individual difference by which it is determined and contracted. Hence others describe negative indetermination as non-repugnance to limitation to one thing. Positive contrary indetermination is the repugnance to every limitation to inferiors — belonging to the nature insofar as it has been

abstracted from individuals by the intellect and considered as one predicable of many. It is called contrary indetermination because it is joined to actual determination, quasi as a contrary habit; and the nature under such indifference and actual indetermination is said to be a complete universal — as Lych. affirms with Scotus at 2 *dist.* 3, *q.* 1, in the exposition of §. *Sed contra*. Against this twofold indetermination and indifference asserted by the Scotists — ingeniously and admirably defended — Fons. at 5 *Met.* c. 28, *q.* 5, *sect.* 2 sharply inveighs, saying that the distinction is specious but that nothing of solid doctrine underlies the appearance. But Fons. has not reached or recognized the true solidity and elegance of this distinction, as I shall perhaps show in *Metaphysics*, easily refuting all that he himself advances in opposition.

First assertion: The universal taken materially, or for the denominate — which is called the metaphysical universal — is a real being preceding the operation of the intellect. So Scotus in the above-cited passages. Proved: first, from Aristotle in the passages of art. 4 of this question, to which I add the testimony drawn from 4 *Top.* 1, where these words are read: "When the genus is destroyed, the species and individuals are destroyed." But the destruction of a being of reason is not followed by the destruction of a real being, since there is no necessary connection between them. Individuals are real beings; therefore genus and species, taken for the denominate, are also real beings — since the corruption of singulars follows from their corruption. All the more so because destruction or corruption is properly of a real being, just as production and generation properly belong to a real being. Again, 5 *Met.* 14: real being is divided into ten categories, whose genera and species are universals. Likewise, the metaphysical universal is one apt to be in many, 7 *Met.* c. 15, T. 45. And without any work of the intellect, human nature is one in its individuals, because it is one species participated in univocally by all its singulars. Therefore the universal taken for the denominate is a real being. Second, what is divided into true things is a real being; but the universal is distributed into true things — substance into incorporeal and corporeal, animal into rational and irrational, quantity into continuous and discrete, quality into intellectual and moral. Again, if the dividing members are real, so too is the divided term. For real parts are only in a real whole; but the dividing members of the universal are real — such as Peter, Paul, and the other individuals of human nature. Therefore the human nature itself, which is distributed among them and communicated to them, must be real. Third, the quiditative and essential predicates of a real being must be real; but universals are quiditative and essential predicates — for "animal" and "rational" are essential predicates of man. Furthermore, with every work of the intellect excluded, human nature of itself is not this particular thing, which is singular, but indifferent and negatively indeterminate; it is properly defined, since it is the essence of man, as the Doctor notes at 2.d.3.q.1, §. *Ad q.*, E. Finally, the object precedes the act of the power whose object it is — as color precedes the sight of the eye, and sound precedes the hearing of hearing. But the

universal is the object of the intellect, *1 Phys.* c. 49. And the Doctor proves this in the first cited passage at *q. 6, §. Contra istam opinionem, A.* Therefore the universal taken for the denominate is a real being.

Second assertion: The universal for its formal element, which is called the logical universal, exists after the operation of the intellect and is a being of reason. The Doctor explicitly transmits this at *1 dist. 23, q. un., §. Item arguo, K,* and *d. 25, q. un.* toward the end, and *2.d.3.q.1, §. Sed contra, H,* and *I.* Proved: first, from Aver. *de anima, com. 5*: "The intellect produces universality in things by stripping away what is the essence of a thing existing in the phantasm." And this Aristotle plainly indicates at *1 De Anima, c. 1, T. 8*: "the universal is nothing, or it is later" — that is, after the operation of the intellect that fashions such a universal formally. Hence the same Philosopher adds there: "And whatever else in the same way is predicated commonly." Note here the verb "is predicated," which is intentional. Second, every second intention and relation of reason is produced through the operation of the intellect, as no one doubts. But the universal formally is a second intention and relation of reason, by which the intellect compares a known superior to its known inferiors, as is plain from Notes I and II. Therefore the universal formally is had through the operation of the intellect and is a being of reason. Third, the universal formally is one apt to be predicated of many, *1 Perih. c. 5.* But nothing is predicated of many except through the work of the intellect — for to be affirmed, denied, predicated, and the like, being intentional operations, depend on a reflective act of the mind. Again, the logical universal requires two conditions for its complete being. The first is that the common nature be abstracted by the intellect from its singulars. The second is that actual predication be attributed to many, which are the inferiors of that nature. But both abstraction and predication are effected through the work of the intellect; therefore so too is the formal universal. Moreover, the formal universal is one intelligible thing and predicable of all its inferiors by exercised and direct predication, as the Doctor writes at 2 of the cited passage, *H.* But one intelligible thing cannot be predicated directly of many except through the work of the intellect. For although it does not repugn the common nature existing in one individual to be in another individual, it cannot nonetheless be predicated of each singular except through the intellect abstracting and predicating that very nature of its inferiors.

Fifty-third objection. First, against the Second Assertion: the formal universal is one apt to be in many, without anyone having to think of it; therefore the formal universal is a real being. The antecedent is from Aristotle, *7 Met. T. 45.* And it is argued: two things are required for the universal — unity and aptitude for being in many. But without any operation of the intellect, it is one apt to be in many — as human nature is one apt to be in many and is actually found and exists in many individuals. I distinguish the major: the metaphysical universal, I concede; the logical universal, I deny — as is derived from the Doctor at

1.d.3.q.6, §. *Contra istam opinionem*, A, and 2 of the cited passage, §. *Ad q.* before F, and 1 *Met.* q. 6. Whatever Fons. objects in the last cited note.

You will press: the logical universal, from what has been said, is one apt to be predicated of many; but without any work of the intellect, human nature is one apt to be predicated of many — for without anyone thinking of it, "Peter is a man" and "John is a man." Therefore the aforesaid argument does not conclude only about the metaphysical universal but also about the logical universal. It may be said, from Scotus in 2 just cited, I, that such a thing is not a logical universal in act but only in potency. The reason is that it lacks the indifference by which the universal is completely a universal. For the actual and formal universal demands a unity and positive contrary indifference, which it receives from the intellect — whereas on the part of the thing it has only unity and negative indifference.

You will press further: the formal universal does not require actual being for its essential being, but only potential and aptitudinal being, as is plain from its definition; therefore the aforesaid distinction of the universal in act and in potency does not resolve the foregoing pressing objection. I say that although this is true in objective being and the being of essence, it is not true in the being of existence — because for the ultimate completion of any thing, existence is required as its actual mode, by reason of which it has actual and complete being.

Fifty-fourth objection. Second: The universal is a real being, from the First Assertion. Therefore the formal universal is likewise a real being. The consequence is shown: that of which one part is real is also real in its other part — as is plain in the physical composite, whose parts are matter and form, which are real beings. I concede the antecedent and deny the consequence. To its proof I distinguish: of the physical whole, I concede; of the logical whole, I deny. Because the logical whole is in the mind, as Ferch. notes at *vestig.* 1, num. 61.

You will press: a real being does not receive its completion from a being of reason. But the material universal is a real being and the formal universal is a being of reason, from what has been said; therefore, etc. The major is evident: for a real being is a being simply, while a being of reason is a being in a qualified and diminished sense. Again, formal being is more noble than material being, as is plain from form, which surpasses matter in nobility. Since therefore the material universal is real, it does not seem to be completable in its being by the formal universal, which is of reason. I distinguish the major: of real and essential completion, I concede; of intentional completion, I deny. For a rose in winter has being of reason, and substance is completed and adorned by accidents as by its ornaments. As for the other thing that is added, a distinction must likewise be made: of real formal being, it is conceded; of intentional formal being, it is denied. Thus a known house has formal being in the mind, which is simply surpassed in nobility by real being outside the soul.

Fifty-fifth objection. Third: What has one opposite properly belonging to it cannot have the other opposite — as Scotus argues at 2 of the cited passage, §. *Primo utrum*. But the singular and the universal are opposites, 1 *Met.* 3, q. 6, shortly before B. Therefore nature has either singularity or universality. But it has singularity: for it is singular on the part of the thing through contraction. Therefore universality is incompatible with it. Confirmation I: nature only formally differs from haecceity; therefore it is really identical with this or that individual, and hence is singular. Confirmation II: haecceity is really identical with nature; therefore just as haecceity cannot be multiplied numerically, neither can nature; and so only singularity belongs to it. I reply that singularity and universality belong to the nature in different ways from different agents. From the natural producer, singularity is conferred on it; and from the intellect, through abstraction and comparison to its inferiors, universality is given to the same nature. Therefore as contracted it is singular, but as abstracted and compared to its inferiors it is universal. The same applies to Confirmation I. For Confirmation II: I concede the antecedent and deny the consequence. Because communicability is not incompatible with nature, as it is incompatible with the individual difference. Therefore the former can be multiplied, but not the latter.

Article VIII: How the Formal Universal Comes to Be

That the formal universal is produced by the intellect is agreed by all, and especially by Scotus at q. 4 *univers*. The mode, however, in which such a universal comes to be, and through which act of the intellect — whether through an abstractive act or through a comparative act — is what we must open and explain. For the Angelic Doctor at *opusc.* 55 and 1 *p.* q. 25, art. 3, Loth. at q. 3 *praedicabilium*, and Tol. there at q. 2 hold that the formal universal is produced through the abstractive act of the intellect. But the Subtle Doctor at 1 *dist.* 3, q. 7 in the body, §. *Contra istam opinionem*, and at 2 *dist.* 3, q. 1, §. *Sed contra istud*, toward *Ex hoc apparet probatio* I; Lych. there; Barg.; Paulus Scriptor; Gadius *Quod.* 15; Tromb. 7 *Met.* q. 8; Fuent. q. 6, *aff.* 3, art. 2; and the Coimbrans affirm that the formal universal is completed through the comparative act of the intellect.

Note I, and it is to be presupposed from the book *De Anima*, that our intellectual cognition requires as a prior condition the cognition of the senses — both external and internal — following that dictum of Aristotle at 1 *de sensu sensato*, c. 1, cited and explained by the Doctor at q. 3 and 4 *univers*.: "Nothing is in the intellect that was not first in the sense." For objects existing on the part of the thing first move the external and internal senses through their species and likeness to knowledge of themselves, before they are reached by the intellect — as Scotus shows at 2 *dist.* 42, §. *Ad* 1 sub O. Thus the primary guides of our cognition are the external senses, followed by the internal senses — chiefly the common sense and the phantasy. After these come the agent intellect and the patient intellect: the office of the former is to make all things actual, and the

office of the latter is to receive all things, as Scotus writes at *Quod.* 15, §. *De tertio*, M, and §. *De isto*, N, after Aristotle, 3 *De Anima* T. 18.

Note II: the soul, as Aristotle testifies at 3 *De Anima* 37, is in potency all things — that is, it can know all things. It is in potency to all sensibles through sense, and in potency to all intelligibles through the intellect. That is to say: the soul through sense can perceive all sensibles, and through the intellect all intelligibles — with this distinction, however, that sense perceives singulars and intellect perceives universals, 1 *Post.* T. 33. Hence that celebrated dictum of 2 *De Anima*, 60: "sense is of singulars and intellect is of universals." Since therefore sense perceives material singulars, and the intellect in knowing is bound to sense, it is necessary that things be divested and stripped of material and individual conditions so that universals may be perceived — by abstracting common natures from their inferiors and singulars. For this to be better and more conveniently understood:

Note III: abstraction is a separation or setting apart of one thing from another, which is divided into real and intentional. Real abstraction is the separation of one thing from another, as the separation of gold from silver. Intentional abstraction is that by which one thing is perceived without another. And it is twofold, as Mauritius notes, cited by Vallo at *Tract. form.* fol. 133: divisive and precise. Precise abstraction is the apprehension of one thing conjoined with another, without apprehension of the other — such as the abstraction of animality from rationality; and of this that dictum of 2 *Phys.* T. 18 is to be understood: "those who abstract do not lie." Divisive abstraction is that by which one thing is denied of another, as "man is not a stone." This is subdivided by the Doctor at 7 *Met.* q. 16, §. *De illo igitur*, into actual — which is effected through actual knowledge of the intellect — and habitual — which is effected through the habitual species in which the object is represented. Therefore, according to Scotus at 1 *Post.* q. 3, §. *Ad arg.*: the cognition of the object to be understood having been previously obtained from the internal and external senses through the acquired species, the very same object — still clothed with singular and material conditions — is presented by the phantasy to the agent intellect, whose chief function is to render what is material spiritual (since nothing material can be received in something spiritual); and it is stripped by the agent intellect of singular conditions, and thus is said to be abstracted from singulars by precise abstraction, and is the universal in proximate potency. Thereafter the patient intellect, receiving in itself the species of the same object purified by the agent intellect, and considering that very object divested of every singularity and materiality, compares it to its inferiors and predicates it of them by formal and essential predication — and then the formal universal in act is had, as "man is a species." Hence, as Gadius well observes at *Quol.* 25, fol. 160, col. 4: the common nature existing in its singulars is the universal in remote potency, called the physical universal; the nature then, as abstracted from its inferiors, is the universal in proximate potency, called the metaphysical universal; and insofar

as thus abstracted it is compared to its individuals and predicated of them, it is the universal in act, called the logical universal and, absolutely, the universal. From this it is gathered that the intellect has two acts with respect to the universal: the abstractive — also called the absolute act — by which the intellect prescindes the common nature from its singulars and considers it precisely thus prescinded from them; and the comparative, by which the intellect compares that same nature to its inferiors and predicates it of them, in the way I just made plain.

Assertion: The formal universal in act is produced not through the abstractive but through the comparative act of the intellect. This assertion is twofold, transmitted by the Doctor cited at the beginning of this article; and the Complutenses at *disp.* 3, *q.* 6, §. 2 draw Aquinas toward this view. The first part is proved: first, through the abstractive act the common nature is a universal in proximate potency; therefore it is not a formal universal in act. The antecedent, beyond being evident from the foregoing, is also argued: nothing new accrues to the nature thus abstracted except precise separation from its inferiors; but such precise separation is not universality; therefore through it the abstracted nature is not a formal universal in act. The argument holds from the abstract to the concrete. The minor is shown: in the state of abstraction, the nature is only considered as separated from its singulars and represented in the intelligible species, known without any reference to singularity or universality — as is plain from the definition of abstraction given in Note III. Second, the definition of the formal universal in act is not adapted to the abstracted nature; therefore as thus abstracted it is not a formal universal in act. The antecedent is proved: the formal universal in act is one in many and of many, *1 Post.* c. 8, T. 63. But the nature thus separated is neither in many — since it is separated from them — nor said of many — since it is not compared to them. Third, the formal universal in act receives the positive contrary indifference spoken of in the afore-mentioned passage, as the Doctor intimates at *q.* 37 *univers.*, §. *contra*. But the nature segregated by the intellect has only privative indifference, as I made plain there. All the more so: the nature thus abstracted is not predicated formally and directly of its singulars, which as such it does not regard. Therefore insofar as it is abstracted through the absolute act of the intellect, it is not a formal universal in act.

The second part is derived from the first and proved: first, such as is the form, such is the thing that is informed by the form — for by form a thing is determined and specified. If the form is absolute, so too is what is informed by it. But formal universality is a second intention that regards the superior and the inferior, from Scotus at *1 dist.* 23, *q.* *un.*, §. *contra istud*. Therefore the formal universal in act comes to be through the comparative act of the intellect. Second, the universal is related to its inferiors, of which it is predicated, and they are correlatives related to one another. Therefore the formal universal in act comes to be through comparative knowledge. The consequence holds: a

superior and its inferiors cannot be formally compared with one another except through the comparative act of the intellect. For since the universal is a second intention — which is a relation of reason, or a passive comparison of superior to inferiors — it follows that it comes to be through a comparative act. Porphyry intimates this in his *Isagoge*, where in defining each universal he defines them through their inferiors. I add: a relation is not known except when its term by which it is specified is known; therefore the universal is not known unless its inferiors — which are its term — are known. And therefore the formal universal in act does not arise except through the comparative act of the intellect. Hence Suarez at *disp.* 6, *Met.* n. 7 and the Coimbrans at *q.* 5, *art.* 3 — who admit an absolutely formal universal — are refuted. For it is plainly established and clearly demonstrated that the formal universal is relative and that its form is relative. Moreover, the abstract, from what will be said in the following book, cannot be predicated of the concrete; but the nature through that absolute universality devised by the aforesaid authors is abstracted, as Suarez concedes in the cited passage; therefore it proximately cannot be predicated of its inferiors — which is required for the formal universal in act.

Sixty-second objection. First: Aristotle at 3 *De Anima* T. 18 writes that just as material light by its radiance renders colors actually visible that in darkness they were not, so too the agent intellect, producing the intelligible species in the patient intellect, renders the nature actually intelligible. From this I argue: the object of the possible intellect is the universal; but this universal precedes the possible intellect itself and its operation, because the object precedes the act of the power whose object it is; therefore through the abstraction alone of the agent intellect, the nature shining forth in the intelligible species becomes actually and formally a universal. I reply that nothing at all can be gathered from this testimony that is opposed to our assertion. For I admit the parallel — namely, that through the action of the agent intellect the nature becomes actually intelligible, just as color is rendered actually visible through the illumination of the medium (which derives its plausibility from Scotus at *Quol.* 15, §. *Si vero*, sub Q) — yet I deny that the nature thus made intelligible is a formal universal in act, unless the comparison to its inferiors is added to it. Therefore, in form, in response to the argument, I distinguish the major: the object of the patient intellect is the universal in proximate potency, I concede; in act, I deny. Or — which comes to the same — the object of the possible intellect is the metaphysical universal, I concede; the logical universal, I deny.

Sixty-third objection. Second: the nature abstracted from its singulars is not singular, as all concede; therefore it is universal. The consequence holds because there is no mean between singular and universal. I reply that the nature thus abstracted is the metaphysical universal, not the logical — or say that it is the logical universal in proximate potency, not in act.

Sixty-fourth objection. Third: The logical universal is defined at *1 Perih.* c. 5 as one apt to be predicated of many. But the nature prescinded from its inferiors is something one apt to be predicated of many. For a universal does not require that the nature be actually predicated, but it suffices that it have the aptitude for predication of many. Therefore the abstracted nature is a universal in act, not merely in potency. I concede the major and deny the minor. The reason is that the nature as abstracted does not have the form of universality in act — just as a wall is not said to be white unless it has whiteness inherent in it; so the nature is not formally and actually universal unless it actually has the form of universality, which is produced through comparison to its inferiors.

You will ask: is the formal universal produced through the act of the agent intellect or of the patient intellect? I reply that it is probable that it comes to be through the operation of the patient or possible intellect, as Scotus teaches at *2.d.3.q.1*, §. *Sed contra*, before I, followed there by Lych., Barg., and other Scotists. The reason is that before the act of the possible intellect, the nature abstracted by the agent intellect is only in proximate potency to becoming a formal universal in act. Moreover, the principal function of the agent intellect is to transfer objects from the order of material things to the order of spiritual things; while the function of the patient intellect is to understand what is presented to it by the agent intellect through intelligible species, and to compare the nature prescinded from its singulars to those very inferiors. It is therefore probable that the actual universal is produced by the possible intellect.

You will say: Scotus at *1.d.3.q.6*, §. *Contra istam opinionem*, D, in perspicuous words asserts that the production of the formal universal pertains to the agent intellect; and he asserts the same at *7 Met. q. 16*. Therefore Scotus does not appear consistent with himself. To the first passage, Mastrius and Bellutus at *disp. 4, q. 3* reply that this text is marked by Faber at *4 Met. q. 9, c. 4* as spurious. And if it is admitted as Scotus's own text, it does not follow from it that the universal in act is produced by the agent intellect, but only in habit — insofar as the agent intellect itself forms the intelligible species through which the patient intellect, understanding the nature separated from individuals, produces the actual universal. But against this, Scotus at *Quol. 15* expressly holds and probably defends this very view, at 6, speaking of this article, saying: "If the first way is held, it could be said that the agent intellect has two ordered actions. The first is to make actually intelligible from potentially intelligible, or actually universal from potentially universal. The second is to make actually understood from potentially understood." Therefore the aforesaid response does not remove the pressing objection. Secondly, the same afore-mentioned authors deal with it through Barg. at *1.d.3.q.6*, §. *Ex alio membro*: that Scotus in that passage embraced the common opinion, but in another passage stated his own opinion. And likewise in the *Met.* passage he spoke of the habitual universal and in the *Sentences* passage of the actual universal. But this exposition does not seem to be altogether according to the Doctor's mind, who in both passages evidently opens

his opinion and in both speaks of the actual universal. To me it seems that one should say that Scotus on this matter, as on many others, is problematic — as is not obscurely intimated by him at the *Quodlibet* just cited, where he probably defends that the agent intellect is the efficient cause of intellection, dissolving all arguments brought against this. Therefore the Scotists, perceiving that both opinions are probable — both in the matter itself and in Scotus — defend now the one, now the other opinion, as may be seen among our recent authors cited above; although the Doctor inclines more to the one than to the other, namely to that which holds the possible intellect to be the maker of the actual formal universal.

Article IX: What the Essence of the Logical Universal Is

In this article it is called into doubt whether the essence of the logical universal consists in being in many, or in being one apt to be in many; or rather in being predicated of many, or in being one apt to be predicated of many. For many, among whom are Ruu. *q.* 2, Alb., Sot., and Tol. (cited by Hurt. *disp.* 3, *sect.* 2), hold that the essence of the logical universal is to be one apt to be in many, while predicability of many is its attribute. This opinion is embraced from among our own by the two recent authors at *disp.* 4, *q.* 2, *art.* 2, who cite Scotus and certain eminent disciples of his in their favor. The common Scotist position, however, establishes the essence of the logical universal to be one predicable of many. Hurt. at the cited passage and Arr. *disp.* 6, *sect.* 9 subscribe to this.

Note I: Scotus has spoken variously on this difficulty in various places. For at *q.* 6 *univers.*, §. *Dicendum*, he proceeds doubtfully and problematically, saying: "If the definition of the universal is true — which is 'predicable of many,' given at *1 Perih.* 5 — then the convertible one, beyond the essence of the universal, will be that which is given at *1 Post.* c. 8: one in many and of many. And if that is a good and true definition, that will be its attribute; and so either one, through the definition of the universal, can be demonstratively concluded of the universal and thus known." He repeats the same at *q.* 8, §. *Ad* 1, *q.* But then at *q.* 15, §. *Dicendum ergo*, he expressly asserts that to be predicated of several is the essence of the logical universal, in these words: "Therefore it must be said in response to the question that this is the true definition, which is thus shown: the reason of the universal is to be predicated of several, according to Aristotle, *1 Perih.*; therefore since in the definition of genus it is placed that it is predicated of several, its genus is placed." The same is also intimated at *q.* 19, toward *Ad oppositum*. And Mauritius, Anglicus, Sarn., and others explain it there.

Note II and recall from what has been said: the metaphysical universal is the universal in being, as its definition indicates — "one apt to be in many" — whose attribute is predicability of many. But the logical universal is the universal in predication, as is plain from its definition: "one apt to be predicated of many." For the constitution of the first, only the abstraction of the common nature from its inferiors by the intellect is required. For the second, the comparison of

the nature thus abstracted to its inferiors is necessary — as Scotus affirms at *4.d.43.q.2*, §. *Respondeo*. Although the foundation of both universals is the same — namely, the common nature inexistent in many — still through the work of the intellect each is affected by distinct respects, by reason of which the division of the universal into logical and metaphysical is received, despite Hurt. objecting at *disp. 3, sect. 2, q. 15*. And they can be marked by different definitions, as will be plain below for genus, species, and the other universals. This can be illustrated by the case of man, who as a physical whole is defined as a natural body composed of body and rational soul, but as a metaphysical whole is defined as a rational animal.

Note III: beyond the two aforesaid definitions of the universal there is a third, given at *1 Post. c. 8* and the end of 2 of the same work, received by the Doctor at *7 Met. q. 13*, *2.d.3.q.1*, §. *sed contra*, H, and of the following form: "The universal is one in many and of many." This seems to embrace both of the aforesaid definitions of the universal, as I noted in the *Epitome*, *l. 1, q. 3, art. 1*. And Fuent. at *q. 6, dif. 3, art. 1* and *2 Met.* indicates: to be one in many is the metaphysical universal, and to be one of many is the logical universal. Indeed, from those two a more perfect and exact definition of the logical universal, as good as any that can be given, is formed and recognized by the Doctor in the cited passage and by other very eminent philosophers, who — setting aside both of the prior ones — approve, clarify, and celebrate this third in their later writings, which are judged to be of greater weight and authority. For its easier comprehension, I presuppose from what was said in art. 7 of this question, not. 2: the universal is a concrete name enjoying a twofold signification — material and formal. The nature existing in many, called the universal in remote potency, and the nature abstracted from many, called the universal in proximate potency, is the material element of the logical universal. And "of many," or "one predicable of many" by formal and direct predication, is the formal element of the logical universal itself — which is the second intention, or the respect of reason caused or left behind by the act of the intellect comparing the superior to its inferiors. Therefore what is defined by the said definition of the universal is the second intention, which is to be one predicable of many. What is materially described is the common nature, in which the said second intention is founded as in its true subject of denomination — as Fuentes excellently notes in the cited passage, art. 1. From this it is plainly gathered that to be one in many is not formally the essence of the logical universal, but only its material and foundational being — not its formal being. And I think Scotus must be interpreted in this way in the passages cited by our afore-named recent authors, so that the Doctor may speak consistently and his writings be well coherent throughout his Doctrine; and the more common Scotist opinion will be true and consonant with its Doctor, luminous to all. In this Aristotle greatly favors us — for at *1 Post. T. 36*, conceding to Plato that science is of universals, but denying to him that universals are ideas of things really separated from singulars, he asserts that the universals about

which sciences are had are universals in many, which are common natures that inhere in individuals, equally participated in by them, univocally predicated of the same — as Zab. and Toletus aptly interpret that passage. Therefore "being in many," which Aristotle places in the definition of the universal, is not being a being of reason but being a real being — which belongs to the common nature existing in its singulars prior to every work of the intellect, as, before others, the same Zab. observes in the cited passage. For this reason Aristotle, establishing universals in many, vehemently rebukes Plato for placing universals before the many — as I deliberately showed in art. 3 of this question. And hence collapse the arguments that the aforesaid recent authors pile up against the common Scotist doctrine, supposing that being in many constitutes the formal character and essence of the logical universal. For this designates only its material and foundational being, not its formal being — as will be made plainer and more evident from the solutions to their arguments to be subjoined below.

Assertion: Formal predicability is of the essence of the logical universal. So Scotus at *q. 12 univers.*, §. *propter istas tres*, and *q. 15*, §. *dicendum ergo*, and elsewhere where he approves the definition of the universal given at *1 Perih. c. 5*, or the other one at *1 Post. c. 8*, cited and pre-explained by us in Note III. Tromb. *7 Met. q. 8, art. 1* marvelously supports this: "For the reason of the actual universal what is required is both that it be actually participated in by many, and the intention of universality attributed to the nature through the act of the intellect comparing such nature, as predicable, to the individuals." Nor do Barg. *1.d.3.q.6* and other most outstanding Scotists dissent. Proved: first, from Porphyry in the last chapter of his *Isagoge*, saying: "to be predicated of several is common to all universals." And having previously defined nearly all of them, and the chief universals in particular, through "being predicated of several" — which he had certainly learned from Aristotle, who in the passage just cited defines the universal through predicability. Second, the logical universal comes to be through comparison of the intellect, as I proved in the preceding article. But such a passive comparison essentially includes formal predicability, since it is a relation of reason of the superior predicable of its inferiors. Therefore predicability is of the essence of the logical universal. The Doctor intimates this reason at *q. 14 univers.*, §. *propter argumenta*: "It must be known that to be predicated, since it is an intention, is an intention per se, but of a thing per accidens." Therefore since the logical universal formally is a second intention, it is plainly demonstrated that it is essentially constituted through predicability. Third, distinct sciences participate in the distinct formal characters of their objects, about which they occupy themselves without admixture — for sciences are divided as things are, *3 De Anima T. 38*. But Metaphysics deals with the universal in being; therefore Logic contemplates the universal in predication. This can in some way be applied to quality, which as conjoined with sensible matter is considered by Physics, but as separated from sensible matter is examined by Mathematics. All the more so because Logic does not meditate on

the essences and quiddities of things but on the subjections and predications of extremes — which are second intentions applied to things — as the Doctor clearly sets forth in the passage just cited.

Seventy-first objection. First, with the two Scotist authors: what we know first about something we say is its essence. But the first thing we know about the logical universal in act is being in many, as is plain from its definition at *1 Post.* c. 8, received by the Doctor at *2.d.3.q.1*. Therefore being in many is the essence of the logical universal. I reply that the major, in the way it is proposed, is not known or true, as those authors themselves think. For we know effect before cause; and accidents before the subject; and yet neither is the effect the essence of the cause, nor do accidents enter into the essence of the subject. But if they understand it differently — as Hurt. in the cited passage seems to wish, and if this is conceded to them — then to the minor I say that being in many is the material being of the logical universal, not its formal and actual being, as is sufficiently established and explained in the last note.

Seventy-second objection. Second: The prior is the thing itself; its attribute is posterior — for the attribute proceeds from the essence of the thing of which it is the attribute, as an effect from a cause. But predicability is an attribute of the logical universal — for a thing is prior to being predicable, just as a thing is prior to being intelligible and visible. Therefore predicability is not of the essence of the universal. Confirmation, from Scotus at *q. 6 univers.*, §. *Dicendum*, and *q. 11 praedicam.*, §. *Item contingit*, toward *contra*: to be predicated properly is the proper attribute of the universal; therefore, according to Scotus, predicability is not the essence of the universal. I concede the major and deny the minor. For although the nature is prior to being affected with predicability, it is not prior as a universal to being predicable — just as the wall is indeed prior to the whiteness that inheres in it, yet it is not white prior to receiving the whiteness through which it is constituted in white being. Or say that the argument pertains to the metaphysical universal, not to the logical. To the confirmation: I say that Scotus in the first passage speaks doubtfully, in the second problematically and disputatively, and perhaps not in his own opinion — since at *q. 15* and *12* he has openly declared his mind, namely that the essence of the logical universal is to be predicated of many.

Seventy-third objection. Third: The argument holds correctly: the nature is universal; therefore it is predicable of many; therefore it is universal — and so predicability is not of the essence of the universal. I reply that the argument holds of the metaphysical universal, not of the logical, which is constituted through predicability.

You will press: what is a property of one thing is not of the essence of another — as risibility, which is an attribute of man, is not of the essence of anything. But predicability is an attribute of the metaphysical universal; therefore it is not of the essence of the logical universal. I concede the major and distinguish the

minor: of fundamental predicability, I concede; of formal predicability, I deny. For the latter comes to be through the intellect, while the former emanates from the nature of the thing itself. Scotus at *q. 15 univers.* and Mayr. there, *pass. I*, touch on this solution.

Seventy-fourth objection. Fourth: Porphyry at *c. 1 Isag.* calls the definition of genus — given through predicability — a descriptive definition; and a descriptive definition is given through a property. Therefore predicability is an attribute of the logical universal. I reply with Scotus now cited, *§. dicitur ad q.*, that the text of Porphyry has "assigned" — that is, "defined" — as is argued from the same Porphyry at *c. de specie*: "It is necessary in the accounts of both to use both." For the account that a name signifies is the definition, as may be seen at *4 Met. c. 5, T. 28*, second summary.

Article X: How Many Kinds of Universal Are There

Joannes Maior, at *praedicabilium, q. 11*, thinks that the fivefold number of universals transmitted by Porphyry has been fenced off by the authority of our predecessors not by reason but by will — citing that verse of Horace: "So I will, so I command; my will stands for reason." Just as, he holds, this is the case for names imposed on things, and Scotus holds the same of the number ten for the categories at *4.d.13.q.1, §. Ad huius autem, C.* Those who try to adduce some reason for the number of categories disagree among themselves, as may be seen in Racon *tract. de universalibus, q. 3*. For some make ten, some six, others only two universals. But the common opinion of ancient and modern Dialecticians establishes only five universals.

Note that the aforesaid variety and diversity of opinions arose from the fact that to be predicable of many can happen in two ways: in one way as to what-it-is, or as to what-quality; in another way, immediately or mediately. Since predication as to what-it-is and immediate predication of many seems more excellent than predication as to what-quality and mediate predication, from this some, holding that only genus and species are predicated as to what-it-is and immediately of many, have established those two alone as universals, not the other three, which are predicated mediately and as to what-quality. Further, since difference has a greater affinity with genus and species than property and accident — because it is predicated as to what-kind-of-thing, and is of the essence of its inferiors — it is decreed by some to be the third universal. But others, using unity and predicability of many more broadly, enumerate more universals than three.

Assertion: There are only five universals — genus, species, difference, property, and accident. So Scotus at *q. 12 univers., §. Dicendum*, and *1.d.8.q.3, §. Alij probant* 5. Tatar. *q. 1 praedicab. scibili 2*, Joannes de Magistris *q. 5* in fine conclusionis responalis, and others commonly there. Proved: first, from Aristotle, who in the chapter on substance mentions genus and species, which he calls secondary substances placed in the straight line of the category of substance; and

difference, which he places in the lateral line; and everywhere he recounts property and accident, asserting the properties of substance, some of which flow from the essence of substance itself and are referred to the fourth universal, while others can be present or absent from substance without its destruction and are reduced to the fifth universal. The same is derived from *1 Top.* c. 3 and 4. And this greatly accords with Peripatetic doctrine, especially predicamental doctrine, for whose sake Porphyry constructed his *Isagoge*. Second, the number of universals is derived from the number of predicables; and the number of predicables is five; therefore the number of universals is also five. The major is plain: because predicability is of the essence of the logical universal, from what was asserted in the preceding article. The minor is argued: whatever is predicable is either predicable as to what-it-is, or as to what-quality. For the character of the universal and the predicable is divided into the predicable as to what-it-is and as to what-quality, as into its essential differences — as Scotus affirms in the cited passage, §. *Dicendum*. If it is predicable as to what-it-is: either according to a part of the essence, and as a potential whole, and it is genus; or according to the whole essence, and it is species. For nothing of the essence is found in one individual that is not in another — otherwise individuals of the same species would differ essentially, which our recent authors prove to be false most excellently against Aversa at *q.* 10, *sect.* 1. If as to what-quality: either as to what-kind-of-thing, or the essential quality, and it is difference; or as to the accidental quality — and this either is a convertible accident proceeding from the principles of the subject, and it is property; or it is a common accident, and it is the last universal.

Seventy-eighth objection. First: There are as many universals as are predicated essentially of their inferiors. But only the first three are predicated essentially of their inferiors; therefore only those three are universals. The minor is evident: because only genus, species, and difference are predicated essentially, while property and accident are predicated accidentally. The major is shown: universals are univocals, as is plain from the definition of the universal; but univocals are predicated univocally of their inferiors, as is plainly derived from the definition of univocals given in the *Praedicamenta*, c. 1. I deny the major — for some universals are predicated essentially, some accidentally. To its proof I say that universals are indeed univocals, yet not all are predicated univocally. For to be univocal is one thing and to be predicated univocally is another, as the Doctor notes at *3 dist.* 7, *q.* 1.

You will say: univocals are those whose name is common and whose account of substance according to that name is the same — as Bonet well explains at *1 Met.* c. 2. Therefore if universals are univocals, they are certainly predicated essentially of their inferiors — otherwise the aforesaid definition of univocals would be unsound. It may be said: taking "univocals" broadly, their common account is either essential or accidental, as Scotus intimates both at the cited passage and also at *1.d.3.q.3* and *d.* 8, *q.* 3. And our aforesaid recent authors

defend this at *disp.* 2, *q.* 4, *art.* 2. But strictly, only those are univocals that are predicated essentially of their inferiors, as is clearly seen from their aforesaid definition. And this can be argued from a parallel case: science, strictly taken, is defined at *1 Post.* c. 2, T. 5 as knowledge of a thing through its proper cause — which does not include science obtained through effect. Likewise, according to Scotus at *q.* 4 *prol.*, praxis, strictly taken, is an operation of good will; taken broadly, it extends to both good and bad.

Seventy-ninth objection. Second: There are as many universals as there are predicates — since to be predicated is the character of the universal, from what was said above in *art.* 9. But there are only four predicates, *1 Top.* 3: genus, definition, property, and accident. Therefore there are also only four universals. I reply, with Scotus at *q.* 12 *univers.*, §. *Ad 1 arg.*, by denying the equivalence — for Aristotle does not pursue the number of predicates in the same way as Porphyry pursues the catalogue of universals. For the Philosopher derives the quaternary series of predicates in view of essential, not accidental, predication — and also in view of convertible and non-convertible predication. For if essence is predicated, it is genus and definition; if essence is not predicated, it is property and accident. Again, if it is predicated convertibly, it is property; but if not convertibly, it is accident. But Porphyry investigates the register of universals in view of predication as to what-it-is and as to what-quality, as was sufficiently explained above. The reason, moreover, why Aristotle in that passage does not mention difference is that if difference is subaltern, it is reduced to genus; and if it is lowest, it is referred back to species because of the similar mode of predication. Or say that the Philosopher there recounts the topical predicates, which share a common subject — some of which are complex, like definition, and some incomplex, like the remaining three listed. But Porphyry enumerates only incomplex universals. And Aristotle says that difference is reduced to genus.

Eightieth objection. Third: To be predicated as to what-kind-of-thing of several differing in species, and of several differing in number, constitutes only one universal — namely, the generic and the specific difference. Therefore to be predicated as to what-it-is of several differing in species and in number makes only one universal as well, since the same reason holds in both cases — and so there are only four universals. I concede the antecedent and deny the consequence. The reason for the disparity is that the generic and specific differences wholly possess the same mode of predication — as to what-kind-of-thing. But this is not the case for genus and species. For genus is predicated as to what-it-is incompletely, while species is predicated completely — the latter giving the whole essence, the former giving only a part of the essence, as the Doctor excellently shows at *q.* 27 *univers.*, §. *dicendum ad q.* — specifically by way of an actual part and a potential whole — or it will be shown in detail at *art.* 2, *q.* 2.

Eighty-first objection. Fourth: The individual is a universal, and is not one of the five recounted above; therefore a sixth universal must be admitted. The antecedent is proved: the universal is what is predicated of many; and the individual is predicated of many — namely, of Peter and Paul; therefore it is a universal. It may be said that the universal is predicated of many non-equivocally, while the individual is predicated of many equivocally — as may be seen in Scotus at *1.d.25.q.un.*, §. *Respondeo*, A, saying: "This man is said of Socrates and Plato equivocally." Or say with the same Doctor in that passage, in the solution of 3, §. *Ad 1*: that the individual is a species of the second intention but not a species of the universal, which is a genus to those five above-named.

Eighty-second objection. Fifth: Being is a universal, since it is predicated of many as the character of the universal demands; and it is not genus, 3 *Met.* T. 10; nor any of the other universals, as is plain. Therefore beyond the five listed, there is another universal — namely, being. Scotus replies by denying the antecedent, because being is equivocal, and the universal must be univocal, as I noted in the *Epitome*, l. 1, q. 3, art. 1. Against Scotus: at *1.d.3.q.1* and elsewhere, he expressly holds that being is univocal to God and creature, to substance and accident; therefore the aforesaid response involves a contradiction in the Doctor's own statements. It may be said that Scotus in the *univers.* work cited speaks in the opinion of others — principally Porphyry, *c. de specie*, who says that if one calls things "beings," one will use the name equivocally. This the same Doctor does not infrequently in the said work, following Aristotle both in the chapter on quantity and elsewhere, as will be made plain in due course. Or it may be said that being is equivocal to real being and to the being of reason, but not to real being itself — as is plain from the same Scotus at *q. 21 praedicam.* and *q. 25, §. Ad 1 principale*, and his expositors there, and Sirect *Tract. form.* fol. 10, §. *Quantum ad 2, art.*, and fol. 27, pag. 2.

Eighty-third objection. Sixth: There are ten modes of being and ten categories; therefore there are ten modes of predication and ten universals. The consequence is to be denied. The reason is that the number of categories is derived from what is predicated of primary substance; and since there are ten things that are predicated in different ways of primary substance, ten categories are established. But the number of universals is derived from the mode of predication — essentially or accidentally — of inferiors. But since there is only a fivefold mode of predication, the number of universals is likewise fivefold.

Eighty-fourth objection. Seventh: In as many ways as one of two opposites is said, in so many ways is the other said, 1 *Top.* 12. But the universal and the singular are opposites, 1 *Post.* T. 5 — since the universal is communicable and the singular is incommunicable. Therefore since singulars are almost infinite, the same must be asserted of universals. I reply, with Scotus at *q. 12 univers.*, §. *Ad 2*, by distinguishing the major: of opposites taken formally, I concede; of opposites taken materially, I deny. In this way Aristotle in the cited passage and

Sot. at 5 *Met.* in the exposition of the text, fol. 150, in the notable passage, are to be interpreted. For "rational" and "irrational" are indeed opposed; yet it is not necessary that there be as many rational supposita as irrational ones. For there are far more irrational beings than beings capable of reason. As for the proposition that Sarn. says is famous, it is not expressly found there.

Article XI: Whether the Universal Is Univocal

Many, both ancient and modern — cited by the Coimbrans at *q. 7, art. 2*, among whom are Amm. in *Porph.* c. de genere, Alb. there, *Tract. 2, c. 9*, and Suarez *disp. 6, Met. sect. 8, n. 1* — hold that the universal is analogous to those five aforementioned. But the more common opinion at the present time is that of the Subtle Doctor at *q. 8 univers.*, Mayr. there, *pass. 30*, Fuent. *q. 6, dif. 6, art. 1*, Racon. *q. 2, sect. postre. prop. 2*, and others who teach that the universal is univocal to those five above-listed.

For a fuller knowledge of this difficulty and a more accurate resolution of it, what I brought forward in the *Epitome, l. 1, q. 1, art. 5* must be recalled, and what I noted at *l. 3, q. de Antepredicam.* presupposed, and in Metaphysics concerning the univocation of being, and also in the tract on the knowability of God. Here I only recall the distinction of the universal for its material and formal elements — since Coimbrans at the beginning of the cited article and Fons. 5 *Met. q. 12, sect. 2*, striving to reconcile both opinions, write that the universal for its material element, or as absolute, is analogous — because it belongs to substance and accident, between which nothing is univocally common; and it is fitting that it be predicated both essentially and accidentally, simply and in a qualified sense, which plainly seems to be analogous. But the universal for its formal element, or as relative, is univocal. This distinction seems to be scented by certain distinct Scotists at *disp. 4, q. 6*, citing in their favor Scotus at *q. 8 univers.*, §. *Ad istam q.* But Scotus rather impedes than helps them. For he explicitly attacks the authors of that opinion, saying: "Their reason does not conclude — because number is a multitude aggregated from units; yet it is not said analogically of binary and ternary, although the ternary consists of more units; but is said simply univocally." And at §. *propter hoc*, he evidently holds that the universal is univocal, and that it is predicated univocally of all five of those. Therefore the Doctor does not favor them, nor does the aforesaid distinction help to reconcile the patrons of both positions. For we contemplate the universal in view of its entity and quiddity, prescinded from any peculiar character of any universal whatsoever — just as when we abstract "animal" from "rational" and "irrational" and contemplate it thus, we assert it to be univocal. And although "rational animal" is more perfect and excellent than "irrational animal," that belongs not to the character of animal but to the character of its difference. Similarly we meditate on being in Metaphysics as prescinded from God and creature, substance and accident, and affirm it univocal to these — which the advocates of the opposing opinion deny.

Assertion: The universal is univocal to all five afore-named universals. So Scotus just cited. Proved: first, what belongs to many according to the same name and the same account is univocal to them, as is plain from the definition of univocals given by the Philosopher in the *Praedicamenta*, c. 1. But the universal belongs to those five according to the same name and the same account — for each of them is one apt to be predicated of many, which is the definition of the universal taken in general, *1 Perih.* 5. Therefore the universal is univocal to them. Second, if the universal were not univocal to them, it would be principally because it is participated in more perfectly by one than by another. For this reason Aristotle adds at *7 Phys.* T. 31: "In a genus, equivocations lurk." But this reason has no force. For what are equivocal in a physical sense are univocal in a logical sense, as the Doctor touches upon at the cited passage, §. *Ad istam q.* For the unity of a common concept suffices for logical univocation. Therefore since the universal has one concept participated in by them, it is plainly inferred that it is univocal to them.

Eighty-eighth objection: Aristotle at c. 1 of the *Praedicamenta* separates denominatives from univocals and equivocals; but the universal is denominative, as is plain; therefore it is not univocal. Confirmation: *4 Met.* T. 4: "If all things are predicated accidentally, there is no universal." Therefore, according to Aristotle, the universal is not univocal — at least to those that are predicated as to what-quality, or accidentally, of their subjects. One can respond from the Doctor at *q. 6 praedicam.* that Aristotle did not separate denominatives from univocals absolutely, but relatively — that is, under a denominative predicate, as man and horse under "white" are not univocated. For univocals participate in the same name and the same account according to that name; but the account of man and horse, or their essential character, is not whiteness. However if the account of denominatives is intrinsic and essential to them, they will without doubt be univocals — as Aristotle indicates in the chapter on substance, and Scotus at *2.d.12.q.1*, §. *Ad argumentum* I, I. To the confirmation: I say that the Philosopher spoke conditionally — namely, if all things were accidents there would be no predicable that is substantial and predicated as to what-it-is of its inferiors, which is conditionally true but not absolutely so, since both substances and accidents are predicated of their inferiors, as is plain from the aforesaid Aristotle.

Eighty-ninth objection. Second: Everything univocal that belongs to many belongs to them under the character of some universal; but the universal in common is not adapted to those five under the character of some universal. Therefore it is not univocal to them. The major is plain from the definition of univocals. The minor is argued: if the universal belonged to them under the character of some universal, it would be under the character of these five themselves or under the character of another. Not the first — because each of these is not essentially distinguished from another. Nor the second — otherwise a sixth universal would be given, which conflicts with Porphyry and Aristotle. I

reply that the universal is the genus and those five are its species, of which it is univocally predicated.

You will press: if the universal is the genus, then the genus is a species — because genus is subject to genus, and what is immediately subject to a genus is a species. But it is false that genus is a species; therefore it is also false that the universal is a genus with respect to those five. The subsumption is argued: no opposite is predicated affirmatively of its opposite — for the same thing with respect to the same cannot simultaneously be both superior and inferior. But these five universals are opposites, for they are species of a genus constituted by opposite differences. Therefore one cannot be predicated of another, and hence the universal is not a genus to them. I concede the consequence and distinguish the subsumption: essentially, I concede; denominatively, I deny. For as Scotus says at *q.* in question, §. *Ad 1 arg.*: each of these intentions can be taken either as a what or as a mode. For when it is what is being understood, it is a what; but when it is the manner in which something is understood, it is a mode — as the Doctor signifies at *1.d.1.q.3*, c, and *4.d.1.q.1* below T. To the proof of the subsumption I say, from the same Doctor, that second intentions are not opposed unless both are taken as a what or as a mode. Thus the proposition "genus is a species" is true insofar as genus is taken as a what and species as a mode — because under such a mode genus is understood with respect to the universal. And this can be illustrated by the example: "the plural is singular," where "plural" is taken as a what and "singular" as a mode. And the sense is: the plural in the nominative case is of the singular — that is, of the singular number — as Gadius notes at *quol.* 6.

Ninetieth objection. Third: The universal is not equally participated in by those five; therefore it is not univocal to them. The antecedent is proved: the essence of the universal is to be predicated of several, as was established above. But genus is predicated of more than species; therefore it participates more in the nature of the universal. And so the universal is analogous to them. I deny the antecedent. To its proof I say that from the argument one can only derive that genus is a greater universal — that is, extends more broadly than species — not that it is more a universal; just as the ternary is a greater number than the binary but is not more a number, because both equally participate in the nature of number — as the Doctor excellently notes in the cited passage, following Aristotle at *4 Top.* 1.

Ninety-first objection. Fourth: What is adapted by priority to one and by posteriority to another is analogous. But the universal belongs by priority to genus and species — especially when they are substances — and by posteriority to the others, especially the last two, which are accidents; and between substance and accident nothing is univocally common. Therefore the universal is analogous. I concede the major and deny the minor. For in Metaphysics it is shown that being is univocal to substance and accident. And priority and

posteriority are derived from proper and peculiar characters that contract and constitute such universals — not from the common account fitting all of these. Or it may be said that this holds of the physical universal, not of the logical universal, which formally is an intentional being.

Ninety-second objection. Fifth: What is included in differences is not a genus, as is plain from being — which is not a genus precisely because it is enclosed in differences. But the universal is included in the difference, which is the third universal; therefore it is not a genus. I concede the major and distinguish the minor: the universal is enclosed in the difference as a contracting character, I deny; as a genus in its species, I concede — just as "animal" is not contained in "rationality" but in "man," as its genus. For the difference is a universal not according to the formal character of difference but insofar as it is a species of the universal.

Article XII: Whether the Universal Is the Subject of Porphyry's Book

Alb., mentioned in the preceding article, Amm. in the preface to Porphyry, Aversa *q. 7, sect. 3*, and others constitute the five afore-named universals as the subject of Porphyry's little book. But the Subtle Doctor at *q. 7 univers.*, Sarn. there, and Maior *q. 3 praedicabilium not. 4, conc. 1*, establish the universal as the subject of the said opusculum.

Note that every cognition and science — whether total or partial — has a proper total or partial object by which it is specified and with which it is occupied. Since, therefore, in this *Isagoge* of Porphyry knowledge of universals is had, it is rightly investigated whether its subject is the universal or something else. For knowledge of this, what I said at *q. 3* of the preceding book about the object in common, its divisions, and its conditions bears greatly; and Maior in the cited passage is prolific in narrating and explaining these.

Assertion: The universal is the subject of Porphyry's *Isagoge*, not its five afore-named species. So Scotus in the cited passage, §. *Ad 1, q. dicendum*. Proved: first, one science has one object, *1 Post. T. 43*. But the doctrine of universals is one with the unity of its partial object, just as the whole of Logic is one with the unity of its total object; and this partial object is the universal, in which the individual subjective parts of the universal univocally agree, from what was asserted above. Second, the three conditions required for a proper subject of this little work are fitted to the universal; therefore the universal is its subject. The antecedent is argued: of the universal it is presupposed whether it exists and what it is; definitions of its species are given; and attributes are demonstrated of it — as Sarn. explains in this passage. And everything that is treated in this introduction is reduced to the universal in some way: either immediately, as species to genus; or mediately, as individuals; or as its attributes; or as its opposites — of which there is the same discipline, as Maior notes in the cited passage, *q. 7, not. 1*. These three conditions of the subject, then, being

rightly fitted to the universal, it is conspicuously concluded that the universal itself is the adequate subject of this little book.

Ninety-sixth objection. First: If the universal were the subject of this *Isagoge* of Porphyry, he would have mentioned it; but he does not do so, as is plain to the reader. Therefore there is clear indication that the universal is not its subject. The major is evident: because the subject is what the author expends his care upon and without which he cannot speculate and act. The other sciences treat of the universal, since there is no science of singulars, 7 *Met.* 53. Therefore the universal is not its proper subject. I concede the major and deny the minor. For Porphyry in *c. de genere* divides the universal into five members. And in the last chapter he adds that "to be predicated of several is common to all universals joined together." To the confirmation: I distinguish the antecedent: other sciences treat of the universal taken in the first intentional sense, I concede; taken in the second intentional sense, I deny. For this belongs to Logic alone.

You will press: in the books of the *Topics* as well the formal universal is debated; therefore the solution is null. I say that in the present work the universal, its species, and its attributes are treated as the main purpose; but in the cited place, only the universal insofar as it pertains to the problems of dialectics.

Ninety-seventh objection. Second: The object of Porphyry's teaching is what Porphyry takes up for discussion; but Porphyry proposes to treat of five words, or five universals; therefore the five universals are its subject. Confirmation I: if the universal is its subject, since every universal is fivefold, it follows that those five universals are the subject of it. Confirmation II: whatever is predicated of the superior is also predicated of the inferior, from the rule of the *Antepredicamenta*. Therefore if the universal is the subject, genus and the remaining universals are also the subject of the same. I concede the major. To the minor I say that Porphyry himself also differs concerning the universal in common, as is plain from the dissolution of the preceding objection; and he expressed its species as being more well-known. To Confirmation I: I deny the consequence — because the object of a science must be one common thing in which its inferiors univocally agree, 1 *Post.* 43. To Confirmation II: I say that rule is to be taken of essential and exercised predication, not of accidental and designated predication — as happens in our case.

Article XIII: Whether the Universal Is in the Thing or in the Intellect

Some — whose names Sarn. himself suppresses, mentioned at *q. 9 univers.*, and whom Tatar. at *q. 1 praedicabilium*, *Not.* 4 indicates after Scotus *quol.* 3 — hold that there is no subject of inherence for the formal universal and the other first intentions. Others, among whom is Mayr., make the intellect the subject of the universal and of the remaining beings of reason. But Scotus at *q. 9 univers.*, and *1.d.23.q.un.*, and *4.d.1.q.2*, together with Anglicus, Mauritius, and the rest, assert

that the formal universal and the other second intentions have their subject in the known and understood thing.

Note, from the Doctor at *q. 3 univers.* in fine, that the formal universal is an intentional accident — that is, a relation of reason caused or left behind by the comparative act of the intellect. Since, however, the being of accident is to be in something, *7 Met.* 2 and 14, it is rightly investigated what its subject is — whether the intellect or the thing to which the second intention is applied. It must not be supposed that the thing absolutely and according to its essential being is the subject of the said second intentions; rather, their subject is the thing according to its known and understood being. Thus their immediate subject is the known thing; and their mediate subject may be called the intellect, insofar as the known thing, according to known being, is said to be in the intellect as the known is in the knower.

First assertion: The universal and the other second intentions possess some subject. This is presupposed by the Doctor in the cited passage and proved: first, from Aristotle just cited — "the being of accident is to be in something," and the universal is an intentional accident; therefore it possesses some subject. Nor does it avail to say that this dictum of Aristotle is to be interpreted of a real accident, not of an intentional accident. For if a real accident needs a subject, by stronger reason so does an intentional accident, which is of lesser and inferior entity. Second, whatever exists either exists per se or in another, from the *Antepredicamenta*. But the universal is not a being per se, because only substance, to which alone being per se belongs, is of that kind. Therefore it is a being in another, and is supported by a subject.

Second assertion: The universal is not subjected in the intellect. So Scotus in the cited passage, toward *Ad oppositum*. Proved: first, by some authors — matter and efficient cause do not coincide, *2 Phys.* 70. But the intellect, from what has been said, is the efficient cause of the universal; therefore the intellect is not its subject — which is called the matter in which, because accidents have no other matter than the very matter in which they inhere. Against this one may press: the intellect is the effective cause of intellection and also its receptive cause; therefore the aforesaid reason has no force. Perhaps it may be said, in defense of the stated reason, that the antecedent holds of a real accident that immediately inheres in the intellect — like intellection — but not of an intentional accident that immediately resides in the known thing. Second, it is argued from Aver. *1 De Anima com.* 8: "The intellect produces universality in things"; therefore universality is not in the intellect — for universality is where it is produced, but it is not produced in the intellect; therefore it is not in the intellect. It is added: accident resides in what it denominates, as is plain of blackness which denominates the raven in which it inheres. But the universal does not denominate the intellect, as is plain; therefore it is not subjected in the intellect.

Third assertion: It is probable that the universal is in the thing as in a subject. This is intimated by the Doctor in the cited passage, §. *Ad 1, q.*, and *5 Met. q. 2*. Proved: first, every form that intrinsically determines something is in the denominated as in its subject — because every form that is in something through inherence informs it; and as it informs, so it denominates, as whiteness is subjected in the wall through which the wall itself is denominated white. But the universal denominates the thing — as "animal" is denominated genus, and "man" species, and things of that sort are called universals. Therefore the universal is subjected in the thing. Second, second intentions are denominatively predicated of first intentions — as genus is predicated of animal, and species of man, and individual of Peter. Therefore they are in those of which they are predicated.

One hundred and third objection. First, against the First Assertion: in the doctrine of Scotus, God causes second intentions from eternity and makes beings of reason, as I showed in *Met. l. 5, q. 2, art. 4*. But such beings of reason are not in things — because from eternity there are no things, as I showed to be an article of faith in the *Tract. de creatione, disp. 3*. Nor are they in the divine intellect, which on account of its infinite perfection is not receptive of any accident. Therefore no subject need be sought for the universal and the other beings of reason. I reply that the argument holds of real reception, not of intentional reception — as is plain in Metaphysics, whose partial principal subject is God, and in Theology, whose total subject is the same God.

You will press: if there cannot be real reception in the divine intellect, then neither can intentional reception — which is lesser and inferior. The full and complete satisfaction of this pressing objection is to be sought at the cited *Tract., disp. 1, q. 13*.

One hundred and fifth objection. Second: Being in its primary division is distributed into real being and being of reason. But real being is on the part of the thing; therefore the being of reason is in the intellect as in a subject — as the Doctor clearly teaches at *7 Met. q. 18*. I reply that the universal being in the thing can be taken in two ways: in the thing absolutely, with no operation of the intellect taken into account — and I deny; in the thing as known by the intellect itself — and I concede. The Doctor explains it thus in the cited passage, as he himself declares at *5 Met. q. 1*.

One hundred and sixth objection. Third: The possible intellect is a passive power, *3 De Anima 5*. Therefore it does not act outwardly by sending forth, as Plato supposes, but by inwardly receiving, as Aristotle thinks. Since, then, the universal is produced by the intellect, it follows that the universal does not go beyond the intellect's limits but is subjected in it. I reply that this is to be interpreted of real transmutation and reception, not intentional. And this can be illustrated by the spoken word "man," to which the intellect attributes number, figure, case, and similar things — which are found not in the intellect but in the

spoken word itself as in their subject. Still, the opposing opinion is also probable in itself and in the Scotist school. For it may be said that the formal universal and the other beings of reason are in the thing causally and occasionally, but formally in the intellect.

Article XIV: How Universals Are Distinguished

Since many things from what has been said above and from what is to be said below cannot be well and fully grasped by us without some knowledge of distinction, we therefore inquire into the nature of distinction and its number in the present passage, and declare it in some fashion. The Thomists establish only two distinctions — real and of reason — and subdivide the latter into the distinction of reasoning reason and of reasoned reason. The Scotists, on the other hand, place between the real distinction and the distinction of reason a distinction from the nature of the thing, which by the same authors is equally called a formal distinction.

Note that distinction taken in the broadest sense is the otherness of the extremes, as Mauritius says in the *Epitome formalitatum* — which is separated into a real distinction and a distinction of reason. For, as follows from Aristotle at 4 *Met.* 4 and Scotus at 1.d.36.q.un., §. *contra istud*, F, being in its primary division is divided into real being and being of reason; likewise the distinction that obtains between them is either real or of reason. Hence our two recent authors at *disp.* 1, q. 5, *art.* 2 do not seem to speak correctly when they say that there are two primary genera of distinctions — namely, from the nature of the thing and of reason. For although they perhaps agree in substance with the other Scholastics, yet in the use of the expression "distinction from the nature of the thing" they differ greatly from the common Scotist sense, which recognizes the distinction from the nature of the thing as a mean between real distinction and the distinction of reason — as may be seen in the Formalists in their *Tract.* They also conflict with Scotus, as is plain to the reader at 1.d.2.q.7, §. *Sed hic restat*, and 2.d.1.q.5, §. *Ad q. istam*, and *collat.* 23, and elsewhere not rarely. They also deviate from the Doctor's mandate at 1.d.14.11.q.un. sub E, prescribing that words are to be used in accordance with the usage of their authors. Moreover, they seem to be opposed to the very distinction which, since it is derived immediately from the other member of the division of being into real being and its plurality, must certainly be called a real distinction; just as that which is derived from the other member of being — into the being of reason — is fashioned by reasoning reason, or is found between beings of reason, or is found between what are only pluralized through reason, and rightly deserves to be named a distinction of reason. And this is also plainly indicated by the remaining distinctions to be adduced below, which derive their denominations from the things about which they are made. Now just as real being is taken in two ways — first, for everything that is on the part of the thing, without any intellect thinking of it (such as substance and its properties, accidents and their

attributes, modes, and the like); or, for what is actually separate from another, like Peter from Paul; or for what can at least be separated by God, like accident from subject; or for what has some proportion to those that can be separated, like motion from the heaven according to Aristotle (as Scotus notes at *2 dist.* 1, q. 4, §. *Ad q.* before N); or, although one thing is inseparable from another, one is nonetheless producing and the other produced, like the divine persons (from the same Doctor at *2 dist.* 25, q. un., §. *Ad primam rationem*, L); or finally, because one essentially depends on another, like the whole on its parts (as Scotus affirms at *3 dist.* 2, q. 2, §. *Quantum ad* 1, C) — between real beings of this second kind there is a real distinction, which the Doctor calls at *1 Report. dist.* 33, q. 2, §. *Dico ergo*, a real distinction simpliciter, which is found between thing and thing. And this is established as twofold by the Doctor at *1 dist.* 2, q. 7, §. *Sed hic restat* sub GG: one real distinction of natures, and another real distinction of supposita. Similarly, from the same at *Quol.* 18, q., from *ex isto sequuntur*, sub Y, one may add the positive real distinction that obtains between two habits, and the privative real distinction that obtains between two privations of them. But between real beings of the first kind there obtains a formal distinction, which from Scotus at the two just-cited passages is between reality and reality. Now a reality, or formality, is an objective and conceivable account prior to every operation of the intellect — for there is a formal distinction between distinct objective accounts, of the kind I recounted above in the first mode of real being, and which enjoy distinct definitions, as is plain from Sirect, Tromb., and the other Formalists in the *Tract. Formal.* The two recent Scotists in the cited passage make a twofold formal distinction — actual and virtual — and for the virtual one, about which there is difficulty alone, they cite Scotus at *1 dist.* 2, q. 7, before HH, and *Quol.* 1, §. *De secundo art.*, P, and *1 dist.* 8, q. 4, §. *Ad q. respondeo*, O. They endeavor to introduce this into the Scotist school, holding it to coincide with the distinction of reasoned reason maintained by the Thomists, and confirm this by the following reason: some things are contained virtually and eminently in something, like the powers of heating and drying in the sun; therefore between those powers there is some formal distinction (because several inadequate objective concepts are formed of them) — but not actual, because those powers are not actually in the sun but only virtually; therefore a virtual formal distinction must be admitted.

But such a virtual formal distinction is seen to be consonant neither with Scotus nor with the truth. For first: the passage cited by them does not help but rather hinders them. For shortly thereafter the Doctor adds: "Briefly, then, I say, passing over those words about the distinction of reason and the virtual distinction — not that they are poorly said, but because there is no need to use them." Especially since previously he had said that the distinction he wished to establish among the divine attributes precedes every act of the intellect — which cannot be said of the virtual formal distinction that they think coincides with the distinction of reasoned reason; because the distinction of reasoned reason

receives its completion from the intellect, as may be seen in the Thomists. Nor does the second passage favor them. For in that passage the Doctor only says that the account is taken either as an account from the part of the thing, or as an objective account and quiddity, or as an account caused by the act of the intellect — that is, as an account fashioned by the work of the intellect — as Gadius correctly notes there. And the third passage seems rather to oppose than to favor those same authors — since the Doctor expressly intends there that the formal distinction is a third distinction preceding every act of the intellect in every mode. Therefore Scotus does not hold that a virtual formal distinction is given that is identical with the distinction of reasoned reason — because the latter is not a third distinction different from real and the distinction of reason; rather, as those same recent authors say, it is comprehended under the distinction of reason, which they themselves also separate into the distinction of reasoning reason and of reasoned reason. Finally, the reason adduced by them has no force. For the power of heating and of drying is in the sun actually and formally — just as the powers and potencies of the soul are actually and formally in the soul, actually and formally distinct from the soul itself and from one another, as Scotus writes at *2.d.16.q.un.*, §. *Ideo dico*, before M — even though the sun is not formally hot and dry but only virtually, as the Doctor clearly teaches at *q. 4 Prol. 5, contra istud*, before GG. The two remaining Scotist distinctions — those of "totally objectively" and "totally subjectively" — are reduced to the one or the other of the afore-expounded and formal distinctions. The distinction "totally objectively" obtains between those that share no quidditative concept — such as two ultimate differences that are really distinguished from each other, and two attributes of different subjects that also really differ, and two attributes of the same subject such as risibility and grievability, which formally differ from each other. The distinction "totally subjectively" obtains between those that share no reality contractible to themselves — such as God and creature, which are really distinguished from each other. So Tatar. thinks at *q. ult. praedicabil. dub. 2*. The distinction of reason is described as one produced through an act of the intellect — such as that between genus and species and other second intentions; and likewise between predicate and subject in an identical predication — as "man is a man," where the intellect distinguishes man as subject and man as predicate. But the afore-mentioned recent authors submit the distinction of reason to division into the distinction of reasoning reason and of reasoned reason, and endeavor with all their strength to introduce this into the school of the Subtle Doctor. But they labor in vain, opposing themselves to the torrent of Scotists, who rightly repel the distinction of reasoned reason as Thomist from the Scotist arena. For if once this distinction is admitted in the way the Thomists teach, the sharp and celebrated controversy between the Thomists and Scotists about the number of distinctions will undoubtedly perish; and the contention between them would be merely about a name — as Suarez *1.4. de Trin. cap. 4*, num. 2 and Hurt. *disp. 6, Met. sect. 3*, §. 63 note before others, following certain interpreters of Scotus

whom Greg. 1 *dist.* 8, *q.* 5, *art.* 2 recalls and whose names Faber 1 *disp.* 19, c. 3, *tract. Formalitatum* c. 3 suppresses. But since this most serious dispute is still before the judge, and the aforesaid authors fight most keenly over the formal distinction and the distinction of reasoned reason, and their minds, reasons, foundations, and authorities on both sides intend and extend more than a mere difference of name, the distinction of reasoned reason is not to be tolerated among the Scotists — since neither their Prince nor his most eminent disciples have ever permitted it to be maintained and persisted in by voice or in writing. I have said that Scotus nowhere concedes a distinction of reasoned reason that coincides with the virtual formal distinction. For at 1.d.2.q.7, §. *Sed hic restat* before HH — from which our afore-mentioned recent authors think they draw the distinction of reasoned reason — nothing is found there that favors them. For, as Faber observes at the cited passage, c. 2, Scotus only says there are two distinctions: one of reason, which pertains to a different mode of considering the same formal object — either grammatically, as "man," "of man," or logically, as "man," "humanity." The other real, which pertains to distinct objects to which the intellect is directed by distinct acts; and if such objects are thing and thing, between them there is a real distinction simpliciter — as between man and ass; but if such objects are one thing and several realities, between them there is a formal distinction preceding every act of the intellect — as is had in whiteness between the character of color and the character of the dispersive. And the Doctor asserts the same in *Report.* 1, *dist.* 33, *q.* 2. The same he writes in 1 *Oxon. dist.* 8, *q.* 4, §. *Ad q. Respondeo* et dico: "that between essential perfections there is not merely a distinction of reason — that is, of different modes of conceiving the same formal object; for such a distinction is between 'wise' and 'wisdom'; and certainly a greater one between 'wisdom' and 'truth.' Nor is there there merely a distinction of formal objects in the intellect, because, as was argued before, that is never found in intuitive cognition unless it exists in the object known intuitively." These last words are omitted by those recent authors — perhaps deliberately, lest the distinction of reasoned reason they strive to build in the Scotist edifice be destroyed and reduced to nothing. For these words plainly indicate the formal distinction that is found prior between formally distinct objects, before the intellect conceives it between said objects; and the Doctor therefore concludes: "Therefore there is a third distinction there preceding the intellect in every mode." And before this he showed at §. *Ista tamen positio*, below M: "The distinction of such formal objects precedes the act of the intellect." Finally, at *Quol.* 1, §. *De 2, art.*, he mentions the distinction of reason — which comes to be through the operation of the intellect — and the formal distinction, which precedes the act of the intellect, as Gadius and other interpreters explain; and this is declared through the Doctor's own words: "If they are distinguished by reason — and this either by reason taken from the part of the thing, that is, as the quiditative account" (and with a few words interposed the same Doctor adds) "or caused merely by the act of the intellect." I add that at 4 *dist.* 49, *q.* 1, §. *Ad argumenta*, P: "Nor do I say that those accounts are otherwise caused together by

the act of the intellect, but from the nature of the thing, as was said in the question on the powers of the soul in 2, and there *q. 4, §. iuxta 1.*" Thus both there and elsewhere the Doctor neither mentions nor dreams of the distinction of reasoned reason; among Scotists I find only the distinction of ratiocinative reason, which is entirely the same as the formal distinction — as Sirect and Tromb. note at *art. 1, part.* of the cited passage. But the Scotists have no need of the distinction of reasoned reason in order to distinguish God's quiditative predicates; nor to discriminate the transcendental metaphysical grades. For these are distinguished from the nature of the thing, as before others the most subtle Lych. teaches at *Quol. 1, in comm., §. De altero termino* — roughly in the way in which things defining and what is defined are distinguished, as Scotus indicates there sub 15. For the predicates of the first mode are included in the account of the divine essence; while the attributes are predicates of the second mode that belong to the essence quasi as second acts, as the Doctor notes in that passage. But these formally differ — as he plainly intimates at *1 dist. 3, q. 3, §. Ad questionem igitur respondeo.* And Tatar. and other cited Scotists expressly hold this — especially Faber *Theor. 94*, citing Scotus at *1 dist. 8, q. 3, §. Ad 1 argumentum*, Y, who establishes a distinction between being and its modes prior to the act of the intellect; which distinction is called by our people the negative formal distinction. The reason is that the transcendental metaphysical grades are not merely formal concepts formed by the intellect but objective concepts preceding the intellect's work. Therefore, although we conceive them inadequately, our imperfect and inadequate cognition of them neither removes nor posits the formal distinction that they have among themselves: for the intellect truly conceiving a distinction in an object — unless it conceives it plainly as it is in the object and in the thing — conceives it truly. Because just as it does not truly know an object unless it knows it as it is knowable in itself (otherwise it would be deceived), so it does not know some things as formally distinct in an object unless they are formally distinguished in the very object — as the Doctor argues at *q. 4* of the cited passage, *§. Ista positio*, around N, and Tromb. pursues this at the cited passage, *part. 2, fol. 22.* Therefore the distinction of reasoned reason must be wholly expelled from the school of the Subtle Doctor as futile, useless to it, and uprooted as a foreign offspring redolent of Thomist doctrine; so that it is a wonder that certain of our new writers embrace it with both hands and fight sharply for it against the entire body of ancient and recent Scotists. They also do not hesitate — as those who do not favor them — to look down upon the Formalists, most learned and most acute men, and to disapprove their labor and work deserving all praise and celebration; from these I require religious modesty. And let them know that toward our predecessors — men of the highest eminence in every kind of learning — honor, not dishonor, glory, not envy, is to be rendered.

First assertion: Universals taken formally are distinguished by reason. This is explicitly transmitted by Lychetus at *2 dist. 4, q., §. Ad quaestionem istam*, and is

derived from the principles of Scotus in the afore-cited passages and at *Quol.* 13; and Vallo, Faber, and the other Formalists cited above follow him. Proved: such is the distinction as are its extremes, as I intimated above — for between extremes that are thing and thing there is a real distinction; between extremes that are reality and reality there is a formal distinction. Therefore between extremes that are beings of reason — as the formal universals are — there falls a distinction of reason. Moreover, a relation is specified by its term, according to Scotus at *3 dist.* 8, *q. un.*, §. *Contra istam rationem secundam*. And if the term is real, the relation is real; but if the term is a being of reason, the relation is a being of reason — as the Doctor writes at *Quol.* 13, §. *Circa* 1, P. The reason is that a relation cannot have being more truly than the term to which it is. Therefore those whose foundations and terms are beings of reason — as the formal universals are — are distinguished by reason.

Second assertion: Of universals taken materially, some differ really and some formally. This assertion is divided into two parts, and each part is according to the mind of Scotus in the cited passages. The first part is proved: first, those that do not imply a contradiction to be separated from each other really differ — as is plain from the definition of real distinction given in the preceding note. But it does not repugn substance and accident to be separated from each other, as is plain from the accidents of the most holy Eucharist, which have been divinely separated from their substance. But some universals are substances, like "animal," and some are accidents, like "color." Therefore some universals are really distinguished. Second, between thing and thing there is a real distinction, as I was saying above with Scotus. But some universals are thing and thing, as I was just signifying of "animal" and "color." Therefore some universals are really separated from each other. The second part is argued: first, those that are inseparable and enjoy distinct definitions formally differ — as is plain from the definition of formal distinction given above. But some universals are inseparable and have distinct definitions — such as "animal," "rational," "man," and "risible." Therefore some universals formally differ. Second, between reality and reality there intervenes a formal distinction, as is plain from what has been said. But some universals are realities, as those I now enumerated. I add that the attribute and its subject formally differ according to Scotus, as will be shown in *Metaphysics*; but the attribute is the fourth universal, and its subject is very often the first or second universal. Therefore some universals taken fundamentally enjoy a formal distinction.

One hundred and eleventh objection. First: Every being is either real or of reason — or, as Aristotle says elsewhere in a passage recalled by us, every being is either outside the soul or in the soul. But universals are beings; therefore between them there intervenes a real distinction, if they are real beings; or a distinction of reason, if they are beings of reason. And so none of them formally differ. I reply that the solution to this argument is plain from what was said in the beginning of the preceding note, where we brought forward the twofold

meaning of real being. For if real being is taken for everything that does not depend on the work of the intellect, then it is true that every being is either real or of reason. But if it is taken for what is incompatible with being without another and possesses a distinct objective account, or distinct reality and formality, then beyond real being there is found formal being — and between two formal objects a formal distinction is established, as was illustrated with examples above.

One hundred and twelfth objection. Second: A property is an accident that really differs from the subject in which it inheres. Therefore it was not well said above that the property is formally distinguished from that of which it is the property. The antecedent is denied. For a property is not what is commonly called a common accident; rather, it is called an accident taken for something extraneous — as I made plain elsewhere.

One hundred and thirteenth objection. Third: One and the same thing is not distinguished from itself — otherwise it would be both the same and not the same, which is a contradiction. But the first and the last universal are one and the same. Therefore they in no way differ from each other. The major is known. The minor is argued: the accident, which is the fifth universal, is likewise a genus, which is the first universal — as "color," which is an accident, is a genus with respect to whiteness and blackness. I distinguish the major: with respect to the same thing, I concede; with respect to different things, I deny. Thus accident, in view of the subject in which it inheres, is the fifth universal; in view of the inferiors of which it is essentially predicated, it is the first universal. This is the explicit response of the Doctor at *q. 19 univers.* in fine, saying: "Nothing is predicated as to what-it-is of that with respect to which it is an accident; but with respect to that with respect to which it is a genus — as color is not predicated of substance as to what-it-is, but of whiteness, with respect to which it is a genus."

Question II: On Genus

It was right to discuss the universal in common first, before its subjective parts — as I proposed at the beginning of the preceding question. The reason can be given: because the universal taken generally is the quiditative predicate and enters into the definition of each universal; hence the universal in common had to be pre-explained before proceeding to each universal in particular. Now, among the subjective parts of the universal, genus occupies the first place — as Aristotle intimates at *2 De generatione*, c. 3, saying that plant life precedes animal life, which is followed by rational life. Therefore genus must be treated first, before the remaining universals.

Article I: What Is Defined in the Definition of Genus

The accepted senses, divisions, and definitions of genus are to be known from the *Epitome*, *q. 3, l. 1, art. 3*. But concerning the present article, three opinions

circulate among Dialecticians, reported by Scotus at *q. 14 universalium*. The first is that of Venetus, c. de genere, Tol. *q. 1*, and others there, who hold that in the definition of genus is defined the thing or nature insofar as it underlies the second intention. The second is that of certain recent thinkers — namely Rumius *q. 2* and Hurtadus *disp. 4, sect. 2* — who think that what is defined in the said definition of genus is the aggregate composed of the nature and the second intention. The third is that which Scotus in the cited passage, §. *Dicendum igitur*, together with his interpreters there, Antonius Andreas c. de genere, Tatar. *dub. 1, art. 1*, Joannes de Magistris, and others nearly in common in that passage, defend: namely, that in the aforesaid definition of genus only the second intention is defined.

Note, from the Doctor in the cited passage, that genus is a concrete name whose abstract is genericity. A concrete term, from what has been said, denotes two things: one material and another formal. "Genus" taken materially signifies the generic nature — such as "animal." "Genus" taken formally signifies the second intention applied to the nature of genus. Now the question is: whether in the definition of genus is defined the generic nature, the second intention, or both simultaneously — that is, the aggregate of both. The Doctor further notes that genus in the first mode pertains to Metaphysics and in the second mode to Logic — as the Doctor intimates in the cited *q.* before §. *Propter argumenta*. And of the universal in common we showed this extensively in the preceding *q. art. 9*.

First assertion: The nature is not defined in the definition of genus. So Scotus in the cited passage, and it is derived from *Quol. 6, §. de tertio*, below 10. Proved: first, Logic does not deal with things per se but per accidens — since it is not a real but a rational science, from what was proved at *l. 1, q. 2, art. 6*. Therefore the definition of genus is not fitted to the thing or nature. Hence the Doctor excellently adds at the end of the cited *q. 14* that Porphyry gave examples from things as being more manifest — not because he gave a definition of them. Those who do not attend to this — Mastrius and Bellutus at *disp. 5, q. 1, art. 1* — say that the definition of genus was transmitted by the afore-named Porphyry as concerning both the thing and the second intention, and they affirm that the Doctor did not reject this. But since his expressed mind is had, it must not be wrested from its meaning. One need only read the Doctor both in the now-cited passage and in §. *Dicendum igitur*, where he says that only the second intention is defined. And it will be plain that Scotus does not approve of what those recent authors allege. Second: what is placed in the definition of genus is not real but intentional — as is plain to anyone who considers its parts, and especially the verb "is predicated," which I noted above to be an intentional verb. Therefore the aforesaid definition of genus is not adapted to the thing.

Second assertion: Nor is the thing, insofar as it underlies the second intention, defined in the definition of genus. This Scotus expressly holds at §. *Allegato, Ad*

quaestionem dicitur. Proved: first, what is here defined belongs univocally to things of all genera — such as "animal," "color," "figure," and similar things — and belongs to them according to the same name and the same account. But it is impossible for something to belong to things of all genera under a second intention. Therefore in the said definition of genus is not defined the thing under the second intention. The major is plain. The minor is argued: a thing cannot be signified in a more common mode than being. If therefore something under an intention were univocal, being under the intention of genus could be univocal to them; and hence "genus" would be universally univocal to them — which is false. Second: if the thing under intention is defined, the thing is defined per accidens — because the intention is accidental to the thing. But everything per accidens is reduced to something per se, from which the per accidens is said. Therefore since the thing has nothing except to be defined by intention, it follows that the thing is not thus defined at all.

Third assertion: Nor is the aggregate composed of the thing and the second intention defined. This too the Doctor maintains in the cited §. Allegato. Proved: first, from 7 *Met.* T. 13, the per accidens being is not defined. But the aggregate composed of the thing and the second intention is a per accidens being, as is self-evident. Therefore in the definition of genus the aggregate composed of both is not defined. Second: of the aggregate there is no demonstration nor science, as will be established at l. 5 of this work. Therefore neither is there a definition — which is the middle term of demonstration.

Fourth assertion: In the definition of genus, only the second intention is defined. So Scotus just recounted. Proved: first, what is considered per se by Logic is defined in the definition of genus. But the second intention is considered per se by Logic. Therefore the second intention is defined in the definition of genus. The major is evident: for whatever is known by something is known by it according to its quiditative being. The minor is supported by that well-known dictum of Avicenna, Boethius, and Scotus in *Report.* 2, *dist.* 1, *q.* 7, §. *Teneo igitur*, received by all: "Logic deals with second intentions applied to first intentions." Second: what is here defined is what the very definition of genus belongs to per se and primarily. But that to which the definition of genus is fitted is the second intention alone — for what is placed in that definition is intentional, as is clear from the verb "is predicated" and the other expressions. Therefore only the second intention is defined in the definition of genus. Thus all second intentions are defined, as Scotus plainly teaches at 4 *dist.* 1, *q.* 2, a little before §. *Ex his praedictis* 7.

Eighth objection. First: Genus is predicated of several differing in species as to what-it-is. But this does not fit the second intention — because the second intention is an intentional accident that is not predicated as to what-it-is. Therefore the aforesaid definition fits the thing; and hence in the definition of genus the thing is defined. I reply that "what-it-is" and "to be predicated as to

what-it-is" are different things: "what-it-is" indeed belongs to the thing, but "to be predicated as to what-it-is" is adapted to the second intention — and is a determination of the inherent, not of the inherence, which I made plain above. Therefore, to the argument in form: I concede the major and deny the minor for the reason just assigned.

Ninth objection. Second: The intention of genus is not predicated as to what-it-is except of this and that intention, which do not differ by more than number — as the Doctor writes at *Quol.* 6, §. *De tertio* sub X. But genus is what is predicated of several differing in species as to what-it-is. Therefore in the aforesaid definition of genus the second intention is not defined. Confirmation: if in the definition of genus is defined the second intention, the same will happen in the definition of species — since the reason is equal in both. Therefore genus could not be predicated of species — which is false. The consequence is proved: the opposite cannot be predicated of the opposite, nor the disparate of the disparate. But genus and species are disparate; therefore, etc. I reply, with Scotus both here and at *3 dist.* 7, q. 1, §. *Quarta videndum*, C: it is one thing for a predicate to be "what-it-is," and another for it to be "predicated as to what-it-is." For in every genus there is something "what-it-is," from *1 Top.* c. 7; but not everything in any genus is predicated as to what-it-is of anything whatsoever — only of its own inferior, in whose essential account it is included. Therefore since the second intention is a "what-it-is" with respect to this and that second intention, it is predicated of those differing in number; but for the substrates and first intentions, it is predicated of several differing in species. To the confirmation: I say that nothing prevents relatively opposed and disparate things from being predicated of each other, as long as the subject is taken as a "what" and the predicate as a "mode."

Tenth objection. Third: Porphyry in the present chapter, advancing the definition of genus, exemplifies it from things — as "animal" and "man." Therefore it is plainly evinced that in the said definition is defined the thing, not the second intention. I reply that Porphyry indeed adduces examples from things precisely because things are better known and more manifest than second intentions — not because he thought that the thing is defined in the aforementioned definition of genus, as Scotus excellently teaches at the end of *q.* 14 *universalium*; especially because what is designated by definition in second intentions is exercised in first intentions and in things, as the same Doctor notes there, §. *propter argumenta*. And that Aristotle did the same thing the Doctor himself rightly indicates at *q.* 9 *praedicamentali**, §. *Ad q.*, toward *Si autem dicatur*.

Article II: Whether the Definition of Genus Is Quiditative

Most extensively and learnedly does Cardinal Sarn. treat this difficulty together with Scotus at *q.* 15 *universalium*, reporting two opinions: the prior is defended, as Tol. *q.* 2 and the Coimbrans *q.* 1, *art.* 2 recount, by Ammonius and Boethius,

who hold the definition of genus to be descriptive — which Maior, Arriaga, and others embrace. The latter belongs to Scotus in the cited passage, St. Thomas in *l. de ente et essentia*, c. 4, Hurtadus *disp.* 4, *sect.* 1, and others who teach that it is quiditative and essential. "Genus is what is predicated of several differing in species as to what-it-is" — which is drawn from Aristotle *1 Top.* c. 4, *5 Met.* c. 28, and Porphyry in the *Isagoge*, c. de genere. What I said in the *Epitome*, l. 2, q. 7, art. 2 on definition and the conditions required for it must be recalled; and once recalled, this dispute is easily settled and this difficulty conveniently resolved.

Assertion: The aforesaid definition of genus is quiditative and essential. So Scotus in the cited passage. Proved: first, from Aristotle and Porphyry as cited — for Porphyry expressly speaking of the definition of genus transmitted by the Philosophers says: "which also those who describe have assigned" — that is (as Scotus and the Scotists explain), "defined." And in *c. de specie* he adds: "It is necessary to use the accounts of both." But account is definition, from *4 Met.* c. 5, T. 28. Therefore Porphyry seems to wish the aforesaid to be a definition, not a description, of genus. Second, from *6 Top.* 1 and *7 Met.* T. 37: what consists of genus and difference is a quiditative definition. But the aforesaid definition of genus consists of genus and difference — for "genus" is what is predicated of many, and the difference is found in the remaining particles through which genus is distinguished from the remaining universals. Third: that is a quiditative definition which possesses per se predicates, does not include the subject per se, and is convertible with the defined. But the definition of genus is of this kind; therefore it is quiditative. The major is from *7 Met.* T. 11, 13. The minor is plain to anyone who runs through all its particles. From this it is plain that Mastrius and Bellutus at *disp.* 5, q. 1, toward the end of *art.* 2 deviate from the truth and greatly decline from Scotus and his school, when they judge this controversy between the afore-named authors to be merely about a name — saying: "If 'to be predicated' is taken formally it is a description, because predication is a property of the universal; but if it is taken radically it is a definition, because the root of predication is the universal essence, which is expressed through being in many." But their assertion and distinction I vigorously attacked and effectively rejected in art. 9 of the preceding question. Therefore I hold they need not be further refuted or harassed in this place.

Thirteenth objection. First: An accident is defined through its subject, which is substance — which from *Met.* T. 4 precedes the accident in definition, knowledge, nature, and time. But genus is an accident because it is a second intention, as is plain from what has been said. Therefore it must be defined through the subject. But in the aforesaid definition of genus no subject is placed, as is plain. Therefore that definition is not exact and essential. I reply that the major holds of a real accident that is educed from the subject by a producer or follows from the subject by its own nature; but not of an intentional accident, which comes to be through the work of the intellect. Or perhaps it may be better said, by denying the subsumption: for as I said in art. 13 of the preceding

question, the subjects of the second intentions are the known things in which the designated predication are exercised.

Fourteenth objection. Second: A concrete term is not defined. But genus is a concrete term; therefore genus is not defined, whether exactly or not. The major is proved from 7 *Met.* T. 20 and 23. The reason is that the concrete term, being composed of two natures — subject and accident — is a per accidens being; which, from the same source at T. 20 and 21, is not defined. I reply by distinguishing the major: of a concrete term aggregated from two natures, I concede; of a concrete term consisting of one nature, I deny. Example of the first: musical man; example of the second: man. Aristotle is thus to be explained — as the Doctor intimates at *q. 5 praedicamentali*, §. *Ad q.*, and Mauritius approves in the exposition, *q. 12, Ad primum principale*, fol. 26.

Fifteenth objection. Third: What is defined is in a genus. But genus is not in a genus — which is Aristotle's dictum at 3 *Top.* c. 1, saying: "it is more in the genus than what is not in the genus, as justice rather than the just." I reply: with the major conceded, the minor is to be denied. The proof of the minor is explained as referring to the genus of virtue, not to the predicable genus. All the more so because, from what is to be said elsewhere, abstracts of accidents seem more properly placed in the genus than their concretes.

Sixteenth objection. Fourth: Only species is defined, from Aristotle 6 *Top.*, 7 *Met.* c. 4, and Scotus *q. 12 universalium*, §. *Ad primum arg.* The reason is that only species consists of genus and difference — which is required for an exact definition. But genus is not species, since genus and species are two distinct universals. Therefore, etc. I reply: with the major conceded, I distinguish the minor: with respect to the universal in common, I deny; with respect to the other universals in particular, I concede — as I showed in art. 10 of the preceding question.

Seventeenth objection. Fifth: The aim of an exact definition is that the defined be known and declared through the definition itself, from 6 *Top.* c. 6; hence it is given through what is prior and better known — namely, the essential and quidditative principles of the defined. But such is not the definition of genus — because it is assigned through what is simultaneous with or posterior by nature to genus itself — as species is. I reply that the argument holds for the definition of an absolute term, not a relative term; for it is necessary to place the correlative in the definition of a relative term, as the Doctor notes both here and at 4 *dist.* 1, *q. 2*, §. *De secundo principales*, H. The reason is that one relative cannot be known without the other, as is plain from the chapter on relation. Aristotle also intimates this at 6 *Top.* 1.

Eighteenth objection. Sixth: That is not a quidditative definition in which there is a tautology, from 6 *Top.* c. 3. But in the definition of genus there is a tautology — for it is tautologous to say "of several," since "several" in the plural already

includes multitude, just as species includes genus, from 5 T. 16, 10 Met. T. 12. Therefore, etc. With the major conceded, the minor is to be denied. To its proof I say that "difference" is placed not tautologically but expositively — for in order that genus may differ from the other universals, "differing in species" is rightly added for the sake of explanation and distinction.

Article III: Whether Genus Is Predicated of Species as a Whole or as a Part of It

Scotus is quite excellent at *q. 16 universalium* in clarifying and declaring the proposed difficulty — which Cardinal Sarn. indicates there at the beginning of his exposition to be both useful and difficult, both on account of the doubts that are adduced and resolved in it and on account of the objections that arise from them and are proposed. The philosophers are not in agreement on its resolution: for some, like Paulus Venetus *c. de specie*, think genus is predicated of species as its actual part. Others, like Canterus in this chapter, hold it is predicated as a potential part. Recent authors cited by Mastrius and Bellutus, *art. 4, disp. 5, q. 1* add that the metaphysical part is predicated of the whole, not the physical part — and with this distinction they think they resolve the entire difficulty. But Scotus and his disciples discern that genus is predicated of species not in the manner of a part but in the manner of a whole.

Note I, with the division of predication into designated and exercised presupposed — concerning which see Note 2 at art. 15 of the preceding question — that parts for now are of two kinds: essential and subjective. Essential parts are those that constitute the essential whole — as soul and body are the constitutive essential parts of the animate whole. Subjective parts are inferiors of which the superior is predicated — as Peter and Paul with respect to man, and man and brute with respect to animal. The former parts are actual insofar as they actually constitute the whole; the latter are potential insofar as they constitute the potential whole — which is the superior that potentially contains its inferiors. Of the former predication is not made; of the latter predication is most truly made — as "Peter is a man" and "brute is an animal."

Note II, from Aristotle 8 Met. T. 9 and Porphyry in the *Isagoge*, *c. de differentia*, and Scotus *q. 7 praedicamentali*: in species two things are found that compose the species as a whole as its parts — namely, the material or potential, and the formal or actual. The first is genus, which is called material and potential insofar as it is determinable and contractible through its differences and is of itself indifferent and indeterminate to this or that difference — just as matter is of itself indeterminate to receiving this or that form. The second is difference, which is called the actualizing and determining entity — because it actualizes and determines to such specific being, as "rational" determines "animal" to be man and "irrational" to be brute. And therefore just as form actualizes matter, so difference actualizes genus. Although genus is a part of species, it is nonetheless predicated of it in the manner of a whole, says the Doctor in the cited passage, §.

Dicendum, and with him Orbellus 3 *Met.* q. 1, and Scotus 1 *Post.* q. 23, §. *Ad primam*: for the mode of its signification in the concrete gives to be understood the whole, insofar as a predicate in the concrete consequently signifies the whole of what is imported through the subject in the manner of what has it.

Note III, and recall from what was said in the *Epitome*, l. 1, q. 1, art. 6: that there is a twofold abstract — from subject and from suppositum — and a twofold concrete: substantial or suppositival, and accidental. The first regards the suppositum, as "man" with respect to "humanity"; the second regards the form in the subject, as "white" with respect to "whiteness." The concrete moreover is signified in the manner of a whole, the abstract in the manner of a part. But a part is not predicated of the whole, especially in the abstract — for these are false: "humanity is animality" and "humanity is rationality." And Bonet not obscurely intimates this at 1 *Met.*, saying: "A concrete and an abstract differ in this: that an abstract is imposed to signify the quiddity precisely prescinding from every posterior predicate; while a concrete is imposed to signify the quiddity without any precision."

First assertion: Genus is aptly predicated of species, and every predication of superior of inferior is universally true. So Scotus just cited, and at q. 20 in fine. Proved: first, from Porphyry c. *de specie*, where he says that all superiors are predicated of inferiors; and Porphyry himself already gave the example in c. *de genere* of "animal," which is predicated of "man." Add Aristotle in the chapter on substance, saying that secondary substances are predicated of primary substances — as "animal" of "man" and of some man. And at 1 *Post.* T. 9: the first mode of saying per se is when the definition or a part of the definition is predicated of the defined — as "man is an animal," or "man is a rational animal." Second, the following is rightly inferred: "man runs; therefore animal runs" — because the opposite of the consequent is not compatible with the antecedent; but every enthymematic inference holds by virtue of some necessary middle through which it can be reduced to a syllogism; that middle is "man is an animal"; therefore it is necessary, as is plain from 1 *Priorum*, c. 28. And from one thing nothing sufficiently follows unless another is understood.

Second assertion: Genus is not predicated of species in the manner of a part, but in the manner of a potential whole. This too the Doctor transmits in the cited passage, citing Boethius at 1 *divisionum* toward the beginning, in these words: "Genus in predication is a whole; in definition, however, it is a part." And at the end of q. 20 of the same work. And at 1 *Post.* q. 23, §. *Ad primum contra hoc*. Proved: first, the same reason holds for physical and metaphysical parts as for real and rational parts. But the physical or real part is not predicated of the whole: for these are false: "man is matter," "man is rational soul." Therefore neither is the logical or rational part predicated of the logical whole — as species is. Second, genus regards many as its subjective parts, of which it can be predicated; but genus as a part connotes only the species that it constitutes.

Therefore it is predicated in the manner of a whole. Moreover, genus is predicated of species as a universal abstracted from its inferiors — but the universal abstracted from its inferiors contains their essence under a common account considered without the inferiors being considered, just as is plain of species abstracted from its singulars. Therefore it is predicated of them in the manner of a whole: for a part cannot be abstracted from the whole with the abstraction of the universal from its inferiors — it can only be prescinded from it, as the arm from man, which as is agreed by all is not predicated of the whole; for it does not hold: "man is an arm."

Twenty-fifth objection. First: That proposition is true in which a superior is predicated of an inferior, as is plain from what was said. Therefore this is a true proposition: "the superior is the inferior." But the consequent is false — for the opposite is predicated of the opposite. I reply, with Scotus at the end of the question, that it is the fallacy of accident: for it does not follow, "animal is a genus; therefore man is a genus."

Twenty-sixth objection. Second: No part is predicated of the whole, from 4 *Top.* c. 2, as "animal is not a hand." But genus is a part of species, from 5 *Met.* c. 3, and it is plain from its definition, in which genus is placed as a part of it. Therefore, etc. I reply by distinguishing the major: no part is predicated of the whole taken in the manner of a part, I concede; in the manner of a whole, I deny. Aristotle in the cited passage is thus explained. And this is illustrated by the example of Avicenna 5 *Met.* of "manuatum" (having a hand) and "capitatum" (having a head). For these two words signify a part determinately — "manuatum" signifies the hand and "capitatum" the head — yet each signifies in the manner of a whole; for "manuatum" signifies the same as "having a hand" and "capitatum" the same as "having a head" — as Scotus explains in the cited passage before §. *Quia verò.*

Twenty-seventh objection. Third: Every concrete term is denominative. But genus is a concrete term. Therefore it is denominative, and is predicated denominatively. But to be predicated denominatively and univocally are opposing modes. Therefore, etc. I reply that the major is true of accidental concrete terms, not of substantial concrete ones — as is plain from the third note.

Twenty-eighth objection. Fourth: If "man is an animal," either the whole nature of animal is in man himself or not. If not, then man is only qualifiedly an animal, because he does not participate in the whole nature. If yes, then since from 3 *Phys.* T. 63 the whole is that outside of which nothing exists, it follows that besides man there is no animal — and so lion would not be an animal, and so on for the rest. I reply that the whole nature of animal is in man inadequately, not adequately — as I made plain in the preceding question, art. 6. But the description of the whole is to be understood thus: the whole is that of which nothing required for it is outside; and in this way nothing of the nature of animal is lacking to man.

Twenty-ninth objection. Fifth: The whole is what consists of parts, as is plain from the very word; but the universal is a whole — as Aristotle writes at *1 Phys.* T. 4 and 7 of the same work, T. 31. Therefore it has actual parts. I reply according to the distribution of whole into actual and potential given above: parts are likewise distributed into actual and potential. We hold with Scotus at *q. 25 universalium* that genus is a potential whole, since it has a concept or grade prescinded from its differences and species, as the Doctor intimates at *1 dist.* 8, *q. 3*, following Aristotle both at *2 Post.* c. 8 and at *7 Met.* T. 42. Therefore to the argument in form, I distinguish the major: of an actual whole, I concede; of a potential whole, I deny. Aristotle is thus to be explained in the two passages just cited.

Thirtieth objection: A definition actually contains its parts of the defined. But the parts of the defined are genus and difference. Therefore it actually contains them. The major rests on the passage from Aristotle *1 Post.* c. 4, saying that the complete definition and its parts are predicated per se of the defined. I deny the major. To its proof from Aristotle I say that the parts of the definition are predicated of the defined not in the manner of an actual part but in the manner of a potential whole.

Thirty-first objection. Sixth: Genus is really identified with the differences into which it is divided — for they can in no way be separated from it. Therefore genus actually contains its differences; and hence it is predicated of them as of its actual parts. Brasavola replies at *q. 24 universalium* that differences are really identified by reason of the species, which is a third thing distinct from genus and its differences — not by reason of genus itself, which contains them only potentially.

Article IV: Whether Genus Demands Several Species in Act

Scotus examines this article with deliberate purpose at *q. 18 universalium*, where he reports some — among whom are Albertus *Tract.* 4, c. 6 and St. Thomas *1 Post. lect.* 12 — who affirm that genus requires several species in act. The opposing view is defended by most others — especially the Scotists in the exposition of the cited question — to whom Ruuius *q. 4 de specie* and Hurtadus *disp. 5, sect. 4* adhere, holding that genus can be preserved in a single species.

Note that the present doubt can be raised both about the logical and the metaphysical genus, and about its objective being and being of existence — which others, perhaps most notably Tatar. *c. de genere, scibilis* 4, express under other words as meaning: it can be understood according to existence, potency, and aptitude. And the Doctor in the cited passage, §. *Ad quaestionem dicitur*, plainly indicates this. It may also be doubted whether the same reason holds for genus with respect to species as for species with respect to individuals — as Aegidius asserts, against the authors of the first opinion in this article, as Fons. 5

Met. c. 28, q. 15, sect. 1, 2 testifies, and with whom the Complutenses at *disp.* 6, q. 1 agree.

First assertion: The metaphysical genus, and in objective being, does not require several species in act but only in potency and by aptitude. This is indicated by Scotus in the cited passage, §. *Contra hic modus dicendi*. Proved: first, from the definition of the metaphysical universal — "one apt to be in many." Therefore since the definition does not demand the existence of the thing, as I noted at q. 2, l. 1, art. 2, not. 4, it suffices for the metaphysical genus to be apt to be in many differing in species — even though neither it nor its species exist in act. Second, the generic nature taken objectively abstracts from all existence, as is plain in the passage just cited, just as every other quiddity does in objective being. Therefore, even if genus does not have species in act, it is nonetheless to be judged that it is a metaphysical genus.

Second assertion: Genus in the being of existence — which some call the physical genus — can be preserved in a single existing species. This is derived from Scotus in the cited passage, toward *Potest igitur dici ad q.* Proved: first, from Porphyry here, and Aristotle 4 *Top.* c. 2: "when the genus is removed, the species is removed; but when one species is removed, the genus is not removed, because it will remain in act in another species." Second, if all animals were destroyed except man — as will happen after the day of judgment — this proposition "man is an animal" is true and essential, being a predication of genus of species and superior of inferior; not only in the being of essence but also in the being of existence. Therefore with only one species existing, the thing is truly a genus. Third, what has the essence of genus is truly a genus — just as what has whiteness in itself is truly white. But genus existing in one species has the essence of genus — for if man exists, animal exists, which is its genus; if indeed man exists, animal exists, following that canon: from inferior to superior the affirmative inference holds. And hence genus can be preserved in one species alone. Moreover, genus is one apt to be predicated of several differing in species as to what-it-is. But with only one species existing, genus still possesses its definition — which regards potency, aptitude, and essence principally, not act and existence. Finally, correlatives mutually posit and destroy each other, from the chapter on relation. But genus and species are correlatives; therefore when one species is posited, its genus is posited. For it is not necessary that all the terms of a relation exist — as is plain of a father who does not have all his children begotten simultaneously, with respect to whom several paternal relations arrive successively, in accordance with the plurality of the children begotten — as the Doctor writes at 3 *dist.* 8, q. *un.*

Third assertion: The logical genus does not require several species actually existing but only apprehended by the intellect. This is taught by Scotus in the cited passage and his interpreters — most notably Barg. 1.d.3.q.6. Proved: first, the logical universal does not require existing inferiors but only possible and

objectively known ones, as is plainly established from the foregoing. Therefore for the logical genus it suffices that its species be apprehended by the intellect. The antecedent is shown: a rational comparison requires only known extremes, since truth is drawn from things in objective being. Moreover, species is placed in the definition of genus, as is plain from an examination of its parts; therefore for the logical genus it is necessary that its species be apprehended — for the definition cannot be fully understood unless what is placed in it is conceived. Again, correlatives are coïntelligible, from Aristotle as cited in the preceding assertion. Therefore since genus and species are correlatives, for the logical genus its species must be apprehended by the intellect.

Fourth assertion: A species is preserved in one individual just as a genus is preserved in one species. This is gathered from Scotus as cited, before §. *Ad q. dicitur*, and below §. *Contra*. Proved: first, both genus and species are universals, which are apt to be in many. Therefore the same judgment must be rendered about species as about genus. But genus can be in one species, as was shown. Therefore species can also be in one individual.

You will say there is a disparity — because genus is divided by two opposing differences, which does not apply to species with respect to individuals; hence genus requires at least two species for its preservation, constituted by two opposing differences. Against this, the Doctor argues in the cited passage: that which is placed in the definition of species ("differing in number") is the same as what is placed in the definition of genus ("differing in species"). Therefore there is no disparity. Second, the superior is essentially in its inferiors. But species is something superior with respect to individuals, just as genus is with respect to species. Therefore species is preserved in one individual, just as genus is in one species.

Thirty-ninth objection. First: Aristotle at 4 *Top.* c. 1 and 6 says: "Every genus has several species." And there: "it is appropriate that species be predicated of fewer things than genus." And at 6 of the same work, c. 2, he adds: "Where there is a genus, there must be also what divides it from the opposite." But the differences that divide the genus from the opposite are constitutive of the species; therefore genus cannot consist without several species. All the more so because the plurality of species is placed in the definition of genus, as the word "differing" denotes. Therefore, etc. I reply that the cited passages and similar ones to be adduced must be explained as referring to potency and aptitude, not to existence and act — unless several species are apprehended by the intellect, as is plain from the third assertion.

Fortieth objection. Second: From 2 *Caeli* T. 19, if one of two opposites is given, the other ought to be given as well. Therefore if one species is given — constituted by one opposing difference — another species ought to be given constituted by the other opposing difference. And hence genus requires at least two species in act. I reply, with Scotus at q. 40 *praedicamentali*, §. *Ad q. dicendum*,

and *q. 42, §. Secunda*: that dictum of the Philosopher adduced in the antecedent must be understood not of act but of potency. For if blackness exists, it is not necessary that whiteness exist — it only suffices that whiteness can exist. Likewise, if health exists, it is not required that disease exist — it suffices that disease can exist, as the Philosopher expressly holds in the chapter on opposites toward the end. Or that dictum is explained as referring to contraries that expel each other from the same subject — not to contraries taken absolutely, which are more generally called opposites, such as the two differences constitutive of two species; about which see Aristotle *5 Met. c. 9, T. 16*, and Scotus *q. 14 praedicamentali, §. Ad quaestionem*, and *q. 24, toward Contra 2 responsionem*.

Forty-first objection. Third: Correlatives are simultaneous by nature, from Aristotle in the chapter on relation. But genus and species are correlatives, as is plain. Therefore there cannot be genus in act unless its species exist in act — and thus genus cannot be preserved in one species. I reply that correlatives are indeed simultaneous by nature; but a relative does not require all its correlatives to exist — since one correlative alone suffices. For if there is a father, there must be a son; but it is not required for the being of a father that all his sons exist. The same must be asserted of genus, for whose being it is not necessary that all its species exist.

Article V: Of What Things Genus Is Predicated

The present difficulty can chiefly be moved about three things — namely, differences, species, and individuals. In accordance with these three matters, I briefly set forth three assertions, with what I wrote in the *Epitome, l. 1, q. 2, art. 2* about predication and its divisions presupposed and pre-known.

First assertion: Genus is not formally and essentially predicated of difference, but only materially and identically. The Doctor discusses and defends this extensively at *1 Post. q. 23**. The first part is proved: first, from Aristotle *4 Top. c. 2*, saying: "It is a fault if genus is predicated of difference" — add: formally and essentially. Second, what does not enter the essence of genus cannot be formally and essentially predicated of it, as is plain from the definition of essential predication given in the passage just cited. But difference does not enter the essence of genus, since it divides genus and constitutes species. Therefore genus is not formally and essentially predicated of difference. The second part is proved: those are predicated identically and materially which are really identified — as I noted in the cited passage of Scotus *3 Met. q. 1*. But genus and its differences are really identified, at least by reason of the species they constitute, as I noted with Brasavola elsewhere. Therefore the predication of genus of its differences is identical and material. Moreover, genus only potentially, not actually, contains its differences, from art. 3 of this question. Therefore it is predicated of them only identically.

Second assertion: Genus is immediately predicated of its species. The Doctor holds this at *q. 17 universalium*, §. *Ad oppositum*, together with Porphyry in this passage. Proved: first, genus proximately and immediately regards its subjective parts, as every universal does; and it is predicated immediately of those, as all Dialecticians acknowledge. But species are the immediately subjective parts of genus; therefore it is immediately predicated of them. Second, between genus and its species nothing is interposed in the straight line of the predicamental series, as is plain from the series of any predicamental line given in the *Epitome*, l. 1, q. 4. Therefore genus is immediately predicated of them. It is added: because genus is more immediately determined to the being of species than to the being of an individual, it is rightly concluded that genus is immediately said of its species.

Third assertion: Genus is only mediately predicated of individuals. This is defended by Scotus at *q. 17 universalium*, §. *Ad quaestionem*, and *2.d.12.q.2*, §. *Respondeo* before C; whom Suarez *disp. 6, Met. sect. 9*, num. 15, Arriaga *disp. 7 Logica, sect. 2*, and many others follow — against the Nominalists, to whom Hurt. *disp. 4, sect. 5* adheres. Proved: first, between genus and individuals the species intervenes — since there is no individual that is not the individual of some species. Therefore since genus is predicated of the individual through the species of which it is the individual, it follows that genus is predicated mediately of individuals. Second, between the highest and lowest things there are means — for there is no series or transition from the highest to the lowest except through means. But genus is the superior, species are the means, and individuals are the inferiors, as is clearly seen in the Porphyrian tree. Therefore genus is only mediately predicated of individuals. Moreover, the proximate correlative of genus is species; the remote correlative is the individual. Likewise there are generic and specific natures, which are contracted through individual differences, from which individuals are constituted. Therefore genus is predicated of individuals only mediately.

Forty-sixth objection. First: If genus is immediately and essentially predicated of species, there would be a tautology, which Philosophers must avoid. Therefore genus is not thus predicated of species. The antecedent is proved: when it is said "man is an animal," either it is the same animal as man, or it is a different animal from man. If it is the same animal, a tautology is committed — for it would be the same as saying "man the animal is an animal." But if it is a different animal — then it is not a genus, because it is not predicated as to what-it-is. I reply, with Scotus at *q. 16 universalium*, §. *Ad 3 principale*, that "animal" is predicated of "man" as prescinding from "man" and "brute"; for as indifferent to man and brute it is genus, but as contracted to the specific being through rationality or irrationality it is a part of the species — which together with the difference constitutes the species. Therefore to the argument in form, I deny the antecedent. To its proof, what is to be said is plain from the distinction given.

Forty-seventh objection. Second: This is a true proposition of genus concerning an individual: "this animal is an animal." But between "this animal" and "animal" no mean is interposed. Therefore the proposition of genus concerning the individual is immediate — and hence genus is immediately predicated of individuals. With the major conceded, I deny the minor — for since "this animal" cannot be without being rational or irrational, it is therefore presupposed to be of some species; and so between genus and individual there is always some species.

Forty-eighth objection. Third: The generic character can be immediately prescinded from individuals and predicated immediately of them. Therefore genus can be immediately predicated of individuals. The antecedent is proved: from this man and from this horse the common sensitive character — which is the generic character of animal — can be abstracted and compared to them and predicated of them. The consequence is shown: the generic character can be immediately predicated of those from which it can be immediately abstracted. But it can be immediately abstracted from individuals. Therefore it can also be immediately predicated of them. I reply that this generic character is abstracted from individuals not absolutely and immediately, but with species presupposed under which those individuals are comprehended. For this reason genus is put forward of individuals only remotely and mediately.

You will press, with Hurt. *disp.* 4, *sect.* 5, §. 45: in the given case no specific character is perceived, nor is any foundation required for perceiving it. Therefore no specific character is involved in such abstraction. I say that although the specific character is not explicitly known in such abstraction, it is nevertheless necessarily presupposed and implicitly contained — since there cannot be a species without being constituted by a difference and the generic character, before the species is determined to individuals through individual differences.

Fiftieth objection. Fourth: Scotus at *1.d.3.q.6*, sub E, and expressly at *4.d.8.q.2*, §. *Aliter*, *conclusionem* 9, O, and *1 Post. q. 23*, §. *Contra in definitionibus*, writes: "In singulars there is an order according to the order of universals — for any universal can be understood descending into its own singular before it is contracted by any difference to something inferior as to a species; so that we may have the order of these singulars: this being, this substance, this body, and so on down to Socrates. This is plain through Avicenna in his *1 Physics*: that we first see from a distance a body, then an animal, and then a man, etc." This is not to be understood of the universal — since sight does not see the universal — but of the singular of the more universal; therefore according to Scotus genus is immediately predicated of individuals. Confirmation: the demonstrative pronoun "this" signifies the singular of being, not the singular of something less common and universal; for when one asks "what is this?" (as the Hebrews asked at *Exod.* 16), one does not investigate whether this is a being — since it is already

supposed to be a being. And the same cannot be both what is supposed and what is sought, as is plain from *l. 5, q. de praecognitis*. Therefore through that pronoun, one inquires whether it is wood or another singular below being. And once the answer is given that it is wood, or stone, or something else special under being, the inquirer's mind is at rest. Therefore there are singulars of transcendentals and genera, of which they are immediately predicated — according to Scotus's Doctrine. I reply: even if the individual of the more common and universal can be understood prescisively — as the Doctor indicates in the passage just cited, saying that any universal can be understood descending into its own singular before it is contracted by a difference to something inferior as to a species — nonetheless not divisively; since no individual can exist without being the individual of some species, as the same Doctor clearly sets forth at *2.d.12.q.2, §. Respondeo* before C. Therefore we gladly admit that we can prescind and understand the singular of the more universal before that more universal is understood as contracted through its differences to its species; but we deny that such a singular exists on the part of the thing without being of some species. And hence we assert that the predication of genus of individuals is only mediate. To the confirmation the same must be said — which Mastrius and Bellutus could not deny at *disp. 5, art. 3, q. 1*, as advocates of the contrary position, as is plain from their responses to the reasons advanced in opposition.

Article VI. Whether Predication in What Distinguishes Genus from Difference

This doubt is raised and resolved by Scotus in *q. 19*, and is excellently explained by Sarnanus, Mauritius, Joannes Anglicus, and among more recent authors by Fuentes in *q. 7, difficulty 3, art. 3*. From the Doctor there cited, it is noted that predication, which was established in *q. 9, the preceding articles*, as constituting the logical universal, is divided into predication in what and predication in what sort, as the two primary modes of predication. Now predication in what is nothing other than predicating an essence in the manner of an essence included in some subject or in some inferior — which is proper to genus; whereas predication in what sort is predicating a form in the manner of something qualifying or adjacent to another — which fits difference. Since genus is taken from the material side, it predicates essence in the manner of something subsisting; but difference, since it is taken from the formal side of the species, predicates essence in the manner of something informing and qualifying the species itself. Moreover, since difference is an intrinsic part of the species, it is therefore predicated not in what sort absolutely, but in what sort with limitation — that is, in what sort of thing.

Assertion: Genus is rightly distinguished from difference in that genus is predicated in what and difference is predicated in what sort of thing. So holds Scotus in the place cited above, which is defended also by Aristotle in *4 Top. cap. 6* and by Porphyry in the present passage. Proof: predication in what is

predicating essence in the manner of something subsisting, as I noted in the preceding remark; but genus predicates essence in the manner of something subsisting, because genus is taken from the material side, which by itself subsists, as I observed above — and this is indicated by its being expressed with a substantive noun. Difference, on the other hand, predicates essence in the manner of something qualifying and adjacent to another. Therefore the aforesaid distinction between genus and difference is properly assigned. Furthermore, there are only two modes of predication appropriate to the species of the universal: but the mode of predicating in what belongs to genus. Therefore the mode of predicating in what sort of thing belongs to difference, as it is distinguished from genus and from the other universals.

Objection I. Aristotle in *7 Top. cap. 2* writes that both genus and difference are predicated in what. Therefore, according to Aristotle, no distinction intervenes between the predication of genus and that of difference. Reply: Aristotle there only asserts that difference belongs to the quiddity of the species and enters into its essence just as genus does; they differ, however, in that difference is like a form. For this reason it is deliberately placed in the definition of difference by the Dialecticians that it is predicated in what sort of thing, whereas genus is like matter, and therefore is predicated only in what, as has already been explained above.

Objection II. That which is predicated in what is that by which one aptly answers the question "what is it?", as Porphyry holds in *cap. de genere*. But to the question "what is it?" posed about a species, one does not rightly answer by giving the genus. Therefore predication in what is not proper to genus as it is distinguished from difference. The minor is shown thus: since genus in its definition is defined as a second intention, if one asks "what is man?", it is not well answered by saying "it is a genus," because genus is not the what or essence of the first-intention thing. And if one asks "what is the species?", it is not suitably answered by saying "it is a genus." Therefore, etc. Reply: there is a twofold interrogation about the species taken as an intention, namely "what is it?" and "what is predicated of the species?" If one asks what is predicated of the species, the answer "genus" is correct. But if one asks what it is when taken as a foundation, then the correct answer is "it is an animal." For the foundation of genus is predicated in what by the predication exercised concerning the foundation of the species.

Objection III. Predication in what does not distinguish genus from difference. Therefore there is no distinction between the two. The antecedent is proved: a superior difference is predicated in what of an inferior difference, as Aristotle holds in *7 Met. 7*, saying that the superior difference is predicated of the inferior per se in the first mode, which cannot be without predication in what. I deny the antecedent. In response to its proof, Scotus says that the whole coordination of differences is to be referred back to the coordination of species, just as a series

of parts is reduced to the series of a whole — something which we shall examine elsewhere.

Objection IV. Accident too is predicated in what. Therefore predication in what does not separate genus from difference and the other universals. The antecedent is proved from *1 Top. cap. 7*: in every genus there is a what — for color, for example, is predicated in what of whiteness and blackness. Reply: accident can be considered in two ways — as it regards the subject in which it inheres, in which case it is not predicated of that subject in what, for accident is not predicated in what of the substance which is its subject; and as it regards its own inferiors, in which case, if it is a genus, it is predicated in what of its species, as the example of color regarding whiteness and blackness aptly shows.

Question III. On Species

Article I. Whether Species is Rightly Defined by Porphyry

Cardinal Sarnanus in *q. 21 of the universals* assembles many reasons to show that after genus, species should be treated next, even though difference precedes species itself. We adduce only one reason, namely that species regards genus as its correlative, as Porphyry affirms in the present passage and Scotus in *q. 21 of the universals*, §. *Dicendum in solutione primi argumenti*, and also in *1 d. 23, q. un.*, §. *Contra istud*. Nearly everything investigated concerning genus can likewise be inquired about species in parallel fashion, as the Doctor notes in the place cited above before the section cited. Therefore, presupposing much from what preceded, we take care to add only certain things peculiar to species itself.

Scotus in the question cited above on the universals identifies two relations in species: one toward genus, according to which it is defined by Porphyry in the present passage — "species is that which is placed under an assigned genus" — and another toward individuals, according to which the same author defines it as "species is that which is predicated of many differing in number in what." That definition of species which is also adduced by Porphyry there — namely, "species is that of which genus is predicated in what" — coincides with the first of his definitions, as the Coimbrans note in *q. 1 de specie art. 1* and Arriaga in *disp. 7, sect. 1, n. 35*. It is merely a notification and exposition of it, as the Doctor notes in the place cited above before the response to the fourth argument. That one and the same thing can enjoy several definitions according to diverse respects is clear from Aristotle in *1 Post. cap. 2*, who attributes to demonstration two definitions: one according to the final cause — "demonstration is a syllogism that produces scientific knowledge" — and another according to the material cause — "demonstration is that which proceeds from true, immediate, prior, more known premises, and from causes of the conclusion." Likewise in *2 de anima cap. 2* he offers two definitions of the soul: first, "the soul is the first act of an organic body having the potentiality of life"; and second, "the soul is the principle by which we live, sense, are moved from place to place, and understand." Among

multiple definitions of a thing, the more exact and formal one is that which better explains the nature of the thing; the others can be called material and descriptive definitions. Observing this, the Doctor adds that the first definition is proper to species because it is given through its primary correlative; whereas the second is given through its secondary correlative, and is therefore not so exact and proper.

First Assertion: Species is rightly defined as that which is placed under an assigned genus, or that of which genus is predicated. This is defended with Porphyry by Scotus in the cited passage, against the opposition of Arriaga in *disp. 7, sect. 2*. Proof: a definition which distinctly explains the thing defined is a correct definition; but the aforesaid definition of species clearly explains the nature of species, inasmuch as it is immediately contained under genus and genus is predicated of it as of something inferior to itself. Therefore, etc. Furthermore, in the definition of a relative, its correlative must necessarily be placed, since a relative is toward another. But genus and species are correlatives, as I noted above from Porphyry, and genus is placed in the definition of species given above. Therefore that definition of species is good and suitable.

Second Assertion: There is only one definition of subiectible species, expressed in different words for the sake of greater explanation. This too is defended by Scotus in the place cited above, to whom Dominicus Soto adheres, while Cajetan and Camerarius oppose it. Proof I: to be subject to genus and to be that of which genus is immediately predicated are entirely identified, since a subject is that of which something else is said, and a predicate is that which is said of another, as I wrote in the Epitome. But Porphyry, defining subiectible species, says "species is that which is subjected to genus," and then adds "species is that of which genus is predicated." Therefore there is only one definition of subiectible species, expressed in different words. Proof II: there is only one relation of species toward genus. Therefore with respect to it there is only one definition. The antecedent is proved: relation, according to Scotus, is specified by its term; but the term of species above itself is only one, namely the genus under which it is comprehended. Therefore, etc.

Third Assertion: Predicable species is properly defined as that which is predicated of many differing in number in what. Scotus in the cited passage holds this and says it is to be proved in the same way as the definition of genus was proved. For this definition consists of genus and difference, and is therefore legitimate. The antecedent is evident: its genus is "to be predicated of many," in which it agrees with the other universals; "differing in number" — supply: immediately and completely — is the difference by which it is distinguished from genus; "in what" is that by which it is distinguished from the three last universals.

Objection I against the Second Assertion: Species, insofar as it is subject to genus, has two diverse formal characters. Therefore there is not one but a

double definition of subiectible species. The consequence is clear: of one formal character there is one definition, and of a double formal character there is a double definition. The antecedent is proved: the character of the universal is "to be one in many," and the character of the predicable is "to be one of many"; but to be a subject in which is a distinct character from being a subject of which. I deny the antecedent and its proof; for it is established from what was said that, according to Scotus, the character of the logical universal is "one of many," whereas the character of the metaphysical universal is "one in many," as I fully explained and proved in *q. 1 of this book, art. 9*.

Objection II. Species is per se subiectible. Therefore it is not per se predicable. The antecedent is well established from the first definition of species; the consequence holds: opposites cannot inhere in the same thing per se; but subiectible and predicable are opposites, as Mayronius notes in *passages 3 and 4 of the universals* above all others. Therefore they cannot belong to species per se. Granting the antecedent, I deny the consequence. In response to its proof, I distinguish the major: with respect to the same thing, I grant it; with respect to different things, I deny it. For species is subiectible insofar as it regards genus, and predicable insofar as it regards the individuals of which it is predicated.

Objection III. A definition is given through things more known, since it is devised to explain the essence of a thing; but genus is not more known than species, for more universal things, which require more difficult abstraction, are less known to us than less universal things, which are nearer to our senses. Therefore species is not well defined through genus. Confirmation: genus is defined through species; therefore species ought not be defined through genus, otherwise the same thing would be both more known and less known, and there would be a circle in the definitions — a thing most to be avoided by philosophers. I grant the major and distinguish the minor: genus taken formally, I grant; genus taken fundamentally, I deny. This resolves the confirmation as well; for those definitions presuppose their foundations, on which Tataretus in *c. de specie, scibile 2* is to be consulted, especially because the correlative is placed in the definition of the relative as something added to it, since it is extrinsic to it, as Scotus says in *q. 28 of the predicamentals, §. Hoc potest concedi*.

Objection IV. A good definition converts with the thing defined, according to the laws of good definition; but the aforesaid definition of species does not convert with the thing defined, that is, with species itself. For there are many species that are predicated of only one individual — the sun of only one sun in number, and the moon of only one moon in number. Therefore the definition of predicable species is not legitimate. Granting the major, the minor is to be denied. In response to its proof, I say that even if those species do not actually have many individuals, a plurality of individuals is not incompatible with them, as was said above concerning genus with respect to species, and as the Doctor expressly teaches in *1 Post. q. 35, §. Ad quaestionem dicitur* and *§. Ad primam rationem*.

Objection V. A definition is adequate to the thing defined; but the definition of predicable species exceeds its object, that is, species itself. For certain things are predicated of many differing in number that are not species — such as "instant" of many instants, "point" of many points, and "soul" of many souls. Therefore the definition of predicable species is not properly assigned. Granting the major, I deny the minor. In response to its proof, I say that by species we understand a complete nature, not an incomplete one such as soul, which is a part of the species, and point, which is the terminus of quantity.

Objection VI. God is predicated in what of the three divine Persons — for one may say "the Father is God," "the Son is God," and "the Holy Spirit is God" — yet God is not a species. Therefore the aforesaid definition of species is accommodated to things other than species itself. Reply: God is predicated of the divine Persons not as their individuals differing from one another in number; since there is only one God and one numerically divine essence without any division or multiplication of itself, God therefore cannot be a species, as Scotus teaches with Augustine in *7 de Trin. cap. 4 in 1 d. 8, q. 3, §. Contra, conceptus ille*.

Objection VII. The notion of person is predicated in what of the divine Persons — for these are true propositions: "the Father is a person," "the Son is a person," "the Holy Spirit is a person" — yet it is not their species. Therefore the definition of species is not adequate. Granting the antecedent, I deny the consequence. For according to Scotus, being is predicated univocally of God and creature, substance and accident, although it is neither genus nor species nor any other universal, since being is a transcendental. The same must be said of person, which is univocally predicated of the three Persons enumerated, as the Doctor writes in *1 d. 23, q. un., §. Item arguo*, and in *d. 26, q. un., §. Ad 1, tertia via sub*, whom Pelbartus follows in *Tom. 1, Rosary, verb. persona, §. 2*.

Article II. Whether Species is a Universal by Relation to Individuals

The two Cardinals Thomas de Vio in *cap. de specie* and Toletus in *ibid. q. 1* affirm that species as subiectible is predicable — which amounts to saying that species through its relation to genus is a second universal — although these two authors rest on different foundations, as Fuentes notes in *q. 8, difficulty 1, art. 2*. For Cajetan thinks that universality and predicability flow from subiectibility as two properties flow from one essence, so that just as this proposition is true, "man is risible," so likewise this one: "subiectible species is universal." Toletus, on the other hand, holds that universality is the essence from which subiectibility and predicability proceed as two passions, so that species as subiectible is a subiectible universal, and as predicable species is a predicable universal. The opposing view is defended by Scotus in *q. 21 of the universals, in the solution of the 4th argument*, Sarnanus, and others there commonly, asserting that species is the second universal through its relation to the individuals of which it is predicated.

It is to be noted and recalled from what was said in the preceding article that species regards two things: the genus immediately under which it falls, and the individuals of which it is completely predicated. According to this twofold respect, it is rightly investigated whether species constitutes the second universal through its relation to genus or through its relation to individuals.

First Assertion: Species as it is subjected to genus is not a universal, neither on the grounds that universality and predicability flow from subiectibility as two of its passions, nor on the grounds that predicability arises from universality as a passion from its essence. This assertion contains two parts and is gathered from Scotus in *q. 21 of the universals, in the solution of the arguments*. The first part, which conflicts with Cajetan, is proved: an opposite does not emanate from an opposite as its property — as could be shown by a long catalogue of the properties of things — but predicability is opposed to subiectibility, since predicability is the respect of a superior to its inferiors, while subiectibility is the respect of an inferior to its superior. Therefore, etc. The second part, which conflicts with Toletus, is proved: predicability is not a passion but the essence of the universal, as was shown in *q. 1 of this book, art. 9*. Therefore, etc.

Second Assertion: Species is not the second universal through its relation to genus, but through its relation to the individuals of which it is predicated. This assertion is likewise bipartite and is handed down by Scotus in the place just cited. The first part is proved: that to which the essence of the universal does not belong is not a universal; but to species as it is subjected to genus the essence of the universal does not belong. Therefore as such it is not a universal. The major is clear. The minor is proved: the essence of the universal is to be predicated of many, from what was said in the place cited; but species as it is referred to genus is not predicated of many, since to be predicated and to be subjected are opposed, as I explained above. Therefore, etc. Furthermore, and this seems to come to the same thing: two formally opposite things cannot belong to the same thing with respect to the same other thing, otherwise two contradictories would be true or false of the same thing. But if species, insofar as it is subject to genus, were a universal, two opposites would formally belong to it simultaneously — namely, predicability and subiectibility — which have been shown to be opposed in the antecedent assertion. Again, according to Scotus, from the distinction of terms the distinction of relations is derived; but genus and individuals are distinct terms to which species is terminated. Therefore there are distinct relations with respect to genus and individuals; but predicability regards individuals as its term. Therefore it is distinguished from subiectibility, which regards genus as its term; and consequently species through that relation to genus is in no way a universal. The second part is proved: that through which something is defined is that through which it is constituted, since a definition explains the thing defined and its parts or essential principles; but species is defined through its relation to individuals. Therefore it is constituted through that relation. The major is known; the minor likewise shines forth from the

definition of species, which is "to be predicated of many differing in number in what." I add that genus is a universal through its relation to the species of which it is predicated; therefore in like manner species is a universal through its relation to the individuals of which it is predicated.

Objection I. Species as it stands under genus is either a universal or a singular; but it is not a singular, because species itself mediates between genus and singular, and as such is not contracted by an individual difference. Therefore it is a universal through its relation to genus. The major is known, because no medium is given between universal and singular. Confirmation: species as it is subjected to genus is predicated of this and that subjectible species. Therefore species as it regards genus is a universal. The major is to be distinguished with respect to that character of subjectibility: I deny it; with respect to the character of predicability: I grant it. Others express this by saying that as such it is a universal materially and specifically, but not formally and reduplicatively. In response to the confirmation, I say that such predication is not essential but denominative — like the predication of an individual of this and that individual — which is excluded from the true character of a universal. Or as others say, such species is subjectible as a what and predicable as a mode.

Objection II. Inferiors are subjected to superiors and participate in their nature; but the five universals are inferiors with respect to the universal in common and participate in its nature, since the universal in common is a genus with respect to those five, as I proved in *q. 1 of this book, art. 11*. Therefore just as those five are universals insofar as they regard their genus, the same must be affirmed of any species. Granting the major, in response to the minor I say that even if those five participate in the nature of the universal, they are not formally constituted in being universal through the respect of subjectibility, but through their relation of predicability concerning their inferiors.

Objection III. The supreme genus in its being is constituted by the fact that it has no other genus above itself, and not through its relation to the inferiors of which it is predicated. Therefore species immediately, as it stands under genus, is a universal. The antecedent is proved from the Doctor in *1 d. 8, q. 3, before §. Alii probant*, where he says it is not of the character of the supreme genus to have many species under it, but rather to have no supervening genus above it — as is clear in the case of "when," which, although it is a most general genus, has few or no species under it. Reply: the supreme genus is considered in two ways: one, as it is supreme, and thus it is said to be supreme by the fact that it has no other genus above itself; and another, as it is a genus, and thus formally it is a genus through its relation and disposition toward the species of which it is predicated.

Article III. Whether Species is the Adequate Correlative of Genus

Among the various opinions of the Dialecticians on this article, one is that of the Lovanienses here affirming that species is the immediate and adequate

correlative of genus. Another belongs to those whom the aforesaid authors report, who suspect that the first and total correlative of genus is something common prescinding from both species and individual, which they call the "subiectible in what incompletely." The third, which is almost common among both ancient and modern Dialecticians, teaches that species is indeed the immediate correlative of genus, but that the total and adequate correlative of genus is species together with individuals.

It is to be noted and recalled from what was said in the Epitome in *1. 3, q. 4, art. 8*, that a relation is a respect toward another; what regards another is called a relative, and that to which the relation is directed is called its term. If from the side of the term itself there also arises a relation that regards that other, it is called the correlative, which can be twofold: immediate, which occurs when between the relative and its correlative nothing is interposed — an example is the act which is the immediate correlative of potency, since potency and its act regard each other immediately and proximately; and adequate and total, which so terminates the relation that it is in no way directed toward anything else — as a son is the adequate correlative of a father.

First Assertion: Species is the immediate correlative of genus. This is elicited from the Doctor in *q. 17 of the universals*, §. *Ad quaestionem*, where he says that genus is predicated immediately of species, and of individuals mediately. And in *q. 21*, §. *Dicendum* he adds that species is the correlative of genus and that genus must necessarily be placed in its definition, which runs: "species is that which is placed under an assigned genus." Proof I: in the direct predicamental line, between genus and species nothing mediates that could terminate the relation of genus, as is evident in the Porphyrian tree. Therefore the immediate correlative of genus is species, as is clearly established from the remark set forth above. Proof II: that which is included in the definition of something is immediate to it, because it is either of its essence or added to it; but species is included in the definition of genus as something added to it, as is clear from the particles of that definition. Therefore it is its immediate correlative. Moreover, Aristotle in *6 Top. cap. 2* writes that a relative must necessarily be defined through its immediate term; but genus is a relative and its term is species, which it regards immediately. Therefore, etc.

Second Assertion: The subiectible is not something common to species and individual; but species and individuals together are the total and adequate correlative of genus. This is deduced from the Doctor in the place cited above. The first part is proved: no predicable common to species and individual is given — otherwise there would be six universals, the opposite of which we established in *q. 1 of this book, art. 10*. Therefore neither is there a common subiectible; the consequence holds because when one relative is removed the other is also removed. Furthermore, the relative of genus is the infima species, as is gathered from *1 Top. cap. 13* and is clear from the definition of species.

Therefore if such a common subiectible were admitted, species and individuals would agree in that subiectible, and so would be one per accidens composed of subiectible and predicable — which is absurd. The second part is proved I: genus is terminated not only to species but also to individuals, and extends to nothing else beyond these. Therefore its adequate correlative is species and individuals; the consequence is clear from the remark set forth above. The antecedent is at hand: genus is subjected to both species and individuals, of whom genus itself is predicated. Proof II: species and individuals participate in the nature of genus — for "man is an animal" and "Peter is certainly an animal." Therefore genus taken formally is adequately terminated to species and individuals; and consequently the total and adequate term of genus is not species alone, but species and individuals together.

Objection. Porphyry brought forward the definition of genus including species alone. Therefore the individual does not belong to the first and adequate term of genus — otherwise he would have improperly omitted the individual, which would be included in its total term. Reply: it was sufficient for Porphyry to mention species, which is proximately and immediately subjected to genus, from which the individual could be understood to follow, since it is contained under genus remotely and under species proximately.

Article IV. Whether Species Requires Many Possible Singular Individuals

With ease we dispatch this difficulty, since with Scotus in *2 dist. 3, q. 6* we deny that the principle of individuation is matter, and assert that every specific nature both corporeal and incorporeal that is created is numerically multipliable — as we pursue at length in the Treatise on Angels, *disp. 1, q. 6* — against the Thomists cited by more recent authors, who hold that spiritual species are immultipliable, and specifically that one angelic species contains only one individual, so that it can in no way have several individuals. But granted that this Thomist opinion is true, the question arises whether that is a true species which has or can have only one individual. On the affirmative side stand Cajetan in *1 p. q. 3, art. 9* and a few others. On the negative side stand all disciples of Scotist doctrine in *2 dist. 3, q. 7* — and this is now the common opinion among more recent authors, so much so that some of them think the opposing view ought to be banished from the schools.

It is noted that Cajetan in the place cited above, for defending his opinion, premisses this foundation: that something can have the character of species in two ways — on the side of the thing and the intellect together, and on the side of the intellect alone. On the side of the thing and the intellect, it occurs when a common nature is abstracted by the work of the intellect from individuals, compared to them, and predicated of them. On the side of the intellect alone, it occurs when the intellect conceives a nature prescinding from individuals, even though that nature exists in one individual in such a way that it can in no way

obtain other individuals. Now all admit the character of species taken in the first way, to which the proper definition of species belongs; but they reject the character of species taken in the second way, which some devise with Cajetan, while other Dialecticians rightly reject it as invented and chimerical.

Assertion: Supposing that there were only one possible individual of some species, such that a multiplicity of individuals would be incompatible with it, it would not be a true species. This is deduced from Scotus in the places cited, and is proved I: the definition of species given by Porphyry does not fit Cajetan's species. Therefore that is not properly a species. The antecedent is proved I: species is one thing apt to be predicated of many differing in number in what. Therefore if a multiplicity of individuals is incompatible with it, it is not a true species, and consequently the proper definition of species does not apply to it. But if you respond that plurality of individuals is incompatible with angelic species on the part of the thing, though not on the part of the intellect and its mode of conceiving — since the intellect can conceive the angelic nature as indifferent and undetermined with respect to several individual differences, and thus the aforesaid definition of species can aptly be accommodated to it — against this it is argued from Scotus in *2 dist. 3*, cited above: if the angelic nature from the side of the thing and of itself is singular and incapable of plurification, it cannot be understood under the character of species and universal, because species and every universal is plurifiable, as is clear from its definition; otherwise the intellect would be deceived in understanding that nature otherwise than it is on the side of the thing. Furthermore, the divine nature, which cannot be plurified of itself since it is of itself singular, cannot be understood under the character of species or any other universal — for the mode of understanding it under the character of species is incompatible with it, because individual multiplicity is incompatible with it. Finally, either the angelic nature has the aptitude to be predicated of many differing in number in what, or it does not. If the first, it is a true species. If the second, it is in no way a species. To invent another species than the one handed down by Porphyry and other Dialecticians is entirely vain and chimerical. Proof II: the universal is one thing apt to be predicated of many, from *1 Perih. s.* and *1 Post. 8*. Therefore a species to which being predicated of many differing in number is incompatible is not a universal. But Cajetan's species is of this kind, as is clear from the remark set forth above. Therefore it is not a universal. Furthermore, a nature to which communicability is incompatible is not common nor universal, as is established from the first question of this book. But the species fashioned by Cajetan has communicability incompatible with it, as is clearly established from his statements. Therefore the said Cajetan rightly endeavors to introduce it into the schools.

Objection I. Angels are placed in the predicament of substance and immediately under the subaltern genus of incorporeal substance. Therefore angels have predicable species, each of which obtains only one individual on account of lack

of matter. Granting the antecedent, the consequence is denied as to that part which asserts that one species has and can have only one individual on account of lack of matter — for that principle we have shown to be false both in *Metaphysics* and in the *Treatise on Angels*.

Objection II. The nature of Michael, for example, can be conceived stripped of singularity as indifferent toward many individuals; but the nature thus conceived and abstracted is not singular. Therefore it is universal, and thus universality according to reason can be adapted to a species that cannot have several individuals. Reply: given the hypothesis that the nature of Michael is conceived in this way, it would be falsely conceived, since indifference and indetermination are incompatible with it, as it is singular and universality is incompatible with it. Wherefore properties compatible with and not incompatible with that nature are to be attributed to it.

Objection III. Formal universality is a relation of reason, as is clear from what preceded; and for its term it suffices that there be something of reason. Therefore for species taken formally, several individuals devised by the intellect are sufficient, even if they are impossible. Confirmation: according to Aristotle in the work on the Heavens, celestial bodies can be universals, even though they are incapable of plurification, because the same Philosopher holds that each of them coalesces from the whole matter, not only actual but also potential and possible within its species, as is clear in *1 Caeli cap. 8*. Reply: formal universality is indeed a relation of reason, but not one that is invented and chimerical — it has a foundation in the thing, for it is a second intention which is founded in first intentions, according to the common opinion of the Dialecticians. Therefore species requires several individuals, if not actual at least possible. In response to the confirmation, I say that those bodies according to Aristotle are incapable of plurification not from within but from without — that is, because there is no other matter that could receive such a form, according to the same Philosopher cited. We, however, assert that a multiplicity of individuals is not incompatible with species from within.

Question IV. On the Individual

Immediately beneath species stands the individual, of which species is immediately and completely predicated in what as of a subjective part of it. Therefore after the discussion of species we speak of the individual, especially because the individual is the correlative of species, and Aristotle in *lib. praedicamentorum cap. de ad aliquid* teaches that correlatives are known simultaneously.

Article I. What and How Many Kinds the Individual Is

The individual is distinguished by Porphyry in *c. de specie*, or rather the individual is taken in two ways: first, intentionally, which has being on the part

of the thing, and is described by the same author as that whose collection of properties is found in no other — as is clear in the following two verses:

Form, figure, place, together with name and blood, Country — these seven no one shares with another.

The individual taken in the second intentional sense, which has being from the intellect, is defined as that which is predicated of only one; it is also described by the same Porphyry as that which is contained under species, and is explained in roughly the same manner as that definition of species which reads: "that which is immediately contained under genus." Furthermore, there is individual substance, which as is clear from Aristotle in the Antepredicaments, *cap.* 2, is neither in a subject nor said of a subject — and this is also called suppositum, hypostasis, and person if it is of an intellectual nature, as Pelbartus notes in *Tom. 1 of his Rosary, verb. persona*, §. 3, following Vorrilong in *1 d. 23* and Mayronius there. Whence Scotus in *1 d. 23, q. un., §. Ad 9, ex Rich. 4 de Trin. cap. 22*, defines person as "the incommunicable existence of an intellectual nature." And there is the individual of accident, which according to the same Philosopher is in a subject but said of no subject — such as this color, this whiteness. Further, the individual is divided into the vague, the determinate, and the suppositional — on which see the Epitome, *art. 8, l. 1, q. 1, 3*.

First Assertion: The prior definition of the individual is not incongruous. So hold all Dialecticians together with Porphyry in the place cited. Proof I: accidents lead us to knowledge of substance, according to the statement of the Philosopher in *1 de anima cap. 1*, "accidents contribute greatly to knowing substance"; but the properties of the individual enumerated above are accidents. Therefore through those properties the definition of the individual is well assigned. The minor is shown: form, temperature of qualities, figure of members, their disposition, and the rest read in the verses cited are clearly accidents. Proof II: in this state substance is not knowable by us in itself, but only through its sensible and material accidents, as the Doctor teaches in *2 d. 3, q. 6*. Therefore the substantial individual is rightly described through properties and extrinsic entities.

Second Assertion: The second definition of the individual is by no means illegitimate. This too is accepted by all philosophers, and is proved: through that definition the nature of the individual is made known and declared — a nature which is indivisible into several subjective parts, as the Doctor notes in *Quol. 19, §. De tertio ante V*. Likewise, in it too the genus-character is assigned, which is "to be predicated," and the difference-character, which is "to be predicated of only one." Therefore, etc.

Objection I. Of singulars there is no definition nor demonstration, from *7 Met. cap. 15*. But the individual is singular — for individual and singular signify exactly the same thing among philosophers. Therefore the individual is

improperly defined. Reply: the major is to be understood of proper and quiditative definition, not of descriptive definition such as the definition of the individual, as Scotus agrees in *2 d. 3, q. 6, §. Ad arg. sub O.*

Objection II. The individual is predicated of nothing, as is held in the Antepredicaments, *cap. 2*. Therefore it is badly asserted that the individual is that which is predicated of only one. Reply through a distinction of the antecedent: by essential and quiditative predication, I grant; by identical and accidental predication, I deny. The locus of Aristotle cited above is to be understood in this way.

Objection III. Some individuals are distributed into parts from which they are composed, as this tree into its many branches. Therefore the individual is not indivisible and impartible. Reply: the individual is said to be indivisible into subjective parts, which are adequately identical with the individual itself — not into integral and entitative parts, as the argument proves.

Objection IV. Some individuals are very similar — such as two eggs, two solar rays, and the like. Therefore the first definition of the individual is not suitable, insofar as it does not fit every individual. Reply: that definition is most fitting to the individual of the human species, and then to the individual of any animated species, and in some manner to the individual of any other species, as Scotus indicates in *2 d. 3, q. 1, §. Contra istud arguitur G.*, saying that those individuals can be discerned at least by diversity of place or position.

Article II. Whether There is Some Common Character among Individuals

That there is no common character among individuals is held by Albertus, Soto, Cajetan, and the Lovanienses in *c. de specie*; opposed to them are Scotus in *1 d. 23, q. un. in fine* and *d. 26, q. un., §. Ad primum tertia via Y*, Lychetus there, Fuentes in *q. 8, difficulty 3*, and very many other more recent authors, teaching that there is a common character among individuals.

It is noted from Scotus in the place cited and more clearly in *2 d. 3, q. 6* that two things are contained in the individual from which the individual itself is composed — namely the specific nature and the haecceity or individual difference through which it is constituted in the being of an individual. Thus in this man there is humanity through which he is man, and there is haecceity through which he is this man. The question now is whether, just as from this man and that man, for example, humanity is abstracted as something common to them, so also a haecceity or individual character is prescinded from them that is common to them. Now something can be common to many either as a what or as a mode or as something quasi-proper, as the Doctor notes in *1 d. 23 of the first book, q. un. in fine*, and as Mastrius and Bellutus explain in *disp. 5, q. 2, art. 4*.

Assertion: There is one individual character common to individuals. So Scotus both in the places cited and in *q. 12 of the universals*. Proof I: things that enjoy the same definition participate in the same common character; but individuals possess the same definition. Therefore they obtain the same common character. The major is clear, because in a definition there is a common character in which certain things agree and a differential character by which they differ from others. The minor is known from the remark in which we explained the common character of the individual. Proof II: whenever from the formal constitutive principles of some things something real and common can be abstracted, something common can certainly also be abstracted from what is constituted through those principles; but individuals are constituted through individual differences, as will be shown in *Metaphysics*, and from their constitutive principles or haecceities, "haecceity in common" is abstracted — which is predicated of this and that haecceity, for Petrinity is haecceity, Paulinity is haecceity, and so forth. Therefore an individual character common to all individuals is conceded. Proof III: that which is formally predicated of many is common to many, for there cannot be predication of many unless something common is participated by many; but the individual is formally predicated of many — for "Peter is an individual," "John is an individual," and "Andrew is an individual." Therefore a common individual character is to be admitted for them.

Objection I. Aristotle and Porphyry as cited above, in defining the individual, say "the individual is that which is not predicated of many." But if there were a common individual character among many individuals, the individual would be predicated of many — for just as through a common nature predication of many comes about (as "Peter is a man," "Paul is a man"), so likewise through an individual character common to many individuals, predication of many individuals would come about ("Francis is an individual," "Anthony is an individual"). Reply: the authors cited are to be understood thus, namely that the individual is not predicated of many quiditatively, but not that it is not predicated denominatively and as something quasi-proper, as is deduced from Scotus in the first place cited above.

Objection II. From the ultimate distinctive and constitutive principles of some things, nothing common to them can be abstracted; but individual differences are the first distinctive and constitutive principles. Therefore no common concept can be prescinded from them. The major is Scotus's from *1 d. 26, q. un., §. Quantum ad tertiam viam G.*, and the reason is that if there were something common to them, they would not be primarily distinguished by that common element but by something contracting it — and so they would not be primarily diverse and primarily distinctive. The minor is clear because they are the ultimate differences constituting individuals in the being of the individual. Reply: I concede indeed that from ultimate distinctive and constitutive principles nothing common predicated of them in what can be abstracted,

because those are primarily diverse; yet another concept distinct from the quiditative can be abstracted, as I said above, and as the Doctor cited above edits, shortly before G. in the solution of the first, and as Faber proves in *Theor.* 95, O. 3.

Objection III. What is the principle of differing is not the principle of agreeing, for by the same thing something cannot both agree and differ; but the individual character is the principle of differing — for through it the individual is distinguished from everything that is not that individual. Therefore, etc. Confirmation: if a common individual character were given, it would be contracted to this and that individuation — which is contradictory, for the contracting character is not contracted, just as place is not placed, nor action acted. Therefore, etc. Reply: I distinguish the major — with respect to the same thing, I grant; with respect to diverse things, I deny — as is clear in the case of rationality, which is the principle by which man is distinguished from brute, yet is also the principle of agreement, since every man agrees in it and participates in it. Likewise, the individual character is the principle by which the individual differs from everything else that is not that individual, yet it is also the principle of their agreement, since all individuals participate in the individual character. In response to the confirmation: the consequence is denied; for the individual character is not contracted but is the principle of contracting, since it is not the individual difference but the common nature that is contracted and determined by the individual difference.

Article III. On the Predication of the Individual

The things said in the Epitome in the general treatment of predication, *q. 2, art. 2 of l. 1*, and its divisions are to be recalled, as well as what I brought forward there in *art. 8* on the individual and its division. Here only, with Lychetus in *1 d. 2, q. 3, §. Ad illa*, I observe that the singular or individual can be taken in three ways: first, as a second intention which is predicability of only one; second, as the foundation of this second intention, e.g., as Peter; third, as the individual difference determining and contracting the nature to singular being. In the first way, the individual can be conceived in itself, and through conception it is an object conceived; likewise it can be conceived under a universal mode — as when it is said that "the singular is a universal" — since to be predicated of only one is common to this and that, as is clear from the preceding article. Thus the object conceived is the singular, but the mode of conceiving is universal, because it is conceived under a universal mode.

First Assertion: The determinate individual is formally predicated of this and that individual. This is gathered from the Doctor in *1 d. 2, q. 3, §. Ad illa C.*, and is proved: what is common to many is formally predicated of those many, as is clear of man, who is formally predicated of the individual members of human nature; but the individual as conceived by the intellect as indifferent toward this and that individual is common to many. Therefore the individual is formally

predicated of those many. Moreover, Scotus in *q. 11 of the universals, in the solution of the 3rd argument*, says that the individual is a species of intention; but a species is formally predicated of those whose species it is. Therefore, etc. And further: just as this is a formal proposition — "animal is a genus" — so likewise this is a formal proposition — "Peter is an individual."

Second Assertion: The vague individual is formally predicated of determinate individuals. This is deduced from Scotus in *q. 12 of the predicamentals*. Proof I: from Aristotle in *c. de substantia*, who in presenting the division of substance into first and second, gives the example of first substance as "some man" and "some horse." Therefore just as the determinate individual is formally predicated, so likewise the vague individual, since both are individuals, even though the vague individual designates a singular thing indeterminately and obscurely, as the Doctor notes in the place cited. Proof II: the formal character of the individual is common both to the vague and to the determinate, since each presents something singular and individual, though one does so determinately and the other indeterminately. Therefore the predication of both is the same. Accordingly, these are formal predications: "Peter is some man" and "Bucephalus is some horse." See Scotus in the place cited above and Fuentes in *q. 8, difficulty 4, art. 2*.

Objection I. What is formally predicated of many is a universal. Therefore if the individual is predicated of many, it follows that it is a universal, and hence there would be posited more than five universals — contrary to Porphyry and our assertion made in *art. 10, q. 1 of this book*. Reply: the object conceived is singular, but the mode of conceiving is universal, as I made plain in the remark set out above. Since the singular is conceived under a universal mode, the individual therefore does not constitute another universal beyond those five handed down by Porphyry. And so in response to the form of the argument, I distinguish the major: if it is a common object, I grant; if it is a singular object, I deny.

Objection II. Scotus in *q. 12 of the universals, in the solution of the third*, writes that the individual is a species of second intention; and in *1 Sentences* in the place cited he admits this proposition: "the singular is a universal." Therefore according to Scotus the individual constitutes another species of universal distinct from those five commonly accepted. Reply: Scotus indeed concedes that the individual is a species of second intention, but not a species of the universal which is distributed into the five common species. For this reason the proposition "the individual is a universal" is not quiditative and essential but modal and denominative, as Cardinal Sarnanus rightly notes in that place. The response to the other point from *1 Sentences* is clear from what was said: the individual is a universal not of itself but from the mode of conceiving, insofar as it is conceived as indifferent toward this and that individual, as was sufficiently explained above. You will insist: the universal is a second intention; therefore if the singular is a species of second intention, as the Doctor teaches, it is certainly

a species of universal. Granting the antecedent, the consequence is to be denied. The reason is that although the individual has the mode of the universal, it does not have the quiddity of the universal, as has been said more than once above.

Question V. On Difference

Just as a substantive precedes an adjective and matter precedes form, so predication in what precedes predication in what sort. Therefore after the universals that are predicated in what, we now approach the universals predicated in what sort — and first of all difference, which is predicated in what sort of thing, or in essential what sort, which precedes predication in accidental what sort, which belongs to the remaining universals.

Article I. What Difference Is

That difference and distinction are taken indiscriminately is commonly found among philosophers; yet there is some distinction between them, which seems evident, even if there is not unanimous agreement on assigning it. For Hurtado in *disp.* 6, *sect.* 1 thinks the distinction consists in the fact that distinction designates plurality and difference designates inequality. Arriaga in *disp.* 8, *sect.* 1, *subsect.* 1 holds that the distinction consists in dissimilarity, whether there be equality or not. Others, like Mauritius Hibernus in the Epitome of formalities, place it in the otherness of the extremes. For the clarification of this matter:

It is noted from Gadius in *Quol.* 4 that these terms are related to one another such that one extends further than the other — that is, as more or less common — namely: divided, distinct, diverse, and not-identical. For everything divided is distinct, but not vice versa, since division, following upon matter and quantity, is found only in material things, as divisibility is a property of quantity, as will be clear in the following book on quantity. Distinction, on the other hand, is found both in material and in spiritual things. Diverse things are those that agree in nothing quiditatively and essentially, as Scotus seems to hold in *1 d.* 3, *q.* 3, *§. Ad q.*, whom the Formalists follow in the Tract. formalitatum. Again, everything distinct and everything diverse is not-identical, but not vice versa. For distinction and diversity, being positive relations, presuppose positive extremes which are their foundation and term. Hence Aristotle says in *7 Phys. T.* 31 that non-identity is more common than distinction, and consequently that between habit and privation, between affirmation and negation, there is not properly a distinction but a non-identity — or if there is any distinction, it is called negative distinction. To these may be added "different," which seems broader than "divided" and "diverse" but narrower than "distinct" and "not-identical." For everything different is distinct; yet not every distinct thing seems to be different, since the divine Persons are said to be rather distinct from one another than different. Accordingly, we order these as follows: non-identity, distinction, difference, division, diversity — the prior ones being broader and more common, the later ones narrower and less common.

First Assertion: The distinction between distinction and difference does not consist in the fact that distinction denotes plurality and difference adds inequality. This assertion conflicts with Hurtado cited above, and is presupposed by Scotus and his disciples. Proof I: among the divine Persons there intervenes distinction and difference, yet not inequality, as we showed in the Tract. de Trin., *disp. 5, q. 6*. Therefore that distinction is not properly handed down. Proof II: if two rational souls were equal, between them there would be distinction and difference, by which they would differ through their haecceities, but not inequality — by supposition that they were equal. Therefore Hurtado gratuitously asserts the aforesaid distinction between distinction and difference.

Second Assertion: The distinction between distinction and difference does not consist in dissimilarity. This is opposed to Arriaga above named, which also all Scotists presuppose. Proof through Arriaga: the divine Persons truly differ and are distinguished from one another, yet they have no dissimilarity, since they have the same essence, perfections, and attributes. Therefore the reason for the distinction between difference and distinction is not derived from dissimilarity. The antecedent is clear from *Hebr. 1: "Who being the splendor of glory and the figure of his substance"* and *Coloss. 1: "The image of the invisible God."* And we showed this at length in the Tract. de Trin., *disp. 7, q. 2*. Again, two individuals of a species differ and are distinguished from one another with respect to individual differences, and are similar with respect to the specific nature. Furthermore, similarity and dissimilarity are founded in quality, while distinction and difference are founded in substance, quantity, and the remaining beings. Therefore the distinction between distinction and difference is not to be located in dissimilarity.

Third Assertion: Distinction and difference diverge in that distinction extends more broadly than difference. This follows from what was said in the remark and from the refutation of others' views, and nothing seems to need to be added for its explanation and proof beyond what has already been said.

Fourth Assertion: Distinction is the character and principle of distinguishing; difference is the character and principle of differentiating extremes. This is indicated by Porphyry in the present passage, saying "difference is that by which singulars differ from one another," and by Scotus cited above. Proof I: relation taken universally is a respect or principle of relating; but distinction and difference are relations, as Gadius writes in the remark cited above. Therefore distinction is the principle of distinguishing. Proof II: identity is the unity of extremes. Therefore, from the opposite, distinction is the otherness of extremes, or the character by which extremes are distinguished from one another. Hence St. Athanasius in the Symbol, signifying the distinction of the divine Persons, uses the word "another," saying: "Other is the person of the Father, another of the Son, another of the Holy Spirit" — and in signifying the

identity of the divine nature he uses the word "one": "But of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit the divinity is one."

Fifth Assertion: Difference as it is the third universal is aptly described as "that which is predicated of several in what sort of thing." So Scotus in *q. 17 of the universals*, §. *Dicendum ad q.* Proof I: the aforesaid definition consists of genus and difference; therefore it is an apt definition. The antecedent is clear: "to be predicated" serves as genus, in which it agrees with the other universals. "In what sort of thing" holds the place of difference, by reason of which it diverges from the remaining universals. Proof II: that definition embraces generic and specific difference, or subaltern and infima difference, and well explains the nature of logical difference, containing nothing superfluous or deficient. Therefore it is a correct definition.

Objection I. Porphyry in the present passage defines difference as "that which is predicated of several differing in species in what sort of thing." Therefore the definition of difference handed down by Scotus and received by us is bad. Granting the antecedent, I deny the consequence. For in this, Hurtado and Arriaga in the place cited note that Porphyry was truncated and deficient; for he was obliged to assign a definition of difference common to both generic and specific differences, or to embrace specific difference under the one he gave. And no one should find this surprising — for if Porphyry himself, when wishing to deviate from the truth of faith, likewise sometimes deviated unintentionally from the truth of philosophy. Or say as I said in the Epitome, in the article on difference.

Objection II. A proper definition is constituted from genus and difference, as I have repeatedly urged in the preceding pages; but difference does not consist of genus and difference — for that belongs to species alone. And if difference consisted of genus and difference, since there is no greater reason for one than for another, a process to infinity would not be avoided. Granting the major, I distinguish the minor: as it is a species of the universal, I deny it — for I said above in *q. 1 of this book, art. 11* that the universal is a genus of which difference is one of the species. As it is the third universal, I grant it. For difference, as Scotus says in *q. Ad 4*, is taken in one way insofar as it is a name of second intention applicable to that which is the principle of differencing — as it is a real relation — and in this sense we speak here, and it is the third universal. In another way it signifies a relation of reason whose species are difference of species and difference of number, from which something is denominatively said to differ in species and to differ in number.

Objection III. The same thing cannot be defined under opposite modes; but the definition of difference given above involves opposite modes — namely "in what" and "in what sort," for what-subsisting and what-sort-inhering signify, as the Doctor notes in *q. 19 of the universals, verf. Nota*. I distinguish the major: with respect to the same thing, I grant; with respect to diverse things, I deny. As to the

thing, difference is predicated in what, because it belongs to the essence of those of which it is predicated; as to the mode, it is predicated in what sort, because it is signified in the manner of something adjacent to and informing another.

Objection IV. Certain differences are not predicated in what sort of thing. Therefore the definition of difference is unsuitable. The antecedent is shown: "irrational" is not predicated of horse, lion, and other species in what sort of thing, because it is a genus with respect to them; but genus is not predicated of its species in what sort but absolutely in what. The major is to be denied. In response to its proof, I say that "irrational" is a generic difference which constitutes the brute, which has many species. Therefore I deny that "irrational" is a genus with respect to them, and assert that it is an intermediate difference, just as "sensitive" is with respect to man.

Article II. Through What Relation Difference is Constituted the Third Universal

This difficulty seems to be resolved from what we said in *q. on Species, art. 2*. For those authors who there assert that species is a universal insofar as it regards genus are bound to say plainly the same here about difference. But we, who in that place held that species is a universal through its relation to its inferiors of which it is predicated, must in this article think the same also about difference.

It is to be noted, first, that some things are perfect and others imperfect — I said some things are perfect, supply: according to the requirement of their own nature; for absolutely, God alone is perfect. But there are natures perfect in their own kind, which do not tend toward any further perfection, such as specific natures — that is, most special natures. Truly imperfect natures are those which are carried toward further perfection, such as generic natures, which comprehend the differences that are constitutive and perfective parts of specific natures. This doctrine is clearly taught by Scotus in *4 d. 49, q. 14, §. Ad 1 rationem principalem M*.

It is to be noted, second, that difference regards three things: genus, species, and its own inferiors. With respect to genus, difference is called dividing, containing, and perfecting — in which regard Aristotle in *5 Met. T. 16* says that difference is a certain diversity of genus, and Porphyry here writes that difference is "that which is apt to divide those which are under genus." This arises from the fact that difference is referred to genus as a potential and determinable whole contracted by its differences, just as matter is determined and contracted by its forms, as I explained at length in *q. on Genus, art. 3*. With respect to species, difference is called that by which the species exceeds genus, or that by which the species surpasses genus. Likewise difference is that by which the species diverges from another. With respect to its own inferiors, it is defined in the preceding article: "that which is predicated of several in what sort of thing."

Assertion: Difference is constituted the third universal through its relation to the inferiors of which it is predicated. This is defended by the Doctor in *q. 19 of the universals*, whom the greater part of more recent authors follows. Proof I: the character of the universal — which is to be predicated of many — belongs to difference insofar as it presents a relation to the inferiors of which it is predicated. Therefore according to its relation to inferiors, difference is established as the third universal. The antecedent is clear from the definition of the universal in *1 Perih. cap. 5*; the consequence is evident from the antecedent of *art. 2*: the universal in act and formally is generated through the comparative act of the intellect, from *q. of this book, art. 8*; but the comparative act involves a relation to the inferiors of which the universal itself is formally predicated. Therefore difference, to which the character of the universal is adapted, is formally determined to be the third universal through its relation to those of which it is predicated. Furthermore, the universal regards many, as its definition indicates; but difference through its relation to genus or to species regards only one. Therefore through such a relation it is in no way the third universal. The objections to this assertion are dissolved from what was said in the place cited at the beginning of this article, since with the mere change of the word "species" to "difference," the objections and responses are exactly the same there and here.

Article III. Whether the Superior Difference is Included in the Inferior of Which it is Predicated

The state of this article is whether, for example, "rational" includes "sensitive," which is the superior difference, and vice versa — and whether the predication of the superior difference of the inferior is true, so that, persisting in the same example, this is true: "rational is sensitive." On this matter there are two principal opinions. The prior belongs to Cantelius in his exposition of the chapter on difference, Jandun in *2 Met. q. 12*, Soncinates in *7 Met. q. 37*, and others affirming that the superior difference is included in the inferior and is formally predicated of it. The latter is the common view, defended by Scotus in *1 Post. q. 24*, §. *Ad q. dicitur*, and in *4 d. 11, q. 3*, §. *Ad rationes ergo*, and in *7 Met. q. 8*; Antonius Andreas in *ibid. q. 15*; Orbellus in *c. 6*; Joannes Anglicus in *q. 13 of the universals*; and others, denying that the superior difference is formally contained in the inferior, nor that it is essentially predicated of it.

It is noted, first, from the Doctor in *q. 24 of the first Post.* and from Maior in *c. de differentia, notable 4*, that difference is derived from form — not from the form which is one of the parts of the physical composite, but from the form which is the formal significate or formal grade of perfection of the thing. Now the superior and inferior difference — namely "sensitive" and "rational" — can be regarded in two ways. First, insofar as "rational" is taken from the ultimate grade of man's perfection and "sensitive" from another grade: in this way "sensitive" is not included in "rational," since they are formally distinct grades. Second, insofar as "rational" is derived from the total perfection of man, which perfects

substance as the most general genus: in this way "rational" includes "sensitive" and all its superior differences, because in that total perfection a part is included. For greater evidence of this:

It is noted, second, that the inferior or superior difference is formally comprehended in the species which it constitutes, whether that species is subaltern or infima — as "living" in "animate," "sensitive" in "animal," and "rational" in "man." The reason is that the whole includes the parts from which it is composed; therefore species, which is a certain whole of genus and difference, contains that difference which is its constitutive part. Again, notice that intermediate species are genera with respect to their inferiors — as "living" with respect to "tree" and "animal." Now since in the species genus and difference are contained as parts from which it is composed, it clearly follows that in any such species there is formally included the subaltern genus together with its comprehended subaltern difference, and vice versa. Again, observe that the inferior difference does not formally include genus, and therefore does not contain the difference of the genus itself through which the subaltern species is made — as "rational" does not formally include "animal," nor "sensitive," which is the constitutive difference of animal itself. The reason is that genus and difference are distinct realities from which the metaphysical whole is composed, as the Doctor writes in *7 Met. q. 19, 1 d. 8, q. 3*, and *2 d. 2, q. 6*.

First Assertion: The posterior difference does not formally contain the prior differences. This is commonly held by Scotus as cited above and by nearly all other philosophers, and is argued from Aristotle in *4 Top. cap. 2, locus 18, locus 22, 6 of the same work, cap. 3*, and *3 Met. cap. 10*. Proof II: if the inferior difference formally included the superior, in the definition of the inferior there would be tautology — which is to be avoided by all in all things. Therefore the inferior difference does not formally comprehend the superior. The antecedent is shown: every definition, from *2 Post. cap. 8* and *7 Met. cap. 14*, is made from genus and intermediate differences down to the infima, or from the proximate genus and ultimate difference. If the definition is made in the first way, a clear tautology appears: since the superior differences are placed in the definition, and the inferior difference contains all those intermediate differences — they are therefore repeated twice: once in themselves and once in the ultimate difference. If the definition is made in the second way, tautology likewise appears: since the proximate genus includes its constitutive difference, and the ultimate difference equally contains it — it is therefore uselessly repeated twice; as "animal" includes "sensitive," and likewise "rational" includes "sensitive," and so "sensitive" is placed twice in the definition of animal, and an evident tautology occurs.

You will say: tautology is not committed, because "sensitive" is not placed twice explicitly, but once implicitly and once explicitly. Against this it is argued from Aristotle in *6 Top. 1*, who teaches that tautology is to be sought by putting the

definition of the name in place of the name. Let therefore the definitions of those names be substituted for those names, and a certain and indubitable tautology will be had. Furthermore, if "rational" includes "sensitive" — since it does not include it adequately and convertibly — consequently it includes it and something more; therefore "rational" will be composed of "sensitive" and that other, and so will be a species and not a difference — which is false. Moreover, formally distinct grades do not formally include one another, as is clear of itself; but the inferior and superior differences are formally distinct grades, as I indicated in the first remark and will clearly show in *Metaphysics*. Therefore the superior difference is not formally included in the inferior. Finally, there would be a process to infinity in differences: for by the same reasoning that "rational," for example, formally includes "sensitive," by the same reasoning "irrational" formally includes "sensitive." Therefore they agree in the common character of "sensitive"; but they differ from one another, as is clear from Aristotle in *5 Met. T. 16* — "differences are whatever are beings for something." Therefore they differ by their own proper differences, and the question must be asked whether those differences include the superior difference, and so on to infinity — or one must stop at the ultimate difference, which does not include the preceding differences at all, and the intention is had.

Second Assertion: The superior difference is not predicated of the inferior formally and essentially, but only identically and materially. This second assertion follows from the first, and the Doctor indicates it in §. *Ad probationem dicitur, q. 24 of the first Post.* The first part is proved: the superior difference is neither the whole essence nor a part of the essence of the inferior difference, because the latter does not formally include the former, as was proved in the first assertion. Therefore the prior difference is not formally and essentially predicated of the posterior. The second part is shown: the ultimate difference is really identical with the preceding ones, as will be shown in *Metaphysics* universally concerning grades or inferior predicates with their superiors. Therefore the superior is predicated of the inferior only identically and materially. And this is what we asserted about genus with respect to its differences in *q. 2, art. 5, assertion 1*.

Objection I. Aristotle in *7 Met. T. 43* seems to want the superior difference to be predicated in the abstract of the inferior difference and in the first mode of saying per se, for he says: "fixedness of foot is a certain footedness." But predication in the abstract and in the first mode of saying per se is quidditative and essential. Therefore, etc. Confirmation: Aristotle in the same place adds that the ultimate difference is the whole substance of the thing, but it cannot be the whole substance of the thing unless it comprehends the intermediate differences, which also pertain to the substance of the thing. Confirmation II: in the same place the Philosopher writes that in substance there is no order; but there would be order if the superior difference were not contained in the ultimate difference according to him. Scotus responds in *4 of the place cited before*

DD. that the locus of the Philosopher is not to be interpreted as being about predication but about division; for he thinks that Aristotle there divides the superior difference into the inferior, saying that in definitions comprehending intermediate differences down to the ultimate, differences are to be taken per se and not per accidens — as when the division of "having feet" is made, one should not say "having feet is either winged or not winged," but "having fixed feet" and "having non-fixed feet," which are per se differences of feet. Therefore he adds: "fixedness of foot is a certain footedness" — that is, fixedness of foot per se particularizes footedness, and therefore per se divides "having feet." In response to the first confirmation: I say with the same Doctor that this is to be understood not totally but completely. For presupposing the genera and intermediate differences, the ultimate difference is the final term and complement of them all. For just as in Physics the whole essence of the possessor is completely from the ultimate form — as the being of man is from the rational soul — so likewise the whole metaphysical or logical thing is completely from the ultimate difference. In response to the second confirmation: I say also with Scotus that this is not to the point; for Aristotle had previously taught that if tautology occurs through the addition of the preceding difference to the following one, so on the other hand tautology would occur in the opposite way — for in substances, that is, in those things that pertain to the substantial or definitive character of something, there is no such order that one ordering rather than another removes tautology.

Objection II. "Rational" is the ultimate difference, which includes the character of corporeal, which is the superior constitutive difference of corporeal substance. Therefore it cannot be denied that the superior difference is formally included in the inferior. The antecedent is proved: "rational" is either corporeal or incorporeal substance; not the second, as is clear; therefore the first. But it cannot be corporeal substance without the character of corporeal, which is the constitutive difference of corporeal substance and divides the generic predicamental substance. Therefore "rational" formally includes the difference of corporeity, which is a difference superior to rationality itself. Confirmation: "rational" formally includes "sensitive." Therefore the ultimate difference formally includes the superior differences. The antecedent is proved: "rational" in this state is a certain sensation and vital operation, for it proceeds from an internal principle of life. Reply: I deny the antecedent. In response to its proof, I say that "rational" is not formally corporeal substance, but only identically, insofar as it is identified with "animal," which includes all the superior differences in the way I indicated in the first remark. In response to the confirmation, I deny the antecedent. In response to its proof, I say that it is true presuppositively: for "sensitive" is presupposed for "rational," but "rational" is not formally "sensitive."

You will insist: vision, for example, is formally a sensation. Therefore reasoning too is formally a sensation, proceeding from a rational animal having an

intrinsic principle of sensing — and is a vital action emanating from an internal principle of life. And thus just as vision cannot be conceived without being a vital and animal action, so neither can reasoning, roaring, or any other animal operation, of whatever kind it may be. It can be said, according to the distinction adduced above, that vision is a sensation not formally but presuppositively, because the particular presupposes the common, and the principle of sensing is common to external and internal senses; therefore sight is not formally the principle of sensing but of seeing, because the principle of sensing is determined to the principle of seeing, just as the principle of living and sensing is determined to the principle of reasoning.

Objection III. That definition is considered good by Aristotle in *2 Post. T. 18* and *7 Met. T. 43* which is made from the supreme genus and the infima difference; and Boethius approves this in *1 divisionum*. But it would not be a correct definition unless the inferior contains the superior differences, because according to Aristotle himself in *2 Post.* cited, the definition must explain all quidditative predicates and include them. Therefore, etc. Granting the major, I deny the minor, because it is not the ultimate difference but the proximate genus that comprehends the preceding differences — as "animal" contains "sensitive," "living corporeal," and the remaining superior essential predicates.

Objection IV. A proposition per se of the first mode requires that the formal of the subject include the formal of the predicate, and by parallel reasoning the material of one contains the material of the other; but this is a proposition per se of the first mode — "man is animal." Therefore "rational," which is the formal of "man," per se includes "sensitive," which is the formal of "animal," and consequently "rational," which is the ultimate difference, comprehends "sensitive," which is the superior difference. Reply: the major is not absolutely true. For that occurs when the whole concept of the predicate is contained in the concept of the subject — as "man is rational." But it can happen that a proposition is per se of the first mode even though the formal of the subject includes only the material of the predicate — as "man is animal," where "animal" is material and is contained in the concept of "man," and the formal of this predicate "animal" is likewise included — as the Doctor teaches at the end of the question of the first Post. cited.

Question VI. On the Proper

With the universals presenting the essence of a thing now resolved, it is now pleasing to investigate those which are outside the essence of a thing and proceed from it — such as the proper, which makes the fourth universal, discussed in the present question; while accident, which is the last universal, will be discussed in the following question.

Article I. Whether the Proper is a Universal

Scotus in *q. 30 of the universals*, Joannes Anglicus, Mauritius, Brasavola there, and the Coimbrans in *c. de specie, art. 3* examine this question and establish that the proper is a universal.

It is noted, first, that "proper" is sometimes used for that whose ownership belongs to someone, as Maior notes in *c. de proprio*; and we in the Epitome in *art. 6, q. 3, l. 1*. Sometimes it is used for what someone habitually does well or badly — thus it is proper to Cicero to speak well and proper to Alexander to wage war gloriously, as Tataretus notes in the present passage, *scibile 2*. Furthermore, notice that the proper, like any other universal, is taken in two ways: first, first-intentionally — that is, as a property flowing from the essence of the thing, which among philosophers is commonly called a passion — thus risibility is the proper or property of man. Of the proper so taken, discussion will be held in Metaphysics. Second, second-intentionally — that is, as the second intention applicable to the property itself that immediately proceeds from the essence, and which is predicable in what sort convertibly. Of the proper so taken we treat in the present passage — which is defined by Aristotle in *1 Top. cap. 4* as "a convertible predicate not predicating essence," and is received by the Doctor in *q. 31 in the body*, where the same Doctor notes that Porphyry does not disagree with the Philosopher, whatever Mastrius and Bellutus may say in *disp. 8, q. 4, art. 1*.

It is noted, second, from Maior in the place cited, that some proper things proceed from the species by reason of matter, and others that flow from the species by reason of the specific form. Examples of the former are being snub-nosed and aquiline, having smooth flesh and straight figure. These are not truly proper things, since they can be removed at least by divine power from those to which they belong, being reckoned among common accidents — and therefore it is not incompatible with their intrinsic principles to be without them, as Sarnanus also notes in his exposition of the question cited, near the beginning. Examples of the latter are being risible, being capable of union, and others of this kind, which are truly proper and inseparable from those to which they are adapted, as the Doctor notes in *q. 33* and *1 dist. 20, q. 5*, and elsewhere. The mode of laughing and weeping is explained thus: rationality is the cause of man's risibility and weptility. From the fact that man is rational and is filled with wonder at what he sees and hears, and through wonder his spirit is held in suspense and strives to have the cause clearly perceived, and when that investigation is completed, if he apprehends something as advantageous to himself, delight follows — and when he is affected with delight, the vital spirits and heat are raised to the face, from which arise the dilation of the heart, the opening of the mouth, and laughter. But if he apprehends something as harmful, sadness arises, through which the heat and vital spirits are drawn to the heart and the brain is compressed, whence flows the lachrymable humor and weeping results. Furthermore, Tataretus notes that according to the twofold generic and specific difference, a twofold proper is assigned: generic, which

converts with genus, and specific, which converts with species — and this Mauritius approves in *q. 29 of the universals*, §. *De tertio, columna secunda in initio*, whom our more recent authors cited follow. However, Aristotle and Porphyry seem to speak only of the specific proper, from which Scotus does not depart in *q. 17*, §. *Ad quaestionem dicendum in solutione secundi*, adding: "proper belongs to nothing insofar as it is genus, but insofar as it is species, and thus converts with it, insofar as it is predicated of many differing in number." The reason for this assumption is that proper belongs to something only insofar as it is naturally apt to be the subject of demonstration, and this only insofar as it is a species — since only insofar as it is a species is it defined, and one must presuppose of a subject both what it is and that it is, from *Arist. 1 Post. 1*. But insofar as it is defined it has genus and difference, and thus is a species. Yet from *5 Top. 2* the generic proper is not entirely to be denied, as the authors named above demonstrate.

First Assertion: The proper is a universal. So Scotus in *q. 20*, proved first from Aristotle in *1 Top. cap. 3*, affirming that the proper is a predicate which is a universal — with whom Porphyry and all his interpreters agree. Proof II: that to which the character of the universal belongs is a universal, by the locus from definition; but to the proper belongs the character of the universal, which is to be predicated of many, from what was said elsewhere — for the proper is predicated of many in accidental what sort convertibly, as "risible" of man; for every man is risible and everything risible is a man. Therefore the proper is a universal. Furthermore, from *1 Post. cap. 4*, demonstration is of universals; but demonstration can be made of that whose proper it is — as "every rational is sensitive; every man is rational; therefore every man is risible." And consequently the proper is a universal.

Second Assertion: The proper only in its fourth mode constitutes the fourth universal. This is deduced from Scotus in *q. 32*, §. *Ad q. in solutione quarti*, and in *q. 33*, §. *Ad quaestionem dicendum*, affirming that the predicable proper proceeds from the essential principles of the subject; but only the proper in the fourth mode proceeds from the essential principles of the subject. Therefore only this kind of proper constitutes the fourth universal. The assertion is proved from Aristotle in *1 Top. cap. 4*: proper is that which does not indicate the what-it-is of the thing, inheres in it alone, and is predicated convertibly. The same Porphyry holds in *the last chapter of his Isagoge*. Furthermore, only the proper taken in the fourth mode cannot without incompatibility and destruction of the subject be separated from the subject; whereas the other proper things taken in the three modes can exist without the corruption of the subject. For man can exist without bipedality, medical knowledge, and greyness. Therefore, etc. Again, the proper in the fourth mode is demonstrated of the subject whose proper it is, as is clear from the demonstration adduced in the first assertion. Finally, the proper proceeds from the essence of the subject, which the other proper things do not have, as is clear of itself.

Third Assertion: The proper is a universal not with respect to the species from which it proceeds, but with respect to the inferiors of which it is predicated. This the Doctor intimates in *q. 30, §. Ad q. in solutione primi*. Proved by the same reasons by which in *q. 3, art. 2* and *q. 5, art. 2* we showed that species and difference are universals through their relation to the inferiors of which they are predicated. Hence some rightly conclude that the proper is indeed a convertible predicate as it regards the species with which it converts, but not under that character of convertibility is it a universal — since the universal is predicable of its inferiors; but the proper as universal does not convert with its inferiors. For the universal is prior to the inferior by priority from which there is no reciprocal entailment of subsisting consequence, as is clear from *Postpred. c. de priori*. Although the Doctor and others commonly call the proper a convertible accident, they nevertheless distinguish it from the common accident in that it is necessarily and immutably predicated, but not that it is reciprocally predicated — as the Doctor perspicuously indicates in the place cited above.

Objection I against the First Assertion: An opposite is not predicated of an opposite; but "proper" and "common" are opposites, and "common" is a universal. Therefore the proper is not a universal. Granting the major, the minor is to be denied: for the opposition must be with respect to the same thing in the same respect. "Proper" is said with respect to the species, while "common" and "universal" are said insofar as it regards the individuals comprehended under the species, as Scotus eloquently edits in *1 Post. q. 33, in fine*.

Objection II. The universal is referred to another, since it is formally relative, and every universal, since it is predicable, regards a subiectible of which it is predicated; but the proper is not referred to another. Therefore the proper is not a universal. The minor is argued: first, because the proper is not referred to that whose proper it is — for no accident is referred to its own subject, otherwise every accident would be a relative, which is false; and second, because the subject whose proper it is naturally precedes the proper itself, so they would not be simultaneous in nature — which conflicts with Aristotle in *c. de Ad aliquid*, who affirms that relatives are simultaneous in nature. Granting the major, the minor is denied. In response to the first part of the proof, I say that this holds for the proper taken first-intentionally, but not for the proper taken second-intentionally. In response to the second part of the proof, I distinguish: if the subject of the proper is considered absolutely, I grant; if it is regarded insofar as it has its proper, I deny — for in that case the proper always inheres in the subject from whose intrinsic principles it proceeds, as the Doctor excellently teaches in *q. 33, §. Ad q. dicendum*.

Objection III. The universal is formally a being of reason, from *q. 1 of this book, art. 7*; but the proper exists without anyone's thinking of it — for with no intellect existing, neighing belongs to the horse and roaring to the lion. Therefore the proper is not a universal. Granting the major, the minor is to be

distinguished: concerning the proper taken first-intentionally, I grant; concerning the proper taken second-intentionally, I deny — as is clear from the first remark.

Objection IV against the Second Assertion. Porphyry here and nowhere else mentions the three modes of the proper. Therefore the three modes of the proper pertain to the fourth — which is the universal. Confirmation I: those three modes of the proper are referred to the subject with a special relation, which does not belong to the common accident, which regards the subject with a common relation. Therefore, etc. Confirmation II: the capacity for philosophizing, and the capacity or aptitude for healing, is a passion of man — for every man is intellectual and rational, and consequently capable of learning. Therefore, since to be a physician, for example, is one of those three modes of the proper, it follows that it pertains to the fourth predicable. Reply: Porphyry mentioned them not because they are true proper things, but because they have an affinity with the true proper — and what he had already done in the chapters on genus and difference, where he adduced and explained the various acceptations of genus and difference (especially because from their explanation the proper becomes clearer to us), he did also here. By the same token the first confirmation is answered. In response to the second confirmation, I distinguish the antecedent: if speech is made about the capacity and aptitude had from the essential principles of the species which man possesses, I grant that the capacity for philosophizing and the aptitude for healing is proper to man in the fourth mode; but if we speak of the aptitude and inclination particular to individuals, arising from individual principles and from the diverse temperament by which one man and not another is endowed — whether toward arms or toward acquiring knowledge — I deny. Accordingly, these inclinations and peculiar propensities of individuals are not proper things but common accidents of the second species of quality, as the Doctor seems to hold in *2 dist. 16, q. un., §. Ad primum argumentum sub q. Ad finem*, and Tataretus in *c. de accid. dub. 3*.

Article II. Whether the Proper is a Universal Distinct from Accident

The common opinion of philosophers holds that the proper is a universal distinct from accident. So that the distinction between the two aforesaid universals may become known to us, we are pleased to examine this difficulty which Scotus raises in *q. 32 of the universals*; and for its understanding:

It is noted, first, with the same Doctor in *q. cited, §. Ad q. dicendum*, that accidents are of two kinds: some proceed from the intrinsic, and others come from the extrinsic. Those that arise from the intrinsic are bipartite: either they flow by reason of the specific form and are true proper things — which proceed from the essential principles of the thing as a kind of natural offspring; or not by reason of the specific form, and this can happen in two ways: either by reason of matter — such as quantity — or by reason of the primary active qualities, and these are secondary and derivative qualities with respect to the primary — and

they are sensible qualities because they are perceived by sense, called such — for example colors, which either proceed from heat, as blackness, or from cold, as whiteness. Those however that come from the extrinsic are also twofold: some remain when the extrinsic principle from which they arise is removed — as blackness in the face or hand caused by the heat of the sun; or when the extrinsic is removed they are likewise removed — as the image of a face in a mirror or in water, which vanishes when the face is removed.

It is noted, second, that there is not one distinction between proper and accident; for Sarnanus in *q. pag. 436* observes ten differences between them, of which Fonseca selects some in *5 Met. cap. 28, q. 19, sect. 4*. But proper and accident differ chiefly with respect to the principles from which they proceed. For the proper proceeds from essential specific principles; accident comes from individual principles — as Porphyry teaches in these words in *c. de communitatibus*: "proper things are born within species, but accidents primarily inhere in individuals." Aristotle in *c. de substantia* and Scotus in *q. ult. of the universals* are in agreement: all accidents pertaining to the nine posterior predicaments primarily inhere in first substances and are primarily said of them. Furthermore, the proper necessarily belongs to the subject, so that it is incompatible for the subject to exist without the proper itself, and it cannot be conceived with its opposite — as Scotus holds in *q. 32 and 1 d. 2, q. 7, sub 1*. But the subject can perfectly well be understood without the accident, as will become clearer in the following question. Again, the proper is convertible with the subject of which it is proper — as "every horse is capable of neighing" and "everything capable of neighing is a horse." Accident, however, is by no means so — for it does not follow that "every man is colored; therefore everything colored is a man." Moreover, the proper conduces to demonstration: from the subject and its proper a proposition per se of the second mode is formed — as "man is visible." Accident, however, is excluded from nearly all demonstration, because it has no necessary connection with the subject in which it inheres.

Assertion: The proper is a universal distinct from accident. This is defended by Scotus in the place cited with Porphyry in the present chapter and Aristotle in *1 Top. cap. 3*. Proof: a distinct mode of predicating of many argues a distinct universal, because the character of the universal from what was said is to be predicated of many; but the proper has a distinct mode of predicating of many from accident — it is predicated of many necessarily in what sort, while accident is predicated contingently. Therefore the proper is a universal distinct from accident. Furthermore, those things are distinguished from one another that have distinct definitions, as our Formalists declare and prove; but proper and accident have distinct definitions, as is to be seen in Porphyry and Aristotle named above, and as is clear from the differences adduced in the second remark. Therefore, etc.

Objection I. Whatever exists is either substance or accident, since no medium seems to intervene between substance and accident; and from *5 Met. T. 14*, being is divided into substance and accident. But the proper is not substance. Therefore it is accident, and consequently does not constitute a universal distinct from accident. The minor is shown: the proper is either the same substance as the species from which it flows, or a different one — since "same" and "different" are immediate from *10 Met. T. 12*. Not the first, otherwise the proper would enter into the definition of the species, since the definition expresses the entire essence of the thing defined. And more: because the proper proceeds from the species itself — but the same thing cannot be at once cause and effect with respect to the same thing. Not the second either, otherwise it could not be predicated of the species — but it is predicated of the species, as "man is risible." Therefore, etc. Confirmation I: except for matter and form in the composite, no other substance is found; therefore the proper, which is in the composite but is neither matter nor form, must be an accident. Confirmation II: that which proceeds from a composite substance is an accident; but the proper proceeds from a composite substance with physical composition. Therefore it is an accident. Reply: the major can be glossed as concerning real identity, not formal. And so in response to the minor: the proper is really substance, but not formally — since formally it is a "somethingness" of substance or accident, as is shown in *Metaphysics*. Or say with the Doctor here, through a distinction: if "accident" is taken for what is extraneous, for what is the same as a predicate not predicating essence, it is granted that the proper is accident; but if accident is taken for what comes from the extrinsic to a subject, it is denied that the proper is accident. Through this distinction the first and second confirmations are answered — a distinction intimated by the same Doctor in *2 d. 37, q. un., §. Propter igitur Q.*, and in *Quol. 1, §. De altero D.*, which Sirectus in *fol. 6 of the Tract. formalitatum*, Trombeta, Brulifer, and others there embrace.

Objection II. What is placed in the definition of something is not distinct from that in whose definition it is placed, since a definition denotes those things which are intrinsic and essential to the thing; but accident is located in the definition of the proper, for the proper, since it is outside the substance of the thing, is an accident. Therefore the proper is not a universal distinct from accident. Confirmation: the divided is included in the dividing members, as "animal," which is divided into "rational" and "irrational," is included in them; but accident is divided into separable accident and inseparable accident. Therefore the proper does not make a distinct universal from accident. Reply: granting the major, the minor is to be distinguished. Accident taken for what is extraneous, I grant; accident taken for what, coming from the extrinsic, accidentally perfects the subject itself, I deny. Or say with Scotus in the question: the intentional accident is indeed placed in the definition of the proper, but not the real accident, about which the question here is. In response to the confirmation: the same is to be said, for that division of accident has its place in real accident, not

in intentional accident — or also in accident taken for a predicate not predicating essence, as is established from what has gone before. Let these things said by a poor usufructuary suffice about the proper; let whoever is the proprietor add more, if he wishes.

Question VII. On Accident

The last place is given to accident in the Porphyrian roster of universals, because accident is posterior to the other universals in origin and dignity. This is clearly evident in the physical composite: the composite is first constituted from matter and form — as man from body and the rational soul — and immediately from it flow its passions, which are called proper things, and afterwards common accidents come to it from outside. And more: because the proper things proceed chiefly from species and common accidents from individuals, as I noted above — and that the former ought to be preferred in order to the latter, no one ought to call into doubt.

Article I. Whether Accident is a Universal

This question is examined by Scotus in *q. 34* and he answers affirmatively with Porphyry and the other philosophers in the present chapter — opposed by most of our more recent authors cited in *disp. 4, q. 5* and *disp. 5, q. 5, art. 1*, with whom Suarez in *disp. 6 Met. sect. 4, n. 4* cited by those same authors seems to agree.

It is noted, first, from the same Doctor cited above in *§. Ad quaest. dicendum*, that accident is taken in many ways. For it is either accident first-intentionally or second-intentionally. Accident first-intentionally is the same as something inhering, as Tataretus notes in *this c. scibile 4*. This is either taken for what happens in fewer cases — and this is threefold: casual, fortuitous, and indifferent — on which the Philosopher speaks in *2 Phys. T. 48*. Or it is taken for what comes to a complete being — from which its denomination derives, for "accident" comes from "accido" because it presupposes a thing complete in its being to which it happens, and is distinguished from substance, which does not happen to a thing but subsists per se. In this sense accident is common to the nine predicaments of accidents and is the other member of the division of being into substance and accident, as is clear in *5 Met. T. 14*. Accident taken second-intentionally designates the second intention which is attributed to something that can without incompatibility be affirmed or denied of a subject. It can also be used for what is extraneous, of which there is speech in the fallacy of accident; or for what is effected by the intellect alone — in which sense all five universals are accidents; or for a non-essential predicate, which is participated by the two last universals — for both proper and accident are called non-essential predicates; or for a predicate that is neither essential nor necessary — and in this sense it is the fifth universal. This is regarded not insofar as it is predicated of its inferiors — as color of whiteness and blackness, since in that sense it does not differ from genus — but insofar as it regards subjects in which it inheres and

denominates them, as whiteness with respect to swan and milk, of which it is accidentally predicated.

It is noted, second, from Joannes Maior in *c. de accidente*, that some accidents are added to only one part of the subject — as flatness to the nose and curliness to the hair — while others regard the parts of the subject indifferently, as whiteness can inhere in the tooth, the hand, and other parts of the body. Again, some accidents reside in the exterior part — as vision in the eye — while others are effected and subjected in the interior part, as recollection. Again, some are uniformly or equally intensified in the subject — as light of equal intensity in a house — while others are non-uniformly so, which are intensified more in one part than in another, as if the light is greater in one part of the house than another.

Assertion: Accident is a universal. This Scotus proves in the place cited: first from Aristotle in *1 Top. cap. 4* and from Porphyry in this passage, both of whom place accident among the universals. Proof II: that to which the definition of the universal belongs is a universal, by the locus from definition to the thing defined; but to accident belongs the definition of the universal. Therefore accident is a universal. The major is conspicuous. The minor is at hand: the definition of the universal is to be predicated of many, as I have often noted above; but accident is predicated of many — "the crow is black," "the swan is white." Therefore it belongs to it the definition of the universal. Again, accident is predicated of many in accidental what sort contingently. Therefore it is a universal distinct from the others. The antecedent is shown from the peculiar character of each universal: the proper is predicated in what sort necessarily, difference in essential what sort, genus and species in what.

Objection I. What is in a singular is singular — for what is received in the recipient is according to the mode of the recipient; but accident is in a singular, from *5 Met. cap. de eodem*. Therefore accident, about which we here treat, since it is that same accident, is not a universal but a singular. It can be answered to the major that common natures and quiditative predicates are in a singular, yet they are not singulars — and this can be confirmed from Aristotle in *c. de substantia*, saying that second substances are in the first — and it is plain that second substances are not singulars. However, granting the major, Scotus responds to the minor: that this intention "accident" is in a common subject, as in "white" or some similar thing to which it is applied — just as species is in this common subject "man"; whereas what Aristotle asserted in *5 Met.* is understood also of that to which this intention "accident" is applied, because that primarily inheres in the singular, since it does not follow from the principle of the species according to itself.

Objection II. No real being is formally universal, as we showed in *q. 1, art. 6*; but accident is a real being, for it is comprehended under being, which from *5 Met. T. 14* is divided into substance and accident. Therefore accident is not a

universal. Confirmation: no second intention is per se predicated of a first intention, because what is not a true nature is not predicated of a true nature; but accident is predicated per se of a first intention, as "color is accident." Therefore since accident is real, it cannot be formally a universal, which is a being of reason. Granting the major, in response to the minor I say that the argument holds for real accident, but not for intentional accident, of which the discussion here is. The same answer applies to the confirmation.

Objection III. No species of the universal properly inheres in a singular; hence "this animal is a genus" is false, and "this man is a species" is false; but this is true: "this whiteness is accident" — since to it the definition of accident, to be adduced in the next article, is accommodated. Therefore accident is not a universal. Reply: granting the major and distinguishing the minor: if accident is taken first-intentionally, I grant; if taken second-intentionally, I deny — as is clearly established from the first remark.

Article II. What Accident Is

Three definitions of accident are adduced in this chapter by Porphyry. The first is this: "accident is that which is present and absent without the corruption of the subject." The second: "accident is that which may happen to be or not be in the same thing." The third: "accident is that which is neither genus nor species nor difference nor proper, but inheres in a subject." The two preceding definitions do not differ from one another except in words, as Sarnanus in the exposition of the question and Arriaga in *disp. 8, sect. 2*, and before them Maior in *notable 3*, rightly note — and they coincide with the definition of accident given by Aristotle in *1 Top. cap. 4*, whom Porphyry imitates in this his Isagoge. The philosophers, however, labor greatly over the examination of the prior definition; some reprove it as bad, such as Hurtado in *disp. 6, sect. 6, §. 38* and Arriaga in *disp. 8, sect. 3, n. 27*. Others approve it as good but disagree in its explanation. On one side, Ruuius in *q. 3* and Joannes de S. Thoma in *q. 12, art. 1* want it to be understood of real inherence in the subject and real separation likewise. On the other side, Scotus in *q. 35 of the universals* and his interpreters there — from whom the Thomists do not seem to dissent — teach that it is to be understood of intentional and intellectual separation.

It is noted, first, from the Doctor cited above, that these words "is present" and "is absent," which are placed in the definition of Porphyry, and "to be" and "not to be," which are found in the definition of Aristotle, can be taken in two ways — namely as terms of first and second intention. About them taken in the first way the Philosopher writes in *7 Met. T. 1*, saying that the being of accident is to inhere; with which accords what the same Philosopher had previously said in *8 Phys. T. 62*, namely: "it is impossible for the same thing simultaneously to inhere in and be absent from the same subject." In these places, therefore, Aristotle speaks of accident taken first-intentionally, or of real accident. If however they are taken in the second way, they denote accidental and denominative

predication of accident of the subject — just as "to be said of" designates the essential predication of a superior of an inferior in the same genus. This is mentioned by Aristotle in the Antepredicaments, where he adduces the famous fourfold division of "to be in a subject" and "to be said of a subject," about which in the following book. Taking therefore "to be present" or "to inhere" as a second intention, or logically, it is the same to say "accident is that which is present and absent without the corruption of the subject" as "accident is a non-essential predicate not necessarily belonging to the subject," as Scotus explains in the place cited and in *q. 32, toward the end*. Or more clearly: "accident is that which is affirmed and denied of a subject without any incompatibility on the part of the subject," as the same Doctor adds.

It is noted, second, that there is a twofold abstraction of the intellect: one is precise, and the other divisive. Precise abstraction is that by which the intellect understands one thing without the other, even though both are conjoined and inseparable. For there is the privilege of the intellect to conceive one without the other, even though they cannot be divided and torn apart from one another. Hence Aristotle says in *2 Phys. T. 18*: "of those who abstract, there is no lying." Divisive abstraction is that by which the intellect separates one thing from another — that is, negates one of another. The Doctor alludes to both abstractions in the question in responding to the last argument, and in *3 d. 14, q. 2*. The first is attributed to the simple intellect and the second to the compounding or dividing intellect. Although certain accidents cannot be removed from their subjects without the destruction and ruin of the subjects — as is commonly shown by the examples of the blackness of the raven and the whiteness of the swan — nonetheless the raven and the swan, which are their subjects, can be understood without them, and under their opposite the essence of those subjects remains intact and no incompatibility is involved in their formal and essential concept. It is indeed true that the subject can be conceived without the proper which flows from it, because it does not enter into its essence; yet it can by no means be conceived under its opposite, because the proper proceeds from its essential principles, as I made clear in the preceding question. The same Oviedo affirms this in *Contr. 6, p. 7, n. 4*, from Bellarmine cited by him.

First Assertion: Accident is properly defined by Porphyry as that which is present and absent without the corruption of the subject, if it is understood in the way Scotus in the place cited expounds it — and he proves it by this single reason: a definition is suitable which is composed of genus and difference, as all philosophers sanction; but the definition of accident adduced above consists of genus and difference — for through its words is signified a non-essential predicate, which is its genus, and one not necessarily belonging to the subject, which is its difference, as I explained in the remarks set out above. Therefore that definition is legitimate. Accident is more conveniently and easily defined as that which is predicated of many in accidental what sort not necessarily, where

genus and difference are clearly seen — the genus in which accident agrees with the other universals, and the difference by which it is distinguished from them.

Second Assertion: The separation which is involved in the definition of accident is not real but intentional and intellectual. This is commonly defended by Scotus as cited above and other interpreters of Porphyry, to whom the Thomists assent. Proof I: from Porphyry in the present passage, who expressly says: "for it can be understood both that the raven is white and that the Ethiopian shines with whiteness beyond the corruption of the subject." And Maior rightly notes in *notable 2* that this separation is to be understood in the definition of accident given by Porphyry, around which the Logician revolves — not as it pertains to another craftsman. For the Logician speculates about the intentional separation of accident from the subject. He is not a real craftsman, as we showed elsewhere. Therefore that separation of accident is intentional, which is placed in its definition. Proof II: judgment is to be made about the definition of accident in the same way as about the definitions of the other universals, since the reason is the same for all universals; but the definitions of the other universals include second intentions, since they are expressed through predication, which is a name of second intention. Therefore the separation of accident that is located in the definition of accident is intentional. Hence the opinion of Fuentes in *q. 11, diff. 1, art. 1, assertio 1* and our more recent authors cited at the end — saying that if the definition of accident is taken only of separable accident it can be expounded of real separation — is not to be heeded, since it is clearly demonstrated that the Dialectician in no way touches real separation of accident, but that it is the task of the real craftsman to investigate that real separation. Therefore neither absolutely nor conditionally is that real separation of accident to be introduced here. Again, a double definition of accident would have to be produced — one of separable and another of inseparable accident — while there would still remain to be desired a definition of accident common to both and prescinding from both. And further, it conflicts with Scotus in the place cited, *verf. Quod accidens*, near the beginning, who cites Porphyry as dividing accident into separable and inseparable. And it is plainly also had from the same author, both in the body of the question and in the solution of the arguments.

Objection I. Porphyry in *cap. 5* here, explaining that the first definition of accident does not conflict with its division, provides two modes of separating accident from the subject — real and intentional — which would not be necessary if the definition of accident were to be interpreted of intentional separation only. Confirmation: one must philosophize about the definition of accident in the same way as about its division, which Scotus in *collation 35, §. Ad 1* and Augustine cited by him admit; but the division of accident into separable and inseparable is understood of real accident. Therefore so too is its definition. Reply: Porphyry is explaining himself in that place. For after giving the definition and division of accident, in order to meet the objection adduced, he

adds these words: "for it can be understood that the raven is white and that the Ethiopian shines with whiteness beyond the corruption of the subject." And the Doctor indicates in *2 d. 1, q. 5, §. Contra istud L.* — where note the word "be understood," which pertains not to real but only to intentional separation.

You will insist: if the reply were correct, no accident would be inseparable, since any accident can be separated or denied of a subject and understood without it. Maior in the place cited in *notable 1* and Tataretus in *scibile 4* respond by denying the sequel. For accident is not called simply inseparable because it cannot be simply separated from the subject, but because naturally and according to the common course of nature it cannot be separated or denied of the subject. Hence by supernatural power every absolute accident can be segregated from the subject and exist without it, as orthodox faith holds concerning the Eucharistic accidents. Add that Albert reports that if the pinions of ravens are anointed with the fat of goose or cat, and with quicksilver, white ravens will be born in a cold place. And we experience Ethiopians and Indians living in the seventh and eighth climates becoming white, as St. Augustine observes in *5 de Trin.* In response to the confirmation: granting the major, the minor is to be denied. For as Scotus says in *q. 32, in the solution of the last*, inseparable accident has the general character of accident; why it is called inseparable, Maior and Tataretus just now explained.

Objection II. Some accidents are present only with prejudice and corruption to the subject, as is clear from the division of Porphyry and from experience. For fever, combustion, death, and others of this kind bring with them the overthrow of their subjects. Therefore the aforesaid definition of accident is to be reproved. Scotus responds that the definition of accident is to be interpreted as concerning the subject of information or inherence — that is, matter, which perseveres incorrupt as the accident comes to it or departs from it — but not as concerning the subject of denomination, such as the composite, which is generated and corrupted, from *7 Met. T. 27*. If this response is accepted, all difficulty of the argument is removed — especially according to those who hold matter to be the subject of accidents. But since according to the Doctor in *2 d. 3, q. 4* the subject of accidents is not matter but the composite, the same Doctor therefore adduces another response: according to what we noted above, namely that "is absent without the corruption of the subject," placed in the definition of accident, is to be expounded of intentional or intellectual absence or separation. Which is to say that the subject of accident can be understood under its opposite with its nature remaining intact, with no incompatibility existing in its formal and essential concept. For the essence of the subject, conceived precisely and objectively, is not harmed — whether it is regarded dressed or stripped in life or in death, in health or in sickness, or in any other accident.

You will insist: through combustion and death the subject of accident is overturned, as is clear. Therefore the subject cannot be conceived without its

own destruction — otherwise the intellect would be deceived in understanding the subject otherwise than it is. And more: because "living" in its essential concept includes life, and consequently cannot be conceived without life. Granting the antecedent, I distinguish the consequence: by the simple intellect, I deny; by the compounding or dividing intellect, I grant. This distinction is plain from the second remark and is further clarified by Sarnanus at the end of the question. In response to the other thing added: I say that life is designated in the living thing necessarily not in act but in aptitude alone.

Objection III. A definition is not assigned through opposites copulatively, from *Arist. 6 T. cap. 2*; but the definition of accident is given through opposites copulatively, as is clear from those words "is present and is absent." Therefore that definition of accident is not correct. Confirmation: if such a definition of accident were apt, the soul of an ox or of another living thing would be accident, because it is present and absent with the subject — namely matter — remaining intact. But that this is false and absurd is shown in the book on the soul. Therefore that definition of accident is not genuine. Fuentes responds that the definition of accident is to be taken not copulatively but disjunctively. For accident can successively and not simultaneously be present or absent from the subject. You however say with Scotus in the solution of the first: it is to be understood not copulatively but circumlocutively, as is clear from what was said — for through those words we circumlocute a non-convertible, non-necessary accidental predicate, as Tataretus indicates in the place cited. In response to the confirmation: the sequel of the major is to be denied, for the soul is not in matter as accident is in a subject, but as a part in its co-part, from what will be said in the place now cited.

Objection IV. If the adduced definition of accident is suitable, it inheres per se in the thing defined; and thus accident per se is present and absent. But if it is per se present, therefore per se it is not absent. Scotus responds by denying the last consequence; for he says it is a sophism from "according to something" to "simply." Just as this does not hold: "the contingent is necessarily contingent; therefore the contingent is necessarily so."

Book III. On the Predicaments

This book on the predicaments was held in such esteem by Herminus the Peripatetic that he always had the ten categories on his lips — which Demonax the Philosopher, addressing him, thus joked: "I think you, Herminus, are not unworthy of the ten categories." The play is on the ambiguity of the word "category," which signifies both predicament and accusation, as Erasmus in *1. 8 Apoph.*, Fonseca in *5 Met. cap. 7, q. 1, sect. 2*, and the Coimbrans in the prooemium to the Categories testify.

Question I. On the Preliminaries to the Predicaments

Article I. Who is the Author of This Book on the Predicaments

First Assertion: Aristotle is to be considered the maker of this work. This is presupposed by Scotus in the questions on the predicamentals and is the common opinion of the Peripatetics, against Iamblichus and certain others who follow him. Proof: from Aristotle, who sometimes refers to this book in his writings, as Fuentes notes in *q. 13, diff. art. 1* — and it is listed in the catalogue of Aristotle's works, as is evident in Laertius in the life of Aristotle himself, Julius Pacius, Franciscus Patricius, and others.

Aristotle perfected Logic, as is clear from *1. 1, q. 1, art. 4*; but had he not published the book on the categories, he would not have completed Logic, for he would have omitted the incomplex terms contained in this work, which are the remote matter or integral parts of the syllogism. Furthermore, the concise and subtle style, as well as the phrasing and order preserved in the present work, plainly savors of Aristotelian doctrine. Therefore he is rightly its author.

Second Assertion: The first author of the ten predicaments is Archytas of Tarentum, a disciple of Pythagoras, whom Aristotle and the other philosophers followed. This assertion is expressly held by Theodorus Zwinger in *vol. 1, l. 2*, where he reports that Archytas is considered the author of the categories, whom Aristotle greatly commends in various places in his writings. And Mirandulanus in *1. 4 de examine veritatis* testifies that the work of Archytas divided into ten categories still exists, written in the Doric tongue, which Aristotle subsequently wonderfully cultivated and enriched — and Scotus does not dissent.

Objection. Aristotle calls the ancient philosophers ignorant of Dialectic in *1 Met. cap. 8*, compares them to inexperienced boxers lacking in skill in *ibid. cap. 4*, and likens them to stuttering infants in *cap. 7 of the same book, T. 51*. Therefore since the book on the predicaments is one part of Logic, as is clear from what preceded, Aristotle is to be considered its author. Reply: everything that Aristotle says about the ancient philosophers is to be interpreted with respect to perfect Dialectic — especially the form of the syllogism, which he himself boasts of having discovered at the end of the Elenchi — but not with respect to all its parts, especially the remote and integral parts, such as the book on the predicaments. And that they were acquainted with the aforesaid parts is clear enough from *l. 1, q. 1, art. 4, objection 2*.

Article II. What is the Subject of This Work

The Nominalists make voices the subject of this book, with whom Fonseca seems to agree in *5 Met. cap. 7, q. 1, sect. 6*. Avicenna at the beginning of his Logic establishes things as the subject of this little work. Scotus however in *q. 1 and 2 of the predicamentals*, Tataretus in *ibid. q. 1, dub. 2*, and other disciples of the same

doctrine assert that the intentional univocal common to the ten predicaments is the subject of this work.

It is noted from Titelmanus in *l. 2 of the dialectical consideration, cap. 1* that the name "predicament" is used in three ways. First, for what is predicated of something — thus Augustine took it in *1 de decem categoriis, cap. 1*, calling "animal" the category of substance. In this regard Cicero in *4 Tusculanarum qq.* describes a predicament as that which is predicated of something or of some things. And this is the acceptation from the etymology of the name. Second, for the whole coordination from the supreme genus and those things contained under it — thus Porphyry used it in his *Isagoge in c. de specie*. The Doctor in *2 d. 3, q. 4, §. Contra istam conclusionem* and the other philosophers in general receive it in this sense. Third, for the supreme genus alone — in which sense we say that man, for example, is under the predicament of substance, and substance is the first predicament. The more frequent use of "predicament" is derived from the second and third signification, so that predicaments in the present context and in the most common usage are taken for the first ten genera and for the ten coordinations of which they are the heads — as Maior and Tataretus excellently observe in *c. de substantia*. Nor is the common acceptation of "predicament" to be omitted for the first intention — that is, for things both substantial and accidental which are placed in the predicaments — or for the second intention attributed to things suitably disposed and ordered under one supreme head, as the Doctor notes in *q. 2 of the predicamentals, §. Ad q. dicitur*.

First Assertion: Voices are not the object of this book. So Scotus in *q. 1 of the predicamentals, before §. Ad q. dici potest*. Proof I: Logic is about second intentions as about the subject of predication and about the syllogism or mode of knowing as about the subject of attribution, as I showed in *l. 1, q. 3, art. 7*. Therefore voices are not the subject of this work. The consequence holds: what is not the subject of the whole is not the subject of the part either, because the part is contained under the whole. But voices are not the subject of the whole of Dialectic, as I proved in the place just cited, *art. 4*. Therefore neither are they the subject of this part. Proof II: of the subject of a science its passions are shown, from *1 Post.*; but no property of a significant voice is demonstrated either in this or in the other books, as is clear to any reader — especially because with no voice existing or possible, there is science about the ten predicaments. Indeed, all the passions of the syllogism and all its parts can belong to it according to the being it has in the mind, even if not uttered, because that being precedes voices. Therefore voices are not to be established as the object of this work.

Second Assertion: Nor can things be the object of this book. This too is defended by Scotus in the place cited above, *post §. Ad q. verf. Ad aliud dito*, and by Antonius Andreas in *q. 1 in lib. sex principiorum*. And it is proved by the reasons adduced in *l. 1, q. 3, art. 2*, by which it is shown that all things are not the subject of the whole of Dialectic.

Third Assertion: The predicament — that is, the intentional univocal common to the ten supreme genera — is the subject of this book. The Doctor holds this in *q. 2 of the predicamentals*, §. *Ad q.* and more expressly in §. *Contra verf. Ideo dici potest*. And it follows from the refutation of the others. It can further be argued: the Logician considers that intentional common to the ten predicaments, just as in the Isagoge Porphyry speculates about the universal. Therefore just as there the universal is established as its subject, as is clear in *l. 2, q. 1, art. 12*, so here "predicament" taken in the aforesaid manner is determined as the object of this book. Hence the reasons brought forward in the place cited to prove that the universal is the subject of the Porphyrian introduction can be accommodated here, changing only the name "universal" to "predicament."

Objection I against the First Assertion: In the present book treatment is had of equivocal, univocal, and denominative, which are differences only of the significant voice — for equivocation is adapted neither to things nor to concepts but to voices. Therefore voices are the subject of this book. Confirmation I: those three things mentioned above are defined through "are called" — but "being called" pertains to voices. Therefore, etc. Confirmation II: according to Aristotle in this place each incomplex thing signifies substance or accident; but to signify pertains to significant voices. Therefore voices are the object of this book. Reply: first, univocal and denominative are differences of predicates which as such belong to concepts, not to significant voices. As for equivocal, Aristotle treats of them on account of their opposition to univocal; or by "equivocal" he understands equivocated equivocal, not equivocating equivocal — the explanation of this division being had in the Epitome, *l. 1, q. 1, art. 5*. In response to the first confirmation: I say that Aristotle places "are called" there, which is the same as "are conceived," as I also noted in *l. 1, q. 3, art. 4*, on the subject of the whole of Logic. In response to the second confirmation: I say that this primarily belongs to the simple concept and secondarily to the significant voice. Whence Scotus concludes that if the subject of this work is something incomplex, rather the concept than the voice is the subject of this work — supply: of predication, not of attribution.

Objection II against the Third Assertion: Of the subject of a science passions are demonstrated, as Aristotle teaches in *1 Post. 1*; but of the predicament taken universally no passion is shown. Therefore the predicament is not the subject of this work. Confirmation I: predicament does not belong to all that is considered in this work, for not everything contained here is a predicament. Therefore it is not its subject. Confirmation II: predicament is contained under the universal, which is the subject of the Porphyrian booklet. Therefore this science is subalternated to the Porphyrian science, because as subject is related to subject, so science to science — but this seems absurd. Therefore so too is that from which it follows. Granting the major, the minor is to be denied. For these passions are demonstrated of the predicament: to be divided into species, to have no genus above itself, and to be predicated universally. In response to the

first confirmation: I say it is not necessary that everything examined here be a predicament, but it suffices if in some way they are reduced to it — as I said about the subjects of other sciences in *l. 1, q. 3*. In response to the second confirmation: I say that besides that condition, another is required for true subalternation — namely that the subalternated science derive its principles from the subalternating one, which this science lacks. Therefore it does not follow that this science is subalternated to the science on universals handed down in the Isagoge of Porphyry.

Article III. Whether There is Science about the Predicaments

Assertion: There is science about the predicaments. This Scotus holds in *q. 2 of the predicamentals*, and it is clear from the preceding article — for of the knowable subject science is given, as is known of itself. But the subject of the predicaments is knowable — for knowable properties are shown of it, such as to be divided into species, to have no genus above itself, and the like. Therefore, etc.

Objection I. Everything knowable is knowable through definition and demonstration, from *1 and 2 Post.*; but of the predicaments there is no definition. Therefore neither is there science about them. The minor: a definition is constructed from genus and difference, as no one denies; but the predicaments, since they are supreme genera, have no genus and difference. Therefore, etc. Granting the major, I deny the minor — for even if there is no definition properly of them, there is nevertheless a certain description, which seems sufficient for the scientific character.

Objection II. The subject of a science is prior to the passions demonstrated of it, just as cause is prior to its effects; but nothing is prior to the ten predicaments, since they are the first and supreme genera. Therefore science about them is not had. Granting the major: I distinguish the minor. In themselves, I grant; with respect to their intentional passions, I deny. For although with respect to themselves no cause through which they are demonstrated is had, nevertheless with respect to their intentional passions which belong to them insofar as they are considered by reason, they are true causes — at least by emanation — as will be made plain elsewhere.

Article IV. Whether the Science about the Predicaments Pertains to the Logician

Some hold that the treatment of the predicaments belongs to no particular and determinate craftsman, as the Coimbrans report without naming them in the prooemium to the predicaments; Ruuius there and Fonseca in *5 Met. cap. 7, q. 1* also. And there are those who refer this discussion to the Metaphysician alone. But Scotus in *q. 2 of the predicamentals*, Fuentes in *q. 13, diff. 1, art. 3*, and the other

philosophers commonly affirm that the work on the predicaments pertains to both the Logician and the Metaphysician under different characters.

It is to be noted from Scotus now cited, §. *Ad q. dicitur*, and to be recalled from what was said in the second article toward the end of the remark, that the predicaments can be considered in two ways: one, insofar as they are real beings — since from 5 *Met. T. 14* the real finite being is divided into ten genera or predicaments; and another, insofar as they are intentional beings caused by the intellect and attributed to real things. With this distinction laid out, the present difficulty is dissolved. For something can be considered by diverse sciences under diverse formalities, as is evident of quantity, which is examined by Physics and by Mathematics, and of body, which Physics and Medicine examine.

Assertion: The treatment of the predicaments is first-intentionally the task of the Metaphysician, and second-intentionally is the office of the Logician. This assertion is divided into two parts and represents the mind of Scotus in the place cited. The first part is proved: the object of Metaphysics is real being, which from Aristotle in the chapter cited, *T. 14*, is divided into ten predicaments as into ten modes; and the Doctor adds there that since Metaphysics speculates about being as being, it speculates also about its modes into which being itself is divided. Likewise the Metaphysician is the common craftsman — for he contemplates common natures and the quiddities of universal things. Therefore it pertains to him to carry out the labor of speculating about the predicaments. Add that the first Philosopher treats of modes of being and the Logician of modes of predicating, as will be proved elsewhere. Therefore, etc. The second part is proved: Logic treats of second intentions applied to first ones, according to the common dictum of Dialecticians, which Scotus recalls in *q. 1, before §. Ad q. verf. Ad oppositum*. Therefore predicaments taken second-intentionally pertain to the Logician. Furthermore, the Logician treats of predicables and subiectibles, for he regards the order of superiors and inferiors in the propositions he elaborates. Therefore predicaments with respect to this ordering and disposition caused by reason pertain to the Logician.

Objection I. Of the predicaments there is real science. Therefore about them there is no Logic, which is a rational science. The antecedent is proved: Metaphysics treats of these, as is clear in 5 and 7 *Met. T. 14*, which is a real science. Reply: following the distinction given in the remark — if the predicaments are considered first-intentionally, I grant; if they are regarded second-intentionally, I deny. For of them so taken Logic exists, as the Doctor indicates in *q. 11 of the predicamentals, §. Ad quaestionem dicendum*.

Objection II. The predicaments are things of first intention; hence Scotus cited above says their distinction is derived from the essences of things, and their predications are of first-intention things — as "man is substance." Therefore the predicaments do not pertain to Logic, which is not a real science. I distinguish the antecedent: as they are considered by Metaphysics, I grant; as they are

considered by Logic, I deny. So Scotus is expounded in the place cited: the Metaphysician per se speculates about the substract of the second intention; but the Logic meditates upon the second intention itself attributed and applied to that substract.

Question II. On the Antepredicaments

Just as this work is in its first division divided three ways — into Antepredicaments, Predicaments, and Postpredicaments — so the Antepredicaments are comprehended under the number three: Equivocals, Univocals, and Denominatives. Aristotle perhaps uses this number not unaware of its celebrated praise among the ancients: "God delights in an odd number."

Article I. On Equivocals

In addition to what I said about equivocals in the Epitome, *l. 1, q. 1, art. 5*, these things are worth learning. For in ignorance of equivocals many fall into many errors; hence Scotus says in *3 dist. 22, q. un., §. Ad 1 arg. sub E.*: "the equivocation of names has many times deceived." First of all, the instruction of Aristotle in *6 Top. cap. 1, locus 5* and of Scotus in *Quol. 1, §. De primo A.* and *q. 9, 10 Elench.* is to be observed: equivocals are to be divided before being defined. The reason for this can be given: because distinction is the manifestation of the true and false sense, as the Doctor notes in the place recently cited at the end of the question. There is also distinguished by the same Doctor in *q. 5 of the predicamentals, §. Ad q. dicendum*, a twofold equivocation: active and passive. Active equivocation is the relation of the supposition of one voice to many significates. Passive equivocation is the relation of many significates to the equivocating voice. Hence arises the division of equivocals into the equivocating equivocal, which is the voice or equivocal name applied to many significates, and the equivocated equivocal, which are the things or objective concepts expressed through the equivocal name. Furthermore, the equivocated equivocal can be used in two ways: first-intentionally, which is the significate or significates of the equivocal name — such as the significates of the name "dog"; and second-intentionally, which is the relation of reason of the signified name or significates to the equivocating significant voice — in which sense equivocals are described as those whose name is common but the account of the substance according to that name is diverse. Again, the equivocating equivocal is twofold: the equivocal equivocating by chance, which equally and primarily signifies diverse things under the same name through diverse concepts — as was explained elsewhere about "dog" — and the equivocal equivocating by design, which under one name designates several things through diverse concepts, yet one of them by comparison to another — as Aristotle exemplifies in the Antepredicaments, *cap. 1*, about "man" with respect to the living and the painted. Furthermore, note from the Doctor in *1 dist. 25, q. un., §. Respondeo A.* that the equivocal is not to be numbered among the equivocated — for it is not rightly said that "the fish and

the star are two dogs"; from Ferch. in *vest. 2, cap. 4, n. 11* — since the enumeration of something among others requires a common character among them, whereas in equivocal the account is diverse, and only the name is common to them.

Objection I. Aristotle in *6 Top. cap. 2, locus 73*, Scotus in *Theor. 19, n. 10*, and Mauritius in his annotation deny that equivocal can be defined. The reason is that equivocal signify many things in the manner of many, and have no common character; whereas a definition signifies one common character which every thing defined participates. Reply: equivocal can be considered in two ways: one way, as they are many absolutely — and thus they are undefinable, as the argument well proves. Another way, as they have the common second intention of equivocation imposed and applied to them by the intellect — and in this way they are definable, as Scotus teaches in *q. 5 of the predicamentals, ad 6*.

Objection II. Equivocal "are called." Therefore equivocal are voices, and consequently equivocal are not those whose names are common but are those names themselves. Granting the antecedent, I deny the consequence. The reason is that although equivocal are formally defined through that common equivocal intention, nevertheless the definition given is accommodated not to equivocating equivocal but to equivocated equivocal — as Antonius Andreas, following Scotus, notes in the exposition of the Antepredicaments, and the other illustrators of Scotus there.

Article II. On Univocal

Univocal seem to be opposed to equivocal, since although both equivocal and univocal share the same name, they are distinguished with respect to the account or objective concept. For equivocal obtain a diverse account and objective concept under the same name; whereas univocal participate in the same name and the same objective concept, as the Doctor writes in *1 dist. 3, q. 2, B.* and *dist. 8, q. 3, §. Ad argumenta P.* Hence the Coimbrans note in *q. 2 of the Antepredicaments*, from Albert, *Tract. 1, cap. 3*, that one must speak of these in the opposite manner to equivocal. And rightly Pelbartus in *Tom. 1 of his Rosary, verb. Ens, §. 2*, from Vorrilong in *1 dist. 4, art. 1*, notes that "univocal" is said quasi "one calling" — that is, when under some voice and quiddity corresponding to the voice, many things are called. This is favored by Aristotle in the present passage, writing that univocal are those whose name is common and the account of the substance according to that name is the same. Presupposing the partitions of univocal given in the Epitome, I observe with the common opinion of the Dialecticians that the univocating univocal and the univocated univocal are taken in two ways — namely first-intentionally and second-intentionally. The univocating univocal taken first-intentionally is a voice signifying something common to many — as the voice "man" with respect to Peter and Paul. Peter and Paul are said to be univocated univocal first-intentionally. The univocating univocal taken second-intentionally is the relation of reason of the significant voice to something common to many — as the relation of reason of this name

"man" to Peter and Paul. The univocal first-intentionally is something common to many signified through one voice — as man, who is participated by many of his individuals under the same name and same account. The univocal second-intentionally is the relation of reason of many significates through one voice — as the relation of reason of the individuals Peter and Paul signified through the voice "man" as it is a species. Accordingly, the definition of univocals given by Aristotle is taken of univocals taken second-intentionally — as Tataretus observes in *ibid. q. 1, scibile 2*, following Scotus in *q. 6 of the predicamentals*. And this is deduced from Aristotle, who clarifies it with the example of animal, man, and ox — for both man and ox are called by the name "animal" and enjoy the same account of animal, which plainly accommodates to the univocal; and the same Philosopher adds: "if anyone assigns the account of both in what they are as animals, he will assign the same account of both" — which equally belongs to univocals.

Three things especially are required for a proper univocal: first, that the name be common to many, as its notion declared above indicates — as "animal" is a name common to man and lion. Second, that the account of the substance be the same — that is, that the quiddity or the same objective concept be the same; not however the formal concept, as the Doctor writes in *1 dist. 2, q. 3* and *dist. 8, q. 3*, and as Bonetus proves in *1 Met. cap. 2*. Third, that the same objective concept be signified through the same name. For if the same account of substance were designated through another name, it would be not a univocal but an equivocal — as the name "dog" is common and "animated sensitive substance" is likewise common to the aquatic fish and the barking dog; yet because the account is not the same for them according to the name "dog" but according to the name "animal," "dog" is not therefore a univocal name for them. Furthermore, these instructions are handed down about univocals: univocals are properly defined; univocals per se are placed in the predicaments; and univocals are the objects of sciences — all of which are explained abundantly in their proper places.

Objection I. All equivocals have the same name and the same account of equivocals. Therefore if the definition of univocals is true, equivocals would be univocals — which is false, since the opposite would be predicated of the opposite. Reply: nothing prevents equivocals from being univocals in a different respect, as is clear of the sea-dog and the barking dog, which are univocal in the account of "animal" and equivocated in the account of "dog." Or the consequence is to be denied — for a sophism is committed from "according to something" to "simply." To have the same account of equivocals is to have an account simply and essentially diverse, yet in a certain respect and accidentally the same — just as to agree in difference is to agree in a certain respect and to differ simply.

Objection II. Those whose essential account is the same are essentially identical; but univocals have the same essential account, as is clear from their definition. Therefore they are essentially identical. But this is false, since man and lion, for example, are indeed univocals but are not essentially identified — indeed they differ essentially through their specific differences. Reply: granting the major, to the minor it must be added that the same essential account has the same common name; for if it were another name they would by no means be univocals, as I noted above. And so in response to the secondary argument: man and lion, insofar as they participate in the same name and common account of animal, I grant are univocals; but insofar as they participate in other names and diverse accounts which are their specific accounts and differences, I deny they are univocals — as is clear enough from what was said.

Article III. On Denominatives

The division and definition of denominatives are to be sought from the Epitome, *art. 7 of the place cited*, in the preceding article. Now the conditions required for proper denominatives are numbered as three. The first is that they agree in formal significate and differ only in mode of signifying — as I said about every concrete and abstract in the place cited above, *art. 6*. For "white" and "whiteness," for example, which are denominatives, formally signify the same thing — namely the form of whiteness itself — but they present a diverse mode of signifying; for "whiteness" precisely designates the form of whiteness itself, while "white" beyond that concerns the subject in which it resides — such as paper or some other thing in which it inheres — as the Doctor clearly teaches at the end of *q. 8 of the predicamentals*. The second is that they agree in the beginning of the word, or that they begin with the same syllables — as the aforesaid denominatives "white" and "whiteness" sufficiently illustrate. The third is that they differ in the ending of the same word — as those particles of their definition, "differing in case," indicate — that is, according to Scotus's interpretation, in inflection; because they have a distinct termination, as can be seen in the example adduced. Or if you prefer another more sublime and subtle interpretation of Scotus in *2 dist. 12, q. 1, §. Ad argumentum primum I.* and *Quol. 18, §. De 1. sub C.*, say that case or inflection of denominatives is toward the form or nature. Now since form and nature are twofold, a twofold genus of denominatives arises: either it is the inflection of substantial nature toward the suppositum, and a substantial denominative is had — as "man"; or it is the inflection of accidental nature toward the subject, and an accidental denominative is had — as "white." The former exposition of denominatives is more common and easier; the latter is broader, and does not seem to be comprehended in the definition of denominatives elaborated by Aristotle — for the substantial concrete does not seem to be a denominative except in a broad signification, as many Scotists intimate following Mayronius in the predicaments, *passage 3*. And this is the express mind of Scotus in *q. 16 of the predicamentals, §. Per idem ad 2 argumentum*, in these words: "It is to be said that

the substantial concrete does not have that definition, because it does not differ only in case — that is, in the inclination of the form toward a subject, as case is taken there — but it differs only in the inclination of the form toward the suppositum." Aristotle is in favor, who in illustrating the aforesaid definition adduces only examples of accidental concretes. The reason can be given: because the denominative designates the form in the manner of something adjacent to another, as Mastrius and Bellutus note in *disp. 2, Qual. 6* — which is proper to accidental concretes, not to substantial ones, as is clear in the Epitome, *l. 1, q. 1, art. 6*. Likewise, denominative predication is properly accidental, as is clear there, *q. 1, art. 2*. Hence the Doctor rightly concludes in *3 dist. 7, q. 1, §. Quarto videndum C.*: "although the denominative is a univocal predicate, it is not predicated univocally" — as will be made plain in the following article. Tataretus in the Summules, *Tract. 3 de praedicamentis in expositione denominativorum, scibile 2*, gladly subscribes to this. And so our more recent authors cited above do not seem to cohere with themselves — for at the beginning of the question cited they say that the denominative signifies form in the manner of something adjacent to another, which belongs only to the accidental concrete, and then near the end of the same question they strive to adapt the aforesaid definition of denominatives to both — that is, to both accidental and substantial — pressed by this slight reason: that both fall toward another and concern a subject or suppositum — as Raconius also implies in *Tract. 2 de Categoria, q. 3*. This motive, I say, is plainly slight and vain, as is clearly shown by what we have adduced thus far for defending and strengthening our position.

Objection. Denominatives pertain to Grammar. Therefore in Logic they are to be presupposed rather than defined and treated. The antecedent is at hand from the conditions that denominatives require — especially from the last two, for to agree in the beginning of a word and to disagree in the ending of a word are matters of the grammatical faculty. Reply: denominatives are considered differently by Grammar and Dialectic, just as I noted about noun and verb in the Epitome, *l. 2, q. 1*. For Grammar regards them with respect to the congruence of speech, while Dialectic regards them with respect to the objective concept and its truth. And that denominatives begin with the same letters and end with different ones expresses their similarity and dissimilarity. Or say, following the second interpretation of them, that their case or inflection is referred not to the name but to the subject, as was explained above.

Article IV. Whether the Definition of Univocals Belongs to Denominatives

Some deny this, among whom is Ruuius in *q. un. of this c.*; the opposite, however, is maintained by Scotus in *1 dist. 8, q. 3, §. Ad argumenta opinionis oppositae*, Vallo in *Tract. Form. fol. 76*, and Fuentes in *q. 12, difficulty 1, art. 2*, asserting that denominatives are comprehended under the definition of univocals.

It is noted from Scotus in *3 dist. 7, q. 1, §. Quarto videndum C.* that it is one thing to be a univocal predicate and another to be predicated univocally. For a univocal predicate is one objective concept common to many, not entering into the essence or quiddity of those of which it is predicated — as "white," which is denominatively predicated of wood and milk, as "the wood is white" and "the milk is white." But to be predicated univocally is when the predicate is of the essence of the subject — thus "animal" is predicated univocally of man and brute, because it is of their essence. This distinction is clearly gathered from Aristotle in *1 de substantia*, when he says that second substances are predicated univocally of first substances, while accidents of the subjects in which they inhere are predicated denominatively. The same Doctor repeats and expresses this in *1 Sentences* in the place cited at the beginning of this article, *P.*, saying that a univocal predicate is twofold: one which is predicated essentially and in what of the subject, as "animal" of man; and another which is predicated according to the same name and the same account — not however essentially and quidditatively — as "white" is predicated of milk and snow. Hence if "univocal" is taken in the first way, between univocal and equivocal there mediates the denominative — because between a predicate which has the same essential account and a predicate which has a diverse essential account there mediates what has the same non-essential, accidental, and extrinsic account, as was confirmed above by examples. But if "univocal" is taken in the second way, between equivocal and univocal nothing is interposed — because between having the same common account and having a different diverse account there is no medium; and so in the last article of this question we will assert that equivocals and univocals are immediate, and that analogs and denominatives do not mediate between them. Although between those mentioned no medium intervenes, yet Mastrius and Bellutus in *disp. 2, q. 6, art. 1*, following Joannes de Magistris in *c. de Denominativis* and Delphinus in *c. de univocis*, think that between the mode of predicating of equivocals and univocals there falls the mode of predicating of denominatives — led by this reason: every predicate either has the same common account for those of which it is predicated, or not. If not, there is the mode of predicating of equivocals. If yes, either that common account is quidditative and essential for those of which it is predicated — and there is the mode of predicating of univocals; or it is extrinsic and accidental — and there is the mode of predicating of denominatives. However, the bipartite mode of predicating of equivocals and univocals seems to suffice for Dialecticians — especially Scotists, who acknowledge no medium between univocal and equivocal — as the Doctor explicitly asserts in the place cited above, saying that in another way "univocal" and "equivocal" are immediate for the Logician. And he adds the reason: because the univocal taken broadly is that whose account is in itself one — whether that account is the account of the subject, or denominates the subject, or is said of the subject per accidens; while the equivocal is that whose account is different or diverse. Since therefore between having the same common account for many and having a diverse

account there is no medium, it follows that there are only two general modes of predicating — of equivocals and of univocals. Again, in investigating the number of universals, only two modes of predicating are assigned — in what, and in what sort; then the mode of predicating in what sort is subdivided into essential what sort and accidental what sort. By parity of reasoning, two modes of predicating of univocals and equivocals are established; then the mode of predicating of univocals — under which denominatives are contained — is subdivided, and the mode of predicating of denominatives falls under it. Furthermore, the fourfold distinction that Porphyry establishes, Scotists reduce to a bipartite one, according to the law of good division handed down by Boethius in *l. de divisione*. Therefore a third mode of predicating of denominatives, distinct from the two modes of univocals and equivocals, does not seem to be introduced into the school of Scotus. Aristotle, however, treated of denominatives not because he thought them to be distinguished from univocals and equivocals — as Scotists must concede — nor because they have a mode of predicating of the subject different from these — as Mauritius holds, cited and received by our more recent authors — but because they are contained under univocals. For whoever treats of the divided whole is certainly bound to discuss its dividing members.

First Assertion: Denominatives are univocal predicates. This Scotus holds in the places cited above, which I prove thus: univocals are those whose name is common and according to that name the account of substance is the same, as the Philosopher writes in *cap. 1 of the predicaments*. But denominatives are of this kind — for "white," for example, which is a denominative, is predicated of the subjects in which whiteness inheres according to the same name and the same account of whiteness: for it is true to say "milk is white," "sugar is white," and so for the rest that participate in whiteness. Therefore denominatives are univocal predicates. Proof II: every universal is univocal, as I proved in *l. 2, q. 1*; but the fourth and fifth universal especially are denominatives — such as "capable of roaring" and "colored." Therefore denominatives are not to be exempted from univocal predicates.

Second Assertion: Denominatives can be comprehended under the definition of univocals. This is established by the Doctor in the place cited, is indicated by Fuentes in the place cited, and follows from the prior assertion. For to univocals there is the same name and same common account, as Scotus excellently notes in the first place cited; but the account taken universally prescindds from essential and accidental account, intrinsic and extrinsic — just as "animal" abstracts from man and brute. Therefore denominatives properly, which obtain the accidental account of subjects, are not to be expunged from the definition of univocals.

Objection I. Scotus in *q. 6 of the predicamentals*, §. *Dicendum verif. potest dici* expressly denies that denominatives are univocals — proving it from Aristotle,

who in assigning the definition of univocals in *cap. 1 of the predicaments* says "univocals are those whose account of substance in the univocated is the same." But the account of white or of another denominative is not the account of substance, since whiteness or another accident is outside the substance or essence of the subject. Therefore the definition of univocals is not fitting to denominatives. Reply: from those words Scotus only deduces that he considers the contrary opinion not improbable — which he signifies by saying "it can be said." But in the theological places cited he, having considered the matter more maturely, absolutely and clearly defends the aforesaid assertion. In response to the proof from Aristotle: I say he can be expounded as speaking not of the quidditative and essential account of substance but of the account prescinding from essential and accidental account, intrinsic and extrinsic — as I was saying above. Or say that according to the mind of the Philosopher he defined univocals taken strictly, as the Doctor indicates in the place of the Sentences cited, and as Bonetus in the place cited explains, saying: "by 'account of substance' is to be understood the definitive quiddity which is found in every predicament of both substance and accident."

Objection II. Aristotle in *c. de substantia* writes that denominatives are not predicated of their subjects by name and account. Therefore denominatives are not univocals. The consequence holds by the locus from the negation of the definition to the negation of the thing defined. Fuentes in the place named at the beginning of this article, *n. 3*, responds that the Philosopher only excludes denominatives from essential and quidditative predication — as second substances are predicated of first ones — not however from accidental predication, which is rightly accommodated to denominatives, as the words adduced by him clearly demonstrate. Or more briefly, and to the same effect: denominatives are indeed univocal predicates, but are not predicated univocally — as I explained in the remark set out above.

Article V. Whether the Denominative Signifies the Form or Its Subject

Franciscus Lychetus in *1 dist. 4, q. 1, at the end*, notes that this difficulty is raised by the Doctor not so much about the denominative or substantial concrete, called "concrete toward the suppositum" — whose form is said to be in the suppositum and not in the subject — but about the denominative or accidental concrete, called the "concrete toward the subject," which presents two things: namely the accidental form and the subject in which this form inheres — as "white" designates whiteness and the milk or wall in which whiteness itself inheres. Now the question is whether the accidental concrete chiefly signifies the accidental form, or its subject, or both simultaneously and equally primarily. Hence according to the threefold sense that can be had about such a concrete, a threefold opinion of the Dialecticians arises. The first belongs to certain authors whose assertion is indicated by the Doctor in *4 dist. 12, q. 1, §. Ad argumenta*

principalia T., in the solution of the fourth — to whom our more recent authors in the place cited, *art. 2*, incorrectly join Fonseca in *5 Met. cap. 7, q. 5, sect. 1* (as is clear to one reading him there) — who hold that the denominative or accidental concrete per se and directly signifies both the form and its subject. The second belongs to Avicenna in *1 of his Logic, c. de proprio*, who holds that denominative concretes formally signify the subject and materially the accidental form — and the Nominalists are cited in this view by Gadius in *Quol. 1, fol. 9*, from whom Maior in *c. de Accidente, not. 5* and certain modern authors from the Society of Jesus do not seem to dissent. The third belongs to Scotus in *q. 8 of the predicamentals, §. Ad q. and 1 dist. 4, q. 1, at the end*, and *dist. 26 and 27*, and also in *4 dist. 12, q. 1, §. Ad argumenta principalia T.*; to Aureolus in *1 dist. 4, propositio tertia*; to Lychetus in the same place; to Tataretus both in those places and also in *Log. q. 2 praedicam. dub. 2*; to Joannes de Magistris; and to others teaching that accidental concretes primarily and per se signify the accidental form, while connoting the subject.

It is noted from Scotus in the Logic in the place cited above, that although accident does not exist without a subject — since it is a being in another, that is, dependent on a subject — it nevertheless has its own proper entity and nature distinct in essence from the essence of the subject. For being is divided into substance and accident, from *5 Met. cap. 7* and *1 Top.*, in every genus there is a what; and since there are nine genera of accidents, it is clearly established that accident participates in its own essence distinct from the essence of the subject. Wherefore accident can be understood in two ways: either precisely and under its own proper character — and in this way it is understood in the abstract; or insofar as it inheres in a subject — and in this way it is understood in the concrete, and by reason of this concretion it is said to signify the subject, not as something intrinsic to it, but as something on which it is supported and without which it cannot be perfectly and completely understood.

First Assertion: The accidental concrete signifies the form and at the same time connotes its subject. So Scotus in *q. 16 of the universals, §. Dicendum ad q.* and in the fourth of the Sentences in the place cited. Proof I: from Aristotle in *7 Met. T. 3, 4* and Averroes in *1 Phys. com. 25* and *12 Met.*, affirming that the accidental concrete — such as "musical" and "white" — simultaneously presents two things: the form and its subject. Proof II: the concrete and the abstract are distinguished from one another in that the abstract signifies the form precisely or in isolation, while the concrete signifies the form and that in which the form inheres, as I said in the Epitome, *1, q. 1, art. 6*. Therefore the concrete signifies both simultaneously — which is the common and indubitable assertion of all Dialecticians.

Second Assertion: The denominative concrete primarily and formally signifies the form, and materially and less principally the subject. Scotus expressly holds this in the places cited above. The first part is proved. I: from Aristotle in the

present passage saying that denominatives differ only in case from their principals — that is, from their abstracts; but abstracts formally signify nothing except the form, as is clear from the definition of the abstract term. Therefore neither do the denominative concretes, which the Doctor asserts in *1 dist. 8, q. 3, §. Contra istam positionem*, and *dist. 27, q. 3, §. Ad 2 q. I.*, differ from them only in mode of signifying. And this is had more expressly in *c. de substantia*: "white signifies quality alone" (understand: principally); now "white" is an accidental concrete and quality is the accidental form — therefore according to Aristotle the denominative concrete signifies the form chiefly. Proof II: whatever more principally is in act than in potency, as is clear of itself. Therefore the concrete primarily signifies form. The consequence is argued from Averroes in *8 Met. com. 7*: "the name is principally said of form, which it signifies only in act; but act in the composite is form, as no one denies." And more: because voices were devised chiefly for signifying, making known, and distinguishing things, and making known and distinguishing derive chiefly from form. Proof III: if denominative concretes formally designated the subject, since there is one common subject of all accidents, there would be one predicament in which all those accidents would be placed or at least reduced — which conflicts with the Philosopher in *5 Met. T. 14*, who divides finite being into ten predicaments, of which nine are genera of accidents. Again, this proposition would be per se: "white is wood," because the subject with respect to its significate is naturally apt to suppose per se, and the predicate would be of the essence of the subject — which contradicts Aristotle in *1 Post. T. 35*. The second part is proved I: in the definition of the concrete the subject is placed as something added, from *7 Met. T. 14*, and such a definition is called a definition by addition, because in it, beyond the essential things of the thing defined, something is added. Therefore the accidental concrete connotes the subject. Proof II: the concrete signifies form in the manner of something adjacent, as is clear in the Epitome cited; therefore it connotes or concerns the subject in which the form inheres. Proof III: that which designates two things equally primarily under its proper character is equivocal, as is clear from *art. 1 of this q.*; but not every concrete is equivocal — otherwise the end of speech would perish, which is to declare distinctly the concept of the mind, and no proposition would be true, no contradiction, consequence, or demonstration would exist, since equivocal is in no way placed in demonstration, from *1 Post. T. 26*. Furthermore, this would be a per se proposition: "white is wood" — for the predicate would be of the essence of the subject, which Aristotle reprobates in the place now cited, *T. 35*. Therefore the accidental concrete signifies its subject only materially and secondarily.

Objection I. In the definition of the concrete the subject is placed first. Therefore the subject is principally signified by the concrete name. The antecedent is at hand: for the concrete is defined as "having form" — as "white" as "having whiteness"; but "having form" is the subject of the form. Therefore, etc. Confirmation: the concrete is predicated of the subject, not of the form —

for one says "the body is white," not "the quality is white." Therefore it primarily signifies the subject. Granting the antecedent, I deny the consequence — for that is only the explanation of the name, not of the significate. Wherefore the concrete designates the subject only from the mode of signifying, not from the significate. Hence it is rightly said that the concrete per se signifies form and concerns its subject, as Scotus clearly teaches in *1 dist. 4, q. 1, at the end*. In response to the confirmation: granting the antecedent, I deny the consequence. For it is one thing to be said of another, to be used for another, and to signify something — for the concrete is said of the subject, as the argument deduces, but it does not primarily signify the subject; rather it only connotes and connotates it, as Scotus says in *q. 16 of the universals*.

Objection II. What per se constitutes the intellect is what per se primarily signifies it, since to signify is to constitute the intellect, from *1 Perih. c. de verbo*; but the concrete name uttered constitutes the intellect of the subject. Therefore it primarily signifies it per se. The minor is proved: the concrete constitutes the intellect of accident, which cannot be understood without the subject, because it cannot exist without the subject; and from *2 Met. T. 4*: "each thing is such in knowing as it is in being." Granting the major, I distinguish the minor: primarily, I deny; secondarily, I grant — as I made plain at the end of the remark set out above.

Objection III. The same term supposes what it signifies; but the concrete supposes the subject. Therefore the concrete signifies the subject. The major is shown: a term, from the fact that it supposes, does not have a new significate on account of its suppositing. The minor is proved from *1 Post. T. 35*: "white is wood" is per accidens — for it designates that to which "white" happens; but that to which "white" happens is the subject. Therefore, etc. Reply: with Scotus in *q. 8 of the predicamentals, Ad 2 principale*, suppositing and signifying do not coincide; for although a term supposes what it signifies, sometimes it supposes for what it connotes — as in personal supposition, where the common term supposes indeed for the suppositum, yet does not signify the suppositum. Wherefore even if the concrete supposes for the subject, it does not however signify the subject but only connotes it.

Objection IV. Scotus in *Quol. 1, art. 3* concedes that inherence inheres, and in *2 dist. 1, q. 5, 4 dist. 52, q. 3, 1 dist. 3, q. 7* writes that this is false: "whiteness is white" — the reason for which he gives in *q. 16*, because the subject and predicate are taken under diverse modes of signifying: for the subject is abstract and the predicate is concrete. Reply: inherence inheres as a by-which, not as a which; thus whiteness is not white, but is that by which the subject is white. The abstract and the concrete, though they signify the same thing, nevertheless obtain a diverse mode of signifying, as I noted above from Scotus.

Article VI. On the Unity and Plurality of Concretes

This difficulty, which seems to be grammatical — as the Doctor notes in a similar matter in *1 dist. 12, q. 1, §. Iuxta quaestionem istam* — can be raised both about accidental and about substantial concretes, and is useful for deciding many difficult and hard things treated in sacred Theology, as Arriaga notes above all others in *disp. prima summularum, sect. 9*. Now the question is whether the unity or plurality of the concrete is to be derived from the unity or plurality of form, or of subject, or of both simultaneously.

Concerning accidental concretes or adjectives, according to the school of Scotus in *1 dist. 12, q. 1, sub T., at the end, §. Ad argumenta respondetur*, and *Quol. 11, §. De tertio, sub H.*, and *3 dist. 6, q. 1, §. Ad argumenta F.*, and *dict. 8, q. un., §. Ad argumenta F.*, it is firmly established and intrepidly asserted that their unity or plurality is to be drawn from the unity or plurality of those same subjects — so that even if there were one accident in number in many subjects, such as one whiteness in number in many walls, the concretes would be multiplied to the multiplication of those subjects, and there would be as many concretes as white walls through the whiteness received in them. But if in one subject in number there inhered many accidents, there would be only one concrete in number — as an artisan endowed with many arts is called one artisan, and a Doctor having many doctrines and sciences is called one Doctor and one knower. Thus, with accident multiplied but the subject not multiplied, the concrete is not plurified; but with the subject multiplied, even if the accident is not multiplied, the concrete is plurified. The reason for this can be adduced from the Doctor in the first place cited above: because accident affects the subject on which it depends and without which it cannot exist. Since therefore it determines what terminates its dependence, its unity or plurality is clearly drawn from the unity or plurality of the subject, which terminates the dependence of the accident. Now if there were two accidental concretes — or as Scotus says in the place cited, two adjectives — since one cannot terminate the dependence of the other (because each is dependent), the dependences of both must be terminated by the subsistence and independence of a third, which is the substantive, which adequately terminates their dependences. Hence Scotus named above concedes that the Father and Son are two spirating things, but not two spirators — for the reason just given. For the numeral term added to a substantive designates that its formal significate is being numbered; thus "two spirators" would denote that the power and principle of spirating is multiplied in the divine Persons — which is false. But "two spirating things" signifies two supposita or Persons who spirate the Holy Spirit — which is true, since both are adjectives and equally dependent, terminated by the independence of a third, which is the Person — as we abundantly showed in the Tract. de Deo trino, *disp. 8, q. 3*.

Concerning substantial concretes or substantives, all affirm that their unity is to be derived from the unity of form or nature, even if many supposita participate in it — thus "there is one God," although there are three Persons participating in the same deity. Likewise "one creator," although there are three supposita having

the same power of creating. The reason can be: because, from what was said in the Epitome, *l. 1, q. 1, art. 6*, the substantive is something subsisting in nature and independent; hence its unity is aptly derived from the unity of form. But from what the plurality of concretes is to be derived is disputed among ancient and modern Scotists. For Bassolius, Bargius, Lychetus, and other eminent theologians — whom Vasquez follows in *1 part, distinct. 115, cap. 4* — hold that for the multiplication of substantial concretes a plurality of natures suffices without any multiplication of supposita, so that if the divine Word assumed several human natures, it would be several men by the plurality of them, with the unity of the suppositum of the divine Word itself remaining. This assertion is indeed deduced from the Doctor, who in *3 dist. 1, q. 3, §. Ad 1 argumentum*, investigating, on a given hypothesis that one Person assumed several human natures, whether that person would be one man or several — rejects others' opinions and twice refers the decision and response to this difficulty to *1 dist. 12, q. 1*, where he says that the numeral term placed upon some determinable places its significate upon it; and since if one divine suppositum assumed several natures, there would be a manifold determinable and manifold formal significate in accordance with the multiplicity of nature — therefore according to Scotus one assuming several human natures could be said to be several men. And if he were to assume a human and an angelic nature, he would be a man and also an angel. Whence St. Anselm in *lib. de Incarnatione Divini Verbi, cap. 5* adds: "when 'man' is uttered in common, it is signified" — and the reason is that for the unity of a substantive the unity of form suffices. Wherefore, since the substantive signifies form in the manner of something per se standing, it is evidently concluded that the dependence of the numeral adjective is terminated by the form of that same substantive. This can be corroborated from the same Scotus in *1 dist. 4, q. 1, B.*: "to every quo there corresponds its own quod" — that is, to every abstract there corresponds its own concrete, as to deity God, and to humanity man. Therefore if a divine Person assumes several humanities, in accordance with their plurality that Person would be several men — especially according to Scotus in the same place, *q. 1 at the end*: "The concrete does not import, concerning its per se significate, what 'having' is, but nature." With natures therefore multiplied, their concretes are multiplied — as among others Gadius notes in *Quol. 11*, following Scotus in *1 dist. 12, q. 1, to the end, §. Iuxta quaestionem istam*. Furthermore, even if it is certain from faith that the Word assumed a singular human nature, it is nevertheless said to have assumed a man, as Augustine not rarely writes, cited by the Doctor in the Reportata, *dist. 6, q. 3*. And certain Councils cited by us in the Tract. de Incarnatione confess this. Hence the Church sings: "Thou, about to take on man for his liberation, didst not shrink from the Virgin's womb." And not incongruously Arriaga, cited near the beginning of this article, observes about Christ as man certain true forms of speech which are not true of the divine suppositum — as "man died," but "the divine Word did not die"; and "man ate," "man consists of soul and body," and so on.

You will say, with Mastrius and Bellutus in *disp. 2, q. 6, art. 2, before the solution of objections*, that the concrete of substantial nature is not numbered or multiplied when natures are numbered and multiplied — because it is not ultimately independent, since it concerns the suppositum, by which its dependence is ultimately terminated. Against this: if from the ultimate termination of the substantial concrete its unity or plurality is to be derived, as those recent authors hold, it follows that at the multiplication of such ultimate termination and supposital independence the concrete and nature must be multiplied — and thus several divine Persons would be several gods, as Scotus argues in *3 dist. 1, q. 3, §. Ad 1*, against St. Thomas in *3 part, q. 3, art. 7, ad 2*. Again, in the opinion of these authors there would be no substantial concrete without ultimate termination by a suppositum; but a little earlier we clearly showed that such a concrete exists without supposital independence, as was established and corroborated there both by reason and by authority. And it can also be confirmed from what Scotus has in *1 dist. 12* cited, around AA.

On the opposite side, the more recent Scotists willingly and firmly maintain, among whom are Philippus Faber in *disp. 42, at the end of cap. 4*, Franciscus de Perugianis in *3 dist. 1, q. 3, art. 2*, and the two younger ones cited above, asserting that for the plurality of substantial concretes a plurality both of natures and of supposita is required.

Objection I. All the places of Scotus adduced at the beginning of this article, in which it is plainly read that for the multiplication of substantial concretes the multiplication of supposita is required. Bargius in *1 d. 12, q. 1, ad 3* most satisfactorily answers by interpreting those places not about substantial concretes but about accidental concretes — of which the Doctor himself subjoins examples there: about one having several sciences, about a father having several sons, about an artisan skilled in several arts, about a principle, and others of this kind, which are accidental concretes. You will insist: if the Doctor were speaking only about accidental concretes in those places, according to the interpretation of Bargius, it could be said that the Father is two principles, two producers — because he has two principles of producing, namely intellect and will; and that Christ is two willing things — because he has two wills, human and divine; two beings — because he has human and divine being; and similar things which Scotus rejects in the places mentioned. Therefore such an interpretation neither agrees with truth nor with the mind of Scotus. The sequel of the antecedent can be denied: for although in the Father there are two aforesaid principles, the Father cannot nevertheless be called two principles — but rightly "having two principles," which were shown above. This truth can be induced in similar cases: as in Christ there are indeed two natures in number, yet Christ is not two in number. And although Christ is man, yet he is not human nature in the direct case but in the oblique — that is, "having human nature." Similarly, matter and form are in the composite, but they are not called the composite. Likewise, soul and body are in man, yet man is not soul nor

body, but "having soul and body," as Scotus carefully notes in the *Reportata*, 3 q. 2, d. 6. And all the more, because since those principles proceed from nature as its powers and virtues, they cannot be said in the direct case of that nature — for what arises from another is not that from which it arises, just as effect cannot be the cause from which it proceeds. More about these things in their proper place.

Objection II. If from the unity of the formal significate the unity of the substantial concrete is derived — as from one deity one God, from one humanity one man, and from one spirating power one spirator — then with supposita multiplied, as is clear from what was said above: therefore since in the Father there are two formal significates, namely the principles of generating and of spirating, without doubt the Father will be called two principles — contrary to the Doctor cited and to other scholastics. Reply: I deny the consequence. For as the Doctor cited writes in *solution* 2: one thing can include in itself many accounts or principles of acting — as is clear of the rational soul having many powers and principles of operating. Thus the Father, although he is one suppositum, has nevertheless two principles of producing, yet he himself is not called two principles, as I was showing a little before. Or better, and more adapted to our Scotistic doctrine: principle is reckoned among accidental concretes or extraneous ones, for it is outside the substantial nature since it proceeds from it. Hence, since the multiplication of accidental concretes requires the multiplication of subjects or supposita, it does not properly follow that the Father, who is only one suppositum, is two principles. But that this is the mind of Scotus is clear from his writings — for he exemplifies there about one having several sciences, who is said to be one and not several knowing persons, which is clearly an accidental concrete.

Objection III. Against the rule of Scotus handed down about numeral terms: if the numeral term falling upon a substantive affects it and multiplies its formal significate — therefore "person," which is a substantive concrete name, through the numeral term has its formal significate multiplied; and thus, just as three divine Persons are said, three gods could be said — because divinity is their formal significate, which the Doctor objects to in 3 *dist.* 1, q. 3, §. *Ad* 1. Reply: the formal significate of "person" is not divinity but personality, which is multiplied in accordance with the multiplication of persons. Wherefore the adjective "divine" does not fall upon divinity; hence three persons cannot be called three gods. But it affects personality — and therefore in accordance with the number of three Persons, three divine Persons are numbered.

Article VII. Whether There are Analogs Distinct from Equivocals and Univocals

We presuppose that there are analogs from the common opinion of the philosophers — namely Aristotle in 4 *Met.* T. 2, in 7 of the same work, T. 14 and 15, and elsewhere; Scotus in q. 16 *Elench.*, and in 2 *dist.* 12, q. 2, §. *Ad* 1 *rationem sub* G., and in *Quol.* 3, §. *de* 1. B.; Richard in 1 *dist.* 25, q. 2, art. 2; St. Thomas in 1 p. q. 3,

art. 5; and St. Augustine in *c. 2 Categ.* The reason is that certain things have among themselves order, proportion, and attribution; hence they enjoy analogy, by which they are called analogs. For the word "analogy" means the same as proportion, according to Augustine in *1 Mus. 12*, or agreement or comparison, as Fuentes in *difficulty 2, art. 1* and Ruuius in the *Tract. de analogia* observe from Cicero and Quintilian. A threefold analogy is established: of proportion, of attribution, and of inequality. The analogy of proportion, mentioned by the Philosopher in *1 Eth. cap. 6* and *8 Met. cap. 4*, and touched on by the Doctor in *4 dist. 1, q. 10, §. Hic dicitur D.*, falls on things that have some similarity and agreement among themselves. By this analogy laughter is said of man and of a meadow — for just as when a man laughs he appears to be in good health and to be filled with joy, so when a meadow flourishes and blooms well, it is said to laugh. The analogy of attribution is that by which a common and superior account belongs essentially and intrinsically to its inferiors, yet with some of them depending on another. This Aristotle in *4 Met. cap. 2* calls "from one and toward one," as Fonseca notes there in *q. 1, sect. 6*; it is referred to by the Doctor in *1 d. 3, q. 3, §. Contra istam univocationem*, and in *d. 8, q. 3, §. Contra istam positionem*. It is called "from one or toward one" because in one the account formally exists, and in others dependently from that one — thus being is said analogically of substance and accident, because accident has being dependently from substance, from which it arises and in which it inheres. Or for another reason — as health is analogically predicated of animal, urine, medicine, and others. For health formally and intrinsically inheres in the animal, but not so in the others enumerated. According to this analogy, there is that well-worn maxim: "an analog placed per se stands for its more famous significate," which Scotus examines and exemplifies in *q. 16 Elench.* The analogy of inequality is that which belongs to many participating in the same name and same common account unequally. And this fits species having the same genus — thus "animal" is said to be an analog with respect to man and brute. This is mentioned by Aristotle in *7 Phys. cap. 4* and *10 Met. T. 13*, and is touched on by the Doctor in *1 dist. 8, q. 3, §. Ad argumenta E.*, and by others it is called *equivocatio physica* — according to that statement of the Philosopher cited: "in genera equivocations lie hidden" — which are plainly logical univocations, as his interpreters note there. Given therefore that analogs exist, it is rightly investigated whether analogs mediate between equivocals and univocals — as St. Thomas thinks in *5 Met. lect. 12* and *1 p. q. 13, art. 5*, Cajetan, Capreolus, and the whole family of the Thomists — or whether they are reduced to equivocals or univocals, as the Subtle Doctor holds in *q. 15 and 16 Elench.*, and in *1 dist. 3 and 8*, as cited by Orbellus in *4 Met. q. 1*; Mauritius in *q. 7 of the universals*; Sarnanus in the same place, *pag. 238*; Sirectus; Vallo in *Tract. formalitatum*; and the whole subtle school.

It is noted, first, from Scotus in *Theorem 9*, that concept is twofold: one formal, which is the cognition by which the intellect understands something — as one says "this is my concept or knowledge," as Vorrilong notes in *1 d. 3*; and another

objective, which is the thing known or the quiddity understood insofar as it moves or at least terminates the cognition of the intellect. In this sense Algazel says in his *Metaphysics*: "when the intellect is certain about one thing and doubtful about another, it has another concept distinct from that about which it is certain and from that about which it is doubtful" — as the Doctor shows in *1 dist. 3, q. 3*, on the univocation of being, where he proves that being designates a univocal concept prescinded from God and creature, substance and accident. Wherefore if the quiddity conceived is one thing common to many in thing and in name, there is one univocal concept; but if there are many diverse quiddities participating only the same name, the concept will be multiple and equivocal.

It is noted, second, that according to the Scotists — namely Canon in *1 Phys. q. 3*, Vallo in *Tract. formalitatum, fol. 71, 72*, and Sarnanus cited above — there are four degrees of univocation. The first is when something common belongs to many according to the same name, same account, same mode of being, same order, and same essential perfection. This degree of univocation is the most perfect and proper only to the most special species. Hence the Philosopher says in *7 Phys.*: "in the most special species is the most perfect comparison." The second is when something common belongs to many according to the same name, same account, same mode of being, and same essential order — yet not according to the same essential perfection — as "animal" with respect to man and brute: for man enjoys a more perfect degree of animality than brute. Hence through this diversity of degrees it is said in *7 Phys.* that "equivocations lie hidden in genus" — since one departs from perfect univocation on account of inequality of perfection, and one approaches equivocation. The third is when something common is accommodated to many enjoying the same name, same account, and mode of being, without order and equality of essential perfection — thus number is univocal to its species: three is more perfect than two, and two precedes three. Hence Aristotle adds in *8 Met.*: "the species of things are like numbers" — that is, one is more perfect than another. The fourth is when something common is adapted to many possessing the same name and same account, but lacking the same mode of being, order, and essential perfection — and this is the minimum univocation, according to which being is said to be univocal to substance and accident, as will be clear in *Metaphysics*. Now the instruction of Scotus in *q. 4 of the Prologue, §. Ad rationes pro opinione opposita, sub EE.*, is not to be passed over in silence: "when there are two opposite extremes, the more something recedes from one of the opposites, the more it approaches the other." Since equivocal and univocal seem to be opposites, and the univocal of the last degree is further from the univocal of the first degree than the univocals of the other degrees, it is therefore said to approach more closely to the equivocal. For this reason perhaps Porphyry in the *Isagoge, c. de specie*, and Scotus in *q. 15 Elench., §. Ad 1 rationem dicendum*, say that if anyone calls all beings univocal, he will name them equivocally and not univocally — insofar as

substance and accident agree only in the common account, character, and name of being, but lack the other things that make for perfect univocation.

It is noted, third, that analogs — whether of proportion or of attribution — can be considered in two ways. One way, insofar as the common account and name formally and intrinsically belong to all the analogated — even if some of them express an attribution and dependence on another — as substance and accident are said to be analogs to which the intrinsic and formal account of being belongs, even though accident depends on substance. And these are univocal analogs, because the dependence and attribution of one on another does not remove their univocation, which consists in the same name and common account of being which they indeed participate — as the Doctor clearly demonstrates in *4 dist. 12, q. 1, §. Ad q. respondeo H.* Another way, insofar as one of the analogated has some formal and intrinsic account signified by one and the same name, while for the rest it belongs only extrinsically and metaphorically — as laughter is properly attributed to man and improperly to the flowering meadow, as Scotus notes in *q. 15 Elench., toward the end.* And health belongs formally and intrinsically to the animal; but to urine, diet, and medicine it is attributed extrinsically, as the same Doctor clearly edits in *2 dist. 12, q. 2, §. Ad 1 rationem infra G.* and in *4 dist. 12, q. 1, before I.* And these are equivocal analogs — because under the same name they participate a diverse account, as is clear in the examples adduced. From these things those are refuted who place analogy as a medium between univocation and equivocation — such as the two recent authors in *disp. 2, q. 5, art. 3*, and Faber in *Theor. 95, at the end of cap. 1* — who, however, having considered the matter more prudently and maturely, in *4 Met. q. 1* denies that analogy mediates between those two, as I will prove below in the second assertion.

First Assertion: There are no analogs distinct from equivocals and univocals. So Scotus and all the Scotists cited above. Proof I: from Aristotle, who in *cap. 1 of the predicaments*, defining equivocals and univocals, makes no mention of analogs — which he would nevertheless have been bound to do, if analogs mediated between them; otherwise he would have been truncated and deficient. For he was there arranging all things placed in the predicaments and in distinct classes of things, and those things excluded from them. Wherefore since he neither here nor elsewhere has brought forth a peculiar definition of analogs, it is an open indication, says Scotus in *q. 15 Elench. versic. Alia est proprietas*, that they do not diverge from univocals and equivocals. Boethius, cited by the Doctor, is in our favor, saying that analogs are comprehended under the definition of equivocals — and this is indicated by Aristotle, who in declaring the definition of equivocals adduces the example of "man," which is equivocally predicated of the living man and the painted one, even though the name "man" is, according to the opponents, an analog with respect to them. The Complutenses at the end of *cap. 1 of the Categ.*, from St. Thomas and Cajetan cited by them, are in favor.

You will say with Arriaga in *disp. 10, sect. 3* and other Dialecticians that analogs are defined by Aristotle in *1 Eth. cap. 6 and 7, 4 Met. cap. 2*, and in *5 of the same work, cap. 6*: "analogues are those whose name is common but the account of substance signified by the name is neither entirely the same nor entirely diverse." But such a definition is contained neither explicitly nor implicitly in those places, as is clear to one reading the text of the Philosopher. I only find in *5 Met. T. 12* these words: "analogues are one, which are such that one has the same relation toward another." Which is to say: those things are analogues that preserve attribution or proportion and comparison to one another. But this is not to have the account of substance partly the same and partly diverse, as Arriaga wants analogues to have — but only similarity, proportion, or attribution, which is not the account of substance in any way the same and in any way diverse, but is only a relation having one accidental account distinct from any other, as I will show in the question on relation. Proof II: same and diverse are immediate from *10 Met. T. 12*. But univocals are the same with respect to name and account, while equivocals under the same name are diverse with respect to a diverse account, as is clear from their definition. Therefore everything is either equivocal or univocal, and consequently analogues are not to be interposed between them. Proof III: between intrinsic and extrinsic, proper and improper, no medium falls, as is clear of itself. But univocals have one proper and intrinsic account — as is clear of laughter, which is equivocally said of the laughter of man and of a meadow. For it properly belongs to man and improperly to a flowering meadow, and it is placed in the second mode of equivocation, as the Doctor notes in the place cited above, *verf. sicut ridere*. Again, the essences of things consist in the indivisible. Therefore every essence is either the same for many or diverse, and consequently the essence of the analogue is not divided so as to be partly the same and partly diverse. Finally, proportion, which is adapted to analogues of proportionality, is a relation founded in the unity of quality — just as the relation of equality is founded in the unity of quantity, from *Arist. 5 Met. cap. de relatione*. Attribution, which is the disposition of one toward another, is accommodated to analogues of attribution, and is likewise founded in the unity of its foundation. If therefore analogues participate the same intrinsic and formal account, they are univocals; but if only an extrinsic and improper one, they are equivocals — and accordingly all analogues are to be reduced either to univocals or to equivocals.

Second Assertion: Analogues — whether taken materially or formally — do not mediate between equivocals and univocals. So Scotus and all the Scotists, except the two recent ones cited above who assert that analogues taken formally are media between equivocals and univocals. Proof I: if analogues taken formally and distinct from equivocals and univocals were admitted, of them there would be a proper definition distinct from those of equivocals and univocals — because a distinct definition belongs to a nature distinct from others, distinctly expressed through it. But there is no distinct nature of analogues from the natures of

equivocals and univocals, because all analogs either have the same or diverse, either intrinsic or extrinsic account, as I clearly induced above. Therefore all analogs are to be inscribed among equivocals or univocals.

You will say that this reason holds for analogs taken materially, but not for those taken formally, because the unity of analogy formally differs from the unity of equivocation and univocation. Against this: univocal and equivocal are immediate, as those recent authors concede. Therefore their formal characters are also immediate — otherwise, given a middle character, a middle predicate between equivocals and univocals would be constituted through such a middle character — just as between white and black a medium is had through a middle quality, such as redness, "red" — which they openly reject. Therefore in no way falls a medium between them. Proof II: every medium according to the consensus of all is either through the negation of the extremes or through participation in them. But in neither way can analogs be media between equivocals and univocals — not through the negation of the extremes, but rather through participation in them, as is clear from the definition of analogs adduced and rejected by the opponents; and clearly the opposite is argued from what I adduced to prove the prior assertion. Therefore analogs even taken formally do not mediate between them. But the foundation and motive of the young authors is of no force at all. For they are founded in the doctrine of Scotus in *1 dist. 8, q. 3, §. Ad argumenta opinionis oppositae, sub E.*, writing that the unity of attribution is less than the unity of univocation and formally differs from it. From these words those authors deduce their opinion, asserting that analogs formally mediate between equivocals and univocals — because the formal character of analogy is formally other than the formal character of univocation, as the Doctor clearly teaches in that place now cited. But Scotus in no way favors them, if his words are read attentively and carefully weighed. First, he there wants the unity of attribution — which is called the unity of analogy — to stand together with the unity of univocation, because greater unity includes lesser, as the unity of species includes the unity of genus; for those that are one in species are one in genus. Therefore according to Scotus the unity of attribution or analogy is included in the unity of univocation, and it stands together with it, because lesser unity can stand together simultaneously with greater unity. But what stands together with another is not a medium of it — for the medium recedes from the extremes of which it is a medium. Furthermore, the included is not the medium of the including — as the account of animal, which is included in man, is not the medium of man — otherwise all superiors would be media of inferiors. Therefore since Scotus asserts that the unity of analogy is included in the unity of univocation, he plainly thinks that it is not the medium of the latter. Furthermore, the unity of attribution is transcendental according to Scotus, which is included in the unity of predicamental univocation; but the transcendental is not called the medium with respect to the predicamental. Add that attribution is a relation, as I noted

above, and the Doctor indicates there — and a relation and its unity is by no means considered a medium with respect to nature or concept, from which univocation is derived. Wherefore every unity of attribution or of name or of thing or of both is best reduced to univocation or equivocation; and accordingly there is no analog formally mediating between equivocals and univocals.

Objection I. Aristotle in *1 Eth. cap. 6* writes that the eye is an analog — for as the eye of the body is to the body, so the eye of the mind is to the mind. And in *2 Post. T. 23*: as the bone is in land animals, so the spine is in marine animals — in which the bone is seen to be an analog. Therefore analogs distinct from univocals and equivocals are to be admitted. Reply: granting the antecedent and denying the consequence, we allow analogs not at all diverging from equivocals or univocals. Now those analogs recounted by Aristotle are univocals: the eye of the body and the eye of the mind are univocated in one account of the principle of seeing, although they differ in their proper differences — one being corporeal and the other spiritual — in roughly the same way that body and spirit are univocated in the common account of substance, but are discriminated from one another by their proper differences. Likewise bone and spine agree in the common account of support, although they are distinguished from one another by their differences — the latter belonging to land beasts and the former to fish of the sea.

Objection II. The Philosopher in *4 Met. cap. 2, T. 2* affirms that being is an analog by analogy of attribution — called "from one and toward one nature," not equivocally, as health is said of animal, urine, and diet. Therefore if being, according to Aristotle, is not equivocal and not univocal, it follows that it is an analog distinct from them — because health, which he adduces as an example, is not said univocally of those things enumerated, as the Doctor affirms in *2 dist. 12, q. 2, §. Ad 1 rationem sub G.* and in *4 dist. 12, q. 1, before I.* The reason is that health formally is in the animal, in urine as in a sign, in diet as in a cause. And the same formal concept of health — as equality of humors, as signifying health, and as causing it — is not the same. Therefore health is predicated equivocally of them. Reply: Aristotle indeed holds that being is not equivocal, but he does not deny that it is univocal. In response to the example of "healthy," I confess it is an equivocal analog — which does not harm us, unless it likewise harms the opponents who deny that being is equivocal. Wherefore that is only adduced to clarify the disposition of being toward substance and accident, just as there is the disposition of health toward animal, urine, and diet — even though the latter is predicated equivocally of them and the former univocally. Similarity, however, does not hold in all things — otherwise it would be not similarity but identity, as Scotus notes in *4 cited above*.

You will say that Scotus in *q. 16 Elench., §. Propter hoc dicendum*, asserts that what is said analogically of the aforesaid things is to be reduced to the univocal, because it is only primarily signified of them — whereas he holds the opposite

in 2 and 4 cited above. Therefore either Scotus contradicts himself, or it must be conceded that analogs mediate between equivocals and univocals. I say that in that question of the Elenchi the Doctor expounds that maxim: "an analog placed per se stands for its more famous significate." Health, however, insofar as it is the principal analog, is equality or proportion of humors, which formally belongs to the animal — in which alone it is formally, as the Doctor intimates there in these words: "and such analogs are to be reduced to univocation, since they primarily signify only one thing. Thus the healthy analog is reduced to the univocal." But if health is taken as it belongs to all the analogated and comprehends the diverse concepts of health as significative and causative, it is certainly reduced to the equivocal, as the Doctor observes in 4 cited above. In this way the apparent contradiction of the Doctor is dissolved; and perhaps Faber, reproved by those recent authors for asserting that "healthy" is a univocal predicate, can be excused in this same way.

Objection III. The account of the analog is distinguished from the accounts of the univocal and equivocal. Therefore the analog likewise diverges from both. The antecedent is proved: the account of the analog is to signify one thing through a prior and another through a posterior, or the account of the analog is to signify several things having attribution or proportion to one another; whereas the univocal under one name precisely signifies one account, and the equivocal through one name simply signifies several things. Reply: I deny the antecedent. In response to its proof, I say that the account of the analog is to be reduced to equivocation or univocation — because even if in analogs there is some disposition, proportion, or attribution of one toward another, as is clear of being with respect to substance and accident, God and creature, yet that proportion or attribution does not remove univocation, as the Doctor rightly notes in the second place cited. But it only signifies that it recedes from perfect univocation, as is clear from what was said in the second remark.

Objection IV. St. Augustine in *l. Categ. cap. 4* and St. Damascene in his Logic affirm that denominatives are media between equivocals and univocals — and Scotus seems to favor them in *q. 13 Elench., §. Ad 1 ergo quaestionem*, where he enumerates analogs as distinct from the aforesaid two. Nor is Aristotle far from them, who after defining equivocals and univocals defines denominatives. Reply: denominatives are chiefly accidental concretes and are univocal predicates, as I showed in *art. 4 of this q.* They can however in some way be called media, insofar as they recede from the first and ultimate degree of univocation and approach some mode of equivocation, as is clear from the second remark. In this way perhaps the Fathers and Scotus cited above, and also Aristotle, can be expounded. It can be added that Scotus in that place indeed asserts that there are names which primarily signify something common that is found diversely in diverse things — as is clear of the health of animal, urine, and medicine; yet he does not remove those that are analogs from univocals or equivocals altogether. For he exemplifies there about continuous and discrete quantity,

from which it is clear that quantity taken generically is univocal. Or perhaps he speaks there in the opinion of others, as sometimes he does in that work, as I noted elsewhere.

Question III. On the Predicaments

Article I. Whether There is Something Univocal to the Predicaments

Scotus in *q. 3 of the predicamentals* asserts that there is something univocal to the predicaments — whom Tataretus in *ibid. q. 1, scibile 2*, Joannes de Magistris, and other disciples of Scotist doctrine follow.

It is to be noted that the question here is not whether some real univocal belongs to the predicaments — since to speculate about the common quiddities of things and to contemplate transcendentals pertains to Metaphysics, as I noted in *q. 1 of this book, art. 4*. Rather the difficulty is only whether some intentional element is given in which the predicaments are univocated — which pertains to Logic.

Assertion: Some intentional univocal is among the predicaments: namely predicament taken in common. So Scotus in the place cited, *§. Ad q. dicendum*. Proof I: something intentional is predicated of the predicaments according to the same name and same account. Therefore something intentional is univocal to them. The consequence holds; the antecedent is proved by the definition of univocals — for the individual predicaments agree in the common name and account of predicament, for substance is a predicament, quantity is a predicament, and so for the other supreme genera. Proof II: diversity in first-intention things does not prevent them from being conceived by the intellect through a univocal concept common to them — as, although man and lion differ from one another, they can nevertheless be conceived under the univocal concept of animal. But second intentions are attributed to things insofar as they are conceived by the intellect. Therefore since the predicaments agree under the common intentional concept which is predicament, it follows that predicament taken universally — as it is intentional — is univocal to the ten first genera.

Objection I. The predicaments are first genera, as all admit; but if something univocal were common to them, they would not be first genera — for that univocal would be prior to and more common than them. Therefore nothing univocal is common to them. Confirmation: given the univocal common to the predicaments, they themselves would be species, for they would agree in that common element as in a genus and differ from one another through their proper differences — whereas it is certain that they are primarily diverse, as the Doctor holds in *2 d. 3, q. 4, sub D*. But it is false that the predicaments are species, since they are supreme genera. Therefore it is also false that they agree in a common univocal concept. Granting the major, I deny the minor. For as Scotus says, that common intentional element is predicated of them not essentially but

denominatively — in roughly the same way that the universal taken precisely is said of genus, as is clear from *l. 2, q. 1, art. 11*. In response to the confirmation: the same is to be said, namely that the predicaments are species denominatively, not essentially — as is made explicit in the place now cited.

Objection II. The second intention proceeds from the thing. Therefore the unity of the intention is effected from the unity of the thing; but no thing belongs univocally to the predicaments. Therefore the second intention does not belong to them. Confirmation: no univocal is denominative; but the aforesaid intentional element would be predicated denominatively of the predicaments, as the Doctor says in *q. cited in the solution of the first and second*. Therefore, etc. The major is argued: because the univocal differs from the denominative, as is clear in the present book. Reply: the major is true occasionaliter, not effectiuè — for every second intention is made by the intellect and is founded in the thing, from which the intellect takes occasion to fabricate it, as Scotus says in *q. 3 of the universals*. In response to the confirmation: I say that the denominative is a univocal predicate, but is not predicated univocally — as I extensively showed in *art. 4 of the preceding q.*

Article II. How Many Predicaments There Are

A fierce quarrel once flourished among philosophers about the number of the predicaments, as the Coimbrans in *q. 2, art. 3* and Fuentes in *q. 13, diff. 1, art. 5* report — and it does not seem to have been settled yet, as Ferch. very recently strives to show in *vestig. 7*, in the places from Aristotle he cites. The decimal number of categories is indeed celebrated among nearly all the ancients, so much so that from what was reported at the beginning of this book, Herminus the Peripatetic always had the ten categories of Aristotle on his lips. Yet this number is even now scorned and reproved by some — especially by Arriaga in *disp. 3 Met. sect. 1* and Raconius in *Tract. 2 de categoria, q. 2, art. 2*, from whom Hurtado in *disp. 9 Met. sect. 2* is not far distant. We, however, with Scotus in *Quol. 11, §. de 4. ante K.* and in other places to be cited below, not departing from the common opinion of the philosophers, observe and recall from what was said in *q. 1 of this book, art. 2* for the firmness and stability of the aforesaid number: predicaments taken first-intentionally pertain to Metaphysics; taken second-intentionally they pertain to Logic. Their distinction, as the Doctor notes in *q. 11 of the predicamentals, §. Ad q. dicendum*, is derived from the essences of things placed in these ten classes, to remove the confusion of things and introduce their distinction — as Ferch. also notes in the place cited. Furthermore, I presuppose from what will be said in Metaphysics that real being — which has or can have being, setting aside the operation of the intellect, precisely taken, from Scotus in *1 d. 8, q. 3, N.* — is divided in its first division as into its modes into being quantitative and non-quantitative, finite and infinite. Finite being in its immediate partition descends to the ten predicaments as to its ten distinct modes, of which each obtains a constitutive character of one supreme genus;

and to these correspond diverse modes of predicating. Therefore they are called predicaments, as Scotus infers in *q. 15 Elench.*, before *§. Ad q.* And since according to Scotus in *1 d. 3, q. 3, §. Contra istam univocationem O.* and *d. 8, q. 3, N.* — whom Sirectus in *Tract. formalitatum*, fol. 12, pag. 1, Trombeta, and others there follow — being is not a genus (the reason for which Aristotle adduces in *4 Top. cap. 6, locus 72* and *3 Met. T. 10*): because genus must be a nature so limited that it can be prescinded from the differences by which it is contracted — but infinite and finite are not differences of being but modes to which being is determined, as will be abundantly shown in the place just cited.

Assertion: There are ten predicaments or ten supreme genera. This is defended by Aristotle both in this *cap. 4* and in *5 Met. T. 14*; by Scotus in *q. 11 of the predicamentals, §. Ad q., Quol. 11, art. 4, before K.*, and *4 d. 13, q. 1, §. Ad huius autem difficultatis intellectum sub C.*, and *8 Met. q. 5, 6*, and elsewhere; and by the other philosophers in general — whom it seems better to adhere to rather than contradict, lest the authority of the ancient philosophers be despised, for which reason Avicenna in *3 Met.* cited by the Doctor in the place cited in *4* says we are compelled to admit that celebrated division of the predicaments and to observe it. For one must speak with the many, and it does not seem safe to oppose oneself to the torrent of Doctors. And Ezekiel implies as much: "Where the impulse of the spirit was, there they went." Hence Maior rightly adds in *q. de proprio §. Sed illum modum*: "the common usage is to be imitated where no reason or authority presses in the opposite direction." And the same author at the end of the predicaments adds: "the authority of the philosophers is the principal reason for the decimal number of the predicaments." Now the proposed assertion can be argued I: by the reason of St. Augustine in *1 Categ. cap. 8*, who presupposing the first predicament of substance as well known to us, gathers the remaining predicaments of accidents thus: some accidents are within substance — such as quantity, quality, and position; some are outside substance — such as where, when, and habit; and others are partly within and partly outside substance — such as relation, action, and passion. Yet this reason does not demonstrate the aforesaid number of categories, since all accidents are outside substance, since they proceed from substance itself. Proof II: the reason of the Scotists is adduced — especially that of Franciscus de Mayronis in the present passage, *passage 8*: whatever exists is either substance or accident. If the first, the predicament of substance is had. If the second, it is either an absolute or a relative accident. If absolute, it either follows matter and is quantity, or follows form and is quality. If relative, it either comes intrinsically and is the category of relation, or comes extrinsically — and this either pertains to causality, or to measure, or to order. If to causality, either actively or passively — and thus two predicaments of action and passion are had. If to measure, either of permanent quantity and is the category of where, or of successive quantity and is when. If to order, either of parts and is position, or of the whole and is habit. But that reason is not convincing either, for it is not received by all — especially by those

who reject extrinsically coming relations, as will be clear below. Proof III: the reason of the Nominalists is adduced — among whom is Aureolus in *1 d. 30, propositio 6* — derived especially from Ockham in *1 p. of his Logic, cap. 41 and Quol. 5, q. 22* — based on the number of questions that can be asked about a first substance. For either we ask of the first substance what it is — and it is the first predicament; or how great it is — and it is the second predicament of quantity; or of what sort it is — and it is the predicament of quality; or to what it is referred — and it is the predicament of relation; or what it does — and it is the predicament of action; or what it suffers — and it is the predicament of passion; or where it is — and the category of where is had; or how it is situated — and it is the category of position; or how long it endures — and it is when; or how it is clothed — and it is habit. But we do not inquire of a first substance ten questions, as the Nominalists do — rather we seek the reason why there are only ten categories, which they by no means provide. Aristotle's reason in *cap. 4 of this work*, derived from the ten significations of things, is added: there are as many categories as there are categorically incomplex signifying beings; but such signifying beings are numbered as ten. Therefore ten categories too. The major seems clear. The minor is shown: they either signify substance, or quantity, or quality, or relation, or action, or passion, or place, or time, or position, or finally habit — all of which are comprehended in the decimal number. But this reason is not convincing either; for if from the multiple signification of incomplex beings ten categories are gathered, then since there are more than ten significant incomplex terms of things — as is clear in the *Epitome, l. 1, q. 1* — more than ten categories too should be enumerated. Furthermore, to signify is to represent something to the intellect through a name imposed at will, as I said in the place now cited, *q. 2, art. 1*. Therefore just as ten categories are signified at will, so they are at will referred to ten — and not because of any reason necessarily confirming the aforesaid number. Wherefore the decimal of predicaments is not demonstrated but probably argued and defended, as the Doctor intimates in the place cited.

You will say that Scotus in *q. 11 of the predicamentals, §. Ad q.*, affirms that Metaphysics can know this division with its reason why; but to know with its reason why is to demonstrate. Therefore such a division of the predicaments is confirmed by demonstration. I say that the Doctor speaks there doubtfully — hence he inserted the particle of doubt "perhaps." But he speaks assertively in the books of the Sentences in the places cited, in which he clearly asserts that the decimal distribution of the predicaments is to be retained on account of the authority of the ancient philosophers, and that one ought not easily contradict this.

Objection I. Being is one supreme thing under which all other things are contained. Therefore there is only one predicament or supreme genus having no genus above itself — especially in the opinion of Scotus who affirms that being is univocal to God and creature, substance and accident. Confirmation I:

what is said by superabundance belongs to one alone, according to Priscian; but being is said by superabundance, for it is most general and transcends all things. Therefore only one predicament of being is to be admitted. Confirmation II: every plurality is to be reduced to one, from *5 Top. locus 5*, which is prior to that multitude. Therefore if there are many genera, they are to be reduced to one most general genus prior to them — which is being alone. Reply: being is indeed transcendental, but is not a genus — because it is not divided into differences but into modes, as I noted above. And so I grant the antecedent and deny the consequence. For being can be univocal even though it is not a genus; and accordingly nothing against Scotus is concluded. In response to the first confirmation: I say the major is true not positively but negatively — for there can be many things first negatively, as are the ten predicaments. In response to the second confirmation: I say the predicaments are reduced to one prior to them in entity, causality, and perfection — namely to God, the principle and end of all things, as is read in *Apoc. 1*.

Objection II. Every being is either substance or accident — because it is either a being through itself and is substance, or is a being in another and is accident; but substance constitutes only one predicament. Therefore accident too makes only one other predicament, and consequently there are only two predicamental series — one of substance and another of accident. I deny the parity. For substance has only one mode of existing through itself and subsisting through itself, and therefore there is only one predicament of substance. But accident participates nine modes of inhering; hence there are nine predicaments of accident — which Arriaga, not attending to this, absurdly criticizes the aforesaid partition of categories.

Objection III. Being is divided into absolute and relative. Therefore just as one predicament of relatives is given, so another predicament of absolutes alone is to be conceded; and thus since quantity and quality are absolute beings, they do not make two distinct predicaments — especially because accidents with respect to their subject do not regard matter or form, as the reason of the Scotists for the ten predicaments does not suppose: but the composite, as I will show in *Physics*. Also there is the division into abstract and concrete. Therefore, just as quantity, which is abstract, constitutes one predicament, so too quantum, which is its concrete, will constitute another predicament — and what is said of quantity and quantum applies to quality and quale, and to the other abstracts and concretes. As for the addition that quantity follows matter and quality follows form, this is not to be understood of matter and form of the part — as is deduced in the argument — but of matter and form of the whole, which are not essentially distinct from the composite. Or perhaps because quantity is adapted only to material composites and quality to spiritual things, which are commonly called forms — hence in the enumeration of the predicaments it was said that quantity follows matter and quality follows form, even though in reality both quantity and quality inhere in the composite. In response to the other point: I

say that the division into concrete and abstract is a division of terms, not of predicaments — it comprehends being and all the rest contained under it. Hence abstract and concrete do not make peculiar categories. And more: because abstract and concrete do not differ essentially but only in mode of signifying, as I noted in the Epitome, *l. 1, q. 1, art. 6*. Hence they do not pertain to distinct categorical series, as Aristotle implies, who in this book in *cap. 14* writes about quantity and quality, and in *5 Met. cap. 13* about quantum and quale. And the Doctor and Maior clearly teach this in the solution of the arguments in the place cited and in Maior's response to the first. In response to the final point: I deny that accident is opposed to substance — it is rather disparate than opposite, unless opposition is taken broadly, for accident is the effect of the substance from which it proceeds.

Objection IV. That division of the predicaments is not immediate — for being is first divided into substance and accident, and also into uncreated and created, before it is divided into the ten categories. Again, some category is to be assigned in which the predicates of God reside. Moreover, every good division is bipartite. Therefore the decimal partition of the predicaments violates the laws of good division — indeed Arriaga, named above, proclaims it to be nearly guilty of seven mortal sins. Reply: it is immediate with respect to finite and created being, not with respect to being taken precisely — hence neither God nor his predicates are enclosed in any predicament, as will be proved in the following question. Although division is most often bipartite — especially if it is a genus into its differences — it nevertheless sometimes necessarily consists of many members, as is clear from the tripartite distribution of figures and of principles, from the fourfold division of elements, and from the soul being distributed into three species of soul; and in Sacred Scripture the law of God is divided into the ten precepts of the Decalogue. Wherefore the decimal of categories is not to be abhorred, despised, taken ill, or scorned — but by all to be embraced and celebrated.

Objection V. Non-beings, fictions, beings of reason, privations, and negations obtain a proper account of superior and inferior; for the intellect apprehends them under the character of conceiving not as singular but as universal — not as belonging to any of the genera enumerated above. Therefore they belong to some particular supremely general genus — which would be one predicament distinct from the others. And more, if one opposite is said in many ways, so too is the other, from *1 Top. cap. 12*. Therefore if accident, which is opposed to substance, is multiplied into nine supreme genera, substance too is divided into nine supreme genera, and consequently eighteen predicaments are to be enumerated. But these and similar things seem absurd. Therefore they are to be reduced to two predicaments rather than multiplying so many predicaments without pressing necessity and without a reason proving it. Granting the antecedent, I absolutely deny that there is one predicament of all relations — for above we divided relation into intrinsically coming, which makes the

predicament of relation, and extrinsically coming, which through six distinct modes that it has, constitutes the six last predicaments. Wherefore it is not surprising if absolute accident is separated into two genera, since it has a twofold mode through which a twofold predicament is constituted. As for the addition that quantity follows matter and quality follows form, this is not to be understood of matter and form of the part — as is deduced in the argument — but of matter and form of the whole, which are not essentially distinct from the composite. Or perhaps because quantity is adapted only to material composites and quality to spiritual things, which are commonly called forms — hence in the enumeration of the predicaments it was said that quantity follows matter and quality follows form, even though in reality both quantity and quality inhere in the composite. In response to the other point: I say that the division into concrete and abstract is a division of terms, not of predicaments — it comprehends being and all the rest contained under it. Hence abstract and concrete do not make peculiar categories. And more: because abstract and concrete do not differ essentially but only in mode of signifying, as I noted in the Epitome, *l. 1, q. 1, art. 6*. Hence they do not pertain to distinct categorical series, as Aristotle implies, who in this book in *cap. 14* writes about quantity and quality, and in *5 Met. cap. 13* about quantum and quale. And the Doctor and Maior clearly teach this in the solution of the arguments in the place cited and in Maior's response to the first. In response to the final point: I deny that accident is opposed to substance — it is rather disparate than opposite, unless opposition is taken broadly, for accident is the effect of the substance from which it proceeds.

In response to the objection about non-beings and beings of reason: all those are reduced to the predicaments in which they are founded and whose privations and negations they are — as the Philosopher writes in *2 de anima, T. 96*, where he reduces the non-visible to the visible and the non-odorous to the odorous. For to the same predicament belong a habit and its privation, body and its shadow. Not attending to this, Arriaga in the place cited holds it as inconvenient that opposites are placed in the same predicament — as sin and grace under the category of quality — whereas the philosophers unanimously place heat and cold and other contrary qualities in the said predicament of quality. Add that the Scotists teach that grace and sin are opposed only demeritoriè. And more: because metaphysically speaking, finite being, which is determined to the ten categories, is real being, as is clear from *Arist. 5 Met. T. 14* and from Scotus cited in *§. Ad q. dicendum* and *q. 25, §. Dicendum*; in which latter place he seems to reduce all intentional things or beings of reason to the real genus in which they are founded — and Lychetus indicates this in *Quol. 13, at the end*. And we noted above that there are Scotists who devise an eleventh predicament of beings of reason — as can be seen in Vallo in *Tract. formalitatum, fol. 48*, Zerbius in *Met. q. 8*, and other more recent authors; whom Scotus favors in *q. 11 of the predicamentals*, who under a form of doubt leaves this difficulty

unresolved, not dissolving the reason he had adduced for the affirmative side. This can be satisfied by saying that in Logic Scotus seems to be vacillating about this; but in Metaphysics and Theology in the places cited he clearly opens his mind and freely sets forth his opinion — which does not diverge from the common view.

Article III: Whether the Categories Differ from One Another Really

Brulifer, in his *Epitome of the Formalities*, reports that philosophers are divided into three groups on this question. Some — among them Paul of Venice (*3 Met. cap. 3*) and Augustine Suiseth (*4 Met. quaest. 4*), with whom agree Tataretus (*quaest. 1 praedicam. dub. 2*), Mastrius and Bellutus (*disp. 6. quaest. 2*), and Faber (*Theor. 41. in fine cap. 2*) — hold that the categories differ from one another really. Others — such as Doctor Scotus (*cap. de quantitate quaest. 1*), Toledo (*quaest. 5*), Suárez (*disp. 39. Met. Sect. 2. numer. 21*), and all the Thomists — hold that a distinction of reason as reasoned (*distinctio rationis ratiocinatae*) suffices to distinguish the categories. Sirectus, however (*Tract. formalitatum fol. 20*), Trombetta, Orbellus (*5 Met. cap. 7*), and all the Formalists, with whom agree John of Ghent (*3 phys. quaest. 5. ad 6*) and Fonseca (*5 Met. cap. 7. quaest. 3. sect. 3*), hold that the categories must differ from one another at least formally.

As presuppositions, we must recall what I wrote in the preceding book (*quaest. 1. art. 16*) concerning distinction and its threefold number as taught by the Scotists, as well as the distinction between categories taken in first intention and categories taken in second intention. For the present question is not raised about categories taken in second intention — since, as Scotus teaches (*quaest. 11. praedicam. §. Ad q. dicendum*), these differ by reason, being formally beings of reason — but about categories taken in first intention, which are real beings, and whose study properly belongs to metaphysics.

Assertion: Some categories differ from one another really, others formally; none differ by reason alone. This assertion is threefold and conforms to the teaching of Scotus, as is clear from the passages of his to be cited below. The first part derives from the same Doctor (*2. dist. 12. quaest. 1. and dist. 16. q. un. and 4. dist. 12. quaest. 2*), who distinguishes quantity and quality really from substance, which is their subject: finite substance, in which accidents inhere, quantity, and quality are three categories. Again, from the same Doctor (*2. dist. 2. quaest. 6. §. Ad q. igitur. G. and Quol. 11*): a body can by divine power exist without any place — the same being said of time, situation, and habit. Add the predicamental relation, which really differs from its foundation according to the same Doctor (*2. d. 1. quaest. 4. §. Contra istam opinionem. 1. and 3. dist. 1. quaest. 1. art. 3. R.*). Thus, according to Scotus, nearly all the categories differ really. This is confirmed first by the following: between substance and accident there exists a real distinction, as between a cause and its effect a real distinction obtains, from (*2. dist. 12. quaest. 1. ante §. Est igitur videndum sub A.*); but the first category is substance, and the rest are accidents, which proceed from substance itself as effects from their

cause; therefore nearly all the categories are really separated from one another. Second: things that can be separated from one another really differ, for real separation of certain things is a clear sign of their real distinction; but some categories can be separated from one another — for instance, substance, which according to Aristotle (*7 Met. T. 4*) is prior to accident in nature, definition, cognition, and time, and which in the divine can subsist of itself without any accident. Therefore, and so on.

The second part is derived from Scotus (*2. d. 1. q. 5. §. Ad argumenta principalia P.*), whom Orbellus also cites (*5 Met. c. 7*). And more clearly in the *Reportata* (*2. d. 1. q. 6. in solutione argumentorum*), where these words are found: "As for the other point, where it is said that the categories are primarily diverse, one may say that this is true with respect to formal quidditative ratios, and then it could be maintained that diverse categories can be the same really but not formally." The Formalists cited above confirm this very point. I have adduced these texts because of certain of our younger contemporaries who, when appealing to them, say that Scotus does not accept that response but gives another. Yet even if the Doctor there resolves in another way the argument proposed concerning the relation of a creature to God — which is transcendental and thus placed in no category — he nonetheless genuinely approves the formal distinction among the categories, as is clear from his words just cited. Hence the Formalists in the passage cited, while expounding the Themistian dictum that "the categories are unmixed," say this is to be understood formally, that is, that the essences of the categories are formally distinct. This is confirmed first from Aristotle (*c. de qualitate, in fine*), who affirms that it is not absurd for the same thing, under distinct formal ratios, to be placed in diverse categories. If you respond, with the recent authors cited, that Aristotle is speaking not in his own opinion but in that of others: against this, because Aristotle satisfies the objection of others with a twofold response, and his second response is that the same thing, under diverse formal ratios, can pertain to diverse categories — which he had made clear in the case of science, which is placed in the category of quality insofar as it is a habit, and in the category of relation insofar as it regards its knowable object. For another, more explicit example, take figure: which, according to the formal ratio of quantity, resides in the category of quantity, and according to the formal ratio of quality, is placed in the category of quality, as will be more evident elsewhere. Furthermore, from (*3 phys. T. 19*), action and passion differ not really but formally. The recent authors respond to this, with Scotus (*4 D. 13. q. 1. §. Ad huius autem difficultatis K.*), that the Philosopher in that passage is speaking of action as enacted, that is, of the term produced by the action, and not of the action that pertains to the category of action. But although the Doctor responds in one way in that manner, he also satisfies it in another way in the same place by interpreting Aristotle under L, with these words: "In another way this is taken, not as determining something prior, and then it is the same as this respect from which — and in this way it can be conceded to pertain to the genus of action;

but in this way it is not motion, which is in the patient, except only terminatively — and this suffices to save Aristotle's words. For Aristotle wants action and passion to be the same, as the road from Athens to Thebes and conversely — understand, not that one road is there understood in terms of the magnitude over which the motion occurs, but in terms of the very motion from here to there and conversely; as is evident from the other example he gave of the distance from here to there and from there to here over the same space: where he maintains that these are materially the same on account of the identity of the space, but formally other. So here the motion is that by which the agent is said to act through a respect from this — understanding by 'from this' the respect from which. In the mobile there is likewise founded, conversely, a respect toward the agent. And these two respects have something the same materially, namely the motion; but formally they are other, and in other subjects." Hence Bonetus adds that it is difficult to demonstrate a real distinction between action and passion, because it seems to many that one reality suffices. Sirectus (*Tract. form. fol. 4*) and Vallo (*ibid. fol. 11*) say the same, which is supported by what the Doctor writes (*Quol. 13*), cited by Vallo in the same place: motion, which is flowing form, can be numerically the same as action and passion — as action insofar as it is from the agent, and as passion insofar as it is in the patient. Second, it is proven that things which are inseparable and have distinct formal definitions are formally distinguished, as is clear from the definition of formal distinction cited in the last article of question I of book II; but action and passion are inseparable, since from Aristotle already cited they are really identified, and yet they have distinct definitions, as is clear from Gilbert of Poitiers (*l. sex principiorum*). Therefore some categories differ formally. The third part is derived and proven from Scotus (*quaest. 11. praedicamentali §. Ad q.*), who says the distinction of the ten categories is derived from the essences of things; but the essences of things do not differ by reason, since they exist apart from any operation of the intellect; therefore the categories do not disagree with one another by reason alone. Third: between thing and thing, or between reality and reality, or quiddity and quiddity, no distinction of reason obtains, as our authors teach (*Tract. formalitatum*) from Scotus (*2. dist. 1. quaest. 5*); but some categories are things and things, such as substance, quantity, and quality; and some are realities and realities, or quiddities and formalities, such as action and passion. Therefore no distinction of reason intervenes among them. This same point is corroborated by all the authorities and arguments adduced in proof of the two preceding parts.

You will object first, with the recently named young authors, that Scotus (*2. dist. 3. quaest. 4. §. Contra istam conclusionem. D. and 5. Met. q. 6*) posits a real distinction among the categories, and this can be proven from the same passage: nothing can be under diverse disparate species, because nothing can have a double essence. Therefore something cannot be in a double category. Moreover, things that differ numerically differ really. But things of diverse categories differ

numerically, because according to the antepredicamental canon, of diverse genera there are diverse differences, species, and individuals. Therefore a real distinction obtains among the categories. I respond that Scotus in those places does not recall the real distinction of all the categories, as is evident to one reading his text. In response to the argument drawn from the same passage, I say that the same thing, under distinct formal ratios, can pertain to diverse categories, as is clear from what has been said above — to which may be added another passage of the Doctor in the fourth text cited, (§. *Ad huius autem C.*): "It is necessary to say that the respects have sufficient formal ratios — sufficient, I say, for the distinction of genera." Nor is it correctly inferred that one thing has several essences, but only several formalities. Hence in the divine there is but one essence, while in the school of the Subtle Doctor there are many things formally distinct — such as attributes, relations of origin, and the like — as I taught at length (*Tract. de Deo uno disp. 3. art. 2*). In response to the other argument, I distinguish: things that differ numerically and can be separated from one another are really distinct, I grant; but things that differ numerically and cannot be separated from one another are really distinct, I deny.

You will object second: being and thing are identified; for they are among the transcendentals, which are really the same and are convertible; but being is divided into ten categories as into real and distinct beings; therefore, so too are ten things — and among things and things, there is a real distinction according to Scotus. Therefore a real distinction obtains among the ten categories. Setting aside the threefold sense of "thing" that Scotus gives (*Quol. 3. §. De 1. A.*), I grant the major; I distinguish the minor: if it is understood as a real distinction with respect to all the categories, I deny it; with respect to some, I grant it, as I made plain above. In response to the subsumption, I say: if "thing" is taken for substance or for absolute being, I grant universally; if it is taken for a mode and circumstance of a thing, it is not always true — especially regarding action and passion, and many others to be named and explained in their proper place.

You will object third: the categories are the highest genera and primarily diverse, from Aristotle (*8 Met. c. ult. T. 16*) and Scotus (*2. dist. 3. quaest. 4. sub D. vers. Ex tertia via*); but things that are primarily diverse agree in nothing, and things that agree in nothing differ really. Therefore all the categories are really distinguished. I respond with Scotus (*in Reportatis 2. dist. 1. quaest. 6*) by distinguishing the major: the categories are primarily diverse in a predicamental ratio, I grant; in a transcendental ratio, I deny: for what is common to them univocally is being, which is transcendent; but they share no common genus, as the Doctor writes (*1. dist. 3. q. 3*).

Article IV: What Is Placed in or Excluded from the Categories

On many things doubt may arise — most especially concerning beings per se and beings per accidens, concerning equivocal and univocal beings, finite and

infinite beings, complex and incomplex beings, complete and incomplete beings, composed beings and their parts, and individuals.

The three predicamental orders — direct, indirect, and reductive — already introduced and explained in the *Epitome* (*lib. 1. quaest. 4. art. 2*) should be recalled.

First Assertion: Beings per se are placed in the categories; beings per accidens are not. This is taught by Scotus (*quaest. 2. primi peri §. Ad partem oppositam, and 3. dist. 22. q. un. §. Contra ista. B.*). Proven first from Aristotle (*5. Met. cap. 7. T. 14*), who includes only being per se in a category; and (*6 Met. T. 4*) he excludes beings per accidens from metaphysics. Second: the categories are natural coordinations of distinct things, by way of essential predications of superiors about inferiors — which is what beings per se are; but beings per accidens, since they signify several things on an equal footing, such as "the musical Coriscus" or "white Socrates," cannot be predicated essentially and subjected. Therefore beings per se are placed in the categories and beings per accidens are excluded from them, as Scotus also implies (*2. dist. 3. quaest. 4. ante F.*).

Second Assertion: Only univocal things have a place in the categories. Proven first from Aristotle and Scotus, who in the Antepredicaments separate univocals from equivocals — thus indicating to us that univocals are included in the categories and equivocals excluded from them, as their commentators note in that place. And (*5 Met. T. 14*) they divide real finite being into ten categories, which according to Scotus is univocal. Second: a category is the coordination of a highest genus, intermediate terms, and lowest terms essentially subordinated; but this belongs only to univocals, which share a common essence; equivocal things differ in essence. Therefore only univocal things are placed in the categories.

Third Assertion: Only finite beings have a place in the categories. Scotus holds this (*1. dist. 3. quaest. 3. §. Ad q. H. and dist. 8. quaest. 3. §. Teneo opinionem meam. N.*), asserting that finite being is distributed into ten genera, and there excluding God, who is infinite being. Proven: the categories, by common consent, are genera; but genera are potential, being contracted and actuated by their differences, as established in the question on genus in the preceding book; but infinite being is most actual and supremely necessary. Therefore only finite beings reside in the categories. More on this below.

Fourth Assertion: Not complex, but incomplex things occupy a place in the categories. This is derived from Scotus (*quaest. 12. universalium, and quaest. 21. ad finem*). Proven first from Aristotle in this place, who, in presenting the division of being into incomplex and complex, sets aside the complex and takes the incomplex, distributing it into ten categories. Second: things placed in categories are predicable and subjectable, as is clear from the description of a category; but only incomplex things are such — having the nature of a

universal, which is one thing predicable of many; whereas complex things have many ratios and many essences, and one cannot be essentially predicated of another, as is evident. Moreover, complex things are fashioned by the intellect, whose function is to compose or divide; but categories taken metaphysically are series of things that in no way depend on the intellect. Therefore only incomplex things are placed in the categories.

You will say: "rational animal" is complex, yet it is placed in the category of substance; and Porphyry (*c. de specie*) takes "animated body" as a genus of the living and "rational animal" as another genus, under which he considered both man and angel to be comprehended. Therefore complex things should not be rejected from the categories. This is supported from the Philosopher (*1 de anima cap. 1. T. 6*), who affirms that definitions of things are to be drawn from the categories. I reply: only those things that are complex according to reality are excluded from the categories; but "rational animal," "animated body," and other definitions are complex only in expression, and coincide with their defined terms or species, as the Doctor recently cited notes. Therefore they are not removed from the categories.

Fifth Assertion: Complete and composite things — whether simply, as individuals of atomic species that cannot enter into the per se composition of another being; or in a qualified sense, as genera and species that enter into the composition of another per se being although complete in themselves — are placed in the predicamental series. Proven first from Porphyry (*c. de specie*), who constructed the predicamental tree, placing genera and species in its direct line — a coordination from which Aristotle does not depart (*in this book, and 5 Met. cap. 7, and elsewhere frequently*); nor is Scotus averse to it (*2. dist. 3. quaest. 3. §. Contra illud sub A. and quaest. 4. §. Contra istam conclusionem D. and E. and 3. dist. 22. q. un. §. Contra ista. B.*). Second: in the direct categorical order, one proceeds from the highest genus as head and apex, through subaltern genera, intermediate and lowest species, all the way to the individuals of that same coordination as its base and foundation; but genera and species are natures complete in a qualified sense, and individuals are natures perfect and simply complete, as I noted above. Therefore, and so on. Third: the first genus is predicated per se and essentially of each predicate within its natural coordination, and the individual is the receptive subject of every predicable within the same coordination; but those of which the highest genus is so predicated are the intermediate genera and species and individuals, which are composed and perfect natures. Therefore, and so on. Hence from the direct predicamental line are removed the metaphysical parts — that is, the differences — which are admitted at the side of the category, as Aristotle implies (*6 Top. cap. 3. and 5 Met. T. 10*). For genus is not predicated formally of them, nor are they predicated formally and in the manner of a whole, since they are primarily diverse and therefore agree in no essential predicate, as is clear from (*lib. 2. quaest. 5. art. 3*). Porphyry makes this plain in the place cited, with the

example of the differences of the category of substance, which he placed at the side.

You will say, with Ammonius (*c. de substantia*), whom Hurtado follows (*disp. 9. Met. sect. 3. §. 30. 31*): genera are equally simple and incomplete as differences. But genera are directly in the category; therefore so too are differences. The major is proven because genera are incomplete beings and parts of species, just as differences are. The case for both is therefore the same. Also, species are placed per se and directly in the categories; therefore so too are differences, since the species is composed from the difference. Moreover, this is a direct predication: "Peter is rational," just as "Peter is animal" — therefore differences are not excluded from the direct order of the category.

I reply: it is not for this reason but for another, shown by us above, that differences are admitted only at the side of the category — namely, because differences do not formally contain superior predicates, nor are they predicated of inferiors in the manner of a whole; and therefore they are rightly excluded from the direct predicamental line. By this reasoning, the other arguments of Hurtado are also dissolved: for species formally includes superiors and is essentially predicated of inferiors in the manner of a whole. In response to the other point: I say both are direct predications, since they are in the first mode of saying per se, and "animal" and "rational" are essential parts of man and his individuals; but from this it is not well inferred that differences are directly in the category — otherwise passions would also be directly in the category, because "man is risible" is a per se and direct predication. I affirm the same, with Scotus (*quaest. 15. praedicam. and 3. dist. 22. q. un. §. Contra ista sub A.*), concerning physical essential parts such as matter and form — which Aristotle explicitly holds of the soul (*2 de anima cap. 1*) — and concerning integral parts such as head, hand, and others, which are called dissimilar and heterogeneous parts, which are not predicated in the direct order of the composites made from them: thus "Peter is matter" or "Peter is form" does not hold, nor "Peter is a head" or "Peter is a hand." Moreover, these are parts of a complete substance, and it is the settled doctrine of philosophers that parts are reduced to the whole of which they are parts. Therefore the said parts are said to be in a category only reductively — and this, beyond what others transmit, is held by Lychetus (*1. dist. 8. quaest. 2. propè finem. §. Ad argumenta pro 2. opinione*) after Aristotle (*7 Met. T. 56*). But concerning homogeneous or similar parts, it does not seem that the case is the same, as Fuentes says (*quaest. 13. diff. 2. art. 5. numer. 23*), against Rubius (*cap. 4. de complexis quaest. 1. num. 12*) and Suárez (*disp. 34. Met. sect. 8*): for, as the Doctor holds in the third passage cited under B, all those things are per se in a genus which include a quiddity or which are themselves the quiddity; but homogeneous parts include the quiddity — that is, the quidditative and essential predicates of superiors — as is evident of a part of water, which, separated from a whole quantity of water, is plainly complete water, and everything that belongs

essentially to water in general also belongs to it. Therefore homogeneous parts are not to be excluded from the direct predicamental order.

You will say: any parts whatever, being parts, have an incomplete being by reason of the whole, because they are ordered to constituting the whole, which is made up of incompletions. Therefore homogeneous parts are not placed per se in the category, but only in relation to the whole, like physical and metaphysical parts. I reply: such things are called parts not per se and subjectively — that is, by reason of some superior under which they fall, so that as such they would be something complete and their entire essence would be predicated of them, as I was just saying — but per accidens and by way of division.

Sixth Assertion: Individuals are per se and directly in the category. So Scotus in the passages cited above, and (2. d. 2. citato D. E.). And from the same passage this can be shown as follows: what does not include any quiddity within a genus, nor does any quiddity within the genus include it, is in the genus neither per se nor per accidens; but the individual includes all quiddities — that is, all superior predicates — and all of them are essentially predicated of it, as "a plant is a living thing, a body, and a substance." Therefore the individual is per se in the genus — indeed it is the base and foundation of the entire predicamental edifice. Again: just as the first predicate or first genus is not removed from the direct catalogue of the category, so the lowest subject of each predicable — which is the individual — is not to be expelled from the predicamental series.

You will say: in a category, predicables reside — as the very name "category" implies; but the individual is not a predicable, but a subjectable. Therefore the individual is not per se placed in the genus. All the more so because Porphyry, treating of predicables in his *Isagoge*, presents the category of substance but makes no mention of the individual. Therefore, and so on. In a genus, not only predicables but also subjectable things are placed per se. In response to Porphyry: I say that he treats of universals and essential predicates, not of particulars and material ones; and that is why he says nothing of individuals.

Article V: Whether Concreta or Abstracta Are Placed in the Categories

Since there is a twofold concrete, as Scotus explains (*quaest. 16. Ad 1. and quaest. 2. art. 5. of this book*) — one concrete by concretion to the supposit, which is the substantial concrete; and another concrete by concretion to the subject, which is the accidental concrete — and since to this twofold concrete there corresponds a twofold abstract, substantial and accidental, the question now arises: whether substances and accidents are placed per se in the categories under concrete names or rather under abstract names.

First Assertion: The concreta of substance, not its abstracta, are placed in the category. This is derived from Scotus (*quaest. 16. universalium, and quaest. 11. praedicam., and also 1. dist. 5. quaest. 1.*), Lychetus, and other Scotists in the same place. Proven first from Porphyry (*c. de specie*), who arranged the category of substance under concrete names, as is clear to one examining the text. Second: from Aristotle (*c. de substantia*), who, in affirming that second substances are predicated of firsts, gives examples of concreta, such as "man," "animal," "some man." Third: in the category of substance, genera and species are placed per se; but substantial abstracta cannot be genera and species, because they are not formally predicated of anything — since they prescind from inferiors; and hence the predication of one substantial abstract of another is not valid, as in "humanity is animality." Therefore only the concreta of substance are ascribed to the category.

Second Assertion: The abstracta of accidents, not their concreta, reside in the categories. Scotus holds this (*quaest. 15. univers. §. Vel aliter*), with whom agrees Sarnanus in the same place; Scotus proves it from (*3 Top. cap. 1*), where Aristotle writes that justice is in the genus, not the just — and justice is the abstract of the accident, while the just is its concrete. Therefore the abstracta of accidents are placed per se in the categories. The Doctor also teaches this (*quaest. 11. praedicamentali §. Ad q.*). Moreover: those things that are placed per se in the categories are so disposed that superiors are formally and essentially predicated of inferiors, as the description of a category indicates; but the predications of abstracta of accidents about non-ultimate abstracta are true and formal — as "whiteness is a quality." Therefore the abstracta of accidents are placed in the categories.

You will object first: Scotus, in the third text cited by us more than once under B, writes that man or humanity is per se in the genus; but "man" is a concrete name and "humanity" is its substantial abstract. Therefore both the concrete and the substantial abstract are per se in the category of substance. It follows from the same reasoning that since the accident is placed in the abstract, so too should substance be placed in the abstract in the same category. The major of this consequence is proven: just as the mode of inhering belongs to an accident, so the mode of subsisting per se belongs to a substance. Therefore the case for both is the same. I respond: concrete and abstract differ only in mode of signifying, a difference which, while it prevents predication of one of the other, does not suffice to distinguish genera or to place something in diverse categories. Wherefore the substantial concrete and abstract are in the same category — with this distinction, however, that the concrete is directly in the genus, and its abstract is there only reductively. This response is drawn from the Doctor (*quaest. 11. praedicam. in solutione tertii. verf. Ad aliud de concretis*). In response to the consequence, I deny the major; in response to its proof, I say there is a disparity: for substance signifies only one thing — that which subsists per se — while accident presents two: one formal, which is the accidental form, and another

material, which is the subject of that accidental form. The result is that substance is ordered in the category under a concrete name, and accident under an abstract name.

You will object second: Aristotle in the *Categories* names and places accidents in the concrete, such as "quantum," "quale," and the like, according to Boethius's translation, and this he explicitly affirms (*1 Top. cap. 7, and 4 of the same work cap. 1, and 5 Met. cap. 13. 14*) and elsewhere. Therefore in Aristotle's book accidents are subscribed to the categories under concrete names. It follows from the Doctor (*quaest. 15. universalium. §. Vel aliter, and quaest. 11. praedicam.*) — who acknowledges that the concreta of accidents are in the genus, because they do not constitute genera distinct from their abstracta, and they bear toward one another the relation of superiors and inferiors, just as their abstracta do — that therefore not the abstracta alone of accidents occupy places in the categories. I respond, passing over the responses of others: when Aristotle sometimes admits accidents under concrete names into the categories, he did so to indicate to us that accidental abstracta do not constitute categories diverse from their concreta, but that both reside in the same categories — with this difference, that abstracta are per se and concreta only reductively placed in those same categories. So Scotus responds (*quaest. 15. univers.*) with these words: "But speaking simply, they are not in the genus except by reduction, because they are not in a category except because the coordination of concreta is reduced to the coordination of abstracta." He says nearly the same in (*quaest. 11. praedicamentali*) in the passage cited. By this, the confirmation drawn from the same Doctor is also answered. I have deliberately adduced these texts because of Mastrius and Bellutus, who, following not Scotus but Rubius (*quaest. 2. de complexis*), assert that both accidental abstracta and their concreta are placed directly in the categories, as is clear from their (*disp. 6. quaest. 3. artic. 2*).

You will object third: parts are rejected from the direct predicamental line, as was established in the preceding article; but accidental abstracta are parts of accidental concreta, since accidental concreta are composed of accidental forms and the proper modes of natural inhering in subjects. Therefore accidental abstracta are not placed per se in the categories. Granting the major, the minor is to be denied: for accidental abstracta are natures perfect and complete in their essential being, and are generic, specific, or individual natures, of which — provided they are not ultimately abstracted — formal and essential propositions are formed, such as "whiteness is a quality," "surface is a quality," and the like; although by reason of their weakness they need subjects as their supports.

Article VI: Whether Something Can Be Placed in Diverse Categories

Many, among them Mastrius and Bellutus (*disp. 6. quaest. 2. q. 4*) and Poncius (*disp. 11. quaest. 2*), deny that the same thing can pertain to diverse categories even under diverse ratios. Against them stand Aversa, cited by them, Arriaga (*disp. 12. sect. 9. numer. 47*), and others who follow our Formalists cited in (*art. 3. of*

this q.) and Bacon (*1. dist. 28. quaest. 2. art. 2. and 4*), holding that the same thing, under distinct formal ratios, can reside in distinct categories. Add Boethius (*in c. de ad aliquid*), whose actual words Bacon cites in the place just referred to; and Simplicius, Albertus, and Orbellus (*5 Met. cap. 7*) are in agreement.

Note from Scotus (*quaest. 10. praedicam.*) after Aristotle (*5 Met. T. 7*): one thing is distributed as one per se and one per accidens. One per se is that which has one per se concept — and this is fourfold according to the same Philosopher in the same place, namely: one in genus, in species, in number, and in proportion. One per accidens is called that which has several concepts, either expressed under one name — as "science," which as designating an absolute is in the category of quality, while as denoting the relation of the measurable to the measure it is in the category of relation — or signified by several names equally and immediately, as "white musician"; or one thing is signified per se and another connoted, as "white," which formally signifies whiteness and materially the subject in which whiteness inheres. More on this: Orbellus (*in Met. loco praeallegato*), Perbaltus (*verbo modus intrinsecus §. 7*), and Tataretus (*ibid.*).

First Assertion: Something that is one per accidens is placed in distinct categories according to its distinct significations. So Scotus (*quaest. praedicam. allegata, verf. Ad 1. istorum potest dici, and 4. dist. 12. quaest. 1. §. Ad q. respondeo. D.*). Proven: categories, as established, are classes of distinct things; but something that is one per accidens signifies several concepts or several things or formalities, as is clear from the note just given. Therefore, in accordance with the distinction of things or objective concepts, distinct categories are to be assigned to them — categories in which such things are disposed and ordered. The same is to be asserted of something one and the same by proportion, as the Doctor holds in the same place (*§. Ad q.*). Proven: such unity and identity of proportion consists in being similarly related — as animal to color; for just as color is related to whiteness, so animal is related to man, that is, just as color is the genus with respect to whiteness, so animal is the genus with respect to man. But it is clear that color and animal belong to distinct categories: animal resides in the category of substance, color in the category of quality. Therefore things that are one and the same by proportion are placed in diverse categories.

Second Assertion: One and the same thing per se is not admitted into diverse categories; but nothing prevents the same thing, under diverse formal ratios, from being placed in distinct categories. This assertion is twofold. The first part is defended by the Doctor in that very passage cited, (*vers. Idem specie vel genere*), and (*quaest. 15. univers. §. Ad 1. arg. verf. Aliter licet*). Proven first from the Philosopher, cited by Scotus in the question cited: things that differ in a prior differ in a posterior; therefore things that differ in genus differ in species and number; and accordingly one and the same thing per se cannot be in diverse most general genera. Second: of diverse genera not placed in subordinate order, there are diverse differences, species, and individuals, as Aristotle teaches in this

place; therefore something one per se — which is one in genus, species, or number — cannot hold its place in distinct categories. For the genus belongs to the essence of the species; therefore if the same thing in species or lower genus were in diverse higher genera, both those genera would belong to its essence, and thus it would not be essentially the same, because two non-subordinate genera predicate a diverse essence. Again: difference and genus constitute one thing essentially; therefore a diverse genus and a diverse difference constitute another thing essentially — and accordingly one and the same thing cannot be ordered into distinct categories. The second part remains abundantly proven in (*art. 3. of this q.*) by the authorities and arguments to be reviewed there.

You will object first, against the first part of the second assertion: Porphyry (*in Isagoge c. de specie*) places body in the category of substance; and Aristotle (*c. de quantitate*) places body in the category of quantity. Therefore something one per se, such as body, can be placed in diverse categories. It follows that figure resides in the genus of quantity — for it is considered by the geometrician, who regards quantity per se — and Aristotle (*c. de qualitate*) enumerates it in the fourth species of quality. Nothing therefore prevents something one per se from being referred to diverse highest genera. I respond: body can be used in two ways. In one way, for the nature capable of three dimensions — namely length, breadth, and depth — which coincides with corporeal substance; and Porphyry cited rightly took it in this sense and places body in the category of substance. In another way, for the three dimensions themselves; in which sense Aristotle admits body into the category of quantity. In response to the consequence: similarly, I say that figure is taken in two ways — either for a surface bounded by lines, and then it is in the genus of quantity; or for the very termination of those lines, and then it is in the genus of quality.

You will object second: the double and the half are quanta per se, and are also numbered among relatives; and likewise the equal and unequal are placed in the genus of quantity and also ascribed among relatives. Therefore something one per se can be placed in distinct categories. It follows regarding motion, which is referred to the category of quantity and also to the genus of action or passion. I respond: the double and the half can be considered either insofar as they are quanta — and then they are in the genus of quantity — or insofar as they regard each other mutually — and in terms of such respects they are in the category of relation. The same is to be thought of the equal and unequal. In response to the consequence: I say that motion is equivocal, as is mentioned in the postpredicaments, and in accordance with its diverse termination it can be placed in diverse categories or reduced to them.

Question IV: On Substance

Article I: What Is the Highest Genus of the Category of Substance

The senses and divisions of substance are to be sought from the *Epitome* (*lib. 1. q. 4. art. 3*). Philosophers labor greatly at finding the proper ratio or quidditative concept of substance as it differs from accident and applies to every substance. On this, see Bonetus (*in praedicamentis, libello de substantia*), Suárez (*disp. 33. Met. sect. 1*), Hurtado (*in Met. disp. 10. sect. 2*), and Arriaga (*disp. 4. subsect. 2*) and following. I myself consider that the ratio common to every substance — both created and uncreated, total and partial, complete and incomplete — that prescribes from and abstracts from all these is designated by "not being in a subject," as is clear from Aristotle in the Antepredicaments, who, in giving the ratio of substance common to both the singular and universal, always posits in them "not being in a subject"; and in assigning the definition common to every accident, he writes that this is "being in a subject," which Avicenna (*2. Met. c. 1*) receives and expresses, saying that being in a subject is accident, and being not in a subject is substance. Scotus subscribes (*Quol. 3. §. Respondeo s. and Quol. 9. §. De 2. A.*). Nor should anyone be surprised if substance is described negatively, since God and prime matter are likewise described negatively from what will be said elsewhere — although they are true and real positive beings. Thus under that negation placed in the description of substance there is understood something positive — namely, being subsisting per se — which applies to every substance, so that "not being in a subject" and "being subsisting per se" coincide: substance so universally taken is transcendent, comprising any substance whatsoever whether complete or incomplete, whether partial or total, as the Doctor excellently pursues (*Quol. 9. praallegato*).

First Assertion: Substance taken transcendentally is well described as "being which is not in a subject," or "subsisting being." This is derived from Aristotle and Scotus in the passages cited, especially (*Quol. 3. P. ad 2.*), to whom adhere Gadius in the same place, Lychetus (*1. dist. 8. q. 2. in responsione ad argumenta pro 2. opinione*), and very many others. This can be proven first from the very notion of substance: substance is derived from subsisting, as I said in the *Epitome* in the cited place, and Suárez extensively shows in the cited section (*num. 3*). Therefore substance is being subsisting — just as man, who draws his origin from the earth, is called earthly, according to that saying of Saint Paul (*1 Cor. 15*): "The first man from the earth, earthly," and so on. Second: being is divided into substance and accident as into mutually opposed dividing members, by the common judgment of philosophers; but accident is defined as "that which is in a subject" or "inhering being"; therefore, by opposition, substance is "being which is not in a subject" or "subsisting being." Moreover, in the aforesaid description of substance, "being" is posited — which is also common to accident — and "subsisting" is added, by which it differs from accident. Therefore the aforesaid description of substance is fitting.

Second Assertion: The highest genus of categorical substance is being subsisting per se, finite, and complete. This is not obscurely indicated by Aristotle and Scotus recently cited, to whom Bonetus (*loco cit. and lib. 8. Met. and*

lib. 1. Theologiae naturalis cap. 1), Suárez in the place mentioned above (*n. 20*), and other philosophers agree — except the Nominalists and certain others to be adduced in (*art. 3. and 4. of this q.*). The assertion can be proven from another etymology of substance which the Philosopher indicates (*5 Met. cap. 8*): namely that substance is derived from "substare" (to underlie), because it underlies accidents; but substance of this kind is finite and complete, since infinite substance is far removed from the reception of any accident, while finite and composite substance is the fitting receptive subject of accidents, as will be shown in Physics. Therefore, and so on. Moreover, from (*7 Met. T. 4*) substance is prior to every accident in origin, nature, perfection, and time; but this is finite and complete substance, such as genera and species are. Therefore the highest genus of predicamental substance is finite and complete being. Again, through the assertion stated above, the common and particular reasons can be given in which all substances agree with and differ from one another. For "subsisting being" is transcendental substance, whose ratio the other substances participate. Through "finite" it is distinguished from God, who is infinite substance. And through "complete" it differs from incomplete and partial substances. Add the conditions previously assigned in (*the preceding q. art. 4*), from which and from all the other premises stated it is inferred that the highest genus of categorical substance is well described as "subsisting, finite, and complete being."

You will object first, against the first assertion: if the ratio and quiddity of substance taken precisely is "not being in a subject," then the form of a horse, and every other form that is educed from the potency of matter, would not be substance — since it is in matter, which is the common subject of all forms; but to deny that these forms are substantial contradicts Aristotle and reason, as will be shown in its proper place. Therefore the ratio of substance is by no means "not being in a subject." It follows that "not being in a subject" is the first property of substance, as is evident in the present chapter on substance. Therefore it is not its essence. I respond by denying the inference from the major: because form is in matter as a part in its co-part, not as an accident inheres in a subject. Wherefore matter is called the subject of forms not by inhesion but by information, as the Doctor writes (*Quol. 9. §. De 2. A.*). Hence from matter and form there arises one thing per se — not so from subject and accident — all the more because the subject of the accident is the composite, which is not so for the subject of forms, which is matter, as the Doctor implies (*q. 15. praedicamentali §. Ad q. potest dici*). Or say with the same Doctor: parts are in a whole, not in a subject; for the mode of being of parts in a whole is different from the mode of being in a subject. In response to the consequence: I say that we circumlocute the essence of substance through its first property — just as Aristotle defines quantity through its first property, which is divisibility (*5 Met. c. de quanto*), and elements similarly through their properties (*2 de generatione T. 7*). This happens when the essence of a thing is hidden from us, but its property is known to us. Hence Bonetus aptly adds in the aforesaid little book: we properly do not know

what substance is, and it becomes known to us in some way through its attributes and passions.

You will object second: the aforesaid description of substance does not apply to every substance. Therefore it is not fitting. The antecedent is proven: it does not apply to second substances, which are in firsts. Hence the Philosopher adds in this chapter on substance: "When first substances are destroyed, it is impossible that any of the others should survive." I respond by denying the antecedent; in response to its proof, I say that second substances are in firsts in the way genera and species are in their individuals, or as superiors are in inferiors — not in the way accidents inhere in their subjects. And the said assertion of Aristotle is to be explained in a secondary and mediate sense, not in a primary and immediate sense. This distinction was already explained (*1. 2. q. 1. art. 1. in responsione prima oppositionis*). Or, if you prefer, say with Scotus (*q. 13. praedicam. §. Dicendum*) that it is to be understood in terms of the being of existence, not in terms of the being of essence, or quidditative and intelligible being.

You will say: second substance is opposed to first substance, because division is through opposed members; but no opposite has being in another opposite. Therefore second substance has no being in first substance. One may say, Scotus adds in the same place, that second and first substance are relative suppositis; and since relatives are simultaneous by nature, from the chapter on relation, therefore when first substance is destroyed, second substance is likewise destroyed, since relatives posit and destroy one another. What the division of substance into first and second actually is will become clear in the next article.

You will object third: Scotus (*q. 15. praedicam. §. Ad q. potest dici*) writes that substance is an equivocal name with respect to the highest genus of the category of substance and the substantial parts. Therefore no common ratio of transcendental substance applicable to all substances — complete and incomplete and partial alike — is to be admitted. I respond that Scotus said this to show that substantial parts are not placed directly in the category of substance, but only reductively, as I said of the other parts in (*the preceding q. art. 3*); and therefore substantial parts do not participate in the generic ratio of substance, but in the common transcendental ratio.

You will object fourth, against the second assertion: that substance is complete which consists of genus and difference, because "complete" and "composite" substance mean nearly the same thing; but the highest genus of categorical substance is not composite substance, because above it there is no other genus — otherwise it would not be the first genus, nor would there be a difference presupposing a genus under which it is contained potentially; instead there would be only transcendentals. Therefore the highest genus of categorical substance is not complete substance. First consequence: for this reason difference is called incomplete substance — because it is a part of composite substance and is ordered to its composition. Therefore the same must be said of

the first genus of categorical substance, inasmuch as it is part of composite substance and is ordered to its completion. Second consequence: no substance considered purely in terms of the being of the first genus of substance is complete, since it is necessary that a difference be added to it, through which it is contracted. Therefore the first genus of predicamental substance is not complete substance. I respond: although every substance composed of genus and difference is complete, it is not necessary that every complete substance be composed of genus and difference. For God is complete substance, although he is not composed of genus and difference, as I will prove in (*art. 3. of this q.*). Therefore complete and perfect substance do not coincide. In response to the first consequence: I say the difference between genus and difference is that difference is a part and always bears itself as a part, and is predicated as a part of species and individuals; but genus is a potential whole and bears itself as a whole, and is always predicated of its inferiors in the manner of a whole, as I showed in (*lib. 2. quaest. 2. art. 3*). In response to the second consequence: I distinguish the antecedent — in terms of the being of an actual whole, I grant; in terms of the being of a potential whole, I deny — as was fully explained in the passage just cited.

Article II: What Is the Division of Substance into First and Second

It is no small labor for logicians to determine what the divided term and the dividing members of this division of substance are. For some — among whom Suárez (*disp. 33. Met. sect. 2*) and Faber (*7 Met. sect. 2*) are referred to by our younger contemporaries (*disp. 7. q. 1. 2*) — affirm that the divided term and the dividing members are real. Others, among whom are found Scotus and the Scotists shortly to be named, maintain that they are intentional. And what kind of division this is — whether univocal or analogical, or one of the other kinds presented in the *Epitome* (*lib. 2. quaest. 7. art. 1*) — philosophers also dispute. For Ammonius (*in c. de substantia*) considers it not a proper division but merely a kind of enumeration — as if one were to say: "Of those reclining at table, one is Christ the Lord, another is a Pharisee" (*Luke 7*), and "Of the Apostles, one is Peter, another is Andrew," and so on (*ibid. cap. 6*). Tataretus in this place (*quaest. 1. scibilis 3*) considers it to be univocal, that is, a division of genus into species. Many others — such as Albertus (*Tract. 1. praedicam. cap. 3*) and Cajetan — make it analogical. But Scotus (*quaest. 4. univers. in solutione 2. and quaest. 12. praedicam. in fine*), Sarnanus, Burleigh here, Gadius (*Quol. 3. fol. 42. columna 2*), and others — to whom the Conimbricenses (*q. 2. art. 1. in fine 3. conclusionis*) seem to agree — assert that it is a division of a subject into accidents, not indeed real but intentional.

Note first: first substance goes by various names. It is called, first, "singular" insofar as it is opposed to the common and universal, at least by relative opposition. Second, "individual," because it cannot be further divided into inferiors, having none below it. Third, "first subject," because it is per se

primarily suited to receive common accidents. Fourth, "hypostasis" and "supposit," insofar as it subsists per se incommunicably and independently. Fifth, "person" — and this name applies only to those endowed with an intellectual nature; thus a stone is not a person but a supposit, while Peter is called person, supposit, hypostasis, individual, and singular. The later names are broader than the earlier ones. Thus "singular" and "individual" are common to both substance and singular accident; "hypostasis" and "supposit" are applied to singular, incommunicable substantial natures, whether endowed with reason or not; while "person" is attributed only to intellectual nature. More on this in the Tract on the Incarnation of the Divine Word. Furthermore, second substance is denoted by the following words. It is called second substance, universal and common, insofar as it can be communicated to many. It is also called genus and species of firsts. Hence it is defined by Aristotle in the plural, to signify that among second substances some are genera and some are species. First substance, however, is described by the same Philosopher in the singular, to show that every first substance is singular and individual.

Note second: first substance can be taken in two ways. In one way, as a term of first intention — in which case it is nothing other than a singular and individual, substantial nature, incommunicable to many subjective parts, described by Aristotle as "that which is neither in a subject nor said of a subject." In another way, as a term of second intention — which is a relation of reason attributed to the singular substantial nature; and in this way it is called the substantial individual, to which belongs the definition of the individual, namely "that which is predicated of one thing alone." Similarly, second substance can be considered in two ways: first, as a term of first intention — and it is the common substantial nature, communicable to many subjective parts, such as "man"; second, as a term of second intention — which is a relation of reason attributed to the common substantial nature that is communicable to many subjective parts. And it is described by Aristotle as "that which is said of a subject, and is not in a subject." Second substance is likewise called genus and species of first substances. And Gadius, mentioned above, notes that first substance has two things: one is that first substance is "this here"; the other is that first substance is incommunicable. Similarly, second substance designates two things: first, that second substance is communicable; second, that it receives formal universality from the collative operation of the intellect, as I proved in (*lib. 2. quaest. 1. art. 8*).

First Assertion: The subject of the aforesaid division is substance in common, prescinding from the ratios of singularity and universality. This is derived from Scotus in the passages cited, which our two young contemporaries already named also indicate along with Tataretus, and which Fuentes (*q. 14. diff. 1. art. 5*) and other Scotists openly defend. Proven first: Logic treats of second intentions founded in firsts; therefore the subject of the said division is common substance abstracting from the ratios of singularity and universality. The antecedent is the common doctrine of logicians: for second intentions are founded in firsts, which

are real natures from the side of the thing. The consequence holds: for common substantial nature can be affected and determined to formal singular and individual being, and to formally universal being, as I showed (*1. 2. q. 1. art. 4. §. 6. 7.*). Second: exactly the same philosophical judgment is to be made of this division as of that division by which being is cut into universal and singular, as is plain by analogy from substance — which is said to be first and second in terms of second intentions, as we prefaced and explained in the second note; but the subject of that partition of being into universal and singular is the real common nature taken precisely, insofar as it abstracts from universality and singularity, as I discussed at length in the said place. Therefore, and so on. Third: the divided term of this division cannot be the substance that is the highest genus of the first category, because the divided term does not coincide with either dividing member but abstracts from both; but the highest genus of the category of substance coincides with second substance, which is one of the members of the given division — comprehending all genera and species of first substances, as is plainly clear from the first and second notes. Therefore, and so on.

Second Assertion: The dividing members of the said division are formally not real but intentional. This assertion is opposed to Faber and in part to the two recent Scotists cited above, who affirm that according to the mind of Aristotle and Scotus these members and their divided term can be maintained as real. Proven first from the Doctor (*q. 4. univers. Ad 2.*), where he has these words: "If therefore that division is valid, it will follow that the members, as he there understands them, are opposed — but what is second substance, apart from the operation of the intellect, is not opposed to first substance, but is the same. Therefore he does not understand it of second substance as regards that which is a being apart from the operation of the intellect." And a little later he adds: "Second substances, as he speaks of them there, are accidents — not indeed real accidents, but intentional ones, of which it per se belongs to be said of," and so on. And in (*quaest. 12. praedicamentali*) he adds that the division of substance into first and second is a partition into intentions that are accidents of substance — that is, intentional accidents. Second: Logic per se treats of second intentions, as was frequently impressed upon us; therefore since this is a logical division, it follows that its dividing members are intentional. Third: the second substances, which are placed under one of the members of the adduced division, are formally genera and species, as Aristotle declares in this place; but genera and species are formally intentional. Therefore the members of the same division are likewise intentional.

Third Assertion: The aforesaid division is of a subject into intentional accidents. So Scotus in the places cited, especially (*quaest. 12. praedicamentali*), where at the end of it there are found these words: "The division of substance into first and second is not a division of the most general genus into species, but of a subject into accidents — because substance (insofar as it is understood according to what ratio it pertains to the logician) is divided into intentions that

are accidents of it." Antonius Andreas agrees with this, and Fuentes in the same place; and our recently mentioned younger contemporaries press this point more forcefully. Proven first: second intentions, as Scotus teaches in the passages cited, are accidents of substance as the logician considers it — just as whiteness and blackness are accidents of man, by which he is divided into white and black. Therefore that division is of a subject into accidents. The antecedent is acknowledged, because Logic does not treat of substance except in terms of its intentional being. Second: a division of a subject into accidents is one by which the subject is divided into what is accidental to it, as I said in the *Epitome* (*lib. 2. quaest. 7. art. 1.*); but to the real common substance there are accidental the second intentions of first and second substance, as we showed above. Therefore the said division is of a subject into accidents. From these it is easily collected and concluded that such a partition of substance into first and second is not univocal, because its divided term is real — namely, the real common substance, as I proved in the first assertion — while the dividing members are intentional, as I showed in the second assertion. But that nothing is common univocally to a real being and a being of reason, our authors demonstrate (*Tract. Formalitatum*) and we demonstrated in Metaphysics. Moreover, the univocal is that which is participated by the univocates according to the same name and the same ratio of the substance; but the real common substance — which is the divided term of this division — is not participated according to the same ratio by first and second substance, because as they pertain to Logic they are beings of reason. Add that univocal division is for the most part a division of genus into species — which the aforesaid division cannot be, for no genus of substance is distributed through it, as was evidently shown above. Therefore that division is not univocal. Thus the division in question is to be called only by the name of a division of a subject into accidents, as was efficaciously proven in this third assertion. You will object first, against the first assertion: common substance is second substance, since it is a universal nature; therefore the given division is inappropriate if the divided term is the real common substance, because it coincides with one of the dividing members. I respond through a distinction of the antecedent: formally, I deny; fundamentally, I grant. This distinction was sufficiently explained in (*lib. 1. quaest. 1. art. 6*), where we rejected the universal formally from the side of the thing.

You will object second, against the second assertion: the members of the division of substance are to be taken as they are defined; but the members of the said division are defined in terms of real being; therefore they are also divided according to real being. The major is evident. The minor is shown: first substance is that which is properly and principally said to underlie. Likewise, first substance is more substance than second substance. And second substance is described as that which is not in a subject yet is said of a subject. Moreover, the properties of substance are real. Therefore the dividing members of the said division are real. I respond: granting the major, the minor is to be denied; in

response to its proof, I say that those things mentioned belong to substance taken in first intention and metaphysically, not to substance taken in second intention and logically. And Aristotle did this because substance taken in first intention and its properties are more evident to us than when substance is affected by second intentions. Hence Porphyry too in his *Isagoge* gives examples of things as more known to us, as I observed in (*quaest. 2. lib. 2. art. 1. in responsione 3. oppositionis*).

You will object third, against the third assertion: the ratio of common substance belongs to both first and second substance. Therefore that division is univocal. The antecedent is urged: the ratio of substance is "to be per se." But first and second substance are beings per se, as the Philosopher indicates here (*T. 1*), saying that it belongs to both substances "not to be in a subject" — which is the same as "to be per se." Therefore, and so on. I respond through the very distinction adduced in the response to the first objection. For I grant it of the fundamental ratio of substance, but deny it of the formal ratio that the logician considers: because both substances taken logically are beings of reason, as is clear from what was said.

Article III: Whether God Is in the Genus of Substance

There are three positions of the scholastics that we must examine. The first is followed by Ockham (*1. d. 8. q. 1. conclusionem 4*), Gabriel in the same place, Bacon (*dist. 9*), Gregory (*d. 8. quaest. 3*), and certain recent authors who posit God in the genus of substance and also in the categories of relation and action; and these are favored by Hurtado (*disp. 9. Met. sect. 4. §. 54*), Arriaga (*disp. 3. sect. 2*), and Vázquez (*1. p. disp. 22. cap. 3*). The second position is embraced by Raconius (*Tract. 2. de categoria art. 3. membro 2. propositionem 2*) and a few others, among whom Saint Thomas is numbered (*qq. de potentia q. 7. art. 3*) — although he holds the opposite (*1. p. q. 3. art. 5*) — and touched upon by Bonetus (*L. 2. Theologiae naturalis c. 1*), these placing God reductively in the category of substance. The third is the common position: Scotus (*1. dist. 8. quaest. 3. §. Teneo opinionem meam mediam F.*, and in *Reportatis eadem d. q. 5*, and *Tract. de 1. principio cap. 4*), Tataretus in the same place and in (*Log. q. de substantia dub. 3*), Auriolus in that place in the fourth part (*art. 2*), Pelbartus (*verbo simplex §. 5*), Bonetus (*9 Met. c. 2. and l. suae Theologiae naturalis c. 2*), Faber (*Theor. 96*), Vulpes (*Tomo 1. disp. 14. art. 3*), and others exclude God from the category of substance and all other genera.

Note first — and this should be recalled from what was said in (*q. 3. of this book. art. 1*) — that finite being is immediately divided into ten categories by ten modes of being, as Antonius Andreas (*5. Met. q. 7*) holds with Scotus. An intrinsic mode or intrinsic degree is that which, when added to a thing, does not alter the thing — as Scotists commonly teach following the Master of Formalities. And this is derived from the Doctor (*1. dist. 8. quaest. 2. paulo ante L.*), who illustrates it with the example of whiteness, which has its six or eight degrees, by the addition or subtraction of which it is not essentially changed. And here the difference

between a degree and a difference is manifest: for a difference, when added to or taken from a thing, changes that thing essentially — as is clear of rationality and irrationality, which constitute essentially diverse species — but degrees or intrinsic modes of a thing do not essentially change it, as was explained above of the degrees of whiteness. Furthermore, a thing can be divided into its modes — as being into infinite and finite — or into its differences — as animal into rational and irrational. By reason of the former division, there is no composition; for whiteness as six is no more composite than whiteness as five, although it is more perfect. By reason of the latter, however, there arises logical or metaphysical composition — which consists of genus and difference.

Note second, from Scotus (*in 1. allegato, 2. d. 3. q. 6. §. Ad q. ergo sub K.*): genus and difference are in some cases taken from thing and thing, and in other cases from reality and reality. For genus is contractible and is contracted by difference; it is potential, actuated by difference — just as matter is contracted, determined, and actuated by form, as we said in (*1. 2. q. 5. art. 2*). Genus is also perfectible, and difference is perfective, and from both as from two parts there is constituted a whole that is perfect. If genus and difference are derived from thing and thing, from them is made a physical whole — a composite of matter and form, such as man from body and rational soul. If genus and difference are taken from reality and reality, from them there is constituted a logical and metaphysical whole, such as an angel. Whatever whole it may be — whether compact from thing and thing, or from reality and reality — it is placed per se in the genus, as Lychetus clearly shows in (*1. cit. §. Teneo opinionem.*). What difference, however, is to be placed between thing and thing, reality and reality, and such composites, is fully and lucidly explained in (*Met. in Tract. de Angelis disp. 1. quaest. 3*).

Note third, from the Doctor (*2. dist. 3. quaest. 1. §. Sed contra I.*): the divine nature is said to be common to the three Persons by inexistence and real communication, because it is of itself singular and individual — and for this reason it cannot be contracted and determined by any individual difference. But a created nature, although it is common by inexistence, is yet contractible by this or that haecceity (*haecceitas*); nor is it more determined by one singularity than by another, and when it is determined by one individual difference, it really identifies it with itself and can be essentially predicated of all its inferiors and individuals. Wherefore a created and finite nature, together with its real community, acquires potentiality and divisibility — by reason of which it can be actuated and multiplied by its differences. But the divine and uncreated nature, together with its real community, enjoys maximal actuality and indivisibility; and therefore it cannot be contracted and actuated by any difference, as the Doctor not obscurely teaches (*1. dist. 5. quaest. 2. §. Tertio principaliter ante K.*).

First Assertion: God is not placed per se in the category of substance. So Scotus in the passage cited. Proven first from Saint Augustine (*5 de Trin. c. 2. and 2. Conf.*): one who seeks pardon from God is sorry for having sometimes thought

God was confined within categories. The same is implied by Saint Dionysius (*c. 4. de divinis nominibus*), Cyril (*1. Thesauri c. 4*), Lactantius, and many others. Add Aristotle, who in this chapter on substance affirms that every substance placed in the genus of substance underlies accidents; and (*5 Met. T. 14*) he divides only finite being into ten categories, as Lychetus notes in (*suprà §. In quo ad illud*). But that God is infinite and underlies no accident, the same Philosopher teaches (*12 Met. T. 15*) — which Scotus also deduces from Saint Augustine (*in Reportatis loco citato*). To these, add the articles of the University of Oxford, which sanctioned as erroneous the view that the first cause is in a genus and not outside a genus, as Bacon reports (*d. 8. primi.*). Second: if God were in a genus, there would be something common to God himself and to the creature, indifferent to finite and infinite — because a genus is participated by those of which it is the genus, and is essentially predicated of them; but there cannot be a genus with respect to God and the creature, to the finite and the infinite, since being — which is common to God and the creature, finite and infinite — is not a genus, as it descends to them not as to differences but as to its intrinsic modes, as I noted above. Therefore God is not enclosed in a genus. Third: that which is in a category is either composable — as the highest genus with its proximate difference to constitute a species, as in our case, substance — which is the highest genus — is composable with "corporeal," which is one of the differences into which it is divided, to compose body as its species; or it is composed of thing and thing, of which one is perfectible and the other perfecting; or from reality and reality, of which one is contractible and the other contracting — as is a species, which is constituted from genus and difference. But God is neither composable nor composed in any way, since he is supremely simple, as the scholastics commonly hold in the passage cited. Therefore God is banished from the category. Fourth: from (*8 Met. c. 5. T. 9. and 16*), genus is potential and as it were matter; difference is as it were form; and from these, as from two essential parts, species is constituted. But in God there is nothing potential, since he is infinite — lacking no being — and supremely perfect — lacking no perfection; but if God were in a genus, one part of him would be in potency to another, as the perfectible to its perfective, namely genus to difference, as animal to rational. God therefore is not to be reduced to a genus.

You will say: genus does not present a distinct entity from the entity of difference, but both amount to the very same entity; therefore the argument cited does not conclude, as Auriolus mentioned above says. Against this, first: this explicitly contradicts Aristotle just cited, who says that the definition is an extended discourse, and through it one thing is expressed as matter and another as form. But it is plain that matter and form are two distinct entities. If they were not two entities, genus would be the whole entity and quiddity of the specific thing, and thus genus alone would suffice for defining the species, and the difference — which according to Auriolus does not differ from genus — would be added uselessly; or the same entity would be posited twice in vain.

Fifth: that which is supremely necessary is not in a category; but God is supremely necessary being, as no one denies. Therefore God does not reside in a category. The major is proven: in a category there are placed per se genera, species, and individuals, as I showed above; but genera are potential in relation to the differences into which they are divided and by which they are completed and actuated; but God is the most actual being, awaiting no final act for his completion. Therefore God cannot be placed in the category as a genus. Nor as a species, which is constituted from genus and difference — especially because species is predicated of many differing in number, while God is one and alone, to whom a multitude in the same nature is incompatible, as I will show in (*Met. q. de Deo*). Nor as an individual, which presupposes species, genus, and the rest that are ascribed in the predicamental series. Therefore God is not placed in a genus per se.

You will say: God is not to be excluded from a genus if his imperfections are removed — that is, potentiality, limitation, and finitude — as the Nominalists mentioned above opine. Against this: there cannot be a genus without being finite and limited, because a genus is by its very nature potential and determinable by its differences, and accordingly finite and limited. Hence it is called a "total power" (*totum potestativum*) because it potentially contains the differences by which it is contracted and actuated, as is clear from the passage cited in the second note.

Second Assertion: Neither God nor any predicate of God is placed reductively in any category. This is derived from the Doctor in the passage cited under N. Proven: what is placed reductively in a category consists of parts and imperfect beings, as is clear from (*3. q. art. 3. of this book*); but God has no part nor any imperfect entity, since he is most simple and most perfect. Therefore God — nor anything of his — is placed in a genus reductively. Moreover: what is common to God and the creature is transcendent, for it belongs to being before being is divided into infinite and finite; as it belongs to God, it is infinite; as it is accommodated to the creature, it is finite. Therefore it belongs to being before it is distributed into ten genera — and thus such predicates are transcendentals.

You will say: transcendentals are common to all, but certain predicates fitting God and the creature are not common to all — such as wisdom, which does not apply to all. Therefore, and so on. The major is to be denied: for it is not necessary that transcendentals belong to all, unless they are convertible with being, as is evident of the distinct passions of being, which are "necessary or possible," "finite or infinite," "act or potency." For "necessary" and "infinite" belong to God alone; "finite" and "possible" belong only to creatures. Wherefore for the ratio of a transcendental it suffices that it not be a genus, nor have a genus above it — not that it belong to all or to one alone.

You will object first, against the first assertion: Saint John Damascene (*in Elementario c. 8*) writes that intellectual substance contains God, and that it is in a

genus. Therefore God, who is comprised under substance, is in the genus of substance. First consequence: from Boethius (*1. 3. de Trin.*), who seems to assert two genera in the divine — namely the genus of substance and the genus of relation. Second consequence: from Averroes (*10 Met. comento 7*), who expounds that saying of the Philosopher in that place, "In any genus there is one first, which is the measure and standard of others," to mean: in the genus of substance, through the first substance — which is the measure of other substances — he understands the first mover, who is God. Just as therefore in the other genera the first of them is something within those genera, so too in the genus of substance, God — who is the first substance — is something of the genus of substance itself and is thus not to be removed from it. I respond: Saint Damascene is to be explained of transcendental substance, not predicamental, as his own words cited by the Doctor indicate. And more clearly (*1. 1. de fide c. 8*), where we read that the divine essence is "supereminent to all substances and excepted from every substance." Wherefore what pertains to perfection in substance — namely "to be per se" — is attributed to God; but what pertains to imperfection — namely to underlie accidents and to be finite and limited — is removed from God himself. Even if Damascene does not allow this interpretation, he is to be set aside in this matter, since other Fathers of no lesser authority cited in the first assertion stand with us. In response to the first consequence: I deny that Boethius asserts two genera in the divine, but only recalls there two modes of predication — substantial and relative — which Saint Augustine calls "to itself" and "to another." Such predicates are transcendentals, as Boethius himself plainly shows (*1. 1. de Trin. c. 5. 6.*) with these words: "Substance in him (that is, in God) is not truly substance, but beyond substance." To this perhaps looking, Saint Augustine (*7 de Trin. c. 5*) says that substance is predicated of God in an improper sense. And Saint Dionysius (*de Divinis nominibus c. 2*) affirms that God is above substance — which Mayronis (*1. dist. 22. quaest. 2*) considers to be said anagogically, that is, by way of excess; while Lychetus (*Quol. 1*) interprets that passage as being about predicamental substance, not transcendental substance, which properly belongs to God. In response to the second consequence: I say that the saying of the Peripatetic is to be explained of an intrinsic measure that is contained within the genus as one of its measured terms — not of an extrinsic measure that is outside the genus, as God is.

You will object second: those that participate the same common ratio of substance are placed in the category of substance, since categories are natural series of unmixed things, as I noted (*q. 3. of this lib. art. 1.*); but God and the creature participate in the common ratio of substance, which is described as "being subsisting per se," as I showed (*q. 4. art. 1.*). And God is being existing and subsisting per se. Therefore, since created substance has its place in the category of substance, uncreated substance — that is, God — likewise does. First consequence: from (*3 Top. c. 1. locus 11*): God and man agree in common

predicates and differ in proper predicates; but among the predicates common to them, substance is numbered — from whose genus man is not excluded; therefore God is not to be expelled from it either. Likewise from (*4 Top. c. 2. locus 17*): if difference is assigned as genus, as "immortal" is the genus of God, then the difference is "immortal animal." Second consequence: incorporeal substance resides in the category of substance, as found in the tree of Porphyry; but God is incorporeal substance, according to (*John 4: "God is spirit"*). Therefore, and so on. I respond: if the major is understood of the common ratio of predicamental substance, it is granted; if taken of the common ratio of transcendental substance, it is denied. In response to the minor, I say that God and the creature indeed participate in the same ratio of transcendental substance, but not predicamental; and thus not God but the creature is placed in the category of substance. In response to the first consequence: I distinguish — God and man have the same transcendental predicates, not predicamental ones; hence God is not in a genus as man is. Or it can be said that Aristotle by "God" understands an angel, which I will show to be in a category in the next article — for as Porphyry rightly observes, it is Aristotle's custom to take "God" to mean "angel." In response to the second consequence: I distinguish the major — limited and finite incorporeal substance, I grant; unlimited and infinite, I deny. With this distinction of the major, the minor is also to be distinguished — and for that reason I deny that God is comprised under that member of predicamental incorporeal substance.

You will object third: if God were to be removed from a genus, it would be chiefly on account of his infinity; but his infinity does not prevent him from being placed in a genus: for if an infinite line were given, it would still be in the genus of quantity, because from (*6 Top. cap. 3. locus 78*), the definition — which cannot exist without genus and difference — would apply to an infinite line. It follows: finiteness or infinity belongs to quantity from (*3 Phys. T. 24*); therefore the infinity of God is not a reason for excluding God himself from a category. I respond: granting the major, the minor is to be denied. In response to its proof: given an infinite line, it would be infinite in a qualified sense and with respect to extension; but finite with respect to its essence. God, however, is simply infinite and with respect to essence. Hence he is not enclosed in a genus. By this the consequence is also answered, according to Scotus (*2. Met. quaest. 6*): for finiteness and infinity in a qualified sense is a property of quantity, as will be more evident in Physics in the treatise on quantity.

You will object fourth: Christ the Lord is placed in the category of substance; but Christ is God, according to orthodox faith. Therefore God is placed in the category of substance. The major is shown: the divine Word through the hypostatic union was made man, according to (*John 1: "And the Word was made flesh"*); but man without doubt is placed in the category of substance. Therefore Christ too is contained under the genus of substance. I distinguish the major: by reason of his human nature, I grant; by reason of his divine nature, I deny. For

Christ is God and man simultaneously — as man he is placed in a genus, but as God he is excluded from it.

You will object fifth: Scotus contradicts himself, for here he asserts that genus is to be taken from one potential reality and difference from another actuating reality, and from both as perfectible and perfecting there emerges the species, which is a metaphysical composite. But in the *Parisian Reportata* (1. dist. 33. quaest. 2) he denies that the ratio of genus is another reality from the reality of difference — otherwise, he says, whiteness would be really composite, which he adduces as an inconvenience. If therefore, according to Scotus, genus and difference do not present distinct realities, there is no reason to exclude God from a category. I respond: no contradiction is involved in the Doctor's statements. For in the *Reportata* cited, Scotus refuses whiteness to be composed of thing and thing — which is every composite with physical composition, made from matter and form. But he admits it to be composed of reality and reality, which is the kind of metaphysical composition made from genus and difference. The proximate genus of the said whiteness is color; its difference is "dispersive." But when Scotus says that in accidental forms there is the same entity from which genus and difference are drawn, understand that the entity is the same really, not formally. Thus whiteness is one thing having several formally distinct realities — namely the realities of its genus and difference.

Article IV: Whether Angels and the Heavens Are Placed in the Category of Substance

Those who posit the highest genus of the category of substance as "generable and corruptible substance" exempt angels and celestial bodies from the category of substance — so hold Averroes (10 Met. T. 26), Janduno (*ibid.* q. ult.), Niphus (q. 9), Zimara (*Theor.* 62), and Zabarella (*lib.* 2. *de materia* c. 15). Those, however, who consider the highest genus of predicamental substance to be "finite substance" — prescinding from corruptible and incorruptible, from corporeal and incorporeal — do not remove angels and the heavens from the genus of substance at all; so hold all those authors who exclude only God from the category, cited in the preceding article's third position.

First Assertion: Angels, whom philosophers call intelligences and abstract substances, are placed in the genus of substance. Scotus holds this (1. dist. 8. quaest. 2. §. *Alia est opinio*, and in *Reportatis eadem d. quaest.* 5. §. *Contra illam viam*), Alensis (5 Met. T. 33), Antonius Andreas in the same place, and Faber (*Theor.* 64). Proven first from Aristotle (5 Met. cap. 8. T. 15), where treating of those things placed in the category of substance, he numbers among them "daemons," who are angels. The same is gathered from (1 Eth. cap. 9). And this was the judgment of the Philosopher, as Themistius (*in initio* 3. *phys.*), Porphyry, Ammonius, and other ancient and recent Peripatetics maintain. Second: what is contained under a species of some category is contained under the genus, since species cannot exist without genus, genus being its essential part; but angels are comprised

under the species of incorporeal substance — for from Porphyry (*c. de specie*) and Scotus (4. *dist.* 6. *q.* 10. §. *Ad q. M.*), substance is divided into incorporeal and corporeal; but angels are incorporeal, as I showed (*in Tract. de Angelis disp.* 1. *q.* 2.); therefore they are in the category of substance. Third: what consists of genus and difference is placed in the category, which is a series of genera, species, and individuals; but angels are composed of genus and difference, being created and limited substances, as I proved abundantly in the place just cited (*q.* 3.). Moreover, the properties of categorical substance belong to angels — for they are capable of contraries, namely hatred and love, and the like, which I pursued at length in the said Tract. Therefore angels reside in the category of substance.

Second Assertion: The heavens surely have a place in the category of substance. This is derived from Scotus in the same place, especially the fourth passage cited, who comprises corporeal and incorporeal substance under the same logical genus. Proven first from Aristotle (5 *Met. T.* 15), who, in treating of what is placed in the category of substance, mentions celestial bodies. And in (12 *Met. c.* 2), subdividing substance into corruptible or elementary and incorruptible or celestial, he enumerates elements and heavens in the same genus of substance. The same is gathered from (7 *Met. T.* 1. and 8. of the same work *T.* 1.). Second: body is not disjoined from the category of substance, as is clear to one examining this coordination; but the celestial spheres are bodies composed of matter and form, as we will say in the book on the heavens and world. Therefore the heavens are not segregated from the category of substance. Moreover, the heavens receive corporeal accidents — quantity, quality, light, rarity, density, and others of this kind. Therefore, since they possess the property of categorical substance, they must also hold its place.

You will object first, against the first assertion: God, on account of his simplicity, does not obtain a place in the category, as Scotus concedes in the *Reportata* in the passages just cited; but angels are pure and simple acts from (8 *Met. T.* 6) and elsewhere. Therefore they are banished from the genus. Granting the major, I distinguish the minor: angels are simple with the simplicity opposed to physical composition, I grant; with the simplicity opposed to metaphysical composition, I deny. For this reason angels are relegated in the genus of substance, but not God — who has both simplicities, opposed to physical and to metaphysical composition. So Aristotle and Scotus are explained in the passages cited.

You will say: Aristotle, both in the passage cited and in (12 *Met. T.* 42) and elsewhere, seems to want angels to be subjects that do not receive accidents. This surely indicates that angels lack composition not only physical but also metaphysical — and thus are simple with an absolute simplicity. Supporting this is Scotus (*Quol.* 7. §. *Secundum. GG.*, and *Quol.* 15. §. *De primo. C.*), who says that, according to Aristotle, understanding is the same in the intelligences as their very substance. All the more so, the same Doctor (2. *dist.* 3. *quaest.* 7. §. *Ad 1. argumentum. C.*) affirms that, in the school of the Philosopher, each intelligence is

of itself "this" — due to the necessity of being which he supposed to belong to them from eternity. Therefore angels are free from both kinds of composition.

I say: Aristotle in those places only wants to say that the first intelligence — which is God — does not underlie accidents, and that it alone is uncaused and infinite; but the other intelligences are caused and finite, and accordingly capable of accidents, as I showed in the present and the preceding article; and Scotus demonstrated this in both the quoted passages from the *Quodlibeta*. As for what is added from the same Doctor — that understanding is the same as the substance of the intelligence — the Doctor is not speaking in his own opinion, but in the opinion of Henry (*Quol. 8. q. 9*) and others who supposed Aristotle held this, as is clear from his words at (*Quol. 7. cit. sub HH.*): "but that understanding, as these say, according to Aristotle, is the same as the substance of the intelligence." He implies the same in (*Quol. 15. ante C.*) with these words: "Against this, although perhaps the Philosopher, who posited the intellection of an angel to be the same as the substance of the angel" — for this is stated by Scotus in the opinion of Godfrey (*Quol. 6. q. 7*), as his margin cites, a little before — and which the same Doctor refutes there. As for the passage of Scotus from the second book of the Sentences: even if Aristotle suspects that the intelligences are necessary beings, eternal and incapable of numerical multiplication, it does not follow well that they are uncaused, infinite, free from metaphysical composition, and incapable of accidents. For Saint Thomas and his disciples, cited by us in (*Tract. de Angelis, disp. 1. quaest. 6. 7.*), although they believe that angels, due to the lack of matter, cannot be multiplied in number, nevertheless do not deny that they are caused, finite, composed of genus and difference, and receptive of accidents. Similarly, although the Philosopher mistakenly supposes angels to be eternal and incapable of numerical multiplication on account of their formal necessity, from this it is not to be deduced that they are alien to metaphysical composition, uncaused and infinite, and separated from all accident — as the Doctor excellently proves in the passages just mentioned.

You will object second, from (*10 Met. T. 25*): the corruptible and the incorruptible differ more than generically; but angels are incorruptible and immortal — being without matter; while other substances, apart from the rational soul, are corruptible and mortal. Therefore angels are not placed in the same genus of substance. I respond with Scotus (*in 4. d. 6. q. 10. §. Ad q. potest dici. M.*): the Aristotelian dictum is to be explained of physical genus, not of logical and metaphysical genus — as is clear of substance, under which corporeal and incorporeal substances are contained: although they differ in physical genus — since the former have matter, and the latter lack it — they nonetheless agree in logical and metaphysical genus. Likewise regarding corporeal and spiritual quality, which similarly participate in a metaphysical genus but not in a physical genus, which befits mutually transmutable things.

You will object third, against the second assertion, from (*1 Caeli c. ult.*): "In eternal things there is no potency." For in them being and being-able are the same. But according to Aristotle the heavens are eternal. Therefore the heavens have no potency; but those lacking potency also lack genus, since genus from what has been said is a potential whole. Therefore the heavens, lacking genus, are expelled from the predicamental seat. I respond by expounding the Philosopher's assertion: in eternal things there is no proximate physical potency to transmutation, I grant; there is no remote physical potency — in spiritual things I grant this, in corporeal things I deny it. This distinction will be more clearly illuminated in the book on the heavens.

Question V: On Quantity

Article I: Whether Quantity Is a Highest Genus Distinct from Others

The Subtle Doctor (*2. dist. 3. quaest. 4. propè initium*) affirms that the first accident proceeding from material substance is quantity. The reason for this can be given from the same Scotus (*4. dist. 12. quaest. 2. §. Hic sunt sub. F.*): just as substance underlies all accidents and is called their "material subject" (*subiectum quod*), so quantity receives the other material accidents and is called their "formal subject" (*subiectum quo*). Hence it is right that philosophers, after substance, turn to quantity. The same Doctor (*q. 16. praedicamentali*) first investigates, as his chief endeavor, whether quantity is one of the ten highest genera — and Antonius Andreas, Tataretus, John of the Masters, Bonetus (*libello de quantitate*), and others follow him in that place. I presuppose from Aristotle (*2. de generatione T. 37*) and Scotus (*Quol. 6. §. Ad primum*), Richard (*1. dist. 19*), and Bonetus in the same place: there is a twofold sense of quantity — virtual and dimensive. Virtual quantity is the perfection of any thing whatever, and it is transcendent, belonging to all things — except the divine relations, as I taught in (*Tract. de Deo Trino disp. 5. quaest. 5.*). In this sense we read (*Gen. 3*): "God saw all things he had made, and they were very good" — that is, perfect in their kind, as Gadius explains (*Quol. praeit.*). Dimensive quantity is the ratio of extension which follows corporeal and material things. Its divisions and properties were presented in the *Epitome* (*lib. 1. quaest. 4. art. 6.*). And it is of dimensive quantity alone that we will speak henceforth.

First Assertion: Quantity is one genus distinct from others. This is taught by Aristotle, Scotus, and other philosophers both in the *Logic* in the chapter on quantity and in (*5 Met. T. 18*). Proven first: what has one common ratio distinct from others, predicable of many differing in species "in what" (*in quid*), is one genus distinct from others, as is clear from the definition of genus; but quantity is such — for it is predicated of continuous and discrete as of its species: for to the question "what is continuous?" it is correctly answered "it is quantity"; and similarly of discrete and other intermediate and lowest species of quantity. Therefore quantity is a genus distinct from others. Second: diverse differences

and diverse species argue a genus diverse from others, as is clear from the antepredicamental rule; but quantity has diverse differences and species, as we presented in the *Epitome* in the place recalled. Therefore quantity is a genus distinct from others.

Second Assertion: Quantity is a highest genus. So Aristotle and Scotus in the passages cited. Proven: what has species under it and acknowledges no other genus above itself is a highest genus, as is clear from what was said in (1. 2. q. de genere); but quantity has species, as is clear from the first assertion; nor does it have another genus above it, since above it there are only transcendentals. Moreover, quantity is referred among the ten categories, as I said (q. 2. art. 2.); but all the categories are highest genera. Therefore quantity is a highest genus.

You will object first, against the first assertion: no genus is predicated denominatively of its species, from (4 Top. cap. 1. locus 2.); but quantity is predicated denominatively of continuous and discrete — for we say "a line is quantum," "a surface is quantum," and likewise "a number is quantum." Therefore quantity is not one genus distinct from the rest. I respond: quantity is excepted from the major by proportion; and the reason for this is given: because the principle of division or measure belongs first to quantity, and afterwards to the other things distinct from quantity. Likewise, it can be said that it is predicated denominatively in an essential manner, as I showed in the *Epitome* (1. 1. q. 2. art. 2).

You will object second: a genus is predicated equally of its species, nor is one species prior to another; but continuous is prior to discrete — for from (3 phys. Tract. 68) discrete quantity is made from continuous. Therefore quantity is not a genus. I respond through a distinction: one species of quantity is prior to another in being, I grant; in predication, I deny. For although continuous participates the ratio of quantity before discrete, the ratio of quantity itself is equally predicated of both. This is evident from affirmation, which, although prior to negation (1 Perib. 4), is nonetheless equally predicated of both.

You will object third: one genus is divided by one division, from Aristotle (6 Top. cap. 3. and 5. and 7 Met. Tract. 43) and Boethius (lib. de divisione); but quantity is divided by a twofold division — namely into continuous and discrete, and into that whose parts have position among themselves and that whose parts lack such mutual position. Therefore quantity is not one genus. I respond: the major is true of formal division; for quantity is formally distributed only into continuous and discrete; but materially into quantity whose parts have position toward one another and into that whose parts are deprived of such position. Just as body is formally divided into animate and inanimate, but materially into corruptible and incorruptible.

You will object fourth: one genus has one measure, from (10 Met. T. 3. and 7.); but to quantity two measures are given — namely one and a point. Therefore

quantity is not a genus. Granting the major, I deny the minor: for it is not the point but only one (*unum*) that is said to be the measure of quantity, as the Doctor implies (1. dist. 24. q. un. §. Circa illud. Sub E.) and in the present question from Aristotle already named.

Article II: What Is the Essence of Quantity

The first opinion is followed by Saint Thomas (*opuscul. 52. in fine, and 1. part. quaest. 29. art. 1*), Albertus (*Tract. de quantitate*), and Cajetan (*in isto c.*), who affirm that the essence of quantity is measure. Bonetus seems to favor them (*propè initium libelli de quantitate*). The second opinion is held by Capreolus (2. dist. 3. quaest. 1. art. 3), Soncinas (5 Met. quaest. 21), and Javelli (*quaest. 20*), who hold that the formal ratio of quantity is divisibility into parts of the same ratio. Into this opinion are cited Scotus (*quaest. 17. praedicamentali, and 5 Met. quaest. 9*) and virtually all of his school. The third is embraced by our Doctor (4. dist. 10. quaest. 1. art. 2. §. Dico ergo. Met. and 5 Met. quaest. 9), Antonius Andreas (*ibid. quaest. 10*), Fuentes (*in Log. quaest. 15. difficultate 1. art. 2*), Tataretus, Gadius, and many others, teaching that the nature of quantity is position or extension of parts outside of parts.

Note from Scotus (2. dist. 1. quaest. 3. ante §. Hoc ergo in solutione quinti. Sub G.) and Orbellus (5 Met. c. 6): sometimes the division of a genus is effected into proper and essential differences — as animal is divided into rational and irrational; but sometimes into passions of the genus that circumlocute its quidditative and essential differences, which are hidden from us — as being is distributed into potency and act as its disjunct passions; and number into even and odd, as Scotus indicates (4. dist. 10. quaest. 1. §. Dico ergo. Sub N.). And the Philosopher clearly teaches this (2 postth. cap. 8. T. 18): "When per se differences cannot be assigned because they are unknown to us, accidental differences are provided." Hence the same Philosopher (5 of the same work cap. de quanto, Tract. 18) says that "quantum" is divisible per se — thus circumlocuting the essence of quantity through its property, which is divisibility. And he had done the same (second de generatione T. 7), saying that the primary qualities are the constitutive differences of the elements — while it is clear they are only properties and accidental differences of those elements. The Doctor (2. dist. 2. quaest. 9. §. Ad argumenta quaest. D. and E.) says the same, and Bonetus in the same place is not far from him.

First Assertion: The quiddity of quantity does not consist in the ratio of measure. So Scotus (*quaest. 17. praedicamentali. §. Ad quaest. dicendum*). Proven first: the ratio of a genus is equally participated by its species, since it is univocal to them and is univocally applied to them; but the ratio of measure does not equally belong to discrete and continuous quantity — indeed it belongs prior to discrete than to continuous, as is clear from (10 Met. cap. 2. T. 3. inde): "Properly most characteristic of one is to be a measure" — and since one is per se the principle of number, from it first the ratio of measure is derived to number, and

from number to the continuous. And there it is read: "A measure is that by which we know a quantum; but we know a quantum as quantum either by one or by number; and all number by one." Therefore the essence of quantity is not placed in the ratio of measure. Second: quantity is an absolute accident, as no one denies; but the ratio of measure is relative, as is clear from (*1 Met. cap. 2. and from 10 of the same work T. 2.*), and is touched upon by the Doctor (*Quol. 13. §. Circa 2. N.*). Therefore, and so on. Third: that to which a property is repugnant is not the essence from which that property flows, as is self-evident; but the property of quantity is repugnant to measure: therefore measure is not the essential ratio of quantity. The minor is argued from (*3. physic. cap. 4. T. 24*): the proper attribute of quantity is to be finite or infinite; but what is infinite is not measurable. Therefore the ratio of measure does not belong to infinite quantity, if it is given or if an infinite quantity — such as an infinite line — can be given; and accordingly measure cannot be the quidditative ratio of the genus of quantity. Furthermore: every measure is either active or passive, or either actual or aptitudinal; but none of these can be the ratio of quantity — not active, because a thing must be quantum before it measures another; nor passive, because it is also presupposed that a thing is quantum in order to be measured by another; nor actual, because a thing is quantum even if it does not actually fall under a measure; nor aptitudinal — which means nothing other than the capacity or property of measuring — which likewise presupposes quantity constituted in its quidditative being. Therefore in no way does the essence of quantity consist in the ratio of measure.

Second Assertion: Divisibility is not the formal ratio of quantity. This is taught by Scotus, especially in (*the 4th passage cited, ante P., and 2. dist. 2. quaest. 9. §. Ad argumenta quaestae. Sub D.*). Proven first: no relation is the proper essence of an absolute, as Orbellus notes from Aristotle in the passage cited. And the reason is that what is "toward another" is formally not "toward itself"; but quantity is an absolute genus, as none of the adversaries hesitates, and divisibility is formally a relation — for it is a capacity or aptitude for being divided, which Scotus demonstrates elsewhere to be formally a relation. Therefore divisibility is not the nature of quantity. Suárez (*disp. 40. Met. sect. 4. num. 3*) makes little of this argument, saying that divisibility can be conceived in the manner of a capacity and passive potency, and at most can be understood as including a transcendental respect — which is not opposed to an absolute being, especially quantity. But the aforesaid argument is not to be despised: for capacity is formally a relation; and even if divisibility is taken together with a transcendental respect, it is either not quantity or it is something aggregated from two genera and something per accidens — which is alien to the nature of quantity, of which we are now treating. Second: what follows upon the essence of something is not its essence, because essence is presupposed to be constituted in its being before anything follows from it; but divisibility proceeds from the essence of quantity — for an integral whole is required to be prior, before it is

divisible into its parts; for in order to be divisible, it must consist of parts into which it is divisible. Therefore the essence of quantity does not reside in divisibility.

The same is to be asserted of impenetrability, which Hurtado (*disp. 13. sect. 4*), Arriaga (*disp. 5. Met.*), and others — whom the two inseparable companions of the Scotist school (*disp. 9. phys. quaest. 1. art. 1*) seem to favor — appear to consider the primary and essential ratio of quantity. Even though quantity renders a body impenetrable: nonetheless the body is first quantum before it is impenetrable, because it is impenetrable by reason of its quantitative parts. Moreover, a formal effect does not coincide with its formal cause — especially according to the Scotists, who hold that material and formal causes have effects distinct from themselves, as is clear from (*3. dist. 2. quaest. 2. art. 1*). And in our matter (*4. dist. 49. quaest. 16*) the Doctor proves that two bodies cannot be in the same place at the same time with respect to local fulfillment. Moreover, a body can be quantum without interpenetration, according to that saying of the Apostle (*Heb. 4*): "We have a high priest who has penetrated the heavens." And this is plain from other mysteries of our faith, which Arriaga mentions in the same place. Nor is it fitting to say that this holds of actual impenetration but not of aptitudinal: since aptitudinal impenetration or impenetrability is not the formal effect of quantity, as those authors would have it, but rather its passion — just as divisibility is; for from the fact that a body is quantum, it follows that it is impenetrable and impossible with another in the same place simultaneously, as Scotus plainly and clearly teaches (*4. dist. 1. quaest. 5. sub F., and dist. 49. quaest. ibid.*). Moreover, the effect of the gift of subtlety is to render bodies penetrable; and the cause impeding their penetration is the quantity of those same bodies as filling up place, as the Doctor writes in the same place. Hence Scotus does not support them. Add that they deny aptitudinal extension of parts to be the essence of quantity; why then do they not equally reject aptitudinal impenetration — since the reasoning is the same in both cases? Finally: the expulsion — whether actual or aptitudinal — of contrary qualities from the same subject is not the essence and formal ratio of those same qualities. Therefore neither expulsion nor impenetration — whether actual or aptitudinal — of two bodies from the same place, as they mutually expel each other, can be the essence of quantity.

Third Assertion: The essence of quantity is the position of parts in a whole, and the extension of parts toward the whole and toward one another. This is expressly defended by the Doctor in (*the 4th passage prealleged*) — so that it is surprising why those two bright lights of our Seraphic Order should most recently draw him into the opinion of the aforesaid recent authors, which is certainly opposed to the Doctor himself. Since his meaning is openly apparent, why should he be led into a contrary and novel opinion? The same in the *Reportata* of the same distinction. Our assertion is also implied by Auriolus (*1. dist. 19. parte 2. art. 1.*), and is nearly common at this time, evidently gathered

from the refutation of the other opinions: for since the ratio of quantity is neither measure, nor divisibility, nor impenetrability, as I proved in the two preceding assertions, it follows that it is the said extension. Proven first: that through which a thing is constituted in its essential being is its essence or of its essence, as is self-evident; but through the extension of parts, quantity is constituted in its essential being. Therefore the extension of parts is its essence. The minor is proven: that by which something is formally quantum, it is constituted in the essential being of quantity, as is clear from Aristotle (*cap. de quantitate.*); but by the extension of parts, material things are formally quanta — such as material substance, quantity, and the like. Hence in the passage cited he explains the nature of permanent quantity through the extension of parts, or the position of parts in the whole and in relation to one another. Second: that from which the properties of quantity arise is the essence of quantity itself — just as because the properties of man proceed from humanity, humanity is the essence of man itself; but from the said extension of parts, the properties of quantity proceed: for from the fact that something is extended, it follows that it is divisible into its parts, measurable, impenetrable, equal or unequal, finite or infinite, and occupying place. Therefore, and so on. But the extension in which we locate the nature of quantity is not actual — as Scotus proves in the passage just cited — nor external and local, as is clear in the Eucharist, where the body of Christ has its proper quantity without actual and external extension in relation to place; but it is internal, or the position of parts in the whole and in themselves.

You will object first, against the first assertion: the essential ratio of some genus, common to its species, is the essence of that same genus; but measure is the common ratio to the species of quantity: therefore measure is the essence of the genus of quantity. The major is evident because a genus is essentially predicated of its species, as animal of man and brute. The minor is shown from Aristotle in the present chapter, who defines speech through measure with these words: "Speech is that which is measured by long and short syllables." And from (*4 phys. T. 117*): "Time is the measure of motion according to prior and posterior." It follows: the species of quantity are varied according to diversity of measure — for something is measured by one dimension, that is, in terms of length, and it is a line; or by two dimensions, that is length and breadth, and it is a surface; or by three dimensions — namely length, breadth, and depth — and it is a body. Also, place is posited by the same Philosopher in Logic in the passage cited as a species of quantity, which differs from surface in that place is an extrinsic measure of the located body, while surface is the extrinsic measure of the same located body. Moreover, every quantity is measurable by access or recession, or by replication. Therefore the formal ratio of quantity is placed in measure. Granting the major, I deny the minor; in response to its proof, I say that Aristotle there only indicates measure to be a property of quantity, not its quiddity. And accordingly the aforesaid definitions are not quidditative but

descriptive. By this also the answer to the consequence is evident. As for what is added about place: I say with Scotus (*quaest. 23*) that place is not a species of quantity distinct from surface, as I will show in Physics — and Aristotle implies this (*5 Met. cap. 13*), who, in enumerating the species of quantity, makes no mention of place. Thus his commentators say that in the *Logic* Aristotle was speaking in the common and popular opinion of others.

You will object second, against the second assertion: what is manifested through the definition of something is its essence, because the definition clearly notifies the essence of the defined thing; but divisibility is placed in the definition of quantity, as is clear from Aristotle recently adduced, where he defines quantity in the concrete as follows: "A quantum is what is divisible into parts that are present in it" — that is, a quantum is divisible into integral parts of the same ratio, from which the quantitative whole is constituted. It follows: the species of quantity are distinguished by divisibility — as a line is divisible according to length, a surface according to breadth, and a body according to the triple dimension of length, breadth, and depth. But the distinction of species is essential and quidditative. Therefore divisibility is the essence of quantity. I respond: the major is true of a quidditative definition, not of a descriptive one — such as is a definition given through a property, which indicates the essence of a thing when the property itself is better known, as I observed in the note just given. By the same token, the answer to the consequence is evident: for through multiple divisibility, the species of quantity are multiplied and distinguished — because divisibility, which is a passion, is better known to us than its essence, which is the position of parts in the whole.

You will object third, against the third assertion: having parts outside of parts belongs to material and corporeal substance, as the Doctor writes (*2. dist. 12. quaest. 2. §. Respondeo*). And we will show this in Physics. Therefore the position of parts in the whole is not the formal ratio of quantity. I respond: the antecedent is true of entitative parts, not of integral and quantitative parts. So the Doctor is to be interpreted in the passage noted. You will press: Scotus (*5 Met. quaest. 9*) removes parts from substance; therefore the Doctor himself is not to be interpreted of entitative parts. Fuentes, cited at the beginning of this article, responds that Scotus there speaks only argumentatively, not assertively — since his clear meaning is had in (*quaest. 17. praedicam., 2. dist. 12. quaest. 2., and 4. dist. 44. quaest. 1.*) and elsewhere. Or say that Scotus removes integral parts from material substance — which are adapted to it through quantity — but not entitative parts, which he openly defends in the cited places.

You will object fourth: if the essential ratio is located in the extension of parts, quantity will never be without such extension of parts; but quantity can be found without such extension of parts, as is clear in the Eucharist, where the body of Christ is quantum without the position of parts, since it occupies no place and exists there only sacramentally. Therefore the essence of quantity is

not placed in the extension of parts. Granting the major, the minor is to be distinguished: without the extension of parts in the whole and among themselves — which is called internal extension — I deny; without the extension of parts in relation to place — which is called circumscriptive external extension, or position of site, as Scotus says (*dist. 10. quarti, quaest. 1. ante N.*) — I grant. These and similar matters are to be examined and illuminated abundantly and precisely in Physics, in the book on quantity.

Question VI: On Relation

Article I: Whether There Is One Genus of Relation Distinct from Others

That relation intrudes and mingles into nearly all the categories, so that there is no genus proper to relation — this is what Zeno and other ancient philosophers are reported to have suspected, according to Averroes (*5 Met. commento 20*), Albertus (*Tract. de relatione cap. 1*), and Rubius (*c. de ad aliquid quaest. 1.*). Against them stand Plato, Aristotle here, Scotus (*quaest. 25. praedicam., and 2. dist. 1. quaest. 4. §. Etsi dicas. E., and §. Ad 1. Sub G. in solutiones*), and all subsequent philosophers, who assert and admit one category of relation distinct from the rest — with the exception of a few recent authors whom Arriaga follows. For Arriaga (*disp. 12. sect. 7*) does not consider it inconvenient to deny a peculiar genus of relation, saying: "No sacrament of the Church is being removed, nor any precept of the Decalogue; for the category of relation is retained only as a manner of speaking." To which one may say: although no mystery of orthodox faith is removed from Philosophy by denying the genus of relation, yet the common doctrine and established assertion of philosophers and theologians is thereby removed from it — and it is rash to expose oneself to that, especially because it is opposed to reason and truth, and many absurdities follow therefrom, to be adduced below.

Note first: although Vorrilonius (*c. dist. 30*) establishes some distinction between respect, relation, and habitude, as Pelbartus reports (*Tomo 1. verba Relatio. §. Secundo*), nevertheless Scotus (*in 2. praecitatus E.*) considers those three to be synonyms, and that respect and relation are used promiscuously by philosophers, as Hurtado notes (*disp. 15. sect. 1. §. secundo*). By whatever name it may be called — whether "to something" (*ad aliquid*), as Plato named it; or "relation," as Aristotle called it; or "habitude," as our authors sometimes called it — it means nothing other than the principle of referring and the habitude of one thing toward another, as the Doctor teaches (*in praedicamentis q. allegata §. Dicendum*), and the Anglicus agrees (*quaest. 24. universalium fol. 94*). Moreover, a relation, from the same Doctor (*in 2. cit. Ante §. Hoc ergo*): by reason of its meager entity — which it has in its foundations — it is not known to us except through those very foundations, since it has more tenuous being in them, as the Doctor says (*12 Met. pag. 366. in Not.*). Hence from their cognition we arrive in some way

at knowledge of relation. This is also noted by Orbellus (*5 Met. c. de relatione*). Hence Aristotle deliberately in the present chapter describes relatives as "those whose entire being is to be toward another" — intending thereby to indicate the definition of relation. For if a relative is "toward another," consequently relation is the respect by which a relative is toward another, or by which it regards another, as Scotus rightly notes (*in praenominata quaest. praedicam. verf. Ad 1. istorum*).

Note second, from the common judgment of philosophers: just as being per se is substance, so being in another is accident. Since, however, accident has a manifold mode of being or inhering in another, there results a manifold accident and a manifold genus of accident. As concerns our matter chiefly, one accident is absolute — which is "toward itself"; and another is relative — which is "toward another." Although the ratio of accident, signified by "being in another," is common to both and is essentially predicated of both, nevertheless a distinction exists between them: for the absolute is "toward itself," while the relative is "toward another," without which it cannot be — since "being toward another" is the proper quiddity or difference of relation, by which it differs from the absolute. So with Augustine (*7 de Trin. cap. 1 or 6*) the Doctor diligently notes (*1. d. 11. q. 2. §. Ad rationes D., and Quol. 3. §. De tertio. and §. Respondeo., and q. 39. praedicamentali §. Notandum pro quaestione*), and Faber (*1. disp. 22. cap. 1.*). Thus two things are included in relation: one is "to be in," which is participated by every accident and by which it differs from substance; and the other is "to be toward another," which is the proper and formal ratio of relation, by which relation itself is distinguished from everything else that is not relation. This is noted, after Scotus (*1. dist. 26. quaest. un.*) and Vorrilonius in the same place, by Pelbartus in the place just cited. Whether "to be in" and "to be toward" belong to the essence of relation or not is disputed among the scholastics and must be scrutinized elsewhere by us.

First Assertion: Relation is a genus, and one of the ten highest genera. So Scotus in the passages cited, and Lychetus (*2. dist. 1. quaest. 4.*). Proven — first part: what is predicated of many differing in species "in what" is a genus; but relation is predicated of many differing in species "in what"; therefore relation is a genus. The major is known through the place from definition to defined. The minor is proven: relation is predicated of relations of equiparance and disquiparance and others which are its species, as I plainly showed in the *Epitome*, where I presented the series of the category of relation. And Scotus expressed this (*in 2. ut. Ad 2.*) with these words: "I say that relation has its distinction into its species, just as another genus has its distinction into its species." Moreover: what possesses a generic ratio is a genus; but relation possesses a generic ratio; therefore it is a genus. The major is evident; the minor is argued: the generic ratio is what essentially belongs to many differing in species; but relation — which is the habitude of one thing toward another — essentially belongs to many differing in species, namely to the relations of its

superposition and supposition. And likewise, all relations in the same manner denominate a substance in comparison to another; therefore relations participate in the same generic ratio, and accordingly there is a genus of relation. The second part is proven: the highest genera are those that acknowledge no other genus above themselves; but relation has no other genus above it; therefore it is a highest genus. The major is plain to all philosophers. The minor is evident: because above relation there are accident, being, and whatever else there may be — but these are not genera, but transcendentals. Moreover, the ten highest genera are derived according to the ten modes into which finite being descends, as I implied (*q. 3. of this lib.*); but relation is a genus through one of the nine modes of accident by which substance is affected. For just as substance is extended through quantity and qualified through quality, so likewise through relation it is compared to another. Therefore relation is a highest genus.

Second Assertion: Relation is a genus distinct from the other genera. The Doctor holds this in the passages cited, and (*Quol. 3. §. Respondeo sub P.*) with the common school; and it follows from what was said above, and can be argued thus: what acquires a generic ratio disjoined from others is a genus disjoined from others, as is clear from Aristotle (*12 Met. T. 21*), who says: "The ratio of one category is not an intrinsic principle of another category." Lychetus approves and explains this (*praecit. §. Respondeo ad omnes istas solutiones*). But relation acquires a generic ratio different from the other genera — which is the principle of referring to another. And likewise relation has distinct differences, species, and individuals, as can be seen in the catalogue of relation. Therefore relation is a genus distinct from the other genera.

You will object first, against the first assertion: if relation is a genus, it is either a genus of substance or of accident — since no genus is found to mediate between the two; but relation is neither. It is not a genus of substance, as all acknowledge; nor a genus of accident, since an accident is "in another," while relation is "toward another." Therefore relation is not a genus. Granting the major and the first part of the minor, the second part is to be denied; and in response to its proof I say that relation has "to be in," which is common to all accidents, and has "to be toward," which is the distinctive ratio of relation itself from everything else that is not relation.

You will say: relation has its entire being "toward another," as Aristotle and Scotus write in this place; therefore relation does not have "to be in," since "to be in" and "to be toward" differ from one another, and accordingly relation is not a genus of accident. I say that in the definition of the relative and of relation as presented, only its formal ratio is placed — presupposing the common ratio of accident, as not infrequently happens in other descriptions, as Bacon (*1. dist. 28. quaest. 2. art. 4*) and Suárez (*disp. 47. Sect. 5. num. 3*) note above all others. For it is

plain that relation is in some foundation or subject, as the Doctor clearly explains (*4. dist. 12. quaest. 1. §. Ad quaest. respondeo, conclusione secunda ante. E.*).

You will object second: a genus is common and univocal to its inferiors; but relation has nothing common and univocal; therefore relation is not a genus. The major is evident, because a genus is essentially included in its inferiors. The minor is shown: to being and non-being there is nothing common and univocal; but certain relations are beings, while certain are non-beings. Therefore there is nothing common and univocal to relation. The major is known: for between contradictories there is no middle term, from (*1 posth. T. 5*). The minor as regards the first part is clear — for instance paternity, and other relations both in the divine and in creatures are real relations; as regards the second part it is argued: between being and non-being there exists contradiction — which is a relation — and since between contradictories no middle is interposed, it follows that such a relation is a non-being, or a relation of reason. Granting the major, I deny the minor; in response to its proof, I also grant the major but deny the minor — because contradiction is not a species of relation. For as Scotus notes in the same place, from (*6 Met. cap. 2.*) real being of itself — that is, real finite being — is divided into ten highest genera, which from what was said are distinct coordinations of things. But a relation that is understood between contradictories, taken in second intention, is only a relation of reason, as the Doctor also notes (*ibid. ante vers. Ad 2. principale*).

You will object third, against the second assertion: what is turned and mingled in other genera is not a genus distinct from them; but relation is of this kind — for in the genus of substance there are relations of identity and diversity; in the category of quantity, relations of equality and inequality; and in the category of quality, relations of similarity and dissimilarity. Therefore relation does not constitute a genus distinct from others. I respond through a distinction of the major: what is mingled in other genera does not constitute a genus distinct from the rest — if we speak of essential mingling and inclusion, such that the thing, losing its proper essence, passes into the essence of those in which it is enclosed, I grant; but if we speak of accidental mingling and inclusion while retaining its proper essence, I deny. With this distinction of the major, the minor is also to be distinguished: for relation is involved in the other categories accidentally, not essentially. So Scotus responds in a similar case (*in 1. suprà allegato*) when he says that a divine relation is included in the essence really, and is not formally identified — since relation does not pass into the divine essence according to its quiddity, but always remains in it in its quidditative being, even though they are really the same.

Article II: What Is the Highest Genus of Relation

Since to every relative there corresponds its correlative, as Scotus indicates (*1. dist. 21. q. un. §. Ad 1. argumentum D.*) — for a relative taken universally is "toward another," and is said "at convertibility" (*ad convertentiam*), as is clear from its

definition: for a relative in the singular is that whose entire being is toward another; and relatives in the plural are those whose entire being is to be toward another, from Aristotle in the present chapter — hence Porphyry (*cap. de genere*) adds that in the definition of relatives there are placed the correlatives, on account of the mutual dependence which they acquire from one another. Bonetus recalls this dependence of the related in (*praedicamento libello 4.*) and reasons about it clearly there. For this reason it is not without point to inquire whether only the relative is the genus of this category, or its correlative, or both at once. Again, since in each highest genus there exist concreta and abstracta, it is not unreasonably investigated whether the highest genus of this category is relation or the related or relation and the related together. Setting aside other positions adduced and refuted by our two young contemporaries (*disp. 8. quaest. 9.*), I present only three: the first is that of Albertus (*in hoc Tract. cap. 2.*) and certain others who consider the highest genus of relation to be "the relative"; the second is that of those whom Rubius follows (*quaest. 3. of this c.*), who affirm that the highest genus of this category is "relation in common" in the abstract, and "the relative in common" in the concrete; the third is that of Scotus (*quaest. 25. praedicam. §. Dicendum in solutione 3. and verf. Ad tertiam igitur.*), Fuentes (*q. 16. diff. 5. art. 2.*), Orbellus (*5 Met. c. de relatione*), Fonseca (*5. Met. c. 15. q. 6. sect. 2. 3.*), and many others, who teach that the highest genus of this category is not properly the relative, but relation — which is the principle of referring.

The divisions of relation, its definitions, differences, and conditions, which I adduced and explained in the *Epitome* (*lib. 1. quaest. 2. art. 8.*), should be reviewed. Moreover, the relation of this category is not of reason but real: because real finite being is common to ten categories, as the Doctor notes (*1. dist. 8. quaest. 3. §. Teneo opinionem. N.*); and the categories are coordinations of things, from the same Doctor (*2. dist. 3. quaest. 4. §. Contra istam conclusionem.*). Nor is it a relation "according to being said" (*secundum dici*) — which belongs to those things that are denominatively only relative and essentially absolute; but it is a relation "according to being" (*secundum esse*) — which belongs to those things that are formally and essentially relative. Nor is it an extrinsically adventitious relation — which does not necessarily arise from the extremes once posited, unless some condition is added, and which pertains to the six last categories — as I will show against Adversaries in (*q. 8. art. 1. of this book*); but it is an intrinsically adventitious relation, which necessarily emerges from the nature of the extremes. Wherefore the predicamental relation is a real relation according to being, intrinsically adventitious, really distinct from its foundation. Nor should the difference be omitted that exists between a transcendental and a predicamental relation, which philosophers dispute. Leaving aside the quarrel of outsiders, I present only the contention among our own. For Tataretus, Lychetus (*2. disp. 1. quaest. 5. §. nunc solvenda*), and Faber (*5 Met. disp. 20. cap. 2.*) assert that a transcendental relation is one that wanders through several genera and belongs to no determinate genus, and belongs to being before it is

distributed into ten categories. A predicamental relation, however, is one that constitutes a peculiar category — which is commonly called the category of relation — or one that has its proper place in the category of relation. But the two new Scotists (*disp. 8. quaest. 1.*) try to show that this is not a certain and adequate distinction and precise cause of such relations, saying that many relations — such as aptitudinal ones — which are really identified with things placed in a determinate genus would be predicamental, since those very relations are in a certain genus — namely in the one in which the things are whose aptitudes and inclinations they are; but it is held by everyone as certain that only relations of the fourth genus, or those pertaining to the six last categories, are predicamental. Hence they add that their adequate distinction must be sought from elsewhere — which they think is placed in the fact that predicamental relations are accidental to their foundations and are separable from them; while by contrast, transcendental relations are those that are really identified with their foundations and are inseparable from them. That Mayronis (*1. dist. 19. quaest. 1. art. 3.*), John of the Masters (*in hoc cap. quaest. 1. dub. 3.*), and others hold this, the aforesaid authors report. I, however, to speak candidly: the earlier Scotists seem to me to approach the truth and the mind of Scotus more closely than the later ones. For the Doctor (*1. dist. 8. quaest. 3. ante §. Alii probant. N., and dist. 19. quaest. 1. §. de secundo C., and 2. dist. 1. quaest. 5. §. Ad argumenta principalia. P.*) openly sets forth his opinion — which is the very one we recited above. Nor does the argument advanced by the Recentiores against it have any force: because aptitudinal relations (which Scotus recalls in (*Report. 2. dist. 1. quaest. 7. ad finem, and Quol. 13. §. Circa secundum. O.*)) reside only reductively in the category of those things of which they are the aptitudes and inclinations, as Tataretus and other Scotists note in the same place; and the discussion in the present place is of a relation that is placed per se in the category — which is actual, and possesses all the conditions previously described.

Assertion: Not the relative in the concrete but relation in the abstract is the highest genus of the category of relation. This is thus derived from Scotus in the passages cited, especially (*quaest. 25. praedicamentali*), where he openly teaches that the most general genus of relation is relation itself, or "habitude toward another"; and it militates against our two recent authors (*disp. 8. quaest. 9.*) who argue against John of the Masters and Fonseca who maintain the assertion proposed. Proven first: in the categories of accidents, their abstracta are placed per se, as was proven above (*quaest. 3. art. 5.*); but the category of relation is one of the categories of accident, as is clear. Therefore relation in the abstract is its highest genus. Second: all the species of relation — whether subaltern or lowest — and their individuals agree univocally in the common ratio of relation, which I previously said to be the principle of referring, and is equally and essentially predicated of all of them: for all relations of equiparance, disquiparance, superposition, and supposition are principles of referring and habitudes toward another. Therefore relation in the abstract is the highest genus of this category.

The authorities and arguments that I adduced in the place cited pertain here, with the common words of those authorities changed only to the particulars of this. The reason for doubt proposed at the beginning of this article causes us no trouble: because relation is not referred toward another as the relative is referred; but it is only the form and principle of referring, by which, namely, the relative is referred to another. Hence the occasion for inquiring what the highest genus of this category is ceases — for in our opinion it is evidently relation in common, described above. And likewise no occasion for doubting remains as to whether one or two genera of relation are to be admitted: for it is certain, persisting in the same opinion, that there is only one genus of relation — just as there is one genus of quantity and one genus of quality.

For the sake of discussion, if you wish to constitute the relative in the concrete as the highest genus of the category of relation — as the genus of quantity has "quantum" and the genus of quality has "quale," as Aristotle seems to hold (*5 Met. c. de quanto, and c. de quali*), and which has some probability in the teaching of Scotus (*q. allegata ad finem §. Etsi forte, and ibid. paulo ante, verf. Contra hoc si relatio, and verf. Item concesso*) — you may argue thus: to every abstract there corresponds its concrete; if therefore there is given relation in common — which is an abstract name — it must be conceded that there is a relative in common — which is its concrete. But the difficulty does not seem to be resolved so easily. For since the relative is referred to another, or to a term, it must be investigated whether the term which the relative regards belongs to the same or to a diverse genus; whether the term is in common — as the relative is in common — or in particular. To this doubt I would think, following the mind of Scotus, that just as the relative is in common, so its term is in common; and since from the same Doctor (*1. dist. 30. quaest. 1.*), relation terminates at the absolute, it does not follow that the term itself belongs to the same genus of relation or constitutes another genus of relation — which is clear for non-mutual relatives, and for mutual relatives will be shown below. And in this opinion so explained, no scruple seems to remain to be further dissolved.

But if against this doctrine you object that Scotus (*quaest. praedicam. citata, propè finem, vers. Ad secundam prius positam, and 1. dist. 21. q. un. §. Ad 1. argumentum. C.*) teaches that the relative in common is not referred to the term in common but to some term among its inferiors — to make his sense clearer, I here append his express words: "I respond that in all relatives of equiparance, the common taken in itself, as it is common, is not referred — because insofar as it is common, it is abstracted from all relatives or terms of relations; for a real relation is only of what is distinct to what is distinct; but if as such it were referred, it would be necessary to give there a term related distinctly to it; and therefore it would not be referred to something of the same ratio as the related, but to something of another ratio. Therefore such a relative is referred only for its inferior: as 'similar' is not referred for 'similar in common' to 'similar,' but for some inferior that can be distinguished from the similar to which it is referred; and likewise it

is so of 'different.' For it is not referred to 'different in common' as if to a first correlative, as if there were two first extremes of the relation, each most common, to every different; but 'different' is different from this different. And if you object that a relative gives first understanding of its common correlative, I respond: such a correlative is its correlative as common only insofar as it is taken for some inferior for which it can be distinguished from the correlative. An example of this in things: if the entire nature of fire were in one individual, that individual could not generate — since if so, it would generate another fire in which there would be the entire nature of fire, and there would be as it were two species of fire, which is impossible. And yet now in one individual the nature of fire is the ratio of generating, because it has sufficient unity for an active principle and sufficient distinction. So this similarity is the ratio of referring, or of terminating the relation; but it neither refers nor terminates unless it is taken for a distinct thing in which it is — so that neither unity nor distinction is per accidens, but each is per se with respect to such a relation, as was said in the question on circumincession." These by no means hinder us, because Scotus in the place cited speaks only of relatives of equiparance, as is clear from his words prefaced; and he does not treat of the relative in common, which prescribes from both relatives of equiparance and disquiparance, as the Conimbricenses (*quaest. 2. art. 1.*) of this chapter, our recent authors cited above, and Suárez (*disp. 47. Met. sect. 17*) rightly observe.

You will press from the same Doctor (*q. praedicamentali adducta, and Gadius in principio Quol. 6.*): relation is the principle of referring to some relative according to the same form. Therefore every relation and all relatives are relatives of equiparance — and accordingly the distinction above is useless for resolving the doubt about relatives of equiparance and about the relative in common abstracting from relatives of equiparance and disquiparance. Scotus responds in the same place just cited that the relative of equiparance is equivocal: for taken properly it is a relative according to the same form in species, from which one name is imported — which is said of both extremes of such a relation, such as "similar," "equal," and the like, of which the Doctor gives an example in the passage cited; but in a transposed sense, that is called a relative of equiparance which denominates both extremes under the same name, even though that name is not imported from one form in species — and in this second sense I grant that the relation which is the most general genus is a relation of equiparance, and the relative denominated by it is similarly a relative of equiparance. For a relative is divided into a relative's relative; but relation taken in the first sense is a species of this fourth genus.

You will press: in whatever way a relation of equiparance is the most general genus, it follows that all inferior relations are in that way such — which seems inconvenient, since paternity, filiation, and all relations of superposition and supposition are in no way relations of equiparance, because they do not denominate both extremes under one and the same name. The same Doctor

satisfies this (*ibid.*), saying that every inferior relation is one of equiparance, or a principle of referring to something said according to the same form in genus — where also both extremes are named by the same generic name, even though not every relation is a principle of referring to another according to the same form in species; nor is it the case that each extreme is named by the name of the species. For a father is called "relative of a relative" according to the form of his genus, even if he is not called such according to the proper form of paternity — because according to the proper form of paternity he is called a father.

Against this Rubius presses (*praecit. q. 3. c. 7.*), taking this middle term which is Scotus's, at the end of the question cited, (*verf. Contra illud.*): in inferiors the essential ratio of a superior is included, as in man and brute the essential ratio of animal — which is the ratio of the sensitive — is included. But the common essential ratio of any relative is to be referred to another, that is, to be referred to a term. Therefore such a common ratio belongs to every relative; and accordingly the relative in common regards the term in common — just as the relative in particular regards the term in particular. It follows: just as this father is the father of this son, and this father regards this son, so too "a father" is a father of a son, and "a father" regards "a son." Therefore the relative in common has the term in common. One may say: granting the major, in response to the minor — the ratio of the most general relative is not properly "to be referred to another" (for this belongs to the relative), but is habitude or principle of referring, by which the relative is not referred but relation refers; as the Doctor writes in the question: just as action is not acted, but is that by which the thing is acted; and likewise place is not located, but is that by which a body is located. In response to the consequence: I say this holds of relatives, but not of relation — which is the most general genus.

You will press from Scotus (*sub fine q. 4. Top. c. 4. locus 48.*): if a species is "toward something," and the genus is "toward something" — therefore if the species is the principle of referring to another, likewise the genus is the principle of referring to another. Again, it is repugnant for the highest genus to be a habitude toward another and yet not to render its subject as one bearing itself toward another, or as regarding a term. One may say: the most general genus of relation is "toward another" not through a diverse but through the same form, because from what was said it terminates not to a relative but to an absolute. By this also the other argument adduced is answered.

Against this: no absolute term can be found toward which the relative in common is borne. Therefore the aforesaid objection is escaped rather than dissolved through the distinction alleged. The antecedent is proven: that term cannot be substance alone, nor quantity alone, nor quality alone (which three are shown below to be the distinct foundations of distinct relations) — otherwise every term of a relation would be one of those three, which is not consonant with truth. Moreover, if the relative in common is referred to an absolute term,

it follows that every inferior relative is referred to an absolute term — which is false; for a father is referred to a son, and a teacher to a pupil, as to his correlative. The antecedent is argued: the inferior relative essentially includes the superior relative; therefore if the superior regards an absolute term, likewise the inferior terminates at the absolute. The antecedent is to be denied; in response to its proof one may say that the term of relation abstracts from substance, quantity, and quality. For being is first divided into absolute and relative before the absolute is subdivided into substance, quantity, and quality. In response to the other argument: the inference from the antecedent is granted, and no inconvenience follows — as will be evident below in the proper article. All the more so because, as the Doctor notes (*1. dist. 21. q. un. ante §. Ad 1. argumentum*), the correlative is not of the understanding of the correlative as something of it, namely as an essential or integral part, but as something toward which the understanding of it terminates. And hence, according to the same Doctor (*d. 30. primi P. 2. §. Ad 1. q. M.*), a relation necessarily co-requires for its being the term which it regards.

Article III: Whether There Are Real Relations

Vorrilonius — in his time the head and prince of theologians, as the Tossignano History of the Seraphic Order testifies — (*1. dist. 30.*) and Pelbartus (*1. Rosary, verbo Relatio, §. 1.*) report that Zeno, Socrates, and other ancient philosophers denied all real relation; and certain theologians subsequently followed them, among whom Auriolus is counted (*1. dist. 31.*), where through three articles he disputes at length and acutely about divine and created relations; and John Bacon cites him (*1. d. 28. q. 1. art. 2.*). The opposite opinion is maintained by Plato, Aristotle (*in Log. c. de Ad aliquid, and 5 Met. c. 15.*), Saint Thomas (*ibid., and 1. p. q. 13. art. 7.*) and elsewhere, Scotus both there and (*2. d. 1. q. 4. §. Et quia posset, ante C.*), Bonetus (*libello 4.*), and nearly all subsequent philosophers and theologians — from whom Bacon was unwilling to depart in the passage cited — who admit real relations.

Note first: there are three kinds of things, of which two are mentioned by Tataretus in the present passage (*dub. 2.*). The first is that of things whose being is complete in itself and is not ordered to another — such as absolute beings, so called as though released from all respect and order, which are called most especially complete and perfect substances, such as man, lion, and the like. The second is that of things which, being essentially imperfect, are ordered to another outside themselves — to such an extent that they cannot be fully understood without such an order, even though they are not that order but something else beyond the said order — such as incomplete substances, namely matter and form: for matter is a kind of imperfect being which together with form is ordered to constituting a physical composite. The third is that of things much more imperfect, whose being not only is in order to another, but is nothing other than order and respect toward another — such as paternity,

filiation, and the like. This doctrine is explicitly transmitted by the Doctor (*12 Met. pag. 336. in notabili.*), and is plainly implied (*2. d. 1. q. 4. §. Secundum membrum ante O.*). The question is now raised: whether that order and habitude toward another — which is relation itself — is from the side of the thing or is made by the work of the intellect. Two opposing opinions on this have been recited at the beginning of this article; Suárez treats of them at length (*citatus sect. 1.*).

Note second, from the same Doctor (*1. d. 31. q. un. §. Ad q. videtur dicendum. A., Quodl. 6. §. De tertio. LL.*), Pelbartus (*praecit. §. 7.*), and Orbellus (*5 Met. pag. 699.*): a real relation requires three things. First: real extremes, so that in the ratio of founding and terminating it does not depend on the intellect. Second: extremes really distinct — for there is no real relation of the same to itself. Third: the relation must arise from the nature of the extremes, apart from any operation of the intellect and any comparison of an external power. For this reason Scotus had noted (*quaest. 25. praedicam. verf. Ad 2. princ., and Quol. 13. §. Circa secundum, ante O.*) that a relation is of reason when both extremes, or one of them, is a being of reason, or because two things are not its extremes except through the consideration of the intellect — as happens in the relation of identity of the same to itself.

Assertion: Real relations are to be conceded. Scotus openly defends this (*ubisupra, and in Report. 2. d. 1. q. 7. J. Teneo.*). Proven first: the categories are coordinations of real beings, from what was said (*q. 3. art. 1. of this book*); but relation is one of the ten categories, as I proved in (*art. 1. of this q.*). Therefore real relations are not to be denied. Second: every real being is either absolute or relative, as after Scotus (*quaest. 25. praedicam., and in Report. loc. cit.*) Sirectus notes (*Tract. formalitatum art. principali*); and this is declared in the first note; and Aristotle does not dissent (*in hoc lib.*) — who establishes a peculiar genus of relation distinct from substance, quantity, and quality, which are absolute; but these are real, therefore relation is real, whose catalogue is presented by Aristotle (*5 Met. c. 15. T. 20.*). Third: what is perceived by sense is real, since sense is neither a reflexive nor a comparative power, as is clear from (*2 de anima T. 152. and 156.*); but relation is perceived by sense — such as the equality or inequality of two walls, the similarity or dissimilarity of the same. Likewise, cacophony and symphony are relations perceived by hearing: the former injures the hearing, the latter delights it. Again, distance and approximation of bodies, and their simultaneous locality, are discerned by sight. Therefore real predicamental relations are to be conceded. Fourth: the unity of the universe consists in the order of parts among themselves and toward one single first principle, from (*12 Met. T. 52*) — just as the unity of an army consists in the order of soldiers toward one another and toward one commander; but that order is relation without anyone thinking it, as the Doctor writes (*1. d. 30. q. 2. q. Respondeo ergo. E.*). Hence those who reject the real predicamental relation make the substance of the universe incoherent, as from Aristotle cited the same Doctor objects to them. Fifth: a composite cannot be made without the union of its component parts;

for with the parts disjointed there is no composite whole; but the union of parts is a relation apart from any operation of the intellect, as will be more evident in Physics (*q. de toto.*). Again, no effect can come about without the proportion and approximation of causes, as experience shows; but proportion and approximation are relations not depending on the intellect; therefore they are real relations. Moreover, mathematics demonstrates many relations about its subjects — such as equality of two right angles, and inequality of the three angles of a triangle; and equality and inequality are relations founded upon the unity of quantity. Finally, the mystery of the adorable Trinity is constituted from real relations of origin, as I made clear in (*Tract. de Deo trino*); and the ineffable mystery of the Incarnation of the Divine Word is not without a relation or union of the assumed human nature to the very Word that assumes — as I similarly showed in (*Tract. de Deo Incarnato*). Therefore real relations are to be admitted — and these reasons are of great weight, whatever Suárez may contrive to the contrary in (*loc. praecit. n. 14.*).

You will object first: what presents a negation or privation is not something real and positive, as is clear from the terms themselves; but equality — which is numbered among relations — signifies a privation, as the Philosopher indicates (*10 Met. T. 17. and inde*), saying that "equal" is opposed to "great" as two privations — for equal is that which is neither greater nor lesser. Therefore no genus of relation is to be introduced into the schools as something real and positive. It follows: equality is unity in quantity; but unity formally signifies a negation — for it is the same as "indivision," from (*3 Met. T. 3.*). Therefore equality and any other relation is not something real. I respond: granting the major, I distinguish the minor — in terms of name, I grant; in terms of the thing, I deny — as I showed at length in (*Tract. de Deo trino disp. 5. quaest. 6.*). In response to the consequence: similarly granting the major, I deny the minor. For unity is a real positive property of a real being, as I demonstrated in (*Met. quaest. de ente*). So Aristotle is to be explained in the passages cited.

You will object second: what receives being only from the intellect is not real; but relation receives being only from the intellect. Therefore it is not real. The major is evident; the minor is proven: relation is a comparison of the intellect comparing one thing to another — as the similar to the similar or to the dissimilar, the equal to the equal or the unequal. First consequence: Aristotle (*6 Met. T. 8. cap. ult.*), distinguishing real being into ten categories, writes that real beings are either quality or quantity or whatever else "the mind couples or divides." From this it is clear that the Philosopher himself wants certain categories to be beings of reason — as those that depend on the operation of the soul — and among them relation is to be placed, since it is of minimal entity, as Scotus notes (*quaest. 25. praedicam.*) after Averroes (*12 Met. comm. 19.*). Second consequence: the relations of number are from the soul — otherwise there would be real actual positive infinity. Therefore relation is not real but of reason. The antecedent is proven: given some double, in it there is the relation of the

double to the half, and the relation of the triple to the third part, and the quadruple to the fourth part, and so to infinity. Add the relations of dominion and servitude and those that follow voluntary obligation — these seem to be relations of reason. Granting the major, the minor is to be denied; in response to its proof I say there is a twofold comparison: one that is drawn from the nature of things — which is the habitude of two things mutually regarding each other, and this is real, without the operation of the intellect; and another that is made only through the intellect constructing order and habitude between things that from the side of the thing have no such habitude — such as the relations of genus to its species and of species to their individuals. The Doctor recalls this twofold comparison (*Quol. 3. §. Respondeo sub P.*). In response to the first consequence: I say that Aristotle immediately disapproves of that, arguing against those of the opposite opinion, as Bacon rightly notes in the passage cited (*art. 2.*). In response to the second consequence: I distinguish the antecedent — relations of numbering number (*numeri numerantis*), I grant; relations of numbered number (*numeri numerati*), I deny — as will be plain in Physics. As for the other point added, I say that relations of dominion are founded in coercive power — which is real and positive; hence relations founded therein are real, as Scotus implies (*2. d. 1. q. 4. §. Contra istam opinionem arguo, ante A., and 4. d. 6. q. 10. §. Hic dicitur infra*).

You will object third: every real being (except God) has a real efficient cause — as Aristotle and nearly all other philosophers subscribe in one voice, and we demonstrated in (*Tract. de creat. disp. 1. q. 17.*); but relation has no real cause. For to something white existing in Avignon there comes the relation of similarity — even though nothing is effected in it — merely because at Aix another white thing is produced. Therefore no real relation is to be admitted. Granting the major, I distinguish the minor: relation has no cause through motion and change, I grant; through simple emanation and resultance, I deny. Thus when two quanta equal to each other are posited, the relation of equality results between them; and given two white things, the relation of similarity arises between them. The aforesaid distinction of causes is to be explained in Physics.

Article IV: Whether Relation Is Distinguished from Its Foundation

Two opinions prevail among philosophers and theologians on this article. The prior is earnestly defended by the Nominalists, who deny that relation is distinguished really or formally from the foundation upon which it rests — but only by reason. So Ockham (*1. dist. 30. quaest. 1.*), Gabriel, Gregory, and others — and from these Suárez (*Tomo 2. Met. disp. 47. sect. 2.*) and Hurtado (*disp. 15. sect. 2. §. 7.*) do not dissent. The latter opinion is firmly maintained by the Realists, who affirm that relation is distinguished from its foundation — some really, others formally. The chief patron of this opinion is the Subtle Doctor (*2. dist. 1. quaest. 4. §. Iuxta istam opinionem. I., and 3. dist. 1. quaest. art. 3. §. Ad illud in oppositum. R., and Quol. 3. §. Respondeo.*), whom follow Lychetus, Gadius in the same place,

Pelbartus (*praecit.* §. 3.), Bonetus (*libello* 4. §. *Amplius autem Dicamus.*), Tataretus here (*dub.* 2.), and all the Scotists — and many Thomists cited by Suárez and Rubius (*quaest.* 14.) do not seem to contradict them.

Note first: relation requires two extremes, of which one is called the foundation and the other the term. The foundation is the root or principle from which relation proceeds and in which it is grounded; while the term is that toward which or at which relation itself is borne. The foundation, moreover, from Scotus (1. *dist.* 19. *quaest.* un. A.), Lychetus (*ibid.* §. *Respondeo.*, and *Quol.* 12. §. *Respondeo* C.), and in (*Reportata* 2. *dist.* 1. *quaest.* 7.), is divided into remote or material and proximate or formal. The remote has already been described by us above — it is that very thing which founds the relation, namely substance or quantity or quality. The proximate is the ratio of founding, recalled by the Doctor in (*Quol. praecite. fin.*), without which from the remote foundation the relation would not arise — such as the generic or specific unity of substance, quantity, and quality. Now since the three principal remote foundations of relation are those already implied by us above — namely substance, quantity, and quality — three overall distinct relations can be enumerated, founded in the aforesaid foundations. In substance are founded the relations of identity and diversity; in quantity, the relations of equality and inequality; and in quality, the relations of similarity and dissimilarity. And the unity of substance, quantity, and quality is the proximate foundation of the relations of identity, equality, and similarity; while the diversity of substance, quantity, and quality is the proximate foundation of the relations of diversity, inequality, and dissimilarity. The Doctor further notes (4. *dist.* 6. *quaest.* 10. §. *Hic dicitur D.*) that although the said foundations are properly accommodated to the aforesaid relations, nevertheless all such relations can be metaphorically adapted to any genus of them taken precisely. For in every genus taken precisely there are found in their own way quiddity, quantity, and quality, and their unities — in which the relations just enumerated can be founded. For according to its substance or quiddity something can be said to be the same or diverse with respect to another; according to its quantity taken virtually, equal or unequal; and according to quality, similar or dissimilar.

Note second, from Scotus (2. *dist.* 1. *quaest.* 4. §. *Contra istam opinionem arguo*), after Aristotle (7 *Top. c.* 1. and 2.): some problem or proposition can be rejected or received through an invented and given contradiction — as if one were to assert: "Matter and form are the same." The opposite of this is established through the contradiction to be immediately introduced. "What exists while another does not exist is not the same as that other — otherwise it would be the same as it and not the same as it: the same by supposition; not the same, because it does not persist when the other persists — which are contradictories." But matter exists, or at least can exist, while form does not exist, as we will show in *Physics* (*q. de materia.*). Therefore matter and form are not the same. The Philosopher uses this mode of argumentation (1 *physic. T.* 60., and 2 of the same work *summa* 2. *cap.*

3., and also 4 of the same work cap. 2.), where he proves that place is distinct from what is placed in it — because, with the located body perishing, the place does not perish. Hence the Doctor adds in the same place and (*Quol. 3. sub P.*) the rule for knowing the identity or diversity of certain things: that which belongs to something in such a way that there would be an absolute contradiction for it to exist without that other — that is really the same as it; and by contrast, where there is not an absolute contradiction, it does not follow that they are in every way the same.

Note third — this must be presupposed from (*Met. q. de accidente*), and Gadius observes it (*Quol. 3. fol. 41. columna prima*), from Scotus (*ibid.*, and 4. *dist. 12. quaest. 1.*): there is a twofold inherence of an accident — actual and aptitudinal — and neither enters into the essence of the accident, as Scotus indicates (*Quol. allegato §. Ad argumentum principale 5.*). Moreover, an absolute accident can exist by divine power without actual inherence, as faith establishes from the accidents of the Eucharist separated from every subject; but not without aptitudinal inherence, which is its property really identified with it and inseparable from it. But a relative accident can in no way exist without actual inherence, because it is really the same as it — as Gadius observes in the same place, and proves through the rule of Scotus adduced by us in the second note. Thus a relation has actual being "toward another" which it regards — and while this lasts it endures, and when it is removed, the relation is removed. So while the son — whom the father regards — persists, the relation of paternity remains; but when the son is taken away and dies, the relation of paternity perishes. Hence that celebrated saying is celebrated: "Relatives mutually posit and mutually destroy one another." Hence the actual inherence of a relation is really the same as it, as Scotus and Gadius affirm (*Quol. citat.*). And a relation depends essentially on the foundation and the term, as Bonetus excellently teaches (*in initio libelli de relationibus*) — and his teacher does not disagree (4. *dist. 12. quaestione secunda §. Ad argumenta principalia M.*), and it is plain from the definition of relatives. Whether a relation depends more on the foundation than on the term or not will be clearly established below.

First Assertion: Relation is not the same as its foundation. So Scotus in the passages recalled. Proven first from Aristotle, who in his *Organon* (*cap. de ad Aliquid*, and 5 *Met. T. 20.*) posits a peculiar category of relation distinct from the rest — which he could not do if relation were wholly coinciding with its foundation. For since the foundation of relation is substance or quantity or quality, as is clear from the first note, relation would be placed in one of those categories. But in the same place the Philosopher says that similarity is founded upon one — and gives the example of quality, in which, from what was said, the relation of similarity is founded. But the same thing cannot be founded in itself; and hence there is no real relation of the same to itself. This the Philosopher also plainly implies (12 *Met. cap. 2. T. 19.*) and in other places. Hence Bacon at the end of the question cited adds that the opposite opinion conflicts with Aristotle.

And solidly in the same place (*quaest. 2.*) he shows it to be the express view of Aristotle and his commentator — which Bacon himself embraces there.

You will say with Suárez (*loco citato, numer. 22.*): relation is indeed an absolute form — but not an absolute form taken absolutely, but an absolute form that is regarding or connoting another form, which the relative denomination includes and connotes. But such a relative denomination is not purely extrinsic — and therefore the category of relation distinct from others is preserved, which the common opinion posits. And with this explanation and interpretation, the said author believes he does not depart from truth or from Aristotle. He illustrates this with the example of similarity — which is a real form existing in the thing called similar, but does not differ from whiteness as it is in the thing called similar, except in respect of the term which it connotes. Thus similarity means nothing other than the very whiteness regarding another whiteness of the same or similar ratio. Against this: if relation is an absolute form insofar as it regards the term, the definition of relatives would be bad — "those whose entire being is to be toward another." And relation itself, which likewise has its entire being "toward another" — as Suárez himself acknowledges (*ibid. sectione quinta, numero secundo*) — would be rightly said in Suárez's opinion to have, in addition to "to be toward another," also "to be toward itself," since by him it is an absolute entity that has being "toward itself" — as is clear from the very name "absolute." Therefore relation itself does not have its entire being "toward another"; since from the same author (*numero tertio*): "to be toward itself" and "to be toward another" are distinguished. For by this he excludes from the definition of relation created substances, because these have being "toward themselves," since they are absolute; but relation has "to be toward another," because it is a relative form whose entire being is "toward another." And in (*numero quarto*), he adds with Aristotle that other accidents of the other genera are distinguished from relation because those have "to be in another" — since they are absolute — while relation has "to be toward another," which is proper to relation itself. Hence there seems to be manifest implication in his assertions. For not without contradiction is one and the same thing altogether absolute and distinguished from the absolute. But Suárez grants that relation is the same as its absolute foundation, and yet is distinguished from that very absolute — which is an evident contradictory. Nor does it avail to say with him (*sectione Secunda, numer. 23. and 24.*) that relation is distinguished from the absolute by reason — and therefore no contradiction follows. Against this: apart from the operation of the intellect that establishes a distinction between relation and its foundation — which is in reality, according to him, none from the side of the thing — either relation is something distinct from the foundation or it is nothing. Not the second, as he admits. Therefore the first — which is not a being of reason, because from the same author (*sectione tertia*), a predicamental relation is real, and only a real relation constitutes the category of relation. Likewise in (*numero sexto, sectione quinta*): "when it is said that relation has being 'toward another' only, the exclusive particle excludes the

absolute, and indicates the being of relation." And at the beginning of (*section 1.*): relation is of minimal entity among all genera. Moreover, the same author wants the entire essence of relation to be in the foundation — which will be refuted below; but he speaks there of real being, not of rational being. Again, he asserts that similarity — which is a relation — is in the thing called similar. Then, that relation results from the extremes being posited, as he himself affirms (*sectione septima, numero primo.*). And its cause is the foundation. And in (*numero quinto*): two whitenesses are referred by the relation of similarity. And he adds other things there that truly demonstrate that relation differs from its foundation more than by reason. Moreover: either relation, for example, is whiteness, or it is something distinct from whiteness — for between the same and diverse no middle falls, from (*10 Met. T. 12.*). But it is not whiteness, which is a quality, as is plain; therefore it is something distinct from whiteness — which is the point in question. If you say with Suárez it is whiteness as it regards another whiteness. Against this: whiteness as it regards another whiteness either adds something above it or not; if not, the argument is eluded and not solved; if so, that addition is either a respect — which from what was said coincides with relation, and seems received by one who (*sectione 5. numer. 5.*) adds that the being of relation consists in a pure respect toward another — or it is the term toward which it is borne, and that cannot be — because the term is one of its extremes; or something in the term — which is a third thing distinct from both extremes, as he concedes (*sectione 2. numer. 23.*); hence it is rightly that the foundation and the term are called extremes — because between them there mediates relation, which is a third thing distinct from them, as he himself, convinced by the argument, acknowledges there. Finally, from (*8 Met. T. 16*): the categories are primarily diverse — that is, agreeing in nothing. Therefore since the formal ratio constitutive of the category of relation is primarily diverse — through which the proper and peculiar category of relation is constituted, distinct from the other categories, some of which are its foundations, as I declared above — it is clearly deduced that relation is not identified with its foundation.

Second: from Saint Augustine (*7 de Trinit. cap. 5.*): "Every relative is something besides the relation" — which is explained as follows: for example, "equal" includes two things — quantity and the relation of equality. Likewise "father" imports two things — the supposit denominated "father," and the relation of paternity by which it is called "father." And so every relative presents two things — the foundation and the relation founded in it. Therefore relation differs from the foundation.

Third: what is absolute is not relative, because being is sufficiently divided into absolute and relative, as is clear from (*Tract. formalitatum, and 2. dist. 1. quaest. 4.*). But the foundation of relation — whatever it may be from those recited in the first note — is absolute; and relation is not of the genus of absolutes, from (*1. dist. 2. quaest. 7. §. Tenendo. K.*). Therefore relation does not coincide with its foundation. Moreover, if relation and its foundation were identified, there would

be one definition for both — which manifests unity of essence; but the definition of the foundation differs from the definition of relation, because their genus and difference are diverse, according to that saying of the Philosopher (*In Antepredicam.*): of diverse genera there are diverse differences, species, and individuals. Therefore relation and its foundation are not the same. Finally: if relation means nothing other than the coexisting absolute extremes, the hypostatic union of human nature with the divine Word is undoubtedly removed — which from the Doctor (*Quol. 19., and 3. dist. 1. quaest. 2.*) is an extrinsically adventitious relation of humanity from the independently personal eternal Word, and which is really distinguished from those very extremes — as I showed in (*Tract. augustissimae Incarnationis disp. 6. quaest. 1.*). These and other objections related there weigh so heavily with Ockham that — as Gadius testifies (*in commento Quol. allegati*) — although in (*1. dist. 30.*) he refuses to distinguish relation from the extremes, nonetheless in the third book he is compelled to honestly admit the aforesaid union, which even according to him is really distinguished from its extremes — namely the Word and the assumed humanity.

Second Assertion: Predicamental relation really differs from its foundation.

Scotus holds this in the passages cited, and (*1 Met. quaest. 11.*). Proven first: that without which something can exist really differs from it — for this is a clear sign of real distinction, as I stated in (*lib. 2. quaest. 1. art. 16.*); but the foundation can exist without the predicamental relation — as when the son is extinct, the paternity of the supposit that was called a father perishes, yet the foundation of paternity persists in the very supposit — which is the generative power, as Scotus says (*4. dist. 6. quaest. 10. §. Hic dicitur., and dist. 12. quaest. 2. §. Ad argumenta. M.*). Likewise Peter, for example, through the arrival of a servant becomes a lord, and through the departure of the servant, Peter himself ceases to be a lord — and yet in that very same Peter there persists the foundation of the relation of lordship, which is coercive power. Therefore between the foundation and such a relation there exists a real distinction. Maius responds that the argument does not conclude: for if the major and minor were true, it would similarly be proved that God and the governor of the world really differ — since if God were to annihilate the world, God would indeed be, but would no longer be the governor of the annihilated world. But the aforesaid argument — which is that of Scotus cited — remains firm and unshaken. First of all, Aristotle uses the same argument (*1 physic. Tract. 79.*) to demonstrate that matter really differs from form — because with form departing, matter persists. And (*4 cap. 1. T. 3. and 17.*) of the same work, he shows that place really differs from what is placed in it — because with the located body perishing, the place does not perish. Moreover, to be governor of the universe places nothing real in God, from what will be said elsewhere — unless perhaps a relation of reason; but a predicamental relation is a real entity, as I proved in (*art. 3.*). And Lychetus clearly teaches (*2. dist. 1. quaest. 4. §. Ad argumenta principalia*), saying that relation

is another thing from the foundation. Hence Maius's response is worthless. Second: composition is a relation that in the opinion of many is founded in the parts united among themselves; but composition or union of parts can be dissolved by the destruction of the composite — as is clear in the death of man, in which soul and body, which are its parts, are separated from one another while still persisting. Therefore the foundation persists while the relation does not; and accordingly relation really differs from the foundation. And this can be corroborated from sacred Theology: the personal union of the Divine Word with human nature is a relation founded in humanity and terminating at the Word — in our opinion — and in the opinion of others who do not distinguish the whole from its parts simultaneously united, founded in the parts themselves united. But in the three-day death of Christ the Lord, such union persisted in the soul and body separated from one another; and just as the Word freely assumed humanity, so it can freely release it: which being given, the foundation would still exist while the relation does not — and therefore between them there shines a real distinction. Third: whatever exists in creatures is either substance or accident, as no one denies — and this can be supported by the testimony of Saint Augustine (*5 de Trinit. cap. 5.*): "What is not said according to substance is said according to accident"; but relation is an accident from what was said — and Suárez holds this (*sectione 6. numer. 2.*). And that accident is really distinguished from substance the Philosopher demonstrates (*7 Met. T. 4.*), saying that substance is temporally prior to every accident; and Scotus receives this (*4. dist. 1. quaest. 1. §. Ideo dici potest circa KK.*). Therefore at least relations founded in substance are really separated from it. Moreover, a relation can be increased while the foundation is not increased — indeed while diminished: for example, if a white wall at degree VI is diminished, which was imperfectly similar to a white wall at degree IV. Therefore a real distinction intervenes between a relation and its foundation — otherwise the same entity would simultaneously increase and decrease, which is impossible.

Third Assertion: Transcendental relation — such as is the relation of a creature to God the creator — is not really but formally distinct from the creature. The Doctor defends this (*2. dist. allegata, quaest. 1. §. Ad quaest. istam, and in Reportatis 2. dist. 1. quaestione sexta.*), whom follow Pelbartus (*Tomo secundo, verb. creatio §. 7.*), Vallo (*Tract. formalitatum*), and the other Scotists. The first part is proven: those are really the same whose one cannot be separated from the other; and that relation is really identified with its foundation — without whose term the foundation cannot exist — as Scotus (*praecitat.*) and Sirectus (*prafato Tractat. fol. 9. pagina prima*) write; but a creature cannot exist without God, on whom it depends in being and conservation — God alone is from himself and independent, and every creature is dependent. Therefore the relation of the dependent creature to the independent God is really identified with the creature itself. Moreover this can be argued from the difference cited in (*art. 2. of this q.*) between transcendental and predicamental relation — namely that

predicamental relation really, and transcendental formally, differs from its foundation. The second part is proven: things that are mutually inseparable and possess distinct definitions or descriptions formally differ, as I said elsewhere; but the relation of a creature to God the creator, and the creature itself, have distinct descriptions arising from distinct formal ratios: for the creature is an absolute entity, while the relation is a relative entity; the former is "toward itself," the latter is "toward another" — which are formally distinct formal ratios. More on this in (*Tract. de creatione disp. 2. quaest. 3.*), where this difficulty is formally examined and decided.

You will object first, against the first assertion: Aristotle (*5 physic. Tract. 10.*) says: "Toward relation there is no per se motion or change." And the Doctor approves this (*2. dist. 1. quaest. 5. §. Ad primum. G., and Quol. 11. §. De quarto K., and 3. dist. 1. quaest. 1. §. Ad illud ante L.*). But if relation were really distinguished from the foundation, there would be per se motion and change toward relation — because the foundation would be changed by the approach or recession of relation: as, for example, Peter from a non-father would become a father through the generation of a son, and from a father would cease to be a father at the death of that same son. It is therefore better to assert that relation wholly coincides with its foundation. I respond with Scotus (*citat., especially Quol. 11.*) by explaining the assertion of the Philosopher: there is no per se motion toward relation, but there is per accidens — for relation cannot be the term or effect immediately produced by an agent through motion, as whiteness is immediately produced in a subject successively, as the Doctor says (*2. dist. 2. quaest. 9.*). Nor through change, as an agent through prior dispositions induces or educes a substantial form from the potency of matter. But rather through resultance — through the positing of the foundation and the term. The authorities of the Fathers adduced by Suárez (*sect. 2. numer. 13.*) can also be explained in this way.

You will press: Scotus (*2. dist. 1. quaest. 4. §. Ad primum alterius opinionis*) indeed says that there is no per se motion toward relation; but he concedes that there is per se change toward relation. And this can be confirmed from the same Doctor (*3. dist. 1. quaest. 1. K.*), who affirms that toward the hypostatic relation there can be per se change. Therefore Scotus conflicts with Aristotle, who denies that there is per se motion and change toward relation — and we wrongly admitted above. I say that no contradiction is involved in the writings of our Doctor. For Scotus (*in 3. alleg.*) explains himself, saying that toward a relation intrinsically adventitious there is neither per se motion nor change; but toward a relation extrinsically adventitious there is per se motion — as he concedes concerning the hypostatic union; and the Philosopher teaches this of "where" (*ubi*) (*in the same 5 lib. T. 9.*), as the Doctor notes in the same place.

You will press: Scotus (*in 3. memorato*) interprets Aristotle as speaking of intrinsically adventitious relation; and he had premised in the second passage

cited that toward the very relation of which Aristotle speaks, change can be. Therefore the objection raised above is not solved. One may say: immediately toward the intrinsically adventitious relation there is no per se change — because such a relation cannot be the immediate term of some agent; but mediate, nothing prevents there being change toward it — insofar as from the acquisition of the foundation and the term it necessarily arises. And this is implied by the same Philosopher (*11 Met. c. 4.*), and by Simplicius and others who grant that the subject is changed by the advent of such a relation.

You will object second: beings are not to be multiplied without necessity, from (*1 physic. T. 52.*); but if relation were distinguished from the foundation, beings would be multiplied without necessity — for absolute beings viewed in diverse ways suffice without any entity newly added to them, to be called relative. For example: one whiteness received in one wall makes the wall white; while another whiteness inhering in another wall renders both walls similar — no new entity accruing to them. Therefore relation does not differ from the foundation. It is confirmed: God is called creator and lord of all things with no real relation whatsoever added to him, as Scotus writes (*1. dist. 30. quaest. 1. §. Ad 2. quaest. respondeo. M.*). Therefore without any distinction of relation from the foundation, absolute beings can be called relative — that is, equal or unequal, similar or dissimilar. Granting the major, the minor is denied; in response to its proof concerning two whitenesses constituting two white walls, I say that by them those walls are made formally white; but they are called similar through the similarity resulting from their positing. Thus "to be white walls" and "to be similar walls" do not coincide. For they are presupposed to be white before similar — since their similarity is founded in the unity of whiteness received in them, and results from the nature of the extremes. In response to the confirmation: granting the antecedent, the consequence is denied — on account of the perfect, supreme necessity, and infinity of God himself, which renders him free of any new real relation and of any other entity, as I showed at length in (*Tract. de creatione disp. 2. quaest. 2.*).

You will object third, against the second assertion: if relation were really distinguished from the foundation, it could be separated from it and exist really without it; but it is impossible — while both foundation and term remain — for the relation to be separated from them. Therefore relation does not really differ from the foundation. The major is that of Scotus (*2. dist. 1. quaest. 4. §. Contra istam opinionem*), which Sirectus (*Tract. formalitatum art. 4. partiali fol. 23. pagina secunda*) explains and patronizes: for real separation of certain things from one another is a manifest sign of real distinction between them — of things that are actually separated or that can be separated without contradiction. The minor is shown: both because relation cannot exist without actual inherence in its subject or foundation, as is clear from the third note; and also because there would be equality without quantity, and similarity without quality, if equality and similarity were disjoined from these. Likewise, there would be paternity without

a supposit, if the relation of paternity were separated from the supposit that is truly a father on account of the son begotten — and if such paternity were placed in another separated from the father, that one would be a father through paternity inhering in it, even though he had begotten no son. These and similar things manifestly imply contradiction, as the Parisian Fathers observe (*1 Physic. quaestione tertia, ante §. Ad rationes suae opinionis.*). I respond: moreover the argument can be retorted, as Suárez does (*sectione secunda, numer. 15.*): relation cannot be disjoined from the foundation while the foundation and the term themselves remain. Therefore relation does not really differ from the foundation. The consequence holds. The antecedent is clear from the reason of Scotus adduced; for if, according to him, separability of certain things is a sign of their real distinction — by contrast, the inseparability of relation from the foundation evidently indicates that it is in no way really separated from it. The inference from the major is to be denied. For this holds of an absolute accident; but not of a relative accident — on account of the essential dependence that relation has most especially on the foundation, as Scotus says (*4. dist. 12. quaest. 2. §. Ad argumenta principalia. M.*); or on account of the real identity with actual inherence, as from the same Doctor (*Quol. 2. §. Respondeo*), Gadius and Tataretus affirm (*ibid. in Log. cap. de accidente, dub. 1.*). And this can be illustrated from the physical whole, which is indeed really distinguished from its parts simultaneously united — yet on account of the essential dependence it has from them, it cannot exist without them. Similarly, a creature is really distinguished from God — yet it cannot exist without God, on account of the essential dependence it has from God himself.

By this also the other objection is answered: from the canon of Scotus previously proposed, those that acquire essential dependence from others are excepted — by reason of which, even if they really differ, they nonetheless cannot be separated from those on which they essentially depend. As was made plain above concerning the whole with respect to its parts, and concerning the creature with respect to God.

You will object fourth: what newly accrues to something does so through a new action — for nothing new is produced unless through some new production; but if relation is something really distinct from the foundation, when a new white thing is produced, innumerable and nearly infinite relations would be produced toward all the white things already produced — whether near or distant. Indeed, at the movement of a finger, infinite relations would be acquired toward the infinite parts of the world, in respect of the approach and recession of the finger to and from such parts of the world; and accordingly at the motion of one finger the whole orb would be filled with infinite things and changed — which is absurd and ridiculous, and also against Scotus, who denies the infinite in magnitude and multitude, as is clear from the book on quantity (*in q. de Infinito.*). Hence Auriolus (*supra citatus art. 2. in initio primae propositionum*) adds that such an infinity of things is irrational, and should come into the mind of no one. I

respond: granting the major, I distinguish the minor — through motion and change, I deny; through natural resultance and concomitance, I grant. Nor on that account is there actual infinity — but only infinity in potency, as will be shown in Physics concerning the continuum, which is not actually infinite even though it is always divisible into innumerable proportional parts. Nor does any absurdity follow from admitting such a multitude of relations, since they are tenuous and of modest entity — nor are they multiplied in vain, except when terms are multiplied, as will be shown below. Hence Mayronis (*1. dist. 39. quaest. 2.*) adds jokingly and wittily that positing so many and such great relations in one and the same being — even the smallest — is no burden to it, unless for a slow wit and crude intellect. Others add no less acutely that the aforesaid argument is "tribunitian" (*tribunitium*) — convincing only the ignorant populace and the unskilled multitude when they hear that at the movement of a finger the whole universe is changed.

You will say: Scotus (*in 3. dist. 14. quaest. 2. §. Tertio modo. L.*) concedes actual infinity in multitude; but if an infinite number of things is given, surely relations are actually infinite — since in numbers there is a mutual respect. I say with Lychetus (*in commento eius loci*) that Scotus does not speak assertively but dubiously and problematically. For in his view it does not seem improbable to admit actual infinity in numbers and other things of modest entity — such as relations are. But consistently (*2. dist. 1. quaest. 4. sub N., and 4. dist. 6. quaest. 10. sub D.*) he denies actually infinite real relations.

You will object fifth, against the third assertion: the relation of a creature to God the creator is its dependence on the creator himself; therefore if it is really identified with the creature, it is deduced that all created things are relative — which the Philosopher adduced as absurd (*4 Met. T. 26.*). I distinguish the consequence with the Master of Formalities (*art. 1. principali, fol. 8. pag. 2.*) and Vallo (*ibid. fol. 38. pag. 2.*): denominatively, I grant; quidditatively and essentially, I deny. Or: really, I grant; formally, I deny — as is sufficiently clear from what was said above.

Article V. Whether a Relation Can Be Separated from Its Existing Foundation and Term

Francis of Meyronnes (*1. dist. 14*), Bonetus (*Libellus de Relationibus*), the Canon cited by Gadius (*Quol. 3. fol. 41*), and others whose names Lychetus passes over in silence (*2. dist. 1. q. 4*), together with Ruvi us (*q. 14, on the separation of a relation from its foundation*), hold that a relation can be separated from existing and permanent extremes. The common teaching runs the other way: Scotus (*Quol. 3. §. Respondeo sub P*), Gadius, Lychetus in the same place, the Parisians (*1. phys. q. 3*), and, unwilling to depart from them, Suárez (*disp. 47. Met. Sect. 8. num. 13*), all affirm that it implies a contradiction for a relation to be sundered from its extremes in reality.

From Scotus just cited, it should be noted that there is a twofold inherence of an accident: actual and aptitudinal. Neither belongs to its essence. Aptitudinal inherence is a property really identified with the thing itself, as I also observed in Article IV of this Question, nota III. Actual inherence, on the other hand, is really distinct from an absolute accident, because such an accident can supernaturally exist without it — as I illustrated above with the example of the accidents of the Most Holy Eucharist — but it is not really distinct from a relative accident. Scotus assigns no other reason for this disparity, as Gadius notes in the place cited above, except that a relative accident is a being toward another, while an absolute accident is a being toward itself. For this reason it involves no repugnance for an absolute accident to exist in act without a subject, whereas it is maximally repugnant to a respective accident to exist in act without an actual subject. Moreover, a twofold bearing of a respective accident is noted: one as foundation, the other as term. The former is called actual inherence, which coincides really with the relation, as Scotus intimates (*Quol.cit.*); the latter is called the bearing toward another. Both depend essentially on each of the two extremes, though more on the term than on the foundation, because the former belongs to the relation in its capacity as a common ratio — that is, insofar as it is an accident — while the latter belongs to it insofar as it is the proper and quidditative ratio through which the relation is constituted in the being of a respective accident and distinguished from everything that is not a respective accident.

Assertion: A relation can in no way be separated from its actually existing extremes. This is taught by Scotus in the place cited above (*2.dist.1.q.4. §.Ad q.infra N; 3.dist.1.q.1. §.Ad illud in oppositum K*) and indicated in (*Log.q.25.praedicam.*). It is proved first from the definition of relatives given in the chapter *Ad aliquid*, in which a bearing toward another is included; for a relation taken universally is described as the bearing of one thing toward another, as the Doctor says in the cited *Logic* question (*verf.Ad tertium dicitur*). Since therefore the extremes of a relation enter into its definition, it follows plainly that the relation cannot exist without them. Hence Boethius rightly writes in his exposition of the *Categories* that it belongs to the essence of relatives to be toward another. Secondly, from the same Philosopher in the same place: when one relative is posited, the other is necessarily posited, and when one is removed, the other is removed. But in the opinion of Meyronnes and others this does not hold: for with the term removed, the relative would still be constituted in relative being by the relation separated from the term — and so the relation would not be toward another, namely toward the term it regards, which conflicts with the essence of a relation. Thirdly, the same thing would be father and son with respect to the same thing: if the relation of son were placed in the father, the father would be a son; and if the relation of father were placed in the son, the son would be a father — and so the same thing would simultaneously, and with respect to the same thing, both generate and be generated, which involves an open contradiction and

impossibility, as Suárez also admits (*sect.5.n.12*). Again, there would be union without the united parts, production without the produced, local motion without a term — and very many other absurdities and inconveniences would follow, given that a relation were separated from its extremes. For union, production, and motion are formally relations, as will be said below, and they would obtain in the manner I described above if the rejected opinion were admitted. Furthermore, nothing ought to be asserted unless reason persuades it, or it is known per se, or known by experience, or approved by the authority of Sacred Scripture or the holy Fathers. But no reasonable cause is offered for a relation being able really to subsist apart from its extremes, as will be evident from the solutions to the objections; nor does this stand in the terms themselves, nor does experience show it, nor does any authority compel it — indeed it runs counter to the great current of the Scholastics, as the abovesited Suárez observes. Therefore a relation cannot be severed from its extremes.

You will object first: things that differ essentially can be separated from one another, at least by divine power; but a relation and its extremes differ essentially. Therefore they can be sundered from one another. The minor is clear from the preceding article. The major is shown thus: things that are essentially identified are inseparable; conversely, therefore, things that are essentially distinct are separable from one another. Confirmation: what depends on one thing in such a way that it could depend on another can exist without the former; but a relation depends on its extremes in such a way that it could depend on another; therefore a relation can be sundered from its extremes. The major is evident: the whole difficulty of separating a relation arises precisely from dependence on its extremes; if the relation could depend on something other than the extremes, it could undoubtedly be detached from them. The minor is proved: God is the first independent being, who terminates the dependence of all things and can supply the place of whatever terminates a dependence. Therefore, if a relation were separated from its extremes, its dependence would be terminated by God.

The major must be distinguished: I concede it for absolute things; I deny it for relatives. This arises from the essential dependence that a relation has on its extremes, from whose positing it necessarily arises. Hence the Doctor writes excellently (*4.dist.12.q.2.§.Ad argumenta M*) that the dependence of a relation on its foundation is most essential — and he sets this out plainly for both extremes in the places just narrated. The reply to the confirmation is evident from the same distinction: the major holds for absolute things, but not for relatives, for the reason just given, which Bonetus treats solidly and acutely in the work cited above.

You will object secondly: if a relation cannot be sundered from its extremes, this is chiefly because of the dependence it has on them; but this reason does not compel — therefore it should not be denied that a relation can be separated

from its extremes by any power whatsoever. The major is clear; the minor is argued as follows: the dependence of a relation on its extremes is either in the genus of efficient cause, or of final cause — and no one denies that God can supply both, since it is a dependence on an extrinsic cause involving no imperfection — or it is in the genus of material cause *in which*, and this too is no obstacle, because an absolute accident has a material *in which*, yet it can be separated from the subject in which it exists and exist without it — or it is in the genus of material cause *from which*, and this also is no hindrance, since a relation has no such cause — or it is in the genus of formal cause, and this, besides the imperfection it includes, inheres in the thing of which it is the cause, whereas the foundation in which a relation exists does not by any means exist in the relation itself. Confirmation: whatever a first cause can do together with a second cause, it can effect without that second cause; but the first cause, together with the foundation and term, can conserve a relation; therefore the first cause can accomplish this without the extremes themselves — and therefore a relation can exist without its extremes.

Granting the major, I deny the minor. To its proof I make a distinction: God can supply the place of whatever dependence terminates upon an absolute thing — I concede; upon a relative thing — I deny. For the production of a relation does not occur through transmutation but through resultance, as Scotus teaches in the cited places. Therefore the dependence of a relation on its extremes is essential, and absolutely inseparable from them, as the Doctor teaches admirably in (*Report.4.dist.12.q.1.propè finem*). By this distinction it is clear what is to be said to the confirmation: the major holds for absolute things, but not for relative ones, for the reason assigned above. This can further be corroborated by risibility and other natural properties, which flow necessarily from humanity once it is posited, so that God cannot impede their resultance, because they come not from without but from within. And for this reason perhaps Scotus calls the predicamental relation intrinsically accruing — which belongs to the fourth predicament — while calling the rest, which belong to other genera, relations extrinsically accruing, as Suárez intimates from his other works (*sect.2.num.17 and sect.16.num.17*). Therefore the objections that Suárez himself and others pile up against us fall apart.

Article VI. Whether *Esse In* Belongs to the Essence of a Relation

While all Philosophers write with one voice and one pen that a relation is essentially constituted by *esse ad* (being-toward), they nonetheless dispute whether *esse in* (being-in) belongs to the quiddity of the relation itself. The Thomists, following St. Thomas (*1.p.q.28*), together with Suárez (*disp.47.Met.Sect.5.num.7*), admit that both *esse in* and *esse ad* enter into the nature of a relation, yet they say that *esse in* is its generic ratio, and *esse ad* is its specific ratio. Others, among whom are Mastrius and Bellutus (*disp.8.q.4*), hold that both belong to its specific ratio. The common view of the Scotists, named expressly

by Trombetta (*7.Met.q.1*), Anthony Andrée in the same place, and Meyronnes (*1.dist.39.q.5*; *4.dist.12.in fine q.7*), holds that the essence of a relation is placed in *esse ad*, while *esse in* belongs to it as a property.

From Scotus (*Report.4.dist.12.q.1. §.Ad quaest. dico*), it should be noted first that although one of the extremes of a relation is ordinarily its subject — because a relation is an accident, and every accident requires a subject in which it inheres — and from the same in the Oxford writings (*ibid. §.Ad quaest. respondeo, conclusione 2 sub B*) the foundation may be called the proximate subject of the respect; nevertheless a relation taken precisely can exist without a subject, as is clear from the divine relations, which, being substantial, have a foundation indeed but not a subject. Therefore a relation as relation requires a foundation, because it requires that of which it is and toward which it is, from the same place (*D. in probatione 2 conclusionis*); it does not, however, necessarily require a subject, unless it is an accidental relation. And because a relation is the bearing of one thing toward another, from (*Quol.3. §.Respondeo ante Q*) or from the same in (*Report.cit.*), a relation is a duality of extremes, because it cannot be understood without two extremes, of which one may happen to be its subject. But if neither extreme is the subject, the relation exists without a subject, though not without a foundation and term, from which it necessarily emerges. What, therefore, in accidental relations is called the subject and the foundation, is in substantial relations — or in relations as relations — called only the foundation. Consequently, in predicamental relations there is no multiplication of a twofold bearing, one toward a subject and another toward a foundation, as our individual fellow-travellers in the cited philosophical course opine. For what is purely the subject of predicamental relations is at the same time their foundation, as the Doctor clearly intimates (*q.2 loci cit. in solutione 4 sub M.N.*). For if the relation did not accrue to it, it would not be denominated a subject but only a foundation, and so the denomination of subject comes from that very accidental inherence of the relation — not from a twofold bearing, one regarding a subject and another a foundation, as Scotus plainly indicates in the place cited above, and as will be shown more fully below. Moreover, lest you think the extremes belong to the intrinsic ratio of a relation: in the next article it will be made plain that they belong only to its extrinsic ratio.

First Assertion: *Esse in* does not belong to the specific ratio of a relation, but is only, as it were, its property. This assertion is twofold and is directed against our more recent contemporaries cited above. The first part is proved first from Scotus (*Report.2.dist.1.q.7. §.Ad aliud cum dicitur*), in whose own words we read: "I say therefore that to-be-in does not belong to the quiddity of a relation." The same is deduced from (*4.dist.12.q.1*) and other places, in which he plainly shows that *esse in* does not essentially and specifically constitute a relation. Secondly, *esse in* absolutely speaking belongs no more to a predicamental relation than to other accidents — which no one denies — it is common to all accidents. Hence the celebrated maxim circulates among Philosophers from (*7.Met.T.2*): "An

accident's being is to be in." But for other accidents, it is not the specific and quidditative ratio, as the Doctor proves in (4.cit.) and we proved in the *Metaphysics* in the question on accident. Therefore etc. Secondly, *esse in* either designates actual inherence or aptitudinal inherence in a subject, but neither inherence belongs to the essence of an accident; therefore *esse in* does not pertain to the specific nature of a relation. The major is well known in the School of Scotus. The minor is shown by the Doctor in the place cited above, and is to be pursued at length by us in the *Metaphysics* in the cited place. The second part follows from the first: since *esse in* does not belong to the essence of a relation and is really identified with it — because it is impossible for a relation to be found without being in some subject or foundation — just as it is impossible for something to be an accident without at least possessing aptitudinal inherence, it clearly follows that *esse in* belongs to a relation in the manner of a property.

Second Assertion: Two bearings essentially and specifically belonging to a relation are not to be distinguished in it, one bearing toward the foundation insofar as it is its subject, and another toward the foundation insofar as it is a foundation. This assertion likewise is opposed to the aforementioned recent authors. It is proved first from Scotus, who most powerfully in (*Report.4.cit.*) asserts that a relation can exist without a subject, but not without a foundation. Therefore, given and not conceded that a bearing toward a subject belongs to a relation, it is not an essential and specific ratio of the relation itself, without which it could not exist — especially because, from the preceding notable point, in an accidental relation the foundation and the subject are taken as the same thing, as I indicated from Scotus there and as Suárez confirms (*disp.4.Sect.10.13*). Secondly, the said authors in the same place, in their solution of the third objection, say that a relation is one simple bearing founded in the foundation and terminated at the term. Therefore a relation does not have a twofold bearing of *esse in* — since bearing and relation are the same thing, from what was said in Article I of this Question; if there is one relation, there is also one bearing, and if there is a twofold bearing, there is likewise a twofold relation, for a bearing is the respect of one thing toward another. Therefore, according to the twofold bearing admitted by them, a twofold relation toward the foundation and toward the term must equally be conceded by them, as Bassolis seems to intimate (*1.dist.30.q.2.art.3*) — a view rejected by them and by Bargius (*1.dist.3.q.5*). And the same authors, under the name of twofold bearing in their conclusion and below, later, pressed by an argument, make it only one bearing, lest they concede that a relation is one thing per accidens if the twofold bearing just explained were of its essence, as they suppose. Thirdly, an essence is prior to a property flowing from it, just as a cause is prior to its effect; but *esse ad* is prior to *esse in*, because a being is first a being toward itself before it is in another — and so being is first divided into absolute and relative before it is divided into being-toward-itself and being-in-another, as Trombetta, Meyronnes, and others

rightly observe in the *Tract. de Formalitatibus*. Therefore *esse in* does not pertain to the essence of a relation — unless one proceeds in a roundabout way, taking a property for an essential ratio, as Aristotle does in (*5.Met.c.de quanto*) and other places I have noted.

Third Assertion: The specific ratio of a relation is *esse ad*. It is proved first from Aristotle, who in the chapter on *Ad aliquid* defines relatives by *esse ad*, saying: "Of relatives, their whole being is to be referred to something else." There he rebukes the ancient philosophers for not recognizing the true nature of relatives, since their whole being-toward did not become known to them, as is clear from the definition given by them and rejected by Aristotle. Scotus concurs, defending this truth in many places, principally in (*Log.q.25.praedicamentali*) and (*1.dist.26.q.vn.§.Quantum ad primam viam L*): "to a relation belongs the fact that it is toward another; even if it is not toward another, it is not a relation," and (*§.Quantum ad 3.viam I*): "a relation is essentially the bearing toward another." Secondly, that by which one thing is essentially distinguished from another is its essential, constitutive, and specific ratio, because the constitutive principle and the distinctive principle are the same, from (*1.dist.11.q.2.B*); but through *esse ad* per se, a relation is essentially distinguished from an absolute thing, whose being is toward itself — for being is adequately divided into absolute and relative, as our Formalists teach with Scotus. Therefore etc. Nor does it help to respond with those recent authors that *esse in*, which is the specific ratio of a relation, is not *being-in* a subject but *being-in* a foundation. For this, beyond being rejected above, means that a single simple thing can never have two specific and quidditative ratios; otherwise it would be one thing per accidents. But by those recent authors a relation is a simple bearing of a foundation toward a term, as is plain from the solution to the third objection. It follows plainly, therefore, that it is essentially constituted by *esse ad*, of which *esse in* appears to be a property, as I said above. All the more so because there must be given some common element in which an absolute and a relative accident agree, and some element in which they differ — something that cannot be assigned in their view, since they want both *esse in* and *esse ad* to be the generic and specific ratio of the relation itself. I add that in the doctrine of Scotus cited above, a relation as relation can exist without *esse in* a subject — a feature it shares with an absolute accident — but not without *being in* a foundation, which is proper to a relation. Since therefore they cannot state a ratio that is both common and proper to a relation, they appear to contradict both truth and Scotus.

You will object first: a relation as relation is an essential bearing between two extremes; therefore such a bearing depends essentially equally on both extremes; and therefore just as *esse ad* belongs to the essence of a relation, so too does *esse in* belong to its essence. Confirmation: it is no less repugnant for a relation to exist without a foundation than without a term; but it cannot exist without a term, by the common view of Philosophers; therefore neither without

a foundation — and so both *esse in* a foundation and *esse ad* a term are its specific and essential ratio. I respond that a relation indeed requires two extremes on which it essentially depends, but its specific ratio is derived not from *esse in* a foundation but from *esse ad* a term — just as motion requires both a term from which and a term toward which, yet the common School holds, and I shall show in (*Phys.1 de motu*), that motion is specified by the term toward which. By this the reply to the confirmation is also clear: I acknowledge that both extremes are required for a relation, since it results from them; nonetheless I deny that its specific ratio is derived from *esse in* a foundation.

You will object secondly: the constitutive and distinctive principle of a thing are the same, from Scotus (*cit.1.dist.11.q.2.§.Contra istam opinionem B*); but according to Aristotle (*5.Met.c.de relatione*), the distinction of relatives is drawn from their foundations. Therefore *esse in* a foundation is the specific and distinctive ratio of a relation. Confirmation from the same Doctor, who writes (*4.cit. conclusionem secunda D*): "a relation, as a relation, is necessarily in a foundation." And in the same place (*q.2.§.Ad argumenta principalia in solutione tertii M*) he openly asserts this very thing; therefore a relation is essentially constituted and distinguished by *esse in* a foundation from everything else that is not a relation. Granting the major, I distinguish the minor: generically, in a circumlocutory and extrinsic way — I concede; specifically and intrinsically — I deny. So Aristotle in the cited place is to be interpreted. And this is plainly taught by Scotus (*4.dist.12.q.1.§.Ad argumenta principalia S*), Meyronnes, Bassolis, Bargius, and other Scotists in the same place. This can be explained by the extrinsic distinction of powers and their acts and habits derived from the objects with which they are concerned, which I treat at length in (*lib. de Anima q.3.artic.3*).

You will press: what is placed in the definition of something, and without which it can neither be nor be conceived, belongs to its intrinsic ratio; but in the definition of a relation its extremes are involved, nor can it exist or be grasped without them, as Scotus affirms (*q.1 prologi and 1.dist.3.§*); for a relation, as stated, is defined as the bearing of one thing toward another, that is, of the foundation toward the term; therefore each extreme pertains to the intrinsic ratio of a relation. I distinguish the major: what is placed in a definition in the nominative case and as genus or difference — I concede; what is placed in the oblique case and as an addition — I deny. To the distinction of the major I distinguish the minor accordingly: the extremes are placed in an oblique, not a nominative, position in the definition of a relation, as is plain to one who inspects it — and this is a definition by addition, as the Doctor intimates in the place just cited, and as Meyronnes (*ibid.*) and Bargius (*1.dist.28.q.3*) expressly hold.

Article VII. Whether a Relation Is Multiplied by the Multiplication of Terms

Against St. Thomas (*3.p.q.25.art.5*), Cajetan in the same place, and others accumulated by Mastrius and Bellutus (*disp.8.q.6.art.2*), who deny that a relation

is multiplied by the multiplication of terms in one and the same numerical foundation — holding that the unity or plurality of a relation is to be derived from the unity or plurality of foundations by which they are specified extrinsically — there stand opposed Scotus (*3.dist.8.9.vn.§.Contra istam rationem secundam*), Lychetus in the same place, Fuentes (*q.16.difficultate 5.art.6.dub.3*), Raconius (*Tract.2.membro 3*), Suárez (*disp.47.Sect.17.num.17*), Hurtado (*disp.15.sect.10.§.140*), and very many others, even from the Thomistic school, all affirming that in one and the same numerical foundation the relation is multiplied through the multiplication of terms by which they are specified extrinsically — so that in one and the same numerical father there are as many numerically distinct paternities as there are sons begotten by him.

It should be noted first that this difficulty is raised about predicamental relation, which, as Tataretus notes in the present chapter, requires four conditions, nearly all of which I touched upon in (*Epitome q.4.art.8.lib.1*). The first is that it be real, on account of a relation of reason, which has no proper seat in a category, as I affirmed above of every being of reason. The second is that it be finite and limited, on account of transcendental relations, among which the divine personal relations are numbered — relations that are formally neither finite nor infinite, neither perfect nor imperfect, as I showed at length in (*Tract. de Deo Trino disp.5.q.5*). The third is that it be actual, really distinct from the foundation — unlike an aptitudinal relation, which is reduced to the predicament in which its foundation is placed, and unlike the relation of a creature to God the Creator, which is really identified with the creature, as the Doctor writes (*2.dist.1.q.5.§.Ad quaest.M*). The fourth is that it be a relation intrinsically accruing, so as to exclude relations extrinsically accruing, which Scotus mentions (*3.dist.1.q.1.§.Ad illud in oppositum K*; *4.dist.13.q.1.§.Ad huius autem C.D*). These four conditions are included in the three enumerated by Scotus (*1.dist.31; Quol.8*), which I mentioned above in Article III of this question.

It should be noted secondly that there are two rules given by Tataretus (*loco praecit.dub.3*) and taught by our Doctor in the places shortly to be cited, and also touched upon by me in (*Epitome lib.1.q.1.art.6*). The first is found in (*3.dist.8.9.vn.§.Ad argumenta F*): for the multiplication of concreta there is required a multiplication both of forms and of supposita. For this reason, for example, since Peter is one, although he has several paternities corresponding to the several sons begotten by him, he is therefore called not several fathers but only one father; just as one who possesses several sciences is called not several knowing persons but one knowing person, because of the unity of the suppositum. For the same reason, Christ, possessing two wills — the divine and the human — is called not several willing persons but only one, as Scotus infers from St. John Damascene in the cited place. The second rule is drawn from (*1.dist.12.q.1*): for the multiplication of concreta there is not required a multiplication of forms, but a multiplication of supposita suffices — so that if one numerical whiteness were in two really distinct subjects, those subjects

would be called two white things, as Lychetus explains (*1.dist.19.q.1.§.Respondeo*). Thus in the divine persons, the Father and the Son are called two spirating, although there is only one power of spirating in them; similarly the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are called three creating, although there is only one power of creating in them. Why they cannot be called three creators and two spirators, see there and what I wrote in (*Tract. de Deo Trino disp.8.q.4*).

It should be noted thirdly that there is a twofold essential ratio, or difference, of a relation: one intrinsic and another extrinsic. The intrinsic and quidditative is that which constitutes the relation itself in its essential and quidditative being, and essentially distinguishes it from everything else that is not a relation — namely the ratio or principle of referring to another. The extrinsic is derived from what is extrinsic to the relation, such as the foundation and term, from which the relation necessarily goes forth; it co-requires extremes as things from which it arises by its very nature, just as an effect presupposes and pre-requires the causes by which it is produced. Whether only the foundation, or both extremes, is the cause of a relation, see Bonetus (*Libellus de Relationibus*) and Lychetus (*Quol.11.§.Respondeo ad instantias*), following Scotus (*3.dist.1.q.1.§.Ad illud in oppositum sub K*). This twofold difference of a relation is indicated by Aristotle, who here does not describe the relation but relatives, as the Doctor observes there (*q.15.praedicamentali*) and more clearly (*2.dist.1.q.antè §.Hoc ergo viso*) and (*3.dist.1.q.1.K*). Furthermore, an accident is not individuated through the subject in which it inheres, but through its own haecceity, as the Doctor states (*2.dist.3 and 4.dist.12.q.2.§.Hic sunt duae opiniones*). See what I have written in (*Tract. de Angelis disp.1.q.6.§.9*) against the Thomists named there, who think accidents are individuated through the subjects in which they are subjected.

Assertion: With the multiplication of terms, numerically distinct relations are multiplied in the same foundation. So Scotus in the place cited above. It is proved first from Aristotle, who says in this chapter: "Relatives are simultaneous by nature and by cognition." Scotus points to this passage (*in Report.d.allegata*) to persuade us of the aforesaid assertion, and after him Ruvius (*q.8.cap.7.de Ad aliquid*); but given the Thomistic opinion of numerical unity of relation in a foundation relative to several terms, relatives are not simultaneous by nature and by cognition. Therefore, in order that this well-known property of relatives transmitted by the Philosopher and conceded by all may hold true, a foundation with one numerical relation does not regard several terms — rather, there are to be counted in that same foundation as many numerically distinct relations as there are terms. The minor is shown: the terms are not all simultaneous by nature and cognition with the foundation, except for the first; therefore with respect to the other terms beyond the first, relatives are not simultaneous by nature and by cognition. The antecedent is well known from the case of many sons begotten by one parent at different intervals of time. The consequence is evident: those whose generation is not simultaneous are not simultaneous by nature or by time, as is clear from the *Postpredicaments*.

The Thomists, in order to meet this and other Scotist arguments, contort themselves wonderfully and move off into different responses, which both of the recent authors cited at the beginning of this article collect with no small diligence. I present only one or two of the chief ones, by which the rest are easily dissolved. The Thomists therefore respond — notably Ruvius in the place cited — through a distinction and explanation of the Philosopher's testimony, saying that the aforesaid property of relatives is true with respect to the substance of the relation, or with respect to an accidental extension to many terms; so that, for example, a father having several sons is simultaneous by nature and cognition with the first son only, with regard to the substance of the relation, while he is simultaneous by nature and cognition with all his other sons with regard to extension. Into the same thing seems to fall the response and distinction of others, particularly Arriaga (*sect.9.disp.12.num.49*), who affirms that a father having several sons has several paternities inadequately but not adequately — somewhat in the way that a genus is said to be in one species inadequately and in all species adequately. Against the first response I argue: a relation does not admit of extension, which is proper to quantity, nor of intension or remission, which belongs to quality — for a relation does not admit of more and less except through its foundations, as all interpreters of Aristotle hold in the chapter on *Ad aliquid*. For a subject is not simply perfected or extended through a relation accruing to it. Therefore that distinction between the substance of a relation and its extension to several terms seems irrelevant. Furthermore, a new extension to something else does not occur without a new relation to something else. Therefore if, as Ruvius concedes in the cited place, there is a new extension to something else, there must equally be admitted a new relation. The antecedent is proved: a new extension is had through a new action of an agent upon a patient; but a new action induces a new relation, as is clear from Aristotle (*5.Met.cap.23.T.20*), affirming that the second genus of relatives is founded on action and passion. All the more so because a new extension to something else is a new ordering toward something else, which is a relation, as Ruvius himself admits (*cit. in solutione 1.arg.*). And the reason is that an order, from what was said above, means nothing other than the respect of some things ordered toward one first thing, as is clear from the order of the things of the world toward one God from (*12.Met.T.55*). Moreover, there are new founding ratios in the father toward sons newly begotten by him; therefore there are also new relations in that very father toward sons newly procreated by him. The antecedent is proved: the founding ratios in the father are active generations, and their foundation is the power of generating; but there are many active generations with respect to the many sons begotten — therefore there are also many relations of paternity in one parent regarding many sons. Furthermore, motion is specified by the term toward which, as I indicated above, from what is to be proved in the *Physics*; and motion is formally a relation, as will be shown there in the book on motion. Again, Aristotle in the cited place says relatives are simultaneous by nature; but by the distinction

offered, a relative and a non-relative would be simultaneous by nature, because through the attainment of only the first term the whole relation — with regard to its substance — would be had; but this does not suit Aristotle, who adds that when one relative is posited the other is posited, and when one is removed the other is removed. But if the first son is removed, the relation of paternity is not destroyed in a father who has other sons; yet the whole substance of the relation ought to perish and the whole would be acquired through the first. But with the first son destroyed, the father is formally still a father through the relation to the second son who is living. Therefore by another paternity distinct from the first the father regards the second son.

But if you say that a father having several sons regards them all by a single paternity as its adequate terms, and regards one or another of them as an inadequate term — which is the second response and distinction of the Thomists recalled above — I argue against this: what can be neither exceeded nor exceeded by another is adequate to it; but this active generation by which this father is this father can neither exceed nor be exceeded by the passive generation by which this son is this son. Therefore the aforesaid distinction is vain and void for solving Scotus's argument. The major is clear from the terms. The minor is clear, because through this active generation the father cannot regard other sons, nor can this son be regarded by the father through another generation, because this act is total and adequate. Furthermore, a cause actually produces an effect in act, such that in act it does not extend to the production of another effect; but these extremes in act are the total cause in act of this relation in act — just as this whiteness in act is the total cause of this wall in act as white. Therefore each individual son is the adequate term of an individual paternity, and just as paternity is founded on having-begotten, so this paternity is founded on this having-begotten, and therefore begettings are multiplied in accordance with the multiplication of those begotten — which is Scotus's assertion.

The proposed assertion is proved secondly: a relation essentially regards another, and is essentially a respect toward another, as I have repeatedly stressed above. Therefore if that *other* which the relation regards is multiplied, the relation is likewise multiplied; but with the term multiplied, the *toward-another* is multiplied; therefore with the term multiplied, the relation too is multiplied. The first consequence is evident, because when the formal ratio of something is multiplied, its form and essence through which it is formally constituted in such being is equally multiplied. Thirdly, when the *quo* (that by which) is posited, what the *quo* is for (the *quod*) is posited — since to each *quo* corresponds its own *quod*, as is common in Scotus: when form and matter are united by an agent, the composite is posited; with the form removed, the composite is destroyed. Similarly when this *quo* is posited, this *quod* is posited, and when this *quo* is destroyed, this *quod* is also destroyed. Therefore just as with the destruction of this filiation this son is destroyed — the son who is formally denominated a son through it — so with the destruction of this paternity through the destruction of

this son, this father too in the aspect of this relation of paternity ought to perish, though not in the aspect of a suppositum. But with the second son remaining, this man is still called a father — not through the relation to the first son, who is supposed to have died — therefore through the relation to the second son who is alive, on account of whom this man is denominated a father. I add that the Thomistic foundation is ruinous, inasmuch as it individuates a relation and any other accident through the subject in which it inheres, as I noted in the third notable point. For there are many accidents distinct by number alone in one and the same numerical subject, such as several sensibles in the same sense organ and several lights in the same medium — as I shall show in the *Metaphysics* in the question on Accident.

You will object first: if with the multiplication of terms the relation is likewise multiplied in the same numerical foundation, it would follow, for example, that just as there are several sons, so there are several fathers; but one numerical father, despite the plurality of sons, is not several fathers, as all hold for certain; therefore in him there are not several numerical paternities corresponding to the plurality of sons. The consequent of the major is proved thus: as a son is constituted in the being of a son through filiation, so a father is constituted in the being of a father through paternity. Therefore just as through this filiation this is this son and through another filiation this is another son, so through this paternity this is this father and through another paternity this is another father — and according to the plurality of paternity it follows that there are several fathers, just as according to the plurality of filiation there are several sons.

The consequent of the major is to be denied; to its proof, the matter is clear from the second notable point: there are several sons according to the multiplication of filiation because not only the relation but also the suppositum is multiplied. But there are not several fathers, even though there are several paternities, because the suppositum is not multiplied — and so from the unity of the suppositum one father is denominated as having several sons, just as one is called one craftsman and one knowing person, although he has several arts and several sciences, as I explained in the second notable point, and as the Doctor sets out lucidly in (*Quol.11. §. De tertio sub H*).

You will object secondly: a genus by a single relation existing in it regards all its species subject to it, of which it is immediately predicated, as animal bears a single bearing to man and to beast. Therefore likewise a father regards all his sons begotten by him through a single paternity. Confirmation: one visual power tends toward all colors, one auditory power toward all sounds, one power of matter toward all forms, and one faculty of understanding toward all that is intelligible. Therefore one father is related to all sons procreated by him through a single paternity. Raconius in the place cited above responds to the first objection by denying the parity, saying that one species is not the total and adequate term of one genus; but one son is the adequate term of one active

generation — therefore a genus regards its species by a single relation, while this father is not related to all his sons by a single paternity. This response is consonant with Scotistic doctrine with regard to adequation of sufficiency — which suffices for the whole thing to exist — but not with regard to adequation of perfection, by which a thing exists in respect of every perfection owed to it, as was sufficiently explained elsewhere. But we can deny the antecedent, for no effective proof of it is offered by the Adversaries. To the confirmation I say that a power regards its common object adequately, but particular objects inadequately. Therefore each individual color is its partial and inadequate term — and the same is to be said of the objects of other powers. Nevertheless, the same cannot be said of the acts of those powers, because each act bears upon a term adequate to it: thus this or that active generation of the father has this or that son as its total and adequate term.

You will object thirdly: that from which a thing receives its being specifies it, as is clear from science, which is caused by its object and specified by the very same — as the Philosopher teaches (*3 de Anima Tex.33*); but a relation receives its being from the foundation, because it emanates and springs from it and then tends toward the term. Therefore a relation is specified by the foundation and is multiplied by its multiplication. I respond that although, as some recent author observes, the major admits of many instances — for a creature receives its being from God yet is not intrinsically specified by him, from (*4.dist.12.q.1. §.Ad quaest.F*); likewise an accident draws its being from the subject, though it is not individuated by it; again, intellection is caused by the intellect yet does not derive its specific distinction from it — nevertheless, granting the major, the minor is to be distinguished: from the foundation alone — I deny; from the foundation and the term — I concede, as Scotus clearly teaches (*3.dist.1.q.1. §.Ad illud in oppositum K*). For the relation is co-produced, or rather arises, upon the positing of both extremes. Indeed the dependence of a relation on the term appears more essential than on the foundation, as Bonetus notes (*libellus quarto de Relationibus §.Amplius autem de dependentia*) and Gadius of Bologna indicates after Scotus in the same place (*Quol.3*). The reason is that a relation essentially regards another, which is the term, and I demonstrated above that several relations exist in one foundation — which evidently shows that a relation depends more essentially on the term than on the foundation.

You will press: Scotus (*4.dist.12.q.2. §.Ad argumenta M*) expressly says that the dependence of a relation on the foundation is most essential. Therefore the dependence of the same on the term is not to be considered more essential. It can be said that both dependences are absolutely most essential, without either of which the relation can in no way exist; yet relatively speaking, dependence on the term is more essential than on the foundation, for the reason just presented. You will object fourthly: if someone procreates twins simultaneously, a single relation of paternity will accrue to him, because the generation of both is one; therefore even when he begets several sons successively, he acquires only one

paternity by which he regards them all — and so with the multiplication of terms, the relation is not multiplied in the same foundation. Confirmation I: one numerical son begotten by two parents — that is, father and mother — is related to both generators as to two terms by one numerical relation of filiation. Therefore one numerical relation existing in one foundation tends toward several terms. Confirmation II: the formal effect of paternity is to constitute the father in the being of a father, just as the formal effect of whiteness is to constitute the subject as white; but through the first relation of paternity to the first son the father is constituted in the being of a father, as no one denies. Therefore through the generation of a second son no new relation of paternity accrues to that father, since such a relation would be superfluous and would attain no formal effect.

I respond by denying the antecedent: just as the son is doubled and the relation of filiation is doubled, so a twofold relation of paternity arises in the same parent simultaneously procreating two children. For the parent has a twofold active generation and a twofold passive generation by which the two sons are denominated. To Confirmation I: I deny the antecedent. For as Scotus holds with Galen, the mother actively contributes to the generation of offspring — and the father and mother are two partial causes constituting one total cause. Therefore the son begotten by them regards them by a twofold relation of filiation — one toward the father and another toward the mother — and one is really distinguished from the other; and one can perish while the other remains, as Scotus (*3.dist.8.q.vii. §.Ad q*), Faber, and other Scotists in the same place teach. To Confirmation II: I say the major can be expounded in two ways. If it is understood that paternity is the ratio or accidental respective form through which a father is called a father and is referred to a son — just as whiteness is the absolute accident by reason of which a wall is denominated white — I concede this. If it is understood that a father having one numerical paternity through one numerical son begotten by him cannot have another paternity through another son begotten by the same, and as many as the sons he has begotten — I deny this, as has been effectively proved above. The unity of the former is compatible with the multiplicity of the latter, just as one God has several creatures, one sun has several effects, and one man has several properties. Especially so because just as a father through paternity is a father, so this father through this paternity is this father — yet it does not follow that through several paternities there are several fathers, because although paternity is multiplied, the suppositum is not multiplied, by reason of which one father is said to be one from what was said in the second notable point. Nor finally does it follow that through another paternity there is another father, for the same reason — since for the otherness of a father there is required not only the otherness of form but also the otherness of the suppositum having the form, as Scotus constantly and subtly teaches (*Quol.11.antè §.De quarto*).

Article VIII. Whether One Relation Can Found Another Relation

In this article there are precisely the same opinions as in the preceding one. The Thomists, with their leader Thomas (*1.p.q.42.art.1.ad 4*) and in other places cited by the recent authors, deny that one relation can be the foundation of another relation. On the other side, the Scotists with their Prince Scotus (*1.dist.19.q.1. §.Hic primo A; 2.dist.1.q.4. §.Ad quaest. istam sub N; Quol.3.P; Quol.6. §.De tertio X; 4.dist.6.q.10. §.Hic dicitur D*) affirm that one relation can be the foundation of another. With them agree Suárez (*disp.47.Met.sect.11.num.11*) and very many other recent authors.

It should be noted here that there is no doubt about the ultimate foundation, which is the substance — the support and sustaining basis of all absolute and relative accidents. Since a relation is an accident, it cannot be the ultimate foundation of a relation. The difficulty is therefore raised about the non-ultimate foundation in which a relation immediately inheres — so that the question is whether, just as a relation is founded in quantity or quality, another relation can be founded in one relation. And although a relation has a modest entity from what was said, this does not prevent one relation from being sustained by another; just as an absolute accident, which is weak — especially with respect to substance — can be supported by another absolute accident, such as whiteness, sweetness, and the like by quantity; and this is clearly evident in artificial things, in which we see with our own eyes some accidents existing in others. Suárez adds in the cited place that motion and time, although they are of diminished entity, can found a relation. Whether the relations of which one founds another are distinct can be raised as a dispute, which Lychetus settles with the Doctor (*§.Nunc solvenda sunt argumenta principalia*), saying that similarity is indeed really distinct from its foundation, while the otherness founded in that similarity is really identified with that very similarity. For it is repugnant for similarity to exist without the term of that otherness. Scotus intimates the same (*Quod.3. §.Respondeo P; Quol.6. §.De tertio X*), to whom Gadius, Tataretus, and their other expositors there adhere.

Assertion: One relation can be the foundation of another relation. Scotus expressly teaches this in the places just named, proving it first from Euclid (*5 Geometriae in initio*): proportionality is a similarity of two proportions; but proportion is a relation in which proportionality is founded, which is likewise a relation. Therefore one relation is founded upon another relation. Secondly, in an absolute accident an absolute accident is founded — as quality, for example whiteness, in surface. Therefore by equal right in a relative accident a relative accident is founded. The antecedent is clear from the preceding notable point. The consequence is proved: the unity of essence, according to Aristotle (*5.Met.cap.15*) and Scotus (*4.dist.6.q.10.antè §.Sed restat infra D*), is a sufficient reason for founding a relation of identity — whether generic or specific — between things of the same genus or species; but a relation brings with it a formal unity of essence, as we showed above. Therefore one relation can be supported by another relation. Thirdly, two paternities stand to each other as

two whitenesses, or two quantities, or two substances do; but between two whitenesses there is a relation of similarity, between two quantities a relation of equality or inequality, and between two substances a relation of identity or diversity — because they are of the same or different genus or species — therefore between two paternities there is likewise a relation of similarity. This argument seems to be a demonstration, to dissolve which no responses are adequate that the Thomists diligently employ, as can be seen in our younger members (*disp.8.q.5.art.2*) — especially those who deny the parity, claiming that between two paternities there is found only fundamental similarity, while between two whitenesses there is a formal similarity through the relative identity joined to them. Against this: two paternities are formally positive entities of the same species, formally positive — since they fall under the species of relation, which is a formally positive entity, as the same Thomists agree with us above. Therefore their conformity and similarity is formally real and positive, just as the similarity of two whitenesses is. Nor does it help to say with others that a relation is a weak and infirm being, unfit to sustain another — since this was already rejected above in the notable point. Furthermore, matter is considered by all Philosophers to be the most minimal being, almost nothing; yet it is constituted by them as the foundation of nature, the subject of all substantial and accidental forms. Therefore it is no obstacle that a relation — even though it is a weak being — can underlie another relation. Fourthly, things that are distinct found distinction: just as white things are white through whiteness and similar things are similar through similarity, so distinct things are distinguished through distinction; but relations are distinct — for even though they are of the same genus, they differ in species on account of the distinct differences into which the genus of relation itself is divided. Therefore they found distinction, and distinction is a relation. Finally, as Orbellus argues (*5.Met.cap.7*): identity and equality are relations between which there is an order, which is a relation. Therefore upon a relation another relation is founded. Add that to a relation belongs inherence — since, from what was said, a relation is an accident — and inherence, from Scotus cited above, is a relation. It is therefore rightly concluded that one relation exists in and is founded upon another.

You will object first: the Philosopher (*5.Met.cap.15*) mentions only three foundations of relation — namely substance, quantity, and quality. Therefore according to Peripatetic doctrine a relation does not found a relation. Confirmation from the same (*4.Met.T.4*): an accident does not accrue to an accident. Therefore a relation, which is an accident, does not accrue to a relation — that is, is not supported by a relation. I respond that Aristotle explicitly names those three foundations which are absolute; but implicitly he adds a fourth, which is the relation, as I intimated from Scotus above in the second proof. To the confirmation I say: explaining that passage of Aristotle thus — an accident does not accrue to an accident as to a subject and ultimate foundation — I

concede; as to a non-ultimate subject and foundation — I deny, as is sufficiently clear from the preceding notable point.

You will object secondly: St. Augustine (*7 de Trin.cap.5*) writes that everything that is said relatively is something, except the relative; but that something which is distinguished from the relative is absolute, since there is no medium between absolute and relative. Therefore a relation is founded only in an absolute thing. Confirmation: Scotus (*Quol.6.X*) adds: "perhaps one relation founds another relation." Therefore the teaching just set forth does not conform to the view of Scotus, who there speaks doubtfully and does not explain the testimony of Augustine in the opposite sense. I respond that St. Augustine speaks of the ultimate foundation, which is always something absolute — namely substance — or speaks of the foundation of the prior relations, but not of the posterior relations, which immediately have only something fixed and stable, as Lychetus excellently expounds (*ibid. sub fine §.Ibi ergo viso*). To the confirmation: I say that although there he speaks doubtfully, nonetheless in (*4.cit.*) and in (*Reportata 4.dist.6.q.9*) the Doctor speaks constantly and assertively, and there judges the opposite view to be false.

You will object thirdly: if one relation were to found another, a further relation would found another, and since there is no better reason for one than for another, there would be an infinite regress, which all Philosophers shun — especially in things ordered per se — with Aristotle (*2.Met.cap.2.T.5*). Therefore one relation does not appear to be the foundation of another. Confirmation I: a relation is the ratio of referring such that it is not itself referred; it is that *quo* in such a way that it is not the *quod* — just as whiteness is not white, place is not placed, and action is not acted upon. Therefore one relation is not founded in another. Confirmation II: Scotus (*4.d.6.q.10.sub E*) admits an infinite regress in relations of reason, which also seems to be conceded in real relations, since the Doctor himself (*2.dist.1.q.4.§.Contra istam opinionem B*) proves a real relation to be distinct from its foundation because a relation of reason is distinct from the foundation. From which the same Doctor infers (*Quol.1.§.De secundo art. infra P*): whatever real per se order would exist between things if they were really distinct, the same per se order exists between them correspondingly if they are distinguished by reason.

The consequent of the antecedent is denied, with Scotus (*2.4.cit.*). The terminus stands at second relations. For even though in two paternities the relation of similarity is founded, it does not then follow that another relation is also founded in that very relation of similarity. For just as in absolute accidents a certain terminus is given — as quality is founded in quantity and no further proceeding occurs — so in relative accidents a boundary is had that is not exceeded. To Confirmation I: I concede the antecedent and deny the consequence. For a relation is not referred but is the principle *quo* by which a relative is referred. And although in two paternities the relation of similarity is

founded, it does not then follow that another relation is founded in it and in those like it, because in any order of things one must arrive at an ultimate — as in differences, among which there are ultimate differences that differ through themselves, as Scotus teaches (*1.d.3.q.3. §.Ad q.igitur F*). Therefore all those things that Adversaries adduce as absurdities fall apart, and they can be examined in Lychetus (*praeallegatum §.Dicitur ab Henrico*). To Confirmation II: the parity is to be denied, with Scotus in (*4.cit.*). The reason is that any relation of reason can further found another relation of reason, since it depends on the intellect, which can carry out such a proceeding.

Article IX. Whether a Relation Terminates at an Absolute Thing

In this article Philosophers are divided into three groups. Some — such as Cajetan (*1.part.q.13.art.7*), Banez in the same place, and Augustine Niphus cited by Lychetus in (*Commentariis 1.dist.30.q.1*) — maintain that every relation, whether mutual or non-mutual, terminates at a relative. Joined to them are Fonseca (*5.Met.Sect.4.cap.15.q.4*) and the Complutenses (*in Log.q.6*). Others — such as Ferrariensis (*2.contra Gentes cap.11*), Ruvius (*in praesenti q.7*), and John of St. Thomas (*q.17.art.5*) — use a distinction to resolve this question, saying that a mutual relation regards a relative term, and a non-mutual relation regards an absolute term. Scotus (*1.dist.30.q.1. §.Respondeo igitur ad quaest. circa E and G; and in Reportata, same distinction and question*), Vigerius in the same place, Bonetus (*Libellus de Relationibus*), Fuentes (*q.16.difficultate 5.artic.4.dub.2*), Raconius (*Tract.2.de Categoria membro 2.art.4*), Suárez (*Tomo 2.Met.disp.47.Sect.16*), Hurtado (*disp.15.Met.sect.7*), and many others — even from among the Thomists, such as Capreolus (*1.dist.30.q.1.artic.2.ad 3*) and Socinus (*5.Met.q.30.ad 2 and 3*) — affirm that both kinds of relation, both mutual and non-mutual, tend toward an absolute term. Hence Fonseca in the place cited inadvisedly claimed that our view is rejected by all, when it is in fact more common and more probable than the opposite.

It should be noted first that in a relative — take for example a father — three things are considered: his substance, his power of generating, and his paternity. The first is called the subject of the relation, the second its foundation, and the third the relation itself. Similarly three things occur in a son — namely his substance, the passive power of generating, and his filiation. The question is now what among the last three items mentioned is the formal term in the son that terminates paternity: the substance of the son, or the passive power of generating, or the very relation of filiation itself? No one appears to make the substance of the son the formal and immediate term, since this can only be called the remote and mediate term and the ultimate subject of the said relation. The whole dispute among the aforementioned authors is about the other two — that is, whether paternity is immediately terminated at the passive power of generating, or at filiation. From this it is plainly evident that we are not speaking here of the material and radical term of the reason, as Ruvius and

some other Thomists suspect, but of the formal and immediate term toward which a relation formally and immediately bears. For the term of a non-mutual relation is not relative, since no relation arises from it — it is absolute, as Ruvius and the others cited above acknowledge along with us. Furthermore, relations are specified by the absolute formal term, and from it together with the foundation once posited, the relations themselves result. And if, per impossibile, in mutual relations no relation arose on the part of the term, that very relation, flowing from the foundation, would immediately and formally regard an absolute term. Again, the extreme and end that a relation regards is something absolute; for we shall show below that a relation bears from the foundation toward the term before a reciprocal relation proceeds from that term regarding the other extreme. Therefore the aforesaid distinction used by the Adversaries is of no use — except to evade, but not to eliminate, Scotus's arguments.

It should be noted secondly, from Aristotle (*5.Met.cap.15.T.20*), Scotus in the same place in the text and (*q.12 of the same work*), (*1.dist.3.q.5.§.Quantum ad hoc C and D*), (*Quol.13.§.Circa secundum*), and other places, that there are three modes of relatives, brought forward and carefully discussed by Bonetus in the present place and by Pelbartus cited above (§.10). The first is founded on one and many, such as the relations of identity and diversity, equality and inequality, similarity and dissimilarity. The second is founded on active and passive power, such as the relations of producer and produced, cause and effect, mover and movable. The third is founded on measure and measurable, such as the relations of intellect to intelligible, science to knowable. The relations of the first and second modes are called mutual, because from each extreme a relation arises; while the relations of the third mode are called non-mutual, because from one extreme indeed a real relation arises, but not from the other extreme — as from the side of science there plainly emanates a relation to the knowable, whereas from the side of the knowable there corresponds no real relation to science, as Lychetus observes with Vorrillone (*1.dist.30*) against Ockham, cited by Pelbartus in the place cited.

It should be noted thirdly that Scotus's doctrine about the absolute term of a relation is to be understood only of prior relations, and not of posterior relations, of which we made mention above in the notable point. For example, similarity, which stands between two white things, is founded in an absolute thing and terminates at an absolute thing; but the distinction between two similarities, or the similarity between two paternities — which is itself a relation — is founded in a relation and likewise terminates at a relation. Although this happens per accidens, insofar as its proximate foundation is a relation, as Raconius in the cited place rightly notes, after Suárez (*cit.num.14*). Furthermore, when a relation is said to be between two extremes, it should be understood that it is in one foundationally and subjectively, and in the other terminatively — not that one and the same numerical relation is in both extremes, as Henry thinks (*Quol.9.q.tertia*), somewhat in the manner in which Aristotle (*3.phys.T.21*) writes

that the road from Thebes to Athens and from Athens to Thebes is the same. For this cannot be maintained, since one and the same accident cannot exist in two really distinct and separated subjects, such as the extremes of a relation are. And the testimony of the Philosopher just adduced does not support Henry. For it is excellently explained by the Doctor (*4.dist.13.q.prima §.Ad huius autem infra L*) not of formal but of material unity and identity, which is compatible with formal plurality. Thus in motion the respect of the mover toward the moved and conversely of the moved toward the mover are formally distinct; similarly, the relation of the foundation toward the term is different from the relation of the term toward the foundation.

First Assertion: A non-mutual relation terminates at an absolute thing. So Scotus in the place cited above (*post E.G.*). It is proved first from Aristotle (*5.Met.c and T cit.*), who establishes the difference between relatives of the first and second modes, and those of the third mode, in that one of the relatives of the third genus is referred to another, but the other is not referred to it in return. But what is not referred to another is absolute; therefore since a relation of the third genus bears toward a term from which thereafter no relation arises toward what bears to it, it is clear through Aristotle that a relation of the third mode terminates at an absolute thing. Secondly, the relation of a creature to God is non-mutual, because there is no real relation of God to a creature, from Scotus recently cited. But God, whom such a relation of the creature regards as its term, is an absolute being. For as the Doctor says in the *Reportata*: if God were the sun, as some have suspected, there would still be a real dependence of created things upon him — which is a relation regarding him under an absolute ratio, since all confess that the sun is an absolute being. Therefore the term of a non-mutual relation is absolute. Thirdly, the relation of science to the knowable is of the third mode, from (*5.Met.loco allegato*). But the knowable, which is its term, is an absolute being, as is clear from natural body, which is the object and term of physics; from quantity, which is the term of mathematics; and from the objects of other disciplines, which are absolute entities. St. Thomas adds (*q.7 de potentia, artic.10.ad 4*), speaking of the relation of servitude of a creature to God himself, who is called Lord, that in God there is no orderly arrangement of lordship, even though he terminates the relation of that servitude. Therefore God is its term with respect to the real absolute being he has, not with respect to the respective being of lordship that he does not have. And so through St. Thomas a non-mutual relation regards an absolute term.

Banez (*1.part.q.13.artic.8*) meets these arguments in two ways. First, from Cajetan in the same place, who says that the relation of the knowable to science — which is also to be understood of the relation of God to a creature — is real solely from the fact that the relation of science to the knowable bears toward it. But this escape — and no true response to the preceding arguments — is rightly judged by Suárez, Hurtado, and other recent authors to be worthless. For either the relation is in the knowable, or it is not. If the first, then the knowable regards

science through its own proper relation existing in it, which Cajetan, along with other Philosophers, denies. If the second, then science does not tend toward a relative term, since there is no relation in it, as Cajetan himself concedes. Again, either the knowable is referred to science through the same relation by which science is referred to it — and this Banez holds to be false, thinking that in this way he lapses into the Scotist view, which he considers improbable — or through a different one, and this seems less acceptable, since the knowable has no real relation in itself to science, and such a relation of science would be non-mutual. Next, a relative through a relation inherent in itself is relative, just as a white thing through whiteness inherent in it is white; but no real relation exists in the knowable through which it terminates a relation as a relative term — therefore it terminates it as an absolute term. Furthermore, a relation presupposes extremes from whose positing it arises, and the knowable is conceived as terminating the relation of science before it receives a denomination from it. And so it terminates it not as a relative thing but as an absolute thing. All the more because even according to the Thomists, a relation has *esse in* and *esse ad*; but in the knowable the relation does not have *esse in*, because all its real being is in science, as they concede; therefore it does not have *esse ad* — and accordingly the knowable is not relative, and if it is not relative, as it truly is not, it can by no means be a relative term of science.

Banez responds secondly in the same place that the relation of the knowable to science is founded in the very same foundation in which is founded the relation of science to the knowable, so that science is the proximate foundation of two relations, of which one is real and the other rational. And he thinks this is what Aristotle intended in the cited place, intimating that the whole reason for founding both relations is really in science and not in the knowable. Against this: it is sufficient that there be in science its real relation by which it tends toward the knowable, as the Philosopher cited plainly teaches and Scotus expounds (*Quol.13.ad finem articulo secundo sub V*). This is supported by the argument that in one relative only one relation is found by which it regards its correlative, as is clear from father and son and the like. Therefore whichever of the two relations posited by Banez in science to escape the force of the argument is superfluous — not the one that is science's toward the knowable, which everyone admits; therefore the other, which is the knowable's toward science. Furthermore, a form intrinsically affecting a subject denominates the subject with an intrinsic denomination, as paper is denominated white through whiteness inhering in it. Therefore if the relation of the knowable were truly in science, science would be the knowable through the relation of the knowable existing in science — which is false. Again, science would be referred twice to the knowable — once through a real relation and once through a relation of reason — because since a relation has *esse in* and *esse ad*, if there is a twofold relation in science in which it has *esse in*, it has *esse ad*, which is proper to a relation. Again, the knowable would not be the correlative of science, as the same Doctor holds with Cajetan, because a

correlative is so through a relation adhering to it by which it corresponds to the other correlative, as the name itself indicates; but through Banez the knowable has no relation in itself by which it regards science, since both relations are in science. Add that the same Author, in responding to the authority of St. Thomas cited above, acknowledges that the relation of lordship is in God — a relation of reason belonging to him through the operation of the intellect. By parity he must concede that a relation of reason is in the knowable, just as shortly before he had conceded it to be the relative form through which the knowable is referred to science. But if he admits this relation of reason — as he truly does admit it along with others of the same school — it is then attacked from Scotus (*1.dist.30.q.2.sub G*): the relation of reason of the knowable to science is not the ratio for terminating the relation of science to the very knowable; for a relation is not in the knowable except when it is actually considered by the intellect, whereas science is really referred to the knowable even if not considered by the intellect. Therefore that rational relation in the knowable is not the ratio for terminating the relation of science. This is also clear from the relation of lordship, which is a relation of reason attributed to God in correspondence with the relation of servitude of a creature to God — which belongs to God independently of any operation of the intellect; whereas a relation of reason requires the operation of the intellect. A relation of reason, therefore, is not the ratio for terminating a real relation of the third mode. Nor does it help Banez to say that certain beings of reason have being before and outside the operation of the intellect. For this is impossible, since a being of reason — such as a relation of reason — depends on the work of the intellect both in its being and in its becoming, as I shall say elsewhere.

Second Assertion: A mutual relation likewise terminates at an absolute thing. Scotus holds this in the places mentioned. It is proved first from Aristotle (*9.Met.cap.7.T.13*): a potency, which is opposed to act, is defined through act; and every relative is defined through its term, from (*6.Top.cap.2.loco 45*). Therefore either potency terminates at act under an absolute ratio — and the intended conclusion is had — or under a relative ratio: in which case act and potency would be simultaneously defined — potency through act and act through potency — and the same thing would be both prior and posterior to itself, and a circle would be committed in the definition of each, as the Doctor infers with Averroes in the (*Quol.nuper.cit.*). Therefore every relation bears toward a term as an absolute thing. Suárez (*ibid.num.34*) makes little of this argument, saying that the inconveniences can easily be avoided in transcendental relatives, and that concomitantly, just as relatives are simultaneous in cognition, so they are simultaneous in definition. However, Scotus uses such an argument to show that his view is consonant with the doctrine of Aristotle, as he does in other matters. And the Doctor asserts this not only to avoid the said inconveniences, but for the thing itself — that is, because a relative bears toward its term precisely under an absolute ratio — as he himself subtly proves in the first place cited (*F*), from

whom much of what Suárez says is borrowed. Secondly, the extremes are presupposed to the bearing and relation that arises from them, just as causes are presupposed to their effect which is produced by them. But a mutual relation is the bearing of the extremes — that is, of the foundation and term from which it results; for when these are posited it is posited, and when these are removed it perishes. Therefore a relation of the foundation presupposes and pre-requires the term no less than the foundation, since it arises from the positing of both; therefore a mutual relation does not terminate at a relative thing but at an absolute thing — especially because mutual relations are simultaneous by nature, and so one cannot be the term of the other, since the term must necessarily be presupposed to it so that the relation arises from its positing and accrues to the term as term, and conversely the term is referred, as Scotus teaches in the cited place (§. *Respondeo sub G*). Thirdly, paternity and filiation are mutual relations of the second mode, founded on active and passive power; but the effect of the generating power or cause is the substance of the son begotten — which is why it is called substantial generation, because its term is the substance produced by it. Therefore a relation regards an absolute term. Even if per impossibile in these relatives God were to prevent the term from being referred to the other extreme, with the term remaining, the relation would undoubtedly have the term itself as absolute. This hypothetical can be confirmed from St. Thomas (3.part.q.25.art.quinto), Cajetan, and others in the same place, who affirm that the Blessed Virgin is referred to Christ the Lord by a real relation of maternity, while Christ himself is not referred to his Mother by a real relation. All the more so because the ratio of terminating is not the ratio of referring, as Bassolis and Bargius note above others (*dist.30 of the first*), and this is clear in non-mutual relations, in which there is a ratio of terminating on the part of one extreme, but no ratio of referring. Therefore the term of a relation is not relative.

You will object first: Aristotle in this chapter expressly seems to assert that the term of a relation is relative; for he says there that relatives are said to convert, as a slave is a slave of a master and a master is a master of a slave. And he adds that they are not said to convert if, instead of that to which they stand, something accidental to them is assigned — as if instead of the term of slave one assigns "man" or "biped." Therefore according to Aristotle a relation terminates at a relative thing. Confirmation: relatives are simultaneous by nature, as the same Philosopher states in the same place; but if one relative did not terminate at another relative, they would not be simultaneous by nature — for the relation of paternity in the father would be prior to the relation of filiation in the son, since being a father is prior to having a son, as every cause is prior to its effect. Therefore a relation does not tend toward an absolute thing.

I respond that Aristotle there only wants relatives to reciprocate by reason of the mutual relations that arise from their extremes, and that with those relations removed, whatever else may remain, there is no further reciprocation between

the said relatives. For just as with whiteness removed from a wall, the wall is no longer white and no longer similar to another white wall, so with the relation of slave to master removed, the one who through that relation was a slave is no longer a slave — and conversely, whatever else may endure in him. Therefore the Philosopher by no means holds that a relation terminates at a relation; for it is one thing for relatives to mutually regard each other, and another for them to terminate — as Lychetus (*cit. §. Respondeo*) and Tataretus here (*scibili quarto*) rightly observe, and as I showed above that the ratio of referring is distinct from the ratio of terminating. To the confirmation: granting the major, I deny the minor. To its proof I distinguish with Scotus (*q. 27. praedicam. propè finem, and primo praecit. F and G*): if relatives are taken fundamentally — that is, with respect to their absolute entities in which a relation is founded — I concede, for in this way the suppositum of the father is prior to the suppositum of the son. But if they are taken formally — that is, with respect to their relative forms — I deny. Just as a genus materially taken is prior to a species, while formally speaking it is simultaneous by nature with the species, as the Englishman (*9. 21. universalium, fol. 91. colum. 3*) observes among others.

You will object secondly: if a mutual relation terminated at an absolute thing, there would be no difference between a mutual relation and a non-mutual one, since both would tend toward an absolute term; but there is a difference between the said relations, as is established from the preceding assertions. Therefore a relation does not regard an absolute term. The consequent of the major is to be denied; for these relations differ in that in non-mutual relations, from the part of one extreme no real relation arises, while in mutual ones, from each extreme a real relation results.

You will press: in all relatives there is a mutual relation if they are conveniently assigned. Therefore the response just given is of no weight. The antecedent is proved: all relatives are said to convert — as science is the science of the knowable, and the knowable is the knowable of science. Likewise the sense is the sense of the sensed, and the sensed is the sensed of the sense, as the Philosopher indicates in the cited place. I deny the antecedent. To its proof I admit that all relatives are said to convert; but I deny that in relatives of the third mode there are mutual relations. For although science bears a real relation toward the knowable, the knowable does not in return bear a real relation toward science. Hence it is denominated the correlative of science not by an intrinsic but by an extrinsic denomination, because there is no real relation in the knowable by which it regards science — as Lychetus recently cited (*§. Respondeo ad rationes Ocham.*) hands down from Aristotle (*5. Met. praecit.*).

You will object thirdly: correlatives are simultaneous in cognition by the common consensus of Philosophers — one who definitively knows one relative knows definitively the other too, as the Philosopher just recounted states; as one who knows a father also knows a son. Therefore a relation terminates at a

relative. The consequence is proved I: if it terminated at an absolute thing, one would necessarily have to know the absolute thing at which it terminates, which conflicts with Aristotle in the place mentioned. Confirmation: one relative is defined through another relative, as Porphyry adds after Aristotle in (*cap. de specie*), where he defines genus through species and species through genus, which the Doctor observes in (*primo allegato sub E*). Therefore one relative is the term of another relative.

Granted and explained, the antecedent — that is, that knowing one relative, the other is easily reached — I deny the consequence, in the interpretation of Tataretus, and I admit its proof. For since the cognition of a relation depends on its extremes, it is therefore necessary that its extremes be known beforehand, as Scotus says (*Quol.14.*). Nor does this contradict Aristotle, as will shortly be made plain. To the confirmation: I say this comes about not through correlation but through the foundation — especially because the definition of relatives is given not through essential elements but through an addition; for just as in the definitions of accidents their subject is placed, so in the definitions of relatives their correlatives are placed, as the Doctor rightly notes (*q.18.praedicam.§.Hoc potest concedi*).

It will be pressed: the Doctor in the place just cited says that the essence of a relative is to bear toward another; but that toward which a relative bears is its correlative; therefore a relative terminates at a correlative. I say that this instance indeed concludes that a relative refers to its correlative, but not that it terminates at its correlative — since, from what was said, to be referred is one thing and to be terminated is another. It will be urged: relatives are opposites and one of them regards the other, as is clear from the chapter on opposites; but this mutual regard is derived from the ratios of referring and terminating that relatives have with respect to each other; therefore the term of a relation is relative. Granting the major, the minor is denied. The mutual and opposite regard comes from the fact that from each extreme a real relation arises; even if from the part of one extreme no real relation arose, the relation of the other extreme would tend toward it — but it would not in turn be referred. Therefore the mutuality and opposition of respect is derived only from the opposing ratio of referring, not from the ratio of terminating.

It is argued again: the divine relations of origin are borne toward relative terms; therefore the same is to be said of created relations. The consequence holds because the same reason runs through both. The antecedent is clear: paternity terminates at the Son, who is a suppositum formally relative — and the same is to be maintained of the other personal relations. I say this instance is of no force in the view of those who affirm that the divine persons are constituted by absolutes — a view that Scotus shows to be not improbable and not heretical (*1.dist.16.q.vn.*), on behalf of John of Ripa who defended it. In the common opinion, however, affirming that the divine persons are formally constituted by

such relations, the antecedent is conceded and the consequence is denied. The reason for the disparity is that a created person is absolute, while an uncreated person is formally relative — therefore it is no wonder that its term is relative. And this also occurs in created things when the foundation of a relation is itself a relation, as I noted above.

You will object fourthly: if a relation tends toward an absolute thing, a substance — which is an absolute being — would be a relative being, because what a relation terminates at is considered relative, as is clear from the knowable, the sensible, and the like; but it is impossible for substance to be relative, as Aristotle asserts in the present place. And even if substance were conceded to be relative, all things too would have to be conceded to be relative — which absurdity is adjudged by Aristotle and later Philosophers alike. I respond by distinguishing the major: formally and quidditatively — I deny; accidentally and denominatively — I concede. The minor is to be distinguished correspondingly to the distinction of the major, and so Aristotle and the rest of the Philosophers are explained when they deny that substance is relative.

Article X. Whether the Same Thing Can Be Referred to Several Things

This difficulty is extensively treated by Scotus (*q.29.praedicam.*), Bonetus (*lib.4.de Relationibus*), Orbellus, Anthony Andrée, and others, (*5.Met.*) — a question that the Philosopher touches upon there (*T.20.6.15*) — for whose explanation and resolution it should be noted from Scotus (*cit. §.Ad istud dici potest*): something can belong to something else in two ways: in one way, per se primarily; in another way, per se not primarily. What belongs to something with respect to its formal and specific ratio is said to belong to it per se primarily — that is, adequately; so having three angles belongs per se primarily to a triangle. What belongs to another in respect of some formal ratio, though not a specific one, is said to belong to it per se not primarily — as having three angles belongs per se not primarily to an isosceles triangle. It should further be noted with Bonetus in the cited place that this doubt can be understood of a relation of the same or of a different mode. Moreover, recall from what was said in Article VI of this question that something can be referred to several things through several relations contained in it — as a father is referred by as many paternities as there are sons begotten by him.

Assertion: The same thing can be referred to several mutually distinct things by several relations contained in it; but by a single relation it is referred to only one thing adequately with respect to its proper ratio. This is handed down by Scotus in the passage recalled, for both parts. The first part is proved first from Aristotle (*4.Top.cap.1 and 2*) and Porphyry (*c.de specie*), who affirm that a species is referred to the genus under which it is comprehended and to the individuals of which it is predicated. Therefore the same thing can be referred to several things by several relations existing in it. Secondly, one whiteness is

referred to another whiteness by similarity and to blackness by dissimilarity; the same science is referred to the same knowable insofar as it is distinguished from it and caused by it, by a relation of the first and second mode, and insofar as it is measured by the same knowable, by a relation of the third mode; and a father is compared to the several sons he has begotten. Therefore the same thing can regard several things according to the several relations it has in itself. The second part is proved first from Aristotle (*5.Met.Tex.cit.*), who considers it absurd for one thing to be said twice — that is, for one thing per se primarily, as Scotus expounds it, to be referred to two altogether different things. Secondly, producing by one production is referred to the produced, as one father by one paternity regards one son. Therefore the same thing, with respect to the same mode, per se primarily is not referred to several things. Furthermore, one and the same thing has one essential and quidditative definition, as we observed in (*lib.2.q.de genere*); and the reason is that the definition of a thing makes known its nature — and there is only one nature and quiddity of one thing. Finally, a relation is specified by its term. Therefore one relation regards one term only. The antecedent is shown in Article VI of this question. I add that a relative is defined through its correlative. Therefore the same thing cannot be referred to several things by a single relation existing in itself.

You will object first: Aristotle in the passage recently cited writes that intellection is not referred to the intellect, but is referred to the object understood. Therefore according to Aristotle the same thing cannot be referred to several things — otherwise intellection would be referred to the intellect as its efficient cause and also to the object as its measure. Since therefore Aristotle denies that intellection is referred to the intellect, he by all means denies that one thing can be compared to several things. I respond: if intellect is taken for the intellective power, it is true that intellection is not referred to the intellect itself by a relation of the third mode — that of the measurable to the measure; but it is referred by a relation of the second mode to the intellect, as to its effective cause. But if intellect is taken for the object understood, then intellection is referred to the object understood as measurable to the measure. So intellection regards both — not by one and the same but by a distinct and different relation. In this sense Scotus seems to interpret Aristotle (*Quol.13.antè §.De tertio art.X*).

You will object secondly: if the same thing could be referred to two things, the same thing would be defined by a twofold definition with respect to those two things it regards; but the same thing cannot be defined by a twofold definition — otherwise the same thing could be both known and unknown, known through one definition and unknown if the other definition were not had. Granting the major, I deny the minor. To its proof I say that with respect to the same thing no two descriptions can be given; but with respect to different things there is no obstacle, as is clear from (*lib.2.q.2.art.1*). I add that there is only one definition through the proper essence of a thing; another, through a property of the thing or some accident of it, is called a description.

Article XI. Whether a Relation Requires an Existing Term

Some — such as Paul Soncinas, it seems, and Gregory of Rimini (*1.dist.28.q.3 and 5.Met.q.7*), to whom Arriaga (*disp.12.sect.10*) and two Scotist fellow-travellers (*disp.8.q.6.art.1*) seem to favor — think that a relation does not necessarily require a term existing in act. The opposite view is defended by Scotus (*1.d.21.q.vn. §.Ad q videtur dicendum; Quol.6. §.de 3.art; 3.dist.1.q.1. §.Ad illud in oppositum*), Lychetus in the same place, and nearly all the other Scotists and Thomists, asserting that a relation necessarily requires an existing term.

It should be noted that this difficulty is raised chiefly about both transcendental and predicamental relations, and about aptitudinal and actual relations, of which the Doctor makes mention (*Quol.13. §.Circa secundum sub O*). An aptitudinal relation coincides with the property or propensity of a thing, which is really identified with the thing of which it is a property. An actual relation is a tendency or respect actually existing, which actually bears toward an actual term — as paternity, by which someone is actually a father, regards the son begotten by him as actually existing. This is intimated by the Doctor (*1.dist.30.q.2. §.Contra istam opinionem antè A; 2.dist.1.q.4.in fine §.Et quia antè D; in Reportat.2.dist.1.q.6; 1.dist.17.q.2.sub O*).

First Assertion: Aptitudinal relations do not require a real term actually existing. So Scotus in the cited place and Orbellus (*5.Met.in fine c.*). It is proved first: aptitudes and properties of things are, from Scotus in the cited place, real aptitudinal and fundamental relations, which are really identified with the things of which they are properties, from the same (*ibid.dist.16.q.vn. §.Ideò dico*); but such aptitudinal respects can exist without their acts and terms — as risibility, or the power of laughing, without laughter, or the act of laughing. Therefore aptitudinal relations do not require real terms actually existing. Secondly, supposing that there were no color toward which sight could bear, there would still be in man the power and aptitude for seeing — but there would be no actual vision, nor its actual term, by the given hypothesis; but the aptitude for seeing is an aptitudinal relation, as I noted above. Furthermore, the Eucharistic accidents have an aptitudinal inherence toward their subjects — namely the substances of bread and wine — in which, thus divinely separated, they do not actually inhere, yet they have the aptitude for inhering in them, as the Doctor writes (*4.dist.12.q.1. §.Ad q. and §.Ad argumenta principalia*). Therefore aptitudinal relations can exist without their equal terms. It is not unknown to me that the two Scotist fellow-travellers in the cited place think these relations to be formally real and actual, because all properties that consist in such aptitudinal respects toward their conforming acts are real. And the potency of matter, insofar as it regards possible forms to be introduced and drawn out, is real, formal, and actual. But their opinion is not to be followed or approved, since it conflicts with Scotus, the chief Scotists, and reason. For Scotus (*Quol.13.sub O*) calls the said relations real potential and aptitudinal, and adds (*sub*

P): "a relation cannot more truly have being than the term toward which it is." But the terms of those relations are potential, aptitudinal, and possible — therefore those same relations are equally potential, aptitudinal, and possible. And shortly after he intimates that they are real on the part of the foundation and rational on the part of the term. The same is nearly the same as what he holds (*4.dist.12.q.1. §.Ad q.respondeo B and §.Ad argumenta principalia A*), saying that the inherence of an accident — both actual and aptitudinal — is a relation, but with this difference: the former is in act, the latter in aptitude. Whence Vallo rightly adds (*Tract. formalitatum fol.106*) that an aptitudinal relation has an aptitudinal term proportionally corresponding to it. And the constant doctrine of Scotus (*Quol.6. §.De tertio sub L.L. and elsewhere*) is that a real actual relation arises from real actual extremes. Since then the terms of aptitudinal relations are not real and actual, it clearly follows that those relations are not real and actual — as their very name also indicates, and as does their difference from actual respects. Again (*4.d.6.q.10. §.Sed restant H*): "a non-being cannot be the foundation or reason for founding any real relation, nor the term — for on this account it is held to be a contradiction, and a relation of reason, because it has a foundation or term that is a negation." And the same mind is openly expressed in (*Quol.6. §.De tertio sub LL. and elsewhere*) that a real actual relation results from extremes actually posited and actually existing. This is openly defended by Bassolis (*3.d.8.q.1.art.1*), Bonetus in the cited place, Faber (*5.Met.disp.22*), and other more distinguished Scotists, whose chief argument is that a relation is essentially toward another as toward a term; but what is not a being, or is a being only in potency, is not properly another, as the Doctor clearly shows (*dist.6.quarti q.10. §.cit.H*) and also (*Quol.13*). Again (*dist.12.q.1 of the same Sentences*), the same Doctor adds that a relation is essentially the bearing between two extremes; therefore if the term toward which the relation is directed is removed, that relation too is removed — it being a relation that emanates from the said extremes. And it is plain there, and in (*1.dist.5.q.1*), that Scotus speaks of the bearing toward an actual term, in the existence of which the relation exists, and in the non-existence of which the relation does not exist. The foundation of the aforementioned recent authors is groundless, because the properties of things, the potency of matter, and the like are called potential and fundamental relations — that is, as the Doctor teaches (*Quol.cit.*), from the part of one extreme or of the foundation, which is real, they are called real; but not from the part of the non-existing term, by reason of which they are called rational — as Lychetus, Gadius, and the rest of his interpreters affirm there, and as those authors also acknowledge at the beginning of (*q.1*).

Second Assertion: Mutual predicamental relations require a real actual term.

The Doctor holds this in the places cited above. It is proved first: a predicamental relation has its whole being toward another, as is clear from its definition delivered by Aristotle in the chapter *Ad aliquid* — he there rejecting the definition of relatives given by the ancient Philosophers. Therefore a mutual

predicamental relation requires that other toward which it actually bears; but that other, which it actually regards, is its term, as is plain. Therefore it is not to be denied that a predicamental relation requires an actual term. Secondly, a predicamental relation pre-requires and presupposes co-existing extremes from whose simultaneous positing it arises — as an effect from its cause. Relatives mutually posit and regard one another, mutually destroy and eliminate one another; they are simultaneous by nature and cognition, and are said to convert. But these things cannot obtain without the actual existence of the term. Thirdly, if a predicamental relation were to tend toward a possible term, as the authors of the first view assert, a man who has never procreated sons would be a father through relations to as many sons as he could generate — since a father is constituted in the being of a father through a relation to a son. But this bears open falsity and absurdity — as, for example, that Christ the Lord would be a father through respects to the sons he was able to generate. Likewise the Blessed Virgin would be a mother through relations to other sons she was able to bear besides Christ, whom she truly brought forth as her only-begotten. Similarly, a maiden not yet married would be married through a relation to a possible man she could take as her husband — absurdities and the like, which no one of sound mind fails to see.

Arriaga in the place cited (*n.50*) tries to reconcile both views with a distinction, saying that Gregory is wrong in the matter but right in manner of speaking. For it is customary to say "this is the son of Francis," even though Francis may have died. Likewise "this evil man is an image of Antichrist," even though Antichrist has not yet come. But Philosophers consider not only the manner of speaking but chiefly the thing itself and its truth — for in this way the serious difficulties proposed for resolution in Philosophy would easily be evaded, if they were deflected into a manner of speaking, especially since manner of speaking pertains more to the grammarian than to the philosopher. And if Arriaga admits this, he should also confess that the view of Suárez — rejected by Arriaga himself — is true, namely that a relation is wholly in the foundation, which is to be refuted at length in the next article.

You will object first: Aristotle in this chapter writes that the heating thing is referred to the heatable, and the acting thing in act to the patient in potency. But such relations are predicamental, mutual, and of the second mode of relatives. Aristotle therefore holds that a predicamental relation terminates at a term not existing in act. Confirmation: some real predicamental relations exist that lack real terms actually existing — as Scotus notes with Tataretus (*in praesenti c.*) in (*Quod.lib.13.*); and this may be argued from the relation of distinction, by which a form differs from its privation, and from the relation of creation, which creation itself bears toward the non-being of the thing immediately preceding it, as the Doctor teaches (*Quod.cit.N*). Likewise from the relation of information toward the non-information immediately preceding it, from (*2.dist.1.q.5.antè T*; *4.dist.11.q.1.F*) and other places, in which the same Doctor

seems to concede that some real and predicamental relations do not tend toward actually existing terms. I respond: if those extremes are actually existing, their relation indeed is real; but if one or both is in potency and a non-being, their relation is not real — and so Aristotle in the cited place is to be interpreted, and he intended no more there, as some recent author asserts. And it is the express view of Scotus (*Quol.12.¶.De 2.art sub E*): "The first respect, which is that of being itself toward the preceding non-being, is not real, because it is not toward a positive term." And in (*Reportata of the first, dist.30.q.2*). By this the reply to the confirmation is also clear: for in the places cited from Scotus the opposite is evident — especially (*Quol.praeallegato sub P*): "when the term does not have real being but only being in the intellect, then toward it there can be only a relation of reason; for a relation cannot more truly have being than the term toward which it is." And this is deduced from (*4.dist.13.q.1.sub V*).

You will object secondly: that from which a thing draws its entity draws its reality from the same, as is clear; but a relation draws its entity from the foundation, because it is caused by it; therefore also its reality — and accordingly, with no real term existing, a relation is real, its reality derived from its foundation. Confirmation: Logic is a real science, even though its term, which is its object — namely the syllogism — is a being of reason. Furthermore, there is real science about a non-existing rose; but science has a real relation of the third mode toward the knowable object. Therefore it is not necessary for the term to be a real actual one in order for a relation to be real. Granting the major, I distinguish the minor: a relation has being from the foundation, to the exclusion of the term — I deny; from the foundation, with the term posited — I concede. This response is Scotus's (*in Reportat.4.dist.6.q.9.¶.Dico igitur*): "There can be no intrinsically accruing respect that can arise from the foundation alone without the term being posited, because nothing is referred to itself." And (*dist.12.q.1.¶.Ad quaest.dico and ¶.Ad aliud dicitur*) and (*Quol.12.art.2*). And this is openly clear from the conditions for a real relation set out as necessary by the Doctor in (*1.dist.31.q.3.Reportata and Quol.6.¶.De tertio; 1.dist.31.q.vn.¶.Ad q.*). And this perhaps, forgetting what they had said earlier, the aforementioned recent authors accept a little later, providing the difference between a predicamental and a transcendental relation — that the latter requires a possible term while the former requires a real term actually existing. To the confirmation: a response was given in (*lib.1.q.2.artic.2*).

You will object thirdly: an aptitudinal and transcendental relation does not necessarily require a real term really existing, as has been proved in the first conclusion. Therefore neither does a predicamental relation, since in both cases the reason appears to be the same, as Suárez labors to show with many arguments (*cit.num.5.6*). Confirmation: one thing can terminate another even if it does not exist, as is clear from a final cause, which terminates toward its effect even if the effect does not yet exist. Granting the antecedent, I deny the consequence: the reason for the disparity is that a transcendental and potential

relation is really identified with the foundations in which they are founded; whereas a predicamental relation really differs from the foundation that sustains it, and therefore unless a really existing term is present the relation does not accrue to the foundation. Furthermore, a transcendental relation regards even a possible term; but a predicamental relation — since it necessarily arises from the positing of the foundation and term — necessarily presupposes a positive term actually existing, as Scotus writes (*in Report.primi dist.30.ad finem q.2*). To the confirmation: I deny that a relation is properly real unless its term really exists; the Doctor gives this reason in (*Reportat.4.dist.6.q.9.§.Dico igitur*): because nothing is referred to itself, but to another, which is a positive term. The same had been expressed in the same work (*primi dist.31.q.2.§.Supponendo*), and Suárez defends it (*ibid.num.18*), following Bassolis (*1.dist.30.q.1.art.1*), Meyronnes, Tataretus, and other students of Scotist doctrine, to whom our recent authors seem to consent (*q.3.art.1 of the same disputation*).

It will be pressed: the relations of images, which lack actual terms — as the relation of an image to Caesar who has now died is a relation of similarity to a non-existing term — and such relations are enumerated by Aristotle (*5.Met.cap.de relatione*). Therefore a predicamental relation does not require a term actually existing. I respond: Aristotle there did not teach that the said relations are predicamental, as Fuentes observes (*q.16.diff.5.art.2*); Lychetus adds that they are not real; and this is deduced from the Doctor (*ibid.§.Ad quaest.2.N*) in these words: "to the second, in a similar manner, since the being of an exemplated thing is only being in a qualified sense (*esse secundum quid*), and therefore the bearing toward such a term is not real, just as the term is not real."

You will ask whether a relation is a thing or a mode. The Doctor responds (*in 2.cit.§.Quod si adhuc proterviaur D*): such a question is almost entirely about a name. For a relation absolutely speaking is a being and a thing — it is contained under that division of being into absolute and relative, as is clear from (*5.Met.T.14*), and likewise under the other distribution of being into substance and accident, and similarly of accident into absolute and respective, speaking of a created relation, which is comprehended under finite being. Comparatively, however, a relation can be called a mode, insofar as a relation is an accident more imperfect than an absolute accident. Thus quality is called a mode with respect to substance, which is nobler than it, even though quality absolutely speaking is a thing. That the same thing can be named in different ways — as thing and as mode — is clear from St. Augustine (*lib.1.de doctrina Christiana cap.1*), who writes that a sign as sign is something, but is also a mode of the signified. From these things one may gather the distinction that exists between a relation and its extremes, and what distinction exists between two real predicamental relations — namely a real distinction, because it exists between thing and thing; and it could be called modal, if a relation is conceded to be a mode, as was explained above. I note, however, that this manner of speaking is not in use in the School of the Subtle Doctor. For modal distinction is used in one sense by

our party, and is taken in another sense by Doctors outside the school of Scotus, as the undivided Scotists also note (*disp.8.q.3.art.1*).

Article XII. Whether the Essence of a Relation Is Wholly in the Foundation

Suárez (*disp.47.Met.Sect.2.num.25*) cites certain recent authors commonly called Connotators as holding that the whole essence of a relation is in the foundation, and that the term is required for it not as something formal and essential to its being but only as something connotated and oblique. They appear to have been preceded by Alensis (*5.Met.ad Tex.20*), Henry (*Quol.9.q.2*), and Baccus (*1.dist.28.q.1.dub.3*). This opinion is fully and well refuted by the abovementioned authors following Scotus in the places adduced in the previous article, and by other Doctors both ancient and recent, who commonly affirm that a relation essentially depends on the term and arises together with the positing of the foundation when the term is also posited. Vitadus (*disp.15.Met.sect.3*), Arriaga (*disp.12.Log.sect.8*), and Fuentes (*q.16.diff.3.art.1*).

What I said in (*Epitome lib.1.q.1.art.6*) about the concrete and connotative name — which has a twofold signification, one primary and another secondary, treated at length in (*lib.3.nostra Logica q.2.art.5*) — should be recalled. Since, however, the significations of terms cannot be proved, as Gadius warns from Scotus (*1.dist.1.q.3.¶.Quod autem, Quol.12.fol.125.pag.3*), but must be drawn from the usage of approved authors, it should not be omitted — from what was said in the cited place — that a concrete accidental name does not differ from an adjective, nor much or at all from a connotative name, as Tataretus touches upon (*Tract.7.summularum comm.1.scibili 2*). Nor is the Doctor far from this (*4.dist.12.q.1.¶.Ad argumenta principalia*). For since to connote means nothing other than to note one thing together with another, it follows from the force of the word that a connotative term is one that notes one thing together with another — one material, which is the subject, and another formal, which is the form inhering in the subject, as was explained in the cited place. But connotation can occur in two ways: in one way, by reason of the object, when a form is signified as attaining the object toward which it bears — so vision, intellection, and the like are called connotative because they signify qualities or cognitions and connote the known objects, of which Scotus makes mention (*Quol.12.13*). In another way, by reason of the term, when one thing is signified dependently on another because one cannot perfectly exist or be understood without the other — so principally the form is signified, and less principally the subject of the form that it connotes, or something else — as "lunch" signifies per se the eating and connotes midday time. Therefore, since a relative per se regards its term, it clearly follows that it is not a connotative name, as Suárez mentioned above wrongly thinks with certain others. And this is noted by our younger members at the end of the cited article, yet in (*1.p.suarum Inst.Tract.1.cap.3*) they take as an example a father who is said to connote a son in

the aspect of a term — which does not seem to have been said consistently. This is also intimated by Gadius with Scotus (*Quol.8 and 12.art.2 and antè q.8.praedicam.*). Furthermore, note the common Scotist assertion that relations are specified by their terms, which is derived from the definition of relatives given by the Philosopher in the chapter *Ad aliquid*. For the whole being of relatives is toward another — that is, toward the term — and a relation is the bearing or respect toward another. Therefore relations are specified by their terms, somewhat in the way motion is specified by the term toward which, and powers by their acts, and acts by their objects, as is clear from (*2 de Anima T.33*). All the more so because in one foundation several specifically distinct relations can exist — as in the same whiteness the relations of similarity with another whiteness and of dissimilarity with blackness. Although the foundation is the cause of the relation, the distinction of the relation is nevertheless not derived from it, as the undivided companions of the Scotist philosophical course think (*dist.8.q.10.art.1*); for just as from God and the sun, as efficient causes, the essential differences of the things they produce are not derived, so too. But such a distinction of a relation from the term is not an intrinsic essential distinction but an extrinsic one, as was noted in Article VII of this question, nota III, with Scotus there cited and (*5.Met.q.12*).

Assertion: A relation does not have its whole being in the foundation, such that with the term perishing, the whole relation would still persist in the foundation itself. This is taught without doubt by Scotus and his disciples in the places cited above, and more expressly in both works (*quarti dist.12.q.1. conclusione prima circa D*): "A respect is essentially the bearing between two extremes, and therefore just as to remove the term toward which the respect is, is to remove or destroy the respect; so to remove that of which the respect is, is to remove the respect and destroy the ratio of a respect." And in the same place (*sub N*) he adds: "for if only the foundation were posited without the term, there would follow no respect." It is proved first: relatives are simultaneous by nature and by cognition, and when one is destroyed the other too is destroyed, from Aristotle in this chapter. But if the whole relation were to persist in its essential and quidditative being in the foundation after its term is destroyed, one relative would exist while the other does not. Therefore the aforesaid assertion of the Peripatetics would be false. The minor is easy to prove: just as what has whiteness is white, so what has a relation is relative; but with the term non-existing, the foundation has the whole relation, as Suárez concedes in the cited place. Therefore the foundation is relative — and so correlatives would not be simultaneous by nature and cognition, which contradicts the common view of Dialecticians. Moreover, a relation arises upon the positing of extremes, as Suárez himself admits in the same place; and yet according to him, with the term not posited, the whole relation exists in the foundation — which openly implies a contradiction.

You will say with Suárez in the cited place that upon the positing of the term no new relation is posited but only a new connotation. Against this, in the first place, the common philosophical maxim endorsed by all is wrested from him — namely that from the positing of extremes there results a new relation, not a new connotation. For that new connotation is either a new relation or something absolute. If the first, the intended conclusion is had — for Suárez merely changes the name of relation into connotation, and unwillingly departs from the common opinion not in reality but in word, which is not his intention — for he plainly intends more, as is clear from his writings. If the second, then it is either substance, quantity, or quality; but it is also plain, even by Suárez, that it is none of these absolutes. Therefore such a connotation is vain. Again, such a connotation is either something or nothing — not the latter, because it belongs to the foundation connotating the term, which is clearly outside of nothing; nor the former, for a respect is something either intrinsic or extrinsic. If intrinsic, then through something newly accruing to the foundation it connotes the term, not through something already pre-existing — that is, through a relation already presupposed in the foundation itself. If extrinsic, it pre-requires a change made in something through a relation received in it — not indeed in the foundation, because the ratio connotating was already pre-required; nor in the term, because the term is something extrinsic and connotated. Therefore that connotation is fruitless and vain for dissolving this difficulty. Secondly, what is formally constituted in being through a form is denominated through that very form through which it is constituted, with everything else excluded. But a relative is constituted in relative being through a relation; therefore it is denominated relative through it. The major, although it seems sufficiently proved from the preceding argument, is further corroborated: what is animated is constituted in the being of an animated thing through a soul, and is denominated animated through a soul; and what is black is constituted in the being of a black thing through blackness, and is denominated black through blackness. The major is evident from similar cases of other accidental concreta, which are constituted in being through the forms they have in themselves, among which number is the relative, as Scotus plainly teaches (*5.Met.q.11*). Since therefore the foundation through the relation inherent in it is relative, it is perspicuously deduced that with the term removed, that very foundation is denominated relative — which the Connotators deny.

You will say that the relation remains in the foundation, with the term not existing, in the aspect of entity, but not in the aspect of denomination. Against this: for something to be intrinsically denominated such, it must have in itself such an entity — for example, for someone to be denominated a knowing person, he must have in himself the science through which he is denominated a knowing person, since intrinsic denomination presupposes the entity existing in that which it formally denominates. But according to the said Connotators, the relation is in the foundation in the aspect of entity; therefore also in the aspect

of denomination. For a manifest implication is seen in Peter — for example, that paternity is actually and formally present according to its whole entity, and that Peter through it is not denominated a father; and in Paul that filiation is actually and formally present according to its whole entity, and that Paul through it is not denominated a son. For it cannot be that in something there is a formal cause without its formal effect. Therefore, since a relation without a term formally affects the foundation, it must render it formally relative and formally denominate it relative.

You will say this holds in an absolute form, not in a relative form, which connotes the term. Against this: the whole relative form is in the foundation, just as the whole absolute accidental form is in the subject. And if there is any disparity, it is the connotation of the term, which a relative form and not an absolute form bears. But such a connotation — besides being rejected above as vain for our purpose — is of no help to the Adversaries for solving the argument. For even an absolute accidental form connotes the subject in which it inheres or has the aptitude for inhering; and a relative concrete is properly denominated even when its object or term does not exist — as "understanding" is a relative concrete, and a man is truly called "understanding," even though the object or term toward which the intellection tends does not co-exist. Therefore the cited authors have recourse gratuitously and without foundation to the distinction between an absolute and relative form. Whether the relation of the "understanding" to the understood object is transcendental and real is clear from what was said above; and this argument seems almost entirely *ad hominem*. A third argument: a new real and intrinsic denomination does not accrue to a thing without a new entity, according to the Connotators, as Arriaga (*cit.*) and Oviedo (*Controversia 9.Met.n.18*) note. Therefore if through the arrival and existence of the term a new real and intrinsic denomination accrues, a new entity is likewise joined to it. But I ask whether that new entity is absolute or relative. Not the first, as is plain; therefore the second must be given — and thus there will be a twofold relation in the foundation: one old, before the term exists; another new, after the existence of the term. But one of the two is superfluous — not the later one, because it arises from the positing of the term together with the foundation; therefore the earlier one, which is imagined to be in the foundation before the term. Again, since a relation is co-produced upon the production of extremes by the common view of Philosophers, I ask: what agent produces or co-produces the relation pre-existing in the foundation before the arrival of the term? If you say it results from the nature of the foundation — as a property flows from the subject of which it is a property — it follows that in a child there are all the future and possible paternities; that in one white thing there are already all the similarities of future and possible white things; and likewise that relations of the second mode are not founded on action and passion — since they were already in the foundation even though no action and passion accrued to it. Hence without active generation there would be

paternity and without passive generation filiation — absurdities and the like, which are plainly false and ridiculous in themselves, clearly demonstrating the absurdity and vanity of the view just recounted.

You will object first: Aristotle (*5.Met.cap.15*) distributes relation into mutual and non-mutual, and this latter is said to be the relation of measure and measurable placed in the third mode of relatives. But if a relation included its term, the aforesaid division would be vain, because a non-mutual relation does not require a term for its being — since a relation does not arise from the term but only from the foundation, and hence its whole ratio is in the foundation independently of the term. Granting the major, I deny the minor — for above in Article IX of this question the difference was presented and explained that I do not repeat here again unnecessarily. But the Doctor writes that a relation essentially depends on the term (*3.d.1.q.1.K and dist.15.q.vn.§.Ad 1.antè X*), and Gadius and Lychetus explain this excellently (*Quol.11*). The reason is that a relation is essentially the bearing toward another — that is, toward the term.

You will object secondly: what is outside the essence of something is not a part of its essence, since nothing is more intrinsic to a thing than its essence; but the term is outside the essence of a relation — since the relation bears toward it and pre-requires it, as is clear from what was said. Therefore the whole essence of a relation consists in the foundation. Confirmation: if a relation included the term, when it is said "Francis is similar to Charles," it would be the same as saying "Francis is similar to himself," which is false — since similarity exists between distinct things having the same quality in species. Granting the major, to the minor I say that neither the term nor the foundation enters into the formal and intrinsic ratio of a relation, yet the relation essentially depends on both as on extrinsic things, as the Doctor clearly asserts in the places just cited and also (*2.dist.1.q.5.antè §.Hoc ergo G and 4.dist.12.q.1.§.Ad argumenta principalia S in solutione tertii*). And this is clear from the relation of a creature to God the Creator, on whom as term it essentially depends; and also from any other relation, which essentially depends on the foundation, even though the foundation is extrinsic to it. Add that, as Lychetus notes in the recent citation, the term is required for the formal and essential being of a relation, because it is a pure order and bearing toward the term, as Suárez frequently acknowledges (*cit.sect.5. and elsewhere*).

You will object thirdly: a divine relation is wholly preserved in the foundation; therefore the same should be affirmed of a created relation, since the reason appears equal for both. The antecedent is proved: the relation of paternity constitutes the Father in the being of a father and regards the Son only as its term, not as a part of it. Let the antecedent pass; the consequence is denied. The reason for the disparity is that the divine relation is transcendental and constitutive, while the created one is predicamental and adventitious — as can

be seen in Scotus (*1.dist.26.q.vn*; *2.d.1.q.5.§.secundum membrum* and *§.Ad auctoritatem sub P*).

Article XIII. On the Threefold Division of Relation

Aristotle (*5.Met.cap.15*) and Scotus (*ibid*; *1.dist.30.q.2.§.Respondeo sub E*; *Quol.13.§.NuncV*) make a threefold partition of relation, which we are now to examine — of which I made mention in Article IX of this question, second notable point. At the outset this well-known distribution of relation is derived from its proximate foundations, from which it sufficiently remains proved and insisted upon from the foregoing that relations draw their distinctions as merely material and extrinsic from the foundations, and as formal and extrinsic from the terms. The first member of a relation is founded on unity and multitude. The second on active and passive power. And the third on measure and measurable.

Concerning the first, it should be asked what unity is and what multitude is, in which relations of this first mode are founded. To understand these more conveniently, it should be recalled from what was said above in Article IV, first notable point: the three main foundations of such relations are substance, quantity, and quality; and the three unities of these are the proximate foundations or founding ratios of those same relations. I said the chief foundations of these relations are three, because five can be counted, in accordance with the five unities related by Aristotle (*5.Met.T.12*) — which are numerical, specific, generic, proportional, and transcendental unity. In these are founded the relations of identity, equality, similarity, proportion, and the like. For as Aristotle (*cit.*) teaches, those whose substance is one are formally the same through the relation of identity; those whose quantity is one are formally equal through the relation of quality; and likewise those whose quality is one are formally similar through the relation of similarity. The Doctor observes (*1.dist.19.q.1.§.De secundo B*; *2.dist.3.q.1.§.Contra istud antè C*; *4.dist.6.q.10.§.Hic D*) that the aforesaid relations are found not only in the three first predicaments but also in all others, and indeed in the transcendentals. The reason is that every being has its own essence and quiddity, in whose unity the relation of identity is founded; likewise it has its own quantity of perfection, in whose unity the relation of equality is founded; and it participates in quality or difference, in whose unity the relation of similarity is founded — as the same Doctor proves from Aristotle in the places cited. And while nearly all concede that the said relations are founded in the four latter unities: St. Thomas (*3.part.q.42.artic.primo*) and his disciples in the same place hold that no real relation is founded in the first unity, which is numerical. But Scotus (*1.dist.31.q.vn*; *2.dist.3.q.1*; *Quol.6*), his interpreters and followers, defend that numerical unity can be the proximate foundation and founding and terminating ratio of the said relations — so that if one numerical whiteness were in two subjects, there would be real similarity between them, just as there is

between the divine persons participating in one numerical divine nature. The reason is at hand: given the hypothesis, all the other conditions adduced and explained for a real relation would be present — for there would be real extremes, really distinct, such as two white things, and independently of any operation of the intellect, from their nature a relation would arise.

You will say that a real relation requires extremes not only really distinct but also a founding ratio distinct from the terminating ratio. But given the hypothesis, there is only the founding ratio — namely the unity of one numerical whiteness — in which the relation is proximately founded; in the term, however, there is no terminating ratio since another whiteness is not found in it. Hence Scotus (*2.dist.3.q.1.¶.Contra sub B*) infers that the unity required in the foundation of a real similarity is not numerical, because nothing that is one and the same is similar and equal to itself. The major is to be denied. For even if this is true in created things as a matter of fact, it is not true of the possible. For a real relation requires only a unity of founding ratio from (*5.Met.cap.15.T.20*), and not the distinction of that unity in the extremes. It suffices that the extremes be really distinct from each other and have one founding ratio, even a numerical one — as is clear from the divine relations of origin, which are founded in one numerical essence, as the Doctor well observes (*3.dist.8.q.vn.in fine 1 and Quol.6.¶.Istarum DD.*). Nor does it follow that the same thing is similar and equal to itself, because with that unity existing, the extremes really differ — which suffices for a real relation.

Relations of this first mode that are founded on multitude — or the distinction and division of the same nature or form — are opposed to the prior relations and are equally numerous: namely the relations of diversity, inequality, and dissimilarity. For those things are diverse whose nature is diverse, such as man and beast; those are unequal whose quantity is not one, such as a palm and a half-palm; and those are dissimilar whose quality is not one, such as white and black. Therefore what I have affirmed about the prior relations is likewise to be said by contrast about the latter.

Regarding the second member of relations, which are founded on active and passive power, the Doctor discusses this in (*5.Met.q.13; Quol.12.¶.Hic sunt C; 4.dist.6.q.10.¶.Sed restat 1; dist.13.q.1.¶.Ad argumenta V; 1.Reportat.dist.27.q.1.Ad 1.principale*). To this mode belong the relations of producer and produced, cause and caused, mover and movable, and others that Scotus mentions in (*dist.13 quarti q.cit. infra V*). Scholastics investigate whether such relations are founded on action and passion — as St. Thomas (*1.part.q.28.art.4*), Cajetan, and others of the same class think — or rather on active and passive power, as Scotus teaches in the cited places, Lychetus, Bargius, and others of the same family, to whom Suárez (*disp.47.Met.sect.12*), Hurtado (*disp.15.section.10.Subsection.2*), and Ruvius (*in Log.capit.7.pedicament.q.12*) agree.

The aforementioned authors note that they are speaking of power not formally — that is, of the respect of potentiality that power formally includes — but of the absolute or the substrate of such a respect: as paternity is founded in the generative power — that is, in the form that is absolute — Scotus expounding this in the (*Reportat. alleg.*). Aristotle in the cited place (*T.20*) seems to expressly hold the same, as Ruvius above others among the recent authors observes.

Although the Philosopher there asserts that power reduced to act is the foundation of such relations, he does not therefore hold that they are proximately and immediately founded in action and passion — because when action and passion do not remain, the relation remains, which cannot exist without a foundation. For someone can generate and die before the formation of the fetus and never be a father, though his action or generation preceded; and when paternity is present, there is no actual generation, because it has already passed. Therefore action stands with respect to the said relation as a prior disposition toward the relation itself. So Aristotle's assertion in the cited place is explained: relations of the second mode are said to be according to active and passive power according to their foundations, and they are said to be according to the actions of powers as prior dispositions toward those relations — in the interpretation of Scotus in the cited place. This argument, which Scotus forms plainly effectively against the Thomists, Suárez and Hurtado in the cited place turn against Scotus himself, as follows: a relation of the second mode can remain while power does not, as if someone after begetting a living son is castrated or the power of generating is divinely removed from him — then indeed he will be a father because he begot a son, yet he will lack the active power of generating, the removal of which eliminates the seminal workshop. But the relation of paternity would not therefore exist, because with the foundation removed the relation is removed, as Scotus asserts (*4.dist.12.q.1. §.Ad quaest. conclusionem prima D and ibid.q.2. §.Ad argumenta M*). Therefore the relation of the second mode is not founded proximately in power.

In dissolving this argument different authors labor greatly and apply various responses that are plainly futile and rejectable. First, Ruvius in the cited place with some modern authors steps forward, saying that a relation of the second mode depends on the foundation and the founding ratio in the aspect of being and becoming, but not in the aspect of being conserved. Therefore if the power of generating is removed from the father while his son lives, the relation of paternity will remain without a foundation and will immediately inhere in the subject, which is his substance. Against this: when the proximate foundation of something is removed, what proximately resides in such a proximate foundation is also removed — as when the surface in which whiteness is proximately subjected is removed, the very whiteness that adheres in that surface is removed. But power is the proximate foundation of the relation of the second mode, as Ruvius holds with Aristotle and Scotus in the cited place.

Therefore if the power of generating is removed, the relation founded in it is equally removed.

You will say that power is the foundation of this kind of relation in becoming, but not in being conserved; and in this respect this relation differs from a relation of the first mode, whose foundation is in being and being conserved, while the foundation of the latter is only in becoming. But this does not help Ruvijs; for besides the fact that he himself refutes those who assert that the relation of the second mode is founded in the radical power — which is the substance of the generator and which coincides with its subject — he, unwilling, falls into the view that he expressly attacks; and what undertakes to attack him overturns his whole edifice. The foundation of a relation, from the very meaning of the name, is universally considered by all to be that by which the entity of the relation — however modest its mass — is sustained; otherwise it does not merit the name of foundation, and to use that name is to abuse it, as is clear from the foundation of a visible thing — such as a house — from which the name is transferred to designate the foundation of any thing. Furthermore, this relation either always remains in the power or it does not; but first in power and afterwards in the substance of the generator. If the first, then power is never its foundation — since it never stands in it, as this relation never inheres in it. If the second, then power is not its proper and permanent foundation, but only its condition and medium — just as action or active generation, which the same author denies to be the foundation of the same relation because it swiftly passes while the relation persists in the foundation, as Orbellus excellently asserts (5.*Met.c.7*) following Scotus (*in Report.4.dist.13.q.1. §.Dicuntur*). Again, the relation of the second mode is not a relation of identity or diversity, whose foundation is the same or diverse substance pertaining to the relation of the first mode. Add that a relation essentially depends on the foundation — as Scotus clearly teaches (4.*dist.12.q.2.M*); nor is a relation real unless it has a real foundation and a real proximate founding ratio, as the same Doctor had premised (2.*dist.3.q.1. §.Contra sub B*). Therefore with the foundation of a relation removed, it must necessarily be removed too; and accordingly not only in becoming but also in being conserved does a relation depend on the foundation, as Scotus affirms (4.*dist.6.q.10.antè I*).

Secondly, Suárez (*disp.47.Met.sect.12*) and Hurtado (*ibid.disp.15.sect.10*), pressed by the preceding argument, step forward and say that the relation of the second mode is founded not in formal but in radical power — that is, immediately and proximately in the substance of the generator, which is commonly called the subject and remote foundation of the same. Therefore, even if the father lacks formal power, he still possesses radical power — and he is truly a father through the relation of paternity existing in that radical power itself. Against this: these authors openly contradict Aristotle, who (*T.20 loci praecit.*) expressly speaks of formal active or passive power and their actions or passions, by which such powers are reduced to act. Furthermore, the powers and virtues of things,

according to Suárez (*disp.18.Met.sect.3*) imitating the Thomists, are accidents that are really distinct from the substance of which they are powers. Therefore the foundation of relations of this second genus is not radical power, which is substance — especially because one substance has many and diverse powers in which many and diverse relations of this second mode are founded. Furthermore, these are relations of producer and produced, which pre-require and presuppose their effective principles and formal powers — from which immediately and proximately actions proceed, as intellection from the intellect and volition from the will. Therefore since radical power cannot be the immediate principle of these actions, it is plainly deduced that it is not the foundation of the said relations. Most recently there come the unseparated Scotists (*disp.8.q.10.art.2*), who, overcome by the preceding argument, distinguishing power of generating as really distinct from the father whose power it is, candidly confess that such relations are real only as long as actions last — and with these past, they are not real but only real denominations. So paternity and filiation would not be real relations but only denominations of father and son — of the one who begot and of the one who was begotten. But these authors are in no way to be tolerated, who evidently conflict with Scotus (*4.dist.6.q.10.¶.Sed restat; dist.13.q.1.sub V; ibid.in Report.antè S.Dicuntur; 3.dist.8.q.vn; 1.dist.27.¶.Ad 2.q.I*). And more clearly in (*Report.terti dist.8.q.vn.*) in these words: "Filiation is the bearing inhering in the produced nature, and it remains as long as the produced nature remains." And this is clearly shown by the reasons that the Doctor presents to prove that a relation is multiplied in the foundation with the multiplication of terms — especially the one found in the Oxford writing (*¶.Contra sub B*) in these words: "When something is ultimately such in something through a thing, it cannot remain in it unless what has it is such through it — just as whiteness cannot remain in a surface unless the surface itself is white, and especially if the surface is ultimately white through the whiteness; but a relation is that by which what has it is ultimately toward another. Therefore it cannot remain the same in something unless what it remains in is through it toward another. Therefore the same paternity does not remain with that term destroyed, toward which the one having it is formally called such by that relation." This also seems to be sensed by the said recent authors (*disp.allegata q.5.art.2*) who admit that two paternities are similar, whose similarity cannot persist unless the paternities themselves remain. They likewise in (*art.1.q.cit.*) state that denomination must necessarily occur either through real reception of a relation or through real termination, from (*5.Met.cap.15*). And in (*q.3.art.1 of the same disp.*) that denomination is intrinsic, and certainly since it is real and not rational, something real is had in the foundation. Again, a relation from the genus of relation, with extremes posited, necessarily arises, and when those are removed is destroyed — as Scotus along with the common body of Philosophers everywhere teaches. With those therefore persisting, this too persists — as no one denies of the relation of the first mode. To say that such extremes are not commensurate to such a relation evades the argument and

wrests the maxim of Philosophers — and it is gratuitously added that something else is required for the permanence of a relation beyond what Philosophers have commonly assigned; otherwise the relation would be extrinsically accruing. Nor does it follow from this that if the relation remains, action or generation also persists with it — since, as Scotus explains in the place cited, Aristotle's said statement means that action is pre-required as a prior disposition toward the relation that afterwards results. Therefore the Doctor denies that action is the foundation of a relation, because action swiftly passes while the relation persists in the foundation, as Orbellus (*5.Met.c.7*) admirably asserts following Scotus (*in Report.4.dist.13.q.1.§.Dicuntur*). And the Philosopher indicates this in the cited place when he says one is called a father because he begot, and a son because he was begotten. Finally, the relations of paternity and filiation are real and constitutive of the persons of father and son, and they always remain. Hence Scotus (*1.dist.9.q.vn.in fine*) approves the assertion of Gregory the Great expressing divine generation in the past, "because in this way a completed nativity is signified." Nor is the reasoning of those who say that the son begotten by the father no longer depends on the father of any weight — therefore he regards the father by no real relation. For although after the completed generation the son in his suppositional and absolute being does not depend on the father, yet in the being of a son — which is a relative being — he plainly depends on the being of the father, according to the condition of relatives: relatives mutually posit one another, mutually destroy one another, between which there is mutual dependence and co-requirement — as the aforementioned younger members hold with Scotus and Bonetus (*disp.8.q.3.art.2 and q.10.art.2.in explanatione 3*).

I myself, however, think that the presented instance is fully answered by denying that the power of generating can be really separated from the father. For although such a power is really separated from the soul, as the Doctor writes (*4.dist.44.q.2.§.Ad quaest.dico A*), nonetheless it differs only formally from the whole composite, as the same Doctor intimates (*2.dist.16.q.vn.§.Ideo sub H*), affirming that powers universally differ formally from the essence of which they are powers — just as the properties of being formally differ from being. And before (*§.dico igitur*) he had noted that substance is generated from substance, both in univocal and equivocal generation. He therefore wants there that the principle or power of generating is a substance not really differing from the essence of which it is a power — therefore formally. Hence he adds (*§.Ad primum P*) that power absolutely speaking is not from the genus of quality — such as the power of removing a stick, of boxing, of running, and the like — which belong not to the soul but to the whole composite, as he explicitly asserts in (*quarti cit.*), where he gives the example of visual power, and teaches in (*Reportat.2.dist.16.q.vn.§.Ad Authoritates*) that it is not really different from the essence of which it is a power, in these words: "From (*2 de Anima T.9*): if the eye were an animal, sight would be its form. Therefore he implies that power is not

really different from essence, since it is its form." More in the (*Tract. de Anima disp.3.q.2*), where I examined this difficulty at length concerning the distinction of the generative, nutritive, and augmentative power. Therefore, although the power of generating can be impeded in many ways, as the Doctor writes (*4.dist.34.q.vn.*), it nevertheless cannot be entirely removed from a man, as I proved abundantly in the place just cited.

Concerning the third genus of relations, which are founded on measure and measurable, what remains to be treated — in which are placed the relations of science to the knowable, intellect to the intelligible, sight to the visible, and the like, which are called non-mutual relations. By the name of measure and measured, Aristotle understands rule and regulated, exemplar and exemplated — as after Scotus (*1.dist.3.q.5. §. Quantum ad hoc C*) and Bonetus in this place, the Conimbricenses interpret (*cap.7.praedicament.q.2.art.2*). Whether those relations exist in the measure and measurable as in a foundation, some doubt — among whom I find Suárez (*cit.sect.13*) and the undivided Scotists cited above, who defend the negative part against the common affirmative, and cite Aristotle (*5.Met.T.memorato*) and Scotus both in the place cited and elsewhere for themselves. But Aristotle seems nearly as expressly to establish the foundations of these relations as of those of the first and second mode, if he is read attentively. For since relations cannot exist without their foundations — as is clear from what was said — and the Philosopher distinguishes these three modes of relatives through the three foundations just recalled, as even the said authors do not deny; and since he lays no other foundations for the relations of the third mode, the foundations commonly received by the consensus of his interpreters are plainly proven. And although he does not express this third foundation there as explicitly as the first and second, he neither ignores it nor denies it; rather from his words there it can be conveniently deduced and explained, as all his commentators unanimously and consistently show. Furthermore, in the *Logic* chapter *Ad aliquid* he presents examples of relations of all the said modes, but passes over measure and measurable and the rest of the foundations. In the same place he defines relatives, but not the relation. And in the *Postpredicaments* he recounts the modes of the former, but not the modes of the latter, which can be easily gathered from those and which Scotus notes — as I cited in (*Epitome lib.1.q.4.art.14*). Nor should weight be given to the words and their position in the text, since the matter is settled and what the name of the thing amounts to is known: thus since Aristotle's commentators plainly show what they understand by the names of measure and measurable, faith is to be given to them and the mind should acquiesce — especially since no reason urges the opposite. What they object there is slight and is easily dissolved from what was said. Why does he in the *Metaphysics* put the knowable before science? In the *Logic* chapter cited he seems to give the reason: because the knowable is absolutely prior to science — for the knowable can exist without science, but not science without the knowable. Furthermore, these would not differ from those if

the interpretation of Suárez were correct: for they would be reduced to the first or second mode, as Suárez himself concedes (*ibid.num.4*) regarding the relation of science to the knowable — which openly conflicts with the cited text in which the Philosopher narrates three modes of relatives and expressly places the relation of science to the knowable in the last one. I add that once such a relation is admitted in the first or second mode, it follows that it is mutual — as are all relations of the first and second mode. And so there would be no distinction that Aristotle establishes between mutually referring and not mutually referring — which that same author and all the rest acknowledge. Furthermore, although science, insofar as it is caused by the knowable, is referred to it as effect to its cause — and that is a relation of the second mode — there still remains the relation of science as measured by the knowable, which is its measure; and that this is a relation of the third mode, Philosophers and Theologians affirm with one voice along with Aristotle — expressly Alensis (*5.Met.*), Scotus in the same place, St. Thomas, and others. Therefore the recent inseparable authors are remarkable for attributing the opposite view to Scotus, who evidently in the place just cited (*q.13*) embraces the common doctrine — which he indicates not obscurely in (*1.dist.3.q.5. §. Quantum ad hoc; dist.36.q.2.Report. §. Secondly I argue; Quol.13.art.2.infra V*); and other places of the Doctor can be adduced for us that the said recent authors falsely adduce for the opposite. Although the Doctor there asserts that relations of the third mode differ from those of the other modes — because the latter are mutual while the former are called non-mutual — nevertheless this difference does not eliminate the distinction that relations derive from their foundations, which those Doctors acknowledge (*art.1.q.allegata*). Hence Bargius (*1.d.30*) admirably adds that the said relations draw their distinctions effectively and extrinsically through foundations, but intrinsically and formally through mutually and non-mutually referring. Nor does it help to say with the cited authors that mutual and non-mutual dependence belongs to relations of the third mode not by reason of the foundation but from the dissimilar assignment of extremes, of which one is assigned in act and the other in potency — while it would be different if both were assigned in act or in potency — and so non-mutual or mutual dependence argues for not an essential but an accidental difference. Against this: Aristotle and Scotus not once but repeatedly bring forward the said difference among the said relations; and neither there nor elsewhere do they mention another proper and essential difference from this one. Therefore this is to be considered intrinsic and essential to them, since it always belongs to them, even if their extremes are handled uniformly or dissimilarly. And the relations of the third genus are always non-mutual, because from the part of one extreme no real relation arises. Hence Scotus (*4.dist.1.q.1. §. Ita sub R*) writes from (*5.Met.T.20*): the measured depends on the measure, not conversely. And Orbellus in the cited place adds that the relation of the actual knowable to science is rational; and the said recent authors do not deny this; and the relation of God to a creature is always rational, as Scholastics hold (*1.dist.30*). Therefore, although all relatives

are said to convert and their extremes can be uniformly assigned — as Aristotle strenuously urges in the *Logic* chapter cited — nevertheless this does not eliminate the fact that relations of the third mode are always non-mutual, for the reason now given.

Article XIV. On Action.

In examining each of the six principles in turn, following the Peripatetic order, the first matter I encounter for inquiry is the category of action, whose proper differentia Bonetus (*libello 5, de actione*) candidly confesses he does not know; nor have the other philosophers left us a sufficiently clear account of it. Therefore, so that action, its divisions, and its properties — insofar as they pertain to the logician — may in some measure become known to us, it is useful to set before us the various senses in which the term is used, as found in (*Scot. 4.d.12.q.1. §. Ad huius autem*), H. Antonius Andreas (*q.7. super sex principia*), Gadius (*in exposit. Quol.13.fol. 139*), and Aureolus (*1.d.27*). For action is an equivocal name, taken in five ways.

First, it is taken for an immanent operation, such as intellection, which is properly a quality, not action except equivocally. It is nonetheless called action on account of two features noted by the Doctor (*Quol.13. §. Ad ista, DD.*) and explained by Vallone (*fol.45 sua lectura*). The first is that it is in continual dependence upon the cause by which it is produced. The second is that the operation passes into the object as into its terminus — though the object does not receive its being through the operation, since it is presupposed to it as its partial efficient cause. The Philosopher mentions this (*1.6.Eth.c.4; 9.Met.c.16*).

Second, action is taken for the relation of the producer to what is produced, in which sense a father is called the active cause of his son. Third, for the relation of what induces to what is induced, or of what educes to what is educed — in this way heat is the cause of heat in wood. These relations are clearly distinct, since they respect distinct termini; and since they are intrinsically advening, they belong to the category of relation, as I noted in the preceding article. Fourth, for the thing done, including within itself a reference to the agent by which it is done or produced — a sense recorded by Aristotle (*3.phys.c.3.7.14*), who says that action is the act of the agent as agent, as a perfection, as the Coimbrans also observe (*q.1 de actione et passione, art.1*). Action taken in this way, insofar as it designates something absolute, belongs to one of the absolute categories; but insofar as it includes a relation, if that relation is intrinsically advening, it belongs to the category of relation; if it is extrinsically advening, it has its seat in this category. Fifth, for the relation of what transmutes to what is transmuted — action taken in this sense is described by the Porretanus as that by which we are said to act upon what is subjected to us. This coincides with Scotus's definition (*Quol.3. §. de 3. circa AA.A.*, cited under G): action is the relation of the agent to the patient that is transmuted. I have explained this at length and illustrated it with examples (*in Epit.l.1.q.4.a.2*).

Action is divided into immanent and transient. Transient action is true action, of the genus of action, which has just been described. Immanent action is not true action but a quality, placed in the genus of quality, as I have noted above. Therefore the division just given is not a division of a genus into its species, but of a word into its significations, as the Doctor rightly notes (*Quol. alleg.q. Ad ista, DD.*).

Again, action is distributed into instantaneous action, which occurs in an instant — as generation and illumination — and successive action, which occurs over some interval of time — as alteration and local motion. Further, into substantial action, whose terminus is a substance — as the generation of a physical composite — and accidental action, whose terminus is an accident — as the whitening of a wall. All of these are held to belong to this category by the companions of the individual Scotistic philosophical courses (*disp.8.q.12.art.2*).

Two properties are enumerated by Aristotle in this category (*Scot.q.36.praedicam. Notandum*): the first is to receive contraries; the second is to receive more and less. These, as Scotus notes in the same place, belong to action itself with respect to the termini toward which and from which it proceeds (*ex 5.phys.T.4*), and are specified accordingly. They are further explained in the Epitome at the cited place.

Assertion I. Action is not something absolute. This is the view of Scotus in the places cited above, to which I add (*Quol.11.§. De 4. sub K*). It is proved as follows. First: if action were something absolute, there would be an action of action; for an absolute that is produced, since it is not from itself nor from nothing, is produced through action. Therefore, if action were something absolute, it would be produced through an action, and so on to infinity — as the Stagirite argues (*5.phys.T.10*), proving that there cannot be motion per se of an action. Second: if action were something absolute, it would be either in the agent or in the patient. Not in the agent: for the agent would be changed, and would be not an agent but a patient, receiving this absolute form — which involves a contradiction in terms, since the same thing with respect to the same thing would be simultaneously agent and patient, as Aureolus (*art.2.§. Restat ergo*) also subtly demonstrates. Nor in the patient: for the patient could not receive any other absolute form — say, quantity or quality — unless it first or simultaneously received action, which is posited as an absolute form distinct from the others. But this is inconvenient: that a subject cannot receive a prior form unless it receives a subsequent form that does not depend on the prior one, since it can persist without it — as is clear from the whiteness remaining in the wall after the whitening, which is a transient action. The reasons adduced in the preceding article, proving that the last six categories (among which action is numbered) are not absolute, likewise support this assertion.

Assertion II. Action of the genus of action is the extrinsically advening relation of what transmutes to what is transmuted. This is Scotus's position in the places

cited above. It is proved from Aristotle (*5.Met.7.17*), who defines active potency as the principle of transmuting another as other. Therefore, just as active potency according to Aristotle is the principle of transmuting, so action — which is the act of active potency — is transmutation, namely, the relation of what transmutes to what is transmuted. The Author of the Six Principles holds the same view when he describes action by saying: action is that by which we are said to act upon what is subjected to us.

Every being is either absolute or relative, as I have established more than once above. But action is not something absolute, as I showed in the preceding assertion. Therefore action is something relative — and not an intrinsically advening relation, because when an active and passive thing are posited, action does not follow necessarily: it can be impeded, whether by an interval or by an opposing agent, even when the two are approximated, as was fully explained in the preceding article. Therefore action is clearly deduced to be an extrinsically advening relation. The same is also shown by what was established in the preceding article, proving that the last six categories, among which action is contained, are relative.

Objection I. No relation is a principle of acting — just as quantity is not, according to Averroes (*4.phys.comm.84*). But action is formally a relation, as is evident from Assertion II. Therefore action is not a principle of acting, which is contrary to its definition given above. I reply that the major premiss must be distinguished. No relation is a principle of acting as the *quod* — as fire is the principle of producing heat in wood: granted. No relation is a principle of acting as the *quo* — that is, as the formal productive principle, as heat is the formal principle of producing heat: granted likewise. No relation is a principle of acting as the *quo* in the sense of a productive act: denied. For by heating — which is a relation of the genus of action — as a productive act, wood is heated; and by cutting — which is likewise of the genus of action — as a productive act, wood is cut. Action is thus called productive because through it, as a productive act, the effect is reached. This solution is drawn from the Doctor (*4.cit. §. Ad argumenta* sub P, and in the *Reportata* there, and *Quol.13.* sub BB).

Objection II. A relation of the second mode is founded upon action and passion (*ex 5.Met.T.20*). But a relation is not founded except upon something absolute. Therefore action, upon which the relation is founded, is something absolute. I reply with Scotus (*in 4.alleg.* sub V) that the Philosopher's statement is to be interpreted as follows: a relation of the second mode is founded upon action and passion as prior dispositions necessarily presupposed to it; whereas it is founded upon active and passive potency as its proper foundation — concerning which see (*q.6.huius lib.art.8 & 13*).

Objection III. To create is properly to act. Therefore creation is properly action. But to create is not to be related, because through creation God is not related to creatures. Therefore creation is not a relation, and thus action taken generally is

not a relation — since the consequence from an inferior to a superior affirmatively holds. Corollary: the act belongs to the same thing as the potency (*ex Arist. libello de somno et vigilia in initio*). But active potency properly belongs to God. Therefore action equally belongs to him. I reply by denying the antecedent and equally the corollary, for the reason given by Scotus in the cited passage (N): where there is total production without any presupposed subject, there is not properly action of the genus of action, because such action always presupposes a subject (*ex 5.Met.comm.17; ex lib.sex principiorum c. de actione*). Therefore, since God creates from nothing, it follows that to create is not properly to act, nor is creation properly action in the sense understood by philosophers — as is clear from its definition given above.

To the corollary I reply with the same Doctor in the same place (X): just as action is an equivocal name — being taken broadly for any production, and narrowly for transmutative production alone, which is the only kind that belongs to the genus of action — so active potency is taken for simply productive potency, and for transmutative potency, from which transmutative action arises, just as simply productive action proceeds from simply productive potency. Therefore the proposed objection carries no weight.

You may say that Scotus in the cited passage attributes to God both productive and transmutative potency, and likewise both simply productive and transmutative action. Now since transmutative action belongs to the genus of action, it follows that God's action itself is placed in a category — which the same Doctor does not seem to concede (*1.d.8.q.3*). I say that God's action *ad extra*, of whatever kind it may be, since it is a being of reason — as Scotus states (*in Report.cit. §. Dico igitur*) — does not reside *per se* in this category, since as has been said, every category is a series of real beings. This is also evident from the analogous case of the relation of lordship, by which God is called Lord in time: this is not formally real but only a being of reason, as the same Doctor explains in this passage before (§. *De 2.art.*, citing *dist.30.primi*, in fine solutionis principalis q.5).

Article XV. On Passion.

The various senses of passion, drawn from diverse authors, are collected in the theological lexicon. Four are found in (*5.Met.c.21.7.26*); but with Vorreillon (*1.d.14*) and Pelbartus (*Tomo 1.Rosarij verbo passio*), we bring forward three that are most relevant to our subject, leaving the others to be weighed in their proper places. First, passion is used for the property of a thing that is convertible with the thing itself and flows from its essential principles — in this way risibility is a passion of man, neighing a passion of the horse. I treated of passion so taken (*l.2.q.6*). Second, for a sensible quality, which is a quality of the third mode — Aristotle took passion in this sense (*2.Rhet.*) when he said that joy, sadness, hope, fear, and the like are passions. Third, for the reception of any form whatever in pre-existing matter. It is described by the Porretanus in these words: passion is the

infliction and effect of action; or, as Titelmans says (*cit.cap.53*): passion is that by which what is subjected to it is said to undergo. And Scotus (*4.dist.13.q.1* & *dist.43.q.5.¶. De tertio* infra H): passion is the extrinsically advening relation of what is transmuted to what transmutes. For since action and passion are opposed relations (*Doct.cit. & Antonio Andrea ubi supra q.8*), they mutually regard each other, and each makes the other known — one is implicitly or explicitly placed in the description of the other, as anyone who examines both definitions can see. Therefore, since from the knowledge of one relative the other is definitively known — as Aristotle writes (*c. de Ad aliquid*) — and since action and passion are correlatives, it follows that from the prior knowledge of action obtained in the preceding article, passion, which is its correlative, is rightly known. And what has been said of the divisions, species, and properties of action applies equally to passion, with only the name of action changed to the name of passion, as I noted (*in Epitome lib.1.q.4.art.9*).

Assertion. Passion is the extrinsically advening relation of what is transmuted to what transmutes. This is Scotus's position (*ubi supra*). It is proved by the same means by which the second assertion of the preceding article was proved, with the proportionate adjustment I have just indicated. For opposite things have the same account and discipline (*8.Top.1*). But action and passion are opposed relations, as I noted above. Therefore, just as action is the extrinsically advening relation of what transmutes to what is transmuted, so passion is the extrinsically advening relation of what is transmuted to what transmutes.

Objection I. Entities are not to be multiplied without necessity — as the common philosophical maxim holds (*1.phys.T.41*). But there is no necessity compelling us to admit passion as distinct from action: for action and passion are one and the same thing signified by two different names. It is called action insofar as it is in the agent and is said to be a relation *from* this; and it is called passion insofar as it is in the patient and is said to be a relation *in* this — as Aristotle seems to hold (*3.phys.T.218*), saying that just as the road from Athens to Thebes and from Thebes to Athens is the same road, the ascent is nonetheless not the same. Therefore action and passion are entirely the same and hence do not constitute distinct categories. Granting the major, I deny the minor. To its proof I reply with Scotus (*4.dist.13.q.1. ante §. Ad propositum* sub L) that they are materially the same on account of the identity of the space, but formally distinct, since they take on distinct definitions as is evident from what has been said; they have different ways of being predicated of their inferiors; and they are in distinct subjects — for action is in the agent and passion is in the patient. Bonetus's reply (*libello de passione*), saying that the space is the same but the ascent and descent — which signify action and passion — are distinct because they are distinct termini, seems to come to the same thing.

Objection II. The definition of passion assigned by the Porretanus is not convertible with passion itself. Therefore it has not been correctly given. The

antecedent is proved: every form terminating a motion is the infliction and effect of action — since the agent produces the form toward which motion tends, through the action itself as a productive act. But it is not to be held that every form terminated by motion is action of the genus of action. I reply with Antonius Andreas (*q.8. of the aforesaid place*) that passion is called the effect of action not because action produces passion as its *quod* principle or as a formal *quo* principle, but as a productive act by which the agent, through transmutation, transmutes the patient. This passive transmutation is called passion and the infliction or effect of action, because it is the relation following upon the form toward which the patient is transmuted.

Objection III. A principle has no principle — just as place has no place, action has no action, and production has no production. But the principle of passion is action, as is clear from the description of passion cited above. Therefore, etc. I reply that the major is not true absolutely, since substance is the principle of accidents, of which there are nine principles or categories. So the major can be distinguished thus: in the same genus, granted; in a different genus, denied. This is supported by the example of form and matter, which are principles of natural things in different genera — not in the same genus, since form is drawn from matter, being educed from it, as will be evident in physics. It can also be confirmed by (*2.phys.7.30*): causes are mutually causes of each other — understand, in different genera of cause, as will be explained there.

Objection IV (a further instance). Active and passive belong to the same genus (*ex 1. de generatione T.50*). Therefore action and passion belong to the same genus or category; the consequence holds by the locus from conjugates. Again, contraries share the same genus (*ex 10.Met.T.42*). But action and passion are contraries. Therefore, etc. I respond that the antecedent derived from Aristotle is to be interpreted of the physical genus, not of the logical genus of which we are here speaking. As for what is added in support of this, I say the major holds for contrary opposites, not for relative opposites, which is what action and passion are.

Article XVI. On *Ubi* (Where).

Bonetus (*libello 9. de ubi*), following Scotus (*4.d.10.q.1. §. Quol.11. sub O*), notes that the description of *ubi* given by the Author of the Six Principles is not common to every kind of *ubi* — for example, active and passive, definitive and circumscriptive. That description is adapted only to passive circumscriptive *ubi*, which is acknowledged by all to be accommodated only to corporeal things. For this kind of *ubi* is the circumscription of a body arising from the circumscription of place. Or, as the Doctor says (*Quol.cit.art.4. ante L*): *ubi* is the extrinsically advening relation of a contained body to the containing place.

A most general account of *ubi* can also be given, which is the presence of a thing in a place, as the Doctor indicates (*nunc alleg. ante and post O*, and also in *4*).

praec. KQ and R). Gadius (*fol.117*) plainly affirms this, and Lychetus (*ibid.* §. *In ista q.*) does not dissent. *Ubi* taken absolutely and precisely in this way is divided into definitive *ubi* — which is the presence of a thing in a place in such a way that it is there and nowhere else, as an Angel is in heaven and not on earth — and circumscriptive *ubi*, which is the formal circumscription of a body in place. Circumscriptive *ubi* is twofold: active and passive. Active *ubi* is active circumscription, or the extrinsically advening relation of the circumscribing place to the circumscribed body. Passive *ubi* is passive circumscription, or the extrinsically advening relation of the circumscribed body to the circumscribing place, which is formally place — as will be evident in physics, where the nature of *ubi*, its unity, plurality, immobility, and other such matters pertaining to it are to be treated fully and accurately.

Objection I. *Ubi* and place, taken formally, coincide — as Gadius (*fol.119*) notes, though the Porretanus seems to mark some distinction between them. But place is the surface of the containing body (*ex 4.phys.T.39* and following), and it is read in the work on the heavens that abstract substances — or Intelligences, whom we call Angels — are not circumscribed by time or place. Therefore the division of *ubi* into definitive and circumscriptive is inappropriate, since only circumscriptive *ubi* is recognized and received by Aristotle and other philosophers, as Scotus himself (*in Report.4.d.10.q.1.vers. Ad quod genus*) acknowledges before the others. Granting the major, to the minor I say that Aristotle's definition and those of the other philosophers concerning *ubi* and place taken universally are too narrow — though, as Lychetus (*in fine 1.art.Quol.11*) notes, Aristotle does not explicitly assert that only passive *ubi* is placed in the category of *ubi* — since they comprehend only circumscriptive *ubi* and place. But I have just noted at the beginning of this article that there is a broader and freer definition of *ubi*.

Objection II. Action and passion constitute two supreme genera because they are two opposed relations having two distinct general accounts predicable of their inferiors. Therefore, equally, active and passive *ubi* constitute two categories, since in both cases the reasoning is the same — otherwise the division into active and passive *ubi* must be judged entirely empty and useless, as Toletus objects (*in hoc c.*). The same can be deduced about certain other categories, as is evident with respect to the series of the *quando* and *habitus* categories (*in Epitome q.4.lib.1.art.12 & 13*).

Antonius Andreas (*q.15. in sex principia*) and Gadius (*fol.119*) raise this difficulty and leave it unresolved. Orbellus, cited here by our two Juniors (*disp.6.q.1.*), in his second solution denies the parity: action and passion take on real and general accounts of acting and being acted upon that are distinct from each other; but active and passive *ubi* denote action and passion only grammatically, because they are expressed through an active and passive verb — they do not signify true and real action and passion — in roughly the same way that the divine Word is

said to become incarnate vocally and grammatically, as Scotus (3.d.1.q.1.art.3.§. *Ad argumenta* sub L) and Orbellus (*ibid.q.1. ad tertium*) note. A not inconsiderable reason for this can be given: for *ubi* is taken either materially — and in that sense it is the surface of the containing body, which is quantity and incapable of action — or formally — and in that sense it is a relation, which likewise does not belong to the genus of actives.

Objection III (further instance). You will say: action is formally a relation, from what was said above, and yet it is a productive *quo* principle. Therefore the reason given is of no moment. I say that action is a productive act through which an effect is produced; but not so the relation that is formally place, since through it nothing is produced. Therefore that argument is not incongruous.

Objection IV. Definitive *ubi* is placed only reductively in the category of *ubi*, as Antonius Andreas (q.12. of the cited place) and other Doctors admit — from whom Scotus (4.cit. sub K) does not seem to be far. Therefore definitive *ubi* is not a species of *ubi* taken generally, since a species is placed per se in the category of which it is a species, as is evident (q.3.art.3. of this book). I respond that the aforementioned authors are speaking according to the common position of Aristotle, the Porretanus, and others, who assign only circumscriptive *ubi* to this category. But speaking absolutely and composing a general catalogue comprehending all *ubi*, we rightly place definitive and circumscriptive *ubi*, active and passive, in it — as is shown (*in Additione Quol.11. ante D*, and in 4. proximately cited), and as received by Lychetus (*in expositione Quol.cit.artic.1*), Gadius, and other Scotists, from whom most of the more recent authors outside the Scotist school do not depart.

Objection V. If two bodies were by divine power to exist in the same place, either they would be in the same *ubi*, or in two *ubi*, or in no *ubi*. Not the third, for they are supposed to be in some *ubi*. Not the second, since that is outside the supposition — we suppose them to be in the same place and *ubi*. Not the third, because since there are two passive circumscriptions by which both bodies are circumscribed, there would consequently be two *ubi* and two formal places — and they would therefore not exist in the same place and *ubi* as the argument supposes. I reply that given the hypothesis, the two bodies would be in the same material place but not in the same formal place, as Scotus writes (*Quol.cit.art.3*), which is to be extensively examined in physics. In the meantime see Lychetus and Gadius there.

Article XVII. On Situs (Position).

What is commonly called position (*situs*) by other philosophers is what the Author of the Six Principles calls disposition by arrangement. Setting aside the popular sense of *situs* for the place or space in which something is said to be situated — in which sense this category is taken by Aristotle (5.Met.c.19.7.14) — for example, when a tree is said to be in this or that spot of a garden, in order

that the nature of *situs* may be fully known to us, we note with the Doctor (*praecit.* §. *Dico ergo* M) that position is twofold.

The first is the one that is a difference of quantity, described as the order of parts in the whole, for which, as the commentators write (*in c. de quantitate*), three things are required: a subject in which these parts exist, which subject must be continuous and have permanent parts — some of which are extreme, some intermediate — and one after another must exist, as is evident in a worm and other creatures. These are treated luminously by Titelmans (*l.2.c.16*).

The second is the one through which the category of *situs* is constituted, which is the order of the parts of a whole with respect to the parts of its place. This presupposes and presupposes the first: it is necessary that the parts first be disposed and ordered among themselves before they are commensurated and coextended with the parts of place. Hence by divine power the first can be separated from the second in two ways. In one way, by negation of the terminus: if God were to create some body outside the heavens, it would have positional quantity, since its parts would be disposed in relation to each other, but it would not have positional *situs*, because with no place and no parts of place in existence, there would be no coextension and commensuration of its parts to the parts of place. In another way, by the positing and existence of the terminus: God can preserve a body with its parts, even though these parts are not contained and circumscribed by place. For what is prior can exist without what is posterior, what is intrinsic without what is extrinsic, and what is contingently conjoined with another can by divine power be separated from it — as is positional quantity in relation to positional *situs*, as Scotus divinely proves (*loco memorato* N and O).

There is, however, a greater doubt as to what the difference is between *ubi* and *situs*. For some — such as Fonseca (*5.Met.q.2.Sect.4.ad 5*), supported by Suárez (*disp.2.Met.sect.1.1.7*), Arriaga (*disp.5.sect.3.n.42*), and two recent Scotists (*disp.8.Log.q.12.art.2*) — hold that philosophically *ubi* and *situs* coincide, differing only popularly. But in agreement with Aristotle and other philosophers, they posit *situs* as a distinct category from the others and attempt to assign the difference by which *situs* is truly distinct from *ubi*.

Bonetus the ingenious Scotist (*lib. de situ*) devotes himself entirely to explaining this accurately and demonstrating it evidently. And certainly — as is clear from the Doctor (*in 4.alleg. M*) — philosophers generally separate *ubi* from *situs* in that *ubi* is the circumscription of the whole located thing with respect to the whole place, while *situs* is the relation of the parts of the located thing to the parts of the locating place. That these two relations are distinct from each other is plainly shown by the fact that while the *ubi* of some body remains the same, the *situs* of its parts can change — as when a vessel full of water remains in the same place while its parts move here and there: then the *ubi* remains the same, but the parts of the water, differently disposed by motion, have a different *situs*.

But if this reasoning does not satisfy you — because whether the whole is in the whole place or the parts of the whole are in the parts of the place, this entirely pertains to the category of *ubi*, since the total *ubi* is constituted from the partial *ubi* — then say with Bonetus and most of the more recent authors that the difference between *ubi* and *situs* consists in this: *ubi* is the presence of a thing in place, prescind from every mode of being present in that place; while *situs* is the determinative mode of *ubical* presence, or the modification of coexistence, not only of part with part but also of the coexistence of the whole located thing with the whole place — such as sitting, standing, lying. This the Doctor hints at (*in 4.cit.* a little before N) when he says: *positio* as a category presupposes positional quantity and specifies *ubi*. The Porretanus also hints at this when he says: position is a kind of ordering of parts and generation, according to which we speak of standing or sitting.

Furthermore, *ubi* can be separated from all *situs*, as is evident in the case of the body of Christ the Lord in the Eucharist, which is stripped of all *situs*. Moreover, *ubi* is the foundation of *situs*, since *situs* modifies and determines *ubi* — and it is plain that a foundation differs from that of which it is the foundation, and a subject from its accident, as is clear from relation and its foundation, and from an accident and its subject. Again, the decadic number of categories is not to be denied, as the Doctor teaches (*ubi supra* in fine *1.art.* and more plainly *d.13.q.1. §. Ad huius C*; and we note *q.3.art.1.* of this book). But if *ubi* and *situs* do not differ, there would be not ten but nine categories — contrary to the whole Peripatetic school, both here and in (*5.Met.*), as Ruuius (*cap.10. de praedicamento situs*) notes, against Mastrius and Bellutus who, lest they agree with Bonetus, deny the aforesaid number of categories on slight grounds, contradicting Aristotle and Scotus — as will be evident in the objections to be adduced shortly.

Nor is Suárez (*praecit.q.9*) satisfactory when, to dissolve the difficulties mentioned, he posits a distinction of reason between *ubi* and *situs*. He is not satisfactory, I say, because from what has been asserted elsewhere, the categories are a series of things or realities, into which a distinction of reason does not fall — only a real or formal distinction. Furthermore, more than a distinction of reason obtains between a mode and the thing modified, between what determines and what is determined, as was sufficiently shown above. Therefore a distinction of reason — which is produced by the intellect alone — is not to be invoked for the resolution of these matters.

Objection I. Scotus (*praenominatus §. Dico aliter M*) acknowledges no other difference between *ubi* and *situs* than the one I have adduced above, which is clear from their descriptions: *ubi* is the extrinsically advening relation of a circumscribed whole to the whole that circumscribes it; *situs* is the extrinsically advening relation of the parts of the circumscribed thing to the parts of what circumscribes. And in (*Report.4.d.10.q.1. §. De 2. difficultate*), he says nothing of *positio* other than that it is a kind of *ubi*. The Stagirite hints at this same

difference (5.*Met.c.19.7.24*): disposition is said to be the order of what has parts — with respect to place, potency, or form. Therefore no other difference between these two categories need be sought beyond the one assigned. I grant that the difference between *ubi* and *situs* given and expressed by these authors is the common and widely known one; but the proper and quidditative one is what we have just shown, and I signified above that it is not unknown or unrecognized by the same authors. All the more because in the *Reportata* just cited, Scotus affirms that position is a category — which, unless the aforesaid essential difference is maintained, does not appear to differ from *ubi*. This Scotus presupposes in many places, defending the division into ten genera as to be maintained, and consequently that the category of *ubi* is to be distinguished from the category of *situs* by the difference just named.

Objection II. Beings and modes are not to be multiplied without necessity — as philosophers and theologians often insist. But if *situs* is a mode of *ubi* superadded to it, as we have explained above, then modes are multiplied with no pressing necessity. For we rightly understand how a thing is disposed according to the order of its parts with respect to the parts of place — whether sitting, standing, or lying — without fashioning any additional mode of existing in place. Therefore it is better to deny that *situs* is distinct from *ubi* than to introduce this new mode of presence. Granted the major, I deny the minor and its proof, as the arguments adduced above appear evidently to compel — and their great weight is not denied by the two younger Scotists named above.

Objection III. In article I of this question it was rejected as the opinion of those who hold that the last six categories are constituted by modes. But now it is affirmed that *situs* — which is one of those six genera — is a mode. Therefore there is a contradiction in what has been said above. I reply that there is no inconsistency in our assertions: for in the cited place we rejected the view that those categories are constituted by absolute modes, or by absolute and relative modes together. We do not, however, deny that these same categories are constituted by relative modes. For a relation can be called a mode, as the Doctor writes (2.*dist.1.q.4.¶. Quod si adhuc D*), with whom Lychetus (*ibidem*) and Fuentes (*in Log.q.16.diff.5.art.1.petitione 2*) concur.

Article XVIII. On *Quando* (When).

It is plainly difficult to conceive the quidditative accounts of the categories, and more difficult still to explain them — as Aureolus (1.*d.30.art.3.propositione 5. in fine*) and Antonius Andreas (q.15. *in sex principalia* §. *Respondeo*) testify. This difficulty seems especially great for us, who strive to reach a distinct and clear knowledge of these last categories. For since they are reckoned among relations — which, as has been said, are of slight and meager entity — they must equally be of thin and slender knowability.

Among these is numbered *quando*, which some — such as Aureolus (*cit. propositione 6*) — think to be a being of reason, or, to use his words, something that the intellect conceives as left behind from time in things that are in time. Others, whom Ruuius (*hoc loco*) and the Coimbrans cite under suppressed names and attribute to St. Thomas (*opuscolo 48*) and to Scotus (*2.d.2.q.2*) — and whom two of our members recently follow (*disp.8.q.12.art.2*) — hold *quando* to be an extrinsic denomination derived from the time with which things coexist and in which they are said to be. Scotus, however (*praecit.*), Antonius Andreas, Tataret, John of Metz, and other Scotists in the present place affirm that *quando* is the extrinsically advening relation of a thing contained in time. For the comprehension of this:

Note I, from Bruliferus (*1.d.8.q.2*), that these three differ: to be *with* time, to be *from* time, and to be *in* time — which I must now explain. To be *with* time is the same as to coexist with time, which belongs to God and to Angels. For since to coexist is the same as to exist simultaneously, and God and time now exist simultaneously, it follows that God and every other created thing possessing its own existence rightly coexist with time. But since from eternity time did not exist — as faith teaches — nor after the universal judgment will it exist (*Apoc.10*: "time shall be no more"), neither did God from eternity coexist with time, nor after the day of judgment will God himself or any creature coexist with time. To be *from* time seems to mean the same as to begin to be, or to newly come into being — and therefore nothing eternal is from time, since nothing eternal began to be, as an eternal thing is free from beginning and end (*Quol.6.ubi Gadius et Lych.*, and I myself in the *Tract. de Deo uno disp.1.q.8*, and *Tract.de Angelis disp.3.q.1*). To be *in* time is to be measured by time, as generable and corruptible things are measured — as I showed (*in phys.l.de tempore*). From the fact that something is in time, or measured by time, there results a certain extrinsically advening relation of the temporal thing to time — which is called *quando*, in roughly the same way as from a located body's relation to its place there arises the extrinsically advening relation of the located thing to the place, which is called *ubi*, as Titelmans (*l.2.c.55*) rightly observes. Hence the Porretanus (*c.4.sui libel.*) describes *quando* as what is left behind in a temporal thing from the adjacency of time. That this description may be better understood:

Note II, with Bonetus (*libello 8*), that *quando* is to be distinguished from time, because it is something left behind by time itself — as expressed in its description cited above. For what is left behind by another is posterior to it, and prior and posterior are evidently distinct from each other. Furthermore, a relation arising from extremes is distinct from those extremes themselves, just as an effect is distinct from its cause. Since therefore *quando* is a relation arising from a temporal thing toward time, it should not be doubted that *quando* is separate from time itself — whatever Fonseca may adduce to the contrary (*5.Met.cap.15.q.10.sect.2*).

The account of this category is drawn from the coexistence of generable and corruptible things with the motion of the first mobile, which — being most orderly and most uniform — is said to measure all things subject to it. Thus a reading is said to last for an hour, a rose for a day. From the coexistence of sublunary things with the motion of the first mobile, two relations emerge: the first is that of time to the temporal thing, as of measure to measured — called active *quando*; the second is that of the temporal thing to time, as of measured to measure — called passive *quando*, which alone is defined by Gilbert (*cit.*), perhaps — as some say — because passions are easier to know and more familiar to us; or more aptly, because that Author failed in this regard, not assigning the most general account of the category of *quando*, comprehending everything contained under it, as I also noted (*art.4.huius q.* with the Doctor (*4.dist.10.q.1.art.1.* sub K)) concerning the category of *ubi*. *Quando* can however be described in universal terms thus: *quando* is a limited being by which something is said to be, to have been, or to be going to be in time or in a moment. It can also be described thus: *quando* is the duration of a created thing, which is divided into aevum and time.

Assertion. *Quando* is not a mere extrinsic denomination derived from time, with which things coexist; rather, it is the extrinsically advening relation just explained. The first part of this is contrary to the two recent Scotists who in (*1.part.Inst.Tract.1.cap.7*) approve the common explanation of this category, yet in (*disp.8.q.2.art.2*) seem to refute it. Moreover, at the end of the cited article they add that *habitus* is an extrinsic denomination. Again, the same authors (*art.1*), inconsistently with themselves, deny that the last categories — among which *quando* is numbered — consist only in an extrinsic denomination. Finally, with the common Scotist position, they hold that the aforesaid categories are extrinsically advening relations — but extrinsically advening relations are not extrinsic denominations, as is evident from action and passion. Therefore *quando* is not the extrinsic denomination set forth and defended by those more recent authors.

I add further: if that denomination signified by *quando* constituted one category, then more categories than those given would have to be posited, corresponding to the plurality of extrinsic denominations — for there are denominations from acts, from objects, from effects, and others of this kind. Moreover, the categories are a series of genera, species, and individuals, not a series of extrinsic denominations. All the more because time is not an extrinsic denomination — as I will show in physics. Therefore neither is *quando*, which is to be in time. For if the thing is not an extrinsic denomination, neither is that which follows from the thing. But *quando* is something left behind from time, as I made clear in the first note. Therefore *quando* is not an extrinsic denomination.

The second part is Scotus's (*4.dist.13.q.1.* C, and elsewhere), and it is sufficiently proved from the first article of the cited place.

Objection. If *quando* formally denotes some real form, that form is either absolute or relative. But it is not absolute, as I proved (*art.1.assert.3*). Nor is it relative: for whatever relation it may be, it is the relation of measured to measure, which is a relation of reason — as the Doctor observes (*Quol.13. N*). The reason is that its extremes do not have real being but only known being, which is a being of reason. Confirmation: time, in the aspect of measure, is not something real. Therefore neither is the relation signified by *quando* real. Granting the major and the first part of the minor, I deny the second part of the same minor. To its proof I say that this is true of the relation of what is actually measured to an actual measure — but not of the relation of what is measurable to a measure, as Lychetus (*ibi*) rightly explains, through whose interpretation there is also explained what the Doctor has (*2.dist.2.q.3.¶. Ad 1. sub C*). This relation is moreover of the third mode of relatives, as is evident (*5.Met.T.20*).

You will say: this does not belong to it by reason of time but from outside — even if there were no time, *quando* would still be measurable through its extrinsic account. I say that this indeed results from time, since it is left behind by time itself; yet that relation itself is the formal and quidditative account of *quando*, as is clear from its definition — and it cannot exist without time, because a relation cannot exist without its terminus. Therefore Bonetus (*cit.*) adds that *quando* has as its foundation the thing that is in time or in an instant, and as its terminus time or the now. And just as past time is not, nor is future time, but only present: so *quando* with respect to the past is past, with respect to the future is future, and with respect to the present is present. To the confirmation the antecedent is denied. The reason for the denial is clear from what has just been said, and will be clearer in physics, where it will be shown that time is a real being independent of the intellect's operation. And even granted that *quando* were a relation of reason, this would not give our cited Recentiores what they intend — for they hold that *quando* is constituted by an extrinsic denomination, which they themselves claim (*disp.3.q.6.art.1*) is not a being of reason, though they seem to acknowledge this later.

Article XIX. On *Habitus* (Having).

The Archbishop of Aquis (*dist.30.art.3.propositione 3*) thought the same of *habitus* as he had of *situs* and *quando*, holding *habitus* to be formally a being of reason. For he says that although armor, clothing, and the body to which they are applied are something real, and the shapes of garments and armor arising from a clothed and armed body are real, nonetheless the intellect fashions from these a certain residual being — namely, being adorned, being safe in battle, or something else — which has no being apart from the operation of the intellect. This view is rejected by nearly all philosophers, both here and in (*5.Met.*) — notably by Antonius Andreas (*q.15. in sex principia*), who teaches that *habitus* and the remaining categories are real beings, as has been abundantly established

from what has been said, and I judge nothing further need be added on this point.

Although philosophers commonly teach that *habitus* is something real, there is nonetheless considerable disagreement among them in assigning what that real thing is. As many different opinions on *habitus* are reported as on *quando* and certain other categories — as Suárez (*disp.53.Met.sect.1*) indicates. Setting aside these and the ones refuted above, I note that some — including two of our younger members (*cit.art.2*), following Bonetus (*in praedicamentis libello ult.*) and Bassolis (*4.dist.12.q.1.art.1*) — make this category too broad, including within it the union or connection of two extremes taken universally, whether it be the union of matter with form, of accident with subject, of relation with its foundation, or of parts with the whole — as will be clear from the definition of *habitus* to be adduced below. Others, however, make it too narrow, judging that under *habitus* only defensive armor is included, not offensive weapons — a view favored by Suárez (*ubi supra sect.2.n.4*). These will be refuted from what follows.

The opinion of Scotus and the common Scotists pleases me: they hold *habitus* to be the extrinsically advening relation of a garment or ornament to what is clothed or adorned — which properly belongs to animate things, not inanimate ones, as the Doctor observes (*1.dist.32.q.2.¶. Contra post Arist.6.Eth.cap.13* and other places). Although, as the same Doctor adds, inanimate things can be denominated from something adjacent to them which, insofar as it is in some way their ornament or covering, can be reduced to the genus of *habitus*. And this can also be said of animals clothed or adorned by human art, and by a certain analogy of trees, flowers, leaves, roofs, houses, tapestries, temples, and other such things said to be clothed or adorned by art or nature. The only difference that perhaps intervenes is that man acquires the former by his own industry for himself or others; the latter receive theirs by their own nature — as Aristotle writes and expresses (*3. de partibus animalium cap.1*).

In one word, the common and general account of this category can be assigned: it is *habitus* in the concrete and *habutio* in the abstract, as Bonetus and after him Suárez (*supra alleg.*) note. It is described by Gilbert (*capite 7.sui libel.*) thus: *habitus* is the adjacency of bodies and of what is around bodies, according to which the one is said to have and the others to be had. Titelmans (*l.2.capite 170*) explains this as follows: by *habitus* is understood a relation — namely, extrinsically advening — arising in a body from the adjacency or application of a garment or ornament to that very body. That such a relation arises from this is clear from the fact that in a body that is clothed in a garment, bound with a belt, or otherwise adorned, it cannot exist without some reference to the garment, belt, or ornament — as Titelmans (*loco cit.*) infers. Aristotle concurs (*1.praedicam.c.10*), saying that to have signifies to be shod, to be armed — that is, as Bonetus (*cit.*) explains, insofar as armor is applied to the body and footwear to the feet, a certain relation of the extremes to each other arises, by which a man is formally

said to be armed, or to have armor. Similarly, a man is formally said to be shod or to have footwear; and such relations are called by their proper names — arming, shoeing. The Philosopher hints at this more explicitly (5.*Met.c.20*), saying that *habitus* is the intermediate act between what has and what is had — just as action mediates between agent and effect, so between the man having the garment and the garment that is had, *habitus* is the intermediary. *Habitus*, therefore, is the same as *habitus*, or the relation we have explained.

Furthermore, in any concrete accident — such as *habitus* — three things are principally to be considered: subject, form, and the relation arising from them when united to each other. Likewise, in *habitus* three things are to be weighed: the body on which the garment is placed, the garment itself, and the placing around. *Habitus* formally is neither the body nor the garment, since each is a substance, and *habitus* — being one of the nine genera of accidents — is an accident. Therefore it is the placing around, which is the said extrinsically advening relation of the garment to the clothed person — called active *habitus* — or of the clothed person to the garment — called passive *habitus*, as is clear from the final words of Gilbert's definition. The divisions of this category and its properties are rightly and clearly expressed by Titelmans (*praecit.*) and by me (*in Epitome 1.1.q.4.art.13*).

Objection. Union must be placed in one of the categories. But it does not seem to be placed in any other category than *habitus*. Therefore *habitus* comprehends union taken generally — whether of corporeal things or of spiritual things — and hence the category of *habitus* is not to be limited or narrowed to the aforesaid unions of garment or ornament, which are accommodated only to bodies. The major should be evident to everyone, since the categories are a series of all created things. The minor is supported by induction through the individual categories. For union does not reside in the categories of substance, quantity, or quality, since these are absolute beings, while union — as was said above — is a relative being. Nor in the category of relation, since it does not follow necessarily from the extremes, as a relation of the genus of relation does. Nor in the category of action — for it is evident that union is not action: once the action is over, union still remains, just as after the generation of a composite, the union of matter and form remains in the composite itself. Nor in the category of passion, for the same reason just given, with only the name of action changed to the name of passion. Nor in the genus of *ubi*, since union — besides the presence of a thing in place that *ubi* expresses — denotes something additional, as is clear from the case of an Angel who is indeed present to a stone, yet is not said to be united to it — because union seems to designate some information of form in a subject, between which the union itself subsists. Nor in the syllabus of *situs*, for the same reason given for the genus of *ubi*. It therefore remains that it be placed in the catalogue of *habitus*, since the union of form with subject seems to be the adjacency left behind from accident and subject when they are simultaneously united. I reply: granting the major and denying

the minor, to its proof it can be said with Scotus (*4.dist.12.q.1.§. Ad quaest. respondeo C*) that union is reducible to the genus of passion — so that passion names not only the relation to the agent but also to the form — or to the genus of action — so that action names not only the relation of the agent to the patient but also that of the informing form to what it informs. Or say that union is reduced to the category of the form it unites, just as a passion that is a property of a thing is reduced to the category in which the thing whose property it is resides — as I have said elsewhere with Scotus. And it is not implausible that union belongs to this category, as I noted from Bassolis (*in Epitome l.1.q.4.art.13*).

Question IX. On the Post-Predicaments.

Article I. What Opposition Is.

That God created opposites is attested by Holy Scripture (*Eccles.42*): "God made all things in pairs, one against another." That they exist in the nature of things is confirmed by experience. For heat is contrary to cold, the moist to the dry, and other things are in turn opposed — as we will discuss in particular in physics. And given that there are opposites, opposition must be conceded: for through opposites things are opposed, just as walls are whitened through whiteness. What opposition is taken universally, however, is not so evident. To make it plain, I first note with Aristotle (*10.Met.T.12*) that the same and the different are immediate — and every being compared with another is either the same as it or different from it. Or, to speak more abstractly: every being is either the same as or distinct from another. And this proposition is very well accommodated to created and uncreated beings alike. For we say that the divine Persons are distinct, but not that they are diverse — for the name of diversity removes the unity of the divine nature, as I noted (*Tract. de Deo trino q.6.disp...*). But we use the name of distinction without any danger, both on account of the relations and on account of the divine attributes, as I proved at length (*Tract.de Deo uno disp.3.q.2 & Tract.praecit.q.8.disp.4*). The Doctor writes (*1.dist.11.q.2.§. Contra istam. B.C.*) that each thing is distinguished from every other that is not itself, by that through which it is formally constituted in being — as man is constituted and distinguished from a brute and from everything else that is not man, by rationality.

Besides opposites there are also disparates, which — as noted (*in Epitome l.1.q.1.art.9*) — have no affinity or community with each other. Among these Scotus (*citato*) numbers certain divine relations, such as filiation and active spiration — whereas passive and active spiration are opposed relations. Thus opposites and disparates are not excluded from divine things.

Nor is opposition taken in the broadest sense to be thought coincident with distinction and diversity, as two recent Scotists (*disp.9.q.1. in initio*) hold, imitating Suárez (*disp.45.Met.sect.1*) — and perhaps the Doctor hints at this (*q.37.praedicam. in initio*). For among disparates there is found distinction but not

opposition and diversity; and distinction extends further than opposition and diversity.

Opposition is twofold: one complex, the other incomplex. I dealt with the former (*in Epitome lib.2.q.4.artic.1 & 2*). I now take up the latter, which is commonly described according to its name as the incompatibility of things that cannot coexist simultaneously and with respect to the same thing in the same subject. Thus the relations of producer and produced, of cause and caused, and the like are opposed. This description can be illustrated by examples and proved by induction through the individual opposites, the knowledge of which will become clear in the following articles, in which I will treat each of them separately. I note only here that in the said definition — as is customary in every definition — something common is posited in which disparates and opposites agree, namely incompatibility; and something peculiar is posited by reason of which opposition is distinguished from everything that is not opposition, as is evident from an examination of each of the words given above.

Objection I. Where there is supreme unity, there is no incompatibility and opposition, since opposition obtains between two extremes of which one is not the same as the other. But in God there is supreme unity and simplicity, as all theologians teach. Therefore in God there is no opposition and no opposites. I reply by distinguishing the major: where there is supreme unity without any formal or real distinction, granted; where there is supreme unity with a formal distinction of attributes and divine perfections, and a real distinction of supposits together with an identity of essence, denied. Or say that this holds for contrary opposition, not for relative opposition — which I have noted above is found in God.

Objection II. Opposition is a species of difference, and difference of diversity, and diversity is a passion of being — as Scotus argues (*q.37.praedicam.*) and as follows from Aristotle (*10.Met.T.24.25*). But in God there is no diversity, as I was saying above. Therefore neither is there any opposition. I reply that the major holds for finite and limited being, among which diverse genera of natures exist — and thus Aristotle and Scotus are to be interpreted in this way — but not for infinite and unlimited being, which participates in only one nature. Therefore there is no diversity in God, which designates multiplicity of nature and contrariety.

Article II. Whether Opposition Is a Real Being.

Scotus (*proximè cit.*) raises this doubt there, and seems to hold that opposition is a being of reason, adducing arguments for both sides that render it probable. In (*q.38.§. Ad 1.quaest.*), however, the same Doctor seems to resolve the present difficulty by this distinction: saying that opposition is an equivocal name. Taken in one way it applies to the opposition that belongs only to contrary and relative oppositions, and in that sense he concedes that opposition is a real being that

belongs univocally to them. Taken in another way, it applies to the opposition belonging only to privative and contradictory oppositions, and in that sense he seems to conclude that opposition is a being of reason — since even if one extreme is real, the other is not, being a privation or negation, as Scotus (*ibid. Quol.1. & Tataret (dub.2)*) notes.

But in this place the Doctor does not seem to be speaking assertively — as is clear from the words he uses, namely "it can be said," and "perhaps," which he repeats several times — the sign of one who doubts. Or else he is speaking not in his own view but in that of others, as frequently happens in that work, as Bargius and other interpreters of his note. For in (*1.dist.23.q.un. §. Item arguo. G; 2.dist.12.q.2. §. Ad 1.rationem ante F*) and other of his writings — which carry greater weight and authority — he plainly asserts that negation and privation exist on the part of the thing independently of any thinking. The same is expressly taught by Trombetta (*12.Metaphys.q.6*), John Canonicus (*1.phys.q.10.artic.2*), and it will be evident in physics in the question on privation.

Others attempt to satisfy this difficulty by this distinction: that opposition taken logically is a being of reason, but opposition taken physically is a real being. It can also be added, as relevant to our purpose, that opposition taken metaphysically is certainly a real being — whose consideration is had (*5.Met.c.10*). For metaphysics studies real being, being a science that is formally and objectively real, as I will show (*1.1.Met.*). The arguments adduced by Scotus at the beginning of the cited question powerfully persuade of this. I adduce only one, which is more evident than the others, being an induction through the individual members of opposites. Contrary opposition clearly shines forth on the part of the thing: there is mutual action between hot and cold, moist and dry, with no intellect thinking about it. Likewise, relative opposition is seen in the nature of things, as is clear from father and son, who regard each other through a mutual relation. Likewise, privative opposition: there exist the seeing and the blind, with no intellect excluded — as from (*4.Met.T.4 & 10* of the same work *T.12*) and following the Doctor confirms (*in 2.cit.*). As for contradictory opposition, it is easy to prove — since it follows upon any other opposition. Therefore, since the others exist outside the intellect, contradictory opposition likewise does not borrow its existence from the intellect.

Objection I. An accident does not enjoy a more real and better being than the subject in which it is subject. But the subject of opposition is intentional, or a being of reason. Therefore opposition is also a being of reason. The major is evident; the minor is proved by induction: for species and genus are relative opposites, from what was said (*1.2.q.3.a.3*), and these are beings of reason. Likewise, genus and non-genus, species and non-species are contradictory opposites, which are likewise numbered among intentional beings — and the same is to be maintained of the other two opposites. Granting the major, I

distinguish the minor: concerning logical opposition, granted; concerning metaphysical or physical opposition, denied — as was declared above.

Objection II. To be predicated and to be subject belong to intentional being, from Scotus (*q.17.Universalium*, ante §. *Ad quaest.*). But opposition is predicated of the four aforesaid oppositions, which are subject to it as dividing members to their divided, or as inferiors to their superior. Therefore opposition is a being of reason. Granting the major, to the minor I say — following the distinction already given — that this is true of opposition taken logically, not of opposition taken physically or metaphysically.

Article III. How Many Kinds of Opposition There Are.

Aristotle makes opposition fourfold, both here and in (*5.Met.c.10.T.16*). Scotus (*q.38.praedicament. §. Ad 2.quaest.*) gives a not incongruous account of this, and Orbellus (*4.Met.cap.4*) aptly explains it: every opposition is either of a real being to a real being, or of a real being to a non-real being. If the first, either one regards the other — as father and son — and we have relative opposition; or one expels the other from the same subject — as heat and cold — and we have contrary opposition. If the second, either one designates the privation of the other in the same subject — as seeing and blind — and we have privative opposition; or one denotes the negation of the other — as seeing and non-seeing — and we have contradictory opposition.

Another cause of this fourfold division — which does not seem to differ greatly from the first — is given by the same Doctor (*5.Met. in comm.T.15*): opposites either mutually posit each other and mutually destroy each other, and are relatives; or they alternately expel each other from the same subject, and are contraries; or one designates the lack of a form existing in the same subject, and they are privatives; or one asserts the negation of the other, and they are contradictories.

Whether opposition is equivocal or univocal with respect to those four oppositions is not a matter of one mind among all. Raconius (*Tract.2.disp.3.sect.1.q.1*) holds it to be univocal. But Scotus and many others make it equivocal. The principal reason is that real positive being has nothing univocal in common with the privative and negative: but some oppositions are real positive — namely relative and contrary — while the other two are negative oppositions, as is clear from what has been said. Therefore opposition is not univocal with them. Furthermore, there is nothing univocal between being and non-being, as is self-evident. But the first two oppositions are properly beings; the other two are not properly beings, as is clear from what was said above. Again, opposition is a relation — as Scotus (*citatus*) hints and Bonetus (*4.Met.c.2*) proves. The two preceding oppositions are real, since their extremes are real positive beings; the two following, though one extreme is positive, the other is

not — as I illustrated with examples above. Therefore those four oppositions are not univocated in the common account of opposition.

Objection I. Every good division must be binary, as Boethius (*1.Divisionum*) notes. But the aforesaid division of opposition is fourfold. Therefore it is not good. Granting the major, to the minor I say that it is made binary by the first account I gave: for I said that every opposition is either of being to being, or of being to non-being — making opposition's division bipartite. Or say it is binary if divided into positive and negative — then positive into contrary and relative, and subsequently negative into privative and contradictory. And I add that elsewhere I will show that a division need not always be binary.

Objection II. Every division is made through opposites, according to Boethius (*ubi supra*). But the said division is not made through opposites, since this partition is among oppositions — and opposition is not opposed, just as action is not acted upon, nor place located — otherwise one would regress to infinity, since there would be no stronger reason why one would be opposed rather than another. The major can be denied with Scotus (*nuper alleg. in solutione primi*): for a division of the genus of substance into its species, properly speaking, is not between opposites but between disparates. Or, if the major be granted — as it seems truly to be — to the minor I say that while opposition is indeed not opposed, it is nonetheless that by which an opposite is formally opposed — whether by relative or any other of the aforesaid oppositions — just as whiteness is not whitened but is that by which a subject is whitened.

Article IV. On Relative Opposites.

Aristotle, in enumerating the opposites (*c.ult. de postpraedicamentis*), begins with relative opposites — and this he also does in treating them. Perhaps the reason is that relatives are the least opposed of all, as the Coimbrans (*in praesenti Comm.*) observe. And this seems to have its foundation in the doctrine of the same Philosopher, who writes (*10.Met.T.15*) that contradictory opposition — which is placed last — is the greatest of all, such that opposition proceeds in grades from relative, contrary, and privative, to contradictory. Hence the Stagirite adds (*ibid.*) that privation is a kind of contradiction, because departing from relative and contrary, it approaches contradictory opposition.

Relative opposites are described by the same Aristotle (*c. de oppositis*): they are those that are said to be *of* the opposites, or in some other way in reference to them — that is, relative opposites are those that mutually regard each other, through some case: genitive — as a father is the father of a son — or ablative — as the disciplined is disciplined by discipline, and a father is a father by paternity — as Titelmans (*l.2.c.60*) rightly notes. And the Doctor touches on this (*q.39.praedicam. §. Notandum pro differentia 24*).

Whether the aforesaid description of relative opposites is legitimate, see what I wrote (*q.6.huius lib.*). For beyond the case of opposites, the very same description

that was given by the Ancients — which was not received there — is here accepted, perhaps because it is more apt for expressing this kind of relative opposition, as the Coimbrans (*cit.*) hint. The Philosopher also hints at this when he says "are said to be *of* the opposites." Or perhaps the same Philosopher is not speaking in his own view but in that of Plato and others — which was then common and celebrated — as he also does in the chapter on quantity, where he records certain species of quantity there according to popular opinion, which he does not admit elsewhere, as is evident (*5.Met.c.de quanto*).

Such relative opposition seems to exist between extremes through the relative forms by which they regard each other, as the Doctor (*proximè cit.*) plainly sets forth, saying that relative opposites reciprocate, while other things that are indeed relatives but not opposites do not reciprocate. Whether such a relative form is directed toward its terminus as absolute or relative — and likewise whether it can be founded on a relation or requires an absolute foundation — these difficulties have already been resolved in the cited place.

Objection I. Things that exist simultaneously are not opposites, since opposition is the incompatibility of two extremes of which one does not tolerate the other. But correlatives exist simultaneously — indeed, one cannot exist without the other, and if one perishes, the other must perish as well, as is clear from what has been said. Therefore relatives are not opposites. The major is to be denied: for opposition is required not with respect to coexistence but with respect to the impossibility of opposed forms, which cannot be simultaneously in the same subject or foundation with respect to the same thing. Father and son are relatively opposed because the filiation that is in the son can in no way be in the father — just as the paternity that is in the father cannot be in the son, whom the father regards.

Objection II. Relative opposites can be simultaneously predicated of the same thing — for the same person can be named father and son, as experience shows. Therefore relative opposites are not opposed according to the incompatibility of relative forms in the same subject. I distinguish the antecedent: with respect to the same thing, denied; with respect to different things, granted. For the same man is called father with respect to the son he begot, and is called son with respect to the father from whom he was begotten.

Article V. On Contrary Opposites.

In order that the proper nature of contrary opposites may be clear to us, we think it opportune to adduce the twofold sense of "contrary" noted by the Doctor (*q.14.praedicam. § Ad 1. in solutione 3*), Orbellus (*4.Met.c. de oppositionibus*), and Tataret (*in q.postpraedicam.scibili 2*). Nor did Aristotle omit this, as will become clear in the explanation of each.

The first and broad use of "contrary" is for any opposite and impossible with another — as Aristotle mentions (*1.Phys.T.142*) when he calls the natural

principles — matter and form — contraries. In this sense, two forms impossible simultaneously in the same matter are called contrary; and such contrariety is found in every genus, as the same Philosopher indicates (*10.Met.T.13.24*), whom the Doctor cites in the place cited. Even among transcendentals such contrariety is found, as Scotus notes (*q.42.praedicam.¶. Quarta propria.*).

The second and narrow sense of contraries is for those that alternately expel each other from the same subject. These are properly contraries distinct from the other opposites — mentioned here and elsewhere by Aristotle — whose description is read (*10.Met.T.14*) in these words: "Contraries are those that, placed under the same genus, are most distant from each other and mutually expel each other from the same subject." The Stagirite himself adds (*c. de oppositis*): unless one of them is present by nature — meaning that some contraries are innate in certain subjects, as heat in fire and cold in water.

This definition is explained through its parts. First, the word "opposed" or "incompatible" is suppressed as a kind of genus. Then "under the same proximate genus" is posited — as whiteness and blackness share the same proximate genus, which is color; or the same remote genus — as virtue and vice, which reside in the genus of *habitus*. Hence contraries are in the same category and differ specifically from each other, as is clear from the examples just given.

Moreover, the difference of contraries from privative and contradictory opposites is indicated: these latter are not placed per se in any genus, since one of their extremes is a privation or negation, which belongs per se to no genus. And perhaps also their difference from disparates is hinted at — which need not share the same genus, as is clear from quantity, quality, and other disparates.

"Most distant" is to be understood not of local or temporal distance but of entitative distance, as Bonetus (*4.Met.cap.2*) interprets it — or of formal repugnance of nature, as the Doctor signals (*3.dist.1.q.1.¶. Ad argument. sub L, in solutione 3*). The remaining words signify that contraries possess the same subject, in which they cannot simultaneously be, but can successively be. For in a subject that now has cold, after some days heat will be received; and in what now has moisture, after a short time there will be dryness — as daily experience teaches.

But this expulsion of contraries does not always seem to occur by violent action, as happens with qualities that are absolutely called active qualities. Sometimes, perhaps, it happens without violent action, by simple cession — as Titelmans (*loco cit.*) exemplifies with colors, odors, tastes, and sounds. Scotus (*supra cit.*) touches on this and Suárez (*disp.45.Met.Sect.2.num.14.15*) does not dissent. Whether such expulsion or cession of contraries is to be understood with respect to number or species, see Scotus (*4.dist.49.q.13.¶. Respondeo B*), where he establishes that it is to be understood of contraries taken according to species,

and of the same thing according to species — and if the same according to number, not of every, but some. Otherwise an accident would migrate from subject to subject, as the Doctor rightly infers there.

Contraries are divided by Aristotle (*hoc loco*) and Scotus (*q.38.praedicament. §. Ad aliud dico*) into immediate and mediate. Immediate are those of which one or the other must necessarily be in any subject capable of them — so that the subject of these can never exist deprived of either of them. As health and sickness are immediate contraries, whose subject is an animal, which is always either healthy or sick. This example of health and sickness that Aristotle gives is subject to criticism, since between those two there is an intermediate state of convalescence, as Galen teaches (*l.de spermate*); and as one who is more experienced in this he is to be given more credence, as Scotus (*3.dist.4.q.un.*) forewarns. Another example can be given of number, which is either even or odd, and no number can be found that is not either even or odd — therefore evenness and oddness are immediate contraries with respect to number.

Mediate contraries are those of which neither is necessarily found in the same subject — indeed, the subject of either can be deprived of both. As heat and cold are mediate contraries whose subject, for example, is water, which sometimes has neither heat nor cold but only tepidity, and is on that account called tepid. Likewise, whiteness and blackness are mediate contraries whose subject, for example, is a surface, which sometimes is neither white nor black but red or furnished with some other intermediate color.

Mediate contraries are subdivided into those mediate through participation of extremes, and those mediate through negation of extremes. The former are those that participate in something of both extremes — which can occur in two ways: either through formal participation in both extremes, as between cold and hot water there is tepid water; or through natural agreement of the middle with the extremes — not that the middle is really composed of the extremes as of its parts, since the middle is as simple as the extremes, but because the middle agrees more with the extremes than the extremes agree with each other — as redness, which is a quality intermediate between whiteness and blackness, agrees more with whiteness and blackness than whiteness and blackness agree with each other. This is deduced from Scotus (*1.dist.7.q.un. §. Ad argument. infra X; 2.dist.15.q.un. §. Dico ergo. B; Tatarum (cit. in fine scibilis 2)*) and other Scotists.

The Doctor further adds (*q.praedicament. nuper alleg.*) that some mediate contraries have several media — as is clear with white and black, between which red, yellow, pale, and others intervene; while others have only one medium — as between hot and cold, tepid is interposed as their sole medium. Moreover, some media have names assigned to them — as those I just mentioned — while others are unnamed and are described by circumlocution: as between friend and enemy there is non-friend; between just and unjust there is the non-just; and between good and evil there intervenes the non-good, etc. — which

Boethius, Scotus, and other authors call neutral and indifferent, and which Aristotle touches on (*c. de oppositis*). Nor is it to be passed over that Scotus notes there that the medium through participation of extremes is properly a medium — since the medium through negation of extremes is found in all opposites except immediate contraries, though a medium through participation is not found between contradictories, as will be plain when I treat of contradictories.

Objection I against the definition of contraries: Some contraries exist that are not subject to the same genus. Therefore it is inappropriately said that contraries are placed under the same genus. The antecedent is proved from Aristotle (*in fine cap.cit.*): "It is necessary that contraries be in the same genus — as whiteness and blackness are in the genus of color — or in different genera — as justice and injustice — or be the genera themselves — as good and evil." I respond by denying the antecedent. To its proof I say it suffices that they be of the same supreme genus: thus justice and injustice, and good and evil taken positively, reside under the genus or category of quality. So contraries are of the same proximate or remote genus, as I was noting above in the explanation of their definition — and in this way Aristotle is well interpreted in the cited place.

Objection II. Many contraries exist that are not greatly distant from each other. Therefore it is not rightly asserted that contraries are most distant from each other. The antecedent is proved: mediate contraries are not as distant from each other as immediate ones — as I was inducing above from intermediate colors. And Suárez (*disp.45.Met.Sect.2.num.9*) and the Coimbrans (*hic cap.10.q.un.art.4*) demonstrate concerning certain virtues and vices, asserting that avarice is contrary to liberality. But avarice is not most distant from liberality — it is more opposed to prodigality than to liberality, since extremes fight more than middles: avarice and prodigality are extremes, while liberality mediates between them. Again, error is contrary to true opinion, but differs more from science than from opinion — since from opinion it differs in truth, while from science it is separated in certainty and evidence. Furthermore, singular contraries fight more against each other than common contraries, since beyond common contrariety they acquire particular contrarieties with respect to individual differences. Therefore it is not certain and firm that contraries are most distant. I deny the antecedent. To the proof I concede this of mediate contraries, but not of immediate and extreme ones — as follows from Aristotle (*10.Met.c.6* and following), who, explaining the statement that "to one there is only one contrary," says it is to be interpreted of extreme contraries, not of mediate ones. Therefore, when it is said that between contraries there is maximum distance, it is to be taken not absolutely but relatively — that is, with respect to the media — as Bonetus (*supra cit.*) observes. In this way the instances of the more recent authors cease. For I admit that avarice does not maximally differ from liberality, because liberality — being a virtue — consists in the middle; and the contrary extreme most opposed to avarice is prodigality, as I also declared in the proposed instance. Likewise, error and opinion are not extreme contraries — as

the instance proves — and so it is not surprising if they do not greatly conflict with each other.

Further instance: The divided is common to all its dividing members, and a definition is adequately suited to all that is defined — from what is asserted elsewhere. Therefore, since contraries are adequately distributed into immediate and mediate, and the definition given of them is equally adequately suited to them, and in that definition it is established that contraries are most distant — which Aristotle's exposition has shown must be adapted only to immediate ones — the response given is evidently shown to be of no moment. It can be said that Aristotle sometimes attributes to a genus what does not belong to all its species: as in the chapter on quality he says that quality receives more and less — which I showed above does not suit certain qualities of the fourth species. Likewise, (*1.phys.T.41* and following) he asserts that the principles of natural things are contrary — though it is plainly established that matter is contrary to nothing. Or it can also be said that the same Philosopher sometimes gives the definition of a genus that is more adapted to its principal species than to the genus itself — as in (*1.Post.cap.2*) he defines science as the knowledge of a thing through its proper cause, which definition applies to science *propter quid*; and in (*2.de anima cap.2*) he defines soul as the principle of vegetating, sensing, moving locally, and understanding — which definition, according to Simplicius, is accommodated to the rational soul alone. Aristotle seems to be imitated by Gilbert, who defines only passive *ubi*, as he did equally for some other of the six principles — as I noted with Scotus above. The reason can be given that the species is better known than the genus; hence philosophers sometimes assigned the definition of the species rather than of the genus. To the final instance I say with Bonetus (*cit.*) that contrariety is principally founded on specific nature, not individual nature. The reason is that contrariety is formally a relation whose proximate foundation is unity or multitude — if it is of the first mode — as I noted above.

Objection III. Contraries in remiss degrees retain their proper specific nature in which they are founded — as I was just saying. But in remiss degrees they do not mutually expel each other from the same subject, as Aristotle (*5.phys.cap.ult.*) writes and Scotus (*1.dist.17*) concedes. Therefore the description of contraries has not been rightly given. The same can be urged about the acts of willing and not willing, of loving and hating, which with respect to objects of the same kind can coexist in the same subject or in the same will. Granting the antecedent, the consequence is to be denied. The reason is that even if they fight each other in remiss degrees too, yet because of their weak and feeble forces, one cannot altogether vanquish the other and thus drive it from the same subject. But these matters are to be treated exactly and accurately (*l.de elementis q.4*). In the meantime see Scotus (*1.dist.17.q.3.¶. Contra istam opinionem*), and in the *Reportata ibid.*, Lychetus, and Bonetus (*citat. in examine definitionis contrariorum*).

Article VI. On Privative Opposites.

Privatively opposed things cannot be fully known unless privation and negation are made perspicuous and visible. Therefore the nature of privation and negation must be investigated before privative opposites are examined. Setting aside the various senses of negation and privation noted by Scotus (*1.d.23.q.un.¶. Item arguo* H.O; *d.28.q.2.¶. Quantum ad 1. B*; Mayr (*ibid.*); Pelbartus (*Tomo 1.Rosarij.Verbo privatio*); and Orbellus (*4.Met.c.4*)), I observe that negation has a wider extension than privation. For every privation is indeed a negation, but not every negation is a privation properly taken — in roughly the same way that every man is an animal but not every animal is a man, since animal extends further than man. Aristotle signals this (*5.Met.cap.22.7.27*) and the Doctor expresses it (*cit.dist.28*) by distinguishing negation into negation outside a genus and negation within a genus.

Negation outside a genus is that which denies every entity and posits nothing positive whatsoever — and can be predicated both of being and of non-being. Hence it is rightly called negation outside a genus, and is expressed in the first principle: "Of any thing whatsoever, either affirmation or negation holds, and of nothing both simultaneously." Negation within a genus is that which posits something in what it underlies, and is called negation within a genus because it denies something within the limits of some genus — as blindness denies sight within the limits of animal, and darkness denies light within the genus of light. Therefore the difference between negation outside a genus and negation within a genus consists in this: negation outside a genus posits no subject of which it is asserted — as non-being, non-man — whereas negation within a genus requires a subject of which it is stated — as negation of sight in a mole.

Privation, however — which is distinguished from both kinds of negation — requires a fitting subject, and is hence described strictly by Aristotle (*cit.*) as "the negation of a form in a fitting subject." Or as Scotus says (*1.dist.9.q.2.¶. Teneo. sub P*; and earlier *q.41.praedicam.¶. Ad istud dici potest*; and *q.39.¶. Notandum quod specialis*): privation is the lack of a form in a subject that is by nature apt for it — as blindness is the lack of sight in a man fit for seeing. Suárez (*disput.14.Met.sect.5.num.7*) and the common run of more recent philosophers are of the same view.

Having explained these matters, which in a certain way contribute to a full knowledge of privative opposites, let us bring forward their definition. As Titelmans (*l.2.cap.63*) notes, it is gathered from Aristotle (*c. de oppositis*) and expressly established by Titelmans himself (*cit.*) and Orbellus (*ubi supra, ad finem cap.alleg.*), and is as follows: Privative opposites are those that have to do with the same subject in an irreversible order and at a time determined by nature.

The definition is explained: first, in this definition the word "opposed" is suppressed — by which their quasi-generic commonality with other opposites is

denoted, as I noted above in the definition of contraries. Then is posited "having to do with the same subject" — noted by Scotus (*citat.q.praedicament.*) to show the agreement of these with contrary opposites, which successively share the same subject — as sight and blindness regard the eye as their proper subject. "In an irreversible order" is added to signify the distinction of privatives from contraries. For when one contrary approaches the same subject, the other recedes and vice versa — as when heat departs from a body, cold arrives in the same body, and conversely, when cold migrates, heat returns to that same body. But in privative opposites, although a transition from habit to privation can be made — from sight to blindness, from hearing to deafness — nonetheless from privation there is no return to habit: from blindness to sight, from deafness to hearing — according to the common saying of Aristotle and others: "From privation to habit there is no return."

"At a time determined by nature" is added to identify another difference between privative opposites and contraries. For the subject of contraries is at all times both capable of them and always receives one or the other of them; but the subject of privative opposites requires a fixed time determined by nature, so that one of them is lodged in it and it is said to have or lack one or the other. Thus a puppy before the ninth day, if it does not see, is not called blind; likewise an infant who before one year has no teeth is not called toothless. But if after the ninth day the puppy does not see, it is called blind; and if after one year the infant is not furnished with teeth, it is called toothless — because the time fixed by nature has passed, at which it should have been adorned with that habit and is not; on that account it is rightly said to be deprived of it, as the Doctor teaches (*in Report.2.d.41.q.un.*). Finally, by reason of the fitting subject, privative opposites are distinguished from contradictories.

Objection I. From darkness to light and from sleep to waking, a daily return occurs. But these are privative opposites, as is evident. Therefore privative opposites are not rightly described as having to do with the same subject in an irreversible order. I reply that the major is true when privations are privations that deprive only in act and not in potency; but we are speaking with Aristotle of privations that deprive in potency — in which sense from death to life and from blindness to sight no return is found by the forces of nature. And the common Philosophers' saying "From privation to habit there is no return" is to be interpreted in this way — as we show more fully (*in phys.q.de privatione*). This is also Scotus's meaning (*q.41.praedicam.§. Ad istud potest*), and Tatarct (*scibili 3*) holds this.

Objection II. Between privation and habit there is no medium — just as there is none between contradictory opposites (*ex 10.Met.7.15*). Therefore a puppy before the ninth day is either blind or seeing. But it is not seeing. Therefore it is blind. And consequently the phrase "at a time determined by nature" is pointlessly posited in the definition of privative opposites. I reply with Scotus (*in*

Report.alleg. §. Ad 1.principale) by distinguishing the antecedent: between habit and privation absolutely there is no intermediate, granted; relatively, denied — that is, having respect to time and other circumstances. For since the time fixed by nature at which the habit should be in the subject has not yet come, there is not its lack, but only negation. Therefore a puppy before the ninth day is neither blind nor seeing, but non-seeing. Scotus likewise adds (*ibid.*) that there is an act of will that is neither good nor bad but indifferent and neutral; and just as there can be indifferent acts, so indifferent acts can generate an indifferent habit — as I showed at length in the moral treatise.

Article VII. On Contradictory Opposites.

From the knowledge of privation and negation obtained in the preceding article, it does not seem very difficult to investigate what contradiction is and what contradictory opposites are. For privation strictly taken is accommodated to privative opposites, and negation to contradictories — as the Philosopher touches on (*1.Post.6.26* and following; *4.Met.cap.7.T.17*) where, signifying contradictory opposites, he mentions negation. Nor does the Doctor dissent (*ibid.*). And Tataré (*q.ult.praedicam.scibili 3*) plainly teaches this, distinguishing negation into infinitating negation — which belongs to contradictories — and depriving negation — which is adapted to privatives.

Hence the Cardinal of Cambrai describes contradiction thus: "Contradiction is the affirmation of one and the negation of the same." And Bonetus (*4.Met.cap.2*): "Contradiction is the opposition by which formally something and nothing are opposed — that is, of which two terms, one is positive, the other negative." For all this to be more easily grasped, a twofold contradiction is to be distinguished from Scotus (*q.41.praedicam. §. Hic assignat; 1.d.4.q.1. §. Ad 1. E; 2.d.2.q.9. R*): one is incomplex, which regards terms — as man, non-man; the other is complex, which regards propositions — as "Peter is learned," "Peter is not learned" — and this requires the same subject, the same time, and other conditions and qualifications of a true refutation. The former is examined here; the latter has its place in the book on *Perihermeneias*.

From these it is clearly gathered what contradictory opposites are. They are described by Aristotle (*1.Post.c.2.T.5* & *4.Met.T.27*) and by the Doctor (*ibid.* & *q.39.praedicam.* & *4.d.1.q.1. §. Ratio 2. sub F*): contradictories are those between which, of themselves, no middle falls — as is clear from the example cited: man, non-man; being, non-being.

The parts of the definition are explained: the word "opposed" is understood, denoting their genus shared with the other opposites — as I noted above. "Between which no middle falls" is added, by reason of which contradictories are distinguished from the remaining opposites. "Of themselves" is added on account of immediate contraries, to which it belongs not per se but per accidens

to have no medium — as Orbellus (*4.Met.q.4*) and Zabarellas (*in comment.1.Post.contex.13*) well explain.

Thus contradictories taken absolutely lack a middle, as the Doctor asserts (*1.d.2.q.7.§. Ad 1. infra KK*). The reason that can be adduced is: that which belongs to something per se and essentially — its opposite can belong to it neither per se nor per accidens, as is clear of rationality, which belongs to man so per se that its opposite, irrationality, is repugnant to him. This can be induced about the others. But lacking a middle belongs per se to contradictories, since it is posited in the definition of contradiction given by the Philosopher in the cited place. Furthermore, in the remaining opposites it is easy to find a medium: for in contraries between white and black there mediates red; in privatives between blind and seeing there mediates the non-seeing. Therefore it is only contradictories that per se are deprived of a medium — understanding a medium of truth and falsity, accommodated to complex contradictories, or a medium of predication, adapted to incomplex contradictories — as Titelmans (*l.2.cap.64*) notes.

Furthermore, contradictories cannot have a middle through participation of extremes — which others call a middle according to form — nor a middle through negation of extremes — which others note as a middle according to subject — as can be observed in Orbellus and Zabarellas as cited. The antecedent is supported: first concerning the middle through participation, because no positive is properly composed of being and non-being; but whatever exists is either being or non-being, and it is impossible for the same thing to simultaneously be and not be (*Arist.4.Met.cap.9; 1.Post.c.8.T.26* and following). But one extreme of contradictory opposites is positive and a being, the other negative and non-being — as is sufficiently clear from the above. Again, one contradictory destroys the other — as Suárez (*disp.3.Met.Sect.3.n.1*) notes. Therefore if one of them is denied of some subject, it cannot be in that same subject, and hence contradictories do not acquire a middle through participation. Then, concerning the middle through negation of extremes: contradictory opposition embraces all things, since everything is either being or non-being. Therefore each thing is comprehended under one or the other contradictory, and there is no medium through negation between contradictories.

Scotus, however, left it written (*nuper cit. & d.5.q.1.§. Ad argumenta logica infra L, in solutione ult.*), with whom Lychetus and Orbellus agree (*in fine q.4.prealleg.*), that complex contradictories taken with a syncategorematic term can claim a middle for themselves — which he confirms with an example: "Man as man is neither white, nor is man as man non-white." For if man as man were white, the sense would be that man is the precise and formal cause by which whiteness would belong to him; and if man as man were non-white, the sense would be that man is the adequate cause by which whiteness would be repugnant to him. Therefore

both proposed propositions are false; and this proposition is true — "man as man is neither white nor non-white" — and mediates between both the aforesaid statements. Likewise, contradictories are not predicated per se: for man is not per se white, nor is man per se non-white. For if man were per se white in the first or second mode of saying per se, he could not be non-white — because what belongs to something in the first or second mode, its opposite can belong to the same neither per se nor per accidens, as is clear from rationality and risibility, which belong to man per se in such a way that their opposite can in no way belong to him. Furthermore, in complex contradictories the term is not to be taken distributively and for something common in contingent matter — otherwise both could be true, as "man is white; man is not white" — which Tataret (*cit.scibili 3*) and Orbellus (*ubi supra in solutione ult.*) diligently note. Finally, Scotus (*1.dist.4.q.1.Ad 3*) notes that contradiction does not follow in the aforesaid composites — for example: "A stone is not a white piece of wood; therefore a stone is a non-white piece of wood" — because "wood" is affirmed in the second, which is not affirmed in the first.

It remains to be examined whether contradictory opposition is the greatest of all oppositions, and what the distance is between contradictory extremes. Scotus (*4.Met.q.4; 2.dist.1.q.2.§. Ostensis, Z; 4.dist.1.q.1.§. ratio secunda, F*) resolves these two difficulties — the second clearly, and the first it only indicates in the two last cited places.

On the former, the common opinion holds that contradiction is the greatest of all oppositions — and the Coimbrans report and receive this (*cap. de oppositis, q.un.art.6*). It is proved as follows.

First: the greatest incompatibility and impossibility of extremes makes for the greatest opposition, since opposition is the incompatibility of things that cannot be simultaneously — as is clear from (*art.1.huius q.*). For just as those things are said to be minimally opposed that have minimal incompatibility, so those that undergo maximal incompatibility are maximally opposed. But contradictories obtain maximal incompatibility, since they cannot be made simultaneously in the same time and subject nor by any power — even divine absolute power — as theologians commonly teach, especially Scotus (*4.d.10.q.2.§. Dico ergo. F*). Since therefore contradictories are maximally opposed, the greatest opposition is consequently contradiction — according to Scotus's rule, from concrete to abstract. And this is had (*10.Met.T.15*).

Second: things that admit of absolutely no medium are opposed with the greatest opposition — for the more some things are immediate, the more they are opposed, since they agree in no middle — whether it is a middle of form or a middle of subject. Therefore the more one extreme departs from the other, the more it is opposed and repugnant to it. But contradictories admit of no middle whatsoever between them, as is clear from their definition given above and from induction through the individual cases. Therefore among opposites

they are opposed with the greatest opposition, and hence among oppositions, contradiction holds first place.

Third: the greatest opposition is that which is found in all things — in supreme and lowest alike, and in middle ones. For the broader and wider an opposition, the greater and more excellent it is. But contradiction can be made in all things: whether superiors — as God, non-God; or inferiors — as earth, non-earth; or middles — as air, non-air, and so on for the rest. But privative and contrary oppositions do not fall upon God nor upon many other things. Therefore contradiction is to be preferred to the remaining oppositions.

Contradictories follow upon privatives, because privation includes negation in a fitting subject — as the Doctor notes (*in 4.praecit.* a little before G). For affirmation and negation — which privatives display — are more repugnant than the two affirmations and positions that contraries and relatives designate. After privatives come contraries — against two of our younger members (*artic.2.q.1.disputat.9*) who think that relatives follow immediately upon privatives as more opposed than contraries.

First, Aristotle seems to agree with us, who in enumerating the individual opposed members, begins from relatives as the minimal opposites. The reason that can be adduced is that relative opposites can be simultaneously in the same supposit with respect to different things — as the same man is called son insofar as he is begotten by another, and is named father on account of the son he begot. But contraries — with respect neither to the same nor to different things — can be simultaneously in the same subject; indeed they alternately expel each other from the same subject by formal expulsion, and not rarely by effective expulsion. I add that among beings, relations have the least entity — as has been seen elsewhere. Therefore they also have the least incompatibility, and consequently hold the least place among opposites.

On the second difficulty: it is celebrated among philosophers — that common assertion that between contradictories there is infinite distance — which Scotus mentions and explains (*locis praenarratis*), noting a twofold distance (*in 4.citat. & 1.Reportat.dist.2.q.3.¶. secundo arguitur*): dimensional and perfective. The former is properly called distance, and belongs to the genus of quantity, having a medium between the extremes — a space lying between them. Where, however, no medium or lying space intervenes, there is no quantitative distance. The latter is a metaphor, attributed to things that lack quantity, and — according to Scotus — is nothing other than the excess of one above the other. Since, then, one extreme of contradictories is positive and the other negative — between which there is no interval — those extremes are said to be precisely distant from each other: and the distance between them is judged to be as great as the greater positive extreme is. This is argued by analogy: the distance of God from a creature — even the supreme possible creature — is as great as God is. Therefore if the supreme possible creature were given, still God would be

infinitely distant from it, because God is infinite. Bonetus the most perspicacious Doctor (*4. Metaphys. capite secundo*) expresses this doctrine luminously, saying that between all contradictories the distance is not equal — since between some there is established infinite distance, and between others finite distance. For the distance of contradictories is drawn from the infinity or finitude of the positive extremes. Therefore if their terms are infinite — as God — the distance will be infinite; but if they are finite — as any created thing — the distance will equally be finite.

From these things the response to the proposed difficulty is clear: between contradictories there is infinite distance — that is, according to Scotus's interpretation, on both sides indeterminate distance. For just as there is no distance so small that it would not suffice for contradictories, so there is no distance so great — even were it greater than the greatest possible — that contradictory opposition would not extend to it and its extremes. Therefore their distance is infinite, that is, indeterminate, toward however great or small an interval. And although all contradictories are equally impossible with each other, they are not all equally distant — for God is more distant from non-God than white is from non-white, because the positive extreme is greater. This the Doctor subtly infers (*4. alleg. H*; and in *Reportat. ibid. §. Ad rationem Sequentis*).

Objection I. Being and non-being are contradictories. But between being and non-being, generation mediates (*ex Arist. 2. Met. T. 7*). Therefore between contradictories there is a medium. Granting the major, I distinguish the minor: between being and non-being simply, no medium falls, denied; between being and non-being in a qualified sense — that is, imperfect being, which is called non-being with respect to perfect being — such as generation, granted. Aristotle (*citatus*) is to be interpreted in this way.

Objection II. The more the extremes are distant from each other, the more media are interposed between them — as experience makes clear. But between contradictory extremes there is the greatest — indeed infinite — distance, as is clear from what has been said. Therefore between contradictories a medium falls. I reply that the major is to be glossed: if understood of dimensional distance, it is granted; if of perfective distance in the way I explained above, it is denied.

Objection III. White and non-white are contradictories. But a shield, for example, of which one half is white and the other half is black, is white and non-white. Therefore between contradictories a medium intervenes. Granting the major, I distinguish the minor: the aforesaid shield is white and non-white simply, denied; in a qualified sense, granted — meaning that the shield is white and non-white with respect to different parts. But contradiction is the incompatibility of what is so with respect to the same thing, as I hinted above — and Major (*in Postpraedicam.*) especially notes this.

Objection IV. What includes is greater than what is included — as induction and daily experience teach. But the remaining oppositions — especially contraries — include contradictory opposition. For if two things exist, one white and the other black, they are contraries — and within them is included contradiction: namely, white and non-white, black and non-black. Therefore contradiction is not the greatest of all oppositions. I distinguish the major: what includes is greater than what is included, if the included is adequately contained in the including, granted — and this alone is what the cited experiences show. But if the included is contained in the including only inadequately, denied — as is clear of superiors, which are included in inferiors, yet superiors are broader and wider than inferiors. So: contradiction is contained in opposites, and moreover in all the others — as is sufficiently established from what has been said.

The remaining post-predicaments are touched upon by me (*in Epitome artic.14.q.4.lib.1*) and treated extensively by Titelmans (*cap.65* and following *lib.2*). On priority and posteriority, see Scotus (*q.43.pradicament.*), Orbellus (*5.Met.cap.5*), Bonetus (*6.Metaph.cap.2*), and most recently Mastrius and Bellutus (*disputat.9.q.2 & 3*).

Book IV. On the Proposition.

We make logic tripartite, as is evident from the beginning of the Epitome and its arrangement. For one part of logic is concerned with simples — of which we have been treating up to now. Another contemplates composites — which we have presently at hand. And a third surveys discourse, which embraces all the remaining matters to be treated in the following book. Thus in the present work we discuss composites or complex things — which by one name are called propositions (*enuntiationes*), by which truth or falsity is designated.

Although this work was inscribed by the Stagirite *peri hermeneias* — that is, "on interpretation" — as Titelmans (*l.3. in praefatione*) notes, and the Doctor (*1.perih.q.1*) hints, nonetheless the common usage of philosophers has taken root so that interpretation and proposition are indiscriminately received in this place — as Titelmans (*cit.*), Tataret (*q.1.dub.1*), the Coimbrans (*in proaemio huius operis*), and before these, Alexander and Ammonius — noble Peripatetics — in their Commentaries rightly observe.

Question I. On the Object of the Books on *Perihermeneias*.

Article I. Whether the Proposition Is the Adequate Object.

Although all of Aristotle's commentators acknowledge that the proposition is the total object of the books of *Perihermeneias*, they are not in agreement and

harmony in determining what it is. For some — such as Ammonius and Boethius — think the simple proposition is the adequate object of this work. Others, however — among whom seem to be Scotus (*hic q.prima*) and his disciples, to whom Toletus and Ruuius subscribe (*in proaemio*) — hold that the total subject of these books is the proposition abstracting from simple and composite propositions.

Note I, that interpretation — whose inscription distinguishes these books of Aristotle — admits of many senses, some of which Tataret (*Tractat.5.Summularum fol.37.scibili 2 & 1.Perihermen.q.1.dub.1*) and James of Valencia (*Tractat.2.artic.quarto.prologi in Spalt.*) adduce. Setting aside those that are grammatical and scriptural, and of little relevance to our subject — since the present discussion concerns philosophical interpretation — I note only from the Doctor (*cit. in principio articul.*) that interpretation is described in two ways.

In one way it is described as an articulate utterance expressed with the imagination of signifying — and this applies both to incomplexes and to complexes, and does not pertain to this place, which deals only with complexes. In another way it is described as an articulate utterance expressed with the imagination of signifying something to be or not to be. Interpretation taken in this sense does not differ from the vocal proposition. But just as I excluded voices from the object of logic (*libro primo, questione tertia, articulo quarto*), so this kind of interpretation — which coincides with the vocal proposition — is to be excluded from the object of this part of logic. The Doctor himself not obscurely teaches this (*ubi supra*).

Note II, that proposition is commonly distributed into mental, vocal, and written. This division, in certain respects, is to be explained in roughly the same way as the division of the term into mental, vocal, and written, explained (*in Epitome l.1.q.1.art.5*). A mental proposition is that by which the intellect apprehends and judges that something agrees or does not agree with another — as "man is an animal," "a stone is not an animal." A vocal proposition is the utterance of one thing of another spoken aloud. And a written proposition is the utterance of one thing of another expressed in letters. As for what and how many kinds of judgment there are, see Scotus (*4.d.47.q.1.¶. Respondeo sub A*) and Gadius (*Quol.15.fol.183*), who define judgment thus: judgment is the certain apprehension of something through another — for every true complex is apprehended as true through another; even if it is immediate, it is still judged true through the grounds of the terms, because from Aristotle (*1.Post.T.6*) we know principles insofar as we know the terms, as is plainly evident from the preface of the Epitome.

Assertion. Not the simple proposition, but the proposition prescinding from simple and composite, is the total object of the books of *Perihermeneias*. This follows from Scotus almost immediately at the beginning of the cited article, and is proved as follows. First, from Aristotle (*cap.4. of the first periher.*), who,

defining the proposition, divides it into simple and conjoined. Therefore according to Aristotle, the proposition taken absolutely is determined to be the adequate object of these books. Second: a conjoined proposition is a true proposition, since it appears to be contained under a proposition as a species under a genus. Therefore it is to be treated in some part of logic, and it does not appear to be considered in any other part than this — as is clear to anyone reviewing the individual parts of dialectic. Third: everything treated here is treated for the sake of the proposition, since we discuss its integral parts, then its genus which is discourse, and likewise its subjective parts, and then its properties themselves. Therefore the proposition taken generally is established as the primary and adequate object of these books.

Objection I. The subject of a science must be common to all that is considered in that science — as is clear from the conditions of a subject given elsewhere by me. But the proposition is not such: for it is not predicated of the noun and the verb — since these are not true propositions: "a noun is a proposition," "a verb is a proposition." Therefore the proposition is not the object of this work. I distinguish the major with Scotus (*praecit.*): concerning the subject of attribution, denied; concerning the subject of predication, granted — as I explained (*1.1.q.3*). And this alone is inferred by the other instance.

Objection II. If the proposition were the subject of this work, it would be either the mental, vocal, or written proposition. But none of these appears to be so. Not the vocal or written, says the Doctor — since, no voice or writing existing, logic and its parts — among which this is numbered — would still be. Nor the mental, because noun and verb are parts of the vocal proposition, since they are voices — as is clear from their descriptions adduced and explained (*in Epitome l.2*). I respond with Scotus: just as vocal noun and verb are parts of the vocal proposition, so the same things mental are parts of the mental proposition — for what is apprehended in the first operation of the intellect is composed in the second, even if not expressed through voices. Therefore in the form of the argument: granting the major and denying the minor, to its proof — admitting the first two parts of it — to the third I say that vocal noun and verb are indeed parts of the vocal proposition, but not of the mental; and this is made manifest through that.

Question II. On the Parts of the Proposition.

The parts of a proposition are of a twofold kind, as the Doctor (*1.Periher.q...*) mentions: some are integral parts — from which the proposition itself is constituted — which are noun and verb; others are subjective parts — into which the proposition is distributed — which are affirmation and negation. Concerning the former I will touch here on a few things more worthy of note; the rest are to be seen (*in Epitome l.2.q.1.art.1 & 2*). Concerning the latter, however, in the following question there will be discussion.

Article I. Whether Voices Signify Conventionally.

There were among the ancient philosophers some — notably the Pythagoreans (as Dexius, cited by Ruuius (*1.1.periher.cap.2.q.3*) testifies) and Heraclitus and Cratylus (as the Coimbrans (*in praesenti q.4.art.2*) and Arriaga (*disp.13.Sect.1.subselt.3*) report) — who held that voices naturally signify things, or that names are natural signs of things. The common position, however, of the remaining philosophers — especially Aristotle (*1.Periher.cap.1 & 2*), Scotus (*ibid.q.4 & 1.d.22.q.uni* sub C; and in *Report.eodem l. & D; & 2.d.11.q.vn.§. De secundo*), Titelmans (*l.3.cap.1*), Tatarct (*q.1*), John of Metz (*ibid.*), and others — is that voices are conventional signs of things, significant by the will and discretion of the imposers.

Note I from Pelbartus (*Tomo 1.verbo nomen*), following Vorreillon (*1.d.22*): that "noun" (*nomen*) is derived from *notamen*, because through it we note the substance and quality of something. Hence among the ancient grammarians, as the Author of the *Grammatica speculativa* testifies, a noun designates the substance and proper or common quality of something. Hence Aristotle, at the beginning of the first *periherm.*, adds that nouns are notes or signs of concepts that reside in the mind. Since therefore a noun is a note or sign of a concept hidden in the soul — and a sign is multiple — it must be investigated what kind of sign it is. And for all this to be better and more distinctly perceived, the descriptions and divisions of signs are to be recalled, which I brought forward and explained (*in Epitome l.1.q.1.art.1*).

Note II from Titelmans (*nuper alleg.*): that among voices, some signify nothing determinately — such as the voices of children, of fools, or of drunkards, uttered by them without articulation, from which nothing is understood by hearers. Others signify something determinately, and these are of two kinds: some naturally signify something even if no imposition had been made by any human being — as laughter signifies joy and groaning signifies sadness. Others signify something from the institution and will of the imposers — as *homo* among Latins and *anthropos* among Greeks signifies a rational animal.

Although a voice that signifies conventionally cannot signify other than what the imposer intends to represent in some way — since a vocal name is as it were the offspring of the mind, and it is pointless to impose a name to signify what in no way is known or at least conceived to exist, since voice was invented to lay open our concept — yet it can signify more than the one who uses or institutes or hears that name can conceive with clear knowledge. For if someone had never seen Rome but used this name with respect to another who had seen that city, it would represent it to the latter more clearly and plainly than the one who used the name could conceive it. Furthermore, Scotus says: if some wayfarer were to address a Blessed soul and name God to it, although the wayfarer did not know God distinctly and quidditatively, nonetheless by that name he would represent God distinctly and clearly to the Blessed soul, which intuitus God evidently.

Again, it can happen that the hearer understands the thing designated by name better and more perfectly than the one who imposes or uses such a name — if the hearer is of keener intellect, of greater learning and practice.

Note III from Gabriel (*3.dist.22* & *35.q.un.artic.2*): although in matters of fact there is no doubt, nonetheless sometimes there is a not inconsiderable dispute among authors about different impositions and the different voluntary use of names — which use takes on the force of imposition. For it sometimes happens that a name is truly and falsely asserted of the same thing simultaneously, according to different senses; and the same vocal and written proposition may be simultaneously true and false, on account of the equivocation of names — as I explained (*in Epitome libro tertio, q.4.artic.3*). Hence the Gloss (§. *De Suppellectili legata, leg.Labeo*) and Gadius (*post Scotum. Quol.20.artic.3. sub R*) rightly add: "Names are not to be taken from the opinions of individuals, but from common use." Likewise (*Extra. de sponsali, ex litteris*): it is read that if one party did not understand what the other proposed, recourse is to be had to the common understanding of the words, and both parties are to be compelled to retain the words uttered in the sense that those who understand correctly usually generate from them. Augustine agrees (*3.Mus.2*).

Assertion I. The concepts of things are the same for all. This is what Aristotle (*1.perih.c.1*) holds, together with Scotus (*ibid.q.4.§. Ad quest.; Quol.3. sub B*), Mayr (*lib.2.Terminorum fol.24*), Bonetus (*2.Met.cap.2*), and the rest of the philosophers. It is proved as follows. First: things are everywhere the same — as the nature of a lion is the same whether the lion exists in Rome or in Paris, whether it is presented before the Supreme Pontiff or before a king. Therefore the concepts of things are the same. The consequence is at hand: because concepts are natural images of things, naturally expressing the very things of which they are images and natural likenesses — and everywhere retain their natural representation, as is seen at the eye in images of objects presented by mirrors. Second: what is from nature is the same for all — as is clear from plants, trees, and other things that nature produces everywhere on earth. But the concepts of things are from nature, being born from the objects of which they are natural likenesses — as I will show in the book on the soul. For just as the sensible likeness of an object in the sense is always representative of that very object, so the spiritual likeness in the mind is always representative of that very object. Therefore the concepts are the same, and the same things exist for all peoples — though not all peoples use the same voices to express things and manifest concepts.

Assertion II. Voices are voluntary signs of things significant by the discretion of the imposers. Aristotle and Scotus maintain this (*ubi supra*, and *2.dist.42.§. Ad 2.quest. N*, and *Quol.3.art.1.§. De 1. sub B*). It is proved as follows. First: what depends on the will of man is conventional. But the signification of voices depends on the will of the imposing man. Therefore voices are significative

conventionally. The major is known; the minor is evident from any language (*idioma*) that men use in conversing with each other — for Hebrews use different voices, Greeks others, and Latins yet others, to express their concepts and declare their things. Second: what is not from nature but from art and human discretion is conventional. But voices are not naturally significative — otherwise they would be the same for all insofar as they signify, since a natural cause, unimpeded and duly approximated, wherever it may be, produces its effect. Likewise, there would be no difference between the voices of men and those of brutes — which is plainly false and absurd. Therefore voices must be conceded to be conventional and dependent on the discretion of the imposers.

Objection I against Assertion I: Every man has his own concept of a thing he knows — as Paul has a concept of a lion distinct from the concept Francis has of the same lion. Therefore the concepts of all are not the same. Confirmation I: if concepts were the same for all, since concepts lead to the knowledge of the things of which they are concepts, every individual would know things in the same way through the concepts representing them, and hence all would be equally knowledgeable — which is absurd. Confirmation II: different things exist among one nation, different things among another — as is clear from clothing, customs, words, letters, characters, and the like. Therefore neither are the same concepts, nor the same things, found among all. I respond that Aristotle's statement is to be understood of specific identity of concept, not numerical — as the argument proves. Or say with Scotus that the concepts of all peoples are the same with respect to representation — since they represent the same thing everywhere — but not in themselves and with respect to their entity. For in this way concepts are distinct according to the distinction of the conceivers. To Confirmation I: the sequel is denied. For although there is one specific and representative concept of the same thing, yet the numerical and entitative concept is not the same, since one person has a confused and obscure concept, another a distinct and clear concept, of the same thing — and hence it does not follow that all have equal knowledge and science. To Confirmation II: I say that this holds not for natural things but for artificial things, which vary according to the variation of craftsmen. Hence Scotus adds (*prope finem q.citat.*) that letters and voices are changed among different imposers, because they are signs from imposition, which is different among different peoples.

Objection II against Assertion II: It is narrated (*Gen.2.*, cited by *Scot.1.dist.22.q.un.¶. de secundo. sub C*) that Adam imposed names on all living creatures according to their natures. For these words say: "Whatever Adam called every living soul, that is its name. And Adam called all the animals by their names, and all the fowls of the air, and all the beasts of the field." Therefore voices are natural signs and not voluntary. I reply that Adam did indeed impose names on all living creatures voluntarily and by his own discretion, guided by God — names that can in some way be called natural signs, not simply, but insofar as appropriate names were imposed upon each according to their

natures, drawn from their specific differences or certain of their natural properties. Thus *lapis* (stone) was named from *laedendo pedem* (harming the foot) — as Scotus (*loco citato* §. *Potest dici*) notes — and *petra* from *terendo pedem* (*ibid.* §. *His praemissis*) by the Latins. Or from motion, shape, operation, or some singular and proper accident. But other names were imposed upon other things by those endowed with life and art and ingenuity, and have been received in common use, with no account taken of their natures, properties, or any of the above — as frequent experience teaches us.

Further instance: The imposition of names upon the stars is ascribed to God (*Psalms 146*): "Who numbers the multitude of stars and calls them all by their names." But God most perfectly knows the natures of things and assigns proper names to them; and proper names are those that signify things under their proper account — as the Doctor teaches (*ubi supra* §. *Ad quaest. prae-mitto*). All the more because voices are signs of concepts, which are natural signs of things, as the Doctor affirms (*4.d.10.q.4. §. Haec duo ante B*). Furthermore, the names that our first parents used and spoke were not instituted at their discretion — for either Adam alone, or both of them, imposed names on things. But neither of these can be said, since it is not apparent when they would have indicated the imposition of so many voices, or with what voices they would have signified mutual consent in the invention of voices. Therefore voices signify naturally. I reply: although God assigned names to things that suit their natures, yet they are not natural in the sense explained above — for God acts *ad extra* not naturally and necessarily, but freely, as is read (*Psalms 134*): "He has done all things whatsoever he wished." And St. Hilary hints at this (*1.de synodis*): "The will of God brought substance to all creatures." To the other objection added: I say that concepts are indeed natural signs, while voices are voluntary signs — as I showed above. To the last: I say that sacred pages only report that Adam gave names to the animals. I believe, however, that the rest was accomplished by God's authorship — who infused the species of things into the mind of both parents.

Objection III. The essence of a thing is everywhere the same — as is clear from Assertion I. But a significative voice is essentially significative. Therefore a voice is everywhere the same, and consequently naturally significative. The minor is proved: a voice receives its signification through imposition, and signification is its form. But every form existing in a subject necessarily causes its formal effect. Therefore having received its signification from the imposer, the voice necessarily and naturally carries its significate. Granting the major, I distinguish the minor: essentially naturally, denied; essentially from institution and the will of the imposer, granted. For where the imposition of a voice and its signification are known, it signifies the same for all — not otherwise, since voices are different among different nations, and according to the diversity of voices there is likewise diversity of significations. This can be confirmed from Scotus (*4.d.1.q.2*) affirming that the sacraments are significative and causative signs of grace — not

natural and physical but voluntary and moral, from God's institution and covenant — as can be seen in the cited place.

Objection IV. Man by his own nature is a discursive being endowed with a natural power of speaking. For, as Aristotle acknowledges (*1.Polit.cap.2*), man is a social animal, and one communicates and expresses his concepts to another. But the instrument of the natural discursive power must be natural. Therefore since a significative voice is the instrument of the aforesaid discursive power, a significative voice is certainly a natural instrument or natural sign.

Confirmation: man is not of a viler and worse condition than a brute — being among animals the most noble. But natural voices are conceded to brutes, as is evident. Therefore natural voices are not to be denied to man.

I reply: granting the major, to the minor I say indeed that the instrument of the discursive power is natural — and manifold: tongue, teeth, palate, throat, lungs, and the like, which concur in forming articulate voice (about which in the book on the soul). But I deny that the articulate voice itself is naturally significative. For man by his art and ingenuity can invent names and impose signification on them at his discretion, to declare his concepts and signify his things. For just as to avoid what is harmful we use instruments — some of which are natural (as hands) and some artificial and voluntary (as weapons) — so in our matter, man, having available the natural instruments for forming voice, then by his own industry and institution has conventional signs for laying open his internal affections and signifying his things. To the confirmation: I say that man has, beyond the natural and inarticulate voices that are common to him and to a brute for designating natural affections — as Aristotle hints (*7.pol.cap.2*) — articulate and conventional voices, by which and by very many other things man surpasses a brute.

Article II. Whether Voices Primarily Signify Things or Concepts.

That voices are signs of concepts, and writing is a sign of voices, is a common saying that later philosophers draw from Aristotle (*1.periher.cap.10*). But whether voices primarily signify things or concepts is not a slight dispute among them. Boethius — in his commentary, cited by Scotus (*q.2.primi periher.*) — teaches that voices signify only concepts, citing Aristotle and Porphyry in this place in his favor. Priscianus seems to go in the same direction — whom the Doctor (*citatus*) mentions, saying that every part of a sentence signifies a concept of the mind. St. Thomas agrees (*1.p.q.13.art.1*). On the other side, Scotus (*praealleg.1.d.22.q.un.¶. de ratione huius; & d.27.q.un.¶. Ad argumenta* infra H), whom Gabriel (*ibid.*) and not a few recent thinkers follow, hold that voices signify principally things — though our Doctor (*in Log. in fine loc.cit.*) teaches a way of defending each position as probable. For he says there that the first is more probable according to authorities, while the second is more plausible with respect to reasons. The Coimbrans (*q.3.art.1*) seem to agree with this, taking a middle path and holding that voices signify both concepts and things.

Note from the Doctor (*proximè cit.*), whom Arriaga (*disp.13.sect.2*) follows: the dispute here is not about names imposed to signify likenesses or species existing in the intellect — which our two new Scotist interpreters (*disp.2.q.1. in solutione 2. obiectionis*) do not consider — nor about voices applied to denote concepts of the mind — such as the intellections residing in the mind itself. For it is quite certain that voices primarily signify concepts in that case. But the entire difficulty bears on other voices imposed upon things outside the intellect — for example, whether the name "man" signifies human nature or the species, or the concept had of human nature itself? Here pertains the distinction of concept into formal and objective — which was adduced and explained (*1.3.q.2.art.7*), to which reference is made, lest I repeat the same things frequently and uselessly.

Assertion I. Voices signify things. It is proved as follows. First: from many places cited by the Doctor (*praecit.*), not far from the beginning of the question. From (*3.c.huius lib.*): the verb signifies something — as "I read," reading; "I write," writing — and constitutes and determines the intellect of the hearer so that he perceives the thing that the speaker represents to him through voice. Therefore, voice according to Aristotle is significative of a thing. Then (*1.Elench.c.1*) the same Philosopher adds: we use names in place of things because we cannot bring things themselves into disputation. And a few lines later: since things are infinite and names finite, one name and one expression must signify several things. Again (*4.Met.T.28*) he adds that the expression (*oratio*) which a name signifies is the definition; but the definition designates the true essence of the thing. Therefore voices are significative signs of things.

This is corroborated from sacred scripture, especially (*Gen.2*) where Adam is read to have imposed names on the animals — as I weighed in the preceding article, Objection II. Again (*Luke 1*): the Angel says to Zechariah: "You shall call his name John." (*Mark 3*): Christ the Lord imposed on Simon the name Peter, and on the two sons of Zebedee, Boanerges — that is, sons of thunder. From these and similar authorities it is clearly shown that names signify things. St. Augustine adds (*7.Trinit.cap.3*) that a voice makes manifest, beyond itself, the thing of which we speak. But we speak of things — plants, flowers, and the like — which are true things. Therefore voices signify things.

Second: voices signify that for the signifying of which they were imposed — namely, that the speaker manifests the thing about which he reasons to the hearer. Voices were devised to make things manifest, so that the name "man" signifies one having humanity, not one having the concept of humanity. Therefore voices signify things.

Third: names either signify concepts of the mind, or things, or both. But they do not per se appear to signify concepts. Therefore they signify things. The major is known since nothing else remains for voices to signify. The minor is shown: names signify either the formal concept or the objective concept. Not the first — since the formal concept is nothing other than knowledge or intellection, which

I gave warning is not in doubt (*in not.*). Therefore the second — and I have what I intend; for the objective concept is nothing other than the thing known and understood. But if it be said that voices signify both, this is to be examined below — how voices make both things and concepts evident. For now it suffices to prove that voices denote things; whether they signify things or concepts first is to be argued (*in 3.assertione*).

Assertion II. Voices in some way signify concepts. This also Scotus proves (*ubi supra*). First from Aristotle (*cit.cap.1*): "Voices are signs of affections of the soul" — that is, of concepts, according to Scotus's interpretation (*1.dist.22.q.un.*). And a little later: "The affections of the soul are the same for all, of which voices are notes, as also for all the things of which these affections are likenesses are the same." Augustine agrees (*15.Trinit.cap.11*): "the word that sounds outwardly is the sign of the word that lies within." And (*lib.2.de ordine cap.12*) he adds that reason introduced speech, since men could not perceive each other's minds or concepts.

Second: voices denote that for the signifying of which they were invented by men — namely, that the speaker lays open his internal concepts through voices, so that men may converse with each other and mutually reveal the sentiments of their minds. Therefore voices signify concepts. The major is evident since voices from human discretion are conventional significative signs, as I said in the preceding article. The minor is acknowledged, since human will is directed toward declaring internal concepts through voices and names — so that what is useful for human society, friendship, and the conduct of life may be understood, undertaken, and carried out — as Plato (*in Timaeo*, cited by the Doctor (*3.dist.28.q.un.¶. In ista quest.*)) writes before Aristotle (*in 1.Pol.c.2*) with these words: "For this reason an ordered discourse is a common sharing, so that mutual indications of will may be at hand."

Third: the truth or falsity of a vocal proposition signifies the truth or falsity of a mental proposition, as Aristotle asserts in this place. Therefore a vocal proposition designates a mental proposition, and the parts of the latter designate the parts of the former. But the parts of a vocal proposition are voices. Therefore voices signify concepts of the intellect.

Furthermore, the intellect joined to knowledge of things is bound to the senses, which are fixed only to corporeal things — as will be evident in the book on the soul — and one person cannot, without voices, reach the counsels and sentiments of another. Therefore to lay open mutual concepts, voices were invented, which are their signs from human institution. Again: we experience teachers teaching their students arts and sciences by manifesting their concepts through voices. But Angels — because they are entirely separated from matter — speak differently with each other and notify their concepts in a different way, as I showed at length (*Tract.de Angelis disp.7*).

Assertion III. Voices signify things by means of concepts. This the Doctor (*praenominatus*) seems to hold as more probable, and (*1.dist.8.q.3.¶. Contra*); and it is expressly defended by Tataret (*q.1.scibili 4*), Toletus (*4.concl.*), and very many others.

It is proved as follows. First: that which a voice primarily signifies is that for the signifying of which it is primarily imposed. But a voice is primarily imposed to signify a thing. Therefore it primarily signifies the thing, and only subsequently the concept of the mind. The major is known since the entire signification of a name depends on the will of the imposer. The minor is proved: for example, the name John — which was imposed on the son of Zechariah — beyond doubt immediately signifies that very son of Zechariah, not the concept had of him. Likewise, the names ascribed to the animals by Adam designate not the concepts of the animals formed by the first parent, but the natures of those same animals — as is evidently clear from the words of the sacred text. Therefore voices signify things by means of concepts.

Second: what is primarily perceived by the hearer is primarily signified by the voice of the speaker. But what is primarily perceived by the hearer is the thing rather than the concept of the speaker. Therefore the thing is primarily signified by the voice of the speaker rather than his concept. The major is evident, since voices are instituted principally so that the hearer may conceive what the speaker intends to signify to him. The minor is supported: a direct act is prior to a reflexive act. But a thing is understood by a direct act and its concept by a reflexive act — as the Doctor diligently notes (*in praesenti*). Therefore in that priority in which the thing is understood, without the understanding of its concept, a name can be imposed upon it — and thus a name primarily signifies the thing.

Third: if voices primarily signified concepts and not things, propositions that are otherwise true would be false. For example, this proposition — "God is just" — which is true, would be false, since the concept of justice that we have is not an attribute of divine justice, as is self-evident. Again, a voice does not primarily signify the formal concept, as I noted above; but it does signify the objective concept, which is the thing itself as known. Finally, what a voice primarily signifies is that for which it is primarily substituted and stands in place of. But a voice is substituted for the thing — as "man" for one having humanity — as I showed abundantly (*lib.1.Epit.q.2.art.3*). Therefore it is concluded that voices signify things by means of concepts.

Objection I. Aristotle (*1.perih. in principio primi c.*) says that voices are signs of affections that lie in the soul — and what resides in the soul are concepts and species, natural likenesses of things. Therefore voices primarily signify concepts. Confirmation: certain names designate the operations of our intellect — such as the name "intellection." But the operations of our intellect are concepts, as is evident. Therefore names signify concepts immediately and primarily.

I reply from Scotus (*1.dist.27.q.3. §. Ad argumenta huius quaest. sub H*) that the Philosopher there only intends that voices are signs of concepts not properly, directly, and ultimately, but mediately and as a presupposition: for it is necessarily presupposed that a thing is first conceived before it is expressed orally by name. Thus for example the name "stone" — with the concept of it being presupposed — properly signifies such a thing as is called a stone, so that the voice is subordinated to the concept. For the concept of a thing comes first, before the thing itself is named and signified by voice — and thus voices signify things by means of concepts. To the confirmation: I say that those names are to be excepted that were invented to signify likenesses and species that have their seat in the mind — as I noted from Scotus above.

Objection II. Names imposed to signify fictions — such as chimera, hircocervus (*goat-stag*), and the like — designate only concepts of the mind. Therefore voices primarily signify concepts. Confirmation: voices designate only the agreement or disagreement of the mind; but agreement and disagreement are concepts of the mind. Therefore voices primarily signify concepts of the mind.

I reply that the aforesaid fictitious names primarily signify impossibilia, or beings of reason, which have no foundation on the part of the thing. Therefore I deny the antecedent — for as Scotus notes (*in q. §. Ad partem oppositam*), fictions and singulars, although they form species in the imaginative faculty, do not do so in the intellect, which is only capable of receiving the species of its object — which for the present state is the quiddity of a sensible thing, as I showed at length (*in Tract. de cognoscibilitate Dei disput.1*). To the confirmation: the antecedent is denied. For we experience a thing being indicated primarily by a nod, since the thing is the primary and immediate significate of the nod — as Scotus states (*loco cit. § Ad q. dicitur*).

Objection III. Voices are substituted in place of concepts, as I showed above from Aristotle. Therefore voices primarily signify concepts. Confirmation: if voices primarily signify things, there would be no lying — for as Scotus says (*2.dist.42. §. Ad 2. quaest. N*): "speech must make known what is in the mind — otherwise it is a lie." Therefore voices properly carry concepts. The consequence of the antecedent is proved: lying in common parlance is going against the mind (*ex 3. Report. dist.38.q.1.*), and lying is the abuse of a voice — since voices were invented to denote the indications of the will. Those who lie do not use voices as indications of the will but the opposite. Furthermore, from St. Augustine (*l. de mendacio*), lying is described as "false signification of a voice with the intention of deceiving." Therefore if voices primarily do not designate a concept, it is rightly concluded that there would be no lying, since no one would speak against the mind or concept that one has in mind — though Scripture says (*Psalms 61*): "the sons of men are liars," and (*Psalms 115*): "every man is a liar."

I reply by distinguishing the antecedent: voices are substituted in place of formal concepts, denied; in place of objective concepts, granted — as was

explained above. Or say that names signify things by means of concepts, as is clear from the response to the first objection. To the confirmation: the sequel of the antecedent is to be denied. To its proof I say that lying consists in the external affirmation of what the mind holds as negation, or conversely in the external negation of what the mind holds as affirmation. But affirmation and negation, truth and falsity, concern things by means of concepts — as the Doctor touches on (*in q.praesenti* §. *Ad quaest. dicitur*) — and can be explained by examples adduced by the same Doctor (*in 3.Report.praecit.*), especially (*Gen.27*) where Jacob says he is the firstborn, the opposite of which he knew very well. And (*ibid.cap.42*) Joseph says to his brothers, by the life of Pharaoh, "you are spies" — the contrary of which was not unknown to him. One can also cite (*Acts 5*) about Ananias and his wife, who defrauding the price of a field lied to God — as St. Peter reproves them (*ibid.*).

Article III. What the Signification of Voices Represents.

This article is discussed and decided by the Doctor chiefly in two places: (*2.dist.42.q.4. §. Ad 1.argum.* O) and (*4.dist.1.q.5. §. Contra opinionem* B). In these I find two chief opinions. The first is of those who assert that the signification of voices is something real — and these seem to dispute among themselves. For some — such as St. Thomas (cited by Lychetus, and refuted by the Doctor (*in 2.praecensito*)) — write that the signification of a voice is something real and intrinsic to the voice, namely a certain power to cause a concept in the mind of the hearer. Others — whose names Arriaga (*disp.13.sect.4*) withholds — think it is a real relation in the names themselves, arising from the free imposition of men. The second opinion is of certain others who think that the significations of names denote nothing real — and these are divided in two: some hold that names are significative through a relation of reason, among whom Scotus seems to be (*in 4.cit.*), and more expressly (*in Report.2.dist.42.q.4. §. Ad aliud dico*). Others — to whom the Doctor in the Oxford writing (*2.dict.alleg.*) seems to be inclined — hold that the signification of voices is constituted by an extrinsic denomination.

What I said (*in Epit.1.1.q.2.art.1*) on sign and signification is to be recalled. Now I only note that this difficulty is not raised about inarticulate and naturally significative voices — whose signification is certainly something real, as weeping signifies sorrow and laughter joy — but about articulate and conventional voices, whose significations are derived from the discretion and will of the imposing men, who by their discretion affix such significations to these names.

Furthermore, as gathered from Scotus (*in 2.cit. infra* O), a voice can be considered in two ways: in one way in itself — as a quality or sound emitted by some cause — and in this sense a voice is a natural sign of its cause, as other effects signify their causes. In another way as significative — and in this sense it is a commemorative sign, the knowledge of which is had by those to whom the imposition of this significative voice is known.

A voice formed by the natural instruments noted elsewhere imprints its species in the hearing, and from the species in hearing it passes through common sense, imagination, and memory to the intellect — in roughly the same way as was said of the universal formally (1.2.q.1.a.8) — which perceives its nature and the imposition to signify, and has its formal and objective concept, relating the voice to the thing signified by it as sign to signate. From this a relation of reason arises. I further observe that we are not led to knowledge of the thing upon which a voice is imposed unless we previously know through its species that thing which is affected by the voice. But when we have habitual knowledge of it, hearing the voice, we acquire through that same voice, as a commemorative sign, its actual knowledge — as Scotus (*ubi supra*) well continues.

Assertion I. Signification adds nothing real — whether absolute or relative — to the voice. This is Scotus's position in both the cited places, and is proved as follows. A non-significative voice undergoes no entity superadded to it beyond its own proper entity — which is a quality, as I noted above. Therefore the same is to be affirmed of a significative voice. The antecedent is open to everyone. The consequence is proved: the voluntary imposition given to a voice to signify cannot be something real absolute or relative. For men at their discretion use the same voice and the same sign for different things to be signified — sometimes they note, sometimes they obliterate; now they innovate, now they abrogate — so that the comparison of voices to leaves on trees, now growing, now falling, is not incongruous. But the same real thing cannot undergo so many opposed real entities — absolute or relative — dependent on human will. All the more because it is not plausible that the will should cause something real and physical in voices by means of free imposition. For such a caused being would be either a free or a natural effect. Not the latter: because anyone, without knowledge of the free imposition, could naturally arrive at knowledge of all significative voices — and thus voices would not be conventional. Nor the former: because from a free principle a natural effect does not issue — just as a natural effect does not proceed from a natural potency freely — as I showed elsewhere with Scotus.

Assertion II. No intrinsic power is contained in a significative voice that causes a concept in the mind of the hearer. This is Scotus's position (*ibid.*) and follows from what was said in the preceding assertion. The same Doctor argues for it thus: the same principal and instrumental causes, remaining the same, natural, sufficient, and unimpeded, always produce the same effect — according to the common saying: "the same remaining the same always does the same." But if a Latin speaker utters Latin words before a Greek who is ignorant of the Latin language, the principal and instrumental cause is the same as if he were speaking to a Latin speaker or to a Greek who knows Latin. Therefore the same effect would be produced — which is the perception of the Latin speech. And hence the Greek ignorant of Latin would perceive the Latin discourse just as the

Latin or the Latinate Greek does; and any individual would be accomplished in all languages — which is false and absurd.

Furthermore, that power inherent in the voice and causative of the hearer's concept is natural, since it emanates from a natural cause and resides in it. But natural things are the same for all, as I asserted (*art.1.huius q.*). Therefore if that power were admitted as contained in a voice, the voice would not be a conventional significative — which conflicts with the cited place. The Doctor exemplifies this with the circle of laurel or some other thing hung before a house to signify wine for sale — in which, on account of that signification, no quality is posited as newly produced. So likewise, in a voice, no real entity is to be placed on account of the signification in act first imposed upon it. The same, he says, is to be held about the price of a coin and other signs significant from human institution — as Scotus says (*in fine q.5. §. Ad 1. L*).

Assertion III. The signification of a voice is a being of reason caused or left behind in it by the institution of the imposer. This is expressly taught by Scotus (*2.Reportat.dist.42.q.4. §. Ad aliud dico*; and *4.dist.1.q.2. §. De 2. a little after H*). It is proved as follows. First: voices are considered by logic as second intentions — from Tataret (*Tract.1.summularum & 1.perih.q.2.scibili 1*) who affirms that the name formally taken is a second intention attributed to a significative voice conventionally. But second intentions are beings of reason according to common consensus. Therefore the signification of a voice is a being of reason. The major can be corroborated: for logic per se scrutinizes nothing real, since it is a rational science — as I said (*lib.1.q.2.art.6*). Second: what has being only through the intellect is a being of reason. But the signification of a voice has being only through the intellect. Therefore it is a being of reason. The major is evident from the definition of a being of reason hinted at (*lib.1.q.3.art.5*). The minor is evident: for actual signification does not belong to the voice itself except through the act of the institutor — as the Doctor teaches (*4.praealleg.*) with these words: "signification is a sign from institution." Such a relation does not arise naturally from a foundation: for even if in the thing there is an aptitude for signifying the signified effect, yet actual signification does not belong to it except through the act of the imposer. Third: the comparison of one to another through the intellect's operation is a being of reason — from the same Scotus (*cit.*). But the signification of a voice is a collation of one to another — namely, the comparison of sign to signate — as the Doctor adds (*q.5. of the proximately cited place, ante §. Ad 1.*). Therefore the B and C follow. Add that things not existing are signified by voices — whether past, as Adam, or future, as Antichrist. But a relation is not real when the terminus does not actually exist, as is clear from what was said in the question on relation. Therefore nothing real exists through the signification of a voice. Hence our two Juniors certainly decline from Scotus (*disp.2.q.2*) when they assert that the signification of a voice is only a real extrinsic denomination derived in the voice itself from the will of the first institutor; then they add that absolutely this extrinsic denomination is not to be

explained as a being of reason. But as is clear from the cited passages, Scotus openly teaches that the signification of a voice is a being of reason — which they seem to sniff afterward (*disp.3.q.6.artic.1*) though there they deny that an extrinsic denomination is a being of reason.

Furthermore, when the mind of an Author is known through the words of that same Author, it is not to be drawn toward an alien position — as Scotus warns about Aristotle's positions (*1.dist.8.q.vlt.& quol.7*). But Scotus plainly teaches that the signification of a name is a being of reason, as the cited passages show. Therefore this other position is not to be attributed to him, as the cited recent authors do.

You will say: Scotus (*in 4.cit.q.5*) speaks doubtfully, adding that little word "perhaps" — which is not the word of one asserting but of one in some doubt. And so the cited Doctors do not expressly contradict Scotus. I say: even if in that place Scotus adds that doubtful particle, nonetheless a few lines later he adds that such signification of a voice is the collation of sign to signate — which, it is evident to students of Scotus, is a being of reason (*in fine eius q. & q.2.eiusdem operis*). And in the *Reportata* just cited he plainly affirms this with these words: "Therefore nothing new arises from imposition except a certain order, which is a relation of reason."

Objection I. A voice is significative of a thing without the operation of the intellect. Therefore the signification of a voice is not a being of reason. The antecedent is proved: the voice "lion," for example, uttered by anyone, signifies a lion — even if the intellect does nothing concerning it. Therefore signification of a voice is not a being of reason. I deny the antecedent. To its proof I say with Scotus (*4.dist.1.q.2* sub H) that something is included in the voice that designates a being of reason — namely, "sign from institution." For this relation does not follow the foundation from the nature of the thing. Even though the aptitude for signifying the signified effect is on the part of the thing, yet actual signification belongs to it through the act of the institutor. From these it follows that, although not all who utter a significative voice form a being of reason — as is clear from (*1.dist.22.q.un.§. Ad quaest.premitto*) regarding a parrot producing human voices — yet the institutor and his author, in imprinting signification upon the voice, forms a being of reason.

Objection II. If the signification of a voice — which is required from the imposer — is a being of reason, then when the imposer and his imposition have passed away, no signification of the name will any longer remain. But this is plainly false. Therefore the signification of a name is something real that persists after the death of the imposer. I respond by denying the sequel of the major. The reason for the denial is that a voice is a commemorative sign — which is of a past thing. Hence, though the institutor has departed from life, the name and its signification are nonetheless not abolished — as long as its use

persists — just as is also clear from the price of a coin and many other things that retain their same value and force even after their authors have died.

Objection III. To know something, its formal account — by which it is formally constituted in being — must be known. But signification is the formal account of a significative voice. Therefore to know it, its signification must be known. But we hold the signification of a voice to be a being of reason. Therefore, to know a significative voice, it is necessary to know a being of reason — which is known to few. Yet the signification of a voice is known to all by whom it is in use.

Confirmation: children learning grammar know names and their significations, but perceive no being of reason whatsoever, since it is a most difficult thing to know. Therefore the signification of a name is not a being of reason.

I respond that the major is true of quidditative, perfect, and evident knowledge — not of knowledge acquired through use and the custom of a common sign invented by some author and received by the community, as is the knowledge had of a significative voice, which both the learned and the unlearned acquire for themselves. Therefore to acquire this knowledge, knowledge of a being of reason is not necessary — just as to know a man in some way, a clear and evident knowledge of him is not required; it suffices that a rational animal is signified by the common custom of the name "man." By the same token the confirmation is answered — which can in some way be illustrated from the case of trainable animals, especially the dog: if a dog is accustomed, when it hears and the word "bread" is repeated, to have bread offered to it several times, it approaches the one who says such a word; and sometimes, when the word "bread" is merely heard and bread is not offered, it still comes to whoever utters this word. And when it hears the word "stick," it retreats. But the dog neither recognizes nor does any being of reason — as will be shown in the book on the soul.

Objection IV. There are some who at times, from the doctrine of others, learn things that had never occurred to them — as experience testifies. Therefore it is not required in the hearer, as the Doctor (*in utroque loco cit.*) holds, that there be habitual knowledge of the things about which the speaker is speaking. I respond: granting the antecedent, to the consequence I say that Scotus is to be interpreted of those things that are understood by a direct act — not those that are by a reflexive act, as the Doctor lucidly expounds (*q.3.univers.*). Or say it is to be interpreted of incomplexes, for which a species is necessarily required in the hearer, so that the hearer may perceive what the speaker says. But the argument proceeds about complexes, for whose knowledge in the hearer is not required, so that what the speaker says may be received. For the intellect has such power that from perceived incomplexes it forms complexes, and from these draws good or bad discourses. And although not every intelligible object moves the intellect to knowledge of itself per se or through its own species, it suffices if the intellect is occasionally excited by a thing outside to acquire for itself knowledge of any object whatsoever — as the same Doctor writes (*in fine q.4.univers.*).

Question III. On the Essence of the Proposition and Its Species.

Article I. Whether the Proposition Is a Being of Reason.

What and how many kinds of proposition there are is clear from (*Epitome lib.2.q.2.art.1* & 2) and from (*1.q.huius lib.art.un.*). There remain in the present question these things principally to be investigated: whether the proposition is among beings of reason — which is to be discussed in this article. Then, whether the proposition is a simple quality. Again, whether the apprehensive proposition differs from the judicative. Then, what the division of the proposition into affirmative and negative is. We set about examining and establishing these in the following articles.

On this article, according to the threefold number of propositions — mental, vocal, and written — three particular opinions are reported by recent philosophers. One is of those who think that every proposition — whether mental, vocal, or written — is a real being, which Blancanus (*disp.1.de enunt.sect.1*) expressly defends. And perhaps those who assert that the object of logic is a real being — whom I rejected (*lib.1.q.3*) — do not differ from these. Another is of others — among whom is Malius (*disp.de oratione q.2*) — who suspect that the mental proposition is indeed a real being, but not the vocal and written. The third is the common one of the others, who teach that any of the aforesaid propositions is a being of reason. Scotus hints at this (*q.3.univers.* a little before §. *Ad rationem*, and §. *Vel potest dici*; and *q.8.praedicam.* §. *Ad quaest. dici potest*). And it is entirely consonant with the principles of the same Doctor. For the comprehension of this difficulty, what I wrote (*lib.1.q.3.art.3*) on active and passive acts of the intellect — the former being the object of the science of the soul, the latter of dialectic, as I noted in the cited place — is relevant.

Assertion. The proposition — whether mental, vocal, or written — is a being of reason. This is clearly deduced from Scotus (*ubi supra*). It is proved as follows. First: such as are the parts of which a whole is constituted, such are those parts — that is, if the whole is real, its parts are real; if the whole is substantial, its parts are substantial. But the logical whole is a being of reason — namely the syllogism or mode of knowing, as is evident from what was asserted (*lib.1.q.3*). And one of the parts of a syllogism is the proposition, since a syllogism is composed of three propositions, among which the proposition exists — as I explained (*lib.3.Epitomes q.1.art.1*). Therefore the proposition is a being of reason.

Second: every passive collation of one known object to another known object is a being of reason (*ex 4.dist.1.q.2*). But the proposition is a passive comparison of predicate to subject and conversely — as is clear from (*1.dist.23.q.un.* ante B). For the extremes of a proposition are compared to each other — whether they agree

or disagree. From this arise affirmative or negative, true or false propositions — as I showed (*lib.2.Epit.q.2.art.3*).

Third: what has real species and properties is a real being; and what has species and properties that are beings of reason is a being of reason. But the species and properties of a proposition are beings of reason. Therefore the proposition is a being of reason. The major is known. The minor is at hand: for the species of a proposition are affirmation and negation, and its properties are truth and falsity, and also opposition, equipollence, and conversion — which, being second intentions, are evidently beings of reason. Furthermore, of the vocal and written proposition it can be specifically urged that voices and writings are conventional signs — from what was said in the preceding question. And the Doctor asserts (*in 4.proximè cit.*) that a sign from institution is a being of reason. Therefore, since the vocal and written proposition is composed of names that are beings of reason, it is clearly inferred that the vocal and written propositions are beings of reason.

Objection I. An act of the intellect is a real being, since it proceeds from a real potency and cause. But the proposition is an act of the intellect, since it is the second operation of the intellect. Therefore the proposition is a real being. I distinguish the major: an active act of the intellect is a real being, granted; a passive act, denied — in the way I made clear (*lib.1.q.art.praealleg.*).

Objection II. What is composed of real parts is a real being. But the proposition is composed of real parts. Therefore it is a real being. The major is evident. The minor is proved by induction: the mental proposition is composed of real concepts; the vocal proposition of voices, which exist on the part of the thing and are really uttered; and the written proposition of written terms, which are also real beings. Again, signification and truth — which belong to the proposition — are real. Therefore the proposition is not to be removed from the list of real beings.

Granting the major, I deny the minor. To its proof I say that the mental proposition is constituted from concepts — not indeed active ones, but passive ones, which from what has been said are beings of reason. As for the vocal proposition being constituted from real voices, and likewise the written from real writings taken materially — granted. Taken formally, denied — as is clearly established from the preceding question. To what is added about signification — natural signification is admitted; free signification is rejected. Likewise, truth of the thing is granted; truth of the intellect and sign is denied — as will be plain in the following question. See Orbellus (*6.Met.cap.2*).

Article II. Whether the Proposition Is a Simple Quality.

That the vocal and written propositions are composite is held for certain by all: for the vocal proposition is composed of spoken voices or names, and the written of letters and characters. The entire difficulty is raised about the mental

proposition — whether, just as those aforesaid are composite from voices and writings, so this one coalesces from partial notions of subject, predicate, and copula.

On this matter, I read two extreme positions of philosophers. The first is that of Soto (*lib.2.summularum*), Hurt. (*disp.7.sect.2*), and Arriaga (*ibid.disp.6.sect.4.concl.*), who affirm that the mental proposition — whether categorical or hypothetical — is a simple quality. Ponce (*disp.19.q.4*) concurs. The latter is defended by John of Metz (*1.perih.q.3.dub.3*), Mayr (*1.Post.cap.1.fol.62*), Ruuius (*q.4*), and most others there, asserting that the mental proposition is a composite quality. And the Coimbrans (*q.4.art.3*) confess that this is more conformable to the common sense of the Ancients — which Scotus (*q.1.primi Perib. in solutione 3*) and Tataret (*ibid.q.1.dub.1*) plainly indicate.

Note I, that the first operation of the intellect is called simple — not only with respect to its entity and principle, but also with respect to the objects apprehended. This is because the terms apprehended through it are simple and incomplex, in the way explained elsewhere. To each simple term apprehended by the intellect there correspond simple concepts of the intellect itself — these are called objective concepts, while the formal concepts are those of the intellect itself. But the second operation of the intellect is called composition and division: composition, because the apprehended terms are united to each other and composed — for one known object is posited with another known object; division, because these terms are divided and separated from each other. Concerning these simultaneously united or divided things, the intellect renders its judgment and pronounces its sentence like a judge, in one direction or the other — seeing these to agree and those to disagree. If, then, the terms agree with each other, the judgment the intellect renders concerning them is called affirmative judgment; if they are mutually repugnant, the judgment of them is called negative — and the former is commonly named affirmation and assent, the latter negation and dissent. Scotus plainly teaches all of this (*1.dist.3.q.4.¶. Quantum ad 2. C and D*).

Note II, that our intellect cannot understand many things simultaneously. The reason is that through one species it can only understand one object; and because of its finitude and weakness it cannot simultaneously attend to several objects represented through several distinct species. Hence arises the necessity of composition and division: for since we cannot apprehend the essence of a thing and simultaneously all its properties and powers, it is necessary that we have distinct apprehensions corresponding to the distinction of things to be apprehended. Therefore what agrees with a thing must be conjoined, and what is repugnant to it separated — and in this task consists the second operation of the intellect, which is founded in the unity or distinction of things. Hence I observed above that composition and division are so called.

Assertion. The mental proposition is not a simple but a composite quality. This is gathered from Scotus (*praealleg.*). It is proved as follows. First, from Aristotle (*1.Perib.cap.1*), who calls the second operation of the intellect composition; and (*c. de verbo*) adds that the verb composes the subject with the predicate, and that a proposition is produced by composition and division of the intellect. Furthermore (*3.de anima cap.6.T.21*) he declares that the second operation of the intellect is composition of concepts. Hence it has taken root among later philosophers to call the second operation of the intellect, composition absolutely. But Vorreillon (*1.dist.8*) especially notes that composition is opposed to simplicity. Therefore, since composition of concepts belongs to the mental proposition according to Aristotle, it undoubtedly follows — in Aristotle's view — that the mental proposition itself is a composite quality.

You will say, with Toletus (*q.19.tertii de anima*) and the Coimbrans (*praecit.*), following St. Thomas and others cited by them, that Aristotle is to be explained of composition and objective concepts — and hence the passages cited from him neither attack nor refute the first position, which removes composition and formal concepts from the mental proposition. On the contrary: to objective composition and objective concepts correspond formal composition and formal concepts — since these arise from those, just as knowledge partially proceeds from the object according to the common position of philosophers. Therefore if objective composition is conceded to the mental proposition, formal composition is equally not to be taken away from it. And this seems especially to have a place in the doctrine of Thomists, who distinguish the knowledge of Angels from the knowledge of men on the ground that the former is simple while the latter is composite. But this difference is not to be understood of objective composition — since both are directed at composite objects. Nor of formal apprehensive concepts, as the Coimbrans interpret (*artic.3. in fine solutionis primae*) — since through the same (*q.4.art.1*) the apprehensive proposition does not differ from the judicative. Therefore our assertion is true both of apprehensive and of judicative concepts.

Second: what consists of parts is composite. But the mental proposition consists of parts. Therefore it is composite. The major is evident. The minor is shown: just as vocal noun and verb are parts of the vocal proposition, so mental noun and verb are parts of the mental proposition. For the vocal proposition is a sign of the mental proposition, and voices are signs of concepts — from the beginning of the first *Periher.* Third: from those things something is composed into which it is resolved — as is clear from a mixed body, which is composed of four elements into which it is resolved according to common opinion. But the mental proposition is resolved into predicate and subject as its parts, and the verb as the bond and copula of both — as I explained at length with Aristotle (*1.Priorum, 1*) (*in Epitome lib.1.q.1.art.2*). Therefore the proposition is a composite quality.

Fourth: the intellect cannot judge that one thing agrees with another unless it apprehends those two things. For apprehension precedes judgment, which is not rendered about unknown things. Therefore judgment includes two apprehensions of two things. And the proposition — which coincides with judgment — coalesces from those two apprehensions as from parts. The consequence is proved: because the intellect either perceives or does not perceive — in the judgment that presupposes apprehensions — the things about which it judges. Not the latter, since it could not judge about them. Therefore the former — and hence judgment is composed of two apprehensions. Since this is identified with the mental proposition, it is clearly deduced that the mental proposition is not a simple quality.

Objection I. The proposition is a judgment by which the intellect directs itself to judge the entire proposition, without tending toward its parts. For the force of judgment is such that it can reach the whole, even if it does not reach its parts — especially in the school of Scotus, who affirms that the whole is really distinct from its simultaneously united parts. Therefore the proposition is a simple quality. I deny the antecedent. For it cannot be that the intellect perceives the whole while its parts are not perceived — otherwise its intellection would be false, understanding as simple what is in reality composite, especially since the whole essentially depends on its parts — as will be said in physics. Therefore, since the proposition is — from what has been proved — composite, consequently the intellect is directed toward it as composite.

Objection II. If from an objective composite proposition a composite formal proposition is argued — as I inferred above — then every objective proposition would be composite, since it is produced from two objects that are really, formally, or rationally distinct — of which one gets the name subject and the other predicate. And thus "God is immortal," "God is infinite," and other propositions formed about God would be composite — and God himself would not be free from composition, the opposite of which I asserted (*Tract. de Deo uno disp. 1*). Therefore it must not be denied that the proposition is a simple quality. I respond that the sequel holds only for those things that undergo composition — that is, objects that in some way are composite or compossible with each other — but not for God or for things that are said of him, since God is immune from all composition and compossibility. And although in propositions about God and his attributes there are extremes — subject, predicate, and verbal copula — nonetheless, because one of them does not stand in the mode of act and another in the mode of potency — which is required for true composition — therefore no objective composition is inferred in the aforesaid propositions; but only that their extremes are distinguished by some one of the three distinctions mentioned above.

Whether God forms true propositions of himself is disputed by some: Hurt. (*adductus in initio art.*), following the Nominalists, affirms; others deny — and

rightly, since God, by reason of his supreme simplicity and infinity, is free from the composition required to form propositions, which in a created intellect involves imperfection.

Objection III. Aristotle (*3.de anima T.23*) speaks these words: "When the intellect that has parts, both as a whole and as something one, contemplates it, it then understands that whole in one and the same time." Therefore the intellect reaches by a single act the whole proposition at the same moment.

Confirmation I: the will by a single volitive act tends toward many things simultaneously united and composed, themselves willed by the will itself.

Therefore the same is to be affirmed of the act of the intellect with respect to the proposition. Confirmation II: what an inferior potency can do, a superior potency can also do — as will be evident in the book on the soul. But the imagination has a simple act of imagining about different and composite things — as is proved in dreams. Therefore this is not to be denied to the intellect, which is a superior and more eminent potency.

I reply that Aristotle there is speaking of a divisible whole — namely a continuum — which can be called divisible in two ways: actually and potentially. If it is conceived by the intellect as potentially divisible into these and those parts, it is understood successively. But if it is conceived as actually divided into parts, it is understood and apprehended simultaneously by the intellect by an apprehension pertaining to the first operation of the intellect — which the same Philosopher calls the distinction of something from something, after he has dealt with the first operation of the mind. To Confirmation I: granting the antecedent, the consequence is denied. The reason of disparity is that — quite apart from the fact that the intellect has three distinct operations not adapted to the will — knowledge is partially caused by the object, but volition is not, being elicited only by the will. Therefore from a complex object there arises complex, or composite, knowledge; just as from an incomplex object, incomplex knowledge arises. Or say, admitting the parity: since the will according to Scotus is a collative potency, it can have concerning the things willed a complex act of willing a complex. To Confirmation II: the major can be granted and the minor denied, with certain Scotists who assert that the imagination has a certain power of conjoining one object with another — which is to be examined elsewhere.

Objection IV. If the proposition were composed of several partial notions, two numerically distinct accidents would simultaneously inhere in the same subject — which Aristotle (*4.Met.T.14*) denies. Therefore the proposition does not appear to be a composite quality. Granting the antecedent, the consequence is denied.

To Aristotle I say that he is speaking of augmentable and remissible accidents, whose termini are simultaneously impossible — not of intentional accidents and others of this kind, which — from what will be proved in the metaphysical question on accident — can be simultaneously in the same subject.

A further instance: Scotus (*4.dist.1.q.2.* O, at the end) says that second intentions are formally one most simple act. Therefore, since the proposition, syllogism, and the like are second intentions, they are not composite qualities. To this it can be answered by saying that the Doctor is speaking of second intentions pertaining to the first operation of the intellect, not of the others about which we are now speaking — though Tataret, pressed by this instance, remains undecided.

Article III. Whether the Apprehensive Proposition Differs from the Judicative Proposition.

Gregory (*q.1.prologi*) and the Coimbrans (*q.4.art.1.huius operis*) — acknowledging no difference between the apprehensive and the judicative proposition — hold that every mental proposition is judicative. The opposite is commonly held by the Scotists from Scotus (*2.dist.1.q.3.¶. Tenentes, circa D*) and by the Nominalists with Ockham (*q.1.prol.*), who teach that the enunciative proposition really differs from the judicative.

Note that apprehension of the intellect is twofold: one of simple terms, pertaining to the first operation of the intellect and commonly called simple apprehension — about which there is no doubt in the present question, since in it there is neither truth nor falsity, nor affirmation, nor negation, nor any judgment. The other is of complex terms, which are indeed perceived by the intellect but not judged — though in these there is truth or falsity — as when we apprehend that stars are even in number or that a circle is a square, without pronouncing our verdict on these. This is called the enunciative apprehension.

Assertion. The apprehensive proposition is plainly distinct from the judicative. This, as coming from Scotus (*praecit.*), is taught by the most learned Bargius (*1.dist.1.q.3*) and followed by Mayr (*1.Post.fol.61*). It is proved as follows. First: everything prior is distinguished from its posterior. But the apprehensive proposition precedes the judicative. Therefore the latter is separated from the former. The major is a common saying of philosophers and theologians. The minor is supported: we first mentally compose extremes with each other before we render judgment on them — for judgment concerns united and complex things, by which we judge that their extremes agree or do not agree with each other. Therefore, since composition — which is the second mental action — precedes judgment, and composition and proposition coincide, it is clearly deduced that apprehensive apprehension is distinguished from judicative.

Second: contradictory propositions are simultaneously apprehended by us, as are indifferent and ambiguous propositions — as "whether the heavens are incorruptible," "whether a mixture is composed of four elements or not." But two contradictory judgments about the same subject simultaneously and in the same intellect are incompatible. Therefore complex apprehension is truly separated from judgment. The major is confirmed by the authority of the Philosopher

(2.*de anima* T.145 and following; and 3. of the same T.28) who says that no sense and no intellect compares extremes unless it apprehends them — and such an apprehension is without judgment, since to the extremes thus apprehended we do not assent. In roughly the same way, the Doctor adds, as we speak of understanding what we believe to be true and not understanding what we believe to be false — though we apprehend the latter.

The Coimbrans reply, with certain authors whom they cite and whom Suárez (*disp.8.Met.sect.4*) imitates, that the aforesaid are not true propositions but simple apprehensions of a voice, of which one is conceived not together with another but one after the other. On the contrary: what possesses truth of the thing or falsity are true or false propositions — as is clear from the definition of the proposition, of which truth or falsity, if not the essence, is at least the property, as I made plain (*in Epitome lib.2.q.2.art.2*) and Tatarct (1.*Perib.q.3.Scibili* 3) defends. But apprehensive propositions possess truth or falsity of the thing about which they make a proposition — as two contradictory ones apprehended together: "stars are even in number; stars are not even in number." Likewise: "a circle is a square; a circle is not a square," and similar ones — which are indeed apprehended by us, but not judged. Therefore they are not simple apprehensions of a voice but true and genuine propositions of things.

Then: doubtful and ambiguous propositions are proper propositions — since although they are known as doubtful by us, yet they are in themselves true or false. Such propositions are only apprehensive, since we render no judgment about them — as the Coimbrans themselves not infrequently leave both sides of a proposed question under doubt. Add that it sometimes happens that a proposition is in itself true while the judgment about it is false. Therefore apprehensive proposition is to be distinguished from judicative.

Finally: it often happens that we form apprehensive concepts about things to be done, yet we are not willing to judge about them — either from their difficulty or from fear of offending someone. Nor is it to be passed over that a vocal proposition is a sign of a mental proposition, and we sometimes express a vocal judgment opposed to the mental proposition — which is express lying. Or, with no mental judgment had, a judgment is uttered in words about certain matters. Therefore if a judgment is uttered in voice, while in mind there is only apprehensive proposition about the same things, it is plainly conceded that an apprehensive proposition distinct from a judicative one exists.

Objection I. The words Aristotle uses to name the second operation of the mind signify that every proposition is judicative. Therefore there is no apprehensive proposition distinct from the judicative. The antecedent is proved: in the book of the categories (*c. de substantia*) the same Philosopher calls the proposition *opinion*, and opinion — since it concerns probable things — includes judgment. And (6.*Eth.cap.3*) he calls it an act of science, which likewise is not distant from judgment. And (3.*de anima* in the cited text, and in this place) he calls it

composition and division, and divides it into affirmative and negative, true and false. Therefore according to Aristotle, the distinction of proposition into apprehensive and judicative is not to be introduced into the schools.

I respond from the cited places that the Philosopher teaches the judicative proposition as more known and more frequent, and distinguished by more names — without denying the apprehensive proposition, even if he did not so expressly state it, just as he did not state the judicative one. This Aristotle does also in many other matters — as Vallone (*Tract. Formal.*) notes. And (*3. de anima T.26*) he defines the proposition prescinding from the apprehensive and judicative.

Objection II. Judgment is nothing other than the affirmation of one thing of another or the negation of one from another — according to St. Thomas (*q.1. de veritate art.1*); or according to Scotus (*4. dist.47. q.1. §. Respondeo infra A*): "judgment is the certain apprehension of something through another." But one who unites and connects predicate with subject affirms one of another; and one who removes or disjoins predicate from subject negates something of another. For to affirm or to negate is to judge, and affirmation or negation is judgment. Therefore only the judicative proposition is the genuine proposition. Granting the major, I distinguish the minor: if a proposition is perceived by the intellect as something complex, without determining anything about it, denied; but if it is perceived by the intellect as a complex thing, determining something about it, granted — which is sufficiently proved and confirmed above.

Objection III. Where there is a passion, there is the essence from which that passion flows — since they are really identified. But truth or falsity is the passion only of the judicative proposition. Therefore beyond the judicative, no other is to be reckoned a proper proposition. The major is evident. The minor is proved: one who judges says something true or false; not so one who apprehends. Otherwise God — who apprehends all propositions — could say something false, which savors of enormous falsehood.

Granting the major, I deny the minor. To its proof, I do indeed grant that one who judges says something true or false; but I deny that without judgment one cannot apprehend something true or false. For one who only apprehends is not said to know or to err, because he does not determine himself toward either side of holding or rejecting. Thus if God apprehends something false, yet his apprehension is not false. For there is not an insignificant difference between apprehending something false — which is in itself false — and being stained with a false apprehension. The first belongs to God; the second is contrary to God.

Article IV. Whether the Division of the Proposition into Affirmative and Negative Is a Division of a Genus into Species.

John Mayr — most acute philosopher and theologian, auditor of the Subtle Doctor — (*Tract.1.summularum*, at the end, on the affirmative and negative proposition) recounts from Boethius (*1.Perth.*) two opposed positions on this article. The first is that of Alexander (*1.priorum cap.1*), the Philosopher (*1.Post.c.21*), and others, who think the aforesaid division is an analogical division into its analogates. The second — which the same Mayr testifies was common in his time — is defended by Porphyry (*1.priorum cap.1*), Simplicius (*cap. de quantitate*), St. Thomas (*cap.4.primi Perih.*), John of Metz (*q.3.dub.1*), and is hinted at by Scotus (*1.post-ante et post. §. Ad quaest. dicitur*) and others from the Ancients and Moderns, who with one voice affirm that such a division is of a univocal into its univocates, or of a genus into its species.

Note I, that Scotus (*mox alleg.*) reports from Averroes three arguments of Alexander to prove that the affirmative proposition is prior to the negative. The first is drawn from the side of the word (*vocis*) and is called priority of simplicity of expression. For the affirmative word is simpler than the negative: negation is produced from affirmation with something added to it. The second is from the side of the thing: even if in particular things non-being precedes being — as is evident in the generation of sublunary things — yet absolutely, being precedes non-being, as the being of the first cause precedes the non-being of a second cause. The being of the first cause precedes the non-being of a second cause — perhaps keeping this in view, Aristotle says "act is prior to potency" (*9.Met.13*). Since affirmation signifies being and negation non-being, the former must precede the latter. The third is from the side of the intellect: because the intellect composes before it divides — which is to say, the intellect affirms before it negates. Others add a fourth: priority of reason — for through affirmation we know negation, and through habit privation, as is evident (*1.Post.cap.21*; *1.dist.41.q.un.*; *dist.47*; and the *Tract.de scientia Dei disp.2.q.5*).

Note II from Tataret (*in praedicam.cap. de quantitate q.un.scibili 1*) that the species of a genus can be compared in two ways. In one way among themselves — and in this way one is prior and more perfect than the other, as man than lion. In another way with respect to the genus, which is predicated of its species — and in this way the account of genus is univocal to them, and is predicated of them immediately and equally. This doctrine Scotus brings forward (*q.4.praedicam. §. Propter hoc*) with these words: "In every genus there is one first, which is the measure of the posterior ones (*ex 10.Met.T.22*); perhaps however the case of analogical voices and of genus with respect to species is not altogether similar — because although the species of a genus have an order among themselves according to more perfect and less perfect in being, yet in participating in the account of genus they have no order, since they participate equally primarily." For genus is predicated equally immediately of the first species dividing it — and then there is no difference in primacy between those predications: "whiteness is a color," "blackness is a color" — even though comparing whiteness and blackness with each other, whiteness is more perfect than blackness.

Assertion. The division of the proposition into affirmative and negative is univocal. This is touched on by the Doctor (*loco cit.*) and (*1.Priorum q.3*). It is proved: that is univocal which is equally participated by its inferiors. But the name and account of proposition are equally participated by the affirmative and the negative. Therefore the aforesaid division is univocal. The major is clear from the definition of univocals. The minor is shown: the account of proposition precisely taken is "the utterance of one of another" — as I explained (*in Epitome lib.2.q.2.art.2*). But this univocally belongs to the affirmative: for each is an utterance of one of another, though they are distinguished according to their proper differences — one being affirmative, the other negative. Furthermore, proposition abstracts from truth and falsity — as Scotus (*4.dist.5.q.2.¶. Aliter sub V*) elegantly teaches — and equally from affirmation and negation; for the divided abstracts from the dividing members into which it is divided. But what is common, abstracted from its inferiors, that agrees with them according to the same name and same account, is univocal. But proposition is this with respect to the affirmative and negative: for each proposition enjoys the same name and common account of proposition. Therefore that partition of proposition into affirmative and negative is univocal.

Objection I. Aristotle (*lib.1.huius operis cap.4*) makes the affirmative prior to the negative. And the reason is that affirmation carries composition and negation carries division; but composition precedes division. But what is prior to another is not univocated with it — since univocals participate equally primarily in the common account by which they are called univocal. Therefore the aforesaid division is not to be reckoned univocal. I reply by explaining Aristotle: the affirmative is prior in the common account of proposition — denied; in the peculiar and specific account of negation — as I made clear in (*Note II*): granted.

Objection II. A division of some essential whole into accidentals is not univocal — as is clear from the division of a subject into accidents. But the aforesaid division is of an essential whole into its accidents — namely of proposition into its qualities, since affirmation and negation are its qualities, as the Philosopher hints in this book. And they seem to differ as a white man and a black man, who do not essentially differ (*ex 10.Met.cap.25*). Granting the major, to the minor I say that affirmation and negation are essential qualities of a proposition — as the divisive differences of a genus and the constitutive differences of species are essential differences, which are sometimes called qualities — as I touched on (*in Epit.lib.1.q.4.art.7 & lib.2.Log.q.5.art.1*) from Scotus (*3.dist.1.q.1.art.3. D*). The interpreters of Aristotle explain him in this way.

Objection III. One of the laws of good division is that the divided not exceed the dividing members — as I explained (*in Epit.lib.2.q.7.art.1*). But the proposition — the divided in this partition — surpasses the dividing members. For some proposition is found that is neither affirmative nor negative — as "no lion is not an animal" — which is not negative, on account of the double negation added to

it; nor affirmative. For if one negation can make a proposition negative, with even more reason two negations can do so. For if one man can carry a weight of ten pounds, more easily can two men carry that same weight. Granting the major, I deny the minor. To its proof I say that the proposition is affirmative, because two negations affirm. To the disproof of this, a distinction is to be applied: if they mutually assist each other, granted; if one impedes the other, denied. And this happens with two negations: the first negation impedes the second; for since negation is of a malignant nature, it destroys whatever it finds after itself and posits the opposite. Hence it follows that an even number of negations before the verbal copula produces an affirmative, and an odd number a negative — as Mayr (*cit.*) and Titelmans (*lib.3. de enuntiatione cap.10*) diligently note.

Objection IV. Affirmation and negation belong to the first principle (*ex 4.Met.T.15*): "Of everything whatsoever, affirmation or negation is true." But this first principle is a common transcendent, to which neither the account of genus nor of species can belong. Therefore the aforesaid division is not a genus into its species. I respond that affirmation and negation are taken in two ways: in one way, with first intention — that is, for being and non-being — and in this sense they belong to the first principle and pertain to metaphysics. In another way, with second intention — that is, for the formal account of an affirmative and negative proposition — and in this way proposition, with respect to them, has the account of genus, and they pertain to logic — as Tataret (*1.Perih.q.1.dub.1*) rightly notes.

Question IV. On the Properties of the Proposition.

Article I. What Truth Is.

That truth exists is clearer than light. For it is attested frequently in sacred scripture — notably (*Deut.13*): "the thing investigated with truth"; (*Judic.16*): "revealing the truth of the thing"; (*Esdras 3*): "truth conquers all." Of which Christ the Lord provides great testimony (*John 18*) with these words: "For this I was born, and for this I came into the world, that I should give testimony to the truth." And (*John 16*): "When the Spirit of truth comes, he will teach you all truth." To acquire this truth — as worthy of all honor and love — philosophers spare no labor or sweat throughout the whole course of their lives, directing all their study and care to its investigation. Indeed, setting aside all other things, they embrace this one thing and love it above the rest. Hence that celebrated saying: "Socrates is a friend, Plato is a friend, but truth is a greater friend" — which is hinted at (*1.Eth.6*). Though — as one who has stripped herself of all advantage and looking with clear eyes at all things — many do not acquiesce to it, as the Apostle witnesses (*Roman.2*) and truth is hated, according to that common saying: "Truth begets hatred."

Since truth, from Bonetus (5.*Met.c.2*), is an equivocal name, and equivocals are to be distinguished — from Scotus (*Quol.1.¶. De primo A*) — a distinction must be used in examining it. First: Scotus (6.*Met.q.3*; 1.*d.2.q.2.¶. Ad arg. F*), Lychetus (*ibid.*), and Bonetus (*cit.*) affirm that truth is distributed into truth of the thing and truth of the intellect. Truth of the thing — also called truth in being and transcendental truth — is a passion of being, pertaining to metaphysics, of which the Doctor mentions (1.*d.3.q.4.5. Circa 4. sub N*). Truth of the intellect, or truth in knowing — which from (1.*dist.48.q.un.¶. Quamvis*) is the conformity of the act of understanding to the understood object — is divided into incomplex truth and complex truth (*ex 1.q.prologi.¶. Antequam sub M*). Incomplex truth is the conformity of the simple act of the intellect to a simple and incomplex object — when, namely, an incomplex object is understood just as it is on the part of the thing. Complex truth is the conformity of the intellect composing one thing with another, or dividing one from another, as it is on the part of the thing. The former pertains to the first operation, the latter to the second operation of the intellect. To the first is opposed ignorance; to the second, falsity is opposed. It is primarily this latter that we must examine in the present work — the former we relegate to metaphysics for examination. According to the multiple acceptance of truth, multiple descriptions of it are also given — as can be seen in the Archbishop of Aquis (1.*dist.19.propositione 2*) and Altenstaig (*in Lexico Theologico, verbo veritas*).

One is the philosophical definition of truth, given by Boethius: "truth is the adequation of the thing to the intellect." Another is that of Avicenna (1.*Met.cap.1*): "The truth of each thing is the property of being that is established for it." The third: "truth is quiddity purified and separated from all that is foreign." The fourth is elicited from the Doctor (*quad.18.art.3.¶. Contra ante T*): "truth is the conformity of what is affirmed to the existence of the thing." The second and third descriptions are adapted to incomplex and transcendental truth. The first and fourth apply to complex and logical truth. Correspondingly, falsity — insofar as it is contrary to logical truth — is described as the disconformity of what is enunciated to what is in the thing. Hence Scotus adds (4.*d.8.q.2.¶. Aliter ante V*; and *dist.50.q.6.¶. Ad argumenta K*) following Aristotle (*in praedicam.cap. de substantia & cap. de modis prioris*): from the fact that a thing is or is not, an utterance is said to be true or false.

Furthermore, from the same Doctor (*Quol. alleg.*) two kinds of truth are drawn: one immediate and indemonstrable — belonging to the principle; the other mediate and demonstrable — suited to the conclusion. And this is indicated by the same Scotus (1.*dist.2.q.3.¶. Quantum A*) with these words: "There are two acts of the intellect assenting to some true complex: the act by which it assents to some true complex on account of itself, as to a principle; and another by which it assents to some true complex on account of another, as to a conclusion on account of the principle."

You will say that Scotus elsewhere teaches that the truth of a conclusion does not differ from the truth of the principle — as Gadius (*fol.188*) notes and Lychetus (*1.1.8.q.4.q.*) explains with these reasons. Therefore there is no aforesaid distinction of truth, or Scotus is not self-consistent. I say that the Doctor only intends in the first sentence that the truth of a conclusion is not absolute and independent, as is the truth of a principle. As Lychetus (*nunc alleg.*) illustrates with the example of a whole — which, though according to Scotus it is something really distinct from the parts of which it coalesces, nonetheless essentially depends on them, as an effect on its intrinsic cause. So the truth of a conclusion is indeed distinct from the truth of the principle — upon which it depends — as will be clearer in the last book of this work.

Objection I. Truth is accommodated not only to things and the intellect, but also to sense — therefore the division into truth of the thing and truth of the intellect is insufficient. The antecedent is supported by the authority of Aristotle (*2.de anima T.63*), saying that sense of proper sensibles is always true. Granting the antecedent, I deny the consequence. To its proof I say that truth of sense is not distinct from truth of the thing and transcendental truth — since a sense is called true because it has a true representative species of a sensible object. Perhaps for this reason Bonetus (*nuper alleg.*) distributes truth into truth in the soul and truth outside the soul — such as the truth of sense. And the truth in signifying — which is accommodated to a name and a vocal proposition — can be reduced to this. The same is hinted at by St. Anselm (*opusc.de veritate*), who investigates truth in speech, action, will, intellect, sense, and in the essences of things.

Objection II. God is called truth (*John 14*): "I am the way, the truth, and the life." Orthodox faith is also called truth. Likewise, moral truth — of which Bonetus (*4.de Consolatione, prosa 3*) mentions, and the Doctor (*Quol.18*) nods — is not to be omitted. Again, other descriptions of truth are assigned — such as those found in Aureolus and Bonetus (*praecensiti*) — as when it is said that "truth is the conformity of the produced to the producing," or of the ideated to the idea, or of the exemplated to the exemplar. I reply: God is called truth in the abstract because he is the purest act, separated from all that is foreign — which can belong to no created thing, which always undergoes some composition. We are called truth, partly because it proceeds from God who is the supreme truth, and partly because it shows the way of truth and points to the true end. The other things that are added show that the aforesaid divisions of truth are not entirely exact and do not comprehend all truth — which I do not deny: I adduced them as more celebrated and worn, and as certain enumerations.

Article II. Whether Truth Is a Real Being or a Being of Reason.

There is no doubt among the Scotists whether truth of the thing — or transcendental truth — is something real positive. For since it is a passion of being, which according to the same Doctors formally differs from being itself —

as I showed extensively (*in Met.lib.2.q.2.art.2*) from Scotus (*1.dist.3.q.3* & *2.d.16.q.vn.* & *3.d.8.q.vn.* ante §. *Ad argumenta* sub E) — it consequently follows that it is numbered among positive real beings, or rather among the entities of being.

But the entire difficulty in this place concerns truth of the intellect. On this matter, various positions of the philosophers and their differences are recounted and refuted by recent authors, and most recently by the paired Scotists (*disp.10.art.3.q.2*). From these I select two principal ones to set forth and examine.

The first is the one that Mayr (*Tract.2.de propositione dub.6*) follows, and testifies to be common to the Nominalists — holding that truth does not differ from the proposition of which it is the truth, and universally that any truth of knowledge is not distinct from the act of the intellect. Hurtado (*disp.9.de anima, sect.3.subsect.4*) approves and champions this. The second is of others who — though by unanimous consent they teach that complex truth is something distinct from the proposition and from the entity of the act of the intellect, and that what formally constitutes truth is not something absolute but relative — nonetheless differ in that some, including our two recent members (*alleg.*), hold that truth of knowledge is formally a real relative being; while others hold it to be a relation of reason — thus Bonetus (*5.Met.cap.2*), Orbellus (*6.Met.cap.3*), and Dar. (*1.dist.19.q.5*), with whom Vasquez (*1.p.Tom.1.disp.75.cap.2*) and Blancanus (*disp.1.de enuntiatione sect.4*) agree.

What was said above is to be recalled — that truth is twofold: one incomplex, the other complex. The former concerns simple terms apprehended by the intellect; the latter concerns complexes composed or divided by the intellect with each other. About each the present doubt can be raised, which will be decided through the assertions to be set forth shortly.

Assertion I. Truth — whether incomplex or complex — is formally neither an act of the intellect nor a proposition. This is gathered from the Doctor (*4.dist.8.q.2.* post V). The first part is proved as follows. First: an act of the intellect is not considered by logic, but by the science of the soul — whose function it is to examine the faculties of the soul and their acts. The antecedent is proved abundantly (*1.1.q.2.art.3* & 6). Second: an act of the intellect is an absolute quality, as Scotus (*Quol.13*) shows copiously. But in the next assertion it will be proved that truth is formally a relative entity. Therefore truth is not essentially an act of the intellect.

Furthermore, what is essential to something cannot be removed while it remains — otherwise its essence would be removed, and yet it would not be removed since it would still persist, which involves an obvious contradiction. But the same act can change from true to false, as Scotus (*nunc allegato*) writes. Therefore truth is not formally an act of the intellect. All the more because this

is true: "the act is true" — but this is not: "the act is truth" — just as "man is risible" is conceded but not "man is risibility." The second part — concerning incomplex truth — is doubted by no one, since the simple terms concerning which incomplex truth exists are not, nor do they make, a proposition, unless they are united and composed by the intellect.

As for complex truth — there is a dispute against the Nominalists. The negative part is shown thus: no passion is formally that of which it is a passion — just as no effect is the cause by which it is produced. But truth is a passion of the proposition — as the Doctor affirms (*q.1.praedicam.*) and Hurt.

(*disp.4.Summularum, sect.1; disp.9.de anima sect.3.subsect.4*) does not dissent.

Likewise: what is in the foundation is not the foundation itself — as Scotus argues (*ubi supra*). But truth is in the proposition as in a foundation — as the same Doctor (*ibid.*) states. Therefore complex truth is not the proposition itself. Furthermore, the prior is not the posterior in the same order and series, as is evident. But the proposition is prior to truth, since truth arises from it — which Hurtado himself does not deny at the end of the cited subsection. Finally, this is not valid: "the proposition is truth" — but this is valid: "the proposition is true" — which equally I was arguing above concerning incomplex truth.

The Doctor (*praecit.*) adds that God could institute some expression that is not significative, at whose utterance by the minister God himself would assist, to cause an effect at the end of the utterance — in which case the expression would be stripped of truth or falsity. Therefore truth is not part of the quidditative concept of the proposition.

Assertion II. Neither of the aforesaid truths is an absolute entity — but each is a relative entity. This is Scotus's position (*1.dist.3.q.4.¶. Quantum ad 2. C; and 4.cit. infra V; and dist.49.q.4.¶. Iuxta I; and 6.Met.q.3.*), whom Tataret (*1.Perih.q.1.dub.3*) and Fonseca (*4.Met.cap.2.q.6.sect.2*) imitate.

It is proved as follows. First: every absolute is "toward itself," and every relative is "toward another." But truth is not "toward itself" but "toward another." Therefore truth is not an absolute entity but a respective one. The major is evident from the explanation of terms (*1.1.Epit.q.1.art.6 & lib.3.Log.q. de relatione*). The minor is proved from the definition of truth received by all: truth universally taken is the conformity of one to another. For if it is truth of the thing, it is the conformity of the thing to its principles; if truth of the intellect, it is the conformity of the intellect to the thing understood. But this conformity to another is formally a relation — as is clear from the description of relation. Therefore truth does not carry an absolute but a relative entity.

Second: every absolute is either substance, quantity, or quality. But truth is none of these. Therefore it is a relation. The major is clear from what was said (*lib.3.q.3.de praedicamentis*). The minor is evident by induction: for truth is not substance — divided into incorporeal and corporeal; nor quantity — which is

continuous or discrete; nor quality — whether spiritual or material (*ex q.de qualitate art.6*).

Assertion III. Incomplex truth — if it regards an actually existing object — is a real relation; but if its object does not actually exist, it is a relation of reason. This is expressly held by Bonetus and Orbellus (*ubi supra*), and deduced from the Doctor (*Quol.13.art.2*). The first part is proved: a real relation requires real extremes, really distinct, from which the relation itself naturally arises — as Scotus (*citat. sub L*) notes. But incomplex truth regarding an actually existing object has actually existing and really distinct extremes: the knowledge and its object — from which the relation of conformity arises — are really distinct. Therefore such truth — which is this conformity — is a real relation. The second part is proved: toward a terminus that does not have real being but only being in the intellect, there is a relation of reason — as Scotus (*ibid.*) argues, because a relation cannot have more true being than the terminus it regards; but a non-existing terminus has only being in the intellect, which is a being of reason. Therefore a relation terminated at it is a relation of reason.

Assertion IV. Complex truth is formally a relation of reason. This also the aforesaid authors teach — with whom Fonseca (*ubi supra*) is joined — and it is drawn from the Doctor (*1.dist.3.q.4.¶. Quantum ad 2. C*; and other places) against our two younger members (*disp.10.q.2.art.3*).

It is proved as follows. First: what has a being of reason as its foundation is itself a being of reason — for a real being cannot be founded on a being of reason, which is of the least entity. But the foundation of complex truth is a being of reason — namely the proposition or enunciation, as Scotus hints (*4.dist.8.q.2.¶. Aliter ante X*), and I clearly showed (*q.3.artic.1.huius lib.*). Therefore complex truth is formally a being of reason. Hence I am surprised at the cited recent authors, who in (*q.1.disp.10*) maintained that the enunciation is a being of reason — but now in (*q.2.art.3. of the same disp.*) affirm that the truth of the proposition — which is founded on it — is a real relation independent of any operation of the intellect. For why is truth posited as a real relation while the proposition — which coincides with the enunciation and from which truth proceeds — is a being of reason? For a being of reason producing a real being is the height of absurdity. Nor does it help them to say that the proposition is true before the operation of the intellect — since the proposition is a work of the intellect. Therefore complex and formal truth — which follows from it — is not had without the intellect's operation.

Second: a relation between rational extremes is a relation of reason, and conversely a relation between real extremes is a real relation. But the extremes of complex truth are beings of reason — namely subject and predicate. Therefore complex truth — which arises from them — is a relation of reason. Third: logic contemplates complex truth — as all confess. But it is established from what was said (*lib.1.q.3*) that logic contemplates second intentions, which

are relations of reason — since they are formed by the intellect comparing one to another object. Therefore the aforesaid truth is a relation of reason.

Objection I against Assertion I: an act of the intellect is the formal representation of an object as it is — for example, I form this proposition: "a lion is an animal," and through this act, the lion is represented as it is. Therefore such an act is conformed to the object; and since truth consists in the conformity of the intellect to the object, it follows that truth is formally the act of the intellect. Confirmation: either the act is essentially similar to the object or not. If the former, it is essentially true. If the latter, it is essentially false, since it is disconformed and dissimilar to the object. Therefore it seems that truth does not differ from the act of the intellect.

I reply: I concede that the act of the intellect is representative and expressive of the known object; but I deny that it is essentially the representation of that very object. For a man who has whiteness is indeed white, but is not whiteness. Similarly, I grant that the act is true — provided it is conformed to the object — but I deny that the act is truth, since it is not such conformity. To the confirmation I say that the act is true or false accidentally, on account of the truth or falsity of it — which is an accidental relation, as the Doctor (*in 4.cit.* a little before X) asserts.

Objection II against Assertion II: a perfection simply speaking is an absolute being — for it is better than it is not, itself — as St. Anselm states (*in Monologion cap.15*) and Scotus explains (*1.dist.8.q.1. §. Ad 1.1.*). But truth is a perfection simply speaking — for it belongs to God, who is not once named by the Holy Fathers — notably Hilary (*6.Trin.*) — "subsisting truth, first and supreme truth," as Fonseca (*4.Met.q.6.sect.2*) notes. All the more because Anselm (*cit.*) separates relative relations from perfections simply speaking; and in anything, it is better to be true than false — for a true stone is better than a false stone. Therefore truth is something absolute.

Confirmation I: truth does not depend on some real existing terminus — as real relation requires. For there are propositions of perpetual truth that prescind from all actual existence — from what will be said below. Confirmation II: this is a true proposition — "a chimera is a fictitious being" — which denotes no relative entity, since it undergoes no conformity. For comparison of measured to measure cannot be made in it (*ex 4.dist.1.q.1. G; and q.13. M*). The reason is that measure is prior to what is measured, but a being of reason is posterior to cognition. Therefore truth is not a respective being. Granting the major, I distinguish the minor: concerning divine truth, granted; concerning created truth, denied. As for what divine truth is, see Vulpes (*To.1.summa disp.10.a.vlt.*) and what I wrote (*Tract.de Deo uno disp.2*). To Confirmation I: I distinguish the antecedent — concerning formal and actual truth, denied; concerning fundamental and objective truth, granted — as will be evident (*a.5.huius q.*). To Confirmation II: I say that the proposition is true with a truth suited to it — for

just as a chimera is a fictitious being, so its truth is fictitious and a chimerical relation.

Objection III against Assertion IV: what precedes the operation of the intellect is not a being of reason. But truth precedes the operation of the intellect. Therefore truth is not a relation of reason. The major is evident, since a being of reason either is or follows the operation of the intellect — as I observed (1.1.q.3.a.5). The minor is supported: the knowledge of God, directed toward himself or toward created things, possesses truth with no intervening operation of the intellect. Especially because for an act to be true means nothing other than to affirm that the thing is as it is on the part of the thing — as when "man is an animal" is said, animal is enunciated of man just as it is truly found in the nature of things and the essence of man demands. But with all operation of the intellect excluded, man is an animal on the part of the thing. Therefore truth also exists on the part of the thing, independently of any fiction of the mind.

Granting the major, I deny the minor. To its proof I say that all of what is adduced applies to objective and fundamental truth of the thing — not to truth of knowledge and formal truth, which is produced by the created intellect alone. But the divine intellect — since it neither divides nor composes — is free of this kind of complex truth, since it involves imperfection.

Objection IV. If complex truth is a relation of reason — since it is founded on the proposition, which is likewise from what has been said a being of reason as a second intention — truth would not be drawn from the thing outside. But this contradicts Aristotle (*c. de substantia*), who says: "from the fact that a thing is or is not, an utterance is said to be true or false." Therefore complex truth is not to be held to be a relation of reason. I reply that the aforesaid truth is proximately founded on the proposition — but remotely on the thing outside. Nor is it inconvenient that one relation be founded on another — as I proved (1.3.q. de relatione a.7). Or say with Bonetus and other authors that truth is formally in the proposition, but causally or terminatively in the thing — which is well perceived as follows.

Article III. In What Subject Truth Subsists.

Five opinions on this article are recounted by Aureolus (1.d.19.p.3). Two being omitted, three are adduced by Aquila (1.d.8.q.1) and Pelbartus (*Tomo 1. Rosarij, verbo veritas*): two extreme ones and a third middle one. The first is that of Durandus (1.d.19.q.5), Henry (*Quol. 3.q.1.4.2.6.3*), Vasquez (1.p.q.67.c.1), and others, who hold that truth is formally in the objective concept of the intellect insofar as it is conformed to the thing as it is in the nature of things. The second is that of Cajetan (2.p.q.16.a.2), Ferrariensis (1.contra Gentes c.59 & 60), Fonseca (4.Met.c.2.q.6), and Suárez (*disp.8.Met.sect.1*), who affirm that truth is formally in the formal concept of the intellect insofar as it is conformed to the thing as it is in itself. The third is the one followed by Aquila and Pelbartus (*praecit.*), who

reconcile both aforesaid discrepant positions, teaching that complex truth is formally in the intellect — namely in the formal concept — but fundamentally in the thing, or in the objective concept.

What was said above is to be recalled: that truth is taken in two ways, as Bonetus (*cit.*) especially notes. In one way, fundamentally — and in this sense, according to some, it is the thing or quiddity insofar as it is conformable to the intellect's knowledge. More correctly it can be said that truth taken fundamentally is the conformability of the thing to the intellect — insofar, namely, as the thing is fitted to be conformed to the knowledge of the intellect. This is perhaps what Aristotle keeps in view (*2.Met.c.1.T.4*) when he pronounces that saying: "as the thing is in being, so it is in truth." In another way, formally — in which sense Pelbartus (*alleg.*) asserts that Isaac (*1.definitionum*) described truth as "the adequation of the thing to the intellect."

Note, moreover, not incongruously, from the philosophers, that conformity or adequation is twofold: one active, the other passive. The former is on the side of the intellect, the latter on the side of the thing. When the conformity of the intellect to the thing and the thing to the intellect is equal, all-round truth is had — which can hold both of incomplexes and of complexes. Therefore, following what I established in the preceding article about incomplex and complex truth, these matters are to be decided in the present in nearly the same way.

Furthermore, since from what was asserted there, truth is formally a relation — which requires a foundation and a terminus from which it arises — it is not unreasonable to investigate whether truth is subject in one or the other of these. Moreover, since the object partially concurs to produce its knowledge, and knowledge is terminated at it, it is rightly asked whether the truth of knowledge is causally in the object — as Godfrey (*Quol.2.q.6*) thinks — or terminatively, as some hold, or in both ways, as not a few think. Bonetus (*ubi supra*) defends both those modes as probable; though the first is judged more frequent and more plausible by the philosophers. Hence the most eminent Sarnanus (*q.15.univers.pag.45*) rightly notes that truth is in three things: in the thing as in the efficient, in the proposition as in the representing sign, in the intellect as in what receives. He illustrates this with the example of the light of the sun, which exists in the sun as in the efficient, in a transparent body and air as in the transmitting medium, and in the earth as in the receiver.

Assertion. Transcendental truth — also called truth of the thing — resides in the very thing of which it is the truth; but truth of knowledge holds its place in the intellect. This assertion contains two parts. The first part is undoubtedly Scotus's (*1.d.8.q.4.¶. Ista tamen, M*), where he teaches that a passion follows its subject (*¶ 2.d.16.q.un.* and elsewhere), and maintains that truth is a passion of real being. From this doctrine a twofold argument is formed to support our assertion. First: a passion is in the thing of which it is the passion — as risibility is in man, neighing in a horse. But transcendental truth is a passion of real being — as is

clear from Aristotle (2.*Met.cap.1* & 4. of the same work, *T.10*), and the common run of philosophers holds it — as Bonetus (*ibid. in initio cap.2*) notes. Therefore transcendental truth has its seat in real being. Second: what follows from some subject resides in that very subject from which it arises — as is clear from accidents, which proceed from substance and are received in it as in their subject. But truth of the thing proceeds from real being, as do its other passions — as I showed (*in Met.lib.2.q.2.art.2*). Therefore transcendental truth inheres in real being.

The second part is drawn from the Doctor (6.*Met.q.3* & 1.*d.1.q.3.D. Quantum ad 1.* sub A; and *d.3.q.3. C*). It is proved as follows. First, from Aristotle (1.*perihier.cap.1*; 3.*de anima c.26*; 6.*Met.cap.2.7.8. summ.2*), who affirms that truth and falsity consist in composition and division. Add Plato (*in Symposio*), Nicaeus (*lib. de vita Moysis*), and Anselm (*lib.de veritate cap.2*), who expressly seem to assert that truth is in the proposition.

Second: in what there is the proximate foundation or subject of something, there the passion of it resides — since subject and its passion formally differ only, as I wrote (*in Met.loco proximè cit.*). But the foundation of complex truth is the proposition, which is in the intellect subjectively. Therefore truth — which is its property — is likewise subject in the intellect.

Third: a being of reason has being only in the intellect — as is plainly clear from the metaphysical question (*q.ult.*). But complex truth is a being of reason — as I proved (*in superiori a.conclusionè 4*). Add that a vocal proposition is subordinated to a true or false mental proposition — as after Tatarè (*hoc loco q.1.dub.2*) the Coimbrans (*q.5.art.1*) note from the Philosopher (*c.1.huius operis*). Therefore, since truth is said to be in a vocal proposition as in a sign — because it denotes the formal truth of the mental proposition — it is clearly deduced that complex truth is in the intellect as in its subject.

Objection I. What belongs to two things, one as cause and the other as caused, belongs primarily to the cause rather than to the caused. Hence, since fire is the cause of heat in all hot things, it is especially called hot (*ex 2.Met.7.4*). But truth of the thing is the cause of truth in the intellect and in the enunciation — as the Philosopher (*c.de substantia*) writes. Therefore truth is primarily and formally in the thing. Confirmation: a proposition is true on account of truth existing in the thing — as Aristotle (*praealleg.*) declares. Therefore if a proposition is true because of truth of the thing, it follows that truth is prior and more formal in the thing than in the enunciation — according to Aristotle (1.*Post.*): "that on account of which a thing is such, and that thing more so." I reply by distinguishing the major: if it belongs to both formally, granted; if it belongs to one formally and to the other causally, denied — as is clear from the sun and the earth, both of which are called hot, but differently: the sun is hot causally and eminently, while the earth is hot formally through heat caused in it formally by the sun itself. Much the same seems to happen in our case: truth is in the

enunciation formally, but in the thing only causally — as I expressed at the end of the preceding note. To the confirmation the same distinction holds, through which the cited Aristotle passage is explained.

Objection II. Just as good is the object of the will, so true is the object of the intellect — which indeed is of truths (*ex 1.Post.T.44*). But things outside are the primary objects of the intellect — not species, acts, or second intentions. Otherwise all knowledge would be reflexive. Therefore truth is primarily in the thing and secondarily in the intellect. Confirmation I: what is adapted to one as a sign and to another as the signified, through such a sign — belongs to the latter intrinsically and formally, and to the former extrinsically and materially — as is clear from health, which formally belongs to an animal and to urine as its sign. Therefore since truth is attributed to the intellect and to speech as a sign, and to conformity with the thing outside, it follows that truth is formally in the thing. Confirmation II: from St. Augustine (*9.Trin.c.11*): "greatness is the same as truth; greater and truer being coincide." But greatness is in the thing. Therefore so is truth.

I reply with the Doctor (*6.Met. in fine, q.3*) by denying the major — whom Orbellus (*ibid. in fine c.3*) follows. For the intellect not only understands the true under the account of truth, but also the good under the account of good, and distinguishes between them. Therefore it studies both — as the Stagirite asserts (*2.de anima T.146*). When it is said that the intellect is "of truths," it is understood of the habit of first principles, which are always true. Hence the same Philosopher adds (*1.Met. at the threshold*): "who will go astray in these?" — especially since on their truth depend the truths of all conclusions — as Scotus (*1.d.2.q.3.1.*) agrees. To Confirmation I: granting the antecedent, I deny the consequence. For that conformity of the intellect to the thing formally resides in the intellect and is terminated at the thing, or caused by the thing. Therefore truth — which expresses that conformity — is formally subject in the intellect. To Confirmation II: I say Augustine is to be interpreted of fundamental truth — but the discussion here is of formal truth, whose subject we make the intellect.

Objection III. Scotus (*1.d.9.48.q.un. §. Ad arg. B*) commits these words: "Truth of the intellect depends only on the object, which, if it is as it is understood, the intellect is true." The same is hinted at (*Quol.18.art.3. §. Contra 5*) and confirmed (*in Report.1.d.48.q.vlt. R*). I say Scotus there is speaking of truth causally and as depending from outside — for only the object from outside partially causes truth, and from it alone as from outside truth itself depends. That this is his meaning is evident from that text: for he compares truth with goodness, saying that truth depends on the object alone, but goodness depends not only on the object but also on due circumstances — which he expresses (*in Report.cit.q.5*). Lychetus and Gadius in (*in expositione Quol. & §. cit.*) are of the same view.

Objection IV. The intellect is not said to be conformed to the object because it is conformed to formal knowledge in being — since the intellect and its formal

knowledge are always spiritual, while the object considered by the intellect is most often material. But because the object is perceived by the intellect as it is on the part of the thing. Therefore the whole comparison is made between the thing in known being and the thing in real being — and consequently the primary truth has its seat in the objective concept. I reply that such conformity of the intellect with the thing is not entitative and real, but intentional — insofar as the object is represented through knowledge in the way it is in the nature of things, as Aristotle (*3.de anima c.8.T.37*) writes. Hence such conformity and representation is not directed toward the known object and itself, as Durandus thinks, but toward the representative concept and the represented object — as Suárez (*praenominatus n.6*) explains at length, where he gives the example of an image, which is called true not by comparison of the represented thing to itself but by comparison of the image to the imagined thing.

A further instance: The object is said to be represented through a true cognition of the intellect. Therefore the object is formally true; and hence formal truth inheres in it. The antecedent is conceded in the response to the preceding objection. The consequence is proved: what is such through representation, the thing represented through it is formally such — as if an image of a lion is fierce, the lion is formally fierce. Therefore if cognition is true representatively, the thing represented through it is formally true through truth inhering in it. Granting the antecedent, I deny the consequence. To its proof I say: this holds in real representation — but not in intentional representation. The reason adduced is that in the former there are two objects, while in the latter only one — at which it is terminated, and which is called true extrinsically through formal truth remaining in the intellect — just as through vision the eyes are intrinsically and the wall extrinsically called seen, as Lychetus (*quol.praememor.*) aptly continues.

Objection V. Truth is in what the vocal enunciation designates. But a vocal enunciation designates the objective concept. Therefore formal truth is in the objective concept. The major seems evident: since just as voices are signs of things, so a vocal enunciation is the sign of an objective enunciation. The minor remains proved (*q.2.huius l.art.2.assert.3*). All the more because a mental enunciation is likewise a sign of an objective concept. Likewise, when the intellect renders a formal judgment, it does not reflect upon its own act but compares the known object to what it itself is on the part of the thing. Therefore formal truth is to be placed in the objective concept.

I reply that the argument concludes concerning truth of the thing and fundamental truth — not the truth of knowledge and formal truth, about which we are now discussing. Especially because voices signify not only things but also formal concepts — as Aristotle says at the beginning of the first *perih.*, and I proved extensively in the cited place. To what is added: I say that since truth is a relation, it designates indeed the object at which it is terminated and which is its

cause; nonetheless the enunciation primarily and formally contains truth. To the other that is added: I say that the truth of cognition can probably be taught to reside in the known thing, or in the objective concept, in roughly the same way as I said concerning the universal formally and the remaining second intentions in the proximately cited place. Vulpes agrees (*1.p.Tom. 2.disp.32.art. 4.*), and Faber does not entirely dissent (*disp.9. de pænitentia cap. 2. num 33.*) — though he displeases in this respect, that he holds the two positions set forth above to coincide, and that the objective and formal concept are not distinguished from each other; whereas it is clearly and plainly established, in the cited authors, what difference intervenes between their senses and their doctrine. But of this more fully elsewhere.

Article IV. Whether Truth Is Found in Every Operation of the Intellect?

Since there are three operations of the intellect, which I introduced and described in Book I, Question III, Article VI, logicians — especially the moderns — carefully inquire whether truth resides in each of these operations. That truth or falsity is to be located in the second operation is confessed by all with one voice; in the third, all likewise presuppose this as certain. The entire difficulty therefore rests in the first. For Cajetan (*1.p.q.16.art.2.*) and others cited by Suárez (*disp.8.Met.sect.3.*), the Coimbrans (*1.de Interp.q.5.art.2.*), and Fonseca (*4.Met.cap.2.q.6.sect.3.*), with whom Faber from our own school agrees (*disp.9.de pænit.cap.3.*), hold that truth in cognition is found only in the second operation of the intellect. The opposite is maintained by Scotus (*6.Met.q.2.*), Orbellis (*ibid.cap.3.*), and others cited by the aforementioned moderns, affirming that the first operation of the intellect is not without truth.

For the resolution of this question, the familiar distinction of truth into incomplex and complex must be recalled, as I introduced and explained in the present question, Article I. Incomplex truth is attributed to the first operation of the intellect, and complex truth to the second. This explanation seems sufficiently apt and adequate for understanding the difference between the two kinds of truth, as well as for discerning the proper truth that befits each operation, as remains evident from the descriptions of those operations given above. The objections that Suárez raises (*num.9.loci cit.*) against this mode of explanation are of no force. For Suárez says there that by the same reasoning one might say that truth resides in a special mode in simple cognition, since only incomplex truth is found in it. But this does not follow correctly, because simple cognition and incomplex cognition mean the same thing; not so simple cognition and incomplex truth, since the latter arises from the former as a property arises from the thing of which it is a property. Unless therefore an equivocation is made on the word "simple," Suárez's objection has no force; and given the equivocation, that term must be distinguished according to the rule about distinguishing equivocal terms, and so his argument is dissolved.

Nor does it help him to add there that from this distinction of truth it does not follow that truth is not more properly and formally adapted to the second operation than to the first — since in man there is composite truth, and in an angel there is simple truth; and likewise in man there is material truth and in an angel spiritual truth, and so on according to the fitness of things. This, I say, profits him nothing. For by the same reasoning composite or complex truth is formally adapted to both man and angel alike. For although the angel possesses a more excellent nature and intellect than man, nonetheless the intellect of each is compositive, divisive, and discursive; and their object and end are the same, as I showed at length with Scotus in the *Treatise on the Angels*. Wherefore the aforementioned division of truth is excellent, and is used by nearly all to resolve this question — notably Bonet (*5.Met.cap.2.*), Hurtado (*disp.9.de anima sect.2.*), and the Coimbrans (*art.3.*) from Aegidius (*quol.4.q.9.*). They add that through this distinction the two conflicting opinions may be reconciled. Why truth is attributed more to the second than to the first will be made plain from what follows. I add that the same Suárez (*disp.8.sect.8.num.37.*) seems to admit this.

The assertion is: in the first operation of the intellect, incomplex truth is found; in the second and third, complex truth. This assertion is threefold. The first part is Scotus's (*cit.in Met.*), which the same Doctor hints at (*q.1.prol.§.Antequam post M.*). It is proved first from Aristotle (*3.de anima cap.6.T.26.*), who likens the intellect to sense in the cognition of simples, since in the second book on the soul (*cap.6.*) he noted that sense with respect to its proper sensible is always true. And in (*9.Met.cap.7.T.21.22.*) he adduces that twofold genus of truth, one of which belongs to the first operation and the other to the second. This is why Fonseca (*sect.4.loci recens.*) marvels that philosophers of the opposing view think they are treading in Aristotle's footsteps. Second, truth is the conformity of a thing to the intellect; but in the first operation such conformity is found; therefore, truth is also found there. The major is evident from what was said above. The minor is proved: the intellect through the first operation apprehends simple and incomplex things as they are in reality — as when it apprehends gold, silver, and things of that kind as they exist in the nature of things. Third, where an entity is apprehended, there truth is found, if it is apprehended in the mode in which it exists; but in the first operation an entity is apprehended as it is in reality; therefore truth is also found there. The major is clear, because truth is a property of entity. The minor is at hand, because the first operation is described as the apprehension of simple terms. Wherefore incomplex truth is to be located in the first operation, just as its entity is incomplex. I add that in the divine intellect there is the most perfect truth, even though in it there is simple apprehension.

The second part is the common view of Aristotle (*in this work cap.1. and cap.1 of the Categories, and 6.Met.T.8. and elsewhere*), of Scotus (*ubi supra*), and of others, among whom is Vázquez (*disp.55.1.p.*). It is proved from the definition of truth, thus: truth is the adequation or conformity between a thing and the intellect;

but such conformity exists in the second operation of the intellect; therefore truth flourishes in that operation. The major is clear. The minor is at hand. For he is said to speak truly and to hold a true proposition when he knows things in the mode in which they exist in themselves — as when he knows and affirms that man is rational, and denies that man is irrational. That affirming something of another or denying something from another belongs to the second operation of the intellect, no one doubts. Second, truth is found where falsity also abides: but falsity inheres in the second operation; therefore truth does also. The major is supported by that pronouncement, "contraries have the same subject," which is drawn from the description of contraries. The minor is clear, because falsity is not opposed to the truth of the first operation, as after Bonet (*5.Met.cap.2.*) Orbellis (*6.Met.cap.3.*) asserts, explaining (*3.de anima T.26. and 9.Met.cap.12.*), in the testimony of the Coimbrans (*art.3.q.5.*): "the intellect concerning that which it is is always true." Third, complex truth or falsity occurs in the agreement of one thing with another or the disagreement of one from another, as is well known; but in the second operation there is effected the agreement or composition of one thing with another, or the discrepancy of one from another, as is clear from its definition. Therefore in the second operation complex truth or falsity is located.

The third part is presupposed as true by all, and was expressed by the Doctor (*quol.18.¶.Contrà 5.*). It is proved: first, where there is conformity, there is truth, as is evident through the argument from definition to the thing defined; but in the third operation there is conformity of the intellect with the thing understood, when a true conclusion is deduced from true premises; therefore in the same operation there is proper truth, distinct from the others. Second, in every proposition there is truth or falsity, for the reason given more than once — namely, that truth is attributed to the proposition as its property; but the third operation involves a proposition, since the syllogism (*q.IV.art.V.*) is constructed, as noted above, from three propositions, one of which is the conclusion, as is clear in the Epitome (*lib.3.q.1.art.1.*) and in the Logic (*lib.5.q.1.art.5.*). It is therefore perspicuous that truth befits the third operation of the intellect.

You will object first: Aristotle (*here cap.1. and 3.de anima cap.5. and 6.Met.cap.2.7.8.*) plainly asserts that truth lies solely in composition and falsity in division — which, it is established, is expressly the second operation. Therefore truth is not ascribed to the first operation. Scotus is added, who (*2.dist.6.q.1.¶.Respondeo.G.*) states these words: "It does not belong to the intellect of simple things to err or to speak truly, for these are conditions of the intellect composing and dividing." I respond that Aristotle and Scotus were speaking of complex truth, which is indeed proper to the second operation; but not of incomplex truth, which befits the first operation, as I declared in the present note. Now the custom of philosophers has grown so settled that whenever discourse is undertaken about truth absolutely, complex truth is understood. For as Fonseca (*4.Met.q.6.cap.2.sect.9.*) well observes, whatever complex statement is presented to

us — "man is an animal," "man is a stone" — we simply say the former is true and the latter false. The reason that can be given is that the composing and dividing intellect is the judge of truth and falsity. Hence truth and falsity simply are attributed to its composition and division.

You will object second: truth advances in words at the same pace as in concepts, because words are substituted in place of concepts; but in simple words there is no truth — for when one utters the simple word "animal," one states no truth. Therefore in the first operation, which is the cognition of simple terms, no truth exists. Confirmation: where there is no falsity, there truth is not found, because contraries have the same subject, as I indicated above; but in the first operation no falsity is found, as the Philosopher plainly teaches (*3.de anima T.21.*). Therefore truth is excluded from the first operation. Granting the major, I distinguish the minor: in simple words there is no complex truth, I concede; no incomplex truth, I deny — in nearly the same way as I said above, namely that truth is in the concept formally and in the word as in a sign. To the confirmation, I say that falsity is used in two ways: in one way for the ignorance of simple intelligence, or nescience, to which incomplex truth is opposed; in another way for error, or ignorance by way of disordered disposition, to which complex truth is opposed — and this is called falsity absolutely, which philosophers generally remove from the first operation and locate in the second, especially Bonet and Orbellis as cited. According to this distinction the argument is solved: for if the major is admitted, the minor is to be distinguished thus — in the first operation falsity taken in the second sense is not found, I concede; taken in the first sense, I deny. Or it could be said, and I would not find it inconvenient, if falsity is distinguished into incomplete and complex falsity. With this distinction in place the argument is easily dissolved: the major is conceded, and the minor is distinguished — of incomplex falsity, it is rejected; of complex falsity, it is accepted. I do not raise particular difficulties about falsity, because since falsity is opposed to truth, as Pelbart observes (*Tom.2.§.1.verbo falsitas*), and the discipline of opposites is the same, what has been said about truth can conveniently serve to dissolve what is said about falsity.

Article V. Whether Propositions of Eternal Truth Exist.

The Nominalists cited by Tataretus (*q.ult.praedicabilium dub.3.*) and certain theologians mentioned by Suárez (*disp.31.Met.sect.12.num.58.*) admit no proposition of sempiternal truth, asserting that of things that exist there are indeed true or false enunciations, but of things that do not exist there are neither true nor false ones. The common opinion of the remaining philosophers and theologians opposes them: Scotus (*1.dist.3.q.4.§.Ad q.igitur*), Lychetus (*ibid.*), Antonius Andreas — both there and in his commentary on the first Perihermeneias — Johannes de Magistris (*q.ult.praedicam.*), the first Meteorologics (*q.1.in fine dub.3.*), and others who teach that there are

propositions of eternal truth. For a more convenient grasp and fuller elucidation of this:

Note first, from Lychetus in his commentary, as Scotus touches upon (*in the passage cited*) and as I already indicated (*lib.1.q.2.art.2.not.4.*), that a thing can be considered in two ways: either in real being, or actual being, and the being of existence, which a thing possesses when it has been produced by its causes — as is clear from Genesis I concerning heaven and earth and the other things created by God, which still persevere in the actual being they received from God; or in objective and possible being, which is called intelligible, quidditative, and essential being, prescinding from all existence and from every circumstance of time, place, and the like — or, as the Doctor (*cit.5.*) speaks in particular of sincere truths, abstracting from everything accidentally conjoined with them. The first being is called temporal, because created things were made in time and participate in that temporal being, as the divine chronicler testifies with the words: "In the beginning God created heaven and earth." The second being is called eternal and perpetual, both because things were producible from eternity — that is, there is no repugnance on the part of things preventing them from having been produced from eternity and persisting in being throughout all time, as I showed abundantly in the Treatise on Creation (*disp.3.*) — and because creatures received known and understood being from God from eternity, as Scotus writes (*ubi supra*), which is diminished and qualified being; hence they are called eternal in a qualified sense and receive existence in a qualified sense, as after the Doctor, Lychetus and Vigerius note in that place. Now a property of a thing in its real and existing being presupposes the real existing being of that thing; and a property of objective being presupposes objective being, as Lychetus (*cit.*) carefully notes. Since, however, each thing possesses its own truth as its property, according to the twofold being assigned above, a twofold truth arises — namely, the truth of real being and the truth of objective being — or rather one truth that follows upon both objective being and real positive being, since what is objective and in objective potency is the same thing, and then what is in act and placed outside its causes.

Note second: that propositions of perpetual truth can be understood in two ways, as Scotus touches upon (*1.d.29.¶.Contra istud, infra B.*): either according to the existing being of the things about which they are formed, or according to the objective being of the things about which they are made. This difficulty is not ventilated with respect to being taken in the first way: for either things are generable and corruptible — and of these, since they do not always exist, there cannot be perpetual truth according to the being of their actual existence; or things are ingenerable and incorruptible — and of these, although there can be perpetual truth from the future direction, yet not from the past direction, since they were not created from eternity, and especially because God by his absolute power can destroy and annihilate them; and if their entities were to perish, their truths would likewise perish. And accordingly from this account one cannot say

that propositions formed about those very things are of eternal truth, in the sense in which philosophers commonly understand this. Nor does it help to say with some that the things themselves are not eternal, but that the connections of their essential and quidditative predicates are eternal. For if things are not eternal — as indeed they are not, as is clear from the Treatise on Creation (*disp.3.*) — neither do their connections enjoy eternity. For a connection is nothing other than a union, and a union is a relation, and a relation requires the extremes from which it arises; but the things and their essential predicates, which are the extremes of the relation, are not eternal, as those authors concede; therefore neither are the connections found between those predicates eternal. Furthermore, what emanates from something presupposes that from which it emanates, as is clear concerning an effect which presupposes the cause by which it is produced; but a union results from the approximated and united extremes, as I wrote concerning every extrinsically accruing relation (*1.3.q.de relatione.*). Since, therefore, the extremes of these connections are the essential predicates of things, which do not exist from eternity, it is perspicuously proved that the connections of those predicates are by no means eternal — on the basis of which connections enunciations might be deemed to be of sempiternal truth. The whole difficulty therefore revolves around being taken in the second way — namely, whether propositions about the objective being of things are necessary and of eternal truth. This seems to require that one say: propositions whose subjects include predicates essentially — as "man is an animal" — or identically — as "man is risible" — are of perpetual truth, whether their extremes exist or not; but other propositions, whose subjects include their predicates neither essentially nor identically, do not enjoy eternal truth. This is deduced from Scotus (*3.d.22.q.un. §.sed quid logicè, sub M. and 1.d.3.q.4. §.Quantum ad 3. and 1.quol.7. §.Ad argumenta, infra X.*), and is handed down by Bassolius (*ibid.*) and Sarnanus (*q.11.univers.pag.178.*).

Note third, from the Doctor (*in 1.alleg.ante §.De ente a.circa 5.*) and Bonet (*cit.not far from the beginning of cap.2.*): a sensible object actually existing in the external and internal senses — especially in the phantasy — produces a confused species representing the accidental whole, that is, the object clothed in quantity, color, and other material accidents. Since the species or phantasm represents the object confusedly and merely accidentally, many people perceive only the accidental being. But those who through the intellect abstract the essence and quiddity of an object from all its accidents, and survey its essential predicates and those that flow from the same essential principles, compose subjects with predicates and form enunciations of eternal truth. This is illustrated by the example of the proposition "every whole is greater than its part," which is first true not insofar as the whole is in wood or stone, but insofar as it prescind from everything to which it is accidentally connected. Hence the intellect that never understands totality except in an accidental concept — namely, in the totality of

stone or wood — never understands the pure and sincere truth of that principle, because it never understands the precise notion of the term by which it is true.

The assertion is: propositions of eternal truth exist. Scotus maintains this (*ubi supra*), and it was indicated by him in the Logic (*1.perih.q.8. §.Ad 2.q. and §.Ad aliam q.*). It is proved first from Aristotle, who (*1.post.T.21.*) shows that demonstration has a conclusion that is perpetually true, because it is from what is per se — that is, from what is necessary and eternal. The same he writes (*1.perih.c.6. and 9.Met.c.6.*), and from there Scotus (*ibid.pag.280 according to the Cauellus edition*). The same seems to be the view of Porphyry (*in Isag.c.6.*) in comparing the difference with the property. Second, from the holy Fathers: Augustine (*6.retract.c.4. and 2.de lib.arbitrio cap.5.*) states these words: "As long as they are future, 'heaven is' and 'earth is,' I do not know; but 'seven and three are ten' is true not only now but always, nor in any way were seven and three not ten, or will seven and three at any time not be ten." And he adds that nothing is more eternal than that two and three are five. And Anselm (*in Dialogo de veritate cap.14.*) expressly maintains the foregoing assertion. Third: those propositions are deemed to be of eternal truth which are about eternal and necessary objects; but some enunciations are of this kind; therefore such are of perpetual truth. The major is Aristotle's (*1.Post.cap.6.*), where he proves that demonstration is from what is necessary and always true. That demonstration is composed of three necessary propositions is certain and beyond doubt to all. Therefore the propositions of a demonstrative syllogism are of perpetual truth. The minor is at hand from what was just said about the propositions of demonstration, which are always true — as "every animal is sensitive," "every man is an animal," "therefore every man is sensitive." Fourth: what is perpetually connected by a bond is perpetually true; but the subjects and predicates of necessary propositions are joined by a perpetual bond; therefore the enunciations formed from these are of eternal truth. The major is the steadfast doctrine of the Philosopher (*2.Met.T.4.*), writing that "as a thing stands with respect to being, so it stands with respect to truth." The minor can be induced through individual necessary propositions; I content myself with one for now — namely "animal is sensitive" — where "animal," which is the subject, and "sensitive," which is the predicate, so stand to each other that neither can ever be separated from the other, which is a clear sign of the indissoluble bond between them. Fifth: where there is perpetual conformity of the intellect with the thing understood, there is perpetual truth; but in necessary propositions there is perpetual conformity of the intellect with the thing understood; therefore in these there is perpetual truth. The major is known from the foregoing description of truth. The minor shines forth — for when the intellect perceiving the proposition "every whole is greater than its part" always understands it exactly as it is in reality, given that the terms have been previously explained. Hence the Archbishop of Aachen (*1.d.39.*) adds that the truth of a proposition is received according to the truth of the thing, because the truth of the sign is taken from the condition of what is

signified. The same author adds that truth cannot be immutable in a proposition unless the signified is immutable in its being.

You will object first: the truth of a proposition is taken from the truth of the thing about which it is made, as is clear from the chapter on substance; but no truth of a thing is eternal, since nothing except God is eternal, as orthodox Faith teaches and as I made plain in the second note. Therefore no proposition is always true. I distinguish the major: the truth of a proposition is obtained about a thing in the being of its actual existence, I deny; in its objective and aptitudinal possible being, I concede. To the distinction of the major, the minor must be distinguished correspondingly. This distinction and solution is drawn from the Doctor (*6.Met.q.1. in the solution of the third principal argument*), who says that the conclusions of demonstration are to be understood of aptitude, not of actual existence. The same is handed down by Mauritius (*q.30.univers.fol.56.col.2.*), and I explained it sufficiently in the first and second notes.

You will object second: necessary enunciations are therefore said to be of eternal truth either because the things about which they are formed always exist, or because there is a necessary and indissoluble connection between their extremes. But neither can be said; therefore no enunciations are to be granted as being of eternal truth. I accept the major for the double cause assigned in it by way of distinction. The minor is shown — and indeed as regards its first part, this is already clear from the first objection: for only God has the attribute of always existing, as David attests (*Ps.101.*): "But you are the same, and your years shall not fail." And the Philosopher agrees in the recently cited passage: "When primary substances are corrupted, secondary substances are also corrupted." As regards the second part, it is shown: first, because a union presupposes existing extremes through which things are united with one another, as is clear from the union of matter and form and other natural and artificial things. The reason is that nothing can be united with anything unless it pre-exists. Second, because what are mutually united are united by some efficient cause; but no efficient cause is found that would always have united the extremes of such propositions. Therefore such propositions of eternal truth are to be denied. Granting the major, the minor is to be denied; and to its proof I say that things always exist — not indeed in the being of actual existence, but (*q.IV.art.VI.*) in objective being, and likewise their necessary connections are in said objective being, which suffices for propositions about them to be deemed of eternal truth, as Mauritius (*shortly after the cited passage*) and Vulpes (*Tom.1.disp.28.art.1.*) correctly note, and as Bassolius expressed excellently in these words: "This is not verified in act, as is the case in reality; but of potency, or aptitude, or non-repugnance — because the thing signified, for example by 'man,' whenever it is posited in reality, is not repugnant to being an animal; indeed, once posited, it is necessarily an animal — so that there is actual verification of aptitude, or actual potential verification."

You will object third: Scotus (*1.dist.3.q.4.Ad q.infra P.*) asserts that eternity is a condition of what exists; but things in objective being receive no existence, as is clear from what was said above; therefore propositions about things in such objective being enjoy no eternal truth. Confirmation: the same Doctor (*3.dist.22.q.un.§.Sed quid logicè M.*) denies that this proposition was true — "Christ during the three days was a man"; therefore neither is this true — "Adam is a man, with no man existing." The consequence is deduced because the reasoning seems to be the same for both, since Christ was truly a man through the humanity assumed by the Word, just as Adam existed. I respond that Scotus explains himself: for he is speaking there of things as they have intelligible being, or known being, as Tataretus (*praecit.*) notes — to which being, since it is diminished and qualified, existence and eternity also belong in a qualified sense, just as to being simply and actually, divine existence and eternity belong simply. To the confirmation, the same Doctor (*ibid.*) meets the objection by adducing a difference between the falsity of the one and the truth of the other. For in the proposition "Christ is a man," one of the extremes — namely "Christ" — does not have a single concept, as Saint John Damascene testifies according to the Doctor (*cit.*): "Christ is a name signifying two natures, human and divine," and thus designates two concepts, namely God and man; but in the proposition "Adam is a man" it denotes only one concept. Wherefore, since for the truth of a proposition it is required that the subject present only one concept, that proposition whose subject includes multiple concepts is false, while that whose subject signifies a single concept is true. See Lychetus (*cit.*).

Article VI. Whether a True Enunciation Can Be Changed into a False One.

Some, such as Hurtado (*disp.9.de anima sect.4.*) and Arriaga (*disp...2.de anima*), deny that a true proposition can be transferred into a false one, or conversely a false one into a true one, following certain authors whom Bonet (*5.Met.c.2.§.Amplius autem habet dubitationem*) favors. But the common position is that of Scotus (*4.d.8.q.2.§.Aliter sub V.*), the Coimbrans and Toletus (*in fine comment.c.de Substantia*), and also Suárez (*disp.8.Met.sect.2.1.q.*) and others, who affirm that an enunciation can be changed from true to false and conversely.

Note first: all confess that necessary propositions, which I treated in the preceding article, undergo no change of truth or falsity; but it is called into question whether contingent propositions, signifying a certain or uncertain part of time, can pass from true to false.

Note second: that something can change in two ways — through itself and by reason of itself; or accidentally and by reason of another. In the first way an enunciation does not admit change; because since it is formally a being of reason, a second intention, and a relation of reason, as is clear from what was said, there can be no per se motion toward it, according to Aristotle's pronouncement that there is no per se motion toward a relation, as is clear from

the fifth book of the Physics. But an enunciation can indeed change in the second way — namely, by reason of the change of the object about which it is made. Just as, when a per se change occurs in what is signified, there occurs an accidental change in the name; for when the terminus is destroyed, the relation to the terminus is also destroyed. The conformity, for example, of this proposition "Peter is writing" — which is its truth — has the writing of Peter as its term, and when Peter is not writing, that conformity ceases to be. Therefore, a per se change having first occurred in Peter's writing, an accidental change is effected in the aforementioned enunciation. Moreover, recall from the Doctor (*cit.*) that a proposition is by nature prior to truth and falsity, and the Doctor adds perhaps also in the property of time; and accordingly the proposition in its formal and quidditative concept does not include truth and falsity but prescinds from them, just as a subject abstracts from every accident received in it, and a foundation from every relation founded in it.

The assertion is: contingent propositions — that is, those formed about contingent objects, signifying a certain or uncertain difference of time — when their objects are changed, can pass from true to false and conversely. The Doctor defends this (*praecit.*) and indicates it (*1.dist.3.q.4. §.De tertiis and §.De sexto ante Y.*). It is proved first from Aristotle (*cap.de substantia and 1.Perih.c.8. and 9.Met.cap.22.*), who plainly teaches it. Second, formal truth depends on fundamental truth, just as cognition depends on the thing of which it is the cognition; but when the object changes, the fundamental truth changes, just as a property changes when its subject changes; therefore a proposition can be transferred from true to false according to the change of the subject about which it is made. Third, a subject changes through the approach or withdrawal of the accidents that are received in it — as is clear with a wall, which changes through the coming or going of whiteness or blackness — and likewise the cognition that is had of it; therefore through the change of the subject about which a proposition is enunciated, there occurs in it a change of its truth into falsity or conversely falsity into truth. Add that if contingent propositions were immutable, there would be no difference between necessary and contingent propositions, since both would be immune from change — which is plainly false. All the more because when the terminus changes, the relation changes; and since truth, as stated, is a relation, it is evidently deduced that the aforementioned propositions undergo change.

You will object first: the proper fourth-mode attribute of substance is to admit contraries, as Aristotle teaches (*c.praalleg.*); but if an enunciation could pass from true to false, the reception of contraries — namely truth and falsity — would be attributed to it as well, as the same Philosopher argues (*ibid.*). Therefore such a property does not seem to be ascribable to a proposition. I respond by distinguishing the major: substance alone admits contraries as the ultimate and primary subject, I concede; as a non-primary mediating subject, I deny. For a surface, which is a quantity as a non-primary and immediate subject, receives

whiteness or blackness or other contraries, as experience makes clear; thus Aristotle (*praecit.*) can be explained in this way. Or say that substance is the subject of contraries per se and by reason of itself, while a proposition is receptive of contraries accidentally and by reason of another — that is, of the object about which it is said — as I made plain in the second note; especially because truth or falsity is not formally placed among contraries but among relations, as was decided in Article II of this question.

You will object second: a property of a thing, according to Scotus (*2.d.16.q.un.*), cannot be separated from the thing of which it is a property, since between them there is only a formal distinction, which holds of those things that are inseparable from each other; but truth or falsity is the property of an enunciation; therefore if a proposition could pass from true to false, it would be found without its property — that is, without truth or falsity — which seems absurd. Granting the major, regarding the minor I say that truth or falsity is a disjunctive property of the proposition, and hence one or the other always inheres in it — just as contingency or necessity is a disjunctive property of being according to Scotus (*1.dist.39.¶.Vifo*) and Lychetus (*ibid.¶.Quantum ad 1.*), and every being is either necessary or contingent, though no being is both necessary and contingent simultaneously. Or it can be said that the aforementioned is not a property of the enunciation in the fourth mode, as the argument proves, and as the Doctor hints (*4.dist.8.q.2.ante X.*), when inquiring what kind of proposition a converted proposition is — whether true or false — he answers that it is then neither, and is prior naturally and perhaps also in time to its truth. You will object third: what signifies that something is or will be according to some certain or uncertain difference of time cannot be changed; but propositions about a contingent object signify that something is or will be at some determined or indefinite time interval. Therefore propositions of this kind cannot undergo the aforementioned change. The major is proved, because according to the common maxim of philosophers, "everything that is, when it is, must necessarily be"; therefore a proposition about the present is so true that it cannot be false; likewise, what is future as future is necessarily future; therefore a proposition about the future cannot be altered either; and about a proposition about the past no one is in doubt, because the past is necessary. Hence the Philosopher (*6.Eth.cap.2.*) writes that "God alone is deprived of this: to make undone what has been done." The minor can be induced through some propositions of a certain moment of time — as "Peter is writing" and "Peter will read tomorrow morning in instant A or B for half an hour" — or of uncertain time and instant, as "Francis at the third afternoon hour will hear a lecture, without the particular moment of that hour being observed when he will apply himself to the lecture." I deny the major. To its proof I distinguish: in the composite sense and the necessity of the consequence, I concede; in the divided sense and the necessity of the consequent, I deny. This distinction is drawn from Scotus (*1.dist.40.q.un.¶.Ad istam q.B. and dist.39.¶.Ad 1.Z.*). In this way nearly

everything that opponents urge is solved — and especially about future contingents with respect to divine foreknowledge, about which Scotus (*in the proximate dist.*) discourses at length over five questions.

You will object fourth: when the object is changed, its cognition is changed; therefore it is not the same proposition if the object about which it is enunciated changes. The antecedent is clear, because the object or species, which is its deputy, concurs in generating knowledge; therefore when the same object is varied, its cognition is also varied. I deny the antecedent. To its proof I distinguish: per se, I deny; accidentally, I concede — as is clear from the second note. Thus at the change of the object, the same cognition remains according to its substance, though not according to its accidents — that is, according to truth or falsity.

Article VII. Whether Enunciations about a Conjoined Extreme Can Be Necessary.

I read in the present article two conflicting opinions of great men: the first affirms that enunciations about a conjoined extreme are necessary and essential — such as Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure, Richard, and Thomas (*3.dist.7.q.1.art.1.*) and others cited by the Coimbrans (*q.6.c.4.art.6.*). The other denies that the aforementioned propositions are necessary and essential — which is maintained by Scotus (*3.dist.11.q.3.§.Hic sunt B. and more clearly dist.22.q.1.§.Sed quid logicè*), Bassolius, Mair (*ibid.*), and from the Thomistic school Capreolus (*same dist.*) and Soncinas (*9.Met.q.5.*), with whom the Nominalists with Ockham and many others agree.

Note first: the title of the present article can be understood in two ways — either of propositions that receive subjects connected with two accidentally united items, as "the black horse is capable of neighing" and "the russet lion is capable of roaring"; or of enunciations that have predicates joined with two accidentally conjoined items, as "Peter is a large man" and "Paul is a small man." About the latter there is scarcely any difficulty, since all hold those propositions to be contingent, because those predicates are connected contingently with such subjects. The whole dispute among logicians concerns the former — whether propositions taken in this way are necessary or contingent.

Note second, from the Report (*3.d.22.§.Sed quid*): for a proposition to be true of something, it must first be true in itself, as is clear from (*5.Met.T.29.34. and c.de falso*), where it is held that a false proposition is true of nothing — as this proposition is false and impossible: "man is irrational," because irrationality is the opposite differentia by which a brute is constituted in the being of a brute and distinguished from man, who is constituted in his being by rationality which is opposite to irrationality, and by the same rationality is distinguished from the brute and from everything that is not man. A proposition can be false in two ways: either when the things of which it is enunciated involve repugnance

with each other — as is clear in the proposition "man is irrational" just cited; or when the things of which it is made are not actually conjoined, though they can exist conjoined — as "Peter is writing," if Peter is not actually writing, the proposition is false, though it can be true. Scotus adds there that if no man were white, "a white man is a man" would be false, though it could be true. That it is false is clear; for it is inferred: "a white man is a man; therefore man is a white man"; if therefore "a white man is a man," then "man is white"; but with no man existing white, "man is white" is false, because it can be said of none in the a-priori sense. Wherefore of a proposition false in itself nothing is truly said. But a proposition is necessarily true when the predicate belongs to the essence of the subject — as "man is rational" — or is its property — as "man is risible" — or is really identified with it — as "risible is rational." It is contingently true when the predicate is actually conjoined with the subject, though it can exist without it — as "man is white" when whiteness actually exists in man.

Note third, from the Doctor (*nuper alleg.*) and Pelbart (*Tom.3.verbo communicatio idiomatum §.8.*): a predicate respecting a conjoined subject can be attributed to it either by reason of the whole subject — as "a rational animal is risible," where "risible" is said not of the animal alone (for then it would be predicated of a brute), nor of the rational alone (for then a rational soul separated from the body would be risible), but is accommodated to the whole subject — namely "rational animal"; or by reason of a part — as "a white wall disperses sight," where "to disperse" is attributed to the wall by reason of the whiteness inhering in it alone. Furthermore, observe that Scotus (*d.22.loci cit.*) inclines strongly to the view that a per se proposition requires a subject that is per se one in order that something be predicated per se of it. The reason is that of what is not per se one, nothing can be predicated per se. In this way "a white man is a man" is not per se, because the subject of this proposition includes two concepts — namely the concept of humanity and the concept of whiteness. Likewise, according to Scotus, "Christ is a man" is not per se, because Christ includes two concepts; for Christ is the same as the Word-man. Since, therefore, propositions about a conjoined subject are not per se for the reason assigned above, it is perspicuously inferred that they are neither essential nor necessary.

The assertion is: enunciations about a conjoined subject are contingent. So Scotus (*in the passages narrated above and 1.d.39.ante S.Sed contra sub H.*). It is proved first from Aristotle (*7.Met.cit. by the Doctor in the Report already cited §.Ad rationes principales*), where it is read: "What the being of a white man is, is not identical with a white man" — because if "white man" were essentially identical with "white man," a "white man" would be essentially identical with "man," which is false, since whiteness does not enter the essence of man. The sequence is clear from the second and third notes. Otherwise no difference would be seen between a per se composite and an accidental composite. Second, a necessary and essential proposition does not involve a contingent copula or union; but in the aforementioned propositions there is a contingent union on the part of the

conjoined subject; therefore they are contingent. The major is known from the preceding article and is supported by that dialectical canon handed down by me in the Epitome (*1.2.q.3.art.2.*): for the falsity of a copulative enunciation it suffices if either of its parts is false. The minor is clear, because whiteness accidentally and contingently adheres in man, and the conjoined subject "white man" is contingent; and "a white man is a man" is equivalent to a copulative — that is, "man is white and is a man." Third, in order that something be essentially and necessarily predicated of some subject, it is required that the formal account of the subject first be essential, necessary, and true for it, as I made plain in the second note; therefore in order that the predicate of an enunciation about a conjoined subject be predicated of that very subject, the account of such a predicate must be included essentially and necessarily in that subject; but the account of the predicate is not essentially and necessarily included in the conjoined subject — as in the cited proposition "a white man is rational" is clear. For "rational" is not necessarily and essentially included in whiteness, because it is accidental for whiteness to be in man, by which man is accidentally and contingently denominated white. And even if "rational" is essential to man, it is nonetheless accidental to him to be white, by reason of which the proposition is called contingent and accidental. Furthermore, the proposition whose subject's parts involve repugnance and impossibility toward each other is false and impossible — as "an irrational man is risible"; and the proposition whose subject's parts are necessarily conjoined is necessary — as "a risible man is rational"; therefore the proposition whose subject's parts are accidentally and contingently connected is accidental and contingent. And thus the Carthusian (*3.d.22.q.2.*) unjustly thinks that Scotus's view is supported by neither authority nor reason.

You will object second, from Aristotle (*7.Met.c.10.T.33.*): a bronze statue is an accidental composite, and it is added there that bronze belongs to the account of that very statue; therefore according to Aristotle a proposition about a subject composed of two accidentally conjoined items is essential. Confirmation I: the same Aristotle places propositions of this kind among simple and categorical enunciations (*1.2.perih.*). Confirmation II: it is doubted by no one that they are necessary. Confirmation III, from (*6.Top.c.1.locus 25.*): accidental being is essentially defined. Therefore nothing prevents propositions composed from accidental being, such as the aforementioned enunciations, from being necessary and essential. I respond that Aristotle in that passage by no means intends that bronze is of the intrinsic account of the statue, because he expressly teaches that a bronze statue is an accidental being, and accordingly bronze is its accidental account; but given that the statue is made of bronze, the proposition "the statue is of bronze" is true — just as, given that man is white, "man is white" is true — though it is accidental and contingent, as the former is. And Aristotle expressed this in the same work cited by me to prove the foregoing assertion, saying: "Whatever the being of a white man is, is not identical with a white man."

To Confirmation I: I say these propositions are simple on the part of the predicate, not on the part of the subject — thus Aristotle is explained. To Confirmation II: I say that he speaks there of definition taken broadly, which coincides with notification or description; for Orbellis (*7.Met.c.2.*) rightly observes that accidental being has no quiddity, since it is an aggregate of things of diverse genera, and therefore it cannot enjoy an essential and quidditative definition.

You will object second: nothing is more essential to any whole than the parts from which it is composed; but "white man" is some whole composed from humanity and whiteness as its parts. Therefore this proposition is essential: "a white man is a man." I respond that the major holds in a whole and its essential parts, but not in an accidental whole and accidental parts — which are integral natures, each perfect in its own genus, so that one is joined to the other accidentally, and the proposition formed from them is accidental. Furthermore, even if the said proposition is true by reason of man, it is not true by reason of white, as the Doctor asserts (*in Rep.cit. §.Ad 1.*).

You will object third: when something absolute can neither exist nor be understood without another, it necessarily and essentially includes that other, as is self-evident; but "white man" can neither exist nor be understood without whiteness; therefore whiteness is necessarily and essentially included in it, and accordingly when it is said "a white man is a man," it is a necessary enunciation. I respond that the major can have two senses: if it is understood absolutely, so that it includes repugnance for the one to exist without the other, it is conceded; if it is understood conditionally, it is denied. To the distinction of the major, the minor must be distinguished correspondingly: absolutely it is conceded; conditionally it is denied. For man can exist without whiteness and whiteness without man absolutely; but once whiteness is posited in him as such, the white man necessarily is white with the necessity of a condition, and this necessity is compatible with contingency — just as when it is said "Peter sits," insofar as he sits, he necessarily sits, because according to Scotus (*1.d.30. §.sed contra*), after Aristotle (*1.perih.c.ult.*): "everything that is, when it is, must be"; but simply Peter sits contingently, so that he can not sit, since the act of sitting inheres in him accidentally and contingently.

You will say, with the Coimbrans mentioned above, that such an enunciation can be considered in two ways: either in the being of existence, and thus it is a contingent and accidental proposition; or in objective and possible being, and in this way it is necessary and essential. Against this: the necessity and truth of a proposition is taken from the necessity and truth of the things about which it is enunciated, as is clear from the preceding article, where I was saying with Aristotle that "from the fact that a thing is or is not, a proposition is true or false"; but "white man," unless he exists, has no necessity or truth — because between these things signified by these terms there is no necessary nexus; for

man is a substance and whiteness is an accident that really differs from the substance, as is established in the Metaphysics in the question on accident; therefore there is neither necessity nor truth in objective being. For this reason a proposition is true in objective being only because it is about things that are essential or at least inseparable; but to be a man and to be white are neither essential nor indissoluble, since they are accidentally conjoined. Therefore such enunciations are contingent. This seems to be scented by the Coimbrans (*c.8.q.un.a.2. in the solution of the first and a.5. in the response to the first of the second objection, and near the end of that article in the fourth rejoinder*).

You will object fourth: an identical proposition is necessary and essential; but a proposition about a subject composed of two accidentally united items is identical; therefore it is necessary and essential. If the major is conceded, the minor is to be denied. For as the Doctor writes (*cit. §.Ad 1.principale*), with no man existing, "a white man is a man" is a false proposition, because the account of the subject is in itself false — namely "white man"; for it is inferred by conversion: "a white man is a man; therefore man is a white man," and further "man is a white man; therefore man is a man and thus," as in Article I (*ad ultimum*), "with no man existing, this is true: some man exists" — which no logician accepts.

Article VIII. Whether, of Two Singular Contradictory Propositions about a Future Contingent, One Is Determinately True and the Other Determinately False.

Approaching this most arduous and obscure difficulty, I find two extreme and diametrically opposed positions. The former is defended by the most eminent Cardinal Archbishop of Aachen (*1.d.38.art.3.prop.1.*), the Cordovan (*q.1.questionary q.55.dub.2.*), Catherinus (*opusc.de veritate enuntiationum*), and Raconius (*2.p.de enuntiatione sect.4.q.1.prop.1.*), who say that of two singular contradictory enunciations about a future contingent, neither is determinately true or false. These are favored by Fonseca (*4.Met. in the explanation of c.7.*), Bonet (*5.Met.c.2.*), and others cited by recent authors. The latter position is embraced by the Subtle Doctor (*1.d.39.§.Viso N. and §.Ad argumenta principalia and in Rep.eadem d.q.2. and Quol.14.§.Hic 5.*), T. Gadius (*ibid.fol.149.col.4.*), Tataretus (*1.perih.q.ult.*), Alexander of Hales (*1.p.q.15.m.7.*), Bonaventure (*1.d.38.q.1.art.3.*), Ockham (*q.1.Ad principale*), Richard (*q.5.art.1.*), Trombeta (*Opusc.de praescientia contingentium*), and many moderns — teaching that of two singular contradictory propositions about a future contingent, one is determinately true and the other determinately false.

Note first, from Scotus (*1.d.3.q.4.§.De tertiis G. and 2.d.7.q.un.§.contra d.*) and Mair (*1.Post.fol.61.§.Quarto arguitur*): there is a twofold agent — natural and free. A natural agent is one that, once all requisites for acting are in place, cannot not act — as fire, properly approximated to combustible material and unimpeded, cannot not burn that combustible material near it. A free agent, however, given all that is necessary for acting, so dominates its own act and mode of acting that

it is in its power to act or not to act — likewise to act intensely or remissly, that is, with greater or lesser effort. Thus acts the will, which is mistress of its own acts, free toward opposite acts, objects, and effects, as Scotus subtly pursues (*1.d.39.¶.Quantum ad 1.E.*). A contingent in the twofold sense, which is now under discussion, regards a free cause; and what is necessary or natural regards a necessary or natural cause. Thus since a free cause is indifferent and undetermined to either part, and can decline toward either one, determining itself to one part, it elicits its act freely and contingently and through it tends freely to its object, and likewise freely produces the effect it wills to produce. It stands, moreover, that the will determines itself to one thing while being able to will the opposite of it in the same instant — and in this the liberty chiefly shines forth; for when, for example, someone is writing, he has the power of not writing at the same time and moment in which he is writing. See what I said in the Physics (*l.de causis q.3.*), in the Treatise on the Knowledge of God (*disp.3.*), and in the Treatise on the Will of God (*disp.3.*).

Note second, from the same Doctor (*proxime alleg.¶.Ad argumenta principalia P.*): there is a difference between the determinate truth of enunciations about the past and present, and the determinate truth of enunciations about the future. For from (*4.d.45.q.3.¶.Circa istam sub B.*), the past has more of truth than the future, because the truth of future things is contingent while the truth of past things is necessary, as Aristotle testifies (*6.Eth.c.2.*). And from (*2.d.5.q.2.¶.Respondeo primo C.*), a proposition about the present is more determined than an enunciation about the future; hence the Philosopher (*1.perih.c.7.*) admits determinate truth in propositions about the present but not in propositions about the future. And in the Report (*1.d.38.q.2.¶.Ad 1.principale*): "The truth in future things is not like the truth in past and present things, because what is present or past is so determined that its opposite is not in the power of the agent." For that truth is certain and determinate in past and present things, such that falsity cannot underlie it — as "Christ was born." The reason is that what has once been posited outside its causes is no longer in the power of the agent to posit or not posit. It is indeed true that a free cause is by nature prior to its effect, and as such can produce its effect or not produce it; but once the effect is posited in being and produced, it cannot have not produced it. But in enunciations about the future, there is such determinate truth on one side that falsity can be there, because it is in the power of the cause, at that instant, to posit and effect the opposite; and this indifference and indetermination of the free cause is sufficient for deliberating and negotiating. Wherefore Trombeta and Tataretus, with the other named Scotists, rightly note that a proposition about the future can be said to be determinately true in two ways — namely, with determination of inherence and with determination of possibility. A proposition about the future is determinately true with determination of inherence that designates the thing as going to be as it is future; and a proposition is determinately true with determination of possibility that denotes

a thing as going to be in such a way that its opposite cannot occur — such is not a proposition about a future contingent, because the latter is so true that it can be false at the very instant at which it is true. Hence determination of possibility is adapted only to necessary and essential propositions. So that this may be perceived more distinctly and profoundly, and the arguments of opponents may be more easily dissolved:

Note third, from the same authors cited above: the indetermination of a free agent is twofold, corresponding to a twofold determination — namely, indetermination of inherence and indetermination of possibility, each of which is likewise doubled on the part of the cause and the effect. Indetermination of inherence on the part of the cause is that by which the cause is undetermined to acting or not acting; indetermination of possibility is that by which the cause is undetermined to being able to act or not being able to act. Indetermination of inherence on the part of the effect is that by which the effect is undetermined to being produced or not produced; while indetermination of possibility on the part of the effect is that by which the effect is undetermined to being capable of being produced. One of the aforementioned indeterminations and determinations is called "of inherence" because the extremes are of inherence, and the other is called "of possibility" because the extremes are of possibility. Just as indetermination can arise from two sources — namely from the indetermination of the cause and of the effect — so too determination can come from a twofold source, from the part of the cause and from the part of the effect. It is quite compatible, moreover, that indetermination of possibility coexist with determination of inherence, as I noted at the end of the second note.

Note fourth: something occurs necessarily in two ways — either by simple and absolute necessity, or the necessity of the consequent, by which it cannot occur otherwise: thus stars necessarily shine, the moon shines, and the sun illuminates; or by qualified necessity and by supposition, or the necessity of the consequence, by which something is, but can nonetheless be otherwise; but supposing that it is, it is necessary with this necessity of the consequence — as Peter sitting can not sit, but given the hypothesis that he is sitting, he necessarily sits with necessity by supposition. The first necessity destroys freedom and the contingency of things; the second, however, is quite compatible with freedom and the contingent occurrence of things. Thus future contingents stand with the immutability and infallibility of divine knowledge, as I pursued at length in the Treatise on the Knowledge of God (*disp. 3. q. 5.*). For God foreknows future contingents in the mode in which they are future; since they are contingently future, because they can occur otherwise, he foreknows them accordingly; and since they will be as he foreknows, and he foreknows as they will be, his knowledge is therefore called infallible and immutable, and they occur necessarily with the necessity of the consequence — as Scotus states (*cit. §. sed contra I. and §. Ad 1. pro 3. opinione Z. and quol. 16. §. De primo sub H.*) — which does

not destroy the contingency and freedom of the free cause. Wherefore, although God foresees all future contingents, according to that of Hebrews IV: "all things are naked and open to his eyes," nevertheless his prevision imposes no force on free will, because it is extrinsic to it; but rather the excellence and eminence of God's knowledge is indicated, which scrutinizes all things whatever they be, even the depths of the abyss. This is illustrated by an example: just as a most skilled physician who foresees that a patient sick with a malignant fever will die is not the cause of his death and imposes no force on him, so God foreseeing, for example, that the Antichrist will die finally in mortal sin — his foreknowledge is not the cause of the latter's eternal death; but his final mortal sin is the cause, just as the physician's prognosis does not compel the feverish man to depart this life, but the malignant fever brings death to him.

The assertion is: of two singular contradictory enunciations about a future contingent, one is determinately true and the other determinately false. So Scotus (*in the places previously mentioned*), with whom the greater part of philosophers and theologians agree. It is proved first: the propositions of the Prophets and the articles of orthodox Faith are so true that falsity cannot underlie them; but propositions of this kind are about a future contingent; therefore of a future contingent there is given determinate truth or falsity. The major is the chief foundation of the Christian Religion. The minor is induced through certain propositions, especially the following. Isaiah VII: "Behold, a virgin will conceive and bear a son." When this was uttered by Isaiah, it was about a future contingent determinately true, such that its opposite — "Behold, a virgin will not conceive" — was determinately false. Likewise those of Christ the Lord, Matthew XXVI: "Before the cock crows, you will deny me three times." And *ibid.*: "He who dips his hand with me in the dish, he will betray me." Luke XIX: the future destruction of the city of Jerusalem. Matthew XXIV: the resurrection of the flesh and the future day of judgment. Such and similar propositions are about a future contingent, determinately true, and their opposites are determinately false. All the more so because if the foregoing propositions were not determinately true, there would be no difference between true prophets and false prophets, since none of them would be a liar or a truth-teller; but in sacred scripture false prophets are convicted and true prophets are elevated with praises, as Ezekiel XIII reads of the false prophets: "They see vanity and divine lies saying: the Lord says — when the Lord has not sent them — and they have persevered in confirming the word." Deuteronomy XVIII: "This you will have as a sign: that the prophet who predicted in the name of the Lord, and it did not happen." And Matthew XXIV: "If therefore they say to you: behold he is in the desert, do not go out; behold he is in the inner rooms, do not believe." Therefore singular contradictory enunciations about a future contingent are determinately true or determinately false. Second, all things known by God are determinately true: for knowledge is of true things, from the first Posterior Analytics (*c.24.T.44.*). But future contingents are known by God,

according to Psalm CXXXVIII: "You have understood all my thoughts from afar, and you have foreseen all my ways." Wisdom VIII: "Who knows past things and estimates future things, knows the subtleties of speeches, the solutions of arguments," etc. Ecclesiasticus XXIII: "Before they were created all things were known, and after they were made he looks back on all things." Citing and weighing this passage, Saint Augustine (*15.Trin.cap.13.*) says: "God knows what is necessary for us before we ask him, nor did he come to know these things from any point in time, but all future temporal things — before the ages in which we were going to ask him for something and when, and those whom he was going to hear or not hear — he foreknew without beginning beforehand." Third, that proposition is true which conforms to its object — that is, which enunciates that to be which is, and that will be which will be; and conversely that is a false proposition which enunciates that to be which is not, and that will be which will not be. But one of the singular contradictory propositions about a future contingent enunciates that will be which will be, if it is affirmative; or that will not be which will not be, if it is negative. Therefore of the aforementioned propositions one is determinately true and the other determinately false. The major is Aristotle's (*1.Perih.cap.4.*) and can be corroborated by the definition of truth, which is the conformity of the intellect with the object. The minor is proved: this proposition which I stated three days ago is determinately true — "I will be writing the day after tomorrow" — because it enunciated that which now is, since I am truly now writing. All the more so because the truth or falsity of a proposition is not taken from the actual existence of the thing; otherwise a proposition about the past would not be true, since it is not about an existing object; nor would God truly and determinately know things unless they existed — which conflicts with the passages of Scripture cited in the first argument. And rightly almost all theologians remove from consideration the eternal coexistence of things with God's eternity, which Cajetan (*1.part.q.14.art.13.*), according to the testimony of Lychetus, and a few others try to introduce into the schools. Fourth: where there is a true contradiction, there is no middle term, as Aristotle (*4.Met.cap.5.T.27.*) and Scotus (*1.dist.2.q.2.ante §.ostenso sub Y.*) hold, and I made plain in the preceding book (*q.9.art.7.*). But between singular propositions about a future contingent there is a true contradiction — as "Francis will write or will not write." Therefore just as by reason of the contradiction, in a proposition about the present there is determinate truth or falsity — "Peter sits or Peter does not sit" — and in a proposition about the past — "Peter wrote or Peter did not write" — so the same is to be affirmed for propositions about future contingents. Finally, between "is" and "is not" no middle intervenes according to the first principle — "whatever is, either is or is not"; therefore between "will be" and "will not be" no middle is interposed.

You will object first: a future contingent is by its very nature indifferent and undetermined to being or not being; therefore an enunciation formed about a future contingent is not determinately true or false. The consequence holds

because the truth of a proposition presupposes the truth of the thing, as Aristotle writes (*at the end of the chapter on substance and 10.Met.T.5.*). The antecedent is easy to prove — both from the description of a future contingent, and also from its cause, which is undetermined to producing it or not producing it. Since therefore a future contingent is not determined in itself, because it does not yet exist, nor in its cause, because it has not yet determined itself and does not determine itself to acting, it is clearly deduced that of it there is no certain knowledge and truth. I respond by distinguishing the antecedent: a future contingent is undetermined with the indetermination of possibility, I concede; it is undetermined with the indetermination of inherence, I deny. This distinction needs no further explanation beyond what I provided in the third note.

You will object second: as a thing stands with respect to entity, so it stands with respect to truth, from (*2.Met.cap.1.T.4.*) and Scotus (*ibid. in the exposition of the text*); but a future contingent has no entity, since it has not yet been produced by its cause but is only future, that is, about to be produced by it. Therefore a future contingent receives no determinate truth. Granting the major, the minor is to be distinguished: in the being of actual existence, I concede; in objective being, I deny. Thus responds the enlightened Doctor Francis of Meyronnes, and before him the Subtle Doctor (*q.8. primi Perih.§.Ad aliam q.vers.Ad 3.*), where he interprets the maxim of Aristotle cited in the major — namely, "as a thing stands with respect to being, so with respect to truth" — saying: "for the truth of such a proposition there must be in the thing a union of the kind that is signified in speech. But the nature signified by what Caesar is, is a being through the intellect; otherwise the intellect would not make a composition about it; and so there is a composition of what exists in the intellect with itself, and such composition suffices for truth where the thing does not exist — as is clear in these: 'a chimera is a chimera,' 'a non-being is a non-being.'" Especially because God certainly foreknows future contingents in objective being from the determination of his will, as Scotus (*1.dist.39.§.Vifo O.*), Lychetus, Vigerius, and others (*ibid.*) hand down.

You will object third: if future contingents were determinately true or false, they would be known by some intellect; but they are known by no intellect; therefore they are not determinately true. The major is Scotus (*4.dist.10.q.8.ante §.Ad argumenta sub N.*), saying that what has determinate truth has determinate knowability in any intellect surveying the whole of being. The minor is shown: for it is not known by the created intellect, which cannot fathom what free will is going to do or not do, except perhaps conjecturally, as the Doctor touches upon (*4.dist.45.q.3.§.Circa istam ante B.*). Nor by the uncreated intellect: Isaiah XXVIII — God predicted the death of Hezekiah and in Jonah III the ruin of Nineveh, and yet these did not come to pass; therefore he did not know them determinately. Confirmation: if God foreknew these things with certainty, he would have foreknown them from eternity, since his knowledge is eternal, immutable, and

incapable of increase; but what is from eternity is necessary and infallible, and accordingly there would be no future contingent — as the Stoics believed. Granting the major and the first part of the minor — namely that a created intellect cannot determinately know a future contingent while it is in its cause, as the Doctor notes (*in 4.cit.*) — if the created intellect does not know this, it is to be attributed to its weakness and infirmity; the second part of the minor is to be denied. To its proof I say that that manner of speaking was minatory or conditional — that is, those things were going to occur unless they amended themselves through penitence; but since they did penance, and he by weeping toward the wall (*2 Kings XX*) and these by fasting and humbling themselves at the preaching of Jonah, as Christ the Lord testifies (*Matt.XII*), they obtained pardon from God, and none of those things that had been foretold to them occurred — just as in Acts VIII, Simon Magus was beseeching the Apostles that through their prayers none of those things they themselves had said would come upon him. To the confirmation I say that this only proves that a future contingent related to divine foreknowledge is necessary with the necessity of the consequence, which is quite compatible with the contingency of things and free will; but not with the necessity of the consequent, which removes created freedom and abolishes contingent effects, as I observed in the fourth note.

You will object fourth: if there were determinate truth about a future contingent, then since it can not be and its opposite can occur — as its name and its description (*1.Prior.cap.4.*) indicate — there could be determinate falsity underlying it; but "from a possible posited in being, no impossible follows." Therefore if its opposite were posited — that which had been foreknown by God — God himself would be deceived, because the thing would occur otherwise than had been foreknown by him. But that God cannot be deceived is a steadfast truth that no one can rightly deny. I respond that the indetermination of possibility stands with determination of inherence; and so we grant that the opposite can indeed occur, but will not occur; and if it had occurred, it would have been foreknown by God. Therefore God cannot be deceived, because to be deceived is to think a thing will be otherwise than it is going to be, for the time when it is believed to be. But God foreknows a future thing as it will be, and likewise foreknows that the thing can occur otherwise, but will not occur otherwise — for example, God foresaw that I would be writing today, and for this time, as I am truly now writing, and that I can not be writing now, but that this would not occur now — namely that I would not be applying myself to writing now — as the Doctor explains and pursues admirably (*in primo alleg.§.Ad 1.2.q.sub Q. and dist.40.q.un. in the solution of the second infra D. and in the Report eadem dist.q.2.near the end*), where he adds that it is a fallacy of the consequent; the same views the resolved Doctor Johannes Baconius (*ibid.*). To what is added — "from a possible posited in being no impossible follows" — Scotus (*ubi supra*) meets the objection: from the positing in being absolutely, no impossible follows; but from the positing together with another proposition of

inherence that stands, an impossible does follow, because it supposes the opposite to be conserved in being — for example, I can write tomorrow; given that I write tomorrow, no impossible is had; but if this is joined to another — namely, I can not write — an impossible follows, because in the same instant it cannot be both that I write and that I do not write. Thus, given the hypothesis that God foreknew that I would be writing, at this very instant I am indeed writing, and I can nonetheless not write; but given that I am now writing, in the composite sense I cannot not write, though I can in the divided sense. Wherefore, although something simply does not conflict with itself, it can nonetheless conflict by reason of the positing of another. In this sense the future contingent can not occur; but given the foreknowledge of God by which he foreknew it as future as it is future, it is a contradiction for it not to be future — because God foresees things in objective being from the determination of his will, in that mode and at that time in which they are future; and if they are not future, he does not foresee them as future but as possible, nor are they determined by the divine will, which is the root of all future things, as Lychetus writes with the Doctor and the Scotists in the passages already cited.

You will object fifth: if a future contingent were determinately true, there would be no need to deliberate and negotiate, as Aristotle argues (*at the end of the first Perihermeneias*); but with deliberations and negotiations removed, human liberty, merit and demerit, praise and blame are also removed — which is heretical and absurd. Therefore a future contingent is not determined. The sequence of the major is proved: for if things are already determined to being or not being, there is no human solicitude; for whether man deliberates and negotiates or not, such things will be or will not be, since they are already determined from all eternity to being or not being, and were foreseen from eternity by God — who cannot be deceived — as going to be in that mode at that time. I deny the sequence of the major. To its proof I say that even if future things are determined with determination of inherence, they are nonetheless undetermined with indetermination of possibility, and thus human freedom is preserved and the indifference of contingent things remains, and deliberations and negotiations are valid; since even though free agents are determined to acting, they nonetheless possess the power of not acting or of doing the opposite — just as one who is actually writing has the power of not writing. Hence he remains free to elicit his acts and to carry out his works, as Scotus (*praecit. §. Ad argum. principalia P.*), Tataretus — both there and also in the Logic (*Perih.q.ult.*) — teach excellently. What Aristotle thought about these things the scholastics dispute among themselves; omitting their quarrels, perhaps it can be said that when Aristotle (*in the cited passage*) asserts that future contingents are undetermined to either, he is speaking of indetermination of possibility, and not of indetermination of inherence. This interpretation seems to the Doctor (*cit.*) when he says: "This indetermination — namely of possibility — suffices for deliberating and negotiating. But if neither part were going to be, there would

be no need to deliberate or negotiate; therefore the fact that one part is going to be, while the other can nonetheless occur, does not prohibit deliberation and negotiation." But if the Philosopher does not accept this meaning and wishes future contingents to be altogether undetermined — as he plainly seems to think in that passage, and as Antonius Andreas explains him there, and as Scotus had already indicated in the Reports cited (§*Ad rationem Philosophi*) — then in this matter, and in certain others, especially about the world being set up from eternity, as can be seen (*5.Phys.cap.1. and 1.Caeli T.102.*), he is not to be followed, but rather the authors of the opposing view, which is common in our time.

Book V. On the Syllogism.

There remains in this last book to treat the syllogism, which I prefaced as the scope of Aristotle and the object of his Logic in the Preface to the Epitome and asserted in (*lib.1.q.3.art.7.*). For having prefaced the books of the Predicables and the Categories — in which I taught simple and incomplex terms, which are the remote parts of the syllogism — and having surveyed the enunciation in the preceding book, which is its proximate part, as the Doctor decides (*1.Priorum q.2.§.Quantum ad 3.not.*) — I now not inopportunately proceed to examine the syllogism composed from the foregoing. The order of nature requires that, once the parts have been investigated, the whole from which they coalesce be subsequently sought — which the Stagirite performed diligently, as I observed (*1.Phys. and in other passages in the prelude to the first book of the Epitome*).

Question I. On the Syllogism in General.

Article I. Whether the Syllogism Is the Subject of Aristotle's Prior Analytics.

This doubt seems to have been nearly decided by me in (*lib.1.q.3.art.7.*); yet I judged that it ought to be expounded here in the proper course — both because this is its proper place, and because logicians are not in agreement about it, as can be seen from the Coimbrans and Ruuvius in the proem. For Marsilius makes argumentation the subject, Averroes with Alexander makes demonstration the subject, while Scotus (*1.Priorum q.2.*), Tataretus (*ibid.q.1.dub.1.*), and others commonly make the syllogism the subject of attribution of this work.

Note first, from the interpreters of Aristotle: these four books, which we have in hand for discussion and about which we propose the five questions mentioned above for decision, are called in Latin "resolutories" and in Greek "analytics." And indeed the first two are entitled by Aristotle and his expositors "analyticōn proterōn" or Prior Analytics; but the last two "analyticōn hystērōn" or Posterior Analytics, as Zabarella (*in comm.1.post.*), Mair (*ibid.*), and the Coimbrans note after Galen, cited by them. Why these books are entitled analytic — that is, resolatory

— the reason given is that in them the norm and mode of resolving conclusions into their principles is handed down. Since, however, as Scotus (*praecit.*) and Mair (*Tract.de syllog.*) say, a conclusion can be resolved into its principles in two ways — namely according to form and according to matter — Aristotle therefore provides the rules and precepts of each mode of resolving: the first mode of resolving in the book of the Prior Analytics; the second in the book of the Posterior Analytics. Since the resolution of a conclusion into its principles according to form consists in the premises properly disposed in mode and figure, as I explained in the Epitome (*lib.3.art.5.q.1.*) — those books are from this resolution called the Prior Resolutories. And since the resolution of the conclusion into its principles according to its matter is sought from the necessary connection of the extremes with the middle term in order to infer the conclusion, the remaining books are for this reason called the Posterior Resolutories. Why the former are called Prior and the latter Posterior: a reason not to be despised is given — because discussion of the syllogism taken generally must precede discussion of the syllogism taken particularly, just as the treatise on genus precedes the treatise on species, and universally more common things are to be prefaced to less common ones, as I noted not once above, and Mair noted in his explanation of the first book of the Posterior Analytics. Hence, because in those books the syllogism in general is treated, and in these the syllogism in species — which is demonstration — I determined to dispute first about the syllogism and subsequently about the rest.

Note second, from the Doctor (*1.Priorum q.6.¶.Respondetur*) and Tataretus (*cit.dub.1.*): two things are found in the syllogism, some of which are called the formal principles of the syllogism — namely, mode and figure — from which the syllogism is constituted as in its formal being, as it were as form. Just as the soul is the form of an animated body, so these seem to be the form of the syllogism; or if you prefer, the essential differentia of it, just as rationality is the essential and quidditative differentia of man. Certain others are called material principles — such as the propositions from which the syllogism is composed, as it were from its matter. And from these as from matter and form the whole syllogism is constituted.

The assertion is: the syllogism, considered according to its generic formal account, or as Scotus says, insofar as the properties common to itself pertain to the necessity of inference, is determined to be the object of Aristotle's Prior Analytics. So Scotus (*cit.¶.Quantum ad 3.vers.si autem fiat consideratio.*). It is proved first from Aristotle (*this locus cap.4.*), where he proposes to treat first of reasoning and then of demonstration, the reason for which he gives as that reasoning is more common and wider than demonstration. For demonstration is indeed reasoning, but not every reasoning is demonstration; for a topical syllogism is clearly reasoning but not demonstration, as all confess; and reasoning coincides with the syllogism, as is clear from (*cap.1 of this book.*). Therefore since according to Aristotle these books treat of reasoning as their subject matter, consequently

reasoning is their object. Second: that whose definition, parts, and properties are examined is the object of a given work, as is clear from the conditions required for a subject, as I handed down and explained in (*lib.1.q.3.*). But the definition, parts, and properties of the syllogism pertaining to the necessity of inference are considered in this work, as is evident to the reader. Therefore the syllogism, in its generic form, is aptly located as the subject of these books.

You will object first: it is Aristotle's intention at the beginning of the first Prior Analytics to treat of demonstration and the science of demonstrating; therefore according to Aristotle's intention, the object of these books is demonstration. I respond that Aristotle's purpose there is to treat of demonstration — not indeed in this work, but in the next following, that is, in the Posterior Analytics — as the same Philosopher plainly indicates (*cap.4 of this book*), where he explicitly ordains that he will discuss first reasoning and then demonstration, which holds the first place among the other argumentations; and he hints at the reason there — because knowledge of the superior serves for knowledge of the inferior.

You will object second: the subject of a science does not exceed the limits of the science of which it is the object, as is clear from what was said in (*lib.1.q.3.art.1.*). But the syllogism exceeds the scope of this prior analytic work; it is established by the Doctor as the primary and adequate subject of the whole of Logic, as is clear from his third question on universals. Therefore the syllogism is not the subject of these books. I concede the major; I distinguish the minor: in all its parts and properties, I concede; in its form or the necessity of inferring, I deny. For it is considered in this way alone as the subject of the present work. I satisfied this from Scotus in the now cited passage (*lib.1.art.7.objection 3.*).

You will object third: Scotus (*cit.*) removes argumentation from the subject of Dialectic, and there establishes the syllogism — in whose footsteps I also followed as I showed above in assertion I. But in (*1.Priorum q.2.*), in the account of all the parts of Logic and its total object, the same Doctor asserts that the object of the Prior Analytic work is argumentation insofar as its general properties pertain to necessary inference. Therefore either Scotus contradicts himself, or the syllogism is not the subject of these books. I respond that Scotus in the said Prior Analytics takes argumentation as coinciding with the syllogism — as the Scotists observe, who hold the subject of that work to be the syllogism, though the Doctor there stated it to be argumentation: which is clearly gathered from the same author, who (*ibid. ante §.Ad 1.not.*) says that "the opposite is argued by those who commonly explain this book, who hold that the syllogism is the subject of this one." But in (*q.3.univers.*) he takes argumentation broadly, insofar as it is distinguished from the syllogism, and thus did not intend to assert there that argumentation is the object of the Logic handed down by Aristotle, for the reasons adduced by him in that place and accepted by me.

Article II. What the Syllogism Is.

Although the definition of the syllogism, which I introduced and explained in all its parts in the Epitome (*lib.3.q.art.3.*), is now nearly clear, it is nonetheless my pleasure to examine carefully and with diligent inquiry the said definition and its principal objections principally with Scotus (*lib.1.Priorum q.5.*). For a more convenient grasp of this, recall what I taught in the Epitome (*lib.2.q.7.art.2.*) about definition and its necessary conditions, as well as what Scotus (*q.alleg.*) notes — especially (§.Quantum ad 1.not.) — namely that definition is of two kinds: the one quidditative simply, which is adapted to composite substance alone, according to Aristotle (*7.Met.T.15.*); the other by addition — such as the definition of an accident, which expresses not only the essence of the accident itself but also the subject in which it inheres. A third can be added — namely the descriptive definition, which the Doctor (*ibid.*) seems to call the definition of the name, and I showed that it is produced in various ways in the cited passage in the Epitome. Furthermore, for clarifying this the distinction introduced in the second note of the preceding article is helpful — into formal and material parts of the syllogism, both proximate and remote, from which the whole syllogism is constructed. Hence it is clear that the syllogism is not something simple and incomplex, but something complex and composed from multiple properly disposed parts. Although the syllogism materially speaking includes many things, it nonetheless receives its proper essence and unity formally — which every logical being of reason or logical second intention possesses as well. For as Scotus most acutely observes (*4.dist.1.q.2.§.Ad 1.arg.O.*), however many diverse things can concur in the foundation of one relation of reason — it is necessary that many things be conceived as one in relation to some signified. And this is clear because this one relation, which is to signify good new wine, can very well have as its foundation the whole of this — a circle covered with ivy leaves set up on a cross, etc. Nor should the difference be omitted that Scotus (*cit.*) and more clearly (*1.Priorum q.16.§.Secundo not.*), and which I touched on in the Epitome (*lib.3.q.1.art.2.*), and others commonly assert between formal and material consequence. For if the conclusion is inferred from the premises by reason of the syllogistic form, which consists in mode and figure, it is called a formal consequence; but if the conclusion is deduced only according to the extremes necessarily connected with the middle term, it is called a material consequence. And according to this twofold consequence a twofold resolution is likewise noted — the prior analytic and the posterior analytic — which is clear from what was said in the preceding article, note I.

The assertion is: the syllogism taken materially is not defined essentially and quidditatively; but this is otherwise if it is used formally. This is indicated by the Doctor (*q.alleg.§.Quantum ad 2. and q.4.cit.*). The first part, which seems to be located by the Doctor (*cit.*) in the present book in conclusion I and II, is proved by him because only substance constituted from genus and differentia is defined essentially and quidditatively, from the seventh book of the Metaphysics, as I noted above. But the syllogism is an intentional accident; therefore its definition

thus accepted is not essential. If you say that an accident is defined essentially, provided it consists of genus and differentia, as every good definition must. Against this: the definition of an accident expresses the subject as something added; but in the adduced definition of the syllogism no subject is explained; therefore it is not to be considered quidditative, if accepted in the way I said. Furthermore, the syllogism is composed of multiple propositions explained in the cited Epitome, which are distinguished from each other. But one definition is declarative of one thing only. Therefore the definition of the syllogism taken materially is not to be numbered among essential definitions. The second part is touched upon there (*concl.3.vers.His igitur praemissis*), where genus and differentia are assigned — which are the chief conditions of an essential definition, by everyone's judgment — and it is the explicit doctrine of the Doctor (*in q.4 just mentioned*); and it is explicitly maintained by the Coimbrans (*q.2.cap.1.art.2.*). And it can be urged thus: that is an essential definition which enjoys genus and differentia, as none denies; but the aforesaid definition of the syllogism possesses genus and differentia, as is clear from its parts explained in the Epitome; therefore, etc. Again, and it seems to come to the same thing: what coalesces from material and formal parts is defined essentially, whether those parts be physical or metaphysical; but the syllogism is composed of material and formal parts, as I declared in the preceding article, note II. Therefore its definition is essential. Add that the definition of genus and other second logical intentions is in its own mode quidditative, as I proved in (*lib.2.q.2.art.2.*); and of all logical second intentions the Doctor writes (*in q.4.cit.§.De 2.1. and §.Ex his K.*). But the syllogism is one logical second intention comprising the rest of the second intentions, as Sarnanus hints (*Tract.de primis et secundis intentionibus art.1.2.*). Furthermore, the operations of the intellect are in their own mode quidditatively defined, as is clear in the preceding book from the definition of the enunciation, which is the second operation of the intellect passively taken. Nothing therefore prevents the definition of the syllogism from being essential and quidditative.

You will object first: definition is given of incomplex things only, since there is one definition of one thing — and especially for clearly declaring its parts; but the syllogism is something complex, for it is a discourse composed from multiple discourses joined to each other, as is clear from what was said; therefore the syllogism cannot be defined essentially. I distinguish the minor: definition is of incomplex things formally taken, I concede; materially or fundamentally accepted, I deny. For multiple things can be disposed and ordered toward one, and of it as such — with the others presupposed — a definition can be given, as I made clear with Scotus (*cit.*) and in the Report (*ibid.*) before the foregoing assertion. Sarnanus (*praenominatus*) declares this same thing lucidly, saying: the intellect cognizes two propositions aptly disposed according to the syllogistic rules, and compares them to another proposition that is properly inferred from those premises; and this comparison of both premises

to the conclusion is a logical second intention called a syllogism. Especially because the syllogism is called one discourse on account of one connection of the extremes and one illative judgment.

You will object second: a good definition belongs to the whole of the thing defined, as is clear from the laws of an apt definition given by the Doctor in the present question. But the aforementioned definition of the syllogism does not apply to every syllogism — namely, to the enthymeme, which from the first Posterior Analytics is a syllogism, though it consists of only two propositions; but a syllogism requires three propositions. Therefore that is not the genuine definition of the syllogism. I concede the major. To the minor I say that the enthymeme is a truncated and imperfect syllogism, in which one proposition is silently understood, which is virtually contained in it, and a perfect syllogism can be made if that proposition which is suppressed is added to it.

You will object third: a definition is vitiated in which a remote genus is placed, from (*4.dist.11.q.3.sub CC.*). But in the aforementioned definition of the syllogism a remote genus is placed — namely "discourse," whereas the proximate genus, which is argumentation, should be placed in it. Therefore that is not an apt definition of the syllogism. Because of this argument some, such as Burana, substitute in place of "discourse" the term "reasoning" or "ratiocination," which they consider to be the proximate genus of the syllogism. But I, approving the common version, can respond by denying that "discourse" is the remote genus of the syllogism, since ratiocination, argumentation, discursus, and the like are used interchangeably, as Hurtado (*disp.9.sect.10.*) notes, and Mastrius and Bellucius (*disp.11.q.1.*) indicate, and Arriaga does not dissent (*disp.15.sect.2.*) — though he thinks in (*sect.1 of the same disp.*) that demonstration is the genus of the syllogism. And this will be more manifest below in Article IV. Therefore to the form of the argument I concede the major and deny the minor, which is proved by no logician I have seen. Add that in the following article it will be shown that the syllogism is not a genus with respect to the demonstrative, topical, etc.

You will ask whether the aforesaid definition of the syllogism is aptly adapted to both the illative syllogism — in which only the illative form is found, and which Aristotle sometimes uses in this work with initial letters, as "every A is B; but C is A; therefore C is B" — and to the probative syllogism, which is formed from some proper material, or a certain and particular thing, as "every virtue is praiseworthy; modesty is a virtue; therefore modesty is praiseworthy." I respond that it applies to each: for each is a discourse consisting of three propositions. Nevertheless it fits the probative more, both because it is useful to the sciences, and because the chief purpose of the syllogism is the investigation of truth.

Article III. Whether the Division of the Syllogism into Dialectical and Demonstrative Is a Division of Genus into Species.

The common opinion of logicians holds that the syllogism is distributed into dialectical and demonstrative as a genus into its species. The opposite position is maintained by Scotus (*1.Priorum q.6.*), Tataretus (*ibid.q.1.dub.1.*), Mair (*Tract.de syllog.ante c.2.*), and others who deny that the aforementioned division of the syllogism is a division of genus into species.

For the elucidation and resolution of this question, the twofold differentia of the syllogism given and explained in Article I of this question, note II, contributes greatly — namely, the formal and material: the formal is the figure with the mode of inferring, or the concluding inference from the premises; the material, however, are the propositions from which the syllogism is constituted as from its matter. For the necessity of the demonstrative and the probability of the topical syllogism — on account of which the aforesaid division is made — are taken from the propositions, which are its matter. If those propositions were necessary, the syllogism composed from them is demonstrative; if they were contingent and probable, a topical syllogism is composed from them.

Wherefore those parts of the syllogism are not essential and formal to it, but accidental and material; and the syllogism is called not a genus but a whole in mode — because it is determined by accidental and material determination — by the Doctor (*ubi supra.*). And thus Aristotle (*1.Top.c.1.*) is to be explained, who enumerating the syllogisms — dialectical and demonstrative — plainly declares them to be species of the syllogism.

The assertion is: the division of the syllogism into dialectical and demonstrative is not a division of genus into species. So Scotus (*cit.§.Respondetur, conclusione I.*). It is proved first: the division of a genus into species is effected through formal and essential differentiae, from (*1.Met.T.43.*). But the distribution of the syllogism into topical and analytic is made through material and accidental differentiae, as I noted before the assertion. Therefore such a division is not one of genus into species. Second: the thing of which things are not species has no genus with respect to those of which it cannot be a genus; but the topical and analytic syllogisms are not species of the syllogism taken generically; therefore the syllogism is not their genus, and accordingly its partition into them is not essential. The major is clear from the definition of genus. The minor is proved: complex entities are excluded from the categories, as is clear from the book of the Predicaments, where incomplex being is divided into ten categories; but the dialectical and demonstrative syllogisms are complex entities, for they are composed of multiple discourses, as is clear from the definition of the syllogism in general. Therefore the syllogism with respect to the topical and analytic is not a genus.

You will object first: what is predicated of many things differing in species in "what is it," is a true genus of those of which it is so predicated, and its division into them is essential; but the syllogism taken precisely is predicated in "what is it" of the topical and analytic syllogisms; therefore it is their genus, and the said

division is formal and essential. The major is conspicuous from the definition of genus. The minor is proved: the definition of the syllogism is correctly adapted to those syllogisms that differ among themselves not in number, therefore in species. I concede the major; I distinguish the minor: if such definition is taken according to material parts, I concede; if it is taken according to formal parts, I deny. All of this requires no other clearer explanation than that which I provided in the second article; see it there.

You will object second, from (*1.Post.T.43.*): the subject of a science is one in genus; but the syllogism is the subject of Aristotle's Logic, from what was asserted in (*lib.1.q.3.art.7.*); therefore the syllogism is one in genus; but it does not appear to be a genus unless it comprises species under itself, which seem to be none other than the dialectical and analytic syllogisms; therefore the syllogism is the proper genus of each. I respond: I deny indeed that the syllogism is a genus having species under it, but deny that those species are the topical and analytic syllogism. For the syllogism insofar as it is a genus can be distributed into four species, which are named by the terms Barbara, Celarent, Darii, Ferio — as Tataretus and Mair probatively defend in the present context. Or it can be said that the common run of philosophers uses material and accidental differentiae in place of essential and formal differentiae, as I noted elsewhere from Aristotle and Scotus in a similar case. In this sense perhaps the Doctor (*3.dist.23.q.un.R.*) calls induction a species of argumentation.

Article IV. Whether Discursus, Syllogism, and Argumentation Are the Same Thing.

Most think that discursus is a genus with respect to argumentation or the syllogism, enthymeme, induction, and example — favored by the Coimbrans (*c.1.primi prio.q.2.art.1.*) and Arriaga (*disp.15.sect.1.*). Others think that discursus, ratiocination, and the rest narrated above — from Saint Bonaventure (*3.d.2.q.5.*) — though differing in word, agree in reality; such seem to be the view of Lychetus (*q.3.prol.4.lat.§.Iuxta hoc*), Bargesius, Vigerius, and the other Scotists (*ibid.*), with whom Raconius (*Tract.de argumentatione sect.1.*) agrees, and Scotus does not differ far from this, as will be cited below.

Note first: that three modes of discoursing can occur. First, insofar as it is the same as understanding one thing after another — and in this way only God, who simultaneously understands everything in a single act, is immune from discursus. Second, insofar as it is the same as understanding one thing through another — thus Saint Augustine (*lib.de divinatione*) says that a demon from the affection and disorder of the air known to itself foresees future storms. Third, insofar as it comprises both — or to know one thing after another and through another, which is to say, from the knowledge of one known thing to arrive at the knowledge of another unknown thing — and for this reason one is said to discourse, a metaphor taken from the running and motion of an animal, as the Coimbrans (*praalleg.*) observe with Albert. For just as an animal when it passes

from one place to another is said to run, so the created intellect, when it knows one thing after another or through another, is said to discourse — from the knowledge of what is prior and known to it to the cognition of what is posterior and unknown to it. Hence discursus is described as the progression of the intellect from the cognition of a known thing to having the cognition of an unknown thing — as when from premises known to it it makes its way to the conclusion inferred from them, which was sought and subsequently becomes evident to it. This description of discursus does not differ from that which the Doctor (*2.d.3.q.9. §. Contrà 2.A. and q.10. ante N.*) gives, saying: discursus is a cognition from the known to the unknown. Nor is it dissimilar to what Lychetus (*cit.*) has and I accept in the Treatise on the Prologue (*disp.3.de scientia Dei disp.1.q.4. and de Angelis disp.6.q.1. §.5.*): discursus is the inference of the consequent from the antecedent, fundamentally including two premises disposed with the proper mode and figure, and terminatively including the conclusion drawn from them — and this same is hinted at by Scotus (*Quol.15. §. De 2. sub V.*).

Note second, from Mauritius (*q.26.univers.*) and Bargesius (*q.4.prol.*): discursus requires three conditions. The first is that one thing be cognized by the intellect after another — that is, once the cognition of the premises is had, the knowledge of the conclusion is acquired. The reason for this is given: because since discursus is a transit or procection from one thing to another, and accordingly a spiritual motion, it necessarily includes two terms — the terminus from which and the terminus to which. The terminus from which are the principles, and the terminus to which is the conclusion. The second is that one thing be understood through another — because since the extremes are conjoined with the middle, so too with respect to being known, the dependence is such that one is not fully perceived without the other, especially because the cognition of one is the cause of the cognition of the other. The third is that the premises be known and the conclusion be cognized by another knowledge. For distinct cognitions generated through acquired species are produced about distinct objects, as is shown in the book on the soul. For the premises differ from the conclusion as cause from effect; and that distinct pieces of knowledge are had of cause and effect no one is ignorant of — and this will be made more manifest from the articles to be examined below. Scotus hands this down clearly (*q.1. primi Post.*), and it is his explicit view in the Prologue (*q.alleg.*), where he plainly teaches that science is caused through syllogistic discursus and is the equivocal effect of the premises. The same he writes in (*3.dist.14.q.2. ante §. Ad 2.q.*), and Gadius (*Quol.15.fol.163.*) and other Scotists follow him. I note this on account of the Coimbrans (*praenominati*), who from Cajetan (*1.p.q.58.art.3.*) argue against Scotus because they think (*q.4.Prol. and 2.d.27.q.1.*) that he asserts that multiple cognitions are not necessary for discursus — but they attribute this to him wrongly, since the opposite is plainly read there, as Pelbart (*Tom.1.verbo scientia §.7.*), Vulpes

(*Tom.1.prima p.disp.24.art.1. and disp.2.art.7.*), the Two Juniors (*disp.11.q.1.*), and the other Scotists both ancient and recent defend.

You will say: Scotus (*3.dist.14.q.2. and Quol.15.*) asserts that the Blessed can in a single vision see the divine essence and the created objects that eminently shine in that essence. Therefore in the view of the Doctor one act suffices for discursus, by which both the premises and the conclusion are attained. I must meet this objection: given the hypothesis, that vision is caused by the divine will in the intellect of the Blessed, but it is not properly discursive, because the Blessed see it in the divine essence as in the most lucid mirror, and not through the divine essence — as Gadius (*fol.163.*) well notes. See the Quodlibet (*cit.*).

Note third, from the same Scotus (*in prol.alleg.*): discursus can be effected in two ways — successively or in an instant. It occurs in time when the cognition of one thing is had prior in time to the cognition of another, which happens to us on account of the weakness and imperfection of our intellect, which — when an effect is cognized — does not immediately come to the cognition of the cause, as is clear from Aristotle (*1.Met.2.*) narrating that men began to philosophize from the effects known to them and their ignorance of causes. But discursus can be effected in an instant, when the premises are cognized prior by nature to the conclusion — and in this way the Parisians (*1.Phys. in fine*) confess that angels discourse, following Scotus (*2.dist.1.q.6. and dist.7.q.un.*) and citing Saint Augustine (*supra Gen.*) saying that the Blessed by knowing God consequently know creatures. And I treat this at length in the Treatise on the Angels (*disp.6.q.1.§.5.*). Wherefore no interval of time is required for discursus, but only an order of nature — that is, as Scotus (*cit.*) affirms, that the principle of discursus be naturally prior in knowledge and as such be causative of the other extreme of the discursus.

The assertion is: discursus and syllogism, argumentation and syllogism, as well as ratiocination, do not differ essentially from each other. The first part is deduced from Scotus (*quol.15.art.2.sub V.*) and is proved: discursus formally or virtually comprehends three propositions, as is clear from its description adduced in note I; but a discursus composed from two propositions is an imperfect syllogism, which is called an enthymeme; and a discursus composed from three propositions is a perfect syllogism, as its definition makes clear. Again, Logic is called a discursive science precisely because it is occupied with the syllogism as its subject. All the more because all discursuses that by virtue of the disposition of the terms evidently infer something, accomplish this only insofar as they virtually contain a syllogism within themselves — which alone is properly a formal and perfect discursus. The second part is likewise gathered from the Doctor (*who at the end of q.2. primi Priorum uses "argumentation" for "syllogism"*), enumerating its parts and properties; and that ratiocination coincides with the syllogism the Philosopher holds (*1.Priorum c.1.*), where he proposes to discourse about ratiocination — that is, the syllogism — as he makes

clear a little later, when he asserts its definition, where according to the common version "syllogism" is placed; others, as the Coimbrans, translate "ratiocination" — and they do the same at (*cap.4 of the same work.*). The reason is that Logic is called rational and ratiocinative (*q.I.art.V.*) because it is occupied with the work of reason or the syllogism; therefore ratiocination and syllogism signify the same thing. And if any difference intervenes, it is accidental. Add that words are to be used according to the common usage of authors, as Scotus (*1.d.14. and 15.q.un.sub E.*) notes. And nearly all logicians use the aforementioned names interchangeably, as appears to anyone reading them anywhere; therefore no essential difference is to be placed between them, as the Philosopher hints (*2.Priorum c.29.*).

You will object first: things of which distinct definitions are given are essentially distinct, as the major shows clearly. But of discursus, the syllogism, and ratiocination, distinct definitions are handed down; therefore discursus, syllogism, and ratiocination are essentially different. The major is perspicuous. The minor is clear from what was said: for discursus is defined as the procession from the known to the unknown, while the syllogism and ratiocination are described as discourses consisting of three propositions disposed in mode and figure; and to be a progression from one to another, and to be a complex discourse, and things of this kind indicate distinct definitions. I admit the major; I reject the minor. To its proof I say that these are not distinct descriptions as regards reality, but as regards word — as is clearly established from what was adduced and explained above.

You will object second: for a perfectly complete syllogism and ratiocination, two pieces of knowledge are required — one of the premises and another of the conclusion, as I said above, and Gadius (*cit.*) noted. But discursus can be effected by a single act or cognition, as Scotus and his interpreters cited above seem to hold. Therefore the foregoing items differ among themselves by more than an accidental difference. Granting the major, the minor has been answered at the end of the second note. Or it can be said that there is indeed one act, but there are distinct terminations and attainments; or, if you prefer, it is one act comprehensively, because it is the third operation of the intellect or the formal illative judgment; but initiatively it is the knowledge of the premises, which the conclusion presupposes. Thus discursus formally presents one cognition, in which it formally consists, and materially denotes and presupposes another, which arises from the principles or premises.

Article V. Whether the Conclusion Is of the Essence of the Syllogism.

On account of differing citation of Aristotle about both the premises and the conclusion, and on account of a divergent mode of speaking and discordant texts, conflicting and diverse opinions of logicians arise. For Averroes and Albert (*1.Priorum T.1.c.5.*) hold that the premises alone are the essential parts of the syllogism, excluding the conclusion from its essence. Conversely, some, with

whom Zabarella (*1.Post.ad tex.4.*) subscribes, think that the whole essence of the syllogism is located in the conclusion. The common position, however, is that of the Subtle Doctor (*q.45.Elench. §.Ad q.*), Orbellis (*1.Priorum c.1.*), Raconius (*Tract.de argum.sect.3.*), and others who hold that both the premises and the conclusion enter the essence of the syllogism.

Note first, from Mair (*Tract.de syllog.not.2.*): Aristotle sometimes takes the syllogism for the premises alone when well disposed — as in (*2.Priorum and 1.post.c.2.*); sometimes for the conclusion alone — as (*1.Priorum in initio 1.figurae and 1.de anima T.48.*); sometimes for the premises and conclusion with the illative particle — as (*1.Priorum c.1. and 2.Phys.T.31.*) and frequently elsewhere. The syllogism taken in this last way can be considered in two ways: first intentionally, and thus it is a discourse composed of two premises and one conclusion with the particle of inference; and second intentionally, and thus it is a relation of reason founded in the premises and terminated toward the conclusion, as Scotus (*Quol.15.art.2.infra V.*), Gadius, and Lychetus hint — both there and in the Prologue (*cit.in ant.art.*).

Note second, from the Doctor (*1.Post.q.10. §.Ad rationem*): the conclusion can be considered in two ways: in one way insofar as it is a certain proposition consisting of subject, predicate, and verbal copula, with no other account being had — and thus it is called the conclusion materially. Although the conclusion is gathered from the premises and depends on them in being, nonetheless since it is one proposition distinct from others, it can be immediately cognized by the intellect in the account of an object, as Gadius (*quol.cit.*) excellently notes, following Scotus (*ibid.*). In another way, insofar as it is a certain proposition deduced and collected from two premises — and thus it is called the conclusion formally, because it concludes and terminates the syllogistic discursus, as the same authors note from Aristotle (*1.Post.2.*), and this is gathered from the same author (*ibid.c.16.*), calling the conclusion "the terminus of the demonstrative syllogism." To these Zabarella (*praecit.*) adds that the conclusion is the form of the syllogism: for since form is drawn out from the potency of matter and is its act and formal terminus, and the premises are its matter, the conclusion is rightly called the terminus of the syllogism. Furthermore, since motion requires two terms — the terminus from which and the terminus to which — and discursus is a kind of spiritual motion of the created intellect, to it accordingly are to be assigned terms: from which, which are the premises, and to which, which is the conclusion, as I noted above.

Assertion I: the syllogism taken first intentionally or materially includes the conclusion as its essential part. This is Scotus (*ubi supra*). It is proved first from Aristotle (*1.Priorum c.4. and lib.2 of the same work*), who among the parts of the syllogism numbers the conclusion. Second, a perfect syllogism is essentially composed of three propositions aptly ordered to each other, as is clear from its definition; but what enters the definition of something is of its essence; since the

conclusion is one of the propositions of the syllogism, it is inferred that it is of its essence. Third, matter and form are the essential parts of a composite, as is clear in the Physics; but the premises are as it were the matter and the conclusion as it were the form of the whole syllogism, or the inference that is in the conclusion — which the Doctor (*q.6.1.Priorum §.Resp.*) asserts to be the form of the syllogism. The illative judgment, moreover, by which the third operation of the intellect is distinguished from both preceding ones, exists most fully in the conclusion formally taken; for the particle "therefore," by which the illative judgment is expressed, is accommodated only to the conclusion. Therefore it is evidently concluded that the conclusion is not separated from the essence of the syllogism.

Assertion II: the syllogism taken second intentionally or formally does not include in its intrinsic and formal account either the premises or the conclusion. This is gathered and simultaneously proved from the Doctor (*2.d.3.q.9.§.Contra 2.A. and Quol.cit.§. and letters alleg.*), where it is indicated that discursus or the syllogism is a kind of spiritual motion of the soul, which begins from the premises and ends in the conclusion; but the intrinsic account of motion does not include its terms from which and to which, as I proved in the Physics (*l.de motu*); therefore neither the premises nor the conclusion, which are the terms of the syllogism, are of its essence. Furthermore, in the essence of a relation its foundation and terminus are not included, since they are prerequired and presupposed to it, and sometimes are substantial — as I stated in (*lib.3.q.de relatione*); but the syllogism formally taken is a relation of reason founded in the premises and terminated toward the conclusion, and is a logical second intention, just like the others that are considered per se by Logic — as Sarnanus writes (*Tract.de 1.et 2.intentionibus c.2.*). Again, the passive comparison of one known object to another known object is a being of reason and a logical second intention, from Scotus (*4.d.1.q.2.§.Hic primo B.*). But the syllogism is a comparison of the premises to each other and to the conclusion, as Sarnanus (*cit.*), Tataretus (*1.Priorum q.1.*), and the Scotists generally excellently affirm. Therefore the premises and conclusion do not enter the essence of the syllogism formally taken.

You will object first, against Assertion I: Aristotle (*1.Prior.*) in defining the syllogism calls the conclusion something different from the premises, as is clear to one examining the said passage; but to be something different from another denotes a diversity of essence, as I noted in (*lib.2.q.de differentia*); therefore since by Aristotle the conclusion is different from the premises, it follows that it is not an essential part of the syllogism. I respond that the Philosopher indeed wishes the conclusion to be different from the premises, because it is their effect — as will be shown below — but he does not assert that it is different from the syllogism, as Scotus (*near the end of q.45.Elench.*) carefully observes; indeed he locates it in the syllogism's definition, which is a clear sign that he does not separate it from the essence of the syllogism. Nor does it obstruct that

something is the effect of something and also its co-part with respect to a third: for flesh is produced from blood, and both are parts of an animal, as will be clear in (*lib.2.de anima.*). Therefore there is no repugnance in the conclusion being the effect of the premises and also being a part together with them for constituting the syllogism, as Scotus writes (*2.Prio.q.2.in fine.*).

You will object second, from (*1.Prio.c.21. and 1.Post.c.19.*): a syllogism has three terms and two propositions; but without the conclusion there are three terms and two propositions; therefore the conclusion does not pertain to the essence of the syllogism. I respond that Aristotle is speaking of the propositions necessary for inferring the conclusion, not of all the propositions necessary for obtaining a perfect syllogism. For in this way the conclusion is necessarily required for its completion as its chief part. Or say that, according to the first note, Aristotle there took the syllogism for the premises alone — using the part for the whole — just as he sometimes used the conclusion alone for the whole syllogism, as I noted there from the same Philosopher.

You will object third: with the same conclusion remaining, the syllogism can be varied; therefore the conclusion does not pertain to the essence of the syllogism. The antecedent is proved: there can be one conclusion of two syllogisms, as Aristotle (*2.Prio.c.1.*) asserts, and Zabarella (*1.de 4.figura cap.10.*) expresses with this example: if an argument is made in Darisi, which pertains to the first figure, and in Datisi, which pertains to the third figure, two syllogisms are preserved with one conclusion — namely "some man is risible" — which remains the same in both aforementioned modes, as can be seen at a glance in these: first in Darii — "every rational animal is risible; some man is rational; therefore some man is risible"; second in Datisi — "every rational animal is risible; some rational animal is a man; therefore some man is risible." I respond: given the hypothesis, there is one conclusion materially but two formally, just as there are two formal syllogisms. Let it therefore stand that the premises alone are not the essential parts of the syllogism, nor the conclusion alone, but the premises in order to the conclusion, and likewise the conclusion in order to the premises.

You will object fourth, against Assertion II: what is per se placed in the definition of something is of its intrinsic account, as I repeatedly insisted; the premises and conclusion are per se established in the definition of the syllogism, since from what was said in Assertion I they are its essential parts; therefore they are of its intrinsic and formal account. I respond that this argument concludes about the syllogism taken materially, about which I spoke in Assertion I, but not about the syllogism taken formally, about which I discoursed in Assertion II.

You will press: Aristotle in his Organon and his other works acknowledged no other nature or definition of the syllogism than the one he adduced; therefore if the premises and conclusion are the essential parts of the syllogism invented by the same Philosopher — as Alexander (*1.Prior.Sect.2.and 3.*) testifies — they are

certainly of its intrinsic and formal account, which is denied in the posterior assertion. I must meet this by saying that Aristotle from his plan treated the syllogism only materially taken, because it is more convenient and easier to know. Hence the same Philosopher, though he discourses about second intentions, which the logician studies per se, nonetheless sometimes provides examples from things in order to declare those intentions — especially in the book of the Categories (*c.3.*), as Scotus (*q.9.¶.Ad q.*) notes there. And I noted that Porphyry does the same (*lib.2.q.1.art.1. in the response to the third objection.*). That Aristotle did the same (*4.Phys.T.39.*), defining place materially only, I observed there with our men.

Article VI. Whether a Fourth Figure of the Syllogism Is to Be Admitted.

The celebrated Medical Academy zealously defends a fourth figure of the syllogism, which Averroes (*1.Prior.c.8.*) testifies that their leader Galen introduced into the schools of logicians against Aristotle — though in the works of Galen that have come down to us nothing about a fourth figure is found, as after Zabarella (*praecit.c.1.*) the Coimbrans (*c.7.q.1.art.1.*) note; or as Mair (*Tract.de syllog.c.2.dub.2.¶.Ad 2.*) says, perhaps Galen differs from Aristotle in word but not in reality. Whatever be the mind of Galen, without doubt distinguished men armed with valid reasons and sustained by robust arguments seek to maintain that fourth figure. But the Peripatetic Lyceum — all of them, and especially Scotus (*1.Prio.q.34.*), Titelmannus (*1.4.c.3.*), Raconius (*3.p.de arg.q.2.sect.ult.*), and Hurtado (*disp.10.sect.20.*) — attacks and overthrows the Galenist figure as useless and unnatural. For a greater grasp of this:

Note first, from Averroes (*cit. and in Epit.c.1.*): for the construction of an apt and true syllogism, before the premises are composed it is necessary that a determinate theme or some problem be proposed, toward which the discursus is directed — or which is to be the future terminus of the syllogism to be made, or the conclusion that is to be deduced from the premises. When the theme is proposed — which consists of the major and minor extremes, as "every man is sensitive" — a middle term must be assumed, as "animal," from which, joined to the said extremes, the premises are formed with the proper quality and quantity, from which is drawn such a conclusion as the premises are fitted to cause. For if the middle is connected to the predicate of the problem, it generates the major proposition; if it is joined to the subject of the problem, it makes the minor proposition; and from both is caused the conclusion, which is the theme proposed in the beginning. Thus a perfect syllogism is had: "every animal is sensitive; every man is an animal; therefore every man is sensitive." Hence Aristotle, from only the threefold complication of the middle term with the extremes in the premises, discovered only three figures, the explanation, definition, sufficiency, and examples of which are to be sought from the Epitome (*lib.3.q.1.art.5.*). The fourth figure is added by Galen from the fourth

complication of the middle, which occurs when the middle is predicated in the major and subjected in the minor — as is seen at a glance in this syllogism: "every animal is sensitive; every sensitive thing is a body; therefore some body is an animal." This illegitimate form of arguing did not escape Aristotle (*1.Prior. and 2 of the same work*), as Zabarella (*cap.8.loc.cit.*) testifies; yet he neglected and despised it as oblique and unnatural — whatever the Two Junior Scotists (*1.p.Tract.3.cap.5.*) may say.

Note second, from Zabarella (*mox cit.cap.5.*): Aristotle, according to the norm of natural Logic, invented artificial Logic — that is, imitating nature and preserving the natural order; for this same reason Aristotle himself contemplated no other syllogism than one that proceeds by the natural way. Those syllogisms that he discerned to deviate from the natural way, he prescribed a mode and rule for reducing to natural syllogisms and to their force, necessity, and evidence — though they can be called artificial, because they have been reduced to art. Hence, in order that their naturalness might be established and become clear (*lib.1.Prior.C.1.*), he adduced the "said of all" and "said of none" — which I already explained in the cited passage (*art.4.*) — on which as most certain and firm foundations is built the whole edifice of perfect syllogisms, and on which all natural and perfect affirmative and negative syllogisms rest. But the naturalness or unnaturalness of a syllogism is not taken from the unnaturalness of predication — such as species of genus and subject of accident; otherwise unnaturalness would befall the modes of the first figure concluding indirectly — as in the conclusion in Baralipon: "some body is sensitive," and in the conversions of propositions such as "every risible thing is a man"; but rather from the illative form, which is had when what is predicated in the premises is likewise predicated in the conclusion, and what is subjected in the premises is likewise subjected in the conclusion — which is known to us through the "said of all" and "said of none"; the opposite of this is effected in the fourth figure. For what is superior in the premises becomes inferior in the conclusion. Hence the said figure as never illegitimate Aristotle does not receive, nor does he judge it worthy of treatment in terms of its modes of arguing.

The assertion is: only three natural figures of the syllogism are to be admitted; the fourth, as oblique and unnatural, is to be rejected. This, with Aristotle (*1.Prior.c.22.23.*), Scotus (*ubi supra*) maintains. The first part is proved: there are as many distinct natural figures as there are distinct natural combinations of the middle term in the premises; but only three distinct natural combinations of the middle term in the premises exist; therefore only three distinct natural figures. The major is evident from the first note. For the number of figures was collected by Aristotle from the number of natural combinations of the middle in the premises. The minor is clear to those following the natural way in constructing syllogisms. For the middle is either subjected in the major and predicated in the minor, or predicated in both, or subjected in both. Hence from this threefold natural disposition of the middle, a threefold figure arises. But if the middle is

disposed in a fourth way — so that it is predicate of the major and subject of the minor, which is desired to be arranged last, so that the middle is involved in the premises in every way and in every place it can be — there arises the fourth figure: the argument is oblique and departs from the natural course of reasoning, which Aristotle has not attended to, as I noted in the second note. Or say with Scotus (*1.Prio.q.34.*): the fourth figure is not to be given, because the disposition of the middle cannot be essentially diversified except in the three modes stated; for the fourth figure introduces the first combination of the middle. Hence it only accidentally differs from the first. For by transposing the premises, the first figure is obtained: as, "every animal is a substance; every man is an animal; therefore every man is a substance." And in the fourth figure: "every man is an animal; every animal is a substance; therefore every man is a substance."

The physicians of no small repute respond that the fourth figure is not to be rejected nor is it illegitimate; for they concede that three diverse dispositions of the middle in the premises cause three figures, so the fourth combination distinct from those three of the middle in the same premises ought to cause a fourth figure distinct from the three already shown. Nor is this to be considered unnatural. For only the composition of the premises varies the mode of the figure, as is clear in Cesare and Camestres, which are two modes of the second figure; and the conclusion in them is natural, as Aristotle does not deny. Likewise, transposing the premises of the first figure, with the position of the middle changed, the fourth natural figure plainly results, as is clear in this example: "every animal is sensitive; every man is an animal; therefore every man is sensitive." This syllogism is of the first figure in Barbara. But if its premises are transposed and the middle holds another seat — that is, the minor becomes the major and the major becomes the minor, and the middle is superior in the major and inferior in the minor — the fourth figure emerges: as "every man is an animal; every animal is sensitive; therefore some sensitive thing is a man." The inference of this is natural, as in the modes of the first figure concluding indirectly — notably Baralipon, etc. But this response does not weaken the force of the foregoing argument, since both the inference of that figure conflicts with the natural order and the seat of its middle is adverse to nature; and hence by such transposition of propositions and the inverted disposition of the middle in the said premises, no figure distinct from the three figures is constituted. For those three figures observe the natural way, as I described above, even if the last two do not obtain the evidence that the first has. Furthermore, although in act they do not have the "said of all" or the "said of none," they nonetheless contain one or the other in potency. But this invented by Galen declines from the natural order; for what is predicated in the premises is not predicated in the conclusion; likewise what is subjected in those is not subjected in this; but in this the natural order of predication and subjection of

the terms is inverted; hence it is rightly judged oblique, unnatural, and monstrous by the Peripatetics.

The assertion is proved second: what is accidental is not numbered among what is per se, as is clear of the accidental cause, which Aristotle (*2.Phys.T.33.*) does not place among the per se causes; but the fourth figure is accidental, because it is not intended per se by nature; indeed it conflicts with the natural and right order of syllogistic discursus, as was confirmed above by example. Therefore it is not to be received. Again, art imitates and perfects nature, from (*2.Phys.T.79.*), but does not invert nature and work against it; but syllogisms elaborated by artificial law are artificial or constructed by art, in the way I said above; therefore they must proceed by a natural process, which the syllogisms of the fourth figure do not do. Hence Averroes most fittingly adds: "in the conclusion of the syllogism and the figure, natural thinking does not fall." Furthermore, the modes concluding obliquely and indirectly of the first figure are of the same figure and are reverted to the directly concluding ones, as all teach; therefore the same is to be judged of the invented modes of the fourth figure, which Hurtado (*cit. §.152.*) recounts. For that transposition of propositions and the inverted disposition of the middle in the said premises does not constitute a different figure from the first; but what is disordered and imperfect in it must be ordered and reduced to the first figure.

You will object first: to that which the proper definition of a figure belongs, belongs a proper figure; but to the Galenist figure belongs the proper definition of a figure; therefore it is a true figure, number four. The major is evident through the argument from definition to the thing defined. The minor is shown: a figure is commonly described as the combination of the middle term with the extremes in the premises according to proper predication and subjection; but the fourth figure receives such a combination of the middle term in the premises, different from the remaining figures — for in it the middle is predicated in the major and subjected in the minor. Therefore the fourth place among syllogistic figures is to be attributed to it. Granting the major, I deny the minor. To its proof I say that it lacks a natural conclusion, as I explained abundantly in the second note; and for that reason, it is not established as another figure distinct from those previously named, but is to be reduced to the first, as Scotus (*cit. at the beginning of this article concl.4.*) approves.

You will object second: those are deemed suitable syllogisms and in a good figure to which the definition of the syllogism given by Aristotle (*1.Prior.cap.1.*) is adapted; but the definition of the syllogism taken generally applies to syllogisms constructed in Galen's figure; therefore the fourth figure devised by Galen and championed by the physicians is legitimate. The major is denied by no one. The minor is shown: from two affirmative premises in that figure an affirmative conclusion follows — as "every man is an animal; every animal is a body; therefore some body is a man." Likewise, in the same figure, from two negative

premises a negative conclusion is inferred — as "no man is a stone; every stone is a body; therefore some body is not a man." I concede the major; I deny the minor. To its proof I say that the inference of those syllogisms is oblique and illegitimate; hence the definition of the syllogism, which is given only for natural syllogisms, is in no way accommodated to them.

You will object third: there can be made many legitimate and suitable syllogisms of none of the three enumerated figures; therefore the ternary number of figures is deficient and insufficient. The antecedent is proved at length by the Doctor (*1.Prior.q.34.*), Tataretus (*ibid.*), and the Coimbrans (*cap.7.q.1.art.2.*) about hypothetical syllogisms — as "every man is rational or irrational; no man is irrational; therefore every man is rational." Likewise about the syllogism adduced by Aristotle (*2.Prior.*). And also about the syllogism from obliques and from opposites, examples of which see with the cited authors. I respond with Scotus (*ibid.*) that the foregoing assertion is to be understood of every categorical syllogism with straight and finite terms, but not of every hypothetical syllogism — as the adduced instances prove. The reason is that only in the categorical syllogism is there proper ordering of the middle with the extremes, according to predication and subjection in the premises, for inferring the conclusion.

Article VII. Whether the Assent to the Conclusion Differs from the Assent to the Premises.

Some Nominalists (*q.8.prol. as cited by Mastrius and Bellucius disp.11.q.2.*) opine that the act and assent by which we assent to the premises and to the conclusion is the same, and Lychetus (*q.3.prol.*) and Aureolus hint the same. And certain recent authors cite Scotus for this same view, but wrongly — as is clearly established from his passages to be adduced below. Nor are there lacking those who, though distinguishing the assent of the premises from the assent of the conclusion, nonetheless hold that once both assents are had, by a repeated assent of the conclusion the premises are cognized — so that the assent to the principles is formally comprehended in that assent to the conclusion. Ruuvius (*1.Post.cap.1.q.6.*) testifies that Saint Thomas (*1.2.q.8.art.3.*), Durand (*2.d.38.q.3.ad 3.*), and others tend toward this opinion. But Scotus (*1.Post.q.1.§.Ad aliud and q.8.9. and also q.3.Prol. and q.4.lat.A.*), Vigerius, and others (*ibid.*) assert that the assent to the conclusion differs from the assent to the principles, and that the latter is not formally included in the former.

Note first: the authors of the second position take it as established that the act of the intellect by which we assent to the premises is distinguished from the act by which we give assent to the conclusion, because each is directed toward distinct objects; and we adhere to principles on account of themselves — that is, on account of the mere explication of the terms; but to the conclusion we adhere on account of the principles, which are said to be prior, more known, and the cause of the conclusion. Taking this as an established supposition, it is inquired

whether the intellect, in having the assents of the principles and the conclusion, rests, or whether it is necessary for it to return and look back at those same principles as the account through which the assent to the conclusion is made.

Note second: the principles and the conclusion and their assents can be considered in two ways: in one way as they are objective propositions or certain objects distinct from each other, with no account of their connection and dependence had — as happens when someone gives assent to some conclusion, resting solely on the authority of a trustworthy man; thus Aureolus thinks (*in Prol. about theological matters.*). In another way, insofar as between them there exists a connection and dependence — such that assent is given to the conclusion on account of the premises as its causes. The defenders of the second opinion say that such dependence is essentially and formally included in the assent to the conclusion as its formal objective account. But although their first assertion is true, their second is not: since the conclusion, besides the essential dependence it has from the premises as effect from its cause, is itself also considered as an objective proposition in the account of an object, as Scotus (*quod.15. §. De z. infra.*) teaches. Nor are the premises the formal accounts of its assent, but its efficient causes, as will be shown in the following article. Furthermore, such assent is an act of the intellect, which as the Doctor proves (*13. quod.*) is of the genus of quality; but dependence is a relation; and no absolute thing essentially and formally includes a relation. Therefore the dependence of the conclusion on the principles, which is formally a relation, does not intrinsically enter the assent to the conclusion.

Assertion I: the assent to the conclusion does not coincide with the assent to the premises. This is Scotus (*1. Prior. q. 8. 9. and quod. 4. lat. prol. and quod. 15. and 3. d. 28. q. un. §. Ad 1. sub G.*). It is proved first from Aristotle (*1. Prior. cap. 1.*), where in defining the syllogism he calls the conclusion "something different from the premises": but the distinction of assents is taken from the distinction of the object by which they are partially caused; therefore since by Aristotle the conclusion is a distinct object from the premises, it is plainly deduced that its assent must differ from the assent of those. Furthermore, the Philosopher there (*ibid.*) when prescribing the syllogistic form notes that the middle must be placed twice in the premises, never in the conclusion. And in (*1. Post. cap. 1.*) he adds that all teaching and all learning arise from pre-existing cognition; therefore since according to Aristotle the assent to the premises precedes the assent to the conclusion, in no way is the former essentially included in the latter. Second, as a thing stands with respect to being, so with respect to being known, from (*2. Met. T. 4.*); but the premises are distinct from the conclusion in the objective account; for both are objectively considered propositions pertaining to the second operation of the intellect, and the conclusion is the third proposition collected from them pertaining to the third operation of the intellect. Therefore the assent to the premises is separated from the assent to the conclusion. Third, cause and effect receive distinct assents, as no one is

ignorant; but the premises are the causes of the conclusion and the conclusion is their effect, from what will be proved in the next article. Wherefore the assents had of each differ from each other.

Assertion II: the assent to the premises does not formally enter the assent to the conclusion, such that there is no return of the conclusion to its principles. This is openly hinted by the Doctor (*and mol.cit. and 1.d.19.q.3. §. Quantum a primum A.*). It is proved first from the common adage of philosophers: "once the terminus is acquired, motion ceases"; but the syllogism from what was said above is a kind of spiritual motion whose terminus is the conclusion, as I stated there from the cited Scotus; therefore once the conclusion is had, the intellect is at rest in its immediate cognition, and accordingly no repetition of the intellect of the conclusion to the premises is required. Second, what is prior as prior is not included in the being of what is posterior, because although the posterior depends on the prior, the prior does not in its being depend on the posterior; therefore the assent to the principles, which is prior to the assent to the conclusion, is not formally included in the assent itself to the conclusion; otherwise the conclusion would be more known and more evident than its principles, and in one and the same act the intellect would simultaneously attain the premises and the conclusion — and things of this kind and similar ones that I introduced in the second note are plainly false and absurd.

You will object first, against Assertion I: the divine intellect surveys all things in a single simple act, as Scotus writes (*in Prol.cit.*); therefore the created intellect, which is assimilated to it, if not all things, at least many things reaches in one act — both because the intellect of the Blessed knows all things in a single act in the divine essence, from (*3.d.14. and quol.15.*), and because wisdom, which is one of the five habits of the intellect and is generated from a single act by species, speculates not only the principles but also the conclusion caused from them, from (*6.Eth.cap.8.*); wherefore the created intellect can terminate at the premises and their conclusion. Granting the antecedent, the consequence is denied. The reason is that God is alien from all discursus, as I proved in the Treatise on the Knowledge of God (*disp.1.*). But the created mind knows one thing through another and from another, and its cognition is caused by things; hence, according to the diversity of objects and things, through diverse species it compares to itself diverse pieces of knowledge. And I satisfied the passages of Scotus in (*art.4 of this question note II.*). To the other thing adduced about wisdom, for its decision I observe that it can be used in two ways: either as the philosophers described it — as Augustine (*14.de Trin.*) says in these words: "wisdom is the knowledge of human and divine things," and thus it is not distinguished from science; or as Aristotle defines it (*1.Met.1.*): "wisdom is knowledge of first and highest causes," and thus it constitutes one peculiar habit of the intellect distinct from science and the others. But in whatever way it is taken, if it respects premises and conclusions inferred and collected from those,

I deny that it can be effected in one and the same simple act — as what I adduced above clearly demonstrates.

You will object second, against Assertion II: every cognitive power tends in one act toward the object and the formal account of cognizing it, as is clear concerning the visual power, which by the same act of seeing is directed toward color — which is the object of vision — and light, which is its formal account of seeing; but the assent to the principles is the formal objective account of the assent to the conclusion, because through the knowledge of the premises we assent to the conclusion. Therefore the assent to the premises is formally included in the assent to the conclusion. Certain recent authors respond that the major is true of the account of cognizing "in which" — as they correctly exemplify with light and color — but not of the account of cognizing "from which," such as are the principles with respect to the conclusion. Or if the major is admitted, it can be said regarding the minor that the premises are not the formal and objective accounts of cognizing the conclusion, but its effecting accounts — as I pledged to show in the following article.

You will object third: the manner of philosophizing about acts of the intellect should be roughly the same as that in which we philosophize about the acts of the will with respect to their means and attainment of ends; but by the same act the will tends toward the means, toward the end through the means, and toward the end itself; therefore likewise the intellect in one act attains the principles and their conclusion. Scotus (*3.d.28.q.un. §.Ad 1.sub G.*) responds — and the Coimbrans (*1.Post.q.4.c.1.art.5.ad 2.*) follow — denying the parity. For with respect to the end and means there is only one goodness that the act of the will respects, by reason of which the will is moved through means to the attainment of the end. But in the premises and conclusion there are two objective accounts moving the intellect to their attainment — namely, the truth of the principles, which is had from the terms and is called immediate truth; and the truth of the conclusion obtained through the premises, which is called mediate truth. For this reason there are two acts of the intellect: one by which it tends toward the principles, the other by which it tends toward the conclusion drawn from them.

You will press: Scotus (*1.d.8.q.4.*) says that the truth of the conclusion is nothing other than a certain participation of the truth of the principles or premises; therefore no other assent of the conclusion than the assent to the premises is to be distinguished in his doctrine. I respond that Scotus intends there that the truth of the conclusion is virtually contained in the truth of the premises, just as an effect is virtually contained in its cause; hence he asserts that the truth of the conclusion is a participation of the truth of the principles. But formally the conclusion enjoys its own truth, distinct from the truth of the premises — as the Doctor (*6.Met.q.1. and 1.d.1.q.3. §.Quantum ad 1.A.*) clearly declares, besides the passages cited above.

Article VIII. Whether the Premises Are the Cause of the Conclusion.

All logicians with unanimous consent affirm that the principles are the cause of the conclusion; but in what genus of cause they are to be located, there is among them no small dispute. For some — such as Rubionius (*in Prol.q.8.art.4.*) — think the premises are causes of the conclusion in the genus of material cause only. Others — such as Hurtado (*disp.7.de anima sect.8.*) and Arriaga (*in Log.disp.15.sect.5.*) — refer the causality of the principles with respect to the conclusion to the genus of formal cause. But Scotus (*1.Post.q.2.§.Ad 1. and q.8.§.Ad 1. and q.9.§.Ad q. and q.1.Prol.§.Ad 2.ante 5.*), Mair (*1.Post.cap.2.dub.1.*), Tataretus (*ibid.q.1.dub.3. and 2.Prio.in fine q.*), and Ruuvius (*1.Post.q.5.*) teach that the premises cause the conclusion in the genus of efficient cause and material cause. The Thomists think the same, with Saint Thomas (*2.Post.lect.3.*).

Note, from Scotus (*1.Post. especially q.1.§.Quantum ad 3.*): the principles being the cause of the conclusion can be considered in two ways — either according to themselves, or as they are applied to the conclusion. In the first way the principles are called the cause of the conclusion virtually and potentially only. In the second way the principles are called the cause of the conclusion virtually and under their proper account. Other modes of causality of the principles in relation to the conclusion Mair (*ubi supra*) adds and weighs, which can be seen with him, since these two modes that I assigned suffice us for untying this difficulty. Furthermore, I observe with the Doctor (*1.d.5.q.2.G.*) that the preposition "ex" sometimes denotes the subject or material cause from which something is made — in which way natural forms are drawn out from the potency of matter, and artificial forms from natural composites, as a figure of Caesar from wood: thus Genesis VI, God commanded Noah to preserve the ark from planed planks. Sometimes it signifies the efficient or originating principle — as Ecclesiasticus XXIV: "I came forth from the mouth of the most High, the firstborn." And Psalm CIX: "From the womb before the morning star I begot you." Sometimes both simultaneously — as from the father supplying the seed the son is said to be produced and generated, where the material and efficient principle is designated; likewise in our matter from the principles as material and efficient causes the conclusion is produced.

The assertion is: the principles can be called material and efficient causes of the conclusion. This assertion in both parts is handed down by the Doctor (*in the cited places*), most explicitly in (*1.Post.q.8.vers.Ad aliud.*). The first part is proved first from Aristotle, who (*2.Post. at the beginning of cap.1.*) leaves in writing this pronouncement: "All teaching and all learning come from pre-existing cognition" — where the greater part of interpreters understand by teaching and learning the discursive knowledge that is had about the conclusion and is caused from the premises; but what is a presupposed subject for effecting something is a material cause, as is clear from the definition of matter (*2.Phys.T.28.*).

Therefore since the major and minor extremes with the verbal copula joining them to each other precede the premises in producing the conclusion — the major and minor being linked to the conclusion — it is most clearly deduced

that the premises exercise material causality in producing the conclusion. Second, the particle "ex" sometimes denotes the material cause from which something is made, as I noted; but all concede that the conclusion is deduced from the premises as its principles, and that besides the middle the remaining terms are placed in the conclusion. The second part is proved first from the same Philosopher (*ibid.cap.2. of the first Post.*), plainly conceding that the premises of demonstration are the causes of the conclusion; hence, using "syllogism" for the premises alone, he adds that demonstration is a syllogism making one know or generating science; but science is cognition through a cause; therefore since the name of cause and effect is there posited absolutely — and by Aristotle (*2.Phys.T.21.*) concerning an efficient cause and the effect of that same efficient cause — the Philosopher himself is to be explained accordingly. Second, the certainty and evidence of the conclusion depends on the certainty and evidence of the premises, as the Stagirite expressly teaches in the same passage, adducing that axiom: "on account of which a thing is such and such, it is so even more"; therefore there seems to be no doubt that the premises contribute effectively to producing the conclusion. Again, in the most powerful demonstration, the middle and the definition of the subject — as will be shown in the proper question — and the predicate of the conclusion is the proper property of the said subject, caused by the subject itself; and the quidditative definition always has an essential part of the thing, which presents the cause of such a property, as is evidently seen in this demonstration: "every rational being is risible; every man is rational; therefore every man is risible." Again, the conclusion in some way assimilates the premises; and we assent to the conclusion on account of the premises; wherefore the premises are rightly deemed efficient causes of the conclusion.

You will object first: what can exist without another is not caused by it, because an effect necessarily presupposes its cause, from which it receives being — if not in actual being, at least in the process of coming to be; but the conclusion can exist without the premises, as is clear in one who proposes logical conclusions for discussion — such as "Logic is a science," "Logic is speculative," and the like — in which the majors and minors of them are not present; therefore the conclusion is not caused by the premises. Granting the major, the minor is to be distinguished: the conclusion can exist without the preceding efficiency of the premises being exerted, I deny. For just as an effect cannot be produced or have been produced without its producing cause, so the conclusion cannot have being without the principles; after the efficiency of the premises has been exerted, I concede: for any effect that does not depend in being and in the process of coming to be on its cause, remains in being when the cause is absent or has perished — as is clear of a house constructed by a builder, which, when he is absent or dead, perseveres in being. Or it can be said that these are conclusions not formally but materially taken, as I declared in (*art.5 of this question note II.*). Or say that propositions of this kind are in reality not

conclusions but claim for themselves the name of conclusions — because the premises are supposed to have been applied to the syllogistic form in the writings of those defending them, or at least are retained in memory by the same persons, if not in act then at least in habit.

You will object second: science can be had without an adhesive cognition of the premises; but science is the habit of the conclusion, from (*1.Post.cap.2.*). Therefore if science can exist without the cognition of the premises, the conclusion can likewise exist without the premises. The major is proved: whatever God can effect together with a secondary cause, he can effect by himself alone, as theologians commonly hold; but God together with the created intellect produces the science of the conclusion; therefore without the created intellect he can produce it; but such science would lack premises, because it would not proceed from a discursive intellect — since God, from whom all discursus is far removed, would produce it immediately; therefore the conclusion can be had without the premises being had first. I respond that the argument holds of supernatural power, but not of natural power. Or, what seems to come to the same thing, the objection proceeds about infused science, not about acquired science, of which logicians speak.

You will object fifth: if the third operation of the intellect, which is expressed by the name of conclusion, is produced by the principles, then likewise the second operation would be effected by the first operation, since the reasoning seems equal for both; but the second operation is not produced by the first. For the apprehension of simples and the cognition of incomplex things is not the cause of the composition of those same terms; therefore neither is the third produced by the two first, which are called premises. Granting the major, I distinguish the minor: about terms that are self-evidently evident by their own nature, I deny; about non-evident terms, I concede. This solution is drawn from the Doctor (*3.d.23.q.un. §. Aliter E.*). For every evident term generates knowledge of itself in the intellect through its own species; then the intellect composes or divides such terms, and such composition or division is called the second operation — flowing from those same incomplex terms that actively and partially concur in eliciting it.

You will object fourth: what determines and actualizes an undetermined and indifferent subject to receiving something pertains to the genus of formal cause, as is self-evident; but the assent to the premises actualizes and determines the intellect toward this or that conclusion, because from these or those premises, this or that conclusion is deduced; therefore the concurrence of the premises for inferring the conclusion is reverted to the genus of formal cause. Granting the major, the minor is to be distinguished: the premises only determine the intellect, I deny; the premises determine and simultaneously concur to effect the conclusion, I concede. The example is at hand regarding the intelligible species of the object, which not only determines the intellect toward the

intellection of the object of which it is the species, but also together with the intellect actively concurs to cause the very knowledge of that same object.

Article IX. In What Way the Premises Precede the Conclusion.

It is taken as established by Aristotle and all his interpreters in this work that the premises are prior to the conclusion; but there is dispute among them about what sort of priority this should be understood as — whether priority of time, as Capreolus (*2.d.3.q.2.*) thinks, or priority of nature, as the more common opinion of logicians holds — notably Scotus (*1.Post.q.8. and q.9. and q.3.prol.principale and q.4.lat.shortly after A.*), Lychetus, Vigerius, and Tataretus — both there and in (*1.Post.q.1.dub.3.*) — as well as Mair (*1.Post.cap.1.dub.3.*), who affirm that the premises precede the conclusion in priority of nature.

Note first: in this article it is not called into question whether the cognition of the premises can be acquired prior in time to the cognition of the conclusion; for since from what was said the assents are distinct, one can consequently be compared after another with some temporal delay. Nor is it disputed whether the premises, insofar as they are certain propositions taken separately in mode and figure without being disposed, can be cognized prior in time to the conclusion — for that is certain and can occur, as the Doctor does not deny (*1.Post.q.8. §.Ad primam.*). But the difficulty is whether the premises aptly disposed according to form and figure, with no obstacle interposed, are cognized prior in time or in nature — whether in apprehensive or adhesive cognition — to the conclusion.

Note second, from the Doctor (*praecit.*): cause and caused can be considered in two ways — formally, that is, insofar as they regard each other mutually and are correlatives; or materially, that is, for the foundation and terminus of cause and caused. This distinction is sufficiently clear from what was said in the question on relation; hence I do not explain it further here. Observe also from the same author (*ibid.q.1.8.*) after Aristotle (*2.Prior.cap.26.*) that the conclusion can be known in universal and in particular, whether in habit or in act. The conclusion is known in universal when the major is cognized, without the minor and conclusion being cognized in themselves; for if "every mule is sterile" is cognized, it is known in universal that this mule is sterile. The conclusion is known in particular and in habit, when the major and minor are cognized, but it is not yet adverted that the minor actually falls under the major — and in this twofold way the premises are cognized prior in nature and in time to the conclusion in act. Finally, the conclusion is cognized in act when the premises are actually aptly disposed and applied to producing the conclusion; and thus, once the premises are cognized, the conclusion is cognized simultaneously in time.

The assertion is: the premises and conclusion taken formally are simultaneous in nature; taken materially, they are simultaneous in time with the conclusion,

yet prior in nature to the conclusion itself. The assertion is threefold and is handed down by the Doctor (*ubi supra.*). The first part is proved: relatives are simultaneous in nature, from the chapter on "ad aliquid"; but the premises and conclusion are relatives — for they are cause and effect, from what was asserted above, and that these are to be numbered among relatives is clear from (*5.Met.cap.de relatione*); therefore they enjoy simultaneity of nature. The second part is proved from (*1.Post.cap.7.*): once the major is cognized, the conclusion is simultaneously cognized in time, as Mair notes in the said passage — provided the intellect is not indisposed and the will does not divert it from the consideration of that same object. Third, a sufficient natural cause, unimpeded, with all requisites for acting in place, has its fitting effect — as is clear concerning the sun with respect to light and fire with respect to heat, as the Doctor pursues at length (*2.d.1.q.3.*). But the premises together with the intellect are natural efficient causes and unimpeded, if they are ordered in mode and figure; therefore in the same moment of time they produce the conclusion; and thus, once the premises are cognized, the conclusion is simultaneously cognized in time. Hence Scotus (*cit.1.Post.q.8.¶.Ad 2.*) rightly adds: "the premises thus applied contain the conclusion in power, just as an efficient thing disposed contains its effect; but an efficient thing posits its effect in act in every disposed matter," etc. The third part is proved: the cause at least in nature precedes its effect, as I said in the treatise on causes; but the premises are the causes of the conclusion, as I proved in the preceding article. Again, that on which something essentially depends is prior in nature to that which depends on it, as is clear from the Postpredicaments; but the conclusion essentially depends on the premises; therefore the premises precede the conclusion in nature.

You will object first: the material cause antecedes in time the effect proceeding from it and inhering in it, as Aristotle proves (*7.Met.T.4.*) of substance, which precedes every accident in cognition, definition, and time; but the premises are material causes of the conclusion, as I asserted with Scotus in the preceding article; therefore the premises are prior in time to the conclusion. Confirmation, from (*1.Prior.cap.26.*): it can happen to know every mule to be sterile and to doubt whether it has something in the womb; therefore, with the premises examined, the conclusion can be unknown — and so the premises and the conclusion are not simultaneously known in time. I respond with Scotus (*cit.*) that the premises receive the account not only of material cause but also of efficient cause with respect to the conclusion; hence nothing prevents the conclusion from being cognized simultaneously in time with them. The passage of Aristotle adduced I explain in the Metaphysics and in (*lib.2.q.6.*) shortly to be published. In the meantime see Scotus (*in that text.*). To the confirmation I say, with the same Doctor, that the objection holds for premises not applied according to the syllogistic form, but not for premises suitably disposed in mode and figure and rightly applied to inferring the conclusion. This response is approved and confirmed by Mair (*alleg.objection 5.*).

You will object second: motion occurs successively and in time, as all philosophers teach with Aristotle (*5.Phys.cap.1.T.10.*); but discursus is a kind of motion, as is clear from what was said in (*art.5 of this question*) — for the intellect, by discoursing from the premises as the terminus from which, passes to the conclusion as the terminus to which; and so it first knows the principles and subsequently the conclusion, which cannot be done without some interval of time. Granting the major, regarding the minor I say that discursus is called motion not properly but by analogy. Although motion is required in constructing, disposing, and cognizing the premises, as the argument proves, yet once the cognition of the well-disposed premises is had and all impediments removed, the cognition of the conclusion is simultaneously acquired in time — and this is what Aristotle affirms near the beginning of this book and what Scotus accepts at the end of the cited (*q.8.*).

You will object third: our intellect, being of finite and limited power, cannot attain by its cognition multiple things as multiple, from (*2.Top.cap.9.locus 33.*), where it is read: "it can happen to know many things, but not to think of them simultaneously"; but the premises and conclusion are multiple intelligibles; therefore they cannot simultaneously be cognized by the intellect. I respond that the maxim of the Stagirite by which the major is firm is to be interpreted about many things that share no order and mutual relation; in this sense, though many things are known in habit, not in act; and given that many things are actually perceived, not equally perfectly and clearly — just as if one were attained by actual cognition, according to that common saying, "for him who attends to many things, the sense for each is less," as the Doctor says (*2.d.42.q.1.§.Respondeo G.*). But about many things that have no connection between them, it can be conceded that the intellect does not direct its cognition as intensely and perfectly as if it were to terminate at one object alone, as is clear of an intellect detained and occupied about many things. Especially because it is probable that the intellect understands many disparate things in act, as is clear of the sense of sight, which in a sheet simultaneously perceives blackness and whiteness — which is to be asserted with all the more right of the intellect, which is a superior and more eminent power, as after Scotus (*cit.*) Mair and Tataretus note (*ubi supra.*). And these authors confirm this concerning the comparative act of the intellect, by which many things are understood, when one known object is compared through it to another known object. Therefore the intellect can simultaneously understand many things ordered and disordered, in the way now set forth.

You will object fourth: if the premises together with the conclusion were cognized in the same instant of time, then no sophism and no error would occur, because in every paralogism the conclusion would immediately be inferred once the premises were pre-cognized. The consequence is to be denied: for a sophism is committed when no right application of the premises in mode and figure is made for inferring the conclusion. But once their fitting

application is had, a good logician simultaneously in time well knows what conclusion is to be deduced from such premises, and what is not to be deduced — as the Doctor carefully notes (*1.Post. at the end of q.8.*).

Article X. Whether, Once the Assents to the Premises Are Had, the Intellect Is Necessitated to the Assent to the Conclusion.

The question of the present article is whether, once the assents to evident premises aptly disposed and properly ordered in mode and syllogistic figure are had, the intellect necessarily assents to the conclusion; or whether it can dissent from it, be impeded or restrained by the command of the will. On this, two opposing views are recounted and celebrated by recent logicians. The one, maintained by Ruuvius (*1.Post.cap.1.q.8.*) and Aversa (*q.25.sect.3.*), affirms that once the assents to the premises are admitted, the will can suspend the assent to the conclusion and divert the intellect to the consideration of other objects. The other is that of Scotus — both in (*1.Post.q.8.§.Ad q. and §.Ad primam and q.9.§.Ad primam*) and also in (*1.d.1.q.4.§.Ad argumenta and 2.d.6.q.1.§.Respondeo H. and d.41.q.4.§.Quantum ad 1.E. and Quol.16.§.de 1.circa C.and D.*) — of Mair (*1.Post.dub.3.§.Quarto arguitur.*), Lychetus, Gadius in his commentaries on the cited Scotus, Fonseca (*1.Met.cap.2.q.3.sect.7.*), and others, who hold that the intellect, once the assents to the principles are had, cannot be restrained from the assent to the conclusion by the will's command, and diverted to other objects.

Note first: although from Saint Augustine (*2.de lib.arb.*) as cited by Scotus (*2.d.42.q.4.§.Ad qq.istas B.*), the will is the mover in the whole kingdom of the soul and all things obey it — that is, all its powers both organic and non-organic comply with the very will — nonetheless in certain of their operations they seem in no way to be subject to the will's command. First, just as the will in being presupposes the intellect, so the operation of the will presupposes the operation of the intellect, according to that common saying: "nothing is willed unless foreknown." Likewise, all the first movements of the other powers are not under the power of the will; in this sense the Doctor (*cit.§.Ad 1.sub R.*) explains that passage of the Apostle (*Rom.VII.*): "the good that I will, I do not do." The same Augustine (*alleg.cap.15.*) asserts: "it is not in our power that we are not affected and influenced by what is seen" — and the Doctor accepts this (*in the memorated passage §.Quantum ad 1.circa D.*), proving it thus: some thought necessarily precedes every act of willing, at least in nature; but what precedes every act of willing and is prior in nature is at least not in our power; the will can however be pleased with it, confirm the intellect in its consideration, avert it from it, and convert it to another and to many others indistinctly and imperfectly — as the Doctor explicitly hands down (*ibid.§.Respondeo F.G.*). Furthermore, the other powers of the soul — or even of the whole composite — such as the generative, nutritive, vegetative, and sensitive, obey the will insofar as they depend on the motive power; so the nutritive requires the application of

nutriment and the approximation of active to passive, and with respect to this and similar operations can be said to be under the yoke of the will. But once all that is necessary for acting is in place, with no obstacle intervening, since they are natural and necessary powers, they cannot be restrained — as open eyes rightly disposed, with the visible object present at the proper distance, the will cannot make them not see such an object. Similarly, unwilling the will, the ear properly disposed cannot not hear, at the proper distance, a vehement sound; and every sense is struck by a most powerful sensible object acting with great force and cannot not feel pain if it is harmful and adverse to it, or not feel pleasure if it is delightful, as the Doctor hints (*3.dist.15.q.un.*). Say the same of the intellect: which, being a natural power, with an evident object proposed to it and the remaining requisites in place, cannot restrain itself from emitting the act of understanding, even with the will opposing it. But after the emission of the act, the will can call the intellect away, so that it desists from its contemplation, or persists in it, or turns to the cognition of another — as Scotus writes (*1.d.1.q.4. §.si tenendo.*)

Note second, from the received doctrine of all theologians, especially Scotus (*1.d.10.q.un. and also Quol.16.art.2.*), Gadius (*ibid.fol.168. and in the Report of the first d.40.q.un.*): there is a twofold freedom of the will — namely freedom of contradiction and freedom of contrariety. Freedom of contradiction, which is also called freedom of exercise, is that by which, with all requisites for acting in place, the will can will or not will, unwill or not unwill this or that; and it is called freedom of contradiction because the acts of willing and not willing, likewise the acts of unwilling and not unwilling, are contradictory. Freedom of contrariety, which is also called freedom of specification, is that by which the will can elicit opposite acts — which are willing and unwilling, loving and hating. The will, moreover, determines itself with the determination of specification in eliciting an act of the same kind concerning the object presented to it — namely the act of willing and not simultaneously the contrary act, namely the act of unwilling. So in its own way the intellect is determined with the determination of specification toward assent to the object presented to it, and not toward dissent from it. Furthermore, the will determines itself with the determination of exercise toward one act alone — as some say that the will is necessitated in loving good in common. Likewise the intellect is determined with the determination of exercise, when it assents to an object in such a way that it cannot dissent from it; and in this the whole difficulty consists — whether the intellect, evidently assenting to the premises, is necessitated to assent to the conclusion, or whether by the will's command it can be drawn away from that assent or attracted to other objects for examination.

The assertion is: once the assent to the premises about necessary and evident things is had, the intellect is so necessitated to providing assent to the conclusion that the will cannot tear it from the said assent and lead it to the contrary. So Scotus (*cit.*). It is proved first from Aristotle (*2.Phys.T. and*

9.*Eth.cap.3.*), affirming that once the assents to the premises are given, the intellect simply tends toward the conclusion. Second, the conclusion necessarily follows from the conceded premises, as is plainly clear from the definition of the syllogism that the Philosopher gives (1.*Prior.c.1.*). Therefore once the premises are posited, the intellect is compelled to assent to the conclusion even against the will's wishes, for a natural power — as the intellect is — with all that is necessary for acting prepared, acts at once, as I made clear in the first note. Especially because the object and the intellect alone are causes of knowledge, not the will; and an evident object has greater efficacy, force, and weight than the will's command. Third, what is essentially or really the same as another is inseparable from it, as our Formalists commonly teach with Scotus in the Tract on Formalitates; but the conclusion is really or essentially the same as the premises in a demonstrative syllogism — as will be made plain in the question on demonstration — and the reason is that through the middle term placed in the premises, the two extremes are necessarily united in the conclusion. Therefore just as necessary assent is provided to the premises through the assumed middle, so to the conclusion — in which such extremes are demonstrated as united — assent is necessarily provided by the intellect, such that whether the will wills or wills not, the intellect cannot retreat from it. This the Doctor lucidly explains (2.*d.6.q.1.ante §.Ad 1.principale sub H.*).

You will say that all of this is true when the will is not opposing; but if the will wills, it can impede the intellect from providing assent to the conclusion. Against this: just as the will cannot restrain the sensitive appetite from an object vehemently delightful or distressing to it, properly approximated; nor the vegetative, generative, and sensitive faculty, with all that is pre-required for their operations in place, from those very operations — as we verify in ourselves by daily experience; otherwise the will could impede man from being cold in winter and hot in summer, and a woman from bringing forth in that pain, and from being afflicted by inconveniences, persistent hardships, and labors — so the intellect, with the assents to the premises had, cannot be torn from assent to the conclusion by the will in the least.

You will object first: as the will stands with respect to its object, which is the good, so the intellect stands with respect to its object, which is the true. For every power seems to regard in roughly the same way the object with which it is occupied, and to require the same conditions in its own way; but the will does not necessarily tend toward the good, even if it were the supreme good, as Scotus (1.*d.1.q.4. §.Quartum and quol.16.*) asserts. Therefore neither does the intellect necessarily tend toward the evident and apparent true. I deny the major. The reason is that although the object of each power is the same and common — not contracted and narrowed by truth or goodness, as I proved with Scotus in the Treatise on the Knowability of God (*disp.1.*) — nonetheless there exists a not insignificant difference between these powers. For the intellect is a natural power and the will is a free power, which receive an opposite mode of

initiating, from the Doctor (*in 1.cit. §.Ista q.*). Hence the former necessarily and naturally, the latter freely, labors about its object.

You will object second: the will dominates all the powers of the soul, both material and spiritual, just as a king absolutely commands all his subjects, great and small — as I was saying with Augustine above; therefore the will, after the assent to the principles, can impede the intellect from providing assent to the conclusion. The consequence is proved: he who can the greater can the lesser, as is clear from the Epitome (*lib.3.q.3.art.4.num.11.*); but the will by its command can prohibit the intellect from giving assent to the premises, in which there is greater evidence; therefore it can also effect that the intellect does not assent to the conclusion deduced from them, in which there is lesser evidence — as Aristotle admits (*1.Post.cap.3.*). The major is known: for he who can bear a weight of fifteen pounds can certainly bear a weight of ten pounds, as is clear from experience. The minor is urged — both because no one experiences being compelled in assenting to first principles, and because there seems to be a certain contention about them, as Orbellis (*4.Met.q.5.*) shows. It can be responded that the antecedent is true in obscure matters, but not in evident matters. Or, given the antecedent, I distinguish the consequence: directly, I deny; indirectly, I concede. This the Doctor expressed (*nuper alleg. §.Si tenendo.*) and I explained above in the first note. To its proof I say that the major holds in things that are of the same account, as the example of weight plainly shows; but not of things that are of another account. For it does not follow that if a man can generate a man, he can also generate a mosquito or a plant, which is a lesser work. Or if that perhaps can hold for assenting to the premises, not so once the assents to the premises about things clearly and distinctly cognized are had, as the Doctor hints (*3.d.23.q.un. §.Aliter post F.*).

You will object third: the same is the account of necessarily operating and necessarily persisting in operating — "if simply, then simply; if when it can, then when it can" — as the Doctor argues (*in 1.alleg.q.4.vers.Item ad principale.*). But the intellect can be withdrawn by the will, so that it does not persist in the cognition of certain things, as Scotus admits — both there and also in (*Quol.16.*) and (*4.d.49.q.0.*). Therefore, with the premises conceded, the will can restrain it from being drawn into assent to the conclusion. Granting the major, I distinguish the minor: directly, I deny; indirectly, I concede — the Doctor in the cited places is to be explained in this way.

You will press, from (*2.Phys.T.89. and 7.Eth.cap.32.*): "as principle is in speculative matters, so is end in practical matters"; but the intellect necessarily assents to principles; therefore the will also assents necessarily to the end — and accordingly with the practical dictate posited, the will necessarily assents to it, as the Stagirite acknowledges (*1.Eth.cap.2.*); and accordingly neither directly nor indirectly can the will suspend and restrain the operation of the intellect. All the more so because in things that are natural and necessary, no habit is to be

admitted, as is clear from the Doctor (*2.d.2.q.10.*). Therefore if the intellect necessarily provides assent to the conclusion, no habit about the conclusion is to be given — which is absurd. I respond that the maxim of Aristotle is explained by the Doctor (*in 4.cit. §. Ad primum M.*): namely that the parallel is placed in this — that as the truth of the conclusion is ordered to the truth of the premises, so the goodness of the means is ordered to the end; and this holds in comparing principles to objects and ends, but not with respect to powers. For the intellect is a natural power and the will is a free power; hence the former acts necessarily and the latter freely. To what is added from the same Aristotle, I say that is not true absolutely but conditionally — that is, if the will is right and follows natural inclination; just as man is said to necessarily will beatitude — that is, by Scotus's interpretation, with natural appetite, but not with the elicited act of the free appetite. To the other thing I say that the antecedent is true of things that are not knowing; such things are indeed capable of habits; but false of knowing things, in which inheres a habit for operating easily, delightfully, intensely, and promptly — as Scotus writes (*3.d.33.q.un.B. and in the Report of the same d. and q.alleg.*). You will object fourth: what is indifferent to doing or receiving something must be determined by something (except the will, which determines itself), as is clear of matter — which, being indifferent and undetermined, is determined and limited by the supervening form; but the intellect is sometimes undetermined toward eliciting two conclusions — namely the direct and the indirect — as is clear when the premises are disposed in the modes of the first figure, of which some conclude directly and others indirectly, and by which it is not determined more toward one than toward the other conclusion. Therefore it is determined by the will toward one or the other; and accordingly once the premises are given, the will can suspend and divert the intellect itself, so that it does not provide assent to the conclusion. Granting the major, to the minor I say that the intellect is determined by the premises to assenting to the direct conclusion necessarily, primarily, and immediately; to the indirect conclusion, secondarily and mediately. And this can be explained concerning light, which is directed directly toward a mirror and indirectly toward us looking at such a mirror.

Question II. On Precognitions and Precognita.

Article I. What is the Subject of This Work.

In this and the following questions we must examine the Posterior Analytics fully and completely. These works shine with such dignity and nobility that they illuminate all the other parts of Logic, and they are of such weight and importance that, when neglected and unknown, philosophical and theological doctrines seem likewise to be unknown, as Maior affirms in the Proem of this work, Zabarella at the end of his dedicatory epistle to his commentary on the Posterior Books, and Sarnanus (*9.1. universalium pag. 15*). In this work the genius of Aristotle shone so brightly that Alexander the Peripatetic publicly declares

that Aristotle taught the art of demonstrating. For this reason, perhaps, lest so great a work should be accessible to everyone, Themistius the distinguished Peripatetic believed in the beginning of his Paraphrase that the philosopher deliberately concealed and obscured it — or rather, what is more pleasing, he did so because of its excellence and eminence, for not all are capable of reaching sublime things, according to the well-known saying: not everyone is given to go to Corinth, to which is accommodated that text of Matthew XIX: not all receive that word, although it was spoken to intimate something else. And so a certain Doctor says that all must view the cottages of Vitriacus. The meaning is that each person, according to the capacity of his own intellect, can acquire for himself knowledge, if not of the sublime things of this present work, at least of its humbler contents. And this, concerning sincere truths, together with Augustine (9. *de Trin.* c.6), Scotus openly sets forth (1.d.3.q.4. §. *Ad q. ante V*): for it belongs to few, as the same Augustine teaches (12. *Trin.* c. 14), to arrive by the eye of the mind at intelligible reasons, and only pure souls attain them. Wherefore, together with Aristotle and Scotus, we here diligently and carefully examine the demonstrative knowledge of the Posterior Books, beginning from its elements and principles, from which its essence is composed, and we shall investigate it and its properties as far as the weakness of our modest intellect permits — provided we first determine the object of these books.

Article I. What is the Subject of This Work.

Some, such as Averroes and Theophrastus in this place, hold that demonstration together with definition is the proper and adequate object of these books. The common opinion, however, is that of Scotus (1. *Prior.* near the end, q.2. and 1. *Post.* at the close of q.2), Maior (*ibid.*), Zabarella, in his commentary, Faber (*Theor.* 19), and others who teach that demonstration is the subject of attribution and the total subject of this work, and with these we take our stand.

Assertion. Demonstration alone is the primary and adequate object of these Posterior Books. Scotus holds this in the place cited above, and I prove it, first, from Aristotle (1. *Prior.* c.4), where in the Prior Books he proposes to treat of the syllogism in general, and in the Posterior Books of the demonstrative syllogism; and he gives his reason, namely that the syllogism taken in general is more universal than the demonstrative syllogism, which is particular, dealing with necessary matter, and falls under that common form as a particular and inferior falls under the common and superior. Moreover, in these books the philosopher provides the method of resolving the syllogism into necessary matter, and is entirely occupied with setting forth the nature of demonstration, its properties, the conditions necessary for it, and its effect which is science, as is clear to the reader. Since, therefore, from what was said in the Prolegomena (q.3), the object of a science is that with which the whole science is occupied, together with the other conditions assigned there — which are rightly applied to demonstration — it is plainly deduced that the subject of these books is demonstration.

Furthermore, there is an equal reason for the object of the whole science as for the object of a part: a single total science has a single total object, as all philosophers and theologians unanimously and in common proclaim. Therefore, since a single total subject has been established for all of Logic, in like manner a single partial object must be established for this demonstrative part, which is demonstration alone, as will appear more clearly from the solution of the arguments of the composite opinion.

You will object, first, that Aristotle (*1. Post. c.7*) and elsewhere in the same work (*c.3*) treats of certain matters concerning definition, and there separates it from demonstration as a distinct instrument of knowing: therefore in these books not only demonstration but also definition is established as the adequate object. I reply that Aristotle in those places treats of definition insofar as it serves demonstration, as Faber observes above all others (*Theor.6.c.3*): for definition is its middle term, or its conclusion, or the entire demonstration differing from it only in the arrangement of terms, as is stated in the passage just cited (*1. Post*).

You will object, second, that three modes of knowing, distinct from one another, are enumerated by common consent of the dialecticians: therefore, according to their distinction, a distinct treatment and proper place must be assigned to each of them for examination. No other proper place seems available than in these Posterior Analytics. For in the sixth book of the Topics, where definition is mentioned, it is rather exercised than taught, as the Conimbricenses note with Alexander at the beginning of their commentary. And in the Metaphysics the common quiddities of things are considered, while definition as a mode of knowing is left to Logic itself to discuss. Therefore the subject of these books is definition together with demonstration. It may be added that definition surpasses demonstration in nobility, because the former investigates what a thing is, while the latter investigates what kind of thing it is; and the quiddity of a thing is more noble than its quality, from the first book of the Metaphysics (*T.4*). Therefore, it is not definition that is ordered to demonstration, but rather demonstration that is ordered to definition, as regarded by Logic. I reply that Aristotle, while he does indeed treat promiscuously of demonstration and definition in this work, nevertheless does not treat of definition through itself and immediately, but only insofar as definition serves demonstration, as I was saying just above. A proper and special place for definition must indeed be conceded, in which definition itself is considered; and that Aristotle provided this through five books is stated in the catalogue of his works — although those books have not come down to us, just as certain others listed in the same index have not, notably the book on Division, which Boethius afterward composed as a complement to Logic. To the additional point, I deny the major premise: for demonstration includes definition either as a part, or as a principle, or as a conclusion, or finally because it differs from it only in the syllogistic form, as Scotus notes (*q. proxime alleg.*). Aristotle moreover wishes it to be more excellent

to contemplate only the quiddity of a thing than its quality; yet demonstration encompasses both, and for that reason surpasses definition.

Article II. Whether All Teaching and Learning Arises from Pre-existing Knowledge.

Zabarella (*1. Post. at the very beginning of c.1*) sets in print that the proposed difficulty, viewed through the various interpretations of commentators — which may be seen among the more recent dialecticians — is extremely obscure; but that, viewed in the text itself as it stands, it is most clear. I shall dispose of it quickly, once I have first premised certain matters that make for its understanding.

Note first, from Maior (*1. Post. propositione 2*), Tataretus (*ibid. q.1. scibili 1*), and others, that teaching and learning coincide in nearly the same thing, though they differ from one another in concept or by reason of diverse respect: for one and the same science is denoted by these two names, namely teaching and learning, but in different ways — it is called teaching insofar as it proceeds from the teacher by voice or writing, and learning insofar as it is received in the learner. Aristotle himself asserts the same thing (*3. Phys. summ. 2. c.6. T.19*), saying that teaching and learning are the same science, just as action and passion are the same motion; although no small difference intervenes between these, for teaching and learning belong to the same genus and are identified really and formally, while action and passion, though really the same, as will be shown in its proper place, are formally distinct from one another.

Note second that cognition taken universally is twofold: sensitive and intellective. Sensitive cognition is subdivided into external, which arises from the external sense with its object present — as sight arises from the sense of sight regarding a color presented to it — and internal, which arises from an internal sense subsequent to cognition by the external sense, regarding a sensible object, as in the sensation of the common sense or of the imagination. Intellective cognition is likewise twofold: incomplex and complex. Incomplex cognition is that which is had of some simple and incomplex thing, by means of a sensible and intelligible species subsequent to the cognitions of the external and internal senses. Complex cognition, on the other hand, is that which, all the foregoing having been posited, is had of some complex or composite thing through the intellect, whether from the side of the thing it is capable of composition or not.

Note third, from the aforementioned Maior after Scotus (*here, q.1. §. Ad quaest.*), that Aristotle established the proposition, all teaching and all learning arises from pre-existing knowledge, against the ancient Academics, especially Heraclitus, Cratylus, and Socrates, who held that all things are unknowable — as Aristotle expressly recounts about Socrates (*4. Eth. c.7*) — and also against the more recent Academics, namely the Platonists, who held that while we do know

some things, nothing is known anew but only through recollection. And by the particles all teaching and all learning, Aristotle refutes the former; by the remaining particles, he refutes the latter philosophers.

First Assertion. Every cognition that is intellective arises from a preceding sensitive internal cognition; sensitive internal cognition arises from sensitive external cognition; and at the level of external sensation we stop. So Scotus in the place just cited, and this is attested by experience, and shines forth most clearly in the manner I showed how the universal formally comes to be and is known, in the second chapter, question I, article VIII. For the cognitive powers of the soul are so disposed and bound together by nature that the higher and more noble ones, in the present state, require and presuppose in their operation the operation of the lower and less noble ones. Hence is celebrated that well-known saying of the philosopher from the book on sense and the sensible (*c.1*), adduced and explained by the Doctor (*q.2. Universalium*): Nothing is in the intellect that was not first in the sense.

Second Assertion. Complex intellective cognition presupposes incomplex knowledge of terms; and complex cognition of a conclusion requires prior cognition of the premises. This assertion is delivered by the Doctor in both its parts in the place cited. As to the first part: it is an acknowledged matter that a composite is not distinctly known unless its parts are known, on which it essentially depends. Now complex cognition is a certain logical whole and composite, as I showed particularly concerning the proposition in the fourth book, for it is composed of subject and predicate joined by a verbal copula. Therefore complex intellective cognition presupposes incomplex cognition. Furthermore, from Aristotle (*1. Post. T.21*) and from Scotus (*ibid. q.2*), we know principles insofar as we know their terms. Now the principles that serve as the premises of a demonstrative syllogism are complex items of knowledge. Therefore complex cognition of propositions that are called principles of a demonstrated conclusion requires prior incomplex cognition of the terms. The second part is evident from what has been said. For an effect presupposes its cause, from which it receives its being. Therefore, since premises are the causes of the conclusion, it is plain that they must precede it.

Third Assertion. The teaching and learning that Aristotle mentions in the cited proposition must be taken to mean only discursive knowledge or science of the conclusion. This is drawn from the Doctor in the place recently cited, and is proved, first, from Aristotle himself, who, as found in the Greek codex, calls teaching and learning *dianoetiken*, that is, discursive and rational, as Zabarella and the Conimbricenses rightly note there; or as Themistius and Simplicius read, *logiken*, that is, rational and syllogistic, which signifies nothing other than the teaching of the conclusion, as the same philosopher's words in the same place (*T.3*), in the second book of the same work toward the end, and in (*6. Eth. c.3*) and (*1. Met. T.48*) — where he repeats this same proposition — clearly

confirm; and this is the more common interpretation of both Greek and Latin commentators. Secondly, Aristotle employs the resolutive method, as is clear from the title of these and the preceding books. He therefore begins from knowledge of the conclusion, which is first in the analytic order and last in the compositive order. The examples adduced by Aristotle in this place, or rather — as others prefer — the induction in the sciences and arts, wonderfully confirm this: first in the mathematical disciplines, which are caused by prior cognition of their principles; second in Logic, which is produced by means of a syllogism that presupposes cognition of the major and minor and knowledge of the terms; third in Rhetoric, which principally uses the enthymeme and example, which, being imperfect syllogisms, are in any case formed from prior cognitions of other things. And some attribute this likewise to the productive arts, which proceed from certain prior cognitions of things, as Themistius illustrates by examples — though this is not to the mind of the philosopher, whose aim and purpose was to teach the instrument of knowing, which is demonstration, and its effect, which is science, as one may observe in his text.

You will object, first, that angels, Adam, and others who possess science divinely bestowed did not receive it from antecedent cognition, as is evident. Therefore Aristotle's proposition cited above is not universally true, even when teaching and learning are taken to mean science of the conclusion. I reply, with Scotus (*q. secunda*, §. *Ad oppositum*), that what the philosopher asserts is to be interpreted of science humanly acquired, not of infused science, as the argument proves.

You will object, second, that as the sense stands to sensibles, so the intellect stands to intelligibles; but the sense can perceive something with no prior sensation. For when a newborn infant, before any cognition or perception whatsoever, has honey applied to its tongue, it immediately perceives sweetness; and the same must be said of sight and the other senses. Therefore the intellect also can know some things without pre-existing cognition. I deny the major premise, because, as the Doctor writes (*q.1. §. Ad 1*), a sensible object has a native proportion with the external sense, such that it is apt to be attained by the sense without any prior disposition or cognition. But the same sensible object, clothed in individual and material conditions, has no proportion with the immaterial and spiritual intellect; and for this reason it needs some prior cognition in order to understand what is presented to it by the senses. All the more so because the intellect is a discursive power that moves from principles to conclusion; and therefore, in order to attain cognition of the conclusion, it must possess cognition of the premises.

You will object, third, that Aristotle (*1. Met. T.48*) adduces and extends this same proposition to the teaching of definition: therefore it ought not to be restricted to the teaching of the conclusion alone, as is written in the third assertion. I reply that in that place of the Metaphysics it does indeed admit a broader sense, extending to cognition of definition as well as of the conclusion. But at the

beginning of the first Posterior Book it takes only discursive teaching, on account of the word opposed to it there, which in Greek is *dianoetiké*, and in Latin discursive, as Zabarella notes above all others in that place.

Article III. How Many Precognitions and Precognita There Are.

A precognition, as Maior (*1. Post. dub.7*) notes from the meaning of the name, is nothing other than cognition prior to others, or cognition had before another; properly speaking, however, as it pertains to our subject and this place, it is the knowledge required as a prerequisite for having science of the conclusion. A precognitum, from the meaning of the name, is what is cognized before another thing; but as it is taken in the present context, it can be described as that which is cognized in advance and required as a prerequisite for producing science of the conclusion, as is clear from Scotus (*4. dist. 1. q.2. §. Ex his*). Aristotle, wishing to furnish a rule of demonstrating and to open the way of knowing, teaches how many precognitions there are and what the precognita are, that is, what must be premised and foreknown. Now there are two precognitions: whether it is, and what it is. Whether it is is twofold, namely whether a thing exists or can exist, and whether it is, that is, whether it is true. What it is is likewise twofold: what the name signifies, and what the thing is — that is, what the thing is, or the nature and essence signified by the name. There are, moreover, three precognita enumerated by Aristotle: the subject, the property, and the principles or premises. Regarding the property, what the name signifies is foreknown; regarding the principles, that they are true; and regarding the subject, both: whether it is and what it is.

Assertion. There are only two precognitions, while there are three precognita as enumerated. So Scotus (*1. Post. q.4. §. Ad quaest.*) together with Aristotle in this place (*c.1. T.2*), whom the Doctor cites (*3. dist. 14. q.2. §. Contra rationem, sub H.*) and (*collation 13. §. Ad quaest.*). The first part is proved as follows: regarding any matter to be known through demonstration, we must foreknow whether it is and what it is. Therefore there are two precognitions as recounted. The antecedent is at hand. For, in order that something be known demonstratively, it must be foreknown whether it exists or can exist, and also what its quiddity and nature is; otherwise it cannot be known. The second part is proved thus: in acquiring demonstrative science, three things must necessarily be foreknown; therefore there are three precognita required for demonstration. The antecedent is shown as follows: a property must be demonstrated of a subject through principles or premises, which are the causes of the scientific conclusion. Hence it is evident that there are three precognita for demonstration, namely the subject about which the demonstration is made, the property that is demonstrated as inhering in the subject, and the principles that produce the conclusion. Since, therefore, nothing else is required to be foreknown for generating science of the conclusion, it is most aptly deduced that there are no more than three precognita, as Zabarella lucidly expresses (*1. de trib. praecognitis c.1*). I add that,

since demonstration is divided into principles and conclusion, and the conclusion into subject and property, these three must be the only precognita.

You will object, first, that regarding the subject what is foreknown is what the thing is, or what the thing is simply, and regarding the property what the name is, or what it is in a qualified sense; but what the thing is and what the name is are distinct precognitions. Therefore there are three precognitions, because to those two just cited there is joined another, namely whether it is. I reply with the Doctor near the end of the cited question that both precognitions, what the name is and what the thing is, are comprised under one general precognition, what it is; and for that reason, at the beginning of this article, I divided the precognition what it is into what the name is and what the thing is.

You will object, second, that there are as many precognitions as there are questions; but there are four questions from the second book of the Posterior (*c.1*): whether it is, what it is, what kind it is, and why it is so. Therefore there are also four precognitions. The major seems evident, because questions require precognitions, since every question presupposes one thing and seeks another. The Doctor replies (*alleg. §. Ad primam obiect.*) that there are two principal questions, namely whether it is and what it is, and the others are reduced to these: why it is so is reduced to what it is, and what kind it is to whether it is — as Zabarella clearly perceives (*suprà cit. c.2*). Or one may say there are two general ones and four special ones; and this reply does not seem to differ from the preceding. Or, if you prefer, there are two necessary ones and the others are by no means so.

You will object, third, that there are three precognita — subject, property, and axiom — and therefore three precognitions. The antecedent is our own assertion. The consequence holds because precognitions must be enumerated according to the number of precognita, for they are relative and are said convertibly. Granting the antecedent, I deny the consequence. For it is not necessary that the subject be multiplied according to the multiplication of forms existing in it, just as a father who has several sons is related to them through several numerically distinct paternities existing in him, and yet he is their one father.

You will object, fourth, that besides those three things enumerated, the middle term and the soundness of the consequence must be foreknown. Therefore there are more than three precognita. I deny the consequence: for the middle term does not constitute a distinct precognitum apart from subject and predicate, but is always one or the other in the first figure, and in the other figures is always either the predicate, as in the second figure, or always the subject, as in the third figure. The syllogistic or inferential form, moreover, belongs to the Prior Analytics, not the Posterior; and therefore it is not counted here as a special precognitum distinct from those three. Or one may say, with

Maior in the present place, that the soundness of the consequence is included in the foreknowledge of the principles.

You will add that subject and property are referred to in the principles as parts in a whole: therefore, if the middle term does not constitute a distinct precognitum because it is placed in the premises and is their subject or predicate, the same thing must be asserted about the subject and property, which are likewise included in those same premises. I say the disparity is this: that subject and property are foreknown by precognitions distinct from the precognition of the principles, but the middle term is not. For this reason the middle term is not a precognitum distinct from those three; but subject and property most certainly are, as will appear more clearly in the following articles.

Article IV. What Must Be Foreknown Concerning Principles.

Aristotle (*1. Post. c.1*), assigning a distinct precognition to each, writes that concerning principles it must be foreknown that they are true; concerning the property, what the name signifies; and concerning the subject, both: whether it is and what it is. These matters must be examined by us one by one, with Scotus (*1. Post. q.5. 6. 7*).

Note first that these three — subject, property, and principles — though necessary for generating demonstrative science, are nevertheless considered in different ways. The subject, to be sure, is regarded insofar as all others are placed beneath it and subjected to it; the property, insofar as it is in the subject, proceeds from it, and essentially depends on it; the principles, insofar as they are the causes from which knowledge of the others derives. Now, since the property is demonstrated of its subject through the principles, in order to acquire science, those three must be foreknown — not, to be sure, by the same foreknowledge, since they regard different things, but by distinct foreknowledges, as will be more fully established by what we shall set forth below.

Note second that a principle taken universally is divided into simple and complex. The simple or incomplex is that which is expressed in a single term (concerning which some remarks were made in the Epitome (*l.1. q.1. art.4*)); it is subdivided into a principle of being and a principle of knowing, treated in the Physics in the book on principles. The complex is that which is signified by several terms, as is clear from the Epitome cited; it is an axiom or universal proposition, which is called indemonstrable, self-evident, a common conception of the mind, and an axiom or dignity; it is subdivided in this book (*c.2*) into common and particular. A common principle is a principle of Metaphysics, which is called the common science, as is established from (*3. Met. T.3*) and (*4. eiusdem T.5*). Furthermore, according to Aristotle (*1. Post. c.8*), the common is twofold: most common, and less common. The former extends to all things, as every being either is or is not; the latter does not extend to all

things, as contraries cannot exist simultaneously in the same subject — which is considered by Physics and Medicine. A proper principle is one that belongs to one conclusion or one science alone, as nature is the principle of motion and rest, which applies to Physics alone. Furthermore, observe from the Doctor (*q.5 loci allegat.*) that a complex item, under the concept of the complex, does not have a what — and consequently, according to Aristotle (*7. Met. T.12*), has no definition.

Assertion. Concerning principles it is foreknown that they are true. So Scotus (*q. nunc allegat. §. Ad quaest.*) together with Aristotle (*ibid. c.1*). Proof: principles are the causes of the conclusion, as I showed above. Therefore concerning them it must be foreknown that they are; for what is nothing cannot be the cause of anything. Again, if something else were to be foreknown about principles, it would above all be what they are; since no other precognition is given, as is clear from the preceding article. But what they are cannot be foreknown about the principles themselves, because they have no what, since they are complex and aggregated from several whats, and I noted from Aristotle that things aggregated in this way have no what simply speaking, at the close of the second note. Moreover, assent to premises, which are the principles of the conclusion, is required before assent to the conclusion. Therefore concerning principles it is foreknown that they are true.

You will object, first, that Aristotle (*c.8 of this book*) states that concerning all principles what the name signifies must be foreknown. Therefore concerning principles it is foreknown both that they are and what they are; and the Conimbricenses (*q.3. art.4*) and Raconius (*art.5. disput.1. parte 3. sect.1*) think so as well. I reply that this must be explained as referring not to the principles precisely as such — since, being complex, they have no what — but to their parts, namely subject and property; otherwise the philosopher would contradict himself, who expressly delivers in (*c.1 of the same book*) that concerning principles it is to be foreknown only that they are. The Doctor indicates this interpretation (*ubisupra in fine*).

You will object, second, that the syllogism and the proposition are complex and have a what, because they are defined, as is clear in (*1. Prior. c.1*). Therefore, even though principles are complex, one cannot deny that they have a what, and that the what of them is foreknown. Scotus replies (*citat. §. Ad 1. rationem*), and signifies (*4. dist. 1. q.2*), that the syllogism is considered in two ways: either under the concept of the complex, and so it is denied that the syllogism has a what; or under the concept of the incomplex, and as it is the second intention signified by the name "syllogism," in which case it is conceded that the syllogism has a what and a definition. The same must be asserted about the proposition, which can also be taken under the concept of the complex or of the incomplex; and likewise about principles.

You will object, third, that existence presupposes and requires essence, just as a mode presupposes the thing of which it is a mode; but principles have existence, since it is universally conceded that it is presupposed about them that they are — especially because, being causes of the conclusion, they must pre-exist, since nothing causes unless it pre-exists. Therefore they also have essence; and what has essence has a what, because essence and quiddity either do not differ or, if they do differ, at least cannot be separated from each other. Therefore, if concerning principles it is foreknown that they are, it is equally to be foreknown what they are. The same Doctor cited replies that what properly belongs only to the incomplex, and it is only of the incomplex that there is a definition that explains what the thing is. For this reason Aristotle rightly denies that beings per accidens and aggregates have a what. Thus, to the argument in form: the whole is conceded; but Scotus denies the minor, because essence belongs both to complex and incomplex things. Or one may say that this is true of simple essence, but not of essence aggregated from many things, as happens in our case.

Article V. What Must Be Foreknown Concerning the Property.

Some, among whom is Raconius (*disp.1. de demonstratione*), place two precognitions of the property: whether it is and what it is; and Mastrius and Bellutus (*2. parte Introd. Tract.1. c.1*) favor them. But the common opinion is that of Aristotle (*1. Post. c.1*), Scotus (*q.6. §. Ad quaest.*), Fuentes (*q.19. diff.1. n.18*), Conimbricenses (*art.4*), and others in the same place, affirming that concerning the property only what the name signifies is foreknown.

Note that the property inheres in the subject and is demonstrated of it by demonstration; it is not, however, properly speaking an accident in the way that accident is called the fifth predicable, or in the way that what is really distinct from the subject inheres in it and accidentally perfects it. Rather it is an accident taken as that which is extraneous, because it is outside the essence of the subject, arises from it, and is really identified with it, as is clear in the first book on the proper (*q. de proprio*). Although the Doctor in this place appears to speak of the property as a common accident, as Fuentes notes; nevertheless one must not doubt that this work is the Doctor's, as that same Fuentes establishes there. For in a similar matter regarding the book on the Prior Analytics, Fuentes himself (*q.3. art.5. diff.2*) reproaches our Faber for denying that those books are Scotus's on the grounds that they contain many things at odds with the books of the Metaphysics and the Sentences, and yet attributes them to the Doctor. I make the same objection here to Fuentes himself, and say, with Bargius cited elsewhere, that in these works Scotus for the most part spoke according to the common opinion, an obvious indication of which is that in these he says not "I say" but "it is said," whereas in his subsequent later works he clearly set forth his own opinion, defended by firm and subtle arguments.

Assertion. Concerning the property only what the name is, or what is signified by the term, must be foreknown. Scotus holds this with Aristotle in the places named, and it is proved: it is impossible that anything be shown concerning something if its name is unknown — for if the name is unknown, the thing signified by the name must likewise be unknown, as Scotus indicates (*q.4 of this book*) and Zabarella (*ibid. T.2*) and (*l. de tribus praecognitis c.3*), following Themistius, whom he cites, saying that the signification of a name is the beginning of inquiry; and I premised this in the Epitome (*l.1. q.1. art.1*). Now the property is demonstrated of the subject in the conclusion through its proper cause, as is clear in this demonstration: every rational being is risible; every man is rational; therefore every man is risible. Here risibility, which is the property of man, is shown of man himself through rationality, which is its proper cause. And so concerning the property what the name signifies is foreknown. Moreover, it is necessary to know the property in some way before it is demonstrated as inhering in its object in the conclusion. For it is a principle or a part that, together with the subject, constitutes the conclusion; but before we constitute the whole, we must have some knowledge of its parts. Therefore a nominal knowledge of it is had in advance and presupposed — I say nominal knowledge, because confused and indistinct knowledge of a thing is acquired before distinct knowledge of the same thing is generated. For a child knows what is signified by the word "horse," even though he does not know the nature of a horse distinctly. Likewise, we have knowledge of the name of non-being, but not knowledge of the thing, since it is nothing. Furthermore, what is sought is not presupposed to be, for otherwise the inquiry would be pointless, as Zabarella observes (*l. de trib. praecognitis c.3*). Now in a demonstration it is asked whether the property inheres in the subject, and it is concluded that it does inhere. Therefore concerning the property only what the name is is foreknown.

You will object, first, that according to Aristotle and Scotus in the present place, concerning the property what it is is foreknown. Therefore also concerning it whether it is is foreknown. The consequence holds because what it is presupposes that it is. For as is clear from (*2. Post. c.1*), the first question is whether it is, and the second what it is; and the prior precognition from (*1. Post. c.1*) is whether it is, and the posterior what it is. Therefore if concerning the property what it is is foreknown, then certainly whether it is is also foreknown of it. Granting the antecedent, the consequence is denied; and to its proof I say that what the thing is indeed presupposes that it is, but what the name is does not. It is urged, from (*4. Met. T.28*), that what is signified by the name is the true definition: therefore if concerning the property what the name is is foreknown, then equally what the thing is. One must reply, from the Doctor cited above (§. *Ad 1*), that sometimes the meaning which the name denotes is the definition of the thing and the true definition, as the philosopher maintains in the passages cited; but sometimes the meaning which the name presents is a description and

not the true definition of the thing, but is called the definition of the name, as is clear from what was proved in the proposed assertion.

You will object, second, that the same philosopher in (2. *Post.*) adds that definition is twofold: one he calls what the thing is, and the other what the name is, which he attributes to non-beings. But the property is a real being, since it springs from the subject, which is a real being. Therefore the property has a real definition, not a nominal one; and consequently it is foreknown as to what the thing is. I reply that the definition of the name belongs not only to non-being but also to being, which likewise possesses a true definition proper to it. As for Aristotle: I say that he does indeed assert that the nominal definition belongs to non-being, but he does not deny that it can be applied to being as well. Now the property, being a being, possesses both kinds of definition, the nominal and the real. The former is foreknown before the demonstration; the latter is not.

You will object, third, that what is conjoined in one of the premises with the middle term must be foreknown to be, as is clear regarding the subject, which is placed in one of the premises and foreknown to be. But the property is numbered with the middle term in one or the other of the premises, as may be seen in the demonstration adduced in the first proof of the assertion. Therefore concerning the property whether it is is foreknown. I reply that the property is considered in two ways: in itself, insofar as it is a certain entity, with no account taken of the subject in which it is; or relationally, insofar as it designates an order and relation to the subject in which it is. In the first way it is placed in the premises and connected with the middle term, and this foreknowledge does not differ from the foreknowledge of the premises. In the second way it is placed in the conclusion and conjoined with the subject, and its inherence or inexistence in the very conclusion is shown there. Therefore, as a property, concerning it whether it is is not foreknown, but it is proved to inhere in the subject — as Scotus seems to suggest in the place mentioned (§. *Contrà istam*). Nor is there any parity between subject and property, because the subject does not depend on the property, whereas the property does depend on the subject. Now any being is cognized as it is; and since the property inheres in the subject, it cannot be known without respect and relation to another, as Scotus rightly adds in the same place.

Mastrius and Bellutus named at the beginning of this article reject this reply, but then go on to say that concerning the property whether it is must be foreknown confusedly and indistinctly, and that Aristotle does not mention this because its inexistence in the subject is clearly shown in the demonstration. But this plainly conflicts with Aristotle and Scotus, as is clear to the reader of the text. For since the precognition of what the property is is a confused and indistinct cognition, as the Doctor writes in the passage cited just above, if a confused precognition of the same property whether it is is admitted, then without doubt both precognitions must be conceded to the property itself, since both are confused

and indistinct — which Aristotle and Scotus cited above teach to apply only to the subject, as will presently be evident.

Article VI. How Many Foreknowledges the Subject Has.

All, while they readily admit with Aristotle (*1. Post. T.1*) that concerning the subject it is foreknown that it is and what it is, nevertheless do not all understand in the same way the manner and sense in which this is to be taken, whether for the first or for the second precognition. For Cajetan, Toletus (*c. praesenti q.vn. Ad 5*), and others cited by the Conimbricenses (*q.3. art.3*), think the first foreknowledge that it is should be interpreted as referring to the actual existence of the subject, so that the subject must be presupposed to actually exist at the time naturally appointed for it. The opposite, however, is maintained by Scotus (*both here q.7 and q.3. univ. §. Dicitur, and also 4. distinit. 1. q.2. §. Ex his H.*), Sarnanus (*q.3. univ.*), Faber (*Theor. 2*), Conimbricenses just cited, and others commonly and unanimously, who teach that the actual existence of the subject need not necessarily be presupposed, but that possible and potential existence — or the absence of repugnance to existing — is sufficient. Regarding the second foreknowledge of the subject, what it is, the dialecticians also dispute among themselves. For Zabarella (*l. de tribus praecognitis c.2*), with whom Toletus (*alleg. Ad 2*) seems to agree, understands and explains by what it is the meaning of the name; while Scotus (*3. dist. 14. q.2. §. Contrà infra H.*) and other authors named above protest, holding that concerning the subject what the thing is must be foreknown.

Note that this twofold doubt is raised with respect both to the total and adequate subject and to the partial and inadequate subject. The reason is equal in each case, since each is the base and foundation of the entire demonstrative edifice, and from it the demonstrable properties must necessarily proceed; and subjects are established as perpetual, necessary, and incorruptible, as I indicated in the first book (*q.3*). Hence the foreknowledge of the subject whether it is is not to be understood of its nature and essence — which, being necessary and eternal in objective being, is not presupposed to exist — but of possible and non-repugnant existence, as the Doctor rightly interprets (*in 4. praalleg.*), Bonetus (*1. Met. c.3*), Tataretus (*2. Post. q.1. dub.3*), and Sarnanus (*citat. pag.72*). The foreknowledge what it is, on the other hand, can be taken of the quidditative concept and of the definition: for demonstrations can be constructed from both, as is clear concerning being, which, lacking genus and difference, has no definition, yet possesses a quidditative concept, and of its properties are demonstrated, as I showed at length in the Metaphysics (*l.2*). Likewise, God from (*3. q. prol.*) is the subject of Theology, and of him, since he is utterly simple, no definition can be given, though a quidditative concept can rightly be given, as is plainly established in the first treatise of our Summa Theologica.

First Assertion. The prior foreknowledge of the subject that it is must be understood of its possible existence. So Scotus cited. Proof, first, from (*2. Post.*

T.21) and (*7. Met. T.20*) and elsewhere, where Aristotle writes that a demonstration whose middle term is a definition is about what does not exist. Therefore, according to Aristotle, the first foreknowledge of the subject is to be taken of possible existence. Second, the object of science is necessary, from (*1. Post. T.5*) and (*28*), and universal, from the same place (*T.29*). But the universal abstracts from all existence, since existence is contingent and a principle of change, which is alien to the notion of science; indeed science itself abstracts from all existence, from (*2. dist. 3. q.9. §. Ad quaest. B.*). Therefore concerning the subject only possible existence is foreknown.

Second Assertion. By the posterior foreknowledge of the subject, what it is, is understood what the thing is. The Doctor holds this in the place cited above and in the third place cited. Proof, first, from Aristotle (*6. Met. c.1*) and (*1. de anima T.11*), who says that the definition of the subject is the head and foundation of all science, and that the definition of the subject is the middle term of the most powerful demonstration. Therefore, according to Aristotle, concerning the subject what the thing is is foreknown. Second, that philosopher must be understood as speaking of the definition that generates science in us, since the scope of this work is to teach the method and provide the instrument apt for generating science; and it is the real definition, not the nominal one, that generates science in us. Therefore concerning the subject what the thing is must be foreknown. All the more so because, as Scotus says (*in 3. nuper alleg.*), and (*11. Met. in expositione Tex. c.1. Summa 3. n.54*), the entire notion of science is virtually contained in the notion and quiddity of the subject. Nor is the what it is acquired in any way by demonstration; indeed it is entirely presupposed, and through demonstration there is generated only cognition of the properties inhering in it.

You will object, first, against the first assertion, that Aristotle (*l. predicam. c. de Ad aliquid*) delivers that science and its object the knowable are correlatives that have mutual existence, and he adds that if science does not exist, the knowable cannot exist. Therefore existing science is of a subject that actually exists; and consequently concerning the subject it is foreknown that it actually exists. It is confirmed: the same philosopher (*2. Post. T.8*) adds that it is vain to ask what something is unless one first has that it is, since the latter includes the former. Therefore it cannot be demonstrated that a property inheres in a subject unless the subject is recognized to actually pre-exist. I reply that science and the knowable belong to the third mode of relatives, namely non-mutual ones; and therefore Aristotle says there that if the knowable is removed, science is also removed, but if science is removed, the knowable is not removed. For if the knowable does not exist, there is no science of it, for there will be absolutely no science of nothing. But if science does not exist, nothing prevents the knowable from existing. Hence I deny the consequence. To the confirmation: that passage must be explained not of actual but of possible existence, as is established from the note just given. You will press: the syllogism, which is a being of reason, is

considered by Logic as its object, and no possible existence on the part of reality belongs to it. Therefore the philosopher's assertion cannot be taken of possible existence. I say that possible existence in reality belongs to the object of real science; but to the object of rational science, such as the syllogism, only objective existence belongs. Just as in its own way definition is attributed to it, as Scotus (*in 4. cit. §. De 2. principali infra H.*) and Bonetus (*1. Met. c.2. §. Quarta proprietas*) say of second intentions in general.

You will object, second, that what is acquired through experience and the ministry of the senses is presupposed to have actual existence, because both experience and the senses deal with singulars that actually exist, as is more than evident; but science is generated by sense and experience, as the philosopher affirms at the beginning of the first book of the Metaphysics (*c.1*). Therefore actual existence of its subject is required. It is confirmed: science of God is about God himself actually existing as the subject of that same science, from (*3. q. Prol.*). Therefore the same must be asserted of the subject of any other science. Granting the major, I distinguish the minor. By accident and occasionally, by reason of the mode of knowing of this present state in which we must find every science by means of prior sense and experience — this I concede; through itself and absolutely, and of science already acquired — this I deny; as Scotus and Lychetus (*cit. q.3. Prol. §. Ad argumenta alterius*) seem to hold. The reason is that we possess the sciences of God, angels, and other things, which we learned from our predecessors by voice or writing, without that mode of cognizing. To the confirmation, one may say that the existence of God is altogether the same as his essence, as I showed with probability in the treatise on God the One (*disp.1*), while created existence differs from created essence formally and negatively.

You will object, third, against the second assertion, that Aristotle (*T.2 of this book*) expressly says that concerning the subject it must be foreknown what it signifies; but to signify pertains to the name, which is described from what was said in the Epitome (*l.2. q.1. l.2*) as a vocal sound signifying by convention, etc. Therefore concerning the subject not what the thing is but what the name is must be foreknown. This is especially so because the philosopher there wishes both foreknowledges to be assigned to the subject, the same ones he ascribed to the axiom and to the property; but he had expressly assigned to the axiom that it is, and to the property what the name is. Therefore he fits the same foreknowledges to the subject, otherwise he does not seem to speak consistently. Granting the major, to the minor it may be said, with Faber (*Theor.3. ad 1*), that not only the name but also the definition signifies; and therefore it is conceded by all that the name or the defined thing signifies confusedly, and the definition signifies clearly and distinctly. And Aristotle himself, explaining this, asserts that when (*T.70 of the same book*) he writes that the definition of the subject is the supposition of the science whose subject it is. To what is additionally urged, I say that just as whether it is is twofold — namely complex and incomplex — so likewise what it is is twofold, namely what the name is and what the thing is. The

incomplex whether it is belongs to the subject, but not the complex. Likewise the real what it is, and not the nominal what it is, is applied to the subject. Thus, just as the complex that it is, which is attributed to the axiom, does not befit the subject, so also the what the name is, which belongs to the property, should not be assigned to the subject. For since whether it is and what it is are established as general foreknowledges — as I noted together with Scotus above — they are subdivided into special ones, of which one belongs to the principles, another to the property, and both, in the manner befitting each and as explicitly stated, are ascribed to the subject.

Article VII. Whether the Subject Can Be Demonstrated in Science.

The principal positions to be recorded in this article are these: the first is that of Niphus (*1. Met. q.1*), Zabarella (*l. de trib. praecognitis c.9*), Raconius (*disp.1. de demonstratione art.3. proposs.*), and before them Bonetus (*1. Met. c.3. §. Septima proprietates*), who deny that the subject can be demonstrated in any way in the science of which it is the subject. The second is that of those whose names Zabarella suppresses, who hold that the subject can be demonstrated a priori in science, from whom Bassolis (*q.3. Prol. §. Ad rationes*) and Tataretus (*2. Post. q.1. dub.2*) do not seem to differ. The third is the nearly common position of Scotus (*q.3. Elench. §. Ad aliam quaest.*) and (*q.3. Prol. §. Ad 1. argum. V.*), Faber (*Theor.2*), and others, both of the Scotistic and Thomistic schools, who hold that the subject of a science can be demonstrated a posteriori by that very same science of which it is the subject.

Note that the principles pertaining to science are twofold, as Orbellus (*1. Met. c.1*) notes with Scotus' assent (*q.3. Prol. §*) — complex and incomplex. The former are called principles of knowing, because nothing in the science is more known or more evident than they, through which things are demonstrated, since they are themselves indemonstrable, at least in the science of which they are principles. Hence they are called first principles and doorways of the sciences, according to that saying of the philosopher (*2. Met. c.1*): who will err at the doorways? The latter are called principles of being, because from them as essential parts the subject of science is constituted — as the natural body is composed of matter and form as its intrinsic and essential principles. The former are necessarily required for constructing demonstration and causing science, because by them the properties are demonstrated of the subject; the latter are not always required. For the subject of a science can exist even without principles of being, as is clear concerning being, which is the subject of Metaphysics and exists without principles of being. Likewise concerning God, who is the object of Theology, of which there are many parts, as Scotus writes in the place cited above, followed by Zabarella (*citat. c.2*). It is therefore not necessary that the subject of a science have principles of being, but only principles of knowing, from which the inherence of the property in its subject is shown in the conclusion deduced and caused from them. Furthermore, it is presupposed

from what will be said in the following question that there is a twofold demonstration: because and propter quid, or a posteriori — which is through the effect — and a priori — which is through the cause.

First Assertion. The subject of a science cannot be demonstrated a priori by that very same science of which it is the subject. The Doctor clearly implies this (*q.3. Elench. in solution. 1. rationis*) and presupposes it elsewhere, and Zabarella names the contrary position vacuous and ridiculous and entirely without reason. Proof, first: what is demonstrated a priori is demonstrated from superior and more known things, as is established from Aristotle's definition of demonstration. But nothing is prior or more known than the subject of a science, since it is the primary root, the first item of consideration, the underlying substratum and receptacle of all things that pertain to that science in any way whatsoever. Therefore the subject cannot be demonstrated a priori. Second: what is demonstrated a priori comes into question and is shown to be through its proper cause, as no one denies; but the subject is presupposed and foreknown, not what is sought and unknown, as is clear from the assertions above. Moreover, in every demonstration there are three terms — major extreme, minor extreme, and middle. Now the subject is not the middle, because it would be shown through the middle; nor is it the major extreme, which is the predicate. And it is repugnant for the subject to be the predicate, and for what by itself underlies to inhere in another. It remains, then, that it is the minor extreme in the conclusion, which is not what is demonstrated but that about which something else — namely the property — is demonstrated as concluding to inhere in it. Furthermore, in demonstration three things principally intervene: the axiom, the subject, and the property; and just as the axiom and the property cannot be the subject, so likewise the subject cannot be the property or the axiom, since from what has been said it is foreknown whether it is and what it is, and consequently it cannot be demonstrated a priori.

Second Assertion. The scientific subject can be demonstrated a posteriori, whether it be partial or total. The first part concerning the partial subject is Scotus's in the place cited above, and is proved from the philosopher as cited by the Doctor there, who shows that the sophistic syllogism is demonstrated through similarities (*1. Phys. T.80*), that matter exists through form which cannot be without it (*1. Caeli c.4*), that the heavens exist through circular motion, that elementary fire exists through upward motion, and in the Metaphysics that abstract substances exist, etc. Second: through an effect the cause can be demonstrated; indeed philosophy began from cognition of effects and ignorance of causes, as the Stagirite notes (*1. Met. c.2*); philosophers were moved to inquire into water. And there are some effects necessarily conjoined with their causes and principles, as is clear from the motions of the heavens, the influences of the stars, and other such things that daily experience supplies us with. Therefore the partial object of a science can be demonstrated a posteriori. The second part, which is Scotus's (*both in prol. cit. and also 1. Met. q.1*), is proved, first,

from Aristotle, who in (2. *Phys.*) demonstrates a posteriori that a natural body — which is the total subject of Physics — exists through motion. And the same is implied (6. *Phys.* T.32). Second: God is the total object of sacred Theology from the Prologue cited, and is demonstrated a posteriori by it, as is clear from Scotus (1. *dist.*2. q.2). And the sacred pages confirm this, especially (*Sap.* 13): From the greatness of beauty, the creator of these things can be seen by comparison. The same is urged by the authorities and reasons adduced to prove the first part of this assertion. For the reason is equal in both cases. Just as the partial object possesses some effects necessarily conjoined with itself, as was established above with many arguments, so the total subject has some proper effects necessarily connected with it, through which it can be demonstrated a posteriori, as has been shown above concerning the natural body. Hence Mastrius and Bellutus are refuted, who (*disp.*12. q.2. art.2), while they receive this entire doctrine, nevertheless conclude that if science is taken strictly for cognition of the conclusion produced through the most powerful demonstration, neither a priori nor a posteriori can its subject be demonstrated. For that it cannot be done a priori is sufficiently proved in the first assertion; but that it can be done a posteriori is efficaciously urged by what I adduced to establish and confirm this second assertion. Nor should the subject of a science acquired through the most powerful demonstration be excepted, since Aristotle and Scotus in the places mentioned speak universally of the subject of science demonstrable by the Posterior Analytics; especially because these more recent authors extend and broaden to every total and partial subject, and illustrate with examples from Physics and Metaphysics, whose subjects are plainly demonstrable — and these are the preeminent sciences, especially Metaphysics, which is not undeservedly called the queen of the sciences. Now just as in the compositive method one proceeds from the known cause to the unknown effect, so in the resolute method one proceeds from the known effect to the unknown cause. And since several properties spring ordinately from a single cause, one presupposing and presupposing another — as in the case of wonder, risibility, and admirability in man, all proceeding from rationality — beginning from the first property, passing through the intermediate ones, we are able to arrive at the last demonstration of the subject in which they inhere, as Orbellus expressly pursues (1. *Met.* c.1. §. *Ad enim evidentiam*). And so a posteriori demonstration of the subject of science taken strictly is constructed. For this reason the philosopher (c.2 of this book) and (2. *de anima* c.2), by the a posteriori definition of the soul, shows its a priori definition, and vice versa, as I showed plainly there. Without reason, therefore, and resting on no foundation, do the aforementioned more recent authors deny this of the subject of science had through demonstration, while they affirm it of the subject of any other science — and unwittingly they slide into the position of Zabarella and the others whom they attack. The passage of Aristotle (T.2 of the same book) adduced by them — namely that concerning the subject what it is is foreknown and not demonstrated — is understood a priori and not a posteriori, as nearly all of

Scotus's disciples interpret it, with whom the Conimbricenses (*q.3. art.3*) and not a few other ancient and modern philosophers agree.

You will object, first, against the second assertion, that some subject of some science possesses intrinsic and essential principles from which it is composed, as is clear from the note just proposed. Therefore through them such a subject can be demonstrated a priori, since those are its constitutive causes and parts, as is clear of matter and form, which constitute the natural body, which is the subject of Physics. Granting the antecedent, I deny the consequence. For although such principles can be shown a posteriori — that is, through some natural effects which are more sensible and closer to the senses — nevertheless, since they have no cause a priori, they cannot be demonstrated. If you infer that at least the subject can be proved a priori through them, because they are its intrinsic causes, the response is first that a priori demonstration is made from what is more known, more evident, and causative of the conclusion — not from principles of the subject, which pertain to its definition. And the definitions of subjects or substances are indemonstrable, as is clear, because they are the suppositions of sciences; and this is the expressed mind of Aristotle (*2. Post. c.4*), (*1. Top. c.1*), and (*6. Met. c.1*). All the more so because demonstration shows the property inhering in the subject, not the cause and intrinsic principle of the subject itself, as Zabarella accurately observes in the place named.

You will object, second, against the second assertion, that what is a supposition and foreknown in science is not what is sought and unknown; but the subject in a science is a supposition and foreknown from (*T.1 c.1 of the first Post.*) — indeed it is the foundation and root of all things considered by science. Therefore the subject of a science cannot come into demonstration, even a posteriori; otherwise the same thing would be both supposed and sought, both known and unknown, which involves a manifest contradiction. Granting the major, to the minor I say that this and similar arguments adduced by proponents of the opposing opinion are to be interpreted a priori, not a posteriori, in accordance with what I maintained and proved in the two preceding assertions.

You will object, third, that it is the function of whoever considers the existence of a thing also to consider its essence, because existence follows on essence as its mode; but it belongs to Metaphysics to examine the essences and quiddities of things, since it is the most universal science. Therefore it likewise belongs to that very same discipline to examine and prove the existences of essences; and consequently no particular science demonstrates the existence of its subject a posteriori. Granting the major, the minor must be distinguished: with regard to common and transcendental notions — I concede; with regard to particular and proper notions — I deny. For since each particular science is a distinct science, it has a distinct object with which it is occupied. And therefore Metaphysics does not contemplate the proper objects of other sciences either as to their essence or their existence, nor does it intermingle with them, as will be more apparent

from what I shall commit to writing in the first and second books of the Metaphysics.

Article VIII. Whether the Subject Virtually Contains All the Truths of the Science of Which It Is the Subject.

The definition of the scientific subject offered by Scotus (*q.3. Prol. §. De 2. B.*) in these words — The notion of the primary subject is to contain in itself primarily and virtually all the truths of that habit of which it is the subject — is attacked, though not overthrown, resting as it does on a most firm foundation and fortified with the strongest reasons; it is attacked both against Outsiders who endeavor to undermine it, among whom are numbered Auriol (*in prol. artic.1. pag.17*), Gregory (*ibid. q.4*), Bacon (*q.3*) together with Ockham (*in loco q.9*), and Cajetan (*1. part. q.1. artic.7*); and also against Our Own, who dispute not a little about which subject is intended and in what sense it is to be explained. For some, like Canonicus (*q. prima 1. Phys.*) and Orbellus (*ibid.*), apply it to the generic and specific subject; others, like Faber (*Theor.5*), concede that it applies only to the specific subject. Nor is the dispute less among the same authors about the very containment of the subject's truths: some, like Bargius (*q.3. prol.*), hold that the truths are contained in the subject in real being; others, like Vigerius (*ibid.*), that they are contained only in cognitive being; and still others, like Lychetus (*in Commentario*), that they are contained precisely with respect to their evidence. What must be said by us in accordance with truth and Scotus will be made clear through what we shall set forth.

Note first and recall from what was said in the first book (*q.3. art.1*) that what science is occupied with has several names and requires several conditions, concerning which the Doctor does not seem to have spoken in the same way in all his writings. For in (*q.3. univ. §. Dicitur*) he enumerates only three conditions required for the subject of science; but in (*q.2 of the first Prior*) he attributes six to it. Then in (*1. Reportat. q.1. Prol. §. Dicitur*) he describes the subject as what determines and dignifies the science, and is said of other determinate things in the science — which are, in rectus or in obliquus, as Mauritius (*q.3. univ.*) and Maior (*l. praedicabilium q.3. not.3*) explain. But in (*6. Met. q.1*) and (*q.3. Prol.*) he defines the subject in the way I stated at the beginning of this article, which he repeats (*3. dist.36. q.vn. §. Quantum ad istum L.*) and in other places of his doctrine. Although this diversity of texts of the Doctor is found in his works concerning the total and adequate scientific subject, no contradiction is involved, but rather one text can rightly be explained by another, or one included in another, or one reduced to the other. For those six conditions of the first Prior are gathered into the three delivered in (*q.3. univ.*), as I showed in the place cited (*propositione 2*). And these three are indicated in the description of the subject from (*q.3. Prol.*). For what adequately contains virtually all the truths demonstrable of it is foreknown whether it is and what it is, and properties are demonstrated of it, and all things treated in the science are reduced to it. Likewise it accords well

with what Scotus adds in (*Reportat. primi, q.1*), since it is the common sense of philosophers that science is determined and specified by its object; and with one voice all philosophers together with Aristotle (*1. de anima c.1*) and (*6. Met. c.1*) proclaim that from it science derives its dignity and nobility — and Scotus cites these in (*prol. q.3. §. Ad 1. T*).

Note second, from the Parisians (*1. Phys. q.4*) after Scotus (*mox cit. §. De 2. B.*), that just as that is called the first being which does not depend on another but other things depend on it, so to contain primarily signifies nothing other than not depending on others while others depend on it — so that the second depends indeed on the first, but not the first on the second. And if by the impossible anything else were removed, while the subject itself remained, such a subject would still virtually contain all the truths knowable about itself, so that such truths are comprehended nowhere except in that same subject. Now primarily is taken here for the primacy of adequation, of which Aristotle speaks (*1. Post. T.11. 14*), so that to contain primarily is the same as to contain adequately, as Scotus notes in the place cited above. Furthermore, for a more convenient understanding of this, Scotists observe that there is a multiple containment. The first is called essential containment, by which one contains another in the first mode of speaking per se — thus the defined contains its definition, and the inferior contains its superior. The second is called unitive containment, by which one contains another really identified with it but formally distinct — in this way the subject contains its properties and the soul its powers. The third is potential containment, by which a superior contains the properties of its inferiors — thus animal contains the properties of man and of brute. The fourth is virtual containment, by which the container can produce the content in being; and this is subdivided into that by which the container can produce the content in being simply, or in the being of real existence, and into that by which the container can produce the content in qualified being or in cognitive and diminished being. The former kind of virtual containment is effected in two ways: either through motion and change, and in this way container and content, producer and produced, really differ — as God and creature, father and son; or through simple emanation and springing forth, and in this way container and content differ formally only — as God and his attributes, subject and its properties. The latter kind is also had in many ways: either in cognitive and effective being, as the intellect is said to contain the object virtually in cognitive being, producing its cognition, whether the object be substance or accident; or argutively, as an accident contains the species of substance, because through cognition of the accident we come to cognition of the substance, according to that saying (*1. de anima T.11*): accidents contribute greatly to knowing substance; or a posteriori, as an effect contains the species of its cause; or terminatively, and this happens in two ways — either adequately and totally, as an object contains the evidence of a thing in cognitive being, since although cognition is generated by the object and the power as two partial causes constituting one

total cause, nevertheless evidence is precisely and totally caused by the object; or it is terminative in another mode. The fifth containment is eminent, by which one is said to contain another in a more perfect mode than it is in itself, which, though in God it coincides with virtual containment, does not in creatures identify with virtual containment — as is clear of gold, which eminently contains silver though it cannot produce silver. Now the truths that the subject of a science contains are, according to the Doctor in the Prologue cited, of two kinds: immediate and mediate. Among the immediate, some consist of the subject and its definition — as man is a rational animal — and such truths the subject contains essentially and equally; while some are made up of the subject and property — which are called immediate by immediacy of cause, because their immediate cause is assigned — as rational is risible. The mediate truths are those constituted of subject and property which are said to be mediate because their immediate cause is not given, as man is risible. We speak here, however, of intrinsic properties, which besides the subject denote nothing else extrinsic; not of extrinsic properties, which always regard something extrinsic — as eclipsability of the moon, beatifiability of a rational creature — as the Parisians cited above and other Scotists rightly note for the solution of the arguments of Ockham, Gregory, and the other Nominalists.

Note third, from the Doctor in the question of the Prologue cited (§. *Contrà istud D.*), that science, being certain and evident knowledge of the intellect about an object, does not receive all its constitutive elements from one and the same source. For as knowledge it has them from the intellect and from the object as two of its partial causes constituting one total cause. But as certain and evident, it derives them only from the object. For as soon as the intellect conceives the essential relation of the predicate to the subject, immediately by the force of the terms the proposition becomes certain and evident. Wherefore, when we say that science is caused by a cause evident to the intellect, we are not speaking of science as knowledge — for in that sense it is generated by the intellect — but of science as certain and evident; for in this way it is caused by a cause known to the intellect, since nothing is known through what is unknown. Similarly, when science is said to be the effect of demonstration, this is explained in terms of the evidence of truth, not absolutely in terms of knowledge, which principally depends on the intellect. In demonstration properly speaking, moreover, it is not the conclusion that is demonstrated, because it is not predicated of the subject, but rather what is properly demonstrated is the inherence or relation of the predicate to the subject through the middle term, which is the definition of that same subject; so that, when the cause is posited and all else removed, such a relation is posited, and when the cause is removed, the relation is taken away. For this reason the subject, including formally and essentially its own definition — which is the precise cause of the inherence of the property — adequately and virtually contains the truth, evidence, and certitude of such a proposition. And therefore truth and knowledge are not the same thing: for knowledge is a

certain quality, in whose essence a relation is not included; but truth is a relation of conformity necessarily arising from the composition of terms, as I showed in the preceding book in the question on truth.

Note fourth, from the Doctor in the question of the Prologue cited (§. *Contrà istud D.*), that just as an object can be compared to two things — either to the power whose object it is, or to the act and habit produced by that same object — so it can bear two mutual proportions to them: one of a mover to the movable, or of the active to the passive; another of a cause to its effect. The first proportion consists in this: that as the object moves the power by producing something in it, so the power is moved by the object by receiving something from it, namely the species. The second proportion is situated in this: that as the object causes the act and habit, so the act and habit are partially caused by that same object. Between these two proportions there is this difference. First, the extremes of the first proportion regard all things contained per se under those extremes. The reason is that when some agent acts on some patient, any agent of the same kind can act on that patient, and conversely, because a patient that can be acted on by some agent, any patient of the same kind can be acted on by that agent. Hence from all actives of the same kind a single concept predicable of them can be abstracted; and likewise from all passives a single concept can be abstracted that is predicable of them: for example, because this color can be seen by the visual power, in like manner every color can be seen by the same power; and conversely, because this visual power sees this color, consequently all other visual powers can see this color. But this does not happen in the second proportion; nor in it can such a common concept be abstracted, nor does it follow that, as the common object can cause the evidence of an adequate act or habit, so also this object contained under that common one can in like manner produce such evidence. The reason is that the cause of evidence is found per se primarily in that common thing, not in the particular contained under it. And so, for example, Peter is risible because man is risible, to whom risibility per se belongs, as is drawn from (1. *Met. c.1*).

Note fifth and recall from what was said in the first book that the unity of a science is derived from the unity of the genus of the subject, which has parts and properties, as Aristotle (1. *Post. T.19*), (4. *Met. T.2*), and Auriol (*art.1. Prol. pag.56*) clearly state. This is understood of generic science, because its object is generic, by which it is partially caused. The same the Doctor delivers in the Prologue cited (§. *De tertio sub D.*) and more expressly (3. *dist.25. q.2. §. Ad 2. C.*) and (*dist.36. q.vn. §. Quantum ergo L.*) and in (*Reportat. 3. dist.25. q.vn. §. Sed quaeritur*) and also (6. *Met. q.1*). Since, moreover, the Doctor in the same Prologue cited establishes a twofold science — generic and specific — there is equally a twofold scientific subject — generic and specific — and consequently a twofold definition: one accommodated to the generic subject, the other to the specific subject. Now the generic subject is commonly described as that which potentially contains the truths demonstrable of it — and I noted above that this

is not inappropriate, since genus is a certain potential whole, as I showed elsewhere, containing its inferiors potentially. For this reason such a generic subject is said to comprehend the truths knowable of it potentially. The specific subject, on the other hand, is that which per se primarily contains virtually the truths demonstrable of it, as I noted above. Between these two descriptions the only difference is that the generic contains and the specific receives its truths virtually. Now virtual containment can be employed in two ways: in one way broadly, as it coincides with remote and potential containment — thus the Doctor took it in the places just cited and in the Reportatio, as some more recent authors explain, following Orbellus (*1. Met. c.1. §. Ad 2.*) and (*6. eiusdem operis c.1*) and Brasavolus (*q.3. universalium*). In the other way strictly, for proximate and immediate containment — and this belongs only to the specific subject, and seems to be the definition of the subject adduced at the beginning of this article, as Auriol (*in Prol. paulò antèar.2. pag.57*), Faber (*Theor.c.*), and many others interpret it.

First Assertion. The adequate subject of a science is aptly described as that which in itself primarily contains virtually all the truths of that habit of which it is the subject. The Doctor expressly holds this (*in prol. memorato q.2. lat. §. De secundo sub A.*), and all his interpreters in the same place approve it, and it is proved in two ways. First: what contains all immediate and mediate propositions virtually contains all the truths of the science of which it is the subject, because there are no knowable propositions other than immediate and mediate ones; but the adequate subject of a science contains immediate propositions because the subject of these contains the predicate and their evidence; and immediate propositions contain mediate ones, namely conclusions. Therefore the primary and adequate subject of a science contains the truths of the science of which it is the subject. Second: the adequate cause of some effect virtually contains that effect, as is clear from the second note. But the subject is the adequate partial cause of the habit of which it is the subject, according to that well-known saying: from power and object knowledge is born. Therefore the primary and adequate subject is rightly defined as what virtually contains all the truths of the science of which it is the subject. Especially because, since from that subject several properties spring forth in orderly fashion, one being demonstrable through another, all the way back to the first which springs immediately from it — as I implied above from Orbellus (*1. Met. c.1*) — such is the adequate subject of a science as was described above.

Second Assertion. The definition of the subject given by Scotus in the Prologue cited and adduced by me at the beginning of this article, while it properly belongs to the specific subject, can nevertheless be extended to the generic subject. This assertion comprises two parts, through which the entire dispute among the Scotists seems to be reconciled and settled. The first part is proved, first, from the Doctor (*cit. B. 3. dist.14. q.1.1*), who, in explaining how the primacy of the object containing virtually is to be understood, adds that the primacy

here is to be taken in nearly the same way as it is taken in (*1. Post. T.11. and 14*) in the definition of the universal — that which is a posteriori, adequate, and convertible with its properties, which is precisely what the specific subject is; for the generic subject is not adequately reciprocated with the properties of its inferiors, since one cannot validly say it is an animal, therefore it is risible, because risibility is not its adequate property, and the inference of subsisting does not convert from one to the other. Therefore the aforesaid definition belongs only to the specific subject. Second, the same Scotus (*ibid. D.*) asserts that between the object and the act and habit, whose evidence the subject is said to contain virtually and adequately, the proportion is that of a cause to an effect — assigned solely to that cause which per se primarily contains the notion of that effect; but the generic subject is not of this kind with respect to the properties of the inferiors, which are contained in it only potentially. Therefore it must be the specific subject. I add that the genus is a potential, confused, and imperfect whole, as is clear from the question on genus; therefore it contains the properties of its species only potentially and imperfectly, and so proper and proximate virtual containment cannot aptly be attributed to it. You will say: why does the Doctor not provide a definition of the generic subject? It may be said because such a definition does not pertain to the matter he discusses there, for he discusses there the object of Theology, which in no way is generic. Also because from that definition the definition of the generic subject can easily be derived, as the same Doctor does in a similar case (*ibid. q.4*), defining good praxis but not praxis taken in general — just as I observed that Porphyry did nearly the same concerning difference in the Epitome (*l.1. q.3. 4. 5. ante n.11*). The second part is proved, first, from Scotus (*1. d.3. q.3. §. Quantum, ad 2. a.*), (*q.7.*), and elsewhere, and also (*quol.7. N.*), affirming that being is the primary object of our intellect, virtually containing its properties demonstrable of it; but being is not a specific object, since it is transcendent. Therefore, according to Scotus, virtual containment belongs not only to the specific object but also to the generic and other objects. Second, the same Doctor (*6. Met. q.1*) expressly teaches that virtual containment belongs to the generic subject, and not obscurely implies this (*1. Post. q.vlt. §. Ad id q.*) and (*3. dist.36*), adducing the example of Geometry, which not being one in species, does not have a specific subject in which its truths are virtually comprehended. And again in (*dist.36 of the same book*) he repeats this same thing of Geometry, prudence, and the objects of other habits. Furthermore in the Prologue cited, not unmindful of the specific and generic object before E, he provided no other definition beyond the one delivered, which is an indication that the generic object was comprised under that one definition, in nearly the way I set out in the last note. Finally, because he must conform to Aristotle, who (*1. Post. c.23*) speaks of the generic subject, as Auriol cited rightly notes, and Scotus seems to hold (*1. Post. q. alleg.*).

Third Assertion. Although the subject virtually contains its properties both in real being and in cognitive being, nevertheless its notion as primary object is not

well explained through either of them alone. The first part, which Scotus (*loco nuper citato*) favors, is opposed to the Nominalists adduced at the beginning of this article, and is proved, first, as to real being: to contain virtually as such is to be able to produce something in being of existence, either through motion and change — as a father produces a son — or through simple emanation — as the subject produces its property, inasmuch as at the positing of the subject the property necessarily emanates and springs forth. Therefore the object virtually contains its property in real being. Second, it is urged as to cognitive being: a thing stands in the same relation to being known as to being, from (2. *Met. c.1. T.4*); but the property depends on the subject in being. Therefore also in being known — if not adequately simply speaking, at least adequately objectively — since its cognition is produced by the object and the intellect. The second part is opposed to certain Scotists, notably Bargius and Vigerius cited, and is proved, first, from Scotus cited, who situates the notion of the subject in its ordering to the science of which it is the subject. Therefore virtual containment, in accordance with which the notion of the subject is posited, does not bear on its real incomplex being but on complex truths; and thus the notion of the subject is not well explained according to the real being of the property produced. Second, from the same: the subject contains all truths, both immediate and mediate, of that habit of which it is the subject; and so the virtual containment of the subject is not considered in terms of its real incomplex being. Nor is it similarly understood in terms of cognitive being: for the Doctor there does not say that the subject primarily contains cognition or habit, but that it contains truths virtually; but truth is not cognition but evidence and certitude of cognition, as was said above. Therefore it is not rightly declared through cognition alone, whether actual or habitual. Furthermore, the Doctor in the same place, examining more openly what is meant by the truth virtually contained in the object, adds the reason that the subject contains the predicate and the evidence of the entire proposition; but evidence formally is not cognition but adds to it the necessary relation or conformity of contents. And shortly after (§. *Contrà istud D.*) he rejects the proportion of cause to effect between the primary subject and its act and habit, because virtual containment of truths is only in the primary and common object, not in the particular object — which pertains to the evidence and truth of the habit. Wherefore the virtual containment of the primary and adequate subject regards not cognition but the evidence of its propositions. Added to this: the precise and formal notion of something must be adequate and intrinsic to it, such that, when it is posited, its effect is posited, and when it is removed, its effect is removed — and this cannot be prevented even by the absolute power of God. Therefore virtual containment, insofar as it precisely tends to knowledge, cannot be the formal notion of the scientific object, since all cognition — not only actual but also habitual — can be immediately produced by God independently of the object; but the formal notion of the object, being intrinsic, can in no way be supplied.

You will say that it can be supplied as to the moving of the object, but not as to the termination, because the former is accidental and the latter essential to the object, from (3. *dist.15. q.2. in fine*); and further, God indeed cannot supply the formal notion, but he can supply its effect. But this reply does not satisfy me. For to terminate a cognition is not the same as to contain it virtually, since termination is merely the simple relation of the attainment of the object by the power through the act in itself or in another; but to contain virtually is to be able to produce, as is clear from what was said above. Therefore our argument is not weakened by the reply adduced. Against what is additionally urged, I press thus: the formal notion of virtual containment is to be able to produce; but if God cannot supply the first, neither can he supply the second.

Fourth Assertion. The notion of virtual containment in the scientific object is aptly and precisely expressed through the evidence and truth — actual or habitual — of the science of which it is the subject. This assertion is conspicuously and accurately defended by Lychetus (*in comm. Prol. c.tato*), whom Bassolis and Rubionius appear to have taught before him, and whom Faber (*Theor.5. c.3*) follows against Bargius Pedemontanus, who stubbornly maintains and defends the opposite. Proof, first, from the passages adduced above in the preceding assertion, in which the Doctor plainly sets forth that the subject virtually contains the truth and evidence of the propositions of that habit of which it is the subject, and that it is the adequate cause thereof — just as the posteriori universal is with respect to its property. And all of this is said precisely of the evidence of the act and habit. Therefore the virtual containment of the primary and adequate scientific object is suitably declared through this truth and evidence. Second: truth and evidence is the adequate effect of the subject, not only in the genus of subject but absolutely. Therefore the notion of virtual containment of the object is well explained through the aforesaid evidence. The consequence holds because the formal notion of the subject, being intrinsic and distinctive of it from all that is not such, must be adequate and belong to it per se primarily. The antecedent is proved: truth and evidence, being nothing other than the conformity of predicate to subject, necessarily arises from nothing other than the intrinsic relation of one to the other, known by the intellect.

You will object, first, that a being of reason is not a knowable object, as is clear (1.1 *q.3. l. postremo Met. q.1*); but a being of reason does not virtually contain the truths demonstrable of it, because it has no power of producing them in real being or cognitive being. Therefore the definition of the subject assigned above is defective. Tataretus (*in proaemio Log. q.2. scibili 3*) easily extricates himself from this argument by saying that the definition given is to be interpreted of the subject of real science, not of the subject of rational science, such as the being of reason, which contains nothing virtually, neither in real being nor in cognitive being, neither partially nor totally, since production is an act of real being, which can belong only to what actually exists. It can perhaps be replied better that the aforementioned definition can also be applied to the being of reason,

because the being of reason in its own way possesses proper entity and only objective and intentional existence and causality, deriving principally from its foundation, and has proper properties demonstrable of it, as may be seen in the places mentioned just above.

You will object, second, that if the subject virtually contained its property, the subject and property would be really distinct — as between what produces and what is produced there is real distinction — and the subject is productive of its property, as Scotus does not deny in the place cited above; but that the subject is really distinct from its property conflicts with Scotus (*2. dist.16. q.vn.*), and I showed this at length in the *Metaphysics* (*l.2. q.2*). Especially because real distinction falls between things and things; but many properties are not things distinct from their subjects, such as creatability, corruptibility, and annihilability. Therefore it is wrong to assert that the subject virtually contains its properties. I deny the inference of the major. For this holds in productions through motion and change, not in productions through simple emanation, as the property proceeds or springs from the subject, as the Parisians note (*cit. in solution. 1.*) and I observed in the second note. Or better, in accordance with the last assertion, say that virtual containment of the subject is to be sought in terms of the truth and evidence of immediate and mediate propositions, not in terms of production of the incomplex in real being and in cognitive being. Through this distinction collapse the arguments that Gregory, Bacon, and the other Nominalists amass at length, as may be seen in Faber cited above.

You will object, third, that nothing created can virtually contain anything. Therefore the subject does not contain the truths knowable of it. The antecedent is proved: according to the common doctrine of theologians, whatever God contains virtually can be produced immediately by him alone as the primary and universal cause. I deny the antecedent; and to its proof I distinguish: as a simply effective cause — I concede; as an effective and objective cause — I deny. For God indeed contains everything creatable with effective containment, but not with objective containment. For the properties of creatures are not knowable through the divine essence but through the formal notion of the object from which they flow.

You will object, fourth, that if the subject virtually contains all the truths demonstrable of it, then matter — which is the primary subject of physical things — must be established as the subject of Physics; God, who virtually comprehends all things in his infinity, will be the subject of all sciences; and substance, which is the cause of cognition virtually according to (*4. Met.*), is without doubt the subject of *Metaphysics*. But these and similar conclusions are thoroughly absurd. Therefore, etc. I reply that these and similar arguments, which can be framed in this manner, conclude with respect to virtual containment in real being — not with respect to virtual containment of the truth and evidence of the scientific habit.

Question III. On Demonstration.

Article I. Whether Demonstration Exists and What It Is.

Nearly all philosophers, with the exception of the Sceptics mentioned by Raconius (*disp.1. sect.2. q.2*), teach that demonstration exists — particularly those who admit science, who are to be cited in the question on science (*art.1*). It is for the sake of science that demonstration itself was devised. For it is the instrument and cause of science; and from the existence of an effect to the existence of its cause there is a ready argument, as ancient and modern philosophers frequently employ in acquiring the sciences. Furthermore, the particular demonstrations offered in each individual science put the existence of this assertion beyond doubt. Presupposing, therefore, the existence of demonstration, we must carefully investigate its essence, which will become clearly known to us through its definition. Now two definitions of demonstration are adduced by Aristotle (*c.2. T.8*), of which the first is expressed in these words: demonstration is a syllogism that produces science — which, as the Doctor observes (*q.11 of the same work, §. Adq.*), is given through the final cause. For the end of demonstration is science, and every instrument is customarily described through the end for which it was devised, as the Conimbricenses imply (*q.2. ad finem art.1*). And so, since demonstration is the scientific instrument, it is rightly defined through its scientific end. The second is given in the same place: demonstration is from what is true, primary, immediate, prior, more known, and causative of the conclusion — which Scotus mentions (*both loco cit. and also 3. dist.24. q.vn. in fine §. Ad quaest. ante E.*). And this is delivered through the material cause. Just as a house is constructed from stones, lime, and other things necessary to it as its material components, so demonstration is put together from the items just described as from its material cause. Both are reported by Maior (*1. Post. fol.70*), who notes that one can be demonstrated by the other — the material by the final, for example — as I showed in a similar case in the second book on the soul. Into the same thing seems to fall that which Aristotle offers (*1. Top. c.1*) and the Doctor accepts in this book (*q. alleg. §. Item*): demonstration is from immediate things and from those that are immediate principles — though it is plausible that this is the definition of demonstration taken universally, fitting both the *propter quid* and the *quia* demonstrations, as the paired Scotists note (*2. p. Inst. Tract.1. c.2*) and the Doctor explains (*in fine q. cit.*): demonstration is from immediate things, resolving finally all demonstrations to first principles which are immediate. And so demonstration can absolutely be made from immediate or from mediate things; and it is commonly said to be from immediate things because, if it consists of mediate things, it can finally be resolved into immediate principles.

Assertion. The aforesaid definitions of demonstration are exact. So together with all interpreters of Aristotle, Scotus (*ubisupra*) and his disciples teach, defending them excellently against the objections of adversaries and fully

satisfying them. This assertion can be urged through a common and well-known argument. For those are considered good definitions that participate in genus and difference; and such are the definitions of demonstration just adduced. Therefore they are legitimate. Although the syllogism cannot be a genus to the topical and analytic, as I proved (*q.1. of this book art.2*), and Zabarella does not dissent (*in com. T.8. and l. de speciebus demonstrationis c.1*), it nevertheless performs the function of genus in the first definition; in the second it is implied; and the remaining particulars hold the place of the difference, which constitutes demonstration in its essential being and distinguishes it from everything that is not demonstration, as any other quidditative and essential difference does.

You will object, first, that a suitable and exact definition must fit everything defined, as the laws of a good definition require; but to be a syllogism productive of science — which is the definition of demonstration — does not fit every demonstration, namely demonstration quia, which, not being from the cause as science requires according to Aristotle's description, cannot consequently be its effective cause. And so the definition of demonstration is not rightly given. Granting the major, to the minor I say that the definition given fits only the propter quid demonstration, which is called by the Doctor at the end of the question demonstration simply speaking. And the same must be asserted of the definition of science, as Tataretus explains (*q.2. art.3*) and Zabarella elegantly sets out (*loco ultimo citato*).

You will object, second, that science is generated by the knowable object and the intellective power as two partial causes constituting one total cause, according to the common position of philosophers. Therefore it is wrong to place in the definition of demonstration that science is the effect of demonstration. Granting the antecedent, I deny the consequence. For the efficiency of the object and of the intellect is presupposed for causing science; and once that is had, the intellect forms the necessary propositional premises, which are the efficient causes of the conclusion.

You will object, third, that nothing superfluous and nothing deficient ought to be placed in a definition, as was established through the canons of definition adduced in the Epitome (*1.2. q.7. art. ult.*). But in the second definition of demonstration there are certain things that appear superfluous and empty — namely primary and immediate. For what is primary is immediate, and what is immediate is primary. Again, demonstration is said to be from prior and more known; but the immediate is prior and more known. Therefore that definition of demonstration is not correct. Granting the major, I deny the minor. For, as the Doctor says, not all principles are immediate — for example, this proposition is per se primary: man is an animal — yet it has a middle term through which it is demonstrated, namely through sentient. It is therefore rightly appended to demonstration that it is from first and immediate things, as the Conimbricenses likewise interpret (*q.2. art.3*). To the further point urged, I

say with the Doctor that principles in themselves and absolutely are first and known; but they are called prior and more known with respect to the conclusion, which is posterior and less known.

Article II. How Many Species of Demonstration There Are.

This difficulty is treated fully and learnedly by Zabarella (*l. de speciebus demonstrationis*), where through many chapters he is entirely occupied in untangling and developing it, by Faber (*Theor.10. 11*), Mastrius and Bellutus (*disp.13. q.1. art.2*), and many others who enumerate three principal positions. The first is that of Avicenna and others cited by our more recent authors, who hold that there is only one species of demonstration, called demonstration propter quid. The second is that of Averroes (*1. Post. com.95*) and his followers, who admit three species of demonstration: the demonstration that or quia, the demonstration propter quid, and the demonstration that and propter quid simultaneously. The third is that embraced by Scotus (*quol.7. §. Hic praemittenda sunt A.*), Gadius, Lychetus (*ibid.*), Zabarella cited, and others commonly, who assert that there are only two species of demonstration: the quia and the propter quid. For its more easy and convenient understanding:

Note first that there are four principal divisions of demonstration. The first, which Scotus (*1. Post. q.13. §. contra istud*) and (*q.34. §. unde*) reports from Aristotle (*ibid. c.18. T.49*), is into universal and particular; and this, as Auriol notes (*1. d.35. a.4*), is derived from the universality and particularity of the subject. For the universal is had of a universal subject, the particular of a particular subject. The second, from the same Doctor (*ibid. q.21. §. Adq.*) after Aristotle (*in the same work c.19. T.40*), is into affirmative and negative — which from what was said in the Epitome (*l.2. q.2. q.3*) is plain. The former is more worthy and excellent than the latter, as the philosopher likewise asserts there, both because it is simpler and because it is more known, as the same Aristotle writes (*1. Phys. T.39*). The third, from (*1. Post. c.20. T.41*), is into ostensive and leading to the impossible, which Scotus mentions (*Quol.2. §. de 2. H.*) and I explain in the Epitome (*l.4. q.1. a.11*). Only this much needs to be noted here: the first is a true demonstration; but the second scarcely merits the name of demonstration, rather that of refutation, as Aristotle wishes (*ubisupra T.40*); and it is commonly called an argument ad hominem. The reason is that the ostensive proceeds from prior things and directly draws its conclusion, while the one leading to the impossible proceeds obliquely and indirectly — not from truth to truth, but from the falsity of the opposite to the falsity of the opposite, since it demonstrates the falsity of a true proposition from the falsity of the proposed conclusion, as was illustrated by example in the passage cited. The fourth, from the Doctor (*1. Post. q.55. §. Adq.*), is into the demonstration propter quid and the demonstration quia, one of which Aristotle calls to dioti and the other to hoti (*cit. c.10*). Since this division is the principal one, it must be diligently examined by me in the present place. Two differences between the two, assigned by Aristotle (*c.4 of the same book*),

intervene. The first: the demonstration propter quid always proceeds through the proximate cause, while the demonstration quia sometimes proceeds through the remote cause. The second: the quia demonstration proceeds through the effect, the propter quid demonstration by no means. From these I gather, first, that a quia demonstration through a convertible effect is possible, as is clear in these two: every non-twinkling thing is near; the planets do not twinkle; therefore the planets are near. And: every thing whose light increases spherically is spherical; the moon is something whose light increases spherically; therefore the moon is spherical. I gather, second, that there can be a negative demonstration through an effect not reciprocal with the cause — more common than the cause — and a positive demonstration is had, as: every triangle has three angles; therefore every triangle is a figure. I gather, third, that there can also be a quia demonstration through a remote cause, as: every breather is an animal; no stone is an animal; therefore no stone breathes.

Note second that, given a double cause — proximate and remote — a double effect must be conceded, proximate and remote, because cause and effect are correlatives whose simultaneous existence in nature the Stagirite records in the chapter on relatives. Between a proximate cause and its proximate effect there is a necessary and essential connection, such that when the proximate cause is posited its effect is necessarily posited, and conversely when the proximate cause is removed its proximate effect is necessarily removed — as if form is taken from matter, its information is removed; and if the soul is separated from the body, its animation and what essentially depends on it must be removed. But this indissoluble link is not always found between a remote cause and its effect, because it is generally wider. Therefore when it is posited, it is not necessary that its effect be posited. Hence Aristotle prescribes that it should be formed not as affirmative but as negative, in Camestres, which is the mode of the second figure, as is clear from the example I adduced at the end of the first note, in which the remote cause of breathing — namely animal — is adduced; this is not the precise cause, but to have lungs, as the Doctor explains (*16. univ. §. Ad 3. in solutione quinti*): for a fish is an animal and yet does not breathe, because it lacks lungs, as the Doctor touches on (*2. d. 34. ante §. Ideò merito*).

Note third that the propter quid demonstration can be constructed through an extrinsic cause, as: as often as the earth is interposed between the sun and the moon, the moon is eclipsed; when the sun and moon are at the head or tail of the dragon, the earth is interposed between the sun and the moon; therefore at that time the moon is eclipsed. Or through an intrinsic cause, which happens when its middle term is the definition of the subject, as: every rational being is risible; every man is rational; therefore every man is risible. Now since demonstration is effected through the four kinds of causes, as Scotus proves (*q. 57*), of which two are extrinsic — efficient and final — and the others intrinsic — material and formal — the most powerful demonstration, which Aristotle and Scotus call demonstration simply speaking, is that which is had through the

formal, proximate, and immediate cause. The remaining demonstrations are less noble and less valuable, because they are lacking in some of the conditions necessary for perfect demonstration, though they possess others by reason of which they are called demonstrations — not absolutely, but with an addition — or secondary demonstrations of a second kind, as Zabarella observes (*l. de speciebus demonstrationis c.1*). Thus demonstration taken universally can be divided into demonstration propter quid and demonstration quia; demonstration propter quid into primary and secondary — the former being constituted through the proximate and immediate cause, the latter through another cause of the other kinds of causes we described. The demonstration quia is further divided into demonstration from the effect and demonstration through the remote cause; and again it can be subdivided into demonstration from an immediate effect and from a remote effect.

Assertion. There are two species of demonstration: propter quid and quia, taken in the manner explained above. So Scotus (*quol. cit. and q. §. post §. ad q. post*) after Aristotle (*1. Post. c.4. T.10*), and Zabarella does not doubt that this is the truest position (*b.1. praalleg.*). Proof, first: every necessary truth not known from its terms, having a necessary connection with another necessary truth, can be demonstrated in only two ways. Therefore only a twofold species of demonstration is established. The antecedent is proved: for either it is demonstrated a priori, that is, from the cause, and the demonstration propter quid is had; or it is demonstrated a posteriori, that is, from the effect, and there is demonstration quia. Therefore, since no other necessary connection of things remains beyond these two, it is rightly and duly inferred that there are only two species of demonstration. Second: there is only a twofold science, from (*1. Post. T.42*) and (*2. eiusdem operis T.25*). Therefore there is also only a twofold instrument of knowing, or twofold demonstration. The antecedent is at hand: for either a thing is known through the cause, and propter quid science is had; or it is known through the effect, and quia science arises. The consequence holds because the species of demonstration seem to be enumerated according to the species of science, since science proceeds from demonstration as an effect from its cause. I add that nearly every division is twofold or is to be reduced to a twofold one, as I declared from the Doctor (*1.2. q. de differentia*).

You will object, first, that a thing can be known not only by quia or propter quid science, but also by quia and propter quid science simultaneously. Therefore, according to this triple science, a triple species of demonstration must be enumerated. The antecedent is read (*2. Post. T.39*) and expressly explained there by Zabarella. I reply that it is per accidens for the same thing to be known simultaneously by quia and propter quid demonstration. For no peculiar third science is generated thereby, by reason of which a third species of demonstration distinct from the two named would have to be admitted, since no third necessary and essential connection of things remains beyond the connections of cause to effect and effect to cause, as was established above.

You will object, second, that a third mode of knowing a thing certainly and evidently exists — proceeding from effect to effect and from equal to equal. Therefore a third species of demonstration invented by Themistius must be admitted. The antecedent is urged: when two effects necessarily depend on one and the same cause and are reciprocated with that cause, one can be demonstrated through the other, proceeding from equal to equal — as from putrid fever two accidents proceed, namely irregularity of pulse and a certain heat residing in the sick person, as its two effects convertible with the fever itself; one of them is not the cause of the other, yet they are necessarily conjoined, and so an argument or demonstration from effect to effect can be formed: whoever has such heat in himself has irregularity of pulse; in Peter, for example, there is said heat; therefore also irregularity of pulse. I deny the antecedent; and to its proof I say that between these effects there is no per se necessary link except per accidens and by reason of a third thing, since one does not enter into the definition of the other, nor is one the cause or property of the other. Therefore such an argumentation is alien to demonstration, which requires a per se necessary link of one extreme with the other; and consequently such an argumentation is not to be ascribed among demonstrations.

You will object, third, that from remote causes sometimes there proceed effects convertible with them. Therefore from them an affirmative demonstration can be constructed in the first figure, which seems to have been asserted with Aristotle above. Granting the antecedent, I deny the consequence. The reason is that what happens rarely is per accidens and is not per se considered by science. But Aristotle, having regard to what is necessary and perpetual, asserts that the demonstration through a remote cause occurs in Camestres, where the major is a universal affirmative, and the minor and conclusion are universal negatives.

You will object, fourth, that certain demonstrations exist that are neither through cause nor through effect — for example: every man is an animal; John is a man; therefore John is an animal. Therefore the division of demonstration adduced above is deficient and incomplete. The antecedent is conceded, since animal is neither the cause of man nor its effect. It is confirmed: when a definition is demonstrated by the defined, or conversely the defined by the definition, there is no demonstration belonging to either of the two just assigned. Therefore the aforesaid division is insufficient. Some, pressed by this argument, are convinced and concede that the division is inadequate and insufficient. But I am not constrained by this, since such argumentations hold through the intrinsic locus from the universal whole to the subjective parts, as I explained in the Epitome (*l.3. q.3. art.3*). Especially because these proceed from essential principles, which stand as causes taken broadly — especially in logical terms, where the genus stands as matter and the difference as form to constituting the whole which is the species composed from them, as I said in the second book. And therefore they fall under the aforesaid division.

Article III. Whether Demonstration Is from True Premises.

Five conditions are enumerated in the material definition of demonstration adduced in the preceding article, and must now be examined individually; among them the truth of the premises holds the foremost place. For demonstration must consist of true things — which is the common assertion of Aristotle in the present place, Scotus (*ibid.* q.1), and others. It is proved, first, from the fact that an effect leads us to cognition of its cause, as philosophers teach with Aristotle (*1. Met. c.2*); but the effect of demonstration is true — namely science, whose end, especially if it is speculative science, is the contemplation of truth, from (*6. Met. c.1*). Therefore also its causes, which are the premises, must be true. Second, it is a commonly received principle among dialecticians that the conclusion follows the weaker part: if one of the premises is negative, the conclusion will be negative; if particular, the conclusion will likewise be particular; and consequently if any premise is false, the conclusion too will turn out false. But science, which is placed in the conclusion, can be neither false nor of a false thing, as is clear from its description in (*1. Post. c.2*). For this reason the philosopher adds there — according to Philoponus — that there is no science of the false. Therefore demonstration proceeds from what is true. Now a greater difficulty arises as to whether the premises are truer than the conclusion. For on the side of denial stand Hurtado (*disp.11. Sect.2*), Arriaga (*disp.1.3. sect.3*), and Fuentes (*q.19. diff.1. art.2*), while the affirmative part is commonly defended by others cited by the aforesaid more recent authors. This dispute, I judge, must be settled by distinction — namely, the premises taken fundamentally are truer than the conclusion, but not taken formally — as I made fully clear in the fourth book (*q.4. art.2*).

Assertion. Demonstration proceeds from premises that are truer than the conclusion fundamentally speaking, but not taken formally. This assertion in both its parts is proved by the advocates of each opinion recounted above; and indeed: the first part is urged, first, from Aristotle (*both here and also 4. Met. T.18. c.4*) and Scotus (*ibid. and 2. dist.26. q.vn. §. Ad 1. tertia via paulò post AA.*) who affirm that one thing can be truer or falser than another. It is proved, second, that truth is the conformity of the intellect with the object; but a proposition about an object is truer than another — as it is truer to say man is a rational animal than that man is white. Therefore premises composed of terms about truer objects are truer than the conclusion deduced from them. Third: it is falser to say three and two are one thousand than to say three and two are six; and it is falser to say man is a stone than that he is a dog. Therefore it is truer to say three and two are five than to say Peter is writing or running. The consequence holds by that axiom: by reason of which something is such, that thing is more so — and this concords with our assertion together with the conditions explained above, as is evident to one reasoning through them. And so I briefly form the argument: what is the univocal and total cause susceptible of more and less is more perfect than its univocal effect; but premises are of this kind, as is clear from what has

been said. Therefore, etc. Second: absolutely speaking, what depends on another is not equally noble, known, and perfect as that on which it depends, as the Doctor expressly declares (*q.13*) and explains and limits (*4. dist.49. q.4. §. Iuxta hoc infra. N.*); but the conclusion depends on the premises as an effect on its cause. Therefore the premises surpass it in certitude, evidence, and perfection. Third: the closer something is to what is most known and most evident, the more known and evident it is; but principles are closer to the first principles — that is, self-evident and most universal principles. Add that a univocal cause is nobler than its effect, as the Doctor asserts throughout, notably (*2. dist.26. q.vn. §. Hic dicitur ante A.*); the reason being that it contains it virtually, which also denotes greater perfection — as is clear of God who contains creatures virtually, as I pursue at length in the treatise on Creation (*disp.3*). I conclude, therefore, that premises surpass the conclusion in certitude, evidence, and perfection.

The second part is in accordance with Scotus (*1. Post. q.13. ad finem*) and the Scotists cited (*l. 4. q.4. art.2. assert.2*), who teach that truth formally is a relation; and hence I derive the proof of this part as follows: a relation formally taken does not admit of more and less, whether in the concrete — as one father is not more a father than another father — or in the abstract — as one paternity is not more a paternity than another paternity. But truth formally is a relation, as I showed in the place now cited. Therefore the truth of the premises formally is not greater or lesser than the truth of the conclusion caused and collected from them. Furthermore, truth is a commensuration and adequation of the act of the intellect with the object; but this adequation consists in something indivisible. For if the object is adequated to the act of the intellect, no other object can be more adequated to it — otherwise it would not be adequated to it, which is contrary to the supposition. And further, the indivisible does not admit of more and less; since therefore truth is indivisible, it is formally equal in premises and in conclusion. This argument does not seem to favor those who do not distinguish truth from the act of the intellect, whom I mentioned in the place recently cited; for since through them the act of the intellect is a quality to which belongs admitting of more and less, this property does not seem to be deniable of truth of this kind.

You will object, first, against the first assertion, that sometimes truth follows from falsity, as is read in (*l. consequentiarum Joannis Morissiis reg.1*) and is asserted by the Doctor (*q.15. §. Ad quest.*) and is derived from Aristotle (*1. Prior.*) as cited by Lychetus (*1. dist.2. q.2. §. Secundo principaliter*). Therefore it is not necessary that demonstration be constructed from true things. The antecedent is clear in this syllogism: every animal is black; a crow is an animal; therefore a crow is black. Here from a false major and a true minor a true conclusion is gathered. It is confirmed, first, that Aristotle (*8. Phys. T.45*) from motion — which he falsely established as eternal — infers that the first Mover is eternal, which is true. It is confirmed, second, that in the demonstration leading to the impossible, one of the premises is always false, as the Doctor argues in the place cited above;

therefore not every demonstration is composed from true things. I distinguish the antecedent: *per se* — I deny; *per accidens* — I concede. But what is *per accidens* does not fall under science, as I was noting above; and so Scotus, Maior, and others who accept the said canon are to be interpreted. To the first confirmation, the same distinction and interpretation is to be applied; especially because, according to truth and the Catholic faith, God is not a necessary but a free first mover — as he clearly implied by creating the world in time, as I showed at length in the treatise on Creation (*disp.1*). To the second confirmation, it can be said that the assertion of the assertion is to be taken of ostensive demonstration, not of that leading to the impossible, whose reason I adduced in the preceding article, first note, and the Doctor implies (*ante §. Contrà*). Or say, with the same Doctor in the same place, that such a demonstration is made from true things as regards the third process, which is from the destruction of the hypothesis to showing that the principal proposition is true.

You will object, second, against the same assertion, that demonstrations are made concerning the void, the infinite, and other things that are beings or false beings. Therefore demonstration is not always composed from true things. The consequence holds because truth is a property of being; therefore non-being is not true, since opposites do not enjoy the same properties. The antecedent is urged: those things are knowable in some way, since they are considered by Physics, which is a real science; especially because concerning non-being, what is opposed to being can be known. And so of it and other things named above a scientific demonstration can be made; and consequently demonstration is not always framed from true things. I reply with the Doctor in that place (§. *Ad primam*): of those and similar things there is a negative demonstration and science, not a positive one, which is always from true things, and in this sense we speak with Aristotle in the present place.

You will object, third, against the second part of the assertion, that one of the properties of relatives enumerated by Aristotle in the chapter on relatives is to admit of more and less. Therefore, since truth from what was asserted is a relation, it undoubtedly follows that this property agrees with it; and thus the premises can be truer than the conclusion. It is confirmed: where there is greater union and greater conformity of extremes in some third thing, there is greater truth, as may be collected from the Doctor in the first place cited; but this happens in some premises. Therefore the premises are truer than the conclusion. I reply that this property is attributed to a relation not formally but fundamentally — that is, by reason of the foundation in which it is grounded — for example, because whiteness and blackness admit of more and less, the relations of similarity and dissimilarity founded in them are said to admit of more and less. The same is affirmed of contrariety, as the Conimbricenses note (*in comment. c.7*) after Scotus (*q.26. praedicam. §. De prima proprietate*) and Boethius. To the confirmation, the same reply and interpretation just adduced applies.

Article IV. Whether Demonstration Is from Primary and Immediate Things.

The second condition of demonstration delivered by Aristotle is that it be from primary and immediate things, which some consider twofold, as the Doctor implies (*1. Post. q.11. §. Ad 1. rationem*); while others commonly, notably Zabarella (*in com. T.9*), Arriaga, and Mastrius and Bellutus (*part.2. Inst. Tract.1. c.4. and disp.13. q.3. art.1*), see it as only one condition — and the Doctor in the place now cited does not demur, though he places some difference between them, drawn from a diverse property. For this reason neither ought to be judged superfluous or deficient, as the notion and signification of each term plainly demonstrate, and the Doctor indicates not obscurely (*both here and in q.1. art.1*). Whether therefore these differ or coincide, they admit without doubt this exposition consonant with the said Doctor. Demonstration is from primary things, that is, principles — the Doctor's interpretation (*cit. q.11. §. Ad quaest.*). From immediate things: supply finally, as the Doctor explains (*ibid. in fine loci cit.*). For although sometimes demonstration is made from mediate things, nevertheless in the end it is resolved into the immediate. And so demonstration is composed of principles, which can be indemonstrable and common — indeed most common, mentioned by the Stagirite (*c.8 of this book*) — and demonstrable and proper, which the same philosopher cites (*ibid. and 4. Met. c.3*); and all of these are found in the sciences, both subalternate and non-subalternate. For in the latter — especially in Metaphysics — the most common and indemonstrable principles are found; in the former, demonstrable principles that, though not proved by the subalternated, are well shown by the subalternating sciences, as I shall make fully clear in the question on science. Furthermore, I observe that a proposition is called immediate and indemonstrable because it lacks a middle term; and this can happen in three ways. First, because it lacks a middle term both a priori and a posteriori — such as the absolutely first principles, which are altogether indemonstrable — as: it is impossible to affirm and deny the same thing of the same, and those which the philosopher considers in (*4. Met. c.3*) and onwards. Second, because it lacks a middle term a priori but not a posteriori — as: man is a rational animal — this proposition has no middle term through which it is demonstrated a priori, yet it can be demonstrated a posteriori through its property and quasi-effect: every risible thing is rational; every man is risible; therefore every man is rational. Third, because it is destitute of a middle term a posteriori, although it has one a priori — as is the case with the proposition just cited, which has a cause through which it is demonstrated a priori, but not a posteriori. What is said of necessary propositions must likewise be asserted of contingent ones.

Assertion. Demonstration is composed of primary and immediate things either actually or virtually — that is, finally. So Scotus (*in q. cit.*) in both its parts, followed by Raconius (*disp.1. art.4*), Hurtado (*disp.11. sect.5*), and Arriaga (*disp.16. sect.6*). The first part is proved: some demonstrations are made from

indemonstrable premises, both a priori and a posteriori, as I noted above and illustrated by example. Therefore demonstrations of this kind, which are composed from those, consist of primary and immediate things actually. The second part is proved: in effects and per se causes there is no proceeding to infinity, as is clear in the Physics in the book on causes; otherwise nothing would be known, as Scotus infers (*ubisupra* §. *Adq.*). But some propositions are demonstrable through others, as when propositions and argumentations are formed from properties ordered among themselves, one being shown through another — as the weepable through the risible, the risible through the admiring, and the admiring through the discursive and rational — in which one finally arrives at an immediate and indemonstrable principle. Therefore finally demonstration consists of primary and immediate things.

You will object, first, that every demonstration is from immediate things; therefore no demonstration is made from mediate things, since the immediate and the mediate seem to be opposed; and that no demonstration is composed from mediate things conflicts with Aristotle (*both here and in 1. Top. 1.*) and with reason, because since some principles are immediate and some mediate — as is clear from the foregoing — it consequently follows that demonstrations made from mediate principles are mediate. I distinguish the antecedent: every demonstration is made from immediate things proximately or remotely, actually or virtually — I concede; proximately and actually always — I deny; for as the instance proves, some demonstrations actually and proximately consist of mediate things, which are finally resolved into the immediate, as the Doctor writes at the close of the question cited.

You will object, second, that if every demonstration is composed of primary and immediate principles, then every demonstration is a priori and from the cause, and none is a posteriori and from the effect — which contradicts the Stagirite (*1. and 2. of this work*) and the common doctrine of philosophers. I reply with Scotus cited, through distinction of the consequent: concerning demonstration simply speaking, which Aristotle defines — I concede; concerning demonstration in a qualified sense, such as the demonstration a posteriori and from the effect — I deny.

Article V. Whether Demonstration Is from Prior and More Known Things.

Concerning the first part of the proposed title, the dialecticians do not contend, since it is more than clear that propositional premises precede the conclusion — which is understood and proved in the first question of this book (*a.9*); and somewhat more will be touched on below in the first note. Concerning the second part of this article, however, I see that not all are agreed — especially the more recent authors, who, wishing to add something to what was discovered by the ancients and not to enter into their positions, endeavor to introduce new things into the schools. They defend that principles neither in certitude, nor in

evidence, nor in perfection surpass the conclusion; among these are Arriaga (*disp.16. Sect.4. subsectione 2*), who warns the Reader in the preface to his philosophical course that novelty of opinions should not be feared; and Hurtado (*disp.11. sect.3*) and others whose names Hurtado (*ibid.*) and Ruuvius (*c.2. q.5*) retain. That certain lovers of novelty and students did the same thing in other matters in their time, Auriol reports (*in Prol. fol.57. art.2*), who — following the reasoning of their positions and departing from Aristotelian and common doctrine, especially Ockham and his disciples — are not rarely imitated by the aforementioned more recent authors. The common body of philosophers, however, is with Aristotle (*1. Post. c.2*), Scotus (*q.11. §. Adq. and q.13. §. Adq. dicitur*), the Inseparable Scotists (*disp.13. q.3. a.2*), Fuentes (*q.19. diff.1. q.3*), Raconius (*disp.1. q.3. a.2. sect.2*), Conimbricenses (*a.5. q.2. c.2*), and others who teach that the premises are more known, more evident, and more perfect than the conclusion, whether taken separately or together.

Note first, from the Doctor (*q.11. §. Ad 1. rationem*), that primary is used in two ways: one way in itself and absolutely — that is, by negation of the prior — thus the categories are called first genera because no other genus is placed above these supreme genera; the other way by comparison to the posterior — that is, the first to the second — and in this way premises are called prior in order to the conclusion, which is posterior to them, just as an effect is posterior to its cause. This same acceptation is admitted by the name firstborn, as I noted in the treatise on the Triune God (*disp.1. q.7*). Furthermore, from Aristotle cited (*T.5. c.2*) and Scotus (*q.10. §. Ad primam*), prior and more known are said in two ways: prior and more known by nature — which is what is most distant from the senses, such as the universal; and prior and more known to us — which is what is closest to the senses, such as the singular. Sometimes what is more known by nature is also more known to us, as are many things in the mathematical disciplines — for example, every whole is greater than its part; likewise, a right angle is greater than an acute angle. Now the *propter quid* demonstration proceeds from prior and more known by nature; the *quia* demonstration does not.

Note second that science caused by demonstration includes principally two things: certitude and evidence, which stand to one another as superior and inferior, or as more common and less common. For every evidence includes certitude, but not vice versa. Faith, for example, is indeed certain, yet not evident. Certitude, moreover, is described as the firm adherence of the intellect to some object — as I am certain that God is triune and one, because I firmly adhere to the page attesting this to me. Evidence, on the other hand, is a clear and plain knowledge of the object. All of this is drawn from the Doctor (*q.3. prol. 3. d.24. q.vii. §. Ad q. infrà D.*), who, adducing the conditions of science, places certitude and evidence as the foremost, saying that science is certain and evident cognition. Perfection, on the other hand, can be called the integrity of a thing, which is convertible with goodness and beauty taken transcendently, as

the Sacred Interpreters signify (*Gen.1.*); and perfect is that to which nothing is lacking, as Scotus, Gadius (*Quol.18. fol.182*), Pelbartus (*Tomo 1. verbo perfectio*), and Vorrilong (*1. d.36*) hold together, which must be diligently investigated elsewhere.

Note third that the axiom, by reason of which something is such that thing is more so — of which Aristotle makes use here (*T.5. c.2*) and mentions (*4. Met. T.4*) — to prove that premises are more known and more evident than the conclusion, is restricted by many to numerous conditions, of which Maior (*1. Post. fol.69. §. Nota and §. Epilogando*) enumerates five, and concludes that it holds only in the genus of efficient and final cause. Tataretus (*ibid. q.2. scibili 4*), for its explanation and verification, adduces three conditions, of which two are placed by Aristotle in the Metaphysics cited, and a third is added by others. The first is that what is predicated of cause and effect formally belongs to each; thus these instances do not hold: the air is hot because of the sun, therefore the sun is more hot; and Peter is drunk because of wine, therefore wine is more drunk — because neither heat formally belongs to the sun, nor drunkenness to wine. The second, that what is said of cause and effect admits of more and less; thus it is not rightly deduced that Francis is a man because of his father, therefore his father is more a man. The third, that one with respect to the other, between which the comparison is made, is the total and adequate cause — for want of which it does not follow that the natural composite is perfect because of form, therefore form is more perfect than the composite, because form is the partial cause thereof, being itself less perfect than the whole which includes it, as Scotus affirms (*1. d.3. q.2. §. Loquendo. Sub M.*). The Doctor touches on these modulations (*1. Perih. §. Ad partem oppositam*) and (*1. Post. q.12. q. Adq. and §. Ad primam*), saying that the aforesaid maxim is to be taken of an efficient, univocal, per se essential, and total cause.

Assertion. The premises of demonstration are more known, more evident, and more perfect than the conclusion. So Scotus in the places cited before the first note, together with Aristotle in the passage mentioned. Proof, first: that which is the cause of another is more known, more evident, and more perfect than it in itself, as I asserted (*l.5. Phys. q.1. a.5*). For it seems to belong to the notion of a cause that whatever is present in the effect in a more excellent and eminent manner is found in the cause, since the cause virtually contains its effect. But premises are, as I have shown elsewhere, the causes of the conclusion. Therefore, the conclusion being known, certain, evident, and perfect, the premises are more known, more certain, more evident, and more perfect. The consequence is clear by the rule assigned above — by reason of which something is such that thing is more so — which fittingly concords with our assertion together with the conditions explained above, as is clear to one who reasons through them. And so I briefly form the argument: what is the univocal and total cause admitting more and less is more perfect than its univocal effect; but the premises are of this kind, as is clear from what has been said. Therefore,

etc. Second: absolutely, what depends on another is not equally noble, known, and perfect as that on which it depends, as the Doctor expressly declares (*q.13*) and explains and limits (*4. dist.49. q.4. §. Iuxta hoc infrà. N.*); but the conclusion depends on the premises as an effect on its cause. Therefore these surpass it in certitude, evidence, and perfection. Third: the closer something is to what is most known and most evident, the more known and evident it is; but principles are closer to the first principles — that is, self-evident and most universal principles. Add that a univocal cause is nobler than its effect, as the Doctor asserts throughout, notably (*2. dist.26. q.vii. §. Hic dicitur ante A.*); the reason being that it virtually contains it, which also denotes greater perfection — as is clear of God who contains creatures virtually, as I pursue at length in the treatise on Creation (*disp.3*). I conclude, therefore, that premises surpass the conclusion in certitude, evidence, and perfection.

You will object, first, that Aristotle (*1. Post. c.2*) asserts that it is not necessary to assent to all principles more than to the conclusion, but to all or to some. Therefore according to Aristotle principles are not always more certain, known, and evident than the conclusion. It is confirmed: Scotus in the places cited adds that the axiom which the philosopher uses to urge that principles surpass the conclusion in certitude and evidence is to be interpreted of a univocal cause per se, whose effect is equally noble and excellent as the cause itself. Therefore the conclusion, in terms of certitude and evidence, is not inferior to the principles. Zabarella replies from Averroes that the philosopher spoke disjunctively, not because he thinks both options are true, as the Greeks explain, but because he did not wish to discuss this difficulty in that place. One can also say that the reason is equal for all principles; for both the major and the minor are causes of the conclusion, and therefore each ought to be more known and evident than the conclusion. To the confirmation, Scotus satisfies it (*q.12. §. Ad primam*): the principles are more known than the conclusion insofar as cognition, or science, is the apprehension of the truth of necessary things — in which way principles are the univocal cause of the conclusion; but if the discussion concerns cognition and science properly speaking, which is acquired through the cause, principles are the equivocal causes of the conclusion, because the conclusion is had through its cause, while principles are not.

You will object, second, that we assent to the conclusion in nearly the same way and for the same reason as to the premises. Therefore the conclusion is equally known and evident as the premises. The antecedent is proved: by the same union by which the extremes are connected with the middle term they are joined with each other; but things that are the same as a third thing are the same as each other, as the common saying of dialecticians expounded and confirmed by the Doctor (*1. Prior. q.9*) has it. Therefore, since the extremes in the premises have the same union as in the conclusion — as is clear in this demonstration: every rational is risible; every man is rational; therefore every man is risible — it is clearly deduced that the premises are not more certain and evident than it,

especially since they share the same object and formal motive. I deny the antecedent; and to its proof I say that the union of the extremes with the middle term is formally or virtually immediate and independent; while the union of the extremes with each other, which is had in the conclusion, is mediate and dependent. Therefore nothing is concluded by the argument. To what is further urged, I say it has already been dissolved in (*q.1. art.7 of this book*), where it was proved that assent to premises differs from assent to the conclusion, and that their formal objects are distinct from that of the conclusion, as Scotus affirms (*3. dist.23. q.vn. §. Secundo sub D.*) and (*dist.28. q.vn. §. Ad 1. infra G.*).

You will object, third, that what is cognized through the cause is more known than what is not cognized through the cause, as is clear of universal and particular demonstration. For the former according to Aristotle is more known than the latter, because it is cognized through the cause; but the latter is not. But the conclusion is cognized through the cause; while principles are known from the cognition of terms alone. Therefore, etc. I reply with Scotus that the major holds when both extremes are cognizable through the cause — which is not the case with first principles, which become known through the sole knowledge of terms, as is assumed in the proof of the minor.

You will object, fourth, that the more noble is not ordered to the less noble, as is evident in this universe of things, and is indicated by St. Paul (*1. Corint.3*) in these words: all things are yours, you are Christ's, and Christ is God's. The reason is that the end is nobler than those things that are for the end, as is established from the book on causes in the question on the final cause; but principles are ordered to the conclusion. Therefore they are not nobler or more certain than it. I reply: granting the major, I distinguish the minor: as means to an end — I deny; as causes to their effect — I concede. For principles virtually contain the conclusion. Hence Scotus adds near the end of (*q.13*): the principle, insofar as the science of the conclusion is contained in it in universal and confused manner, is ordered to perfect cognition of the universal and of the particular — in which way the imperfect is ordered to the perfect.

You will object, fifth, that more causes of equal force and nobility applied to produce an effect bring about an effect more noble and excellent than fewer causes of the same genus and kind. But more equally noble causes flow into the conclusion than into the principles. Therefore the conclusion is more perfect and noble than they. The major is obvious. The minor is shown: to bring forth the cognition of principles, only the object and the light of the intellect concur; but to cause the conclusion, besides the object and the light of the intellect, the premises themselves cooperate. I reply that the major is true of an effect of greater nobility that is capable; but false of an effect that is incapable of greater perfection, such as the conclusion, which can be affected with neither as great nor greater nobility than that which the principles possess, since it is their equivocal effect.

You will object, sixth, that from two premises of faith there follows a conclusion of faith, which is equally certain as the very premises from which it is drawn. Therefore it cannot be denied that the conclusion is equally certain as its principles. All the more so because from one natural premise and another premise of faith there is collected a conclusion of faith, which is more certain than the natural premise, as is seen in this syllogism: every man is weepable; Christ is a man; therefore Christ is weepable. And so the conclusion can be more certain than the premises. I reply that our assertion is to be taken of premises that have a formal object and assent distinct from the object and assent of the conclusion — as premises of faith and a conclusion deduced from them do not, for they share the same object, the same assent, and the same motive, as Scotus affirms (*3. dist.23. q.vn. §. Adquest. D.*). But if you wish the same doctrine to hold universally of natural and revealed syllogisms, say that the conclusion collected from principles of faith is not equally certain as its principles, since those immediately rest on divine testimony, while this belongs mediately to the theological habit — concerning which there is abundant treatment in the first treatise of our *Summa Theologica*. Whatever Fuentes says (*q.19. diff.1. art.3. ad 4. 5. objectionem*). To the further point urged, the same must be said. For according to that dialectician's maxim, the conclusion always follows the weaker part; and therefore, whether both premises are of faith or only one of the premises, the conclusion is always less certain — as Ruuvius also infers (*c.2. q.5. primi Post.*).

You will object, seventh, that if our assertion is true, it is so especially because of that axiom delivered by the philosopher cited and restricted and confirmed by the three modifications; but this is seen to be false in many cases — most importantly in this: things are hot because of fire; therefore fire is more hot. The antecedent is true and the consequent false. But iron hurts the one touching it more than fire does; therefore iron is hotter. This comes from nothing other than the greater heat present in the iron. Scotus replies (*q.12*) that this is per accidens: for although iron heats more than fire, this does not arise from greater heat inhering in iron, but from the density of matter in which the force of heat is united — and therefore more active — according to that well-known saying: power united is stronger than itself dispersed, as the Doctor implies (*2. dist.42. q.4. §. Respondeo G.*) and Maior sets forth (*fol.69. colum.4*). The remaining condition of demonstration is that it be from causes, which I examined in (*q.1. art.8*). Since demonstration is the perfect mode of knowing, it must consist of causes, because science is cognition of a thing through its cause from (*1. Post. T.1*), whether the cause be actual or virtual, as the philosopher shows (*2. Caeli T.13*): for having proved there that the east is the right side or principle of motion, he objects to himself that the motion of the heavens never began, because in his opinion the world is eternal; and he replies that if motion had begun, it would have taken its beginning from the east. Hence it is clear that in that place Aristotle uses a virtual cause for demonstrating — described as that which does not truly produce an effect, yet if the effect were to be produced, it

would proceed from none other than that which is assigned — as in God incomprehensibility would proceed from infinity and eternity from immutability, as the paired Scotists affirm (*2. part. Inst. Tract.1. c.4*).

Article VI. Whether the Premises of Demonstration Are from Necessary Things and from All.

Some more recent authors, among whom are numbered Hurtado (*disp.9. sect.6*) and in part Arriaga (*disp.16. sect.7*) and Conimbricenses (*c.7. q.1. art.3. ad 2*) — but only with respect to singulars — consistently affirm that demonstration can be made from contingent, singular, and corruptible things. Against them I oppose nearly the entire school of philosophers, first Aristotle (*1. Post. c.4.8*) and elsewhere, Scotus (*q.14*), Maior (*ibidem fol.70. §. Ad 2*), Fuentes (*q.19. diff.1. art.7*), and others who teach that demonstration is composed of necessary, universal, and eternal things.

Note first that Aristotle (*citat. c.4. T.44*) puts forward other conditions of demonstration — namely that demonstration consists of necessary things, proper things, from all, per se, and of universal predicate — which he does not adduce or mention in (*c.2 of the same book*) where he defines demonstration and examines its principal conditions. Zabarella gives the reason (*l. de speciebus demonstrationis c.3*): because those conditions are not distinct from these, but these implicitly contain those, which in (*c.4 alleg.*) he teaches explicitly. For principles being true, immediate, prior, and more known cannot be so unless they are proper, from all, per se, and according to what itself — as will become more clear from what will be said. Hence three grades of necessity required for demonstration are noted: the first is that the demonstration be from all; the second that it be per se; and the third that it be of the predicate convertible with the subject. These must be explained by us individually — the first in the present place, and the rest in the two following articles.

Note second that syncategoremata or universal signs — namely all or none — appended to any subject render a proposition universal, as I noted in the Epitome (*l.2. q.2. art.3*). When therefore Aristotle says that demonstration, or the proposition of a demonstration, as Zabarella explains (*l.1. de propositionibus necessariis in fine c.2. 1. Post. in comm. c.4*), must be from all — that is, of a universal subject, by reason of which it is called universal. Now since universality can be sought in two respects — namely with respect to the subject of which its predicate is universally stated, and with respect to the perpetuity of time — there accordingly arises a twofold predication: from all in the prior sense, and from all in the posterior sense. The former is when the predicate is said of every subject, with no account taken of the universality of time — as if at present all men were white, this would be from all in the prior sense: every man is white. But if the predicate is applied and stated of the subject not only at every subject but also at every time, the proposition from all in the posterior sense is had — as every man is an animal. The former is called from all in the prior sense because

in the Prior Books only the syllogistic form is attended to without the perpetuity of time. The latter is called from all in the posterior sense because the universality and perpetuity of time is attended to in it. Wherefore this first grade of necessity requires two conditions: one which is the universality and perpetuity of the subject; the other which is the perpetual link between subject and predicate, which I treated in the fourth book.

First Assertion. The premises of demonstration must be necessary. Scotus holds this expressly with Aristotle cited at the beginning of the article, and (*1. dist.3. q.4. §. Ad 2. artic.*). Proof, first: what are immediate or mediate principles are necessary; but the premises of demonstration are immediate or mediate principles. Therefore the premises of demonstration are necessary. The major is clearer than the midday sun; and indeed that principles are necessary, especially immediate ones, is read (*2. Met. c.1*): the first principles are known to all like the doorway in a house, because the doorway is hidden from no one, as the Doctor cites in the first place just cited (*§. Ista rationes*), and explains in the Metaphysics in the passage mentioned, where Anthony Andrews, Orbellus, and others comment. Mediate ones are also seen to be necessary because they derive their necessity from the first and immediate ones. The minor is sufficiently clear from the preceding articles and the material definition of demonstration makes it most evident. Second, from the same places cited (*§. De secundis E.*): a natural and necessary effect has a natural and necessary cause, just as a free and contingent effect has a free and contingent cause. But the effect of the premises of demonstration is necessary — namely the conclusion, which possesses the necessity of both the syllogistic form and the matter, as is clear in the prologue (*q.4*). And in this the demonstrative syllogism differs from the topical, because the latter participates only in the syllogistic form, while the former enjoys both. Therefore demonstration is composed of necessary principles.

Second Assertion. Demonstration requires premises from all in the posterior sense. So Scotus with Aristotle in the place cited above, and this follows from the preceding assertion. For that is a proposition from all in the posterior sense whose predicate is stated of every subjective part of its subject, and between both its extremes there is a perpetual link, as I declared in the second note. But the premises of demonstration are of this kind, as I proved in the first assertion. Therefore demonstration is composed of premises from all in the posterior sense.

Third Assertion. Demonstration must be composed of universal, incorruptible, and perpetual things. The first part is from Aristotle (*this place, and 2. de anima T.80, 7. Met. T.53*) and frequently elsewhere; and from Scotus (*ibidem in fine q.34. and collatione 26. §. Ad 1. istorum*). Proof, first: demonstration is made from premises from all, as is clear from the preceding assertion; but it cannot be from all unless it is from universal things, as is clear from the first note. Therefore demonstration consists of universal things. Second: science is of the universal,

from (2. *de anima* T.60); hence Plato invented the ideas of things, lest there be no universals about which science is had, as I noted (1.2. q.1. art.3). Again, singulars do not have proper properties distinct from the properties of the common nature, as Conimbricenses concede (c.7. q.1. a.3) after Scotus (2. d.9 q.2. §. *Ad argumenta* X). Therefore demonstration is not constructed from them. The second part is defended by Aristotle (1. *Post.* c.7. T.21) and Scotus (*ibid.* q.14. §. *Ad 1. dicitur*). Proof, first: necessary things are incorruptible and perpetual, as may be deduced from the definition of science delivered by Aristotle (1. *Post.* c.2. T.5); and the reason is that they are indissoluble and inseparable from each other. But demonstration is made from necessary things as I showed in the first assertion. Therefore also from eternal and perpetual things. Second: the conclusion of demonstration is of eternal and incorruptible things, because it is scientific; and science is of incorruptible and eternal things, from the same Aristotle cited above. Therefore the premises must also be incorruptible and eternal, since they are universal; but if one of the premises were singular, the conclusion would likewise be singular and therefore corruptible, as the philosopher argues (*cit.* T.41).

You will object, first, against the first assertion, that Aristotle (1. *Post.* 8.24. T.44) and Scotus (1. d.3. q.4. §. *De secundis* E.) write that every syllogism is made either from necessary propositions or from those that hold for the most part — as rain in winter and heat in summer; but what holds for the most part is contingent. Therefore demonstration does not always consist of necessary premises. It is confirmed, first, that Physics, which is defended by nearly all philosophers as a science, is of mutable things — namely elements and compounds, which undergo perpetual change and vicissitude, as daily experience makes clear. Therefore the demonstrative syllogism is not composed of necessary and immutable things. It is confirmed, second, that for the moon to suffer eclipse rarely happens; but what rarely occurs is contingent; and yet this is had through demonstration. Therefore demonstration can be composed of contingent things. Averroes and other commentators reply that there are two kinds of demonstrations: some are mathematical, which are made from simply necessary things; others are natural, which are composed of those that happen frequently — as the Doctor says of a natural cause and its effect in the place cited. But if through opposition you object that this is hindered, that is, per accidens, which is not worthy of scientific cognition, this is deduced from Aristotle, who (1. *Prior.* c.13. sect.1) says that necessary is what happens for the most part. Or say that Aristotle there speaks disjunctively: namely, every demonstrative syllogism is made from necessary things; a dialectical one from those that happen frequently. Thus every contradiction in the words of the philosopher is removed. To the first confirmation, what is to be said is clear from the first book of Physics (q.1), where it was shown how physical things fall under science by reason of the necessary connection that obtains between them, as Fuentes named above notes. To the second confirmation, I say with Scotus

cited that the demonstration rests on that per se known principle — namely, an opaque body interposed between a luminous body and a transparent one impedes the multiplication of light to such a transparent body; but the earth is such an opaque body interposed between the sun and the moon. Therefore, on account of the premise stated and the cause adduced, it is evidently shown that the moon suffers eclipse. And so as often as such interposition occurs, the moon suffers eclipse, because the cause is natural to producing its natural effect — despite Ruuvius's objection (6.4. q.1).

You will object, second, that from contingent and singular effects produced by God, the existence of God himself is demonstrated — an existence that is necessary — according to that text (*Sap.13*): From the greatness of beauty, the creator of these things can be seen by comparison. And (*Rom.1*): The invisible things of God, understood through the things that are made, are seen — his eternal power and divinity. Therefore from contingent and necessary things a demonstration can be made. It is confirmed: Theology, which is numbered among the sciences, is of contingent and singular things — as of God creating and preserving, augmenting human nature, and other things that are contingent and singular. I reply that those effects can be considered in two ways: in terms of their existence and their free production; or in terms of the essential dependence they have on God. In the first way they do not come into demonstration; in the second way they very much do, because it is impossible for a creature to exist without essentially and necessarily depending on God. Hence Fuentes rightly adds that from the existence of a creature the existence of God is necessarily inferred, on whom the creature necessarily depends. To the confirmation, Scotus responds (*q.4. prot. §. sed aliud. C.*) that Theology is from necessary things as regards the possible — namely that God is creative and receptive of human nature — understanding thus that, as they are taken according to power, they are necessary; although that they be put into effect is not necessary. For it is not necessary that God create, but God is necessarily creative.

You will object, third, that demonstrations are constructed about the sun, the moon, and God, as the Doctor asserts (*1. d.2. q.1. §. Ex his C.*). But these are singulars; therefore demonstration can be made from singulars. The Doctor replies (*collatione 36*) from Aristotle (*1. Met. 55*) that there is science of one thing — as of God or the sun — the science being of God as if there were a thousand Gods, as is clear according to Averroes (*6. Eth.*). Therefore Theology is of God as of something universal, as if there were several Gods — although God is singular. This reply, while it holds for the sun and moon and others of whose species only one individual actually exists, because many individuals of those same species are possible, does not however seem to hold for God, because a plurality of Gods is incompatible with divine nature, as I shall show in the *Metaphysics*. One may say that Aristotle and Averroes — in whose sense Scotus speaks there — were discussing according to the common opinion of those who

admitted a plurality and possibility of gods. Whether there can be science of a singular, eternal, and necessary being, Scotus does not deny; and perhaps Aristotle and Averroes would not have held this — as Faber observes against Vasquez (*1. p. q.1. a.2. c.7*) in the Prologue (*q.3. disp.6. c.1. n.5*).

Article VII. Whether Demonstration Is from Per Se Premises.

The subtle Doctor (*1. Post. from q.15 through q.29*) is very extensive in establishing and declaring the per se modes delivered by Aristotle (*cit. c.4. T.30*), about which Pelbartus (*Tom.1. verbo modus intrinsecus*), the Formalists with Sirectus (*art.3. partiali, and 2. principali Tract. Form.*), Maior (*1. Post. fol.71*), Tataretus (*q.3.*), Johannes de Magistris (*ibid.*), and others also treat at length, and I touched on somewhat in the Epitome (*l.1. q.2. a.2*). For their easier understanding:

Note first that one thing is commonly said to belong per se to another, as the Doctor (*quol.1. §. de 2. P.*), Gadius (*ibid.*), and Orbellus (*5. Met. c.7*) imply, when it intrinsically and necessarily belongs to it — as to be rational per se belongs to man — while conversely something is said to be applied to another per accidens when it comes to it extrinsically and contingently, as to be white or black is applied per accidens to man. The Doctor further notes (*q.15. praecit.*) and implies (*quol.9. A.*) that this condition per se can be taken in two ways: namely in propositions and in things. In the first way it constitutes a mode of inhering; in the second way it constitutes a mode of being; and in both ways such a per se condition is possible. It is possible in propositions because in some enunciations the subject is the cause of the predicate, and in some the predicate is the cause of the subject. Example of the first: in the second mode of saying per se — man is risible — because the property proceeds from the essential principles of the subject. Example of the second: in the mode of saying per se — man is an animal — when part of the definition is predicated of the defined, or the whole definition of the whole defined, as man is a rational animal. Likewise this condition is possible in things and constitutes a mode of being, excluding the principal cause, according to the Lincolnian. And this in three ways: for it either excludes the efficient and final cause — and in this way only the first cause is per se, because it has neither efficient nor final cause, being itself the efficient and the end of all things; or it excludes material cause — and in this way intelligences are per se, because they are without matter; or per se excludes being in a subject — and in this way substance is a being per se; and this mode can be reduced to material cause, because substance is the receptive of accident.

Note second that concerning the number of the modes of saying per se there is not one sense among all dialecticians. For some, like the Lincolnian in the present place, as Scotus testifies (*q.16*), admit only two modes of saying per se. Others, like St. Thomas as cited by the same Doctor there, accept only three modes of saying per se. Nor are there those lacking who devise more than four — among whom is Themistius, who adds a fifth mode. The common opinion, however, is that of Aristotle (*c.4. primi Post.*), Scotus (*cit.*), Trombetta (*Tract. Form.*

fol.45), and others in that place who enumerate four modes of saying per se. The reason for this number of four can be adduced from Trombetta (*cit. in fine pag.2*): whatever is said per se of another is said either as the predicate is of the essence of the subject — and the first mode of saying per se is had — as man is rational; or as the predicate is the proper property of the subject — and the second mode of saying per se arises — as substance is subsistent; or finally through the predicate the proper cause of the effect of the subject is expressed — or, as Tataretus says, when the subject includes the cause through which what is produced is present in it — and the fourth mode of saying per se arises — as fire heats through heat, as Scotus explains (*1. d.32. q.2. §. Contra*). All these modes share the common name of saying per se — rightly so, as Zabarella judges (*l. de propositionibus necessariis c.3*) — because Logic in the Posterior Books considers the modes of saying per se, and in the Perihermeneias the modes of stating, leaving the modes of being to the fifth book of the Metaphysics (*c.28. T.33*). Each of them, however, possesses its own proper name. For the first mode is called the mode of predicating per se, perhaps for the reason that the definition is predicated essentially and quidditatively of the defined. The second mode is called per se inhering, so named because the property which is predicated of its subject necessarily and naturally inheres in it. The third is named per se being, because it is said of those things that are per se, or that subsist per se — which the Doctor also says (*1. Post. q.31*) belongs to secondary substances. The fourth is called the mode of per se causing, because it denotes a cause conjoined with its actual effect — as is shown of fire heating through heat — and the Doctor indicates (*3. dist.7. q.1. §. Quarto*).

Note third, from Scotus now cited and (*1. d.8. q.3. T.*) and (*1. Post. q.20*), Trombetta, and the other aforementioned Formalists, that these modes have their own grades and conditions. The two foremost conditions of the first mode, implied by Aristotle (*T.30*), are these: one is that the predicate be in the subject — that is, that a natural predication be made; without this, this is not of the first mode — animal is man — as Scotus notes (*q.28. primi Post.*). The other is that the predicate be said of the subject in quid — that is, that it be the whole definition, as man is a rational animal; or part of the definition, as man is rational; or anything else proximate or remote pertaining to its essence, whether transcendental — as man is a being — or predicamental — as man is a body. To this mode are also reduced identical propositions, when the same is predicated of itself — as man is man — as is clear from Scotus (*q.15*) and is drawn from Aristotle (*1. Top. c.4*) and other places cited by more recent authors. The reason can be that in identical predication the participating cause is excluded; for the sense of the said proposition man is man is: man is per se man in such a way that no other cause is required for him to be man. Hence the philosopher adds (*7. Met.*) that the question of why man is man is no question at all, because a question presupposes one thing and seeks another; but in the said proposition nothing is presupposed and it has no other cause. Hence Brulifer (*Tract. Form.*

fol.17. pag.2) thinks that propositions of this identical kind are improperly of the first mode, because according to Aristotle cited and the common sense of the Doctors, that is a proposition of the first mode when the predicate is of the essence of the subject; but the same thing is not of the essence of itself. All the more so because in the first mode either the predicate is the whole definition or part of the definition of the subject; and this the Doctor appears to assert (*1. Post. q.10; 1. d.8. q.3. T.; and 3. d.7. q.1. D.*). To this first mode also belong negative propositions — as man is not irrational — as Scotus holds (*q.21. and quol.4. E.*); and propositions of intrinsic modes, as Smissinus asserts (*Traft.2. disp.1*) with more recent authors. The reason is that, as I said in the treatise on God the One, an intrinsic mode cannot be perfectly and adequately understood without the thing of which it is the mode. To these four per se modes correspond four per accidens modes — although Scotus (*q.18*) and other authors adduce only three per accidens modes, comprising the second under the first. The first per accidens mode is when the predicate is not of the essence of the subject nor contained under any of the grades set out — as animal is rational. The second is when the predicate is neither of the essence of the subject nor follows the essence of the same subject — as man is white. The third is when something is applied to something not existing per se — as blackness is. The fourth is when an effect proceeds from the cause assigned only accidentally — as when the man was walking, it lightened. For lightning is not the cause of the man's walking, but it happens by chance, and only a simultaneity of time of both is had — that at the same time both lightning and the man's walking occur — as is clear from (*1. Post. T.9*).

Assertion. Demonstration must be made from per se premises. So Scotus with Aristotle in the place described. Proof: demonstration consists of necessary things, from what was said in (*art.5 of this q.*); but every necessary proposition is in some mode of the four per se, as is clear from the preceding notes. Therefore demonstration is made from per se premises. It is added: the premises must necessarily be conjoined with the conclusion, as a necessary cause is necessarily conjoined with its effect — as has been established from the foregoing. But this cannot be done unless the premises are from per se things. For common and extraneous things are not necessarily connected with each other, as is clear from what Aristotle argues (*c.7*) and Maior cites (*ibidem, §. In quinta, fol.72. pag.2*) against Bryson who demonstrated the quadrature of the circle through a common cause. Therefore demonstration must be composed of per se things.

You will object, first, that what several sciences use are common principles, as is clear from the preceding assertions; but several sciences use the same principles — as I shall show of subalternate ones in the last question of this book, and can also be shown of non-subalternate ones — notably Logic, Physics, and Metaphysics, which use this or a similar principle for constructing their demonstrations: an apt definition consists of genus and difference. Therefore demonstration need not necessarily be composed of per se things. Granting the

major, to the minor the philosopher concedes this for subalternate sciences (*c.7 cited above*). For disparate sciences it can likewise be admitted, provided they are not caused through the most powerful demonstration.

You will object, second, that what is made from those things that belong per accidens to something is not made from proper things; but some demonstrations are woven from things that belong to something per accidens. Therefore not every demonstration is made from proper things. The major is known; the minor is proved from Aristotle (*2. Post. c.1*), who — as the Greek commentators note there — admits that things predicated per accidens of some things pertain to demonstration. The Greek commentators offer the example of the lunar eclipse, which is said to belong per accidens to the moon, because it does not always belong to it. Granting the major, I deny the minor; and to its proof I say that the moon can be considered in two ways: in one way absolutely, with no account taken of the interposition of the earth — and in this way the eclipse is applied to the moon per accidens; in the other way as it regards the interposition of the earth — and in this way the eclipse is attributed to the moon per se and necessarily as its property, as Aristotle plainly signifies in the passage cited, affirming that the eclipse is demonstrated of the moon by the proper quid demonstration as belonging to the second mode of saying per se, and Zabarella teaches clearly (*c.16. l.2. de propositionibus necessariis*).

Article VIII. Whether the Premises of Demonstration Are from Universal Predicate.

The final grade of necessity required for demonstration is offered and explained by Aristotle (*1. Post. c.4. T.11*), and is called the universal predicate. For since already in the preceding sections two grades of necessity — namely from all and per se — have been expressed, now the third remains to be explained. At the outset I note that the first grade of necessity can exist without the second and third, but not vice versa, as Scotus indicates (*q.28. Post.*). Likewise the second can exist without the third, but not the third without the second, as the Doctor asserts (*q.33. §. Adquæst.*). So that by these three conditions the premises of demonstration arrive step by step at the highest necessity. Moreover, lest I labor in equivocation, I note that universal is not taken here for what is one apt to be predicated of many — about which there was extensive treatment in the second book — but for a predicate that adequately and reciprocally belongs to a subject, as the Doctor interprets (*loco proximè allegato*): thus risible is a universal predicate with respect to man, to whom it belongs adequately and convertibly. Hence the universal is described by Aristotle (*nuper citato*) and received by the Doctor (*q.35*): what is from all, and per se, and according to what itself. And shortly after (*T. cit.*): the universal exists when it is demonstrated of each thing and primarily. Three necessary conditions are attributed to it: the first is that it be from all — supply in the posterior sense. The second is per se — understand in some of the four modes adduced and explained in the preceding article. The third is that the

predicate be according to what itself — that is, that it be reciprocated and adequated with the subject, as Scotus explains (*q.33. §. Ad quest.*). Hence it is clear that the last condition does not coincide with the second, as some suspect — from whom Zabarella does not seem to differ (*loco citato, and l.1. de propositionibus necessariis c.2*) — since many propositions are per se that do not have the predicate according to what itself: for sentient is indeed said per se of man, yet not according to what itself, because it is not adequated to him, belonging to others besides man, and is attributed to him not as man but as animal. Therefore I do not think that two descriptions of the universal predicate are affirmed by Aristotle, but only one, whose conditions are expressed in two places — and more in the latter than in the former. For to be demonstrated in each thing and primarily is the same as to be predicated from all and according to what itself. But since the predicate according to what itself includes the mode of saying per se, as I noted above, Aristotle therefore did not express it in the first place. Furthermore I infer that it is not the same for a predicate to belong immediately to a subject as to belong universally to the same, as certain Themistians cited by Ruuvius (*q.3. c.4*) think, following Themistius in the present place. For the universal predicate belongs to the subject primarily — that is, adequately — as the Doctor explains (*q.34*) and Averroes and Zabarella (*ibidem*) clearly teach. But genus, though it immediately belongs to the species, does not do so adequately, because it exceeds the species. Likewise difference is immediately subject to genus, though it is not its universal predicate, for the reason just given. Therefore it is not the same thing to say that a predicate immediately belongs to a subject as that the same belongs to it universally. And lest anyone in assigning a universal predicate to some subject err, Aristotle (*c.5. of this book T.12*) and onwards warns that three mistakes can be imprudently committed, which Scotus also adduces (*q.35. paulò ante §. Ad 1. rationem*). The first can happen when there is only one individual of some species — as the sun and the moon — and a property is attributed primarily to one of them as if it were a species; for example, if eclipsability is applied primarily to this moon, since many other moons are possible, such a property cannot be applied to it primarily — that is, adequately. The second error occurs when a proper property of some genus is demonstrated of its species and one imagines such a demonstration to be universal, when in reality it is not. Such deception occurs when the genus, under which many species are comprehended, is unnamed, and the property of such a genus — whose name is unknown — is granted not to the genus itself but to the species contained under it; for example, if someone attributes commuted proportion, which is a mathematical property, primarily to lines, numbers, times, and solids, when it plainly belongs to their genus — though that genus is anonymous. The third is committed when a proper property of some species is thought to be a proper affection of its genus — as if someone thought that risibility belongs to man because he is an animal.

Assertion. Both premises of the propter quid demonstration, or at least one of them, must have the universal predicate. Aristotle (*c.4*), Scotus (*q.34. §. Adq.*), and Maior (*ibid. fol.72. §. In 7. cap.*) deliver this. The first part is proved: in the conclusion of the propter quid demonstration the proper property of the subject is demonstrated of it through the middle term, which is the definition of that same subject — from what will be said below; and such a conclusion cannot be deduced unless from premises with the universal predicate, as is clear in this demonstration: every rational being is risible; every man is rational; therefore every man is risible. Furthermore, the subject of which the proper property is demonstrated is its immediate and adequate cause, as is clear; therefore the premises which are the causes of such a conclusion — in which the proper property is shown of its primary subject — consist of the universal predicate. The second part is proved: propter quid demonstrations can be made even when one of the premises does not have the universal predicate. Therefore for the propter quid demonstration it is not always required that both premises have the universal predicate. The antecedent is shown in this demonstration: every animal is alive; every man is an animal; therefore every man is alive. Here it is plainly established that the major does not have the universal predicate, as I showed before the proposition.

You will object, first, that per se is the same as according to what itself; therefore the universal predicate does not differ from the per se predicate. The antecedent is clear from Aristotle (*T.11*), who says: per se and according to what itself are the same — as per se the point inheres in the line and the straight, insofar as it is a line; and the triangle has two right angles insofar as it is a triangle, etc. The same is read in (*c.7 of the same book*) and is received by Themistius there, with Scotus' assent (*q.34. §. Intelligendum*). I distinguish the antecedent: per se and according to what itself are the same really, just as a lower predicate is really identified with a higher one — I concede; per se and according to what itself are the same formally, primarily, and convertibly — I deny; as I explained near the beginning of this article, and the Doctor touches on (*q.33. 39. §. Item si*). And Aristotle appears to express this in the passage cited, when to the condition per se he adds a third condition — according to what itself; otherwise the third condition would be pointless if it wholly coincided with the second. And (*T.16*) he assigns a rule for the universal predicate with respect to the primary and adequate subject — namely that of which the removal brings about its removal and the positing brings about its positing is the primary subject of the universal predicate — as is clear of man and risible, which are equal and convertible terms; and man being posited, risible is posited, and man being removed, risible is likewise removed.

You will object, second, that the universal predicate is the same as the reciprocal and adequate predicate, as I was observing from Aristotle. But the definition belongs to the defined as a convertible and adequate predicate, as every man is a rational animal and every rational animal is a man. Therefore it is its universal predicate, and consequently genus — which is part of the definition of the

species — belongs universally and adequately to the species; which is false and was rejected above. Granting the whole argument, the last inference is denied, because genus is one part of the definition of the species that is wider than the other part, which is the difference — that part being equal to the species itself. For this reason the notion of genus does not reciprocally and adequately belong to the species in the way the whole definition belongs to the defined, as the Doctor signifies (*1. Post. q.16. §. Ad haec*).

Article IX. Whether Demonstration Is from Proper Things.

The acceptations of property are recalled from the Epitome (*l.1. q.3. art.6*). Only this is to be sought here: I note with Hurtado (*disp.11. Sect.7*) and Fuentes (*disp.11. q.19. diff.1. art.6*) that proper is opposed to alien and common — so that proper thus taken is what proceeds not from extraneous and extrinsic principles but from intrinsic and essential principles of the thing of which it is the property, and thus belongs to it necessarily that it cannot belong to another, as I declared in the place just cited, and the Doctor touches on (*q.25. §. Adquaest.*). Proper can also be extended to what is proximate and immediate by immediacy of subject or cause, which Scotus mentions (*q.34. §. Huic dicitur*). In this sense genus and other quidditative predicates can be called proper to a thing, even though they belong to many others; and in this sense those demonstrations are said to consist of proper things that are made in the first and second mode of saying per se; while the others, made in the other modes of saying per se, do not seem to be from proper things, as the Doctor signifies (*q.26*). But if a property neither arises from an object nor inheres in it unless an extrinsic cause intervenes, and once that cause is posited the property is necessarily posited, and once it is removed the property is necessarily removed, there is without doubt a necessary link between such a subject and property, and a demonstration about these can be made — as is clear of the moon, whose property is the eclipse caused by the earth interposed between the moon and the sun. For such a demonstration is had from a per se known principle — namely, an opaque body interposed between a luminous body and a transparent one impedes the multiplication of light to such a transparent body; but the earth is such an opaque body interposed between the sun and the moon. Therefore, on account of the premise stated and the cause adduced, the moon suffering eclipse is evidently shown — as Scotus clearly inferred (*1. dist.3. q.4. §. De 2. cognoscibilibus ante E.*).

Assertion. Demonstration is composed of proper things. So Aristotle (*1. Post. c.1*) and Scotus (*ibidem q.39. paulò ante §. Ad 1.*). Proof: demonstration, as I showed in the preceding sections, must consist of premises from all, per se, and of universal predicate; but these are proper, because they belong to the subject of which the demonstration is made in the first or second mode of saying per se, as is clear from what has been said. Therefore demonstration is made from proper things. It is added: the premises must necessarily be conjoined with the conclusion, as a necessary cause is necessarily conjoined with its effect — as has

been established from the foregoing; but this cannot be done unless the premises are from proper things. For common and alien things are not necessarily connected with each other, as is clear from what Aristotle argues (*c.7*) and Maior cites (*ibidem* §. *In quinta fol.72. pag.2*) against Bryson demonstrating the quadrature of the circle through a common cause. Therefore demonstration must be composed from proper things.

You will object, first, that what several sciences use are common principles, as is clear from the preceding assertions; but several sciences use the same principles — as I shall show of subalternate ones in the last question of this book, and it can also be shown of non-subalternate ones — notably of Logic, Physics, and Metaphysics, which use this or a similar principle for constructing their demonstrations: an apt definition consists of genus and difference. Therefore demonstration need not necessarily be composed from per se things. Granting the major, to the minor: the philosopher concedes this for subalternate sciences (*c.7 cited above*). For disparate sciences it can likewise be admitted, provided they are not caused through the most powerful demonstration.

You will object, second, that what is made from things that belong per accidens to something is not made from proper things; but some demonstrations are woven from things that belong to something per accidens. Therefore not every demonstration is made from proper things. The major is known; the minor is proved from Aristotle (*2. Post. c.1*), who — as the Greek commentators note there — admits that things predicated per accidens of some things pertain to demonstration. The Greek commentators offer the example of the lunar eclipse, which is said per accidens of the moon, because it does not always belong to it. Granting the major, I deny the minor; and to its proof I say that the moon can be considered in two ways: in one way absolutely, with no account taken of the interposition of the earth — and in this way the eclipse is applied to the moon per accidens; in the other way as it regards the interposition of the earth — and in this way the eclipse is attributed to the moon per se and necessarily as its property, as Aristotle plainly signifies in the passage cited, affirming that the eclipse is demonstrated of the moon by the proper quid demonstration and belongs to the second mode of saying per se, and Zabarella teaches clearly (*c.16. l.2. de propositionibus necessariis*).

Article X. Whether Demonstration Is from Per Se Known Things.

Concerning the proposed difficulty it does not seem necessary to labor too much, nor to linger long in dissolving it, since it is universally conceded that some demonstrations are composed of per se known things — as every whole is greater than its part; body is a whole; therefore body is greater than its part — while some are not constructed from per se known things — as every weepable thing is risible; every man is weepable; therefore every man is risible. A greater contest is seen among scholastics, both external and our own, as to what a per se known proposition is and what its proper division is. For St. Thomas (*1. part. q.2.*

art.1), Cajetan (*ibid.*), Ferrariensis (*1. contra Gentes c.10*), and others of the same school assert that a per se known proposition is one in which the predicate is of the essence of the subject, and they consistently and unhesitatingly defend that every immediate proposition is per se known. But the subtle Doctor (*d.2. q.2. §. quoniam A. G. in Report. ibid. §. dico*), Lychetus, Bargius, Orbellus in that place, Pelbartus (*Tom.1. verbo Deus §.4*), and the Nominalists — among whom are Auriol (*same d. art.5*) and the greater part of the more recent — affirm that a per se known proposition is described as one that is cognized from the sole knowledge of its proper terms. Whether, moreover, for a per se known proposition a confused cognition of its terms suffices — as Faber (*Theor.7. c.1. 1. disp.14. 6.1*), Fuentes (*diff.2. a.2. q.19*), and the inseparable Scotists (*disp.13. q.3. art.1*) think — or a distinct cognition of the same terms is required, as Lychetus, Posnaniensis in the place cited, Vulpes (*Tom.1. disp.1. art.1*), and others whom Fuentes wrongly cites in the opposite opinion hold — what must be said by us according to truth and the mind of Scotus will become known through the following notes.

Note first that the per se known proposition is described by the Doctor now cited in these words: a proposition is called per se known that from its proper terms, which are something of it and as such, has evident truth — and not on account of anything else outside the proper terms does it have its evidence, but from itself alone, as every whole is greater than its part. More briefly and clearly, a per se known proposition can be defined as one that is cognized from the sole and simple knowledge of its terms. This Aristotle undoubtedly delivers (*1. Post. c.3. T.6*) saying: we know principles insofar as we know their terms — which is to say that the sole terms being understood — namely subject and predicate — with everything else excluded, the per se known proposition is immediately understood; as if what a whole is and what its part is are cognized, immediately it is cognized that every whole is greater than its part. But the efficient cause of it is not excluded from this — namely the intellect partially concurring to produce the knowledge of any thing, as Scotus affirms (*1. d.3. q.4. and quol.15.*). Nor is it called per se in contrast with a proposition per accidens; otherwise every per se proposition would be per se known, and so there would be no mediate per se propositions — which was shown to be plainly false in the foregoing. But it is called per se so that all may understand that the cognition of a per se known proposition — as to evidence — does not depend on any intrinsic cause or probative medium other than the cognition of its terms. Therefore two principal conditions are required for a proposition properly per se known, as Tataretus rightly notes (*1. Post. q.2. dub.2*). The first is that it be an immediate and indemonstrable proposition lacking a medium for its proof, as the Doctor's authority (*ubisupra §. Exhis*) establishes, because it is known per se and not through another. Although not every immediate proposition is per se known — as the same Doctor shows (*ibid. §. quoniam sub A.*) through what — the thing of whose quiddity is understood confusedly through the defined is not known except when the same is conceived distinctly through the definition.

Furthermore, if it were otherwise, any necessary proposition of the first mode — as man is an animal — all the way up to substance, would be per se known, which the Doctor infers as false (*praecit.*), because it does not have evidence from the sole knowledge of its terms. The second condition is that such a proposition be naturally apt to have evident truth from its proper terms, because the terms, as they are terms of such a per se known proposition, evidently show that the complex expression conforms to the proper notions of the terms and their relation, as the Doctor subtly deduces (*in quest. §. Ad argumenta principalia in Solutione ult. sub F.*). Hence contingent propositions are not per se known, because they are not naturally apt to have evidence from their terms — since they do not conform to the relation and notions of the terms — from (*1. Post. c.3.*). Especially because they are cognized by us through sense and experience, and by God through the decree of his will, as I wrote at length in the treatise on the science of God. But Auriol, Mastrius (*1. d.2. q.5*), and Valentia (*1. p. q.2. puncto 1*) object that the aforesaid description of the per se known proposition is insufficient: because, while true in abstractive cognition, it nevertheless has no place in intuitive cognition — as this snow is white. But such and similar propositions are known by sense and experience, and at least by divine power it can be brought about that from cognition of the terms they are not known — as if, while snow is not destroyed, God were to remove whiteness from the snow itself — which Mastrius himself admits can be done. Thus in a given hypothesis this would be false: snow is white — and from itself it would not have evidence, which that same Mastrius also thinks formally belongs to a per se known proposition. Furthermore, Aristotle (*1. Post. c.3*) denies that a contingent immediate proposition is per se known, asserting that every per se known proposition is necessary; for which reason Scotus in the question cited (*paulò ante D.*) denies that this is per se known: man is white. Therefore the description of the per se known proposition given by Scotus is apt.

Note second, from the same Scotus in the question (*§. quoniam A.*), that the proper terms of a per se known proposition are its definition — whether terms be taken for the significant sounds or for the understood concepts signified. For from (*1. Post. T.10. and 20*) the definition of the subject is the middle term in the most powerful demonstration, in which the proper property is shown to inhere in the subject — or the defined — through the definition as the middle term. If therefore the definition were not another term than the defined in the aforesaid demonstration, there would be a begging of the question, and one of the premises would not differ from the conclusion — as may be seen in this argument: every rational animal is risible; every man is a rational animal; therefore every man is risible. Here the major does not differ from the conclusion except as definition from defined; yet the major is indemonstrable and the conclusion demonstrated, and there is a process from what is known of the definition to what is unknown of the defined. Therefore the definition is a different term from the defined; otherwise in the argument just adduced there

would be only two terms, whereas every perfect syllogism requires three terms, as is the common agreement of dialecticians. It is added: a thing is cognized confusedly before it is cognized distinctly in the natural order, as is clear from (1. *Phys. T.3*); but the defined represents a thing confusedly and the definition distinctly. But the same thing cannot be prior and posterior, known confusedly and distinctly simultaneously. Hence the Parisians (*q.4. primi Phys. §. Innata*) and Brulifer (*in Epit. Form.*) add that between the defined and the definition there is a formal distinction, which can only intervene between distinct terms. Therefore the terms of a per se known proposition are the definition and the defined. Now since such terms do not express a thing in the same way — because what the defined expresses confusedly the definition expresses distinctly — for this reason Scotists at the beginning of this article rightly inquire whether a per se known proposition requires terms known confusedly or distinctly. I think this dispute must be settled and the authors reconciled if one says that in universal and supreme science — such as Metaphysics — a per se known proposition requires terms distinctly known, because its function is to know the quiddities of things distinctly, and to it the ultimate resolution belongs. But in a special science, for a per se known proposition terms known confusedly suffice, because prior is the confused cognition of things than their distinct cognition of the same things. Since therefore the special sciences in the order of teaching precede the universal science — that is, Metaphysics — as I showed in that place, and axioms and per se known propositions serve them and assist in forming and establishing their conclusions, it is evidently deduced that confused cognition of terms suffices for such per se known propositions. This doctrine is entirely Scotus's (1. *d.2. q.2. §. quoniam sub A. vers. similiter*). And more openly (3. *dist.24. q.vn. ante §. Ad aliud sub R.*) in these words: similarly natural science, as it precedes Metaphysics, has its terms known confusedly; but the Metaphysician through definition expressly expresses the distinct knowledge of those terms, and then the knowledge is more perfect when it is with Metaphysics. The same he also asserts in the Reportatio of the third (*eadem dist. §. Ad 3.*), and Lychetus and his principal interpreters follow him. Therefore it seems to me that it must be said and concluded that a per se known proposition taken universally is one that from the sole knowledge of its terms has evident truth, as is clear from the Doctor cited (*A. and infra vers. Igitur*). And it can be twofold: one that is cognized only from terms known confusedly; the other that is cognized only from terms known distinctly.

Note third, from the same Scotus (*paulò ante §. Ex his. vers. Ex hoc patet*), that the division of the proposition given by St. Thomas (1. *p. q.2. a.1. in solutione princip.*) into per se known and per se knowable is not appropriate — since the members of a good division ought not to coincide, as its canon requires. For the first member of this division coincides with the second. For a proposition is not called per se known because it is actually cognized — otherwise, with no intellect thinking, no proposition would be per se known. Rather it is called per

se known because, from the nature of its terms, it is apt to have evident truth from its terms, in whatever intellect conceives the terms. And if no intellect conceives the terms, the proposition is nonetheless per se known from itself. By this it likewise appears that there is no section of the per se known proposition into one in itself and one for us — because whatever is per se known is per se known to any intellect apprehending its terms, though it may not be actually cognized, since it is evidently known from its terms if the terms themselves are conceived. For just as a syllogism is perfect which needs nothing to appear necessary and requires nothing extrinsic for the necessity of its extremes to shine forth — since it is of necessary things whose relation between its extremes is essential and indissoluble, whether actually cognized by us or not — so that is a per se known proposition which from its terms alone made explicit possesses evident truth, whether actually cognized by us or not. Furthermore, when Aristotle divides the proposition into dialectical and analytic, he does not subdivide it into dialectical in itself and for us, nor into analytic in itself and for us. Therefore the aforesaid division of the per se known proposition is not legitimate. For the same reason the division of Aegidius is dismissed — into a proposition known to the wise and to the unwise — as is Varro's division, Scotus's teacher, into a per se known proposition of the first genus and of the second order. For the formal and intrinsic notion of a per se known proposition consists in the sole per se evidence of its terms, without any medium whatsoever, as is clear from what has been said. Therefore it is irrelevant to the per se known proposition whether it be known to the wise or the unwise, and whether it be of the first or second order, provided it enjoys evidence from its proper terms. All the more so because Scotus speaks of the objective and not the formal or mental proposition, as Theodorus notes with Fuentes (*q.19. diff.2. art.3*), against Suarez (*disp.29. Met. Sect.3. n.33*), who interprets the said Scotus as speaking of the formal proposition. For the Doctor himself does not distinguish the per se known proposition from the per se knowable — which is certainly the objective and not the formal proposition. Likewise the same Scotus adds that a proposition is per se known that from its terms is naturally apt to have evidence — which without any doubt belongs only to the objective proposition. Furthermore, it follows that the controversy between St. Thomas and Scotus is not over the name, as Vasquez (*1. p. disp.16. sect.10. n.8*), Molina (*ibid. art.2*), Hurtado (*disp.11. sect.4*), Suarez cited, and two of our more recent authors (*disp.13. q.3. a.1*) imagine. For it does not seem probable how a question about name alone would be so diligently proposed and accurately weighed, would so greatly exercise the minds of most learned men, and would engage the studies of the most subtle Doctors — as Valentia objects (*Tract. de Trinitate q.1. p.4*). I on the other hand oppose the authorities and reasons adduced just above, which plainly show that the matter itself — not merely the name — is at issue.

Assertion. Sometimes demonstration is from per se known things; sometimes not. This assertion is common to Aristotle and Scotus (*cit. 1. d.3. q.4. §. primo A.*).

The first part is proved: sometimes demonstration is composed of both premises that from their proper terms alone have evidence — as every whole is greater than its part; the natural body is a whole; therefore the natural body is greater than its part. The second part likewise becomes clear, because demonstration very often consists of mediate and demonstrable premises. Therefore demonstration is not always composed of per se known things. The antecedent is clear in this demonstration: every risible thing is weepable; every man is risible; therefore every man is weepable.

You will object, first, that Scotus in the question (§. *Ex his sub B.*) affirms that this is per se known: God is, to anyone who perfectly conceives its terms; but to perfectly conceive the terms is equivalent to distinctly apprehending those very same terms. Therefore for a per se known proposition it is necessary that its terms be distinctly cognized. Some reply that that text is not the Doctor's, but an addition by an annotator. But nearly all disciples and interpreters of Scotus assert it to be his own text — and indeed this is clearly seen (3. d.24. q.vn. ante §. *Ad aliud infra R.*), as I observed above. Therefore admitting the aforesaid text, I say that sometimes a per se known proposition requires that the terms be perfectly and distinctly conceived — as in Metaphysics and also in Theology, which is the supreme science — especially because the proper terms of the aforesaid proposition cannot be cognized unless they are distinctly apprehended. Therefore not every per se known proposition requires terms distinctly known, as I declared at length in the place cited.

You will object, second, from the same Doctor (*ibid.*), who before D says that man is white is not a per se known proposition unless it is per se known that man and white are actually conjoined; but if they were not actually conjoined, its converse would be true: no man is white. From this it is evidently collected that, according to Scotus, for a per se known proposition it is not required that the extremes be necessarily conjoined, since it is contingent that man is white. I reply that Scotus adduces this by way of example, as may be seen in his text, corroborating what he was asserting there — namely that for a per se known proposition the extremes must truly be united with each other, because no notion of something is true unless in itself it is true, as is read (*s. Met. c. de falso*): a notion false in itself is false universally. Thus it is denied that what is inferred follows, as I made clear in the first note against Maior and Auriol.

You will object, third, that the same Scotus in the question (*sub A. vers. Ex hoc patet*) reproves the division of the per se known proposition into one in itself and for us — which he seems openly to approve (*ibid.* §. *Ex his B.*), saying that this is per se known: God is — but not to us. Therefore Scotus is inconsistent with himself, and consequently the aforesaid division of the per se known proposition should not be rejected. Some, to more easily extricate themselves from this difficulty of Scotus — as Cavellus, whom Fuentes (*cit. art.2. in resp. 2. obiectionis*) follows — delete that text, asserting it to be some addition and not

the Doctor's text. But in truth the said text does not seem to be removable from the codex of Scotus, since it is plainly not an addition, as is established from its original. The same is contained in the Reportatio in the same distinction and question, and is received by all his interpreters except the two just cited. Therefore I say that no inconsistency is involved in Scotus's assertions. For the Doctor says that this is per se known — God is — because its extremes are naturally apt to cause evidence in one who perfectly apprehends such extremes. But since we do not conceive God under the notion of Deity or as this divine essence, but under the common and attributal notion — as the Doctor aptly deduces — for this reason this is not per se known to us: God is — but demonstrable a posteriori, as the same Scotus establishes in that place.

You will press: from what was said at the end of the last note, for a per se known proposition it suffices that its terms be apprehended confusedly. Therefore, since the terms of this — God is — are confusedly conceived by us, it will be per se known to us; or the aforesaid division of the per se known proposition into one in itself and for us must be conceded. I say with Fuentes cited that for this — God is — a distinct apprehension of terms is required — not because this necessarily belongs to every per se known proposition, as I showed above; but because it must be cognized from proper terms, and because the proper terms of this — God is — cannot be apprehended unless those very terms are distinctly known. Therefore Scotus maintains that for it a distinct cognition of terms is required. Since therefore God cannot be cognized by us under his proper notion of divinity, but under the common concept — as I showed at length in the first question of the Prologue and in the treatise on the cognizability of God — for this reason the cited proposition is not per se known to us.

Article XI. Whether Demonstration Can Be Made in All Genera of Causes.

Zabarella (*2. de medio demonstrationis c.5*) holds that only three genera of causes — namely efficient, final, and material — can be the middle term of demonstration. Albertus (*2. Post. Tract.2. c.12*) holds that the final cause cannot be the middle term for demonstrating. Others except the efficient and material causes. Against these stand Aristotle (*2. Post. c.6. T.11. 48*), Scotus (*ibid. q.57. Ad quaest.*), Faber (*Theor.15. c.2*), Conimbricenses (*q.3. artic.2.3*), and others commonly, who teach that demonstration can be made through all four genera of causes.

Note first that, since science — which is the effect of demonstration — is cognition of a thing through its cause from Aristotle (*1. Post. c.2. and 2. eiusdem operis c.8. T.11*), it is rightly to be investigated which cause is required for it and whether in every genus of causes demonstration can be formed. First, it is taken as certain that for demonstration a proximate and adequate cause is required, as I proved at length in the foregoing, and Zabarella pursues excellently (*ubisupra*

c.4). But a greater and more difficult doubt remains — which Zabarella himself holds (*citat. c.1*) to have not yet been adequately untangled and explained by the dialecticians — whether the middle term assumed for demonstrating is in the genus of efficient cause, final, material, or formal; and whether one cause is sufficient or whether all or several causes are necessary for demonstrating.

Note second, according to Scotus in the place cited at the beginning of this article, that from the four genera of causes named, some are causes in fieri — such as the efficient and final; while some are causes in facto esse — such as the material and formal. And the latter are likewise called intrinsic causes, because they enter into the essence of the composite and constitute it; while the former are extrinsic, and for that reason remain outside the composite and the constituted thing — about all of which extensively in Physics. Now here it is asked whether for demonstration an intrinsic or extrinsic cause is required, and whether one or the other suffices or both are required.

Assertion. Demonstration can be made through all four genera of causes, and several causes can concur to demonstrate the same thing. So Scotus with Aristotle in the places cited and (2. *Phys. c.7*), and Ferchius (*vestig.2. c.4. n.11. l.1*). The first part is proved, first, that the middle term and the cause are the same, as is clear (2. *Post. c.1*); but demonstration is made through every appropriate and necessary middle term from the same Aristotle now cited. Therefore also through every cause. Second: demonstration is a syllogism generative of science; but we can know through every cause, because the effect necessarily depends on every cause by which it is produced. Therefore we can demonstrate through every cause. Third, by induction through individual causes. Through the material cause: every thing having matter is corruptible, as is clear (1. *Phys. T.82*); man has matter — for he is composed of matter and form as every natural composite is. Therefore man is corruptible. Then through the formal cause: every thing having a soul vegetates; a tree has a soul; therefore a tree vegetates. Furthermore through the efficient cause: what prevents food from ascending to the mouth of the stomach causes health; walking after meals prevents food from ascending to the mouth of the stomach; therefore walking after meals produces health. The major is at hand because, for good digestion, food must descend to the bottom of the stomach. Finally through the final cause: what is good and causative of health must be done for acquiring health; walking after meals is good and effective of health; therefore after meals one should walk to acquire good health. The second part certainly follows from the first, and can be corroborated from that saying of the philosopher at the beginning of the first book of Physics: we consider ourselves to know each thing when we have known all its causes and principles, all the way down to its elements. Again, the same material conclusion can be caused from diverse media and diverse causes, from diverse principles and premises — as I evidently showed in this book (*q.1. art.5*). Furthermore, several causes of different orders can produce the same effect — with the common doctrine of philosophers — as is shown in the book on causes.

All the more so because any given thing is knowable through several causes on which it necessarily and essentially depends, as I was deducing in the first part of this assertion. Therefore to know something fully and perfectly it is necessary that all its causes be known; and consequently several causes can cooperate in demonstrating the same thing.

You will object, first, against the first part of the assertion: the middle term of demonstration must precede the effect, because the middle term and the cause coincide, as I observed above; and that the cause precedes its effect is beyond doubt. But the final cause is posterior to its effect, because the end is acquired last. Therefore demonstration does not occur in every genus of causes. I reply with Scotus in the question (§. *Ad 2.*): granting the major, I distinguish the minor — in execution, I concede; in intention, I deny — which must be explained in the *Physics* in the question on the final cause.

You will object, second, that the middle term of demonstration must be necessarily connected with its extremes, as is clear from the conditions assigned. But between the efficient cause and its effect there is no necessary connection; therefore demonstration is not effected in the genus of efficient cause. The minor is proved: a builder being posited, a house is not necessarily posited; and conversely, with a house remaining, the builder necessarily does not need to be, since the builder can perish while the house remains. It is confirmed: demonstration consists of proper and intrinsic things, as is clear from the foregoing; but the efficient cause is extrinsic, as also is the final cause, as I noted in the second note. I reply with Scotus in the same place: granting the major, I deny the minor; and to its proof I say that the one actually building is the cause of the house in fieri, not in facto esse. Hence it is no wonder that the builder does not exist while the house does not exist, and that the house exists while the builder may not exist. To the confirmation, I deny that demonstration always proceeds from proper and intrinsic things — as the demonstration of the eclipse of the moon and others to be adduced below will make clear.

You will object, third, that the same thing is not demonstrated by itself; otherwise there would be a begging of the question, as Zabarella argues with Scotus in the present place (*c.3. 4. l.2. de medio demonstrationis*). But if demonstration were made through the formal cause, the same would be demonstrated through the same — for form designates the essence of the thing, since it provides being to the thing. Therefore demonstration cannot be made in the genus of formal cause. Granting the major, the minor must be denied. For whether by form is understood the form of the part — which together with matter constitutes the composite — or whether it is understood as the essential and quidditative difference of the thing, while it presents the foremost and preeminent part of the essence of the thing, nevertheless it is not the whole essence of the thing — as was established in the second book of this work in the

questions on genus and difference, and in the Physics in the questions on matter and form.

You will object, fourth, that what is assumed to demonstrate something must be necessary, since demonstration proceeds from necessary things as is clear from the foregoing; but the material cause is not necessary — for according to Aristotle, matter is what a thing can be or not be. Therefore through the material cause no demonstration is had. It is confirmed, first, that from which a property emanates is the cause or middle term of demonstration; but a property flows not from matter or form but from the composite. Therefore, etc. It is confirmed, second, that the conclusion cannot be the middle term of demonstration, because the conclusion is mediated; but the middle term is not mediated; but the material cause is concluded through the formal cause, as the philosopher states. Therefore through the material cause no demonstration is made. Granting the major, I deny the minor; and to its proof I say that the philosopher is to be explained as speaking of matter taken for the individual difference, which by our authors is called the haecceity — not of the matter of the part, whether physical or metaphysical. To the first confirmation, I say that although knowable properties proceed principally from the composite, nevertheless matter and form have their own properties — as I showed in the Physics in the questions on matter and form. To the second confirmation, I say that the material cause can be demonstrated through the formal cause mediately by mediation of cause; but immediately it can be demonstrated through its proper property. Nor is it inconvenient for one thing to be prior and posterior with respect to different things.

Article XII. Whether the Circle Must Be Excluded from Demonstration and the Regression Admitted.

Most of the ancient philosophers — especially the Pyrrhonians, who admitted science of all things — concede the demonstrative circle and regression, as the Conimbricenses (*1. Post. c.3. q.1. art.1*) cite them after Zabarella (*l. de regressu c.1*); and the inseparable Scotists (*disp.13. q.4*) partially agree with them. On the opposite side, others — whose names Zabarella suppresses in the same place — followed by Suesanus (*1. Post. com.35*), banish circle and regression entirely from demonstration. Others, among whom are Scotus (*1. dist.28. q.3. §. Aliter E.*) and (*2. dist.42. q.4. §. Ad argumenta ante 1.*) and (*quol.7. §. Hic praemittenda A.*) and (*2. Prior. q.4. in fine*), Faber (*Theor.9. c.1*), Maior (*1. Post. fol.70. dub.1*), Tataretus (*q.2. dub.3*), Toletus (*ibidem q. de regressu*), and others, reject the circle properly speaking and receive the regression.

Note first that a circle, from the meaning of the name, is a transition or return from the same to the same — as is clear in the mathematical circle, in which a beginning is taken from one point by drawing a line around, and a return is made to that very same point, as Scotus clearly explains in the question (§. *Notandum*). It can further be illustrated from circular motion, which is effected

by returning to that from which the movable began its motion. In the likeness of such motion, a circular syllogism is called — from Aristotle (*1. Post. c.3*) and (*2. eiusdem operis T.15*) and the passage from Scotus now cited — when from two premises to a conclusion, and in turn from that same conclusion to demonstrating both premises, the discourse is reiterated. Now a circle can happen in four ways, which Maior and Tataretus cited mention and Scotus implies in the place cited above. First, a circle occurs when from cause to effect and conversely from effect to cause there is a progression — as every rational animal is risible; every man is a rational animal; therefore every man is risible — a demonstration from cause to effect is had. Conversely from effect to cause: every man is risible; every rational animal is man; therefore every rational animal is risible. Second, in different genera of causes. For since from (*2. Phys. T.50*) causes are causes of one another, for that reason through one cause another cause can be shown — as every syllogism that produces science proceeds from first, true, immediate things and causes of the conclusion; demonstration is a syllogism that produces science; therefore demonstration proceeds from first, true, immediate things and causes of the conclusion. Furthermore, every syllogism that proceeds from first, true, immediate things and causes of the conclusion is a syllogism that produces science; but demonstration is such; therefore demonstration is a syllogism that produces science. The first syllogism proceeds through the formal cause, the second through the material cause. Third, when some material conclusion — which I mentioned above — is demonstrated by several demonstrations, and then through that same conclusion one of the premises is demonstrated through which the said conclusion was demonstrated. Fourth, when the same thing is demonstrated through the same thing in the same way, with the same species of demonstration from immediate things. Aristotle offers this example for its understanding: if through A, B is demonstrated, and then by regressing through B, A is demonstrated — and each is a *propter quid* demonstration. This latter circle is called a uniform and simple circle; the three former are called deformed and qualified circles, which nearly all philosophers admit as possible, while they reject the last as impossible.

Note second that regression is described as a progress from effect to cause and from cause to effect — as if man is demonstrated to be rational because he is risible, and to be risible because he is rational. The prior process is a demonstration *quia*; the second is a demonstration *propter quid*. In the first process one proceeds from the effect distinctly known to the cause confusedly known; in the second process one proceeds from the cause distinctly known to the effect distinctly known. From these it is permitted to collect the difference between regression and simple circle. For in regression two demonstrations of a different kind are found — as I made clear above by examples; while in a circle both demonstrations are of the same kind and species — for each is a *propter quid* demonstration, as is clear in the preceding note — and Faber likewise notes

(*Theor. citat. c.1*). Furthermore, regression and circle differ in terms of end. For in a circle the beginning is the same as the end, as is seen in the example adduced by Aristotle; but in regression the beginning differs from the end, as is also clear from what I have just stated. Many things learnedly and eruditely said by Zabarella (*l. praenomata*) from which our two more recent authors cited are refuted, who suspect that the circle taken broadly is a genus with respect to regression and the circle properly said. For neither is a syllogism a genus with respect to the topical and analytic, as is clear from what was said in the proper article; nor is any common generic notion found agreeing with regression and the circle properly said. Therefore the circle is not to be considered a genus with respect to those two.

Note third that in regression three things occur to be considered. First, the process from effect to cause. For since effects are more sensible and evident than their causes — as philosophers with Aristotle (*2. Post. T.1. 1. Met. c.1*) teach, especially Scotus (*both ibid. in com. and also 1. d.3. q.4. and quol.7*) — second, the examination of the discovered cause and its comparison with its effect foreknown by us. For having had cognition of the effect we proceed to knowledge of its cause, weighing its conditions and properties — as Aristotle does in the Physics (*T.82*) concerning matter, noting that it is the subject of contraries, the basis of generation and corruption, the receptacle of forms, the foundation of nature, and such things, from which the essence of matter becomes plainly known to us who consider these things. Depending on the perspicacity or slowness of one's intellect, more or less time is spent. Third, from cause to effect — and the proper quid demonstration is had, generating science in us properly speaking. And all of this, after Scotus (*Quol. cit. ante B.*), Zabarella elegantly sets forth (*c.9. l. alleg.*).

Assertion. Regression must be embraced, and the circle must be rejected. This assertion is twofold. The first part is delivered by the Doctor mentioned just above, who, though he does not use the name regression there, in reality concedes and shows it, as is most clearly evident to the reader of his text. The same is committed to writing by him (*2. Prior. q.4*), (*1. de primo principio c.2*). Proof, first, from Aristotle, who (*c.3, primi Post.*), rejecting the circle, admits that the same thing can be demonstrated in diverse ways — as happens in regression through a posteriori and a priori demonstration. The same he teaches more clearly (*2. Post. c.15*), adducing the difference between the demonstration quia and propter quid, through which regression is had — which he illustrates with the example of both demonstrations, necessary for it: every non-twinkling thing is near; the planets do not twinkle; therefore the planets are near — which is a demonstration quia; then: what is near does not twinkle; the planets are near; therefore the planets do not twinkle — which is a demonstration propter quid. The same he likewise indicates (*1. 8. Phys.*) and in other places. Second, science can be acquired by us in two ways: either through effect to cause — to which the demonstration quia is assigned — or through cause to effect — to which the

demonstration propter quid serves; and this double science is produced through regression, as is clear from the description of regression delivered in the second note. Therefore regression must be received. The major is the common doctrine of all dialecticians, proved by our Doctor in the Quolibeta cited as may be seen there. Third, the effect can be known while its cause is unknown — as is clear of science acquired through experience, which was produced by the ministry of the senses through knowledge of many singular effects; and to prior philosophers the effects became known while their causes escaped them. Hence they were moved to hunt out the causes of those same effects, as Aristotle testifies in the passage cited. And this can be shown conveniently of the motion of the heavens, of the ebb and flow of the sea, and other effects known to us while their causes are unknown. Therefore, diligent examination and accurate inquiry being applied, if the causes become known, from the causes themselves one can turn back to their effects — in which way a useful regression is effected in the acquisition of the sciences. The second part is expressly defended by Aristotle (*1. Post. c.7*) and Scotus cited at the beginning of the article, and is proved, first: the same with respect to the same cannot simultaneously be prior and posterior, more known and less known in the same respect; but if a simple and formal circle were conceded, the same with respect to the same would simultaneously be prior and posterior, more known and less known in the same respect. Therefore a simple and formal circle is impossible. The major is at hand from the laws of contradiction adduced elsewhere. The minor is shown: the premises are prior and more known than the conclusion, from what was said above; but through a circle, the conclusion — through transposition — becomes one of the premises, and the other of the premises becomes the conclusion. Therefore those absurdities just recounted are rightly inferred. Second, it is impossible for the same thing to be demonstrated by itself; but if a circle were given, the same would be demonstrated by itself. Therefore a simple circle is impossible. The major is known from what is required for demonstration. The minor is proved: for if, for example, A is the cause of B, and in turn B is the cause of A, then A will also be the cause of itself — because what is the cause of a cause is the cause of the caused thing in the same genus of cause; but the premises — namely A — are the cause of the conclusion — that is, B; and afterwards the conclusion is the cause of the premises, because through the conclusion the premises are demonstrated. Therefore the conclusion B will be the cause of itself, because it is the cause of its own proper cause. And so the same would be demonstrated by itself — which is absurd. Third, the circular demonstration is made only in equal and reciprocal terms, as the Stagirite writes in the present place and (*2. Prior. c.5*): for as is clear from the first note, a circle is effected whenever we deduce the minor from the conclusion together with the converse of the major, or we collect the major from the same conclusion together with the converse of the minor. But reciprocal and convertible terms are few; while there are many demonstrable things — yet not all fall into demonstration, as those Ancients at the beginning of this article

imagined, against whom Aristotle forms these three arguments. Therefore the demonstrative circle is vain and empty.

You will object, first, against the first part of the preceding assertion: when we proceed from effect to cause, either we know the cause or we do not; if the latter, just as it is pointless for someone to proceed to what he does not know — because even if it presents itself to him, he cannot recognize it — similarly it is to no purpose for someone to investigate the cause of some effect if he is ignorant of it, because even if it presents itself to him, he will not be able to recognize it. If the former, it is useless for us to proceed from cause to effect, since we already know both cause and effect and clearly know that the effect depends on the cause through the prior process; and for that reason regression is pointless and superfluous. I reply that in the first process the cause is cognized by us confusedly; but in the second process distinctly. Therefore we proceed from confused to distinct cognition; and this order nature presents and Aristotle maintains — especially in physical matters, as is clear from the first book of *Physics*. Those who rely on such an argument therefore err, not recognizing that between science and ignorance there mediates confused cognition — as the philosopher rightly distinguishes (*1. Post. c.1*), responding to the sophistical trick of Meno who abolishes science as something new.

You will object, second, against the second part of the assertion, that in causes a simple circle is effected; therefore also in demonstrations. The consequence is at hand, because demonstration is had through a cause. The antecedent is supported by the authority of the philosopher (*2. Phys. c.3. T.30. and 5. Met. c.1. T.2*): causes are causes of one another — the efficient cause causing the form, and the final the efficient; matter likewise causes form, and form matter. Again (*2. Post. c.15*): from vapor rain is demonstrated, and from rain vapor. Then (*2. Caeli T.59*): it is shown that the stars are immobile because they are spherical, and that they are spherical because they are immobile — where an apparent circle is seen. I reply that the argument concludes indeed in a different genus of cause, not in the same genus of cause — which is the entire point of the difficulty.

You will press: act is the efficient cause of habit, and yet habit, generated from repeated acts, is the effective cause of acts, as Scotus proves (*1. d.17. q.2.*). Therefore this holds as much of a different genus as of the same genus of cause. I say it is certainly probable that a habit concurs effectively in the production of subsequent acts; yet the opposite is also plausible, as the Doctor shows in the place cited, and the matter is still under judgment. Given the affirmative side — which is more common and probable, and toward which the Doctor leans more — I say that habit is productive and effective of subsequent acts, not of prior ones — those, namely, that precede the habit itself. For this reason no absurdity is deduced, since in the same genus of efficient cause the same thing with respect to different things can be both cause and effect — as Peter is the father of

Francis, and then Francis is the father of Anthony; but with respect to one and the same thing, the same thing cannot in the same genus of cause be both cause and effect.

Article XIII. What is the Middle Term of the Most Perfect Demonstration?

Having examined and rejected many opinions of logicians on the question of the middle term of demonstration — by Baldwin in *Quest. de medio demonstrationis* cap. I, by Faber *Theor. X*, cap. I, by the Coimbrans 2. *Post. quæst. un. art. II*, and others — I propose four principal positions for examination. The first is defended by Zabarella (*cit. 1.2.*), who attempts through several lines of argument to prove that any genus of cause can serve as the middle term of the most perfect demonstration. The second belongs to Albert and Aegidius (2. *Post. quæst. de medio demonstrationis*), and is attributed to Averroes (1. *Post. com. XI**), *who maintain that the middle term in the most perfect demonstration is always the definition of the passion and never the definition of the subject. The third is defended by the Doctor* (1. *Post. quest. LVI*; 7. d. 3. *quest. VI*, §. *Ad quest. Sub M.*; and 3. d. XIV, *quest. I, A.*; and *ante quæst. I Univers.*, as Sarnanius notes there, p. 23), *followed by all his disciples and in part by the Coimbrans (alleg. art. III), with Zabarella observing (cap. II, l.* I*, prærecensiti)* that St. Thomas (lect. I secundi Post.) does not diverge from them — these authors teach that the middle term of the most perfect demonstration is the definition of the subject. The fourth holds a position intermediate between the two just mentioned and belongs to certain more recent thinkers, notably the Thomists and the Coimbrans, who assert that the middle term of the most perfect demonstration is simultaneously the cause and the definition of both extremes, namely of the subject and of the passion.*

Recall, and supplement with what was established above in Article X of this Question, that demonstration can indeed be effected through every genus of cause, though the question of which genus of cause yields the most perfect demonstration was not settled there — it is to be resolved here. To proceed more expeditiously and conveniently, we must call to mind what was said above concerning demonstration and its species, as well as the conditions required for it. Above all else, it must not be passed over what is meant by the name "most perfect demonstration" and how it is distinguished from other kinds of demonstration. First, it must not be supposed that the most perfect demonstration constitutes a species of demonstration distinct from demonstration *propter quid*, which is subdivided into primary and secondary. The primary proceeds through the proximate and immediate formal cause and possesses all the prerequisite conditions; the secondary proceeds through another cause of a different genus and lacks one or more of the conditions necessary to it. The name "most perfect demonstration" is not found in the writings of Aristotle, as Zabarella carefully notes (*cap. XVII**, lib. alleg.), *having been invented by later philosophers, yet it is received by all as fitting and apt. All the more*

so since, as demonstration is the instrument of knowing, it ought by right to take its name from its highest end, which — in the judgment of Aristotle (1. Post. cap. X) — is the most excellent science acquired through the proximate, intrinsic, and formal cause. Accordingly, the most perfect demonstration — which strictly merits the name "demonstration" or "demonstration simply," as Zabarella (cit.) attests — is that which possesses the middle term, or intrinsic immediate and adequate cause, together with the other conditions handed down and examined in the preceding articles.*

Recall also, from what was established in the *Summulae*, that in every syllogism — whether topical or analytical — three terms are found: one is called the major extreme, or passion; another the minor extreme, namely the subject; and the third is called the middle term, which is assumed in order to demonstrate the passion of the subject. For example, "rational" is the middle term assumed by the arguer to demonstrate risibility of man, preserving the required mode and figure for the proper construction of the syllogism. Now, the passion flows from the subject, being really identified with it, as the Doctor (*quæst. cit.*) affirms. The middle term through which the inherence or indwelling of the passion in its subject is demonstrated is called the form and definition of that same subject — as the Coimbrans (*ibid. art. I*, loci pracit.*)* note from Aristotle (2. Post. cap. XI*). *The reason is that the intrinsic and essential form of the subject, which is its ultimate constitutive difference, is its noblest and most excellent part, and denomination comes from the nobler part, as the interpreters of Aristotle observe with him (7. Met. ad T. XIV,* XV*)*. Therefore, since the middle term of demonstration is the principal part of the subject and the intrinsic cause of the passion — and since the passion is commonly called a proper accident flowing by emanation — the most perfect demonstration consequently participates in the middle term or intrinsic formal cause; whereas demonstrations that are not most perfect can employ a middle term that is an extrinsic cause, which is called a cause by transmutation, which a common accident obtains, as Scotus notes (*in quæst. §. Sed si passio*). Thus the eclipse of the moon arises from an extrinsic cause, namely the earth interposed between the moon and the sun; similarly, thunder is produced by an extrinsic cause, namely the extinction of an exhalation in a cloud.*

To make this clearer: from Scotus (*cit. §. Ad quest*) there is a twofold accident: one common and one proper. The common accident follows a singular subject; the proper accident follows a universal subject, for it is caused by the essential principles of the species and is demonstrable through the intrinsic form of its subject. Not so the common accident, between which and its subject there is no necessary connection of the kind required among demonstrables. Furthermore, the Doctor adds (*quest. XL*, §. Ad* I arg.*): "This moon is eclipsed" is contingent, and likewise "the earth is interposed between the sun and the moon," and in general, what happens frequently is contingent. What falls within demonstration is necessary; and, as the Lincolniensis says, such things are taken with the circumstances that make them necessary — as I showed in Article VIII of this

Question — and this is further illustrated by the same example given there, namely when the sun is at the head or tail of the Dragon, and the moon in the same position, the moon is eclipsed on account of the earth's interposition between the sun and the moon. This is especially so because philosophers speak not of actual eclipse but of aptitudinal eclipse, as John of Mairs (*2. Post. quest. ult.*), the Venetian (*cap. IV primi Post.*), and Zabarella (*1. de medio demonstrationis cap. VII**)* particularly note. From these considerations it is gathered, with Scotus (*quæst. LVII**), *that not every demonstration propter quid proceeds through an intrinsic cause, but sometimes through an extrinsic cause — as in the demonstration just cited, which is not the most perfect, according to Faber (Theor. XIV), followed without division by all Scotists (disp. XIII, quæst.* II*, art.* II*). That such a demonstration is nonetheless propter quid the Doctor plainly declares (quest. LIV,* LVII*), against the objection of those more recent authors who follow Faber (cit.), a matter I have amply demonstrated above. Finally, observe from the same Doctor (q. LVI, §. Ante ad* I arg.)* that the passion is called "first" and "last" term in different respects: it is called the first term with respect to predication, because the passion is always directly predicated and never made subject except indirectly; yet it is called the last term with respect to the order of nature, since the passion is posterior in nature to the subject and to its principles, deriving its origin from them, as I showed above.

First Assertion: The definition of the passion is not the middle term of the most perfect demonstration.

So holds Scotus (*loco proxime alleg. §. Ad quest.*). Proof: First, that which, when known, still prompts inquiry into the reason why a thing is so, is not the middle term of the most perfect demonstration; but when the passion is known of the subject through the definition of the passion itself, there remains inquiry into the reason why it inheres in the subject. Therefore the definition of the passion is not the middle term of the most perfect demonstration. The major is evident, since the demonstration under present discussion proceeds from first and immediate principles. The minor is also clear, since a definition of this sort does not constitute the reason for the passion's inherence in the subject. Second, that which produces the most perfect science — such that it depends on nothing else for its being or its knowability — is the middle term of the most perfect demonstration. But the definition of the passion depends for its being and its knowability on the subject and is caused by the subject's essential principles, as I noted above. Therefore the definition of the passion cannot be the middle term of the most perfect demonstration. Furthermore, cause and middle term are interchangeable, as established above; therefore, since the cause of the passion is the subject, the definition of the passion cannot be the middle term of the aforesaid demonstration. Again, if the definition of the passion were the middle term of that demonstration, a *petitio principii* would occur; for in exactly the same way one accepts that man is risible as one accepts that man is capable of laughter — which is the formal definition of risibility itself, the passion of man. Finally: the opponents deny that the middle term of such demonstration is the

definition of the subject on the ground that since its premises must be immediate, the minor would be mediate; yet with the definition of the passion as middle term, the minor would equally be mediate, because the passion inheres in the definition of the subject by means of its own proper definition. Therefore, turning the argument against the opponents, it is concluded that the definition of the passion is not the middle term of the most perfect demonstration.

Second Assertion: The definition of the subject is established as the middle term of the most perfect demonstration.

So holds Scotus (*ubi supra, præsertim quæst. LVI post §. Ad q.*). First proof: from Aristotle (*2. Post.*), as cited by Tartaretus, who writes that the middle term in demonstration is the reason for the ultimate term, which is the subject — for the reason assigned at the close of the third note. Moreover, as the Doctor (*cit.*) also notes from the same Aristotle, if some passion is to be demonstrated of a subject, it ought rather to be demonstrated through C, which is the definition of the subject, than through B, which is the definition of the passion. Aristotle's reason (*ibid.*) is that C, the definition of the subject, is the cause of A, the passion, and likewise of B, the definition of the passion. The same is confirmed at (*4. Phys. T. LI**; *1. de anima T.* XI**; *2. eiusdem operis T.* XII**). *Second: that which is the proximate and immediate cause of the passion demonstrable of the subject — from which it immediately flows — is the middle term of the most perfect demonstration. But the definition of the subject is of this kind. Therefore the definition of the subject is the middle term of the most perfect demonstration. The major is proved: the most perfect science, which is the effect of the most perfect demonstration, is through the proximate and immediate cause, as is clear from the definition of science (1. Post. cap. II)* and from the conditions of principles and premises treated at length above. This is also signified at the end of the second book of the Posterior Analytics, as Scotus (loco ante cit.) attests. The minor is shown: first, because once the subject is posited, its passion immediately emanates from it, and when the subject is removed, the passion itself is removed; second, because the passion flows from the quidditative principles of the subject and is inseparable from the subject itself — therefore the subject is the proximate and immediate cause of its proper passion. Third: the most perfect demonstration proceeds from first, true, and immediate principles that are causes of the conclusion, as established above. But the syllogism in which the passion is concluded of the subject through the definition of the subject proceeds from true, first principles, etc. Therefore the definition of the subject is the middle term of such demonstration. There is the further point that what is the root and primary cause of all demonstrables is the middle term of the most perfect demonstration — composed as it is of first and immediate premises. But the definition of the subject is the root and immediate cause of all passions demonstrable of the subject. The major can be supported from Aristotle's statement (*Met. cap. IV**)* that what is the principle and cause of others' being such is maximally such — supplying this for univocal causes: if fire*

is the cause of other things being hot, fire itself is maximally hot. The minor can be shown from flability, visibility, and admirability, which in the view of many are passions demonstrable of man, ordered among themselves such that one is demonstrated through another, up to the last, which is demonstrated through rationality — the definition of man or its principal part — as Aristotle intimates (*1. Post. cap. XX**)*.

Third Assertion: The middle term of the most perfect demonstration is not both definitions together — that of the major and that of the minor extreme.

This follows from what was said in the two preceding assertions and is assumed by the Doctor and indicated by Aristotle (*1. Post. T. XXII**; *2. eiusdem operis T. II**). *First proof: of one effect there is one total and adequate cause, as is clear in natural philosophy and in the book of causes, and as the Philosopher teaches (2. Post. cap. XVII); whence Averroes (1. Post. com. XLVI)** adds that of one thing there is one demonstration and one definition, because there is one formal cause. Therefore the middle term of the most perfect demonstration cannot be both definitions — of subject and of passion — but only the one established above. Second: the middle term of demonstration is one thing per se and one cause per se; but both definitions of both extremes are not one per se, as is clear. Therefore the middle term of the said demonstration is not composed of both definitions of the said extremes. From these points and from what was established earlier, it is evident that the middle term of the most perfect demonstration is of no other genus than the formal cause, which is called the quiddity and essence of the subject; the remaining causes are extrinsic — as the material cause, which is more ignoble and inferior.

Objections against the First Assertion.

First objection: that which is the reason for the first term is the middle term of the most perfect demonstration; but the definition of the passion is the reason for the first term. Therefore the definition of the passion is the middle term of the most perfect demonstration. The major rests on the authority of Aristotle (*2. Post. T. XXV**), *who demonstrates it by the following analogy: that leaves fall from the vine is demonstrated through this middle term, "the sap congealing at the junction of leaves with branches," as Scotus (quæst. LVI, ferè in initio)** reports. Confirmation from the same: Scotus (*ibid. cap. II**)* says that the eclipse of the moon is demonstrated through the definition of the eclipse itself, and the concord of sounds through the definition of consonance itself; and at (*T. X eiusdem lib.*) he adds that the middle term for demonstrating thunder is the definition of thunder itself. Therefore the definition of the passion is the middle term of the most perfect demonstration.

I deny the major. In response to its proof I say, with Scotus (*cit. §. Ad I arg.*), that Aristotle does indeed assert there that the definition of the passion is the middle term of demonstration — which I also grant together with the same Doctor —

but not that it is the middle term of the most perfect demonstration, as the authors of the first opinion contend. The same reply can be made to the confirmation. Or one may say that this argument and its confirmation conclude concerning the causal definition of the passion, not its formal definition, which is what is at issue here.

Second objection: the most perfect demonstration proceeds from what is more immediate and prior; but the demonstration whose middle term is the definition of the passion proceeds from what is more immediate and prior. Therefore its middle term is the definition of the passion alone. The major is clear from what was said. The minor is shown: since the passion is more immediately predicated of its own definition — as when one says "what is suited to instruction is instructible" — than of the definition of its subject, as in "a rational animal is instructible." First confirmation: from Aristotle (*1. Post. cap. VI**)*, the extremes and middle must be of the same genus; but the passion belongs to the category of quality, therefore the middle term will be of the same genus and category of quality — which can only be the definition of the passion itself, since the definition of the subject belongs to the category of substance just as the subject does. Second confirmation: the middle term of the most perfect demonstration must be midway by position — that is, prior to the passion and posterior to the subject. But only the definition of the passion is of this kind, being posterior to the subject and prior to the passion. Therefore the definition of the passion is the middle term of the most perfect demonstration.

I concede the major and deny the minor. In response to its proof, I say that a proposition is called immediate not because it is through a cause proximate to the effect — as the argument infers — but because it does not have another cause through which it can be demonstrated of the subject. The definition of the passion is not of this kind, since it can be demonstrated through the definition of the subject, which is its proximate and immediate cause, and also the first among all demonstrables, as I noted above. In response to the first confirmation, Scotus (*alleg.*) replies that the extremes and middle are said to be of the same genus — that is, of the same generating genus — because the same generating principle produces both the principles of the subject and its properties; for what produces man consequently produces his properties, namely flability, risibility, and the like. Or one may say that the passion of the subject is reduced to the genus or category in which its subject is placed, as I taught elsewhere with Scotus. In response to the second confirmation, I concede the major and deny the minor. It is sufficient for the middle term to be a means of knowability — that is, to be the cause of knowing the passion's inherence in the subject — but it is not necessary for it to be prior or posterior in order. This is clearly evident from demonstration from effect, in which the effect, which is posterior to its cause, serves as the middle term — as the two recent interpreters of Scotus noted above after Tartaretus, whom they cite.

Third objection: the science produced by the most perfect demonstration is the science of the passion; therefore the middle term of such demonstration is the cause of the passion; but the definition of the passion includes the cause of the passion, since the perfect definition of an accident includes the subject of which it is an accident. Therefore the definition of the passion is the middle term of the most perfect demonstration.

I distinguish the antecedent: the science obtained through the most perfect demonstration is the science of the passion through the formal definition of the passion — I deny; through the causal definition of the passion, which is the form of the subject itself — I concede. For thus the definition of the passion includes the subject, just as every quietative and perfect definition of an accident involves the subject. For this reason it is called a definition by addition, as I noted in the *Epitome* in the article on definition.

Fourth objection against the Second Assertion: if the definition of the subject were the middle term of the most perfect demonstration, a *petitio principii* would occur. The same thing would be proved by the same thing, since definition and defined are identical, as Aristotle plainly teaches (8. *Top. cap.* IV*, loco* L*)*, saying that one of the modes of begging the question is when the defined is proved through the definition and vice versa. Confirmation: the most perfect demonstration is composed of first principles, as I have frequently premised; but if its middle term were the definition of the subject, it would not be from first principles, because the subject is the last. Therefore the definition of the subject is not the middle term of the most perfect demonstration.

The consequence is to be denied, because definition and defined differ formally, as Scotus and his followers Brulifer and the other Scotists hold (*Tract. Formalitatum*). Moreover, the argument proceeds from the distinct knowledge obtained through the definition to the confused knowledge obtained of the defined — as the Doctor (*cit.*) carefully observes in his solution of this argument. As for Aristotle: Scotus, expounding him, says: if the predicate is shown of the defined through the definition where the predicate more evidently inheres in the defined, a *petitio principii* occurs; but if that predicate more evidently inheres in the definition, there is plainly no *petitio principii*. In response to the confirmation, I say with the same Doctor that demonstration proceeds from first principles — that is, from propositions that are self-evident, or in the other sense explained above. Whether the subject ought to be called first or last I made plain at the close of the third note.

Fifth objection against the Third Assertion: Aristotle (2. *Post. cap.* IV*, T.* V*, and T.* I *ibid.*) writes that the "what is it" and the "why is it" are the same, which he illustrates with the example of the eclipse and other cases to be seen there. Therefore the middle term in the most perfect demonstration embraces both the definition of the subject and the definition of the passion: since the middle term must be the cause of the passion's being simply, and this by reason of the

passion's formal definition; and of the passion's existing in the subject, and this by reason of the causal definition of the subject — and accordingly the middle term contains both definitions. Confirmation: the middle term is that through which the passion and the subject are necessarily connected to each other; therefore the middle term is the definition of both extremes, since the necessary connection depends on both extremes.

I respond that the aforesaid questions are the same according to the thing but differ with respect to the mode of inquiry — as Scotus (*1. Post. quæst.* LIV*, §. Ad quæst.)* and Tartaretus (*2. Post. quest.* I*, dub.* II*)* note. Thus the said questions may be said to be identified because they seek the cause of a thing — whether simple or complex — yet, in the judgment of Averroes, they do not properly coincide, because *propter quid* properly regards the external cause, whether efficient or final — as is clear from Aristotle's example of the eclipse, produced by an external cause, namely the interposition of the earth — while *quid* regards the internal cause, which is the form and essence of the thing itself. In reply to the objection formally stated: granting the antecedent, the consequence is denied, because the middle term of such demonstration is the causal definition of the subject, as I showed above. In response to the confirmation, I concede the antecedent and deny the consequence, since the connection depends on the definition of the subject as proximate and immediate cause, not on the passion — even though it also depends on both extremes.

Question IV. On the Effect of Demonstration.

Having treated at length in the preceding question of demonstration as the cause of science, I have now judged it opportune in this final question to discuss its effect, which is science itself — presupposing many things already discussed and to be discussed elsewhere, so that this work I have begun and elaborated may be brought to completion.

Article I. Whether Science Exists.

Three opinions of the philosophers once held sway. Two were utterly extreme — recalled and refuted by Aristotle (*1. Post. cap.* III*)* and by the Doctor (*ibid. in initio eiusdem lib., and 1. distinct.* III*, quæst.* IV*, §. Primo infrà A.)* — and the third, a middle position, is the one best discovered and set forth by the Stagirite in the present work, to which later philosophers readily adhere and subscribe. The authors of the first opinion are the Pyrrhonists, also called Sceptics, Aphoretics, and Epochists, as the Coimbrans (*in comm. præfati cap.*) testify, and who are called Academicians by Scotus (*præcitato*) — men who deny all knowledge of things and admit universal ignorance. The proponents of the second opinion are called Platonists, as the Doctor (*ubi supra*) reports — or followers of Empedocles, as the Coimbrans (*mox allegati*) hold — who suppose there to be science of all things. Those who take the middle path are all the Peripatetics, with their two leaders — the author just named — who teach that

there is science of some things, against the proponents of the first opinion, and not of some things, against the defenders of the latter. See Ferchius (*vestig.* VI*, cap.* IV*, numero* XI*)*.

The acceptations of "science" as adduced by Scotus (*lib.* I*, quæst.* II*, artic.* II*, not.* II*)* are to be presupposed. It should only be noted here that in this place we are dealing chiefly with science taken properly and strictly, as it is the effect of demonstration — whose definition will be set forth, carefully and accurately discussed, in the next article.

The assertion is: certain things fall within the scope of science, while many things remain unknown to us. This assertion is twofold, and both parts are defended by Aristotle and by Scotus (*præcit.*) and by the remaining younger philosophers. The first part is proved: first, from St. Augustine (*lib. de vera religione*), who doubts whether anything can be known but does not doubt about doubting — he is certain of it — and one is not certain except of what one knows; therefore he who doubts whether he knows anything must necessarily concede that he knows something. Again from the same saint (*lib. II contra Academicos*): when the Academicians claim that we know not what is true but only what is probable, they do not attend to what they are saying; for if we do not know the true as it is, it follows that we would not know what is probable. Just as it is impossible for someone to know that Chrysippus resembles Socrates without knowing Socrates himself in any way. Relevant here also are other passages from the same Augustine adduced by Scotus (*in primo nuper cit. A.*), to which I add (11. *Ciuit. cap.* XXVI*, 19. cap.* XVIII*). *Second: there are things that are necessarily and perpetually connected with each other, one of which is demonstrated of the other — for instance, a passion of its subject. Therefore of some things science is obtained. The antecedent is proved: it is demonstrated that a triangle has three angles, that man is risible, and other such things. Add what Euclid demonstrates in his work, and what Aristotle and other philosophers demonstrate throughout. Relevant here is what Scotus (proximè recensitus) teaches: that the form of a perfect syllogism is naturally evident to everyone, as is clear from its definition (1. Prior. cap. I). And the science of the conclusion depends only on the evidence of the principles and on the evidence of the syllogistic inference. Therefore, any demonstrable conclusion can be naturally known to any person from premises that are self-evident. Hence, one who possesses a perfect demonstrative syllogism — which is the cause of science — and likewise knows the demonstrable thing to be demonstrated, thereby possesses science. Furthermore, science concerning knowable things is generated through experience, as Aristotle (1. Met. cap. I)* and Scotus (ubi supra) assert, and the Doctor pursues this at length and learnedly, both there and at (4. distinct. XLIII*, quæst.* II*, §. Respondeo infra D.). Moreover, the desire for knowledge naturally innate in us, from (1. Met. cap. cit.), must not be frustrated — since God and nature do nothing in vain, from (1. de Cælo T. CCCXX; 3. de anima T.* XLV*). Finally, science is the perfection of man, and in the true knowledge of God above all does his happiness principally and incipiently consist. It cannot therefore be denied that some things are known to us. The second part is easy to prove: since science is*

knowledge of a thing through its cause, and since we are ignorant of the causes of many things — why the magnet attracts iron, amber attracts chaff, the remora halts a ship, the torpedo numbs the hand of the fisherman, and the like — it plainly follows that we do not have science of all things. Moreover, science is of eternal, necessary, and universal things, as I have repeatedly urged and proved above; but many things are contingent, temporal, and singular; and what depends on the divine will is hidden from us, according to (Rom. XI): "For who has known the mind of the Lord, or who has been his counselor?"*

First objection: with Scotus (*1. Post. quest. X*)* on behalf of the Academicians. Science taken properly is effected through demonstration, by the agreement of all; therefore, since principles are known, they ought to be known through demonstration; but principles cannot be demonstrated; therefore they cannot be known. The first consequence is clear: apart from demonstrative science there is no other science. The subsumed claim is proved: either the principles are immediate — in which case they are not known, since they lack the middle term required for science — or they are mediate, in which case they are either known through other middle terms, and those through yet others, and so on to infinity; therefore there is no science of them, since the infinite cannot be known by any created intellect.

Granting the antecedent, I deny the consequence. For first and immediate principles are indemonstrable, as Aristotle (*1. Post. cap. II**; *4. Met. T. XXVI*)* writes, cited by the Doctor (*1. distinct. II**, *quæst. IV**, §. *De tertiis ante G.*)*. Indeed, principles and conclusions are known by distinct habits: the former by the habit of intellect, the latter by the habit of science. And so there is no objection in favor of the Academicians.

Second objection: all our cognition is born through the ministry of the senses, according to the saying of Aristotle in the *De sensu et sensato*, "nothing is in the intellect that was not first in the sense"; yet we experience that the senses frequently err — both in dreams and in waking — as Raconius demonstrates at length (*disp. de demonstratione, sect. III**, *quæst. II**, *artic. I*)*. Above all with respect to sight, which judges a stick in water to be broken and bent, though it is in fact whole and straight; similarly, it apprehends the sun as though it were a foot in diameter, though in fact it exceeds the entire earth in size; again, what is truly white or black we see through red glass as red; and other such things to be adduced and examined in the *De anima*. Therefore nothing certain, nothing undoubted and evident is to be asserted.

I respond with Scotus (*citato ante G., and quæst. III univers. in solutione tertii*) that our intellective knowledge comes from the sense as an occasion, not as a cause — thus the major is distinguished and the philosopher's dictum is explained. As for the minor: I say that a badly disposed sense does indeed err, but a well-disposed sense, properly approximated, with an unimpaired medium, does not deceive at all with respect to its proper sensible — as Scotus excellently teaches (*loco citato, §. Quantum ad III**, *L. and M.*). Above all because a wandering sense can be

corrected by the intellect, as I shall show at length in the place just cited. See Bonet (2. Met. cap. V).*

Third objection: it is possible that just as a conclusion is demonstrated through premises, so premises are demonstrated through the conclusion — and that everything is shown by mutual and circular demonstration. Therefore everything can be known through circular demonstration. I respond that this argument has already been dissolved. For in Article XI of the preceding question, circular demonstration was rejected by me as useless and empty.

Article II. What Science Is.

The Subtle Doctor (*1. Post. quest. I**, and ** X eiusdem operis*), drawing on the Lincolniensis, enumerates four acceptations of science, which do not seem to differ greatly from those I presupposed in the preceding article from the places cited there. I therefore do not pause over their investigation and explanation — they are to be seen in those places. Here I only note that in Aristotle, science taken broadly means that both principles and conclusions drawn from them are known. For the same Philosopher says in the text that principles are known more than the conclusion. But science taken strictly means that only the conclusion is known — as the same Philosopher says both here and in (*6. Eth. c. III**), and Bonet (*1. Met. cap. II*): *science is of conclusions, and understanding is of principles. And since there are two kinds of demonstration — quia and propter quid — there are likewise two kinds of science: science quia and science propter quid, that is, through effect and through cause. Science taken most properly of all is defined by Aristotle (1. Post. cap. II)* as: knowledge of a thing through its proper cause; that is, in Scotus's interpretation, science is certain, evident knowledge of a necessary thing through its proper cause, obtained through syllogistic discourse.* These conditions, drawn from the cited Aristotle, are set forth and explained by the Doctor (*1. Post. quest. I**, and ** III Reportat. distinct. XXIV**, *quest.* I**, §. *Ad quæst.**). Science thus understood is divided, according to Scotus (*1. Post. quest. nunc alleg.*), into actual and habitual. Actual science is: *certain and evident knowledge of a necessary object through its proper cause, actually acquired through syllogistic discourse.* Habitual science is: *a quality acquired from repeated scientific acts, facilitating the intellect to operate scientifically.* Note further, following the Parisian masters (*quest. I primi Phys.*) after Scotus (*2. Post. quest. I*), that the proposition properly knowable is the necessary and doubtable proposition which by nature is apt to become evident through evident propositions applied to it through syllogistic discourse; since this coincides with the scientific conclusion of which there is science, it requires no further explanation or conditions distinct from those enumerated.

The assertion is: the definition of science given above is correctly formulated. So Scotus (*1. Post. quest. X**, §. *Ad quest.*, and in other places)*. This is clear: for into it are assigned the genus — namely, knowledge — and the difference, indicated by its remaining clauses as shown above. Moreover it contains nothing

superfluous and nothing lacking, and through it the nature of science itself is distinctly and clearly explained. Therefore it is a legitimate and fitting definition.

First objection: principles are known more than the conclusion, as Aristotle proves in the present (*cap. II**)* through the axiom "that on account of which each thing is such is itself more so"; but science of indemonstrable principles is not effected through a cause or middle term, of which they are devoid; and similarly science of the conclusion is not acquired through a cause. First confirmation: our cognition takes its beginning from what is more known to us, from (*1. Phys. T. II**)*; but what is more known to us is not causes but effects, as is clear. Therefore our science is not obtained through a cause. Second confirmation: if science were through a cause, perfect science would never be had unless the first cause were perfectly known; but the first cause is known by us only imperfectly and confusedly with respect to common predicates, as is clear from the first question of the Prologue.

I respond: the argument concludes concerning science taken broadly, not concerning science taken strictly, as I noted near the beginning of this article. To the first confirmation: I say it holds for science from effect (*a posteriori*), not for science from cause (*a priori*), regarding which the aforesaid definition of science is given. To the second confirmation: I say science is through a cause — supplying: the proximate and proper cause of the known thing, not through the most remote and universal cause, such as the first cause. Whether perfect science everywhere requires knowledge of all causes was touched upon above in Article X, and will be examined by design in natural philosophy.

Second objection: God possesses all science, which is free from all discursive reasoning, as I showed at length in the *Tract. de scientia Dei disp. I*. Therefore it is not necessary that science taken generally be produced through syllogistic discourse, as expressed in the aforesaid definition of science. Granting the antecedent, I say that created science alone involves discursive reasoning and carries with it imperfection, which is far from God, as I showed at length in that place.

Third objection: sometimes science is had of a contingent object — as of the eclipse of the moon, which is contingent — and of a corruptible and mutable object, as of physical things. Therefore it is wrongly asserted that science always has a necessary, incorruptible, and immutable object. I respond with Scotus (*ante §. Unde*): although the eclipse can be otherwise in itself, yet with respect to its cause it cannot be otherwise — for once the earth is interposed between the sun and the moon, the eclipse of the moon is necessarily obtained. As for the other point that is adduced: I say that science is not of an incomplex object but of a complex one — or of a conclusion — between whose subject and predicate there intervenes a necessary, eternal, and incorruptible relation, as the Doctor (*locis præcitatis*) says, and as I sufficiently declared in the first book (*quæst. II**, artic.* II*)*.

Article III. Whether Evidentiality Belongs to the Essence of Science.

Certain authors — such as Cano (*lib. XII de locis cap. II**)* and Mastrius (*cap. X primi Post. quest. III**, *conc.* I**)* — deny that evidentiality belongs to the essence of science. Scotus, however (*quæst. III principali, and IV coll. prol. §. Sed aliud; and III distinct. XXIV**, *quæst. vn. §. Ad quæst. sub D.*), Ruuius (*Tract. II de habitu scientiæ*), and the Coimbrans (*cap. XVI, quæstione prima, articulo tertio*)* affirm that evidentiality enters into the essence of science.

Note, from the Seraphic Bonet (*3. distinct. XXVI**, *quæst.* IV**), that certitude is described as the firm adhesion of the intellect to some object without fear. This is twofold: apparent and true. Apparent certitude is when the intellect, on account of some probable reason and through the efficacious application of the will, tenaciously adheres to some object — with reference to which Aristotle (*7. Eth. cap. III*)* says: "Some people cling as firmly to their false opinions or errors as others cling to the sciences." True certitude is that by which the intellect, on account of a solid and firm cause of the thing or an infallible authority, adheres to some object — as the philosopher firmly assents to: "man is risible, because he is rational"; or to: "the day of judgment will come, because Christ the Lord testifies it." The necessity of a proposition is that by which the proposition is true in such a way that it cannot be false, on account of the indissoluble nexus found between its extremes. Evidentiality, moreover, beyond firm adhesion, adds the manifestation of truth. For it is called evidentiality — that is, clear vision of the thing — which principles possess absolutely and of themselves, while science possesses it by participation in principles. Furthermore, evidentiality is divided into evidentiality of the object, which is the clear manifestation of the object to a cognizing power; and evidentiality of cognition, which is the clear manifestation of the knowledge attaining the object.

The assertion is: evidentiality belongs to the essence of science. So Scotus (*præcitatus*). First proof: from the definition of science, which is certain and evident knowledge, etc. What enters into the definition of something, especially in the direct line, belongs to its essence. Therefore, since evidentiality is included directly in the definition of science, it is clearly shown to belong to the quiddity of science. Second: what is the essential principle distinguishing something from other things is its essential constitutive principle, as I explained in the *Epitome* (*lib. I**, *quæst.* III**, *artic.* V**, *numero* X**)* and in the *Tract. de Deo Trino disp. ult.* Now evidentiality is the principle distinguishing science from faith, which is non-evident and obscure. Therefore evidentiality is the essential constitutive principle of science. Third: the principles that are the causes of science are essentially self-evident from their terms, as is clear from what was said. Therefore science is essentially evident. The consequence is deduced because if the cause is evident, its effect is likewise evident — indeed, effects are more evident to us than their causes, for through them we are led to the evident knowledge of causes. Therefore science essentially includes evidentiality.

First objection: subalternated science is true and proper science, yet it is not evident — since it can exist without the subalternating science from which it derives its evidentiality. Therefore evidentiality does not belong to the intrinsic nature of science.

I respond: subalternated science is science only insofar as he who has it can possess evidentiality of the principles that are handed down in the subalternating science. If he is unable to resolve these but only relies on someone's testimony, he will not be truly scientific, nor will his habit be properly called science — as I shall show below.

Second objection: our theology is truly science, even though it is non-evident and proceeds from the principles of the Catholic faith, which are non-evident. Therefore evidentiality does not pertain to the essential nature of science.

I respond by denying that our theology is properly and strictly science — what our authors call *de primo* of the *Posterior Analytics* — as I pursued at length in *Tract. I summæ Theologicæ*, and as Scotus does in *prol. quæst. IV*. It would now remain to treat of the unity of science. But since this can conveniently be understood from what was said about the unity of Logic (*lib. I**, *quæst.* VII**, *art.* IV**)*, I judge it should be passed over here.

Article IV. Whether the Division of Science into Practical and Speculative Is Essential.

Godfrey of Fontaines, the Nominalists, and not a few Thomists — cited by Faber (*quæst. IV**, *prol. disp.* IX**, *cap.* VI**)* — hold that the partition of science into practical and speculative is accidental, such that one and the same science can be simultaneously practical and speculative. Some assert this of theology, medicine, and logic — as certain authors whom Suárez (*disp. XLIV Met. Sect. XIII**, *numero* LIV**)* enumerates and defends, and which Ferchius (*1. vest. IX**)* vigorously champions. To these Scotus and with him all the Scotists oppose themselves (*quæst. IV Prol. §. Ad II quæst. E.E.*), together with the Complutenses, Diego, (*disp. I**, *quæst.* VI**)*, and many others, who hold that the aforesaid division is essential and quidditative — given, that is, through essential and quidditative differences. For the clarification and resolution of this difficulty:

We must recall and reconsider what I treated at length in (*lib. I**, *quæst.* II**)* and in *Tract. I summæ Theologicæ*. Above all in this place we note from the Doctor — both in the *quæst. præcit.* and in (*dist. XXVIII**, *quæst. vn. primi, §. Quamvis*)* — that the practical habit is used in two ways: either for the twofold aptitudinal respect of natural priority and conformity, or for the intrinsic nature of the habit itself, which is the foundation of that twofold respect. And the speculative can likewise be taken in two ways: either for the absence of that twofold respect just named, or for the intrinsic and essential constitutive nature of speculative

science, from which the negation of that twofold respect follows and arises as its passion. Accordingly, speculative science lacks the aforesaid twofold respect of natural priority and conformity; whereas practical science possesses it and is called practical by denomination from praxis, which taken most properly is an act of the will naturally posterior to the act of the intellect, to which it must conform — as I explained at length in the passage cited.

First Assertion: if "practical" is taken for the twofold respect just described, and "speculative" for the absence of both of the said respects, the aforesaid division of science is not essential. This is derived from the Doctor (*in prol. quæst. citata*, §. *Ex hoc D.*). First proof: of different genera not placed subalternately there are different differences, by the pre-predicamental rule. But science belongs to the genus of quality, as is clear from its series given in the *Epitome* (*lib. I**, quæst.* IV*, art.* VII*)*. The twofold respect mentioned, however, belongs to the genus of relation. Therefore "practical" and "speculative" are not essential differences of science. Second: no relative enters into the essence of an absolute, since they are opposed members of being. But science belongs to the genus of absolutes, being a quality — which is an absolute being — while "practical" taken in the first way is something relative, and "speculative" is the absence of the twofold relation just described. Therefore, with "practical" and "speculative" taken thus, such a partition of science is not quidditative. They may, however, be called disjunctive passions of science, just as even and odd are passions of number — as the Doctor (*ubi supra*) writes, followed by Mair (*ibidem*).

Second Assertion: "practical" and "speculative" taken in the second way are essential differences of science. So Scotus (*loco in antecedente assertionem memorato*, §. *Ad II quæst. E.E.*). First proof: from Aristotle (6. *Met. cap. I**; 6. *Eth. cap.* I**; 1. *Magnorum moralium cap.* XXXIII**)* who divides science into practical and speculative accordingly as it divides objects externally — which argues an intrinsic and essential distinction of the sciences, as two of our younger authors argue (*disp. XII**, quæst.* V*, art.* III*)* against Vásquez (1. *p. disp. IX**). *Second: every subaltern genus is divided into essential differences, as is clear from body and living thing in the Tree of Porphyry. But science is a subaltern genus, as can be seen in the table of Quality that I adduced in the Epitome (loco citato). And no other essential differences appear for it besides the rationes of the speculable and the practicable. These rationes are therefore essential and quidditative differences. Moreover: what constitutes distinct species are essential differences. But the practical and speculative rationes constitute distinct species of science. Therefore they are its essential differences. The major is known from "rational" and "irrational," which constitute man and brute. The minor is equally at hand from natural philosophy and ethics, which are distinct species of science — one speculative, the other practical. From these considerations it is clearly gathered that there is no intermediate science through participation in the extremes — between practical and speculative — as Suárez (*præcitatus numero LI*)* holds together with some others. But not rightly — and he seems to be mistaken on many points. First he fails to notice that one species cannot participate the specific nature of another species,*

just as a stone cannot participate the specific nature of man. For although man and stone agree in the common nature of being and substance, they share in no way in the nature of stone and man respectively. Similarly, since speculative and practical are like differences with respect to science in common, or even like species of it, science is properly divided into practical and speculative — just as a genus is divided into its species, or rather into its differences. However this is put, it plainly follows that no science can be simultaneously practical and speculative — a point urged not lightly in (*lib.* I*, *quæst.** II*, *art.** V*, *dub.** II*, *assert.** II*). *All the more so since, even through Suárez (ibidem), that division into practical and speculative is simply sufficient; therefore no intermediate science through participation in both is to be admitted. Hence Aristotle, dividing science taken generally, sets forth only two members — practical and speculative. If a middle science were granted, that partition would plainly be defective and incomplete. Again, according to the same Suárez (num. XLIII)*, practical and speculative are essential differences that make one science essentially differ from another; but one and the same habit cannot participate two essential differences essentially distinct from each other — as I showed regarding rationality and irrationality with respect to man in the passage cited. Therefore no science is found that mediates between practical and speculative.*

One may say, with Suárez, that two sciences can agree in this: that both treat of an operable thing as such, while differing in that one treats adequately of an operable thing and the other does not adequately, but in a superior and more universal manner. Thus "practical" can be taken either as abstracting from adequate and inadequate — and so it is only a subaltern difference — or as defined and limited to the habit that is adequately practical, and so it is the ultimate difference; and the same is to be said proportionally of "speculative." Accordingly, those differences do not cause essential diversity except as they are ultimate, and in this way they are never conjoined in the same habit; but as they are subaltern, they can be conjoined, because the same thing can have subaltern differences, and accordingly the same habit can be simultaneously practical and speculative.

Against this: every science is ordered toward speculation or toward praxis. For the end of the speculative is the contemplation of truth, and of the practical, operation — (*2. Met. cap. III**). *And although in practical science there are some principles that seem to be speculative, in reality they are not speculative but practical, because they tend to praxis mediately or immediately, formally or virtually. Hence the whole science is practical. And what Suárez further subjoins — that "practical" prescribes from the habit whether adequately or inadequately practical or speculative — is false. For either that is the primary genus in the nature of the practical or speculative, or it is not. If the first: then it is neither practical nor speculative formally, because it abstracts from both — just as being precisely taken is neither finite nor infinite, neither created nor uncreated. But it is impossible for any science to be constituted under the genus of practical and speculative while being practical and speculative simultaneously — just as it is impossible*

for a created being to be also uncreated, since it is contained under being in common. Furthermore, it is false to assert that "practical" — insofar as it includes an essential difference distinct from "speculative" — is an ultimate difference, because under one genus of formally practical or speculative science several species are comprehended, as is clear from the Doctor (3. distinct. XXXIV, quest. I*). Moreover, the inadequate notion of a thing does not constitute a subaltern genus. For every genus — whether subaltern or infimal — has its own adequate notion according to its being: as body, which is a genus, is adequate in the notion of body. Therefore that notion of an adequate or inadequate habit is irrelevant to whether a habit is simultaneously practical and speculative. Furthermore, two contradictories cannot simultaneously belong to one and the same thing. But practical and speculative appear to be two contradictories: for the speculative does not extend to operation, while the practical does extend to operation — as is clear from (3. anima cap. X; 2. Met. passu præalleg.)*.*

One may say: that is true of a habit that is adequately practical or adequately speculative — but not of a habit that is inadequately practical and inadequately speculative in different respects and under different considerations. Against this: whatever that habit may be, either it is ordered toward operation or it is not. If the first, it is simply practical. If the second, it is formally speculative. Therefore no intermediate habit intervenes between the two — as the Doctor (*in prol. citato*, §. *Quarta via sub M.*) concludes — whether through participation in the extremes, as I have proved up to this point, or through negation of the extremes, as Ferchius (*vestig. IX**, num.* XXVII*)* tenaciously maintains — against whom the undivided Scotists vigorously argue. And indeed Aristotle frequently divides science into speculative and practical only — as in (6. *Eth. cap. I**; 2. Met. T.* II*; 6. eiusdem operis, cap.* I*)* and in other places. The reason is, from the same Philosopher (1. Met. cap. II*, T.* XXVII*), *that every science is either for its own sake or for the sake of an operation. Likewise from Scotus (in prol. citato), every scientific habit either extends to praxis or does not extend to praxis. I add, from (3. anima T. XLIX; 6. Eth. II*)**, that every intellect is either practical or speculative. There is therefore found no middle through negation of the extremes between practical and speculative.

Nor should you be troubled or frightened by the objection of Ferchius based on Aristotle's frequent use of the tripartite division of science into speculative, active, and productive (8. *Top. cap. I*; 6. Met. I; 11. eiusdem operis cap.I). *For even if "practical" taken in the strictest sense, among Aristotle and all the Greeks — as appears from lexicæ — is equivalent to "active," and even though the passages of the Philosopher adduced by Ferchius (ubi supra) show this, and from which no Scotist departs in accepting the definition of praxis taken most properly — which, from what was said, is an operation of the will — nevertheless it cannot be denied that "practical" is also used for an operation that abstracts from active and productive. I produce the text of Aristotle (which Ferchius (num. XII, cap.II) greatly desires in his work ridiculing Vásquez (disp. VIII, cap.V), who for a text of the Philosopher adduces the testimony of Gregory (quæst. V prol.)). From (Met. VI, 1): αἱ δὲ πράξεις δὲ αἱ γενέσεις πάσαι, περὶ τὸ κατέκαστόν εἰσιν — where Fonseca*

translates: "actions and all processes of generation are concerned with singulars." Scotus and his disciples read: "actions are of singulars." The Thomists read: "actions are of individual supposita." It is clear there that praxis abstracts from action and production, since among singulars some bring forth action and others production. And a little further on, the same Aristotle calls those who work with their hands "practical men" (πρακτικούς). It is therefore clear that even in the usage of the leader of the Peripatetics the name "practical" extends to both active and productive. And rightly so, since this can be derived from its notion. I add from (2. Met. cap. I, T. III*): "the end of the contemplative is truth, πρακτικῆς δ' ἔργον" — that is, "but of the practical, operation." And shortly after he adds: "if practical men consider." In Greek this reads πρακτικοί. Nor does there seem to be a stronger reason for "speculative," which is predicated of all speculative sciences, than for "practical," which must likewise be common to practical sciences — into which Ferchius (cap. IV, ante num.*XVII) seems inadvertently to fall. Moreover, in (vestig. II, num.XIX) he observes from (7. Pol. I) and other places that speculation is called action and operation — or praxis — and he calls speculative men "active men." If this is conceded to Ferchius himself, why will it not be permissible for us, from the same Stagirite cited, to call the active and productive sciences practical? Again, the same author (cap. III*, vestig.* IX*, num.* XI*)* plainly admits that names are to be used according to the usage of Aristotle and other distinguished men. Since, therefore, Aristotle and commonly other philosophers employed the names just adduced, those who use the same words in the Peripatetic school are not to be blamed. Furthermore, although action taken strictly is not production (6. Eth. IV*)* — for action is πράξις in Greek and production isποίησις — nevertheless the Philosopher sometimes conflates both terms and speaks of them very ambiguously, as Suárez (disp. XLIV Met. sect. XIII*, num.* XXVIII*)* observes. Hence the custom has prevailed among all that "practical" comprehends both active and productive, and is distributed among them — just as "operation" is common to action and production and is distributed among them, as Tartaretus notes (6. Eth. quest. II*). Moreover, Diogenes (in vita Aristotelis) reports that there is a twofold branch of philosophy: one concerned with acts, called practical (πρακτικόν); the other consisting in understanding and speculation, called theoretical (θεωρητικήν). Again, "dialectic" is used for the Topics and "logic" for the Analytics, yet the common usage of recent philosophers aptly employs both names for the whole doctrine of reasoning — as I clearly showed in (lib. I, q.* I*). Moreover, Aristotle — in the chapter on quality — makes "disposition" common to habit and to disposition differing from habit itself; and in (3. Phys. cap. II, T.* VI*)* he defines motion, which is the genus of continuous mutation and motion, and "motion" absolutely is taken for continuous motion itself, especially local motion — as I noted there. There is therefore no such scruple about the acceptance of a word that "practical" cannot be adapted to both active and productive. All the more so since, as Scotus warns (3. distinct. VI*, quæst.* I*, §. Concedo sub D.), from Augustine (5. Trin. cap. VII; 1. Retract. cap.* XV*): "when the matter is clear, no violence need be done to the name." The same in (2. contra Cresconium cap. II): "when the matter is clear, there is no need to labor over the name." Cicero, cited by Augustine (lib. I*

contra dictum Crescon. cap. XI; 5. Civit. cap. V*), supports this: "A verbal controversy has long been tormenting those Greeks who are more desirous of contention than of truth." Finally Bartolus warns (in lib. de nomine, §. Plurimum): "In questions of name, common usage makes truth." For this reason the Doctor (1. dist. VIII, quæst.* I*)* rightly calls an objection about a name "childish."*

First objection: just as affirmation and negation are related to each other, so are speculative and practical; but negation and affirmation are not essential differences of science. The parity of the major is conceded: for "practical" affirms the twofold respect already explained in the being of science, while "speculative" denies that twofold respect.

I respond: this argument holds of "practical" and "speculative" taken in the first way, but not of them taken in the second way. This can be clarified by the division of the proposition into affirmative and negative, as well as by the differences "rational" and "irrational" — the former of which carries affirmation, the latter negation. For under the name of negation, a positive and real entity is understood, for which the negation is substituted.

Second objection: "extending to praxis" and "not extending to praxis" are contradictories, as I argued above — one negating the other — and therefore they cannot be opposed real positive differences. But practical science extends to praxis, and speculative science does not extend to praxis. Therefore practical and speculative are not essential differences of science.

I distinguish the major: if "not extending to praxis" is taken for the pure negation of extension to operation — I concede; but if it is taken, as it is taken in our matter, for a positive entity signified by the negation — as I was explaining in the solution of the preceding objection — I deny.

Third objection: practical and speculative are accidental differences of the intellect. For the same intellect is simultaneously practical and speculative through the practical and speculative habits received in it. Therefore likewise practical and speculative are accidental differences of science.

I concede the antecedent and deny the consequence. The reason for the disparity is that the intellect is the subject of inherence of all sciences, and therefore the speculative and practicable rationes are accidental to it. But since science is a subaltern genus of quality, it obtains the speculative and practicable rationes as its essential differences into which it is divided.

Article V. Whether Science Is Called Practical or Speculative from Its End or from Its Object.

In the present discussion, no doubt exists about the intrinsic and formal being of practical or speculative science; for it is held as established among all that science is practical or speculative through its own proper, intrinsic, and

quidditative speculative or practicable ratio — as Scotus teaches (*quæstione quarta, prol. articulo quarto, §. Contra istud G.G.*). The question concerns the extrinsic and effective being — namely, from what science is primarily made practical or speculative: from its end or from its object? On this point Godfrey (*quol. X*, quæst.* XI**)* asserts that act and habit are practical from the object, but the intellect from the end. Henry (*quol. VIII*, quæst.* I**), Gregory (*in Prol. quest. V, art.* III**)*, and others hold that act, habit, and intellect are practical from the end toward which they extend — which is praxis itself. But Scotus (*quæst. IV prol.*), Faber (*ibidem*), Vigerius, and other Scotists in the same place derive these differences of practical or speculative habit from the object, and of the intellect from the act and habit — practical or speculative — received in it.

First note: science is generated from the intellect and the object, as I wrote in the book *de anima* and in *Tract. de cognoscibilitate Dei disp. II*. For these are two partial causes constituting and making up one total cause — though one is more principal than the other, namely the intellect, which, being a universal cause, does not specify the science but rather the object of which the science is. This is clear from God and the sun, which, being universal causes, do not specify the things they produce; rather, specification comes from an inferior and particular cause cooperating with universal causes toward a common effect — as I showed at length in the book *de causis quæst. III*. Accordingly, the object concurs particularly in producing science, and science is denominated and specified from it — so that science of a natural body is called natural science, and science of God is called divine science. I further observe that the discussion here concerns the formal object, not the material object — around which several sciences labor — as Algazel (*lib. I*, cap.* I**)* says, and as I noted in (*lib. I*, quæst.* III*, artic.* I**)*.

Second note: from (2. T. XXXV *de anima*), the end is twofold: the end *for which* or *on account of which* something is done, and the end *to which* or *through which by means of which* something is done. The first is the object attained through the operation — as God, whom the blessed attain through vision and fruition. The second is the operation by which the object is attained — as vision and fruition, by which the blessed see and enjoy God. The end is also customarily divided into the end of the science — toward which the science by its own nature tends, as the end of metaphysics is the speculation of being universally taken — and the end of the learner, which is the goal he sets for himself who learns a given science, such as honor, profit, or something else. Some authors, whom Suárez (*ubi supra num. XXXII**)* cites, hold that both ends are necessary for the notion of a practical habit, but incorrectly — since, as Ockham (*quæst. IV*, prol. art.* II**), Gabriel (*ibidem, quest. XI*), and Gregory (*quæst. V**)* argue, in this way the practical and speculative would in science be a merely extrinsic denomination coming from the will of the knower, and so by a mere change of intention on the part of the knower, the same habit would shift from practical to speculative and vice

versa. Note also that the end of science is a cause only insofar as it is loved and desired, for the sake of which the efficient cause is moved to act.

First Assertion: acts and habits are not practical by virtue of extension to praxis as to their end. First proof: if acts and habits were practical because of extension toward praxis as to their end, this would be either because of actual or aptitudinal extension. Not the first — otherwise an artisan who is not actually working would not have practical knowledge. Not the second either — because aptitude does not belong to one nature and is incompatible with another except because of something intrinsic in that nature; therefore it is not on account of aptitudinal extension that acts and habits are to be regarded as practical.

Second: if a habit is practical from its end, it would be so either from an end had in reality or from an end known and loved. Not the first, because the end in reality is the last and posterior to the habit, and what comes first does not derive its being from what is posterior. Not the second either — for whether or not the end is desired and loved, most people have practical knowledge of these propositions: "one must live chastely," "the neighbor is to be loved" — yet they neither wish to live chastely nor to love the neighbor. Moreover, someone can learn architecture and know it excellently, even if he has no wish to practice it — which is the end of architecture. Third: if a habit were practical from its end, moral philosophy would not be practical, since according to Aristotle the end of moral philosophy is not praxis but the speculation of abstract substances, in which the same Philosopher imagines man's happiness to consist. But it is held as certain by all that ethics is practical; and therefore science is not practical from its end.

Second Assertion: a habit is not practical from its own proper act as from its primary and originating cause. The Doctor implies this (*citato*, §. *Concedo G.*). Proof: an act is not practical from itself but from something else — namely, from the practical object, as is clear from what was said. What is not practical of itself cannot be the reason for another's being practical. Therefore the habit is not primarily practical through the act.

Third Assertion: habit and act are held to be practical from the object with which they are concerned. This follows from the two preceding assertions, and is explicitly held by the Doctor (*ubi supra*) and by Antonius Andreas (6. *Met. quæst.* I*). First proof: from (6. *Eth. cap. I*)* where Aristotle distinguishes the ratiocinative from the scientific with respect to a necessary and a contingent object; and from (3. *de anima T. LI*)* he assigns the practical object not as just any object but as what is doable and contingent; and from (1. *Magnorum Mor. cap. XXXIII*)*. Therefore according to Aristotle, science is practical per se from the object. Second: from what a science has the twofold respect of priority and conformity, it is practical from that; but practical science has that twofold respect from the object. Therefore it is practical from the object. The major is clear from what was said. The minor is at hand: practical science has the respect of priority not

only by reason of the naturally ordered powers — insofar as the intellect is naturally prior to the will, and praxis is the act elicited or commanded — but also from the object, which precedes practical knowledge just as a cause precedes its effect, and practical cognition precedes praxis just as a rule precedes its regulated. It likewise obtains the respect of conformity from the object, because the object is either the rectitude of praxis or something virtually including that rectitude. For this reason practical science is such that praxis can conform to it so as to be right — because practical science is of such an object.

Fourth Assertion: the intellect is called practical by extrinsic denomination from the practical acts and habits inherent in it. So Scotus (*citatus*, §. *Ad rationes sub E.E.*). This is easily shown: practical acts and habits reside in the intellect just as whiteness and other colors inhere in paper. Therefore just as paper is denominated white and colored through the colors received in it, so the intellect is called practical or speculative through the practical or speculative acts and habits inhering in it.

First objection: Aristotle (*1. Met. cap. I**; *2. Met. cap.* III**; *6. eiusdem operis*)* writes that the end of the speculative is truth and of the practical is operation. Confirmation from (*3. de anima T. XLIX**): *the speculative and practical intellect differ in end. And from (6. Eth. cap. IX)**: the good of the practical intellect is acknowledged to be its conformity to right appetite.

I respond with Scotus (*citato*, §. *Ad argum. II quæst. sub D.D.*), expounding Aristotle thus: if "end" is taken not in the sense of end but in the sense of object, I concede that the habit is practical or speculative from its end; but if it is taken in the sense of end, I deny that the habit is practical or speculative from the end — except manifestatively and *a posteriori*. Although speculative and practical sciences obtain different ends, yet these ends do not primarily distinguish the sciences themselves; the prior distinction of sciences must be sought with respect to objects. To the confirmation I say, with the same Doctor (§. *Ad rationes E.E.*), that the speculative and practical intellect do not employ themselves about the same formal object, nor is the speculative intellect made practical by any extension. For Aristotle posits three grades of intellect: the first is to consider only speculables; the second is to consider doables in the universal without a dictate about their pursuit or avoidance; the third is to grasp means in the particular for attaining or avoiding an end. The intellect existing in the second grade — in which it is imperfectly practical — extends itself to the third and becomes perfectly practical by dictating the pursuit or avoidance of the end; and so that extension is of an imperfectly practical intellect toward perfectly practical consideration. Even if the speculative intellect can become practical in the way I now explained, the same is not to be asserted of the habit, since practical and speculative, with respect to the intellect, are accidental differences; but with respect to the habit they are essential differences. As for the text from (*6. Eth.*): I say Aristotle there is speaking not of the end posited in reality but of

the end known — which is interchangeable with the operable object — or he is showing *a posteriori* the difference between the speculative and practical habit.

Second objection: science is not called practical from the object. Therefore it is so from the end. The consequence holds. The antecedent is proved: a practical and a speculative habit can be concerned with the same object. For medicine is divided into speculative and practical, both of which deal with the same object — namely, the healable body. Confirmation: practical principles are derived from the end posited in reality; therefore the habit is practical from the end.

I deny the antecedent. In response to its proof I say that medicine is absolutely and simply practical, even though comparatively and in a certain respect it can be called speculative — as I explained at length in (*lib.* I*, quæstione secunda, articulo quinto, dub.* II*, not.* III*)*. To the confirmation I say it holds of the end insofar as it has the character of an object — not of the end insofar as it has a character distinct from the object, as I noted above.

Third objection: the quidditative ratio is derived from the per se causes of a thing through which it has its being per se and essentially. But the per se end of practical knowledge is the per se cause of it. Therefore the quidditative ratio of practical knowledge is drawn from its per se end — which is operation or praxis. First confirmation: practical knowledge is that which conforms itself to right appetite, from (6. *Eth. cap.* II*)*; but right appetite is appetite of the end as intended and loved. Therefore the ratio of practical knowledge is taken from right appetite as from a rule. Second confirmation: a practical act is called morally good or evil; but goodness or malice belong primarily to the act from the circumstance of the end. Therefore the habit is practical from the end.

I respond by conceding the major and distinguishing the minor: concerning the end *quo* — I deny; concerning the end *qui* — I concede; for this causes practical knowledge and has the character of an object. To the first confirmation: I explain that locus — practical knowledge conforms to the appetite for things passively — I deny; actively — I concede; for it has the character of directing and ruling, not of being directed and ruled, as is clearly evident from what was said. To the second confirmation: I concede the major and deny the minor. For as Scotus (*allegatus sub E.E.*) says, an act is primarily good from its object and secondarily from its end — as to love God is simply good without other circumstances. Therefore the goodness of a moral act is not derived primarily from the end as end, except insofar as it coincides with the object — as remains sufficiently explained in the above.

Article VI. Whether the Tripartite Division of Science Is Legitimate.

Since, from Aristotle (1. *Post. T.* XLIII*; 3. *de anima T.* XXXVIII*; 1. *Magn. Mor. cap.* XXXIII*), *the division of sciences is derived with respect to things and objects, and their origin from the same Author is from sense — consequently, as many primary sciences*

acquired through the way of sense are to be enumerated as there are primary things and objects, as the Scotists carefully observe with Scotus (6. Met. q. I).*

The assertion is: the partition of speculative science into natural philosophy, mathematics, and metaphysics is fitting and sufficient. Aristotle (6. Met. cap. I*), Scotus (*ibidem*, and III dist. XXXIV, quæst. vn. §. Notandum D.)* hand this down. Proof: there are as many primary speculative sciences as there are primary speculable objects; but there are only three primary speculable objects; therefore there are only three primary speculative sciences as enumerated above. The major is clear from the assertion of Aristotle cited at the beginning of this article. The minor is shown: the first speculable thing that presents itself to us is being — according to Avicenna (1. cap. V*)*: "being and thing are the first things imprinted on us" — and of being, together with the other transcendental predicates and the common quiddities of things, there is metaphysics. Being is most immediately followed by substance, which is divided into incorporeal and corporeal. Because incorporeal substance is known by us only with respect to common predicates, a particular and distinct science of it distinct from others is not generated in us; rather, its consideration also belongs to metaphysics as the general and universal science. Corporeal substance, however, can be considered in two ways: either insofar as it is affected by quantity — and of this mathematics is constituted, as Scotus (6. Met. citato, §. *Sed hac ratio*) writes — or insofar as it is the principle of motion — and of this there is natural philosophy. Therefore, since no other primary speculable object remains distinct from those three just mentioned of which another science might be had, it is clearly shown that the aforesaid distribution of science is legitimate and sufficient.

First objection: beyond the three theoretical objects just enumerated there is another speculable object — namely, the mode of knowing, which from what was said in (*lib. I**, quæst.* III*)* is the object of logic, which I counted among the speculative sciences (*ibidem*, quæst. II*, dub.* I*, art.* V*). *The aforesaid division of speculative science is therefore defective and illegitimate. Alexander (1. Priorum), Philoponus (ibid.), Themistius (1. Post. c. II), and the Parisian masters (1. Phys. quæst. II)** respond that this division was handed down concerning real speculative science, not rational science such as logic; or concerning principal speculative science, not instrumental science such as logic.

Second objection: of corporeal substance there is one contemplative science — namely natural philosophy. Therefore of incorporeal substance another speculative science is to be constituted, and accordingly there are at least four speculative sciences.

I respond: the reason has already been given by us why there is no special speculative science of incorporeal substance distinct from the three enumerated — namely, because of that threefold division discovered and assigned through the way and ministry of sense. By this way we cannot hunt down knowledge of

incorporeal substance, since its passions are hidden from us. Therefore a fourth speculative science of it is in no way conceded.

Third objection: being is adequately distributed into substance and accident. Therefore just as of corporeal substance there is one speculative science, so of corporeal and material accident another speculative science is to be posited.

Granting the antecedent, the second part of the consequence is to be denied. The reason is that science is of a conclusion — when, namely, a proper passion is demonstrated to inhere in a subject. But an accident — whether proper or common — cannot be such a subject. Therefore no speculative science of it is acquired that is distinct from the three related.

Article VII. Whether One Science Is Subalternated to Another.

That among sciences some are unrelated, having no relation, connection, or dependence on each other — as natural philosophy and metaphysics — and that some are subaltern or subordinated, with one depending on another, is distinctly and openly taught by Aristotle (*1. Post. cap. I**), Scotus (*in prol. utriusque operis, Oxoniens. quæst. IV principali, 5. later. Report. quæst. III; 3. dist.* XXIV*, quæst.* I**), and the interpreters of both in the same places.

First note: subalternation, by the etymology of the name, means nothing other than the placing of one science under another — which expresses the subordination, containment, and dependence of one science on another with respect to certitude and evidentiality, as the Doctor hints (*4. distinct. XLIV*, quæst.* III*, §. Hic dicitur D.*). Bonet (*2. Met. cap. VI**) and Tartaretus (*1. Post. quæst. V*, scibili* IV**) assert many modes in which sciences can be subalternated to each other. The Coimbrans (*eo in loco, quæst. VII*, art.* I**), Fonseca (*4. Met. cap. I, quæst.* I**), and Suárez (*disf. II Met. Sect. V, n.* XLVII**) mention three. The first is effected by reason of end: in this way the science whose end is under the end of another is said to be subalternated to it, the latter commanding the former to minister to it in operation whatever is opportune and necessary for the attainment of the end — as in (*1. Eth. cap. I**) the art of bridle-making is subalternated to horsemanship, horsemanship to military science, and military science to politics. The second is by reason of principles: when the principles of the inferior are proved through those of the superior — as is clear from surgery and geometry. The third is by reason of object: in this way that science is subalternated to another whose subject is comprehended under the subject of the other and essentially depends on it — as music and arithmetic. This last is the true and proper subalternation of sciences, of which Scotus (*cit., and III distinct. XXIV*, quæst. vn. §. Quæstio ante A., and §. Ad* I ante J.*) treats.

Second note: for the genuine subalternation of sciences, three conditions are required — gathered from Aristotle (*cit.*) as noted by Oviedo (*contr. I*, puncto* IV**). *The first is that the object of the subalternating and the subalternated science be in some way the same. For since sciences are specified by their objects, and these sciences are*

subordinated to each other, it is necessary that the object of the subalternated be contained under the object of the subalternating, so that both enjoy the same essential object, differing only accidentally. For they are distinct sciences with distinct conclusions, since the principles of the subalternated are conclusions of the subalternating. Hence Scotus (*in prol. alleg. §. Sed quid*) produces that common saying, defining: "where the subalternating ends, the subalternated begins." The second condition is that the object of the subalternated be contracted through some accidental difference — as a line is the subject of geometry, while a visual line is the subject of perspective. Likewise, number is the subject of arithmetic, while sonorous number is the subject of music — as Scotus expresses (*1. Prior. q. II, q. Quantum ad* III**)* and as is gathered from Aristotle (*ubi supra*), who affirms that the subject of the subalternated is other than the subject of the subalternating. For I noted in (*lib. II*, quæst. de differentia*)* that the term "other" (*alterum*) designates accidental difference, while "another" (*aliud*) designates essential difference. All the more so, since if the subject of one subaltern science differed essentially from the subject of another, there would be no difference between subaltern and unrelated sciences. For since the essential distinction of sciences is derived from objects, if their objects differed essentially — just as the objects of unrelated sciences — these would not differ from those. The third condition is that the subalternated derive its principles from the subalternating — as some explain of medicine, which they hold to be subalternated to natural philosophy, because it takes its principles from natural philosophy — for instance, that hot things are cured by cold. This is a true proposition of medical discipline, relying on that assertion drawn from natural philosophy: "contraries drive each other out from the same subject." For since there is between these sciences the dependence that I asserted above to be required for subalternation, it follows that the principles of the subalternated are conclusions of the subalternating — and where the subalternating ends, the subalternated begins. This is the teaching of Aristotle (*lib. de sensu et sensili; Met. c. I**)*. Nor does anyone properly understand the subalternated unless he knows how to resolve the conclusions of the subalternated into the immediate or mediate principles of the subalternating — for all the certitude and evidentiality of conclusions is derived from their principles. Hence Aristotle adds that principles are truer than conclusions, because the latter obtain their truth on account of the former. Whoever does not possess the subalternating cannot resolve the conclusions into their principles — from which those conclusions derive their certitude and evidentiality.

The assertion is: some sciences are subalternated to each other. So Aristotle (*1. Post. c. XI**)* and Scotus — both in (*1. Prior. q. II*, §. Quantum ad* III**)* and in (*q. IV prol. and S. lat.*). Proof: those sciences are subaltern which possess all the conditions required for true and genuine subalternation of sciences; and some sciences are of this kind. Therefore subaltern sciences exist. The major is known. The minor is at hand concerning arithmetic and music, and concerning geometry and perspective — to which the conditions described in the second

note are adapted, as was explained there. Furthermore, science taken generally is divided into unrelated and subaltern — from Aristotle (*passu alleg.*) — because some sciences do not depend essentially on others, as natural philosophy, mathematics, and metaphysics; while some essentially depend on each other, as I just declared. Add what Bonet, Suárez, and others (*præcit.*) argue — that metaphysics does not subalternate the other sciences to itself — as I shall make plain in (*l. I Met. q. II*, a.* II**)*: both because the other sciences are acquired without metaphysics, as is clear from the practice of teaching and learning; and because the subject of the other disciplines is not contracted through an accidental difference, and therefore does not form one thing per accidens with being — the subject of metaphysics. And the other doctrines obtain their own proper principles independently of the principles of metaphysics, and therefore are not subordinated to or subalternated by it.

First objection: from (*6. Met. T. IV**)*: of being per accidens there is no science; but the object of the subalternated is being per accidens — namely, contracted through an accidental difference — as is clear from the second note. Therefore no subalternation of sciences exists.

I distinguish the major: concerning being per accidens that is casual and fortuitous — I concede; concerning being per accidens that designates a subject with an accident inhering in it, whether expressed by one or more names — I deny. So from Scotus (*6. Met.*) respond Orbellus (*ibid. c. I**)* and Tartaretus (*in loco*). The Coimbraans (*in proæm. Phys. q. II*, l.* IV*, ad* III**)* and the Doctor (*in Report. q. VII prologi*) sense the same. The reason is that subaltern sciences participate the same essential and formal object, merely in the subject; to the subalternated is added an accidental difference through which the latter accidentally differs from the former — as to the line, which is the subject of geometry, is added visibility, which is the accidental difference considered by perspective. For perspective proves many things that do not belong to the line precisely, and shows many things not through visibility alone but through both rationes — that is, the visual line. Hence the subalternated science is of being per accidens because its nature so demands, possessing an object that differs only accidentally from the object of the subalternating. This therefore seems to be its proper character — just as it belongs to quantity to be predicated denominatively of its species, as I noted in the question on quantity. And the motion of the heavens is regular, except in the epicycle circles, as I noted in (*lib. de cælo quæst. I*, art.* X**). Similarly, of second intentions — which are predicated of first intentions, and of which logic is the proper science — as the Doctor teaches (*4. d. I, q.* II**). Moreover, the subalternated is not reckoned a science unless it is caused by the object of the subalternating. Hence the perspective student is not scientifically knowing unless he is a geometer — as Scotus infers (*3. Report. d. XXIV, §. Ad* II**)*. Finally, although the object of the subalternated is one per accidens in entity, it is nevertheless one per se in order — which can be defined, demonstrated, and known.

Second objection: Aristotle (*1. Post. c. VII**, *T.* XX**)* writes that the musician and the perspectival scientist are concerned with the same demonstrations that the arithmetician and geometer pursue. Therefore there is no subalternation of distinct sciences; and afterward the same Philosopher adds this difference — that the subalternating demonstrates *a priori* and the subalternated *a posteriori* — and calls them univocal, others calling them related and cognate.

I respond: the cited text is wrongly adduced by some. For Aristotle there only asserts that every science proceeds from its own proper principles, and that there is no passage from genus to genus in them — except in subalterns, on account of their kinship and mutual dependence. To the other point subjoined: I say the Philosopher there only means that the subalternating proceeds from immediate principles and the subalternated from mediate principles only — because the conclusions of the former are the principles of the latter. To the final point: I say that the Stagirite calls them "univocal" on account of the subordination and connection found between them.

Article VIII. Whether the Subalternated Is Properly a Science.

St. Thomas (*in lib. Boëtij de Trin. q. II**, *a.* III**, *ad* V**; *1. p. q.* I**, *art.* II**), Cajetan, and others of the same school (*ibid.*) affirm that the principles of the subalternated are held on human faith alone — insofar as he who has subalternated science believes them to be certain and true from what has been demonstrated by the subalternating science. Scotus, however — (*q. IV prol. §. Ad II q.*, in *Report. q. III*, and in *both works 3. d. XXIV*, *q. unica*)* — and his disciples (*ibid.*), together with Bañez (*1. p. q. I**, *art.* II**, *dub.* II**)* who subscribes to them, teach that such principles are known by subalternated science with certain and evident cognition, such that he who has the subalternated science is not truly scientific unless he fully knows their evidentiality.

First Assertion: the subalternated is truly and properly science, distinct from the subalternating. Scotus (*locis prænominatis*) defends this. First proof: from Aristotle (*1. Post. c. X**)*, who, presupposing that true demonstrations are effected in the subalternated — through which true science is generated — only investigates the mode in which they are formed. Since, therefore, proper and distinct demonstrations generate proper and distinct science, it is clearly shown through Aristotle that the subalternated is properly science. Second: the subalternated is of conclusions properly known, distinct from the conclusions of the subalternating — as is clear from the saying I adduced in the preceding article: "where the subalternated begins, there the subalternating ends." Again, the object of each is scientific and in some way distinct — and one presupposes the other and depends on it — as was explained above. Therefore the subalternated is to be numbered among the sciences.

Second Assertion: the subalternated is not science unless it knows the principles of the subalternating and can acquire for itself the subalternating. So Scotus (*in*

Report. q. III prol., in the III just mentioned). First proof: from Aristotle (*1. Post. cap. II**), who writes that in order for someone to have science of any demonstrated conclusion, the principles must be self-evident to him from the terms and indemonstrable — or, if they are demonstrable, he must know how to reduce them to the indemonstrable. But he who does not know or cannot do this has neither demonstration nor science. The principles of the subalternated, however, are demonstrable through the subalternating science — being its conclusions. Therefore if he does not know or cannot reduce them, he will not be truly scientific, nor will the subalternated be truly science. Second: certitude and evidentiality are of the intrinsic nature of science, as was established above from Scotus (*3. Report. d. XXIV, q. vn. §. Dico**). Therefore, since the conclusion of which there is science derives its certitude and evidentiality from the principles, it follows that it is not properly science unless he has those principles as known and evident and can resolve them.

First objection: our theology is subalternated to the theology of the blessed, as St. Thomas (*1. p. q. I*, art.* II**)* asserts; yet we have no evidentiality of its principles, since we now see in an enigma (*1. Cor. XIII**)*. Therefore it is not necessary that for one possessing the subalternated, the principles of the subalternating be known and evident.

I deny the antecedent with Scotus (*q. III prol.*). The reason is that both theologies are about the same principles — with this difference, namely, that to the blessed the principles are evident, while to us they are obscure and enigmatic.

Second objection: the identity and diversity of sciences is derived from the identity and diversity of objects, as I have urged more than once above; but the object of the subalternated and the subalternating is essentially the same formal object, as is clear from the second note. Therefore subaltern sciences are not distinguished.

I concede the major. To the minor I say that although the essential object of both is the same, nevertheless the object of the subalternated differs accidentally from the object of the subalternating — which is sufficient to distinguish subaltern and subordinated sciences.

Article IX. Whether Science Can Be Newly Acquired.

Plato (*10. de Rep.*) and others — among whom Origen (*1. Periarchon. c. VII**)* does not seem far distant, and to whom Avicenna and Averroes (*3. de anima*) appear not dissimilar — suppose that rational souls were created from the beginning of the world, adorned with all sciences; and therefore that in our age no new science is generated in them, but that all science is the recollection of things they already possessed before the souls were united to bodies — through union with the bodies, however, they forgot all of these things and were as it were clouded over and buried. The opposite is defended by Aristotle (*1. Post. T. IV**; *2. eiusdem operis, c. ult.*; *1. Met. T.* IV**), Scotus (*1. Post. q. I, 2., 3.*; *Quol.* XIII*, §.* Nunc ante S.; *3. d.* XXIV*, q. vn. §. Contra infra B.*; *4. d.* XXXIV*, q.* III*, §. Hic*

paulò ante G.), *Gadius* (*Quol. alleg. fol. CXXXVI*), *Lychetus*, *Tartaretus* (*ibid.*), and all other philosophers — both pagan and orthodox — especially Augustine (12. *Trin. cap. XI*)*.

The assertion is: science is newly acquired by us, and no knowledge of things is innate in us. So Scotus (*locis prænominatis*). This can be shown from sacred Scripture: (*Gen. III*)*: "I have learned by experience." (*Rom. XVI*): "The doctrine which you have learned." (1 *Cor. XIV*): "that all may speak." And (*Joan. VII*): the Jews, hearing Christ the Lord teaching in the Temple — knowing that he had not attended the schools — marveled, saying: "How does this man know letters, since he has not learned?" But if knowledge of things were innate with us, there would be no need to teach or to learn — since we would already possess it. Again, in the book of Genesis the first inventors of the arts and sciences are narrated; they would be wrongly called authors and inventors if all those things had existed from the beginning of the world. Second: if sciences were created together with our souls, they would not be hidden from us — as the Stagirite argues at the end of the second book of the *Posterior Analytics*. For it is impossible that one who knows should be unaware that he knows, since science is clear and evident knowledge — just as it is impossible for someone who has light present and an object properly approximated, with every obstacle removed, not to see. But we experience in ourselves no science naturally instilled in us. On the contrary, whatever we have, we acquire by labor, sweat, and study. Third: no form is harmed through union with matter, since it naturally tends toward it. But the rational soul is the form of the body, as the Lateran Council (*ad Leonem decimum*) ordains. Therefore the rational soul is not impeded by the body from exercising the acts of science; and accordingly, if it had science from nature, it would elicit its acts, and man would need neither teacher nor study — which is contrary to experience. Therefore, since it is verified by experience that all science in us is generated either through invention or through teaching — whose first guides are the senses, perceptive of singulars, from whose knowledge experience arises, and from experience science is generated — as Aristotle (2. *Post. in calce*; 1. *Met. c. I*)* plainly teaches — it is shown that science in us is not from recollection. All the more so because the Platonic foundation is false and erroneous. For orthodox faith teaches us that the rational soul is created by God at the very moment at which the human body is duly organized in the mother's womb — into which it is infused by God himself — so that from both man is constituted and composed; and at that moment it is like a clean tablet on which nothing is depicted, as the Peripatetics admit with their chief (3. *de anima XIV*)*. Therefore no scientific knowledge is naturally implanted in us, but whatever knowledge a man possesses, he acquires and obtains for himself through art and study.

First objection: either someone already knows the proposed thing or he is ignorant of it. If he knows it, there is no need to seek it further. If he is ignorant, he seeks it in vain — since he does not know what he is looking for; and even if it presents itself to him, he will not know that he has found it. Therefore no new science can be acquired by us. This dilemma of Meno is mentioned and refuted

by Aristotle (*1. Post. c. I**)* and by the Doctor (*ibid. q. II**), *and is touched upon by the same* (*4. d. XLV, q.* III*, §. De* II sub F.*).

I respond: granting the case, that person knows the thing confusedly and virtually — because he knows the principles, in which the conclusions are virtually included — but he does not know it distinctly and actually. Between ignorance and science there mediates confused cognition; and Plato, not acknowledging this, denies that science can be newly acquired. Aristotle, however, admitting it, grants that science is acquired by us anew — for whose attainment the judgment of the intellect is needed, so that from evidently known principles, from knowledge of the terms, scientific conclusions are deduced through appropriate application of the premises to those conclusions, as Scotus (*1. Post. in fine q. III**)* rightly observes against Plato.

Second objection: if any scientific knowledge of a thing could be newly obtained or acquired by us, it would be acquired either through the intervention of the senses or through the work of a teacher — but neither can be effected. Therefore all science is had through recollection. The major is clear. The minor is shown for both parts. Not through the ministry of the senses, because the senses frequently err, and many things escape the senses of which we have science; nor through the industry of a teacher, since for understanding things — beyond the natural light of the intellect — intelligible species are required, which the teacher cannot transfer into and infuse into the intellect of the pupil — as the Platonists argue, as Scotus (*1. Post. q. II*, §. Ad q.*)* reports.

I respond: science is generated in us in both ways — and indeed in the first way, for whose acquisition it is sufficient if things are present in sense per se motivally or occasionally; and also in the second way. For the teacher proposes to the pupil axioms and self-evident principles, for the knowledge of which knowledge of the terms alone is required; then through external signs and sensible examples presented by the same teacher, the mind of the pupil is easily roused to know things, aided and taught — as the Doctor (*passu nuper citato*) hands down no less learnedly than eruditely.

Article X. Whether Science and Faith Can Simultaneously Exist in the Same Intellect Concerning the Same Object.

The common opinion of scholastics (*3. d. XXIV*, q. vn.*)* holds that subalternating and unrelated science can coexist in the same intellect about different objects. But concerning whether subalternating science can simultaneously coexist with faith about the same thing in one and the same intellect: St. Thomas (*1. p. q. I*, a.* II**), Cajetan, and others (*ibid.*) maintain it can — holding that our theology is a science subalternated to the theology of God and the blessed. Scotus, however — (*q. II mox alleg.*) — together with Ballester, Lychetus, and others (*ibid.*) deny that science — whether subalternating or subalternated — and faith about the same object can be compatible in the same intellect. As for whether our theology is

science or not, and whether it is subalternated to the theology of God and the blessed, see what I wrote at length in Tr. I summæ Theolog. disp. II, q. II*.**

First note: this question can be agitated both concerning divine and human faith. Faith taken universally is a firm and determined assent sustained by the testimony of one worthy of belief. "Assent" is placed as genus. "Firm and determined" is added to differentiate it from ambiguity, suspicion, and opinion. The remaining words are added on account of science, which is obtained through a proper and evident cause. Since, moreover, the testimony on which faith rests is twofold — namely divine and created — faith is accordingly posited as twofold: divine and created. Divine faith is described from (*Hebr. XI**): *"the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen."* This is subdivided into *infused — which is a habit infused in us by God concerning matters to be believed — and acquired — which is a habit acquired in us from hearing things to be believed, sustained by divine authority.* Created faith — whether angelic or human — is a certain assent to a thing had on the testimony of one worthy of belief. On this see Scotus (*Quol. XIV**) and Gadius (*eo in loco*).

Second note: every kind of faith rests on two principles: one is that the thing to be believed is stated by someone; the other is that the one who states it is truthful — as is clear from the description of faith given in the first note. Each of these, moreover, is either obscure — as when I know both from conjectures — or both are manifest — as when I hear a speaker and what he says is plain — or one is obscure and the other manifest — as when the thing to be believed is clear, but not the one testifying. The Doctor (*præcit.*) notes that acquired faith exceeds opinion, because faith firmly adheres to one part while opinion, even if it adheres to one part, does so with fear of the other. But faith is surpassed by science, because science is evident while faith is non-evident and enigmatic.

The assertion is: science and faith — both divine and human — concerning the same thing cannot simultaneously be in the same intellect. So the Doctor (*ubi sup.*). First proof: from the definition of faith handed down by the Apostle and recalled by me in the first note — which is "the evidence of things not seen"; but science is of things seen and evident, as is clear from (*1. Post. c. II**). *Either, therefore, things do not appear — and of these there is faith — or they appear, and of these there is science — as St. Gregory divinely concludes (hom. c. XX Joan.). And accordingly, science and faith cannot simultaneously hold in the same intellect about the same object. Add the saying of the same holy Doctor received by all: "Faith has no merit where human reason furnishes experience." If, therefore, there were in us science of the divine articles, we would be worthy of no merit. But having faith of those same things, we merit — indeed without faith it is impossible to please God. We are not those who know the mysteries of God but only those who believe; and accordingly science and faith do not tolerate each other simultaneously in the same intellect about the same object. Hurtado (disp. X de anima, sect. V, §.* LVII*) and Arriaga (ibid. disp. VI*, sect.* VI*, subf.* I*, n.* XCVII*) respond after Valentine (t. III*, disp.* I*, q.* I*, p.* IV*),*

distinguishing: through the same formal objective ratio — they concede — because the motive of faith is divine revelation, or human or angelic authority, which are obscure and non-evident; through a diverse formal objective ratio — they deny — because through the scientific motive the same thing can be clear and evident. Against this: first, these authors seem to overstep the limits of the proposed theme by asserting their position about the same material object with respect to diverse formal rationes — since in the present discussion, as Tartaretus and others (præcit.) note, the dispute concerns the proximate, not the remote object — the material object being of this kind — and also concerning the specific and numerical object, as Hurtado (cit. §. LXV) and Arriaga (subf. II*, n.* CVII*)* indicate. Above all because it is held as conceded by all that around the same material object several habits are concerned — as I explained in (l. I*, q.* III*, a.* I*). Then Hurtado (q. LIX)* asserts that actual science and actual faith cannot simultaneously exist. From his assertion I argue thus: actual faith and science come about through diverse media — as Hurtado himself (sup.) openly admits; for that reason science and faith can be composed. Either, therefore, that response and distinction are void, or Hurtado's assertion is false and self-contradictory. Nor does it help to say that actual faith and science involve a contradiction while habitual faith and science do not. For someone could easily respond in the doctrine of those recent authors that there is no incompatibility — since each would be had through diverse media. If, therefore, the diversity of media makes the simultaneous existence of habitual faith with science possible, so equally that of actual faith with science. And if Hurtado objects, saying that no one can persuade himself of two contradictories simultaneously — while through science he has an evident object and through faith a non-evident one, and evident and non-evident are contradictories — the same applies equally in both actual and habitual faith with science. Absolutely, therefore, it must be denied that faith and science can be composed together. Moreover, contradiction is negation and affirmation simultaneously of the same with respect to the same — as Hurtado admits (§. LXIII*)* from (4. Met. T. IX*)*. But someone in his view and that of others could present himself and say: there is no contradiction in the simultaneity of actual faith and science, because contradiction is not found with respect to diverse media — as I was just arguing.*

Second proof: the same thing cannot simultaneously be clear and obscure — as is clear from air, which is either luminous or shadowy. But through faith the object is rendered obscure, and through science clear — as the Doctor (alleg. ante §. Quæstio) confirms from the authority of the Apostle Paul (2. Cor. V): "for we walk by faith and not by sight." Therefore faith and science cannot simultaneously remain. The authors just named respond, distinguishing the major: through the same act — they concede; through a diverse act — they deny. For they say clarity and obscurity regard the act, not the intellect, which is capable of a clear and obscure act. Hence they add there is no parity with luminous and shadowy air, since obscurity designates the privation of clarity in the same act — not in the same intellect — and in this the disparity with darkness, which denotes the privation of light in the air, not in the light itself, is located.*

Against this: the same Hurtado (§. LIX) explicitly says that the intellect cannot simultaneously affirm or deny through one act, or through two, because it cannot persuade itself of two contradictories. Therefore even if there are two acts — which Hurtado himself concedes — contradiction is still present. For through faith he affirms that the object is obscure and non-evident; and through science he denies that the object is obscure and non-evident. For the same object to be simultaneously obscure and not obscure, clear and not clear, evident and not evident, involves open incompatibility — which the diversity of media or acts cannot remove. Furthermore: if the duality of acts removes contradiction concerning the same object in the same subject, then plainly assent and dissent about the same thing in the same intellect would simultaneously be possible — because through one act the intellect gives assent and through another act dissent about the same object. This Hurtado (*disp. VII de anima, sect. II*)* and Arriaga (*disp. VI*, sect.* VI*, n.* LXXXVII**)* deny. Again, the same will could will the same through an act of willing and simultaneously not will it through an act of not-willing — because these are distinct acts. Which the same Arriaga (*ubi sup.*) does not concede. Therefore, by the diversity of the acts of science and faith about the same object, the argument is not dissolved — especially because a clear and an obscure act are opposed, just as light and darkness. Therefore, just as light and darkness cannot simultaneously be received in the same air, so a clear and an obscure act cannot be in the same intellect — which is the subject of both — and in this lies the parity. Hence in heaven there is no act of faith on account of its obscurity, but there is indeed an act of science on account of its clarity: (1. Cor. XIII*): "then face to face." And (Apoc. I): "his face shines like the sun." For this reason Hurtado (*cit. §. LXXIII*)* concedes that the light of glory and habitual faith are incompatible ex natura rei.*

First objection: the same object can simultaneously be known by the same intellect through abstractive cognition — which is had through a species of an absent object — and through intuitive cognition — which is of a present object — as Scotus (2. d. III*, q.* IX*, §. Ad q. B.)* writes; and in the same place (q. VIII*)* he concedes morning and evening cognition in the blessed, and in (3. d. XIV*, q.* III*)* he posits infused and acquired and beatific science. But abstractive cognition is obscure and intuitive cognition is clear. Therefore there is no incompatibility in simultaneously having faith and science in the same subject and about the same subject. Confirmation: Thomas the Apostle simultaneously had faith and science concerning Christ the Lord — as is read at (Joan. XX*)*: "because you have seen me, Thomas, you have believed." Likewise, John the Evangelist saw Christ crucified — of which there is an article of faith. Therefore science and faith are not incompatible with each other in the same subject and about the same object.

I respond: although both types of knowledge can be in the same intellect, not simultaneously. The reason is that the same thing cannot simultaneously be present and absent, existing and non-existing, seen and not seen to the same

intellect. To the confirmation: I say with Scotus (3. d. XXIV*, q. vn. §. ad* I *ante M.*), from St. Gregory (*hom. in octava Paschatis*), that Thomas saw one thing and believed another. He saw the humanity and believed the divinity of Christ. Hence the same Apostle adds: "my Lord and my God." Similarly John the beloved and the others saw Christ as man suffering and believed him as God. Likewise, the Blessed Virgin, although she knew for certain that she had conceived a man without male seed, believed by faith that she had conceived the God-man. Thus those who saw Christ born, crucified, and risen did not have faith about these things but about other mysteries — and even if they had not seen those mysteries, they could by the habit of faith believe in them, as Scotus (*ubi supra*) learnedly infers. One may press further: St. Paul (2. Cor. XII*)* saw the divine essence, and about it had faith. For he did not lose the habit of faith through such a vision. Therefore faith and science can simultaneously coexist in the same intellect. It must be answered that the Apostle had faith concerning what he did not see — since such vision was passing and of an hour; for this reason it is probable that he did not see all that we believe, but saw some things and believed others. Therefore he retained the habit of faith concerning what he did not see.

Second objection: every person — whether learned or unlearned — is bound to believe that God exists. According to (*Hebr. XI**): "*he that comes to God must believe that he is.*" This is numbered among the articles of faith, as is clear from the Apostles', Nicene, and Athanasian Creeds. The unlearned person knows God only through faith; but the learned philosopher has not only faith but also science of the existence of God — as I showed in (*Met. I, 4., q. vn.; Tract. de Deo uno, disp.* I*, q.* I**)*. Therefore faith can simultaneously coexist with science in the same subject.

I respond: with the arrival of science, faith retreats — just as with the arrival of light, darkness departs. Therefore the philosopher who has science that God exists does not have faith about his existence, but about other articles — such as that God is one and triune, the restorer of the human race, and the like — which are supported only by divine revelation.

Third objection: Aristotle and other philosophers sometimes, after a demonstration that produces science, adduce authorities of ancient philosophers, which produce faith. Therefore it is possible for faith and science to simultaneously dwell in the same intellect. The illumined Doctor (3. d. XXIV*, q. vn. art.* VI*)* considers this argument seriously, saying: it was the custom of philosophers to instruct disciples through authorities and sayings of others, then through probable arguments, and lastly through demonstrations. Authorities produce faith, probable arguments produce opinion, and demonstrations produce science.

I respond: authorities following upon the demonstration of a knowable object produce nothing in one who has demonstration and science of the same object — as the Doctor (*in II cit. §. Ad I princip. M.*) affirms concerning the dialectical

middle term with respect to the analytical. But if testimonies precede the demonstration, they produce faith — and with the arrival of demonstration, faith is removed and science alone remains. But when something is demonstrated, the assertions of others are usually adduced not because they cause faith in the one demonstrating, but so that it may be plain that such doctrine is in agreement with others, and so that it may be shown that other authors preceded who championed such doctrine — and that Aristotle or another philosopher was not its primary inventor and author. Scotus adds (*1. d. II**, q.* *III**, §. *Ad illa ante C.*)* that things which can be demonstrated it is useful for the community to have handed down through authorities — both on account of the negligence of the commonwealth in seeking truth, and on account of the weakness of the intellect, and also on account of the errors of those who hunt by demonstration, who mingle many falsehoods with their truths, as Augustine (*18. ciuit. c. XLI**)* asserts. And since simple folk, leaning on such demonstrations, might doubt whom to assent to and stand with, therefore the safe way is the common, easy, and certain authority — which can neither deceive nor be deceived.

Fourth objection: the light of the sun and the light of the stars are found in the same part of a medium, even though the former is greater and the latter lesser — and together they constitute one light. Therefore likewise in the same intellect, authority and demonstration cause the same assent about the same object.

The parity is to be denied: because since those lights are qualities of the same species, they intensify each other; but the latter — authority and demonstration — are of a different species, being opposed habits, and therefore cannot coexist.

Article XI. Whether Science and Opinion About the Same Object Can Simultaneously Exist in the Same Intellect.

Although this difficulty is almost resolved from the preceding article, and the same number of opinions exists in the present as were related there, it is nonetheless pleasing to inquire specifically whether science and opinion can simultaneously persist in the same intellect. The Irrefragable Doctor (*3. P. q. LXXV**, n.* *III**)* and the Seraphic Doctor (*3. d. XXIV**, q.* *III**, art.* *I**)* — to whom Ruuionius, Richard, Mair, Basle, and most other ancient and recent scholastics adhere — affirm that, through diverse media — namely demonstrative and topical — both as regards habits and as regards acts, about the same object in the same intellect, science and opinion can simultaneously cohere. The opposite is defended by the Subtle Doctor (*3. d. XIV**, q. *vn.*), the *Angelic Doctor* (*1. Post. lect. XLIV*; *de veritate q.* XIV**, a.* *IX**, ad* *VI**)*, and the disciples of both — ancient and modern — who deny that, as regards acts and habits, science and opinion can simultaneously remain about the same thing in the same mind.

Note: two genera of intellectual habits are found. Some are certain and evident; others are uncertain and non-evident. The former are the three enumerated by Aristotle (6. *Eth.* c. III*): *understanding, wisdom, and science. The latter are divided into those concerned with the false — such as error and ignorance — and those to which it is not incompatible to have the false or the true beneath them — such as opinion, suspicion, and doubt. Opinion taken generally is described as a determined assent to one part with fear of the opposite part — and can be divided into immediate and mediate. The reason for this is that just as among necessary things some are immediate and others mediate — about which there are distinct habits — so among opinables and contingents there are some immediate and others mediate, as the Doctor (in prol. q. V laterali, and 3. d. XXIV ad finem) and John of Mairs (1. Post. q. ultima) observe. Of the former there is immediate opinion; of the latter mediate opinion. Immediate opinion is defined by Aristotle (1. Post. T. XLIV)* as the assent of an immediate and non-necessary proposition — or: a certain assent of a thing that is probably known from its terms, with fear of the opposite part — as "a mother loves her child," which is commonly received by all as true, placed in the column of contingents. Mediate opinion is a certain assent given to something probable through a dialectical middle term — as "a man, because he is joyful, will do you a pleasing thing." Whether fear belongs to the essence of opinion is disputed by some Scotists — notably Tartaretus and John of Mairs (*præcit.*) — who affirm that fear, not actual but aptitudinal and radical, enters the essence of opinion, against Mair and Basle (*ubi sup.*) who absolutely deny that fear belongs to the essence and quiddity of opinion. The foundation of the affirmative side is that fear is placed in the definition of opinion, and also that through it opinion is distinguished from science — since opinion is of contingents which can be otherwise, while science is of necessities which cannot be otherwise. For necessary things are certain and infallible, while contingent things are uncertain and fallible. Hence Aristotle (1. Post. T. XVI*)* subjoins that what we know must be immutable, while what we opine can be otherwise. Doubt, moreover, is the hesitation of the intellect adhering to neither of the two opposed parts. Suspicion is that by which the intellect probably conjectures that this or that will or will not happen.*

The assertion is: science and opinion about the same object cannot simultaneously be in the same intellect. So Scotus (3. cit. §. *Ad I principale M.*). First proof: from Aristotle, who in the cited passage expressly defends the assertion set forth, adducing the differences that exist between science and opinion — which are faithfully and elegantly adduced and expounded by Zabarella and other interpreters of his. Second: diverse habits and acts cannot be about the same formal object, because — as I have repeatedly stated — habits and acts receive their denomination and specification from their proximate and formal objects. But the object of science is universal, necessary, immutable, and infallible; while the object of opinion is singular, contingent, mutable, and fallible — as Zabarella (*ubi supra*) notes from Aristotle. Therefore opinion and science cannot simultaneously be about the same object.

One may say: the simultaneity of the aforesaid habits and acts about the same object is possible through diverse media — one topical and another analytical. But besides the fact that this was already attacked concerning faith and science in the preceding article — which applies equally to what is commonly asserted about science and opinion — I argue specifically with Aristotle (*cit.*): it is incompatible for the same object to be capable of being otherwise and simultaneously incapable of being otherwise. But the object of opinion can be otherwise — because it is contingent; while the object of science cannot be otherwise — because it is necessary. Therefore, whether through the same or through a diverse medium, one and the same object is not simultaneously scientific and opinative.

Third: it cannot be that the same object is simultaneously estimated by the same intellect as certain and uncertain, as necessary and contingent — because two contradictory judgments simultaneously about the same thing in the same intellect would be admitted. But the assent of science is a judgment about a conclusion by which the object is judged certain and incapable of being otherwise; while the assent of opinion is a judgment about the same conclusion by which the object is judged uncertain and capable of being otherwise. If someone thinks differently about an opinable object, that comes from temerity and presumptuousness of spirit, as Tartaretus (*cit.*) notes — or from stubbornness and ignorance, as Aristotle (*7. Eth. cap. III**)* observes.

One may say: the intellect can deliver both judgments through distinct media, by reason of which there is no implication of contradiction. Against this: the intellect cannot judge a thing otherwise than it is from the side of reality — otherwise it would err and its judgment would be false. But the predicate of a scientific conclusion is necessarily conjoined with its subject. Therefore the intellect cannot judge that the same predicate is not necessarily conjoined with the subject of the same conclusion, lest it break into a contradictory judgment — and so the diversity of media does not remove the incompatibility just assigned. I add: the intellect is convinced by scientific truth and not convinced by apparent and probable truth, which is obtained through a topical medium. But it is incompatible for the same intellect to be convinced and not convinced with respect to the same object. Therefore, etc.

Fourth: the same thing cannot be simultaneously evident and non-evident — as I showed in the preceding article. But through science the object is evident; through opinion the object is non-evident — as is clear from its definition given in the note. Therefore science and opinion about the same thing in the same intellect cannot simultaneously be.

One may say: the argument concludes about the act of science and the act of opinion — not about the habit of one and the act of the other, or about the habit of both. Against this: acts and habits are concerned with the same object and are had through the same medium. For a habit is a readiness for producing acts

about the object with which it is concerned — through the same medium — as is clear from what was said in (*l. I**, 3. q. de qualitate)*. Therefore habits among themselves have exactly the same incompatibility as acts have with each other. But acts of science and opinion cannot simultaneously be about the same thing, as the arguments just given prove. Therefore also the habits of both do not simultaneously cohere in the same intellect about the same object. Moreover, the scientific medium removes the opinative medium: but with the object removed, the habit cannot persist. He who elicits a scientific act, therefore, cannot simultaneously retain the habit of opinion about the same thing. The major is known from what was said: for the object of opinion is uncertain and fallible — because contingent; while the object of science is certain and infallible — because necessary. Certitude and infallibility, moreover, expel uncertainty and fallibility — since they are mutually opposed. The minor is shown: habits and potencies do not seem to depend less on the object than on the subject, since they necessarily depend on both. Finally: the intellect through science is confirmed and stabilized in the object, while through opinion it is weakened and vacillates about the object. Therefore they cannot simultaneously coexist.

Some authors — at the Coimbrans (*1. Post. c. XXVI**, art.* III*, q.* II*), followed by two of our younger authors (*q. II*, disp.* XXIV*)* and Poncius (*disp. XXII**, concl.* VI*)* — argue that by divine power science and opinion can simultaneously remain in the same intellect. But this is not possible in the common opinion, nor is it to be tolerated in the Scotist school. For what is incompatible can be effected by no power — not even divine absolute power — as all scholastics hold by common consent. But the Scotists said so far have asserted that science and opinion cannot simultaneously persist because of the incompatibility they mutually exhibit — especially according to Scotus, who in (*loco cit. §. contra hat ante B., and ibid. sub G., and in Report. eadem dist. tertii*) openly teaches that science and opinion have incompatibility with respect to simultaneously inhering in the same intellect about the same object; and what is incompatible cannot be brought about even by supernatural power. Then, these two undivided Scotists at the end of the cited question approve the position of Tartaretus — whom a little before they attacked. Again, in (*q. II eiusdem disp.*) they accept the general description of opinion, which includes fear — which they seem afterward to disavow. Moreover, opinion is distinguished from science through uncertainty, which includes uncertainty and evidence. If, therefore, uncertainty and fear are placed in the definition of opinion, they are always connected together — and accordingly cannot be separated and segregated from each other. Furthermore: just as certitude and evidentiality are of the essence of science, and hesitation about both parts is of the essence of doubt, so fear is of the intrinsic nature of opinion. But a probable assent belongs to faith, doubt, suspicion, and opinion — therefore, to distinguish opinion from those, it must be asserted that fear enters the essence of opinion. And accordingly such an assent — as it abstracts from fear — is not opinion, just as animal as it abstracts from rational is not rational.

Moreover, given their position, all the contradictions and absurdities that we adduced above from Aristotle, Scotus, and others follow. Nor does it help them to say that opinion formally opposes science by reason of actual fear, because actual fear is not of the essence of opinion nor its passion — just as actual risibility is not the passion of man but is per accidens that man actually laughs. Moreover, the species of one genus are not opposed with respect to their actual being but with respect to their intrinsic and essential differences — as is clear from man and brute. Therefore science and opinion — which are placed under the same genus of quality — are said most principally to be incompatible in the same subject and about the same object not according to their actual certitude and fear, but according to their essential and quidditative being — as what I adduced above plainly demonstrates.

First objection: the same thing can be proved through a dialectical medium — which generates opinion — and demonstrated through an analytical medium — which produces science. Therefore it is not incompatible for science and opinion about the same object to be simultaneously had in the same intellect through diverse media. The antecedent is shown: about man an opinion can be acquired through a topical medium — namely "joyful" — and science through a demonstrative medium — namely "risible." First confirmation: one who has habitual science can not use it in act — for it is free to a man to exercise or not exercise the habits with which he is adorned. Therefore, while he is not actually thinking about the scientific conclusion, he can assent to the same conclusion through a topical medium — and thus he will simultaneously have science and opinion. Second confirmation: if the aforesaid assertion were true, no probable arguments should be provided before or after demonstrative ones — since they would do us no good; and yet that Aristotle and other philosophers not rarely adduce them, their writings plainly testify.

I distinguish the antecedent: simultaneously — I deny; successively — I concede. For it is impossible that the same thing is simultaneously known as evident and non-evident, certain and not certain, necessary and not necessary. To the first confirmation: Scotus (2. d. XLII*, qu.* IV*, D.)* responds that the two media are simultaneously incompatible in causing assent — and if one causes it, the other will cause nothing, being impeded by the stronger. For if the analytical medium is present, which is stronger and more efficacious, the dialectical medium will cause no assent, impeded by it. Why authorities and topical arguments are employed was said in the response to the second objection of the preceding article. To the second confirmation: a response and satisfaction were given there.

Second objection: one and the same potency inclines toward opposed acts — as the intellect toward assent and dissent, and the will toward willing and not-willing. Therefore it also inclines toward opposed and diverse habits, such as science and opinion. The consequence holds: because habits are generated in a

potency from repeated acts. Therefore just as a potency can elicit and receive diverse and opposed acts, so also habits.

I distinguish the antecedent: simultaneously and about the same object — I deny; successively and about a diverse object — I concede. I add that perhaps this does not hold in the will, as will be clear shortly. One may press: a man of loose morals, or one caught in some form of intemperance, if he repents of his corrupt life and produces an act of continence opposed to the habit of lust — which he still retains, for a habit is not suddenly destroyed by a single opposed act — will simultaneously have the habit and an act simultaneously opposed to that habit. And therefore opposed habits and acts can simultaneously exist about the same object in the same subject. This objection — touched upon by the Doctor (*3. d. XXXIII**, quæst. unic. sub B.)* — is accepted by Poncius (*disp. XXII**, concl.* VII*)* and made much of by him (*ibid.*), not noticing that it is evidently against Scotus — both there and in (*6. Met. quæst. I**, not far from the beginning)*. The parity can be denied from the same Doctor in that place — especially in I — since science and opinion are intellectual habits, while temperance and intemperance are moral habits. The intellect, namely, is necessitated and convinced by a necessary and evident object; whereas the will, which is rational appetite, is by its nature indifferent, and according to its inclination can desire this or that and desist from it — even though one who has a habit is more inclined toward the object of that habit than toward its opposite, whose habit he lacks.

Third objection: contrary qualities in remitted degrees can be compatible in the same subject — as is clear with lukewarm water, in which heat and cold are simultaneously received in remitted degrees. Therefore even more so can science and opinion coexist — since they do not have as great a mutual incompatibility as those qualities have.

The parity is to be denied: because contrary qualities are not caused by the object — about which Scotus is correct — whereas science and opinion are. Therefore they cannot simultaneously be about the same thing.

Natural Philosophy, or Physics

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Subtle Doctor.*

Preface

Having set forth what pertains to the method of knowing, or to a thorough acquaintance with Dialectic, we now follow the order of doctrine and, with God as our guide, take up Physics. For, as the Philosopher testifies (*2. Met. T. 15.*), it is absurd to seek science and the method of knowing simultaneously. It is certainly fitting and profitable, once the method of knowing has been obtained, to pursue and acquire science, or Physics. And so, having passed through the arid and sandy fields and the thorny plains of Dialectic, we enter the fruitful, flowery, and pleasant storehouses of natural philosophy, which we shall attain with greater ease of understanding, shall find no small delight, and shall make our way toward those things that are above nature — as Augustine forewarns (*1. de ordine cap. 11. Et 1. Retract. cap. 6.*).

The treatment of Physics, moreover, is extensive. For it encompasses the natural body, concerning which and its properties taken universally the discussion proceeds in the eight books on physical hearing; the celestial and elemental body, treated in the four books on the heavens and the world; the generable and corruptible body, treated in the two books on generation and corruption; the imperfectly mixed body, treated in the four books of the Meteorologica; the perfectly mixed body, treated in the book on metals and stones; the animated body, treated in the book on the soul, on the generation of animals, and in those works called the Parva Naturalia. Following the order we have proposed, taking our beginning from the work on physical hearing, we shall establish eight books. The first, On the Preambles to Physics. The second, On the Principles of the Natural Body. The third, On Nature and Art. The fourth, On Causes. The fifth, On Quantity. The sixth, On Place. The seventh, On Time. And the eighth, On Motion.

Book I. On the Prolegomena to Physics.

Relying on the order already set out and prefixed by us, we bring forward and discuss the preliminary questions in the present book, as we do in our Logic and other works, with as much diligence as we can. For once the origin, name, utility, excellence, and nature and object of Physics have been understood, we shall arrive at knowledge of all the rest more easily and exactly.

Question I. On the Discovery and Utility of Physics.

Article I. Who is the Discoverer of Physics?

The origins, names, and classes of philosophers, their sects, successors, and leaders, their customs, their modes of philosophizing, and the times in which they flourished — all these are recounted abundantly and eloquently from Laërtius and Augustine by Vives in his commentary on Augustine's *City of God*, book VIII, and by Fonseca likewise in his preface to the *Metaphysics* (*Viues in comm. 8. Ciuit. eiusdem August. Conimbr. in proæm. Dia. & Fonf. pariter in proæm. Met. 3.*). Concerning the name of philosophy, its acceptation, and its division, I treated briefly in the *Logic* (*Log. lib. 1. quest. 2. art. 10.*), and more copiously Augustine in the place now mentioned. And concerning the discovery of the arts and sciences I touched on certain matters there (*quast. 1. art. 4.*). The discipline which we now intend to examine is called philosophy in the absolute sense, and commonly natural philosophy, as its very name indicates. For Physics, which is also called physiology, is the same as discourse or science about nature. For what the Greeks call φύσις, the Latins call *natura*. This discipline, indeed, contemplates the natural body, its principles, causes, and properties, as will be clearly established throughout its entire course.

Nor should it pass without remark that the ancient philosophers before Socrates devoted all their effort to the knowledge of natural things, as Laërtius testifies concerning Plato (*Laër. in Plat.*). The pursuit of philosophy once moved in the province of Physics alone; Socrates came along and added Ethics, and Plato added Dialectic — as Augustine writes (*August. vbi supra cap. 3.*) and Vives in the same place. And certainly, since natural and material things are known by us before supernatural and spiritual ones, and since they are more accessible to our senses — which are the first guides of our knowledge — in keeping with that scholastic dictum often repeated, drawn from the book *On Sense and the Sensible* (*lib. de sensu, & sensato cap. 1.*): "Nothing is in the intellect that was not first in the sense" — therefore the first philosophers rightly philosophized first about these things, so that, having come to know them, they might afterward be able to arrive at knowledge of spiritual and heavenly minds and of the supreme God, as though by certain steps. This is noted by Augustine (*Aug. 6. Musica, & 8. Ciuitat. propè finem cap. 3. Et 1. Retract. cap. 11.*), from whom the Doctor does not depart (*1. distinctione 17. quest. 1. 4.*).

Assertion: the primary discoverer of Physics is God; its secondary author is held to be Thales of Miletus. The first part is derived from Scotus (*libro de primo rerum omnium principio*) and other places where he teaches that God is the primary origin and source of all sciences. It is proved in roughly the same manner as it was proved in the passage just cited that Logic flowed from God as from its first source. For there is one Teacher of ours, God (*Matt. 23.*), who teaches man knowledge (*Psal. 92.*). Indeed, "we are not sufficient to think anything of ourselves as from ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God" (*2. Corinth. 3.*).

"What do you have that you did not receive? And if you received it, why do you boast as if you had not received it?" (*1. Corinth. 4.*).

This is confirmed from the historical record. For it is held as certain among all Latin authors that they learned the liberal arts and philosophy from the Greeks, as is evident from Cicero (*Tullio 1. off.*); and that the Greeks received them from the Egyptians is attested by Jerome in his epitome to Paulinus and by Laërtius (*Hieronym. in Epitome ad Paulinum, & Laër. lib. 7.*); for among the Greeks, Plato came to Egypt for the sake of learning, as Augustine affirms (*Aug. 8. Civitatis 3.*). Then that the Egyptians and Chaldaeans were instructed by the Hebrews, specifically by Abraham and Moses, is narrated by Josephus (*Iosephus 1. contra Apionem*), Eusebius (*Eusebius 10. de præparatione Euang.*), and Berosus (*Berosius 3. Hist.*). Furthermore, that the Hebrews received Physics and other learning from the children of the first parents, and these from Adam, and Adam himself from God, is written with one pen by the annalists of the world. Moreover (*Gen. 2.*), Adam assigned names to things, "and whatever Adam called a living creature, that was its name." This he could not have done without knowledge of those same natural things, which undoubtedly pertains to Physics. And he who brought the animals to Adam himself so that he might give names to them plainly bestowed on Adam a knowledge and science of them as well, without which he could not have called them by their proper names.

The second part is handed down by the Doctor (*Doct. in comm. 1. Met.*) and proved by the testimony of the Philosopher just cited (*cap. 3.*), who makes Thales of Miletus, one of the Seven Sages of Greece who lived in the time of the prophets Ezekiel and Daniel, the discoverer of Physics. The same is written by Augustine (*Aug. 8. Civitatis 2.*), Vives in the same place, and other later chroniclers. Again, that Pythagoras greatly enriched Physics, and that Aristotle reduced it to a better form, is the common view among philosophers. Moreover, what Themistius left in writing should not be passed over. Although Thales and other discoverers of the sciences are celebrated by all, it is not to be thought that they were the first authors of those sciences; rather, after the Thessalian flood which under Deucalion almost destroyed all of Greece, those men of keener intellect, taught by the Egyptians, restored those sciences.

Physics was, moreover, discovered through the direct act of the intellect, as is clear from Aristotle (*1. Met. cap. 2.*). For wonder — from which the Stagirite says philosophy drew its origin — is a direct act of the intellect. Furthermore, Physics speculates about sensible things, which, since they are directly attained by our senses, it evidently follows that Physics was acquired through the direct act of the intellect.

Article II. Whether Physics Is Useful.

That every science is a good is subscribed to with common pen by Aristotle (*1. de anima 1.*) and his commentators. For since every human being by nature desires

knowledge (*1. Met. 1.*), and natural appetite tends toward the good, it plainly follows that knowledge is to be numbered among goods. Since the good is divided into the useful, the delightful, and the honorable (*1. Eth. 8.*), science appears to share in this threefold good, as the Philosopher clearly expounds in the cited passage from the *De anima*. Indeed, science obtains the honorable good, inasmuch as the intellect rightly desires it and the will fittingly covets it. It enjoys the delightful good, in whose existence and presence our intellect takes great delight. It also enjoys the useful good, since it is ordered toward speculation, if it is speculative, or toward action, if it is practical. For the utility of science is not to be measured by monetary gain, but by the eminence, dignity, and perfection of the knowledge of things, by which our mind is adorned, illuminated, and perfected, so that it may afterward be raised to know objects that are more excellent and more worthy. Hence Saint Augustine writes (*1. de doctrina Christiana*): "Making our way toward blessedness by means of those things which we are to use, we are aided and in some sense supported, so that we may arrive at those things that make us blessed, and abide in them."

Assertion: Physics is beneficial to the other sciences. This is indicated by Aristotle (*1. animæ T. 1.*), Scotus, and the followers of both (*ibidem*), who affirm that the science of the soul — which is the principal part of Physics — belongs to the genus of the honorable sciences (*T. 2.*), and that it contributes to all truth, and most of all to natural science. If a species is beneficial to certain things, there is no doubt that its genus is equally beneficial to the same. Therefore, what has been made by God is plainly useful, in keeping with that common dictum (*1. Cæli T. 32.*): "God and nature do nothing in vain." That Physics has proceeded from God was demonstrated in the preceding article. Again, through knowledge of natural things our intellect is perfected and prepared, especially for receiving the knowledge of other things. Hence Augustine (*1. Trin. 1.*) writes: "Sacred Scripture uses words and bodily things so that, step by step, our intellect may ascend to divine and sublime realities." The Parisian masters add (*Parisienses ful. 1. primi Phys.*): its utility consists in having perfect knowledge of natural things, which is the ultimate disposition of man toward happiness and eternal life.

Furthermore, its utility and benefit can be urged by induction, running through the individual sciences. First of all, it helps Dialectic, which treats of second intentions, which are founded upon first intentions. Now it is well established that many first intentions pertain to Physics. Moreover, reflexive and comparative knowledge presupposes direct knowledge: the former pertains to Logic, the latter to Physics. Again, our knowledge takes its beginning from sensible things, which are the subject of Physics' consideration, and it is recorded (*1. Met. 1.*) that experience of individual material things begets science in us. And so, since all the intentions of Logic rest upon these first things which belong to Physics, it is clear that the latter is beneficial to the former. Furthermore, it contributes to the mathematical disciplines, inasmuch as these meditate on quantity — immense matter and its properties and accidents —

while those contemplate quantity separated from matter. This can be brought to bear on individual cases: in Astrology, since Physiology disputes about the heavens and the world, their properties and accidents; in Music, because it surveys sound, voice, and its instruments; in Geometry and Arithmetic, since the one investigates continuous and the other discrete quantity. It also serves Medicine, since it inquires into the natures and powers of herbs, plants, animals, the human body, and other things that assist it. This is not obscurely indicated by the philosophical maxim introduced and explained by me (*lib. 5. Log. quæst. 4. art. 7.*): "Where Physics ends, Medicine begins." It is equally an aid to Ethics, since it considers the natural and free powers, their acts and habits. Nor does it harm Metaphysics, since through the motion of the heavens we arrive at the existence of the Angels who move them and of God, the first mover. And it is not useless to Theology. For as Augustine pursues at length (*D. Aug. 8. Ciuit. 6.*): "From movable things to one immovable, from mutable things to the immutable God, from corporeal things to the supreme incorporeal, and from visible creatures to the invisible Creator, we arrive at knowledge." As the Apostle writes (*Rom. 1.*): "The invisible things of God, through those things that have been made, are clearly seen and understood — his eternal power and divinity." I add that many physical matters occur in sacred Scripture which cannot be grasped without knowledge of this science, just as concerning the arts, and specifically concerning Dialectic, Augustine aptly teaches that they are of great value for penetrating and resolving what is in the sacred text (*August. 2. de doctrina Christiana cap. 31.*). Hence, recognizing and appreciating its utility, Thales of Miletus and others of that class endured many labors and sweats in devotion to its study, as Vorrilong lucidly shows (*Vorrilong. in Prol. primi sentent.*).

As for the delight and pleasure it affords a person, Cicero (*Cic. 2. Acad. quæstionum*) and Aristotle (*Aristot. 10. Eth. 1. & indè*) commit to writing in their characteristic eloquence what was certainly experienced by those who, out of love and admiration for it, said farewell to the enticements of the world and the pleasures of the age — a long catalogue of whom is woven by Vorrilong in the place cited above. For it is a speculative science to be sought for its own sake, on whose pleasant and sweet nourishment our soul feeds, is nourished, and grows in the present, so that in the future it may be nourished on another invisible food and enjoy the blessed life — as Augustine (*August. 1. de dotr. Christ. cap. 1.*) and Hugh of Saint Victor (*Hugone vict. libro primo de Arca Noë*) intimate.

One objects, first, that Saint Paul, cited by Augustine (*Aug. 8. Cinit. cap. 9.*), warns and deters us from the study of philosophy (*Coloff. 2.*) with these words: "Lest anyone deceive you through philosophy and vain deceit." Added to this are Tertullian (*Tertul. contrà Hermog.*): "Philosophers are the patriarchs of heretics"; Gregory Nazianzen (*Nazian. orat. de modestia seruanda*): "Like the plagues of Egypt, philosophers have crept destructively into the Church"; Jerome (*Hieron. in Epist. ad Iulia.*): "The philosopher is the plaything of glory and the cheap slave of popular applause"; and Hugh of Saint Victor, addressing his soul: "The image

deceives you, O my soul. For these are not wisdom but human madness — those studies in which the imprudent and the foolish, with labor as useless as it is stubborn, inquire into the natures of things, while they remain ignorant of their Author and of the Artificer of all natures." From these and similar testimonies of the saints it is concluded that natural philosophy, and any other philosophy, is not profitable but harmful to the Christian commonwealth.

I respond: the passage from Paul cited carries its own solution. For there it is written, "through vain deceit" — that is, through sophistic deceit, which is rejected (*Ecclesiastici* 37.): "Whoever speaks sophisticatedly is hateful." Then it is added: "according to the tradition of men, according to the elements of the world, and not according to Christ." Therefore, philosophy that is not from God, that does not accord with Christ, but has been craftily introduced by a deceiving man using it to bring in errors — that philosophy is certainly to be rejected as evil and harmful. Hence Augustine writes (*August. 3. conf. 4.*): "There are those who seduce through philosophy, coloring and painting over their errors with a great, appealing, and honorable name." Against such persons the warning of Paul and of the others whose words I cited above is effective. All the more so from the same Augustine (*August. 1. de ordine cap. 11.*): "Sacred Scripture commands us not to shun and mock philosophers absolutely, but philosophers of this world." Finally, that Moses was instructed in all the wisdom of the Egyptians, from which Physics is not excluded, is related by Augustine himself (*Aug. 2. Doct. Christ. cap. 40.*).

One objects, second, that magic is a part of Physics, inasmuch as it regards the mutual sympathies, the hidden powers of things, the intimate and concealed natural causes which, when combined and linked together, produce marvelous effects by which people are led into wonder and stupor — as is apparent from Alexander of Hales (*Alenf. 3 part. quest. 16. num. 3.*) and Saint Bonaventure (*S. Bon. 2. distinct. 9. quæst. 3.*). But this is condemned as nefarious and harmful to mankind by civil law, as is clear (*Cod. de malef. leg. Nemo, leg. culpa*), and by canon law (*quæst. 6.*). Therefore Physics is not beneficial to man but harmful. I grant the major and to the minor I say: what is reprobated is malefic magic, which is mixed up with sorceries, witchcraft, and dealings with demons, as may be seen in Augustine (*Aug. 10. Ciuit. cap. 9. & 10.*), Alexander of Hales, and a great many others — not natural magic, which teaches how to apply active forces to passive ones, from whose application and approximation admirable effects are produced without any intervention or patronage of the evil spirit, as will be made clear in the book on nature and art. The use of this natural magic, however, is prohibited by the Catholic Church, as is read in a certain Bull of Sixtus V, on account of the great danger that men incur in learning, practicing, and professing it: "For he who loves danger shall perish in it" (*Ecclef. 3.*). For it is to be feared that, in those things which are difficult to grasp and to perform, a person affected with the desire of knowing and doing, and led astray, may become entangled with a demon who teaches and fulfills magical arts.

One objects, third, that Physics draws one away from civil affairs, human society, the study of sacred Scripture, and other things that greatly contribute to the common good. For he who is devoted to Physics is wholly absorbed in probing its object and properties; therefore Physics does not benefit man but harms him. Add that all heresies have flowed from philosophers, as Jerome (*Hierony. l. contra Pelag.*) and Tertullian just cited attest.

I respond: in every well-ordered and well-constituted commonwealth, some apply themselves to civic affairs, others to divine, some to practical, and others to speculative matters, and all their studies and labors redound to the common utility, as the Apostle intimates (*1. Cor. 12. Et Eph. 4.*) and as is found (*Luc. 10.*) in the names of Martha and Mary Magdalene, by whom the active and contemplative life are signified, as the sacred interpreters note there. To the other objection that is appended, I say that it is not philosophers absolutely but those who philosophize badly who are to be reproved and condemned, as I was saying in response to the first objection. And so Physics in itself is good, even though the wicked make bad use of it. Sacred Scripture too, being from God, is most excellent, even though heretics draw false and erroneous propositions from it, as Augustine declares (*August. l. de vera Religione cap. 20. 1. contra Cresconium cap. 23.*): "There are many things which, though good and instituted for some useful end, are not useful to all who have them, but only to those who use them well. For the same light bathes both healthy eyes and diseased ones — to the latter it is torment, to the former an aid. The same food nourishes some bodies and harms others. The same medicine cures some and weakens others. The same weapons protect some and impede others. The same garment covers some and entangles others. So too Baptism avails some unto the kingdom, others unto judgment."

Article III. What Rank Physics Claims Among the Other Sciences.

Many and diverse views of the philosophers are related, particularly among the recent ones — Toledo (*Tol. in prol. Phys. c. 3.*) and the Coimbrans (*Conimb. ibid. quest. 5. art. 1.*) — concerning the order and place that the parts of philosophy occupy among themselves, which I touched on (*l. 1. Log. q. 1. art. 6.*) and there briefly tasted and explained the twofold order of nature and of doctrine. I note here, however, that the order of doctrine has been introduced by human beings, whereas the order of nature was not instituted but rather discovered by them — as Augustine testifies (*Aug. 2. Doct. Christ. c. 32.*): "Just as one who narrates the order of times does not compose that order himself, and one who shows the sites of places or the natures of animals, serpents, or plants does not display things instituted by men, and one who demonstrates the stars and their motions does not demonstrate a thing instituted by himself or by any man." Thus, since the sciences preserve the same order of nature as their objects enjoy, such an order of nature must be established among them as exists among those same objects. Wherefore Metaphysics is first in the order of nature, for its object,

which is being, is first. After Metaphysics comes Physics, which meditates on corporeal substance; then Ethics follows, which, since it instructs the morals of human beings, must come after consideration of human nature, its faculties, and its physical acts — which pertain to Physics — to a discourse on their morality, or goodness and evil, about which Ethics discourses. After this comes Mathematics, which surveys quantity, which is preceded by substance (*7. Met. 1.*). Dialectic holds the last place in the order of nature, for it arose from those preceding disciplines (*vbi supra art. 5.*). To this, however, the order of doctrine seems to be opposed. For those things which are prior in the order of nature are said to be posterior in the sequence of doctrine. Hence in our time, by the common assent of philosophers, the order of doctrine in the schools is: first Logic is taught, then Mathematics, afterward Physics, then Ethics, and lastly Metaphysics.

Assertion I: Mathematics in the order of doctrine is to be placed before Physics. This is intimated by the Doctor, who (*3. d. 34. D.*), enumerating the three aforementioned speculative sciences, takes his beginning from Mathematics; and (*6. Met. 9. 1.*), in drawing out the sufficiency of the said sciences from the threefold theoretical object, addresses the object of Mathematics before that of Physics. Orbellis adds (*Orbel. in proæm.*), in the consideration of Mathematics, declaring that he follows Scotus in all things, and openly teaches that Mathematics precedes Physics. The same is the view of Augustine (*Aug. 2. de ordine 15. Et indè*), Plato (*Plato. 7. de Rep.*), and many others. This is proved first from Aristotle (*1. ex Arist. 6. Eth. c. 8.*), who affirms that boys can be mathematicians but not yet wise in the manner of philosophers or physicists. The reason is that Physics requires long experience of things, which is not necessary for grasping Mathematics. Second, Mathematics treats of more evident and better-known things; hence its demonstrations are said to share in greater evidence than those of Physics (*2. Met. 16. & 8. Top. 2.*), as I proved (*1. 1. de anima q. 2. art. 2.*). For Physics deals with things intimate and hidden in nature. Again, accidents are better known than substance. For, as is read (*1. animæ, Top. 31.*), "accidents contribute greatly to the knowledge of substance." Since, therefore, Mathematics concerns itself with quantity, which is an accident, and Physics with the natural body, which is a substance, it is clear that Mathematics must be learned before Physics.

Physics ought to be taught before Ethics. This is drawn out and gathered from the Doctor (*Quol. 5. art. 1. Et Gadio ibid. fol. 183. colum. 4.*), who, treating of the goodness of a natural and a moral act, explain the natural first and the moral afterward, and from the description of the former they draw the description of the latter — and rightly so, since the moral derives its origin from the natural, just as Medicine derives from Physics. Therefore, just as Physics is taught before Medicine, so too in the order of doctrine Physics is to be preferred to Ethics. Augustine adds (*Aug. 8. Cinit.*), who at (*c. 4.*), adducing the tripartite division of philosophy into rational, natural, and moral, treats first of Physics (*6. eiusdem lib.*)

and then of Ethics (*cap. 8. 10.*). Furthermore, the ancient philosophers devoted themselves first to physical and then to moral matters, as is evident concerning Socrates from the Doctor cited (*cap. 3.*), who, having left physical matters, devoted himself entirely to moral ones — an order and custom retained by Aristotle, as is clear from the arrangement of his books. Hence (*1. Eth. 3.*) he writes that a young person is not suited to be a hearer of moral philosophy. And in Augustine (*Aug. 4. Conf. 12.*), a certain bishop wisely declined to engage with Augustine himself (though his mother urged it strongly) and to discourse on his conversion, because the said Augustine was then still a young man, overly ardent, unteachable, and puffed up with the novelty of the Manichean heresy. For the correcting and ordering of morals, a firm judgment about matters of action, experience and prudence, a calm and peaceful mind — such as an adolescent does not possess — and many other circumstances are required, which Scotus enumerates and explains (*Scot præcit.*) and touches on (*q. 4. prol. antè DD.*). Moreover, the intellect is first illuminated by the light of knowledge of things before the will is set aflame by the flame of love and desire for those things. Hence the common saying: "the will does not tend toward the unknown." And of Saint Bonaventure it is written in his life that he ruminated with feeling on every truth that he grasped with his intellect. Furthermore, Philosophy is called by the philosophers the medicine of the body, because it was invented to cure the disease of the body, which is ignorance of natural things. Ethics, however, is called the medicine of the soul, since it was discovered to heal the sickness of the soul, which is moral wickedness. But since the body is known before the soul — for spirit, being further from the senses, is more remote — therefore Ethics is posterior in the order of doctrine to natural science.

Assertion III: Metaphysics is to be learned last. So Scotus (*Scotus 1. d. 3. quest. 2. §. Loquendo.*), and Avicenna after him (*Sub. M. post Auic. 1. Metaphysica, cap. 3.*). This is proved first: our knowledge is raised from the lowest to the highest, from small things to great, from the lowest to the supreme, from the corporeal to the incorporeal, and from natural to supernatural — as Augustine philosophizes well (*Aug. 8. Cinit. 6. Et 1. Retract. 3. Et 7. conf. 17. Et 6. de vera Religione 29.*). But Metaphysics treats of the sublime, the great, the supreme, the incorporeal, and the transnaturals — as its very name indicates. For, going by the force of the name, it is the same as what is transnatural (*Arist. 1. Met. 2.*). Therefore, in the order of doctrine, Metaphysics is to be placed after the other disciplines. Second: those things which are most remote from the senses, most abstract, and most universal are the most difficult to know and are known by us last. But Metaphysics concerns itself with those things which are most distant from sense, and which are transcendent and most universal (*Philos. vbi supra*). Furthermore, what is first in the order of distinct cognition is last in the order of confused cognition, as will clearly appear in the next question. But Metaphysics is first in the series of distinct cognition — for it is first philosophy, the supreme and universal science that confirms and fortifies the principles of all the sciences

discovered by natural light, as the Philosopher and all the others confess with common voice. Therefore, in the order of doctrine, Metaphysics holds the last place among the disciplines.

Against Assertion I, it is objected from the part of Tataret (*Tatar 1. Phyf. quest. 1. scibili 2.*) and the Parisians (*Parisiensium ibid. q. 2. conc. 2.*): from one extreme to the other there is no passage except through the middle (*Scot. in Report. 2. d. 1. q. 7. post Aug. 1. Musica, c. 12.*). This can be illustrated from continuous motion, from whose starting term there is no passing to its end term except through the intervening middle; and from the foundations of a house, to the roof of which one does not ascend except by traversing its intermediate parts. But between Physics and Metaphysics, Mathematics acts as the middle: for Physics abstracts neither really nor rationally from matter, while Metaphysics abstracts really and rationally from matter. Therefore Physics is to be taught before Mathematics. It is confirmed: the starting point should be from easier and better-known things (*5. Met. cit. à Parisienf. vbi supra*). But what Physics treats of is easier to know, because closer to the senses. Therefore one should begin from Physics rather than from Mathematics.

It can be responded, with the cited Scotus (*in fol. 1. §. Ad aliam probationem*): the major holds for a middle that is necessary for the attainment of one extreme, as the instances already given show — but not for a middle that is not necessary, as God acts through intermediate causes and yet can act without them. Or, if the major is granted, the minor is to be distinguished. Mathematics is the middle between Physics and Metaphysics in respect of abstraction — granted; in respect of attainment and the order of doctrine — denied. To the confirmation: I grant the major, I deny the minor. For Mathematics concerns more evident things and things easier to know, as was proved in Assertion I.

One objects, second, against Assertion II, from the part of Zeno, Diogenes, and other ancients: only those imbued with good morals are fitted for undertaking Physics. For a flood of vices impedes and constrains the mind from contemplating the truth of things. Therefore, as Plato in the *Phaedo* and Seneca warn, whoever is not free from the enticements of the world and the corruption of vices cannot, cannot philosophize. Therefore one must begin with Ethics and not with Physics. I respond: there is no doubt that it is greatly helpful to one who wishes to learn the precepts of philosophy to be separated from vices and estranged from corrupt habits. For, having cast aside the pleasures of the world and having restrained the passions of the soul, one contemplates truth more freely and conveniently — as I indicated from the example of Socrates and others (*art. 2.*) and as Augustine pursues elegantly (*Aug. 8. Cinit. 3.*). Nevertheless this is not necessary, since many who are entangled and ensnared in earthly desires excel in Physics and other sciences — among whom Augustine himself before his conversion is clearly numbered, as is evident from his *Retractations* and *Confessions*, especially (*l. 3. 6. 4. q. 1. 8. c. 7. 9.*). You will say (*Sap. 1.*): "Into a

malevolent soul wisdom shall not enter." Therefore a wicked person imbued with corrupt habits is not capable of moral philosophy, which may not inaptly be called wisdom. I say that this saying is to be taken of charity, or of the knowledge that is joined with grace and which is called sapid knowledge, as I observed (*1. f. Philosophia Moralis q. 3. art. 2. dub. 1.*) and indicated in the Logic (*1. s. quæst. 4. art. 1. in resp. 1. oppos.*). Nor is it necessary that the moral philosopher be filled with charity, as is clear from the pagan philosophers, who lacked grace and charity.

One objects, third, against Assertion III, from Bonetus (*Bonet. 1. Phys. cap. 1.*) and Mirandola (*Mirand. 3. de sing. cert. sect. 2.*): Metaphysics speculates on transcendentals and on predicates that are most universal, and on the highest and supreme causes of things, without which the objects of other sciences cannot be clearly and distinctly known — therefore, in the order of doctrine, Metaphysics is to be placed before the other sciences. I respond with the cited Scotus (*sub N.*): the argument concludes with regard to the order of nature and of distinct cognition, but not with regard to the order of doctrine and of confused cognition. Wherefore, Metaphysics is first in the former order and last in the latter order.

Article IV. On the Order of Dignity of Physics and the Other Sciences.

By the greater or lesser dignity and nobility of the sciences in the present article is understood that which pertains to them, both among the speculative sciences and among the practical ones; and it is inquired whether the speculative sciences surpass the practical in nobility, and which of these and those holds first place. Since the excellence and eminence of a science is derived from its object, that science is judged nobler which has a nobler object (*6. Metaphysica 2. 11. eiusdem operis, f 6. Et Scot. ibidem*). For a more accurate inquiry and easier understanding, it is necessary to know that the object of speculative science in general is the speculable, and that of practical science is the operable. The speculable object is set down as threefold, from what was said in the Logic (*Log. lib. 5. quest. 4. art. 6.*), which constitutes threefold speculative science. The first is being taken universally, under which are contained God and substances, which are considered by Metaphysics. The second is the natural corporeal substance, which Physics speculates. The third is quantified substance, which pertains to Mathematics. The operable, or practical, object is determined to be twofold, through which there is a twofold practical science: the active and the productive. The former pertains to the active science, which directs morals; the latter pertains to productive science, which occupies itself with external and manual works.

Assertion II: speculative science surpasses practical science in dignity. This is the position of Aristotle (*1. Metaphysica, cap. 2. Et 6. eiusdem operis, cap. 1. & 2.*) and Scotus (*ibidem & quest. 4. prol.*). It is proved first by the same authors: it is nobler

to be for oneself and for one's own sake than to be ordered toward another and to serve it, because the former designates a kind of independence and the latter a dependence on another — and it is simply nobler not to depend than to depend on another, as is clear from God, who is absolutely independent, and from the creature, which is dependent. But speculative science is for its own sake and is sought for itself, while practical science is for the sake of work and use. Therefore speculative science precedes practical in nobility. Second, speculative science was discovered to flee ignorance; practical science was discovered on account of the need for work and the necessity of carrying on life. Hence the Stagirite testifies in the place cited that men, stirred and provoked by wonder at effects and by ignorance of causes, were brought to philosophize; and that, once all necessities for sustaining life had been obtained, they applied themselves in leisure to acquiring speculative doctrines — particularly the mathematical ones, whose inventors were men of leisure, namely the Egyptian priests, as the same Aristotle relates in the same place. Third: the greater or lesser nobility of a science is derived from the greater or lesser excellence of its object (*initio huius articuli*). But the object of speculative science is worthier than the object of practical science — as can be brought to bear on any speculative or practical science, adduced and explained before this assertion. Furthermore, the end of practical science is the work, but the end of speculative science is truth, in the enjoyment of which Augustine confesses that blessedness is situated (*10. conf. cap. 13.*).

Assertion II: among the speculative sciences, Metaphysics is preeminent in dignity; then Physics follows; Mathematics comes after. Among the practical sciences, the active is more worthy than the productive. The assertion is fourfold. The first part is expressed by Aristotle (*1. Met. cap. 2.*), fortified there by the same and by Scotus in the same place and (*1. dist. 3. quest. 2. §. Loquendo sub N.*): that science is most noble which has the most noble object; but Metaphysics speculates on the most noble object — namely God and abstract substances (*Arist. ubi supra*). Therefore it is called divine, first science, first philosophy, the contemplator of first principles and causes, and wisdom — which to possess, and to possess most perfectly, belongs to God alone, as the same Aristotle adds in the cited passage. Second: it is better and nobler to command than to be subjected, to direct than to obey. Hence the same author in the passage noted says: "It is for the wise man not to receive instructions but to give them, and not for the wise man to follow the judgment of another but for the less wise to follow his judgment." But Metaphysics is the queen and mistress of the sciences, to whom the other sciences, as her handmaids, are obedient (*3. Met. cap. 2. T. 3.*). Then (*1. Post. cap. 8. T. 23.*), Metaphysics regards the common and first principles of the other sciences. For it considers the quiddities of all things in common and in the universal, as the Doctor writes, cited by Orbellis (*Orbel. 1. Met. cap. 4.*). Again, Metaphysics explains, confirms, and corroborates the principles of the other sciences, as after Avicenna the same Doctor asserts in the first cited passage.

Furthermore, Metaphysics is first in the order of nature and in the method of distinct cognition; therefore it rightly holds primacy among the sciences.

The second part is that of Aristotle and Scotus (6. *Met. in cap. 1. T. 3.*), who say that if there were no spiritual substance, natural philosophy would be found first among the sciences, just as Metaphysics now holds the citadel among all of them. This is proved first: substance is worthier than accident (7. *Met. T. 4.*), where the Doctor (*quest. 2.*) says; and among corporeal substances, the natural is nobler than the quantified, because the former is the principle of motion and rest, while the latter is set down as the principle of no action, since quantity does not belong to the genus of the active. Therefore, since Physics contemplates the natural body and Mathematics the quantified body, second place among the parts of philosophy is fittingly assigned to Physics. Second: Physics discourses about the animated body, as is clear from the book on the soul; Mathematics, however, about the body consisting in three dimensions, which is precisely devoid of soul. But whatever is living and animated is to be preferred to whatever is inanimate and not living, as Augustine teaches (*lib. de vera Relig. cap. 29.*) and the Doctor accepts (*Quol. 1.*). Therefore, after Metaphysics, Physics is more excellent — "whom Medicine, as a sister, does not forsake, sitting at her side."

The third part follows from what precedes, defended by Aristotle and Scotus in the same places. For since quantified substance is the object of Mathematics, as stated in the passage just recalled, it consequently holds the third seat of dignity among the speculative sciences, which is given to it in accordance with the third place that its object occupies among the speculables. Especially since no other real speculative science acquired by the powers of nature is found besides those three enumerated — and therefore that order of nobility already assigned is to be maintained. Since, however, Mathematics is primarily twofold — Arithmetic and Geometry — it can be doubted which of them is principal. To this difficulty Orbellis and the Coimbrans (*Orbel. citatus, & Conimbr. articulo quarto*) respond, affirming that Arithmetic is to be placed before Geometry in dignity — to which I willingly subscribe. For (1. *Met. cap. 2.*), that science is more certain and accurate which concerns simpler and more abstract things. But Arithmetic treats of unity, which is the principle of number, and which is prior to the point, which is the principle of the line — since the point adds position in the continuum over and above unity. Furthermore, Geometry derives its demonstrations from Arithmetic. For proportion in magnitudes is drawn from proportion in numbers. Hence Euclid rightly placed Arithmetic before Geometry. Close to Arithmetic stands Music, subalternated to it, which considers the number of sounds — and which Augustine treats piously and fruitfully in his six books. Geometry is closely followed by Perspectiva, subalternated to it, which regards the visual line, of which there is an extensive treatment in the Perspectiva of Alhazen, cited by the Doctor (2. *distinct. 13. quest. vn. §. Quantum D.*). Not far from these stands Astrology, which meditates on the

motions of the stars and uses mathematical principles to investigate their effects and natural properties. Hence it is judged by the aforesaid Orbellis to be midway between Physics and Mathematics.

Now, which of these excels in certainty and evidence as regards the knower is something that can be called into question. This may be resolved by saying that, as regards us, the mathematical sciences are more certain and evident, because mathematical things are more patent to us and require less experience than natural and divine things. Aristotle (*1. Eth. 3. Et 2. Met. 3.*), Scotus, and other philosophers in the same places support this view. But absolutely speaking, Metaphysics is more certain and evident. The reason is given by Aristotle (*1. Met. cap. 1.*): that science is most certain which occupies itself with the most universal things and constructs its demonstrations from the simplest principles — and it is clearly established that this is Metaphysics, which contemplates the transcendentals and divine things, which are most certain, most firm, and most evident by their own nature, even though they are attained but little by us, since our intellect stands in relation to them as the eye of the owl to the light of the sun (*2. Met. 1.*). This doctrine Scotus teaches perspicuously (*1. d. 3. quest. 2. §. Nunc f. De ordine perfectionis*): I distinguish that what is more perfectly intelligible can be understood by us in two ways — either simply or proportionally. For example, the eagle's vision of the sun is simply more perfect with respect to the sun than our vision with respect to a candle; and yet our vision is more perfect proportionally — that is, it has more of the nature of vision according to its proportion to the visibility of the candle than the eagle's vision has of the nature of vision with respect to the visibility of the sun. This distinction is taken from the Philosopher (*primo de partibus animalium cap. 5.*), who holds that although we have only minimal knowledge of immaterial things — which is to be understood proportionally — still that knowledge is more desirable than the great knowledge that can be had of material things, which is great in comparison with those knowables.

Furthermore, concerning Logic it must be said that just as it is last in invention, from what was said in the Logic (*Log. lib. 1. quest. 1. art. 5.*), so it appears to be simply posterior in dignity to the other disciplines. The reason is at hand: it disputes about second intentions, which are beings of reason, while the other disciplines labor about real beings. That a real being is simply more excellent than a being of reason escapes no one. Furthermore, the cause surpasses its effect in nobility, and the mistress surpasses her servant in dignity — this is the common assertion of the philosophers. Since, therefore, from what was said in the cited place, Logic is the offspring and effect of the other sciences, and their handmaid, it is not unreasonably assigned the last seat. It can, however, be said to be more excellent than the practical sciences in a qualified sense, because it is speculative — and that the speculative surpasses the practical is clear from the first assertion. Again, Logic concerns itself with the craft of the mind and judges truth from falsehood, which certainly indicates some preeminence over

mechanical works, which are produced by productive habits. Wherefore Logic excels the practical sciences in a qualified sense, just as a spiritual accident is said in a qualified sense to be nobler than material substance, and the heavens nobler than a sublunary living being.

The fourth part is handed down by Aristotle (6. *Met. cap. 1.*) and Scotus (*ibidem*) and elsewhere, who almost always subordinate the productive to the active. The reason is that action is prior in dignity to production. For action properly is a moral operation proceeding from the will; production, however, is a manual operation passing into external matter. Again, action strictly taken is spiritual, while production is material. Since, therefore, the active science expends its effort on action and the productive on production, the active is without doubt preferred to the productive. Furthermore, the active is called the medicine of the soul, and the productive the medicine of the body; the former directs the works of man, while the latter exercises itself on mechanical and other works apart from the cares of man. Hence Scotus says (*questione quarta Prol. antè DD.*) that the active, or moral science, was discovered for the sake of intrinsic necessities — that is, for moderating our passions and operations. Finally, the active science treats of the last end of man, his happiness, and his supreme good (*Diuus August. 8. Ciuit. 3.*) — which clearly demonstrates its eminence above the other sciences, especially the productive, as may be seen in the first book of our moral philosophy.

One objects, first, against the first assertion: Theology, by the common assent of all, excels the other sciences in nobility, which according to the cited Scotus is practical. Therefore the speculative does not surpass the practical. I respond: the first assertion proposed is to be understood of sciences acquired by human effort, not of sciences divinely inspired, such as Theology, which is set down by Scotus as practical. This response is derived from the same Doctor (*quest. tertia sub T. & quest. allegatâ sub BB.*), and is accepted by Orbellis, Faber, and others in that place.

You will press: it is nobler to be for one's own sake than for the sake of another, as Aristotle grants (1. *Met. 1.*) and as is admitted in the first assertion. But speculative science is for its own sake and practical science for the sake of another, from the same author. Therefore, whether science is had from nature or from God, the speculative always surpasses the practical in dignity. The major is to be distinguished, according to the cited Scotus (*CC.*): if it is for the sake of something inferior and less noble — granted; if it is for the sake of something more noble and more excellent — denied. This response is clarified and confirmed from (7. *Pol. 14.*): "It pertains to the noble to attain its own superior in an inferior being." Hence the sensitive faculty of man is nobler than the sensitive faculty of a brute, even though the latter exists for itself and is not ordered to any higher faculty, while the former exists for the sake of another — that is, is ordered to a more excellent power, namely the intellective. Similarly, that

science is to be judged nobler which tends toward a nobler act of another power than that science which stops at the intellect and goes no further. Thus Theology, tending toward practice, that is, toward love and charity toward God, which is a nobler act of the will than an act of our intellect, therefore surpasses in dignity the speculative doctrines. Aristotle, however, thinks that speculative science excels practical science because he posits no science that conforms to the practice of the will regarding the end. For he does not suppose that the will has a practice regarding the last end, but only a certain natural movement. Hence he does not judge there to be any science nobler through conformity with the end.

You will urge: if the response given is valid, Ethics would be worthier than the other sciences, because Ethics directs practice, which is an operation of the will conformable to the right dictate of the intellect, while the others remain in speculation alone — or, if they go beyond the intellect, are directed toward the affection of an external work. But from what was asserted above, Ethics holds its place after the speculative sciences. Likewise it follows that Metaphysics would be practical, since it is about God, attainable by operation — that is, visible through the vision of the intellect and lovable and enjoyable through love — which contradicts the common doctrine of the philosophers and especially the Scotist school. If perhaps the consequent of the major is granted, no inconvenience seems to follow from what was conceded. For, with Aristotle (*10. Eth.* 7.) and the saint locating happiness in the contemplation of abstract substances — and therefore admitting no practice regarding the last end — it is no wonder if he prefers the speculative to the moral and to all the practical. We, however, illuminated by the light of faith and recognizing that the last end is attainable by us through operation, especially through love and enjoyment, and that our blessedness consists most of all in the enjoyment of God, which is an operation of the will or practice — we willingly and openly maintain that the practical surpasses the speculative in the manner stated above. All the more so because what is practical in this sense is called not precisely Ethics but Theological and divine science, since it regards God as attainable through operation. To the other thing that is appended concerning Metaphysics, I say that Metaphysics considers being, God, the Angel, and the other transcendents as speculable and not as operable; therefore simply speaking Metaphysics is speculative.

You will say: the dignity of a science is derived from the excellence of its object, as I have often insisted. But the speculative participates in a nobler object than the practical — as Metaphysics has God, who is the most excellent substance, as its object, while the practical — as Ethics — has the moral act, which is an accident, as its object. And if some substance is assigned to it as object, none other will be given than the human substance, which is inferior to the substance of God and of the Angel, as no one denies. Therefore no practical science precedes speculative science. Granting the major, to the minor I say that Ethics,

as Aristotle handed it down, has for its object the human being to be imbued with good morals (*libro primo Philosophiæ Moralis, questione tertia articulo vn. assert. 3.*). But the practical science which we maintain surpasses the speculative in dignity tends toward God, the supreme good, attainable by us through vision and enjoyment. Therefore it formally and objectively excels the speculative sciences. And this science is properly to be called not Ethics but Theological science, as I forewarned above.

Question II. On the Nature of Physics.

Article I. Whether Physics Is a Science.

Aristotle (*4. Met. cap. 5. T. 22. Scot ibi, & 1. Post. quest. 1. & 1. distinct. 3. quest. 4.*), Lychetus in that place, Bargius, the Parisians (*1. Phyf. quest. 3.*), Tataret (*ibid. quest. 1.*), John of the Masters, and others, preceded by Augustine (*1. Retract. 1.*) and in three books against the Academics — recount and refute the opinion of the ancient and recent Academics who suspected that all things are ambiguous and uncertain, probable and apparent, mutable and inconstant, concerning which there is neither natural science nor any other, and that the truth of natural things is sought but not attained, lies hidden in darkness, and never comes to light. Thus the Academics appeared to be masters of ignorance rather than of science — whom the authors just named argue against most keenly, refute, defeat, and overcome, asserting that there is a science of natural things, that certain knowledge of them is acquired by us, and that truth concerning them shines upon us.

Note first, from Scotus (*in prol. quest. 5. lat. §. Sed aliud sub C.*) and to be recalled from what was said in the Logic (*Log. libro primo, quest. 2. artic. 2.*): one of the conditions required for science is that it be about a necessary object — necessity obtaining not on the side of the science, since it itself can be contingent and erased by forgetfulness, but on the side of the object. This is not to be understood with respect to existence and entity, since we have science of Man, Lion, and others which are contingent and corruptible and at times do not exist, but with respect to the objective and quidditative being — not indeed in the incomplex mode but in the complex mode, that is, according to the necessary connection and relation that the extremes have toward each other. Thus this proposition is necessary: "Man is risible," because between its predicate and subject there obtains a necessary bond. For the knowable proposition is described by Tataret and the Parisians, cited (*quest. 1.*), as: a necessary proposition naturally fitted to be made evident through necessary propositions applied to it through syllogistic discourse. Of this there are three necessary conditions: the first is that it be necessary, to exclude contingent propositions like "Man is white"; the second that it be dubitable, to exclude self-evident propositions known from the mere explanation of their terms; the third that it be generated

and rendered evident through syllogistic discourse, in distinction from the habit of principles, about which there is no science.

Note second: science is not of singulars (perhaps with the exception of Theology) but of universals, because singulars do not have properties distinct from the universals through which we might acquire science of them. Furthermore, individual material things are corruptible and temporal, while science (*1. Post. cap. 7. T. 21.*) is of incorruptibles and eternal things. Therefore, although individual natural things are subject to generation and corruption, Physics is not to be removed from the company of the sciences, since it is not concerned with them insofar as they are singulars, but with their common natures, which have properties necessarily and perpetually cohering with them; and as such, those natures are not corruptible except mediately and per accidens, as Aristotle (*1. Met. in proœm.*) holds. Insofar, that is, as their individuals are corrupted. Wherefore Scotus (*3. distinct. 22. quest. vn. §. Ad 1. argumentum sub H.*) adds that science is had about mutable, generable, and corruptible things, not in the singular but in the universal — knowing that such things are mutable, generable, and corruptible. Or, as others say, of mutable things science is given not reduplicatively but specificatively. For (*1. Post. 2.*): "Corruptible things" — supply, "reduplicatively" — "are not scientifically knowable." For a corruptible thing cannot be incorruptible, just as a mutable thing cannot be immutable, and a contingent thing necessary — as the same Doctor writes (*quest. f. lat. §. Sed aliud H.*) and Pererius objects (*lib. 2. Phys. cap. 3. in resp. 6. dub.*). For to know a contingent thing as necessary is not to know a contingent thing, and to know a mutable thing as immutable is not to know a mutable thing — as Scotus argues against Henry (*mox citatus §. Primò*); and to know a corruptible thing as incorruptible is not to know a corruptible thing. Otherwise everything would fall under science, since there is nothing that cannot be considered under that reduplicative particle "as" or "insofar as it is such" — which was amply rejected in the Logic (*Log. lib. 5. quest. 4. art. 1.*). I add that the intellect would be deceived in knowing things otherwise than they are. If, therefore, things are mutable, it knows them as mutable, and so with the rest, as they are.

Note third: although the Philosopher wrongly supposed the world to be eternal, and likewise prime matter, motion, the Intelligences, the natural necessity of God in acting, and other things of this sort — it is not on that account to be judged that Physics is in large part not a science, as Pererius thinks (*vbi supra ad 8.*). For concerning those matters, science is not had with respect to their existence but with respect to their essence as prescinding from existence, as Orbellis rightly notes (*Orbel. 7. Met. cap. 3.*); and therefore the nature of science is not taken away, whether things have existed from eternity or in time. Moreover, even we who are illuminated by the light of faith cannot for the most part demonstrate what the Philosopher perhaps did not demonstrate. Therefore it does not seem any more ours than the Philosopher's science. Although the same author mixed in some falsehoods and inserted some probable matters, science

is not thereby taken from it — just as in Logic many probable matters are treated, although Logic itself is absolutely and simply a science. For that is absolutely called a science which regards an absolutely knowable subject, of which sort the natural body is.

Assertion: Physiology is truly and properly a science. So Scotus (*quest. 3. vniuerf. in solut. 2. Et 3. dist. 22. quest. vn. §. Rationes sub D. Et distinct. 34. quest. vn. Et quest. 3. prol.*), preceded by Aristotle (*3. Phys. cap. 4. 2. Met. T. 5. & 22. Et 6. eiusdem operis cap. 1.*), who divides speculative science into Physics, Mathematics, and Metaphysics, and supported by Augustine (*Aug. 8. Ciuit. cap. 4.*), who, adducing and accepting the Platonic tripartite distribution of philosophy into moral, natural, rational, and metaphysical, adds that the moral is most engaged in action, the natural is assigned to contemplation, and the rational distinguishes true from false.

This is proved first from that vulgate division of philosophy and science, related by Augustine (*Aug. 8. Ciuit. cap. 4.*) and delivered by Plato, drawn from the Hebrews: into natural or Physics, moral or Ethics, and rational or Logic and Metaphysics. Second: about a truly knowable object, there is true science (*1. Post. 2.*). But Physics has for its object the properly knowable thing, which, as will be said in the next question, is the natural body, about which many things are demonstrated and known — some of which the Doctor adduces (*3. distinct. 22. cit.*): "Every body composed of elements is corruptible, because it is put together from contraries; but the human body is of this sort, as is clear; therefore the human body is corruptible." Likewise: "What is composed of matter and form is generable and corruptible, since the first root of corruption, as the Doctor testifies in the same place, is matter together with the privation conjoined to it, which is in potency for transmutation to another form it lacks — as the matter of air to the form of water, and vice versa. But every mixed composite is made up of matter and form; therefore every mixed composite is generable and corruptible." Third: demonstration and science are of universals (*1. Post. T. 43. Et 7. Met. T. 53.*). But Physics is about the natural body, which is universal, for it abstracts from animate and inanimate, from simple and mixed, from this and that — as I introduced universally in the preface to this work. I add that the other conditions of science adduced and explained by us in the cited Logic agree with this admirably. For Physics is certain and evident knowledge of a necessary natural thing, acquired through syllogistic discourse. And in Physics it is demonstrated no less that man is risible than in Mathematics that a triangle has three angles. For in both cases an equal reason is given — namely that from the nature of man and from the nature of a triangle there necessarily flows a proper property, and an indissoluble bond intercedes between each and its property. Finally, what Scotus adduces at length and acutely (*1. distinct. 3. citatus*) openly demonstrates the proposed assertion; and what he accumulates against the Academics (*August. post Aristot. allegatum*), at the beginning of this article, clearly and neatly convince everyone, even the obstinate — so much so that

some strive to vindicate those great men aforesaid from such great falsehood and absurdity of philosophizing, among whom is Cicero (5. *Tusc. quest.*) whose words Augustine cites (3. *contrà Academ. cap. 20.*), and with whom the same Augustine seems to agree, both there and in (8. *Ciuit. cap. 4.*). For it is said that it was their custom to conceal their opinion and not to reveal it to anyone except those who had lived with them into old age.

One objects, first: the first guides of all our intellection and scientific cognition are the senses, as the Philosopher's dictum (*lib. de sensu, & sensato cap. 1.*) indicates: "Nothing is in the intellect that was not first in the sense." But the senses frequently err and are deceived concerning sensible things — as sight judges a stick placed in water to be crooked and broken, when it is truly straight and whole; taste in a sick person judges sweet food to be bitter; and touch with fingers crossed, when one hand moves only one globe, judges there to be two globes. Therefore no certain and scientific knowledge can be had of sensible things. I respond from the Doctor in the first cited passage (§. *De tertiis*): our intellect takes its beginning of knowledge from the senses not as from a cause but as from an occasion. Therefore, even if all the senses erred, the intellect itself would not err, given certain and proper conditions regarding the proper sensible, to be explained in the book on the soul — especially because it has its terms within itself, which are the cause of truth. Thus the Doctor says in the cited place (*Sub D.*): if someone born blind had the species of whiteness and blackness impressed on him miraculously in dreams, and afterward awakening, his intellect abstracting from these could compose this proposition: "White is not black." And in this enunciation the intellect would not be deceived, even though the terms were not received from a senses that erred — because the formal nature of the terms, to which one has arrived, is the necessary cause of truth of the aforesaid negative proposition. Wherefore the intellect cannot go astray, relying on that universal affirmative proposition which is true from a necessary and natural cause duly applied and not impeded: "A necessary and natural effect flows" (2. *Phyf. T. 48.*). Hence, to the instance about the stick which appears oblique and broken in water, I say that the intellect is confirmed and certified by this evident proposition: "Nothing harder is broken on contact with something soft that yields to it." But that the stick is harder than water, and that water yields to it, is plainly known both by sight and touch — and so it is plainly clear to the intellect that the stick is not broken, as sight judges. To the other instance I say that it arises from the indisposition of taste, which, affected by a bitter humor, judges sweet food to be bitter. More will be said in its proper place.

One objects, second: science is about an object that is known, determinate, and necessary (1. *Post. 2.*). But Physics concerns itself with something unknown, indeterminate, and contingent — namely prime matter, which is unknown (7. *Met. 35.*), indifferent to receiving all forms, and contingent, since, as is stated in the same place (*T. 22.*), matter is that by which a thing can be or not be.

Therefore Physics is not counted among the sciences. This reasoning is one of the principal ones by which the aforesaid philosophers, who did not distinguish potency from act, existence from essence, and singular from universal, openly confessed themselves overcome. I grant the major, I deny the minor. To its proof, which is supported by the testimony of Aristotle, the Doctor responds (*in expositione illius tex. & 3. distinct. 22. quest. vn. §. Ad 1. argumentum sub H.*): matter is said to be unknown because form is in some way the reason for knowing matter itself. Or you may say that the Philosopher is speaking of matter taken for the individual difference, which is not known by scientific knowledge, as the same Doctor notes in the same place.

One objects, third: about mutable and inconstant things, and about temporal and fleeting things, science is not generated (*1. Post. 2. 7.*). But Physics contemplates mutable and variable things — such as the elements and things compounded from them, which undergo constant mutation; it also considers durable and mobile things — the motions of the heavens, the risings and settings of the stars, the eclipses of the sun and moon, the perpetual generation and corruption of sublunary things, the life and death of living beings, and other matters treated in the course of Physiology. Therefore Physics is not to be numbered among the sciences. This is the other fundamental argument of the aforesaid authors, who, perceiving that nothing under the sun is firm, that no degree of created being is fixed, and that everything is stirred by restless motion — acquired and lost by sensible and mobile things — judged that all certainty and truth was to be eliminated. I distinguish the major: in the incomplex mode and in the being of existence — granted; in the complex mode and in the being of essence — denied. The authority of the cited Aristotle is thus expounded. For mutability and corruptibility are properties of mutable and corruptible things, just as visibility is a property of color, as Scotus holds (*in tertio citato sub G.*). For just as this is true and in the second mode of per se predication: "Color is visible" — so these are true and in the second mode of per se predication: "Man is corruptible," "The heaven is mobile," and "The moon is eclipsable," since between the extremes of these propositions there obtains a perpetual and necessary connection. For the intellect can apprehend simple terms, then compose them with each other, come to know the property emerging from the subject, and from premises that are true and necessary deduce conclusions that are true and necessary — as the Doctor shows in the same place. I add with the same author (*1. distinct. 3. quest. 4. 9. De tertiis circa H.*): "Although the object is corruptible and mutable, it is nevertheless immutable from a true entity into a false one."

Article II. Whether Physics Is Speculative.

What I treated at length in the Logic is to be recalled (*Log. lib. 1. quest. 2. art. 5. Et lib. 5. quest. 4. artic. 4. 5. 6.*).

Assertion: natural philosophy is speculative. Defended by Aristotle (*6. Met. cap. 1. T. 2. Et 11. eiusdem operis, cap. 2.*), Scotus in the same place and (*3. distinct. 34. quest.*

vn. D.), Orbellis (6. *Met. cap. 1.*), Anthony Andrew in that place, the Parisians (1. *Phys. quest. 2.*), Tataret (*quest. 1. scibili 2.*), and others, who with one voice approve and confirm the division of speculative science into Mathematics, Physics, and Metaphysics — supported by Augustine (*Aug. 8. Ciuit. cap. 4.*), who, adducing and accepting the Platonic tripartite distribution of philosophy into moral, natural, and rational, adds that the moral is most engaged in action, the natural is assigned to contemplation, and the rational distinguishes true from false. That science is speculative which regards a speculable object, and practical which has an operable object, from what was asserted in the Logic (*Log. lib. 5. quest. 4. art. 5. O 6.*). But Physics contemplates the natural body, which by Aristotle (6. *Met. cap. 1.*) is one of the three contemplative objects. For we have science of those things about which we have neither art nor choice. Third: every science is either speculative or practical, since between the two there is no middle ground, either through participation in the extremes or through negation of them — as I proved at length in the place just cited (*art. 4.*). But Physics is not practical, since it is not active or moral, nor productive or manual. Therefore it is to be numbered among the speculative sciences.

One objects, first: Aristotle (1. *de partibus animalium cap. 2.*) seems to expunge Physics from the theoretical sciences, saying that the mode of demonstrating and the ratio of certainty in Physics are different from those found in the speculative sciences. Therefore, in the Peripatetic doctrine, Physics has no place among the speculative sciences. I respond: the Philosopher there only intends that Physics does not enjoy a mode of demonstrating as easy and evident as the mathematical disciplines possess — which he is openly speaking about in that place. The reason given is that the latter contemplates things mixed with matter, for the acquisition of which we need long experience, while the mathematical disciplines abstract from sensible matter, for the acquisition of which, on account of their manifest certainty and evidence, experience does not seem to be necessary. Therefore they are said to take on a more speculative mode. Wherefore Aristotle nowhere denies that Physics is speculative; rather he expressly affirms it, as is clear from his testimonies already cited in support of our proposed assertion.

One objects, second: Physics tends and is ordered toward practice; therefore it is practical. The consequent holds. The antecedent is proved: from physical and sensible things we are raised to knowledge of the first cause, namely God, and to love of him — as, after the Doctor of the Gentiles (*Rom. 1.*), Augustine plainly teaches (1. *Retract. 6. Et difertè 2. de ordine. Et in soliloq.*). For the human being, desirous of the good and the beautiful, is supremely captivated and delighted by the greatness, goodness, and beauty of sensible and visible things, and from knowledge and love of them he is undoubtedly stirred and provoked to know and love God, their Maker and Author. Hence the same Paul rightly reproaches the pagan philosophers for having failed to glorify God as they knew him. I deny the antecedent. To its proof I distinguish: *per se* — denied; *per accidens* —

granted. For the end of Physics is not practice, nor is its object practical, but the speculation of natural things is its proximate end, and the natural body is its speculable object. Wherefore it is per accidens that someone might be raised from the appearance and form of sensible things to love for their Creator — just as it also happens to Metaphysics, if someone, from its predicates that are transcendent and divine attributes, is moved to love God and the Angels.

You will insist: that part of Physics which treats of how clouds, rain, snow, hail, and other meteors are formed in the middle region of the air does not seem to be excluded from the number of the practical sciences; and that which concerns human operations is no less practical than the part of Ethics which labors about those same operations. Therefore Physics is not entirely speculative. I say that Physics speculates on the proper natures, quiddities, and formalities of the aforesaid things; the making of them is accidental to it, and it does not rest in it of itself — just as Astrology does not rest in the making of an astrolabe, Geometry in the forming of a triangle, and Logic in the construction of a syllogism. Such works do not exclude the aforesaid sciences from the company of the speculative disciplines, since they are accidental to them.

One objects, third: Medicine is practical; therefore Physics is too. The consequent holds, for the former is a part of the latter, since it considers the human body, which is contained under the natural body as one of its species. The antecedent, besides being Scotus (*quest. 4. prol. §. Ad rationes oppositas. FF.*), is urged: Medicine expends its effort on curing sick bodies, on the laws of healing and antidotes; it strives to introduce and preserve health in those same bodies — which is suited to a practical habit. I grant the antecedent, I deny the consequent. For they are distinct sciences possessing distinct formal objects, since Physics speculates on the natural body under the formal notion of naturalness, which is speculable, while Medicine inspects the natural body under the formal notion of healability, which is the distinct formal practical notion from naturalness. Hence the former is aptly placed among the speculative sciences and the latter among the practical. Although the common run of physicians distinguishes Medicine into theoretical — which discourses about the universal causes and cures that are more remote from practice — and practical — which treats of particular cures that are proximately and immediately conformed to practice — and this latter is entirely practical while the former, though relatively called speculative, is nonetheless simply practical. The reason for this is given by the Doctor in the cited first place: because it virtually includes the said particular mode, formally and proximately conformed. Nor does it escape me that Aristotle (*l. de sensu, & sensibili cap. 1.*) calls Physics and Medicine sisters — perhaps for no other reason than on account of the affinity and similarity they have toward each other, which seems to lie in the fact that each heals, though in different ways, as is stated by the same author. For Medicine prepares remedies for the body, while Physics applies healing to the soul. For all Philosophy can be called the medicine of the soul, as Pererius notes above all

others (*Perer. 1. Phys. cap. 2. cit. à Ferch. vestig. 9. cap. 2. num. 7.*). There are moreover two diseases of the soul: disease of the intellect, and disease of the will. The former is ignorance of truth, which is removed by speculative philosophy; the latter is corruption of morals, which is taken away by practical philosophy, or Ethics. Finally, since Physics and Medicine occupy themselves about the same material object — the natural body — and since the latter borrows much from the former and frequently puts on its character, the Philosopher not unfittingly named them sisters.

Article III. Whether Physics Is One Science.

Henry (*Henr. Quol. 9. quest. 4.*), Cajetan with Thomas (*Caiet. Tract. de subiecto Philosophia naturalis, 12. quest. 54. art. 4.*), Ferrariensis (*Ferr. 1. contra Gentes*), and not a few recent thinkers — particularly Ruuius (*Ruuius in proæm. Physic.*) — affirm that Physics is one simple quality that extends to all the parts considered in it. Or, as some prefer, that it is one most simple quality which is wholly generated at the first physical demonstration, as regards intention, and afterward extends to other scientific conclusions through other demonstrations to be constructed — or is increased as regards extension, with no new entity and no new degree accruing to it — just as one and the same heat, extended through various parts of the body, receives no new entity or degree of intensity. Some thinkers, whom Soncinas mentions (*6. Met. quest. 9.*), judge it to be a simple quality but explain it differently from the authors just cited. For they say: just as from many heterogeneous parts — head, arms, and so on — one body is constituted insofar as they agree in one matter and form, so all the partial habits of Physics, generated through individual demonstrations — though they differ among themselves in species, since they are concerned with specifically distinct subjects such as heaven, earth, and the like — nonetheless, insofar as they agree in a kind of one form of science, which is the formal notion of the object, namely naturalness or mobility, are said to constitute one simple quality. The rest, however, think that Physics is a quality composed of partial entities truly united among themselves, since without any addition there can be no true augmentation, and without true union there can be no unity of a habit. The Nominalists — Ockham (*in prol. q. 9.*), Gabriel (*ibidem quest. 8.*), and Gregory (*quest. 3. artic. 1.*) — hold that any science acquired by the powers of nature is one by aggregation. Cited in support of this opinion are Scotus (*quest. 3. Prol.*), Anthony Andrew, and the entire Subtle school — though these do not teach that Physics and any other science is one by aggregation but one by the unity of a remote genus, as may be seen in Anthony Andrew (*6. Metaphysicæ, questione 3. articul. 1.*), Tataré (*hoc loco, questione proæmiali, dubio 2.*), and Scotus (*text. citat. & 6. Metaphysica, quest. 1.*).

Note, from the cited Scotus and to be recalled from what was said in the Logic (*Log. l. 1. quest. 2. artic. 4.*), that the unity of a science is twofold — intrinsic and extrinsic. Intrinsic unity is that which follows on the entity and essence of the

science, since every being is one, given that unity is a property of being, as will be said elsewhere. The extrinsic unity of a science is derived from the object it regards. And therefore, if the object is one in species, the science about it is one in species; if it is one in number, the science is likewise one in number; if it is one in genus, the science is equally one in genus. Hence arises the distinction of science into formal, virtual, and potential. Formal science is knowledge of a particular demonstrated conclusion — whether the demonstration be proper quid or quia — inclining the intellect precisely toward speculation of that conclusion. Virtual science is knowledge of the first or adequate subject that contains virtually within itself all the knowable conclusions demonstrable about such a subject, inclining formally toward its speculation and virtually toward knowledge of all those things that are virtually included in it — which happens when the subject is specific. Potential science is knowledge of the subject and of all those things that are potentially enclosed in it — and this occurs when the subject is generic, potentially containing its species. Wherefore a science can be called one in number, or in species, or in proximate or remote genus, as Anthony Andrew rightly notes in the prenominated place. What, moreover, is and how many kinds there are of containment, and the rest of what makes for a full understanding of this difficulty — all these are to be reviewed in the Logic (*Log. libro 5. quest. 2. artic. 8. notat. 1. indè*).

Assertion I: Physics is not one simple quality generated at the first demonstration as regards intention and afterward increased as regards extension through the other demonstrations. Deduced from Scotus in the cited places, near the beginning of the article. This is proved first: the same reason holds for one demonstration as for all the others. Therefore, if the intellect acquires a new science through the first demonstration, it will also receive a new science through the second and third. But according to the Adversaries, through the first demonstration it receives a new scientific cognition; therefore through the subsequent ones as well. The antecedent is clear because a demonstration — whether first, second, or third — is the natural instrument of knowing. If, therefore, the first demonstration generates science, equally, with no obstacle interposed, science is generated through the second and third. Second: granted that opinion of the Thomists, whoever lost the first demonstration would also lose all the science acquired through the other demonstrations, since he would have acquired it all through the prior demonstration according to the aforesaid authors. But this conflicts with experience. For he who forgets the modes of demonstrating of the first figure and what is taught in the Analytics does not thereby consign to oblivion the modes of arguing of the second and third figures and what is delivered in the Topics and the Sophistical Refutations, since the latter do not depend on the former in the least. Third: in the opinion of the said Thomists, acts naturally generate habits by this — that they naturally leave their likeness in what receives them. But of agents specifically different there are real likenesses specifically distinct — just as acts specifically diverse are, such as

the intellections of diverse principles and diverse conclusions, about which one does not have the same specific habit. Fourth: where the cause is the same, the effect is also the same. But moral objects and acts specifically different — such as those of temperance and justice — generate habits specifically diverse, because they impress specifically different natural likenesses on the faculty according to their proper specific natures. Therefore in no way is the whole of Physics acquired by a single demonstration.

Assertion II: Physics is not one thing constituted from various degrees of the same species. This follows from the principles of Scotus and is opposed to some recent thinkers. This is proved first: things of diverse species cannot constitute one thing in species, as is clear from the terms. But cognitions, or scientific acts, about specifically diverse objects are of diverse species, just as their objects differ in species. Therefore from the said acts diverse in species, one science in species is not coalesced. Second: granted that opinion, there would be no generic science, but all sciences would be specific — which contradicts (*1. Post. T. 43.*): "One science is of one genus of subject." Therefore Physics is not one science constituted from many degrees of the same species.

Assertion III: Physics is not one by aggregation, nor one by the unity of order, in the manner in which a house or a ship is said to be one. This is gathered from the Doctor in the cited passage. The first part is proved: first, things aggregated into one are beings per accidens, like a heap of grain and a pile of stones, which do not fall under science (*6. Metaphysica, T. 5.*), since science resides per se in the category of quality, as is clear in the Epitome (*libro 1. quest. 4. art. 7. in fine*). Therefore science is not to be reduced to things that are one by aggregation. Second, science is about a conclusion, and it is said to be the effect of demonstration proceeding per se from principles and causes — as I showed at length from Aristotle (*1. Post.*) in the Logic (*leg. 5. quest. 3.*). I add that the subject of science, which potentially or virtually contains all its scientifically knowable truths, is one per se — since it is a species or genus, which everyone denies to be a per accidens being. Therefore Physics, which is concerned with the natural body as its subject — which is a subalternate genus, as may be seen in the tree of Porphyry adduced in the Epitome (*libro 1. quest. 3. artic. 4. num. 6.*) — is not one by the unity of aggregation, whatever Ponce may say (*disp. 30. quest. 2. concl. 4.*).

The second part is proved: first, things that are one by order are of diverse genus and species, as is clear from the World — which, since it has unity of order as Aristotle (*12. Metaphysica, T. 51.*) and Scotus affirm (*lib. de primo principio cap. 3.*); following Pythagoras, who delivers the World to be the totality of all things, it contains all the genera and species of diverse things. But Physics is of one genus only, namely the category of quality. Therefore it is not one by order. Second, things that participate in unity of order agree only in a relation, because order is a relation, from Scotus (*2. diff. 1. quest. 4.*): for it is the relation of equals and unequals. But Physics, being a science, is of the genus of quality, which is an

absolute being. Therefore it is not to be judged one by order. Third: a relation, such as order, is not per se caused but results from the posited terms, as has been said elsewhere. But Physics is per se caused from principles — for it is the effect of demonstration (2. *Post. cap.* 2.) and the terminus of the action of the intellect (9. *Met. T.* 16.). Therefore Physics is not constituted one by unity of order.

Assertion IV: natural philosophy taken universally is one by the unity of a remote genus. This is thus deduced from the same Doctor in the same place. This is proved first from (1. *Post. T.* 43.): "One science is of one genus of subject." And (4. *Met.*), cited by the Doctor (*quest.* 2. *primi Priorum*): "Just as one sense is of one genus of the sensible, so one science is of one genus of the knowable, that is, of the subject." The same is gathered from (1. *Post.* 2.) and from (3. *de anima T.* 51.): "If the sciences are cut just as the things they are concerned with, and from the same things their unity is derived — therefore for the diversity of things there is a diversity of sciences, and in accordance with their unity the same unity is fittingly derived." But many things in Physics differ in species and agree in the same genus. For, as will be shown in the next question, the natural body is set down as the total object of Physics — and this is a genus with respect to simple and mixed body, animate and inanimate. Therefore natural philosophy, which treats of all these, is one in genus.

One objects, first: the habits of the will — such as virtues and vices — are referred among simple qualities, though they labor over diverse objects (as temperance about food and drink). Therefore the same is to be said of the habits of the intellect, in whose number Physics is found. The antecedent is to be denied. For, as the Doctor says (3. *distinct.* 34. *quest.* 1.), temperance is not one in species. For there can be as many distinct pleasures as the will can repress, and as many species of temperance that moderates them — whether regarding gustables or tangibles, or not only regarding sensibles in which the will conjoined to them takes delight, but also regarding insensibles and what is properly its own, in which the will taken precisely finds its pleasure.

One objects, second: there is no stronger reason why several lights should mix with one another and constitute one simple light, and why many degrees of heat should coalesce into one perfect and intense heat, than why several demonstrations — which are lights of the intellect — should constitute one simple and perfect specific science. Therefore nothing prevents all the demonstrations of Physics from coming together in one and making one specific science. I deny the parity. The reason is that lights and degrees of heat are of the same species and are not caused by specifically diverse objects. But the partial habits of Physics differ in species among themselves and are generated by partial specific objects — therefore the former coalesce into one in species, but not the latter.

Article IV. Whether Physics Is a Subalternate Science.

Some thinkers hold that all the other sciences are subalternated to Metaphysics, cited by Fonseca (*Font 4. Met. quest. 2. cap. 1.*) and Suárez (*Suarez disp. 1. Met. Sect. 5. numero 45.*) — to whom the Complutenses most recently adhere (*Complut. quest. 2. Proæmiali*). Others, whom Pererius mentions (*Perer. lib. 2. cap. 4.*), affirm that Medicine is subalternated to Physics and Physics to Metaphysics. Nor are there those lacking who think that Logic and Ethics are subalternated to Physics. The common opinion, however, is that of the other philosophers who deny the aforesaid subalternations of the sciences.

Note first, and recall from what was said in the Logic (*Log. lib. 5. quest. 4. artic. 7.*), what subalternation is and how many kinds it has, and what conditions are required for it properly taken. For, first, true subalternation of sciences requires that the object of the subalternated be contained under the object of the subalternating — for lack of which Medicine is not subalternated to Geometry, because the healable body, which is the object of Medicine, is not comprehended under the line, which is the object of Geometry. Second, that the subject of the subalternated add an accidental difference — for which reason the science of the species is not subalternated to the science of the genus, since though the species is under the genus, it adds above it not an accidental but an essential difference. For this reason Anthony Andrew (*1. Met. questione prima ad f. Post.*) and Scotus (*ibidem, quest. 9.*) note that those who set down mobile being taken for a property of the natural body as the object of Physics cannot avoid establishing Physics as subalternated to Metaphysics, since mobility is as it were its accidental difference. Third, that the principles of the subalternated are conclusions proved and demonstrated in the subalternating — as is clear from *Perspectiva*, which proves that things are seen smaller from a distance than if they were nearby, through this principle: that a triangle with two larger sides makes two smaller angles at the base, and the one at the point is smaller — that is, those two lines touching the seen object make a smaller angle in the seen object the more remote it is, and a larger one the closer it is, as may be seen in this figure. This principle is a conclusion in Geometry, where it is demonstrated; in *Perspectiva*, however, it is not proved but presupposed as a proved truth.

Note second, from Trombet (*Tromb. quest. 6. Met.*), that one science may be subalternated to another in two ways. First, through extrinsic denomination — that is, with respect to the subject that denominates the subalternated science extrinsically. Second, through intrinsic denomination — which happens when one science is by its own nature subjected to another, just as the less common is to the more common. Nor should it be passed over, from Scotus (*in Prol. quest. 4. principali, & f. laterali §. Ad 2. quest. dico sub E.*), that although the same proposition can be considered by two sciences in different modes — that is, by one more clearly and by the other more obscurely — nevertheless between them there falls no proper subalternation. Thus, although Metaphysics knows the quiddity of a line more distinctly and perfectly than Geometry, Geometry is not subalternated to it on that account. For both of them are deficient in the

proper conditions of subalternation set out above. Hence, for the same reason, although Metaphysics proves and confirms the principles of the other sciences and sees more clearly the quiddities and essences of things in common, the other sciences are not thereby subalternated to Metaphysics itself.

Assertion I: Medicine is not subalternated to natural philosophy. This is proved first from Scotus, who (*quest. 4. Prol. §. Ad rationes pro opinione opposita AA.*) writes that all Medicine is practical-productive. And (*6. Met. quest. 1.*) he had previously stated that Physics is speculative. But the practical is not subalternated to the speculative, because according to the same Doctor now cited in the first place they differ essentially. Therefore in Physics and Medicine there falls no true subalternation. Second: the formal objects of both the aforesaid sciences are formally and essentially diverse. For Medicine does not speculate on the principles, causes, and properties of the natural body; rather it tends toward production — that is, it is ordered toward the natural body as healable. Physics, however, contemplates the essence, causes, properties, and species of the natural body without any respect and order to production or action. Therefore, since their objects do not possess merely an accidental distinction, as proper subalternation requires, it is plainly deduced that the aforesaid disciplines do not undergo true subalternation.

Assertion II: Logic and Ethics are not subalternated to Physics. This is gathered from the principles of Scotus in the cited passage. This is proved: proper subalternation requires the same essential subject in subalternate sciences, only accidentally distinct in the subalternated, from what was noted above. But the three enumerated sciences possess three subjects formally and essentially distinct from one another. For Physics contemplates the natural body as natural; Logic the syllogism as such; and Ethics regards the human being to be imbued with good morals, as Scotus agrees (*questione tertia, prol. f.*). Again: real being is not accidentally contracted by rational being, and vice versa — since being is equivocal to real being and being of reason, as the Formalists demonstrate (*Traetus Formalitatum*). But the syllogism is a being of reason, while the objects of the other sciences are real beings. Furthermore, natural being presupposes artificial and moral being, as is clear (*Quol. 18.*). Between these no one doubts there to be an essential distinction. Moreover, the conclusions of Physics do not seem to be principles of Dialectic or of Ethics — as they would be if they were subalternate. Therefore the aforesaid sciences are immune from subalternation.

Assertion III: Physics is not subalternated to Metaphysics. Deduced from the Doctor (*questione tertia prol. §. Ad 1. argum. 2. quest. T.*), which is expressly held by Trombet (*Tromb. vbi supra*) and Canonicus (*Canonic. 1. Phys. quest. 1. art. 2.*). This is proved first, by the absence of the conditions required for true subalternation of the sciences, which are contained in the three-part number given above and already explained — and indeed the first condition is lacking to the said sciences, since they enjoy distinct essential subjects, of which one is being,

proper to Metaphysics, and the other the natural body, adapted to Physics. The second is also lacking: because the subject of Physics is contracted not by an accidental but by an essential difference, which is naturalness. Nor is the third found: since Physics enjoys its own per se and self-evident principles, independent of Metaphysics — such as "there are many beings," "motion exists," "nature is given," and the like, which do not depend on Metaphysics. Second, noting Scotus in the cited passage (§. *Sed quid*): one who has a subalternated science is not truly knowing unless he knows how to resolve his conclusions into the principles of the subalternating, which are immediate and indemonstrable. But it is clear that Physics has its own proper and immediate principles independent of Metaphysics. Therefore the former is not subalternated to the latter.

One objects, first, against the first assertion: Aristotle, almost at the beginning of the book *On Sense and the Sensible*, affirms that Physics knows the first principles of health and sickness, and brings forward that vulgate saying: "Where Medicine ends, Physics begins" — which the Doctor cited asserts to be proper to subalternate sciences. All the more so since the human body, which is the subject of Medicine, is comprehended under the natural body, which is the subject of Physics, and is contracted by the accidental difference which is healability. Therefore it is not to be denied that Medicine and Physics are subalternate. Pererius, cited above, although he agrees with us that there is no subalternation of Medicine in comparison with Physics, nevertheless notes that the Medicine which concerns itself with universals altogether coincides with Physics. But that Medicine which labors about singulars — the exercise and experience which the same author calls practical — says it is a habit diverse from Physics, and therefore that it is not subalternated to it. But this author is to be heard — since Medicine and Physics are distinct sciences enjoying distinct essential objects. And if only the use, practice, and experience of medical matters pertained to Medicine — what he calls practical — Medicine itself would be an art and faculty; indeed it would not formally be an art, because use is formally an extrinsic accruing relation, as I affirmed in a similar case (*Log. libro primo, quest. 2. art. 3. dub. 2.*). Again, all Medicine is simply practical, inasmuch as it is wholly directed toward inducing health into a sick body — which is an external productive work, of which the Doctor speaks (*questione quarta prol. §. Ad rationes, pro opposita sub EE.*). Furthermore, Medicine enjoys its own laws and demonstrations and principles distinct from those of Physics. I add that although Physics opens the first causes of health and sickness, it nevertheless does not treat of them insofar as they are capable of health and sickness, but insofar as they are natural things — and thus the species remains distinct from it. And so I respond, by admitting everything that is adduced from Aristotle — since it does not harm us. For those general and universal principles of Physics, being like the principles of Metaphysics adapted to the other disciplines and presupposed in them rather than proved in them, do not cause the other

sciences to be subalternated to Metaphysics, as I maintained above. Again, "where Metaphysics ends, Theology begins" — yet neither is subalternate, as the Doctor intimates (*vbi supra*, §. *Si obiiciatur*). To the other thing appended: I deny that healability is an accidental difference of the natural body, as I made plain in the foregoing.

One objects, second, against the third assertion: that science to which others are subalternated is the one which can demonstrate and confirm the subjects of those doctrines. But Metaphysics can show and strengthen the subject of Physics. Therefore Metaphysics subalternates Physics to itself. The major seems evident. The minor is urged from (1. *Post.* 8.), (1. *Phyf.* 1.), and (4. *Met.* 3.), where the Philosopher and his commentators affirm that Metaphysics supplies principles to the other disciplines, proving and corroborating them. Hence from the same Philosopher Orbellis adds (1. *Met.* 3.): all sciences are ordered to Metaphysics; indeed, that they are openly subalternated to it is delivered by Themistius, Simplicius, and many others, among whom Aquinas is cited (*Opusc. de natura generis cap. 4.*). It is confirmed: the first cause is considered by Metaphysics, in which the effect of all things is virtually contained; and Metaphysics itself can prove that the first cause exists. Therefore it will be able to prove that every effect of any thing is virtually comprehended in the first cause. I respond: the major can be conceded of improper and qualified subalternation, but not of proper and simple subalternation, which above all requires an accidental difference added above the object of the subalternating. But the objects of the other sciences participate in a formal and essential rational distinction, of the kind that cannot fall upon being, which is the object of Metaphysics — especially in the doctrine of Scotus, who divides being not into differences but into modes (1. *distinct.* 8. *quest.* 3. *N.*). Furthermore, Metaphysics does not demonstrate the objects of the other sciences by ostensive demonstration, but only by demonstration leading to the impossible — which is indirect and oblique demonstration, as is clear in the Epitome (*libro tertio, quest.* 1. *artic.* II.). Moreover, every other science apart from Metaphysics enjoys its own per se known principles independent of Metaphysics. Therefore it is not properly subalternated to it, since the subalternated borrows its principles from the subalternating, and these are the conclusions of the latter — so that a conclusion in Physics would be a true principle in Metaphysics, which the Doctor introduced as an inconvenience (*in Rep. quest.* 4. *prol.*). To the confirmation: I deny that Metaphysics treats of God insofar as he is the cause of natural effects as such, but precisely insofar as they are beings — and therefore no proper subalternation is to be introduced between the said sciences.

Question III. On the Object of Physics.

Concerning the subject of Physics, the philosophers go off into various and divergent opinions, which are touched on concisely and refuted by Bonetus (*Bonet.* 1. *Phyf. cap.* 1.) and treated at length by our two recent Scotists in the

preliminary question about the whole of philosophy. I select the more celebrated ones to be briefly and diligently examined, as best I can, in the following articles.

Article I. Whether Mobile Being or the Mobile Body Is the Adequate Object of Physics.

That mobile being is the total subject of Physics is asserted by Thomas (*Th. 1. Phys. in proœmio*) and Metaphysics (*Met. & indè*). But (*1. Cæli lect. s.*) he decrees that the adequate object of the same Physics is the mobile body. Hence the Thomists are divided among themselves. Some of them — such as Pomponatius — say that Thomas, when he was young, held in the cited place of Physics I that the object of physiology is mobile being; and then, having grown older, changed his opinion in the cited passage on the heavens and decreed that the object of this science is the mobile body. The older Thomists, however, as Javellus testifies (*1. Phys. quest. 1.*), think that Thomas' mind absolutely was to set down mobile being, and not the mobile body, as the object of that discipline. So think Cajetan (*Caiet. Tract. de subiecto Philosophiæ naturalis*), Fonseca (*Fons. 2. Met. cap. 3. quest. f. felt. 2.*), and the Coimbrans (*Conimb. quest. 4. art. 1.*). Albert (*Albert. Trait. 1. cap. 3.*), Avicenna (*Auic. cap. 1. suæ sufficientiæ*), Aegidius, and the man from Lincoln, however, judge the adequate object of Physics to be the mobile body — from whom some say the Angelic Doctor does not diverge, citing him (*1. p. quest. 84. art. 1. & quest. 14. de veritate art. 8. ad 18.*). But whatever may be the mind of Thomas, and whatever is to be replied to the proposed difficulty, his disciples may see to it. We, however, hold it as certain that the Subtle Doctor and his followers to be cited below do not place mobile being or the mobile body as the object of this discipline.

Note first, and recall from what was said in the Logic (*lib. 1. Log. quest. 1. art. 1.*), the multiple acceptations, divisions, descriptions, and conditions pertaining to the formal and adequate object of a science — as well as what I maintained (*lib. 5. eiusdem operis, quest. 2. artic. 8.*) about the containment of the subject and its multiplicity, shown and declared there at length. Presupposing and taking all this as pre-known, the material and formal object of this doctrine is investigated in the present question — although Aversa (*quest. 2. de obiecto Philosophiæ sect. 4.*) neither adverts to nor admits any formal objective notion restricting the material object of Physics.

Note second: in the view of most philosophers, mobile being, natural being, the mobile body, corporeal substance, and the natural body are taken confusedly and interchangeably (*Hurt. in proœm. Phys. Fuentem diff. 1. art. 1. Et Conimbr. quest. 4. art. 1.*). Therefore the same cited authors suspect that this is a dispute more about name and mode of speaking than about the thing itself. This seems to have a foundation in the doctrine of Aristotle, who (*2. Met. T. 1. & 6. eiusdem cap. 1.*) designates mobile being as what is considered by Physics, but (*1. Cæli 1.*) indicates that Physics labors about the mobile body. In this way those

philosophers judge they can call all others into agreement. Nevertheless these thinkers certainly do not achieve their intention. For both Thomas and Javellus and others of the same school are unwilling to come into that agreement, establishing a distinction between mobile being and the mobile body, repelling the latter and accepting the former as the proper and adequate object of Physics, as I made clear before the first note. And Fuentes (*Fuent. citat. art. 1. & 2.*) observes this. Indeed, mobile being is something more common and abstract than the mobile or natural body — for an Angel is mobile and is incorporeal. Being, however, can be taken in two ways: in one way transcendently, and thus it is broader than body and anything else predicamental; in another way particularly, that is, for physical being, which seems to coincide with the natural body, as the Philosopher intimates (*3. Phyf. T. 15.*): "Motion is the act of a being in potency, as in potency." Where being is not taken transcendently — otherwise that definition of motion would be defective, because it would be assigned through a remote genus, which is rejected (*6. Top. cap. 1. loco 27.*). And the same place of Physics states: "Motion is the act of that being which is partly in act and partly in potency, and motion is the act of that being not from the side on which it is act but from the side on which it is potency." For this reason it pronounces that axiom: "Those are physical beings which, being moved, move." Because they are partly in act and partly in potency. From these things it is well inferred against Ruuius and the Coimbrans cited — Scotists reproaching Thomists for decreeing the object of Physics to be mobile being in its whole breadth, prescinding from body and accident. For in this way a being per accidens and a transcendent being would constitute the object of Physics, which is shown to be false by what has so far been maintained and pursued at length by Faber (*Faber Theor. 20. cap. 3.*). Furthermore it is rightly deduced against Pererius (*Perer. libro primo de communibus rerum naturalium principiis*) that it is not unreasonably that Scotists attack Thomists — not because those Thomists themselves accept mobile being for mobility, which is a property of the mobile body, but for the internal principle of motion, which is the mobile and natural body — since the aforesaid Thomists, namely the cited Cajetan and Javellus, are unwilling in any way that mobile being and the mobile and natural body coincide. These thinkers, therefore, should not be dragged unwilling into common ground and a verbal dispute, as the cited recent authors frequently do, mollifying both schools. Moreover, genuine and distinguished philosophers — such as the Thomists and Scotists opposing the Nominalists, to whom not infrequently these modern thinkers favor and adhere — disdain to contend, when the matter is established, about a word and mode of speaking (*Aug. 1. Mufica 2.*).

Note third, from Aristotle (*2. Phyf. c. 1. T. 4.*): a natural being is one that consists of matter and form — of which sort the natural body is, as Tataret notes (*1. phyf. q. vn. proæmiali, not. 1.*). Body is moreover set down as twofold — physical and mathematical — as is gathered from the Doctor (*4. d. 11. q. 1. & d. 49. q. 16.*) — against Ruuius, the Coimbrans (*cit.*), and Pererius (*1. 2. c. 3.*) who add a third,

which they call the metaphysical body. Primarily, Aristotle (*3. Met. T. 17.*) enumerates only those two — from whom Averroes does not depart (*3. phys. com. 4. c.*), saying that there are two genera of bodies: one intelligible or mathematical, which is triple dimension; and another sensible or physical, which coalesces from matter and form. Nor does it help to say that Aristotle is speaking of bodies that really exist and fall under our senses, not of those that are apprehended by thought and abstracted from accidents — of which sort the metaphysical body is. For, apart from the fact that Aristotle would be defective in nowhere mentioning a metaphysical body, his division would also be insufficient. If such a metaphysical body is not real but fictioned by thought alone, it does not constitute a third body distinct from those two — just as imaginary substance and a being of reason do not make another category distinct from the genus of substance — so much so that it would be true to say: there are two genera of substance, one of real substance and another of rational substance. Furthermore, body is either intelligible and is mathematical, or sensible and is physical. To say, however, that there is a body abstracted, not compounded from matter and form, separated from motion and from sensible qualities — that does not savor of truth, since a true body is real, composed from matter and form. What consists of matter and form is mobile and sensible. Therefore body cannot be segregated from those accidents and sensible properties, at least radically.

You will say that the metaphysical body is indeed real, composed from matter and form, but is considered by Metaphysics insofar as it precedes sensible accidents in the order of nature and is examined as prescinded from them — though having a relation and propension toward them as their subject. But this does not satisfy in the least — since from that alone it is only argued for a diverse respect and differing consideration of the same body, as I said (*in Log. l. 2. q. 1. art. 4. & 6.*) about the common nature in itself and as it is abstracted and compared to its inferiors — not for any true and real distinction and diversity of body, by which a third body would be made distinct from the two previously narrated. Body, moreover, is placed in the category of substance not because its consideration pertains to Metaphysics, but in order to show the distinction and ordering of things — which is the task of Metaphysics. Or it can be said that Metaphysics considers body not precisely as body but as being and in terms of its common and transcendent predicates. Furthermore, that tripartite division of speculative science into Mathematics, Metaphysics, and Physics is derived from the three speculable objects: for Metaphysics concerns itself with being as being; Mathematics with body affected by quantity; and Physics with the natural body. But if another body distinct from these two is conceded, either a fourth speculative science distinct from the said three will be given, or Metaphysics will treat of body — which goes beyond its limits and borders.

You will say that the metaphysical body is given, consisting of genus and difference, just as every metaphysical composite is. Against this: according to

Pererius and Ruuius cited, the same thing is the physical body composed of matter and form and the metaphysical body, and the difference is only that it is abstracted from motion and sensible qualities — which distinguishes it from the physical body. But many things are composed from genus and difference which are not bodies, such as Angels. Therefore recourse to what is constituted from genus and difference does not avail to save the metaphysical body.

Assertion I: mobile being is not the proximate and adequate object of Physics. So Scotus (6. *Met. q. 1.*). This is proved: first, the adequate and proximate subject of a science is constituted in being through its proximate genus and proximate difference — otherwise its definition would be defective, as after Aristotle (6. *Top. loco 27. c. 1.*) the Doctor writes (1. *Poft. q. 24.*). But being is distant from mobile, and being is more broadly founded than mobile, since it is transcendent. Therefore mobile being is not the proximate and adequate object of Physics. Second: mobile is either a difference of being or a mode of it, since there is no middle between these. But mobile is not a difference of being — since being, according to Scotus, is not divided into differences; otherwise it would be a genus, which is commonly denied. But if it is conceded to be a mode, since the consideration of being and its modes pertains to that science, and Metaphysics contemplates being while Physics contemplates the mobile — it plainly follows that Physics is a part of Metaphysics, and consequently there are not three specifically distinct speculative sciences. Third: mobile is either a property of being, or its essence and intrinsic difference, or an extrinsic accidental difference. Not the first — otherwise Physics would be subalternated to Metaphysics, as Aegidius rightly argues against Aquinas. Not the second — as is proved by the second argument just given. If it is preferable to say that mobile is used for the root and internal principle of motion — as those recent thinkers cited, with whom the Complutenses subscribe (*disp. 1. q. 1.*), object against the Thomists — I oppose this: the root and intrinsic principle of motion is not mobile being, unless they mean that every being is mobile, which they themselves admit to be false. Not the third — because since a property flows from the essential principles of a subject and is convertible with that subject of which it is a property, given mobility as a property of being, every being would be mobile — which conflicts both with truth and with Aristotle. With truth indeed, since God is being and an immobile being; an Angel too is being and, according to Aristotle, an immobile being.

Assertion II: neither is the mobile body determined as the formal subject of Physics. Deduced from the Doctor (6. *Met. q. 1.*). This is proved: first, no science proves its subject a priori but presupposes it (1. *Poft. 1.*). But Physics (1. *Cæli T. 5.*) proves and demonstrates the mobile body by this syllogism: "What has an internal principle of motion is mobile; but the natural body has an internal principle of motion, which is nature (2. *phyf. T. 3.*); therefore the natural body is mobile." Second: no per accidens being is the object of any science, because (7. *Met. 12.*) a per accidens being is not definable. But the mobile body is a per

accidens being, for it is put together from body, which is substance, and from mobility, which is a proper accident or property of body, demonstrable of body (1. *Cæli* T. 5.). Therefore the mobile body is not the object of Physics.

You will say, with Javellus (4. *Met.*), that although mobility is an accident, it nonetheless functions in the role of a difference — as Aristotle argues elsewhere, cited by us, about the divisibility of quantity and the primary qualities of the elements. But this response helps nothing against our assertion. For in this manner it is not mobility itself but that notion, whose place mobility holds, that is the formal and essential difference of the object of Physics. Hence I argue thus: that is the formal objective notion of Physics which formally and essentially constitutes the object of Physics and distinguishes it from any other knowable object (*Log. loco cit. not. 1.*). But mobility is not of this sort, since it is a property of body, as Javellus cited does not deny. Therefore another formal objective notion, and another formal object of Physics, must be found — to be named and established in Article IV of this question.

One objects, first, against Assertion I: Aristotle (6. *Met. 1. & 11. eiusdem operis 3.*) writes that natural philosophy occupies itself with mobile being. He had previously stated this (1. 2. & 6. *Phyf.*), as well as (1. *Cæli 1.*). Nor does this seem incongruous: for just as first philosophy concerns itself with being as being, so second philosophy spends its attention on mobile being. Which the same Stagirite signified (6. *Met. T. 3.*), saying: "If there were no abstract substance, Physics would be first philosophy." Therefore, if between both doctrines there is a distinction on account of separated substances, it is not inaptly inferred that both consider being — and indeed Metaphysics being as such, and Physics mobile being. It is confirmed from (3. *phyf. T. 6.*): motion is defined as "the act of a being in potency" — not as "the act of the mobile body." And there, in the explanation of the already cited definition, an example is given from generation and corruption, whose subject is prime matter — which is indeed a being but not a body. Therefore mobile being is established as the total object of Physics. I respond: apart from the fact that, as Fuentes notes (*vbi supra, in fine art. 1.*), none of those cited authorities is expressly found in the translation of Perionius — granting and admitting those testimonies, Aristotle explains himself shortly afterward, for he adds that Physics speculates on natural substance (*Conimb. vbi supra in calce 1. art.*). And the same Stagirite had previously indicated (1. *Cæli 1. & 2. phyf. 12.*) and in other places — which, if rightly weighed, favor us more than the adversaries. To the other thing appended, I say that with the treatment of abstract substances removed from Metaphysics, Physics would be first in the priority of dignity — for after abstract and spiritual substances, the first place is held by corporeal and material substance, as is clear from the lists of all things adduced in the Logic (l. 2. & 3.). And therefore, given the hypothesis, Physics would shine before all other disciplines. This I proved on purpose in the preceding question (q. 2. 4.). Again, in the order of nature too, Physics would precede the other parts of philosophy — because, if transcendents and

abstractions from matter were removed, the corporeal and material substance would undoubtedly occur to us first, in the knowledge of which Physics is occupied. And so what Aristotle asserted would be true: with substances separated from matter removed, Physics would be the first philosophy — which the Coimbrans testify was the case among the older philosophers, who did not distinguish Physics from Metaphysics (*Conimb. cit. a. 3. ad 2.*). To the confirmation: it is clear from the second note that in the definition of motion, mobile being is taken for the composite from matter and form, which is the natural body. To the other matter, about generation and corruption, about which Aristotle adduces examples, I say that in these motion occurs per accidens. For in generation one proceeds from the imperfect to the perfect, and in corruption from the perfect to the imperfect. Although matter is in some way mobile, since it is a part of the natural and mobile body, it is reduced — as the quo by which motion occurs — to the natural body itself, which is the whole and the quod by which motion occurs.

One objects, second: what is the first and adequate subject of the first property of Physics is the first and adequate subject of natural philosophy. But mobile being is of this sort. Therefore mobile being is constituted as the total and adequate object of Physics. The major is evident and can be brought to bear on all the formal, proximate, and immediate objects of the sciences. The minor is shown. The first physical property is mobility — which is either subjective, or total substantial terminative, which is suited to the substantial composite, or partial substantial, which is accommodated to matter and form since they are natures — for nature (*2. phyf. T. 3.*) is the internal principle of motion and rest — and this is conspicuously seen in the rational soul, which is set in motion when separated from the body. Or total accidental, since the whole accidental is transmutable. For it comes to be from the privation of an accidental form; hence the Philosopher (*1. Phyf. 17.*) treats universally of the principles of natural things, comprehending both substantial and accidental generation — especially because accidents are per se mobile, as is evident from the accidents of the most holy Eucharist, which, separated from their subjects, are moved. Hence Aristotle, signifying all this (*3. phyf. 6. 9.*), sets down being as the adequate subject of motion, and then adds (*1. Cæli 1.*) that natural science speculates on bodies, magnitudes, and their affections. Again (*4. Met. 1.*): each of the particular sciences cuts off a part of being and meditates on it. From these and similar things amassed by Cajetan and others of his followers, mobile being seems to be concluded as the total object of Physics. I grant the major, I deny the minor. To its proof I say that matter and form are mobile as quo — the means by which — and are reduced to the natural body, which is mobile as quod — the whole by which — just as parts are reduced to the whole. Although the soul, or other part, can be separated from the body, nevertheless whether always conjoined with the body or separated from it, if it is mobile, it always exhibits an ordering, dependence, or inclination toward the body itself, and therefore will be reduced

to the whole, as complete and perfect. Accidents too are referred to the natural body as their adequate subject, to which they are ordered (*Scot. 4. d. 12. q. 2. §. Ad questionem.*). Therefore Aristotle could not rightly say that the adequate subject of Physics is the material substance prescinding from matter, form, and composite — nor the composite abstracting from the whole substantial and accidental — as our two recent thinkers cited freely grant to Aversa and the Cajetan cited by them. Because science is of one genus of subject (*1. Post. 33.*), which is a whole, not something prescinding from the whole and its parts. Indeed, besides Metaphysics, which looks to the transcendentals, the other sciences enjoy some generic subject — as is clear from the distribution of the objects of the speculative sciences given (*6. Met. c. 1.*). The reason is that the subject of any science contains potentially or virtually all the knowable truths demonstrable about it from (*2. q. prol.*) — which is undoubtedly a whole and perfect thing, not something imperfect, partial, and incomplete. Hence the Scotists, treating of the books *On the Soul*, set down as the total and adequate subject not the soul but the animated body — which is the perfect whole. Similarly in Logic, not the enunciation or the enthymeme but the syllogism, which is the whole, is determined by the same as the proximate subject of said Logic. As for the testimonies of the Philosopher appended by them — they have already been nearly all explained in the second note. For the aforesaid Philosopher very often accepts mobile being for the natural body and confounds the two (*Conimb. cit. ex. 1. Cæls 1. & 3. eiusdem operis T. 1. ac 10. Met. 1. nec non 11. eiusdem voluminis capite etiam 1.*), whom Averroes follows (*4. Met. com. 1. & l. 12. com. 5.*).

One objects, third, against Assertion II: Scotus (*q. 3. §. 35. vniuers. §. quantum ad 1. Et 1. post. q. 47. §. ad 1. argumentum*) expressly writes that the mobile body is the subject of Physics. Therefore in the Subtle school no other subject of Physics distant from the mobile body is to be sought. I respond with the Englishman, in his exposition of that passage, that Scotus speaks not in his own opinion but in that of others — as Aristotle is noted to do in the chapter on quantity by his commentators. Especially since the Doctor adduces this by way of example. In giving examples, moreover, one need not be overly scrupulous (*ex. 1. Prio.*). Veglia adds (*veft. 6. c. 9. 1. 1. anten. 40.*): in examples truth is not sought but only the manifestation of truth. Or it can be said that the Doctor is to be interpreted by taking "mobile" as a circumlocution for "natural body" — that is, taking the property for its subject, which Aristotle did (*5. Met. c. de quanto.*), defining quantity through divisibility, which is its first property. With this agrees what Scotus adds (*1. Met. q. 9.*), where, adducing Aristotle's saying that "Physics considers mobile things insofar as mobile," he notes that the Philosopher said this both because motion is better known, and also because it designates the convertibility and reciprocability of the property with its subject, as I was saying just now.

Article II. Whether the Generable and Corruptible Body Is the Total Object of Physics.

Some thinkers — such as Faber (*Faber Theor.* 20.), suppressing the name and rejecting it (*c.* 1. & *ibidem* *c.* 3.), and among them the twin Scotists at the beginning of the preliminary question refer and include Galen (*Galen.* 1. *de elementis simpl.*), Pererius (1. *Phyf.*), and Raguseius (*disp.* 1. *Perip.*) — judge the generable and corruptible body to be the object of Physics. Not far from these diverge those cited by Fuentes (*diff.* 1. *art.* 2. *num.* 4.) who suppose the object of the same science to be sensible substance — since every sensible sublunar thing is subject to generation and destruction, and thus the generable and corruptible seems to coincide per se or per accidens with the sensible. But the opposite is defended by Faber, Fuentes cited above, and the other philosophers who deny that either the generable and corruptible body or the sensible body is the object of natural philosophy.

Note that although it is at anyone's discretion to begin a treatment from this or that partial or total object, and to explore and examine this or that object — it is nevertheless not at the discretion of anyone to assign objects to sciences and to provide and constitute their formal and essential notion, as the undivided Scotists seem to wish (*cit.* 4. 1. & *apertè disp.* 12. *Log. q.* 3. *a.* 1.). For sciences are cut just as things are (3. *anima* T. 48.). From them sciences derive their unity (1. *post.* 32.) and are specified by them (*ibid.*): "One science is of one genus of subject." And from three formally speculable objects three specifically distinct speculative sciences are had (6. *Met.* 1.). The reason is that since sciences derive their entity from their formal objects, it plainly follows from those same objects that they derive their unity and distinction. Furthermore, formal objects — if they are generic, contain knowable truths potentially; if they are specific, virtually — as I maintained above. Again, demonstrations — whose effects are sciences — are discriminated according to diverse objects about which knowable properties are demonstrated. Then the knowable being depends on the being of the thing, and any knowledge is partially caused by the object of which it is knowledge. Nor does it escape me that some among the ancients and recent thinkers — notably Anthony Mirandola (13. *de everfione fingularis cert.*) — compose one science of all things and divide it into partial ones. But in order to remove confusion among things and introduce their distinction, Aristotle and nearly all later philosophers have especially brought in the discretion of sciences according to the distinction of formal objects. And those who before Aristotle did not distinguish the sciences according to the distinction of objects did not arrive at full and perfect knowledge of things, and appeared rather to babble than to philosophize aptly (1. *Met.* 6.). Finally, the end of a science is one thing, and the end of the knower is another, as I touched on at the end of the Logic (*adfinem lib.* 1.). The place of Scotus cited by our recent thinkers does not patronize them — both because it is an addition and is left under doubt, as those same authors confess, and also because everything I have noted is found in Scotus (*quest.* 3. *prol.*) and other

writings of the same Doctor. Nor in this and other matters that do not conflict with the faith did Scotus want to depart from Aristotle.

Assertion I: sensible substance is not the object of Physiology. Gathered from Scotus (*6. Met. q. 1.*). This is proved: first, the object of a science is one per se, just as the science itself is undoubtedly one per se, depending on the object from which it is generated and on the demonstration of which it is the effect (*1. post. T. 5.*). But sensible substance is not one per se — since sensibility is an accident, and from an accident and a subject what is made is one per accidens (*6. Met. T. 4.*) — both because (*7. Met. T. 12.*) it does not have a definition; and also because, as Bonetus notes (*1. Met. cap. 3.*), it is not a necessary being, since their union is contingent. Therefore sensible substance is not aptly determined as the object of Physics. Second: accidents are per se sensible (*2. animæ T. 65.*); substance, however, is called sensible per accidens and remotely. Here also belongs what I said in the preceding article about material substance taken precisely, insofar as it abstracts from matter, form, and composite, which cannot be placed as the formal object of this science — since incomplete and partial substance is reduced to the complete and total. And so, since sensible substance is said to be of those substances, it follows without hesitation that it is not the object of this discipline.

Assertion II: the generable and corruptible body is not the adequate object of Physics. Deduced from the Doctor in the cited passage and proved: first from Aristotle, who (*2. phys. T. 71.*) writes that those things that are moved while moving — whether corruptible or incorruptible, as heaven is — pertain to Physics. Again (*1. Cæli 1. & 1. Meteor. 1.*) he adds that all things constituted by nature and mobile are subject to the consideration of Physics. Furthermore (*5. Met. 7. 8. eiusdem operis*), among sensible substances and natural bodies he reckons heaven, which is perpetual and incorruptible. Second: every mobile body pertains to Physics, because mobility properly taken is a property of the mobile body — for body has a nature, which is the principle of motion and rest. Since, therefore, heaven has a nature (*1. Cæli s.*), it is clearly inferred that heaven itself pertains to Physics. The Philosopher indicating this, immediately after the eight books of Physics, adds the books on the heavens. Third: that science which treats of a genus undoubtedly discourses about its species, because the genus potentially contains its species. But Physics treats of the natural body taken generically, whose species are the celestial and sublunary bodies — as I noted in the preface to this work. I add that unless heaven fell under the object of Physics, the tripartite division of speculative science (*6. Met. 1.*) would be insufficient — for a fourth speculative science would have to be given that discourses about the celestial spheres, which opposes the torrent of the philosophers. Furthermore, the formal notion of the object of Physics cannot be corruptibility and generability, but is rather a property of the sublunary body. Hence Aristotle, treating of the subject of science in general, denies that it is a corruptible being. The reason is given by Bonetus (*1. Met. 3. §. Quinta.*): because

with the subject corrupted, the science of that subject is also corrupted, since the science consequently depends on that same subject.

One objects, first, against Assertion I: Aristotle (*12. Metaphysica sum. 1. capite 2.*) divides sensible substance into temporary and eternal, and holds that Physics is to be occupied in the contemplation of both. The reason can be that sensible substance moves our intellect to consideration of it. Therefore sensible substance must be set down as the object of Physics. I respond: the aforesaid division of substance is not that of a genus into species but of an accident into subjects. For sensibility belongs per se to accident and per accidens to material substance (*2. anima, 65.*). And so since sensibility cannot be the formal notion of sensible substance, the sensible substance itself cannot validly be the object of Physics. This is also confirmed by what I said in the preceding article in responding to the second objection.

One objects, second, against Assertion II: the object of Physics is to be determined whose principles and properties are treated in the eight books of Physics, because as what is common, they are suited to the rest of what is considered in Physics. But the principles and affections of the generable and corruptible body are handed down in the said work (*1. Phys. T. 56. & indè*), where matter, form, and privation are treated — which clearly do not belong to heaven, since it is incorruptible. All the more so since Aristotle thinks heaven is a simple body immune from matter, as Scotus notes (*2. d. 14. q. 1.*). I grant the major. To the minor I say that although principles and properties of this sort are assigned in the aforesaid work, it nevertheless does not follow that all of Physics is occupied with the generable and corruptible body, but with the natural body abstracting from the corruptible and the incorruptible — as the Philosopher clearly expounds (*2. Phys. T. 71.*), and as the same (*1. Cæli T. 5.*) indicates and the Coimbrans expound (*1. phys. capite f. quest. 1. a. 4.*).

You will insist: in the view of Aristotle, heaven is not composed from matter and form, as I touched on with Scotus above. Nor does it enjoy an internal principle of motion, since it is moved by an external thing — namely the intelligence. I say indeed that according to Aristotle heaven is a simple body; nevertheless, according to the theologians, heaven is compounded from matter and form, and is immediately incorruptible — not, however, remotely — because there is no other natural agent that can overcome its power and introduce another form distinct from that which it enjoys (*Scot. 2. dist. 14. quest. 1. 4. d. 49. quest. 6. §. Hic duo sunt Sub B.*). But heaven has an internal principle of motion, about which in its proper place.

One objects, third: the subject of a science must be univocal, since it is either generic or specific (*dictis supra*). But body, insofar as it comprehends both celestial and sublunary bodies, is not univocal. For (*10. Met. ad finem*), the corruptible and the incorruptible differ more than in genus. Since, therefore, heaven is incorruptible and sublunary things corruptible, it plainly follows that

Physics expends its effort solely on the sublunary body, which is generable and corruptible. I grant the major. I deny the minor. To the testimony of Aristotle I say it is to be interpreted of the physical genus, which is matter — not of the logical or metaphysical genus. Or you may say that the Philosopher himself is speaking of the proximate genus, not of the remote genus (*Scot. 4. d. 6. quest. 11. §. Ad quest. propè medium.*). This can be illustrated from stone and man, which, though they differ in the proximate genus, nevertheless agree in the remote genus — namely in the common notion of body and categorical substance.

Article III. Whether Finite Being Is the Object of Physics.

I see the Scotists divided three ways in this article. Some — such as Bonetus (*1. Phys. cap. 1. §. perscrutandum.*) and Tatarct (*ibid. quest. vn. scibili. 4.*), with whom Toledo seems at least verbally to agree (*eo loci quest. 2.*) — judge that the adequate subject of the whole of natural philosophy, considered in itself and in its full breadth, is finite natural being taken generally. Others — among whom are numbered Canonicus (*1. Phys. quest. 1.*) and Trombet (*6. Met. quest. 1.*), to whom the twin Scotists adhere (*quest. proæm. a. 2.*) — establish as the total subject of Physics considered in itself the finite natural substance. The rest — notably Faber (*Faber Theor. 20. cap. 1.*), Fuentes (*quest. 1. proæm. a. 2.*) — deny that either finite natural being or finite natural substance is the adequate and proximate subject of Physics — whether considered in itself or in any other manner.

The tripartite distribution of speculative sciences acquired through the service of the senses, handed down (*6. Met. 1.*) and explained by me (*Log. lib. 5. quest. 4. a. 6.*), is to be recalled. Furthermore: just as one speculative science of corporeal substance is admitted, so another speculative science of incorporeal substance is to be conceded. But because the proper predicates and properties of incorporeal substance are not knowable and demonstrable by us through sense, and because what we know about such substance consists of common and transcendent predicates, therefore we do not have of that same substance another science distinct from Metaphysics. For Metaphysics, as the universal and common doctrine, contemplates the common and universal predicates of each substance and of whatever else there is. Note also that both nature and what has a nature are substance (*2. Phys. T. 4.*) — not indeed incorporeal substance, which Physics does not care about, but corporeal and material substance, which Physics itself meditates (*1. Cæli 1. & 1. de partibus animalium 1.*) — as Veglia accumulates from many places (*vest. 6. cap. 1. & indè*). Furthermore, the same thing, under diverse formal aspects, is treated by diverse sciences — after Aristotle (*2. Phys. 18.*): as Orbellis notes (*cit. in fine*), Physics considers quantity as an affection of the natural body; Mathematics considers it precisely insofar as it is quantity; and Metaphysics considers it as being.

Assertion I: finite and limited being is not the object of Physics. Drawn from Scotus (*6. Met. quest. 1.*) and consonant with Aristotle in the places just cited. This is proved: first, Physics does not concern itself with the inspection of finite being

— since that is the office of Metaphysics, as is clear (*5. Met. T. 14.*), where Aristotle divides finite being into the ten categories, which also, according to Bonetus cited, are not considered by Physics as its object. If, therefore, Metaphysics examines the ten predicaments, into which as into ten modes finite being is distributed, then finite being too is surveyed by Metaphysics itself — since it belongs to the same science to investigate the dividing members and the divided. Hence the same Bonetus confesses (*9. Met. cap. 2.*) that he has brought the partition of being into infinite and finite. Second: from the distinction of objects the division of sciences is derived — a common axiom received and defended by the same Bonetus there. But the finite and the infinite are modes of being, as I will show in the Metaphysics. Therefore finite being is not determined as the object of Physics — otherwise there would be only two sciences posited, one of the infinite and another of the finite, whereas the same Bonetus admits Metaphysics as a science distinct from the rest, whose concern he wants to be to speculate on being, which he calls the first nature of origin, and on the first intelligence, which he names the first nature of perfection, which is the infinite God. For if from the second nature one science is constituted, without doubt from the first nature another science is to be established. Furthermore, finite being comprehends accident, which Orbellis particularly notes (*præcit.*) is the object of no science. Here also belong the things I adduced in Article I of this question to repel mobile being from the object of Physics.

Assertion II: finite natural substance is not the proximate and adequate object of Physics. This follows from the sayings of the Doctor cited and is urged: first, the subject of science is presupposed as to whether it exists and what it is, and about its knowable properties are demonstrated (*1. post. 1.*). But in Physics, finite natural substance is not presupposed as to whether it exists and what it is. For finite natural substance is nowhere in Physics defined, nor are its affections demonstrated, as is evident to anyone going through all the books of Physics. Therefore finite natural substance is not established as the object of Physics.

You will say: this argument proves only with regard to the object of Physics as delivered by Aristotle, not with regard to its object taken in its full amplitude, as the aforesaid Scotists speak. But this response does not seem to be of any weight. For, besides the fact that the said authors make Aristotle defective and diminished in establishing the object of Physics, the subject of any science — since it precedes the science and its author — is not constituted at the discretion and pleasure of the same author, as I considered and confirmed in the preceding article. Especially because the respect of the author of a science is entirely extrinsic, both to the science itself and to its object. Above all, almost all philosophers acknowledge that Aristotle delivered Physics complete and perfect in all its numbers, as is clear from the enumeration of its parts briefly assigned in the beginning of this work. To devise another broader Physics and a broader object for it is something for which neither any authority nor any argument of

any moment is adduced to support it, as will be evident from the resolution of the objections to be adduced below. Although in the Logic I use this distinction in establishing the object of Logic, yet there a sufficient foundation is laid and a sufficiently firm reason given for not disapproving that distinction. Second: the well-established distinction received by all between Physics and Metaphysics, drawn from the Philosopher passim in his writings — notably (*2. Phys.* 18. & 6. *Met.* 2. & 1. *de partib. animalium*, 1.), whose words are these: "No natural science can contemplate a thing abstracted from matter, since nature makes all things for some purpose; but what we understand by the phrase 'for one thing's sake' is divorced from abstract things." Then (*12. Met. cap. 2.*) the same Philosopher treats of finite and infinite substance, as the Doctor notes (*ad finem quol.* 7.). Therefore finite natural substance is not decreed the object of Physics — otherwise Physics would not differ from Metaphysics. Furthermore, Aristotle (*6. Met.*) in the cited passage derives the distinction of speculative sciences — among which Physics is mentioned — not from the finiteness or infiniteness of substance, as may be observed there and as I expressed in the cited Logic. Third: given that opinion, Angels would fall under the object of Physics, since they are finite substances — and those authors concede this. But they are not comprehended under the object of Physics, nor does Physics itself demonstrate their proper properties — since they are not subject to the senses, being devoid of matter and form. Rather, another science would have to be assigned for them than to include them under Physics. I add that their location is definitive, distinct from the circumscriptive (*Veglia velt.* 6. 1. 2. c. 5. num. 93.), and (*1. Cæli T.* 100.) they are said not to be in place. Likewise their motion is of another nature, as Tataret asks dubiously and other scholastics assert. Therefore they are not subject to the consideration of Physics.

You will say, with Trombet and the undivided Scotists (*cit. q. 2.*): the motion of Angels, though subjectively spiritual, is nevertheless, by reason of the space and things through which it is effected, extended and material — and therefore in this respect it pertains to Physics. But this response removes the substance of the Angel, which is finite, from the object of Physics while including its motion under the same object — and so finite substance is wrongly established as the object of this science, but rather mobile being, which the said authors reject together with us. And if the motion of an Angel is contained under this object on account of material and extended space, equally the intellection of the same Angel about a quantified and material object objectively and terminatively pertains to Physics — since in both cases the reason is equal. Again, if motion were to occur in an instant — which the Doctor (*2. d. 2. q. 11.*) does not deny to be possible — and likewise if God were to destroy that positive and material space, there would certainly be nothing by reason of which the motion would be called material and extended. Finally, even the motion by which God moves material and corporeal things would be regarded by Physics. And thus not only

finite but even infinite substance would be the subject of Physics — which none of the objectors dares say, and which all see to be plainly false.

One objects, first, against Assertion I: the distinction of sciences is derived from the distinction of objects (*1. post. T. 43.*). But the object of Metaphysics is being (*4. Met. 1.*). Therefore the object of Physics — which immediately follows it — is finite being. It is confirmed: not only finite substance is mobile, but accident too is mobile, as is clear in the Eucharist. Therefore the adequate object of Physics comprehends both finite substance and accident, which is finite being. I respond: it is not from the finiteness or infiniteness of being — which are modes of it pertaining to Metaphysics — that Physics and the other sciences derive their specificative and distinctive objects, but from substance in terms of its formal notions. But accident is the subject of no science (*Orbel. præcit. ex 6. Met. T. 5.*) — because it cannot be the first and ultimate subject of demonstrable properties, since it is ordered toward substance, from which it is produced and on which it depends for its being. Hence it is called its being (*1. Eth. cap. 6.*). Wherefore, to the confirmation I say that accident is mobile not of itself but dependently on substance; and since it is referred to the substance in which it is subjected, it is therefore contained under substance — and so what is more common and broader than corporeal substance and the natural body is not to be assigned as the object of Physics.

One objects, second: that in which mobility — which is the first property of natural substance — is adequately subjected is to be decreed the total object of Physics in its full breadth. But finite substance — which comprehends both incorporeal substance, such as the Angel who is mobile, and corporeal substance as the total physical being — is the first and adequate subject of mobility. Therefore the total and adequate object of Physics is finite substance. It is confirmed: Aristotle separates from Physics the abstract substances because he judges them to be immobile and immutable (*1. Cæli T. 100. Et 12. Met. T. 5.*). If, therefore, he knew them to be mobile — as the Doctor truly shows they are (*2. d. 2. quest. 9.*) — he would undoubtedly include them in the object of Physics. I respond by distinguishing the major: regarding sensible and material mobility, which proceeds from the physical composite and is most of all subjected in it — granted; regarding insensible and spiritual mobility, not indeed from the side of the space to be traversed but from the side of the mobile — denied. To the distinction of the major I distinguish the minor: for, as the Stagirite clearly delivers (*12. Met. cap. 2. ad T. 6.*), sensible substance and its motion pertain to natural philosophy; but insensible substance separable from matter pertains to Metaphysics. For the mobility of the latter is of another nature from the mobility of the former (*Tatar. cit. cum Doct. 2. d. 2. quest. 6. §. Ad propositum. O.*).

You will insist: the rational soul is altered in the body and is moved in it, and receives such motion — which also pertains to Physics. Therefore the same is to be asserted about the motion of the Angel. I add: Scotus (*cit. quest. 11. §. dico sub.*

O.) argues that the notion of place is a common univocal notion for both the circumscriptive place, which is suited to the natural body, and the definitive place, which is suited to the Angel. Equally, there is no inconvenience in having the universal notion of mobility convene univocally with the mobility of each — in roughly the same way as the human intellect and the angelic intellect participate in the common notion of an intellective principle, and as the vision of an ox and an eagle are of the same species (*Scot. cit. d. 1. quest. 6. §. potest etiam. D.*). Therefore the aforesaid distinction about mobility dissolves the argument, even though their natures differ in species. The parity is to be denied. For the soul is the informing, constitutive, and perfecting part of the body — and it belongs to the same science to speculate on the whole in which it is occupied and on its parts, principles, and properties. Wherefore, since Physics contemplates the animated body, it likewise contemplates its parts, among which the soul shines preeminently. Likewise it meditates on the faculties and affections of the soul itself, in the number of which mobility is found. But since the Angel is separated from matter and has nothing material, consequently neither its essence nor its principles and properties — among which mobility exists — are subject to the consideration of Physics, as the Doctor just cited intimates (§. *conclusis.*).

To the other thing appended, I say: even if the definition of place delivered (*4. phys. T. 41.*) is suited only to the circumscriptive place — which Gilbert of Poitiers (*1. Sex principip.*) and others also accept — and even if it is admitted that material and immaterial substance participate in the common notion of place prescinding from circumscriptive and definitive place, it is not inferred from this that each place is of the same nature — just as man and Angel have the common concept of transcendental and predicamental substance, yet all confess them to differ in species. Similarly substance and accident are univocal in the common concept of being, according to Scotus, yet no one doubts they are of another nature. And so, given that the abstract and matter-conjoined substance enjoys a common and general notion of mobility, it is not well deduced that the mobility of each is of the same nature — since they proceed from diverse principles and subjects, whose powers and properties are diverse. Nor does the opinion of the adversaries have support from the Doctor. For even if he should want the intellect of the Angel and of man to participate in the same notion, perhaps he asserts this because each intellect is spiritual and enjoys a spiritual principle of understanding and labors about the same object. Similarly the Doctor adds (*ibid.*) that the vision of an ox and an eagle does not differ in species because both are material, engaged about the same object. Yet since the mobility of the Angel is formally and subjectively spiritual, and the mobility of the natural body is material, it does not seem to be of the same species — except very remotely — nor to be examined by one and the same science. To the confirmation: let us grant that Aristotle judges those substances to be necessary, immobile, even uncaused — which the Doctor shows does not savor of truth (*1.*

d. 8. q. 5. Et quol. pracic.) — and I demonstrate at length (*Tract. de creatione disp. 1. q. 17.*): for God alone is immobile, immutable, and uncaused (*8. Phys. T. 34. 37. inde, necnon 12. Met. T. 38. 41. 49.*). Nevertheless, the precise reason why those substances are considered by Metaphysics is not their immobility but because they are devoid of matter and separated from it, as the Philosopher lucidly expounds (*2. Phys. T. 26. Et 1. Phys. T. 83. 6. Met. T. 3.*): if there were no abstract substances, Physics would be first philosophy — since, given the hypothesis, there would be only material substances, which are treated by Physics.

Article IV. Whether the Natural Body Is the Object of Physics.

A few thinkers, whom Aversa follows and cites (*2. 3.*), hold that the natural body as natural is the formal and proximate subject of Physics. But the common opinion at this time is strenuously defended by Faber (*Theor. 20.*), Fuentes (*in proæm. Phys. a. 3.*), Hurtado, Arriaga, and others — preceded by Scotus (*6. Met. q. 1.*), Anthony Andrew, and others in that place — who affirm that the natural body as natural is the adequate and formal object of attribution of natural philosophy.

Note that "natural" is derived from nature, which is taken in many ways (*q. 1. prot. L. Et 2. d. 18. q. vn. B.*) — and "natural" has many acceptations (*4. d. 43. q. 4. §. Intelligendum A.*), which are touched on (*Dyol. 17. prope initium*) and adduced by me (*l. 3. de natura, & arte q. 1. a. 1.*). Furthermore, I note that "natural," or the natural thing, is the total physical being — named the composite from matter and form (*2. Phys. 1. Cæli t.*). Then the Philosopher (*2. Phys.*) divides nature into matter and form, and makes privation in some way a nature; but the being that consists in nature is the substantial composite, which has matter and form — each of which is nature. Hence the same Aristotle (*1. Phys. in proæ.*) had previously noted that he must treat of the principles of natural science, which are matter, form, and privation; and there (*a 2.*) he calls questions about these natural questions. And at the end of that book he remits discourse on separate forms to first philosophy, because that is not natural. The same is delivered (*1. 2. Phys. c. 2.*). Furthermore, Aristotle inscribes the first work of the Metaphysics as being after physical things. Wherefore nature properly, and the natural, in the second philosophy, by no means spreads and extends to substances separated from matter and to insensible and immaterial beings. And those who discourse otherwise about these speak unnaturally, as Cajetan objects in the present question. Furthermore, recall from what was said in the Logic (*q. 3. a. 1. 1. 1.*) that the scientific subject which is too broad, regarded by several sciences, is restricted and limited through the formal and intrinsic notion by which it is determined and appropriated to only one science. Thus the natural body — which is the material object of Physics, about which Medicine also concerns itself — through healability, which is the formal notion of the healable natural body, is determined, made adequate, and regarded by Medicine alone. Similarly, through naturalness, the natural body is contracted, restricted, and

considered only by Physiology. Wherefore to derive the unity and specification of a science from its formal object is a common maxim among philosophers.

Assertion: the natural body as natural is established as the formal and adequate object of the whole of Physics. That this is according to the mind of the Doctor (6. *Met. q. 1.*) is maintained by the Parisians (*in fine q. alleg.*). This is proved: first from Aristotle (2. *Phyf. & 1. Cæli præcit.*), saying that Physics is concerned with what consists in nature. But what consists in nature is the natural body, as I was explaining just above. Then (6. *Met. 1.*): natural science speculates on corporeal substance in which there is a principle of motion and rest. The same is read (11. *Met. 1. 12. eiusdem operis T. 6.*). Second: the natural body has all the conditions required for the formal and proximate object of Physics. Therefore it is to be determined as its total and adequate object. The antecedent is urged from what was said in the Logic in the place just mentioned: there are three necessary conditions for the formal subject of a science. First, that the subject be presupposed as to whether it exists and what it is. Second, that it have knowable properties demonstrable from its principles. Third, that to it all things treated in the science are reduced. But these three conditions are suited to the natural body. The first indeed: for since Aristotle (2. *Phyf. 1.*) delivers the definition of the natural body, it is thus presupposed about the natural body itself whether it exists — for the question of what a thing is is never raised unless it is presupposed whether it exists. Second, because both its incomplex principles are delivered — which are matter, form, and privation (1. *phyf. T. 56.*) — and complex ones — which are its axioms, such as "nature does what is best" — and knowable properties are demonstrated of it, such as mobility (1. *Cæli, 1.*). Third and finally: because all things are comprehended under the natural body — either as parts, or as properties, or as species, or per se, or per accidens — as is evident to anyone reading the books of Physics. Third: what is the root and originating principle of all the affections and properties of Physics is by unanimous and unhesitating consent judged to be the formal and total object of Physics. But the natural body is of this sort: from it flow quantity, quality, place, time, motion, and other things of this kind. Fourth: from the refutation of the others. Since, from what was proved above (*art. 1. huius q.*), it is not mobile being, nor the mobile body, nor the generable and corruptible body (*ibid. a. 2.*), nor finite being and finite substance (*co loci, a. 3.*) — consequently and sufficiently it is concluded that it is the natural body as natural.

One objects, first: the object is not proved but presupposed by the science of which it is the object (1. *post. c. 1.*). But the natural body is proved (2. *Phyf. 31.*). Therefore the natural body is not the subject of Physics. I grant the major, I deny the minor. For there it is only shown that every mobile thing is quantified and divisible — but it is clear that the quantified and divisible does not coincide with the natural body. This the Philosopher plainly indicates (2. *Phyf. T. 6.*), saying that the existence of nature is not argued for but presupposed. And (1. *Phyf. T. 11.*): "That some things are moved is manifest."

One objects, second: the formal object is what is proper and distinctive of one science from another, for from it the science derives its unity and distinction (3. *anima*, 38.). But "natural" is common to other sciences — for Metaphysics (5. *diuinarum* T. 5. c. 4.) defines nature as the principle of motion and rest; it likewise contemplates the four genera of causes (*ibid.* T. 2.). Again, Astrology considers the natural body, its motion, figure, and position (10. *Met.* 4.). Furthermore, Medicine examines the natural body itself along with its powers and natural affections. Therefore the natural body is not the first and adequate object of Physics. I grant the major, I deny the minor. To its proof I say that Metaphysics inspects nature, causes, and things of this kind not in terms of their proper predicates, under the notion of naturalness, but in terms of common and transcendent attributes — since it is a common and general science investigating the common and transcendental notions of all things. Hence it is clear what is to be said of Astrology, which surveys celestial bodies under the mathematical notion, inquiring their measure, order, position, equality, and other things of this form — and not under the notion of naturalness, as Physics does. About Medicine it is clear that it has its own formal and objective notion, which is healability — distinct from the formal and objective notion of Physics, which is naturalness.

One objects, third: the formal object is the principle and proximate foundation, and the origin of all the properties and accidents treated in the science of which it is said to be the formal object. But "natural" comprehends only those things that come about through motion, not through mutation and simple emanation — such as those which are congenital and always conjoined with those of which they are properties, as quantity with corporeal substance, powers with the soul, and the like. Therefore naturalness is not the proximate and adequate notion of the formal object of Physics. I grant the major, I deny the minor. For under those words "of motion and rest" placed in the definition of nature are contained all the properties of Physics — whether they be congenital with their subjects or not; whether they proceed from the natural body through motion or through mutation and simple emanation. This will become clearer in its proper place, in the explanation of the said definition of nature, and will be confirmed through the definition of the efficient cause — which is such a principle whence motion and rest.

You ask: what is the object of the eight physical books? Scotus responds (*q. 3. vniuers. ad 2.*) that it is the natural body taken precisely, insofar as it abstracts from its species — concerning which Mastrius and Bellutus are to be seen (*quest. proæm.*).

Book II. On the Principles of Natural Things.

Aristotle is no sluggish executor of the precept he himself laid down at the very beginning — (*1. Phys. 1.*) — that in every discipline one must begin from its principles, causes, and elements; and a few passages later (*T. 4.*) — that one must advance from what is more common and universal to what is less common. For when these are first known and understood, anyone may easily attain knowledge and understanding of the other things of which they are the principles and causes. Once the causes are known, it is no difficult or troublesome matter to know their effects. I follow this method, which I likewise observed and set forth in the Logic — most particularly in its preface and at the beginning of Book I. Accordingly, I judge that one should treat first of the principles of natural things in general; thereafter of the same in particular; and finally of the remaining matters that follow from them.

Question I. On Principles Taken in General.

No philosopher, whether ancient or modern, calls into doubt whether natural principles exist. For this is held to be manifest in the transmutation of natural composites, which presuppose principles and parts from which they are generated and composed; and likewise in the natural agent, which presupposes a subject upon which it acts, into which it introduces — or rather educes — something from the subject, of which that same subject was previously deprived. But what, how many, and what kind natural principles are — the many discordant opinions and conflicting views of the Ancients are recounted at length and admirably refuted by Aristotle (*1. Phys. cc. 3 and following*). I shall set forth clearly what I judge opportune and necessary concerning these principles through the articles that follow, and I shall resolve the questions as best I can.

Article I. What Natural Principles Are.

Since the philosophers recalled in the preceding remarks have reasoned about principles in such varied ways that some of them spoke about these matters in an unnatural fashion — a fault for which Aristotle reproaches them (*ibid. c. 3*) — while others spoke in so stammering and discordant a fashion about the same matters that one may rightly say of them what is said of those who disagree: "as many heads, so many opinions" — it pleases me to investigate carefully and precisely what is said about the aforementioned principles both in general and in particular. And so that their nature may be more clearly evident to us, and their distinction from one another and from other things more easily understood:

First Note, from Scotus (*4. Met. in tex. p. 96.*), Averroes (*5. Met. in com. c. 1.*), Vorrlong (*1. d. 29.*), and Fonseca (*l. 5. Met. in expositione c. 1.*), these three — principle, cause, and element — stand to one another as superior and inferior, so that principle is the highest, cause is inferior to it, and element is the lowest

of all. For every cause is a principle, but not every principle is a cause — just as place is indeed a principle from which motion proceeds, but not its cause. Similarly, every element is a cause, but not every cause is an element — as is evident from the final and efficient cause, which is not an element, since an element belongs intrinsically to what is elementated, just as letters, which are the elements of speech, belong to its composition and integrity. This may in some measure be illustrated and clarified by these three terms: produced, created, and caused — among which produced has a wider extension than created, and caused wider than the latter, as Mayr observes (*1. d. 8. q. 7.*). For in the divine persons, the Son is produced but not created, nor caused — as the Athanasian Creed affirms: "not made, nor created." The same point may be noted with these three verbs: to emanate, to be produced, and to be generated. For the divine attributes emanate and spring forth from God's essence, but they are neither produced nor generated; and the Holy Spirit is produced by the Father and the Son, but is not generated by them. More on this in the Treatise on God as One (*disp. 3*) and the Treatise on God as Triune (*disp. 1*).

The reason why not every principle is a cause can be given as follows: something can be the principle of another thing even if it exerts no influence upon it — as is evident from privation, which is numbered among the principles, even though it exerts no influence upon the composite. A cause, however, in the usage of the Latin scholastics, always concurs in the production of its effect and exerts influence upon the very effect itself, which is distinct from the cause in species or in number — as will be shown when causes in general are treated.

I am not unaware that the Philosopher sometimes conflates principle with cause and uses both terms interchangeably. For at (*12. Met. T. 12. c. 2.*) he explicitly calls privation a cause. And at (*5. ibid.*), after listing various senses of principle, he finally concludes: "Causes are said in as many ways as principles." And at (*4. Met. c. 2. T. 3.*) he had premised that cause and principle are interchangeable, just as being and one — it therefore follows, on Aristotle's account, that cause has the same extension as principle. However, Suárez (*disp. 12. Met. Sect. 1. n. 26 and following*), Fonseca (*cit. q. 7. sect. 2.*), and Pereira (*1. 3. de principiis c. 1.*) adduce and reject many responses given by great scholars to the aforementioned passages of the Philosopher, and in the end they concede — Suárez explicitly at (*cit. n. 30.*) — that principle taken in whatever sense is more common and universal than cause. And so those testimonies of the Philosopher stand in their force, and they appear to amount to a modest concession of Aristotle's lapse — as the aforementioned Suárez charges others: for if principle taken in any sense whatever has a wider extension than cause, then Aristotle was wrong to say that principle is interchangeable with cause as one is interchangeable with being, and that causes are said in as many ways as principles, and that privation is a cause.

Furthermore, the Greek Fathers — Chrysostom, Theodoret in their commentaries on the Epistle to the Hebrews, Damascene (*1. fidei, 11.*), and others

cited by the Conimbricenses (*1. Phys. c. 5. q. 1. a. 1.*) — hold the same view. And in the acts of the Council of Nicaea, St. Athanasius used cause in place of principle. Why may Aristotle not do the same, given that he too was Greek and used the same acceptance? All the more so since certain Latin writers — among them Augustine (*7. Trin. 1.*) and (*l. 83. qq. q. 16.*), and Jerome in his commentary on (*c. 3 of the Epistle to the Ephesians*) — used cause in the sense of principle. I add that those same authors do not reject the common, popular acceptance of cause as any kind of principle, even one that exerts no influence upon an effect — as Fonseca senses (*4. Met. T. 3.*) and Suárez concedes (*n. 29.*) from (*12. Met. T. 12.*). Yet Suárez himself is reluctant to grant this, lest he be forced to assert that cause and principle are equally common in extension.

To remove every difficulty and settle the dispute in the matter itself and in Aristotle, it seems to me that one must say that principle can be taken in two ways — commonly and properly. Taken commonly, principle and cause in a broad sense coincide; and in this sense Aristotle is to be understood when he says (*5. Met. T. cit.*) that causes are said in as many ways as principles, and (*4. Met. at the passage cited*) that cause is interchangeable with principle as one is with being, and (*12. ibid.*) that privation is a cause. In the same sense Jerome is expounded: "The Father is the origin and in some manner the cause of the substance" of the Son. And Augustine (*4. Trin. c. 20.*): "The Father is the principle of the whole divinity." Properly, however, principle is that which exerts influence upon what is produced and is called the origin of one thing from another — thus in the divine persons the Father is the principle of the Son, and the Father and Son are the principle of the Holy Spirit. Principle so taken and cause, among the Greeks, are interchangeable — as is clear from the Fathers cited above, and as is received in the Council of Florence (*sess. ult. in the letters of holy union*). Among the Latins, however, they are by no means interchangeable, since the Latins take cause more strictly, as what provides being to the effect that depends upon it and exists in a species or number distinct from it. In this way cause and principle are not interchangeable, since principle is wider than cause.

For this reason Aristotle, treating of cause as distinct from principle, perhaps discusses it later (*6. 2. 1. 5. Met.*) in roughly the same manner as he had reasoned at (*2. Phys. sum. 3. c. 1.*), as Orbellus and Tartaretus note there. Moreover, in created things, principle and that which is principiated enjoy distinct natures, just as cause and effect do, and one always depends upon the other; nor should one suppose that Aristotle acknowledged one thing to be produced from another without dependence, or that the principiated is not the correlative of the principle in divine matters — as the Latins hold, on which see the Treatise on the Trinity (*disp. 2. q. 6.*) at length.

Furthermore, this twofold acceptance of principle and cause does not seem incongruous. It is akin to the use of being and thing, which the Doctor sets forth (*Quol. 2. § De 1.*) and which Orbellus explains (*4. Met. quaest. 1. 2.*), and which

Aristotle indicates at the passage just cited, subjoining the common definition of principle, to be adduced in the next note.

Second Note: from various writings and different passages of Aristotle, four descriptions of principle are to be derived — three in the singular and the fourth in the plural. The first is found near the beginning of the *Poetics*: "A beginning is that which does not itself necessarily follow upon something else, while something else naturally is or comes to be after it." This account of principle is restricted by Fonseca (*cit. q. 1. Sect. Prima*) to the principle of a quantitative and extended thing only — such as the unit of number, the point of a line, and the instant of time. But it is, as Suárez writes following Damascene in his *Dialogue against the Manichaeans* (*cit. n. 4.*), most broad and highly equivocal. For it can extend not only to quantities but also to qualities — so that the first degree of a quality is called its principle, a foundation is the principle of a house, a higher place is the principle of a lower one, letters are the principle of grammar, the exordium of a speech, and the terms of dialectic. This Fonseca seems also to sense, extending that definition of principle to things that are actually or potentially principles, as well as to those very things from which others are or come to be.

The second is given (*5. de generatione animalium c. 7.*): "That is a principle, that is itself the cause of many things, but has no superior cause above it." This account of principle appears broader than the preceding. For since principle is defined through cause — as if cause were the genus and something superior to it — cause appears to be superior and more extensive than principle. But although in a broad signification cause and principle possess the same extension, as has been said, nonetheless, since cause regards a caused thing and effect that depend upon it essentially, and principle taken properly, though it always exerts influence upon what is produced or communicates being to it, yet what is produced does not always depend upon the producer — as is evident from the divine Persons who are produced, among whom there is indeed co-requiredness but not dependence, and priority of origin but not priority of nature or time — it follows that cause properly is not more extensive than principle; on the contrary, it is narrower, since it concerns only those things that enjoy essential dependence upon one another, such as the many effects proceeding from one cause, of which it is called the first cause and the principle in that series and order — much as the ten predicaments are said to be the ten first genera.

The third is drawn at (*5. Met. 1.*): "A principle is the first from which something actually is, or comes to be, or is known." There Aristotle and his interpreters note that "first" applies to all principles — for every principle is first, yet not every first thing is a principle, since being is the first of all things of which it is predicated, yet one cannot call it a principle of God, since God is without a principle, indeed is himself the principle and end of all things (*Apoc. 1.*). Thus a principle is said to

be first absolutely, and something is called a principle in a given order when in that very order it is preceded by no other. In this way, in the order of the divine Persons, the Father is the principle of the entire divinity — as Augustine writes (*4. Trin. c. 20.*): "Among universals, genus; among predicaments, substance; among natural principles, matter; among men, Adam; and among the Friars Minor, St. Francis." Similarly, something is called a first principle in a qualified sense within a given order — thus an intermediate point is called the first and principle of the subsequent points of a line, and an intermediate instant of time is called a principle comparatively, that is, in relation to the other instants succeeding it in time.

Hence it is essential to a principle to be first and to be prior to that which is from it — whether absolutely or relatively, and in whatever order. In created things, a cause is at least prior by nature to its effect; and in the divine persons, the Father is prior in origin to the Son — on which see the Treatise on God as Triune at length.

In the aforementioned definition, the word "from which" is placed to designate the consequence or connection between a principle and something else that is from it. Since a principle is a relative thing — as Vorrlong concedes (*cit.*) — it must regard another, which in some manner is from it: either consecutively, as the first instant regards the second instant; or originatively, as a father regards his son; or causatively, as a cause regards its effect. This Aristotle expressed by adding: "from which something is, or comes to be, or is known" — wherein three kinds of principles are signified. Some, from which other things are, though they produce and exert no influence whatsoever upon those of which they are principles — as a point is called the principle of a line, and privation of natural generation. Others communicate being to what is produced, yet do not properly cause it — as has been said above of the divine Persons who produce, with respect to the Persons who are produced. And still others properly cause what is produced — as in created things a father causes his son. The remaining ones are principles of knowing, called dignities, suppositions, and axioms of the disciplines — of which Aristotle makes mention (*1. Post. cc. 9–10.*).

One might object: a true definition is given through genus and difference, as asserted in the Epitome (*1. 2. q. 7. art. 2.*); but that definition of principle is given through members into which it is divided, which appear to be rather its species than its genus and difference. It is also assigned by way of disjunction, and therefore is not a suitable definition. I grant the major and concede this much to the minor: I say that this is sometimes done when the proper genus and difference of the thing defined are not fully known to us, as Aristotle himself does (*1. Prior. 1.*) in defining the proposition through the affirmative and the negative, which are evidently its species — as I noted in the Epitome (*cit. q. 2. a. 2.*). In like manner it can be said in the present case that Aristotle assigned and set forth the aforementioned definition of principle through its dividing

members or quasi-species — especially because for things that are so broad, diffuse, equivocal, and transcendent, one can scarcely give a strict definition, but only a certain description and notification.

A most general definition of principle, suitable to all principles, can however be given in these words: "A principle is the first from which something follows." Here "first" serves as a kind of genus, and the remaining words serve as a kind of difference. Principle taken in this way is distributed into three members signified by the words of the Aristotelian definition: "from which something is, or comes to be, or is known."

The fourth definition is read (*1. Phys. c. 1. T. 42.*): "Principles are those things that are made neither from others, nor from one another mutually, but all things are made from them." This definition is proper and adapted exclusively to the principles of natural things, all interpreters agreeing there — except Arriaga (*disp. 1. sect. 2. n. 4.*) and Hurtado (*ibid.*), who make it common to every principle, even outside of Physics — including God, as the principle of created things, and Adam, as the principle of human beings. But apart from the fact that this definition is taken collectively, not distributively — as Fonseca rightly notes (*cit. q. 2. sect. 2.*) — for it is not principle in the singular but principles in the plural that are described, and those who, like Melissus and Parmenides, decreed one immovable principle such as God, are censured by Aristotle as speaking in an unnatural fashion (*cit. c. 2. qq. 7–8.*) — he himself treats of the first and immovable principle (*12. Met. sum. 2. c. 2. and following*), which is called the first principle and immovable, from which all things are moved, depend, and are essentially subordinated. Aristotle also investigates the principles of natural generation and composition, as is evident at the passage just cited, and his conclusion (*ibid. c. 7. T. 68.*) is stated in these words: "I have now sufficiently explained how many principles of natural things there are, those to which generation belongs, and in what manner they are so many." Furthermore, (*5. Met. 2.*) the efficient cause is described as the first principle from which motion and rest proceed — or from which motion and rest originate. From all this it is sufficiently indicated that God, who is the efficient cause of creatures, is their extrinsic principle. Since, then, Aristotle in the Physics discusses the intrinsic principles of natural things, it is clearly established that the aforementioned definition does not apply to God as the effective principle of things. Again, the preposition "from" placed in that definition does not designate the relation of an efficient cause to its effect. For although it is sometimes so taken — as Hurtado endeavors to urge from Sacred Scripture — yet it is not properly used by philosophers to denote the order to extrinsic causes; for a thing is not properly said to be made "from" an agent, but "by" an agent, as is explicitly stated (*1. Phys. c. 4. T. 40.*), and (*5. Met. T. 2.*), and as will be made clearer in the book on causes. Hence David of Dinant, who supposed God to be prime matter from which all things were created, is commonly censured.

Moreover, all philosophers together with Aristotle, from the foregoing remarks, concede that principles are contraries and that all natural composites come to be from them — either as from a terminus a quo or as from component parts. Furthermore, the three necessary conditions for those principles, set forth in the aforementioned definition and explained by the Parisian masters, plainly demonstrate that in no way can that definition be adapted to God, to angels, to accidents, or to the other things from which natural composites are neither generated nor composed. The first condition is that they are not made from others — the explanation being that since principles are contraries, as will be said below, and first contraries per se are not made from one another since they are simple (otherwise they would not be contraries per se), while secondary contraries are made from contraries, as Aristotle teaches at that passage. The second condition is that they are not made from one another — because they are contraries, and contraries are not made from one another, either as from a subject (since whiteness is not the subject of blackness) or as from a constitutive part (since blackness is not made from whiteness as from a constitutive part of it), although one can certainly be made from the other as a terminus a quo — thus from the non-white, white comes to be; and from the unmusical, the musician comes to be, as Aristotle testifies (*1. Phys. c. 5. T. 43. and following*). And if white comes from black, that is per accidens, as the same Philosopher adds there and the Parisian masters explain in that place. Through this distinction the apparent contradiction that seems to be involved in Aristotle's writings is removed — for at (*T. 43. c. 5.*) he says that contraries are not made from one another, yet below at (*T. 47.*) he concludes that all things are generated from immediate or mediate contraries. The solution, I say, is this: at (*T. 43.*) he writes that nothing is made from contraries as from a subject or as from a constitutive part — for form is not made from matter, since matter is not a constitutive part of form. But at (*T. 47.*) he asserts that all things are generated from contraries as from a terminus a quo, or from their privation — as he himself explains at (*T. 43–44. and following*). The third condition: "but all things are made from them." All natural composites come to be from the said principles — from privation indeed as from a terminus a quo, and from matter and form as from component parts. Therefore from the aforementioned definition of principles there are excluded God, angels, accidents, and all other things from which natural composites are neither generated nor composed.

Assertion. Physical principles are rightly defined as those that are made neither from others nor from one another mutually, but all things are made from them. So Aristotle (*cit.*), from whom Scotus (*9. Met. q. 14. § De aliis*) and the other Scholastics do not depart. Proved first: that definition is deemed suitable which explains the thing defined and possesses all the conditions required for it — as I set forth in the Epitome (*1. 2. q. 7. a. 2.*). Such is the aforementioned definition of principles, as is clear from the three conditions explained a little above. It is therefore a legitimate definition. Secondly, in it there are, as it were, a genus and

a difference — I say as it were, because things that are partial and incomplete cannot strictly participate in genus and difference, as I have noted elsewhere. The quasi-genus of physical principles is principle or principles, and the remaining words serve as a quasi-difference. Through these, physical principles are distinguished from all other principles. The aforementioned definition of them is therefore correct.

Objection I: Form comes to be from privation as from a terminus a quo, and from matter as from a subject — as I was explaining above. Therefore one principle comes to be from another, and so it is wrongly placed in the said definition that principles do not come to be from one another. This objection seems already to have been dissolved above, before the assertion. Nevertheless, for a richer treatment and on account of the multiplicity of responses that can be seen among our own authors, it is worth examining it more precisely. Suárez, Hurtado, and Arriaga (*cit.*) — following Toletus and others, whom the Parisian masters seem to have anticipated — respond that one principle comes to be from another in a different genus of principiation, as the instance proves, but not in the same genus of principiation — that is, form does not come from another form, nor privation from another privation, nor matter from another matter.

Against this: their response conflicts with Aristotle, who at the passage cited, giving the reason why principles are not mutually made from one another, says it is because they are contraries, and because first contraries per se are not made from one another per se since they are simple (otherwise they would not be first contraries per se). Secondary contraries are made from secondary contraries, Aristotle teaches at that same passage. Therefore, according to Aristotle, from the absolute primacy and primary contrariety it is clearly shown that principles are made neither from others nor from one another. Furthermore, when Aristotle's express meaning is plain, he is not to be dragged into another sense — and it is evident that the Stagirite says in explicit words that all things are made from those principles, as is clear from their definition. Therefore the principles themselves are not made. Moreover, (*c. 7. T. 64.*) we read: "It is therefore manifest from what has been said that whatever comes to be is always composite." And (*T. 82.*): "Matter is the primary subject of each thing, from which something — that is, a composite — comes to be." And (*7. Met. c. 8. T. 26.*): "Form does not come to be nor is it generated." And (*1. 8. of the same work, c. 3. T. 5.*): "It has been shown and established that no one makes the species or form; what is made is the composite." The same is read (*12. Met. T. 12.*) and confirmed by Scotus (*7. Met. concl. 22.*). If sometimes matter and form are said to come to be, the verb "to come to be" is used in a broad sense — as when it is said "from nothing, nothing comes to be" and "from night, day comes to be"; it is so taken (*1. Phys. T. 58. 64.*) where coming to be is attributed to privation. But in the proper and strict sense, only the composite comes to be — as is plainly evident (*1. Phys. T. 65.*) and in the other texts cited. The reason is that what properly

comes to be does so from a pre-existing subject; if, therefore, matter were to come to be, it would come to be from a presupposed subject, which would lead to an infinite regress — as Aristotle infers (7. *Met.* T. 26–27.) and (12. *ibid.* T. 12.) and as Veglia astutely notes (*vest.* 1. c. 17. n. 50.), and before him Bonetus (1. *Phys.* c. 3.). This twofold acceptance of the verb "to come to be" is gathered by Veglia at that place from the passages just cited, and from (1. *Caeli* T. 112.) and (121.), by which the present objection is well and fully answered — and it is lucidly conveyed by the Doctor (1. d. 3. q. 6. § *Tertia quaestio.* X.) and (2. d. 17. q. 1. § *Dimissa.* A.)

Again, the response of the moderns is shown to be invalid: for in the same genus of principiation one principle is in turn made from another — since form comes from privation as from a terminus a quo (as from a dark state luminous air comes to be), and from form as a terminus a quo privation comes to be (as from a luminous state dark air comes to be). Nor does it avail to say with Hurtado (*cit.*) that this occurs in a different order — namely, that in generation the terminus a quo is privative, while in corruption the terminus a quo is positive — for this does not remove the fact that in the same genus of principiation one principle is made from another, which is a terminus a quo from which change begins; and it is accidental whether the terminus a quo is positive or privative, provided the change begins from it. All the more so: if one principle is conceded to be made from another in a different order, since different change is thereby had, a different order is plainly involved — and it is plainly clear from the stated definition of principles that the particle "mutually" is placed there explicitly, which demonstrates just such a diversity of orders, and which is excluded from them by that very prefixed term.

Hence is also exploded the response of our younger Scotists (*at the end of q. 4.*), who, pressed by that argument, concede that in a different order and genus of acquisitive and depletive change, contrary principles are made from one another. But this contradicts Aristotle, who at the very beginning of (1. *Phys.*) proposes to treat of the principles of natural things; and at (c. 7. T. 68.) he concludes that he has handed down the principles of natural things to which generation belongs. And it is clear from (*ibid.* from c. 2. nearly to the end) that earlier philosophers were intent upon the same — for their opinions and arguments about the principles of natural generation and their number are recounted there, as the aforementioned moderns do not deny, both in the passage cited and in their exposition of the text. For corruption, and whatever principles it may have per se, are not intended by nature but per accidens — as Scotus testifies (2. *dist.* 1. q. 3. § *Ad 1. argum. principale.* L.). Tataretus adds (2. *Phys.* q. 1. *scib.* 1.) that corruption and depletive motion are not natural. I said "if it has principles" because such things do not deserve the name of principle, since nothing comes to be from them; on the contrary, something ceases — namely, the composite that is corrupted. Therefore the definition of principles, as commonly received, cannot be adapted to them, since in it the clause "all things

are made from them" is expressly placed. And so, without purpose and against the intention of the philosophers, those authors have devised principles common to both acquisitive and depletive changes — pressed by the opposing instance, abandoning true Aristotelian doctrine and embracing a new one, they tenaciously defend their given response.

Furthermore, the dissolution of Pontius (*disp. 31. q. 1. n. 6.*), who thinks our response is merely nominal, is made void. It is vain, I say, because our response is Aristotle's — the head of the Realists — and Scotus's — the master of the Franciscans — sufficiently fortified and defended by the reasons adduced above.

Objection II: Matter comes to be from integral and entitative parts, according to Scotus (*2. d. 12. q. 2. § Respondeo D.*). Therefore principles come to be from others. Confirmation I: Since matter is included in the predicament of substance, it consists of metaphysical degrees, which are genus and difference.

Confirmation II: Particular principles come to be from common ones.

Confirmation III: The body, which is the matter of the soul according to Scotus (*4. d. 11. q. 3.*), comes to be from other matter — for the body is composed of matter and form. Therefore principles are made both from others and from one another.

I deny the first part of the antecedent: since integral parts are quantitative parts, and quantity presupposes the substantial whole because it is its subject, consequently matter cannot be constituted from the parts of matter. To the second part I say that entitative parts are not principles from which a composite is generated — of the kind that the principles of which we are speaking are — but from which the material part is put together. Therefore, since only the composite is made from the said principles, and matter is created while form is educed or induced into matter itself, it is soundly deduced that those entitative parts are not the physical principles from which the physical whole comes to be. To Confirmation I: I say that although matter, as an incomplete substance, is reduced to the predicament of substance and is composed, as it were, from genus and difference — as will be clear in the next question — yet it is composed from them not physically but metaphysically, as the Doctor writes of the rational soul (*2. d. 1. q. 6.*). To Confirmation II: The answer is clear from the same distinction. For that is indeed true metaphysically but not physically. I add that just as from common physical principles come common physical composites, so from particular principles come particular ones — as from the principles of fire, fire; and from the principles of water, water — as the Parisians note in the present context. Although that definition does not apply to individual principles taken singly, it is not therefore to be considered unsuitable — since it presupposes them collectively, not individually — just as the definition of genus, which does not pertain to each species singly: for the species of which genus is predicated is not itself that which is predicated of many things differing in species in quiddity. To Confirmation III: I say that the organic body has the

form of corporeity subordinated to the soul, and therefore in that respect it stands as proximate and immediate matter, as the Doctor indicates there (*ibid.*) and treats at length (4. d. 11. q. 3.) — which is not what we are treating here; just as we are not treating of the matter of artificial things, but of prime and remote matter, which acknowledges no prior matter.

Objection III: The heavens, which are a natural body, do not come to be from the aforementioned principles. For since the heavens are ingenerable and incorruptible, they are not to be considered as made from privation and matter. Therefore the definition given above is not correct. Fonseca (*cit. sect. 2.*) — where the common translation has "are made" — renders it as "are." He meets the instance this way: the heavens have principles of constitution, which are matter and form, but not principles of generation, among which privation is included.

But the common translation is not to be abandoned in order to satisfy the argument. For at (5. Met. c. 1.), in the common and general description of principle — and Fonseca himself agrees — "are made" is read. And (1. Phys. T. 82.), similarly in the definition of matter, "are made" is written. And other not undistinguished writers observe that the Greek verb can extend to "are made," "are," and "consist of."

It can be responded, in the view of the Philosopher, that the heavens do not consist of matter and form, since they are a simple body — as the Doctor shows in both the Oxford and the Paris works. But in the common doctrine of the scholastics who hold that the heavens are composed of matter and form, the antecedent is denied. For although matter did not precede the form of the heavens in time, it did precede it by nature, and in that prior state privation was present as a principle from which the heavens can be said, as from a terminus a quo, to have been principiated. And that its form was educed from matter — or from that chaos which Theologians postulate as having extended to the empyrean heaven — the Doctor indicates (2. *ibid.* § *Secundum. D.*).

Article II. To Which Principles the Aforementioned Definition Applies.

In this article, three difficulties can be raised. The first is whether the aforementioned definition of principles applies both to intrinsic and to extrinsic principles, under which the four genera of causes are comprehended. The second is whether principles of generation and of composition are defined; and if of generation, whether precisely as generation or rather as mutation. The third is whether principles regard substantial and accidental generation.

First Note, from Scotus (1. d. 5. q. 2. § *Ideo tenendo. E.*) and (d. 2. q. 7. K.): generation in created things presents two things that are distinct from one another — namely, production and mutation. Production formally belongs to what is produced, which is the composite (7. Met. 26.); it is incidental to it that it

comes to be with the mutation of some part of the composite itself. Mutation, on the other hand, formally belongs to the act of the mutable thing, which passes from privation of form to form. But mutation always and necessarily accompanies production in the generation of natural things, on account of the imperfection of the productive power, which cannot confer the total being upon the terminus of the production without presupposing something of it that it transmutes to another part of the same — and in this way produces the natural composite. But if the agent were perfect and did not require matter from which or in which to act, and could produce the effect from and through itself, then there would be production without mutation — as is evident in creation, in which, on account of the perfection of God's creative power placing the whole in being at once, there is truly the character of production insofar as through it the terminus produced receives total being; yet in it there is not the character of mutation properly so called, insofar as mutation designates something now comporting itself otherwise than before — as the Stagirite writes (*6. Phys. 31.*).

Second Note: Aristotle sets forth several definitions of natural generation in different places of his doctrine, which I gathered in the book on generation (*q. 2.*); and in all of them mutation is placed, especially at (*5. Phys. T. 7.*), where it is expressly read: "Generation is a mutation from a non-subject to a subject." Therefore most, such as Rubiis (*1. de generatione c. 4. Tract. 1. q. 2.*), think that generation is essentially a mutation, so that it would be pointless to investigate whether Aristotle prescribes principles of generation or of mutation. But since the same Philosopher seems to abstract production from mutation — because he abstracts the simply productive power from the transmutative power, as Veglia shows with many arguments (*vest. 2. most of all c. 8. T. 31.*) from (*1. Caeli T. 100.*): "Something is immortal and divine, from which it has been communicated to others — to some more clearly, to others more obscurely — being and living" — for this reason some not unreasonably inquire whether in (*1. Phys.*) the Philosopher assigned principles of generation or of mutation.

Assertion I. Natural principles of generation are defined not precisely as production and action, but as mutation. This assertion is divided into three parts, signified by the Doctor (*ibid.*) and (*2. d. 12. q. 1.*). The first part is proved in the first article from Aristotle, who at the beginning of (*1. Phys.*) proposes to treat of the principles of natural science in general and reproves those who transcend them as speaking unnaturally (*ibid. c. 2. qq. 7–8.*); and at (*c. 7. T. 68.*) he concludes that he has handed down those same principles of physical generation and their number. And I, from the other definitions of principles that do not pertain to Physics, have sufficiently explained and established that first part. Nor is there anyone I have seen who appears to dissent from it.

The second part is indicated by Duns (*in 2. cit. contra Aversam q. 10. sect. 2.*) and Hurtado (*sect. 2. § 7.*), who comprehend under that definition every genus of cause. It is urged first: generation as production is transcendent, as it belongs to

the generation of the divine Word — as Scotus asserts (*ibid.*) — and to creation, which, being a making from nothing and presupposing no pre-existing matter, is not properly a mutation, but is nevertheless truly a production. The principles in (*1. Phys. T. 62.*), however, are defined as those from which natural composites come to be — either as from a terminus a quo or as parts composing the whole — as Aversa agrees (*alleg. sect. 1.*). Therefore they are not defined as principles of action and causation. Secondly: what abstracts from motion and mutation is not of physical consideration (*2. Phys. c. 2. and 12. Met. 6.*). Therefore principles of generation as action are not treated in this place. This Aristotle plainly intimates to us: at (*5. Met. c. 1.*) he presents another definition of principle general and congruent to all and singular principles — as is clear from the second note together with the prefatory passage of (*1. Phys.*) where he had premised a definition of the principles of generation, which always involves mutation. Again: the simply productive power does not pertain to Physics, as Veglia most recently notes (*vest. 2.*). Therefore production simply is not evaluated by Physics, as is evident in (*Met.*) at the passage just cited.

The third part follows from the two prior parts and is expressed by Aristotle (*8. Phys. T. 57.*) and elsewhere, who in defining generation always places mutation in its definition. Moreover, those three principles are found and proved to be present in natural generation through mutation. For since two principles are contraries and the third is their common subject, and impossibles are simultaneously in the same subject, it is necessary that mutation take place from the terminus a quo to the terminus ad quem — that is, from privation to form — for a new generation to be had. This the Stagirite shows at length and clearly (*1. Phys. T. 50. to T. 71.*); and before that, at (*T. 48.*), he intimates it in these words: "Those that are generated and corrupted come to be from contraries." Furthermore, at (*T. 78.*) he warns that those philosophers who posit other principles deviate from the truth. Then at (*T. 80.*) he reproves Plato who, among the number of said principles, does not place privation. Moreover, at (*T. 82.*) he defines matter as the common subject of every natural transmutation. Finally he concludes that those three, and no more and no fewer, are to be established as principles. The same is transmitted (*12. Met. T. 12.*). Therefore it is clear from Aristotle that the four genera of causes are excluded from the catalogue of natural principles, and that those are principles of generation not precisely as production is, but as it is mutation.

Assertion II. Principles both of generation and of composition are defined. This is deduced from Scotus (*ibid.*) and (*2. Rep. dict. 12. q. 1. § aliqui*), and it is opposed by our younger Scotists (*cit. q. 2. concl. 2.*), who think that in (*1. Phys.*) Aristotle treats only of principles of generation, and in (*2. Phys.*) of principles of composition. It is proved first from (*1. Phys. c. 6. T. 51.*): principles must always remain. For privation withdraws when form arrives — which, together with matter, constitutes the composite — and both persist in it until the composite itself is corrupted. And (*T. 60.*): "Some principles remain, others do not" —

which is to say: the principles of composition remain in the composite, but not the principles of generation, such as privation. Secondly: in the definition of them where the common reading has "all things are made from these," from the Greek text it is derived that "all things are" or "consist." This can certainly only be taken of principles of composition, since the whole that comes to be from the principles is not made from, nor consists of, privation, but only from matter and form. Thirdly: the Philosopher must discuss principles of composition in this place — both because at the beginning of (*1. Phys.*) he himself promises to treat of principles in general, and because he confirms this at (*T. 58.*), and at (*T. 66.*) he adds that privation is a principle per accidens, to which Scotus subscribes (*2. dist. 12. q. 1. sub 1.*) — which is plainly expounded of a principle of composition. Hence at (*T. 82.*): "For matter, that is, the remaining cause of those things that come to be, together with form, is a cause — just as a mother." But in (*2. Phys.*), where our moderns suppose him to be treating of principles of composition, he there reasons about matter and form as they are natures and causes, which they themselves candidly confess are not contained under the stated description of principles (*cit. concl. 1.*) — against Hurtado, cited by them. Therefore, in the aforementioned definition of principles, principles of generation and of composition are simultaneously captured.

Assertion III. Aristotle hands down primarily the principles of substantial generation, and secondarily the principles of accidental generation. This is gathered from the Doctor (*loc. pramem. § Ad argumenta sub I.*). It is proved first: those principles are described per se and primarily by Aristotle (*cit. T. 42.*) from which composites come to be per se and primarily — as is clear from those words: "all things are made from these." But substantial composites come to be per se only, as is read (*ibid. T. 62.*): "to become properly belongs to substance alone." Then to accident, as is shown beforehand at (*T. 58.*): "from one thing, another" — meaning, a substantial composite; "and from one, another" — meaning, an accidental composite comes to be. Again, (*8. Met. c. 1.*) and (*12. ibid. c. 3.*) substance is divided into matter, form, and composite; and it is there added that the composite is the third from these — that is, from matter and form — to which alone generation and corruption belong. Furthermore, the definition of matter (*1. Phys. T. 82.*) is accommodated only to prime matter, which is substance. Then the questions that are raised by philosophers in (*1. Phys.*) about the same principles of generation are raised most of all for substantial generation. Moreover, the composite is said to consist of nature — that is, of substantial form and matter, which is also nature (*2. Phys. T. 4.*). And very many other things are said about the same that can only be understood of principles of substantial generation. But whatever is adduced about accidental generation is said only for the sake of explanation and by way of consequence — since accidents are per se sensible, and through their knowledge we are led to the knowledge of substances, just as through artificial things we are led to natural things, the Philosopher furnishing this at (*1. Phys. T. 69.*). Furthermore, the

accidental composite is a being per accidens, which does not fall under science; and the object of Physics, as asserted, is the natural composite, which is substance. Finally, our moderns, against whom our assertion is directed, are compelled to confess this truth (*q. proaem. a. 1.*) in their responses to objections, saying that accidents pertain indirectly to Physics.

Objection: Against Assertion I — In natural generation two aspects are to be considered: the aspect of production or action, which regards the agent; and the aspect of mutation, which designates a subject passing from privation of form to the possession of that form. But the aspect of mutation is never mentioned throughout (*1. Phys.*); what is mentioned well is the aspect of action, under the word "to come to be" (*T. 43. and following*), or under the title of generation (*T. 68.*). Therefore principles of generation as action and production alone are given.

Confirmation I: Those are described as principles in that passage about which the Philosopher decrees he will treat at the beginning of the book cited; but it is his intention there to discuss principles, causes, and elements, from which principiation, production, and action proceed. Therefore those very things are the principles of generation precisely as production.

Confirmation II: Principles, as first things, exhibit primacy and origin, and involve no principiation by another — as Cicero testifies (*3. Tusc.*); otherwise they would not be first principles. Since, then, the stated definition is congruent to all principles, it is aptly inferred that they are considered as principles of generation and production, not of mutation.

I concede the major and deny the minor, as is clear from (*T. 68.*). For to carry out mutation, one contrary — whether present or absent — together with the other will suffice. And (*T. 78.*), and finally at the end of that book, he defines prime matter as the primary subject of every natural mutation; and privation, which is one of those principles, can only be a principle of generation as mutation. To Confirmation I: I concede the major; to the minor I say that the proposal there is to discuss principles not absolutely and universally — for he treats of these as such at (*5. Met. c. 1.*) — but of physical principles, as he himself explains in these words: "It is evident that natural science too must first define those matters that relate to principles." But physical principles involve mutation, as I have noted above. Nor does it matter that causes are also written there, since the term cause is not placed there so that the principles he will hand down comprehend the four genera of causes — since at (*12. Met. 12.*) he calls privation, which is truly not a cause, a cause; and three principles are assigned while four causes are counted; and causes precisely do not pertain to Physics but to Metaphysics, as can be seen (*5. Met. c. 2.*). To Confirmation II: I say that the universal definition of principle is found at (*5. Met. just cit. c. 1.*), which I examined above in Article I, Second Note. But here I adduced the definition particular to the principles of natural generation, which involves mutation.

Objection II: Against Assertion II — Aristotle at (*1. Phys. T. 68.*) concludes that he has provided the principles of generation, or those that are required for natural generation. Therefore only the principles of becoming are described there, which are principles of generation — and not the principles of being in fact, which are principles of composition.

Confirmation I: The same Philosopher there always considers matter insofar as it is the subject of transmutation, and form insofar as it is its terminus.

Confirmation II: The principles of composition are treated at (*2. Phys. T. 7.*) under the name of nature, and at (*T. 27.*) under the title of causes. Therefore in (*1. Phys. cit.*) they are posited only as principles of generation.

I concede the antecedent and deny the consequence — for he attributes both to them, as is clear from (*T. 51. 81.*) and at the end of that book. To Confirmation I: I say that there matter is considered not only as it is the subject of natural mutation but also as it is an intrinsic part of the natural composite. To

Confirmation II: I deny the antecedent, since in that place the discussion is about nature and art and their differences. And nature is there considered as it is the passive principle of motion and rest, which belongs both to matter and to form — in which way form is not the principle of the composite, nor a part of it. Likewise in that book the discussion is about causes insofar as they exert influence upon an effect, not insofar as they compose a whole as intrinsic and essential parts of it.

Objection III: Against Assertion III — One common univocal concept can be abstracted, equally congruent to substantial and accidental generation. Therefore in the stated definition of principles, both substantial and accidental principles are contained.

Confirmation: In no other place is another definition assigned congruent to the principles of accidental generation; therefore, lest Aristotle appear deficient, it must be asserted that all are included in it.

I concede the antecedent and distinguish the confirmation: equally primarily for substantial and accidental — I deny; primarily for substantial and secondarily for accidental — I concede. They are therefore called first principles because substance is the first being and the foundation of the others, while accident is said to be a being of being, inhering in a subject. To the Confirmation the same is to be said. For just as substance is treated directly and accident, which follows upon it, indirectly — so the principles of substance are treated first and the principles of accidents secondarily, as Aristotle (*ibid.*) has done.

Article III. How Many Natural Principles There Are.

Concerning natural principles and their number, the ancient philosophers are seen in Aristotle (*1. Phys. from c. 2. nearly to the end of that book*) to disagree, differ, and stammer to such a degree that one may rightly say of them: "as many heads,

so many opinions." It is tedious to recite and refute their opinions and dreams — since all of them have been recounted and rejected at length and admirably by Aristotle, and their wranglings so settled, convicted, extinguished, and buried that scarcely anyone has dared or been able to rescue them from oblivion. Therefore, the common doctrine of Aristotle on these matters, as solid and acute, is to be received and retained.

For the decision and confirmation of this difficulty, the distinction of principles into intrinsic and extrinsic, drawn by Aristotle (*5. Met. 1.*) and recalled by me in the two preceding articles, is relevant. Intrinsic principles are those that are intrinsically and formally required for the being or becoming of something — thus matter and form are intrinsically and formally required for the being of the whole composite, and privation together with matter and form for its becoming, and they are contained within it — the former as essential parts of the composite, the latter as the terminus a quo of its generation. Extrinsic principles are those that do not enter into the being of something, such as the efficient and final cause, which contribute neither to the generation of the composite nor to its composition. Intrinsic principles are further divided into principles of composition — which are required for composing the whole as its intrinsic parts, namely matter and form, and these are called principles in the state of being (*in facto esse*), so called because they remain in the whole after the whole is made and as long as it persists in being — and into principles of generation, such as privation, which, beyond the two aforementioned principles, are required for the generation of the whole. These are called principles in the state of becoming (*in fieri*), because they are necessary for the making of the whole, even though not all of them remain in the whole itself — such as privation. Therefore privation is called an intrinsic principle — not of composition, since it withdraws from the composition of the natural thing when form arrives, but of generation, because it is the terminus a quo and the intrinsic terminus of natural generation. Likewise, privation is called a principle per accidens of composition, or with respect to the being of the thing; and a principle per se of generation, or with respect to the becoming of the thing.

Assertion I. Only three principles of the generation of natural things are numbered — namely, matter, form, and privation. So Aristotle (*1. Phys. c. 6. T.*) and (*12. Met. T. 12.*), and Scotus in both works (*2. d. 12. q. 1.*). It is proved first: natural generation is necessarily a mutation, which is the passage from non-being to being (*5. Phys. T. 7.*). Mutation, however, requires three things — a terminus a quo, which is privation; a terminus ad quem, which is form; and a subject of both, which is matter, which passes from not-having a form to having a form. Therefore only three principles of natural generation are established. Secondly: there are two contrary principles — form and its privation — as will be proved in the next article. Beyond those two, there is decreed a common subject of both, which is matter. For contraries share the same subject, even though they are not simultaneously compatible with one another in it.

Therefore three are the natural principles previously enumerated. Thirdly: there are as many distinct natural principles as there are distinct natural modes of principiating; but there are three diverse natural modes of principiating — therefore also three natural principles. The major is evident. The minor is ready at hand: privation principiates as terminus a quo and by way of rejection; form principiates as terminus ad quem; and matter as the receptive subject of both. Therefore there are so many principles — neither more nor fewer — as have been enumerated above.

Assertion II. There are only two principles of natural composition — namely, matter and form. So also Aristotle (*cit. c. 7.*) and Scotus (*ibid.*), and he intimates as much (*1. Post. q. 57. § ad 1. arg.*) and (*7. Met. q. 10. § Ad 1.*). It is proved first: there are only two principles that intrinsically and essentially compose the whole and make one thing per se (*2. Anima T. 7. and 8. Met. T. 15.*). Therefore there are only two principles of composition. Secondly: there are as many essential principles and intrinsic parts of the whole as there are things into which the whole is resolved — for the same things are compositive and resolute principles, as is evident (*1. Prior.*), from which that saying is derived: "that from which something consists, into that it is resolved" — as a man is composed of body and soul, and is resolved into body and soul. But there are only two aforementioned constitutive principles of the physical composite — therefore there are only two principles of composition. Thirdly: there are only two contrary principles — as the ancient and modern philosophers agree (*1. Phys. T. 48.*) — simultaneously impossible in the same subject — namely, form and its privation. But in the persisting composite, privation does not exist — for while form exists in it, privation is absent from it. Moreover, whatever is a positive being and a complete substance consists of positive principles, which privation is not. Therefore only the two aforementioned principles of composition are established.

Objection I: That upon which something essentially depends in its becoming is its principle — as is noted from the broad and narrow definition of principle given above. But the physical composite essentially depends not only upon those three aforementioned principles in its becoming, but also upon an agent, without which it cannot be produced. Therefore, beyond those three, a fourth principle must be admitted — namely, the agent.

Confirmation I: The potency of matter, its quantity, and the prior dispositions toward the production of the composite are required; therefore they are its principles distinct from the other three.

Confirmation II: For the constitution of the composite, beyond matter and form, the union of both is necessary — which I shall show (*q. 4. of this book*) to be something distinct from both simultaneously united.

Confirmation III: The whole is also composed of substance; therefore there are more than three principles of natural generation.

I concede the major and distinguish the minor: the composite depends upon the agent as its extrinsic principle — I concede; as its intrinsic principle — I deny. For here, with Aristotle, we are speaking of the number of intrinsic principles. Moreover, as has been proved in the preceding article, it remains established that the definition of principles is to be accommodated not to generation as production and action, which regards the agent, but as it is mutation — which includes neither agent nor action in its definition.

One might press further: privation is an extrinsic principle since it does not enter into the composition of the whole. If therefore the efficient cause is removed from the number of principles because it is an extrinsic principle, then privation too is to be exempted from their catalogue. The parity is to be denied — because although privation is an extrinsic principle of composition, it is nevertheless an intrinsic principle of generation, which is a mutation from non-being to being (*5. Phys. T. 7.*).

One might urge further: the terminus a quo and the terminus ad quem are extrinsic to motion — since motion formally is a relation, as will be said (*1. 8. q. 1.*), which arises from posited extremes, and therefore accrues to it from without. But privation is the terminus a quo of natural generation; therefore privation is an extrinsic principle, both of composition and of generation. One must respond that privation is called an intrinsic principle of generation not constitutively, but terminatively — which is to say that generation necessarily requires a terminus a quo, which is privation of form, in order that a new composite may be generated.

To Confirmation I: I say that the potency of matter is really identified with matter itself; therefore it does not constitute a principle distinct from matter itself. The other things required on the part of matter cannot be called a principle per se, but rather appendages of a principle. Especially since quantity and the other accidents are not primarily subjects in matter but in the composite — as I shall show (*1. 5. q. 1.*).

To Confirmation II: I say that for the construction of the composite, union is indeed required, not as its principle, but as the bond of its constituting principles — in much the same way as in Logic the verb is the copula of subject and predicate and is not numbered among the terms, as I showed in the Epitome (*l. 1. art. 2. q. 1.*).

To Confirmation III: Arriaga (*disp. 1. Phys. at the end of sect. 2.*), pressed by this instance, concedes that subsistence is a principle of the composite in reality, but not in the opinion of pagan philosophers, to whom subsistence was unknown. He therefore thinks the dispute about the number of principles is merely verbal. But on account of so slight an argument, one should not depart from the

common position of philosophers; and without any compelling necessity, no other principle distinct from the aforementioned three is to be introduced. Otherwise Arriaga himself should multiply other principles — such as existence, which differs from subsistence — since the divine Word indeed assumed a humanity that existed but did not subsist in itself. Nor does subsistence deserve the name of principle; on the contrary, it is rather a terminus, since it terminates and completes a substantial nature, as Arriaga himself asserts (*disp. 4. Met.*). For subsistence follows upon matter and form united and upon the composite made from them, of which it is the terminus and complement — especially in the view of Arriaga, who does not admit partial subsistences of matter and form. Again, subsistence is not a thing but a mode that accompanies the thing whose mode it is, as I shall show in the Metaphysics against the aforementioned Arriaga. Therefore to the argument I deny the antecedent — both because the subsistences of matter and form are partial, following upon them as modes follow upon the things they modify; and also because the total subsistence, which belongs to the whole composite, likewise follows upon the whole, since it is its ultimate terminus.

Objection II: From (*1. Phys. c. 6. T. 50.*): principles must always remain. But privation does not always remain, since it withdraws at the arrival of form. Therefore privation is not to be numbered among the principles of natural things — and so the previously adduced triad of principles is not to be accepted.

Confirmation I: What exerts no influence upon a natural thing is not its principle, since a principle principiates by exerting influence upon what is principiated. But privation exerts no influence upon the natural thing because it is a non-being. Therefore in no way is privation to be placed among the principles of natural things.

Confirmation II: If privation is conceded to be a principle because it precedes the composite to be generated, then a fourth principle must likewise be admitted — namely, the departing form, which equally precedes the composite to be generated. But this is not numbered among physical principles; therefore neither is privation.

I respond that the Philosopher is to be expounded as speaking of principles of composition and of disparate things, which persist in the composite as long as the composite endures — not of principles of generation, such as the contraries, of which privation is one.

To Confirmation I: I say that the major holds of principles per se and intrinsic to the composite itself — as Aristotle testifies (*1. Phys. T. 66. 75. and 77.*) and Scotus (*2. d. 11. q. 1. infra I.*).

To Confirmation II: I deny the consequent of the major. For that is per accidens — because if the preceding form did not depart (which many think is possible by divine power), then the form to be expelled would assuredly not be a

principle. But privation is always prerequisite for the new generation of the composite as the terminus a quo. And upon the arrival of the new form, privation itself withdraws. Therefore privation, and not the departing form, is established as the principle of natural generation. This is deduced from Aristotle (5. *Phys. T. 7.*) and Scotus (*q. 4. prol. § contra hoc.*) and (2. *d. 1. q. 5. at the end.*).

Objection III: Those three principles are not coextensive with natural generation. For they apply to the creation of Adam, which cannot be called natural generation. Nor do those same principles intervene in every generation. For if a consecrated host putrefies and from it a worm is generated, then there will be true generation with no pre-existing matter from which as from a material principle such a worm is produced — because according to faith, in that host there is no substance of bread, but only its accidents remain, divinely sustained. Therefore the triad of principles is neither coextensive with natural generation nor necessary to it.

I respond: the procreation of Adam, even if considered extrinsically — that is, with respect to God who creates — is said to be supernatural; nevertheless intrinsically it is natural, since truly three natural principles intervened in it. Just as the sight restored by God to a blind person is supernatural — because it comes from God acting supernaturally to illuminate the blind — yet the illuminated blind person sees naturally, and his vision is natural, as Scotus writes (3. *d. 14. q. 2. § In quaest. infra C.*) and in the Paris Reportatio there.

To the other instance about the consecrated host I say, given the hypothesis that the accidents of that host are unable to attain to the production of a substance — nor can any natural agent do so — God, who can supply every causality of a secondary cause and immediately perform what that secondary cause cannot accomplish, would create a new matter, and a new composite substance congruent with those accidents disposing toward its production. And so from the consecrated host a worm would be generated — as Scotus agrees (*Quod. 10. § Ad argumentum principale.*) and (4. *d. 12. q. 6. § Dico D.*), and Vorrlong and Orbellus there.

One might say: the aforementioned production or generation is not properly a mutation, as the Doctor teaches (2. *1. 5. q. 2. 1.*) and (3. *d. 2. q. 3. E.*), (*d. 7. q. 2.*), and (4. *d. 43. q. 5.*); and from what has been said, those principles exist under the character of mutation. Therefore the given response is invalid. I say: although such a production is not rigorously a mutation in the sense the Philosopher takes it — who acknowledged things to be generated only in the ordinary course — nevertheless it does not seem to be exempt from the series of mutations, as the Doctor intimates (4. *d. 11. q. 1.*).

Objection IV: A principle is prior to that of which it is the principle, as its common etymology and definition indicate. But form is not prior to generation, since it is its terminus ad quem. Therefore neither is it its principle. Pontius

(*disp. 31. q. 2. concl. 2. n. 14.*), pressed by this argument, concedes that form is not a principle of natural generation. But this conflicts with the torrent of philosophers who teach three principles in fieri and two in facto esse; and with the truth, since, generation being truly a mutation, it requires three principles. For the passage cannot be effected through the subject, which is matter, unless it begins from the terminus a quo, which is privation, and is directed toward the terminus ad quem, which is form — as is sufficiently clear from what was said above. So the triad of principles is not to be denied.

Suárez (*disp. 12. Met. sect. 1. n. 9.*), to whom Hurtado adheres (*disp. 1. sect. 2. § 1.*), responds that form is prior to generation in the order of intention, but not in the order of execution. Against this: the order of intention pertains not to the formal but to the final cause. But to posit the final in place of the formal is to exclude the formal and include the final, and to introduce extrinsic principles — which are the efficient and final causes — and to reject the intrinsic principles, which are matter and form; which is false. Moreover, the composite is prior in intention even to form, since it is the total terminus and ultimate end of the latter, while it is posterior in execution. Now it is a common maxim of philosophers that what is posterior in execution is prior in intention. Yet no one until now has dared to assert that the composite is a principle in intention — since in truth it is the principiated thing and is composed from principles. Therefore form as prior in intention should not be considered a principle of generation.

My response, then, is this: just as matter is prior to generation because it is the subject in which generation itself is subjected, so too form is prior to generation — both because generation is formally a relation, according to Scotus, which presupposes two extremes from which it arises, and also because generation is the way to the composite, of which it is properly the generation, as Scotus says in the Paris Reportatio (*2. d. 8. q. 1. § Dices.*). For that reason generation, which is ascribed only to the whole, presupposes its principles, among which form is counted. Therefore form is truly called a principle of natural generation.

Article IV. Whether Principles Are Contraries.

The affirmative part is supported by authority and by reason — by authority of the ancient philosophers, who, whether they posited one or many, finite or infinite principles, with one accord register that principles are contraries (*1. Phys. c. 5. T. 48.*); then by reason: because what comes to be passes from non-being to being, that is from privation to form; and privation and form are contraries. Then by truth — because, as is read there, those philosophers were compelled by truth to assert this. The negative part, though it was formerly utterly abandoned and despised by all as false, now has some patrons who approve and celebrate it as true — among whom Aquarius and Aversa are cited by our moderns (*disp. 1. q. 5.*).

First Note, from Aristotle (*5. Met. c. 10. T. 16.*) and Scotus (*q. 14.*) and (*23. univers.*): contraries are taken in two ways. First, properly — thus they are defined as things that, under the same genus, mutually expel one another from the same subject, such as the primary qualities, about which Antonius Andreas (*10. Met. q. 6.*) and I at length (*Log. l. 3. q. 9. a. 5.*). Second, improperly — for those that are repugnant and do not simultaneously coexist in the same subject; in this way contraries are called a habit and its privation. For while form exists in matter, its privation cannot simultaneously be in the same matter. Thus the philosophers speak in the present context when asserting that principles are contraries — where Averroes, expounding Aristotle, uses the name of contrariety as extending to privatively opposed things, and to the differences of any genus (*10. Met. T. 23.*). For every genus is distributed into two differences of unequal perfection — the more perfect designated by the name of habit, and the less perfect by the name of privation — as is clearly stated of the differences of animal, one of which — namely rational — stands as a habit, and the other — namely irrational — stands as a privation.

Second Note: since substance is called being simply, because it is a being subsisting per se and prior to accident in nature, time, and definition (*7. Met. 1.*), and accident is called being in a qualified sense, because accident receives its being from substance, inheres in it, and is sustained by it — and is therefore said to be a being of being — it follows that there is a twofold contrariety: one between a substantial form and its privation, called contrariety simply and primarily; the other between an accidental form and its privation, called contrariety in a qualified sense and secondarily. This twofold contrariety is intimated by Aristotle (*10. Met. c. 7. T. 15.*) in these words: "The first contrariety is that of habit and privation — not every privation, however, but that which is perfect." The other contraries are said according to these. Note further: some contraries are contraries in themselves totally, or per se primarily and adequately — such as the form of a man and its privation; while others are contraries not in themselves totally but by reason of parts, or inadequately — such as a man and a non-man. A man is contrary to a non-man because a man has a form which the non-man lacks. Those that are contraries in themselves totally, or by reason of parts, are called per se contraries. Those that are contrary neither through either taken as a whole nor through anything added to them are called contraries per accidens. So that the opposition between form and its privation may be fully evident:

Third Note: there is a triple substantial mutation. One is purely depletive, in which form is cast off and nothing positive is acquired — and the form to be cast off is the terminus a quo of this mutation, and its privation is the terminus ad quem. Another is purely acquisitive — in this nothing is lost, but something positive is acquired — and the terminus a quo of this is the privation of the form to be acquired, and the terminus ad quem is the possessed form. The third is both acquisitive and depletive simultaneously, which has two forms and two

privations corresponding to the two aforementioned mutations. For there is the privation of the possessed form, which is contrary to the possessed form; and there is the privation of the form to be possessed, which is contrary to the form to be possessed. Therefore in every mutation there is always the contrariety of form and its privation, and the termini of every mutation are privatively opposed — one of them being lost, the other acquired.

Assertion I. The principles of natural things are contraries. So Aristotle (*1. Phys. c. 5. T. 42.*) and Scotus (*ibid.*) and (*2. d. 1. q. 2. § Respondeo sub A.*). It is proved first: those are contraries which cannot simultaneously be in the same subject — as is clear from the first note. But the natural principles, in the same subject or in the same matter, do not simultaneously coexist: for privation withdraws from matter upon the arrival of form, and conversely. Therefore physical principles are rightly established as contraries. Secondly: the termini a quo and ad quem of mutation are contrary, as is evidently seen in the termini a quo and ad quem of local motion, which are impossible with one another in the same subject (*5. Phys. T. 26.*). For otherwise the mobile would not move from one place to another unless it left one ubi from which the motion begins and acquired another ubi in which its motion ends. But one of the natural principles is the terminus a quo of natural generation — namely, privation — and another is the partial terminus ad quem — namely, form, as is clear from what was said above. Therefore principles are rightly established as contraries.

Assertion II. There are only two contrary principles — form and privation. The Doctor holds this (*cit.*) from Aristotle (*1. Phys. c. 7. T. 67.*), taking it as indefinite — just as that which is read (*ibid. T. 50.*): "principles always remain" — meaning not all, but only two, namely matter and form. And (*2. Phys. T. 30.*): "Causes are causes of one another" — meaning not all, but only the efficient and the final, as Lychetus explains (*2. d. 12. q. 3.*). And (*1. Post. c. 3. T. 6.*): "Of certain things there is demonstration; of others there is not." It is proved first: things that are impossible with one another share a common subject in which they cannot simultaneously exist, as is clear of proper contraries that mutually expel one another from the same subject. But the natural principles, as proved in Assertion I, are contraries that share a common subject — namely, matter — in which they exercise their contrariety and conflict. The receptive subject of contraries, since it is not itself contrary to the others and is posited as one of the principles, plainly leads to the deduction that there are only two contrary principles. Secondly: every mutation requires two termini — a quo and ad quem — which are impossible in the same subject in which the mutation occurs, as I explained in the Third Note. But those two termini are the two initial principles of natural generation — namely, privation and form. I add: contraries cannot simultaneously enter into the essence of something, since they conflict and destroy one another. Therefore, since the composite is constituted in being from principles, it is necessary that one contrary depart — which is privation — and the other remain for its composition — which is form,

which together with matter makes up the physical whole. Consequently it is established that there are only two contrary principles as aforementioned.

Assertion III. The principles are first contraries. Aristotle transmits this (*1. Phys. c. 5. T. 42.*), from whom the Doctor (*ibid.*) does not deviate. It is urged first from what was proved in Assertion I: principles are contraries; but they cannot be anything other than first contraries, since they are defined as those from which, neither from others nor from themselves mutually, but from which all things are made. Therefore principles are first contraries. Secondly: privative contrariety is broader and more common than the other contrarieties, to which even positive ones are reduced — since one is more perfect than the other (e.g., heat compared to cold), which designates the privation of the perfection of the other, as Aristotle brilliantly sets forth (*10. Met. T. 16. sum. 2. c. 3.*). Again, since this contrariety exists between substance and its privation, and substance is being simply and the first predicament, it is plainly deduced that it is the first of all contrarieties. Hence Aristotle (*7. Met. c. 1.*) asserts that substance is prior to every accident in time, in nature, and in definition, since it is their subject, base, and support.

Assertion IV. Primary contrariety per se primarily belongs to the substantial form and its privation, and secondarily to the accidental form and its privation. This assertion is consonant with and consequent upon the third assertion, which I placed above (*art. 2. of this q.*), and it is gathered from Scotus (*ibid.*); and it militates against two of our more recent Scotists (*disp. 1. q. 5.*). It is proved first from Aristotle (*cit.*), who, treating primarily in this context of the principles of the substantial composite, says at (*T. 51.*): "from non-substances, substance does not come to be." Therefore in that place, primary contrariety is treated first, and subsequently the contrariety of the principles of the accidental whole. Hence the Philosopher at (*10. Met. c. 7. T. 15.*) explicitly adds: "the first contrariety is that of habit and privation — not every privation, however, but that which is perfect." And at (*T. 16.*) he urges that all things come to be from contraries and that contrariety is found in every genus — plainly suggesting this. Since, therefore, substance is the first genus, the first contrariety is without doubt adapted to it. Secondly: generation properly belongs to the substantial composite — from Aristotle (*7. Met. T. 22. and following*) and Scotus (*1. d. 3. q. 6. § Tertia quaest. sub X.*) — and our said moderns near the end of (*q. cit.*) candidly confess from (*T. 50.*) of the first Physics that first contraries are in the genus of substance. Therefore, per Aristotle, the first contrariety is not equally and adequately attributed to both the substantial and the accidental form and the privation of each.

Objection I: Against Assertion I — Aristotle at (*1. Phys. T. 47.*) subjoins that principles are contraries because everything that comes to be comes to be from a contrary. But what comes to be from another is not a principle but a principiated thing, or a composite. Therefore a principle is per se contrary to the principiated thing, and principles are not contrary to one another.

Confirmation I: The terminus a quo is contrary to the terminus ad quem, as is clear from what has been said. But the principiated thing is the terminus ad quem. Therefore contrariety exists between a principle and the principiated thing, not between principle and principle.

Confirmation II: A terminus a quo is found also in the making of non-physical things — for an angel comes to be from the non-being of the angel as from a terminus a quo. And if this is admitted, anything will come from anything — which conflicts with Aristotle (*cit. T. 43.*). Therefore it must be asserted that principles per se and directly are not contraries.

I respond: that assertion subjoined by Aristotle is to be interpreted not per se primarily of the total terminus a quo, but of the partial terminus a quo — as remains explained in the Second Note. And such is the express meaning of the Philosopher (*cit. T. 45.*), saying: "The musician comes to be from the non-musician — but not from just any non-musician, but from that in which there is the privation of music." And (*T. 46.*): "Figures come from the privation of figure." Thus the non-musician is not per se primarily and adequately contrary to the musician, but by reason of the privation that is in the non-musician and that is contrary to music in the musician. And so principles are per se and adequately contrary to one another; and principiated things are contrary not in themselves totally, but by reason of the principles themselves — just as in positive contraries, not the very subjects of contrary qualities are per se primarily contrary, but the contrary qualities themselves — e.g., heat and cold per se primarily conflict with one another.

To Confirmation I: I say that the partial terminus a quo, which is privation, is precisely contrary to the partial terminus ad quem, which is form — but not to the total terminus ad quem, which is the principiated thing or composite.

To Confirmation II: I say that in creatables and non-physical things the terminus a quo is nothing, or a negation; while in generable and mutable things the terminus a quo is a privation. Therefore it does not follow that anything can be made from anything — since each form has a privation precisely opposed to it, from which as terminus a quo generation begins, as the Stagirite clearly sets forth (*ibid. T. 43.*).

Objection II: In the generation of a symbolic element from a symbolic element, the symbolic quality that was in the corrupted body persists in the generated body (2. *de gen. T. 34.*). Therefore the transformation of symbolic to symbolic is easier than that of non-symbolic to non-symbolic. Therefore principles are not contraries. And this may be confirmed when from red or white wine, vinegar is made — for from red or white there comes red or white, since the redness that was in the red wine and the whiteness in the white wine persist in the vinegar, which is red or white. Likewise from a shaped thing comes a shaped thing. Therefore not every generation has contrary principles.

I respond: in the said generation, not the same numerical but the same specific quality persists in the generated thing — since an accident does not migrate from subject to subject. But this must be examined precisely in the book on elements. To the Confirmation I say that this cannot happen, but occurs per accidens. For per se, from non-vinegar, vinegar comes to be; but per accidens, from red comes red, from white comes white, and from shaped comes shaped — as the Stagirite asserts in a similar case (*1. Phys. T. 43. c. 5.*), and the Doctor agrees (*2. d. 1. q. 3. § Ad 1. and q. 5. at the end.*).

Objection III: If it were possible by nature's powers to produce something tending toward a pre-existing thing — whether through the transmigration of souls from body to body of different species, as the Pythagoreans held, mentioned at (*1. Anima T. 53.*) — or of the same species, which Ferchius indicates Aristotle did not reprove (*vest. 6. 1. 2. n. 127.*) — this could be illustrated by circular motion beginning from one point and ending at the same point from which such motion began. In this way that circulation would have no contrary termini; and therefore natural principles need not be contraries.

Given the hypothesis, there would be a new generation and a new generated thing, because matter would pass from one form of which it was deprived to another form by which it was informed — in which case principles would always be found to be contraries. Regarding the example of motion: I say that circular motion returns to the same specific point and ubi, but different numerically. But more on this in the book on motion.

Article V. Whether Principles Are Univocated.

I discern in this article the opinions of the philosophers differing from one another. One is that of two recent Scotists (*disp. 1. Phys. q. 1. concl. 2.*), from whom Fuentes (*ibid. q. 3. art. 3.*) is not far distant, who think that the three aforementioned principles share a common univocal account of principle. Another is that of Fonseca (*5. Met. c. 1. q. 5. sect. 1.*), Suárez (*disp. 12. Met. Sect. 1. n. 13.*), and Pontius (*disp. 31. q. 2. Quaest. 1.*), who think that principle is analogous to them. The third must be the common position of Scotists — notably the Formalists (*art. 1. Tract. of theirs*) — who teach that being and non-being, real and of reason, have nothing univocal in common. For since privation is not properly a being, while the other principles are positive real beings, it follows that principle is equivocal to the three of them. Hurtado agrees (*disp. 1. sect. 2. § 17.*), as does Arriaga (*ibid. at the end of sect. 3.*).

The acceptations and definitions of principles adduced and expounded in Article I of this question are to be reviewed. For even if the word principle appears to have been imposed by the Ancients most of all to designate the beginning of motion and of time — which is more known to us and more sensible, and more suited to representing and making things — and for this reason they posited and distinguished beginning, middle, and end. This

Aristotle not obscurely intimates (*5. Met. c. 1.*), where in enumerating the various senses of principle, he begins from that from which motion begins — as his expositors note there. Nevertheless it receives many other significations and extends both to real beings and to beings of reason; to positive and to privative; to per se and per accidens; as well as to created and uncreated. For this reason one may doubt whether principle, with respect to all these, can be said to be univocal, analogous, or equivocal.

Again, principle can be considered in two ways — formally, that is, for the relation of a principle, by which it is formally called a principle and regards the principiated as a relative regards its correlative; or materially, that is, for what is the foundation of this kind of relation and is denominated a principle through it — as I showed in the Treatise on God as Triune (*disp. 4. q. 7.*), where I proved that principle in the immanent divine relations is indeed univocal with respect to the essential, notional, and personal; but principle in the immanent and in the transitive sense by no means so — since the former formally is a positive real relation, while the latter formally is a being of reason. But that to real being and to being of reason nothing univocal is common, the Doctor expressly teaches (*1. dist. 2 q. q. un.*), followed by Vorrlong and Orbellus there, and others — except Bonetus (*1. Met. c. 6.*).

Assertion. Matter and form are univocated in the account of principle, but privation is not. This assertion contains two parts, which are indicated by Scotus (*just mentioned.*). The first part is urged first: matter and form are positive real beings exerting real influence upon the composite and constituting it — therefore without doubt these two principles are univocated in the common account of principle. Secondly: both are natures (*2. Phys. T. 11.*), incomplete and partial substances (*ibid. T. 21.*), and two intrinsic causes (*ibid. T. 28.*); and moreover the aforementioned definition of principles most fittingly applies to these two. Therefore these two are univocated in the common account of principle.

The second part is shown first from Aristotle (*1. Phys. T. 66.*) and (*T. 75.*), asserting that privation is a principle per accidens; and (*2. Phys. T. 15.*) and (*5. Met. c. 4.*), where in listing natures he does not place privation among them. Secondly: to being and non-being, nothing is univocally common — as the Formalists cited above urge from Scotus. But matter and form are positive real beings, intrinsic parts composing the whole; while privation is a non-being (*1. Phys. T. 75.*). Therefore principle does not apply univocally to those three principles. Thirdly: either they are univocated in real being, or in being of reason — since there is no middle between real being and being of reason. But they do not agree in either: not in real being, because real being is not determined or contracted by non-being, such as privation (*from the passage just cited*); nor in being of reason, because real being is not contracted by being of reason — otherwise the difference of real being would be a being of reason, which implies a

contradiction. Fourthly: if what seems more to inhere does not inhere, neither will what seems less to inhere — as is evident in the Epitome (*l. 3. q. 3. a. 4.*). But real being and being of reason seem more to agree than positive being and privative being, since the former participate in their own manner in the account of being, while the latter do not at all. For if privative being were superior, it would be included in positive; and if positive were superior, it would be included in privative — which is repugnant. Finally: either these principles are univocated by reason of the formal being of principle, which is relation, or by reason of its fundamental being, which is the nature and essence of the said principles. Not the first — because the formal account of principle for matter and form is a real relation, while the formal account of the principle of privation is either nothing or a being in a qualified sense; and it is already evident that to being and non-being, positive and privative, nothing is univocally common. Therefore the account of principle is equivocal to the three enumerated.

Hence Fuentes is refuted, who at (*q. 3. of this book a. 3.*) — although he tasted these reasons at (*n. 5.*) — yet at (*n. 6.*), distorting the terminology of Scotus (as one may see at (*3. d. 7. q. 1. § Quarto. C.*)), writes that principle is indeed not a univocal predicate, yet is univocally predicated of the aforementioned three. But he is surely mistaken — because since to be predicated univocally means nothing other than to be predicated essentially, and nothing essential can be common to matter, form, and privation for the reasons adduced above, it is evidently concluded that principle is neither a univocal predicate (which he concedes) nor univocally predicated of them (which Fuentes himself asserts). Nor does it help him to say that principle stands to real and rational being as the knowable does — which he supposes to be univocally predicated of these; or that opposition is said univocally of being and its privation. For just as being that abstracts from real and rational being is not univocal in the school of Scotus, so neither is the knowable that abstracts from the knowable of real and rational being univocal — since a property, such as knowability, enjoys no greater privilege than that of which it is the property. And what he adds about opposition — it is evident that it is equivocal, just as man is said equivocally of the living and the dead, and of the real and the pictured, as is evident (*1. Predicam. c. 1.*).

Objection I: The same reason that is adduced by the Doctor (*1. dist. 3. q. 2. B.*) to urge the univocation of being, is the one that can be adduced to introduce the univocation of principle with respect to the three aforementioned. For someone may be certain that privation is a principle, and doubt whether it is a principle in the manner of a terminus a quo or in the manner of a terminus ad quem. Such a common concept of principle is quidditatively included in each of the singular principles; therefore principle is univocal to them.

The parity is to be denied — because being, which Scotus (*cit.*) posits as univocal, is positive real being, which is univocally predicated of God and creature, of substance and accident. But principle with respect to those three is not a positive real being; therefore they are not univocated in this.

Objection II: Privation is a principle of generation just as matter and form are, and the aforementioned definition of principles is rightly adapted to it. Therefore just as privation is not exempted from the definition and number of principles, so neither is it expunged from the univocation of principle.

Confirmation: From (*1. dist. 23. q. 1.*) — the infinitating negation is accommodated both to positive, privative, and negative, and even to the impossible. But a person, according to Scotus, presents the negation of communicability as quo and as quod, univocally predicable of its inferiors. Therefore, even though privation is not a positive being, it is not thereby excluded from the univocation of principle.

I respond: privation is indeed a principle of generation, yet it is not univocated with the other positive principles — even though the common description of principles applies to it. Just as equivocals are described by a common description at (*c. 1. Predicam.*). Nevertheless it does not follow from this that equivocals are univocal through it, since they agree in name and not in reality.

To the Confirmation: if that most improper univocation is admitted, the parity is to be denied — because all those things are negative and agree in a common negation. But that positive, privative, and negative should be univocated in something common to them is not to be tolerated.

Objection III: Aristotle (*12. Met. c. 4. T. 19. 23.*) expressly asserts that principles share an analogous account of a common principle. Therefore in this kind of common account of principle, principles are not equivocated.

I respond by granting that principles are analogous equivocals, not analogous univocals, nor something distinct from either — but all analogues are to be reduced to one or the other — as I showed in the Logic (*l. 3. q. 1. a. 7.*). And thus the testimony of Aristotle just adduced is expounded.

Article VI. Whether Anything Comes to Be from Nothing.

Three propositions are set forth from Aristotle (*1. Phys.*) which, as Bonetus notes and examines (*1. Phys. c. 2.*), appeared to the ancient philosophers to be true and self-evident. The first is found at (*T. 41–42.*) and (*12. Met. 6.*): principles are contraries. The second is read (*ibid. T. 52–53.*) and (*1. Caeli T. 120.*): beyond the two contrary principles, a third must be posited, which is their common subject, from which everything that comes to be comes to be. The third is written (*at the same place T. 64.*) and (*7. Met. 26.*) and (*8. ibid. 3.*) and (*12. T. 12.*) and elsewhere: everything that comes to be or is generated is composite. The first two have already been discussed by us — the first in Article IV of this question, and the

third in Article I in the response to the first objection. It now remains to investigate the second — not indeed whether there is a common subject that is the receptive matter of all forms (for this we reject in the following question, Article I) — but whether everything that comes to be does so from that third thing, or whether something comes to be from nothing. And certainly, speaking naturally, Bonetus (*alleg.*) adds that the proposition "something comes to be from nothing" terrified all philosophers and seems to be an implication of terms. Yet some, according to Averroes — and most recently Ferchius (*vest. 1.*) endeavors with many arguments to show — hold that it is true both in the doctrine of the Philosopher and in the reality of the matter, and that the contrary is false.

First Note, from (*1. Phys. T. 33–34.*), (*1. de gen. T. 11–12.*), and (*11. Met. sum. 2. c. 4.*): the common maxim of philosophers is "from nothing, nothing comes to be." Therefore some among them — among whom Marcus Varro is listed by Vorrlong (*2. d. 1. a. 2. concl. 3.*) — thought that God produced all things from his own substance. Some, such as Anaxagoras, posited an eternal chaos in which all things were mingled and confused, or, as the Philosopher says, anything was in anything. And from this, perpetual generations were said to separate and segregate them. Others, such as Democritus, suspected that all things were made from atoms and were moved from eternity confusedly and without order, coming to be and being generated by chance. Nor were there lacking those who thought that matter was unproduced and ungenerated, and that all things were produced and generated from it — that Aristotle held this view, Vorrlong testifies (*ibid.*). So before Aristotle, the maxim "from nothing, nothing comes to be" was received by all philosophers, and did not originate with Aristotle. Whether it was rejected or received by him as true or false is disputed by Ferchius (*cit.*). But so that the truth of this may be clearly apparent:

Second Note: There exists a controversy among those same philosophers about the production of natural forms. For form, according to Plato — who calls the same Plato the giver of forms — emanates from an extrinsic source or from God. Others, like Anaxagoras, thought that all forms pre-existed, and the natural agent only separates and segregates them from one another. Aristotle, however, and with him all subsequent philosophers, teach that natural forms are educed from the potency of matter — that is, they depend in being and in becoming upon matter. Hence the same Philosopher (*1. Phys. T. 82.*), in defining matter, says: "Matter is the subject from which all natural composites are generated, and into which all corruptibles are ultimately resolved"; and matter is commonly said to be ingenerable and incorruptible, because it always persists through every generation and corruption as their common subject. The same he writes plainly (*ibid. T. 60.*): "all things come to be from a subject, and this comes from this." And (*2. Phys. T. 28.*) and (*5. Met. 2.*): "Matter is that from which something comes to be." And (*5. Phys. T. 15.*): a common subject is presupposed for

something to come to be, whether substantial or accidental. The same is read (7. *Met.* 8.) and (11.) and (12. *ibid.* c. 12.).

Third Note: Although the question still remains sub judice as to the mind of the Philosopher — whether he admitted (the first mover excepted) that all things are created, or not, as is evident from Scotus (1. d. 8. q. 5.) and (*Quol.* 7.) — and likewise whether the first cause acts ad extra freely or necessarily in the school of the same Philosopher — our Doctor (*now cit.*) asserts that Aristotle held that God acts naturally and necessarily ad extra, and that he created the world from eternity, as one may see (7. 8. *Phys.*). But the Catholic faith teaches us both that the world was created by God in time, and that he operates freely ad extra — as I showed at length in the Treatise on creation (q. 19.). Moreover, among all philosophers and theologians it is certain that creation and generation differ from one another — most of all in that creation is the production or making of a thing from nothing, that is, with no presupposed subject and no pre-existing matter (2. d. 1. q. 5. *infra T.*). In this way an angel is said to be created from nothing. Generation, however, is the production or mutation from non-being to being, with a subject presupposed and pre-existing — which is matter.

Fourth Note, from St. Anselm as cited by Vorrlong (*ibid.*): something can be said to come to be from nothing in three ways. First, materially — that is, nothing is the matter of the making of some thing; and this is impossible, since the matter from which something comes to be is a real being, which is opposed to nothing as affirmation is to negation. Second, causally — that is, nothing is the cause of something; which is likewise impossible, since every cause per se exerting influence upon a real effect is a true, real, positive being, which is opposed to nothing. Third, ordinally — which is to say that after nothing something comes to be; or rather, something comes to be from nothing as from a terminus a quo — just as I asserted above that a composite comes to be from privation as from a terminus a quo. This sense is embraced by theologians who admit the creation of the world in time, freely by God. And according to Aristotle, even when conceding creation from eternity without novelty of being, as Baconius notes (2. d. 1.) — since Aristotle holds that God acts naturally and necessarily ad extra, as I forewarned from Scotus in the second note cited.

Assertion. Aristotle did not reject the proposition "from nothing, nothing comes to be" as false. The Doctor (2. d. 1. q. 2.) does not dissent. I prove it first from Aristotle himself, who at (1. *Phys.* c. 1.) intends to discuss the first physical principles and is wholly occupied with searching for them and determining them in that book, which at (q. 6. T. 42.) he defines; then at (c. 6. T. 56.) adds that they number three; and then at the end of that book at (T. 82.) concludes that matter is the primary subject from which all natural forms are educed.

Therefore throughout that entire book he does not reprobate the aforementioned proposition. Secondly: the same Philosopher does not reject the other two propositions of the eminent philosophers touched upon at the

beginning of this article — namely, that principles are contraries, and that the composite properly comes to be. Nor does there appear any text in which it is refuted by him. For even if at (*T. 33.*) he cites it as the doctrine of Anaxagoras and others, he does not reprove it as a bad assertion, but only in that those philosophers abolished all substantial generation by placing the confusion of things and their segregation, and by holding that all forms pre-exist in matter and that anything is in anything — as is clear to anyone reading the passage cited and (*T. 74.*) and (*1. de gen. T. 8–12.*) and elsewhere frequently. Hence the Stagirite had premised at (*T. 21. c. 2. of the first Phys.*): "one is in potency and the other in act." Then he adds (*T. 78.*): "the other is, because it is in act and potency"; and finally (*12. Met. T. 44.*) he concludes that from an agent nothing comes forth except to extract what is in potency to act. Therefore it seems he does not receive it as a bad principle, but as badly understood and applied; nor does he cite it as his own, but as something already sung by others before him, as is clear (*ibid. T. cit.*) and (*34.*) and (*11. Met. sum. 2. c. 4.*). In this way he sometimes, to demonstrate something beyond demonstration, cites the authorities of ancient philosophers to show that the doctrine he defends is neither new nor devised by himself, but invented and corroborated by others. I noted this (*1. 5. Log. q. 4. a. 11.*).

Thirdly: the doctrines and assertions of the Ancients that displease Aristotle as false and absurd he explicitly and strenuously explodes and pursues everywhere and convicts — as is clear from (*c. 2.*) nearly to (*c. 9.*), where he convicts both those who posited one principle whether mobile or immovable, and those who posited many whether finite or infinite, and those who posited only two, and those who could not distinguish as he does (*T. 74.*): and not only does he solidly and acutely reject them, but sharply and unhesitatingly convicts them of error and ignorance, as is clear (*c. 8. T. 71. 74. 78.*). But at no passage of his book, where it is the proper place to inquire into the truth of that assertion, nor elsewhere, does he absolutely repel the aforementioned doctrine except as badly taken. And (*8. Met. 4.*) he refers back to what he taught in the Physics about the difference that exists between things that come to be simply and not simply.

Fourthly: the same author opens and expresses at length and accurately the ways in which natural things are generated, beginning from (*T. 43.*) of the first Physics to (*T. 48.*), and continues through (*cc. 7, 8, and 9.*). And what the earlier philosophers erred in, he clearly demonstrates there. In these matters, to uproot the errors of the ancients and establish his own doctrine, he admirably and ingeniously provides a twofold manner in which from non-being being comes to be. One is written at (*T. 75.*): "from non-being per accidens — that is, from privation as terminus a quo — something comes to be," and in this he differs from earlier philosophers who affirmed that everything comes to be from being, or from what is. But from non-being simply — which is nothing, or the negation of being — nothing comes to be; and in this he agrees with the ancient philosophers who affirmed that from nothing, nothing comes to be. I cite the

words of the text: "We too say that nothing comes to be simply from what is not; yet something does come to be in a way from what is not — namely, from what is not as a qualification. For it comes to be from privation, which is per se non-being, not from what is inherent in it." The other is found at (*T. 78.*) and more expressly (*12. Met. c. 2. T. 8.*): "Since there is a twofold knowing, everything is changed from a being in potency to a being in act — as from a potentially white thing to an actually white thing; and in the same manner with augmentation and diminution." Therefore not only per accidens does it happen that something comes to be from non-being, but also all things come to be from being — but from being in potency, and from non-being in act. The same distinction is adduced by Aristotle (*4. Met. c. 5. T. 20.*) — to show how those who philosophized about this have reasoned: "To those, therefore, who think on this basis, we shall say that in one way they speak truly and in another they are ignorant. For being is said in two ways. Therefore in some way it is possible for something to come to be from non-being, and in another way it is not. And the same being and non-being can be simultaneously — but not in the same respect: for in potency it is possible for contraries to simultaneously be the same thing, but not in act."

From these it is manifest what Aristotle thinks — in what he agrees and in what he disagrees with the Ancients. He receives the proposition "from nothing, nothing comes to be" by taking nothing simply and per se and insofar as it designates non-being in potency and in act. But he denies it if nothing is taken per accidens and in potency — for he holds that from non-being, that is, from the privation of being or from privation of form as terminus a quo, form comes to be; and from non-being in act but being in potency, something comes to be — as from matter, in whose potency and not in act form is, form can come to be. Therefore, in all his physical works he everywhere preaches that in all physical works a subject or matter must pre-exist, and he commends those who introduced this third principle — privation — and reproves those who did not distinguish privation from matter as another principle, as is clear (*1. Phys. T. 79–80.*).

Fifthly: art imitates nature (*2. Phys. T. 22.*) in many respects, as can be seen (*1. Phys. T. 69.*) and (*2. ibid. T. 86.*) — most of all in this: that if nature always presupposes a subject from which it acts and from whose potency it educes natural forms, so art requires pre-existing matter from which it educes artificial forms. And therefore neither nature nor art makes anything from nothing. Although at (*ibid. T. 24–25.*) certain arts are said to make their own matter, this is not to be taken absolutely — since it is most clear as light that no art does anything without pre-existing matter — but in a qualified sense: some arts prepare and dispose their proximate matter, such as pottery with clay and sculpture with marble; others command others, such as the art of navigation, that of joinery, and that of woodcutting. Thus neither nature nor art makes anything from nothing. Again, Aristotle (*1. Caeli c. 9. T. 95.*) thinks another world is not possible because no other matter is available from which the composites

of another world could be made. He also writes that God and the heavens produce all things through light and motion, and that the efficient cause is the first principle from which motion and rest come (*5. Phys. T. 17.*); active potency is transmutative of another insofar as it is another. These things, and others like them, since they require a subject, plainly show that from nothing, nothing comes to be. Averroes agrees in the Proem to (*3. Phys.*) and (*8. ibid. com. 4.*) and (*2. Met. com. 15–16.*); Bonetus (*1. Phys. c. 3.*); Baconius (*2. d. 1.*); and the other Peripatetics both ancient and modern. So that it is surprising why, in a matter so manifest and known in the school of Aristotle, Veglia (*vest. 1.*) so vigilantly labors and sweats to introduce the opposite into Peripatetic philosophy.

Objection I: Ferchius (*vest. 1. c. 1.*) adduces the book of Xenophanes, in which Aristotle cites the proposition "from nothing, nothing comes to be" as wrong, not his own, and alien to the Peripatetic school. And this is also evident from (*1. Phys. T. 33–34.*) and elsewhere not infrequently. Therefore in the school of Aristotle the aforementioned proposition is not to be received.

I respond: apart from the fact that some consider that book to be a work of Aristotle, Aristotle himself in that book speaks not assertively but dubiously — as is clear from the particle "perhaps" (*fortasse*) added by the Philosopher himself. Malonius agrees (*2. disp. 2.*), adding that Aristotle there proceeds not asserting but disputing. And if it is granted that he speaks assertively, he is to be expounded as above — namely, that he rejects such a doctrine not absolutely, since he expressly admits it (*1. Phys. T. 75.*) saying: "We too say that nothing at all simply comes to be from what is not." But in the manner the Ancients supposed — that all things exist in act, abolishing all generation and new production of things — anything comes to be from what is in act; while from nothing in act nothing comes to be. This is how the ancient philosophers thought, and it is them, philosophizing in this manner, that Aristotle refutes. Ferchius (*vest. 1. p. 40. c. 15. n. 46.*) responds that the particle "simply" is not to be connected with non-being but with the verb "to come to be." But this exposition does not accord with the said text, which reads thus: "nothing simply, from what was not, comes to be" — that is, from pure nothing something cannot come to be; for in this way nothing designates the negation of being, and is non-being simply. But from non-being per accidens, or from privation, something can well be produced — especially because if "simply" is joined with the word substance, it only concerns substance simply, while accident is only in a qualified sense; just as generation simply is of substance alone, and in a qualified sense of accident (*4. d. 11. q. 3.*). But that is not what the Philosopher intends when he explicitly shows there that something comes to be from both the privation of substantial and of accidental form. Therefore the Stagirite concedes that from privation something comes to be, but does not admit that from negation something comes to be.

Objection II: Certainly that proposition does not come from Aristotle — for he says several times expressly that it is the principle and origin of grave errors and evident absurdities: but such is the aforementioned proposition "from nothing, nothing comes to be." Therefore, etc. The major is evident. The minor is shown from (*11. Met. c. 2.*): Heraclitus concedes that two contradictories are simultaneously true. And Protagoras admits that "what appears to each person is true." But that these two great inconveniences arose from that doctrine, the Philosopher writes there. And (*4. Met. T. 19.*) the impossible assertion of Anaxagoras and Democritus — that contraries and contradictories are simultaneously — is said to have proceeded from that same false principle. Again, (*1. Phys. T. 33–34.*): the denial of substantial generation, and instead the segregation of things, flowed from that same pernicious source. Moreover, the maxim of Melissus — that all things are one; that whatever is, is eternal; and other falsehoods and absurdities — arise from that same unfortunate root. Therefore the proposition is manifestly alien to the Peripatetic school, false and absurd, to be thoroughly rejected and exploded.

I respond: these and similar things, which Ferchius investigated and assembled with such diligent and studious labor, are easily refuted and dissolved from the principles laid down and fortified in the preceding remarks. For the Philosopher did not reject it but received it as a true axiom (*1. Phys. T. 75.*) and (*1. de gen. T. 12.*); and all the errors, absurdities, and falsehoods of the Ancients flowed from ignorance and unawareness of the second physical principle — namely, privation — as the Stagirite explicitly teaches there: "For from privation, which is per se non-being, something comes to be." And (*T. 81.*), and in the two final chapters of that book, and (*12. Met. T. 8.*): from non-being in act, and from potency that is not objective but subjective, all natural things come to be — as is clear from the definition of matter (*1. Phys. T. 82.*). But this saying, ingeniously devised by Aristotle — true and necessary, newly introduced into the Lyceum — appeared novel and foolish, marvelous and impossible to the Ancients; while it is declared possible, opportune, and supremely necessary to true philosophy by the same Aristotle (*T. 75.*), and is admirably received and commended by subsequent philosophers. From this, therefore, it is clear what the difference is between Aristotle and the ancient philosophers, and in what way the aforementioned saying is to be embraced and in what way to be rejected.

Objection III: The proposition is denied insofar as it is qualified. But the aforementioned proposition is glossed and narrowed in two ways by Aristotle, as is clear from (*T. 73.*) and (*T. 77.*): "From non-being simply, or from non-being per se, which is pure nothing, or the negation of being, nothing comes to be; but from non-being per accidens, or from non-being in a qualified sense, which is privation, something comes to be." Then (*T. 78.*) and (*12. Met. T. 8.*): "From non-being that is neither in act nor in potency, nothing comes to be; but from non-being in act though being in potency, something comes to be." Therefore per se

from nothing, nothing comes to be; but per accidens from nothing, something comes to be.

I deny the major. For many propositions are qualified that are nonetheless not denied — such as (*1. Post. c. 2. T. 5.*): "That because of which each thing is such is itself more so" — which is restricted by three conditions, but not rejected. Similarly, (*2. de gen. T. 56.*): "The same thing remaining the same always does the same" — which holds in a natural and necessary cause, but not in a contingent and free cause. Again, many things are conceded in the divided sense that are denied in the composite sense, as I explained in the Epitome (*l. 3. q. 4. art. 3.*). And so the qualification of Aristotle, far from driving it to falsehood, on the contrary leads us carefully and industriously to the truth of the same.

Objection IV: Aristotle in the cited book on Xenophanes explicitly says that he once held that proposition together with the vulgar philosophers, and that afterward, having considered the matter more maturely and deliberately, he both cast it aside and expelled it from himself. He writes the same against Zeno. Nor does it help to say that from non-being simply, or from negation, nothing indeed comes to be; but from non-being in a qualified sense, or from privation, and from a presupposed subject, something comes to be. For in this way the difficulty is not dissolved but inverted and evaded. For privation is in the subject, and form comes to be not from the subject but in the subject. But this commutation perverts the sense of the Aristotelian text — especially because the same Stagirite in that book against Xenophanes, pursuing the proof of the proposition he had set forth, supports it with the authority of Hesiod, who clearly sets forth that some things were generated from others and some produced from nothing. Veglia makes much of this argument and thinks he convicts those of the opposite view. And I, thinking him to have dozed rather than kept watch, say that this has already been fully answered — since Aristotle there speaks not assertively but dubiously, as the word "perhaps" (*fortasse*) openly appended by him makes clear. He intends deliberately to introduce the doctrine he himself had previously transmitted and brought into his school (*1. Phys.*) and at the other passages cited above: "From non-being per accidens, and from non-being in act but being in potency, something comes to be." But what Ferchius adds — that it comes to be not from privation nor from a pre-existing subject but in a presupposed subject, and from nothing — is plainly contrary to Aristotle throughout, and to the common body of Peripatetics, who hold that form is educed from the potency of matter — which is to be examined below in the question on form. All the more so because the said author (*vest. alleg. p. 55.*) approves that the opposite comes from the opposite. And he himself urges this very point (*ibid. c. 3. n. 4.*) from (*1. Phys. T. 43.*) and (*T. 47.*) and from (*12. Met. T. 6.*).

To the other objection I say it is stated in the opinion of Hesiod — as is clear to anyone reading the text. Nor should Ferchius, who wants Aristotle to have

pronounced that proposition in the sense of the ancient philosophers, object — for I equally say that he stated it in the doctrine of Hesiod. Add: from (*1. Met. c. 4.*) — Hesiod held that chaos was before all things, then the broad earth, then love. And Tataretus rightly writes for the resolution of the whole difficulty: "From nothing, nothing comes to be naturally; but supernaturally, from nothing something comes to be." I add, according to Scotus and other scholastics, that Aristotle conceded creation from eternity — which the aforementioned Ferchius also admits at the conclusion of the vest. cited.

Question II. On Matter.

The first principle of natural things is matter — inasmuch as it is the first and common subject of their forms and privations (*1. Phys. T. 82.*), presupposed for everything natural as the foundation of nature (*1. Met. T. 17.*), as Augustine indicates (*1. de Gen. ad lit. c. 15.*) and (*l. 8. c. 20.*), and Scotus (*Quol. 10. § de secundo ante S.*) and (*3. dist. 13. q. 4. L.*) and (*dist. 22. § Ad 1. F.*) and (*4. d. 11. q. 3.*).

Therefore, being about to treat of the individual natural principles, we not unreasonably begin with matter, intending to pursue the others afterward with care and in order.

Article I. Whether Matter Exists.

Certain individuals — whose name the Doctor suppresses while mentioning them in both works (*2. d. 12. q. 1.*), thinking that everything generable and corruptible is simple — deny matter; and although thoroughly routed and nearly convicted by the Doctor there, they are still defended by Gomez as cited by Arriaga (*disp. 2. sect. 1.*) and by some others proscribed by the Parliament of Paris, as Camerarius testifies (*q. 1. part 2.*), utterly removing matter. But the common body of ancient and modern philosophers openly and strenuously maintains that matter exists — both in (*1. Phys.*), in (*1. Met.*), and elsewhere throughout.

First Note: Matter has many epithets, which can be comprehended in a list of twelve — six improper, six proper. First it is metaphorically called mother (*1. Phys. T. 81.*) — because from the potency of matter, as from its womb, all natural and corporeal forms are drawn out by the natural agent. Second, female (*ibid.*) — because, receiving forms from the natural agent, it partially concurs in generating the composite, just as a woman concurs with a man in begetting offspring. Third, ugly (*ibid.*) — because it lacks the perfection of form, which is called beautiful and comely. Hence in Genesis I, under the name of earth formless and void, matter is not incongruously named, as Vorrlong (*2. dist. 12. art. 1.*) notes before others. And it is said to resemble the moon. Fourth, by the Egyptians it is called the first law of life because it is the lowest being. Because of this, Augustine (*12. Conf. c. 31.*) calls it near-nothing. Fifth, silva ("wood" or "forest") by the same Augustine (*l. de natura boni c. 18.*) — because just as in a forest the artificial forms are contained in potency, so natural forms are said to

be contained in the potency of matter from which they are educed (*1. Phys. T. 69.*). Sixth, being in potency (*12. Met. T. 22.*) — because it is in receptive potency for all forms. The other six proper names of matter are recited by Avicenna (*1. sufficientia*). The first is the familiar name among philosophers, namely matter — so called because all material things are made from it. The second is mass (*massa*) — because from it, distributed into various portions, various composites are generated (*1. Phys. T. 65.*). The third is origin (*origo*) — because it is the root and foundation of the generation of all natural things, as I warned at the very beginning of this question from Aristotle. The fourth is element (*12. Met. c. 4.*) — because from it all natural things are composed, and into it they are ultimately resolved. The fifth is hyle, from Aristotle (*1. Phys. T. 56.*) and Augustine (*l. 20. contra Faustum c. 14.*) — because it receives forms and desires them (*1. Phys. T. 81.*). The sixth is subject (*subiectum*) — because in it all forms are subjected (*ibid. T. 82.*).

Second Note: Matter is taken in many ways. First, for the individual difference, which the Philosopher seems to touch at (*1. Caeli T. 92.*): "When I say heaven, I say form; when I say this heaven, I say matter." And Scotus expressly transmits (*Quol. 2. Met.*) and (*3. d. 12. q. un. F.*). Second, for the subject of mobility, of which the same Philosopher makes mention (*8. Met. T. 12.*): "perhaps some things do not have matter, or not such matter, but only that which is mobile according to place." Third, for any subject of a material accident, especially of quantity — whether it be immobile, like the empyrean heaven, or mobile, like the other heavens. The Parisians (*1. Phys. q. 4. fol. 22.*) cite this acceptation of matter from Avicembron (*l. fontisvita.*). Fourth, for the coarseness or thickness of something — in which sense a man of dull intellect is called material. Vorrlong (*cit.*) mentions this. Fifth, for the receptive subject of substantial forms — and when speaking of matter thus taken, with Aristotle, philosophers speak in the present context, especially the Doctor (*3. d. 22. q. un. B.*) and (*Quol. 2.*) — from whose potency form is educed, and from which, together with form, the composite comes to be.

Third Note: There are many divisions of matter. The first is into matter *ex qua*, *in qua*, and *circa quam*. This division can be taken in terms of various relations and respects. For if matter is taken insofar as from it the agent educes or introduces form, it remaining, it is truly called matter in the defined sense (*1. Phys. T. 82.*) and (*5. Met. T. 2. 4.*). Matter *in qua* is called the subject of inherence in which a substantial or accidental form is received — thus the intellect is the matter in which knowledge inheres. Matter *circa quam* is the subject about which knowledge is occupied. The second division is into transient and remaining matter, on which the Doctor (*1. d. 2. q. 7. § Ad 1. arg. principale. S.*). Remaining matter is properly matter, as is established from its definition: "Matter is that from which something comes to be, when it is inherent in it" (*2. Phys. T. 28. 2.*). Transient matter is not truly so, but rather appears to assume the character of a *terminus a quo* — as when from the opposite the opposite comes

to be, as fire from air and water from fire. This is called by some the matter of alteration. The third is into matter that is not necessary for the constitution of the thing — such as the matter of syllables is said to be wax, since syllables are made from it, even though both wax and syllables can exist separately from one another — and into that which is indeed necessary for the thing but is not of its essence, as a semicircle is not an essential but an integral part of a circle. The fourth is into remote and proximate matter. Remote matter is that from which a thing is mediately made — as a circle is made from bronze. Proximate matter is that from which a thing is immediately made — thus from a semicircle, as from proximate matter, a circle is made, as Scotus testifies (3. d. 22. q. un.). The fifth is into metaphysical and physical matter. Metaphysical matter is genus; physical matter is the subject of forms, of which we treat in the present context. The sixth is into first and second matter — the former defined (1. Phys. T. 82.), the latter called whatever else is prepared and disposed to receive a form.

Assertion. Matter exists. So Scotus (*loc. cit.*). It is proved first: the natural principles are contraries, as proved in (q. 1. of this book art. 4.); but contraries require one common subject in which they may exercise their contrariety (1. Phys. T. 16. 68.) and (T. 70.). This is most true of properly so-called contraries, which mutually expel one another from the same subject. Therefore matter must be conceded. Secondly: a natural agent always acts from some presupposed subject — hence the maxim "naturally from nothing nothing comes to be" was established by Aristotle and approved by him (*ibid.* T. 75.). But that from which something is made by a natural agent is matter, as is evident (*ibid.* T. 65. 82.). Thirdly: there is substantial transmutation from one form to another when there is perennial generation and perpetual corruption — of both simple and composite things, of both living and non-living; and such transmutation requires a subject, which is matter. Fourthly: a composite substance consists of two things, one of which is related after the manner of potency — which is matter — and another after the manner of act — which is form. Hence (2. Anima T. 2.) substance is divided into matter, form, and composite. Likewise the composite is caused by matter and form as by two intrinsic causes (7. Met. sum. 2. c. 1. T. 7.). Again: just as art requires matter for making its artifacts, so nature presupposes matter for carrying out its natural works (1. Phys. T. 69.) and (1. 2. T. 11.). Moreover: if nothing of a living man were to remain after his death, the holy Church would neither concede nor enjoin the veneration of the relics of the saints; nor would the body of Christ the Lord during the three days when it lay in the sepulcher have been worthy of any cult — since nothing would have been Christ's own, neither soul (which descended to hell) nor matter, on the supposition that matter does not exist. Augustine confesses this truth (12. Conf. c. 32.) and (7. Super Gen. ad lit. c. 6.).

Arriaga (n. 3.) adds that these arguments do not convince Gomez, who thinks differently about natural things than philosophers generally do and than the aforementioned arguments conclude. For Gomez admits that after the death of

a man and of any animate being some subject remains, which he thinks is not prime matter but something composed from the four elements united and mingled with one another, and holds that the elements are simple and alien from all composition.

But if Gomez thought this way — as Arriaga reports — he would unwillingly be conceding prime matter, since as Arriaga himself notes at the beginning of (*sect. 1.*), by prime matter is commonly understood the common subject of substantial forms. But that compound from four elements devised by Gomez is just such a common subject of forms — especially of souls — which persists after the separation of rational souls. Thus through Arriaga's explanation, Gomez would not dissent from the true and common doctrine. Nevertheless Arriaga concedes (*ibid. n. 3.*) that Gomez utterly disagrees with it. And in our school, the body deprived of soul is not a simple substance but one composed of matter and form, for whose composition the union and mingling of the elements is prerequisite. Moreover, the question of whether matter exists would be converted into the question of what matter is. For in the present we investigate whether matter exists. To respond that matter consists of four elements is not to satisfy the question posed. For as will be evident below, Empedocles and other ancients — joined by some moderns — hold that prime matter is the four elements. To hold this opinion is not to deny prime matter, but to disagree with the question of what prime matter is. Since, therefore, we here do not inquire what matter is, it consequently and evidently follows that neither Gomez nor Arriaga in his view satisfies the question proposed and the arguments set forth. All the more so because if a natural agent can create something, as Arriaga responds together with Gomez, then no subject of forms is required — whether composed from elements or from other things; and it can also annihilate something: and all that Arriaga assembles against Gomez collapses, since it presupposes some subject — as can be seen from him — and when that is supposed, his arguments are strengthened. But that a natural agent can create contradicts the decree of the Ancients (*11. Met. c. 4. sum. 2.*) and conflicts with the truth — as I shall show elsewhere.

Objection I: If matter existed, it would be in one of the ten predicaments — for since it would not be an infinite being, which is God alone, it would be a finite being, which, from what was said in the Logic (*l. 3. q. 4.*) and from what will be said in the Metaphysics (*l. 2. q. 1.*), is distributed into ten supreme genera. But matter does not reside in any of them — since from (*7. Met. T. 8.*), it is "not what, nor how much, nor any of those by which being is determined." Therefore matter is not to be conceded.

I concede the major and deny the minor. To the testimony of Aristotle I say that it carries its own solution, when he says "not any of those by which being is determined" — where he signifies that matter is not an act actuating and

distinguishing, such as form is, but is indifferent and indeterminate to receive any form whatsoever.

Objection further: Matter is predicated of nothing essentially, but only denominatively — from the same Aristotle (*ibid.* T. 25.). Therefore since matter is nothing of what things are, it is altogether nothing.

I concede the antecedent and deny the consequence. For if matter is predicated denominatively, it is something — since nothing does not denominate something, as the Doctor rightly infers (*cit.* § *Ad arg. ante I.*).

Objection II: If matter existed, it would be either a being in act or a being in potency — since being is sufficiently divided into being in act and being in potency (11. *Met. sum.* 2. c. 4.). But matter is neither — not a being in act nor a being in potency, as is clear from (5. *Phys. c.* 2. T. 8.): "what is moved is, but what is generated is not." But matter is not what is moved — for that is a natural body; nor is it what is generated — since properly generation belongs to the composite alone (7. *Met.* T. 26.).

I concede the major and deny the minor. To its proof I say that the subject of motion is indeed the natural composite, while the subject of generation is matter, which is the subject of substantial forms. And so it is clear that the mobile is in potency to an accidental form, and the generable to a substantial form.

Article II. What Matter Is.

Although the vulgar crowd and the whole body of philosophers acknowledged matter from which all natural things are generated — for they established that maxim "from nothing, nothing comes to be" — yet what matter is, its nature and quiddity, was hidden from them. For the sake of distinction and clarity I divide their positions into the following doubts.

Doubt I. What the Vulgar Thought About Prime Matter.

An ancient and widespread opinion it was, as Aristotle testifies (1. *Met. c.* 7. T. 14.), that earth is the matter of all things from which all natural things are composed; the same Philosopher reports (*ibid.*) that Hesiod held this, and Pherecydes subscribes — as Theodoret (*l. de materia*) narrates. But that no later philosopher embraced it, Aristotle himself asserts and proves in that place. We agree with them.

We assert: Earth is not prime matter. The reason is that earth is very dense and dry, and takes on other qualities that do not render it apt for easily receiving figures and forms. Furthermore, earth is composed of matter and form, as will be shown below for the other elements as well. Therefore earth is not to be considered prime matter.

Objection I: In Genesis I, where the Vulgate reads "but the earth was formless and void," St. Augustine (*1. de Gen. ad lit. cc. 1, 2, 14, 15.*) and (*l. 2. of the same work c. 11.*) translates it as "the earth was invisible and unorganized," and affirms that the sacred text there intimated prime matter under the name of earth. Not incongruously, therefore, is earth named prime matter.

I respond: although the divine Chronicler under "earth" intended to signify prime matter — and also water — to the uneducated people, as Augustine notes (*l. 1. cit. c. 15.*) — because these two elements are more tractable to the hands of those who work and make something — yet in truth neither earth nor water is prime matter, since they are composed of matter and form. Just as the same Moses, by heaven, indicated every spiritual creature (even though heaven is a physical composite), and by earth every corporeal creature — as the same Augustine interprets (*l. 1. cit. c. 1.*). This the Lateran Council sanctions: "God created both creatures — the celestial and the mundane" (*c. Firmiter de summa Trinitate et fide Catholica*).

Objection II: All things come from earth and return to earth — Genesis III: "In the sweat of your face you shall eat bread, until you return to the earth from which you were taken." Moreover, earth is at the center of the universe as the fitting receptacle of all forms. Furthermore, from it living things are generated, nourished, and fostered. Therefore it is now called Vesta, now Ceres, now the common mother.

I respond: although man and other terrestrial animals are resolved into earth, that resolution is not the ultimate one — there still remains a further resolution into prime matter, to be examined in the book on generation (*q. 3. a. 2.*). Earth is situated in the middle of the world because it is the center of the world itself; it is called mother not on account of receiving forms, but because of the nourishment it furnishes to living terrestrial things — just as water can be called the mother of fish, and air of birds.

Doubt II. What Thales of Miletus Thought About Prime Matter.

Thales of Miletus, the inventor and founder of natural philosophy (*1. Met. c. 3. and c. 7. T. 14.*), posited water as the first material principle of natural things — as Augustine (*8. Civ. c. 2.*) and Vives (*ibid. in com.*) report, the latter citing in favor of this opinion Cicero, Eusebius, and others. The same is signified by Orpheus, Musaeus, and the other ancient poets and theologians, who call Oceanus and Tethys the parents of all things; and indeed the sacred text of Genesis I seems to indicate it: "The Spirit of the Lord was borne over the waters" — where Augustine (*1. de Gen. ad lit. c. 18.*) says that in the Syriac idiom the reading is "resounded"; others render it "brooded over." The same Doctor (*cit. c. 5.*) explains it with this simile: "Just as eggs are warmed by birds, where the warmth of the mother's body also contributes in some way to the formation of the chicks through a certain affection of love in its kind." It is also suggested by (*Matt. 23.*):

"as a hen gathers her chicks" — in the same way God brooded over the water as the first matter, so that from it he might educe all the forms of things he willed. And this does not displease the same Augustine (*ibid.*), who under the name of water calls the whole matter — the reason he gives being that from a humid nature we see all things on earth take shape and grow through various forms. The same holy man intimates the same thing in the unfinished work on Genesis (*c. 4.*). And before this, Egypt figured it in the idol of Serapis, which represented water. That Thales descended to Egypt to study, and that the Egyptians were taught by the Hebrews, I reported (*l. 1. q. 1. a. 1.*). It therefore does not seem improbable that that opinion about prime matter under the name of water was borrowed from the sacred codex.

Nor is it valid what Fonseca adds (*1. Met. c. 7. q. 2. sect. 2.*): that in Holy Scripture, water is not taken to mean prime matter but the familiar element of water; nor that the Egyptians under the image of Serapis adumbrated prime matter, but rather water, which is numbered among the elements — on account of the Nile, which floods and irrigates their entire territory. For St. Augustine at the passage cited clearly interprets that passage of Genesis as referring to prime matter, which he himself calls formless, unorganized, and invisible matter, from which the world — consisting principally of two great parts, namely heaven and earth — was fashioned with the elements arranged and form received. And there he adds that matter preceded form not in time but in origin or nature. Thus the exposition of the sacred text — whether by the name of earth or of water prime matter is understood — is congruous. Hence (*c. 4. of the unfinished work cit.*) he subjoins: "For this reason, more fittingly would matter be named by the name of water when it was shown to be subject to the work of the artificer, because of the mobility and conversion into any nascent body, than by the name of air, in which only mobility could be observed." All the more so since in Holy Scripture, under names other than earth and water, prime matter — which was undoubtedly created by God — is not indicated. Yet these considerations notwithstanding:

We assert: Water is not prime matter. Aristotle (*ibid.*) and Scotus (*ibid.*) hold this. It is proved first: water requires and presupposes matter as its part — for it is one of the four common elements, which are simple bodies composed of matter and form, as will be proved below. Secondly: water is transmutable, like the other elements, one of which is transmuted into another. From air, fire is generated, and from water, earth; but matter is ingenerable and incorruptible, since it is the common subject of all transmutations. Therefore water is not prime matter.

Objection I: St. Augustine (*1. de Gen. ad lit. c. 5.*) and (*1. de Gen. contra Manich. c. 7.*) seems not to reprove but to approve the opinion of those who understand formless matter under the name of water. Therefore the opinion of Thales, who decreed water to be the first material principle of natural things, is plausible.

I respond: Augustine indeed affirms that under the name of water the first matter can be signified in Sacred Scripture — because since it is certain that prime matter was created by God, and the sacred text expressly does not mention its creation, the holy Doctor writes that it can fittingly be designated by water. Yet in truth it is not prime matter, but an element composed of matter and form.

Objection II: From (*1. Met. c. 3.*): water is humid; but the nourishment of all things is humid; even the warm is nourished by the humid; animals live by the humid and perish when it is consumed; and indeed all seeds have a humid nature. Therefore since water is the principle of humid things, it is not unfittingly asserted that it is the first material principle.

I respond: these and similar motives that can be adduced for introducing water as the material principle of natural things only prove that water is necessary for nourishing all mixed things, and that it is in some way their sustenance and quasi-fodder — so that it should be called second matter rather than first. Looking toward this, perhaps, the Church sings at Vespers on the feria: "Great is God's power, / Who made the race that rose from the waters, / Part by releasing it into the deep, / Part by lifting it into the air."

Doubt III. Whether Prime Matter Is Air.

Anaximander, the successor in the school of Thales but not the defender of his opinion, posited as the material principle of things an infinite element, without specifying which element it might be. His hearer Anaximenes, third in the Ionian sect, expressly affirms it to be air — as Aristotle (*1. Phys. c. 6. T. 54.*) and (*1. Met. c. 7.*), Augustine (*8. Civ. c. 2.*), Cicero (*1. de natura Deorum*), and others cited by Vives in his commentary on the said Augustine (*alleg.*) report. By air, however, in the book of Genesis prime matter is not designated — although the same Augustine (*in the unfinished work de Gen. ad lit. c. 4.*) narrates that some understood the element of air under the name of spirit. Thus the royal prophet names air in this way (*Ps. 118.*): "I opened my mouth and drew in the spirit." Why air is not so fittingly held to be matter as earth and water — the reason Augustine (*just mentioned*) touches upon: that air or fire has rather the power of acting than of suffering, which is adapted to matter.

We assert: Air is not prime matter. So Scotus with Aristotle (*ibid.*). It is urged by the common middle argument: air is one of the four elements, as philosophers commonly teach and St. Augustine (*cit.*). But the individual elements consist of matter and form, as is clear since they are natural bodies composed from the said matter and form. Therefore prime matter is not air. Again: air excels water and earth; and what is superior is more active than what is inferior. For this reason fire, since it is more eminent than the rest, is most active; but prime matter is said to be the lowest being and passive. Therefore air is not to be thought prime matter.

Objection: It is the proper characteristic of matter to receive all forms, according to the common agreement of philosophers. But air more easily than water receives external and foreign impressions of heat, cold, smell, and the like. Therefore air should be considered prime matter.

Confirmation I: Air is warm and humid, in both of which animal life consists and is preserved.

Confirmation II: Air, as has been said, is called spirit; and in seed there are spirits; and therefore perhaps seed is called divine by Galen. All the more so, demons who are spirits are called aerial powers and aerial animals, as Augustine indicates (3. *de Gen. ad lit. c. 10.*) and (8. *Civ. T. 15.*).

I respond: the major holds of substantial forms, not of accidental ones — of the kind that air receives, and which are adduced to strengthen the minor. To Confirmation I: I say that this only proves that animals, especially terrestrial ones, need air for living and breathing — which I freely admit. To Confirmation II: I say air is called spirit because of its tenuousness and subtlety; whence perhaps demons are said to be aerial — either because they dwell in the air, as is read in Augustine (*ibid.*).

Doubt IV. Whether Fire Is Prime Matter.

Aristotle (1. *Phys. c. 2. T. 6.*) mentions those who hold that fire is the first principle, though he refrains from naming them there; but (1. *Met. c. 3.*) he explicitly names them as Hippasus of Metapontum and Heraclitus of Ephesus, and he ranks their opinion (*ibid. c. 7. T. 13.*) above the reasoning of the others.

We assert: Fire cannot be prime matter. Aristotle and Scotus (*ibid.*) hold this. Beyond the common middle argument, one can urge: fire is superior to air and the other sublunary things, as Augustine testifies (2. *de gen. ad lit. c. 3.*). But prime matter is the lowest of all things; for this reason it is said to be like dregs and like nothing. Again: fire is most active, while matter is passive; fire is ranked before the other elements in nobility; but matter is subjected to all things. Furthermore, fire by means of moderate heat gathers homogeneous things together; but matter without distinction receives all forms on account of the universal appetite it has for them. Finally, since dryness and heat are adapted to fire, and when dryness presses and heat burns, animate things nearly perish — it seems inept to hold fire to be the constitutive principle of those things of which it is destructive.

Objection: Fire is the thinnest and most subtle thing. Hence into its sphere it does not suffer external impressions to enter; the other elements, however, are coarse and impure. It pervades and penetrates all things and is divided into the minutest parts, as the Philosopher notes (*ibid. T. 13.*). I add that fire is the fount of heat; and that in warmth chiefly life consists — no one fails to see this. It therefore seems plausible that fire is the first principle of physical things.

I respond: this instance only shows the excellence and eminence of fire above the other elements — but it does not prove that fire itself is the first matter and principle of things.

Doubt V. Whether Prime Matter Is Something Intermediate Between the Elements.

Some make prime matter something intermediate between fire and air, which Aristotle (*1. Phys. c. 4. T. 32.*) mentions. Others make it something intermediate between fire and water — as the same Philosopher testifies (*1. Met. c. 7. T. 14.*). And both opinions the same Stagirite reports (*2. de gen. c. 5. T. 32.*), counting it more probable than the preceding ones (*1. Phys. c. 6. T. 54.*). The reason why no philosopher placed anything interposed between water and earth is perhaps that earth is coarse and dense and not apt for receiving any forms whatsoever.

We assert: No intermediate thing — whether between fire and air, or between air and water — is to be posited as the first principle of natural things. The Doctor, Aristotle, and Scotus presuppose this (*loc. cit.*). It is proved first: prime matter is indeterminate and indifferent to receiving any forms whatsoever, since it is the common subject and universal receptacle of forms. Therefore it is not aptly restricted to being something intermediate between fire and air, or between air and water — since it must embrace and encompass all forms of every natural thing. Secondly: such an intermediate between the aforementioned things devised by the aforementioned philosophers is either composite or not. If the first, then it is not matter — which is presupposed by nearly all as a part of the composite. If the second, it no more ought to mediate between those elements than between others. For not only what pertains to fire, air, and water participates matter, but also what pertains to earth and all the other natural composites. Moreover, it is not explained what that intercepted intermediate is, nor is it proved, nor is anything worth knowing adduced to establish it. And to say that it is infinite, as Anaximander holds, is of no help — since Aristotle in many places convinces that an infinite being in act is not given (*3. Phys. c. 5., 1. de gen. c. 3., l. 2. c. 1. and following.*).

Objection: Prime matter is not assigned to sensible things, nor is it affected by contraries, since it is the foundation of nature immune from them and subject to all transmutations. Therefore matter appears to be that intermediate between the aforementioned elements.

I grant the antecedent and deny the consequence, for the reasons adduced in the proposed assertion — since by those words the perfect nature of matter is not designated, nor are the other things that pertain to its integrity and to a perfect knowledge of it conveyed.

Doubt VI. Whether All Things Are One Material Principle.

Those who introduced one principle are, as Aristotle testifies (*1. Phys. c. 1. and Met. c. 3.*), bipartite. For some — like Melissus and Parmenides, speaking unnaturally — thought that one principle to be immovable. Since nature is a principle of motion (*2. Phys. T. 3.*), and such a one principle is devoid of motion, Aristotle rightly considers them unnatural — as denying natural principles. Others, whom I recalled in the preceding doubts, posit that one principle as mobile — such as water, or air, or fire, or something interposed — of whom enough has been said above. Now it is worth briefly pursuing those who make it immovable, or who are internally inconsistent. For Melissus thinks it infinite, while Parmenides thinks it finite. Both, however, assert that all things are one — and these Aristotle sharply refutes and clearly convicts (*cit.*), proceeding metaphysically, as Alexander and others note there before all.

We assert: All things are not one principle. So Aristotle (*ibid.*) and the Doctor presupposes (*ibid.*). It is proved first: to say all things are one principle involves a contradiction in terms — for if it is a principle, then certainly there is something principiated. For principle and principiated are correlatives, just as cause and effect; but principle and principiated cannot be one and the same. For what is from another must necessarily be distinguished from that which is not from another, since the same thing cannot be from itself and dependent upon another, and independent; origin and originated; maker and made; cause and effect. Secondly: being is divided into infinite and finite — the former bounded by no limit, the latter constrained by a term. But to be unbounded and bounded are without doubt not one and the same. Moreover, being is divided into substance and accident: substance is being subsisting per se; accident is being inhering in another. But to be per se subsisting being and to be inhering in another plainly do not coincide. Furthermore, finite being descends to the ten supreme genera, which are clearly established to be distinct from one another. Again: if all things are one, then consequently all things are of the same species; and thus plant, tree, horse, lion, and man would not differ in species — and that these and many similar things are absurd, no one fails to see. Hence Aristotle rightly adds (*1. Phys. T. 10. 22.*): given one absurdity, many follow. Moreover, if all things are one — either with the unity of continuity, but this cannot be since the continuous is divisible into parts of which one is not another; or with the unity of indivisibility, but this too cannot cohere, since the indivisible is not a quantity, and therefore would not be infinite as Melissus said. To quantity, however, finitude or infinity belongs. Nor can they be one by definition — otherwise the same thing would be simultaneously white and black, good and bad; contraries and contradictories would simultaneously be true and false — which Aristotle shows to be absurd (*4. Met. T. 19.*).

Objection I: On the part of Melissus — whatever is, either is generated or ungenerated; but it is not generated; therefore it is ungenerated. The major is evident — for what is, is either from itself or from another; unproduced or produced. The minor is urged: what is generated is generated either from

another or from nothing; not from another, since it would already be a being before it was, which is repugnant; nor from nothing, since from nothing nothing comes to be. If therefore it is ungenerated, it has no beginning; but what has no beginning has no end; and what is without beginning and end is infinite; but what is infinite does not admit another alongside it. Therefore Melissus concludes there is only one infinite and immovable principle.

Aristotle responds that this argument errs both in form and in matter. In form, because its minor is negative, from which in the first figure no conclusion follows — as observed in the *Epitome* (*l. 3. q. 1. a. 10.*); or, as others say, the inference proceeds from the inferior to the superior negatively — as if someone were to reason: "he is not a man, therefore he is not an animal" — which is censured (*3. Elench. 4.*). In matter it is deficient, arguing from the beginning of time (when it is said: "what has no beginning has no end") to the beginning of magnitude (when it is inferred: "it contains all things and occupies all place, because it is infinite").

Objection II: On the part of Parmenides — cited (*1. Phys. c. 2. 3.*) and (*1. Met. c. 5. before T. 1.*): "Whatever is, besides being, is non-being; but non-being is nothing; therefore whatever is, besides being, is nothing. But being and one are interchangeable; therefore whatever is, besides the one, is nothing; and so there is only one being, and this immovable, since it has nothing by which it might be moved."

I respond: this argument of Parmenides, although in Aristotle's judgment (*1. Phys. T. 23.*) it is not so empty as that of Melissus, is nevertheless captious and sophistical, erring through the fallacy of equivocation. For being and one are said in many ways — as Tataretus notes with Aristotle (*1. Phys. q. 2. scib. 2.*). For if they are taken transcendently, the instance is indeed true but does not conclude what was intended — since the proposal of the aforementioned Parmenides was to prove that there is only one being existing numerically in act, and this immovable — as Toletus notes in the text just cited together with other interpreters.

One might say: if the ancient philosophers, compelled by truth, decree that principles are contraries — as Aristotle testifies (*ibid. c. 5. T. 48.*) — how is it that the aforementioned authors assert there is only one principle, since one and many — these being contraries — do not cohere? One must respond that they thought there to be one principle according to truth and reason, but many principles according to sense and appearance. Thus some of them posited hot and cold, some humid and dry, some even and odd, and others rare and dense. These held that all things are of the same nature and species, and that the difference between them is only accidental. Hence they distinguished the elements in rarity and density and other accidents; and mixed things in terms of the diverse combinations of said elements — and these from those as warm water from hot and cold water. And they held that accident does not deserve the

name of being, nor is to be placed among beings, as Fonseca notes (*1. Met. c. 7. q. 2. sect. 3.*).

Doubt VII. Whether There Are Many Material Principles.

After careful examination and diligent investigation of one-principle positions, their defects and absurdities had been seen and, wishing to avoid them, later philosophers suspected there to be many material principles — some thinking them infinite, others finite (*1. Phys. c. 2. T. 6., 1. de gen. c. 1., 1. Met. c. 4.*). The opinion of the former we treat in the present doubt, and that of the latter in the following one. Among those who posit infinite principles, Leucippus, Democritus, and Anaxagoras are most cited — saying those principles are little bodies, or atoms, indivisible and insectile either mathematically or physically, from whose composition and aggregation (in terms of diverse figure, order, and position) perennial generations come to be, and from their dissipation and segregation perpetual corruptions of things occur. Then some of them, like Democritus, add that all atoms are similar, from which homogeneous things are generated; others, like Anaxagoras, hold those atoms to be dissimilar, from which heterogeneous things are composed. Others add that natural bodies are constituted not only from these as something full, but also from the void or empty. And what is marvelous — they maintain that from these, infinite worlds are composed, that all things are naturally generated and corrupted as those atoms are set in circular motion through infinite spaces, and as they roll about by chance, at times combining into these bodies, at times segregating — and so generations and corruptions of natural things occur. From this they deduce that all things are made by chance, that the universe is governed and ruled fortuitously, and is finally dissolved.

We assert: The material principles of natural things are not infinite, whether they are held to be similar or dissimilar. Aristotle transmits this (*1. Phys. c. 4. T. 35.*), and Scotus does not dissent (*in com. Met. ad T. 15.*). It is proved first: natural things are knowable, for physical science is about them. But the principles of a knowable thing are known — for we consider that we know a thing when we know its principles (*1. Phys. in initio*); and the whole is perspicuous to us when its parts are known to us. But the infinite is unknown, as the Philosopher rightly pursues (*1. Met. c. 2.*). Therefore infinite principles of natural things are not given. Secondly: animate natural things are bounded by a definite limit of their size or smallness (*2. Anima T. 41.*). Therefore they do not consist of infinite principles. For if their principles and parts were infinite, they too would be infinite. And from evident experience it is seen that they are constrained by definite limits of their size or smallness. All the more so, since an infinite being in act is not given and cannot be given — as will be proved in the book on quantity (*q. ult.*). Furthermore, if parts are removed from any natural composite, it diminishes and is finally consumed — a manifest indication that in it there are not actually infinite parts, nor similarly infinite principles. Moreover, it is not

apparent how such indivisible atoms are receptive subjects of divisible and material forms. Nor can a real positive being — such as a natural composite — consist from them and the void. Again: the inconveniences of the earlier philosophers are not avoided. For given such atoms and infinite principles, natural things would still differ accidentally from one another in figure, position, and other accidents — since generations would mean nothing other than alterations and aggregations of things, and corruptions their separations and disaggregations. Finally, it is foolish and absurd that this most firm and beautiful mass of the world was established by chance, and is governed, ruled, and preserved fortuitously. Hence Democritus, laughing at all things and defending these positions, made himself plainly ridiculous to all. And rightly the mark of ignorance and imprudence is tacitly branded upon him (*1. Phys. T. 39.*), and he is refuted (*1. de gen. c. 1.*), and ranked below Empedocles at that passage (*T. 40.*) and (*1. Met. c. 3.*).

Anaxagoras proves his opinion and renders it plausible on the basis of two foundations: the first is "from nothing, nothing comes to be"; the second is that contraries come from contraries. Everything that comes to be, comes to be either from non-being or from being; not from non-being — because from the first foundation received by all, "from nothing, nothing comes to be"; nor from being, since then it would already be a being before it came to be. But what comes to be from being comes from a contrary — as hot from cold and humid from dry — as is clear from the second foundation. But it does not come from a contrary remaining in the generated thing, as is evident. For the cold from which the hot was produced does not persist in the hot, nor the dry in the humid. Therefore it comes from being that was present in it or lay hidden in a contrary. Such being is the infinite aggregate of atoms, commonly called chaos, in which all things were supposed to be mingled, confused, and hidden. I respond: this argument has already been dissolved in (*q. 1. of this book art. 7.*), where according to Aristotle it was established that from non-being simply and per se nothing comes to be — in which sense that assertion "from nothing, nothing comes to be" is understood. But from non-being per accidens and from being in potency, something can well come to be — thus from privation as terminus a quo, form is educed from the potency of matter, and from matter and form the composite comes to be.

Doubt VIII. Whether the Four Elements Are Prime Matter.

Aristotle (*1. Phys. c. 4. T. 40.*) approves the opinion of Empedocles who decrees there to be many and finite principles, but reproves his position of holding those principles to be the four common elements transmutable into one another — as can be seen (*1. Met. c. 7. T. 15.*) and at other places.

We assert: The four elements are not the prime matter of natural things. This is deduced from Scotus (*in com. 1. Met. ad T. 15.*). It is proved first: matter is ingenerable and incorruptible, since it is the common subject of generation and

corruption, as the Doctor explains (*in 1. Rep. d. 5. q. 2.*). But the elements are mutually transmutable. From water, air comes to be; from air, fire; and so of the rest — perennial generations and perpetual corruptions of them occur (*3. Caeli and 2. de gen.*). And this is plainly indicated by their qualities continually fighting and mutually expelling one another from the same subject. But such alterations, generations, and corruptions require the same common subject, which is their common matter. Therefore the four elements cannot be prime matter.

Secondly: principles are contraries (*1. Phys. c. 5. T. 48.*); but contraries must share the same common subject in which they exercise their contrariety — as is clear from their definition. Therefore they require and presuppose a common subject, which is matter, as Aristotle acutely subjoins (*n. cit. c. 7.*). Consequently elements cannot be the matter of natural things. Thirdly: Aristotle argues in the *Metaphysics* (*passage alleg.*): if Empedocles does not admit common matter for the elements, he undoubtedly abolishes alteration — which is the motion of the same subject according to contrary or intermediate qualities (*1. de gen. c. 4. T. 24.*); but that alteration exists is clearer than light; and if alteration is removed, which naturally tends to corruption, corruption too would be removed, and consequently generation — since the corruption of one is the generation of another (*1. de gen. c. 4. T. 17.*). Furthermore, if elements were the matter of natural things, they would be formally in the mixed thing — just as matter formally exists in that of which it is matter — and matter would be of diverse character, just as the elements are of distinct species. Moreover, there would be four prime matters, as there are four elements, and matter would exist without form — since the elements themselves would be matter without form. These and similar things seem very inept and absurd. I add: from the cited passage (*1. Phys. c. 4. T. 32.*), Empedocles agreed with Anaxagoras in positing confused chaos, or the sphere, from which they thought all things came to be — although they differed in some things, as I suggested above and Tataretus explained (*in exp. of the aforementioned c.*). Therefore that chaos rather than the elements that arise from it is prime matter. Finally: in the book on elements I shall show that the elements are composed of matter and form. Therefore the elements themselves cannot be prime matter.

Objection I: Mixed things differ essentially — and of their essence matter is included, as will be proved below. Therefore their matter must be essentially distinct, and this distinction is sought in terms of the four elements. Consequently the elements are the proper matter of all natural things.

I concede the antecedent and deny the consequence, because their essential difference is derived from their forms.

Objection II: Mixed things are generated from elements fighting among themselves, as the common opinion of philosophers holds. Therefore the elements are the matter of all natural things.

I distinguish the antecedent: dispositively — I concede; effectively and principally — I deny. Unless one says that the elements are matter, not indeed prime, but second matter.

Doubt IX. Whether Numbers Are Prime Matter.

So much power and force does custom have in contemplating or doing things that it seems equal to nature — according to that commonplace: "custom is a second nature." Hence the Pythagoreans, accustomed to and exercised in mathematical disciplines, thought that unity or number was prime matter — as Aristotle testifies (*1. Met. c. 5. and T. 19. of the same work and following*). For since in magnitude nothing is prior to unity and number, they consequently thought that all things are composed from unities and that all things are numbers — as if from a subjected matter — perhaps imitating certain people called secret theologians among the Hebrews, Kabbalists, as can be seen in the *Harmonia Mundi* of Francesco Giorgio.

We assert: Numbers in no way can be the matter of natural things. The Doctor holds this with Aristotle (*in the texts just cited*). It is proved first: a corporeal substance is not composed from an accident — otherwise the composite would be a being per accidens. But unity and number are accidents placed in the genus of quantity; yet matter is reduced to the predicament of substance as a part of the physical composite. Therefore numbers are not the matter of physical things. Secondly: substance is prior to accident in nature, time, and definition (*7. Met. c. 1. T. 4.*). But number presupposes things to be numbered — for it is because things pre-exist that they can be numbered. Since, therefore, number follows upon things to be numbered, it cannot be their matter. Thirdly: number is found not only in natural things, which are mobile, but also in others that are immovable. Again: mathematics would not differ from natural philosophy — which conflicts with (*2. Phys. c. 1.*). Moreover, principles are contraries; but numbers undergo no contrariety. Furthermore, it is proper to matter to receive any form whatsoever; but numbers are not capable of receiving any form whatsoever. From these and other things adduced by Aristotle (*c. 7. of the passage just cited*), it is plainly deduced that the Pythagorean opinion is absurd and improbable.

Objection: It is recorded that Plato received much from Pythagoras; and that the same Plato thought well about matter is evident from what he writes in the person of Timaeus. Aristotle also seems to concede this (*1. Phys. T. 80. c. 9.*), and there he only reproves the saying of Plato because Plato himself despised privation and did not distinguish it from matter. Therefore Pythagoras and Plato agree in substance with Aristotle, even if they differ in words, and they adumbrated that matter under unity and number, and under the great and small.

I respond: even if Pythagoras had some knowledge of matter, he does not seem to have fully grasped its nature — since he treated it not physically but mathematically. And the opinion about matter so proposed at the beginning of this article is undoubtedly false. As for Plato: even if much erudition should not be denied to him, he nonetheless does not seem to have fully recognized the essence of matter, since he did not segregate it from privation — as Aristotle charges him (*at the passage just cited.*). And then in the *Timaeus* (*alleg.*) he named the very same matter "this something" — which was not said correctly. For, as Aristotle rightly adds (*2. Anima c. 1.*) and (*7. Met. c. 2.*), "this something" is not matter but the composite.

Doubt X. What Matter Is According to Aristotle and the Truth.

Having dismissed and routed the ancient philosophers, Aristotle sets forth his own opinion in two places — namely (*1. Phys. c. 9. T. 82.*) and (*7. Met. c. 3. T. 8.*). And indeed in the first place he defines matter positively: "Matter is the primary subject of each thing, from which something comes to be, when it is inherent in it, and not according to accident; and if something is corrupted, into this it ultimately passes." In the second place, negatively: "Matter is not what, nor how much, nor what kind, nor any of those by which being is determined." In the same manner God is known both positively and negatively — as the Doctor says (*1. dist. 3. q. 1.*). That this is a privilege of the most perfect and of the most imperfect being, the Seraphic Doctor notes before others (*2. dist. 3. q. 2. art. 1.*). Hence God is said to contain the fullness of all goods and perfections — Exodus XXXIII: "Come, and I will show you all good." And St. Anselm (*in Prosl. c. 2.*) subjoins: "God is that than which nothing greater can be conceived." Both modes of defining are also observed by Porphyry (*Isag. c. de accidente.*): "An accident is that which is present and absent without the corruption of the subject." Then: "An accident is that which is not genus, nor species, nor difference, nor property." Augustine agrees — who at (*12. Conf. c. 3.*), confessing that matter is a certain real positive lowest being, yet expresses it through negations in these words: "Did you not teach me, O Lord, that before you formed and distinguished this formless matter, there was not anything — not color, not figure, not body, not spirit — yet it was not altogether nothing? It was a certain formlessness without any species." And at (*ibid. c. 5.*) he adds of that same matter: "Let human thought strive either to know it while not knowing, or not to know it while knowing."

Assertion. Matter is well described as: "the primary subject of each thing, from which something comes to be, when it is inherent in it, and not according to accident; and if something is corrupted, into this it ultimately passes." This is explained with respect to all its particles before it is proved. "Subject" is placed on account of form, which is in a subject — just as a part is in its co-part and the perfecting in its perfectible. "Primary" is added to distinguish it from second matter, of which in Article I of this question. "Of each" is placed — that is, of

each substantial form. "From which something comes to be" is added — meaning, a composite. "When it is inherent in it" is appended to exclude privation, which withdraws when form arrives — as Scotus interprets (*1. dist. 2. q. 7. § Ad 1. arg. principale. sub S.*) and (*2. d. 12. q. 1. ante § Hic dicit.*). "Not according to accident" is added both because matter is a principle per se, and also because from matter and form something one per se comes to be. Finally: "and if something is corrupted, into this it ultimately passes" is subjoined because matter is the common subject of generation and corruption. From matter, indeed, all natural things are generated, and into it they are ultimately resolved. Therefore it is said to be ingenerable and incorruptible.

The assertion thus explained is urged first: that definition is apt which explains the nature of the thing defined — as stated in the Epitome (*l. 2. q. 7. art. 2.*); but the aforementioned definition of matter is of this kind, as is clearly established from the explanation of each of its words set forth above. Secondly: that definition is deemed suitable for things that are not of a complete specific nature but are parts of a species and incomplete, which consist of a quasi-genus and difference. But the aforementioned definition of matter is of this kind — for matter is a part of the physical composite. Therefore subject serves as a quasi-genus, and the remaining particles hold the place of a difference. Such a definition is therefore legitimate.

Objection I: A definition, according to Scotus (*4. D. 1. q. 2.*), belongs to a real positive, per se, composite, and universal being. But matter is not a real positive, composite being — since (*7. Met. c. 3.*) "matter is not what, nor how much, nor what kind, nor any of those by which being is determined." Therefore the definition of matter is not rightly adapted.

I respond: the major is to be glossed as speaking of definition strictly taken and complete in all its numbers — which in truth cannot apply to matter, since it is a part of the composite. Conceding, however, the major, one can say with Scotus (*cit. § Ad arg. 1. H.*): Aristotle is speaking in the person of the ancient philosophers — as is clear from the course of the text, for he adds these words: "thus it happened to those who attended that matter is the subject; but this is impossible." But Aristotle's manner is not to assert something but to declare it impossible. Or say with the same Doctor (*ibid.*): if Aristotle speaks in his own judgment, the aforementioned instance carries its own solution — for those words "by which being is determined" indicate the nature of matter, which is to be indifferent and indeterminate for receiving any form whatsoever. This is true and no one I have seen dissents from this explanation. And Augustine intimates it (*cit. c. 3.*): "Not altogether nothing; but a certain formlessness without any species."

Objection II: What is absolute is not defined through what is relative — otherwise it would not be absolute but relative, as is clear from the description of each adduced in the Epitome (*l. 1. q. 1. art. 6.*). But matter is defined through

the order and relation to form — for it is the common subject of all forms. Therefore the aforementioned definition of matter is not suitable.

I distinguish the major: of what is total and perfect absolute, I concede; of what is partial and imperfect absolute, I deny. As is clear from the soul, which (2. *Anima T. 1. and T. 6.*) is defined through order and relation to the organic body: "The soul is the first act of an organic body." A part, however, as a part regards its co-part; and the one is relatively opposed to the other — as Fuentes notes (1. *Phys. q. 5. dif. 1. a. 1. n. 3. and 10.*) after Aristotle (2. *Phys. T. 26.*).

Article III. Whether Matter Is Substance.

The affirmative part seems so certain that the earlier philosophers cited by Aristotle (1. *Met. c. 3.*) held the whole substance of the substantial composite to be matter alone, the rest being accidents; and consequently that substantial composites differ only accidentally — e.g., the elements in rarity or density, and the rest in the manner previously indicated above (1. *Phys. c. 5. and 6.*). Later philosophers, however, even if they place matter among substances, think it a partial and incomplete substance from which, together with form, the composite is constituted — which is a total, complete, and perfect substance. Hence substance is distributed into total — which is the composite — and partial — which is subdivided into matter and form: the former is perfectible, indifferent, and indeterminate to receive all forms; the latter is perfecting, determining, and actuating matter. Therefore from both — as perfectible and perfecting, actuable and actuating, or, as commonly said, from potency and act — something one per se comes to be, which is the substantial whole, as Aristotle clearly sets forth (2. *Anima T. 7. and 8. Met. c. 6. T. 15.*).

Assertion I. Matter is substance. So Scotus (2. *d. 11. q. 1.*). It is proved first from Aristotle (2. *Anima T. 1.*) and (7. *Met. c. 3. T. 7.*), dividing substance into matter, form, and composite. Secondly: substance is divided into simple and composite; but composite substance, as it is distinguished from simple, is composed only of matter and form — because substance is made from substances (1. *Phys. c. 6. T. 52.*). Otherwise all substantial composition would be removed, which requires substantial parts, one of which is matter and the other form. Substantial corruption too would be removed — which leaves behind a certain surviving substantial part; otherwise it would not be corruption but annihilation. But the substantial part that remains after the corruption of the composite is matter. Therefore matter is substance.

Assertion II. Matter is a partial and incomplete substance. The Doctor defends this (*ibid. § Dico igitur*) and (*§ Sequitur.*). It is urged first from Aristotle (2. *Phys. T. 28.*) and (5. *Met. T. 2.*): matter is an intrinsic cause of the composite. And (7. *Met. T. 7. c. 3.*): matter is a part of the substantial composite. Therefore, per Aristotle, matter is a partial and incomplete substance. Secondly: the parts of a whole are imperfect, since they are ordered to completing and perfecting it. But matter is

a part of the composite — because from this and form the whole is composed (7. *Met. T. 7. and 9.*). Therefore matter is a partial substance. Thirdly: a composite is one per se, consisting of perfectible and perfecting, receptive and received, determinable and determining (8. *Met. T. 15. and 16.*); and in this it differs from those that are one by aggregation or by order. It follows therefore that matter is a partial and imperfect substance.

Objection I: Against Assertion I — The receptive of some genus is nothing of that genus of which it is receptive, as is evident in the individual genera of accident. For the receptive of color is not in the genus of color — for color is in the category of quality, while its immediate subject is a surface, which belongs to the predicament of quantity. Therefore the receptive subject of substantial form, which is matter, does not reside in the genus of substance; and thus matter is not substance.

I respond: the major is not universally and perennially true. For every genus has its own potential and actual — so that, e.g., whiteness, though it is a simple form, is yet composed from intrinsic principles (12. *Met. 2.*). In this way the receptive of some genus is in the same genus reductively — as indeterminate quantity has its own potential in the genus of quantity. The reason why the receptive of color is not in the same genus but in the prior genus of quantity is that color participates in the potential which, according to the whole genus, is prior to the whole genus of color. But since substance is the first genus, its receptive — which is matter — is of the same genus reductively.

Objection II: Matter is called near-nothing, as Augustine says (12. *Conf. c. 32.*), so much so that nothing is closer to nothing than matter. But substance is a being subsisting per se, as is clear from what was said in the Logic (*l. 3. q. 4. a. 1.*). Therefore matter is not to be placed among substances.

I respond: matter is called near-nothing not because it is not a true, real, positive, substantial being — but because among substances it holds the lowest place and is perfectible, lacking all form, perfection, and beauty — as the same Augustine clearly shows (*cit. c. 3.*).

Article IV. Whether Matter Is Created.

Some — among whom Aristotle is numbered, as Vorrlong (2. *d. 1.*) testifies, and others cited by Suárez (*disp. 13. Met. Sect. 4. n. 15.*) — think that matter is ungenerated and uncreated, calling it chaos from which they suppose all things were made. But the common opinion of Scotus (2. *d. 12. q. 1.*) and other scholastics there is that matter is created.

It must be presupposed from what will be said in the book on the world and in the Treatise on Creation (*disp. 1. q. 1.*): that creation properly so called is the production of a thing from nothing — that is, with no presupposed subject and no pre-existing matter. Therefore it is adapted solely to God, who is from

himself and independent. Other agents, since they are dependent, require a subject and presuppose matter in order to be able to exercise their operations.

Assertion. Matter was created by God. It is proved first from Augustine (*l. de natura boni contra Manich. c. 18.*) and (*l. 12. Conf. c. 7.*), where addressing God he says: "You were, and there was nothing else. From what did you make heaven and earth? Two things, one near to you, and the other near to nothing." This means, according to Scotus (*4. d. 12. q. 6. § Quarta opinio B.*): matter, which is properly called nothing — not absolutely (for it is substance), but relatively (when compared to soul and body), and because it lacks all species, it is called nothing — as the same Augustine testifies (*l. 83. qq. q. 54.*). And in the same book of Confessions (*c. 8.*) the saint himself subjoins: "For you, O Lord, made the world of formless matter, which you made from no thing." He repeats the same (*l. de vera religione c. 18.*): "if the world was made from some formless matter, this itself was made wholly from nothing." Secondly: what properly comes to be, does so either through creation or through generation. But matter cannot come to be through generation; therefore it comes to be through creation. The major is evident — for no other mode of producing is found besides those two. For either a thing is produced without a pre-existing subject, and comes to be through creation; or from a presupposed subject, and comes to be through generation. The minor is urged: matter is the subject of generation, or the fundamental presupposition of generation — as the Doctor (*cit.*) says. For generation is a mutation that always requires a subject. Moreover, Ferchius shows at length (*vest. 1. c. 8.*) that there is no repugnance on the part of matter against having been created by God, and proves with many arguments that this is the opinion of Aristotle — which I shall evaluate elsewhere.

Objection: "From nothing, nothing comes to be" — according to the common decree of physicists (*11. Met. c. 5.*). But creation, as has been said above, is a making from nothing. Therefore matter was not created.

I distinguish the major and interpret that maxim as holding through the power of a natural agent, which in acting depends upon a subject — I concede; through the power of a supernatural agent, which is independent and can act without a presupposed subject — I deny. And Augustine confirms this (*1. de Gen. ad lit. c. 15.*): "There is no doubt that this formless matter is so near to nothing that it was not made except by God, and that together with the things that were made from it, it was fashioned at the same time."

Article V. Whether Matter Has an Entitative Act.

Two most noble schools dispute strenuously about the proposed difficulty: one — that of St. Thomas (*1. p. q. 66. art. 1.*) and his disciples Capreolus, Ferrariensis, Cajetan, the Complutensians (*in praesenti disp. 3. q. 2. § 2.*), Baconius (*2. dist. 12. art. 2.*), Zabarella (*l. 2. de materia c. 2.*), and Rubio (*Tract. 1. de materia q. 2.*) — who affirm that matter is such a pure potency that it includes no entitative act. The

other — that of Scotus (7. *Met.* q. 5.) and (2. *d.* 12. q. 1.) and (4. *d.* 11. q. 3.), and of Antonius Andreas, Mayr (*ibid.*), the Parisians (1. *Phys.* fol. 25. q. 2.), Hurtado (*disp.* 2. *Phys.* sect. 2. § 24.), Arriaga (*ibid.* Sect. 5. subsect. 1.), Suárez (*disp.* 13. *Met.* Sect. 4. and 5.), Fabri (*Theor.* 22.), and other Scotists and Nominalists — who teach that matter is not pure potency but has an entitative act.

First Note, from Scotus (7. *Met.* q. 5. § *Responsio.*) and (q. of the same work q. 2.) and (2. *d.* 12. q. 1. § *Est igitur videndum.* B.), Baconius (*ibid.* d. 1. q. 5.) following Aristotle (7. *Met.* T. 56.) and (8. *ibid.* T. 15.), and also (q. of the same work T. 13.) and Augustine (12. *Confessionum* T. 32.): potency is divided into objective and subjective. Objective potency is that which regards what is producible and makeable — by effective potency; just as a rose presently not existing is in objective potency to be caused by its cause, as its object and terminus. And this kind of potency is rooted not in the passive potency of matter but in the active potency of the agent. Subjective potency, however, is that by which something is capable of receiving a form — thus a wall participates in the subjective potency to receive whiteness, and an organic body to receive a soul. But Scotus (*cited in* 2.) adds that perhaps these are not absolutely two potencies, but one and the same, only relatively diverse — for insofar as it regards an existing subject, it is called subjective potency; but insofar as it regards the agent, it is called objective. Nevertheless they can be separated from one another — for what is creatable is in objective potency but not in subjective potency, since creation presupposes no subject. But what is in objective potency is not something real actually existing, since it is producible and makeable by an agent; it is in fact pure nothing in act. But what is in subjective potency is something real actually existing caused by an efficient cause. For a wall would not receive whiteness in itself unless it actually existed — since the subject must pre-exist and be presupposed for those things that are received in it. Hence the Doctor well says (*Quol.* 10. § *De secundo ante G.*) and (3. *d.* 13. q. 4. L.): matter is prior to form, because it is the subject and foundation of form, in which it is founded and originates.

Second Note: potency is opposed to act — from Aristotle (9. *Met.* ad T. 10.) and Scotus (2. *d.* 2. q. 10. § *Ad 1. H.*). Therefore a twofold act is opposed to the twofold potency just recounted — namely, the entitative and the formal. The entitative act is that by which a thing has existing being outside its causes — for it is derived from being; and therefore that is said to have an entitative act which has a being caused by an efficient cause and actually exists. The formal act, however, is that by which something is constituted in specific being and distinguished from every other that is not itself — for form is said to be what confers upon a thing its specific and essential being. From this it follows that "to be in act" is commonly attributed to form and appropriated to it — because it determines, specifies, and distinguishes a thing. Matter, however, because it receives form and is in potency to receiving it, and is itself determined by form — for this

reason is said to be, and is defined as, potency (2. *Phys. T. 12.*), and (5. *ibid. T. 8.*), and (8. *Met. T. 3.*). And the Doctor intimates this (*l. de 1. principio c. 2. concl. 6.*).

Third Note: just as subjective potency presents two things — namely, aptitude in the subject and the privation of the form to be received (for that is said to be in potency which is fit to receive a form that it lacks) — so potentiality can designate two things: namely, the aptitude to receive form — which is a certain real and actual entity, whatever Bacconius may say (2. *d. 12.*) — and the negation of form and act, in which way potentiality is not a real and actual entity, and indeed is distinguished from actuality itself as privative from positive. Hence the dilemma of Bacconius is easily dissolved, who says: "either the potentiality of matter is actuality, or it really differs from actuality." To this one satisfies by responding that potentiality is radically and really an actual entity, really differing from the actuality of form — since just as it has its own being, so it has its own entity. Nor is it rightly inferred from this that matter is composed of actuality and potentiality — since potentiality follows from matter as a property from its subject, or as a relation from a foundation, as the Doctor indicates (1. *d. 7. q. un. § Ad quaestionem sub. L.*).

Assertion. Matter is not pure potency but has an entitative act. Scotus holds this (*loc. cit. at the beginning of this article*), and urges it from Aristotle: (1. *Phys. T. 52.*): "Matter is per se a principle of natural things." (2. *Phys. T. 7.*): "Matter is nature." (5. *Met. T. 2.*): "Matter is per se a cause." (7. *Met. T. 28.*): "Matter is a part of the composite substance." (1. *Phys. T. 82.*): "Matter is the subject of forms." And (1. *Met. T. 17.*): "Matter is the foundation of nature." But matter cannot exercise these and similar functions unless it is a real actual entity — for a principle does not principiate, nor does a cause cause, nor does a nature naturate, nor does a part compose, nor does a subject receive a form, nor does a foundation found those that are built upon it, unless it is actually a real being. Therefore in the school of Aristotle and of truth, matter possesses an entitative act. The same Augustine intimates (*l. de natura boni contra Manich. c. 18.*) and (*l. 1. contra Advers. legis et Proph. c. 8.*) and (12. *Conf. c. 7.*). The same truth, pressed by it, Thomas seems to confess (*q. 3. de veritate art. 5. ad 1.*), saying that matter's being is to have an imitation of the first being — which means nothing other than to be in act, which belongs to God, who alone is said to be most actual. Therefore matter imitates God — not in potential being, which is far from him, but in actual being, which belongs to God independently. Nor is it valid what the Complutensians add (*disp. 3. q. 2. § 3.*) — that Thomas meets the instance by saying that matter has a weak and lowest being. For although matter's being is weak and feeble, it nevertheless participates in actuality, in which it imitates and is assimilated to God — as the said Doctor intends.

The Thomists respond to all the aforementioned passages and testimonies by saying that matter performs all the functions listed as it is potency, not as act — of which it is devoid. For since matter is essentially potency, and being is

divided into potency and act, matter is consequently comprehended not under actual being but under potential being.

Against this: matter is either objective potency or subjective potency, since no middle is intercepted between the two — just as between being and nothing. Not the first — since matter is not nothing, but exists as the terminus of objective potency, whose being is fulfilled and terminated through such potency. If the second — then matter possesses an entitative act. And the Thomists — notably the Complutensians at the end of (§ *cit.*) — unwilling to do so, fall into the position of Scotus, who asserts that matter is subjective and receptive potency for forms. Moreover: (2. *Phys. T.* 69.), (2. *ibid. T.* 86.), (1. *de partibus c.* 1.), and (2. *de gen. T.* 57.): just as artificial matter stands in relation to artificial forms, so natural matter stands in relation to natural forms. But the potency by which artificial matter is able to receive artificial forms does not remove its actual being. Therefore neither is the actual being of natural matter removed, even though it presents an order and relation to receiving natural forms.

Again: matter actually exists in the order of things, since it was established by God and always perseveres. Therefore it possesses the act that is called entitative act — as Aristotle not obscurely indicates (7. *Met. T.* 59.).

The assertion is proved secondly: what actually terminates the actual dependence of some actually existing being is an actually existing being. For it cannot terminate the actual dependence of that being unless it actually exists — since termination presupposes the existence of what terminates, just as a relation presupposes that which is related to another. But matter terminates the actual dependence of form — since form is educed from it and is subjected in it. This cannot be unless matter itself actually exists. Therefore matter has an entitative act.

Thirdly: what actually inheres in a composite must actually exist — since it is prior to exist than to inhere, just as it is prior to be than to inhere. But matter inheres in the composite, since it is its essential part, from which together with form the composite itself actually comes to be. Therefore matter is an actual entity and therefore enjoys an entitative act.

Rubio (*Tract. 1. q. 2.*) responds that real entity is divided by Aristotle (9. *Met. T.* 1.) and (6. *ibid. T.* 4.) into act and potency; and therefore the inference from the divided to one member of the division taken per se does not hold — just as it does not follow: "it is an animal; therefore it is rational." Against this: as the Doctor says in the exposition of the text, that division of being into act and potency is a distracting division — such as "another man is real, another is painted." But a painted man is not truly a man; so being in potency simply is not being. But matter properly is a being, since it is a substance and an essential part of the composite. Therefore it is not contained under that member of being in potency, but under the other — namely, actual being.

Furthermore, Rubio himself (*cit. q. 3.*) asserts with Scotus that matter has its own existence independent from the existence of form and composite. Therefore it participates in its own entity — since existence follows upon essence and entity. For nothing exists unless it has being. Moreover, the said Rubio, to prove that matter possesses its own existence, says this is deduced from the principles of Aristotle, who teaches three things about matter: one, that it is a real and actual entity outside its causes, distinct from any form and composite; another, that it is the primary subject of every generation; and a third, that with all forms and composites destroyed, it perseveres — and therefore is ingenerable and incorruptible. But all these things cannot be said of pure potency, since they belong to something actual and existing. Therefore Rubio is inconsistent with himself.

Nor does it avail to say with the aforementioned author (*cit. q. 3. in resp. 2.*) that matter is pure potency in terms of essence but not in terms of existence — since essence and existence are one and the same thing participating distinct formalities, which Rubio and other Thomists do not concede. If, therefore, matter in terms of existence is an entitative act, then equally so in terms of essence. All the more so since they cannot be separated from one another, as they are formally distinct from each other only.

Finally: the matter of sublunary things, in the school of St. Thomas, differs in species from the matter of celestial things. But such a difference is in terms of essence and act. For difference actuates and determines the thing of which it is the difference. Therefore matter also in terms of essence possesses an entitative act. Nor does it help to say with the Complutensians (*cit. q. 3. § 2.*) that only a negative difference exists. For the constitutive difference of something positive is the real constitutive principle of it — as the rationality of man and the irrationality of a brute; therefore it must be established absolutely that matter possesses an entitative act.

Objection I: What enters in the nominative into the definition of something is its essence or belongs to its essence — for a definition denotes and explains the essence of a thing. But potency in the nominative is placed in the definition of matter. Therefore matter is pure potency. The major is evident. The minor is supported by the testimonies of Aristotle, especially (8. *Met. c. 2. T. 5.*): "Matter is potency." And (12. *ibid. Met. c. 4. T. 22.*): "Matter primarily and per se is potency." And that saying is on everyone's lips: "a composite comes to be from act and potency." Hence (7. *Met. T. 8.*) the same Philosopher adds: "Matter is not what, nor how much, nor any of those by which being is determined." Scotus agrees (1. *Post. q. 25. § Aliter dicitur.*), where these words are found: "Matter is of itself in passive potency, including no act in its essence." He writes the same (*q. 15. Elench. § Ad quaestionem dicendum.*).

I concede the major. I distinguish the minor: matter is objective potency — I deny; subjective — I concede. To the subsumption from (7. *Met.*) it has already

been dissolved and explained above in Article II, Doubt X, in the response to the first objection — namely, that matter is an indifferent and indeterminate being for receiving forms. To Scotus: I say either that his cited passages admit the distinction drawn about potency, or that he speaks there in the view of others — as the Angelic Doctor similarly notes, and after him Bargius (9. 3. *prol.*).

Objection II: Act actuates and distinguishes — and because form is act, it is therefore said to give being to a thing and to distinguish it from every other thing. But matter neither actuates nor distinguishes, since it is the foundation of nature in which nothing is distinguished (1. *Met. T. 11.*). Therefore matter is neither act nor something having act.

I distinguish the major: formal act — I concede; entitative act such as matter is — I deny. To the minor I say that matter has a distinguishing act metaphysically, not however physically — as is evident from the rational soul and from angels, who are without matter and form, yet obtain a distinction from one another that is metaphysical — some differing in species, others in number — as I showed at length in the Treatise on Angels (*disp. 1.*).

Objection III: From two beings in act there does not come one per se (7. *Met. T. 19.*) — for form accruing to a being in act is accidental. But if matter were an entitative act, from it and form as from two acts there would come one per accidens — which conflicts with (T. 59.), where it is found that from potency and act one per se comes to be — that is, a composite coalesces from matter and form. Therefore matter is stripped of every act, even the entitative.

I respond with Scotus (3. *dist. 22. q. un. § contra ista. H.*) by distinguishing the major: in complete and perfect act — I concede; in incomplete and partial act — I deny. For from an entitative act that is partial and incomplete, and from a formal act likewise partial and incomplete, a composite is composed that is one per se.

Objection IV: There is pure act excluding every potency — both objective and subjective — such as God. Therefore there is also pure potency, from which all entitative and formal act is remote — such as matter.

I concede the antecedent and deny the consequence. The reason is that although the highest good is given, yet the highest evil is repugnant — as the Doctor notes (2. *dist. 34. q. 1.*). For what is, participates some entity, and therefore some goodness — since every being is good. Similarly, pure potency having no actuality whatsoever is not admitted — because every uncreated and created being has actual and existing being, if it is actually in the order of things.

Article VI. Whether Matter Has an Existence Distinct from the Existence of Form

From what has been said in the preceding article, it is clear enough what must be held in the present question. Nevertheless, so that the truth of Scotist

doctrine may stand out more distinctly and shine forth more precisely, I wish to examine this article carefully and investigate it diligently. Presupposing what I brought forward and explained in the cited article, I note here only that the more celebrated and reliable Thomists agree with the Scotists in this: that by "entitative act" they understand existence, so that to inquire whether matter has an entitative act is the same as to investigate whether matter enjoys an existence distinct from the existence of form. I further presuppose from Metaphysics that essence and existence are really identified, and are distinguished only formally and negatively, as a mode from the thing modified.

LXIX. Affirmative position: matter participates in an existence distinct from the existence of form. So holds the Doctor and his disciples, and the Nominalists, at the step previously recalled, supported by the greater part of recent authors.

Against the Thomists: Cajetan, (*lib. de ente, & essentia capit. 5. quaest. 8.*)

Ferrariensis, (*1. contra Gentes capit. 4.*) Soncinas, (*capit. 7. Met. quaest. 17.*) and the Complutenses. (*1. Phys. disput. 3. quaest. 5. §. 2.*)

It is proved first: matter is the foundation of natural being (*1. Met. 17.*) and the subject and receptacle of forms, (*1. Phys. 82.*) as well as a part and cause of the composite. (*5. Met. T. 2.*) But matter cannot perform these functions unless it exists by its own proper existence. Therefore matter has an existence distinct from the existence of form. The major is clear. The minor is easily proved: a subject cannot receive anything into itself unless it exists, nor can a cause produce an effect, nor can a part compose a whole with its co-part, unless they exist — for actions belong to singular existing and subsisting things, (*1. Metaph. 1.*) as even the adversaries do not deny.

The Complutenses respond, (*nunc alleg. §. 4. ad 4.*) granting the major and denying the minor: it is sufficient for matter to perform those functions provided it has its own potential essence, which really differs from existence. In that case, matter has being in via, or in process of emerging, which is not properly to exist, since existence is the ultimate term of a thing. In that prior state, matter is directed toward form and toward the composite, and therefore has no existence except what is borrowed from form.

Against this: a cause that is actually causing actually is; but whatever actually is, actually exists. For "to exist" and "to be in act" coincide. But matter actually is, because it actually causes and composes, and from it form is drawn out by an agent; and from it together with form the composite comes to be. The argument is therefore not dissolved but evaded, and there is a contradiction in terms to say that matter actually is a cause because it truly causes, and yet does not actually cause, since according to them it does not exist through those acts. For whatever is outside of nothing and outside its causes, exists. But matter, insofar as form is drawn out from it and it concurs partially in causing the whole, is outside of nothing and outside its causes, truly created by God from nothing, since it is the terminus of creation. Therefore it exists by true and

proper existence. Moreover, to say that it then has *esse essentiae* but not *esse existentiae* — being of the way but not being of the term — is ridiculous and empty. For if its essence is in act, because it is actually produced by an agent, it truly exists, since existence is the actuality of the thing. It is contradictory to say that its essence is in act and yet its existence is not, since for a thing to be in act is its existence. But the essence of matter is conceded to be in act because it is in *via*, and what is in *via* is in act; therefore its existence too must be admitted. For to be in act is nothing other than to exist.

LXX. Nor does it help to say that existence is the ultimate term of the thing, and that matter is then tending toward form and toward the composite. For even if it exhibits such order and relation, it does not follow from this that it is not in act — on the contrary, it is in act precisely because it is ordered to something else. A thing must first be in act before it can be ordered and related to another. All that is inferred, therefore, is that matter has incomplete and imperfect being, and that its existence is incomplete and partial, tending toward its complement and its specific being, which it obtains through form. And this is what those authors seem unwillingly to concede when they say that its being is *vialic* and in a state of emergence — and therefore from it together with form there arises the ultimate term, which is the composite, the complete and perfect being, whose existence is said to be its ultimate term. All the more so, since the rational soul, separated from the body, enjoys its own proper existence, even though it inclines toward the organic body, which is its matter.

Second: matter is the common subject of form and of its privation. These two natural principles are found in it successively, since it is the subject of natural change and remains under each extreme. Therefore it exists as ingenerable and incorruptible. (*1. Phys. cap. 9.*) But this it cannot be unless it exists by its own proper existence. Therefore matter enjoys its own existence independent of the existence of form. The major is clear. The minor is admitted. Matter, as it stands under privation, is actually, since privation exists in it — just as darkness is in air when light is absent — and after privation, form arrives. Just as a vessel exists that receives water, so matter actually is when it receives form. But to be actually is nothing other than to exist. Therefore, since matter is actually, because it underlies privation and form, it plainly follows that it truly exists without the existence of form. Certain Thomists respond that matter is only the subject of both aforementioned principles with respect to essence, not with respect to existence, which it derives from form.

LXXI. Against this: the mind of Aristotle and the other philosophers who assert that matter is the subject of natural change is that it is such a subject not only with respect to essence but also with respect to existence. For they say that forms are drawn out from matter itself; but forms are not drawn out by an agent from matter as possibly existing, but as actually existing in the nature of things — since forms are drawn from it as already created by God, not as possibly able

to be created, and the material forms themselves depend on that same matter in their being and in their becoming. But what depends on another is presupposed to exist and to stand in itself — which is what the word "existence" denotes. Especially because, (1. *Phys.* 69.) matter in natural things is related to natural forms as the matter of artifacts is related to artificial forms. But the matter of artifacts undoubtedly has its own existence, as is clear from wood, which is the matter for making the figure of Mercury. Likewise, therefore, the matter of natural things possesses its own existence.

Furthermore, the subject of accidental forms properly exists, as a wall in which whiteness is received. The same must be asserted of the subject of substantial forms, which is matter. Moreover, when the rational soul is separated from the body, which is its matter, the body truly exists — not by the existence of the soul, which is supposed to be far distant from it, nor by the existence of another form, since the Thomist school does not recognize any form in a human being besides the soul. Therefore the body, which is the matter of the soul, possesses its own existence without the soul.

LXXII. The Complutenses respond (*ubi supra ad 2.*) that matter exists not through the existence of the preceding form but through the existence of the subsequent form. Therefore matter is never without existence, but at one time coexists under the existence of one form, at another time under the existence of another form — just as the same light persists, even though it is conserved not by the luminous body that produced it but by another.

Against this: at the moment when the preceding form departs, privation is present, and the subsequent form has not yet arrived — matter is actually, since privation is in it, and from it a new form is to be drawn out or introduced. Therefore matter then exists, not by the existence of the old form nor of the new, since neither is there present; therefore by its own proper existence.

Furthermore, matter would not persist as the same throughout natural changes, but just as the prior form perishes because its existence fails, so the existence of matter would perish when the prior form perishes. But it is false that matter ceases to be, since it is incorruptible. Therefore it is also absurd to deny it its own proper existence. Nor does it help to say that it is destroyed with respect to existence but not with respect to essence — for the same could be said of form, which would fail with respect to existence but not with respect to essence, since the reasoning seems equal in both cases.

Again, when the rational soul is separated from the body, the existence of the body would not cease, since the soul itself would exist as separated — and from the soul, which is its matter's form, the body derives its existence, according to those authors. I add that in local motion the subject of motion actually exists; in artifacts the foundation of them likewise exists, as is evident in houses and city walls. Therefore, since matter is the foundation and subject of natural forms, it

must of necessity exist of itself. The example of light is not to the point. For it belongs to the genus of efficient cause, and it ought to have been brought forward under the genus of formal cause, as existence is — which proceeds from essence as a mode from the thing modified, as Aversa notes among others.

Third: things produced by distinct actions enjoy distinct existences, because a distinct action is directed toward a distinct existing terminus — as the Thomists do not deny. But matter and form are produced by distinct actions. For matter comes forth through creation, and form through generation. Therefore matter obtains an existence distinct from the existence of form.

The Complutenses respond (*praeal.*) granting the major and denying the minor: matter and form are not produced per se separately, but co-produced toward the production of the whole. Against this: matter is the terminus of creation, as Augustine writes, (*lib. de natura boni, contra Manich. c. 18. 12. Conf. capit. 7. 8.*) and form is the formal terminus of generation, as I showed (*quaest. 1. artic. 3. huius lib.*)

Furthermore, if God were to produce form first — as the rational soul — before its matter, and they were then united simultaneously, they would be produced by distinct actions and enjoy distinct existences, corresponding to distinct actions.

I conclude therefore that matter participates in a proper existence distinct from the existence of form, as the arguments brought forward prove — admitted by the Conimbricenses (*1. Phys. cap. 9. quaest. 6. art. 2.*) and received by Suárez (*disp. 15. Met. Sect. 8.*) as true doctrine.

LXXIV. Objection I. In several places, notably (*1. de gener. T. 22. 2. Phys. T. 12.*) and (*5. Met.*) Aristotle says that form gives being to a thing. Boethius writes the same (*1. Trinit. capit. 2.*) and Dionysius (*lib. de divinis nominibus capit. 3.*) uses these words: "To exist is the most perfect effect, which seems to be the effect of form." I explain the cited testimonies by the following distinction: of specific and complete being and existence, I grant; of partial and incomplete being and existence, I deny.

LXXV. Objection II. Being exists for the sake of operation. (*2. Caeli 7. 17.*) But matter issues forth no operation, since it is only passive and receptive; therefore neither does it have any existence. I respond that the major is not universally true, for relations have being even though they are not active. To the minor I say that the proper passions of matter arise from it, and from it the composite is also partially caused.

LXXVI. Objection III. If matter had a certain, determinate, and proper existence, it would be determinate in species and would be individuated by an individual difference. But this is seen to be false, because specific being comes from form. Therefore matter by its own nature is devoid of existence. I grant

the conclusion of the major. I distinguish the minor: in incomplete and partial species, I grant — which Scotus also teaches of the rational soul, which is a part of the human being, (2. *dist.* 1. *quaest.* 6. *conclusio ante A.*) But in complete and total species, I deny. For this is derived from form, as was to be said above with Aristotle. Furthermore, I grant that matter is individuated by its haecceity, as the same Doctor proves. (*cit. dist.* 3. *quaest.* 6.)

Article VII. Whether Matter Has Partial Subsistence

LXXVII. Those who deny existence to matter also take subsistence away from it — of which subject there is full and precise treatment in the *Metaphysics*. But since this difficulty seems to rest on an equivocation, the Scotist school notes (*Quod.* 4. §. *contra illud M. & Quol.* 5. §. *Ad 1. istorum. V.*) that the name "subsistence" is equivocal and offers three senses of it. (*Quol.* 9. §. *de secundo. A.*) After him, Bassolius (2. *dist.* 12. *quaest.* 1. *art.* 3. *ad 3.*) and Trombeta (*in initio Form.*) who dispute this question in proper terms:

First, it is taken for the per-se-ness or existence of something without coexistence with another — so that whiteness not actually inhering in a subject is said to subsist per se or exist per se, because it does not actually depend on a subject, even though it has an aptitude to depend on it. The Stagirite mentions this (1. *post.* 9.) by adducing the third mode of per se predication, as "whiteness is." In this sense, the accidents of the Eucharist subsist and exist per se, since they are actually sustained by no subject — as Hurtado frankly admits. (*disputat.* 5. *ante sect.* 8. §. 128.)

Second, it is taken for the per-se-ness and existence of something existing without any actual or aptitudinal inherence in a subject. In this sense every substance, both complete and incomplete, subsists per se, because it neither actually nor by aptitude inheres in a subject. Even though it exists in another, as a part in its co-part — as form in matter — it does not exist in it by inherence but by information, since it is act simply speaking. Therefore from both together there arises one per se thing, which is the composite; whereas an accident, which is in a subject by inherence and is act only in a qualified sense, therefore makes only a per accidens one with the subject and subject together (8. *Metaphysica* 10.) — and by this, accident is distinguished from substance. This sense is mentioned by St. Athanasius in the debate held against Arius at the Council of Nicaea.

Third, for incommunicable existence to another, and not ordainable to another act simply speaking, since it is the ultimate actuality of the thing both as quo and as quod. This is cited by the Doctor. (1. *dist.* 23. *quaest. unic.* §. *Ad quaest. respondeo ante C.*) What subsists by this subsistence is called, in irrational nature, a suppositum or hypostasis; and in rational and intellectual nature, a person. This is the more strict and proper sense of subsistence, as the Doctor notes. (*Quol.* 4. & 5. *pranom.*)

LXXVIII. Affirmative position: matter participates in partial subsistence taken in the first and second senses, but not in the third. This is drawn from the Scotists (*ubi supra in 2. memor.*) against Vásquez. (*1. p. Tom. 2. disput. 147.*) The position is threefold.

The first part is urged as follows: First, from what will be said in the next article, matter can by divine power exist without form, and therefore also exist per se and not be sustained by another. Second, an accident that does not rest on a subject subsists in this first sense, as I declared above. But matter can exist by itself alone, just as an accident in the Eucharist exists per se; therefore it also subsists in the first sense.

LXXIX. The second part is proved as follows: First, every substance subsists in the second sense. For in this it differs from accident — since accident actually or by aptitude requires a subject, whereas substance, whether complete or incomplete, is immune from all inherence, both actual and aptitudinal. Therefore, since matter is a substance, it subsists by this subsistence. Second, "substance" is derived from "subsisting," as I noted with St. Bonaventure (*1. dist. 23. quaest. 2.*) in the Epitome. (*lib. 1. quaest. 4. artic. 3. numer. 9.*) Therefore, since matter is a substance, it is not deprived of this mode of subsisting — especially because it is the subject and vehicle of forms, which undoubtedly requires subsistence taken in the second sense.

I am not unaware that some concede this kind of subsistence to matter while denying it to form, except the rational soul — as two of our more recent authors do (*disputar. 2. quaest. 2. artic. 2.*) who combat above all Scotus, who expressly teaches (*Quol. 9.*) that substantial form subsists in this sense without qualification, and gives the reason, saying: "Substantial form, although it is in matter by informing, does not however inhere in it — because to inhere means not to inform per se, since what inheres is not act simply speaking, and does not make a per se whole with that in which it inheres; the opposite holds of what informs per se." It is clear, then, according to Scotus, that form subsists in the second sense, because it differs from accident, which is in a subject by inherence; whereas form is in it by information, as a part in its co-part, from which together a whole is constituted that is one per se — whereas from accident and subject there arises only a per accidens one. Again, according to Scotus in the same place, what subsists per se in this sense is what is supported by no subject either actually or by aptitude; but substantial form of whatever kind neither actually nor by aptitude inheres in a subject or in matter — since substance differs from accident precisely in this. Therefore this subsistence is wrongly denied to it.

LXXX. One might say: form that is drawn out from the potency of matter does not subsist, because it exhibits dependence on matter. Against this: the aforesaid subsistence excludes only inherence, as Scotus declares in the same place; therefore, even though form depends on matter, it does not lack that

subsistence. Moreover, if form were separated from matter by divine power, it would exist *per se* independently of matter. Even though form actually exists in matter, it is not stripped of the said subsistence. Furthermore, integral parts, even though they are in the integral whole, nonetheless do not lose their subsistence. The same must be said of the essential substantial part, such as form existing in matter. Finally, every substance depends on God, but notwithstanding this dependence it possesses its own subsistence; and therefore, even though form depends on matter, it is not on that account without proper subsistence, which flows from it as a mode from the thing modified.

LXXXI. The third part is shown as follows: First, from (2. *animae capit.* 2.) where Aristotle writes that the whole from matter and form is simply "this something" — which Scotus interprets as subsisting *per se*. There are added the Councils adduced by Molina (1. *p. disputat.* 3.) in which it is decreed that in the Holy Trinity there are three personal and incommunicable subsistences, and in Christ there is one subsistence of the Divine Word. The Greek and Latin Fathers, cited by Vásquez, agree unanimously in attributing proper subsistence to the composite nature, which is the whole totally from matter and form. Second, total and complete subsistence is incommunicable existence as *quo* and as *quod*, from Richard of Saint Victor, cited and explained by the Doctor in the passage cited. (1. *recens.*) This does not belong to matter or form, since they are communicable to the whole. Third, subsistence taken in the third sense is the ultimate term of complete nature, since it is that by which something ultimately subsists and is not directed to any further act simply speaking. And therefore, since the subsistence of matter tends toward composing and completing the whole together with form, it is plainly deduced that subsistence does not belong to matter in the third sense.

LXXXII. Objection I against the second part of the affirmation: Scotus (*Quol.* 4. *ad finem artic.* 2. *M.*) writes that there is a twofold subsistence — one that excludes inherence and inexistence in another as a part exists in a whole, and another that is the same as incommunicable existence — and neither subsistence belongs to matter: not the first, because it exists as a part in a whole; not the second, because it is communicable to the whole. Therefore no subsistence belongs to matter. I respond that Scotus there is replying to a testimony of Augustine saying that the divine essence subsists with a perfect and absolute subsistence common to the three Persons, just as the Godhead is participated by the three — and that in that place he teaches nothing about partial subsistence. But (*Quol.* 9.) he clearly states that matter and form subsist by partial subsistence, as we have explained.

LXXXIII. Objection II. Subsistence is the ultimate term of a complete and perfect nature, by which it is rendered incommunicable to another — as all scholastics confess with one voice. But the existence of matter is directed toward the subsistence of the whole, as a part toward the whole. Therefore no

subsistence is to be assigned to matter. I distinguish the major: total and complete subsistence, I grant; partial and incomplete subsistence, I deny. For subsistence is wider in extent than suppositional or personal being. Therefore it is not incongruous that the former is adapted to the part, and the latter to the whole. For subsistence taken broadly is divided into partial and total, and properly and strictly speaking total subsistence is subsistence, as Scotus notes. (*Quol. 9. Sub A.*)

LXXXIV. Objection III. Form is not subsistent; therefore neither is matter. The antecedent is proved: form depends in being and in becoming on matter, because it is drawn out from its potency. I deny the antecedent. To its proof I say that matter also depends on form with respect to specific being; and yet it retains its subsistence, which belongs to it by its very nature as a substance distinct from accident. Therefore, even though form is dependent on matter, it is not on that account without subsistence, which flows from it as a mode from the thing modified. I add that material form can by divine power exist separated from all matter; and given that hypothesis, it would subsist per se — not by a new subsistence accruing to it, nor by a new influx added to it, as will be shown below — but by the antecedent subsistence by which it subsisted while existing in matter.

Article VIII. Whether Matter Can Exist Without Form

LXXXV. The Thomists, with St. Thomas (*1. p. quaest. 66. artic. 1.*) and St. Bonaventure (*2. dist. 12. quaest. 1.*) joined by Aureolus and Durandus (*ibidem, quaest. 2.*) deny that matter can exist without form by either natural or supernatural power. The Scotists, however, with Scotus (*2. dist. 12. quaest. 2.*) Richard, (*ibidem, quaest. 4.*) and Gabriel (*quaest. 1. artic. 3.*) — to whom among the Thomists Scotus of the Physicists (*1. Phys. quaest. 6.*) and Báñez (*1. p. quaest. 66. artic. 1. dub. 2.*) adhere — teach that matter cannot indeed naturally be stripped of all form, but that supernaturally it can be separated from all form.

LXXXVI. Note I. Essence means nothing other than the nature and quiddity of a thing. For it is that of which a definition is given: a definition clearly declares the nature of a thing, prescinding from its actuality outside its causes. Existence, however, as it is distinguished from essence, is nothing other than the proper actuality of a thing outside its causes, of which the Doctor makes mention (*3. dist. 6. quaest. 1. B.*) — and it is called a mode of essence, formally negatively distinct from it. Therefore existence follows upon essence. Just as a thing has its own proper essence distinct from all others, so it enjoys its own proper existence. And thus, corresponding to the twofold essence — total and partial — there will be posited a twofold existence: total, which belongs to the composite, and partial, which belongs to matter and form.

LXXXVII. Note II. From the Seraphic Doctor, (*praecit. questione tertia.*) "matter" as sometimes called "formless" can be taken in two ways. In one way, by exclusion

of every form — both that of the elements and of the other things that adorn the universe. In this sense matter was never formless, as Hugo of Saint Victor (*libro primo de Sacramentis, parte prima, capite quarto,*) Boethius, (*1. Trinitatis, capite secundo,*) and other Doctors hold, as Richard attests. (*citata questione quinta.*) His reason is that matter and form are directed toward constituting the composite. Therefore, just as form never existed without matter, so neither did matter exist without form. In another way, presupposing the substantial forms of heaven, earth, and the rest, but excluding the other things that could be generated from the elements — in which sense some testimonies of the Saints may be explained, who think that matter was prior to form, that is, by priority of nature, not of time, as St. Bonaventure (*ubi supra, questione prima.*) and Scotus (*ibidem, questione secunda, §. Respondeo sub A.*) note, following Augustine (*duodecimo Confessionum.*) The reason is that matter is the subject and foundation of form, which precedes form and has priority of origin. In this sense, at the beginning of the world, the earth had not yet generated green grass, nor the water fishes, nor the air adorned with birds — as Augustine plainly suggests (*citato capite tertio,*) addressing God in these words: "Did you not teach me that before you formed and distinguished this formless matter, nothing was — no color, no figure, no body, no spirit, yet not absolutely nothing: there was a certain formlessness devoid of any species."

LXXXVIII. Note III. From Scotus (*1. distinctione 44. quaestione unica, §. Respondeo. A.*) a twofold power is to be distinguished in God: one ordained and another absolute. The ordained power is described as the principle of doing something in conformity with law, according to the order established by that law. The absolute power is the principle of acting apart from or contrary to that law, provided no contradiction is involved.

LXXXIX. First Assertion: by natural power, matter cannot exist without form. The Doctor holds this. (*2. distinctione 12. quaestione secunda, §. Ad primam rationem, ante G.*) It is proved first from the manner of operation of natural agents, which cannot introduce one form into matter without expelling the preexisting form. Hence arose that axiom cited by Aristotle: (*4. Phys. Titulo 17. & primo de generat. Titulo 17.*) "The generation of one thing is the corruption of another, and vice versa." The Doctor illustrates this. (*1. distinctione 27. quaestione 3. §. contra ista generatio, Ad C.*) Since therefore a natural agent cannot deprive matter of all form and leave it bare, it is plainly deduced that matter stripped of all form cannot exist.

XC. One might say, with Arriaga, (*disputatione secunda, sectione sexta, subsectione tertia, numero 116.*) that this argument does not press hard. For even if matter, once produced, is always conjoined with some form, this does not prevent it from having been created by God at the beginning of the world without form. Against this: Arriaga himself (*citat. numero 111.*) establishes, with the common opinion, that matter cannot naturally exist without all form. Yet he now adds

that it could have been created by God stripped of all form. But our dispute is not about what is possible — which will be established in the next assertion — but about what is in fact the case. If therefore, in fact, matter never lacked form, the argument brought forward effectively makes the case that, both now and at the beginning of the world, matter participated in some form.

Second: from the slightness and weakness of matter and form. For they are two partial entities that by their very nature tend toward a third and total entity, which is the composite, and neither can subsist without the other. For matter is the sustainer and subject of form; the one is perfectible, the other is perfective. But nothing naturally exists without its essential perfection. Since therefore form is the perfection and complement of matter, it follows that matter does not exist without it.

Arriaga attempts to break this argument too, (*ubi supra*,) saying that just as a hand can exist without a body, so matter can exist without form. Against this: matter and form are essential parts of the composite, but a hand is an integral part of the human body. Therefore it is no wonder if it remains without the body — especially since a hand severed from the body is not a hand except equivocally, as the Stagirite clearly teaches. (*1. Pol. c. 2.*)

Third: matter depends on form no less than a subject depends on accident. For both are subjects, with this difference: matter is the subject of substantial form, as a body is the subject of accidental form. But a body is never found without accident — for instance, quantity, quality, and the like, as experience makes clear. Therefore likewise matter does not exist without form.

XCI. Second Assertion: by divine power, matter can exist separated from all form. So Scotus (*1. 2. citat. §. Respondeo. A.*) proves as follows: Every prior thing that is absolutely, really distinct, and not essentially dependent on another can, by the supernal power of God, exist separated from it. But matter is prior to form, really distinct, absolute, and not essentially dependent on it. Therefore by divine power matter can exist without form. The major seems evident in that it contains what is really distinct from what is posterior. For if the prior were really identified with the posterior — as a property with its subject from which it flows — it could not be separated from it; what is absolute is posited in contradistinction to what is relative, which cannot formally exist without its correlative. "Not essentially dependent" is added to distinguish it from the composite, which, being essentially dependent on its parts, cannot exist without them. The minor is at hand: since matter is the subject of form, and form is drawn out from it, matter undoubtedly precedes form in nature and origin, is a substance, and does not essentially depend on it, since form is extrinsic to it, having its own entitative being independently of form.

XCII. The Thomists respond by denying that matter without form participates in any entitative being, whether of essence or of existence — since, being pure

potency, it derives all its being from form. Against this: beyond what has been efficaciously proved and evidently demonstrated in the preceding Article VI, that matter has its own proper essence and existence without form — even if matter derived its existence from form, it could still by divine power exist without it. For in the Thomist opinion, the humanity of Christ borrows existence from the Divine Word, and yet that humanity can exist without the Word. Therefore, even if matter derived its existence from form, it could still supernaturally exist without it. Possibly with this in mind, Augustine (*lib. 5. de gen. ad lit. capit. 8.*) says: "When someone thinks that what scripture records as having been done cannot be done, let him either pull back from the faith or not approach it." And it was decreed at the University of Paris, as Gadius reports, (*Quol. 16. artic. 1.*) that in things really distinct, essentially ordered, and absolute, by God's power the prior can exist without the posterior.

Second: accident depends on a subject no more than form depends on matter. But accident can by divine power exist without a subject. The minor is a matter of faith, for the faithful believe that in the Eucharist, the accidents remain without a subject. The major is shown: accident is posterior to subject, whereas matter is prior to form. But what is posterior depends more on what is prior than the prior depends on the posterior, since everything posterior has the character of being dependent, and what is prior, as prior, participates in the character of being independent. Again, to be per se belongs more to substance than to accident, since substance is a being subsisting per se, whereas accident inheres in another. But matter is a substance — for from non-substances, substance is not made. (*1. Phys. 53.*)

XCIII. The Thomists, notably Cajetan, (*adductus a Complut. citat. §. tertio ad secundum,*) respond by denying the parity, because accident has the character of an actual and complete act in its genus, whereas matter is an incomplete and potential being. Therefore accident can exist without a subject, but matter cannot without form. Against this: matter is more actual than accident, because matter exists per se whereas accident inheres in another — whence comes the axiom: "The being of accident is to be in another." Therefore the argument stands firm and unshaken.

Third: what God can immediately create, he can also immediately conserve. But God can create — and in fact immediately created — matter. Therefore he can conserve it without any form. The major is evident, since to conserve and to create matter are equally and of the same power, as will be said elsewhere. The minor remains proved in Article IV of this question. Furthermore, God is a free agent whose power is his will. But God can will to create matter without there being a form in it. Finally, God can destroy the form by which matter is informed and prevent a natural agent from drawing out another form from the potency of that matter — and given that hypothesis, matter would exist without

form. We conclude, therefore, that there is no incompatibility with matter being able to exist without form.

XCIV. Objection I against Assertion I. Genesis I: "The earth was void and empty" — that is, formless, as some explain that passage. Therefore in fact matter naturally existed without form, and therefore matter can by the forces of nature remain without form. I respond with Lyra that that passage is to be interpreted not of the matter of the earth but of the element of earth itself, which is composed of matter and form like the other elements. And so it is clear that earth was created by God with its own substantial form. Likewise, the celestial bodies were called formless at the beginning of the world not because they lacked their own forms but because they were deprived of some adornment. In the same sense, earth was said to be void and empty because it was not yet adorned with herbs, plants, and trees. Augustine seems to hold the same. (*12. Conf. cap. 21. & serm. 34. de tempore.*) For it was invisible and unformed, not yet ordered and filled with diverse fruits.

XCV. Objection II against Assertion II. What involves a contradiction is not contained under the object of divine power. But the real separation of matter from all form implies a contradiction. Therefore it is impossible for matter to exist stripped of all form. The major is the common assertion of theologians. The minor is clear: given the hypothesis, matter would be in act because it exists, and would not be in act because it is pure potency. But it is contradictory for the same thing to be in act and not in act. I grant the major and deny the minor. To its proof I say that matter would then be in entitative act, but not in formal act. Therefore there is no contradiction in matter having entitative act and being separated from all form or formal act.

One might press further: matter cannot exist without dependence on God, union of its parts, distinction from other things, and the other items enumerated by Canon (*1. Phys. quaest. 9. §. Ista opinio*) — and these are modes of form. Therefore it is impossible for matter to be separated from all form. Pontius (*1. Phys. quaestione 5. numero 81.*) grants this with respect to accidental forms, but denies it with respect to substantial forms. Against this: the difficulty in question applies not only to substantial forms but also to accidental forms, as can be seen from Scotus (*2. cit. §. Respondeo.*) And the arguments brought forward prove it for both kinds of forms. These instances, therefore, are to be handled differently, with Scotus (*ubi supra ante §. Ad argumenta, sub D.*) — namely, that those forms are really identified with matter and formally distinct from it, and are called transcendental, about which there is no difficulty here; the difficulty concerns physical forms really distinct from matter, absolute and non-relative, among which are not included union and the other items listed by the aforesaid Pontius.

XCVI. Objection III. The more united things are, the less separable they are from one another, compared to things that are less united. But matter and form

are more one than a subject and its property, since from matter and form there arises one per se thing, while from a subject and its property there arises only a per accidens one. Therefore matter cannot in any way be separated from form. I grant the major. I distinguish the minor: by unity of union or composition, I grant; by unity of real identification, I deny. For subject and property are really identified; but matter and form are really distinct, although together they make one per se, which is the composite.

XCVII. Objection IV. If matter could exist without form, it would belong to some species, because nothing exists in the nature of things that is not placed under some species. But matter participates in no species, since the specific character is derived from form, which gives specific and essential being. Therefore it must rather be said that matter can participate in no existence without form. I grant the major. I distinguish the minor: matter does not obtain a complete and total physical specific character, I grant; an incomplete and metaphysical one, I deny. Thus the rational soul is said to be of a different species from the vegetative and sensitive soul. Likewise, Angels, though they lack a physical form, nonetheless differ in species and others in number, as I said (*tract. de Angelis, disputa. 1.*) I add that in the Thomist school, sublunary matter is of a different species from celestial matter. Therefore nothing is inferred in this objection that tells against us.

Article IX. Whether Matter Separated from Form Needs a New Being and Influx in Order to Exist and Be Conserved

XCVIII. The prior opinion is that of Henry (*Quol. 1. quaestione 10.*) and the Conimbricenses, (*1. Phys. capit. 9. quaestione 6. artic. 3.*) who think that matter separated from form, in order to exist as such, would need a new being and a special assistance. St. Thomas seems to favor them (*4. distinctione 12. quaestione 1. in solutione 2. artic. Quaestiuncula 3.*) saying that for an accident in the Eucharist to exist without a subject, it requires a new being bestowed by God. He would perhaps say the same of matter, if it were to exist per se without form. The posterior opinion is that of Scotus (*in utroque opere Oxon. & Paris. 2. distinctione 12. quaestione 2. propè finem,*) Bassolius, Tartaret, and other Scotists (*ibidem,*) teaching that if matter were separated from all form, it would receive neither new being nor a special influx from God. Ruiz, (*1. Phys. quaestione 5. art. 1. num. 15.*) Hurtado, (*disp. 2. Sect. 9. §. 55.*) and Arriaga (*ibid. sect. 6. Subsect. 4.*) support this.

XCIX. Note I. Matter can be considered in three ways: first, as having its own proper essence and existence distinct from anything else; second, as receiving formal or specific being from the form with which it is united to constitute the whole; third, as conceived existing per se, separated from all form. It is in this last way that the present inquiry is conducted — whether in that state some new being or special influx would come to it that it did not previously possess.

C. Note II. From the Doctor in the passage just cited: that some being accrues to matter existing per se stripped of all form can be taken in two ways — positively and negatively. Positively: that some entity is newly attached to it — this sense Scotus rejects and Henry accepts. Negatively: that matter exists per se without form communicating anything to that matter, so that such being is equivalent to the negation of the aforesaid being communicated by form. In this sense, Scotus says, it can be admitted that separated matter has such being — that is, per se being negatively understood — which does not belong to matter existing in the composite. For in order for the composite to be one per se, it requires the union of matter and form, from which it is caused. The Doctor asserts the same (*4. distinctione 12. quaestione 6. §. Ad Argumenta.*) of separated quantity in the Eucharist — which has no positive mode of existing per se, but only a negative one, that is, not actually being in a subject, while God maintains and conserves it just as he maintained and conserved it when it rested on and inhered in a subject, as Bassolius explains excellently. (*in 4. cit. 9. 1. a. 3.*)

CI. Assertion: if matter were separated from all form, it would receive neither new being nor a special influx. This assertion is divided into two parts, as the Doctor presents it. (*passu nuper citat.*)

The first part is urged as follows: First, matter enjoys its own essence, existence, and partial subsistence distinct from form and everything else. Therefore if it were separated from form, it would retain the same preceding being without anything added to it. The antecedent I proved in what precedes. The consequence holds: the same being that it has when conjoined persists when separated. For no change occurs except from the state of conjunction to the state of separation, which does not take away its being or introduce a new one.

Second: the rational soul, when separated from the body, remains the same without receiving new being, since it enjoys an essence and existence that is distinct and independent of matter. Therefore the same must be asserted of matter, which is prior to form and less dependent on forms than the soul is, as Scotus states. (*2. citat. ad calcem quaestionis 2.*)

Third: to the accident in the Eucharist separated from a subject, no other being is communicated than what it had in the subject — as the Doctor proves effectively and subtly. (*in 4. praememorto, quaestione 1. §. Hic dicitur ante A.*) The same therefore must be affirmed of matter if it were to exist without form, since the reasoning is equal in both cases. Furthermore, the conservation of a thing is a continued action of the same kind, as will be said in the book on causes. If therefore matter were separated from form, it would be conserved by God in its being by his maintaining it in its being — just as if the sun were deprived of its light, since it is by its very nature prior to light, it would persist in its being with nothing newly added to it. Likewise, if flowers are removed from a plant, fruit from a tree, or clothing from a person, the person and the aforesaid things remain the same without any addition.

CII. The second part is proved as follows: First, that power or influx would be either created or uncreated. Not the latter, for it would be God, since nothing except God is uncreated. Nor the former, for it would be either substance or accident, since there is no intermediate between substance and accident. Not substance, since matter alone is supposed to exist per se. Nor accident, since an accident cannot sustain a substance such as matter. Therefore there would be no influx or power for conserving matter existing per se without form.

Second: a subject that passes from privation to habit is changed, since change means nothing other than such a transition. But with matter alone existing, no change would intervene — no generation, no augmentation, etc., as is evident. This can be illustrated by staves held together and sustained by a hand: if one is separated from the others and held and conserved by the same hand, it would exist per se without the others, with nothing added to it. Say the same of matter existing alone, removed from form.

Furthermore, it is the same action by which God conserves matter joined with form and separated from form, since it is the same terminus. For if there were a new action and a special influx, there would assuredly be a new terminus. Therefore, since the same matter persisting per se endures, it must be conceded that there is no new power and no special influx there.

CIII. Objection I against the first part of the assertion: an accident cannot exist separated from a subject unless a new being is attributed to it; therefore likewise matter cannot exist without form unless it receives a new being from God. The consequence holds by parity. The antecedent is proved: an accident existing in a subject derives its being from the subject itself, so that the being of accident is to be in a subject or to inhere in it; therefore, to exist without a subject, it requires new being. I deny the antecedent. To its proof I distinguish: accident derives being from the subject in such a way that its being coincides with the being of the subject — this I deny, because accident participates in its own proper being distinct from the subject, since being is divided into substance and accident (5. *Met.* 15.) and the members of a proper division do not coincide, as I noted in the Epitome. (*lib.* 2. *qu.* 7. *art.* 1.) Accident derives being from the subject, that is, is caused by the subject and actually or by aptitude inheres in it — this I grant. But when it is by divine power separated from a subject, as quantity in the Eucharist, it retains its own proper accidental being and is only deprived of actual inherence in a subject. This is not the positing of a new being but the negation of actual inherence in a subject — as the Doctor notes among others. (4. *citat.* §. *Ad argumenta. ante G.*)

One might say: an accident separated from a subject has being per se because it exists without a subject; therefore, existing in this way, it has this new being, which is to exist without a subject. I grant the antecedent. To the consequence I say that this is not new being but the preexisting being of the accident, which previously actually inhered, and afterward does not actually inhere in the state

of its separation. Therefore the separation of accident from subject is not a positive action toward the term of what is separated, but rather the cessation of its actual inherence in the subject — as Bassolius well observes. (*cit. in fin. art. 2.*)

CIV. Objection II. An integral part separated from an integral whole takes on a new character of wholeness — for example, if a part of water is separated from the whole mass of water, that part takes on a new character of totality. Likewise therefore an essential part, such as matter, if separated from form, receives a new being that it did not have before. I grant the antecedent and deny the consequence. The reason for the disparity is that an integral part is a complete being; therefore, separated from the other parts, it enjoys a positive mode of totality. But an essential part, being an incomplete being, is also incomplete when separated from its co-part. Therefore in that state it obtains only the negative mode of not existing together with its co-part.

CV. Objection III. A new miracle does not exist without a new action toward that in which it is wrought; and a new action requires a new terminus. Since therefore the separation of matter from form is a miraculous and supernatural action, it plainly follows that in matter separated from form there is something new. I deny the major. For sometimes a miracle is effected by the withdrawal of divine concurrence — as the fire of the Babylonian furnace, with God not concurring, neither burned nor consumed the three Hebrew children cast into it. (*Daniel. 3.*) The sun did not hasten to set against Gibeon. (*Josue 10.*) So in the matter under discussion: if God were not to conserve form, nor the whole, but only matter, then matter would stand and exist per se. From this only the negative mode previously explained in Note II is derived.

One might say: matter would then not have natural but supernatural being, since its natural being is to be united and joined with form. But in that state it would be disjoined from form; therefore it would participate in a new being which is supernatural. I say that, given the hypothesis, matter would indeed have natural being with respect to its substance, but not with respect to its mode — because it would possess a supernatural negative mode, since it would be neither united nor joined with form.

CVI. Objection IV against the second part of the assertion: by natural power matter cannot exist without form, because of the mutual requirement of both, as is clear from what was said above. Therefore, for it to subsist alone, supernatural power and a special concurrence of God are required. I grant the antecedent and deny the consequence. For by that very power and concurrence of God by which matter was conserved when joined with form, matter abstracted from all form would itself be conserved — although the mode would be a supernatural negative mode, as was explained above.

Article X. Whether Matter Is of the Essence of the Composite

CVII. Many among the ancients — such as Averroes (7. *Metaphysica*, co. 21.) and Ianduno (*ibidem quaestione 12*) — as well as among the moderns — such as Zabarella (1. *de natura caeli*, capit. 8.) and Ricius (*primo de elementis*) — hold that matter does not enter into the essence of the composite. Durandus (4. *distinctione 44. quaestione 1.*) asserts that common matter is contained in the essence of the common composite, but that singular matter is excluded from the essence of a singular composite. Scotus, however, (7. *Metaphysica*, *quaestione 16.*) Anthony of Andrés, (*ibidem, quaestionis 12. & 3. distinctione 22. quaestione unica, artic. 1.*) Richard, (2. *distinctione 12. quaestione 3.*) Alexander of Hales, (3. p. *quaestione 6.*) and Faber (*Theor. 28.*) assert that matter is an essential part of the composite, both universal and singular.

CVIII. Note I. Setting aside the various senses of matter and form adduced by Scotus and Bassolius (*ubi supra*,) form and matter are each taken in two ways. Since they are relatively opposed (2. *Phys. 7. 26.*) and one relative term is spoken of in as many ways as the other, (1. *Top. capit. 12.*) they consequently admit of the same senses. I begin with form, which is better known than matter and through which matter is known by us.

First, form is taken as the form of the whole, which is the total essence and nature of a thing, signified by an abstract name — as humanity is the form of the whole, or the total essence of a human being. And just as something white is white through whiteness, so a human being is human through humanity, which is its concrete name. Second, for the form of the part, which partially and principally concurs in causing and constituting the whole — as the rational soul is the form of the human being, through which the human being is constituted in the being of a human being and is distinguished from everything else that is not a human being. Similarly, matter is taken as the matter of the whole, which is that which has the form of the whole — for instance, a human being having humanity — and then as the matter of the part, which together with form constitutes the whole. It is about the latter that the present difficulty concerns: whether, namely, the matter of the part is contained in the essence of the composite or not. Furthermore, both form and matter taken in the second way are divided into the universal, which belongs to the whole in common, and the singular, which is adapted to the singular whole. Furthermore, individual difference is usually called matter, as Scotus and Bassolius observe from Aristotle, as will be cited below.

CIX. Note II. The name "quiddity" is not found expressly in Aristotle, but only "what it is" (7. *Metaphysicae*, T. 11.) and frequently elsewhere. This is sometimes taken only for form (2. *Phys. 28. & 5. Met. 2.*) and sometimes for the total essence and nature of a thing (1. *de anima 11. and 7. Metaphysicae 39.*) and (8. *eiusdem operis 15.*) Aristotle therefore appears to speak variously about the quiddity of a thing, as the texts cited indicate. Therefore no judgment should be made as to whether those who call only form the quiddity are more Peripatetic than those who also

call the total essence the quiddity, as Perera prefers (*lib. 6. capite 1.*) — since Aristotle's doctrine is not located in the multiple acceptance and diverse use of names, as is clear from rational philosophy, which some call entirely dialectic and others call only the part that treats of probable matters. I would say that quiddity, which derives from "what," is more common and more universal than form and total essence, and abstracts from them both — just as substance abstracts from primary and secondary, as I explained and proved in the Logic. (*libro 3. quaest. 4. art. 2.*)

CX. Note III. From Scotus (*loco praecit. §. Ad 1. arg. G.*) "corruptible" is taken in two ways: as corruptible by remote potency, and corruptible by proximate potency. Something is said to be corruptible by remote potency when it has within itself the principle of corruption, yet cannot pass to act unless it is first in proximate potency — just as something is said to be able to heat when it has the power to heat, yet cannot heat unless the obstacle is removed and the patient is brought close. So fire is corruptible and color is visible. (*2. animae Titul. 66.*) But something is corruptible in proximate potency when it has its own existence in the nature of things, with the patient aptly disposed and no impediment interposed — so fire existing with nothing impeding it is proximately corruptible.

From this the saying is easily understood and explained: (*7. Met. Titul. 22.*) "Matter is that by which a thing can be and not be, and all things composed of matter are generable and corruptible" — even though he had maintained in the same place that quiddity cannot be generated or corrupted. And (*8. Met. capite 2.*) he had premised that all parts of a definition are forms. For there he takes matter for the singular existing thing that is generated and corrupted and does not fall under definition; for form, however, he takes the thing in the universal, abstracting from existence, which is defined and known and is ingenerable and incorruptible objectively — as the Doctor follows out excellently. (*ubi supra.*)

CXI. Assertion I. Common matter is of the essence of the common composite. This is defended, besides Scotus and the others named above, by Avicenna. (*5. Met. capite 5.*) It is so evidently true that the opposite opinion now seems antiquated, obsolete, and abandoned. It is proved first from Aristotle, who (*2. Phys. Titul. 21. & 7. Met. 39.*) writes that it pertains to the natural philosopher to treat of matter, because the whole physical thing is constituted from matter and form as its intrinsic constitutive principles. Hence shortly before, he argues against those who removed matter from consideration, admitting only form, in treating of the nature of the whole material substance. Then (*8. Met. Titul. 6.*) he greatly commends those who in the definition of the whole include both matter and form. And he had already signaled this. (*1. animae, Tuul. 16.*) Again (*7. Met. Tuul. 24. & Titul. 33. 34.*) he establishes that matter and form are parts of the composite; but form is undoubtedly of the essence of the whole; therefore matter also is. Furthermore (*2. Phys. Titul. 28. & 5. Met. Titul. 2.*) matter is an

intrinsic cause of the composite, for it is defined there as that from which something existing within it comes to be. Moreover (7. *Met. Titul. 17.*) definition belongs to composites, and composites are essentially integrated from matter and form. Whence in the same place (*Titul. 34.*) he illustrates this by the analogy of a syllable, which is constituted from letters just as the whole is composed from matter and form.

Second: the essential whole differs from the integral whole in that the essential whole consists of parts essentially constituting it, whereas the integral whole is made of parts not belonging to its essence at all — such as hands, feet, and the other members that integrate the body of an animal. But the physical whole is an essential whole, as no one denies, constituted from matter and form as its essential parts, as is clear. (2. *animae*, 2. 8. *Met. 3.*) Matter therefore is one of its essential parts.

Third: what is placed per se in a definition in the nominative case enters into the essence of that thing, since a definition is a discourse declarative of the essence of a thing. But matter is placed in the definition of the whole, as is clear from the passages just cited, in which it is read that the whole is the third thing constituted from matter and form. Therefore matter is an essential part of the whole.

Fourth: natural and corporeal things differ from incorporeal and spiritual things in respect of matter. Therefore God and the Angels, who are incorporeal and spiritual, are called immaterial and pure spirits. But if matter were not contained in the essence of natural composites, these would not differ from those in respect of matter — since, with matter removed from them, they would still participate in their total essence. To imagine another essential difference is entirely arbitrary and vain, and repugnant to the common sense of all.

Fifth: if form were the total essence of the composite, the rational soul, which is the form of a human being, would be the total nature of the human being — namely, humanity. And so a dead human being, since the rational soul persists, which is immortal, would also be humanity; and since a human being is human through humanity, just as a wall is white through whiteness, it would follow that a human being does not die, since its nature, which is humanity, does not perish — consisting, according to the adversaries, solely in the rational soul. How false this is, no one fails to see except the obstinate and the contentious. Augustine adds: (3. *Ciuit. capite ult.*) "The soul is not the whole human being, but the better part; nor is the body the whole human being, but the inferior part."

Sixth: just as artifacts consist of matter and form as their two essential parts, so natural composites are composed from matter and form, on the authority of Aristotle (*cit. Titul. 26.*) Hence they are defined through matter and form. (8. *Met. Titul. 9.*) And the metaphysical composite is made of genus and difference, which are related as matter and form. Finally, to the sacraments matter and

form are assigned as their essential parts, as Scotus teaches among others. (*4. distinctione 1. q. 2.*) Matter is therefore rightly numbered among the essential parts of the whole.

CXII. Assertion II. Singular matter enters into the essence of the singular composite. This is defended by the Doctor (*passu praealleg. sub. B.*) and proved as follows: First, from Aristotle (*7. Met. Titul. 36. 39.*) — just as the common whole is made of common matter and form, so the singular whole is made of this matter and form. But common matter is an essential part of the common whole; therefore singular matter is also an essential part of the singular whole.

Second: universal causes are productive of universal effects, and singular causes of singular effects. (*5. Met. capite 2.*) But this matter and this form are singular intrinsic causes — just as matter and form taken generally are universal intrinsic causes. Therefore just as from the latter a common composite is made, so from the former a singular composite is caused.

Third: in the predicamental series there are genera, species, and individuals. Those derive their constitutive and distinctive essential principles and causes from common and universal ones. Likewise, individuals participate in intrinsic and essential causes constitutive of them. And therefore, just as metaphysical composites are constituted from those causes and principles, so are physical composites. Since therefore the metaphysical individual consists of a singular nature contracted by the individual difference, consequently the physical singular is essentially constituted from this matter and this form. Finally, individuals of one species differ from one another in number because one is constituted from this matter and this form, and another from different matter and different form. I conclude therefore that singular matter is contained essentially in the essence of the singular whole.

CXIII. Objection I against Assertion I. Aristotle (*7. Met. Titul. 35.*) says: "The soul is the species, the account, and the what-it-is of the animated thing." But the soul is the form, and the quiddity and what-it-is: therefore according to Aristotle, matter is not of the quiddity of the whole. Confirmation I: From (*2. animae 8.*) and frequently elsewhere: form is what a thing is and what gives being to a thing. Confirmation II: From (*7. Met. 9.*) the composite from matter and form is to be set aside, because the substance of this is posterior to the quiddity of the thing — where the Stagirite expressly excludes matter from the essence and quiddity of the composite. Confirmation III: from the same book (*Tuul. 20*) — in things conceived without matter, quiddity and that which has quiddity are the same, as humanity and the human being who has humanity; but in things conceived with matter, quiddity and that which has quiddity differ. If therefore according to Aristotle matter is the cause why quiddity does not coincide with that which has quiddity, it is established in Aristotle's doctrine that matter is not an essential part of the material whole.

These must be handled and explained by a single distinction: form is the partial, principal, and completive quiddity — I grant; form is the total and complete quiddity — I deny. This explanation accords with the mind of the philosopher (7. *Met. Titul. 36.*) writing that the soul is not the animal but a part of the animal; and (2. *animae Titul. 10.*) he openly affirms that the soul and body are parts of the animal but not the animal itself, which arises from both together. This can also be confirmed by analogy with the ultimate metaphysical difference of a species, which is called its quiddity — not the total and complete quiddity, but the completive and constitutive one, just as rationality is the ultimate difference of the human being, but not the total one, since the human being essentially consists of animality and rationality. To Confirmations I and II the same is to be said. To Confirmation III: I say that that passage is to be interpreted as follows: in abstracts from singulars and individuals, essence and that which has essence are identified, because they are coextensive — humanity and human being extend equally, and the only difference is in the mode of signification: humanity is signified by an abstract name, and human being by a concrete name. But the singular is not coextensive with the universal, as this human being with the human being and humanity taken specifically, on account of the individual difference by which the common quiddity or nature is contracted and determined to singular and individual being. Therefore the instance at hand suffers from equivocation, taking the matter of the part for the individual difference, which Aristotle mentions. (1. *Caeli 9. 6. 12. Met. T. 49.*)

CXIV. Objection II. Matter is the principle by which a thing can be or not be — since privation is annexed to it and it is the cause of the corruption and generation of things. (7. *Metaphysica 22.*) But quiddity is necessary, eternal, and incorruptible, since it abstracts from all existence, by reason of which a thing is in proximate potency to generation or corruption, as I noted in Note III. Therefore matter is not a quidditatively part of the whole. Confirmation: quiddity pertains to the definition, which declares it. But matter does not pertain to the definition of the whole, since the parts of a definition are not material but formal. (7. *Met. 35.*) Therefore matter is to be removed from the quiddity of a material substance.

I respond by distinguishing the major: matter is the cause of generation and corruption with respect to its essence in the universal and in its quidditative being — this I deny, except remotely, as I explained at the passage just cited; with respect to existence and in the singular and in proximate potency — this I grant. For actions, such as generation and corruption, belong to singular existing things. Therefore, since matter in its essential quidditative being abstracts from existence and consequently from actual generation and corruption, it is not excluded from the quidditative character. The same response satisfies the confirmation: for the parts of a definition are called formal, that is, of the formal concept of the thing defined or definable. This does not exclude matter from the essence of the composite, since there form is not taken as it is distinguished

from matter, but for the essence and nature of what is defined, as I noted in the last note.

CXV. Objection III. What is not something, nor quantified, nor qualified, nor anything else is not of the essence of the composite. But matter is of this sort. (7. *Met.* 8.) Therefore matter does not pertain to the quiddity and essence of the whole. I grant the major. I distinguish the minor: matter is not a complete and total something — I grant; not an incomplete and partial something — I deny. For it is properly a substance, as is clear. (7. *Met.* *Tituul.* 9. 2. *animae* 2.)

CXVI. Objection IV. The human being and the brute differ essentially, being of different species — not in respect of the matter they participate in, since they are of the same species in sublunary and celestial things, as Scotus teaches (2. *distinctione* 14. *quaestione* 1.) — but in respect of form. Therefore the total quiddity of a thing is derived from form. I respond: even though the principal and specific difference is derived from form, the total difference is not — as Aristotle indicates. (12. *Met.* 27.) "Your matter is different from mine." Especially because the whole is a third thing really distinct from its parts and obtains a single total essential difference, by reason of which it is essentially distinguished from another specific whole. So a horse differs from a human being by irrationality and equinity, and the human being likewise differs from it by rationality and humanity.

CXVII. Objection V. What flows in and out of the composite is not its quiddity, which always persists as the same, since it is ingenerable and incorruptible. But matter flows through the continuous nutrition of an animal — for through it certain parts are lost and others acquired in their place, so that what is lost may be repaired and the animal restored. Therefore matter in no way contributes to the essence of the whole. Confirmation: the same matter can be informed by different forms, as is clear in those who eat human flesh. And in the Resurrection, the same matter in number, having been informed by different souls in the course of life, will be reassumed when those souls return to life.

I distinguish the major: what flows in and out entirely is not of the essence of the material substance — I grant; only partially — I deny. For the whole living thing persists throughout its life even though its parts are changed through continual nutrition. This is true not only of matter but also of material form, as will be proved elsewhere. All the more so because, even though this takes place in the singular and with respect to existence, it does not take place in the universal and with respect to essence, since actions belong to singular existing things.

To the confirmation I say that the same matter can be informed by different forms, not simultaneously but successively. It does not follow, however, that in the Resurrection the entire single matter in number will be under different souls at the same time. For even though it previously existed under them successively,

after the Resurrection it will belong to the first person whose soul informed it — as Scotus writes after Augustine (*in Ench. capite 85.*) (4. *distinctione 44. quaest. 1. §. de secundo O. & §. Ad argumenta L.*) giving the reason: through animation that matter is proper to the first human being; therefore, if it is appropriated by the subsequent person, it must be returned to the first, whose possession it previously was and whom it concerns before the subsequent one. Just as if a woman happens to have had two husbands, both still living, she shall leave the latter and cleave to the former.

Article XI. Whether the Matter of Sublunary Things Is One in Species

CXVIII. This difficulty in the present context is treated only of the matter of sublunary, that is, corruptible things. For the matter of the celestial orbs will be discussed when we treat of the heavens. There are two positions in this article. The first is that of Gandavensis (*primo Phys. quaestione vigesima quarta*) and Zimara (*Theor. 96.*) who think that the matter of all these lower things is one in number only. The second is defended by Scotus (*secundo distinctione decimaquarta, quaestione prima, §. Respondeo. Sub A. Et 3. distinctione vigesima secunda, quaestione unica, §. contra ista. B. Et 4. distinctione undecima, quaestione tertia, §. De secundo. H.*) Richard, (*2. distinctione duodecima, quaestione nona.*) Mayr, (*ibidem quaestione tertia.*) Bonet, (*primo Phys. capite tertio, §. Habetur autem*) Hurtado, (*disputas. Secunda sect. quinta.*) Arriaga (*ibidem sect. undecima, subsect. prima*) and Suárez (*disputar. decimatertia Metaphysicae, sect. quinta, numero octavo.*) who affirm that the matter of sublunary things is one by specific unity. Although the authors of this second opinion commonly hold that the matter of corruptible things participates in specific unity, they nevertheless dispute among themselves. For some — such as Canon (*primo Phys. quaestione nona, dub. sexto, prop. tertia*) and the Complutenses (*disputat. tertia, quaestione tertia, §. tertio*) — think that specific unity is negative. Others, however — such as Faber (*Theor. 27.*) and two of our more recent authors (*disputat. 2. quest. 4.*) — assert that the aforesaid unity is positive.

CXIX. Note I. Matter, which is called first and second in different respects, as was said in Note III at the end of Article I of this question, when considered in itself and absolutely can be one positively and negatively. What has an entity from which positive unity arises is said to be one positively — as a human being participates in the rational soul through which it is one thing positively. But what lacks such an entity and principle from which such positive unity proceeds is called one negatively. In this way, those who posit matter as devoid of all entitative and formal act hold that it is one in species negatively. This is illustrated as follows: just as God, having an infinite and immense essence, is everywhere positively — because he fills all things — so the universal is everywhere negatively, because it is not determined to any place but abstracts from all place. So if matter obtains a real actual specific entity from which a

specific unity can proceed, it will be deemed one in species positively; but if it lacks the aforesaid entity from which such unity cannot proceed, it will be considered one in species negatively.

CXX. Note II. Unity taken universally is divided into transcendental and predicamental. Transcendental unity belongs to every being, since unity is a property of being. (*quarto Metaphysica, Titulo tertio.*) In this way, what is a being is one by this unity. Predicamental unity belongs to what is located in one of the ten categories. It is threefold: (*quinto, Phys. Titulo trigesimo tertio*) unity in genus, in species, and in number — of which there is abundant treatment in the Logic. (*libro tertio quarto.*) A fourth is added, called unity of integrity and continuity, which belongs to things that are homogeneous — thus the whole water of the sea is one by unity of integrity; and if all the waters that are distant from the sea were gathered together in one place, they would be one by the aforesaid unity of integrity. And if the parts and portions of the integral whole are separated from one another, they obtain their own numerical unity and differ from one another in number. Furthermore, something is one by intrinsic unity — as this matter is numerically one through its haecceity, which contracts and determines it to singular being — or by extrinsic unity, so matter is called one extrinsically through the form received in it, by which it is actuated and specified.

Note III. Unity follows upon the entity of a thing. If a thing is incomplete and partial, its unity is likewise incomplete and partial. But if a thing is total and complete, its unity is total and complete. Since matter, as shown above, is a partial and imperfect substance, from it there consequently proceeds an imperfect and partial unity — just as its existence and subsistence are also partial and incomplete. The reason for this can be adduced: a property does not surpass the nature and quiddity from which it emanates in nobility and perfection — on the contrary, it is surpassed by the very essence itself, since it is foreign to and consequent upon that essence.

CXXII. Assertion I. The matter of sublunary things is one in species. So Scotus, (*ubi supra.*) It is proved first from Aristotle (*duodecimo Metaphysica, Titulo vigesimo sexto*): "Your matter is different from mine by universal reason the same." But your matter and mine are singular and numerically distinct, agreeing in specific character and in the quiddity of matter — just as Peter and Paul are two human beings numerically distinct, participating in the same nature specifically, which is humanity.

Second: matter is defined. (*1. Phys. 82.*) But a definition does not belong to singulars but to universals, (*7. Met. 53.*) and especially to species. (*ibidem Titulo 13.*) Therefore, since matter is defined, it follows that it participates in specific unity. The same is derived from (*1. de gener. 24. & 2. eiusdem operis.*)

Third: one and the same thing in number cannot simultaneously be in different and distant places. But if matter were one in number, it would be in multiple

distant places simultaneously. Therefore it is not one in number but in species. The major is clear: the same thing cannot be both undivided and divided from itself. The minor is admitted: the same matter in number would be simultaneously in Rome under the form of Peter and in Paris under the form of Francis, and so on. More strongly: if God were to remove and separate the form that is in Rome from the matter remaining there, and also to separate the form from the matter that is informed in Paris while the same matter persisted, it would be evidently established that the same matter in number occupies those distant and remote places. Again, the same matter in number would be informed by contrary forms — the form of fire and of water — and would simultaneously be in what is generated and in what is corrupted; natural transmutation would be eliminated, and other absurdities would follow that render the aforesaid opinion false and untenable, as Canon in the passage cited attests.

Furthermore, from this matter contracted with this form there arises this individual. (7. *Metaphysice* 39.) Therefore from matter and form in common there arises a composite that is one per se. But such a composite is specific — for instance, fire. Therefore just as specific fire has a specific form, so also it has specific matter. For (2. *Phys. capite* 2.) cause and effect are proportioned: if in genus, in genus; if in number, in number. And if what is principled and composite differs, the principles must also differ — whether in genus, in species, or in number. But it is evident that sublunary composites differ in genus, or in species, or in number. Therefore their principles, among which is matter, obtain the same distinctions, differences, or unities.

Finally, just as from this and that form the specific character and quiddity of form is abstracted, so from this and that matter the specific character and quiddity of matter is abstracted — common to individual and particular matters and predicable of them.

CXXIII. Assertion II. The specific unity of matter is not negative but positive. This is undoubtedly taught by the Doctor (*cit.*) following Aristotle (*ubi supra.*) It is urged first: from a real positive being there proceeds a positive property, as can be induced in all and each of the beings. But matter is a real positive being and of the essence of the whole, as I proved above. Therefore its specific unity is real and positive.

Malius, and with him the Complutenses (*praealleg. §. 3.*) respond, granting this of transcendental and analogical unity, but denying it of the categorical and specific unity of matter — which, being devoid of all positive act, consequently lacks positive specific unity. Against this: beyond the fact that this is said gratuitously, while the reasoning is equally clear for transcendental and predicamental unity — both entities are positive. Therefore from both a positive unity proceeds, especially because, from what has been proved, matter has entitative act, real positive existence and subsistence; therefore it also has real

positive unity. Again: form enjoys the aforesaid positive unity, even though it is drawn out from and depends on matter; therefore matter also enjoys the aforesaid unity. Furthermore, singular matter is one by positive unity through its haecceity; therefore its species also possesses positive unity — for if Peter is one by positive unity through Petrinity, the human being also, which is his species, is one by specific positive unity proceeding from humanity. Therefore, since matter is an incomplete species of material composite substance, and its individuals participate in positive numerical unity, positive specific unity is not to be denied to it.

Second: everything negative is reduced to something positive, as the adversaries do not deny. Therefore if specific negative unity is attributed to matter, such unity must be reduced to specific positive unity. It cannot be reduced to a subaltern or lowest species of body, because it does not regard any species unless it is informed by a form. Therefore matter does not lack positive specific unity.

The Complutenses respond (*praememorati, numero 37.*) that it is reduced to a positive species — not positively but negatively: that is, not as an imperfect positive species to a perfect one, but as a negative to a positive, negatively. The reason is that matter borrows its actuality and unity from form. Therefore matter taken in itself and nakedly has no positive unity.

Against this: matter is a partial and incomplete substance, referring to the composite of which it is a positive essential part. But a positive part is reduced to a positive whole. Therefore matter is reduced to a complete positive species not negatively but positively. Again, matter is located in the category of substance reductively as I noted in the Logic (*libro 3. quaest. 3. articulo 4.*) — because it is a part of a complete species, since from it, per se, together with form, the natural body coalesces, which is one per se and a complete substance. But an imperfect positive being is reduced to a perfect positive being; therefore, since matter is an imperfect positive being, it is reduced positively to a perfect positive being, and consequently its unity is positively specific.

CXXIV. Objection I. Aristotle (*1. Phys. 60. & 66. ac 2. Met. capite 2.*) writes that matter is one numerical subject of the transmutations of natural things, remaining under each extreme — and such a subject is matter. Therefore according to Aristotle, matter is one in number. I respond by explaining the philosopher thus: matter is one subject numerically of forms simultaneously — this I deny; successively — this I grant. For this body, which is now the subject of the soul, after the death of the animal will be the subject of the form of a worm; and what is now under the form of water will afterward be under the form of fire. Therefore this matter in number is, over the course of time, subject to many and diverse forms.

One might say: matter and privation are one in number; therefore not only successively but even simultaneously is matter one in number. I say that this is to be one in number by the unity of the subject and extrinsic unity, not intrinsic unity — which is what we are speaking of in the present context.

CXXV. Objection II. If matter were deprived of all form and all its portions existing in the world were gathered together into one, they would be one in number. Therefore, even though it is now found in many distant places, it does not depart from numerical unity. Confirmation I: matter is the terminus of creation, which regards the singular. Confirmation II: what is one in species is predicated in the "what" of its individuals. But matter is not predicated of singulars in the "what" — both because it is not a "what" (*7. Met. 7. 8.*) and because singulars presuppose species and presuppose genus; but no genus can be assigned that belongs to matter.

I respond: given the hypothesis, matter would be one by unity of integrity and continuity, not however by numerical unity, as was explained above in the case of the sea. To Confirmation I: I say that the immediate terminus of creation is singular, and the mediate terminus is universal — which also holds in other created things. For a human being is said to be the terminus of creation, even though this particular human being is immediately created and the human being mediate. To Confirmation II: I say that matter is not a total but a partial "what," less principal, and it is a part of the species, reducible to the genus of substance.

CXXVI. Objection III. If things principled differ from one another in genus, or species, or number, the principles also differ according to genus, species, or number. (*12. Met. 27.*) And the same is premised (*5. Me. cap. 2. T. 3.*) Things principled, or composites, differ from one another some in genus, some in species, and others in number. Therefore the same must be asserted of matter — especially because matter concurs toward the essential constitution of composites just as form does. And form and composites from both obtain the aforesaid unities and differences. Therefore matter does too. All the more so because matter derives its being from form; therefore just as form is one in genus, or species, or number, so also is matter.

I respond that those passages are to be interpreted of second matter, which, being disposed with various and diverse dispositions fitting and proximate for receiving various and diverse forms, and clothed with them, participates in those unities or differences. Therefore it does not receive those aforesaid unities intrinsically but extrinsically — that is, from form and the composite that coalesces from them.

One might say: those cited testimonies of the philosopher, brought forward in the preceding assertions to prove the specific unity of matter, introduce not only specific but also numerical unity. I say that through them is proved the intrinsic

unity of prime matter taken nakedly, and the generic extrinsic unity of second matter taken with the proximate and due dispositions mentioned. Therefore they do not tell against the preceding assertions.

Article XII. On the Potency of Matter

CXXVII. That matter is in potency to receiving form and to causing and constituting the composite seems to present no difficulty. The question is, however, what kind of potency this is and how many kinds it has, and whether it extends to every form — all of which I shall decide and settle through the following disputations.

Dubitation I. Whether Potency Is of the Essence of Matter

CXXVIII. I find three divergent philosophical positions. The first is that of Themistius, (*1. Phys. digreff. ult.*) Averroes (*ibid. com. 69.*) and Ianduno (*quaest. 25.*) who think that the potency of matter is an accident superadded and adventitious to it, of the genus of quality. The second is that of St. Thomas, (*1. Phys. T. 79. 1. P. quest. 115, a. 1. ad. 2.*) and his disciples, to whom are joined Ruiz, (*Tract. 1. de materia, quest. 6.*) Hurtado (*disp. 2. quaest. 2.*) and others, who affirm that the potency of matter entirely coincides with its essence. The third is defended by the Doctor, (*2. d. 12. quaest. 1.*) Mayr, (*ibid. quest. 4.*) the Parisian school, (*1. Phys. quest. 3. fol. 29.*) Canon, (*quaest. 9. dub. 5.*) and John of Magistris, (*quaest. 12. dub. 1.*) who assert that the potency of matter is formally distinct from it.

CXXIX. Note. From Scotus (*4. d. 43. quest. 3. §. Quantum ad istum art. H.*) the potency of matter is twofold: fundamental and formal. Formal potency is the relation of potentiality of matter really inhering in it, through which matter itself is formally said to be able to receive form. Fundamental potency is the potential principle or root of potentiality, from which formal potency emanates — just as risibility proceeds from humanity. Formal potency is subdivided into actual and aptitudinal: actual, by which matter is said to be actually able to receive form; aptitudinal, by which matter is said to be able to receive form by aptitude. Furthermore, it is divided into proximate and remote. Proximate is that by which matter exists disposed by the fitting and due dispositions for receiving this or that form. Remote is that by which the same matter is taken nakedly, without any dispositions, for receiving any form whatsoever. The former is called particular; the latter universal. Nor is the division of potency into receptive — by which matter receives form — and causative — by which matter itself partially causes the composite — to be despised. And perhaps the subdivision into receptive and sustentative will not be useless: since matter receives any form whatsoever, but is said to sustain the irrational and not the rational.

CXXX. Assertion I. The fundamental potency of matter is of its essence. The Doctor holds this. (*ubi supra.*) It is proved first from Aristotle: (*2. animae 2.*)

"Matter is potency, but form is act." Therefore, according to Aristotle, just as form is essentially act, so matter taken fundamentally is essentially potency. And in (8. *Met.*) the philosopher, (7. 15.) investigating why from matter and form there arises one per se thing, gives the reason: because matter is per se potency and form is per se act. And in the same book (*Titul. 3. & 5.*) he had premised that there are two essential parts of a material composite substance, one of which is potency or matter and the other is act, namely form.

Second: what is placed in the nominative case in the definition of a thing is of its essence, since a definition is the declarative instrument of the essence of a thing. But potency is placed in the nominative in the definition of matter, as is clear from the passage just cited and from (1. *Phys. capite 9. Titul. 82.*) where in defining matter he says it is the receptive subject of form — which is the same as saying that it is a potency capable of receiving form, as all the interpreters explain. Hence it is rightly named by Scotus and others "subjective potency" — just as the human being is called rational.

CXXXI. Assertion II. The formal potency of matter does not enter into its essence, but follows as its property. The Doctor patronizes this. (*citat.*) It is proved first: the formal potency of any subject is a potency and power, since it is said of the subject in the second mode of per se predication and is its property. Therefore, since the formal potency of matter is of this kind, it is not of its essence.

Second: what proceeds from the root and foundation of something does not participate in its essence, since root and foundation are presupposed and prerequisite to those things that arise from and follow upon it. But the formal potency of matter emanates from matter itself as from its root and foundation — as neighability from equinity and risibility from humanity.

Furthermore, relation does not enter into the essence of an absolute being, since being is equally divided into absolute and relative. But formal potency is a transcendental relation of the receptive to the received, from Scotus. (*in 4. distinctione 43. quaest. 3. ante 1.*) Therefore formal potency is not of the essence of matter, which is an absolute being, but is formally distinct from it as its property — as the Doctor teaches of every property. (*2. distinctione 16. quaest. unic. D. contra, quia. G.*)

Finally, the aforesaid potency is an inclination, aptitude, and capacity for receiving form — which plainly presupposes matter, whose inclination and aptitude it is. Therefore it is not essentially identified with it, but only really, as Scotus attests. (*4. dist. 49. quaest. 10. A.*)

CXXXII. Assertion III. The actual potency of matter is an accident separable from it. This is defended by the Doctor. (*4. distinctione 43. quest. 3. 1. §. Quantum ad istum.*) It is urged first: accident is defined as what is present and absent without the corruption of the subject, from Porphyry. (*in Isag. c. de accidente.*) But

actual potency is present and absent without the corruption of matter. For with matter remaining the same, the prior and preceding forms cease to be with their dispositions, and new subsequent forms arrive with their proximate and due qualities — as daily experience teaches us in the perpetual generation and corruption of sublunary things. Therefore the actual potency of matter is an accident of it.

Second: by divine power matter can be separated and exist without form and its qualities. Given that hypothesis, matter would be without the actual potency and union with form. Therefore the aforesaid potency is an accident located in the category of quality, as the Parisian school notes among others. (*praecit.*)

CXXXIII. Objection I. If potency were essentially or really identified with matter, potency would remain with matter remaining, and with matter ceasing so would potency cease. But potency persists while ceasing — since, when form arrives and informs matter, there is no longer potency in matter for that form; otherwise, with the form remaining, it could receive it again, and so could have it twice simultaneously, which is impossible. Moreover, the appetite of matter is for something not had; therefore once form is had, that appetite and desire for having it cease. But since the appetite of matter and its potency seem to coincide, if appetite ceases, then potency also ceases to be in matter with the arrival of new form, and therefore potency is neither essentially nor really identified with matter.

I grant the major and distinguish the minor: with respect to proximate and actual potency — I grant; with respect to remote, fundamental, and aptitudinal potency — I deny. For when a human being laughs, it has the potency to laugh, and when it runs, it has the potency to run — as Aristotle rightly argues against the Megarians (9. *Met. cap. 3.*) who denied that act and potency coexist. Therefore, when an agent exercises its operation it does not lose the potency to exercise it — on the contrary, it then most of all has it, because it brings it to act and conjoins it with act. To what is added about appetite: I say that even when form arrives, the appetite of desire ceases in matter, but not the appetite of complacency. Nor do I think that appetite coincides with the potency of matter, since the potency of matter is receptive of form and partially causative of the composite — which cannot be said of appetite.

CXXXIV. Objection II. Formal potency is a relation, as the Doctor concedes (*in 4. citat.*) For it regards a terminus and is directed toward it, by which it is specified. But matter is a substance and an essential part of the substantial whole. (8. *Met. Titul. 3.*) Therefore, since relation is an accident, it is not really identified with matter — otherwise form would be received in matter by means of an accident, namely its formal potency, and a per accidens one would be made, which is false.

I respond that formal potency is not a predicamental but a transcendental relation, really identified with matter — and is a proper accident, not a common one, about which the difficulty concerns. Therefore it does not follow that a per accidens one is made — just as from the soul and its faculties, really identified with it, when united to the body, there is no union by means of an accident, nor from the soul and the organic body is there made a per accidens one. But from a common accident really distinct from its subject, when they are joined together, there results from them a per accidens one.

CXXXV. Objection III. Formal potency is a predicamental accident: for potency and natural impotency are placed in the second species of quality. Therefore formal potency is not a property of matter nor really identified with it. I deny the antecedent. For as the Doctor writes, (*2. distinctione 16. quest. unit. in fine,*) in the second species of quality there resides not the principle of operating but the ease or difficulty of operating.

Dubitation II. How Many Kinds of Potency Matter Has

CXXXVI. Those who posit one matter in number for all sublunary things, as I recounted in Article XI of this question, consequently think there is one potency in number for receiving all forms. But those who teach that matter is one in species attribute to it one aptitudinal and universal potency, and hold that however many forms there are to be received in matter in number, there are that many proximate and particular potencies for receiving each of those forms.

CXXXVII. Assertion I. There is in matter a remote and universal potency indiscriminately regarding all forms. This is the position of Scotus, (*4. distinctione 43. q. 30. 1. & ibid in Report. quaest. 4.*) as he had demonstrated (*4. dist. 1. quaest. 1. ad finem.*) Vigerius, Orbellus, Lychetus (*ibid.*) the Parisian school, (*1. Phys. quaest. 3. fol. 20.*) John of Magistris (*ibid. quaest. 12. dub. 1.*) Tartaret (*quest. 7. dub. 3.*) and Canon. (*9. 9. dub. 1. in solutione diff. 2.*)

It is proved first from Aristotle (*1. Phys. cap. 9. Titul. 82.*) who, in defining matter, says it is "one and the first subject of all forms." But it is not one in number, because a definition does not belong to singulars; therefore it is one in species — which is capable of receiving all forms. But such capacity is its universal potency. Again, in (*7. Met. Tuul. 8.*) describing the same matter he says it is an indifferent and indeterminate subject for receiving any form whatsoever; therefore, since it does not of itself incline more to one than to another, it is clearly deduced that its potency is universal. The same is suggested in (*12. Met. 27.*) where he adds that there are singular matters to which one common and universal character of matter belongs, from which proceeds aptitudinal potency toward all forms, indifferent and indeterminate.

Second: as the entity is, so is its property — for property arises from entity, as is clear from being, whose property is unity. But the entity of matter is common

and universal since it is one in species; therefore its property, which is the receptive potency of forms, is one, universal, and common.

Third: the inclination of a thing follows upon the thing whose inclination it is — as the inclination toward the place above follows fire, and the propensity toward the place below follows earth. But there is one universal inclination of fire toward the upper place and of earth toward the lower place. Therefore likewise there is one inclination, capacity, and passive potency of matter toward all forms. Therefore just as there is in the human being one aptitude for laughing, in the horse one aptitude for neighing, and so on — so in matter there is contained one aptitudinal potency toward all forms.

CXXXVIII. Assertion II. As many proximate potencies in number are adapted to matter as there are forms receivable in number in it. The Doctor favors this along with his disciples (*ubi supra* & *in Rep. 2. distinctione 12. quaest. 1.*) and nearly all outside his school subscribe to this. It is urged first from (*12. Met. passu proxime alleg.:*) "Your matter is different from mine." But these singular matters obtain their singular properties — as this human being this risibility and this horse this neighability. And this matter, which is now under the form of a human being, has the potency of existing under the form of a worm; and what is under the form of a worm can be under the form of earth; and so on. Therefore corresponding to the multitude of forms, the potencies of matter are enumerated — and more explicitly (*3. Physicae 10.*) the capacity to be healthy and the capacity to be sick differ, just as being healthy and being sick differ, as Scotus notes. (*in Rep. cit.*)

Second: there are as many potencies in number in matter as there are natural tendencies of matter toward the reception of forms, because potency formally means nothing other than the respect and relation of the receptive to the received, on the authority of Scotus. (*in 4. cit. infra H.*) But its natural tendencies are multiplied according to the multiplication of forms — for each thing tends and is directed toward its perfection and complement. Furthermore, relation is multiplied according to the multiplication of termini in one numerical foundation. But the potency that is founded in matter is terminated at form, by which it is specified, determined, and actuated. Furthermore, in the same matter there are as many appetites as there are forms receivable in it through which it is perfectible. Again, one species regards all its individuals and singulars, one intellect all intelligibles, and one sense all sensibles. Therefore one matter is affected by as many potencies in number as there are forms receivable in it.

CXXXIX. Objection I against Assertion I. Act and potency are of the same genus. (*9. Metaphysica Tituul. 7.*) But act is form and potency is matter. Therefore, since form is manifold in genus and species, the same must be asserted of matter; and therefore there is not one remote and aptitudinal potency of matter. I respond by interpreting the major: of objective potency, about which the discussion is in

the present context — I deny. So the Doctor explains. (2. *distinctione* 12. *quaestione* 1. §. *positio ista*. A. Et 4. *distinctione* 11. *quaestione* 3. §. *Alii concedentes ante X.*) And he gives the example (*in Report. 2. definitione cit.*) of whiteness, which is the same actually existing thing that was previously in potency of the agent.

CXL. Objection II. Relations are multiplied corresponding to the multiplication of termini, on the authority of Scotus. (3. *distinctione* 8. *quaestione unica.*) But the potency of matter is formally a relation, from what was asserted above, and its formal terminus is form. Therefore, since there are many forms differing in genus and species, there are likewise many potencies of matter differing in genus and species; and therefore the remote and aptitudinal potency of matter is not one. I respond that the argument concludes about extrinsic, not intrinsic, unity and multiplicity — which is what we are speaking of. So one intellect regards intelligibles differing in genus and species, one common sense many sensibles far distant from one another, and one sight very many visibles greatly differing from one another. Therefore it is not inconvenient for one aptitudinal potency of matter to be directed toward many forms differing both in genus and in species.

CXLI. Objection III. The actual potency of matter is nothing, as the Doctor attests. (2. *Rep. distinctione* 1. *quaestione* 7. *propre finem*. Et 4. *Oxon. distinctione* 43. *quaestione* 3. K.) Tartaret gives the reason for this (*ad calcem* 2. *Phys.*): such potency perishes when its terminus — namely form — is posited, as Averroes writes. (1. *Phys. com.* 70.) But relation, with its terminus and foundation remaining, also remains, since it emerges from both. If therefore actual potency is nothing, it follows likewise that there is no numerical multiplication of it corresponding to the numerical multiplication of forms.

I respond that the said potency is nothing positive, if viewed as preceding form — for in that case it is the privation of form, which perishes when form arrives and its privation, signified by such potency, ceases to be. So the Doctor handles this (*in 4. cit. I.*) followed by Tartaret (*ubi supra*) and Toledo. (*quaestione* 12. *ad 1.*) But actual potency taken together with the actual capacity of matter for this or that form actuating and informing it is something real and positive — as the potency of laughing in Peter and the potency of neighing in Bucephalus.

One might say: if the aforesaid response is true, the potencies of matter would be multiplied to the multiplication of privations, and there would be as many potencies as privations. I say this is not inconvenient — not because form designates privation formally, but only connotatively. All the more so because form cannot be drawn out from the potency of matter unless privation precedes in matter. For the terminus a quo of natural generation is privation. Therefore, in order to acquire the partial principal terminus ad quem, which is form, it is necessary to proceed from privation to form.

CXLII. Objection IV. If matter regarded all future and possible forms, which are nearly infinite, it would be of infinite capacity. But infinity involves the greatest perfection, which is not fitting for matter, which is the least among substances. Therefore it does not seem to involve order and relation toward all forms. I distinguish the major: of active capacity and potency — I grant; of passive capacity and potency, which is the potency of matter — I deny. This response is derived from the Doctor. (*3. distinctione 14. quest. vn. ad finem.*)

Dubitation III. To What Forms the Potency of Matter Extends

CXLIII. That the potency of matter regards all present, future, and possible forms, all philosophers agree. They disagree, however, about forms that are past, already lost and destroyed. For many — among whom is Arriaga (*disputatione 2. Physica sect. 4.*) — deny that matter has any potency toward a form that has been corrupted and already destroyed. On the other side, Scotus (*4. distinctione 43. questione 3.*) Bassolius, Tartaret, and other Scotists (*ibidem*) affirm that matter has potency toward a past and lost form. Hurtado, (*disputatione 2. Sect. 3.*) Ruiz, (*tractatu 1. de materia, questione 2. dubitatione 4.*) and Racon (*disp. 2. articulo 3. Sect. 1. memb. 3.*) adhere to them, and Aureolus (*2. distinctione 12. quaestione 1. articulo 5.*) and the Parisian school (*1. Phys. 9. 2. fol. 29.*) suggest the same.

CXLIV. Note I. In the opinion of those — among whom is Scotus, cited — who think that certain things can naturally be reproduced, there is, with respect to them, no difficulty about whether the potency of matter extends to past and lost forms. Whether this is true or not I will show and decide in the book on generation. But among those who deny that anything can be restored by natural power, the debate in the present context holds. Setting aside that negative position, then, the investigation is whether in matter there exists a potency and natural inclination toward a past form already once corrupted — about which two opposing positions cited above are recorded.

CXLV. Note II. That something cannot be effected in another can happen from two sources. First, intrinsically — if no capacity and inclination is found in it, as wood cannot see because in it no fitness and propensity for receiving sight is found. Second, extrinsically — if an obstacle intervenes or a natural agent cannot by its natural power introduce a form into a subject, as grace cannot be introduced into a human being by a human being, because grace is not in human but in divine power, according to the psalm: (*Psal. 85.*) "The Lord will give grace and glory."

CXLVI. Note III. Matter can be considered in three ways. In one way, as it is disposed with fitting and due dispositions for receiving form — in this way it is called proximate matter. In another way, with no congruous disposition or prior quality for the reception of form — in which way it is called remote matter. Third, insofar as it lacks both those qualities and there is no natural agent found

that can introduce or draw out form from it — in this sense it is called most remote matter.

Furthermore, it must not be omitted that receptive potency regards the agent and the form. If it regards the agent, it is called natural when the agent is natural and produces it in the usual manner, and supernatural when the agent is supernatural or produces it in an unusual way. But if it is considered in relation to form: either matter inclines toward it, and the potency is natural; or it is repelled, and the potency is violent; or it neither inclines nor resists receiving it, and the potency is neutral.

CXLVII. Assertion. The potency of matter extends also to forms that have been had and now lost. The Doctor defends this. (*4. distinctione 43. quaest. 3. H... K.*) It is proved first: the rational soul, which is the form of the human body, when separated from the body, naturally inclines toward informing the same body. But the human body is the matter of that soul. Therefore matter is receptive of past and corrupted forms. The major is from Augustine (*tum 12. de gen. ad litt. capite 35. tum etiam 22. Ciuit. capite 22.*) citing Virgil (*6. Aeneid.*): "And wishing once more to return into bodies." And Scotus (*Quol. 13. §. Ad argumentum principale. MM. Et 4. distinctione 49. quaest. 3. F.*) openly teaches that the rational soul separated from the body has a natural propensity by its own nature toward union with the body previously informed by it.

One might say, with Arriaga (*disp. 10. de anima sect. 2.*) that the soul naturally inclines toward reunion with the body not absolutely but conditionally — that is, if such a union were naturally possible. But it is naturally impossible, since no natural agent can effect it.

Against this: matter participates intrinsically and of itself in such a natural inclination, as Arriaga himself frankly admits there. But the fact that no created agent can achieve its reunion with the soul does not stand in the way. For no natural agent can attain the creation of the soul, since it is created and infused by God alone into a rightly organized body — toward which the body absolutely inclines. Again, a human being cannot produce grace and glory, which God alone bestows, and yet the Doctor shows that it has simply a passive and natural receptive potency for it. (*quaestione 1. Prol.*) All the more so because the question is not whether there is a natural agent that can reunite matter with a corrupted form, but whether a potency toward it exists in matter. Arriaga in the passage cited admits such potency in matter toward that form; therefore also the inclination, simply and absolutely.

Second: perfectible and incomplete matter tends of its own nature toward its perfection and complement. But form is its perfective and completive element — for it specifies and actuates matter. Therefore if matter loses the form that was perfecting it, it remains perfectible and incomplete as it was before receiving the form; and therefore it still has potency and inclination toward it.

One might say: toward the impossible there is no potency and no inclination. But a corrupted form is impossible, because no created power can restore and reconstitute it. Hence Aristotle in the *Logic* on opposites adds that from privation to habit there is no return. Therefore matter no longer inclines toward the lost form.

Against this: a destroyed form is not simply impossible, nor does it involve any contradiction that it be reproduced and restored by God — as the adversaries do not deny. But if God restores it, from it and matter joined together there arises one per se thing — for no other reason than that the one is act and the other is potency. Therefore, even though natural powers cannot achieve its reproduction, this does not remove from matter its natural potency toward receiving it again.

Third: the potency of matter is either its essence, as the Thomists think, or its property, as the Scotists think. By whichever you choose, it cannot be taken away from it; therefore matter still inclines toward the lost form.

One might say: the potency of matter formally includes the negation of the first production of form — since the corrupted form was already once produced; therefore the potency of matter no longer naturally tends toward it. Against this: the potency of matter means nothing other than the capacity to receive form. Therefore, without any authority or reason, it is imagined to formally include that negation in order to neutralize the force of the argument. For whether the form has not yet been produced or has already been produced, the potency for receiving it — if it be produced or reproduced — remains in matter. For if God reproduces the form and unites it to matter, matter will receive that form through its potency; therefore the negation in the potency of matter with respect to the production of form is futile and irrelevant, since with that removed matter always retains the aforesaid potency. This Arriaga seems to sense (*disp. 10. de anima cit.*) when he says that matter inclines of itself toward receiving the soul separated from the body.

Fourth: after the corruption of form, the privation of it remains in matter — just as after light there is privation of light in the air. Therefore matter is directed toward having it again. The antecedent is at hand, for privation is found only in a subject fitting and capable of receiving the form it lacks.

Arriaga responds by denying that there properly remains in matter a privation, appetite, or potency for recovering the form. Just as there is no potency for past time, so there is no potency of matter for a corrupted form. Against this first: the same author in the passage on the soul frankly admits that matter of itself enjoys a potency toward a form already had — as the body toward the soul — but now in the *Physics* he denies it. Then: matter is then properly deprived of form, just as it lacked it before receiving it — even if it cannot possess it again, the fault is not its own but that of the natural agent unable to reproduce it. Just

as the heavens are simply corruptible even though no created power can destroy them. Again: even though the past, as past, cannot be made so as not to have been past, yet what was past can be future again — toward which there is potency. So a lost form, even though it cannot be made so as not to have been lost, can nonetheless be future again — toward which there is potency and capacity in matter for receiving it again, and in form the capacity to inform it anew, as the Doctor not obscurely indicates. (*ubi supra.*)

CXLVIII. Objection I. To every natural active potency there corresponds a natural passive potency, as is derived from (5. *Met. Tuul. 17.*) where Aristotle describes passive potency through its relation to active potency. And (3. *animae 17.*) he urges that the soul has a passive intellect because an active intellect is adapted to it. Furthermore (2. *Caeli cap. 8.*) he adds that if nature had given the stars a progressive power, it would have given them instruments through which to exercise that power. But in the series of natural things there is no natural active potency for a destroyed form; therefore neither is there a passive potency for receiving it.

I respond that the major admits of counter-instances. For in the human body there is a passive potency for receiving the rational soul, but not an active potency, since it is produced and infused by God alone. Likewise in a blind person there is passive potency for sight, but not active potency. And in celestial matter there is passive potency for another form, but nonetheless no created active potency is given that can draw it out and destroy the preexisting one.

In order for that proposition to be universally true, it must be explained and distinguished with the Doctor: (4. *d. 49. quaest. 11. §. Ad argumenta. K. & dist. 43. quest. 3. Et quaest. 1. Prol. sub Q.*) in the series of created nature — I deny, as the instances brought forward make plain; in the whole coordination of created and uncreated being — I grant. For God, supremely sovereign over all, can produce and reproduce every form toward which passive potency is inclined. Therefore, even though that axiom is true in many created things, it is not true in all, unless it is explained in the way I now set out.

CXLIX. Objection II. Potency does not tend toward the impossible. But a destroyed form is impossible to be restored by a natural agent. Therefore no potency of matter exists toward it. I grant the major and distinguish the minor: by a created agent — I grant; by an uncreated agent — I deny.

One might say: that form would not be natural, as is supposed, but supernatural, because it would be effected by a supernatural agent. I say that it would be absolutely natural, because it would be received in a nature — matter — naturally inclined toward it; and relatively and extrinsically it would be supernatural, because it would be effected by God as a supernatural agent.

CL. Objection III. A relation does not exist unless its terminus, by which it is specified, exists. But the potency of matter is formally a relation, and the

corrupted form, which ought to be its terminus, does not exist. Therefore neither is the potency itself in matter for that form. I distinguish the major: a predicamental relation — I grant; a transcendental one — I deny, as is clear from what was said in the Logic. (*l. 3. q. 6. art. 11.*)

Article XIII. On the Appetite of Matter

Dubitation I. Whether Matter Desires Form

CLI. Avicenna (*1. sua sufficientia 2.*) and Justin Martyr (*in conf. dogmatum Aristotelis*) deny that matter desires form. Albertus seems to support them (*tractat. 3. cap. 17.*) saying that appetite is not in matter but in the one directing and moving it toward form. But Aristotle and his interpreters affirm it, (*1. Phys. Titul. 81.*) notably Scotus. (*1. distinctione 1. quaest. 1. ad finem. Et quaest. 10. quarti, d. 49. §. Respondeo sub 4.*)

CLII. Note I. Appetite proceeds from the nature that desires as its property, and taken universally is described as the inclination of a thing toward a good that is fitting and proportioned to it. Appetite is multiplied corresponding to the multiplicity of things and natures. Since one nature is devoid of cognition and another possesses it, from them is born a twofold appetite: natural and elicited. Natural appetite is the inclination of a nature toward a good fitting to it without any prior cognition — so the earth by natural appetite desires the place below and fire the place above. Elicited appetite is that by which a nature tends toward a good fitting to it with cognition of it preceding. Since nature that knows is twofold — sensitive and intellectual — its appetite is likewise twofold: sensitive, which is also called animal, and intellective, which is also called rational. The former is the natural tendency toward a fitting good with its cognition preceding — so a horse desires oats and an ox hay. The latter is the inclination and propensity of intellectual nature with intellectual knowledge antecedent toward its perfection — so a human being by will desires honor and an Angel felicity. All this the Doctor touches upon (*1. distinctione 1. quaest. 5. §. Ex his patet.*) and Gadius indicates. (*Quol. 13. fol. 182.*)

CLIII. Note II. These three things — appetite, desire, and joy — seem to be related and to differ as follows: appetite abstracts from what is present and what is future. Desire is only of an absent thing, as St. Bonaventure (*3. dist. 26. in expof. lit.*) and Scotus (*ibid. quaest. 31. quest. unic. §. Respondeo Sub E.*) teach after Augustine (*in Psal. 118.*) saying: "Desire is the longing for absent things." Joy or complacency is of a present and possessed thing, which one enjoys and possesses. The Doctor mentions this (*2. dist. 17. quest. unic.*) and Tartaret expresses it (*1. Phys. quaest. 7. not. 4.*) and the Parisian school decides. (*ibid. q. 2. fol. 29.*)

CLIV. Assertion I. Matter desires form by natural appetite. So Scotus (*4. distinctione 49. quaest. 10. §. Respondeo sub A.*) citing that saying of Aristotle (*1. Phys. capite 9. Titul. 81.*): "Matter desires form as the ugly desires the beautiful and the

female the male." It is urged first: every perfectible thing naturally desires its perfective principle. For each thing inclines toward a good fitting to it, as I explained in Note I. But matter is perfectible, being the lowest substance, lacking all adornment, signified by the formless and empty earth (*Gen. 1.*) as Lyra interprets. But form is perfective — since it determines, actuates, and specifies matter, and covers what is as it were naked and obscure with its garment, illuminates it with its splendor, and — as Plato signifies in the *Phaedrus* — adorns it. Therefore matter rightly desires form.

Second: everything beautiful and divine is most desired, as Plato testifies in the passage just cited. But form is something beautiful and divine, as the Stagirite concedes in the passage just cited. For it is a certain participation and likeness of divine being — since just as all being is from God, according to (*1. Caeli capite 9. Tit. 100.*) "from him being is derived, more clearly to some, more obscurely to others" — so from form there is being, according to the common saying: "Form gives being to a thing." Furthermore, a part desires union with its co-part, and an incomplete being desires its complement. But matter is a part of the whole, and form is its co-part, from which together the whole is constituted. And matter is very incomplete and imperfect, capable of being perfected and completed only by form — just as natural materials are adorned and illuminated by artificial forms, as Aristotle suggests. (*loco cit. T. 69.*) Therefore matter naturally desires form.

CLV. Assertion II. Matter indiscriminately desires all forms. So the Doctor. (*1. dist. 1. quest. 1. in fine. Et 2. dist. 18. quaest. unic. §. contra primum infra D.*) It is proved first: matter is defined (*1. Phys. Tit. 82.*) as the first subject of each and every one — that is, of form, as all Aristotle's interpreters explain there. Therefore, since matter has universal capacity and common inclination toward all and each of the forms, it follows that it regards and desires them indifferently.

Second: matter is of itself indifferent and indeterminate. For in this it differs from form, which determines and actuates it. But as the nature of a thing is, so is the potency and appetite corresponding to it, as I was explaining in Note I above. Therefore, since the essence of matter is by its very nature indifferent, its appetite toward forms is likewise indifferent.

Furthermore: every form is a perfection of matter — since matter is specified and actuated by any form; therefore it indifferently desires each one. Just as the material of artifacts does not regard the form of Mercury more than that of Jupiter or another, as the Stagirite indicates. (*1. Phys. T. 69.*)

CLVI. Assertion III. Matter desires with the appetite of desire the form it lacks. This is consistent with the Doctor (*4. d. 49. quaest. 4. ante D. Et 3. d. 31. quaest. vn. §. Respondeo. C.*) and inconsistent with Arriaga. (*disp. 2. Phys. sect. 4. subsect. 1.*) It is proved first from Aristotle (*cit. T. 81.*) where he explicitly says that matter desires

and longs for form. Second: desire is appetite for something not had, as I noted with Augustine and Scotus in Note II; but matter does not have many forms toward which it nonetheless inclines as toward its perfection and complement; therefore it desires them not with the appetite of complacency — which is of a present thing — but of desire, which is of a thing not had and absent.

Furthermore, natural desire is directed toward a fitting good, and good is what all things desire (*1. Eth. cap. 1.*) — but form not existing in matter is something good and beautiful for it, as is clear from Assertion I. Moreover: there are as many appetites of matter as there are forms receivable in it, as Scotus asserts. (*1. distinctione 1. quest. 1.*) But the appetite of matter for a form not yet received in it is not an appetite of complacency, since it does not possess it; therefore it is an appetite of desire — since there is no intermediate between the two recounted above.

One might say: the appetite of matter having and actually possessing one form is satisfied, so that it does not desire another form. For since matter is incomplete and is completed through form, enjoying one form actually, it does not want another. And therefore, since it always underlies some form, it does not desire form by appetite of desire.

Against this: matter actually participating in one form is not at all satisfied, nor is it extensively completed, unless there were a most perfect form containing all the others virtually — as the Doctor says (*in 1. citat. in solut. 4.*) For the same matter obtains another appetite toward another form, because its appetite is multiplied corresponding to the multiplication of forms receivable in it. And existing in one and the same form, there is in it also privation of another form, by reason of which it desires that other form as drawable out from it. Especially because a future and possible form is something good, which is coveted by matter lacking it.

CLVII. One might press: if matter having one form were to desire another, it would be desiring its own destruction — since it cannot obtain the future form without the present one being expelled, for two non-subordinated forms cannot simultaneously be in the same matter. I say this is per accidens, since two forms cannot simultaneously exist in one and the same matter in number on account of their simultaneous impossibility, as the Doctor touches upon (*2. distinctione 18. quaest. unic. D.*) after Aristotle. (*1. Phys. Titul. 81.*) Furthermore, concerning the identity or distinctness of appetite from matter, and its plurality, the same is to be said as was asserted of the potency of matter in the preceding article — with only the term "potency" changed to "appetite" — as Fuentes suggests. (*1. Phys. quaest. 2. dif. 3. art. 3.*)

CLVIII. Objection I against Assertion I. Appetite presupposes cognition of the thing desired, as Aristotle concedes. (*1. magnorum mor. cap. 12.*) But matter is devoid of all cognition, since it lacks soul and mind; therefore it also lacks

appetite. I respond that the major holds of elicited, animal, and rational appetite, as is derived from Aristotle's cited text — but not of innate and natural appetite, about which we are speaking here, with Scotus. (*1. d. 1. q. 5. in fine.*)

CLIX. Objection II. Matter either desires the form it has, or the form it does not have. Not the first, because no one desires what it holds and possesses. Not the second — otherwise it would be troubled and would be under that form violently. Therefore in no way does matter desire form. I respond that matter desires each form but with a different appetite: with the appetite of complacency it desires the form it actually participates in, and with the appetite of desire the form of which it is deprived. Nor does it follow that it is violently under the form by which it is informed, because it does not incline determinately toward the opposite form — which would be the case if it were there violently. Therefore, since matter of itself does not incline more toward one form than another, it follows that it regards all indifferently and naturally inclines toward them, as Scotus teaches. (*1. distinctione 1. quaestione 1. in solut. vult. Et 2. dist. 18. quaest. vnic. D.*)

CLX. Objection III. Natural appetite is the inclination of a thing toward a good fitting to it, as Scotus attests. (*1. dist. 1. in fine quaestionis 5.*) But if matter desired a form it does not have, its appetite would tend toward evil — namely, the corruption of the form it has, since it cannot enjoy the form it desires unless the form it possesses perishes. Therefore no appetite exists in matter.

I grant the major and distinguish the minor: per se — I deny; per accidens — I grant, as Scotus indicates (*in 2. mox alleg.*) For matter per se is directed toward the form to be induced or drawn out into it — and this good is connatural to it. But the cessation of the preexisting form happens to it because of an agent unable to introduce a new form without the prior form being corrupted.

Dubitation II. How Many Kinds of Appetite Matter Has

CLXI. Recent philosophers appear quite discordant in deciding this proposed difficulty. For some — among whom Sghemma is listed (*1. Phys. digreff. 5. quaest. 6.*) — think that the appetite of matter tends toward form in common and universal terms, but not in particular and singular terms. And there are those who assert that the appetite of matter is multiplied corresponding to the multiplication of forms, both in universal and in singular being. Fuentes seems to hold this position. (*1. Phys. q. 2. diff. 3. 4. 4.*) The common view of the moderns, however, is that there is one universal, specific, and indeterminate appetite of matter, regarding form in common and each form in particular.

CLXII. Note I. From John of Magistris (*1. Phys. quaest. 13. scibili 3. dif. 3.*) and the Parisian school (*quaest 1. fol. 28.*) there is a twofold appetite touched upon by Scotus (*1. d. 1. quaest. 1.*) and made explicit by Vigerius (*ibid.*): one aptitudinal and indeterminate; another actual, singular, and determinate. The first belongs to matter taken nakedly and specifically, as its property flowing from its essence,

really identified with it — just as the universal and remote potency of the same matter. The second is adapted to matter disposed with these or those dispositions for receiving proximately this or that form. This latter appetite is really distinct from matter, just as the proximate potency is really distinct from matter and can be separated from it, as Canon notes among others. (*1. Phys. q. 9. dub. 5.*)

CLXIII. Note II. From the Parisian school (*cit. quaest. 2.*) that matter by its appetite is directed toward form can be taken in two ways: adequately and inadequately. Matter adequately regards form taken generically as its complement and perfection connatural and adequate to it. It inadequately regards any particular form, through which together with it there is constituted one per se singular thing, which is the singular composite — just as the universal regards singulars and especially species, individuals, and the relative its correlative, as Aristotle suggests. (*2. Phys. 26.*)

CLXIV. Assertion. Matter by its universal appetite is directed toward form not only with respect to its generic and specific degree but also with respect to its singular and individual degree. This is derived from Scotus (*5. Met. quaest. 7. §. contra confirmationem. Et 1. d. 1. quest. 1. 4. 4. 6. Ad 1. principale. Et 4. distinctione 43. quest. 3. §. Quantum ad istum.*) The Parisian school holds this explicitly (*praealleg. quaest. 2.*) followed by Ruiz (*tract. 1. de materia, quaest. 7. dub. 1.*) and two of our more recent authors. (*disp. 2. quaest. 6. 4. 1.*)

It can be urged first from (*1. Phys. Tuul. 81.*): "Matter desires form as the ugly desires the beautiful." But the ugly desires the beautiful not only in common but also in particular — as a fruit, this beautiful fruit delightful to the eye and pleasing to the gaze. Therefore matter desires form and this form, which renders it beautiful and gracious.

Then (*ibid. Titul. 82.*) matter is defined as the first subject of each and every form; therefore its appetite is founded toward all and each of the forms and toward form in common as well as in particular. And (*2. Phys. Tuul. 26.*) matter is said to be of the genus of relatives and to tend toward form, and toward another form there is another matter — where it is signified that matter is ordered toward universal and particular form, as the Doctor well infers in the Metaphysics passage mentioned.

Second: the appetite of matter is directed toward form as its perfective and completive terminus, so that from both there arises one per se thing, which is the whole. But not only from matter and universal form does there arise one per se universal thing; from matter and particular form too there arises one per se particular thing — as from matter and the form of fire there comes fire, and from this matter and this form of fire there coalesces this fire. Therefore the appetite of matter regards common and particular form.

Third: appetite is given to matter so that it may be perfected and completed. But matter is perfected and completed not only by universal form but also by particular form — for the singular is more perfect than the universal, since beyond the perfection of the universal it includes its own proper perfection, and actions are terminated at it. (*1. Met. in procoem.*)

Fourth: a property is coextensive with its subject, whose property it is, and belongs to those things that participate in the subject — as risibility is adapted to the human being and to each of its singulars, since the human being and each human being is risible. But appetite toward form is a property of matter, just as its potency toward form, as I showed above. Therefore, since there is universal form and singular form, its appetite is directed toward both. I add that a relation regards an adequate and an inadequate terminus — as the relation of species regards the specific nature, which is its adequate terminus, and its singular, which is its inadequate terminus. Similarly the appetite of matter tends toward universal form as its adequate terminus and toward particular form as its inadequate terminus, as I noted in Note II. Moreover, matter is perfected by form with respect to specific and individual being; therefore its appetite is completed and satisfied by both the aforesaid forms.

CLXV. Objection I. The appetite of matter is not one but multiple; therefore matter does not desire universal and particular form by the same appetite. The antecedent is affirmed by the Doctor: (*1. d. 1 quaest. 1. ad 4.*) there are as many appetites of matter as there are forms receivable in it. And (*3. d. 8. quaest. un. §. contra*): in a subject there are several potencies for several forms — but the potency of matter seems to differ little or not at all from its appetite.

This must be handled: the aptitudinal appetite is one, just as the potency of laughing in the human being is one and the potency of neighing in the horse is one; but the actual appetite is multiple, corresponding to the multiplicity of dispositions — in this way Scotus is to be explained from the cited passage, as I noted and explained in Note I.

CLXVI. Objection II. If matter naturally desired a singular form, if it actually possessed that form, it would be under another form violently. But matter cannot be violently under a form; therefore it does not desire a singular form but only the universal. I deny the consequence of the major, because violence designates the resistance of the subject in which form is received. But matter underlying one form does not resist another form receivable in it — on the contrary it inclines toward it; therefore it does not remain in a state of violence, as the Doctor writes. (*1. d. 1. quaest. 1. in fine. Et 2. dist. 18. quest. vnic. D.*)

CLXVII. Objection III. The appetite of matter does not tend toward the impossible — otherwise it would be in vain. But if matter desired singular forms, its appetite would be directed toward the impossible, since some forms are mutually contrary and impossible. Therefore matter does not desire

individual and singular forms, but only common and universal ones. If the major is granted, the consequence of the minor is denied. For even though contrary forms cannot simultaneously exist in the same matter, they can do so successively — as is clear of contrary qualities, which do not simultaneously but successively affect the same subject. Therefore there is no opposition and impossibility on the part of matter, since it is of itself indifferent and indeterminate to receiving any forms. But on the part of the forms themselves, which are simultaneously incompatible and impossible in the same thing — as the Doctor excellently shows. (5. *Met. q. 7. §. pro solutione notandum.*)

Dubitation III. Whether the Appetite of Matter Is Equal toward All Forms

CLXVIII. The prior opinion is that of Toledo, (1. *Phys. quaest. 15. in fine,*) Arriaga, (*disp. 2. sect. 4. Subsect. 1.*) and Ruiz (*tract. 1. de materia queaest. 7. dub. 2.*) who think that matter desires all forms with equal appetite, both noble and ignoble. The posterior opinion is that of others, whose names Ruiz suppresses (*praecit.*) and which is strenuously defended by the twin Scotists (*disp. 2. quaest. 6. art. 2.*) and Pontius (*quaest. 7. de materia conc. 2.*) and others who think that matter desires forms unequally — that is, nobler forms more than ignoble ones.

CLXIX. Note I. Recall from Dubitation I of this article that appetite is twofold: innate and elicited. The innate is the inclination of the desiring potency toward its end and perfection without any elicited act — as Bassolius well shows. (4. *dist. 49. quaest. 6.*) The elicited is conjoined with an elicited act of the desiring potency — so the will by elicited act pursues what is good and fitting to it. The first always remains with the nature and potency whose appetite it is, since they are really identified and differ only formally. The second is sometimes present and sometimes absent — both because it is really distinct from the nature whose appetite it is, and because the desiring potency does not always elicit an act. Hence it comes about that the intellectual appetite, which is the will, always has a natural appetite consequent upon and concomitant with it, which means nothing other than the inclination of the will toward a good fitting to it, as Tartaret notes. (1. *Phys. quaest. 7. scibili 4. in fine.*)

CLXX. Note II. From Anthony of Andrés (1. *Met. q. 2. 9. Respondeo.*) there are many differences of natural, animal, and rational appetite. First, rational appetite is formally free; not so animal and natural appetite. Second, animal and rational appetite sometimes name a potency and sometimes an elicited act, whereas natural appetite names neither — because each thing of itself, without anything added to it, inclines toward its natural end. Third, natural appetite is wider than animal and rational appetite. For natural appetite belongs to all, both animate and inanimate; the others only to those that know and enjoy life. Fourth, the latter two presuppose a prior act of the knowing potency — as the will the act of the intellect, and sensitive appetite the act of the knowing potency — while the former presupposes no act of another potency; so heavy things desire the below and light things the above with no preceding act.

CLXXI. Note III. One form surpasses another in nobility with respect to specific difference and essential degree — as the form of fire is essentially more excellent than the form of earth, and the sensitive soul than the vegetative soul. And one surpasses another with respect to individual and perfective degree — as the soul of Christ the Lord is nobler than the soul of Judas. Therefore among forms one excels another, and among natures form excels matter — and form is more of a nature than matter. (2. *Phys. T.* 12.)

CLXXII. Assertion I. Matter more desires a nobler than an ignoble form. This is gathered from Scotus. (4. d. 49. *quaest.* 10. §. *Respondeo. B. & dist.* 50. *quaest.* 5.) It is proved first: a perfectible thing desires perfection; what is more perfectible desires greater perfection; and what is most perfectible desires the greatest perfection — as Scotus argues from Aristotle (1. *Met. in initio*,) (*ibidem*,) explaining that saying: "All human beings by nature desire knowledge." If every human being by his own nature desires knowledge, he most desires the greatest knowledge. But metaphysics is the greatest knowledge, being the queen of the sciences and the apex of learning. Therefore he most desires it.

Given this, I argue by analogy: matter desires form as the ugly desires the beautiful and the imperfect desires the perfect. (1. *Phys. T.* 81.) Therefore matter more desires a nobler form as its greater perfection than an ignoble one, which is a lesser perfection. The consequence holds, because nature per se tends toward what is better and more perfect. (2. *de gener. T.* 59.)

Second: what more perfects, completes, and satisfies the appetite of matter is more desired by matter — because, since natural appetite is the capacity and inclination toward a fitting good, a greater and more perfect good more satisfies and terminates its tendency. Hence the Doctor adds (1. d. 1. *quaest.* 1. ad 4.) that if there were a most perfect form containing the other forms virtually — as the rational soul contains the sensitive and vegetative — it would completely and fully satisfy the appetite of matter. Therefore if the most perfect form perfects the most, the more perfect form will more perfect and satisfy the appetite of matter than the less perfect.

Third: matter desires form in order that there may be one per se thing and one perfect thing, which is the composite, as the philosopher indicates. (1. *Phys. Titul.* 80.) But from a nobler form there is constituted a nobler and more perfect whole. Therefore matter more desires a nobler form than an ignoble one.

Fourth: matter more desires substantial form than accidental form, as even the adversaries grant — for no other reason than that substantial form is more excellent than accidental. Therefore among substantial forms, the one that is nobler and more perfect is more desired by matter.

Nor does it help to say with Pontius (*citat.*) that matter desires substantial form not precisely because it is more perfect but because through it accidental form is acquired. For in the opinion of the adversaries who assert that matter

immediately receives accidents, matter does not receive substantial form on account of accidental form, but rather the contrary. Then, matter is not perfected by accidental form except in a qualified sense — especially because the proper subject of accidental form is the composite, and from it and the subject there arises only a per accidens one. I add that nature acts for an end (2. *Phys. T. 75.*) — but the principal end of matter is not accidental but substantial form. Therefore matter as recipient is not recipient of substantial form on account of accidental form.

Fifth: elicited appetite tends toward the greater good; therefore natural appetite also tends toward the more perfect good, which is the more perfect and excellent form. The antecedent is clear. (2. *Phys. T. 76. 78.*) Nature per se intends what is better, more fitting, and more perfect.

One might say with Pontius (*ubi supra*) that there is a disparity between elicited or free appetite and natural appetite — since an agent with elicited appetite acts by choice and by discerning one good from another and preferring the nobler and more perfect to the ignoble and less perfect. But the natural appetite of matter, without any prior cognition and discrimination of one good from another, inclines toward form; therefore it equally desires both the noble and the ignoble.

Against this: freedom, which belongs to elicited and free appetite as it is distinguished from natural appetite, is not the cause of the former tending toward a greater good. For sometimes the will by its own pleasure chooses a lesser good — or even evil — as I showed in the Moral Philosophy. (*quest. 3. art. 3. 1. 2.*) The parity holds in this: just as elicited appetite most often tends more toward the greater good, so natural appetite inclines toward the more perfect and more fitting good. Hence Scotus (*in 4. dist. 49. cit.*) asserts that the will by innate appetite inclines toward beatitude, which is its greatest perfection. Therefore judgment and discernment toward greater or lesser good bear extrinsically and impertinently on the matter. All the more because appetite taken precisely is a natural tendency toward a fitting good; therefore toward a greater and more fitting good there is a greater tendency — with any discernment and judgment whatsoever set aside. So a heavier weight rushes toward the center with greater speed and more rapid impetus, as experience shows.

CLXXIII. Assertion II. Matter having a nobler form also desires to be under an ignoble form. This is derived from the Doctor (*in 1. nuper alleg.*) who teaches that in matter there are as many appetites as there are forms receivable in it. It is urged first: each thing desires its own perfection, as I have repeatedly emphasized. But an ignoble form is a perfection of matter, because from this and that there arises one perfect thing, namely the composite. Therefore matter informed by a noble form desires an ignoble form.

Second: appetite is the same as the fitting capacity to receive a form not had. But matter existing under a more excellent form has such a capacity, since it is the receptive subject of all forms. (1. *Phys.* 82.) Therefore, thus existing, it desires a less excellent form.

Third: unless matter participating in a superior form were to desire an inferior one, the perennial generation and corruption of sublunary things would cease, and the whole constituted from matter and the more excellent form would be perpetual, and those that possess the lowest and deepest forms would utterly perish — whereas we experience the continuous generation and corruption of things; but Aristotle testifies that such birth and death arise from the appetite of matter. (9. *Met.* 17. & *premised* 7. *eiusdem operis* 22.)

CLXXIV. Assertion III. If matter enjoyed the most perfect form virtually containing all other forms, the appetite of matter would be terminated. Scotus expressly holds this (*passu proxime cit.*) against Pontius (*ubi supra conclus. 3.*) — preceded by our more recent authors mentioned at the end. It is proved first: the reason matter existing under one form is not satisfied is that its appetite is not intensively and extensively perfected and completed, as the Doctor shows (*ubi supra.*) But through the most perfect form virtually containing all the others, its appetite is both intensively and extensively perfected and completed, as Scotus teaches. (2. *d.* 14. *quest.* 1. §. *Respondeo. B.*) Therefore matter is entirely satisfied through it.

Second: the intellect of the blessed seeing God, who contains all things formally or virtually, is completely perfected and satisfied — according to the psalm: "I shall be satisfied when your glory appears." Likewise therefore matter is entirely satisfied by the aforesaid form.

Furthermore: that is said to be everywhere satisfied which has whatever it desires, as is clear from Augustine: (1. *Trin. c.* 5.) "Blessed is he who has whatever he wills." But matter informed by that form possesses whatever it desires, since it captures all other forms virtually through it.

One might say: the rational soul virtually contains the vegetative and sensitive, and yet the appetite of each kind of matter tends toward formally receiving them in itself — even toward the more imperfect ones. Again, the form of a mixture virtually contains the forms of the elements; nonetheless the form of the mixture does not so satisfy the appetite of matter that it does not also desire to be under another form — whether of an element or a mixture.

This must be handled: even though the aforesaid instances hold for those forms that do not at all satisfy the matter they inform, they do not hold for the most perfect form as described by the Doctor — because this form is supposed to fully satisfy the appetite of matter both intensively and extensively, just as the appetite of the will in the supreme and beatific object is completely quieted, so that it extends no further, as Vigerius notes. (*nuper alleg.*)

CLXXV. Objection I against Assertion I. Matter is indifferent and indeterminate toward any form; therefore it does not desire the more perfect more than the less perfect. I grant the antecedent and deny the consequence — because, together with its indifference and indeterminacy, it is consistent that it should more desire the nobler than the ignoble. Just as the light of the sun and of a lamp is indifferent for illuminating all parts of a hall, yet illuminates the closer parts more than the more distant ones.

CLXXVI. One might say: a surface that is indifferent to whiteness or blackness does not desire the one more than the other. Likewise, artificial matter that is indeterminate toward the form of Jupiter or of Mercury is not more inclined toward one than toward the other. Therefore the same must be said of natural matter with respect to its forms. The parity is to be denied, because both surface and artificial matter are in neutral potency toward those forms, whereas natural matter is in natural potency toward the aforementioned natural forms.

CLXXVII. Objection II against Assertion II. If matter underlying a nobler form desired an ignoble form, its appetite would tend toward evil — because a vile and imperfect form, in comparison to a nobler one, is something evil. For to lose the perfect in order to acquire the imperfect seems to be evil — not only in natural things but also in moral ones. Therefore, when matter is under a more perfect form, it does not desire a less perfect one.

I deny the consequence of the antecedent. For a vile and imperfect form is a substance; therefore it is simply and per se good — even though in a qualified sense and per accidens it may be called evil, because for it to be introduced into matter it is necessary that the preceding nobler form and its composite be corrupted, as Aristotle indicates. (*1. Phys. T. 81.*)

CLXXVIII. Objection III against Assertion III. The appetite of nothing can be completed and satisfied except in an infinite object containing every good, as Vigerius notes among others. (*praecit.*) But no form can be infinite. Therefore no form — however most perfect — can fill the appetite of matter.

I distinguish the major: of rational appetite, which is of infinite capacity regarding the infinite God — I grant; of natural or animal appetite — I deny. For this is completed in a finite object and satisfied in the most noble form virtually containing all other forms — if such a form were given.

Article XIV. Whether Matter Is Per Se Knowable

CLXXIX. That matter is not per se knowable is the teaching of Averroes, (*4. Phys. com. 17.*) St. Thomas, (*1. p. q. 87.*) and Aegidius. (*Quol. 2. q. 13.*) The opposite is defended by Scotus, (*2. d. 12. q. 1. §. Ad argumentum paulò ante R. Et 3. d. 22. q. vn. §. Ad 1. arg. H.*) Faber, (*Theor. 25.*) the Parisian school, (*1. Phys. q. 4. fol. 27.*) John of Magistris, (*q. 11. scib. d.*) Tartaret, (*q. 7. scib. 2.*) and others in the same place, who assert that matter is per se knowable.

CLXXX. Note I. That matter is known by us through the natural transmutation of one form into another. For since such transmutation requires a subject in which it occurs, that subject is called matter — and in this way it is apprehended by Aristotle (*1. Phys. T. 51.*) and defined by him (*ibidem Titul. 82. cap. 9.*) For we experience that something always corrupts and in its corruption something is lost — namely form — and something remains — namely matter. From this we argue that matter is the receptrix now of this, now of that form. And so by reasoning from effect to cause, our knowledge of matter is acquired, as the Doctor signifies. (*in 2. cit. post I.*)

CLXXXI. Note II. That something is knowable can be taken in two ways: one way, per se and absolutely, with respect to its entity, with no other prior cognition required — whether it is knowable a priori or a posteriori; another way, comparatively — that is, through relation and likeness to another. This occurs when something is so hidden from us that it cannot be known by us through its cause or its effect, but only through the likeness and analogy of another, by reason of which we are led to knowledge of it, as the Doctor suggests. (*7. Met. q. 2. §. contrà de inseparabilibus. Et 9. 5. propre finem.*)

CLXXXII. Assertion I. Matter is per se knowable. So Scotus (*ubi supra. Et 2. Met. quest. 2.*) and Anthony of Andrés. (*7. Met. quest. 12.*) It is proved first: every positive being is per se knowable, because knowability is a property of being. (*2. Met. T. 4.*) But matter is a real positive being, since it is a substance. (*12. Met. cap. 2.*) Therefore it is per se knowable. This is corroborated: every color is per se visible, since it is the object of sight; therefore every being is knowable, since being is the object of the intellect. But matter is a being and a substantial part of the complete physical being. (*8. Met. Titul. 3.*) Therefore matter is not excluded from the roster of per se knowable beings.

Second: what is definable is per se knowable, because definition is the instrument of scientific cognition. But matter is defined positively (*1. Phys. Titul. 82.*) and negatively. (*7. Met. T. 8.*) Therefore it is per se knowable.

CLXXXIII. Assertion II. Matter is knowable by us through likeness and analogy to form. So the Doctor. (*in 2. cit. propè finem eis q.*) It is proved first from Aristotle (*1. Phys. T. 69. & 2. eiusdem operis, T. 86. & 2. de generatione T. 53.*) speaking thus: "As the statue is to bronze and a bed to wood, so form is to matter." But we know that bronze is the matter of a statue and wood the matter of a bed. Therefore through the analogy of artifacts matter is known by us. For just as art in its works presupposes matter, so nature also requires matter beforehand for its operations. From this likeness of artifacts, therefore, we arrive at knowledge of natural things, as Averroes aptly explains. (*textum 69. primi Phys.*)

It is urged second: form is more knowable by us than matter; but form is not known by us except through operation; therefore neither is matter. But the effect of matter is to sustain form and together with it to cause the composite.

Therefore matter is knowable by us through its relation to form. The major is clear. The minor is at hand: from a new and diverse operation we argue a new and diverse form; likewise from a new transmutation, with the same subject persisting, we come to knowledge of matter, which is that subject. Furthermore, there are two contrary principles whose contrariety is exercised in a common subject, which is called matter. Moreover, from the sensible accidental form the subject of it is known — according to (1. *animae* T. 11.): "Accidents contribute greatly to knowledge of substance." It is clearly inferred that we pursue knowledge of matter from its relation and analogy to form.

CLXXXIV. Objection I. From (3. *de anima* T. 9. & 7. *Met. c. de partibus definitionis*): the philosopher, in enumerating per se knowable things, mentions form and the composite but not matter. Moreover (7. *Met. T. 35.*) he adds that matter is by itself unknown. Augustine adds: (l. 20. *contra Faustum cap. 14.*) "Prime matter can neither be sensed nor understood by itself." I respond to the two prior passages: Aristotle indeed affirms that form and the composite are known by us, but does not assert that matter is unknown to us. For he affirms one thing and does not deny another. An argument drawn from negative authority is not conclusive.

To the last: the Doctor says (*in expositione eius text. & 3. d. 22. quaest. vn. §. Ad 1. arg. sub H.*) that matter is called unknown because it is not the primary or most potent reason for knowing — but form is, which is the cause of knowing matter in the way stated above. By the same token satisfaction is given to Augustine, who, while indicating the difficulty of knowing it (l. *de natura boni cap. 18.*) writes that matter can scarcely be thought of through no species but through the privation of all species. And (12. *conf. c. 5.*) that we try to know matter by not knowing — or not to know it by knowing.

CLXXXV. Objection II. What is proper to form is not to be attributed to matter. But to be known by the intellect is proper to form; therefore it does not belong to matter. The major is clear. The minor is shown: to be received in a subject, to terminate and inform a subject belongs to form — hence Aristotle adds (3. *animae. T. 6.*): "The soul is the place of forms." I grant the major and deny the minor: for knowability belongs to every being. (2. *Met. T. 4.*) To the testimony of the philosopher I say that it is to be explained of intentional forms, such as intelligible species.

CLXXXVI. Objection III. What is not act nor has act is not per se knowable, because potency is a kind of latency and concealment. But matter is potency (8. *Met. T. 5.*) participating in no act; therefore it is not per se intelligible. The major can be denied, because being, which is divided into being in act and being in potency (6. *Met. T. 4. & 9. eiusdem operis T. 1.*) is per se intelligible. But if the major is granted, the minor must be distinguished: matter is subjective potency having no formal act — I grant; it is objective potency participating in no entitative act — I deny. In this way the testimony of the philosopher adduced must be interpreted.

Article XV. Whether Matter Is Ingenerable and Incorruptible

CLXXXVII. The common run of philosophers together with Aristotle (*1. Phys. c. 9. T. 82.*) grant that matter is ingenerable and incorruptible terminatively and objectively, yet generable and corruptible subjectively. But this manner of speaking, although common to both Thomists and Scotists, both ancient and recent, does not please two of our more recent authors. (*disp. 2. q. 8. art. 2.*) So that the truth of the matter may be evident and the common manner of speaking appear as true and genuine, we proceed.

CLXXXVIII. Note I. From (*5. Phys. T. 4. & 1. de gener. T. 23.*) generation is the transition or change from non-being to being with a subject presupposed, and corruption is the change from being to non-being with a subject remaining. From this it is not obscurely deduced that what is objectively or terminatively generable means nothing other than being the object or terminus of generation — so that what passes from non-being to being is generable, and what passes from being to non-being is corruptible. This terminus is twofold: the terminus quo, which is form, and the terminus quod, which is the composite. Since matter, once created by God, always remains and will endure perpetually, it is therefore said to be ingenerable and incorruptible. But what is generable and corruptible subjectively is what is presupposed and subjected to generation and corruption — and this is called matter, in which the transition occurs from non-being to being and from being to non-being, with it always persisting and remaining, as Aristotle sets out excellently. (*1. Phys. T. 80. & 82. & alibi non rarò.*)

This sense is embraced in common, and this doctrine is freely confirmed by Scotus, (*7. Met. quaest. 8. 10. Et 1. Rep. d. 5. q. 2.*) Anthony of Andrés, (*7. Met. q. 9.*) Canon, (*1. Phys. q. 9. art. 2. dub. 1.*) the Parisian school, (*1. Phys. q. ult.*) John of Magistris, (*ibid. dub. 1.*) Tartaret, (*q. 7. scibili 3.*) Richard, (*2. d. 12. q. 2.*) Bonet, (*1. d. 8. q. 2. q. 2.*) St. Thomas, (*1. p. q. 46. a. 1.*) and all the rest except the two recent authors mentioned, who, opposing themselves to the common sense and thinking that Aristotle is speaking of generation and corruption actively and not passively, in the character of production or destruction — and thus thinking that others are in error — are themselves in error. For those authors explicitly affirm that matter is the common subject of all natural generations and corruptions, not however that it is the subject or terminus of them and is denominatively generable and corruptible from them insofar as they occur in it as in their common subject. Let them read only the passages cited and they will evidently see the truth of the common saying. I add from Augustine (*5. Trin. c. 7.*) and Scotus: (*3. d. 6. q. 1. D.*) "When the matter is established, no violence should be done about the name." I add from Bartolus: (*in l. de nom. §. plurimum*) "In questions of name, common opinion makes truth." Since therefore those recent authors freely admit that through the distinction brought at the beginning of this article the difficulty about word and manner of speaking is resolved and

dissolved, no concern need be taken — especially since it is the assertion of Scotus, whose doctrine they publicly profess to follow.

CLXXXIX. Note II. Generation and corruption are taken in two ways. First, broadly and improperly, for any production, inception, or cessation. In this way, both what are properly created and annihilated, and others that come forth to light and cease to be in another manner, are said to be generated and corrupted. This sense is mentioned (*Gen. 2.*) "These are the generations of heaven and earth," and is indicated (*1. Caeli T. 112. & 113.*) Second, narrowly and properly, for substantial progression from non-being to being with a subject remaining, and from being to non-being with the same subject persisting — and this is called natural generation and corruption, as John of Magistris notes. (*nuper alleg.*) This twofold sense is also taken by the word "is made" — first (*Gen. 1.*): "Let light be made," and (*1. Phys. T. 58.*): "From a musician a musician is made," and (*1. de gener. 13.*): "From the whole mixture blood is made." The second sense: (*Gen. 2.*) "The human being was made into a living soul," and (*1. Phys. T. 64. 6. 8. Met. T. 8.*): "Only the composite is made" — that is, is generated.

CXC. Assertion I. Matter is objectively generable and corruptible in the broad sense of the word. This is derived from Scotus (*2. d. 12. q. 1. §. dico igitur.*) and John of Magistris expressly favors it. (*passu memorato.*) It is proved first from Sacred Scripture: (*Ioan. 1.*) "All things were made through him." But matter was made — that is, created — as I proved in Article IV of this question. Therefore before it was made it was makeable and producible and generable and corruptible in the broad sense of the word.

Second: all things except God are in the aforesaid manner generable and corruptible. For God alone is supremely necessary, unproducibile, and incorruptible. Therefore, since matter resides in the series of created things, it follows that it is generable and corruptible in this sense. Here too belong the things I brought forward in the tract on creation, (*disp. 1. q. 17.*) to show that, except for God, all things are causable and makeable — even according to Aristotle.

CXCI. Assertion II. Matter is generable and corruptible subjectively. The Doctor holds this. (*7. Met. q. 10.*) It is proved first from Aristotle (*8. Met. T. 4.*) calling the matter of sublunary things generable and corruptible. And (*3. Phys. T. 6.*) in defining motion he gives the example of generation and corruption. Generation is the act of the generable as generable, and corruption is the act of the corruptible as corruptible; but what receives these acts is matter. Therefore in the Peripatetic school, matter is generable and corruptible subjectively.

Second: form existing in a subject denominates formally the subject in which it exists — as whiteness inhering in a wall denominates it white. But generation and corruption are formally in matter, since matter is the common subject of

generation and corruption. (1. *Phys. T.* 82.) Therefore they denominate it generable and corruptible — and thus matter is generable and corruptible.

Third: whatever changes from non-subject to subject is generable, since generation is change from non-subject to subject. (5. *Phys. T.* 7.) And what changes from subject to non-subject is corruptible, since corruption is change from subject to non-subject. (*ibid.*) But matter changes from non-subject to subject — as from non-water to water — and from subject to non-subject — as from water to non-water. Therefore matter is subjectively generable and corruptible.

CXCII. Assertion III. Matter is ingenerable and incorruptible terminatively. This is defended by the Doctor. (7. *Met. q.* 8. & in *Report. praealleg. q.* Et 2. d. 1. q. 3. §. Ad. 1. arg. principale sub K.) And it is the express doctrine of Aristotle. (1. *Phys. T.* 82.) It is urged first: matter is subjected to every generation and corruption, and a natural agent does not act except upon prior-existing matter. Hence it is described (2. *Phys.* 28. & 5. *Met.* 2.) as that "from which existing within it something comes to be." For what is generated is born from matter, and what is corrupted is resolved into matter. (1. *Phys. T.* 82.) Therefore matter is ingenerable and incorruptible terminatively.

Second: what is creatable and annihilable is ingenerable and incorruptible terminatively — as is clear of the Angel and the rational soul. But matter is creatable — and in fact was created at the beginning of the world — as I showed in Article IV of this question. Third: the terminus of generation is either total or partial. Matter is not the total terminus of generation, because that is the composite. Nor is it the partial terminus, because that is form. Therefore matter is ingenerable terminatively.

All the more so: generation and corruption occur in sublunary things for the most part from contraries and from what is repugnant; but nothing is contrary to matter — on the contrary, matter is itself the willing common subject of contraries and the foundation of all forms. Therefore it is not subject to generation and corruption.

CXCIII. Objection I against Assertion III. From (7. *Met. T.* 22. Et 8. *eiusdem operis T.* 4.): matter of these lower things is said to be generable and corruptible. Therefore the last assertion conflicts with Aristotle. I respond through the distinction brought forward: matter is generable and corruptible subjectively and denominatively — I grant; objectively and terminatively — I deny. The philosopher's testimonies cited are to be explained in this way.

CXCIV. Objection II. What is the cause of generation and corruption is generable and corruptible. But matter is such; therefore etc. The major is supported by that axiom: (1. *post. c.* 2.) "That by reason of which each thing is such, that thing is more so." The composite is corruptible on account of matter desiring another form; therefore matter itself is more corruptible. The minor is

from Aristotle. (*1. Phys. T. 80.*) "Matter stripped of form contrives harm" — namely, the corruption of the composite. I distinguish the major: in univocal and efficient causes — I grant, as if a hand is cold because of frost, frost is more cold. In equivocal and material causes — I deny. For it does not follow that a person is drunk because of wine; therefore wine is more drunk. In this way the philosopher's maxim is explained.

CXCV. Objection III. What can do the more perfect can also do the less perfect — for what can do the greater can do the lesser, as is established by the argument from the greater to the lesser. But a natural agent can act upon the composite, generating and corrupting it, which is more perfect than matter. Therefore it can also generate and corrupt matter. This is corroborated: the principles of a corruptible thing are themselves corruptible. Since therefore the whole is corruptible, its principles — among which is matter — are corruptible. The antecedent is from Aristotle. (*1. Caeli, 61.*) Furthermore, generation is a change of the whole into the whole, with nothing sensible remaining. (*1. de gener. 24.*) Therefore if the whole is corrupted, whose one part is matter, matter itself is also corrupted.

I distinguish the major: if it is of the same nature and within the sphere of its activity — I grant; if it is of a different nature and outside the sphere of its activity — I deny. For it does not follow that a human being generates a human being, who is more perfect than a dog; therefore it also begot a dog, who is less perfect than it. To the distinction of the major, the minor is to be distinguished. To the corroboration the antecedent is denied universally. To its proof I say that the philosopher's saying is indefinite. For even though it is true of form and privation, it is not true of matter — just as the principles are contrary, namely form and privation, but not matter.

To the other thing added, I say that it is to be understood with respect to the third entity, which is entirely corrupted and another new one entirely generated — not however with respect to all parts; for some persists, which is the common subject of generation and corruption, as Aristotle notes, (*1. Phys. 60. Et 8. Met. c. 2.*) and Scotus (*4. d. 11. q. 1. q. De primo. A.*) and Anthony of Andrés (*ad finem exp. 6. princ.*)

CXCVI. Objection IV. The incorruptible surpasses the corruptible in dignity — just as the immortal surpasses the mortal and the eternal the temporal. But form and the composite are more excellent than matter, since matter is the lowest and most refined being. Therefore matter is not incorruptible, otherwise it would surpass form and the composite in perfection and dignity — which are corruptible.

I distinguish the major: simply — I deny; in a qualified sense — I grant, as is clear of the heaven, which is incorruptible and to which any animate living being is preferred, even though the latter is incorruptible and the former

corruptible. Likewise an element according to the whole is incorruptible and yet is ranked after the corruptible mixture.

One might say: matter needs form in order to exist and subsist, since it is a partial and imperfect substance. Therefore if deprived of all form — which God can do — it would perish and be corrupted; therefore it is not alien to corruption. I say that even though in the order of created things established by God matter is never without form and its appetite is fulfilled through form and it is perfected thereby — nonetheless, given the hypothesis, through the general concurrence of God it would exist per se, since it enjoys its own proper existence and subsistence, as I showed in Articles VI and VII of this question.

Article XVI. What Is the Root Cause of the Corruption of Natural Things

Since we observe around us the unceasing destruction and continual corruption of things, it is fitting to investigate and examine what the original cause of this might be — whether it is form, matter, or something else altogether. Avicenna, in (*1. suff. cap. 3*), holds that sublunary things are assailed and corrupted by contraries. Averroes, in (*l. de substantia orbis*), thinks that the destruction of things arises from contraries and from matter. But the Canonist (*1. Phys. 9. 9. 4. 2. dub. 2*) and John of Maisières (*ibid. quaest. 13. dub. 2*) judge that the corruption and perishing of composites originates from form. However, the common body of philosophers, together with Aristotle (*1. Phys. c. 9. T. 81*), teaches that the root of corruption arises from matter alone.

I do not here rehearse the various modes and degrees of corruption that I explained in the Moral treatise (*1. 5. 9. 2. art. 10*). I note only, following Aristotle (*l. de longitudine et brevitate vitae*) and Scotus (*2. Rep. d. 12. q. 1*), that the principle and cause of corruption is twofold: an active cause, by which a corrupting agent corrupts what is corruptible, and a passive cause, by which the corruptible is corrupted. This is further divided into intrinsic corruption, by which something has an internal principle of corruption, and extrinsic corruption, by which something is corrupted by an external principle. It can also be subdivided into primary corruption, which is the first origin of corruption, and secondary corruption, which follows from and depends upon that primary root. Again, there is remote corruption, by which something lacks the prior dispositions leading to corruption, and proximate corruption, by which something participates in qualities suited to produce corruption. Further, there is subjective corruption, by which a subject is made subject to corruption, and objective corruption, by which something is the object or terminus of corruption. Finally, I note that almost all of these causes of corruption are reducible to one fontal and radical cause, which is intrinsic. For there would be no extrinsic corruption if there were not first intrinsic corruption — since an agent would not act upon a subject unless that subject were capable of receiving its action; and likewise, a corrupting agent would corrupt nothing unless the

subject were open to undergoing corruption, as the Doctor agrees (*2. d. 12. q. 1*) and (*3. d. 12. q. vn. §. Rationes ante C*).

The source and primary root of the corruption of natural things is matter clothed in privation. This is the position of the Doctor just cited (*2. d. 12. q. 1*), together with his disciples. It is proved, first, from Aristotle (*1. Phys. T. 80*): "Matter, deprived of form, contrives mischief" — that is, the corruption of the composite — as the commentators explain there. Second, what is immaterial is incorruptible — as is the angel and the rational soul — while what is material is corruptible; therefore matter is the origin and cause of corruption. One might object that the heavens are material, being composed of matter and form, yet are incorruptible, and so matter cannot be the primary and adequate reason for corruption. Scotus responds (*2. d. 14. q. 1*) and (*4. d. 49. q. 6. §. Hic duo sunt sub B*) that the heavens are corruptible in a remote and absolute sense, yet incorruptible in a proximate and qualified sense, because no natural agent is found capable of overcoming their power and corrupting them. Third, matter desires the form it lacks, as something suited to its good; but it cannot possess a new form without the corruption of the form it currently enjoys, and that form is not corrupted without the whole composite being corrupted. Moreover, matter is in a state of contradictory potentiality — toward being and toward non-being (*7. Met. T. 22, and frequently elsewhere*). It has the capacity to receive a form of which it is currently deprived, just as a place is capable of receiving what is placed in it. And, more to the point, matter receives contraries, one of which cannot coexist with another; thus, when one form recedes, the privation of the other arrives. Now that which receives what harms and destroys another is the cause of its demise and corruption. Therefore, since matter is the common receptacle of contrary principles — namely form and privation (*1. Phys. T. 68*) — matter is undeniably the root of corruption.

Objection I. Where there is no contrary, there is no corruption (*1. Caeli T. 20*) and (*1. de long. et brev. vitae*). Matter has no contrary (*1. Phys. T. 67*). Therefore matter is not the cause of corruption. Confirmation: matter is ungenerable and incorruptible, as was established in the previous article. Therefore it is not the origin of corruption. Response: the major premise holds for corruption proceeding from an extrinsic source, but not for corruption emanating from within, which is what we are discussing here. Hence Scotus, just cited, says that the heavens are in fact incorruptible because no natural agent capable of overpowering and corrupting them is to be found. To the confirmation: I concede the antecedent but distinguish the consequent — in itself and absolutely, I concede; when joined with privation and its own potentiality, I deny — as the Doctor explains (*3. d. 22. q. vn. ante C*).

Objection II. What is the cause of change is the cause of corruption, since corruption is a change (*3. Phys. T. 6*). But form is the cause of change (*1. Phys. T. 68*), since when form informs matter the composite is generated, when it

persists the whole is conserved, and when it departs and is absent the whole is corrupted, as the Philosopher acknowledges in the passage just cited. Therefore form is the cause of corruption. Confirmation: if a preceding form were to coexist with a subsequent form, no corruption would occur, because no change would occur; therefore, since corruption happens through the separation or cessation of form, it clearly follows that form causes corruption. I concede the major; I distinguish the minor: as primary and radical cause, I deny; as secondary and accidental cause, I concede. For just as a sailor by his presence is the conserving cause of a ship and by his absence is the cause of its sinking, as Aristotle notes (*2. Phys. T. 50*) and the Doctor accepts (*2. Rep. d. 34. q. 1*) — so when form is present the composite is conserved, and when it is absent the composite is corrupted. To the confirmation: the same must be said. For even if the composite is not proximately corruptible as long as form remains, it is nonetheless corruptible remotely, on account of the potentiality of contradiction that exists in matter, as was established from Aristotle and Scotus cited above.

Objection III. If form were fully to satisfy the appetite of matter, corruption would not occur. Corruption occurs precisely because the appetite of matter is not satisfied by form. Hence the Doctor adds (*1. d. 1. q. 1*) that if there were given a most perfect form containing all other forms virtually, the desire of matter would cease. Therefore corruption derives from the form that fails to satisfy matter's appetite. Confirmation: as was said above, form is generable objectively and terminatively, being the object and terminus by which generation is directed; therefore it is also corruptible terminatively, and since it is possible and in a state of contradictory potentiality, it follows that form itself is the origin of corruption. Response: even on that hypothesis, although corruption would not actually occur, it would remain possible — since the root of corruption, which is inseparable from and intrinsic to matter, namely its potentiality of contradiction, would remain, as Scotus notes from (*2. de gen. T. 51*) in (*2. d. 12. q. 1. infra A*). For matter existing under that most perfect form would still be capable of being under another form, whether equal or inferior, and would therefore not be exempt from corruption. To the confirmation: I concede that form is corruptible terminatively; but I deny that it is the primary origin of corruption, which is the whole point of the dispute.

Article XVII. Whether Matter Is Purely Passive

Some hold that matter possesses no activity whatsoever, as those cited by Mayr (*2. d. 12. q. 1. art. 5*), followed by Toledo (*1. Phys. q. 11*), Ruvio (*tract. 1. de mat. q. 9*), and Vasquez (*1. p. disp. 196. n. 13*). On the other side, the Manicheans cited by Augustine (*lib. de natura boni cap. 18*) make matter the maker of all corporeal things, and some even suspect it to be God the maker of all things, as Aquinas reports (*1. q. 9. 3. art. 8*). Others, however — such as Scotus (*3. d. 12. q. 1*), (*2. d. 14.*

q. 1), Mayr as just cited, Arriaga (*disp. 2. Phys. sect. 9*), and Poncius (*ibid. ad finem disp. 32*) — treat matter as passive, yet without stripping it of all activity.

Note I. There is not just one question about the activity of matter. One can inquire whether matter is the origin and cause of its own properties; whether it is active in the eduction of the form drawn from its potency; whether it cooperates in the generation of the whole; whether it is a partial cause of the operations proceeding from the whole; and finally, whether it moves the intellect to the knowledge of itself, as other knowable objects do.

Note II. From the Doctor (*1. post. q. 25. §. Ad quaestionem respondeo*), there are two kinds of cause. One acts by transmutation, as a plant produces its flowers and a tree its fruits; the other acts by emanation, as risibility proceeds from humanity and the divine attributes from the Divinity. Again, a cause is divided into physical or real — which emits its effect outside itself, as fire emits heat — and intentional, which receives within itself the operation it produces, as the intellect produces an act of understanding, which is called an intentional action, as will be established and explained elsewhere.

Note III. Among the properties of matter, the following are most important: its ungenerability and incorruptibility, its perpetuity and passibility, its appetite for forms, and its knowability by analogy with forms — all of which are sufficiently evident from what has been said above, and are explained by recent authors, particularly Ruvio and Arriaga as cited.

Assertion I. Matter is the cause of its own properties. This is drawn from the Doctor (*2. loco cit.*), (*ibid. d. 16. q. un.*), (*4. d. 12. q. 3. §. Dico ergo sub E*), (*d. 13. q. 1. §. De tertio art. ante CC*). It is argued, first, that properties or attributes flow most of all from the specific nature, as I explained in the Epitome (*lib. 1. quaest. 3. art. 6*). Now matter is a specific nature, albeit an imperfect and partial one, as I proved in article XI of this question. Therefore its properties arise from matter itself, and it is therefore their cause and origin. Second, every effect requires a cause, since these are correlatives, each requiring the other. But there are several properties that are like effects of matter and proceed from no other cause but matter itself — not from form, nor from the composite, which are generable and corruptible. Someone might say that properties proceed from an act or from something that includes an act, and not from a pure potency such as matter. But on the contrary, matter has an entitative act, as I showed in the present question, article V. It is a substance, whose properties are enumerated in logic in the chapter on substance. Moreover, from matter itself there arise relations of similarity and dissimilarity: one matter is similar or dissimilar to another. Therefore not all active power is removed from matter.

Assertion II. Matter, in its own material genus, cooperates in the eduction of form from its potency. This is drawn from Scotus in the places cited in the previous assertion, and more explicitly (*4. Met. in exp. Tit. 20*) and (*8. eiusdem*

operis, in Tit. 14). First proof: matter is "that out of which something comes to be while it is present in it" (*2. Phys. Tit. 28*). If, therefore, matter cooperates in the generation of the composite, it also cooperates in the eduction of form, since form depends upon matter both in its becoming and in its being. Second, an immaterial form is introduced into matter from without, while a material form is drawn out from it; therefore matter in some way co-acts in its production. Perhaps this is why it is called "material," because it is caused from matter. Furthermore, if matter were merely presupposed for the production of form and contributed nothing to it, then if form preexisted and were presupposed to matter, one would say it comes to be from the preexisting form — just as it is said to come to be from the preexisting matter. But this is false. Therefore, for a form to be drawn from the potency of matter means nothing other than that matter cooperates in the production of that form, as Mayr rightly saw. Someone might say: if matter causes form, then since both are principles, one principle would come to be from another, which contradicts (*1. Phys. Tit. 42*). The inference is denied, because, as I said in question I of this book, article I, note II, "to come to be" properly belongs to the composite; and so it is only in an improper sense that form is said to come to be — properly speaking, it is drawn out from the potency of matter by an agent.

Assertion III. Matter exercises partial activity in the generation of the whole. The Doctor supports this (*3. d. 2. q. 2. art. 1. §. Quantum ad 1. C*). First proof: from (*7. Met. Tit. 7*) and (*8. eiusdem, cap. 2. Tit. 3*), the composite is said to be a third thing caused from matter and form as two partial causes that together make up one total cause. Second, matter is one of the four genera of cause (*2. Phys. Tit. 28*), and it causes the composite partially, because the whole arises from it and form together. Therefore matter performs the function of a cause in the generation of the composite. More on this when I treat the composite.

Assertion IV. Matter does not cooperate in the operations of the whole. This conflicts with Poncius as named above, but is favored by the Doctor, who in the third assertion cited above makes the whole distinct from its parts taken together. Therefore the actions that proceed from the whole do not proceed from its parts — especially from matter, which is passive. First proof: from (*1. de anima Tit. 64*), where the Philosopher denies that actions belonging to the whole — such as building and weaving, and those attributed to a human being — belong to the soul; therefore neither form nor matter cooperates in those works, otherwise they would in some way be attributed to them. Second, if matter cooperated in the works of the whole, it would be knowable from those works, just as form is known through its operations. But matter is not knowable by us except by analogy with form, as I showed above in article XIV of this question. Therefore it contributes nothing to the works of the whole. Third, if matter were to cooperate actively in the effects of the composite, mixed things would not be distinguished from the elements, nor would animate things be distinguished from inanimate, nor would there be any distinction between these and those

species of things, since they all share the same common matter and the same active principle. But it is established that the genera, species, and individuals of things are diverse, as are their faculties and operations. Hence Lucretius sings: "And in this matter it is impossible that all things come from all things, for in certain things there resides a hidden power."

Assertion V. Matter can act upon an intellect freed from the senses by an intentional action. This is indicated by the Doctor (*2. d. 12. q. 1. Ad arg. R.*). First proof: an object moves a faculty to an intuitive cognition of itself when present, or by means of a species representing it when absent. But matter is a per se intelligible object, being a substantial being. Therefore it can act intentionally upon the intellect. Second: just as the sensitive relates to sensibles, so the intellective relates to intelligibles (*3. anima cap. 1. Tit. 3*). But the sense is acted upon by the sensible — it is moved by it to sensation — therefore the intellect too is moved by the intelligible, of which sort matter is. Third, quantity is considered by all to be in the genus of passive things, yet by an intentional action it moves the cognitive faculty to knowledge of itself, since it is known by us as the primary accident of corporeal and material substance. Therefore, even though matter is passive, it must not be excluded from intentional activity.

Objection I. From (*1. de gen. Tit. 55*) and (*2. eiusdem Tit. 52*): it belongs to matter to suffer. Augustine gives the reason in (*lib. de natura boni cap. 18*), comparing matter to a wood or forest. For just as a wood is suited to have something made from it, but not to make anything itself, so matter makes nothing; rather, something is made from it, namely the composite. Confirmation: efficient cause and material cause do not coincide, for they are two generically distinct causes (*2. Phys. Tit. 31*). Therefore neither is matter the effecting cause of its own properties nor of anything else. Response: I explain the Aristotle passages by means of a distinction. Matter suffers insofar as it receives form — I concede this. But insofar as it causes its own properties, or the composite, or anything else — I deny it. In this sense, sensing and understanding are said to be a kind of suffering. For just as the sense in receiving sensation is passive, but in causing it is active — so the intellect suffers insofar as it receives an act of understanding, but acts insofar as it produces it. The same response applies to Augustine's authority and the confirmation, which Scotus supports (*2. d. 25. q. vn. §. Ad 1. sub V*), giving the example of a physician who, insofar as he induces health in himself by his art, is called active; but insofar as he receives it, is called passive.

Objection II. A second act, which is action, presupposes a first act, which is its principle. But matter is neither a first act nor does it include a first act, being pure potency (*8. Met. Tit. 5*) and (*12. eiusdem, Tit. 22*). Therefore matter is not active in anything. Confirmation: properties arise from a specific nature, which is constituted and determined by its proper difference — as whinnying comes from equinity. But matter belongs to no species, since it is indifferent and indeterminate. Therefore it does not produce its own properties. Response: I

concede the major; I distinguish the minor. It is not a formal act — I concede. It is not an entitative act — I deny. It is indeed a potency, but not an objective potency — a subjective one, as I made clear in article V of this question. To the confirmation: granted the major, I say as to the minor that matter is specifically one in an incomplete, not a complete, sense, as was said above in article XI.

Objection III. If there were no matter, the effects that are now caused would still be caused — for instance, heat would cause heat, and snow would cause cold.

Therefore matter is the cause of nothing, since it produces no effect.

Confirmation: matter does not virtually contain form or anything else.

Therefore it is purely passive. Response: although not all effects proceed from matter — since form is more active — nonetheless, without matter, neither material form, nor the composite, nor any other operations would be produced, as the Doctor demonstrates well (*2. d. 12. q. 1. §. positio ista*). To the confirmation: I deny the antecedent, since it is asserted without proof. Therefore it is dismissed with the same ease with which it was advanced.

Article XVIII. Whether There Is a Seminal Reason in Matter Co-Eternal with It

This difficulty appears quite hard and arduous to both ancient and modern philosophers, both on account of its considerable obscurity and on account of the multiple disagreements among great men, as Mauritius notes above others (*in 7. Met. quaest. 12*), and as St. Bonaventure touches on (*2. d. 18. q. 3*). On this topic there are two principal positions. The affirmative position is attributed to Albert by the Scotist commentators (*Scot. 2. d. 18. q. un.*) and to Henry (*Quol. 4. q. 14*), who hold that form preexists in matter as co-eternal with it, cooperating with the extrinsic agent in generating the composite. Five modes of this opinion are adduced and refuted by Scotus (*7. Met. q. 12*) and Antonio Andrea (*ibid. q. 11*), and two by the Seraphic Doctor in the passage cited. One mode alone is treated by Durandus (*2. d. 12. q. 2*) — that of a pure possible residing in matter, distinct from it, transmutable into form, which he calls the seminal reason or inchoation of forms. These modes have been so thoroughly contested, routed, demolished, and nearly extinguished by the Doctor (*in loco cit.*) and also (*2. d. 18. q. un.*), by Bassolis (*ibid.*), Richard, and others, that one is almost reluctant to add anything further, and hardly anyone is found at this time who attempts to defend them. The negative position, which these authors embrace, teaches that nothing of form preexists in act in matter.

For the understanding of this, I observe with the Canonist (*2. Phys. q. 1*) that being is divided into actual and potential, and potential being is subdivided into subjective and objective — the explanation of which is known from what has been said above. I also observe, with the same author there, that when it is said that an active principle is found in matter, this can be taken in two ways: in one way, as the whole general or particular form, and in this sense there is no active principle in matter; in another way, as a certain prior disposition of the form to

be generated, and in this sense such a principle in matter can be granted as an instrumental active principle for the production of a new form. It is perhaps in this sense that Augustine speaks (5. 9. *Super Gen. prop. finem*), saying that in a grain of wheat there is a power by which wheat rather than a bean is produced from it, and in a bean there is a power by which not wheat but a bean is produced. This is noted by the Canonist (2. *Phys. q. 1. dub. 4*) from Averroes (6. *Met.*).

Assertion. Nothing actual or possible of form exists in matter before generation. The assertion is twofold, defended by Scotus in the passages already narrated. The first part is proved, first, from (1. *Phys. T. 82*), where Aristotle makes matter alone to be ungenerated and incorrupt — for it is the primary subject from which all natural things come to be, and into which they are all ultimately resolved. And in (7. *Met. Tit. 29*), he adds that, just as a house comes to be from an extrinsic principle alone, namely from an intelligent agent, so fire is generated not from an intrinsic but from an extrinsic principle only. Therefore, according to Aristotle, nothing is found in act in matter that always remains with it for the production of a new form and the generation of a composite. Second, contrary principles do not simultaneously persist in the same subject, especially if they are privative contraries, of which one denotes the absence of the other in a suitable and fit subject, as I explained in Logic (*lib. 3. q. 9. art. 6*). But privation and form are privative contrary principles (1. *Phys. Tit. 66 and 67*). Therefore, when privation is present in matter, nothing of form exists in it.

Someone might say there is something of an imperfect form in matter. On the contrary: between privative opposites there is no intermediate, just as between contradictory opposites (10. *Met. Tit. 15*). Therefore between form and its privation there is no such thing as an imperfect form or inchoation of form. For either form is in matter, or privation of it is — as the Philosopher argues (1. *Phys. cit.*). But before generation, form is not actually in matter; therefore only its privation is there. Third, the termini of a motion are incompatible (5. *Phys. Tit. 26 and at the end of that book*). But privation and form are the termini of generation — privation being its terminus from which, form being its terminus toward which, and their common subject being matter (1. *Phys. Tit. 60*). Therefore nothing of form always remains in matter as co-eternal with it. Fourth, form is impartible and invariable, from the book of the Six Principles, cap. II, and this is signified in (8. *Met. cap. 5. Tit. 10*): "Substances are like numbers, to which no addition or subtraction is made, otherwise they do not persist as the same." Now form is a substance, which in respect to essential and specific being admits no more and less, but only in respect to individual being. Therefore one part of it is not co-eternal with matter while another part is newly produced by the generating agent, since it is simple and indivisible. I add the simultaneous incompatibility of forms in the same matter, their syncategorematic infinity, parity with accidental form which does not precede in act before being drawn from its subject, and with artificial form which is

extracted from a subject by the artisan when nothing of it preexisted in that very subject — as Antonio Andrea shows together with the author of the Six Principles in the exposition of the cited chapter.

The second part is proved, first: every potential and possible being is either subjective or objective, as I observed not far from the beginning of this article. But that pure possible which the adversaries locate in matter — lest form come to be from nothing — is not subjective, since Aristotle in (*1. Phys. esp. c. 9*) admits no other subjective being besides matter. Nor is it objective, since this is the terminus of active potency, and the pure possible located in matter is not of this kind. Someone might say: it is not matter itself, but something possible in matter, transmutable into form. On the contrary: what is in matter is either a property of it — but this is not the case, since a property always remains in it, whereas this does not always remain but is transmuted into form — or it is something really distinct from matter. But it is not privation, which does not pass into form since privation is its terminus from which; nor form itself, which is its terminus toward which; nor the composite, which is the total and adequate terminus of generation. Therefore it is nothing, and thus the adversaries do not avoid the creation of form, which they strive to escape by means of that pure possible.

Second: every being is either actual or potential (*9. Met. T. 1*). But the pure possible imagined in matter is not an actual being, as its very name indicates, nor a potential being — since this is either subjective or objective — and the first argument recurs. Third: that pure possible resides in matter before form is produced from it, just as privation is present in matter when form is absent. Therefore, if it actually exists in matter, it is an actual being, because no being is found in another unless it is an actual being. Therefore, if it is an actual being, it is either uncreated — and is God — or created and produced from nothing, which the said authors deny. And if they say it is a potential being, since the possible does not yet exist, or it comes to be from something, and unless we proceed to infinity, we must assign that from which it comes to be — which cannot be anything other than matter — yet they distinguish it really from matter and hold it to be incapable of being made. And furthermore: the pure possible is in act nothing; therefore if form comes to be from it, it comes to be from nothing — which they refuse.

Objection I. Against the first part of the assertion: Aristotle (*7. Met. T. 29. cap. 9*) writes that in matter there pre-exists a part of the thing to be generated. Therefore, in the Peripatetic tradition, something of form preexists in matter before the generation of the whole. Augustine adds (*7. cap. lib. 3. de Trin.*): "The hidden seeds of all things that are born lie concealed in the elements of the world." Hence Augustine himself (*lib. de natura boni cap. 18*) calls matter a "wood," because just as from a wood planted with trees artificial works are made, so from the forms preexisting in matter natural composites are generated. Response: I

explain the Philosopher's text with Scotus there in the commentary — by "part" he understands a cooperating power in the generation of form, just as prior dispositions dispose matter and cooperate instrumentally in the production of form. Likewise, the potencies and faculties of the soul are called its "parts" by the same author (3. *anima* 1), as Scotus notes (2. d. 16. q. un.) together with the Seraphic Doctor (*ibid.* d. 24. q. 1. art. 2). For this reason Boethius (*lib. divis.*) divides the soul like a whole into virtual parts. The same response applies to the first passage from Augustine — for the same saint plainly acknowledges, in (3. *de Gen.*) and (5. and 9. *eiusdem operis*), the aforesaid active power in the generation of trees and animals, as Richard rightly noted (2. d. 18. q. 2. art. 1). To the second passage: the comparison holds in this respect, that just as an artisan draws out artificial forms from the trees in a wood, so a natural agent draws out natural forms from matter. But just as there are no actual artificial forms in the wood, so neither are there actual natural forms to be found in matter, as Aristotle signifies (1. *Phys. T.* 69 and 2. *eiusdem operis T.* 86).

Objection II. Unless form preexists in matter in some manner, there would be generation but not creation — for form would be produced from nothing of itself. But creation is the production of a thing from nothing. Therefore either part or the whole of form preexists in matter as co-eternal with it. I deny the inference of the major. The reason is that form is produced not from nothing but from preexisting matter; therefore it is not creation, which is production from no presupposed subject, as the Doctor teaches (2. d. 1. q. 2).

Objection III. If form does not precede generation in any respect of its being, generation would not be natural but violent — because it would lack an intrinsic principle, which is required for it to be natural, and would have only an extrinsic principle, which renders it violent, since the violent is that whose principle is extrinsic (3. *Eth.* 1). Therefore in some respect of its being form precedes generation. I deny the inference of the antecedent. For generation participates in an intrinsic principle — not indeed an active one, but a passive one, naturally inclined toward form, which is all that is required for what is properly called natural, as the Doctor sharply explains (2. d. 18. q. un. §. *Contra D.* 1).

Question III. On Privation

Since in matter privation precedes form, as Scotus notes (3. d. 3. q. 1. §. *si autem G*), because privation is the terminus from which of generation, as Aristotle says (5. *Phys. Tit.* 7), and as Antonio Andrea expresses (10. *Met.* q. 4), while form is the partial and principal terminus toward which, which is undoubtedly posterior to the former — for this reason we treat of privation before form.

Article I. Whether Privation Exists

There are those who deny privation any existence on the side of the thing, among whom are numbered Soncinas (10. *Met.* q. 15) and other Thomists, who

hold that it depends solely on the intellect and is therefore a being of reason. The more common opinion, however, is that of Scotus (*1. d. 23. q. un. §. Item arguo H*) and (*4. d. 22. q. 1. §. De primo A*) and (*Quol. 18. §. Ex isto Y*), Auriol (*2. d. 2. art. 2*), Mayr (*Quol. 7. punct. 5*), Parisian (*1. Phys. fol. 25*), and the other Scotists, who hold that privation exists on the side of the thing independently of any intellectual operation.

Note I. From Scotus (*1. d. 23. q. un. §. Item arguo H*) and (*in Rep. d. 28. q. 1. §. A. quaest. dico*) and Durandus (*d. 23. q. 3*), privation is taken in three ways. In one way, for the lack of something of which something is capable — not according to genus or species but according to a common and transcendental notion — so a person is said to be deprived of the supreme and infinite perfection that a being, or God, is naturally disposed to participate in, and this is called privation outside the genus. In a second way, for the lack of something that something is naturally disposed to have according to its genus — so a mole is called blind because, as an animal, it is capable of sight, and this is called privation in the genus. In a third way, for the lack of something in a proper subject according to species — so a person who does not see is properly said to be deprived of sight, or blind. The first two acceptations are improper and are called negations rather than privations. The third is the proper sense, which is under discussion here.

Note II. Privation and negation are not infrequently confused with one another, but they are distinguished in this: negation exhibits no aptitude or capacity in the subject of which it is said — so a stone is said not to see, because it is in no way capable of sight. Privation properly speaking, however, denotes capacity and suitability in the subject of which it is predicated — in this manner a person deprived of sight is said to be blind, as Augustine suggests (*lib. 3. de lib. arb. cap. 24*). More on this in Logic (*lib. 3. q. 9. q. 6*).

Assertion. Privation is conceded to exist in the nature of things independently of any intellectual operation. So Scotus as cited, and (*2. d. 12. q. 2. §. Ad 1. rationem sub F*) and (*5. Met. with Arist. cap. 22*). First proof: from Sacred Scripture (*Gen. 1*): "Darkness was upon the face of the deep" — that is, privations of light, according to the interpretation of Lyra there. Second proof: from the Fathers — Augustine (*lib. de decem categ. cap. 18*) and (*in imperfecto de gen. ad lit. cap. 5*): "One thing is light, another are those privations of light which God arranged in the contraries called darkness"; Anselm (*lib. de casu Diaboli cap. 41*) and Damascus (*cap. 2. of his Philosophy*). Third: opposites exist on the side of the thing, as is clear with contrary opposites such as heat and cold; but privation and form are opposites, as is evident in the postpredicaments chapter on opposites. Likewise, privation is established as a principle of natural generation (*1. Phys. T. 75, 79*) and as a terminus of change (*5. Phys. T. 7*). Furthermore, privation, as has been said, means nothing other than the absence of form in a suitable subject. But such an absence is sometimes found in the nature of things — night is a privation of light in the air, blindness is a privation of sight in a blind person, deafness is a

privation of hearing in a deaf person, and so with the rest. Therefore privation cannot be denied existence on the side of the thing.

Objection I. Non-being is not on the side of the thing, because non-being is tantamount to nothing; but privation is a non-being (*1. Phys. T. 75 and elsewhere*). Therefore privation is not on the side of the thing. Response: I distinguish the major. Non-being is not on the side of the thing absolutely, as something participating in positive being in the nature of things — I concede. It is not on the side of the thing in some manner, as the terminus from which of a positive being — I deny. For privation is in this manner, as Aristotle indicates (*4. Met. Tit. 2*) and Scotus there, when they count privations and negations among the substances and accidents that stand in relation to them, and which are said to be insofar as they in some way regard those positive beings, as the Doctor notes there.

Objection II. Everything that is, is either a real being or a being of reason. But privation is not a real being, since it is the negation of a real form. Therefore it is a being of reason. Response: the major is insufficient. To it must be added: or it is a privation or negation of a real being. For Aristotle in the passage just cited places privations and negations among beings — which he would not do, Scotus adds in that place, unless negation and non-being possessed being in some manner.

Objection III. Affirmation and negation are treated by logic, which deals with beings of reason, and are acts of reason or intellect. Therefore if negation is a being of reason, so too is privation. Response: if affirmation and negation are taken for active acts of the intellect, they are real and belong to psychology; if they are taken for passive acts, they belong to logic and are beings of reason. But they also belong to privation independently of any intellectual operation — as night is, blindness is, a person is not a stone, a plant is not a lion — as the Doctor suggests (*1. d. 23. q. un. E*) and (*2. d. 12. q. 2. ante G*) and (*Quol. 19. q. de tertio Y*).

Article II. What Privation Is

The Canonist (*1. Phys. q. 10. art. 2*) and the Parisian (*ibid. q. de privatione prop. 2*) report that Thomas the Englishman thinks privation to be a real positive being; but the opposite is defended by Scotus (*1. d. 25. q. un. §. Item arguo H*) and (*in Rep. d. 28. q. 1*), Auriol (*2. d. 2. q. 2. art. 2*), John of Maisières (*1. Phys. q. 13*), Tatar (*ibid. q. 1. dub. 1*), and the rest, who deny that privation is anything real and positive.

Note I. Privation, properly taken, presents two aspects: one in the direct case or formal aspect, which is the absence of form; and another in the oblique case or material aspect, which is the subject apt and suited to receive the form. Through the first, privation and negation agree, because both are an absence of form; through the second, they differ from one another, since negation requires no suitable subject. Hence St. Augustine (*3. de lib. arb. c. 24*) adds: "Blindness in eyes newly born is not a defect, nor can it properly be called blindness" — so an

infant is not called imprudent, because it is not yet capable of prudence. Therefore in these cases there is negation of sight before the ninth day and the appropriate time; but afterward, if deprived of those forms, they are said to be deprived — so that the one is called blind, the other imprudent. And this is what the Doctor signifies (*1. d. 5. q. 2. §. Tertio principalius infra P*) and (*d. 28. q. 2. §. Quantum ad 1. B*) etc.

Note II. Being taken universally, insofar as it abstracts from the positive, the privative, and the negative, is equivocal, as the Canonist (*ibid.*) suggests and the Doctor in (*Rep. 1. d. 42. q. 2*), with whom Antonio Andrea (*4. Met. q. 2. §. Ad argumenta*) and John of Maisières (*1. Phys. ubi supra*) agree, accepting the division of real being into positive, privative, and negative. Hence real being is taken in two ways: in one way, improperly — so privation and negation are called real beings; in another way, properly — and so only positive being is real.

Assertion I. Privation is not a positive being. This is the position of the Doctor in the passages already cited. First proof: from Aristotle (*1. Phys. T. 75*), calling privation a non-being — that is, a non-positive being, as Antonio Andrea explains in the *Met.* passage cited, along with other interpreters. And in (*5. Met. cap. 22*): "Privation is the absence of form in a suitable subject" — as blindness is the privation of sight. But blindness in a blind person formally designates no positive entity. Therefore, according to Aristotle, privation is not a positive being. Second: privative opposites relate to one another such that one is positive and the other privative — as light and darkness, from the postpredicaments chapter on opposites. If privation were a positive being, there would be no opposition between them, for they would be positive, and they would be called habits rather than privation and habit, as privative opposition requires. Third: a created positive being is the terminus and object of a productive and factitive potency and of positive change; but privation is the terminus of corruption and destructive change. Fourth: evil is not a positive being, but the privation of good, as I showed in the Moral treatise (*1. 2. q. 2. art. 3*). But privation is evil, because through it matter contrives mischief — that is, the corruption of the form it possessed. Therefore privation formally presents nothing positive.

Assertion II. Privation is rightly called a privative being. This is the view of Scotus above, especially (*4. Met. with Arist. ibid. T. 2*), where Aristotle affirms that privations and negations are beings. But they are not positive beings, as I proved in the previous assertion; therefore they are privative beings. Hence the Doctor in the cited Reports explicitly says: "Of beings, some are positive, some privative." First proof: being is the participle of the verb of existence "sum, es, est." Privation, however, is like blindness in an eye deprived of sight — "and a blind man is one deprived of sight." For it is valid to say "the blind man exists," therefore "the blind man is an existing thing." But a blind man is not an existing thing except through blindness; and what is existing is a being, since existence is its mode. Therefore it is rightly concluded that privation is a privative being.

Second: the principle of natural generation is a being, because from it a natural composite comes to be. For "from nothing nothing comes to be" is the common maxim of the philosophers (*1. Phys. T. 33, 34*), as I have sufficiently discussed in this book, question I, article VI. Again, privation is the terminus from which of positive change (*5. Phys. T. 7*), as Scotus confirms (*4. d. 43. q. 3*), and it is one of the contrary principles (*1. Phys. T. 66*). Moreover, distinction is a property of being; but privation is distinguished from other principles and from other things that are not privation. Further, darkness, which is the privation of light, truly exists in dark air, and in (*Gen. 1*) is said to have been upon the face of the deep, and in (*Luc. 23*): "Darkness came over the whole earth." Therefore if privation exists and is said to have come to be, it is certainly a being — not a positive one, therefore a privative one, as Arriaga perceives (*disp. 2. sect. 12*).

Someone might say, with Mastri and his associate (*disp. 4. q. 1. art. 1*) following Hurtado (*disp. 3. sect. 12*), that it is self-contradictory for privation to be a real privative being, since a real being is the same as a positive being, which differs from non-being and from a being of reason. Furthermore, one could equally say that illness is a privative health, and sin is a privative justice. On the contrary, there appears rather to be a contradiction in saying that a real privation exists on the side of the thing — as they concede — while denying that it is a real privative being. For what exists in the nature of things independently of any intellectual operation, such as deafness in an ear and blindness in an eye, is a real being. The copula signifies such being as is its predicate, and the predicate is real privative; therefore it signifies real privative being. Hence when one asks whether there is a vacuum, it is equivalent to asking whether there is a place deprived of a body. Furthermore, common usage must be maintained, as the Major testifies (*1. Praedicabilium q. de proprio*). And the customary usage, both among the ancients and among moderns, is to call privations privative beings, as may be seen in Scotus cited, in Fuentes (*q. 3. diff. un. art. 1*), John of Maisières, the Parisian, and countless others. Nor does it help them to append the examples of health and illness, sin and injustice — for these are qualities, as is evident in the chapter on quality, which are positive beings agreeing univocally in the generic notion of quality; therefore one cannot say that illness is a privative health, nor that sin is a privative injustice, since both illness and injustice are positive beings placed in that predicament. Nor does it help what others add with Auriol (*2. d. 2. art. 2*), that it is better to say "form is not present" than "privation is present" — for instance, "light is not present" rather than "privation of light is present." For among everyone, the following locutions are admitted as true: "Night is," "death approaches," "darkness arises." Hence Augustine (*1. contra Manich. cap. 4*) writes: "Where light is not, there is darkness." And Damascus (*2. fid. cap. 7*) adds: "Darkness is not the substance of air, but the privation of light." The reason given is not incongruous: for things are thus understood and expressed as they are on the side of the thing; and such privations exist on the side of the thing — namely, night is the privation of light,

and blindness is the privation of sight. Therefore such expressions and locutions should not be dismissed.

Assertion III. Privation is the absence of form in a suitable subject. So Scotus (*1. d. 5. q. 2. infra P*) and elsewhere. First proof: from Aristotle (*5. Met. cap. 22*), who defines properly-taken privation in just this way, as stated above. Second: that is a correct and fitting definition in which genus and difference are present, or quasi-genus and quasi-difference in those things that cannot be exactly defined, such as privation. But the aforesaid definition has a quasi-genus — namely, absence of form, in which privation and negation agree — and a quasi-difference, indicated by the following words. Therefore it is well formulated. I add that it contains nothing superfluous and nothing deficient, which is required for an exact and genuine definition, as I have insisted not infrequently in the foregoing.

Objection I. Against the first assertion: what is created is a positive being, since it is the terminus of a positive production. But privations are created — as darkness, which is the privation of light, according to that passage (*Isa. 45*): "I, God, who made light and created darkness." Therefore privation is a real positive being. Confirmation: privations invite praise and blessing of the Lord, as is evident in the hymn of the three youths: "O light and darkness, bless the Lord." This therefore is a sign that they are positive beings. Response: I concede the major; I deny the minor. As to the testimony of Isaiah, Augustine responds (*q. 106 of the Old and New Testament*) that by light is to be understood heaven, and by darkness, earth — which is the same as Moses' statement in (*Gen. 1*): "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth." It can also be explained as an improper and metaphorical creation, just as the praise and blessing attributed to them are interpreted metaphorically — which also explains the passage adduced in the confirmation, and that of (*Josh. 24*): "Behold, this stone shall be a witness to you, because it has heard all the words the Lord has spoken."

Objection II. A real positive effect proceeds from a real positive cause and principle; but to be set in motion, to become evil, to be corrupted, and the like are real positive effects proceeding from privation, as is evident from (*1. Phys. Tit. 80, 81*). Therefore privation is a real positive being. Confirmation: privation is perceived by the senses — for sight distinguishes darkness and light (*2. anima Tit. 138*). Therefore privation should not be removed from positive being. Response: I concede the major; I distinguish the minor. Per se — I deny; per accidens — I concede, as Aristotle explains there. The same distinction applies to the confirmation. For sight attains light per se and positively; darkness per accidens and negatively, insofar as it does not perceive light, whose absence is called darkness — just as silence is said to be where there is no sound, nakedness where there is no clothing, and void and emptiness where there is no body, as Augustine explains (*lib. de natura boni c. 16*) and (*contra epist. fundament. cap. 30 and 31 in fine*).

Objection III. What is nothing determines nothing; but privation determines a subject, which is why one sometimes says "the blind man walks" or "the blind man loves" — not because blindness is the reason for walking or loving, but because the subject in which such a privation resides is the subject of that predicate, that is, the subject is determined by that predicate, as the Doctor writes (*1. d. 23. q. un. infra H*). Therefore privation is a positive being.

Confirmation: privative opposites differ from contradictory opposites not by reason of the negation in which they agree as a genus; therefore they differ by reason of the other extreme, which is positive — and therefore privation formally implies the positive. Response: I concede the major; I distinguish the minor. Positively — I deny; privatively — I concede. For privation, beyond the absence of form, connotes a subject suited to receive the form of which it is deprived. Therefore actions are attributed to it by reason of what it connotes, as the Doctor excellently explains in the passage cited. To the confirmation: I say that contradictories differ from privatives in that the latter in one extreme designate the absence of form in a suitable subject — which is properly called privation — while the former designate the absence of form without any capacity of the subject of which they are predicated, as I noted in note I and the Doctor fully explains (*1. d. 28. q. 2. §. Quantum ad 1*).

Objection IV. Against the third assertion: St. Augustine (*lib. de natura et gratia, contra Pelagianos cap. 51*) teaches that through blindness the power of seeing is lost; therefore privation is not the absence of form in a suitable subject, since where there is no power, there is no aptitude. I deny the inference. For there can be aptitude in a subject to receive a form, even if there is no power in it to produce that form — just as in a suitably organized body there is aptitude and capacity to receive a soul, yet no power exists in it to create that soul and infuse it into the body. Or I distinguish the antecedent: the proximate power of seeing is lost — I concede; the remote and radical power — I deny. For this is inseparable from the subject in which it resides, since it is distinguished from it formally only.

Article III. How Many Kinds of Privation There Are

Some, who strip privation of all entity, consistently remove from it all plurality and distinction as well. Others, however, who grant privation some mode of being, concede it a corresponding unity, plurality, and distinction, in proportion to the unity and multiplicity of the opposed forms. For the understanding of this, what I said in the preceding question on the potency of matter (*art. 12*) and on its appetite (*ibid. art. 13*) is in some way helpful. It will now be useful to note a twofold privation: one remote or indeterminate, the other proximate and determinate. This is illustrated by example. Matter can receive in itself all forms other than the one it currently possesses, and since it does not have them, it is said to be deprived of them by a remote privation — since it cannot participate in them without prior dispositions by which it is, as it were, brought near to

them. Therefore it does not look to them proximately, because it looks indifferently and no more to one than to another. But when it is disposed and prepared by suitable qualities for the reception of some particular form, it is said to be brought near to that form and to acquire the proximate and determinate privation of that form rather than of another.

Assertion I. Privation is multiplied in proportion to the multiplication of opposed forms. The Doctor agrees (*2. d. 12. q. 2. §. Ad argumenta F*) and (*Quol. 18. §. Ex isto Y*). First proof: from Aristotle (*1. perih. cap. 5*), where the Philosopher holds that the number of negations is derived from the number of affirmations, which denote the positive forms to which their privations are immediately opposed, as Scotus notes (*2. d. 2. q. 1. §. Hic dicitur*) and (*q. 9. ante M*). Therefore privation is multiplied in proportion to the multiplication of opposed forms. Second: of opposites there is one science and one account (*1. Top. cap. 14*) and (*2. priorum sect. 3. cap. 1*). But privation and form are privative opposites, chapter on opposites. Therefore according to the multiplication of one, the other is multiplied. Third: there is no terminus toward which unless the terminus from which precedes it, as is clear in progressive motion. But privation is the terminus from which of natural change, and form is the terminus toward which; therefore when the latter is multiplied, the former is also multiplied — and so there are as many privations as there are opposed forms.

Assertion II. Privations differ from one another just as the habits or forms to which they are opposed. Scotus teaches this (*2. d. 37. §. Ex ista solutione E*) and (*Quol. 18. §. Ex isto Y*). First proof: that by which something is constituted is the same as that by which it is distinguished, for the constitutive principle and the distinguishing principle are the same (*1. d. 26. q. un.*). But privation is constituted by the absence of form in a subject capable of receiving it (*5. Met. cap. de privatione*). Therefore it is distinguished primarily from the form opposed to it. And just as that form has its quasi-species and individuals — as is evident in the elemental and mixed forms, and in the vegetative, sensitive, and intellective souls — so privation in its own way acquires its species and individuals: thus deafness and blindness differ from one another as quasi-specifically, and this deafness from that deafness, and this blindness from that blindness, as quasi-numerically distinct. Second: a shadow follows an opaque body in relation to the light of the sun or another luminous body; therefore just as a body acquires its specific positive difference, so a shadow has its specific privative difference — and thus this body and this shadow share a numerical difference. Third: a being of reason does not lack its own species and individuals, just as the positive being on which it is founded does not. Likewise, therefore, a privative being, which is privation, is not deprived of its privative species and individuals. I add that opposites are adequate to one another — as is especially evident with contraries — and one is placed in the definition of the other in the oblique case; and these are recognized through and reduced to their positive opposites, as Antonio

Andrea observes with Scotus (*4. Met. q. 2. §. Ad argumenta*). Therefore one must philosophize in like manner regarding the distinction of privations as of forms.

Objection I. Against the first assertion: Aristotle (*1. Phys. Tit. 79*) makes privation one in number with matter. Therefore, according to Aristotle, privation is not multiplied in proportion to the multiplication of forms. Confirmation I: there is one potency numerically in matter for all forms; therefore there is also one privation of all forms. Confirmation II: one relation can be directed toward several terms; therefore also one privation toward several forms. Response: I distinguish and explain the text already cited. Privation and matter are one in number subjectively — I concede; formally and intrinsically — I deny. To Confirmation I: I distinguish the antecedent. In species — I concede; in number — I deny. For there are as many numerically distinct potencies in matter as there are forms receivable in it, as the Doctor teaches (*1. d. 1. q. 1. §. Ad 1. G*). To Confirmation II: I deny the antecedent. For relations are multiplied in proportion to the multiplication of their terms, as I proved in Logic (*lib. 3. q. 6. art. 7*).

Objection II. Many privations can be opposed to just one form — as many kinds of darkness are opposed to the light of the sun, by which not only they but also other kinds opposed to the light of fire and other luminous bodies are dispelled. Therefore it is not necessary for privations to be multiplied in proportion to the multiplication of forms. Confirmation: in moral matters, extreme vices, which are privations of virtue, are opposed to one single habit of virtue — as prodigality and avarice are opposed to liberality. Therefore, analogously, in natural things many privations can be opposed to one form alone; and thus, without form being multiplied, privations can be multiplied. Response: I deny the antecedent, since there are as many kinds of darkness as there are lights opposed to them. For the light of the sun is one thing, that of fire another, and so on with the other luminous things, which differ in species. To the confirmation: I deny the antecedent, for there are several formally distinct virtues because there are several formally distinct objects, and diverse rules and teachings are given about them, as Scotus suggests (*2. d. 17. q. 2*) and (*3. d. 36. q. un.*).

Objection III. Against the second assertion: what differs in species or number is placed in the predicaments, which are a series of genera, species, and singulars; but no privations reside in the predicaments, since these are positive beings, while privations are privative beings. Therefore no specific or numerical distinction is to be sought in them, as in those opposed forms. Response: I distinguish the major. What differs positively — I concede; privatively — I deny. Especially because privations are reduced to the categories in which the habits opposed to them are placed, just as shadows are reduced to the bodies whose shadows they are.

Article IV. Whether Privation Is Distinct from Matter

Earlier philosophers, as Aristotle notes (*1. Phys. T. 79*), make privation and matter one; later philosophers, however, together with the same Aristotle there, distinguish privation from matter.

Note that distinction is a property of being (*4. Met. cap. 1*) and (*5. eiusdem, cap. 9*), and does not extend further than its subject, which is being. Now since being is divided by Scotus (*in Rep. 1. d. 42. q. 2*) into positive and privative, it follows that between real positive beings there is a real positive distinction; and between positive being and privative being there is a real privative or negative distinction, as the Canonist notes (*1. Phys. q. 1. art. 4*), followed by Ruvio (*Tract. 3. de privatione, ad finem q. 3*).

Assertion. Privation is really and negatively distinct from matter. The assertion is twofold and agrees with Scotus (*2. d. 12. q. 1*) and (*4. Met. Tit. 2*) and (*12. eiusdem Tit. 12*), and is explicitly defended by the Canonist (*ubi supra*), Tatar (*ibid. q. 1. dub. 2*), and the Parisian (*q. 1. de privatione, prop. 3. fol. 25*). The first part is proved, first: those of which one remains while the other does not are really distinct, as Scotus explains (*2. d. 1. q. 4. §. contra istam*). But matter always remains, being ungenerable and incorruptible (*1. Phys. T. 82*), while privation departs when form arrives (*ibid. Tit. 60*). Therefore privation really differs from matter. Second: a subject and what is in the subject are really distinguished, as is evident with an accident, which is in a substance, and a soul, which is in a body. But privation is in matter, which is their common subject and that of form. Therefore privation and matter are really distinct. Furthermore, privation is the cause of mischief or corruption of the composite (*1. Phys. T. 81*), and is the terminus from which of generation and a non-being; but matter is a substance, an essential part of the composite, the receptacle of all forms — and these and similar things argue a real distinction between the one and the other. Moreover, if matter possessed all forms, there would be no privation in it; therefore a distinction falls between them, since an evident sign of real distinction is the separation of one from the other. And this is signified by Aristotle in the postpredicaments, where he warns that to be blind and blindness are not the same. For a person is blind, but blindness is the privation of sight. Therefore matter and the privation residing in it are really distinct. The second part is shown against Arretinus (*1. Phys. in annot. q. 21*): between two real positive beings there is a real positive distinction, as between Peter and John; therefore between a positive being — such as matter — and a privative being — such as privation — there intervenes a real privative or negative distinction. Furthermore, they are called privative opposites, taking the denomination from the one extreme that is only privative, even though the other is positive; therefore likewise the distinction between matter and privation is called negative, because privation is a privative or negative being. Moreover, distinction — from what was noted above — is a property of being; therefore, such as the being is, such is the

distinction. But privation is a privative being; therefore between it and matter there intervenes a privative or negative distinction.

Objection I. Privation and matter are distinguished by the same distinction as form and matter; but the latter differ from one another by reason alone. Therefore so do the former. The major holds by parity, because each is a distinct principle receivable in matter. The minor is supported by the authority of the Philosopher (*1. Phys. T. 60*), who says that form and matter differ by reason. Response: I concede the major; I deny the minor. As to the testimony of Aristotle, I say it must be interpreted as meaning by "reason" the essence and definition, not merely the operation of the intellect, as he indicates (*ibid. T. 29*) and in the antepredicaments, where he plainly teaches that the reason of univocals is the same — that is, their essence and quiddity.

Objection II. Distinction is a property of being and a real relation, as I noted above; but privation is not a real being. Therefore between it and matter there is no real distinction. Response: I concede the major; I distinguish the minor. It is not a real positive being — I concede; it is not a real privative being — I deny. Therefore between matter and privation there falls a real negative distinction.

Objection III. By no power, not even by God's absolute power, can matter exist without privation, since matter cannot receive in itself all possible forms — especially those that are simultaneously incompatible — therefore between them there is no real distinction, which falls between what can be separated from one another at least by divine power. Response: even if this holds collectively, it does not hold distributively — just as integral parts are really distinct from one another, and each can be individually separated from the others, even if not all simultaneously, since otherwise the whole constituted from them would be destroyed. Or one may say this arises not from the side of matter, which is capable of all things as far as it itself is concerned, but from the side of the simultaneous incompatibility of those forms, as the Doctor hints (*2. d. 12. q. 1. F*). Someone might say: matter, setting aside everything that is not itself, is deprived of form; therefore in its own essence it includes privation, and consequently privation does not differ from matter. Response: I distinguish the antecedent with the Canonist cited: formally — I deny; fundamentally — I concede. Just as being precisely and formally is neither finite nor infinite, but fundamentally and radically it is, above all because being is the foundation and origin from which finitude and infinity proceed — so matter in itself and in its essence does not formally include privation, yet by reason of the appetite it has for forms it is the root and foundation from which privation emanates, and in which it is grounded and resides.

Article V. Whether Privation Is Truly a Principle of Natural Generation, and in What Sense

Plato denies this, according to Aristotle (*1. Phys. Tit. 80*), from whom the Nominalists do not appear to depart, according to the Parisian (*q. 1. de privatione fol. 24*), who make privation and matter into one principle alone. Aristotle affirms it in the passage just cited, along with his commentators there, establishing privation as a second principle of natural change and distinguishing it from matter and form, which are the remaining principles of the same natural generation.

Note I. Recall from what has been said that privation is indeed a principle of things in their becoming, but not in their being already made. That is to say: it is a principle of generation as a terminus from which and by way of origin, as Tatar rightly explains (*1. Phys. cap. 3. q. 1. dub. 1*). It is not, however, a principle of composition, since only matter and form enter into the composition of the whole as its essential and quidditative parts. Furthermore, it must not be passed over that "principle" has a wider extension than "cause." For a cause has influence upon an effect, but it is not necessary that a principle furnish influence upon what is principiated — it suffices that it be prior to what proceeds from it; so that the precise notion of a principle is to be prior to that of which it is the principle, as is clear of the point that initiates a line, contributing nothing to it, and of the terminus from which of a motion, which is its principle while contributing nothing to the motion itself.

Note II. From Scotus (*2. d. 1. q. 2. §. Respondeo Ad A*), priority is twofold: of duration and of nature. Priority of duration belongs to what precedes another in time, as Adam is prior in time to Abel. Priority of nature is twofold: positive and negative. The positive priority is that by which one thing precedes another in act and is placed first in the order of things — as animal is positively prior in nature to rational, and rational is prior to risible, and in general a cause is prior to its effect. The negative priority is that which belongs to what would truly have preceded another, had it not been impeded by an agent — as at the beginning of the world, privation would have been in matter before form, had not God co-produced and co-created form in it. The Doctor says the same (*q. 3. §. Tenentes autem H*) and (*in Rep. q. 3. §. Ad q. dico*) and (*q. 4. §. prima istarum in solutione 3*).

Note III. From the same Doctor (*3. d. 2. q. 3. §. Ad rationes E*) and (*d. 7. q. 2. §. Ad argumenta E*) and more clearly (*in Rep. 3. d. 3. q. 3. in fine*), change is taken in two ways: broadly and strictly. In the first way, it is taken for any transition of a thing whatsoever — so creation is called a change (*2. d. 1. q. 5. §. Secundum T*) and (*4. d. 10. q. 1. §. Quantum G*) — the new presence of Christ's body in the Eucharist is called a change, and (*1. d. 39. §. Ad 1. argumentum 3. q. 5*) progression from one contradictory to another is also called a change. In the second way, strictly, it is taken for a transition from the privation of form in matter to the form itself — so matter is changed because it goes from not having form to having it, and is otherwise now than before, as the proper notion of change given by Aristotle (*5. Phys. T. 7*) and accepted by Scotus in the places cited and explained by Lychetus

(*ibid.*) and (2. d. 2. q. §. *Respondeo ad 1. contra*) demands. Therefore change properly requires that privation temporally precede form in matter, and that form's arrival cause privation's recession, and that matter be changed from privation of form to form. Since two privative opposites cannot simultaneously be in the same subject, it follows that privation is first and form is afterward, as the Doctor says (3. d. 7. q. 2. E) and (4. d. 43. q. 5. §. *De tertio H*), and Bassolis agrees (3. d. 7. q. un. q. *Ad 1. in oppositum*). By this twofold acceptance of change, Mastri and Poncius can be brought into harmony. For Mastri (*disp. 4. q. 3*) holds that privation is a principle of natural generation insofar as it temporally precedes form in matter; while Poncius (*q. 1. de privatione disp. 34*) holds it sufficient that privation precede by nature, if not positively, at least negatively. They can be reconciled, I say, if we hold that Poncius is speaking of change taken improperly — that is, generation as production — in which sense privation is required only to precede by nature privatively or negatively, as when the generation of fire had been from eternity, and as in the generation of things at the beginning of the world, in which forms of the heavens, elements, and mixed things were produced simultaneously in time with matter; and as in the worm generated through the corruption of the Eucharist, a new matter with form produced by God in an instant in which privation precedes only by nature. And this is all that is proved by the arguments that Poncius accumulates there. Mastri, however, speaks of change taken properly, and of generation as change, not merely as production, as he himself explains there. Nor do the authorities and reasons he accumulates prove anything else. For proper change does not occur unless the subject is otherwise now than before, through the reception of a new form of which it was previously lacking. And so the dispute seems to be one over a name rather than a thing, in which the common usage of authors is to be maintained, as I noted elsewhere.

Assertion I. Privation is a per se principle of natural generation. So Aristotle (1. *Phys. T. 67, 79*) and (12. *Met. T. 12, 22*), and Scotus in the commentary there. First proof: a per se principle of something is that from which something arises and begins, as is clear from note I above. But natural generation arises from non-being, which is privation — as a horse comes from what is not a horse, and a human from what is not human, as the Philosopher argues against the ancients in the passage cited. Therefore privation is a per se principle of natural generation. Second: natural change requires two termini — a terminus from which and a terminus toward which; the first is where it begins, the second where it ends. But the former is privation (5. *Phys. T. 7*), and the latter is form. Third: when air passes from darkness to light, the principle and terminus from which is not the air, because it is the subject; nor is it the form to be expelled, because the agent does not per se intend to expel it, but to introduce a new form — and if the preceding form were to persist, no new generation would arise from it. Therefore the terminus from which, or the principle, is established to be darkness, which is the privation of light.

Someone might say privation is a per accidens principle (*1. Phys. Tit. 81*). The Doctor responds in the commentary (*12. Met. T. 12*) that privation is a per accidens principle of the thing generated, because it neither exists nor remains in it; but it is a per se principle of generation, because generation begins from it, as a line from a point and local motion from its terminus from which.

Assertion II. Privation temporally precedes form in matter before that form is drawn or introduced from it by generation. So the Doctor (*3. d. 7. q. 2. E*) and (*4. d. 43. q. 5. H*) after Aristotle (*1. Phys. T. 43, 44*). First proof: a natural agent does not act instantaneously but successively, since it is of finite and limited power. For it first disposes and prepares the subject with prior and suitable qualities, then expels the former form so as to introduce a new form into the same subject — and this entire progression takes place in time. For there is a transition from privation to form; therefore privation in matter temporally precedes form. Second: natural generation is a change between opposed termini, of which one is called privation and the other habit or form. But these termini cannot simultaneously coexist in the same subject. It is impossible that non-form, or privation, and the form that is opposed to privation, should simultaneously be in the same subject — just as it is impossible for contradictories to be simultaneously in the same subject and said of the same subject, so that the same thing is and is not at the same time. And privative opposites repugn one another as much as contradictories do, although the latter are wider and more extensive than the former, as the Doctor rightly notes (*in Rep. 2. d. 1. q. 6. in fine*).

Someone might say that privation naturally precedes form, so that in the first instant of nature there is privation, and in the second instant of nature there is form — both, however, at the same and identical moment of time. And this becomes especially clear because generation is an instantaneous change, in which way there is no repugnance or contradiction between the aforesaid opposites, since they are distinct signs of nature, which suffice to remove contradiction. On the contrary: such signs of nature, even if sufficient for conceiving and prescinding one from another, are not sufficient for dividing them. For I can conceive of the sun without light and a human without risibility; but I cannot rightly separate the sun from light and a human from risibility, nor deny that the sun is luminous and a human risible; nor can I simultaneously say in the same instant of time that the sun is not luminous and is luminous, that a human is not risible and is risible, because these mutually contradict one another. Analogously in our matter: in the same instant of time, form and its privation cannot coexist, otherwise the same form would simultaneously be with its privation and not be — and so contradictories would coexist, as the Doctor argues (*3. d. 3. q. 1. E*). Furthermore, generation is called instantaneous when understood only as the introduction of form into matter, not as the entire progression required for it, as I showed in the book on generation. Third: one must philosophize in nearly the same way about artificial form and its privation as about natural form and its privation, as Aristotle repeatedly notes, especially

(1. *Phys. Tit.* 69) and (12. *Met. Tit.* 12). But the privation of artificial form in a subject precedes the form itself. For before the form of Mercury is fashioned from wood, in the wood itself the absence of that form precedes — and previously it was true to say that the wood does not have the aforesaid figure and form. Therefore, by analogy, privation preexists in matter before the agent draws from it the form opposed to that privation; and consequently privative opposites are successively grounded in matter, and in generation privation is temporally prior to form.

Assertion III. Privation initiates after the manner of a terminus from which and by way of origin — which others call "through its own non-being." This is drawn from Scotus (12. *Met. in com. Tit.* 11 and 12) and (2. *d. 1. §. Secundum T*) and (4. *d. 11. q. 1. §. Dico ergo E*). First proof: privation initiates when form is drawn from the potency of matter, because generation then begins, and generation cannot be initiated without a principle. But when form is drawn from the potency of matter, privation no longer exists, because it yields to the arriving form, as darkness flees when light comes. Therefore privation initiates by way of origin, or through its own non-being. Second: privative opposites do not coexist in the same subject simultaneously — for one is the negation of the other in a suitable subject. But when generation arises through the power of an extrinsic agent, privation does not remain, because form, with which it cannot coexist, arrives; and when form arrives, privation recedes — just as the terminus from which perishes in motion through the acquisition of the terminus toward which, to which the former is opposed. Third: the terminus from which of creation — which is nothing, or negation outside the genus — when a thing is created does not exist, because nothing and a thing cannot simultaneously be. Therefore, just as when the creation of a thing begins its negation no longer exists, so when a thing is generated, privation escapes, driven out by its contrary, which is form — and thus privation is established as a principle of generation through its own non-being and by way of origin.

Objection I. Against the first assertion: principles are those from which all natural things come to be (1. *Phys. T.* 42). But nothing comes to be from privation, because privation is a non-being (*ibid. Tit.* 75), and from non-being nothing comes to be, since non-being is nothing, and "from nothing nothing comes to be" is the common maxim of the philosophers there (*Tit.* 33). Therefore privation is not a principle of natural generation. Confirmation I: a principle is more noble than what is principiated, just as a cause is nobler than its effect (3. *anima T.* 19), as cited by the Doctor (1. *d. 3. q. 7*) and (4. *d. 44. q. 2*). But privation is not more excellent than the composite, which is the principiated, since the composite is a real positive being while privation is a real privative being. Confirmation II: a principle produces and has influence upon what is principiated, which is produced by it. But privation does not produce but corrupts, does not construct but destroys what is produced, since it is the cause of corruption of natural things (1. *Phys. T.* 81). Therefore privation is not to be

numbered among the principles. Response: I concede the major; I distinguish the minor. As the terminus from which of generation — I deny; as an intrinsic part of composition — I concede. For just as the terminus from which of creation is nothing or negation outside the genus, so the terminus from which of natural generation is privation or negation in the genus; and something comes to be from privation as from a terminus from which, physically. But from negation outside the genus or from nothing, nothing comes to be naturally, as I explained at length (*lib. 2. q. 1. art. 6*). To Confirmation I: I distinguish the major. Absolutely and universally — I deny; in a qualified and indefinite sense — I concede. As matter, which causes the composite partially, is nobler in a qualified sense and in the notion of a principle — but absolutely and simply, the composite is more excellent than it, as a whole is more excellent than its part. To Confirmation II: I distinguish the major. Principle of composition and of being already made — I concede; principle of generation and of becoming, which is what privation is — I deny. Just as I explained of the point that is the principle of a line while contributing nothing to the line itself, in note I. To the minor: I say, with Aristotle there and Scotus (*2. d. 12. q. 1. I*), that this is per accidens — not with respect to the thing to be produced, of which privation is the principle, but with respect to the thing produced, of which it has no character of principle.

Objection II. Against the second assertion: Aristotle (*7. Phys. T. 1*), (*5. eiusdem*), and also (*1. Caeli T. 103*) establishes that motion, time, and other created things have existed from eternity. And Scotus (*2. d. 1. q. 3*) defends as a problem that the world could have been created by God from eternity. On that hypothesis, the generations of things would have existed from eternity. But in eternal things there is no before or after in duration. Therefore in matter, privation would not have preceded form — and thus for generation to occur, it is not necessary that privation temporally precede form. Confirmation: generation is a momentary change, just as illumination is (*2. d. 2. q. 9. sub L*). But in it there are always required two termini — from which and toward which — without any priority or posteriority of duration, just as a relation requires two extremes naturally simultaneously existing, from which it emerges. Therefore privation need not preexist before form. Response: even if in this and certain other matters the Philosopher erred, nonetheless on that hypothesis the production or generation would not be a proper change but an improper one. Therefore it does not require privation to precede positively but only negatively, as was made clear with Scotus in note III above. By the same reasoning the confirmation is answered: generation, insofar as it is not properly a change but only a production, does not require privation preceding in matter positively but only negatively. Therefore between privation and form to be received in matter no temporal interval intervenes.

Objection III. Against the third assertion: action is not without an agent, therefore neither is initiation without a principle and initiator. Therefore, just as

a cause in act has its effect in act (*2. Phys. T. 38*), so a principle in act has what is principiated in act and vice versa; therefore if privation initiates, it initiates through its own actual being. Confirmation I: privation initiates when it is expelled by form; but at that point privation exists, because what is expelled and the expelling thing must simultaneously exist. Confirmation II: privation is deemed a principle as the terminus from which of generation; but the terminus from which exists when something proceeds from it, as is clear of one who travels from one city to another. Confirmation III: from (*4. Met. T. 22*), that which casts away retains something of what is cast away; likewise, therefore, when privation is cast away, something of it remains which exists, and therefore it initiates through its own existing being. Response: the argument concludes only about a principle that has real influence upon what is principiated, and about a principle that is intrinsic, constitutive, and permanent in what is principiated — but not about a principle that causes nothing in what is principiated, that is extrinsic, that departs and recedes from the subject and the principiated, as the Canonist suggests (*1. Phys. q. 10. art. 3*), after Aristotle (*1. Phys. T. 68, 60, 61*). To Confirmation I: I say this holds in the case of an effective collision and conflict of contrary opposites, as with heat and cold which mutually expel one another from the same subject — but not with privative opposites, of which one is said to expel the other through its own being posited: so when form is posited in matter, privation departs — just as when light comes, darkness is driven out, not by any efficient action of light against darkness, but by the sole position and presence of light, by which darkness is expelled, having been immediately before that light in the air. To Confirmation II: I concede the major; I distinguish the minor. About a terminus from which that remains, as illustrated in the example — I concede; about a terminus from which that departs and recedes, as privation does — I deny. And this is clear from night, which vanishes as day approaches. To Confirmation III: I say with Scotus in the commentary there that this passage is to be understood of things that are moved and changed, of which some parts persist — as matter — and others cease to be — as form. Or of things capable of intension and remission, of which some parts grow and others diminish — from which arose the opinion of Heraclitus and others who held that all sensible things are in continuous motion.

Article VI. Whether There Is a Return from Privation to Habit

Aristotle in the postpredicaments, chapter on opposites, pronounces this saying, frequent on the lips of the Peripatetics: "from privation to habit there is no return." This is variously explained and illustrated by various interpreters, as may be seen in the Coimbricans (*ibid. q. un. art. 5*). Bassolis however notes (*4. d. 43. q. 2. art. 2*) that this was proved by the Philosopher but not demonstrated, since it is proposed not universally but indefinitely, as Antonio Andrea in the exposition of that passage and Scotus (*8. Met. in cap. 5*) indicate. Just as "principles are contraries" (*1. Phys. T. 41, 42*) is indefinite — meaning not all

principles are contraries, such as matter which receives contraries, but form and privation (*ibid.* T. 67) — so likewise in our matter, sometimes there is a return from privation to habit, as from darkness to light; and sometimes there is not, as from death to life. Therefore the aforesaid maxim is not universally true.

To clarify in which cases it is true and in which it is false, I observe with Scotus in the passage cited and (*q. 41. praedicam.*) that the form which is opposed to privation either proceeds from an intrinsic principle and is innate and congenital to the thing — as sight in a human, the privation of which is blindness — and in this and similar cases the Philosopher's saying is true, that from privation to habit there is no return, which is illustrated by the cited example of blindness and sight, and of baldness and hair, in which cases there is no recovery. Or the form arises from an extrinsic principle — as light from the sun in the air — in which way dark air becomes luminous and passes from privation to habit through the illuminating action of the sun. And such a return is possible: the reason is that an extrinsic agent, when it ceases to operate in a subject capable of the form induced by it, deprives the subject of that form, and the subject is said to be deprived. But if the same agent again approaches and operates upon the said subject, it restores the same form to it — in this way there is a return from privation to habit, as from darkness to light. In the former cases, however, the contrary occurs: because in the catalogue of natural things, no agent is found capable of repairing in a subject a form once lost there, as no one can restore to a person deprived of life the life of which he has been stripped. Therefore in these cases, from privation to habit there is no return. Others add — among whom is Antonio Andrea — that the latter privations deprive subjects of forms both actually and potentially in which they exist, whereas the former deprive them of forms only actually; therefore to the latter recovery is impossible by the forces of nature, while to the former it is possible.

I further note a twofold return: immediate and mediate. The first is when one thing is turned by a single change into what it was previously — as when water becomes air and immediately from air water returns; and when waking becomes sleep and from sleep waking returns. The second is when, through many changes of things, what previously existed returns — as (*2. Post. cap. 7. T. 15*): from rain falling on the earth vapors arise, from vapors clouds are born, and from clouds rain returns. The same is suggested by Augustine (*6. de Genesi ad lit. cap. 13*) and (*lib. de spiritu et anima cap. 15*), and Scotus in the Met. passage cited. But each kind of return is not to the same thing in number, but to the same in species (*2. de gen. T. 70. in fine*). By divine power, however, a return to the same thing in number is possible — (*Ioan. 11*): Lazarus, who had been dead, came back to life at the voice of Christ the Lord calling him: "Lazarus, come forth."

Against the teaching just presented, certain authors such as the Coimbricans cited above object: first, coldness is a form congenital and co-created with water; but if it is removed from water, when left to itself the coldness returns to it, as is

clear with heated water, which afterward returns to its original coldness. Therefore the said teaching is not true. Granted the major. To the minor: I say that heated water is actually deprived of coldness, but not potentially. Therefore when left to itself and with heat expelled, it returns to its native coldness. Hence the teaching in question holds for privation that deprives both actually and potentially, but not for privation that deprives only actually. For this reason the Philosopher uses the example of blindness, which deprives a person of sight both actually and potentially, as Augustine explicitly teaches (*l. de natura et gratia, contra Pelagianos c. 51*): "through blindness the power of seeing is lost."

Second objection: privation and form are two principles of natural change (*1. Phys. T. 67*), and hence also two termini of the same (*5. Phys. T. 7*). The terminus from which is privation, and the terminus toward which is form. Therefore since there is a change to these termini, it follows that there can be a return from privation to habit. Response: that proposition is not universal but indefinite, as I noted just above at the beginning of this article. Therefore in some cases it is accepted, in others rejected, as I made clear with the examples cited above, confirmed by authority and reason.

Third objection: one of two contraries includes privatively the opposite of the other (*10. Met. T. 15, 16*). But between contraries there is a change, as from heat to cold and vice versa; therefore also between privative opposites. Response: in the present theme and proposition under discussion, the Philosopher is speaking of a perfect privation, which belongs to one extreme in relation to the other extreme that is form — not of an imperfect privation, which belongs to one imperfect contrary, such as black, which in relation to white is said to be deprived of some perfection that white possesses, as Scotus rightly notes in the proximate *Met.* passage cited. Or one may say that this does not occur precisely by reason of privation but by reason of the contrary joined to it. Or one may deny the parity. For the change of contraries always occurs with motion properly so called and in time; but not always so with privative opposites, as is clear with illumination, which occurs in an instant (*2. anima T. 70*).

Question IV. On Form

Form occupies the third place among the principles. For although it is prior in order of dignity, it is nonetheless posterior in order of generation to privation. For since privation and form are contraries, they consequently require and presuppose their common subject — matter, which is the first principle; then follows privation, the second principle, which is the terminus from which of generation; and afterward form, the third principle, which is the terminus toward which of the same — its formal and principal terminus — about which it now remains to speak last.

Article I. Whether There Is a Substantial Form

Among the ancient philosophers, hardly any are found who acknowledge substantial form, as is clear from (*1. Met. sum. 2. cap. 1*). After Aristotle, however, the affirmative position so prevailed in the schools regarding substantial form that it is not an uncertain and non-evident dogma — indeed, the opposite is deemed erroneous, as Scotus writes (*in com. 7. Met. sum. 2. cap. 1*).

Note I. Because of the diverse and excellent functions form performs, it receives many names and epithets. First, it is called "one," because it draws indifferent and indeterminate matter to a determinate and fixed species, and chiefly constitutes what is one per se — namely the composite. Then it is called "species," both because it specifies matter and because it renders it beautiful and fair; for this reason Augustine writes that species and form coincide (*lib. de vera religione cap. 18*). And Aristotle had not unreasonably prefaced this: "Matter desires form as the ugly desires the beautiful" (*1. Phys. T. 81*). Furthermore, it is called "ratio," because from it especially the definition of natural things is derived; in this sense it is sometimes also called "what a thing is" and "quiddity." Besides, it is called "exemplar, light, character, act, entelechy, end, terminus," and the like — by which it is wondrously adorned and illustrated.

Note II. Form is divided into natural and artificial (*1. Phys. T. 69*): the latter is produced by art, while the former is drawn by nature from the potency of matter. Natural form is subdivided into substantial and accidental (*7. Met. Tit. 7 and elsewhere*), as Scotus expresses (*4. d. 11. q. 3. §. Alij Y. AA*). The former is a being simply and a primary act that together with matter constitutes what is one per se; the latter is a being in a qualified sense and a secondary act that together with its subject makes what is one per accidens. Furthermore, substantial form is subdivided into assisting and informing, as Aristotle indicates (*1. de partibus cap. 1*): the assisting form moves its subject from without by directing it, as a sailor steers a ship and a charioteer a chariot. The informing form moves from within the subject in which it exists, as the soul moves the body it informs. Finally, the informing form is divided into one conjoined with and inseparable from matter — as the form of a horse — and one separable from matter — as the rational soul, of which the Philosopher makes mention (*3. anima T. 19*).

Assertion. Substantial form exists. So Scotus as cited, after Aristotle (*1. Phys. T. 65*) and frequently elsewhere. First proof: from matter and form as two substantial parts there coalesces what is one per se substantially — namely the whole. Therefore form is a partial substance. The antecedent is clear from (*8. Met. T. 2*); the consequent holds from (*1. Phys. T. 51*): "From non-substance no substance comes to be" — that is, as intrinsic parts and principles constituting what is one per se, the substantial composite. But if every form were an accident, it would produce what is one per accidens — since from a subject and an accident what is one per accidens arises (*7. Met. Tit. 16*). Second: natural things differ in species from one another — as a human and a brute. But this specific difference is not derived from matter, which is common to both; therefore it is

derived from form, which is certainly a substance just as matter is — indeed, substance is more properly derived from it (*7. Met. Tit. S*), and it is more "nature" (*2. Phys. Tit. 12*). Third: substantial changes occur — as fire is transformed into air, air into water, and so with the rest; and perpetual substantial generations are observed. "The sun and the human generate the human" (*2. Phys. T. 26*). And there are the continuous corruptions of sublunary things, especially at the sun's retreat, as is clear with herbs, plants, and animals generated from putrid matter. But these do not occur without the production of new substantial forms and the perishing of the old ones. For since matter is ungenerated and incorrupt (*1. Phys. T. 82*) and the substantial whole is produced — certainly the substantial whole is not produced anew unless some substantial part of it is produced, namely form, which passes from non-being to being. Furthermore: diverse operations proceeding from diverse agents argue for their diverse substantial forms — for forms are known chiefly through their sensible operations, as Scotus teaches (*7. Met. q. 6. ad finem*) and (*q. 20. §. contra movens*). For just as matter becomes known to us through change, so form becomes known through operation. Someone might say: to save all this, accidental forms suffice. For it is clear that fire heats through heat, and water cools through coldness, which are accidental forms. Therefore no argument compels us to introduce substantial form into the schools. On the contrary: fire ignites not through heat — since through heat it only heats — but through an ignitive principle, which is its substantial form. Likewise water produces water, not coldness which is an accident, but through its own substantial form. For if water is heated and boils and loses its coldness, when left to itself it returns to its native coldness — not through coldness which was removed by the heat residing in it, nor through matter which is passive; therefore through an intrinsic principle, which is its substantial form. Finally, it has been established by faith in the Council of the Lateran under Leo X (*sess. 8*) and in Vienne under Clement V, as is read in the Clementine constitution on the supreme Trinity (§. 2), that the rational soul is the substantial form of a human. Therefore the same must be affirmed of the remaining souls and forms, both of elements and of mixed things.

Objection I. The motives of the ancient philosophers, touched on by Aristotle (*1. Met. sum. 2. cap. 1*) and explicitly treated by the subtle Doctor there in the commentary, by which they were moved to deny substantial form and to admit only one primary principle of all natural things, which is matter, are: first, matter is that from which all natural things come to be; second, all things are resolved into matter; third, from it per se and primarily all things come to be; fourth, matter alone remains while the others begin and cease to be. Therefore, besides matter, there is no substance that serves as a principle of natural things, and if there is any form, it is accidental. Response: the aforesaid arguments show that matter is the first principle of natural things, the primary subject of forms, that it enters into their essence, that they are at last resolved into it, and that it endures perpetually. All this we indeed admit. But we reject the claim that

it is the sole substantial principle, and we establish a substantial form from which, together with matter, the substantial whole coalesces as from intrinsic and essential parts.

Objection II. Aristotle (*2. de gen. cap. 7, 8*) writes that the forms of the elements are the primary qualities, which are accidental forms. Therefore the same must be affirmed of the forms of mixed things, since the reasoning is equally valid in both cases. Confirmation: the same Philosopher frequently compares natural things with artificial ones, as is clear (*1. Phys. Tit. 69*), (*2. eiusdem, Tit. 35*), (*7. Met. T. 26*), and (*8. eiusdem T. 15*). But the forms of artificial things are accidental; therefore so also are those of natural things. Response: the Philosopher speaks there by circumlocution, taking the qualities or properties of elements for their substantial forms, because the latter are hidden from us while the former are manifest. The same is done in (*5. Met. Tit. 18*), where quantity is defined through divisibility, which is its property. To the confirmation: I say the parity consists in this, that just as an artisan draws artificial forms from a preexisting and presupposed subject, so a natural agent draws natural forms from the potency of matter. In the rest there is a disparity — especially because natural forms are substances, while artificial ones are accidents, as will be more clearly apparent in the following book.

Objection III. Every substance exists and subsists per se. For this term "substance" is derived from subsisting per se, as I said in the Epitome (*dia. lib. 1. q. 4. art. 3. ante n. 10*). But a form drawn from the potency of matter does not exist or subsist per se, because it depends upon matter both in its becoming and in its being, as is clear from the soul of a dog, a lion, and the rest. Therefore no substantial form is found. Confirmation: substance is not in a subject, as Aristotle teaches in the antepredicaments. But every form is in a subject — namely in matter, which is its primary subject (*1. Phys. T. 82*). Therefore no substantial form exists. Response: I concede the major; I distinguish the minor. Actually — I concede; potentially — I deny. For even though a form drawn from the potency of matter actually enjoys the company of the matter that is its partner, it can nonetheless by divine power be separated from it and, thus separated, exist by itself, as Scotus teaches (*2. d. 12. q. 2. in fine*). To the confirmation: I concede the major; I distinguish the minor. Through inherence — I deny; through information, as a part exists in its counterpart — I concede. As is clear from second and universal substances, which are in first and singular substances through inexistence, not through inherence, which belongs to accidents.

Article II. What Form Is

There is not one definition of form held by all. Plato defines it thus: "Form is the image of a divine exemplar impressed upon things." The Arabs: "A participation of the first act, or of God, impressed upon things." Porretan in the book of the Six Principles, cap. I: "Form is what is contingent to composition, consisting of

simple and invariable essence." Aristotle (*2. Phys. Tit. 28*): "Form is the account of quiddity and essence." The Complutensians (*dispositione 4. Phys. q. 1*): "Form is the first act of a body." Others, more commonly and accurately: "Form is the primary act of matter, constituting with it what is one per se." This is drawn from the Doctor (*4. d. 11. q. 3. Y*), and its individual elements are explained. It is called "act" because of matter, which is potency. "Primary" is added to distinguish it from accidental form, which is a secondary act. It is located "of matter" — if it does not presuppose another subordinate form, as the form of an element; but if it does presuppose another form, even in relation to a non-subordinate form, it also holds the role of matter — as the soul, which presupposes the form of corporeity, in relation to which it is an act; hence it is defined as "the act of an organic body" (*2. anima T. 6*). The remaining words are added to distinguish it from the accidental composite, which is one per accidens. The definition of form thus explained is easy to prove by the common and ordinary method — it clearly possesses a genus, which is "act," and a difference, indicated by the subsequent parts; and it contains nothing superfluous and nothing deficient, as a good and fitting definition requires, as Porretan notes in his definition cited above.

Objection I. An absolute being is not defined by a relative one, since each is of a distinct genus. Therefore, since form is an absolute being, it is badly defined through its relation to matter, as is done in the aforesaid definition. Response: I distinguish the antecedent. In the direct case — I concede; in the oblique — I deny. So too an accident is defined by its relation to the substance in which it is grounded, science by its relation to the knowable, and the soul by its relation to the body. Especially because the said definition is not quidditival but descriptive, as Fuentes notes above others (*1. Phys. q. 4. diff. 1. art. 2. n. 7*).

Objection II. What is simple cannot be defined, because a definition consists of parts corresponding to the parts of the defined (*7. Met. T. 33*). But form is simple and a part ordered toward constituting the whole. Therefore no definition of it is to be given. Response: I distinguish the major. By an exact and complete definition — I concede; by an incomplete and rough one — I deny. Especially because form, even if it is simple with the simplicity opposed to physical composition, is nonetheless not simple with the simplicity opposed to metaphysical composition — since it is in the predicament of substance and coalesces from what is quasi-genus and partial difference, being an incomplete and partial substance.

Objection III. A fitting definition does not belong to anything other than the defined. But the aforesaid definition of form belongs to God, who is a first and simple act. Therefore that definition is incongruous. Response: I concede the major; I deny the minor. For God is a pure act composable with nothing, whether physically or metaphysically, and is supremely simple with a simplicity opposed to all composition.

Article III. Whether Form Is Newly Produced in Matter

The Parisians (*Ioannes de Magistris 1. Phys. c. 9. q. 12. art. 3*) and Durandus (*2. d. 18. q. 2*) enumerate three principal classes of ancient philosophers disagreeing among themselves about the origin and production of form, of which two are extremes and the third is in the middle. The first is that of Anaxagoras and his followers, who held that forms proceed from within, are all actually in matter, are contained as if in its bosom — though hidden and confused — and that the natural agent brings them to light, distinguishes and manifests them by its power, like silver immersed in mud, which by the artist's cleansing appears, shines, and gleams. The second is that of Plato in the *Phaedo* and his disciples, who held that forms proceed from without, or from ideas, as universal efficient causes of singular sublunary things, really separated from them. Avicenna adds (*1. suff. cap. 10*) that forms come from a certain intelligence, which he calls the giver of forms. The third consists in a middle position, which belongs to Aristotle and all the Peripatetics, who teach that forms are partly from within and partly from without — that is, forms do not preexist in act in matter before generation, but are contained only in its potency, from which they are drawn by the power of natural agents.

Note I. An agent is divided into equivocal, which is of a different nature than the effect it produces — as the sun is an equivocal cause of the generation of a human (*2. Phys. T. 26*) — and univocal, which shares the same nature and species as the effect it produces. This is further divided into an immediate agent, which immediately attains the effect — as fire immediately generates fire — and a mediate agent, which generates an effect by means of seed severed from itself, as a human generates a human by means of seed.

Note II. From Tatar (*1. de gen. q. 1. Scibili 1*), between creation and generation the following distinction is to be noted. Creation is the production from nothing — that is, from no presupposed subject — so that the terminus from which of creation is nothing, that is the negation of a being. Generation is the production of a thing from preexisting matter, or from a presupposed subject, so that the terminus from which of generation is the privation of the form that is introduced or drawn from the potency of matter. But "to be drawn from the potency of matter" means nothing other than that the form, in its becoming and in its being, depends upon matter, as will be made clear in the next article.

Assertion I. Forms do not proceed from within, as Anaxagoras and his followers hold. This is defended by the Doctors in the commentary on Aristotle (*1. Met. T. 16. sum. 3. cap. 2*) and (*7. eiusdem T. 28*), and has already been proved in article XVIII, question II, of this book. I judge nothing needs to be added for its corroboration, especially since it is an outdated, routed, and obsolete opinion.

Assertion II. Nor do forms proceed entirely from without, as the Platonists hold. This is given by the Doctors (*1. post. q. 3. §. ad quest.*) and rejected by us in Logic

(1. 2. q. 1. art. 3) regarding the ideas that Plato established as the universal efficient causes of singular things — if what Aristotle ascribes to him throughout his writings is true, some of which I cited in the passage referred to. As regards the giver of forms invented by Avicenna, it is condemned as an erroneous opinion by the University of Paris (*cap. 7 of the collection that precedes the first Sentences of the Seraphic Bonaventure*), and Trombetta testifies (12. Met. q. 6). Furthermore, a univocal natural agent generates an effect similar to itself (7. Met. cap. 7, 8) — as fire generates fire and a human generates a human. Therefore the forms of natural things are produced not by an intelligence but by a natural agent. And more to the point, because no intelligence is capable of producing a substance, as Scotus proves (4. d. 1. q. 1. §. *Ista ergo M*) and (§. *Secunda Y*). The principal reason is that an angel acts through intellect and will, which are productive potencies of accidents but not of substance; and what substances are produced by it come to be through the application of active to passive principles, as is clear in the frogs produced by the magicians of Pharaoh (*Exod. 8*).

Assertion III. Material forms are drawn from the potency of matter by the power of natural agents. Scotus teaches this (2. d. 12. q. 1. ante §. *Ad argum. 1. G*) and (4. d. 12. q. 3. I) and (d. 13. q. 1. §. *ex dictis*), and Augustine suggests it (12. *Confess. c. 32, 18*). First proof: what depends in its becoming and in its being upon matter is drawn from its potency, as I observed in note II. But material forms depend in their becoming and in their being upon matter, without which they are neither produced nor conserved, and from which they cannot be separated — otherwise they would be creatable, immortal, and incorruptible, like the rational soul, which is created by God and infused by him into a suitably organized body. Therefore material forms are drawn from the potency of matter by a natural agent. Second: one must philosophize about natural form in the same way as about artificial form (1. *Phys. T. 69*) and (2. *eiusdem T. 36*). But artificial form is drawn from a preexisting matter — as the form of Mercury from stone, and the form of an ox from wood. Therefore the same must be affirmed of natural form.

Objection I. What is in potency is the same as what is in act — as the same man who was creatable is the one now formed (8. Met. T. 15), where Averroes and Scotus agree. Therefore forms are actually in matter just as they are potentially, and consequently they are not drawn from the potency of matter. Confirmation I: something more excellent and noble is not drawn from something more ignoble and inferior; but form is more excellent than matter; therefore form is not drawn from matter. Confirmation II: from Scotus (*Quol. 9*), substantial forms do not depend upon matter, only accidental ones. The reason is, from the same author (1. d. 35): "Nothing that has a more perfect being in any genus depends upon what has a less perfect being in that genus." Response: I explain the testimony of Scotus cited as referring to objective potency, not to subjective potency, of which we are now speaking. To Confirmation I: the major can be

denied. For from earth gold is drawn, from water coral, from a dead grain of wheat a living one, and other things from other things, which plainly surpass in nobility the things from which they are drawn. To Confirmation II: I say that even if this is not explicitly stated in Scotus cited, one must nonetheless answer that substantial forms indeed do not depend upon matter as upon an inherence subject, as accidental forms do — but they depend upon it as upon a sustaining subject, as a part depends upon its counterpart. As to the reason adduced from the same author: I say he explains himself, for he says "in the same genus." Since form, however, depends upon matter not in the genus of formal cause but of material cause, it is consequently not incongruous for the former to depend upon the latter in this way. And this can be explained regarding the whole, which, though more noble than its parts, nonetheless depends upon them essentially.

Objection II. What contains another has that other actually in it, as is clear of a vessel actually containing wine. But matter contains forms, since it is their subject (*1. Phys. T. 82*). Therefore forms are actually, not virtually, in matter. Confirmation: from (*5. Met. T. 2*): "From matter something comes to be as from what is pre-existing in it — as bronze of a statue, and silver of a cup, and their genera." Therefore if matter and form remain, from which the whole coalesces, it is inferred that form preexists actually in matter. Response: the argument concludes about a virtual containment, which is the kind of containment matter has in respect to the form drawable from it by the power of a natural agent. To the confirmation: I say that from preexisting matter as material cause, and from form as another formal cause, the composite is indeed produced; but I deny that form is actually present in matter without being drawn from it by a natural agent, as Scotus indicates in the commentary on the passage cited.

Objection III. The vegetative and sensitive souls are material forms which, according to Scotus (*2. d. 18. q. un.*), have their origin from God. Therefore not all material forms are drawn from the potency of matter. Response: I concede the antecedent; I deny the consequent. The reason is that they indeed originate from God, but not without the intervention and cooperation of matter — therefore they are not created but drawn from the potency of matter by God's power.

Article IV. What It Is for a Form to Be Drawn from the Potency of Matter

Several modes of speaking are recited and refuted on this topic by the inseparable Scotists (*disp. 2. q. 7. art. 2*), Poncius (*disp. 33. q. 2*), and Suarez (*disp. 15. Met. Sect. 2. n. 14*) and following, of which I adduce and express the four principal ones in the next four assertions.

Assertion I. For form to be drawn from the potency of matter is not for it to be drawn from the potency of a natural agent. This is drawn from the Doctor (*2. d.*

18. *q. un. §. contra*) and is contrary to Gerard of Odo, according to the Canonist (2. *Phys. q. 1. dub. 1*). First proof: the eduction from the potency of matter designates a relation of material cause, not of efficient cause, as Fuentes rightly noted (1. *Phys. q. 4. dif. 2. art. 1*). Therefore such an eduction is not from the potency of a natural agent but from the potency of matter as patient. Second: if God were to draw a form from matter, as he draws the vegetative and sensitive souls according to Scotus (*ubi supra, §. Dico igitur I*) — such an eduction would not be from the potency of a natural agent, yet it would be a true and proper eduction. Therefore the eduction from the potency of matter does not consist essentially in the efficient activity of a natural agent. Third: given the opinion of Gerard named above, form would come not from within but entirely from without, as Plato and Avicenna held — both rejected above. For form would be produced by an agent that is extrinsic, while matter does not concur and from which it is extracted, since it is only virtually contained in matter.

Assertion II. The eduction of form from the potency of matter does not require that matter previously exist in time under privation of it, but only in nature. This agrees with Scotus (1. *d. 39. §. quantum ad 1. sub E*) and is explicitly treated (2. *Rep. d. 17. q. 3. §. Item quaro*) against the Coimbricans (1. *Phys. q. 12. art. 5*) and the Complutensians (*ibid. q. 2. §. 3*). First proof: instantaneous productions — such as the illumination of the sun in the air — are true eductions of forms from the potency of matter; indeed all generations of sublunary things, with prior dispositions removed, occur in an instant, as I said (1. *de gen. q. 2. 4. 3*) after Scotus (2. *d. 2. q. 9. sub L*). Therefore the eduction of form from matter does not require priority of duration in matter stripped of form. Second: if God were to draw the form of a worm from new matter in the Eucharist, there would be no duration or succession, since such an eduction would be in an instant and would not be delayed by preceding dispositions — since none would be present there. Therefore it is not necessary that matter deprived of form temporally precede the form to be drawn. Third: accidental forms that by their nature emanate from subjects — as heat from fire and cold from water — are drawn from their potency just as substantial forms from the potency of matter; but subjects do not temporally precede those forms; therefore neither does deprived matter precede those latter forms. For the reasoning is the same in both cases, as Scotus suggests (8. *Met. c. 6. sum. vnic.*).

Assertion III. Nor does the eduction of form from the potency of matter consist in form and the composite being produced by one and the same action. This assertion is at variance with Fuentes (1. *Phys. q. 4. dif. 2. art. 1*) and Suarez as cited (*n. 15*), supported by Lychetus (2. *d. 17. q. un.*) and Mastri (*disp. 2. Phys. q. 7. art. 2*). First proof: from the Doctor (4. *d. 13. q. 1. §. Ad huius autem F*), eduction is a distinct action from generation, because the former is directed to form as its terminus, while the latter is directed to the composite as its total and adequate terminus. But relations are distinguished by their distinct termini, as was decided in Logic (*q. De relatione art. 7*). The same is gathered from the same

Doctor (4. d. 1. q. 1. *ante HH*) and (d. 43. q. 2. §. *potest dici*) and also (2. d. 17. q. 1) and (d. 18. q. un.). Second: the prior is caused as prior before the posterior, as is clear from a cause, which is produced before its effect. But form is prior to the composite, since it is its intrinsic and essential cause; therefore eduction is not the same action by which the composite is produced. Third: form is not generated per se but the composite is (7. Met. Tit. 26) and following. Therefore form is produced by one action and the composite by another. Furthermore, the composite pre-requires the union of matter and form as its constitutive principles, and the simple — namely form — precedes the composite. And if God were to draw form from the potency of matter without uniting it to matter — since they really differ — form would be produced, but not the composite. Therefore form and the composite are produced by distinct actions.

Assertion IV. For form to be drawn from the potency of matter means nothing other than for it to depend upon matter in its becoming and in its being. This is drawn from Scotus in the places cited above, and also in the Reports in the same passages as in the Oxford writings. Canon (2. Phys. q. 1), Bassolis (2. d. 18. q. un. art. 2), and Trombetta (12. Met. q. 5) subscribe to this. First proof: from the refutation of the other modes of speaking in the preceding assertions, of which the present is the better, more fitting, and more common. Second: the eduction of form from matter thus explained is distinguished from creation, according to Scotus (2. Rep. d. 17. q. 3), and from generation and other productions (4. d. 13. q. 1. §. *Ad huius*). Therefore it is to be accepted. Third: the eduction of accidental form from a subject is of this kind (7. Met. T. 16) and frequently elsewhere; and artificial form is drawn in this way from preexisting matter — as from wood or marble — as Antonio Andrea rightly develops (*in exp. lib. sex principiorum, cap. 1*).

Objection II. Against the second assertion: the eduction of form from matter includes in itself an alteration. For it is necessary, in order to draw form from matter, that fitting and suitable dispositions precede, which cannot be produced except successively and in time. Therefore matter with privation of form temporally precedes form to be drawn from it. Confirmation: form is first in potency before it is in act. Therefore prior to the eduction of form from matter the aforesaid temporal priority is required. Response: I distinguish the antecedent. Precisely and formally — I deny; antecedently and extrinsically — I concede. For God can draw form from matter without any temporal interval or gap of duration. I add that generation occurs in an instant, understood as the production of the whole constituted from matter and form; likewise eduction is momentary, understood as the sole production of form in matter. To the confirmation: I say the argument infers only a priority of nature. For it suffices that a cause naturally precede its effect, as is clear from Augustine (6. Trin. cap. 1): "If the sun had existed from eternity, its splendor would have existed from eternity — the sun would have preceded, however, not in time but in nature only," as Scotus rightly develops (2. d. 1. q. 3. §. *Hic dicitur*) and (§. *Tenentes autem M*).

Objection II. Against the third assertion: Aristotle (*7. Met. Tit. 26*) and following writes that form is produced by the same action by which the composite comes to be — that is, it is co-made with the composite. Therefore the eduction of form is the same action by which the composite comes to be. Confirmation: Scotus (*2. d. 17. q. 1. §. Dimissa A*) and (*§. Ad 1. C*) and (*in Rep. ibid.*) establishes that the form drawn from the potency of matter is the form produced by the same production as the whole; while one produced by a different production is created. Response: I say Aristotle there only means that form does not per se come to be or is generated. The Doctor gives the reason in that passage: because if form were generated, and since what is generated comes to be from matter and form, it would follow that form comes to be from form — which is false and absurd. The Philosopher says, however, that form is co-made and co-generated — not because it is not produced by a different action than the action of the whole (since form is prior to the whole and its cause), but because it is not produced by a different action outside matter — and this is what happens with form that is created by the action of the supreme agent. The same response applies to the confirmation. For, as is clear from the passages cited above, form is indeed produced by a different production than that of the composite; yet because it does not pass outside but remains within the limits of matter, it is said to be produced by the same action as the composite, as Lychetus just cited notes.

Objection III. Against the last assertion: the rational soul presupposes matter — namely a suitably organized body. Therefore if our opinion is true, the rational soul is also drawn from the potency of matter — which was rejected above. Therefore our assertion that form's being drawn from the potency of matter is its dependence upon matter in becoming and in being does not seem to be true. Response: I deny the inference. The reason is that in the efficient production of the rational soul, matter does not cooperate as it cooperates in its own genus in the eduction of a corporeal and material form — as the Doctor shows (*2. d. 18. q. un. §. contra primum A*).

Article V. Whether the Forms of the Heavens and the Elements Were Drawn from the Potency of Matter in the First Production of Things

Although the common run of philosophers, with the exception of the rational soul, holds that all forms are drawn from the potency of matter, the moderns nonetheless raise a special question whether the forms of the heavens and the elements in the first framing of the world were evoked from the power of matter by God. Some, cited and followed by the Complutensians (*1. Phys. q. 3. §. 1*) and (*q. 4*) and the Coimbricans (*ibid. in cap. 9. q. 12. art. 5*), deny that both the forms of the heavens and the forms of the elements were drawn from the potency of matter. Others, to whom Suarez adheres (*disp. 15. Met. sect. 2*), though they reject that the forms of heavenly bodies were drawn from the potency of matter, admit this of the forms of elementary bodies. Still others — such as Fuentes (*dif.*

2. q. 4. art. 3), Hurtado (*disp.* 4. sect. 2), and Ruvio (*Tract.* 2. *de forma.* q. 2) — assert that the aforesaid forms were drawn from the potency of matter.

Assertion I. The forms of the heavens were drawn from the potency of matter at the beginning of the world. This is drawn from the Doctor (2. d. 17. q. 1. §. *Dimissa B*). First proof: the said forms depend in their becoming and in their being upon matter, as a true and genuine eduction of form from matter requires, from what was said in the preceding article. Therefore they were drawn from the potency of matter. The antecedent can be further supported. For if the aforesaid forms were independent of matter, they would be incorruptible — like the rational soul — which is false and erroneous. The consequent holds, since matter was naturally created before being adorned with those forms, as the Doctor suggests (2. d. 12. q. 1) following Augustine (12. *Confess.* c. 7, 8). Second: every form is either created or drawn from the potency of matter, as the Doctor teaches (d. 18. q. *unica*, §. *contra*). But the forms of the elements were not created, since they were produced from presupposed matter and depend upon it in being and operation. Therefore they were drawn from the potency of matter. The major is clear because between creation and eduction there is no intermediate. Third: God could in the beginning of the world have created matter together with the fitting dispositions for the form of the heaven; since form and matter are really distinct from one another, he could then from matter so disposed have drawn out the form of the heaven — as among the adversaries Fonseca concedes (5. *Met. cap.* 2. q. 4. sect. 1). Therefore in that case the form would truly have been evoked from the power of matter; therefore also in fact, since no compelling reason to the contrary exists, as is clear from the preceding article.

Assertion II. The forms of the elements likewise, in their first production, were drawn from the potency of matter. This is gathered from the same Doctor (*ubi supra*) and is proved by the same reasons by which the preceding assertion was confirmed and established. But the argument of Suarez cited and of the others is futile and empty, already overturned in the previous article.

Objection I. (*Gen.* 1): "God created the heaven and the earth." Therefore, since by "heaven" are to be understood the celestial bodies, according to Lyra's interpretation, and by "earth" the elementary bodies, it is inferred that their forms were not drawn but created. Confirmation: everything produced is either created or generated; but the heaven is ungenerable and incorruptible (1. *Caeli sum.* 6. *Tit.* 20). Therefore it is created, and consequently its form was not drawn from the potency of matter but created from nothing. Response: the verb "created" is used there broadly, not strictly for producing a thing from nothing, as is clear from that passage of Sacred Scripture: "God created the great sea creatures and every living soul that moves, which the waters produced, according to their kinds." Then: "God created man." And afterward: "God formed man from the clay of the earth" (*Gen.* 2). From these and similar passages it is abundantly clear that creation is taken broadly in the cited Scripture passage as

the production of anything from preexisting matter; but strictly and properly creation is the production from nothing — that is, from no presupposed matter — of which sort is the production of an angel and of the rational soul. By this the confirmation is answered: if the major is admitted by taking "created" in the two senses just explained, the minor is to be distinguished. *Per se* — it is denied; *per accidens* — it is conceded. For the heaven has no contrary, nor is there found in the nature of things a created agent that by its own power could destroy or construct it, as the Doctor rightly notes (4. d. 49. q. 6. §. *Hic duo B*) and (11. Met. sum. 2. in exp. cap. 3), followed by Mauritius in the annotations on the theorems there.

Objection II. The celestial and elementary bodies were produced in a single moment of time together with their parts, so that creation was first directed to those wholes, and then to their parts — which were therefore co-created. Confirmation: the attributes and powers of things are not drawn from them as from a matter or quasi-matter; subsistence is not drawn from the substance of which it is the subsistence; existence and universally the modes of things are not extracted from the potency of those things whose modes they are. Therefore the same must be affirmed of the forms of the heavens and the elements. Response: although those bodies together with their parts were produced in the same instant of time, nevertheless their parts were by nature produced before the composites assembled from them — for parts precede in origin the composites constituted from them, just as principles precede principiated things and causes their effects, and divided things precede the members that divide them, as the Doctor touches on (1. d. 5. q. 1 and 2). To the confirmation: I concede the antecedent; I deny the consequent. The reason is that those attributes emanate, flow, and spring from the natures of things — not so forms. For those attributes do not require an external agent, since they flow from the intrinsic principles of things; but forms do require an extrinsic agent to extract them from the power of matter. The same nearly applies to subsistence, which is the ultimate terminus of a substantial nature; and to existence and the other modes that modify things.

Query: whether eduction is identified with union? Response: No. The reason is that eduction precedes union. For in order for form to be united to matter, it must already have been drawn from the potency of matter. The unifiable extremes are presupposed before they are united, just as I was saying about the parts of a whole. I add that eduction is a relation intrinsically accruing, while union is a relation extrinsically accruing; and the terminus of the former is form, but that is not the terminus of the latter. Furthermore, there can be union without eduction — as is clear with the rational soul, which is indeed united to the body but not drawn from it. These and similar considerations clearly show, against Suarez (*disp. 13. Met. Sect. 9. n. 10*), that eduction is distinct from union.

Article VI. Whether Accidental Forms Are Drawn from the Potency of Matter

I note in the present context that "matter" is not taken here for prime matter but for second matter, which is the whole said to be "matter" because accidental forms are grounded in it. I further note that some accidental forms are real — such as heat — and some intentional — such as light. Real forms are subdivided into natural, which proceed from a natural agent, such as whiteness, and supernatural, which proceed immediately from God, such as grace. Thus, since there are two kinds of agents — natural and supernatural — in proportion to this twofold respect, a form is called natural if produced by a natural agent, or supernatural if produced by a supernatural agent. But in respect to the subject in which it is received, it is natural if the subject inclines to it, violent if the subject resists, and neutral if the subject neither inclines nor resists. This teaching is given by the Doctor (*q. 1. Prol. §. ad q. igitur L*). Furthermore, some forms are artificial, worked by an artisan through art, such as the form of a house.

Assertion I. A natural, real accidental form is drawn from the potency of a subject. This is common, defended particularly by Scotus (*4. d. 1. q. 1. §. Idea dici potest GG*) and Mayr (*2. d. 13. q. 4*). First proof: every such form depends in its becoming and in its being upon the subject of which it is an accident, as a genuine eduction of form from the potency of matter requires. Therefore it is drawn from the potency of its subject. The antecedent is at hand: since an accident's being is to be in a subject — that is, to inhere in a subject — from which it either naturally proceeds or is produced by another and grounded in that subject or in another. Second: such a form is not created. For since it is produced by a created agent, it cannot come to be through creation, since a created agent can neither principally nor instrumentally attain creation, as Scotus teaches in the passages just cited. Nor is it generated — since generation belongs to the composite alone (*7. Met. Tit. 27*). Therefore it is drawn. Third: what proceeds from matter or from the composite is drawn, since eduction is the dependence of form upon matter or another subject in becoming and in being. But every accidental form proceeds from the matter in which it inheres, according to some; or from the composite, according to Scotus and other philosophers. But matter or the composite cannot cooperate in creating anything, since creation belongs to the supreme independent agent. Therefore every natural form just mentioned is drawn from the power of matter.

Assertion II. A natural intentional form is drawn from the potency of a subject. The Doctor presupposes this (*2. d. 13. q. unic.*), and Mayr (*ubi supra*) and Richard (*eadem d. art. 2. q. 1*) explicitly defend it, followed by the greater part of the moderns. First proof: an intentional form is natural, just as a real form is. For it produces a real natural effect — as light illuminates a medium, a sensible species cooperates partially in sensation, and an intelligible species cooperates in an act of understanding. But a natural real form is drawn from the potency of its

subject, as proved in the first assertion. Therefore so also is an intentional form. Second: what is produced with the cooperation of a subject is drawn from its potency, as the word "eduction" indicates. But light is produced with the sun's cooperation, and an intentional species is co-caused by the object whose role it plays. Therefore every intentional form is extracted from the power of its subject. Hugo of St. Victor adds (*lib. de sacr. part. 6. cap. 26*): "Works of creation, multiplication, and annihilation are possible for God alone." Therefore since light proceeds from a luminous body and intentional species from objects, it is clearly inferred that such forms are drawn from the potency of the subject.

Assertion III. Supernatural acts — such as the acts of faith, hope, and charity elicited by a created agent — are drawn from the potency of their subject. The Doctor teaches this (*1. d. 17. q. 2. §. Ad argumenta pro opinione PP*). First proof: the aforesaid acts are elicited by a created agent dependently upon the subject, just as natural acts are caused partially by a habit and an eliciting potency. But these are drawn from the potency of their subject; therefore those are too. Second: only an act immediately produced by God is properly said to be created, because it belongs to God alone to act independently of matter and subject. But such acts are caused by a supernatural habit and a natural potency — namely the intellect or will. Therefore they are not properly created but drawn from the potency of the subject.

Assertion IV. Supernatural habits — such as faith, hope, grace, and the light of glory — are created by God. The Doctor holds this (*1. d. 17. q. 2. §. Ad solutionem*) and (*§. sexto q. 3*) and (*2. d. 34. §. Ista quaestiones A*) and (*4. d. 1. q. 5. §. Ad primam ergo*). First proof: what is produced immediately by God alone is created, since creation is the production from no presupposed subject, and God alone acts independently of matter and subject. But the aforesaid habits proceed from God alone — as of grace and the light of glory specifically is found in (*Ps. 83*): "Grace and glory you will give, O Lord." Therefore they are created. Second: the aforesaid habits are not drawn from the potency of their subjects; therefore they are created. The consequence holds because there is no other mode of producing them. The antecedent is proved: forms that are drawn from the potency of a subject are natural; but those habits are supernatural and so eminent in their order as the rational soul is in its own catalogue — and the rational soul is created; therefore so also are they.

Assertion V. Artificial forms are drawn from the potency of the subjects from which they are extracted and in which they are grounded. This is drawn from Aristotle (*1. Phys. T. 69*) and (*7. Met. sum. 2. cap. 7. Tit. 27*) and Scotus there, who compare natural forms with artificial ones. But the former, as established above, are drawn from the potency of matter; therefore so also are the latter. Furthermore, art can accomplish nothing except from preexisting matter, as is confirmed by experience — the carpenter, to make a seat, presupposes wood; the blacksmith, iron; and so with the rest. Further, art presupposes nature, of

which it is an imitator (2. *Phys. T.* 79). But nature does not produce form from nothing, since from nothing nothing comes to be naturally; therefore neither does art — and consequently artificial forms are drawn from the potency of a subject, just as natural forms are.

Objection I. Against the second assertion: the eduction of form from matter is a real action having a real terminus and proceeding from a real physical agent. But light is an intentional form, as the Doctor concedes (2. *d.* 13. *q.* *vn.*).

Therefore an intentional form is not drawn from the potency of a subject.

Response: with Scotus just cited, light participates in both. It is a real form, because it really illuminates the medium; and it is an intentional form, because through that illuminated medium an object bathed in light is seen by us.

Objection II. Against the fourth assertion: an accident's being is to be in a subject, from Aristotle (7. *Met. cap.* 1. *T.* 2) and Scotus (4. *d.* 12. *q.* 5. §. *Ad q. respondeo sub E*). But supernatural habits are accidents; therefore they are in a subject, depend upon it in being and becoming, and consequently are not created. Confirmation I: creation is of self-subsisting things; but the said habits do not subsist, since they are not substances; therefore they are not created. Confirmation II: what God creates persists in eternity — as the rational soul and the angel; but the aforesaid habits do not always endure — as faith and hope do not remain in the fatherland; grace perishes through sin. Therefore such habits are not created. Response: aptitudinal inherence in a subject is indeed a property of an accident. But this does not prevent the said habits, which are accidents, from being created by God. For the rational soul is in the body, informs it, and yet is created; likewise the said habits are in the subject which they inform, and yet are created by God. To Confirmation I: I deny the major, which is supported by no argument. Therefore it is dismissed with the same ease with which it was advanced. To Confirmation II: I say the major is not universally true — even if true of the rational soul and of the angel, it is not true of grace, which on account of the demerit of the sinner is annihilated by God, as the Doctor writes (2. *d.* 35. §. *Ex ista solutione Ad 2. in fine*) and (3. *d.* 23. *q.* *vn.* §. *Ad 1. principale sub K*).

Objection III. Against the fifth assertion: what is drawn from the potency of a subject is drawn by a proper and distinct action of the agent, as the verb "to be drawn" indicates. But artificial forms result from cutting, planing, and polishing, which are local motions by which the instruments of artisans are moved and the parts of the matter from which the artificial whole — such as a statue or a house — is constituted are brought together. Therefore the said forms are not drawn from the potency of a subject. Response: I concede the major; I deny the minor. For even if those aforesaid motions are pre-required, nevertheless the aforesaid forms are produced by a proper action of the artisan — since art is a habit productive together with right reason — and are drawn from the power of the subject, just as other forms, as Antonio Andrea states (*in exp.* 1. *sex principiorum*).

Article VII. Whether Several Substantial Forms Can Simultaneously Inform One and the Same Matter in Number

The present dispute is not about subordinate substantial forms, of which one is presupposed and ordered to another — as the form of corporeity and the form of the living being, treated (*in 2. de anima*) — but about disparate and unrelated forms, of which the one does not regard the other, such as the form of a dog and of a lion. The proposed and put forward difficulty can be treated in two ways: naturally and supernaturally. With regard to the first way, hardly anyone asserts that several forms can simultaneously inform one and the same matter — both because one form sufficiently and totally completes and perfects the matter it actually informs, and because from those forms there would arise what is one per accidens, since one would accrue to another when the whole was already constituted, which is an accident. Moreover, one form does not coexist simultaneously with another, as experience confirms: "The generation of one thing is the corruption of another," as one reads in Aristotle (*1. de gen. cap. 3. T. 17*) and Scotus (*2. d. 1. q. 5. §. Ad 1. arg. L*). For the agent must necessarily, in order to generate a new composite, expel the original form so as to introduce a fresh form into the same matter — since both simultaneously in the same subject are incompatible, as Scotus writes (*2. d. 2. q. 7. §. Ideo ante D*) and (*5. Met. q. 7. §. pro solutione*) and (*2. d. 15. q. vn. §. Dico ergo sub A*) and (*d. 1. q. 3. sub L*). With regard to the second way, however, there is no small controversy among the scholastics. For Gregory (*2. d. 12. q. 3. art. 2*), Fonseca (*5. Met. c. 4. sect. 5. q. 4*), Ruvio (*tract. 2. de forma q. 7*), to whom the twin Scotists (*disp. 5. q. 7. art. 2*) and Poncius (*disp. 33. q. 33. q. 3. concl. 2*) adhere, following Sghemma (*2. Phys. digreff. 7*), affirm this. But Fuentes (*1. Phys. q. 4. dif. 3. art. 1*), the Complutensians (*ibid. disp. 4. q. 6. §. 1*), Vasquez (*de incar. disp. 24*), Arretinus (*in annot. q. 19. primi Phys.*), and several others of both schools deny it.

Assertion. It cannot be brought about by uncreated power that two substantial forms simultaneously inform one and the same matter in number. The Doctor holds this in explicit terms (*4. d. 49. q. 16. §. Ad 1. argum. prop. finem*): "Nor can it be said that it is in alien matter, because two specific substantial forms cannot simultaneously perfect the same matter." He suggests the same (*ibid. 4. d. 11. q. 3. §. Alij concedentes*) and (*d. 10. q. 2. §. Dico ergo*) and (*2. d. 2. q. 7. §. Et ideo D*) and (*Quol. 9. §. De secundo*). Lychetus and Gadius agree in those places. Someone might say either that Scotus is proposing and opposing arguments against the assertion he himself holds — as in the first passage cited — or that he is speaking naturally. Therefore Scotus is not a proponent of the aforesaid assertion. On the contrary: Scotus himself, in the former passage, answers those things that fight against his teaching and refutes the contrary. But to the incompatibility of two forms simultaneously in the same matter, he gives no answer — and this is evidence that he in no way admits it, as becomes clear afterward in the other passages just mentioned, in which he reasons about created power. As is clear to anyone reading the adduced testimonies, Poncius therefore wrongly draws

Scotus himself into the opposite opinion — as is also made clear by the reasons to be adduced presently, which are in conformity with his principles to support our proposed assertion.

The assertion is proved, first: what is per se, simply, and ultimately subsisting through one substantial form and one matter, cannot tolerate another substantial form in the same matter in number, because that is a supposit or person which is incommunicable both as "by which" and as "which," as the Doctor explains (*Quol. cit.*). But a composite of matter and one substantial form is simply subsisting, since it is a supposit. Therefore in that matter there can exist only that one form that informs such matter — and consequently two substantial forms cannot coexist simultaneously in the same matter. This argument is akin to that first one which the Doctor gives in the passage cited above, to prove that an angel cannot inform matter.

Someone might say the argument does not conclude, since a supposit is adequately subsisting, independent, and incommunicable, while a composite of matter and form is not subsisting except through the suppositional being which is its ultimate terminus. Therefore nothing prevents matter, which does not subsist by the subsistence of a form but of the whole, from being able to receive two forms simultaneously in itself. On the contrary: suppositional being is the terminus of both natures assembled from them. Therefore if one form in its own genus and order totally and simply causes it, another cannot simultaneously cause that same being — otherwise the same effect would simultaneously be caused by two causes of the same order and kind, which Scotus denies (*3. cit.*).

Someone might say this holds for total and adequate causes, but not for partial and inadequate ones. On the contrary: just as two total causes cannot totally and simultaneously produce the same individual effect, so neither can two partial causes of the same order and kind simultaneously and partially, though inadequately, attain the same individual effect. For in their own way, the reasoning runs equally in both cases. Second: if two substantial forms were to simultaneously inform the same matter in number, they would give it either an act simply or an act in a qualified sense. Not the latter, since that belongs to an accidental form that accrues to a thing already complete and perfect in its essential and substantial being. Nor the former, since it is the common maxim of the philosophers that from a twofold act simply there arises what is one per accidens. Therefore in no way can two substantial forms coexist simultaneously in the same matter. This argument is similar to the latter one which the Doctor uses in the cited *Quodlibet* to show that an angel cannot be united to matter as an informing form.

Someone might say, with the cited Poncius, that this holds naturally but not supernaturally. On the contrary: what is required for the essence of something cannot be supernaturally removed without its essence being destroyed. For it

cannot be that there is a human unless he consists of body and soul, nor a binary unless it is assembled from two. But from act and potency — that is, from matter and form — what is one per se arises (8. *Met. T. 15*), and no other reason is given except that the one is potency and the other is act; and from a twofold disparate act there arises what is one per accidens — and no other reason is adduced except that each is an act, and neither is ordered to the other, but one is accidental to the other. Therefore it is impossible for two forms to simultaneously inform a single matter — otherwise one would be ordered to the other, and they would be subordinate, which is contrary to the thesis. Furthermore, is matter completely and fully actuated by one form, or is it not? If not, then the whole assembled from both is not complete — which is false. If it is, then while that form remains in matter, there is no aptitude or capacity in it to simultaneously receive another form — just as while whiteness remains in a wall, there is no capacity in it to simultaneously receive blackness.

Third: if one matter in number could simultaneously be informed by two forms, it could also be informed by three — indeed by infinitely many, if there were infinitely many — since no stronger reason appears for two than for infinitely many. But this is impossible; therefore so also is the former. The major is shown from the Doctor (3. *d. 1. q. 2. §. Contra*), who employs the same form of argument against Varron: "If human nature could be supposed by several supposits, then by infinitely many, since no determination to a fixed number is apparent." Analogously, if one matter could be actuated simultaneously by two forms, then also by infinitely many — and so it would be infinite, since it would be the receptacle of infinitely many forms. Nor does it help to say with the cited Poncius that this does not argue such an infinity in matter as is not argued by the infinity of a place, which can receive infinitely many bodies. For, beyond the fact that the Doctor argues in this way in the passage cited, a place receiving several bodies does not have this from within — as matter would have on the given hypothesis — but from without, as Lychetus rightly explains there from Scotus (4. *d. 10. q. 2. §. Dico ergo K*).

Fourth: it is repugnant for a human nature, and for any other singular and numerical substantial nature, to be supposed simultaneously by three supposits. Therefore it is also impossible for the same matter in number to be actuated and informed simultaneously by several forms. The antecedent is Scotus's in the third passage just cited. For it is impossible for the same nature to depend adequately and totally on many supposits simultaneously — just as it is impossible for one effect to be caused simultaneously by many total causes of the same genus and order, otherwise it would be caused simultaneously by them and would not be caused, and would simultaneously depend essentially upon them and would not depend, as the Doctor excellently infers in the passage cited. The consequent is proved: one form is the total informative and completive principle of one matter, and the total determinative principle of the same in a fixed species and individual. Therefore the very same matter cannot

simultaneously be adequately and totally actuated, informed, and determined by another form — otherwise it would be totally actuated and informed and would not be totally actuated and informed by that form, since it is totally actuated and informed by another.

Someone might say that form does not fully and adequately complete the appetite of matter nor adequately perfect it. Therefore the adduced parity with the plurality of supposits and forms does not hold. The antecedent is the common saying of the philosophers, notably Scotus (2. d. 1. q. sec. *ad finem*) and (2. d. 14. q. 1. §. *Respondeo B*). On the contrary: even though matter, in respect to another form, inclines to it and desires it, it does not do so with the same appetite simultaneously but separately, with a distinct appetite. Hence the Doctor in the first citation premits that there are as many appetites in matter as there are forms receivable in it. Therefore the parity holds, and the argument retains its force — whatever our aforesaid modern authors may contrive to assert to the contrary.

Objection I. Matter is the receptive subject of all forms, no more determined to one than to another, since each is its perfection and complement. Therefore one matter in number can be informed by two forms for which it is disposed and prepared. Response: I distinguish the antecedent. Successively — I concede; simultaneously — I deny. Just as wood is suited for the artisan to draw from it the form of Jupiter or Mercury, yet those images can be formed in that wood not simultaneously but successively. Analogously, Scotus in the third passage cited concedes that one nature, taken separately, can indeed be hypostatically and personally assumed by three persons, but not jointly.

Objection II. By the absolute power of God, two bodies can simultaneously exist in the same place, according to Scotus (4. d. 49. q. 16); several relations can exist in the same foundation (3. d. 8. q. un.); and very many accidents can exist in the same subject (5. Met. q. 7). Therefore also two substantial forms in the same matter. Response: I concede the antecedent; I deny the consequent. The reason for the disparity is that all those things are extrinsic to the subjects in which they reside, and they accrue to them complete and perfect in their own being — therefore they are forms in a qualified sense. But a substantial form intrinsically constitutes and essentially actuates matter, and determines it in a fixed species and individual; therefore it is a form simply — and consequently, while one remains in the same matter, another cannot simultaneously coexist in that very matter, because of their incompatibility and repugnance.

Objection III. By the supreme power of God, two contraries in the highest degree can simultaneously exist in the same subject — as supreme heat and supreme cold; therefore likewise two forms can simultaneously inform the same matter in number. Response: I deny the antecedent with Scotus (1. d. 17. q. 3. §. *Contra istam opinionem*) and (3. d. 4. q. un. §. *Ad argumenta H*), after Aristotle (4. Met. Tit. 19 and 27). For if contraries in the highest degree could simultaneously

inform the same subject, contradictories would simultaneously be true of the same thing. Therefore if contradictories cannot be simultaneously verified of the same subject, neither can contraries simultaneously inhere in the same subject.

Article VIII. Whether One Form Can Simultaneously Inform Several Matters

The views of the philosophers here are nearly as many as those set out in the preceding article. Indeed, naturally no one doubts that no form can simultaneously inform many matters. But that it is possible supernaturally is asserted by Fonseca (5. *Met. cap. quarto, sect. tertia, q. quarta*), Ruvio (*Tract. secundo de forma, q. septima*), as indicated by Auriol (3. *d. 1. q. quarta, art. secundo*) and Durandus (*ibid. q. tertia*), followed by Poncius (*disp. trigesima tertia, q. quarta*). That it is impossible, however, is indicated by Scotus (3. *d. 1. q. 2. §. Ad quest. A*), Lychetus there, Faber (*disp. quarta*), Fuentes (1. *Phys. q. 4. dif. 3. art. 3*), and Mastri (*disp. quinta, q. septima, art. secundo*). And Richard had previously indicated this (3. *d. 1. q. 4*).

Note I. Form is divided into partial or inadequate — such as the form of a head or foot — and total or adequate — such as the form of the whole body. Again, into conjoined, which is integrated from all the parts simultaneously, as a form that simultaneously informs all the parts of the body joined together; and into disjunct, as if form were to inform certain parts severed from the whole and remote in place. Further, into divisible or material, which is drawn from the potency of matter, such as the soul of a dog; and into indivisible, which is created by God, such as the rational soul. The question is principally whether one complete and total form can inform several total and adequate matters in number; and also whether it can simultaneously inform several partial matters, severed and remote in place.

Note II. The more extensive and unlimited a form is in informing and perfecting many things, the more excellent and perfect it is — as is clear from the rational soul, which primarily and adequately perfects the whole body, and inadequately its individual parts, since it is whole in the whole and whole in all its parts. But since form confers essential and perfectional being upon the body it informs, if it could adequately inform several bodies simultaneously, it would be more perfect; and if infinitely many simultaneously, it would be infinite — because it would confer perfectional being upon infinitely many, which it could not do unless it were infinite. As Lychetus rightly inferred from Scotus cited about a nature giving being to infinitely many supposits.

Assertion I. One form by the force of nature cannot simultaneously perfect two adequate matters, nor two inadequate matters remote in place. The conclusion is twofold, as the Doctor suggests (8. *Met. in com. cap. 6. Tit. 15*) from Aristotle there, and (2. *d. 1. q. 3. §. Ad 1. L*) and (*d. 12. q. 1. §. positio*) and frequently

elsewhere. The first part is proved, first: adequate perfection by its very nature requires an adequate perfectible. For one thing is seen by experience to be adapted and proportioned to another. But form is the adequate perfection of matter, and matter is its adequate perfectible, since from both joined together what is one *per se* arises, as the Philosopher says in the passage just cited — for no other reason than that matter is potency and form is act. But if another form of the same order is added, what is one *per accidens* arises — for from a twofold act what is one *per accidens* arises (7. *Met. T.* 26). Therefore one form requires one matter only. Second: only two intrinsic causes are required to constitute a composite, which is distinguished from what is simple in that it consists of two parts — namely matter and form — while the latter is devoid of parts, as the Doctor develops well toward the end (§. *positio ista. d. 12. secundi q. 1*). Third: a metaphysical composite coalesces only from genus and difference, and an individual from nature and individual difference — as a human from animal and rational, and this human from humanity and thisness — as Scotus teaches (2. *d. 3. q. 6. §. Ad q.*). Therefore a physical composite is certainly also content with one form and matter. It is further clear in the perpetual motion and vicissitude of sublunary things, as well as in their birth and perishing — whether of elements or mixed things — that only one matter and one form are found: as when air becomes water and water becomes air. In these and other cases, the same matter is in the generated thing as was in the corrupted, as the Doctor notes (5. *Met. in exp. capitis sexti Titulo duodecimo*). Finally, an agent, in order to introduce a recent form into matter, must necessarily expel the original form. From which that common saying derives (1. *de gen. Titulo vigesimo*): "The generation of one thing is the corruption of another." Therefore one form encompasses only one matter. The second part is evident: if a hand is amputated from a human, that hand dies; and if a branch is cut from a tree, that branch perishes. The reason is that the soul informs the organic body, its members, and its continuous and contiguous parts joined and linked together; therefore if such parts are severed and separated from it, the soul ceases to inform them and to give them life — and so they pass away and perish.

Assertion II. It is impossible for one form to adequately perfect several total matters. The Doctor holds this in the third passage cited (§. *contra hoc obiicitur*). First proof: what is of the intrinsic and formal notion of something cannot, even divinely, be otherwise — as it is of the essence of a human to be a rational animal, so it cannot be that there is a human who does not participate in the nature of a rational animal; so that it is necessary that he consist of precisely these two — animality and rationality — neither more nor fewer. But a physical whole is composed of matter and form, and is a third thing essentially assembled from both (7. *Met. Tit. 7. cap. 1. sum. secunda*). For its essential definition is thus: and what enters into the definition of a thing is of its essence — especially since matter and form are causes, parts, and constitutive principles of the whole (2. *Phys. T.* 52) and (5. *Met. T.* 2). Therefore it involves repugnance for

one form to totally inform many adequate matters. Second: matter and form are relatively opposed (*2. Phys. Titulo vigesimosexto*), and form is the terminus of generation, from which the relation is specified. And in as many ways as one of the opposites is said, so also the other (*1. Top. cap. duodecimo*). But in the preceding article I showed that one matter, by either created or uncreated power, cannot be informed by several forms; therefore neither can one form simultaneously inform several matters. Third: those things are numerically one whose matter is one (*5. Met. cap. sexto, Titulo duodecimo*) — which Scotus there explains as referring to the individual difference by which a nature is singularized and individuated. Therefore if one individual difference is required for singular being and suppositional being, one suppositional being follows — so that several suppositional beings and singularities in one and the same simultaneously repugn. The same must be affirmed of several matters in relation to one form. What I adduced in the preceding article to corroborate that assertion also pertains here.

Objection I. Certain saints — such as Denis at Paris and Mitre at Aix — carried their amputated heads in their own hands for some miles and at that time preached to the people; which could not have occurred unless the soul informed the head severed from the body. Therefore it does not involve contradiction for a form to simultaneously inform and perfect several matters remote from one another in place. Response: this was accomplished through a miracle — not in order that one and the same soul should inform several total and adequate bodies, but only certain members, which are parts of the body and inadequate matters, such as the head of which mention is made in the argument.

Objection II. Place is an accidental form and can be simultaneously in two subjects informing them — as if two bodies were to exist simultaneously in the same place. Scotus holds it possible by divine power (*4. d. 49. q. 16. §. Respondeo F*). Therefore if one accidental form can simultaneously inhere in two adequate subjects and inform them, certainly one substantial form can simultaneously perfect two total matters. The parity is conceded by the Doctor (*3. cit.*). The Doctor responds (*§. Ad argumenta D*): there is one material place and a twofold formal one — for on the given hypothesis the two bodies would be encompassed by the same surface, which is the material place; but there would be two active circumscriptions and localizations of the two said bodies, which are the formal places, as Gilbertus notes (*lib. 16. Sex principiorum, cap. 5*). Someone might say: the same surface encompasses those two aforesaid bodies, and since it is an accident in them, it undoubtedly inheres in them. But a surface is an accidental form of the genus of quantity. Therefore one form can simultaneously inform several total and adequate subjects. Response: I say the surface only encompasses the body that is circumscriptively in place — but not another, which prescribes from local replenishment, as the Doctor establishes (*4.*

passus memorato). And so it does not follow that one accident simultaneously inheres in two adequate subjects.

Objection III. One supposital being or personhood can terminate the dependence of two supposable or personalizable natures, according to Scotus (3. d. 1. q. 3). Therefore also one form can simultaneously perfect two adequate matters. Response: I concede the antecedent; I deny the consequent. The reason for the disparity is that form is a real positive being, really informing the matter of which it is the form; while supposital being formally presents only a twofold negation — as "by which" and as "which." And if it is defended that personhood formally designates something real and positive — as the Doctor holds as probable — one may say it stands as a cause in respect to the supposable and personalizable nature. But it is not repugnant for one cause to simultaneously have several effects, as is clear from a father who simultaneously has several children. I add that Scotus in this and several other matters is problematic and shows that the opposite opinion does not lack probability — which Bassolis, Mayr, Poncius, and many others defend. But he seems to incline to the negative side, as Fuentes noted above (*art. 3*), and his principles and foundations indicate this. Someone might say Scotus in the passage cited frankly acknowledges that the divine supposit can supposit several natures simultaneously, and that in fact in the unity of the divine supposit of the Word the divine and human natures are united. Therefore there is absolutely no implication at all. Response: there is a disparity, since a created supposit enjoys only a twofold incommunicability, while a divine supposit has a threefold one — on which I treated at length in the treatise on the Incarnation.

Question V. On the Union of Matter and Form

Union requires the extremes it unites and simultaneously connects, so that from them there arises one thing, which is a third constituted from them. Therefore, having examined matter and form — which are the two extremes to be joined together in order to cause the composite — it is now fitting to dispute about the union of both.

Article I. Whether There Is a Union Distinct from Matter and Form

The prior opinion belongs to Ockham (1. d. 30. q. 1), Gregory (*ibid.* d. 26. q. 2), Auriol (2. d. 22. q. 1. art. 3), and the other Nominalists and many Thomists, who affirm that matter and form are united by themselves, so that no bond is interposed between them distinct from them. The posterior position is that of Scotus (2. d. 1. q. 5. §. *contra istam opinionem ante A*) and (3. d. 2. q. 2) and other places, and of his disciples and not a few Thomists, who teach that the union of matter and form is something distinct from them.

Note. Union is taken in three ways. First, for an aggregation or conjunction of certain things — so many stones are joined for the construction of a house, and

many soldiers for the composition of an army. Second, for the concord and love of many — so in (*Ioan. 17*) Christ the Lord prays to the Father that his disciples may be one — namely, in love and charity. And Augustine, cited by Calepinus, adds: "For who doubts that this can occur in so great a union of souls?" Third, for the bond or link of matter and form for composing the whole — and it is about union taken in this sense that the philosophers dispute here.

Assertion I. Matter and form are not united by themselves to make the composite, but by means of a union distinct from them. The Doctor holds this in the passages just reviewed. First proof: union is the bond of two extremes distinct from one another. For nothing is united to itself but to another — since from Scotus (*4. d. 43. q. 3. §. Hic duo sub B*), union is the relation of one being to another — that is, of the perfectible to the perfecting, and of the perfecting to the perfectible — or the respect of matter to form and conversely, as will be more apparent in the next article. But a relation or respect differs from the extremes of which it is the respect, since those extremes are absolute, while the relation is a relative being, and it is the common dogma of the philosophers that a relative being differs from an absolute one. Therefore union differs from matter and form. Second: unless union adds something real and positive above the united extremes, the separated extremes would be united, and things united simultaneously would be separated — which is self-contradictory. Therefore union is distinct from the united extremes. The consequent of the antecedent is shown: if union does not differ from the extremes, since the extremes retain exactly the same essence and existence whether separated from one another or joined, it is rightly concluded that separated things are joined and vice versa — which involves repugnance. Someone might say: when they are united, one is in the other — namely form in matter — and both enjoy mutual presence. On the contrary: at least by divine power, form can be in matter and present to it without any information or causality, as is clear with an angel and with God, who are present to things without informing them. And more to the point, because approximation and presence — according to the Nominalists against whom we are arguing — present no real positive being; therefore the argument retains its force and strength. I add that approximation, presence, and the like are rather prerequisite conditions than essential to the said principles. Third: a thing is not changed unless it newly receives something real in itself, as the Doctor notes (*2. d. 1. q. 5. §. Secundum primam T*). But when matter and form are simultaneously united, they are changed — for matter goes from not being informed to being actually informed, and form from not informing to actually informing. For it is impossible to pass from one contradictory to another without change, as the Doctor argues (*1. d. 39. §. Ad tertiam quaestionem*). Therefore union implies something distinct from the simultaneously joined extremes. Fourth: the divine Word and humanity are simultaneously united in the hypostatic union, which differs from them both joined together — as is clear in the triduum in which it was removed when Christ truly died. Likewise in logic

the union of subject and predicate differs from them; and this is easily induced from the remaining unions of other things.

Assertion II. Union is really distinct from matter and form simultaneously united. This is drawn from Scotus in the passages cited. First proof: those of which one remains while the other perishes are beyond doubt really distinct from one another — as Peter and Paul are really distinguished from one another, since Peter lives while Paul is dead. But when union is dissolved, the extremes can remain — as is clear at the death of Christ the Lord, in which the union of humanity with the Word was destroyed while the Word itself and his rational soul persisted. Second: what can exist separately, at least by divine power, really differs. But matter and form by divine power can exist separately with their union destroyed, as is clear at the death of a human, in which the union of soul and body perishes while both persist. Therefore between the united extremes and their union there intervenes a real distinction. Someone might say: union cannot exist without the united extremes, just as a relation cannot be without a foundation and a terminus. Therefore if it is impossible for union to be separated from its extremes, it clearly follows that it does not really differ from them. On the contrary: a predicamental relation, from what was said in logic, really differs from its extremes, and yet is inseparable from them. Likewise the composite is really distinguished from its parts simultaneously united, and yet cannot be disjoined from them because of the essential dependence it has upon them. So the same must be said of union, which — being a relation — has an actual dependence upon the extremes it connects; therefore it cannot be separated from them, even though between them and it there falls a real distinction.

Objection I. Against the first assertion: matter and form are immediately united to one another by the agent so as to cause the whole. Therefore no union intervenes between the two. The antecedent is shown from (8. *Met. Tit. 15*) and (2. *de anima, Tit. secundo*): "From matter, which is potency, and form, which is act, what is one per se comes to be, and nothing further is required as a medium for connecting those two extremes." Response: I distinguish the antecedent. Matter and form are immediately united as "what" — I concede; as "by which" — I deny. As to its proof, this is clear by the same distinction: for union is not united but is that by which matter and form are united — just as action is not acted but is that by which an agent acts; and place is not located but is that by which a body is located. Hence from matter and form as immediate and essential parts what is one per se arises, and these the agent connects by means of union as their bond.

Objection II. If there were a union to simultaneously bind matter and form, it would either precede form in matter, accompany it, or follow it. Not the first, because since union is a relation, it presupposes the extremes, one of which is form. Not the second, because matter more immediately and directly regards form than union, since the former is a substance and the latter an accident; and

the substantial order precedes the accidental order, as I shall show (*1. 5. q. 1*). Not the third, because nothing posterior necessarily connects what is prior and really distinct from it. Therefore no union of matter and form distinct from them is to be admitted. Response: union follows matter and form, from which as its extremes it arises. Nor is it incongruous that a posterior thing necessarily follows — just as existence follows essence, subsistence substance, relation its extremes, and a creature follows God.

Objection III. If there were a union differing from matter and form, it would be either a substance or an accident — neither can be said; therefore it is not to be conceded. The major is clear because substance and accident immediately divide being. The minor: it is not a substance, because substance is sufficiently divided into matter, form, and composite (*2. Anima Tit. secundo*); nor is it an accident, otherwise the union would be accidental, and consequently the whole would be a being per accidens, which conflicts with (*8. Met. Tit. decimo quinto*) where the Philosopher establishes that from matter and form simultaneously joined there arises what is one per se. Response: I concede the major; I concede the first part of the minor; but I deny the second part and its inference. For even though union is formally an accident, it is nonetheless substantial — because its extremes are substances, just as generation is called substantial not formally, since it is an action, but terminatively, because its terminus is a substance. Likewise the hypostatic union of the divine Word is called substantial by Scotus (*3. d. 7. q. 1. art. quinto*), because its extremes are substances and united in the subsistence of the Word himself — even though it is formally an accident, namely a relation extrinsically accruing, from the same (*ibid. d. 1. q. 1. art. 1. A. §. de primo dico*).

Article II. What the Union of Matter and Form Is

Several moderns — such as Suarez (*3. p. disp. 8*) and Vasquez (*ibid. disp. decimasecunda, cap. tertio*) — hold that the aforesaid union is a substantial mode, which is the foundation of a transcendental or predicamental relation, as others think. But Scotus, in both the places cited in the preceding article and also (*3. d. 22. q. vn. §. Ad 1. arg. L*) and (*4. d. 12. q. 1. §. Ad q. N*) and (*d. 43. q. 1. ante §. Aliter ponitur sub B*), Bassolis (*2. d. 12. q. 2*) and (*3. d. 1. q. 1*), Oviedo (*ibid. dub. 2*), and Mastri and Bellutus (*disp. 5. Phys. q. 9*) teach that this union is a predicamental relation extrinsically accruing.

Note. Union is taken in two ways. First, actively — so union is the same as the unitive action of a natural agent uniting matter with form. For it is necessary that matter and form be united before the composite is generated, as Scotus agrees (*1. Rep. d. 1*): causes always precede their effect, at least by nature. Second, passively — in which way union is the effect of the uniting action of the agent that unites matter with form; and this union is the bond or link of both. This teaching is excellently explained and corroborated by Faber (*3. disp. 3. cap. 3*) regarding the hypostatic union of the divine Word with human nature, in which

through the action of the most holy Trinity nothing is produced except a relation extrinsically accruing to the dependent and sustained nature, in relation to the independent Word, sustaining personally and hypostatically — as the Doctor excellently notes (*in Rep. 3. d. 1. q. 2*).

Assertion I. Union is not a substantial mode. Defended by the Doctor (*3. d. 1. q. 1. §. De prima A*) and (*in Rep. q. 2*). First proof: a substantial mode is intrinsic to the thing of which it is a mode, since it follows its nature and is inseparable from it, and is distinguished ex natura rei or modally from it — as the adversaries seem to concede. But the union of matter and form can be destroyed while they persist — as when the composite is corrupted, the union perishes while matter and form remain, separated from one another in the death of a human; and by divine power they can persist separated, since they really differ, as the Doctor signifies (*2. d. 12. in fine q. 2*). Therefore union is not a substantial mode. Second: every being is either a substance or an accident (*5. Met. T. 14*). But that mode is not an accident, as the adversaries concede; nor is it a substance, which (*2. anima T. 2*) is sufficiently divided into matter, form, and composite. Third: if union is a substantial mode and something absolute, it is either in one extreme only or in both. Not the first, because each extreme is united, and they mutually refer to one another. It is necessary that there be a foundation in both for a relation to arise in both; but both refer to one another; therefore that mode exists in both, since it is the foundation of the said relation. Nor the second, because the same form, whether substantial or accidental, cannot simultaneously inform two subjects; and the adversaries themselves admit that union is found in only one of the extremes. Moreover, that absolute thing would have to be united to matter and form, as the Doctor infers (*8. Met. q. 4*) — and so it is not a union but something uniteable by means of a union, as in the humanity assumed by the Word, which the Doctor proves to be false in the passage cited and Faber develops effectively.

Assertion II. Union is a relation — not indeed intrinsically, but extrinsically accruing. The assertion is twofold, held by the Doctor in the passages cited above. The first part is proved, first, from Aristotle (*2. Phys. T. 26*), who calls matter and form simultaneously united relative beings. But they are not relative beings except through the union accruing to them — since they are substances that receive absolute being. Therefore union is a relation. Second: union is the relation and bond of the united things. For one thing is not united to itself but to another; therefore union is not a being "to itself" but "to another." But a respect "to another" is a relation; therefore union is also a relation. Third: the hypostatic union of the divine Word with the assumed humanity means nothing other than the relation of dependent human nature to the independent Word in the notion of personality, as the Doctor shows in the passage just cited. Therefore the union of matter and form also formally is nothing other than the said relation. The second part is argued: a relation intrinsically accruing arises necessarily when its extremes are posited. But when matter and form are

posited, the relation does not arise unless they are simultaneously joined; and if they are separated from one another, the said relation of union perishes.

Therefore union is not a relation intrinsically accruing but extrinsically accruing — one that does not arise from the nature of the extremes but upon the positing of some condition of presence, approximation, or other circumstance of each extreme. Furthermore, the union of an accident with the subject in which it inheres is a relation extrinsically accruing — for God can separate an accident from its subject and conserve it thus separated; and the same can be done with matter and form, as the Doctor rightly teaches (*4. d. 12. q. 1. §. Ad q. ante O*).

Therefore this union is numbered among the relations extrinsically accruing.

Objection I. Against the first assertion: what enters into the constitution and composition of something, if that thing is a substance, is certainly itself also a substance — as is clear with matter and form, which, since they constitute the composite substance, are themselves also substances. But by means of union the whole is constituted, which is a substance; therefore union is a substance, or rather a substantial mode. Confirmation: if union is not a substance, then it is an accident; but an accident cannot unite extremes except accidentally, and if it unites them accidentally, it makes what is one per accidens — which conflicts with (*8. Met. T. 15*), where the Philosopher establishes that from matter and form simultaneously joined there arises what is one per se. Response: I concede the major; I distinguish the minor. As a part entering into the essence of the whole — I deny; as a prerequisite condition — I concede. For it is necessary that the parts first be simultaneously united before they cause the whole — just as the approximation of a thing in place is necessary so that it be placed in place, and of fire to tinder so that the tinder be burned. Hence union is not an essential part of the whole but only the bond of the parts, as the Doctor rightly explains (*2. d. 2. q. 2. §. quantum ad 3. F*). To the confirmation: I concede the consequent for the subsumption; I say union unites the extremes substantially — both because its extremes are substances, from which it receives its denomination, just as generation, which is an action and therefore an accident, is denominated substantial from the substance that is generated by it; and also because its total terminus is a substance, namely the composite.

Objection II. Against the second assertion: from (*5. Phys. T. 10*), there is no per se motion to a relation. But if something were produced by means of union, there would be per se motion toward it, since it would be produced by the action of an agent. Therefore union is not formally a relation, being as it is in the genus of sterile things. Response: I distinguish the major. To a relation extrinsically accruing — I deny; to a relation intrinsically accruing — I concede. So the Aristotelian saying cited is to be explained. For there the Philosopher gives the example of the "where" — which is a relation extrinsically accruing, as Faber just cited notes above others.

Article III. How Many Unions There Are Between Matter and Form

On this question, as on the preceding one, certain philosophers — such as Suarez (*disp. 13 Met., sect. 9*) and the Complutenses (*1 Phys., disp. 6, q. 3*) — hold that there is only a single union connecting matter and form simultaneously. Others, however — such as Scotus (*2 d. 1, q. 5, § Secundum primam 5, and ibid. in Rep., q. 6, § Ad aliud, cum dicitur, and 8 Met., q. 4*), Mauritius (*ibid. in annot.*), and Mayr (*3 d. 1, q. 3*), to whom our recent Scotists also give their assent (*1 Phys., disp. 5, q. 10*), and Pontius (*disp. 34, q. 3, n. 31*) — hold that there is a twofold union between matter and form: one grounded in matter and directed toward form, and another grounded in form and directed toward matter.

Note and recall from what was said in the *Epitome* (*1 l. 1, q. 4, a. 8*) that one kind of relation is mutual, being real in both extremes — as the relation of similarity between two white things — while another kind is non-mutual, being real in one extreme and of reason in the other, as the relation of knowledge to its knowable object: in knowledge it is real, but in the knowable object it is of reason. The former relations are said to be of the first or second mode, being grounded in unity and plurality or in active and passive potency. The latter are of the third mode, being grounded in the measure and the measurable, as is evident from (*5 Met., cap. 15, T. 20*). Furthermore, recall from the same passage cited above that relation is subdivided into relations of equiparance, which share the same common account — such as relations of similarity, which are said to be of the same kind, and whose extremes are therefore equated, meaning they stand equally in that common account — and relations of disquiparance, which receive a diverse account. These are called relations of disquiparance because their extremes stand unequally with respect to the account that grounds them, as in the relations of paternity and filiation. For the relation of paternity is grounded in active potency, while the relation of filiation is grounded in passive potency. Nor do I think it should be omitted that there is a certain difference between mutual and non-mutual relations on the one hand, and relations of equiparance and disquiparance on the other. Although all mutual relations are either of equiparance or of disquiparance, as is clear from the examples already given, it does not follow validly that: it is mutual, therefore it is of equiparance — since it could be of disquiparance. The non-mutual relation, moreover, extends further than the relation of equiparance. Therefore in these matters the argument holds negatively but not affirmatively: it is not mutual, therefore it is not of equiparance.

Assertion. Between matter and form there exists a twofold union: one inhering in matter and directed toward form, and another in form, directed toward matter. This is the teaching of the Doctor in the passages cited above. It is established first from Aristotle (*2 Phys., T. 26*), who calls matter and form relatives, which cannot exist unless they are mutual. They are indeed relatives of the second mode, grounded in active and passive potency. For matter is passive and form is active. Therefore they are mutual relatives, and accordingly, just as a relation of union arises from matter toward form, so likewise a relation of union

results from form toward matter — and thus a twofold union is determined between matter and form, simultaneously united to compose the composite.

Second, the parts that are disposed and ordered together toward constituting a whole are united and mutually embrace one another in causing it. But matter and form are the essential parts of the whole, ordered toward causing it.

Therefore, if a real relation regarding the other part arises from one part, there certainly corresponds a relation from the other part in turn. And since from what has been said union is formally a relation, it clearly follows that the union is doubled in accordance with the doubling of the parts.

Someone might object, appealing to the case of the creature's real relation to God, while — according to Scotus (*1 d. 30, q. 2, M.*) — God has no real relation to the creature. Likewise, the humanity assumed to the assuming Word in the unity of hypostasis has a real relation, whereas the Word has no real relation to the humanity, according to the same Doctor (*3 d. 1, q. 1, § De primo. A.*). In the same way, it need not be surprising that from one part of the composite there should arise a real relation without one arising from the other. On the contrary: the reason why God has no real relation to the creature is that He is most actual and most perfect, and nothing new can come to Him, as the Doctor cited just above maintains. The parts of a whole, however, are ordered toward one another and mutually perfect each other. For just as matter is potential and capable of perfection, so form perfects, actualizes, and informs. Hence the same Doctor in the passage cited (*1 d. loc. cit., L.*) says that all the parts of the universe are ordered to the universe as a whole, because they are potential with respect to the form of order, which is the arrangement of like and unlike things, in the words of Augustine (*19 Civ., cap. 13*). Therefore matter and form regard one another with a reciprocal relation, and accordingly there is no parity between God and the creature, or between the Word and the humanity hypostatically assumed by Him, that would support the defense of a single union existing in only one of the parts of the whole.

Third, there are as many unions as there are terms toward which the union is directed, since union, being a relation, is multiplied in accordance with the multiplication of terms. But there are two terms capable of being united. For just as the union of matter is directed toward form, so the union of form in turn tends toward matter. Therefore the union is doubled in accordance with the duality of the parties. For there seems to be no stronger reason why the union should intrinsically affect one part rather than the other, since both are in fact united simultaneously. Therefore between them a mutual relation exists.

One might object with the Complutenses (*cited at the beginning of this article*) that there is a single union intrinsically affecting both parts simultaneously, just as one point unites and connects two parts of a continuum, one instant connects two parts of time, and one piece of glue connects two parts of a plank. On the contrary: it is incompatible that one and the same accident should be

simultaneously subject in two subjects, as is clear from what was established above. But a union is an accident, since it is a relation, as the Complutenses also concede. And matter and form are two distinct subjects, being two substances — though incomplete and partial ones. Therefore a single union cannot simultaneously affect both intrinsically. The analogies adduced above are of no help, since a point is something absolute and connects integral and non-essential parts — which is not the matter at issue here. The same must also be said of the rest, as will become clearer below. I add further that the union by which body is united and which inheres intrinsically in body cannot unite the rational soul, since the soul is spiritual while the body is material. That a bodily and material thing, whatever it may be, does not physically touch or intrinsically affect a spirit is indicated by Augustine (*12 in Gen., cap. 29*) after Aristotle (*1 de gen., T. 43 and following*), and it is treated explicitly by Doctor Scotus (*4 d. 44, q. 2*).

First Objection. Union is described as the bond and tie of two things, by which two extremes are bound and fastened together. Therefore there is only one union of matter and form as jointly connected. The antecedent is obvious; the consequence holds: for if the union were doubled, each part would have its own union, and therefore the two extremes would not be united by a single union, nor would they be joined together to cause the whole. First Confirmation: The divine Word and the humanity assumed by Him hypostatically are united by a single union in personal subsistence. Therefore the same must be said of matter and form as jointly connected. Second Confirmation: In natural and artificial things, a single union suffices to unite two extremes — just as one rope binds two bodies. Therefore matter and form are united by a single union so as to cause the composite.

I concede the antecedent and deny the consequence. In response to the proof of the consequence, I say that from each of the two extremes there arises a doubled relation of union, and this is called their bond — just as the relation of similarity is the assimilation of two similar things, and the relation of equality is the relation of two equal things, even though from each extreme there arises a real relation of similarity in similar things, and of equality in equal things. The reason is that, since they are mutual relatives, it is impossible that once all the extremes are posited and simultaneously conjoined, a relation of union should not result and intrinsically affect each of them. In absolute bonds, however, the case is different, and therefore a single bond and a single union suffices to join them — just as two parts of a line are coupled and united by the same point, as Aristotle teaches (*in the passage on quantity*), because the point, which is their bond and connection, is an absolute indivisible. To the first confirmation, I concede the antecedent and deny the consequence. The reason for the disparity is that the Word, being most actual and most perfect, cannot give rise on its part to a real relation of union toward the humanity assumed by it personally. But from matter and form, since they are parts and incomplete substances tending toward sharing in the perfection of the whole, if they are simultaneously joined,

a twofold relation of union necessarily arises, as the Doctor indicates (*3 d. 1, q. 1, § De primo. A. and Quol. 9, § De tertio. M.*). To the second confirmation, I distinguish the antecedent: in natural things that have essential parts, I deny it; in natural things that have integral parts, I concede it. The reason for the disparity is that essential parts are ordered to the whole, are perfected and completed by its perfection — but not so the integral parts, which when joined to the integral whole or separated from it do not possess greater or lesser perfection, as the Doctor says (*Quol. now cited, a little before N.*). As for artificial things, the parity does not hold, because either the bond is of the same entity as the united extremes — as when several ropes are bound by one rope — or if it is of a different kind, it is something absolute which the agent can connect to the separated parts and extremes, as two bodies are bound by a rope and two garments by a thread.

Second Objection. A union unites parts that already exist simultaneously, and does not presuppose that they are already united to one another — otherwise the union would be superfluous. But a relation of union presupposes extremes already simultaneously united, from which it subsequently arises, as is evident in any relation that results from the positing of extremes. Therefore the union in matter and form as jointly connected is not doubled.

I respond that the argument holds of a union that is something absolute interposed between two extremes capable of being united — and of this kind some examples were adduced above — but not of a relative union, which presupposes the extremes as fundamentally united but not formally, because it is the very thing by which they are formally united, just as similar things are formally assimilated by similarity, and equal things are formally equated by equality. This response is indicated by the Doctor (*2 d. 1, q. 2, § Ad 1. E.*), expressed by Lychetus (*ibid.*), and received by the twin Scotists (*cited above*).

Third Objection. The relation of union that emanates from the human body and tends toward the rational soul cannot connect the rational soul itself, because the material — such as that union of the body — cannot unite the spiritual, such as the rational soul, nor vice versa. Therefore only a single union should be posited, by which matter and form are simultaneously connected. I distinguish the antecedent: as subject, I concede it; as term, I deny it. For the relation of union on the part of the body is subject in the body and directed toward the soul. The relation of union on the part of the soul, however, resides in the soul as its subject and is directed toward the body as its term. That a spirit can be received in a material subject is evident from the soul, which is the act of the body (*2 anima, T. 6*).

Question VI. On the Composite of Matter and Form

Having treated above of the principles taken generally and specifically, and of their bond and union, I now treat chiefly of the whole constituted from those parts.

Article I. Whether the Composite Is One Per Se

All unanimously proclaim and affirm that the whole constituted from matter and form is one *per se*, although on the grounds for this some disagree, as can be seen in our two recent Scotists (*disp. 5 Phys., q. 11, a. 1*).

Note first that unity is a property of being (*4 Met., cap. 2, T. 3*). Therefore every entity is followed by its own unity, as Scotus observes (*8 Met., q. 4*). For if the entity is simple, it possesses simple unity; if composite, it shares in composite unity. Therefore matter, form, and the composite — being distinct entities — are endowed with their own proper and distinct unities, conformable and proportioned to themselves.

Note second that Aristotle sets out grades of unity (*5 Met., cap. 6*), as expounded by Scotus both there and in (*1 d. 2, q. 7, § Sed hic restat HH.*). I set forth and explain the more important ones that are most relevant to our purpose. Unity taken in the most general sense is divided into unity *per se*, which flows from the intrinsic account of the thing, and unity *per accidens*, which comes to the thing from without. Each of these is established as multiple by Aristotle in the passage cited. Unity by aggregation is the lowest, because many things are heaped together without any addition to the thing, as a pile of stones. Unity by order adds a relation and disposition by which many things are ordered to one, as all things in the world are one by order toward one God the creator, and an army is one by the ordering of soldiers toward one commander. Third is unity *per accidens*, which beyond order denotes a subject that is informed and perfected by an accidental form. Fourth is unity by composition, which belongs to the whole constituted from matter and form — and it is this that is being investigated in the present discussion. Fifth is unity by identity, which belongs to those things that are really identified, and by this unity a nature and its property are endowed. Sixth is formal unity, possessed by those things that share the same quiddity and formal account — as Peter and Paul in the account of the species are one and the same formally.

Assertion. The composite is one *per se*. This is the teaching of the Doctor throughout, most notably (*3 d. 22, q. un., § Contra ista. Sub. B., 8 Met., q. 4*), and Antonio Andrea (*ibid., q. 7*), following Aristotle (*2 anima, T. 7, 8 Met., T. 17*). It is proven first: what is constituted from that which is perfectible and that which perfects, substantially, is one *per se*. But the composite is constituted from that which is perfectible and that which perfects substantially — namely from matter, which is perfectible, and form, which is perfective. Therefore the composite is one *per se*. The major and minor are received as true by common consent of all philosophers.

Second: from essential and incomplete parts, of which one is *per se* a potency and the other *per se* an act, there comes to be one *per se*, as the common school teaches. But the composite consists of essential and incomplete substances, of which one is a potency — namely matter — and the other is act — namely form. Therefore the composite is one *per se*.

Third: from a primary act that gives primary and unqualified being, and a primary potency receiving that being, there comes to be one *per se*. On the other hand, from a secondary act that provides qualified being — such as an accidental form — and a subject receiving that kind of being, there comes to be one *per accidens*, as the Doctor rightly speculates (4 d. 11, q. 3, § *Aly concedentes*. Y.). But the composite comes to be from a primary and unqualified act, and from primary matter receiving that being, as experience makes plain. For from matter and igneous form, fire comes to be, which is one *per se*. Likewise, from matter and the form of a mixture there comes to be a mixture, which is one *per se*. Therefore it is rightly concluded that the whole is one *per se*. Nor is any other reason given except that matter is potency and form is act, as the Philosopher states in the passage cited above (8 Met., T. 15). To this Scotus adds (2 d. 12, q. 1, § *Dico igitur*. D.) that the reason why from matter and form there is constituted one *per se* is that they are the intrinsic causes of the composite. Not so from subject and accident, because the accident is extrinsic to the subject, and therefore from these there comes to be one *per accidens*.

First Objection. From two beings in act there comes to be one *per accidens* (7 Met., T. 49). But matter and form are two beings in act, especially in the school of Scotus, who teaches that matter has an entitative act, because it truly exists and subsists independently of form, from what was established in this book (q. 2, art. 5). Therefore a composite of matter and form is not one *per se*. I distinguish the major with Scotus (2 d. 12, q. 1, sub D.): from two things existing in formal and complete act, I concede; from two things existing in act, of which one is in entitative and incomplete act and the other in formal, incomplete, and imperfect act, I deny. The passage cited is thus expounded. For matter is an entitative act and form is a formal act, and each is an incomplete and imperfect act.

One might say that the subject is imperfect and yet perfectible *per accidens* by what can inhere in it, and that from subject and accident there does not come to be one *per se* — therefore neither from matter and form, and thus the response given above holds no ground. I distinguish the major: the subject is perfectible *per accidens* by something that can be received into it simply and intrinsically, I deny; according to a certain respect and extrinsically, I concede. This is drawn from the Doctor in (4 d. cit.). Hence from subject and accident there comes to be one *per accidens*, but from matter and form there comes to be one *per se*.

Second Objection. What are maximally distant cannot be united simultaneously and make one *per se*, as is evident with similar parts, which —

being proximate and of the same kind — make one *per se*. But dissimilar parts that are distant from one another and of diverse kinds make something less unified. Matter and form, however, are maximally distant, being of different kinds: matter is a potency and form is an act, and that potency and act differ greatly from one another Aristotle teaches (*1 anima*, T. 6). Therefore from these there is not constituted one *per se*.

I distinguish the major: things that differ greatly cannot make one by unity of identity — I concede, since this kind of unity is found between a subject and its property, which are really one. Things that differ greatly cannot make one by unity of composition — I deny. For even if they are greatly distinguished, provided they have a native proportion to one another, they are capable of being united and of causing one *per se*, and matter and form are such with respect to the composite, as the Doctor notes (*ibid.*, T.). As for what is raised about homogeneous and heterogeneous parts, I say there is a disparity, because those pertain to the integral whole, while these pertain to the essential whole, which is what we are discussing here. So the Doctor addresses it (*in Met.*, cited, at the end of the question).

Article II. Whether the Whole Is Really Distinguished from Its Parts

There are two chief opinions on this article that are diametrically opposed. The first is attributed to Averroes (*1 Phys.*, com. 9) and to other Peripatetics, followed and cited by Toledo (*this place*, q. 6), the Complutenses (*disp.* 6, q. 4, § 2), Suarez (*disp.* 36 *Met.*, sect. 3), Hurtado (*disp.* 6 *Phys.*, § 16), Arriaga (*disp.* 5, sect. 1), and the Nominalists are cited, as are most Thomists along with Thomas (*4 contra Gent.*, c. 81, ad 2, and 1 p., q. 77) and other places — all denying that the whole really differs from its parts. The second is that of the Subtle Doctor (*3 d.* 2, q. 2, § *Quantum ad 1, ostendo C.*, and in *Rep.*, q. 1, 6, *De primo dicit.*), Mayr (q. 10), John of Ovando (*ibid. in comm.*), Bonetus (*1 Phys.*, c. 4), the Parisienses (*fol.* 12, q. 1), Tataretus (q. 2, dub. 1), John of Magistris (q. 5), and others who affirm that the whole really differs from its parts. The Conimbricenses (*1 Phys.*, in cap. 2, q. 1) and not a few of the more celebrated Thomists cited by them also favor this view.

Note first that the title of this article can bear two senses: one asks whether the whole is really distinguished from its parts taken separately — what some call the syncategorematic whole — and all concede this, since it is certain that the whole really differs from any of its parts taken individually. The other asks whether the whole is really distinguished from its parts taken together and jointly — what some call the categorematic whole — and on this there exist the two opinions just recounted.

Note second that the whole is multiple: the universal whole, which has subjective parts of which it is predicated — as the genus is a universal whole predicated of its species. The integral whole, which consists of integrating and quantitative parts, and is itself twofold: one homogeneous, having parts of the

same kind, as fire and water; the other heterogeneous, having parts of different kinds, as an organic body composed of head, arms, hands, feet, and the rest. The essential whole, which has essential parts and is divided into the metaphysical whole, constituted from genus and difference — as a species, composed from the reality of the genus and the reality of the difference — and the physical whole, which coalesces from matter and form, as a human being consisting of body and soul. It is chiefly this latter that is at issue in the present controversy.

Note third that the third entity distinct from matter and form — which Scotus endeavors to introduce into his school in the passage cited above (§ *Quantum ad* 3. *E.*) — is called the form not of the part, as though another form were to come upon a form already pre-existing in matter informing and perfecting that form of the part, but rather the form of the whole, or the nature and quiddity of the whole composite. This is what Aristotle signifies (5 *Met.*, c. 2) and what Avicenna explains (*ibid.*, c. 1), saying that *equinitas est tantum equinitas* — that is, the nature of the horse, considered precisely and abstractly, is called equinity; and the nature and quiddity of man, considered in the same way, is called humanity. For it is the entire nature and essence of man, by which man is constituted formally in the being of man, essentially and quidditatively. Therefore the third entity is the entire nature of the composite, by which the composite itself is formally constituted in the being of the composite, essentially and quidditatively, and from which the properties and actions of the whole flow and proceed, as Aristotle indicates (1 *anima*, T. 64), cited by the Doctor (4 d. 49, q. 7, *ante* § *Respondeo*).

I further note that this controversy is so difficult and arduous to understand and judge that two men of great genius — namely Aristotle and Augustine — appear to leave it nearly undecided and under doubt. Aristotle speaks with hesitation in (1 *Phys.*, T. 17), raising the question whether the whole is the same as or differs from its parts. Augustine in turn (l. 1 *de moribus Ecclesia, contra Manich.*, c. 4) remarks that it is difficult to judge what man is — whether he is his soul, or his body, or something else distinct from both.

First Assertion. The essential whole is really distinguished from its parts simultaneously united and taken jointly. So Scotus (*ubi supra*). This is established first from Aristotle (1 *Phys.*, T. 17, c. 2), who, in proving the stated assertion, employs this reasoning: if the whole did not really differ from its parts taken together, the parts taken together would be identical to one another. But this is false, because the whole would be indivisible — therefore the parts would be as well. The force of the major is supported by the well-known axiom: things that are identical to a third thing are identical to one another. For if the whole and the simultaneously united parts entirely coincide, the whole is undoubtedly its parts — which Aristotle there introduces as an absurdity. Furthermore, the same Philosopher (2 *anima*, T. 2, c. 1, 7 *Met.*, *sum.* 2, c. 1, T. 7) divides substance into matter, form, and composite. But the members of a good division do not

coincide, since they are opposites, from what was said in the *Epitome* (1 l. 2, q. 7, art. 1). Therefore, since the whole is a substance distinct from matter and form according to Aristotle, and since he there affirms that the first substance is matter, the second form, and the third the composite — just as the third differs from the first and the second, so the whole differs from matter and form taken together from which it coalesces. Moreover, in (8 *Met.*, *sum. unic.*, c. 6, T. 15) he plainly states that the whole is something distinct from its parts taken together, saying that the substantial whole is not like a heap of stones, which beyond parts simultaneously united and aggregated is nothing else, but that it is something differing from them simultaneously united. These and similar testimonies of the Philosopher, collected and adduced by our authors, show that the doctrine set forth is conformable and consonant with the Peripatetic school, as Toledo, before others, observes (1 *Phys.*, q. 6). Nor does Augustine appear to disagree, who in (13 *Civ.*, c. 13) distinguishes the death of the soul, the body, and the whole man — not without reason, since in (*ibid.*, *the preceding chapter*) he asserts that man consists of soul and body (*ibid.*, cap. 15 and 24) and in (*lib.* 83, qq., q. 1), because the soul is other than truth, he infers that the soul is one thing and truth another.

Second, every effect really caused by a real cause is really distinguished from it, because the same thing cannot produce itself (2 *anima*, T. 47), nor is any greater absurdity conceivable than that the same thing causes itself and is simultaneously prior and posterior to itself with respect to the same thing. But the composite is a real effect, caused by matter and form (2 *Phys.*, T. 23, 5 *Met.*, 6 l. 2). Therefore it really differs from them when simultaneously united.

Someone might say that the argument concludes regarding extrinsic causes such as the efficient and final, but not regarding intrinsic causes such as matter and form. On the contrary: a cause taken generally, applying both to extrinsic and intrinsic causes, is defined as a principle, upon the existence of which something else follows — or as a principle that *per se* influences the effect, as even the adversaries themselves concede, particularly Hurtado (*disp.* 8 *Phys.*, sect. 1, § 1). Since, therefore, every effect caused by any cause — whether intrinsic or extrinsic — is something other than it, it plainly follows that it is really distinguished from the very cause by which it is caused. All the more so because between a real effect and its cause there is a real relation, which requires really distinct extremes. Therefore, since the whole is a real effect of matter and form, it is really separated from them. This argument is so compelling that one can scarcely find anyone who satisfies it, as John of Ovando (*cited above*) notes. Indeed, Hurtado (*disp.* 6, sect. 1, §§ 13 and 14), pressed by the weight of this argument, candidly admits that matter and form are not, properly speaking, causes. But this conflicts with Aristotle and the flood of other philosophers who number matter and form among the causes properly so called — which I will demonstrate evidently in its proper place.

Someone might say with the same author and others that the united parts do indeed cause the whole, not collectively — that is, not taken simultaneously, since in that case they would mean nothing other than the whole and would cause nothing, being themselves the very whole, just as parts simultaneously aggregated are a heap of stones — but distributively taken, that is, one united to another constitutes the whole — as stones taken individually, that is, one in relation to another, make a heap. On the contrary: a total and adequate effect requires a total and adequate cause, since the cause and effect observe their due proportion toward one another. But the whole is the total and adequate effect of matter and form simultaneously united, as I touched upon in the first note. Therefore it requires both simultaneously and collectively, not distributively — since an effect in its becoming, depending on two partial causes, cannot be produced unless those causes are simultaneously joined and simultaneously cause that effect, as is evident in the case of the intelligible species and the intellect simultaneously producing an act of understanding, and of father and mother simultaneously begetting offspring. Moreover, matter and form simultaneously joined, taken distributively, seem to do nothing other than the active and passive informing, which is not their effect — since they are substances, while informing is an accident or relation. But the composite is a substance, which is only produced by a substance. Therefore the distinction proposed is irrelevant to dissolving the objection stated. Finally: if one causes in relation to the other, either it really influences the effect or it does not. Not the latter, because then it would not be a true and real cause, as is assumed. Therefore the former — and thus the whole is really distinguished from its parts taken together, since it is something else produced and caused from them simultaneously united.

Third, a property is grounded in the whole as its adequate subject and belongs to it alone, as is evident in risibility, which belongs to man, not to his soul or body. But a property is not accommodated to the parts taken separately or jointly, as Aristotle indicates (*1 anima*, T. 64) — both because these are not perfect nor do they reside in the right line of a category, and because they are not the total and adequate term of generation or corruption, as the whole is (*1 Phys.*, T. 64 and *7 Met.*, T. 27). Therefore the whole really differs from them as simultaneously united.

Nor does it help to say that the property belongs to the simultaneously united parts insofar as they thus constitute the whole — since the union, which from what has been said is a relation, does not constitute a thing in perfect and absolute being, nor does it cause the whole, which is an integral and complete substance, since it belongs to the genus of sterile things. Therefore united parts are not the subject and ground of a property. I add that the union is indeed a condition presupposed for causing, but is not itself the cause of the whole and its property.

Fourth, among those things of which one can exist without the other, there is real distinction, according to Scotus (*2 d. 1, q. 4, § Contra istam*). But matter and form can exist without the whole existing — as in the three days of Christ's death, His humanity was truly destroyed because Christ truly died, yet His integral parts remained: namely His soul, which descended into Hell, and His body, which lay in the sepulchre incorrupt, according to (*Ps. 15: Non dabis sanctum tuum videre corruptionem* — "You will not allow your holy one to see corruption"). It must therefore not be denied that the whole is really distinguished from its parts taken together.

One might say with Ruiz (*1 d. 3, q. 1, in corp.*) that in the corruption of the whole it is only the union of the united parts that ceases, so that they persist separated from one another, as occurred in the death of Christ the Lord. On the contrary: in the death of a man, humanity is corrupted — which is a complete and absolute substance — and not the union, which is a relative accident, of which there is properly speaking no corruption or generation. Therefore in the destruction of the whole, it is not only the union of the parts that is dissolved, but the whole is destroyed — which is a third substance distinct from its parts taken together.

Second Assertion. The whole is not really the same as its parts transitioning into a third entity, since the parts remain in the whole itself. So the Doctor (*cited above, and 2 d. 22, q. 1*) and all his disciples, with the exception of Faber (*Theor. 21 and 3 disp. 9, c. 3*). It is proven first from Aristotle (*1 Phys., c. 7*), who teaches that matter and form are principles in the composite's actual being, because they persist in the composite. And in (*2 of the same work, T. 28, and 5 Met., cap. 2*), matter is defined as that from which something comes to be while it inheres, and form as the what-it-is of the thing. Therefore in the Lyceum of the Peripatetics, the parts do not pass into the whole but remain in it.

Second, parts that are the causes of the whole do not pass into its entity. For a cause does not pass into its effect. It is incompatible that a cause should become the effect and the effect the cause — for if it is a cause, it causes something, and therefore what is caused is not precisely the cause; otherwise the same thing would make itself and pass into itself. For this reason Scotus (*in 4 cit.*) says that matter and form are not caused, because they are the first principles and first causes of the thing. Therefore the distinction drawn by Faber between parts that do not pass into a third entity and parts that do pass into a third entity is opposed to Scotus and to the truth. Nor does his response help, saying that this is gathered from the passage cited (*§ Quintum ad 3 art.*) — since the Doctor teaches nothing there other than that the union is presupposed for the production of the whole, and that it is not the whole, since it is a relation, and therefore the whole is not the parts simultaneously united. As for what the same Faber adds — that Scotus admits that distinction, since in the solution of (*q. 2*) the Doctor wants the whole to be assumed first by the Word and the soul to be

the instrumental medium, with no other union of parts in the living Christ supervening or preceding — this proves nothing for him. For as I showed in (*Tract. de Incar., disp. 5, q. 1*), in Christ there were three unions according to Scotus, the union to the whole being prior and the union to the parts — that is, to the soul and body — being subsequent. Therefore the said Faber openly contradicts Scotus and reason.

Third, the parts that enter into and constitute the composite are not corrupted but remain in their real being and persist therein, as is evident for matter — which is ingeneratable and incorruptible — and for form, especially the rational soul, which is immortal. Therefore the parts do not pass or change into a third entity. Nor does it help to say with the said author that the rational soul changes with respect to its substantial being but not with respect to its substance, because in the body it has the operations of sensing and vegetating, which it does not exercise outside the body. For since the rational soul is immortal, it remains in the body in its being — therefore neither does it change nor does it pass into a third entity, since that composite of rational soul and body is something distinct from the soul itself, as is clear at a man's death, when the man is corrupted but not the rational soul.

Furthermore, to pass into a third entity is either to pass according to one's substance, or according to substantial being, or according to accidental being. Not the third, because on this there is no doubt. Nor the second — for either by substantial being he understands the principle of the operations of the whole, such as vegetation and sensation, and this is irrelevant to the controversy, since it is certain that the soul separated from the body does not carry out the operations it performs when joined to the body; or it means the first, since it cannot be denied that the substance of the soul remains incorrupt in the composite.

Fourth, in Faber's position there seems to be a contradiction: if the parts do not remain but become the whole, then a real distinction between parts and whole ought not to be admitted — since real distinction obtains between positive real extremes actually existing. But if the parts are not in the whole, they are not distinguished from it, and therefore it is superfluous to ask whether the whole is really separated from its parts. And if one responds that they are distinguished when they are only united but have not yet passed into the whole — on the contrary: when they are only united, there is no whole, because the union of parts is presupposed for causing the whole. And when the whole exists, there are no parts, as he himself admits. Therefore his distinction is empty and void.

Finally, it is true to say that the parts are in the whole — as soul and body are in a human being. Therefore they do not change or become the whole, but cause and constitute the whole as its intrinsic and essential parts persisting in it as long as the whole itself endures and persists.

Third Assertion. Between the united parts and the whole there is a positive and mutual real distinction. This assertion contains two claims. The first part is derived from Scotus (3 d. 2, q. 2, § *Quantum ad 3. F.*, and d. 22, q. un., D., § *Quantum ergò*) — against Faber (*cited above*), who admits only a negative distinction. It is established as follows: between positive real entities that are really distinct, there is a positive real distinction, since this derives its entity and denomination from them. But the stated distinction obtains between positive real extremes that are really distinct — namely the united parts and the whole caused from them, as I showed above. Therefore between the said parts and the whole there is interposed a positive real distinction.

Moreover, what essentially depends on another differs from it by a positive real distinction, as is evident in the creature, which essentially depends on God and is really and positively distinguished from Him. But the whole essentially depends on its parts, as Scotus asserts in the places cited above. Therefore it is also really and positively distinguished from them.

The second part is gathered from the Doctor (*ubi supra*), which is systematically maintained by Fuentes (1 *Phys.*, q. 6, *dif. un.*, art. 5) with others cited by him, against Trombetta (*Tract. Form.*, quarta part., art. 4, *concl.* 2) and certain others among the earlier Scotists. It is proven as follows: a relation pertaining to the second mode of relatives is mutual (5 *Met.*, c. 15, T. 20). But the distinction between the united parts and the whole is a relation of the second mode, obtaining between a cause — which is the parts — and what is caused from them — which is the whole. Furthermore, the whole, since it is finite and limited, is capable of relation and real distinction, just as the united parts are. Therefore if from the side of the parts there arises a real distinction and relation toward the whole, in the same way from its side there results a real distinction and relation toward the parts that concause it.

First Objection, against the First Assertion. Aristotle (1 *Phys.*, *sum.* 2, c. 3, T. 17) seems not to distinguish the whole from the parts taken together. And in (4 *Phys.*, T. 23) he plainly says that the whole is nothing other than its parts. And in (2 *anima*, T. 7, c. 1) he states that body and soul are one. And in the same work (T. 10) he adds that just as the eye is the pupil and sight, so soul and body constitute the animal. The Fathers corroborate this, especially Augustine (7 *Trin.*, c. 4): body and soul are the whole man. And in (*in Ps.* 56): man himself is soul and flesh. And in (*in Ps.* 145): the whole man, that is, spirit and flesh. Consonant with this is that saying of Athanasius in the Symbol: *Sicut anima rationalis et caro unus est homo: ita Deus et homo unus est Christus* — just as the rational soul and flesh are one man, so God and man are one Christ — and from the person of the Word and the humanity assumed by Him there does not result something third really distinct from them. Therefore neither from rational soul and flesh is there caused something really distinct from them. Boethius adds (*l. de Trin.*, c. 3): any whole means nothing other than its united parts. Dionysius (*de caelesti hierar.*,

cap. 4) favors this, calling death in us not the destruction of substance but the separation of united things. Augustine himself (*in Ps. 48*) asserts the same: *Mors est separatio animae a corpore* — death is the separation of the soul from the body. And in (*tract. 43 in Ioan.*): death is the abandonment of the body, the laying down of a heavy burden. Nor is that saying of Damascene irrelevant (*3 fidei, c. 16*): what He once assumed He never laid aside. But if the whole were to differ from the parts at Christ's death, He would have laid aside humanity — and thus He would then have laid aside something that He had at another time assumed.

I respond: the first testimony of the Philosopher actually works against rather than for the objection — since the same author introduces as an inconvenience the identity of the whole and its parts, as the Canonists (*1 Phys., q. 5*) and John of Magistris (*ibid., Scibile 2*) note. Nor does Tataretus dissent (*q. 2, dub. 1*). To the second, I say it is to be taken causally, not formally, and that this is the sense intended by Boethius, as our recent authors (*ubi supra*) plainly convey. The response of Trombetta (*cited*) seems to amount to the same thing when he says that the parts taken together are not other than the whole — meaning that they integrate and constitute the whole, and that nothing other than the parts themselves causes the whole. To the third and fourth, the same response holds, since they are taken in the same sense. And no other reason need be sought for why from matter and form there comes to be a whole, except that the one is potency and the other act, as Aristotle clearly explains (*8 Met., T. 15*). The same response serves the passages from Augustine and Boethius cited above. And it can be added that those texts are to be understood not by formal predication but by containment — meaning that man, beyond body and soul as essential parts, contains nothing else. As for Dionysius and Augustine cited again, it suffices to say that they are speaking against those who hold that the soul of man perishes at his death. For this reason Ecclesiastes (*3*) says: *unus est interitus hominis et iumentorum, et aqua utriusque conditio* — the death of man and beast is one, and the condition of both is the same. To turn them back from this error, the said Fathers assert that at the death of a man the soul is separated and parted from the body, and that his death is the separation from the body. As for Athanasius, he can be explained thus: just as from rational soul and flesh there comes to be one *per se* supposit and person, so from God and man there is had one supposit and one person. Finally, what Damascene asserts is interpreted by the Doctor (*3 d. 2, q. 7, § Ad argumenta. 1.*) as referring to the essential parts — namely soul and body — never laid aside by the Word.

Second Objection. What is absolute and really distinguished from another can be separated from it, at least by divine power, as Scotus repeatedly notes. But the whole is absolute and really distinguished from its simultaneously united parts, according to the same Doctor. Therefore the whole can exist by divine power without its parts. But it is incompatible that the whole should exist without its essential parts — as that a man should exist without soul and body. Therefore it is impossible for the whole to really differ from its parts.

I distinguish the major: if there is no essential dependence, I concede; if there is essential dependence, I deny. In accordance with the distinction of the major, the minor must be distinguished. For the whole essentially depends on its parts, which are its intrinsic, essential, causative, and constitutive principles. Therefore, although it really differs from them, it cannot exist without them nor be separated from them. This is evident in the creature, which really differs from God the creator, yet on account of the essential dependence it has on Him, it cannot exist without Him. Likewise, a predicamental relation really differs from its own foundation, from which it nevertheless cannot be segregated on account of the essential dependence it has upon it. This response is drawn from the Doctor (*2 d. 1, q. 5, § Ad q. M., and 1 Rep., d. 1, q. 2, § Item quaecumque*), and is embraced by Antonio Andrea (*7 Met., q. 18*) and the Canonist (*q. 5, 1 Phys., art. 2*).

One might insist that an accident essentially depends on the subject in which it inheres, and yet God can really separate and divide the one from the other. Therefore the same must be said of the whole and its parts. The parity must be denied, since the dependence of the accident on its subject is extrinsic, whereas the dependence of the whole on its parts is intrinsic. Therefore the whole is inseparable from its parts, but an accident is not inseparable from its subject, as Scotus indicates (*4 d. 12, q. 1, ante § Ad argumentum. N. O.*).

Someone might say with Faber (*cited*) that this essential dependence of the whole on its parts is nowhere taught by Scotus. For this reason the same author adds that Scotists are deceived in thinking the same applies to efficient, formal, and material causes and their effects. On the contrary: first, even if Scotus had not transmitted this kind of dependence, the response given would not thereby be false — for an argument from negative authority does not conclude. Furthermore, I find this dependence in his writings, particularly in (*1 Rep., d. 1, q. 2, § Item quaecumque, and 2 d. 1, q. 5, § Ad q. M., and 4 d. 12, q. 1, § Ad q. N. O., and § Ad argumenta, near the end, and 3 d. 2, q. 2, § Quantum ad 1., and 2 d. 12, q. 1, § Dico igitur. C., and a little before, § Est igitur videndum.*). From these it is clear that Scotus admits intrinsic and essential dependence between the whole and its essential parts, and at the same time points out the difference between efficient causes on the one hand and material and formal causes on the other. Between the efficient cause and its effect there is an extrinsic essential dependence; but between the material and formal cause and their effect there falls an intrinsic essential dependence. Faber's distinction, however, between parts that do not pass into a third entity and parts that do pass into a third entity, is supported neither by the authority of Scotus nor by reason, and is therefore rightly rejected as novel and empty by all Scotists.

Third Objection. The whole cannot in any way be conceived without its parts, since the whole is that which consists of parts. Therefore the whole does not really differ from its parts. I concede the antecedent and deny the consequence,

as is evident in the case of a relative, which cannot be conceived without its correlative and yet really differs from it.

One might say, from the passage *c. De ad aliquid*: it is the property of relatives that one is understood along with the other. But an absolute thing, such as the whole, just as it does not depend on another in being, so also it does not depend on another in being understood. Therefore if — as I have conceded — the whole cannot be understood without its parts, neither can it exist without them, and thus it is not really distinguished from them.

I say that a relative differs from its correlative in this: a relative always co-requires its correlative as something extrinsic and as its term. But an absolute either co-requires nothing else, or if it does co-require something, that something is intrinsic to it — as the whole co-requires its parts, which are intrinsic and essential to it.

One might press further: if the parts belong to the essence of the whole, then they do not differ from the whole — since the essence of a thing does not differ from the thing of which it is the essence, as rational animal, which is the essence of man, does not differ from man himself. For nothing is more intimate to a thing than its essence. But the parts are the essence of the whole, since the whole is defined as that which has parts. Therefore there is no distinction between the whole and its simultaneously united parts.

This must be addressed by a distinction: the united parts are the essence of the whole *in obliquo*, I concede; *in recto*, I deny. For man is not body and soul, but a being consisting of body and soul. Therefore the whole is not the parts but the having of parts, since it includes the parts and is something third distinct from them.

Fourth Objection. Either the whole is simple or composite. But it is not simple, since it consists of parts. Therefore it is composite. But a composite essentially includes its parts. Therefore it is not really distinguished from them.

I distinguish the subsumption: the whole includes its parts as its intrinsic causes, I concede; as its essence and quiddity, I deny. Since the whole is caused from them, it is consequently something else, really differing from them.

One might say: either form alone causes the whole, or matter alone, or both together. But none of these can be said. Therefore the parts are not the causes of the whole but are the whole itself. The major is evident from the sufficient enumeration given. The minor is plain: not the first, because since form is a partial cause, it concurs only partially in effecting the whole. Nor the second, both for the same reason and because matter is purely passive. Nor the third — for in man there is a rational soul and a body, and thus his composite would be at once bodily and incorporeal, material and spiritual, mortal and immortal, divisible and indivisible, which involves a contradiction.

I say that each causes the whole in its own genus, and no contradiction follows in man. For since the rational soul is incorporeal, immaterial, immortal, and indivisible, the aforesaid predicates are affirmed of man by reason of it; while by reason of the body the other predicates are affirmed of him. For man is constituted from spirit and body. Yet he is said absolutely to be corporeal, material, mortal, and divisible, as Mayr notes before others (*Quol. 10, ad finem*) — because the effect follows the weaker part, and it is commonly held in logic that the conclusion follows the weaker part. Therefore man *per se* and directly belongs to the category of corporeal substance.

Fifth Objection. What comes to a thing already constituted in its being makes one *per accidens*. But the whole comes to the parts already constituted in their being and simultaneously united. Therefore if the whole were something really distinct from its parts, it would be one *per accidens*, which conflicts with Article I of this Question.

I concede the major and deny the minor. For the whole is not adventitious to the parts but is intrinsically constituted from them, truly caused, perfected, and completed. One might insist: what comes to a being in act is accidental to it. But the whole comes to matter actuated by form. Therefore it is accidental and adventitious to it. I concede the major and deny the minor — since, as I have said, the whole does not come to the parts but is caused from them.

Fifth Objection, against the Second Assertion. Matter and form constitute one *per se* (8 *Met.*, T. 15). Therefore the whole does not really differ from the parts. The consequence holds because real distinction falls between two things; but matter and form make the composite, which is one. Therefore they pass into its third entity. Confirmation: it is incompatible that something should be really separated from that which intrinsically and essentially constitutes it — for if it is intrinsic to it, it is not other than it itself. And if it is other, it is clearly extrinsic to it. Therefore it is rather to be said that the parts pass into the whole than that the whole is really distinguished from the parts.

I concede the antecedent and deny the consequence. For matter and form are two constituting principles and two partial causes integrating one total cause, while the whole is one constituted and principiated thing, one effect caused from them. That a cause and its effect really differ is the common teaching of philosophers.

To the confirmation, I say that the objection concludes concerning parts and extrinsic causes such as the efficient cause — not concerning parts and intrinsic causes such as matter and form, which cause and essentially constitute the whole, upon which it depends in becoming and in being, and from which it is inseparable even by divine power, as the Doctor indicates (1 *d.* 17, q. 2, *sub CC.*).

One might say: the parts also depend on the whole, and yet they can be separated from it. Therefore the same must be said of the whole. The parity

must be denied — for the whole depends on the parts with a dependence that is unqualified, while the parts depend on the whole with a dependence that is qualified. For this reason the latter can be separated from it but not it from them, as Vorillong rightly saw (3 d. 33, art. 3, ad 2) and Aristotle touches upon (6 Top., cap. 3, 1 pol., cap. 2). For when the parts are corrupted the whole must be corrupted; yet when the whole is corrupted it is not necessary that the parts be corrupted.

Article III. Whether the Integral and Per Accidens Whole Is Distinguished from Its Parts

Among Scotists I find very great discord and disagreement on this article. Some — such as Mastrius and Bellutus (*disp.* 5, q. 13, art. 2) and Pontius (*disp.* 35, q. 2) — deny that any whole, whether integral or *per accidens*, is really distinguished from its parts taken together. Others, from whom Fuentes (q. 6, dif. 2, art. 7) does not seem to be far distant, concede that both of the aforementioned wholes really differ from their parts taken together. Still others — such as Sirectus (*Tract. form., ad finem, art. 4, partialis*), Vallo (*ibid.*), Mayr (3 d. 2, q. 10, in calce), Tataretus (1 Phys., q. 2, dub. 2), and the Parisienses (*ibid.*, q. 4, fol. 13) — admit that the integral whole is really distinguished from its simultaneously united parts, but deny this of the *per accidens* whole.

First Assertion. The integral whole is really distinguished from its simultaneously united parts. So Scotus (2 d. 16, q. un., § *Alia opinio. F., and ibid. in Rep., § Item si sint partes, and 3 d. 22, q. un., ante § Sed quid logice, sub L.*). It is proven first from Aristotle (7 Met., T. 60), who says that the syllable *ba* is not A and B but something distinct from A and B — for if A and B are separated from one another, they indeed remain free, but the syllable does not. Likewise, flesh is not earth and fire from which it is composed, but something distinct from them — for if it is dissolved, those elements indeed remain, but flesh does not, as the Doctor excellently explains there. Mastrius and his colleague (*cited*) respond that those testimonies are to be taken of the integral whole distinguished from its parts taken separately, not from parts taken jointly. On the contrary: that is beside the point, as the same authors along with all the rest candidly confess — and they themselves together with Scotus adduce that same passage of Aristotle to prove that the essential whole is really distinguished from its simultaneously united parts, as is clear from their own first argument in (*art. 1*). Therefore they do not satisfy the passages of the Philosopher, and appear rather to contradict themselves in trying to solve them.

Second, this proposition is denied by no one: the integral whole is composed from parts. Either in this proposition the whole stands for its parts, or for something else. If the latter, then it is distinguished from them. If the former, then the same thing is composed from itself — that is, parts from parts — which is absurd. The authors cited above respond that the integral whole is not distinguished from its united parts — or from its parts taken with the union —

but that it is well distinguished from parts taken separately. But they do not resolve the argument; they beg the question. For what is in dispute is precisely whether the integral whole differs from its parts taken jointly or not. All the more so because the said authors in (*art. 1, first argument*) attack this response as void and empty.

Third, the integral whole is either homogeneous or heterogeneous, and each really differs from its parts — and indeed the heterogeneous, such as man, about which Scotus provides an example (*3 cited above, below L.*), and likewise the homogeneous, such as flesh, about which the same Doctor with Aristotle (*7 Met., T. ult.*) provides an example. Therefore the integral whole is distinguished from its parts.

Second Assertion. The quantitative whole is also something other than its parts. This is derived from Scotus (*2 d. 3, q. 4, § Ad primam rationem, sub I., and 3 in the passage cited above*), followed by Sirectus and Vallo (*ubi supra*), against Trombetta and the twin Scotists (*cited*). It is established first: there is a distinction between the universal whole, which is divided into subjective parts, and the quantitative whole, which is divided into quantitative parts. The universal whole is truly and correctly predicated of its subjective parts — as animal of man and beast — while the integral whole is not at all predicated of its parts, since this part of water is not predicated of the whole water — it is truly a part of the water, not the whole water. Therefore the quantitative whole is something other than its parts. Moreover, the universal whole, since it is identified with its parts, is rightly predicated of them.

Second, a subjective part cannot exist without the universal whole — as Peter cannot exist without man. But a quantitative part can exist without the quantitative whole — as this part of water can exist without the whole water. Therefore the quantitative whole is distinguished from its parts. Furthermore, the quantitative whole is either continuous or discrete. The continuous is evidently distinguished from its parts from what has already been proven. The discrete is also shown by Aristotle (*5 Met., c. 14*): twice three is not six, but once six is six. And Scotus (*ibid., in exp. tex.*) concurs.

Third Assertion. The *per accidens* whole is not distinguished from its parts. So the Doctor (*3 d. 2, q. 2, § Quantum ad 3, sub E.*), from whom John of Magistris (*1 Phys., q. 5, Scibile primo*) departs. It is proven first: a third thing resulting from two things that cause it is either a substance or an accident. For nothing mediates between these two members, since being is adequately divided into substance and accident (*5 Met., T. 14*). If, therefore, the *per accidens* whole were something other than the subject and the accident inhering in it, it would be either a substance or an accident. But it can be neither — otherwise a substance would be a part of an accident and an accident a part of a substance, which involves the contradiction that a substance would inhere in a subject and an accident would subsist *per se*.

Second, the subject and accident that make one *per accidens* are each complete and perfect in their own genus. Therefore they do not tend toward causing a third thing distinct from them. For to do that, they would have to be imperfect and incomplete, as is evident from matter and form causing the composite. Furthermore, the constituting principles of something other than themselves are of the same genus and category, as is clear by induction from the principles of the universal whole — which are matter and form — and from the principles and parts of the integral and quantitative whole. But the subject and the accident inhering in it are of different genus and category.

First Objection, against the First Assertion. If the integral whole were something other than its parts, then matter — which according to the Doctor (2 d. 32, q. 2, *Respondeo. D.*) consists of integral and entitative parts — would be generable and corruptible. For if it were divided into parts, its third entity would be corrupted; and if those same parts were reunited, its third entity would be generated — which conflicts with (1 *Phys.*, T. 82). Therefore the integral whole does not differ from its parts. Confirmation I: if a drop of water were to fall into the sea, a new entity of water would be generated spread through the vast expanse, and if a drop were to be taken from that same sea, a new entity of water would perish — which is extraordinary and unheard of. Confirmation II: numerically the same thing could be naturally reproduced — for if the divided parts of water are rejoined, the whole water that existed before will return. This seems absurd and unreasonable.

I respond by distinguishing the major: simply, I deny; according to a certain respect, I concede. That is said to perish simply, as the Canonist notes (1 *Phys.*, q. 9, art. 2, *dub. 1*), which is corrupted with respect to its parts and whole — as in the death of a brute, the brute perishes, as does its soul and body, or at least some part of the whole is destroyed, as in the death of a man, where his body is corrupted but his soul persists. But what ceases to exist with respect to its third entity while its parts nevertheless remain is said to be corruptible according to a certain respect. As in our present matter: if matter were divided into its substantial and entitative parts, it would be corrupted according to a certain respect. Nor is this surprising, since matter itself is commonly said to be corruptible and generable *subiective*, even if not *obiective*. And the parts of a nourished individual ebb and flow with respect to material and formal being, as the Doctor teaches (4 d. 44, q. 1).

Someone might say: if the whole is corrupted even though its parts remain, then it is corrupted simply — both because the whole is more excellent than its parts, and because once the whole is destroyed, the thing is said simply to perish and be destroyed. Thus Christ died absolutely because His humanity, which was His third entity, then perished, even though all His parts remained incorrupt. Therefore matter would be simply and absolutely corruptible and generable.

The consequence must be denied. The reason is that if the parts remain when the whole is destroyed, they can still be reunited by an agent, and since they are integrating and constituting principles, they can again cause the whole — as is evident with a whole body of water, which if divided into its parts loses its totality, yet because those same persisting parts can be reunited by an agent and cause the whole water as it was before, it is therefore said to be corrupted according to a certain respect. But if once the whole is destroyed, a part or parts do not survive but also perish, then the whole cannot return — and for this reason it is not unreasonably said to be corrupted simply. Nor does any other difficulty seem to arise, except perhaps about a name — whatever Mastrius and his colleague (*cited*) may contend. To Confirmation I: given the hypothesis, a drop of water would be united to the sea as a part is united to a whole, and a part of flesh added through nourishment is joined to the pre-existing flesh, as the Doctor teaches (*4 d. cited, passim proximé cit.*). To Confirmation II: the major is conceded, on the authority of the same Doctor (*d. 43, q. 3, § Quintum ad istum. E.*).

Second Objection. The chief reason the Scotist school defends the essential whole as being something other than its parts is that the essential parts cause the whole itself. But integral parts do not cause the integral whole — for one of them is not in the mode of that which is perfectible, and the other in the mode of that which perfects, as matter and form are. Therefore the integral whole does not differ from its parts.

I concede the major and deny the minor, from Scotus (*2 d. 16, q. un., § Alia opinio. F.*), who writes as follows: because integral parts always make a certain whole, something other than any of the parts, through something formally concurring.

Third Objection, against the Second Assertion. If the quantitative whole were posited as something other than its parts, a new quantity would be lost in its division, and in its opposition and continuation a new quantity would be acquired. But this contradicts Scotus (*4 d. 12, q. 1, § Ad quest. respondeo. K.*), who affirms that in the division of parts the relation of the united parts perishes, and in their apposition this relation of united parts is acquired. Therefore, according to Scotus, the quantitative whole does not differ from its simultaneously joined parts.

I respond that Scotus affirms one thing there without denying another. He affirms that in the division of a continuum the aforesaid relation of parts perishes, and in the apposition of parts it is acquired. But he does not deny that the quantitative whole is something other than the parts. On the contrary, before (*K.*) he plainly and openly shows that in the continuous whole there is a third entity differing from the parts, in these words: *Illa autem tertia entitas quae praefuit, non manet nunc* — that third entity which was present before no longer remains now. He also clearly acknowledges the same entity in the places cited in the second assertion.

Fourth Objection. If the quantitative whole also differs from its parts, then three would be four, and two pounds would be three pounds, and other inconveniences would follow that Tataretus (*cited*) recounts — since the number three, beyond its three parts, would include a fourth entity by which it is constituted in the being of three, and beyond the duality of two pounds a third entity distinct from them would be added.

The consequence must be denied. For that third entity of the number three is not counted as a distinct part — just as the common account and nature is not reckoned as something distinct from the particulars. For it does not hold to say: there are three men, and those three share in the common account and nature of man; therefore that common nature is distinguished from the particulars — since common things are not numbered in the enumeration of particulars, as Scotus (*1 d. 24, q. unic., D.*) and Mauritius (*q. 24, univ., § de tertio*) touch upon. The reason that can be given is that this common account is the essence and nature of the particulars, which can make no number among them.

Fifth Objection, against the Third Assertion. Every composite is distinguished from the parts of which it coalesces. But the *per accidens* whole is composed from subject and accident, from which there comes to be one *per accidens* — and each of these is in the mode of potency, as the subject, and the other — namely the accident — is in the mode of act, as both Aristotle (*8 Met., T. 15*) and Scotus (*ibid., in exp. Top.*) acknowledge. Therefore the *per accidens* whole is something other than its parts.

Confirmation I: every change has its term by which it is specified. But alteration is a change (*5 Phys., cap. 4*) whose term is the *per accidens* whole, which is therefore to be distinguished from its parts. Confirmation II: Scotus (*3 d. 2, q. 2, § Quantum ad 3, below E.*) writes that the *per accidens* whole is one something, just as the essential whole is — for just as the latter comes to be from potency and *per se* act, so the former comes to be from potency and *per accidens* act. For this reason he had just previously premised that the *per accidens* whole is not its own parts, as the aggregate whole is. Hence Aristotle (*7 Met., T. 11 and 12*) argues that a white man, who is a *per accidens* whole, is something one. Therefore it is something other than its parts.

I distinguish the major: a composite composed *out of* these, I concede; a composite composed *with* these, as the *per accidens* whole is, I deny. So responds the Canonist (*1 Phys., q. 5, art. 4*) and the Parisienses (*q. 3, fol. 13*). To the second point.

To Confirmation I: I say that alteration is specified by its formal term — so when whiteness is placed in a wall, the action is called a whitening (*5 Phys., T. 5*) by the whiteness, which is its formal term.

To the confirmation: I say that there is a parity in this — that just as matter is perfected by form, so the subject is perfected by the accident received in it —

but a disparity in that form perfects matter simply, while an accident perfects the subject in a qualified respect. From the former there results a third thing, but not from the latter, for the reasons assigned in the third assertion. Furthermore, the *per aggregationem* whole has minimal unity, from the Doctor (*1 d. 2, q. 7, § Sed hic restat.*). And the *per accidens* whole adds above that the unity of information. Hence because of this union and unity, the Philosopher (*cited*) says that the latter is not its parts even taken together — but the former is. Scotus, however, cites the example rather of the aggregate whole than of the *per accidens* whole, because the former is better known and clearer than the latter.

Book III. On Nature and Art

Aristotle treats of Nature and Art in *2 Phys.* — first of Nature, then of Art, since Nature precedes Art, which Art itself imitates.

Question I. On Nature

Article I. What Nature Is

The Philosopher in *2 Phys., cap. 1* warns that it need not be debated whether nature exists — since experience makes it evident and it is self-evident that there is natural motion, whose principle is nature. If anyone wished to prove that nature exists, he would be like one blind from birth who tried to demonstrate evidently to those who see that visible colors exist. For it is clearer to those who see that colors exist than any arguments could establish. Therefore the question of whether nature exists is set aside, and the inquiry turns to what it is.

Note first from Aristotle (*5 Met., cap. 4, T. 5*) and Scotus (*ibid., in com.*) that nature is taken in many senses. First, for God, the parent and maker of all things — as Augustine (*15 Trin., cap. 1*) takes nature — and this is by some called *natura naturans*, while the thing created by God is called *natura naturata*, as can be seen in the Conimbricenses (*2 Phys., q. 1, art. 1*). Hence the world founded by God is by some called the work of nature and intelligence.

Second, for the essence of any thing — thus the Doctor says (*2 d. 1, q. 5, § Contra ista. 1.*) after Aristotle (*7 Met., T. 41 and 42*): a definition is a statement distinctly unfolding the nature of a thing. In the same way, the faithful say that in the Divine there is one nature, and that the union of the divine Word was made not in the nature but in the person of the same Word.

Third, for the entire collection of created things — in which sense something is said to happen or to be in the nature of things, and what surpasses the powers of creatures is called a miracle. Augustine makes mention of this usage (*l. 26 contra Faustum, cap. 4, and l. 29 contra eundem, cap. 7*): if God does certain things

contrary to the customary course of nature, they are called great deeds and wonders; but those that do not exceed the manner and use of nature are called natural.

Fourth, for nativity, which is the generation of living things. For nature derives from nourishing, as Scotus (*recently cited*) notes. Since generation proceeds from an internal principle, the name of nature arose to designate the internal principle of any thing, as is evident in the Philosopher (*cited just above*). Therefore nature, properly speaking — about which we treat in the present discussion — is taken for the origin and intrinsic principle of motion and rest.

Note second that nature is defined in 2 *Phys.*, *cap. 1, T. 3* in these words: nature is the principle and cause of motion and rest in that in which it is, primarily and *per se* and not according to accident. It is explained with respect to all its parts. The word *principle* is placed as the genus. *Cause* is added on account of privation, which is indeed a principle but not a cause. *Of motion, of rest* is added — understand this disjunctively, with *or*. For some bodies, such as the heavens, are always in motion; others are always at rest, such as the earth. It can also be taken conjunctively — for all natural things are suited and capable of motion and rest, even though in act some only move and others only rest. *In that in which it is* is said so as to differ from an extrinsic principle such as the efficient cause. *Primarily* is added on account of accidents, which in some way contribute to motion and rest — as gravity in a heavy thing and levity in a light thing — and it designates nature as the radical and principal principle of moving and resting. *Per se and not according to accident* is added on account of art, which is the principle *per accidens* of motion and rest — as a bench is moved or rests not insofar as it is a bench or a work of art, but insofar as it is a natural body or wood, in which nature inheres as the aforesaid principle of moving and resting.

Assertion. The proper and genuine definition of nature is the one just given and explained above. The Doctor accepts it (2 *d. 2, q. 10, § Respondeo. F.*) together with the entire Peripatetic school. It is established by the common medium. That is a good definition in which the proper genus and difference are assigned, from what was established in the *Epitome* (1 *l. 1, q. 7, art. 2*). But this definition is of this kind — for the word *principle* is in place of the genus, and the remaining parts hold the place of the difference. Therefore it is a sound and exact definition. Furthermore, it belongs to everything contained under the defined term and to nothing else, and contains nothing superfluous or deficient — as the laws of good definition require. Therefore it is rightly given.

First Objection. An absolute thing is not defined by a relative, since they are opposites. But *principle* is a relative, and nature is an absolute being, since it belongs to the genus of substance. Therefore nature is ineptly defined by *principle*.

I distinguish the major: formally and essentially, I concede; fundamentally and materially, I deny. Thus matter is defined by *potency* and form by *act*, which are relatives, as Aristotle shows (*2 Phys.*, T. 26).

Second Objection. The same thing cannot be the cause of opposites — especially privative opposites — as is evident (*4 Meteor.*, *sum.* 2, *cap.* 3). But motion and rest are privative opposites, since rest is the privation of motion. Therefore nature is wrongly defined as the principle of motion and rest.

I concede the major. I distinguish the minor: if rest is taken as the privation of motion, I concede; if it is taken for consisting in a place, as it is taken in the present context, I deny. This response is derived from Scotus (*4 d.* 48, *q.* 2, § *Ad argumenta.* O.) and touched upon by Augustine (*2 de lib. arb.*, *before cap.* 8).

Third Objection. A correct definition applies to all things contained under the defined term (*6 Top.*, *cap.* 4). But the definition given is not of this kind — both because it does not belong to the rational soul or to angels, which are separate forms, and also because it does not apply to the earth, which stands forever (*Eccl.* 1), nor to the heavens, which are always in motion. Therefore another definition of nature should be assigned.

I concede the major and deny the minor. In response to its proof, I say that the rational soul is nature, since it is the true form of the human body — which, although it can exist separated from the body, nevertheless always has an aptitude and inclination toward it. An angel, however, is not a physical form as a part of a body, but is a complete and perfect nature, and therefore the definition of nature does not suit it. As for what is said of the earth, I say that even though in fact it rests, motion is not incompatible with it, since it has in itself the principle of motion, which is nature. In the same way, although the heavens always move, they can nevertheless rest — as they rested in the time of Joshua until the battle against Gibeon was completed (*Jos.* 10), and after the day of judgment they will no longer be moved. Therefore the heavens and the earth have within themselves the principle of moving and resting.

Article II. Whether Nature Is a Passive Principle

Philosophers are divided three ways on this article. Some — such as Vallesius (*controvers.* 11, *Phys.*) and Vasquez (*1.* 2, *disp.* 25, *cap.* 3) — hold that nature is only an active principle. Others — among whom are Mastrius and Bellutus (*disp.* 6 *Phys.*, *q.* *prima*) — hold that nature is both an active and a passive principle. Still others — such as Scotus (*2 d.* 2, *q.* 10, § *Respondeo.* F., and *d.* 18, *q.* *un.*, § *Contrà primum*, and *4 d.* 43, *q.* 4, § *Intelligendum*), Faber (*Theor.* 33), and Pontius (*disp.* 36, *q.* 2, *n.* 9) — maintain that nature, properly taken, is only a passive principle. I see, however, that this dispute is almost entirely verbal and consists in the multiple acceptance of the terms *nature* and *natural*. Some take these more broadly, others more narrowly — just as was said of *praxis* in (*Log.* l. 1, *q.* 2, *art.* 5, *dub.* 1)

and of *action* in the work on generation (*l. 3, q. 1, art. 1*). Therefore, to satisfy the proposed difficulty, I premise what I observed in the preceding article.

Note first from Scotus (*q. 1 prol., § Ad quest. L.*) that the receptive subject of a certain form can be compared in two ways — either to the form it receives, or to the agent from which it receives it. If it regards the form, either it inclines toward it — as fire toward an upward place — and is called *natural*; or it does not incline toward it but resists, as fire toward a downward place, and is called *violent*; or it neither inclines nor resists, as the surface of a wall toward receiving whiteness, and is called *neutral*. But if it is referred to the agent, either the agent habitually produces that form — and this kind of form is called *natural* — or the agent does not habitually produce it and does produce it, and it is named *supernatural*, as if God were to produce fire immediately, that fire would be called supernatural. Likewise, if He were to restore sight to a blind man, it would be a miracle, as Christ foretold (*John 9*): *A saeculo non est auditum, ut quis aperuerit oculos caeci nati* — from the beginning of the world it has not been heard that anyone opened the eyes of one born blind.

Note second from the same Doctor (*4 d. 42, q. 4, § Intelligendum. A.*) that *natural* is an equivocal name which must be distinguished and explained with respect to its multiple acceptances (*1 Top., c. 12*). Natural is taken, first, as opposed to supernatural — in which sense everything contained in the series of created things is called natural, and God alone is called a supernatural being, because He exists above all created things, surpassing and excelling them as their cause and author. Second, as opposed to free — in which sense every necessary agent lacking will and freedom, or everything non-free, is called natural. Thus fire is a natural agent and naturally heats and burns, and man naturally reasons, laughs, and performs other actions naturally, insofar as he is endowed with intellect and other necessary and natural potencies, distinct from the will, which is a free potency. Third, as opposed to the violent and the neutral — in which sense, natural is that which inclines toward receiving a certain form. Hence Augustine (*3 de lib. arbit., cap. 1*) writes that the downward motion of a stone is natural, since by its own nature it tends toward that place — and it is in this most proper sense that nature, from which natural is derived, is defined in *2 Phys., T. 3* as the intrinsic and *per se* principle of moving and resting.

Assertion. Nature taken most strictly and narrowly is only a passive principle, according to Aristotle, Scotus, and truth. This assertion is divided into three parts.

The first part is established first from Aristotle (*cited, cap. 3, T. 5, proximé cit.*), who, when showing us what kind of principle nature is — active or passive — offers the example of fire, which is naturally carried upward, evidently with respect to a passive principle, as the word *is carried* plainly indicates. And shortly before (*T. 3, cap. 1*) he had given the analogy of a sick physician who is cured, not insofar as he is a physician — for it is accidental that the patient is a physician —

because he is not cured insofar as he has an active principle, that is, medical art, but insofar as he has a passive principle of receiving health. The same is suggested in (8 *Phys.*, T. 27, 28, 29) and (2 *Phys.*, T. 71 and 3 of the same work, S.), where he says that physically moved movers are the subject of physical consideration, but not unmoved movers. And this, according to the Greek codex, Aristotle had plainly indicated in the definition of nature (2 *Phys.*, T. 3) — which, as the Conimbricenses note (*ibid.*, in cap. 1, q. 2), reads: nature is the principle and cause in that which is moved. Where the verb *is moved* — a passive form — is used.

The second part is shown from Scotus, who writes (2 d. 2, q. 10, § *Respondeo, sub F.*): motion is not natural because it has an active principle, but because it has only a passive principle, naturally inclining toward motion. He teaches the same expressly (d. 18, q. un., § *Contrà.* 4., and in *Rep.*, d. 17, q. 3).

Mastrius and his colleague (*cited above*) respond that those testimonies of Scotus are to be understood primarily of the passive principle and secondarily of the active, insofar as the active is connected to the passive. On the contrary: the Doctor (*cited*) explicitly says that only the passive principle is the nature described in 2 *Phys.*, cap. 1. Therefore, since the particle *only* is exclusive, it undoubtedly excludes the active principle. I add that in (5 *Met.*, in exp., cap. 4) he evidently removes the response given, in these words: the principle of motion which is called nature — by which natural motion is distinguished from violent — is not taken for the active principle, as some say, but for the passive principle. And the same (7 *Met.*, q. 12, § *Ad 1.*) adds: motion is never called natural because of an intrinsic active principle, but only because of a passive one.

Nor does it help to say with Mastrius that Scotus (q. 1 *prol.*, § *Ad argumenta pro opinione Aristot. Q.*) extends the definition of nature given in 2 *Phys.*, T. 3 to the active principle. For the Doctor there says that many subjects are naturally receptive of a certain perfection that do not have an intrinsic active principle — as the organic body is indeed receptive of the soul, yet not its efficient principle. Likewise, the soul is receptive of grace and glory, but not their efficient cause. Furthermore, in (5 *Met.*, near the end, comm., cap. 4) he adds that it is not incompatible for form, as it is nature, to have an active principle. Therefore it seems that the Doctor comprehends under nature both principles — the active as well as the passive.

However, the Doctor there teaches that in the class of created things, certain things have the capacity to receive a certain perfection, yet do not have in themselves an active power to produce it. But whether nature most properly taken is an active or passive or both principles simultaneously, he does not decide in that passage — as he does in the passages cited. Moreover, although something may in itself possess a natural active principle of producing something — as a heavy thing has the active principle of tending downward and a light thing of tending upward — nonetheless it is not called nature in the strict

sense because of that active principle, but because of the passive principle. For it is accidental that a thing has an active principle, as I made clear above in the case of the sick physician. Thus also the testimony adduced from (5 Met.) is satisfied: form is properly called nature not because of an active principle but because of a passive one. All the more so since no one denies that Scotus opines rather than demonstrates — and perhaps for this reason he places the word *repugnare* (*is incompatible with*) there with some tentativeness, even though he himself firmly and evidently adheres to the opinion he cites.

The third part is proven first from Scotus (5 Met., *now cited*). A change is natural with respect to which the patient is changed — that is, in the way it is naturally suited to be changed by any agent — as is evident from (8 Phys., T. 32), where it reads that light things are carried upward and heavy things downward because they are naturally suited to be moved in this way. But the patient is never naturally suited to be moved in this way because of an active principle existing in it, but only because of a passive principle — so that if water is heated by fire, that heating is not natural to the water not because it is produced by fire, but because the water does not naturally incline toward it. Whereas if the same water becomes cold, that cooling is natural not because it is produced by the water itself or by another agent, but because the water by its own nature inclines toward it.

Second, from the same Doctor (4 d. 43, q. 4, § *Intelligendum. D.*): that is *per se* the cause of some effect which, once posited — with everything else excluded or changed — the effect follows. But once the natural inclination of the subject toward receiving something is posited, even if there is in the subject no active principle for producing it, the effect properly follows and is properly called natural — and not the reverse. Thus health is called natural to man not because he has in himself an active principle for it — which is accidental (2 Phys., T. 3) — but because by his own nature he inclines toward it. Therefore properly speaking nature is a passive principle. I add that it is impossible for the active principle of motion to be in the moved thing primarily and *per se* — since it is accidental for the mover and the moved to coincide in the same subject, since they can be separated from one another. Say, therefore, that nature properly taken is only a passive principle.

First Objection against the first part of the assertion. Form is nature (2 Phys., T. 11). But form is an active principle. For in the passage now cited, (T. 70 and T. 13), if a bed is buried and rots and then sprouts, it will sprout not as a bed but as wood. Again, in the chapter on the parts of animals, (*cap. 1*), the soul — which is form — is nature, and Aristotle there wants it to be an active principle.

Furthermore, in (9 Met., T. 13): nature is of the same genus as active potency. Moreover, in (8 Phys., T. 27): animals are naturally moved of themselves because they have within themselves an active principle of moving, which is the soul,

and the soul is nature. Therefore in Aristotle's school nature is predicated of an active principle.

I concede the major and distinguish the minor: as it is nature, I deny — for thus it is a passive principle, from Scotus (*5 Met., in comm., cap. 4, 7 Met., q. 12, q. Ad omnes.*). As it is distinguished from art and from a free principle, I concede — as Scotus writes (*q. 1 prol., § Ad argumenta pro opinione Aristot. Q.*). By this distinction all the cited testimonies of Aristotle are explained, and I declared this above in Note II.

Second Objection. Natural things differ from artificial things in that artificial things do not have an active principle, whereas natural things do (*2 Phys., cap. 1, T. 3*). But if nature were a passive principle, there would be no such distinction, since both natural and artificial things would share in a passive principle.

Confirmation I: from (*6 Met., l. 1*), the principle of artificial things is in the knowing agent, and the principle of natural things is in the moved thing. But the principle of artificial things that exists in the knowing agent is active. Therefore the principle of natural things is likewise active. Confirmation II: in the definition of nature the word *cause* is placed. But a cause is active, since it influences the effect. Therefore nature is an active principle.

I respond with Scotus (*2 d. 18, q. un., § Contrà. C., and 6 Met., in com., cap. 1, in fine, and Met., q. 2, § Ad aliud de differentia*): natural and artificial things are distinguished in that natural things have a passive principle inclining toward the perfection they receive, while artificial things have a neutral and indifferent principle for receiving this or that form — as wood is indifferent toward the craftsman fashioning from it the form of Jove or Mercury. To Confirmation I: I say that *principle* is not taken uniformly but differently — in the craftsman it is active, in the natural thing it is passive, as the Doctor teaches (*cited above, before D.*). To Confirmation II: I say that *cause* is used in the definition of nature for a passive and receptive cause having an inclination toward the form to be received — as is evident in matter, which is numbered among the causes even though it is passive.

Third Objection. From (*3 Eth., l. 1*): the violent is that whose principle is outside, with the patient contributing no force. Therefore by opposition, the natural is that whose principle is within, having some force or power of acting — and accordingly, nature is an active principle.

I respond with the Doctor (*in Met. recently cited, at the end of q. 12, and 4 d. 29, q. un., § De primo. B.*) that the words of the Philosopher, *with the patient contributing no force*, are to be taken not negatively but contrarily. That is to say: the violent is that whose principle is outside, with the patient resisting and reluctant toward the form being received in it, toward the contrary of which it inclines. The natural, by contrast, is that whose principle is within, inclining toward receiving the form.

Fourth Objection, against the third part. Natural is named from nature, from which it derives. But by an active principle something is called natural — as igniting is natural to fire, and ignition is a natural action proceeding from fire acting actively, as Augustine (*in Ps. 104*) and Damascene (*4 fidei, c. 41*) indicate. Therefore nature is an active principle.

This argument is given great weight by Mastrius (*cited*), but it seems to me to be of little moment and weak force. For it commits the sophism of equivocation, placed in the multiple acceptance of the word *natural* — of which I made mention above, as Scotus notes (*7 Met., q. 12, near the end, and he suggests the same in q. 1 prol., q.*). For it holds of nature and natural as opposed to free and spontaneously acting — but not of nature and natural as in (*2 Phys., T. 3*), as opposed to the violent and the neutral.

Article III. To What Things the Account of Nature Belongs

A question can arise regarding matter, form, the composite, and the soul — especially the rational soul — which will be briefly decided and settled through the following assertions.

First Assertion. Matter is nature. This is taught against Vallesius (*contr. 11*) and Vasquez (*1 l. 2, disp. 25, n. 22*) by the natural philosophers together with Aristotle (*2 Phys., T. 4 and 10, and 5 Met., T. 5*) and Scotus (*ibid., in com., and 2 d. 18, q. un., § Contrà, sub C.*). It is proven first by the reasoning touched upon by Aristotle (*cited*): what constitutes the natural composite is nature, because the natural does not come to be from non-nature. But matter partially constitutes the natural composite — for what is composed of matter and form, from what was established in the preceding book (*q. 6, art. 1*). Therefore matter is nature.

Second, that to which the definition of nature belongs is nature, as is evident by the argument from definition to the thing defined. But the definition of nature applies to matter — for it is the first subject of every natural transmutation and the first principle of any natural motion. Therefore matter is nature.

Second Assertion. Form is nature, both of non-living and of living things, including the rational soul. This assertion is threefold. The first part is transmitted by Aristotle and Scotus in the preceding assertion, and is established first: what is denominated by an intrinsic denomination is intrinsically such — as is evident of a man who is intrinsically called rational, and of a white wall which is called white. But form is denominated nature (*2 Phys., T. 11*). Therefore it is truly nature.

Second: what is more such in a given order is such in that order — as what is more white. But form is more nature than matter (*2 Phys., T. 12*), and matter is nature as established above. Therefore form is also. Third, the whole comes to be from natures (*ibid.*), among which form is the principal. And (*ibid., T. 14*): generation is the way toward nature, or toward form — which is rightly called

more nature, both because it is more perfect than matter and because it is a principle in a more perfect mode. Therefore the account of nature is well adapted to form.

The second part is defended by Aristotle (*cited, T. 1, 12, and 1 de anima, T. 1, and 1 de partibus animalium, cap. 1*), Scotus (*Quol. 9, art. 2 and 3*), and the other philosophers, against Albertus (*2 Phys., Tract. 1, cap. 1*) and Simplicius (*in the present passage*). It is proven first: the soul of living things endowed with vegetative and sensitive life is the true form of the organic body. But from the first part of this assertion it has been shown that form taken universally is nature. Therefore the soul, whether vegetative or sensitive, is nature.

Second, the soul taken generally is the principle and cause of motion and rest. Therefore it is nature. The consequence holds. The antecedent is shown: the soul is the receptive principle and cause of natural changes suitable to it — such as nutrition, growth, sensation, and the like — which proceed from nature. Therefore the soul is not to be exempted from the account of nature.

The third part is intimated by Aristotle (*2 Phys., T. 12*), who numbers man among the things constituted by nature. But man is most of all man through the rational soul, which is his form and principal part. And in (*1 de anima, T. 1*) he calls the soul taken universally a nature — and under the soul, as under its quasi-genus, the rational soul is comprehended. And in (*2 of the same work, T. 24*): the soul is the first principle of vegetating and understanding — and the rational soul is this kind of principle, especially of understanding, by which it is distinguished from others. This is stated plainly by the Doctor (*cited, and 2 d. 18, q. un., sub C., § Contrà, and 4 d. 43, q. 2, art. 1, and elsewhere*).

It is proven first: every form informing, together with matter, constitutes a physical whole, is nature (*1 Phys., T. 12*). But the rational soul is an informing form — both because it is defined in the Council of the Lateran under Leo X and of Vienne under Clement V, and because it constitutes man in the being of man and distinguishes him from others. Therefore it is nature.

Second, the definition of nature applies to the rational soul — for it is the first principle and cause of natural changes and operations, namely vegetating, sensing, and understanding, not insofar as these proceed from it actively, but insofar as they are received in it passively. Therefore it is nature. Furthermore, in (*1 l. 1 de anima, q. 1, art. 2*) I shall show that the rational soul, with respect to the grade of reasoning and understanding, belongs to the natural philosopher, since it is the true and proper form of the human body, through which man is integrated.

Third Assertion. The form of the whole and the composite is not nature. From this Fuentes (*2 Phys., q. 1, dif. 2, art. 8*) and Mastrius (*disp. 6, q. 2, art. 1*) deviate. But all other philosophers incline toward this view, together with Aristotle (*2 Phys., T. 12, and 5 Met., T. 5, cap. 4*) and Scotus (*ibid., in com.*). Hence Mastrius (*cited*) is

refuted — who admits that this is Aristotle's view but denies it is Scotus's. For Scotus clearly teaches and defends it in the passage cited, saying with Aristotle that where Aristotle speaks of form in that place, it is to be understood of the form of the part, not of the form of the whole. Therefore when Scotus calls the form of the whole the essence and quiddity of the thing, he is taking nature in the passages cited by Mastrius in a broad sense — as he himself declares in explaining the modes of nature in his commentary on that same passage of the *Metaphysics*.

The assertion is established first: what comes to be from something is not that from which it comes to be — as in natural things a son, who comes to be from a father, is not the father; and in artificial things an ark, which comes to be from wood, is not wood. But the form of the whole and the whole itself consist of natures — namely matter and form, which are natures as proven above. Therefore it is not nature.

Second, nature is the first principle of motion and rest (*2 Phys.*, *T. 3*). But the form of the whole and the composite is not the first principle, but rather something derived from first principles. Therefore it is not the nature defined in the passage just cited. Furthermore, Aristotle (*2 anima*, *T. 4*) proves that the soul is not a body because it is in the body. And Augustine intimates the same (*lib. de immortalitate animae*, *cap. 7*, and *lib. 83*, *qq.*, *q. 54*). But in the composite, nature is like a part in the whole. Therefore the whole is not nature but a thing having nature.

First Objection, against the First Assertion. Aristotle (*5 Met.*, *cap. 4*, *T. 1*) says that matter is nature only metaphorically, and gives the reason: because every substance is called nature on account of form. Confirmation I: nature, beyond the passive principle, denotes an inclination toward what is to be received in it. But matter of itself is indifferent and indeterminate toward any form whatever, as Scotus teaches (*4 d. 43*, *q. 3*, *1.*). Therefore it is not nature. Especially because, according to Aristotle (*2 Phys.*, *T. 5*, and *8 of the same work*, *T. 32*), natural motion is determinate — as the motion of the elements. Therefore if matter were nature, all motion would be natural, since it inclines toward all, and no motion would be violent, since matter cannot suffer violence.

Confirmation II: nature is the receptive principle of motion. But matter is not the subject of motion — rather the composite is, which according to Scotus is established as the subject of all accidents. Therefore matter ought not to be regarded as nature.

The Doctor responds in his exposition of that text of Aristotle: Aristotle says extensively and improperly that every substance is nature, because nature is substance. Yet shortly before he had already affirmed that matter is properly nature — and he had premised this in (*2 Phys.*, *T. 4 and 10*). Therefore there he only intimates that form is a more excellent and nobler nature, confirming what

he had already said in (*Phys., cited, T. 12*): form is more nature than matter. To Confirmation I, I concede the major. To the minor, I say that matter participates in a universal and unlimited inclination of itself toward every form, which inclination is limited and determined by this or that form. Thus the matter of a stone, because of its form and gravity, inclines toward downward motion, as the Doctor clearly explains (*in both works, 2 d. 18, q. un.*). Hence the same Doctor (*in Met., cited, with Aristotle, ibid.*) teaches that matter is nature because it is receptive of form, and that every mode of nature is reduced to form, which is the principal nature. To Confirmation II, I concede the major and distinguish the minor: matter is not the *quod* subject of motion, I concede; it is not the *quo* subject, I deny — especially because it is the common subject of every generation and corruption, as is evident (*1 de generatione, T. 1*).

Second Objection, against the first part of the Second Assertion. Form is the active principle of natural operations, as no one denies. But nature, from the assertions above, is a passive principle. Therefore form is not nature.

The Doctor responds in the places recently cited: form is called nature not with respect to the active principle but with respect to the passive. Thus the downward motion of a heavy thing is called natural not insofar as the mobile moves, but insofar as it is moved by an intrinsic principle, which is passive.

Third Objection, against the second part of the said Assertion. The definition of nature does not belong to the soul. Therefore the soul is not nature. The antecedent is shown: for the soul is defined as the first act of the organic body having the potency for life (*2 anima, T. 6*).

I respond that the soul is considered in two ways. One way as it is nature — thus the definition of nature applies to it, since it is the first principle and cause of natural motion, namely vegetating, sensing, and understanding, not indeed insofar as these proceed from it actively, but insofar as they are received in it passively. The other way as it constitutes the living body, giving it life and animated being — and thus it is defined in the passage cited from *2 de anima*. Nor is it inconvenient that the same thing should have diverse definitions, as is evident in logic regarding genus, difference, and others. For with respect to diverse formal accounts, those diverse definitions are sought.

Fourth Objection, against the third part of the same Assertion. Nature is established as the principle of physical motion, which is material and corporeal. But the rational soul, with respect to the intellectual grade, does not depend on matter or body in being or in operation — for the will and intellect and the operations of each are altogether immaterial and spiritual. Therefore the rational soul according to the said grade is not nature.

I respond that nature need not be the immediate subject of motion, as is evident from matter, which — although it is nature — nonetheless does not receive alterations, augmentations, and other motions immediately, but rather the

living and animated composite does. And the same must be said of the vegetative and sensitive soul, which do not immediately receive the aforesaid motions. Therefore it suffices that a thing be an essential part of the physical composite for it to be nature. Now since the rational soul, even according to the said intellective grade, is this kind of physical form of the human body, it therefore rightly possesses the account of nature, as the Doctor indicates (*Quol. 9, § De secundo, before D.*).

Fifth Objection, against the Third Assertion. In (*2 Phys., l. 1*) these words are found: *naturalia sunt quidem, ut animalia et partes ipsorum et plantae et simplicia corpora, ut terra, ignis*, etc. — things that are natural include animals and their parts, plants, and simple bodies such as earth, fire, and so on. The same is found in (*5 Met., cap. 4, T. 5*): *Natura quidem igitur, quod ex his utrisque est, ut animalia et eorum partes* — nature, then, is what consists of both of these, as animals and their parts. But animals and the other things named are composites having the form of the whole. Therefore the form of the whole and the whole are nature.

Scotus answers in his commentary on that text of the *Metaphysics*: by *nature* there one must understand things having nature — as Aristotle also explains (*2 Phys., T. 5*) — meaning that composites are not nature but things having nature.

One may ask first whether privation is nature. I respond that it is nature in a qualified sense, but not simply, as Aristotle (*cited, T. 15*) acknowledges. The reason is that privation is in some way form, since it is in a subject as form is in matter.

One may ask second whether matter and form are univocally predicated under the common account of nature. I respond affirmatively with the Doctor (*2 Rep., d. 17, q. 3*). The reason is that the definition of nature applies equally to each. And those things that share the same definition are univocated with one another.

Question II. On Art

Art is defined by Aristotle (*6 Eth., 4*) and Scotus (*Quol. 8, § Ad ista. E., and 1 d. 38, q. un., F.*) as a habit productive with right reason. Its parts have been explained and its acceptances have been adduced in the *Logic* (*lib. 1, q. 2, art. 1*). Here we treat of art only insofar as the essence of nature may become better known to us and its similarity or dissimilarity may be brought to light.

Article I. Whether Art Imitates Nature

No one doubts that art imitates nature, since the statement (*2 Phys., T. 22*) is well established. Yet in what respect its truth holds may be questioned — namely whether it is in the effects, in the agent, or in the form of each.

Assertion. Art in some things imitates nature, and in some things departs from it. This assertion has two parts and is intimated by the Doctor (*2 d. 18, q. un., § Contrà C.*). The first part is established first: just as nature assimilates to itself the

effect it produces — and this is held to be its most perfect work, in accordance with the well-known saying, *the most natural work is to generate what is similar to oneself* — so art renders the work it produces similar to the form or idea the craftsman carries in his mind. Toward this Aristotle (*7 Met.*, T. 22, and 12 of the same, T. 24) looks when he says that health and a house externally are produced from health and the house that is within, or in the mind of the craftsman.

Second, each presupposes a subject from which it produces its effects, since neither can operate from nothing, as the Doctor shows (*4 d. 1, q. 1*).

Third, each advances from the imperfect to the perfect, as daily experience confirms, and as Aristotle observes (*2 de generatione animalium*, cap. 3, and *2 de historia eorum*).

Fourth, both are the measure of the things to be done by them — for they operate by certain rules and laws, as is evident from the art of dancing, singing, and the like.

Fifth, in both there occur accidents and monsters, of which we treat in the following Book IV.

The second part is shown first: nature is a substance (*2 Phys.*, T. 4), while art is an accident residing in the category of quality. Second, nature is an internal principle of motion and rest, while art is only an external and directive one, as Scotus warns (*1 d. 38, q. un.*, § *Ad autoritates. F.*). Third, nature is the maker of true and proper things, while art only of likenesses and appearances. Hence natural forms are alive and active, while artificial forms are, as it were, dead, having no power of acting. Fourth, nature is occupied with hidden and recondite elaborations, while art is engaged with external and visible ones. Fifth, nature is perfectible by art, and art is its perfective. Hence arises that adage (*2 Phys.*, T. 79): art perfects nature — as from rough stone a beautiful statue is fashioned, and from the mixing of colors things more beautiful than nature has made are produced. Art also teaches how to operate perfectly what is done imperfectly by the guidance of nature alone, as is evident in music.

Furthermore, what cannot be effected by nature is elaborated by art, as a house. Moreover, what by its nature appears immovable is moved by art, as a clock. And finally, what the force of nature does not attain is wonderfully accomplished by art, as is evident from cannons and other artifacts sufficiently admirable, which reduce men to stupefaction.

Objection. Nature properly taken is only a passive principle. Therefore it is not the cause of real effects, and accordingly does not differ from art.

I say that in the present context nature is taken not only as opposed to the violent, but also as distinguished from a free agent, as the Doctor notes (*5 Met.*, in com., cap. 4).

Article II. Whether Art Can Produce the Works of Nature

The earlier opinion is that of Albertus (*3 Miner., cap. 9*) and Henry (*Quol. 5, q. 3*), who affirm that art can bring about the works of nature. The later opinion is that of Scotus (*Theor. 18, and 2 d. 18, q. un., § Dico, sub K., and 4 d. 3, q. 3, in solutione 3. H.*), Thomas (*2 l. 2, q. 77, art., ad 1*), and the disciples of both — who deny that art *per se* and by its own proper power can accomplish the works of nature.

Note that art is taken in two ways: one way, for practical knowledge that directs what is to be made — in this sense art is one of the five habits of the intellect enumerated in (*6 Eth., 3*). Another way, for the form of art in matter elaborated by the craftsman — as the image of Saint Francis formed on a wall.

Furthermore, in a work of art two things can be seen, as in a chest: the wood, which is from nature, and the mode or figure, which is from art. Furthermore, a work can be done by art in two ways: *per se* and by proper power, or *per accidens* and by the application of actives to passives.

Assertion. Art by its own power cannot attain the effects of nature. So the Doctor (*ubi supra*). It is proven first from Aristotle (*2 Phys., T. 2*), who, in establishing the difference between art and nature, writes that nature has in itself the principle of motion and rest, while art lacks this kind of principle. Second, every true and proper cause contains virtually the effect to be produced from it — otherwise it could not produce it. But art does not virtually contain the effects of nature, because these are substances while art is an accident, and I shall show elsewhere that an accident cannot produce a substance. Third, art does not operate except by directing, regulating, and modifying the works of nature, as I declared in the preceding note. But direction, regulation, and modification — being intentional accidents — cannot attain the offspring and effects of nature. Therefore art by its proper power cannot produce them.

First Objection. In (*Exod. 7*), by magic art the wise men of the Egyptians made serpents, which Augustine — in numerous places, notably (*10 Civit., cap. 8, and lib. 2, qq. super Exod., q. 21*) — testifies were true serpents just like the serpent made by Moses. Again, Vives (*in com., 4 Civit., cap. 19*) narrates from Livy and Plutarch that a statue of Fortune spoke twice, in these words: *Rite me matrona vidistis, riteque dedicastis* — Rightly, matrons, did you see me and rightly dedicate me. Many other marvelous things fabricated by art are reported by historians, which appear to have attained the works of nature.

I respond that these and similar things adduced by the adversaries are to be interpreted through the distinction given in the preceding note — namely that they are effected by art not *per se* and by its proper power, but *per accidens* and by the application of actives to passives, as Scotus acknowledges (*2 d. 18, q. un., before § Ad argumenta. L.*).

Second Objection. By a certain art there are produced certain effects that nature cannot attain. Therefore much more can art produce effects that nature makes. The consequence is evident by the argument from the greater to the lesser. The

antecedent is established regarding icons and astronomical rings, by the power of which many things are accomplished that surpass the forces of nature.

I deny the antecedent. In response to its proof, I say that those works are accomplished not by the power of such images and figures, but with the help of demons, who come — by explicit or tacit compact — to mock and deceive men and to draw them away from the worship of the true God. Hence Augustine (*lib. 2 ad Simplicianum*, q. 3), from (1 Reg. 28), believes it possible by God's permission that a demon through the witch of Endor caused Samuel to rise up to speak with Saul.

Third Objection. By art are made glass, butter, and things of that kind, which are substantial effects. Therefore the effects of nature can be produced by art.

I concede the antecedent and deny the consequence, because effects of this kind do not proceed from the power of art but from the power of natural things applied through appropriate positioning, mixing, and application of actives to passives, as the Doctor indicates (4 d. 3, q. 3, § *Ad 1. G. and H.*), and before him Augustine (3 *Trin.*, 8), who says: the man who plants does not create the harvest, nor did Jacob, applying rods at the watering troughs from which the sheep drank, create the spotted color of the sheep.

Article III. Whether Artificial Forms Are Distinguished from Natural Ones

The Parisienses (2 *Phys.*, q. 4) report that the Nominalists hold that artificial forms are confused with natural ones and that there is no distinction between them except with respect to words and names. Others, however, whom the said Parisienses and Antonio Andrea follow (*in cap. 1, lib. Sex Principiorum*), establish a real distinction between the aforesaid forms.

First Assertion. An artificial form is something real and positive. So the Doctor (8 *Met.*, *in com.*, cap. 3, and 4 d. 1, q. 1, § *Tertia ratio. K.*), and elsewhere as cited by Lychetus (2 d. 5, q. 1, § *Dicitur ab Henrico, in comm., before the solution of certain doubts*), whom Porretanus preceded (*lib. Sex Principiorum*, cap. 1). It is proven first from Aristotle (2 *Phys.*, T. 11), who says that a bed not yet having the form of art is only potentially artificial, but becomes actually artificial through the artificial form newly coming to it. Second, what falls under the object of sense is a real positive thing, since sense is of singulars (2 *Post.*, T. 27, cap. 11), which are real and positive — being things that are produced and perceived *per se*. But the form of art falls under the object of sense — for figure is a common sensible (2 *anima*, T. 64). Therefore the form of art is a real positive being.

Third, the term of a real positive action is real and positive, since action is not directed toward nothing. But the artificial form is the term of the real positive action of the craftsman — since the craftsman truly acts upon the pre-existing matter so as to introduce into it the form of art he intends. Fourth, art is defined

as a habit productive with right reason (6 *Eth.*, 4). Therefore its work is something real and positive, which cannot be without a real positive form — which is the artificial form.

Second Assertion. The form of art is really distinguished from the form of nature. This is derived from Aristotle (2 *Phys.*, T. 3 and 11) and Scotus (6 *Met.*, in com., cap., in fine, and 7 of the same, q. 12, § *Ad aliud*, and 2 d. 18, q. un., § *Contrà*, sub C.). It can be established first by the differences between each adduced in the second part of the assertion in Article I. Second, what remains when another is destroyed is really distinguished from it — as the Doctor subtly and effectively proves from Aristotle (2 d. 1, q. 4, § *Contra istam*). But the natural form remains while the artificial form perishes, as is evident from a statue figured in marble, which is destroyed in the marble while the form of the marble remains as it was before the impression of the said figure. Therefore the one really differs from the other.

Third, between accident and substance there is a real distinction, as is evident (7 *Met.*, sum. 1, cap. 2). But art is an accident, and its form is an accident — since it can be present and absent without the corruption of the subject. But nature and its form is a substance (2 *Phys.*, T. 4). Therefore between the said forms there is interposed a real distinction.

Third Assertion. An artificial form is not a location. This is drawn from the Doctor (*cited*) against Arriaga (*disp.* 6, sect. 2). It is proven first: if the form of art were a location, then when an artifact is merely changed locally, its form would also change — since its location changes. But this is plainly false, since the same artificial vessel, moved many times according to place, retains the same artificial form. Therefore, etc.

Second, the artificial form is effected by the craftsman, just as a natural form is effected by a natural agent. But the craftsman does not produce a location but presupposes it — for what is located presupposes the place in which it exists. All the more so since the same wood remaining in one and the same place receives several artificial forms — such as the form of Jove, Mercury, and so forth. Therefore it is evidently established that the artificial form is not a location.

Fourth Assertion. The artificial form is a quality that terminates quantity, elaborated by the craftsman through his practical intellect and will. From this the Doctor does not appear to deviate (*in com.* 12 *Met.*, T. 15, and 4 d. 1, q. 1, § *Tertia ratio*), which is maintained by John of Magistris (2 *Phys.*, q. 2) and the Parisienses (*ibid.*, q. 4), with whom Bonetus also agrees (*lib. de qualitate*, digress. ult.). It is explained before being proven. *Quality* is placed as the genus. *Terminative of quantity* is added to distinguish it both from the substantial form — which is the term of matter — and from the form or figure of quantity — which belongs to its own genus, as a triangle. The remaining parts are added so that its nature may be better known and its difference from other things may be

observed — especially from the intellectual form which is in the mind of the craftsman, in whose likeness the said form is produced, and on account of which it is called the external form, as Aristotle intimates (*7 Met., T. 22*): the house externally comes to be from the house within, or from the exemplar and form that the craftsman has in his mind. With the assertion and definition of the artificial form thus explained, it is easy to prove by the common and ordinary medium. For that is a good definition which partakes of genus and difference — and the definition given is of this kind. For its genus is quality, and the remaining words hold the place of its difference. And nothing deficient or superfluous is annexed to it, as a good definition requires — and thus it is correctly given.

First Objection, against the First Assertion. Many artificial forms come to be by subtraction of matter, as is evident from images and figures sculpted in marble. But what emerges by subtraction presents nothing positive — since rather a pre-existing positive thing is taken away than a new subsequent one should arise. Therefore artificial forms are not real positive beings.

I concede the major and distinguish the minor: with respect to the first term, I concede; with respect to the second term, I deny. This is evident from corruption, which is a privative and depriving motion that is followed by generation — which is a positive and acquisitive motion. Thus by the mere subtraction of parts of a natural subject, nothing positive is produced. Yet from that precise cutting, incision, and subtraction there arises an artificial form, which is indeed something positive.

Second Objection, against the Second Assertion. What possesses the same properties as something else does not differ from it, because the identity of properties argues the identity of nature. But the artificial form possesses the same properties as the natural form — for it is light or heavy, hot or cold, moist or dry. Therefore there is no distinction between the aforesaid forms.

I concede the major and distinguish the minor: *per se*, I deny; *per accidens*, I concede — that is, by reason of the natural subject, which truly participates in said properties. Just as if a heavy thing were tied to a large light thing and were carried upward, that upward motion would be attributed not to the heavy thing but to the light thing.

Third Objection, against the Fourth Assertion. Scotus (*4 d. 12, q. 4, § Ad quest. F.*) writes that figure — which is an artificial form — is a certain relation supervening upon diverse parts of quantity, which can be changed while the same parts remain in themselves and in the whole. Therefore the form of art is not a quality, which is an absolute being.

It can be responded that figure and any other artificial form presupposes and assumes the aforesaid relation of positions of the parts of quantity. But from these there arises and follows the form of art impressed upon them and upon

the whole composed of them — which is an absolute entity placed in the category of quality. Thus the image of a sculpture presupposes the incision of parts, from which subsequently emerges the image called a statue. It can also be conceded with probability that the form of art is formally the said relation — as the Doctor (*cited*) seems to hold — and that it is denominatively quality, as I indicated in the *Logic* (*q. de qualitate, ad finem, art. 2*).

Article IV. Whether True Gold Can Be Made by Alchemy

Blessed Angelo de Clavasio in his *Summa* (*verb. Alchymia*), following Averroes and others cited by the recent authors, holds that the production of true gold by alchemy is impossible. Oldrardus, however, in his *Consilia*, and not a few others following Albert (*3 Miner., cap. 8*) and Thomas (*2 l. 2, q. 77, art. 2*), hold that alchemical art can attain the production of true gold.

Note that in things that are very arduous and difficult, or that men most greatly desire — such as gold and silver — in accordance with that saying of Virgil (*3 Aen.*): *Quid non mortalia pectora cogis, / auri sacra fames* — to what do you not drive mortal hearts, O accursed hunger for gold — and Ovid (*1 Met.*): *Effodiuntur opes irritamenta malorum. / Iamque nocens ferrum, ferroque nocentius auro / Prodierat* — the wealth that provokes evil is dug up, and now harmful iron and gold more harmful than iron had appeared — there is danger that the demon may intrude, who knows best how to apply natural actives to passives and nearly all sublunary things obey his will, as Scotus notes (*2 d. 18, q. un., § Dico igitur. L.*). For this reason the Church, as a provident mother — lest the faithful of Christ perish through this kind of production — reprobates and condemns the said alchemical art in the extravagance *Spondet*, and declares that those selling alchemical gold are bound to restitution. The reason is that for the most part alchemists do not master this art well, and of them may be said what (*2 Tim. 3*) says: *Semper addiscentes et nunquam ad veritatis scientiam pervenientes* — always learning and never arriving at the knowledge of truth. Hence the adage on everyone's lips: alchemists do not fill but empty purses, do not make but consume gold.

Assertion. True gold and silver can be made by alchemical art, through the proper application of natural actives to passives. This is not at odds with the principles and foundations of the Doctor (*recently cited*). It is proven first: art imitates nature (*2 Phys., T. 22*). But nature from sulphur and mercury, through the intermediate heat of the sun, with the elements concurring, produces gold in the womb of the earth, as is written in (*the book on the properties of things, c. de Alchymia*). Therefore art, from those same principles and causes, by the heat of fire — which is of the same kind as the heat of the sun — can likewise elaborate and make true gold.

Second, the raw can be cooked and the impure purified (*4 Meteor., sum. 1, cap. 2 and 3, and sum. 2, cap. 3 and following*). But lead and tin are raw, and copper and

iron are impure. Therefore, with the appropriate requisites applied, through various concoctments and purifications, they can be rendered cooked and pure — such as gold and silver.

Third, more outstanding and excellent works are produced by the benefit of art than the making of gold and silver. Therefore if art attains those, it also attains this — for what can do the greater can certainly do the lesser. The antecedent is shown: by art, bees are generated from a slaughtered young bull, as Scotus (*ubi supra*) testifies, following Augustine (*2 de gen. contra Manich., cap. 17*). From a basilisk and from women's hair, scorpions and other things are born, as Pliny reports (*lib. 11, cap. 20*). These surpass the production of gold and silver, which are inanimate — and the inanimate is surpassed in nobility by the animate, as Augustine teaches (*lib. de vera religione, cap. 55, ad finem, and cap. 37*). I add that by the power of certain herbs, glass, and by human art, gunpowder, the cannon, and similar things are fabricated — which seem not only to equal the production of gold and silver, but to surpass any other work and to be assimilated to the divine, as Paul Arelius elegantly follows through (*Tomo 2 suorum operum*). And that certain men have mastered this art well and have produced true gold and silver is reported by men worthy of trust and distinguished writers, to whom the greater part of modern authors assent.

First Objection. What is perfect in its genus does not have a vague and indifferent cause but a certain and determined one, as is evident from man, lion, and other things perfect in their species. But gold and silver are perfect in their genus, as Aristotle touches upon (*ubi supra*). Therefore, since gold is produced in the womb of the earth by the power of the sun, it cannot be generated in any other way, such as by alchemical art.

I respond that the major is not universally true. For the most perfect fire of the elements is generated from another fire, from solar rays, and from the collision of two bodies, as the Doctor indicates (*1 d. 2, q. 7, § Ad 1. S.*).

Second Objection. Long experience has established that alchemists have not yet produced true gold, even though they have labored greatly and consumed much in searching for and obtaining it. What has not yet been done does not seem any longer feasible or possible.

I respond that although, because of the excellence and difficulty of that work, many have not attained its production — since virtue and art are concerned with arduous and difficult things, as St. Bonaventure says (*3 d. 40, q. 3*) — it must nevertheless not be denied that it is unfeasible and impossible. For many things are feasible and possible that have not yet been done — such as the squaring of the circle, the Antichrist, and things of that kind. All the more so since truly certain men have accomplished it and have well understood the method of doing it — as Thomas (*cited at the beginning of this article*) and Cajetan (*ibid.*) attest.

Third Objection. Alchemical gold does not have the properties of true gold — for it does not strengthen the heart, nor is it ductile into very thin sheets. Therefore, if such is the gold, it is only counterfeit and adulterated gold, as it were generated from an illegitimate parent.

I respond that even if sometimes this kind of gold does not obtain the affections of true gold — perhaps because the agent does not know the proper method of producing it — it is nonetheless absolutely feasible with all its properties and affections, as the arguments I adduced above well establish.

Book IV. On Causes.

That philosophy arose from knowledge of effects and ignorance of causes is attested by Aristotle (*1 Met. cap. 2*). For causes are, as it were, perennial springs from which the streams of natural things flow. On this account Virgil, at the end of the second Georgic, cited by St. Augustine (*in Enchir. cap. 16*), sings: *Felix, qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas* — "Happy is he who has been able to know the causes of things." And a thing cannot be known unless its causes are known, as Scotus writes after Aristotle (*2 Met. T. 11*) in (*3 distinct. 22. §. Rationes, quas Paulo ante C*). For this reason causes must be treated.

Question I. On Causes Taken Generally.

Article I. What a Cause Is.

There is no doubt whether a cause exists, since when effects are evidently perceived, there must be a cause. But philosophers are not in agreement on what a cause is, although their dispute is of little moment and can be reduced to a good and legitimate sense, as will become entirely clear through what we now set forth in opposition.

Note that "cause" is taken in two ways. First, for everything from which something proceeds in any manner whatsoever: in this sense "cause" is confounded with "principle," a usage Aristotle mentions (*12 Met. T. 12. cap. 2*), calling privation a cause, when it is plainly evident that privation is only a principle in the process of becoming, without any influx into the effect. In this sense the Greek Fathers perhaps speak when they assert that in the Godhead the Father is the cause of the Son, and likewise that the Father and Son are the cause of the Holy Spirit, taking "cause" in the sense of "principle." Second, "cause" is taken for that which flows into another, or in consequence of whose being another distinct thing follows — distinct, that is, either in nature or in numerical or specific identity. In this sense the Latin Fathers are interpreted, when they deny that in the Godhead the Father is the cause of the Son, because although the Father generates the Son and communicates being to him, nevertheless the Son is not other than the Father, since he enjoys entirely the same nature.

The thesis is: a cause, properly speaking, is a principle that of itself flows into an effect. This is indicated by Aristotle (*4 Met. at the end of T. 3*) and the author of the book *On Causes*, with whom agrees Mayr (*Quol. 101. §. Circa 1. partem*). And it is expressly defended by Scotus (*5 Met. in com. T. 1. cap. 1*), who says: a cause is that which necessarily flows into the being of what is caused. He also touches on it (*in lib. de primo principio cap. 1*), as well as in (*Theor. 19*). It is explained before it is demonstrated. "Principle" is placed as the genus. "Of itself" is added to distinguish it from a per-accidens cause. "Flowing" is said on account of privation, which flows into nothing and is called a cause only popularly and not philosophically, as the Conimbricenses explain (*1 Phys. cap. 5. quaest. 1. artic. 1. in fine*). "Into an effect" is added so that the distinction between the divine Persons who are produced — who are not effects of the one producing them, since they share the same numerically identical essence — may be made known. The thesis, so explained, is easy to prove. For it consists of genus and differentia, explicitly declares the nature of a cause, contains nothing superfluous, and is not accommodated to another thing: therefore it is a correct definition. One may object that Scotus (*Theor. alleg.*) writes that this is not a definition but a notification, and gives as his reason that "cause" is an equivocal name, which is not defined, as stated in Logic. I reply that the Doctor is to be interpreted as speaking of "cause" taken broadly, as it coincides with "principle," and not of "cause" taken strictly, which we are now treating.

You will object first that the final cause is counted among the causes (*2 Phys. cap. 3*). But the final cause flows into nothing in the effect, since it is the terminus of the thing. Therefore a cause is not well defined as a principle that of itself flows into an effect. I concede the major; I distinguish the minor: according to real being, I concede; according to intentional being, I deny — as will be evident in the question on the final cause.

You will object second that the divine Word is the cause of the humanity assumed by it, because it is God through whom all things were made; but the Word causes nothing in the humanity; therefore the aforestated definition of cause is not legitimate. The major is evident. The minor is supported by the common theological saying drawn from Augustine (*in Ench. cap. 28*) and (*tract. 23. in Ioan.*): the works of the Trinity ad extra are undivided. I distinguish the major. The Word causes the humanity hypostatically united to itself, as God — I concede; as the Person of the Word — I deny. And thus the minor is true, since the Word alone terminates the dependence of human nature, inasmuch as the Word alone was incarnate.

You will object third that if a cause is that in consequence of whose being another follows, then a point will be the cause of a line, because a line follows from the first point; and privation will be the cause of a composite, because the generation of a composite follows from privation; and indeed the divine Word will be an effect of the Father, because the Son follows from the being of the

Father — but this is rejected by the Latin Doctors. The consequent of the major is to be denied. For in order for something to be a cause, it must not only flow into the effect, but it is also required that what is produced by the cause be other in nature — which does not apply to the Word, since the Father and the Son enjoy the same nature. For this reason the word "other" is placed in opposition, designating an essential and quidditative distinction, as I noted in Logic (*quaest. de differentia*).

You will press the point that St. Augustine (*qq. novi testamenti, quaest. 28*) calls the Son of God an effect of the Father: therefore the aforestated reply is void. Some meet this by saying that work is not Augustine's, since it does not breathe his manner of speaking. But say that Augustine speaks in the sense of the Greeks, who use "cause" and "effect" in a broad and extended sense, as I indicated above, and as the Seraphic Doctor shows (*1. dist. 20. quaest. 2. propè finem*).

Article II. How Many Kinds of Cause There Are.

On the enumeration of the kinds of causes, there was once a vigorous dispute, as one may see in Racon (*tract. de causis disp. 2. sect. 1. quaest. 2. art. 1*), the Conimbricenses (*2. Phys. cap. 7. quaest. 2. art. 1*), and the Complutenses (*ibidem, disp. 8. quaest. 2*). But now the opinion of Aristotle (*2 Phys. cap. 3. T. 28*) and (*5 Met. cap. 1. T. 2*), of Scotus (*ibidem*), and of others in common has prevailed — namely, that there are neither more nor fewer than four kinds of causes: material, formal, efficient, and final.

Note first, from the Doctor (*1 Met. in com. cap. 2*) and (*9 eiusdem quaest. 4. §. Hi sunt*), that the aforementioned causes are treated both by Physics and by Metaphysics, though these sciences consider them in different ways. For Metaphysics treats them insofar as they abstract from motion and change, while Physics treats them insofar as they include motion and change.

Note second that these causes can be compared and ordered among themselves in two ways. First, according to real being: in this order, the first cause is matter, because it is the first subject of motion; the second is form, which is drawn out from matter in potency; the third is the efficient cause, from which motion arises; and the fourth is the final cause, which is the terminus of motion. Second, according to intentional being, and in this order the ordering of causes is contrary to and the inverse of the preceding order. For what was last among them in this order becomes first. Since what is later in execution is prior in intention, as Scotus (*1 Reportat. distinct. 41. quaest. un. §. Dices*) draws from Aristotle (*7 Met.*). Wherefore in this order of intention, the final cause is first, because it is first intended by an intellectual agent; the efficient cause is second; the formal cause is third; and the material cause is fourth.

Note third that there are four and only four genera of causes. The Doctor holds this (*1 distinct. 2. quaest. 2. §. Ostenso. 5*), (*distinct. 3. quaest. 7. §. Contra istam opinionem A*), (*1 Post. quaest. 57. §. Ad 1. arg.*), and (*1 Met. in com. cap. 2*). It is proved

first from Aristotle (*2 Phys. cap. 7*): there are as many kinds of causes as there are kinds of questions, since a cause is what is adduced to explain a question. Now, regarding a physical thing, four questions are raised and answered: from what is it? — that is the efficient cause. From what is it made? — that is matter. Through what is it made? — that is form. And for the sake of what is it made? — that is the final cause. Therefore there are four kinds of causes. Second: every cause is either intrinsic and constitutive of a physical thing, or extrinsic and not pertaining to its essential composition, as the Doctor implies (*2 Reportat. distinct. 34. quaest. 1. §. Item illud malum*) and (*lib. de primo principio cap. 2. conclus. 8*). If intrinsic, it is matter and form, which intrinsically and essentially integrate and constitute the whole physical composite. If extrinsic, it is twofold: the efficient cause and the final cause. Third: a physical composite comes to be through generation; therefore it presupposes matter, from which it comes to be; form, through which matter is specified and completed; an efficient cause, by which it comes to be; and a final cause, for the sake of which it is brought about. Therefore the number of four causes is to be acknowledged.

You will object first that St. Augustine (*lib. 83. qq. quaest. 28*) writes that every cause is an efficient cause: therefore only one genus of cause should be posited, namely the efficient. I reply that Augustine is to be interpreted not as excluding other causes, which he acknowledges elsewhere, but by antonomasia, because the efficient cause has the nobler influx and the more excellent real mode of causing, which is attributed even to God. For this reason Augustine speaks of every cause by antonomasia. Christ the Lord uses this manner of speaking (*Mar. 16*): preach the word to every creature — that is, to man, who is the most excellent of all created things, according to Gregory. Or, say that Augustine is to be interpreted as speaking of every extrinsic cause, which always requires an efficient cause. For although the final cause is an extrinsic cause, nevertheless there is no final cause that is not also an efficient cause, as Scotus subtly observed (*1 distinct. 1. quaest. 5. §. Ad argumenta*), and after him Suárez (*disp. 12 Met. Sect. 3. numero quinto*).

You will object second that, beyond the said causes, there are others, such as the dispositive and the instrumental — therefore there are more than four genera of causes. Confirmation: an object moves a faculty toward knowledge of itself; therefore it constitutes another genus of cause. I reply that these are reduced to the efficient cause, as will be shown below. To the confirmation I say that the object enjoys a twofold character: motive and terminative. The former is reduced to the efficient cause, as is evident (*3 distinct. 27. quaest. 1. Quol. 13*); the latter, since it flows into nothing, is in no way a cause — for so the Scholastics say (*3 sententiarum*) that the Word alone terminated the dependence of the assumed humanity without any special influx and causality.

You will object third that the exemplar cause is distinct from the other causes; therefore it constitutes a fifth genus of cause. I deny the antecedent with the

Doctor (*1 distinct. 2. quaest. 2. §. Quantum ad 1. art. sub G*) and (*distinct. 36. quaest. 1. §. Contra ista B*), and I say that the exemplar cause is reduced to the efficient cause: for the efficient cause is of two kinds, one natural and the other intellectual, which operates through the idea and exemplar it holds in its mind, as is clear (*7 Met. Tract. 22*).

Article III. What Causality Is.

This is indeed a difficult and subtle question, on account of which, given its difficulty and the limited knowledge available, various and diverse opinions of philosophers exist. The Nominalists — by name Rubion (*2 distinct. 1. quaest. 1. art.*) — do not distinguish causality from the cause as it causes an effect. Others, whom Pontius (*disp. 37. quaest. 3*) follows, are of the opinion that causality means nothing other than union. A number of more recent authors hold that it is an action, or influx, and a certain absolute mode intermediate between a cause actually causing and its effect. The common run of Scotists, however, holds formal causality to consist in the relation of cause and effect resulting from them.

Note that a cause can be considered in two ways. First, formally, insofar as it includes a habitude and respect toward what is caused — in which sense cause and effect are correlatives. Second, fundamentally, that is, for the entity of the cause in which the aforesaid relation of cause is grounded — and in this way the cause is something absolute, namely a substance or a quality. Now Gadius (*vol. 8. fol. 93. pag. 1*) observes that a cause taken in the first way is a concrete relative, to which the power of causing proximately corresponds, and that its abstract is causality, which formally imports the relation of a causer to what is caused. Furthermore, note that it is not the same to ask through what a cause causes and through what a cause is formally denominated a cause. For a cause causes through its power and faculty, which is something absolute residing in the category of substance or quality. But it is formally denominated a cause through a relation that necessarily results from the causer itself and from the effect caused by it, as the Doctor signifies (*2 distinct. 1. quaest. 2. §. Ad 1. sub D*).

The first thesis is: causality is distinct from a cause. This is deduced from Scotus (*now cited*), and (*4 distinct. 13. quaest. 1. §. Ad huius autem F*), and (*Quol. 8*). It is proved first: that which can exist without another is not identified with it, for this is a manifest sign of the real distinction of one from the other. But a cause can exist without causality — namely when the cause does not cause, as when the builder sleeps: there is indeed a cause suited to build, but no causality. Therefore causality does not coincide with a cause. Second: that which arises from another differs from that from which it emanates. For the same thing in respect of the same thing cannot simultaneously be principle and what is principiated, cause and what is caused — just as the sun, which is the cause of rays, cannot be caused by those rays. But causality proceeds from a cause; for when a cause

causes, it is said to exercise its causality. Therefore cause and causality are not the same.

You will say that the concrete and the abstract signify the same thing and differ only in their mode of signifying, as was established in Logic: but "cause" is a concrete name and "causality" is its abstract; therefore they are in reality not distinct from one another. I say that this holds for absolute terms only, not for relatives, which are what we are speaking about here.

The second thesis is: causality is not the union of a cause, in whatever sense this be taken. This is drawn from the Doctor (*ubi supra*) and seems explicitly defended by him (*3 dist. 2. quaest. 2. §. Quantum ad 3. F*). It is proved first: plainly the same account holds for the causality of the efficient cause as for the causality of the other causes, since the definition of a cause applies univocally to all causes. But the causality of the efficient cause is not a union — as the Conimbricenses especially indicate (*1. Phys. cap. 7. quaest. 7*). The reason is that causality of the efficient cause can exist without union of the efficient cause with its effect, as when an agent acts at a distance, or when the effect is produced after the agent has perished — as when a father is dead but a son is born. Therefore neither in the remaining causes is union their causality. Second: union precedes the causality of a cause; therefore it is not its causality. The consequence holds, for what precedes is not the same as what follows. The antecedent is proved: parts must first be united with one another before they cause the whole, just as fire must first be brought close to combustible material before it burns it. The same is clear in artificial things, which are first joined and fitted together before those works are brought forth from them. Third: there can be union of intrinsic causes without their causality; therefore it is plainly established that union is not causality. The antecedent is urged: the rational soul is united to matter without any causality. For since it is created, matter exhibits no causality to its production. The same would hold for other souls promiscuously, if they were created by God and afterwards united to matter. Fourth: a thing must first exist before it is united to another, as is evident to the eye not only in natural things but also in artificial things. But form is to be united to matter in order that the whole may come to be; therefore it must exist, since union is the bond of existing things. Therefore it is presupposed already caused and drawn from the potency of matter before it is bound to it, and hence its causality has preceded — since it cannot be caused except through causality. And thus union is not causality. What Pontius adds — that this does not hold when union is the reason for placing form in the existence of being — is stated without foundation and supported by no argument. For union can never be the reason for placing form, since form can pre-exist without union; and union is an accident and a habitude of things capable of union, which must at least by nature precede the union itself. For the ground and the terminus must necessarily be pre-required and presupposed, so that a relation may emerge from them. But union is a relation

of form and matter; therefore it is not the reason for placing form, but arises from matter and form when they have been placed and jointly conjoined.

The third thesis is: nor is causality a substantial mode devised by certain more recent authors. The Doctor (*cited*) does not depart from this, and it is evident from (*lib. 2. quaest. 5. art. 2*), where I repelled at length this kind of substantial mode. Furthermore, it can be urged that in a whole there is nothing to be found besides matter, form, and the union of the two, according to the said recent authors; but none of these three is causality, as the same authors maintain, and this is evident because matter and form are substances, and union is an accident. Again: action, which according to the said Doctors is the causality of the efficient cause, is not a substance but an accident. For it holds its place in the category of quality, or in the special predicament called action. Moreover, it is present and absent without corruption of the subject — being present when the aforesaid parts cause the whole, and absent when those same parts remain together in the whole or are separated from one another. Therefore causality is not a substantial mode of said causes.

The fourth thesis is: the causality of a cause, formally speaking, is a relation to what is caused — posterior by nature to the ground, but prior by nature to the terminus. This thesis has two parts. The first part is handed down by the Doctor (*9 Met. quaest. 4. §. Sciendum*), and (*Theor. 22*), and (*4 distinct. 13. quaest. 1. §. Ad huius autem*). It is proved first: that whose concrete is a relative, its abstract is a relation — since they are of the same genus — and conversely, that whose concrete is absolute, its abstract is an absolute form, as is clear in the case of "man" and "humanity," "white" and "whiteness." But "cause" is a concrete relative, for a cause has respect to what is caused, as I observed above in the note. Therefore causality, which is its abstract, is a relation of cause to effect. Second: a relation is that which has its entire being toward another; it is a habitude toward another, as I said in Logic. But causality has being toward another, since it is the causality of some effect. I add that upon action and passion is grounded the second genus of relatives (*5 Met. cap. de relatione*); and that action, which is one of the ten predicaments, is a pure respect and relational entity, as the school of subtilists holds; and that action is the causality of the efficient cause — this is the common opinion of more recent authors. It must therefore be maintained that causality is a relation.

The second part is intimated by the Doctor (*1 distinct. 7. quaest. vn.*) and (*2 distinct. 1. quaest. 2*) and (*Quol. 1*), and is expressly defended by Canon (*3 Phys. quaest. 2. art. 1*), Bassi (*1 distinct. 7. quaest. 4*), and Palsero (*quaest. 18. Sua Pinacotheca*), against Fuente (*2 Phys. diff. 3. quaest. 2. art. 2*) and Mastrius (*disp. 5. quaest. 2*). It is proved first from Aristotle (*2 Phys. T. 14*), who affirms that generation is a way to nature. And (*3 eiusdem operis T. 21*), cited and explained by Scotus (*4 distinct. 13. quaest. 1. sub L*): action and passion are the same, like the road from Athens to Thebes and conversely from Thebes to Athens. If therefore

action, which is the causality of the efficient cause, is a way to the effect that is its terminus, without doubt action itself precedes the terminus, just as a road precedes the boundary to which it leads. And thus, in the opinion of both authors, causality of whatever kind precedes the effect to be produced by it. Second: a cause is that which of itself flows into an effect through its causality — as the efficient cause flows through action and produces its effect; for example, fire through heating causes heat, and the sun through illumination causes light. But that influx or causality of the efficient cause precedes the effect, just as motion precedes the terminus determined by the agent. For once the terminus is acquired, motion ceases. Therefore causality is prior by nature to the effect produced through it. Hence Scotus rightly adds (*Quol. 13. art. §. De tertio BB*) that action is productive, or eductive, or inductive of its terminus. He also adds that in the Godhead, through active generation, which is in the Father, the Son — who is its terminus — receives being; and the same he maintains of active spiration, through which the Holy Spirit is produced. Finally, the causality of the efficient cause — for example, elicitation, which is the action of the will belonging to the genus of action, through which praxis is produced — is referred back to the efficient cause itself, as the Doctor writes (*in prol. quaest. 4. antè §. Ista tres via N*), which is confirmed by Viguer and Lynch (*ibidem*). And what pertains to the effective principle — such as the causality of the efficient cause — precedes the effect that is its terminus, through which the terminus itself is produced, as the same Doctor also maintains (*1 distinct. 3. quaest. 6. §. Tertia quaestio Y*). And his faithful Achates, Anthony Andreae, explains this lucidly (*in com. lib. sex principiorum, cap. 2*), saying that action belonging to the genus of action — which is the relation of the transformer to what is transformed — is neither the principle "which" (for example, fire generates fire), nor the formal principle "through which" (for example, heat generates heat), but the productive principle "through which," just as heating is the productive principle "through which" heat is caused.

You will object first, against the first thesis, that the uncreated agent acts on things ad extra without any action or causality mediating between its power and the creatures founded by it. Therefore the same is to be maintained of the created agent, and thus causality is not distinct from a cause. The parity is to be denied, since the uncreated agent, on account of its infinity, can receive nothing new in itself — otherwise it would be changed — whereas the created agent, on account of its finitude, is capable of receiving something new, such as action, which is a relation residing in the agent and having respect to the terminus of which it is productive, as is clear (*1 dist. 30. quaest. 2. §. Ad argumenta, quaest. 2. R*).

You will object second, against the second thesis, that once the union of matter and form is posited, the composite is immediately caused. Therefore union is the causality of each. The antecedent is at hand: that which, once posited, is also posited, and which, once removed, is also removed, is the cause and causality of it. Since union is of this kind, it must be established as the causality of the

aforesaid causes. I reply by distinguishing the antecedent: as a necessary condition and prerequisite for the production of the whole — I concede; as its causality and productive principle — I deny. For the approach of the combustible to the combustible is indeed required for combustion to occur, but it is not its cause — it is only a condition, as I made clear above.

You will object third, against the first part of the fourth thesis, that a relation is the productive and effective principle of nothing, since it belongs to the genus of sterile things; therefore causality cannot be a relation. The confirmation is from the Doctor (*3 distinct. 1. quaest. 2. §. Ad 1. argum. D*): what is absolute in the cause immediately gives rise to what is absolute in the effect; but the relation between cause and effect is subsequent and arises and results from them once they are posited; therefore, according to Scotus, causality is not a relation. I distinguish the antecedent: a relation intrinsically advening — I concede; a relation extrinsically advening, such as action — I deny. This is how Anthony Andreae responds (*passim alleg.*). By the same answer the confirmation is dealt with; and I add that it is true of the principle "which" and of what some call the fundamental principle "through which," but not of the formal productive principle "through which," as I was explaining before the first objection.

You will press the point that every relation pre-requires and presupposes a ground and a terminus from which it arises and emanates; therefore even a relation extrinsically advening cannot be productive of its terminus. I distinguish the antecedent with Canon (*ubi supra*): a relation in the mode of first act and in quiet being, such as paternity and filiation — I concede; a relation in the mode of second act and in motion and flux, such as active generation, action, and the like — I deny. Mastrius (*cited*) objects and says that this doctrine is opposed both to Scotus and to truth. As for Scotus: in (*2 distinct. 1. quaest. 2. E*) and (*4 distinct. 13. quaest. 1*) and elsewhere, he openly asserts that a relation follows from its extremes and arises from them once they are posited in being. But as for the truth: this doctrine conflicts with it, since a relation is toward another — namely toward the terminus — and therefore presupposes the terminus already existing, and hence it does not receive being through the relation. On the contrary, Scotus plainly teaches the aforesaid doctrine both in the places cited before the first objection, and also in (*2 distinct. 25. quaest. vn.*) and (*4 distinct. 11. quaest. 2. §. Ad argumenta. Ad 1. Sub B*) — a doctrine which his most eminent and most ingenious disciples Bassi and Canon, already named, willingly receive and defend. Reason and truth are on our side. For this enunciation is true: an agent acts through action, as fire heats through heating and the intellect through diction produces intellection. Now such action belongs to the genus of action and influx, through which its terminus receives being: for through diction intellection — which is its terminus — receives being, and through heating heat is produced. Therefore Scotus and reason are with us; and the testimonies of Scotus adduced by Mastrius do not help him, because in them the Doctor speaks of a relation of the first genus, which presupposes both

extremes already produced, from which it results — or rather of a relation intrinsically advening. Nor does the argument he adduces from reason help him: for a relation is toward another — supply, already produced or to be produced through it — as I was just saying of diction, which tends toward intellection to be generated through it. That this holds in the Godhead as well, the Doctor maintains (*in 4 alleg. D*), saying that through active generation the Son of God receives being. But active generation is a relation productive of its terminus. Therefore the aforesaid distinction and doctrine of the relation of the first and second genus, both in creatures and in divine things, remains firm and stable.

If you press again that a relation depends on the terminus by which it is specified — therefore it is not produced through it — I say that it depends on a terminus not yet produced, if it is of the second genus, but to be produced through it. On the contrary: a relation, as it is a cause, and the terminus is not, but through it will be, because it is to be produced — but nothing can depend on a non-being and a non-existent. I say, given the hypothesis, that the terminus is not in completed being, but is indeed in the process of being — which has been shown above through examples to be sufficient.

Article IV. Whether a Cause Is Prior to Its Effect.

The modes of priority are adduced and weighed both in the Postpredicamenta and in (*5 Met. sum. vn. cap. 18. T. 16*) by Aristotle, and by Scotus (*ibid.*). Of the two modes in question here, the only doubt is whether a cause is prior in nature or in time to what is caused by it. On this matter, the only one I find who holds that a cause neither by nature nor by time precedes its effect — but that cause and effect are simultaneous both in time and in nature — is Paul of Soncino (*in 5 Met. quaest. 7*). All the rest commonly and unanimously maintain that a cause always precedes its effect, if not in time, at least in nature.

Note that a cause can be considered in two ways. One way is according to its absolute entity, which is denominated a cause — as in the case of a person to whom the relation of paternity belongs and accrues through the generation of a son. The other way is according to the character or relation of the cause itself, through which it has respect to the effect; for a cause, as stated above, is a concrete relative name, to which an effect corresponds as its correlative. All of this the Doctor intimates (*2 distinct. 1. quaest. 2. §. Ad 1. E*) and (*Theor. 18. 19*).

The first thesis is: a cause is necessarily prior by nature to what is caused by it, but prior in time only per accidens and contingently. The thesis is bipartite and is indicated by Aristotle (*2 Post. T. 9*) and (*5 Met. T. 1. 11*); and the Doctor receives it (*ubi supra*), and (*2 distin. Et. 1. quaest. 3. §. Tenentes ante F*), and (*3 distinct. 18. quaest. vn. §. Ad 1. K*). The first part is proved first from Augustine (*6 Trin. cap. 1*): if fire had existed from eternity, the splendor caused by it would have been coeternal to it. Nevertheless, fire would have preceded its splendor — not in

time, otherwise it would not have been coeternal to it — but only in nature. And Basil (*contra Eunomium*) says explicitly: we say that the cause is prior, and that what comes from it — supply, the effect — is posterior, these differing from each other not by any interval. That Aquinas thinks the same in this passage, (*lect. 6*) the Complutenses report (*disp. 8. quaest. 4. §. 2*). Second: that which communicates and gives being to something is prior to it at least in nature, if it is not separated from it — as is clear in the case of essential and universal predicates with respect to particulars and singulars, for these are prior in nature to those. And it is clear from the description of priority of nature adduced in (*Epit. 1. 1. quaest. 4. art. 14. num. 36*). But a cause gives being to an effect, since the effect is caused by it; therefore it is prior to it in nature. Third: that on which another depends in its becoming is prior to it in nature. For the dependence of one thing on another argues priority and posteriority of nature, which no one denies. But an effect depends in its becoming on a cause — as light on the sun, heat on fire, risibility on man, and so of the rest. Fourth: it can be urged by induction through each of the genera of causes. For since matter is the first principle of natural things and cannot exist without form, which is drawn from it, it precedes form in nature; and form, which is the other principle, precedes the composite in nature. For each is an intrinsic and constitutive cause of it, united by the efficient cause. Furthermore, the final cause moves the agent to act and is first intended by it and proposed to itself as something to be attained; and for this reason it is rightly deduced that a cause, whether intrinsic or extrinsic, always and necessarily precedes the effect that proceeds from it.

The second part is shown as follows: God is the efficient cause of created things, preceding them in time, as is clear from (*Gen. 1*): "in the beginning" — that is, in time, as the sacred interpreters explain — "he created heaven and earth." Therefore sometimes the efficient cause precedes its effect in duration. Second: nature progresses from the imperfect to the perfect over an interval of time, as is established in the formation of a human being, who first lives the life of a plant, then the life of an animal, and afterwards the life of a man (*1 de generatione animalium, cap. 3*). The same is clear in all successive things, whose measure is time. In these it is evidently seen that a cause precedes its effect in time — as a father his son, a tree its fruit, and in artificial things, craftsmen like a painter the picture he has drawn and a builder the house he has built, existing and enduring for a prior time.

The second thesis is: a cause and an effect, insofar as they are correlatives, are simultaneous in nature. The Doctor holds this (*2 d. 1. quaest. 2. §. Ad 1. E*) and (*Theor. 19*). It is proved first from (*l. praedicam. cap. de Ad aliquid*) and (*5 Metaphysica, T. 20. cap. 14*), where there are enumerated relatives of the second mode, such as the relations of cause and what is caused. Second: relatives mutually posit and mutually destroy each other — as, once a father is posited, a son is posited, and when the father perishes, the son perishes as regards the relation of filiation. Now they are simultaneously conceived and simultaneously

arise from the positing of the extremes; therefore they enjoy simultaneity of nature.

You will object first, against the first thesis, that Aristotle (*2 Physic. T. 28*) and (*5 Metaphysica, T. 3*) writes these words: "A cause in act has an effect in act." Therefore between cause and effect there is no priority and posteriority of nature, but simultaneity of nature and of time. I reply by explaining the aforesaid maxim from the Doctor (*2 dist. 2. quaest. 10. §. Et si dicatur sub B*): a cause actually causing flows actually into the effect that is actually caused by it — as when a heavy body actually descends downward to the center, such actual motion and descent proceeds from the actual cause that influences and causes such descent. Otherwise there would be an effect without a cause, which is impossible. Although therefore cause and effect are simultaneous in time, the cause is nonetheless prior by nature, with the effect emanating from it. This interpretation, as true and conformable to the text of the Philosopher, is embraced by Suárez (*disp. 26. sect. 2. n. 20*).

You will object second that what is prior in nature to another can be separated from it. For priority of nature argues priority of independence; and what does not depend on another can be disjoined from it. If therefore matter does not depend on form, it could exist without it, which is naturally impossible. And likewise, matter and form could exist joined together without a composite, which also cannot be brought about. I reply that the major is not universally true; for many things are prior in nature to others and yet are inseparable from them — as humanity and risibility, and any subjects whatsoever, from which their passions flow, cannot be separated from one another, although those are prior in nature to these, as is clear from the Doctor (*2 dist. 16. quaest. vnic.*). Again: although matter does not depend on form — since in being it precedes form — yet since it is the lowest of beings, feeble and partial, it is never naturally found without form, because form actualizes and perfects said matter.

You will object third that being is for the sake of operation (*2 Caeli 17*), and a thing cannot operate in an instant. Hence that celebrated saying: nature does not act in an instant. Therefore a cause producing an effect precedes it in time. Confirmation: the will, which is a free cause, cannot act in an instant; it requires time for deliberating what is to be done and what means are opportune and necessary for attaining the end. Therefore a cause, in order to produce its effect, must necessarily precede it in time. I concede the major; I distinguish the minor: when there is an obstacle present, and the power is feeble and operates through motion — I concede; when every impediment is removed and a sufficient power is applied — I deny. In this way the aforesaid maxim is explained. By the same token the confirmation is also answered: for a perfect will that has whatever is needed for acting — such as the will of an angel — does not require time for operation; for it immediately determines itself to one or

the other alternative, according to Scotus (*2 d. 5. quaest. 2. §. Respondeo primò. A*) and (*1 d. 39. §. Quantum ad 1. E*).

Article V. Whether a Cause Is Nobler Than Its Effect.

The question concerns the extrinsic and intrinsic cause, the equivocal and univocal, the partial and the total. Since nobility and excellence can be sought from two sources — namely from the comparison of causes among themselves and from the comparison of causes with their effects — the difficulty is raised with respect to both comparisons. Furthermore, a cause can be considered and examined in two ways. First, in the character of a cause, insofar as it gives and communicates being to an effect — and in this way a cause simply and absolutely surpasses an effect in nobility, according to that oft-repeated saying: "It is better to give than to receive," intimated in (*Alt. 10*) and defended by Lyra (*ibid.*) and Augustine (*3 contra Maximin. cap. 14*), who says that this is true in this life, where there is want — for abundance is certainly better than want, and it is better to have than to lack, better to give than to receive, better to bestow than to beg. Second, in its absolute entity — and in this way an effect sometimes surpasses its cause in nobility, as will become entirely clear from what is to be said below.

The first thesis is: a cause is absolutely said to be nobler and more perfect than its effect. This is common, and the Doctor defends it above all (*4 dist. 49. q. 0. §. Respondeo antè F*). It is proved first: the active principle is superior in nobility and excellence to the passive principle, according to the well-known saying: "The agent is nobler than the patient." But a cause is an active principle, for it flows into the effect, as is clear from its definition stated in Art. I of this Question. Therefore a cause is more excellent than its effect. Second: what is prior and independent excels in nobility what is posterior and dependent — for it is more excellent to be from oneself than from another. But a cause is prior and independent, while an effect is dependent and posterior; therefore the former surpasses the latter in nobility.

The second thesis is: the formal cause is more perfect than the material cause. This too is commonly defended by philosophers, and above all by Scotus (*in utroque opere 2. d. 12. q. 2. in calce*). It is proved first from Aristotle (*12 Met. T. 55*): "Form is the chief principle." And (*9 eiusdem operis, T. 19*): "Act is nobler than potency." But form is act and matter is potency, as I showed in its proper place. Therefore the material cause is less noble than the formal. Second: matter is nearly nothing, the lowest and most deficient of beings; but form is a beautiful, divine being, and the what-it-is of a thing. Again: matter is that which is perfected, while form is that which perfects and operates, and matter is passive. Therefore the formal cause excels the material in perfection.

The third thesis is: the composite excels each of the aforesaid causes, whether taken jointly or separately. The Doctor supports this (*Quol. 9. artic. 3*) and (*3 dist.*

1. *quaest. 2*) and (*dist. 22. quaest. vn.*). It is proved first from Aristotle (*7 Metaphys. cap. 3. T. 7*), where he establishes that form is more excellent than matter, and that the composite, which is compounded from both, surpasses them — as Scotus (*with Alex.*) interprets there. Second: what includes the perfections of matter and form and something beyond is more perfect than they — as if new light is added to pre-existing light, a greater and more excellent light results. But the composite contains matter and form as its intrinsic and essential parts, and a third entity caused by them, which is formally the whole and is really distinct from them. Therefore, etc. Third: the composite is a perfect and complete substance, while its parts are imperfect and incomplete substances, ordered toward the whole so that they may be perfected and completed. Moreover, the whole is the total and ultimate terminus of substantial generation, which subsists by ultimate and suppositional subsistence. Finally, the logical and metaphysical whole — such as a species, for example man — is more perfect than its parts, which are genus and differentia. Therefore the same is to be maintained of the physical whole, which is the composite, to which passions and actions properly belong as the total and complete principle "which."

The fourth thesis is: the equivocal efficient cause is more excellent than its effect; but the univocal cause is of equal perfection to its effect. This is deduced from the Doctor (*1 dist. 3. quaest. 7. §. Ad argumenta. R.*). The first part is proved: that which can produce several effects — not only of the same but also of diverse species — is a more perfect and eminent cause. For greater power argues greater excellence and eminence. But the equivocal cause can cause diverse effects of the same and of diverse species, as is clear of the sun, which is the cause of all living things, and of the intellect, which concurs to the production of intellections of diverse things and objects. Therefore the equivocal cause is eminent above other causes. Second: to contain many things virtually denotes greater perfection and power, as is clear of God, who virtually contains all things that can be made. But an equivocal cause is of this kind, inasmuch as it can cause many effects of a different character and species, as may be seen in the Doctor (*1 d. 2. quaest. 7. §. Ad 1. arg. principale. R.*). Therefore it holds the first place among other causes, as the Doctor expressly teaches (*1 d. 17. quaest. 2. sub 11*), (*4 d. 49. quaest. 4. M.*), and (*2 d. 25. quaest. vn. Q.*). The second part is indicated by the same Doctor (*ibid.*) and (*1 d. 2. quest. 7. R.*) and (*d. 3. quaest. 7. R.*), and is proved first: things of the same species are of equal essential perfection, as is clear of John and Francis, who share the same specific nature. But a univocal cause and its effect are of the same species, as is clear from the definition of a univocal cause; therefore they share equal essential perfection. Second: a natural univocal cause that is not impeded cannot act beyond the sphere of its activity; therefore in conferring being on an effect it does not exceed it, nor is it exceeded by it in dignity and perfection.

The fifth thesis is: the final cause is sometimes more excellent than its effect, and sometimes less noble. This is not inconsistent with Scotus, above all (*1 d. 1.*

quaest. 4) and (*d. 49. quarti quaest. 4. §. Ad argumenta. F*). The first part is urged: God, who is the final cause of man, is the most noble of all things, far surpassing all his acts and works tending toward him, which are effects of the very same being and greatly inferior and lower than him. Sometimes, therefore, the end is superior and more excellent than its effect. The second part is at hand. For sometimes a man sets for himself an end whose effect is worse than it — as one who devotes himself to philosophy for the sake of gain. Gain, which is his end, is lower and less noble than the exercise of philosophy, which is his effect.

You will object first, against the first thesis, that many effects are superior to their causes in their absolute entity — as a great fire and large flame produced from a small fire and small flame; for a small fire ignites a great forest (*Jas. 3*). Similarly, through words, herbs, and stones, marvelous effects are produced which without doubt exceed the forces of their causes. I reply that those effects arise from the application of an approximate cause to suitably disposed matter, for that reason that fire and the like grow by the addition of new matter to pre-existing matter, and these acquire greater perfection — not essential but accidental and gradual — as the Doctor hints (*1 dist. 8. quaest. 3*) and before him Augustine (*1. 1. de sermone Domini in monte cap. 23*). As for what is added, I say that it is effected through the application of natural active things to passive things, and sometimes there exists a tacit or express pact with a demon, as the Conimbricenses recently observe (*2 Physic. cap. 1. quaest. 6. art. 2*) after Augustine (*10 Ciuit. cap. 11*).

You will object second, against the second thesis: what is prior and independent excels what is posterior and dependent, as I argued above in the first thesis. But matter is prior and independent, founded by God; while form is posterior, dependent, and drawn out and produced by a created agent from matter. Therefore matter is more eminent than form. I distinguish the major: what is prior in perfection and independent — perfect and complete, such as God — I concede; what is prior in origin, imperfect by nature and incomplete, independent but tending toward perfection suited to it — such as matter, which tends toward form as its complement — I deny. The minor is to be distinguished in the same way. For the whole depends on its parts, and the species on genus and differentia — and yet the species surpasses them in perfection. This is touched on by the Doctor (*Quol. 9. art. 3*), (*3 d. 2. q. 2. §. Quantum ad 3*), and (*4 d. 12. q. 2*).

You will object third, against the third thesis, from (*7 Met. 7*): form is prior and more perfect than matter — and indeed also than the composite, because form is act formally, while the composite is in act through form. Confirmation: the composite borrows every perfection it participates from form, which gives being to the thing; therefore form is nobler than the composite. I reply that the text of the Philosopher is the opposite, for as the common run of expositors — by name Alexander and Scotus — reads there: what comes from both — that is,

the composite — is more substance, that is, more perfect, than matter and form. But if it be said that Aristotle genuinely has in his own text that form is prior and more being than the composite, the Doctor (*Quol. precit.*) meets it by saying that "prior" and "more" are to be understood not in terms of perfection but in terms of principality and independence — since the being of the more principal principle is independent with respect to what is principiated and with respect to the less principal principle. To the confirmation I deny the antecedent: for not only form but also matter — although form is more principal and effective — flows into the whole, as Scotus rightly teaches (*1 d. 8. q. 1. §. Ad quaest. D.*).

You will object fourth, against the fourth thesis, that from an equivocal cause there come forth effects more excellent than it — as from putrid matter, through the power of the sun, mice, frogs, and other such things are generated, which, being animated, are superior to the inanimate things that are their equivocal causes. Confirmation I: from parents of slow intelligence are born children of elevated and keen intelligence. And from an ass and a horse a mule is generated, which surpasses the ass. Confirmation II: an object, or its species — which is devoid of life — concurs in the production of intellection, which is a vital and spiritual act; therefore the equivocal cause is to be ranked below its effect. I reply that the excellence and superiority over the particular cause in the aforesaid effects is to be attributed to a higher, universal cause — just as the excellence and nobility of a mixture arising from the conflict of elements is attributed to the universal agent, as the Doctor hints (*2 d. 15. quaest. vn. §. Dico ergo*). Similarly, the excess of nobility of the aforementioned living things is referred back to the first cause, which supplies the efficiency and insufficiency of particular causes, with other universal causes disposing the pre-existing matter, according to Scotus (*1 d. 18. quaest. vn.*). To Confirmation I, I say that souls created by God are of unequal perfection, as I touched on above, and as Solomon indicates (*Sap. 8*) when he says: "I was a talented child and received a good soul." And Aristotle (*2 anim. cap. 9. T. 94*) observes that "those who are tender of flesh are well adapted in mind." The influences of the celestial spheres and the diverse dispositions of matter also contribute — for this reason the same Philosopher adds (*in problem. sect. 30. quaest. 1*): that the melancholic have often been seen to be more ingenious. And (*7 polit. 7*): that Asians are more cunning than Europeans, and conversely Europeans more robust than Asians. Sometimes the nobility of an effect depends on one or the other cause — as the excellence of the mule on the mare, and the excellence of intellection on the intellect. To Confirmation II: it is evident that the intentional species is not the total cause of intellection but the partial and less principal cause. Therefore vitality and spirituality proceed from the other partial and principal cause, which is the intellect, as the Doctor excellently pursues (*1 d. 3. q. 8. O*).

You will ask which causes hold the first rank of dignity. I reply that among causes the extrinsic surpass the intrinsic, for the intrinsic display potentiality and imperfection: for one is ordered toward completing and perfecting the

other, and both toward a third — namely, toward composing and constituting the composite. But the extrinsic causes designate excellence and perfection, inasmuch as they are adapted to God — the most perfect of all — who is the efficient cause and end of all things. And the Doctor teaches this lucidly (*1 dist. 2. quaest. 2. §. Quantum ad 1. art. L*). They are ordered among themselves in the following order of dignity: first is the final cause, second the efficient, third the formal, and fourth the material. In the order of nature and existence, however, the first place is occupied by the efficient cause, then matter, followed by form, and lastly the final cause.

Article VI. Whether Causes Are Causes of Each Other.

Since Aristotle (*2 Physic. cap. 3. T. 30*) and (*5 Metaphysica. 2*) put forward the proposition "causes are causes of each other" — not as a universal but as an indefinite — its interpreters labor greatly over its truth and explanation, divided into two camps. For many more recent authors, such as Suárez (*disp. 27. Metaphysica, sect. 2*) and Ruv. (*2 Physic. Tract. 8. quaest. 2*), extend that proposition to all causes, both extrinsic and intrinsic, and receive it as universal. But the ancients — by name Tatar (*quaest. ult. praedicam. ad finem scibilis primi*) and (*2 Physic. in com.*), John of Magistris (*ibid. quaest. 4. scibili 2*), Lynch (*2 dist. 12. quaest. 2*), nor do the Parisienses (*2 Physic. quaest. 1. fol. 37*) disagree, with whom agree the Conimbricenses (*ibid. cap. 7. quaest. 9. art. 2*) and Font (*3 Metaphysica, cap. 2. quaest. 16. sect. 3*) — restrict the said proposition, properly and simply, to the extrinsic causes only, namely the efficient and the final.

Note, from the irrefragable Doctor (*5 Metaphysica, in com. cap. 2*) and the Subtle Doctor (*ibid.*) and (*quaest. 1. eiusdem lib.*), and from Anthony Andreae (*eodem loco, quaest. 2*), that one cause is said to be the cause of another cause in two ways — either as to being or as to causality. Now conversely, one cause cannot be the cause of another with respect to being and existing, since, in order for a cause to cause, it must necessarily be and exist — for action presupposes the agent, and heating presupposes the heater. Wherefore it cannot come about that a causing cause has its essence and existence from another cause that is caused by it — as form, which is drawn from the potency of matter, should produce the very matter from which it is drawn and produced. But with respect to causality, it can come about that one cause moves another cause to causing — as an amiable or loved end excites and moves an agent to act, to attain it and possess it.

The first thesis is: causes are not causes of each other with respect to essence and existence. So the Doctor (*cited*) and (*Theor. 19*). It is urged first: each thing is and exists in itself prior to acting and operating, because first act is prior to second act, and being is for the sake of operation (*2 Caeli T. 17*). Therefore conversely one cause cannot be the cause of another: for if it is and exists already, it does not receive its essence and existence from another cause, since it already has its own essence and existence independently of the other cause — otherwise it would both be and not be, which is self-contradictory. And indeed it would be,

by hypothesis; and it would not be, because it would receive being from another cause. Therefore, lest we admit and include repugnance and contradiction in our theses, it must be maintained that, with respect to being and existing, causes are not causes of each other. You will say that this holds in the same genus of cause, but not in a different genus of cause. On the contrary: what is already constituted or caused in its being — whether in the same or in a different genus of cause — is not to be further constituted or caused in being, since it is presupposed already constituted and caused. If therefore with respect to being one cause is already constituted and caused, it is no longer to be constituted and caused in being by another cause — otherwise it would not be caused, or it would be caused twice, both of which are false. Again: a cause, in order to cause and communicate being to an effect, must exist. For actions belong to existing things (*1 Metaphysica 1*). Therefore the effect to which a cause gives essence and existence cannot conversely give essence and existence to its cause — just as matter, which flows into form, does not receive from form the subjective and potential being which it had prior to form. Second: a cause is prior in nature to its effect, as was proved in Article IV of this Question. But if the said proposition were true, the cause would be both prior and not prior with respect to the same thing, and both dependent and not dependent: prior as cause, and not prior as effect of another cause; dependent as effect, and not dependent as cause. Third: the same thing would be the cause of itself, which Augustine (*1 Trin. 2*) rejects. For whatever is cause of a cause is cause of what is caused. And whatever is prior to what is prior is prior to what is posterior, as the Doctor rightly pursues (*in Met. cit.*).

The second thesis is: causes are causes of each other — not in the same but in a different genus of cause — with respect to causality. The Doctor holds this (*ubi supra*). It is proved first: the final cause excites and moves the efficient cause metaphorically to acting, and the efficient cause acts from appetite for the end; while the efficient cause is the cause of the final cause as to its attainment and possession. Second: matter causes form, for form is drawn from matter; while form gives matter its formal being and specific being. Nor is any repugnance to be seen, since this mutual causality exists in different genera of causes with respect to different characters.

You will object first that Aristotle (*2 Physic. T. 30*) speaks in particular of the efficient and final causes and gives an example of them only — as moderate labor is the efficient cause of health, and health is the final cause of labor. Therefore the aforesaid enunciation does not hold for the material and formal causes. I concede the antecedent; I deny the consequent. For an argument drawn from negative authority does not conclude. Even if he affirms it of the prior causes, he does not thereby deny it of the posterior ones — especially since it is more evident in those than in these, above all in the opinion of those who do not distinguish the whole from its simultaneously united parts.

You will object second that in the same genus of efficient cause, act is the cause of habit and habit is the cause of act. Again: vapor is the cause of rain and rain is the cause of vapor. Moreover: pepper is the cause of heat in the stomach, and conversely pepper heats the stomach in the genus of efficient cause. Therefore the said proposition holds both in different and in the same genus of cause. I reply that the aforesaid examples are true not with respect to the same thing but with respect to different things — and with respect to different times: as one who was formerly someone's student now becomes his teacher, and one who was once someone's master now becomes his servant.

You will object third that the final cause is the first of all causes. But if the aforesaid proposition were true, it would not be first in all things but sometimes last. Therefore it is not true even of extrinsic causes such as the final and efficient. I distinguish the major: in intention and in perfection — I concede; in execution and in real being — I deny, as will become clearer below.

You will ask first whether that axiom drawn from (*2 de gen. T. 56*), cited by the Doctor (*4 dist. 49. quaest. 3. antè §. Hic dicitur*): "the same thing, remaining the same, always produces the same" — is true. I reply affirmatively, provided it meets three conditions. The first is that the cause be necessary and natural, since a free and voluntary cause changes and produces different effects — as the will now loves and now hates, concerning which Scotus (*2 dist. 25. quaest. vnic. §. contrà conclusionem*). The second is that it be a particular cause: for a universal natural cause produces diverse effects — for the sun hardens clay and liquefies wax, and causes other opposite effects, which the Doctor mentions (*9 Metaphysica, cap. 2. T. 4. in com.*). The third is that it be a per se cause. For from one per-accidens cause, several effects can arise — as a helmsman by his presence is the cause of the ship's salvation, and by his absence is the cause of its destruction, as Scotus notes (*2 dist. 37. quaest. unic. §. Tertiò modo*) and (*in Report. 2. dist. 34. quaest. 1*).

You will ask second whether the same thing is the cause of contraries. Aristotle answers affirmatively (*5 Met. cap. 2*), and Scotus (*ibid.*) explains the aforesaid saying — not in the same but in a different way: thus a helmsman is the per se cause of the ship's safety and per accidens the cause of its coming to grief.

Question II. On the Efficient Cause.

The first cause in execution is the efficient cause, which is called cause by antonomasia, and whose existence is evident from the effects of sublunary things and from the union of matter and form, which is obtained through the efficient cause. For matter and form are not united and a whole does not coalesce from them both except through the intervention of an efficient cause, as several writers, among whom is Scotus (*1 d. 2. q. 2. ante M*), rightly observe in Bonet (*1. Phys. cap. 1*).

Article I. How Many Kinds of Efficient Cause There Are.

For a good classification, or division, St. Augustine (*3 de Doctr. Christiana c. 2*) draws attention to the matter. Hence the Doctor adds (*1 d. 3. quaest. 2. §. Loquendo. N*) that division must precede definition. Following this precept, before we define the efficient cause, we now distribute it — above all in the immediately following and proximate members.

First, into a cause per se and per accidens, from the Doctor (*1 d. 2. quaest. 2. §. Quantum ad 1. 1*) after Aristotle (*5 Met. 2*). The former is that which by its nature and proper power attains the effect — as a builder builds. The latter is that which causes through something accidentally conjoined to it — as a musician builds.

Second, into a principal and instrumental cause, (*2 Phys. 29*) and Scotus (*d. 6. quaest. 5. §. Ad istam quaest. D*). The principal is that which has the power of acting in quiet being, through which it attains the effect — as a man cutting wood. The instrumental is that which acts in the power of another — as a saw cutting wood.

Third, into a physical and moral cause, (*5 Met. 2*) where Scotus (*in com.*) and (*4 d. 1. quaest. 4. 5*). The former truly produces the effect — as man produces man. The latter does not flow into the effect, but excites, urges, or counsels another cause to produce the effect — as one who advises or gives counsel to another to kill a man.

Fourth, into an equivocal and univocal cause. This is drawn from (*2 Met. T. 4*) and explained by the Doctor (*ibid.*). The equivocal is that which produces an effect dissimilar to itself. The univocal is that which generates an effect similar to itself and of the same species and character — as fire generates fire.

Fifth, into a universal and particular cause. This is elicited from (*5 Metaphysica, 2*) and expressly adduced by the Doctor (*ibid.*). The universal is the maker of many effects of diverse character — such as God and the sun. The particular is determined to producing one effect of the same character — as a tree, which brings forth only fruits and flowers.

Sixth, into a first and second cause. This is deduced from (*7*) and (*8 Phys.*) and (*12 Metaphysica*). It is handed down by the Doctor (*4 d. 1. quaest. 1. in fine*) and elsewhere frequently. The first cause is from itself and entirely independent — such as God alone. The second cause is from another and dependent in its being and operating — under which fall all created things.

Seventh, into an immediate or proximate cause — which attains the effect without the intervention and mediation of another, as fire generates fire — and a mediate or remote cause, which concurs to the production of the effect through an intermediary, as the sun through the medium of light heats the earth. This is touched on by Aristotle (*2 Phys. T. 53*) and (*1 Post. cap. 13. T. 30*), and by Scotus (*1 distinct. 39. §. Tertia positio*) and (*2 distinct. 37. quaest. vn. §. Ad argumenta principalia. AA*).

Eighth, into a total and partial cause. This is grounded in Aristotle (*cited*) and handed down by the Doctor (*1 distinct. 3. quaest. 7*) and elsewhere not rarely. A total cause is that which in its genus, without the aid of another, causes the effect — as fire generates fire. A partial cause is that which needs the help and concurrence of another in order to produce the effect — as the intellect requires an intelligible species acting together with it to cause intellection.

Ninth, into a natural cause — which attains the effect without any prior direction, as fire burning a forest — and an artificial cause, which produces the effect with prior knowledge and direction — as a builder constructs a house. This is intimated by Aristotle and the places of Scotus cited above.

Tenth, into a necessary and free cause. The former is that which, once all that is required for acting is posited, cannot not act — as fire properly approaching tinder necessarily burns it. The latter is that which, having all things necessary for acting, can act or not act, or suspend its action — such as the will, mistress of its own acts. This is signified (*2 Perih. cap. 3*) and (*9 Met. T. 2. 10. 12*), and expressed by the Doctor (*ibidem*).

Eleventh, into a cause called the principle "through which" — as the intellect is the principle "through which" of understanding — and a cause called the principle "which" — as man is the cause or principle "which" of understanding and of exercising the other acts of life. This is placed by Aristotle (*1 anim. T. 64*) and received by the Doctor (*4 distinct. 49. quaest. 7. ante §. Respondeo*).

Twelfth, into a cause essentially subordinated to another — among which one depends in its acting on the other, as man, the sun, and God — and a cause accidentally subordinated to another, among which one does not at all depend on the other, as great-grandfather, grandfather, father, and son. This is intimated by the Philosopher (*2 Met. cap. 2*) and explained by the Doctor (*1 distinct. 2. quaest. 2. §. Quantum ad 1. H*).

You will object that other distributions of causes are to be found in Aristotle (*2 Phys.*) and (*5 Met. cit.*). Therefore they have been enumerated by us insufficiently. The antecedent is evident: for there are universal causes, particular causes, and actual and potential causes, and precise and not precisely cause. I reply that the more important and celebrated ones have been listed, to which the rest can be reduced — as universal causes to equivocal ones, and particular causes to univocal ones.

Article II. What the Efficient Cause Is.

Some authors, such as Hurt (*disp. 9. Phys. Sect. 1*) and Arr (*ibid.*), entirely reject the definition of the efficient cause given by the Philosopher. Others, among whom is Suárez (*disp. 17. Met. sect. 1*), surround and clothe it with such great masses of difficulties that it seems entirely different from the Peripatetic definition. The common opinion, however, is that of Scotus (*5 Met. in expof. cap. 2*) and others,

who teach that it is appropriate and legitimate. The thesis is: the efficient cause is aptly defined as "the first principle whence motion and rest." So Aristotle (*2 Phys. cap. 3. T. 29*), (*5 Met. 2*), and also (*1 de gen. animalium, cap. 1*), and Scotus (*in com. 5 Met. praalleg.*). It is explained as to all its terms. "Principle" is placed as the genus. "First" is added on account of its appendages. "Whence" — that is, from which — is added to denote its difference from the other causes. For matter is that from which something is made; form is that through which something is caused; and the final cause is that for the sake of which something is made. The remaining terms, "motion and rest," are taken broadly, to signify its way, which is production, and its terminus, which is the effect. The thesis so explained is proved by the common middle: a definition is apt that consists of genus and differentia, as has been often said. But the aforesaid definition is of this kind, as I have explained above. Therefore it is correct and appropriate. I add that it contains nothing superfluous and nothing deficient, which belongs to the laws and rules of a sound definition.

You will object first that Aristotle (*1 Caeli T. 100*) defines the efficient cause in these words: "The efficient cause is the principle whence being is communicated." Hence it is said that being is communicated to some more clearly and to others more obscurely — and this is being and living — as Ferchius rightly notes (*vestig. 1. cap. 11. num. 30*). The same is intimated (*9 Met. T. 10*) and (*12 eiusdem operis, T. 30*). Therefore the aforesaid definition is bad. I reply, according to the explanation we have given above, that this definition is not really distinct from that one, except in words; and because that one seems more contracted and narrower, while this one is broader and ampler, fitting not only sublunary things, which come to be through transmutation, but also celestial things and those that are caused through creation.

You will object second that the definition of one thing does not fit another, for a definition equals the thing defined. But the aforesaid definition fits nature, which is distinguished from the efficient cause. For nature (*2 Phys. 3*) is defined as "the first intrinsic principle of motion and rest." Therefore it is not correctly stated. I concede the major; I deny the minor. For nature is an intrinsic passive principle, while the efficient cause is an intrinsic active principle.

You will object third that the efficient cause is adapted to God, the maker of all things, who does not cause through motion and change but through creation, which is not in the least a mutation. Therefore the aforesaid definition is not legitimate and genuine. I concede the antecedent; I deny the consequence, since, although creation is not properly a mutation, it can be called a mutation improperly, insofar as it is a passage from non-being to the being of a thing, as the Doctor signifies (*2 distinct. 1. quaest. 5. in fine*) and (*in Reportat. ibidem, quaest. 6*).

You will ask whether the aforesaid definition is univocal to all per se efficient causes enumerated in the preceding article. I reply affirmatively. This is

deduced from the Philosopher, who (*2 Phys.*) and (*5 Met. cit.*) gives examples of all of them; and the Doctor hints at it (*ibidem*), and Suárez expressly holds it (*disp. 17. Met. Sect. 1*), with Mastrius reluctant (*disp. 7. phys. quaest. 1*). The reason is that each of the above-enumerated causes is a principle on which the effect depends, and each in its own way flows into the effect — either as principal, or as instrumental, or as commanding and directing, or as executing, or as counseling, or as assisting, or in any other way in which a cause produces an effect in the genus and order of the efficient cause. Hence, by the Holy Fathers and sacred Theologians the Sacraments are said to be proper and true causes of grace, although in the School of Scotus they are only moral causes of it.

Article III. Whether Several Causes Can Simultaneously Produce the Same Numerically Identical Effect.

The heading of this article can be understood as concerning subordinated and disparate causes, as well as partial and total causes of different or the same order and species. This question can be agitated in two senses. First, naturally — in the affirmative of which seem to hold Ockham (*3 quaest. 1*) and (*Quol. 4. quaest. 8*), Gabriel (*3 distinct. 1. quaest. 1. dub. 4*), and the other Nominalists — while all the others, to be cited immediately below, adhere to the negative. Second, supernaturally — of which the prior opinion is that of Bonet (*2 Phys. cap. 3*), Mayr (*3 distinct. 5. quaest. 3*), Suárez (*disp. 26. Met. sect. 4*), and others who think that by divine power the same numerically identical effect can be produced simultaneously by two total causes of the same order and species. The posterior opinion is held by Scotus (*2 distinct. 1. quaest. 2*) and (*lib. de primo principio, cap. 3*), John of Magistris (*2 Phys. quaest. 4. artic. 3. dub. 1*), the Parisienses (*ibidem, quaest. 2. fol. 27*), and not a few of the Thomists, who consider it impossible.

The first thesis is: two total causes of different orders simultaneously concur to produce the same numerically identical effect. This is common, and the Doctor hints at it (*1 distinct. 3. quaest. 7. §. Ad auctoritatem sub BB*), and proves it from (*2 Phys. 26*): "the sun and man generate man." But the sun and man are two total causes of different orders essentially subordinated; therefore several total causes of different orders simultaneously co-act toward the causation of one numerically identical effect. Moreover: creator and creature are two total causes of different orders concurring simultaneously — not only toward one numerically identical effect, but toward the causation of all natural effects. Therefore the aforesaid thesis is truly held.

The second thesis is: two partial causes — whether of the same or different species — simultaneously produce the same numerically identical effect. The Doctor conveys this in the preceding thesis (*§. Ad quaest. respondeo K*), and Aristotle signifies it (*2 Phys. T. 31*) and (*5 Met. cap. 2*). It is proved from the well-known example: two men simultaneously pull the same numerically identical ship, and likewise bear the same numerically identical weight. Again: father and mother concur simultaneously to procreate the same numerically identical

offspring. And the intellect and the intelligible species, as two partial causes integrating one total cause, produce the same numerically identical intellection. It is therefore established that two partial causes simultaneously cause the same numerically identical effect.

The third thesis is: two total causes of the same order and species cannot jointly produce the same numerically identical effect, either naturally or supernaturally. So Scotus (*ubi supra*) and elsewhere. It is shown first by this argument, which Bonet (*precit.*) regards as its Achilles: that the same thing should simultaneously both exist and not exist in respect of the same thing evidently involves a contradiction. But if one numerically identical effect were caused simultaneously and at once by two total causes of the same species, the same thing in respect of the same thing would simultaneously be and not be. It would be, by hypothesis, in that it is caused simultaneously by both; it would not be, because without either one of them existing it would not be caused — since it would not have being from it — and could be caused without it, because it would be totally and adequately produced by the other. For example: Plato is generated by Sortes and simultaneously by Socrates as two jointly cooperating total causes. He can exist without either one of them being present. For if Plato is not generated by Sortes, he is generated by Socrates — and Socrates exists without the one by whom he is supposed also to be generated. But it is plainly repugnant for the very same Plato to be generated simultaneously and at once by both, since each is his adequate cause, and to be generated by only one of them, since with the other not existing he is still generated, as the other is his total cause. It is therefore impossible that both causes should concur in the said way to produce the same numerically identical effect.

Bonet meets this — and with him Suárez (*passim allegato*) — by denying the consequence of the minor. For the effect demands only to be from its causes as they flow into it; and therefore it has its being even if one of its causes does not exist. Just as if the same numerically identical light were to receive being simultaneously from two burning candles, if one were extinguished the same light would persist, because it would be preserved by the other still burning. The same is to be maintained in our case: if one cause did not exist while its effect remained, such an effect would depend on the other surviving and still remaining cause. In this way Scotus's argument, which seemed invincible, is weakened. On the contrary: the effect receives being from the causes from which it flows, since a cause of itself flows into the effect it causes. But the same effect proceeds simultaneously from two total causes, according to the adversaries — therefore it receives being from them, and cannot exist without them. Aristotle hints at this (*2 Phys. 37*), writing: "A cause in act has its effect in act." If therefore both total causes simultaneously cause and flow into the effect, the effect is plainly caused by them as existing, and essentially depends on them. Therefore it can only have its being from those very existing causes. Now the aforesaid argument proves that, given the hypothesis, the effect can be and exist

with one of the causes not existing; and so the argument remains in its force. The example adduced is not helpful but harmful: for it is one thing for an effect to be caused and another for it to be conserved. It can be conserved by one remaining cause; but it cannot be efficiently produced except by both causes — given that it totally proceeds and essentially depends from those two total causes. Wherefore, light caused by two candles, even though it can exist with only one candle remaining lit and the other extinguished, can nevertheless not be except as caused by both said candles — inasmuch as both equally cooperated together toward its causing, according to the position of the adversaries. Second: the terminus of one total and adequate cause cannot be the terminus of another total and adequate cause — as is clear from the very notion of a total and adequate terminus, and can be induced from created things. A composite is the total terminus of one matter and one form, so that it cannot be the total effect of another matter and form. And according to Aristotle (*1 Caeli, cap. 9. T. 95*), this world is the adequate terminus of matter, such that there cannot be another world, since all matter was exhausted in its founding. And in the Godhead, the Son of God is the adequate terminus of the generative power of the Father, such that it is incompatible for there to be another natural Son of God, as the Doctor rightly pursues (*Quol. 2.*). But the effect of one total cause is its adequate and total terminus — as no one denies, for the total cause fully supplies the entire need of its effect, from which the effect draws its total and adequate being, and in the causation of which the entire force and power of the cause is exhausted. Therefore it cannot come about that it is the total and adequate terminus of another total cause.

Some of Mayr's and Bonet's followers say that God provides effects so that they depend on another cause — not out of need but out of abundance. Just as a body naturally occupies only one place, but supernaturally can be in several adequate and total places, according to Scotus (*1 distinct. 20. quaest. 2*). On the contrary: what is of itself and by its very nature incapable of something cannot be made to possess it even by divine power — as a brute, being by its nature irrational, cannot be made rational; and a bodily eye, being material, cannot attain the divine essence by its vision, which is spiritual and immaterial. Similarly, since a total and adequate effect is incapable of the influx of another total cause, it cannot validly be the total and adequate terminus of that cause. But place is intrinsic to a body, and a body does not depend essentially on place — indeed, a body can exist without place, as the ultimate Heaven is not in place. But an effect without the cause by which it is produced and on which it essentially depends cannot exist.

Third: the same effect would at the same instant be produced totally and adequately — once by one total cause and once by another total cause. For since each cause obtains its own causality and total action, and likewise its own total terminus produced by it: but there is a double causality and action corresponding to the double total cause producing it; therefore there is also a

double terminus or total and adequate effect produced by the two total and adequate causes producing simultaneously.

Some more recent authors reply that both total causes with simultaneous and total concurrence flow into one and the same numerically identical effect — just as two essentially subordinated total causes, such as the sun and man, simultaneously flow together and co-act to procreate one singular man. On the contrary: either one cause produces the entire effect and the other is superfluous, contributing nothing to it — which is outside the present dispute — or both produce some part of it piece by piece, and so they are partial causes, which is not what this question is about — or both simultaneously cause it totally, and the aforesaid argument returns: that the effect is caused twice by them simultaneously according to their doubled causality. Nor does the adduced comparison help, since essentially subordinated causes are of a different order and character — one being universal and the other particular, which contracts and determines the universal to a suitable and specific matter. I add that the same must be said of two final causes as of two efficient causes with respect to the same numerically identical effect, since the account is equal for both, according to Scotus (*1 d. 2. quaest. 3*).

You will object first, against the third thesis, that what involves no contradiction can be brought about by God, as the common run of Scholastics teaches — by name the Doctor (*4 d. 10. quaest. 2. Dico ergo. F*). But it involves no contradiction for the same numerically identical effect to be simultaneously produced by two total and adequate causes. Therefore this is possible. The major is evident. The minor is shown: if God were to create two suns, and both were simultaneously to illuminate our hemisphere, that illumination would be one in number emanating and caused from them as total causes simultaneously. I concede the major; I deny the minor. To its proof I say: in that case both suns would cause that illumination partially and simultaneously; and by means of the light of the newly created other sun the illumination would grow — just as several lights placed in the same room illuminate and brighten that room more, as experience confirms.

You will object second that two priests can simultaneously baptize the same numerically identical infant and consecrate the same numerically identical host. Therefore two total causes can simultaneously produce the same numerically identical effect. The Doctor replies (*4 d. 6. quaest. 2. §. de primo argumentum*) that the argument includes two moral causes, and also two instrumental causes — but not principal and total physical causes. The reason is that moral and instrumental causes do not act and attain the effect through their own power and special influx — such as the aforesaid priests, with respect to baptismal grace and the body of Christ existing in the Eucharist. He writes the same (*in Rep. quaest. 4*).

You will object third: let there be two fires of equal power, equally disposed, properly approached to one numerically identical piece of tinder, with all impediments removed — they will totally and adequately introduce and produce one numerically identical heat and fire in it, equally concurring toward generating it, since they are natural total causes. Therefore one and the same numerically identical effect can simultaneously be produced by two total and adequate causes. I reply from Scotus (*4 d. 10. quaest. 2. §. Dico ergo ante Q*) that, given the hypothesis, each fire acts partially — for natural causes act to the extent they can. Since each strives to assimilate the effect to itself, but cannot fully render it similar to itself on account of the other cause co-acting with it toward the same effect, for this reason such an effect is partially caused by them — just as two men carrying the same weight simultaneously act partially and inadequately in bearing it, even if either one of them could carry such a weight.

You will object fourth that the first and second cause are two total causes producing the same numerically identical effect simultaneously — as God and man produce one and the same numerically identical man, even though God is a cause sufficient of itself to produce it totally, just as he alone created Adam (*Gen. 1*). Therefore there is no inconsistency in two total causes of the same kind co-acting equally and totally toward the causation of one numerically identical effect. I reply that the argument concludes with respect to causes of different orders and essentially subordinated, but not with respect to causes of the same order and accidentally ordered. This is how Lynch (*2 d. 37. quaest. vn. §. Tertio modo*) replies, and the Doctor hints at it both there and in (*2 d. 2. quaest. 3. §. In ista quaest. B*), and expressly holds it (*in Rep. 2. d. 37. quaest. 2. §. Teneo igitur, de devotione*), which he says is from two essentially ordered causes — namely the will of God and of man. Or say with Mayr (*2 d. 43. quaest. 4*) that the first and second cause are partial causes concurring to the production of one numerically identical effect.

You will say that a partial cause designates imperfection and insufficiency of a power unable to cause the entire effect; but God is distant from all imperfection, since he is most perfect and the cause of all perfections. Therefore the first cause does not have the character of a partial cause in concurrence with the second cause toward producing a common effect. I say that this holds for a cause acting partially out of impotence and need — not for a cause acting thus freely and voluntarily, having the power to cause the entire effect if it wished, such as the first cause cooperating with the second.

Article IV. Whether Several Total Causes Can Separately Produce the Same Numerically Identical Effect.

The state of this difficulty is whether an effect that was produced by one cause could also have been caused by another total cause — for example, this fire A, which was caused by fire B, could also have been caused by fire C. On this I find chiefly two positions. One is that of Averroes (*7 Met. com. 41*), Land (*1 de gen. q.*

12), Marblij (*ibid. quaest. 8*), Mal (*2 Phys. cap. 3. sect. 5. quaest. 3*), the Complutenses (*disp. 15. Phys. quaest. 4*), and other Thomists, who hold that it implies a contradiction for the same numerically identical effect to proceed from two total causes of the same order separately. The other is that of Scotus (*2 d. 20. quaest. 2*), Gabriel (*ibid.*), Suárez (*disp. 26. Met. sect. 5*), Ruv. (*2 Phys. tract. 7. quaest. 2*), Fabr. (*Theor. 42*), and others, who teach that this is possible by created and uncreated power.

Note from Scotus (*precit. §. Dico quod B*) that for the unity and identity of something — for example, a composite — only its essential and intrinsic parts are required, so that it is the same composite if it consists of the same matter and form, with whatever other extrinsic circumstances of place, time, and other conditions removed, as well as the efficient cause. For whether it has the same or different accidents, whether it is produced by one or another cause, it always remains the same essential and substantial composite participating the same essential and intrinsic parts.

The thesis is: the same numerically identical effect can be produced separately by two total and adequate causes of the same order. This is defended by the Doctor (*ubi supra*) and (*4 d. 43. quaest. 2*) and (*in Rep. 2. d. 20. quaest. 2*). It is proved first: if the state of innocence had persisted, all children of chosen parents would have been procreated; but now in the state of sin, some children were born of reprobate parents — such as Sts. Martin, Barbara, and Christina, as their acts testify. Therefore those who were begotten of the reprobate could have been generated by the elect and predestined, and hence the same numerically identical effect can separately be produced by good total causes of the same order. And this is supported by the testimony of Gregory the Great (*4 Mor. cap. 22*), who says: "If the first parent had been corrupted by no stain of sin, he would in no way have generated sons of gehenna from himself; but those who are now to be saved through the Redeemer would be born from him alone as the elect." Therefore the first argument of Scotus is firm. Those who reject it — Suárez and Ruv. (*cit.*) — must necessarily reject the teaching of Gregory and the ancient doctrine of the Scholastics as new, in order to introduce the doctrine of middle knowledge. Second: what is intrinsic and extrinsic to something does not destroy its unity and essential identity, as is clear from the preceding notable — and the efficient cause is extrinsic to the effect, since it can exist without it. Therefore the same effect can separately be produced by several causes. For if this heat had not been caused by the sun, it could have been caused by fire; and if Abel had not been begotten by Adam, he could have been begotten by Noah. This is corroborated: the same Lazarus, who was generated by his progenitors, rose by the power of Christ the Lord (*Joan. 11*): "immediately he who had been dead came forth." And faith teaches this of all men to be resurrected on the day of judgment. The reason for this is given: because the aforesaid causes possess equal and sufficient power to produce the same numerically identical effect.

You will say that God indeed, as a universal cause eminently and virtually containing all things, can do this — but not a creature, which as a particular cause is determined to one particular effect that the other cannot at all cause. On the contrary: the universality of causing all things implies only that God's power extends to effects both of the same and of diverse species; but it does not prevent a particular cause from attaining all the effects of the same species — and if one were not to cause one of them, the other would cause it, since that effect is contained within the sphere of its activity. For if this food is not eaten by Peter, it can be eaten by Paul and converted into the substance of the one nourished; and from what remains, seed is formed from which Paul generates Francis, who could have been begotten by Peter if he had eaten such food. You will say again that this cannot come about, because each cause has a certain and determined series of effects that the other cause cannot attain. On the contrary: those that participate the same specific nature enjoy the same property and power — as is clear of individuals of human nature, of which if one can laugh and understand, likewise the other can; and what one saw together can cut this wood, so can another — and if one does not perform this work, the other will. And it seems vain and ridiculous that this gunpowder, which this fire burned, another fire could not have burned if it had been properly applied and brought close to it. The order and series of effects of one cause, therefore, does not prevent such effects from being able to be produced by another cause of the same species — especially because among them there is not an essential but only an accidental subordination, as Aristotle notes (*2 Met. 2*) and (*3 eiusdem cap. 11*), which does not prevent what one individual of the same species can do from being equally possible for another, since it is comprehended within the sphere of the same activity. Second: a cause that can conserve can also produce the same numerically identical effect — since to conserve is no less a power than to effect. But two total causes can conserve the same numerically identical effect — as the same heat that is conserved by this fire can be conserved by another fire, and also by the sun and by warm air, as experience makes clear. Third: the efficient cause contributes nothing to the essential identity or diversity of the effect, since it is extrinsic to it; and the same corpse results whether a man dies by poison, disease, or the sword. Therefore it involves no contradiction for the same numerically identical effect to proceed separately from two total causes.

You will object first that a determined effect has a determined cause — as man generates man and a lion generates a lion. Therefore the same numerically identical effect cannot separately arise from two total causes. I reply that the antecedent is not universally true, as is clear of gold, which is produced both by the sun and by chemical art, and of certain animals that are generated either from putrid matter or from seed, as Scotus affirms (*1 distinct. 2. quaest. 7. §. Ad 1. R. & S.*) after Augustine (*in epist. ad Deogratias*).

You will object second that if the same numerically identical effect were to be produced separately by two total causes, it would both essentially depend on

them and not depend on them — which involves a contradiction, as the Doctor (*cit.*) argues in the preceding article. I deny the consequent of the antecedent. For a contradiction is repugnance in the same respect of the same thing for the same time and place; but this does not occur in our case. For given the hypothesis, the same effect would be produced not by both simultaneously and at once, but by only one of the two — although it could have been produced separately by both, as the Doctor (*ubi supra*) subtly and consistently infers. You will say that, given the hypothesis, this effect would per se depend not on the cause but per accidens. I say there is an equivocation in the particle "per se." For if "per se" means that the effect requires one cause such that it cannot be produced by another — I deny it. But if the term denotes that the cause flows into the effect — I concede it; yet if one cause were not to communicate being to it, another would communicate being to it. But a per-accidens cause is described as one that does not of its own proper power give being to the effect, as from the Doctor (*1 dist. 2. quaest. 2. 1. §. Quantum ad 1*).

You will object third that every agent acts through its action, which is the medium through which the agent acts and attains the effect. But one numerically identical action has only one numerically identical terminus and effect. Therefore the same numerically identical effect cannot emerge from two causes and two actions. I concede the major. To the minor I say that action is extrinsic to the effect, and the effect does not derive its unity and essential identity from it. Therefore the same effect can arise from this or that cause, through this or that action — indeed, there can be distinct actions toward the same terminus and effect, as Scotus writes (*4 distinct. 43. quaest. 3. §. Tertia opinio*) and (*dist. 13. quaest. 1. §. Ad huius autem D*).

You will press with (*8 Met. 12*): "If the agent is the same and the matter is the same, the effect will be the same." Therefore for the unity of the effect the unity of the efficient cause and action is required. Scotus meets this (*in 4. cit. distinct. 43*): if the agent is different and the matter is diverse, the effect arising from them is indeed different and diverse. But conversely it does not rightly follow that if the agent is the same and the matter is the same, the effect is the same — since the unity and identity of the effect is in no way to be sought through the unity and identity of the agent, inasmuch as one and the same efficient cause can produce several numerically distinct effects: for example, one father produces several children, and one tree produces several fruits.

Question III. On the First and Second Cause.

One of the more important divisions of causes enumerated in the preceding Question, Art. I, is into the first cause — which is God, the maker of all things — and the second cause — which is every created thing. On their causality and concurrence it is fitting to inquire into and decide the following articles.

Article I. Whether the First Cause Preserves the Second Cause in Its Being.

Some authors, whom Augustine (*5 de gen. ad litt. cap. 20*) mentions, are of the opinion that God imparted power to it and then left it, so that it acts through the power bestowed and communicated to it by him, and does nothing further concerning it and does not preserve it. Their position is touched on by Scotus (*2 dist. 37. quaest. vn. §. Si hac*) before Q, and (*ibid. in Report. quaest. 2. §. Secundo est declarandum*), and Averroes hints at it (*ibid. quaest. vn. art. vn.*). The opposite, however, is defended by the common run of theologians and philosophers, and by Scotus (*now cited*), and (*Quol. 21*), (*Quol. 12. §. De primo B*), St. Bonaventure (*1 distinct. 37. artic. 1. quaest. 1*) and (*2 distinct. 7. quaest. 2*), Alexander (*1 part. quaest. 10. num. 2. 3*), St. Thomas (*ibid. quaest. 8. art. 1*), and Henry (*Quol. 7. quaest. 3*) — who teach that God preserves all things and maintains them always, such that without his help and maintenance they could not subsist even for a moment.

Note from Vallon (*tract. form. fol. 4. pagin. 2*) after Aristotle (*7 Met. T. 59*): every question presupposes one thing and inquires about another. In the present case, it is presupposed that the second cause acts — from what is to be said below — and the question is whether it operates of itself and by its own proper power, or whether it needs the help and concurrence of God both in being and in operating. Further, it is presupposed that the second cause received being from God, since before it did not exist; and the question is whether that being which God communicated to it is preserved by God himself through a perennial and continuous influx of the same being that it received at the beginning of its creation. For preservation means nothing other than the continuation of the same being already received and previously had from God, as will be shown at length elsewhere.

The thesis is: God preserves all creatures such that without his help and preservation they would be reduced to nothing. So Scotus (*cited*), and (*1 distinct. 2. quaest. 2. §. Quantum ad 1. art.*), and (*4 distinct. 1. quaest. 1. PP.*). It is proved first from Sacred Scripture: (*Isa. 40*): "Who holds the whole world in three fingers." (*Hebr. 11*): "Upholding all things by the word of his power." And (*Act. 17*): "He is not far from any one of us, for in him we live and move and have our being." Moreover (*Sap. 8*): "He reaches from end to end mightily and orders all things gently." Second, from the Holy Fathers: Augustine (*6 de gen. ad litt. cap. 3*) and (*8 eiusdem operis, cap. 26*): "If the power of God were to cease from the things that were created, their species would immediately cease, and all nature would collapse." And (*tract. 106. in Ioan.*) he writes that God is the one who holds all things, whom the Greeks call παντοκράτωρ. And Gregory (*in 2. cit. à Seraph. ubi supra*): "All things would pass into nothing if the hand of the Founder did not hold them." Dionysius adds (*10 de divinis nomin.*): God is the one who holds all things, that is, preserves them, lest they fall into nothing. And that this was also the mind of Aristotle and his Commentator is attested by Canon (*2 Phys. quaest.*

3. §. *Ista tamen opinio*). Third: light depends no less on a luminous body than a creature depends on God, since a creature depends on God in its becoming and in its being — for God alone is independent and all other things are dependent, as Scotus notes (*4 nuper alleg.*). But light cannot exist without a luminous body, as experience establishes. Therefore neither can a creature exist without God. And the Seraphic Doctor (*primo precitato*) illustrates this with two examples: of an image imprinted in water by a seal, and of a weight suspended in the air by a hand. For the image remains in the water only as long as the seal remains, and when the seal is removed it immediately vanishes. Likewise, the weight persists in the air only as long as the hand holds it; and if the hand were no longer to hold it, it would immediately fall to the earth. So too a creature, without God's preservation and maintenance, would pass into nothing. Again: the mutable is reduced to the immutable; the temporal to the eternal; the dependent to the independent; the second to the first; potency to act; life to the living; and accident to subject. But God is immutable and the creature mutable; God is eternal and the creature temporal; God is independent, the first cause, pure act, life, and self-subsisting; while the creature is dependent, a second cause, potential, imperfect, having nothing from itself but receiving all things from God. Therefore unless it were preserved by God, it would perish and be reduced to nothing.

You will object first that an uncreated agent is no less powerful than a created agent — since the former is of infinite and the latter of finite power. But a created agent does not preserve its work after it has brought it into being — as a builder leaves the house already constructed by him and does nothing further concerning it. Therefore God too, after founding a creature, leaves it and provides nothing more concerning it, as Ecclesiasticus (15) intimates: "He left it in the hand of its own counsel." The parity is to be denied, since the works of a created agent depend on it only in their becoming, but God's works depend on him in their becoming and in their being. Therefore they require his assiduous and continuous maintenance. The Seraphic Doctor (*proxime citato*) adduces a not unfitting reason: a secondary agent presupposes principles from which it constructs its principiated and compound works — as a builder pre-requires stones, sand, lime, timber, and the like for constructing a house. But the first agent produces both the principles and the principiated things; therefore all things depend perennially on it, and without it they would fall into nothing.

You will object second that there are certain second causes that cannot fall or perish — such as an angel and the rational soul, which are incorruptible and immortal. Therefore not all created things are preserved by God. Scotus replies (*4 distinct. 49. quaest. 6. §. Hic duo. B*) that the said creatures, although they are not subject to corruption — since they lack matter, which, together with the privation conjoined to it, is the origin of corruption — are nevertheless annihilable by God. For as he created them from nothing, so he can reduce them to nothing. He writes the same (*Quol. 7. O*).

You will object third that second causes, unless preserved by God, would tend toward nothing — for as they were founded from non-being, so they would be borne toward non-being. But it is against the nature of a thing to tend toward non-being, since nature desires being and does what is better. Therefore it does not seem that a continuous preservation by God is needed for it. I concede the major; I distinguish the minor: for a thing to tend toward non-being is against its nature if the thing naturally desired non-being — I concede; for a thing to tend toward non-being is contrary to nature by reason of its own deficiency — that is, a thing cannot of itself subsist if left to itself but needs God's help and his maintenance — I concede. So the Seraphic Doctor intimates (*ubi supra*).

Article II. Whether Second Causes Are Active.

I find the Scholastics divided into three camps in this article. Some — whose position Gabriel (*4 distinct. 1. quaest. 1. dub. 3*) considers not improbable — remove all efficiency and activity from second causes, holding that God alone acts — heating at the presence of fire and cooling at the presence of water. Others — the chief of whom seems to be Avicembron (*l. fontis vita*) — suspect that spiritual things do indeed possess the power of acting, but that corporeal things are entirely devoid of it. The rest — both ancient and modern — openly defend that second causes, both spiritual and corporeal, clearly act and truly operate.

Note from Scotus (*Quol. 7. §. Sed licet P.*) that God can destroy the entities and essences of things together with their powers and faculties, or — while their essences remain intact and uninjured — suspend the actions of those powers; as he did in the Babylonian furnace. He cannot, however, remove their aptitudes and powers so that they cannot act and operate — because these are really identified with them and distinguished from them and from one another only formally, as is established (*2 distinct. 16. quaest. vn.*). Wherefore, fire can indeed be prevented or hindered by God from actually heating and burning the rightly disposed and properly approached material — but he cannot take away and remove from it the aptitude and virtual suitability of heating and burning a suitably disposed subject.

The thesis is: second causes are truly and properly active and operative. So Scotus (*precit.*) and (*1 dist. 7. quaest. vn. §. Ad 2. principale*) and (*dist. 4. 2 dist. 25. 37. §. Si hac via est vera*) and (*4 dist. 1. quaest. 1. PP. Quol. 21*). It is proved first from Sacred Scripture (*Gen. 1*): "Let the earth bring forth green grass and grass making seed, and a fruit-bearing tree bearing fruit according to its kind." Where we have God's command to work, and a little later its execution: "And the earth brought forth green grass and grass making seed according to its kind, and a tree bearing fruit." Then (*cap. 2. eiusdem libri*): "God placed man in the garden of pleasure to work and keep it, and commanded him not to eat of the tree of knowledge of good and evil" — and for the transgression thereof Adam was punished together with his wife. And because it was done by the persuasion of the serpent, the

Lord said to it: "Because you have done this, cursed are you among all animals and beasts of the earth." And (*cap. 22. eiusdem operis*), the same God commanded Abraham to sacrifice his son there — and he immediately, in obedience, was blessed by him, who said: "Because you have done this thing and have not spared your only begotten son on my account, I will bless you and multiply your seed as the stars of heaven and as the sand that is on the seashore." From these it is clearly evident that second causes act by their own power — since some, like Adam, are punished and others, like Abraham, are rewarded — because the former acted badly and the latter well. Otherwise this would be done unjustly and without cause. Likewise (*Luc. 6*) and (*Mat. 7*): "A good tree bears good fruit; but a bad tree bears bad fruit. Therefore by their fruits you will know them." St. Augustine, explaining this (*lib. contra Fortunatum*), writes: "By a good tree and a bad tree are meant not natures but our wills" — as is read (*Matt. 12*): "Either make the tree good and its fruit good, or make the tree bad and its fruit bad, for the tree is known by its fruit." Augustine (*cit.*) adds: "It is ours to choose what we will." Second, from the Holy Fathers: Basil (*Hom. 9 in Hexam.*), Damascus (*3 fidei, cap. 15*), and Augustine (*Tom. 4. suorum operum lib. 5. qq. quaest. 15*): "He — that is, God — works; we cooperate. For he does not remove but assists the good will of free choice." And there is the celebrated saying of the same Doctor (*7 Ciuit. 30*): "God so administers all things that he allows them to perform their own motions." Hence Scotus adds (*4 dist. 19. quaest. 12. §. Respondeo E*): "God has disposed, in this state, for things to co-act and to have their own proper actions." The Council of Trent is added (*sess. 6. can. 4*), expressly condemning those who think that created free will does nothing at all and conducts itself merely passively. On this at length and learnedly: Alphons (*libro 9. adversus haereses, verb. libertas*). Third, from the Philosophers: Aristotle (*cum suo Lyro 1. Perih. cap. ult.*), (*1 Phys. 2*) and (*8 eiusdem operis*), and also (*1. 9. 12. Met.*); Plato with his Academy (*citat. à D. Damasc. 9. suae Physicae*); Trismegistus and others, who constantly and unanimously embrace and defend this truth. To whom Averroes subscribes (*12 Met.*), deriding the Saracens who remove operations from things. Fourth: what is established by experience and evident to the senses must not be denied. But it is confirmed by experience and perceived by the senses that second causes act — therefore this is not to be denied. The major is clear, and illustrated by Aristotle (*1 Met. cap. 1*). The minor is freely admitted: fire heats and burns, water cools, and so of the rest. And if this be denied by anyone, he is to be thrown into fire until he confesses that fire burns — as Avicenna (*1 Met. cap. ult.*) recommends, and Scotus concurs (*1 dist. 39. §. Quantum ad 1*). In harmony with this is what the Stagirite says (*1 Top. ad finem cap. 9*): "One who doubts whether one ought to honor the gods and love one's parents needs punishment. But one who doubts whether snow is white is devoid of sense." Fifth, from (*1 Eth. 7*) and (*2 Caeli 17*), cited by the Doctor (*4 Reportat. distinct. 49. quaest. 1. propè initium*): being is for the sake of operation — which is to say, each thing exists for the sake of its own operation. Thus plants exist for flowering, a tree for bearing fruit, a man for labor, and a bird for flight, as is read (*in libro Iob. cap. 5.*). But second causes were founded by

God, as is clear (*Gen. 1*): "In the beginning God created heaven and earth." And indeed heaven was made for influencing and the earth for germinating. This is plainly demonstrated in animals by the various and diverse organs and instruments suited to exercising diverse functions and operations: thus man has hands, an ox horns, an eagle a beak, and so on for each — in which nature permits nothing superfluous and nothing idle. I add that artificial figures and forms differ from natural ones above all because the latter are living and active, while the former are dead and without action. Again: no one would be worthy of punishment or of glory. Finally: the first cause is not sleeping but always works, contemplating and loving itself; and the angels attending and ministering to it, and the other blessed, are in continuous and perennial operation — namely the vision and fruition of the divine essence. And this is daily and clearly shown by the motions of the heavens, the conflict of the elements, the powers of mixed things, and all of nature, which is the principle of motion and rest. These and similar reasons indisputably convince the supporters of the opposing opinion that not only spiritual but also corporeal things participate in the power of acting — from which dependence Gabriel, cited recently, does not dare to adhere to them but professes to follow the common opinion. Hence it is not without reason that certain authors accuse the listed writers of ignorance and folly, and rank them among heretics.

You will object first: (*Joan. 1*): "Without me you can do nothing." And (*1 Cor. 11*): "Who works all things in all." And (*2 Cor. 3*): "We are not sufficient to think anything of ourselves." And before: (*Hierem. 10*): "It is not man's way that is his, nor is it for a man to walk and direct his steps." From these and similar testimonies of Sacred Scripture it seems to be concluded that God operates and therefore creatures do nothing at all. I reply by explaining those passages: the second cause cannot do anything without the first, because the second is essentially subordinated to the first, and the first operates all things independently and in its own order. Unless the first concurs, the second cannot act — but not in the order of the second cause, which acts dependently on the first. Wherefore, for the second cause to cause, the co-causation of the first cause is required. This is what Christ the Lord hints at in the cited passage, saying: "As the branch cannot bear fruit of itself unless it abide in the vine, so neither can you unless you abide in me." The same is hinted at by St. Paul (*cited, cap. 3*): "Each one shall receive his own reward according to his own labor, for we are God's fellow workers." And (*ibid. 11*): "Not I, but the grace of God with me" — especially in meritorious works, which cannot be done without the help and grace of God preventing and accompanying, as the same Apostle shows (*ibid. cap. 13*): "If I should have prophecy and know all mysteries and all knowledge, and if I should have all faith so that I could move mountains, and have not charity, I am nothing." And then (*cap. 15*): "But by the grace of God I am what I am, and his grace in me has not been void, but I have labored more abundantly than all of them."

You will object second that the most perfect mode of acting is to be attributed to God, who is the most perfect maker. But to act alone is a more perfect mode of acting than to act with the partnership and fellowship of another. Therefore God accomplishes all things without creatures co-causing with him. I concede the major; I distinguish the minor: to act alone is a more perfect mode than to act with the partnership of another if this arises from impotence and weakness of power — I concede; but if it arises from the communication of power and virtue conferred, through which the second cause can co-act with the first to produce an effect simultaneously — I deny. For that argues greater power and perfection in an agent able to communicate the power of acting to an effect so that it cooperates with it — which craftsmen cannot do for their artificial works, as Scotus hints (*Quol. 7. §. Sed licet P.*) after St. Paul (*Galat. 3*).

You will object third that if bodies were to act, they would act either through matter or through quantity; but both matter and quantity are passive and of the genus of sterile things; therefore bodies do not possess the power of acting. Hence Augustine adds (*1 Ciuitat. 19*): corporeal causes are not to be numbered among the efficient. Confirmation: action is brought about through an intimate inpouring into the patient. But bodies cannot intimately inpour into the patient on account of quantity, which is impenetrable. Therefore bodies are devoid of action. I reply that the major is insufficient. For bodies act through form as the principle "through which," and through the bodies themselves as the principle "which," as the Philosopher notes (*1 animae T. 64*). To Augustine I say that he does not remove activity from corporeal things — since he names them causes — but indicates that they are not more powerful and swift, as spiritual and immaterial causes are. To the confirmation I say that bodies act not through intimate inpouring but through contiguity. For it is established that fire acts on water and conversely, if they are contiguous and properly brought close.

Article III. Whether the First Cause Concurs with the Second Cause in Producing Every Effect.

Although all Scholastics willingly confess and firmly maintain that the first cause co-acts with the second toward every effect produced by that second cause, they nevertheless dispute about the manner in which this concurrence takes place — whether mediately or immediately. Aureolus (*2 distinct. 38. quaest. un. artic. vn.*), Durant (*ibidem, distinct. 1. quaest. 5*), and some others cited by Augustine at the beginning of Art. I of this Question are of the opinion that God provides his concurrence to the creature only mediately — insofar as at the beginning of its formation he communicated to it the power and ability to act, through which it can totally produce on its own any effect proportioned to it. All others, however — among whom are chiefly the Subtle Doctor (*2 distinct. 37. quaest. vn. §. Propter igitur sub P.*) and (*4 distinct. 1. ad finem, quaestion. 1*), the Seraphic Doctor (*1 distinct. 45. quaest. 2. art. 2. 2. distinct. 37. 1 primo princ. quaest. 2*), the Angelic Doctor (*1 parte quaest. 105. artic. 5*) and (*3 contra Gentes cap. 70*), the Irrefragable Doctor (*1 p.*

quaest. 9. num. 2), the Illuminated Doctor (*1 distinct. 43. quaest. 7*), and the prince of the Nominalists (*Quol. 3. quaest. 4*) — teach that God is the immediate cause of all effects of second causes.

Note first and recall from what was said that between the first and second cause there is essential subordination, such that the second cannot operate without the first, even though the first can act without the second. The reason is that the second is inferior and dependent, while the first is superior and independent. Then it must be noted that the first cause freely and voluntarily causes and operates all effects of created things, even though some of them concur toward those effects naturally and necessarily — as fire toward the generation of fire — while others do so freely and voluntarily — as man in the acts of his will, whether elicited or commanded.

Note second that although the first cause is prior in priority of existence and perfection, it is not prior in priority of causality and concurrence: for both produce the common effect with simultaneous concurrence. Some Scotists deduce this from Scotus (*2 distinct. 37. quaest. un.*) in these words: "The first cause acts with priority of 'from which,' because it acts independently and more perfectly — not with priority 'in which,' such that it attains the effect before the second cause." This can be illustrated by the example of matter and form. For although matter is prior in being and existing than form, it is nonetheless not prior in flowing into and producing the composite — rather, both simultaneously concur toward causing it, as the Doctor suitably pursues (*mox alleg. §. Ad solutionem V.*). Now when two causes co-cause the same effect, if any defect happens to that effect, such a defect can proceed from one and not from the other concurring simultaneously. As (*2 Phys. 26*): "The sun and man are two causes concurring toward the generation of man." If a monster results, such a monster is not attributed to the sun but to man, on account of the excess or deficiency of matter or other causes to be given below. So the first and second cause simultaneously produce the same effect; and if any defect happens in it, that defect is imputed not to the first but to the second cause — as David, repenting, freely and publicly confesses about himself (*Psal. 118*): "My soul has failed in your salvation." For the first cause, as far as it is concerned, would perfect the effect if the second cause co-acting were willing to furnish the same perfection and rectitude to that effect. But since the second cause does not will to cause together with the first and deflects from the rule prescribed to it by God, for this reason a defect or sin happens — which is attributed to that cause alone, which is bound to obey it and does not obey, as Augustine signifies (*Psal. 70. conc. 2*) and (*lib. de cantico nono, cap. 8, qui habetur Tom. 9. operum eius*).

Note third, from the common position of Theologians — especially Scotus (*prenominatis §. Ista quaestiones*) and (*§. Ex ista solutione*) and (*in Reportat. 2. distinct. 35*) — that in sin two things are to be considered: the material and the formal. The material of sin — which is also called the substrate and the physical being

— is that positive element that is really effected by both the first and the second cause. The formal of sin is the absence of due rectitude in the second act of being, and is not in it — which is called moral evil and deformity. This is explained by the example of the wounding and killing of a man, to whose cutting of the flesh God concurs — but not to the deformity of homicide, insofar as it is prohibited by God himself in the Decalogue (*Exod. 20*): "You shall not kill." Wherefore sin formally means nothing other than the privation of rectitude, usefulness, order, and entity, according to St. Bonaventure (*2 distinct. 37. art. 2. quaest. 1*), whom St. Augustine preceded (*tract. 1. in Ioan.*): "Sin is nothing, and when men sin, they become nothing." And (*in Psal. 68*): "There is no substance, because it is iniquity, which is nothing." And David hints at this (*Psal. 14*): "The wicked man is brought to nothing in his sight."

The first thesis is: God concurs immediately with all effects of created things. This is common: Scotus (*cited at the beginning of the article*), Rich. (*1 distinct. 45. art. 2. question. 2*), and the others (*ibidem*). It is proved first from Sacred Scripture: (*Isa. 26*): "You have worked all our works for us." (*Deut. 1*): "The Lord our God who goes before you, he will fight with them with you at the same time." And (*Ioan. 1*): "All things were made through him, and without him nothing was made." And (*15*): "Without me you can do nothing." Some meet these testimonies and similar ones to be adduced, explaining them as referring to the mediate influx and concurrence of the first cause with the second. On the contrary: in those passages it is read that God works all things in all and with all — which cannot be effected without his immediate co-causation, as Christ the Lord plainly shows in the last cited passage of John, saying: "As a branch cannot bear fruit of itself unless it abide in the vine, so neither can you unless you abide in me." But the vine flows immediately into the branch — otherwise the branch itself would wither if separated from it, or if anything were intercepted between them. Therefore the aforesaid passages are to be explained as referring to immediate concurrence. Second, from the Fathers: Augustine (*lib. 1. qq. Deut. cit. quaest. 1*): "It is sufficiently shown that God is a helper in such a way that men also do something." The same (*in Deut. 20. quaest. 30*) and (*in Psal. 143*): "If through you you filled up the whole, a helper would not be necessary." Again: "If you yourself, by your will, were to do nothing, you would not be called a helper. For a helper helps one who is doing something." The same (*serm. 14 de verbis Apostoli*). If therefore God in all works helps man, as the holy Doctor says, it is plainly inferred that God is their immediate cause — like one who helps another carry the same weight or pull the same ship. And Bernard (*1 Meditationum*): "God is more intimate to internal works than to external works. But a creature is immediately present to itself and is the immediate cause of its own effects; therefore God too, who is more immediate and more intimate according to St. Bernard." Third, from (*2 Met. cap. 2*): in essentially subordinated causes, the lower cause cannot act without the superior. But the second cause is essentially subordinated to the first cause, since it is caused by it and depends on it in

being, and is a being by participation. Therefore the first immediately flows into all its effects.

You will say that this is not rightly deduced, since between the first cause and the effects of the second cause, the second cause itself mediates, from which the effects immediately proceed. On the contrary: if the second cause perishes and its effect persists — as if the generating fire is destroyed and the generated fire remains — without doubt the generated fire depends on some cause, since it is a dependent being really identified with its dependence. It does not depend on the generating fire, since that has been destroyed; therefore it depends on God immediately, since between it and God there is no longer any medium.

Fourth: the first cause absolutely and fully dominates over the second cause, since it is omnipotent — so that when it wills it withdraws its concurrence, and the second cause cannot do anything, as in (*Daniel. 3*) the burning fire did not heat or burn the three Hebrew boys. But if the first cause were not immediately causing with the second cause its action, it could not impede it — for the second cause would have the entire power of acting from itself, and whatever is required for it. The opposite of this is clear both from the cited passage and from other places of Scripture.

Fifth: God certainly and undoubtedly would not know what the second cause would do in the future, because since he is omniscient by determination of his will — whereby he has decided to concur with every efficiency of the second cause, as I said from Scotus (*tract. de scientia Dei*) — if the second cause operates independently of the influx of the first, then since it is free — as in the case of man — it can do the opposite, which God foreknows. And thus God would not be omniscient, since with a possible being posited in being, no impossible thing follows (*1 Perih. ad finem*). I add that the second cause would depend more on the first than its effect does — for the former depends immediately and the latter mediately — which seems inconvenient: that what is principiated should be more independent and absolute than the principle. Therefore the operations of the second cause depend immediately on the first. And the Author of Causes affirms this (*propof. 1*), and Averroes (*ibidem*) confirms it, saying that the first cause flows more into the effect than the second. But the second cause flows into the effect immediately; therefore so does the first. And to flow into is the same as to cause; if therefore the first flows immediately, it therefore immediately co-causes all effects of the second cause.

The second thesis is: the opinion denying the immediate concurrence of God with created things and affirming only mediate concurrence does not seem erroneous or heretical. This is deduced from the Doctor (*nuper alleg.*), who adduces arguments proving this but does not dissolve them, and (*2 Rep. dist. 37. quaest. 2. §. Secundo est declarandum*) openly says that the aforesaid opinion is probable — even though he himself with his followers defends the affirmative and common opinion. This opinion is expressly and deliberately taught by two

classical Doctors: Aureolus, a most eminent and most learned Cardinal, and Durant, most skilled Master of the Sacred Palace and most learned Bishop. Nor does it greatly displease Arr (*disp. 10. Phys. sect. 1. subsect. 2*), who strives to resolve the arguments opposed to it — as Hurt (*ibid. sect. 2. subsect. 1*) had done before him, although afterwards (*subsect. 2*) he incautiously and imprudently rejects it together with Suárez (*disp. 22. sect. 1*) and others cited by him. Nor are those far from it who maintain that God does not immediately concur with the material element of sin — among whom are eminent theologians cited by the Seraphic Doctor (*2 distinct. 37. quaest. 1. art. 1*), whom neither he nor the Master of the Sentences dared to argue against and determine the opposite of their assertion. But if according to these Authors the first agent does not immediately co-act with the second agent toward the physical act which is called the material of sin, it is not clear why it should behave the same way toward other physical acts. Sacred Scripture is added: (*Gen. 1*), where it is read that God gave the power of acting to the earth and other things, and left them thus with their powers, so that they would perform their proper works without his immediate influx: "Let the earth bring forth green grass and grass making seed," etc. Then (*cap. 2. eiusdem lib.*) it is added: "He rested from all the work which he had made" — that is, as Lyra explains, he ceased from the founding of things and completed his work. And (*Ecclesiastici 15*): "He left him in the hand of his own counsel." Augustine inclines this way (*7 Ciuit. cap. 30*): "God so administers all things that he allows them to perform their own motions." And Anselm (*l. de concordia, parte prima, cap. 8*): "God makes all actions and all motions, because he himself makes things, by which, from which, and in which they happen, and no thing has any power of willing or doing except he who gives it." And in the second part he adds: "God who predestines does not make the will by compelling it or resisting it, but by leaving it in its own being." Further: it is condemned in no Council, nor expressly reprobated by any holy Father that I have seen — as Scotus shows of the absolute principles and properties constitutive of the divine Persons (*1 dist. 26. quaest. vn.*). Moreover: the opposing testimonies and arguments can be resolved by a single distinction — namely that they hold of mediate, not immediate concurrence. And so an easy response is given to that weighty difficulty that God is not the author of evil and the cause of sins, since he does not concur with such an act. On this account the Council of Trent (*sess. 6. can. 6*) decrees that the betrayal of Judas is not from God as is the calling of Paul. Added to this are reasons urging its probability. First: a sufficient cause, once all that is required for acting is posited, produces an effect suited and proportioned to its power — without any other sufficient and total productive cause co-causing with it. As fire burns, water cools, a plant flowers, and a tree bears fruit. Therefore another sufficient and total productive cause is not required, co-causing immediately the same work; for in this way a passion proceeds from a subject without any other interposition, as light from a luminous body and risibility from man. Again: either the uncreated and created agent both simultaneously and immediately cause the effect totally — and then the effect would be

produced twice — or one of the two causes would be superfluous; or both would be partial causes partially causing it — and this derogates from God's power, which is supreme and infinite, and is sufficiently productive of any effect. Furthermore: God does not immediately concur with the effect of the material and formal cause, on account of the annexed imperfection of their causalities — which no one denies. Therefore the same must be maintained of the effect of the other causes. Finally: there are not two immediate ends; therefore neither are there two efficient causes simultaneously and immediately causing the same effect.

I have adduced these things not by opposing the common opinion, but by disputing for both sides — not asserting but opining — and by defending the aforesaid orthodox Doctors from error and heresy. But I submit myself to better judgment and to the most holy Church, and I follow the affirmative part. Therefore I respond to what is put forward for the negative part and say that the passages of Scripture and the testimonies of the Fathers affirm one thing and do not deny the other. For they affirm that creatures received the power of acting from God at the beginning of their formation, as Lyra indicates above. But they do not deny that God immediately co-causes with them — indeed, they presuppose this, since they are dependent, participated beings, essentially subordinated. What causes difficulty is the decree of the Council of Trent (*cited*), which denies that God co-acts toward evil and sin — since he is the author of goods and not the cause of evils. To this it is sufficient from Augustine (*12 Civit. cap. 7*) and Bonaventure (*2 distinct. 44. art. 1. quaest. 2*), who say that sin and moral evil have not an efficient but a deficient cause — which cannot belong to God, who is a perfecting cause. To the first argument the same is to be said: that second causes act, but dependently on the immediate concurrence of God, which they always require and continually demand, without which they cannot operate. To the second I say that both are total in their own order and cause the common effect — or they are partial, and on account of this no imperfection is attributed to God, since he causes partially not from deficiency of power but from the good pleasure of his will, thus willing to cooperate in the efficiency of all effects of creatures. To the third I say that God concurs in the genus of efficient cause, which designates no imperfection. To the fourth I say that there are two subordinated ends, just as the causes are essentially subordinated — and therefore there is no inconsistency.

Article IV. Whether the First Cause Concurs with the Second Cause Immediately by Immediacy of Power and of Suppositum.

Certain Thomists — by name Ferr. (*2 contra Gentes, cap. 7*) — maintain that God operates with created things immediately by immediacy of power and not of suppositum. The common opinion, however, is that of the Doctor (*2 dist. 37. quaest. vn. §. Ad solutionem*), Fuente (*2 Phys. quaest. 5. art. 2. diff. 1*), Conimbricenses (*ibid. cap. 7. quaest. 14. art. 1*), and others, who teach that the first cause acts with

the second in both modes — immediately by immediacy of power and of suppositum.

Note that in every agent two things are distinguished: the power of acting, which is called the principle "through which," and the agent itself, which is called the principle "which." As the power of the sun for illuminating is the principle "through which" the sun illuminates, and the sun itself is the principle "which" of illuminating. Now since in the preceding article it was established that the first agent acts with the second immediately, it remains for the present article to investigate whether it operates immediately by immediacy of power and suppositum, or not. An agent acts immediately by immediacy of suppositum when no suppositum is interposed between the agent and the patient — as the sphere of the moon acts immediately by immediacy of suppositum on the sphere of fire contiguous to it. Conversely, to act mediately by mediation of suppositum is when between the agent and the patient another suppositum mediates — as the moon acts on air, water, and the rest of the lower bodies. To act immediately by immediacy of power is when the agent acts on the patient through its own proper power inherent in it — as fire immediately by immediacy of power heats and burns wood close to it. Conversely, to act mediately by mediation of power is when the agent acts through power borrowed from another and not inhering in itself — as a craftsman operates through the power of natural active things applied to passive things. Some add another mode of acting immediately by immediacy of power: when an agent acts from itself and independently of anything else — in which sense God alone operates, since he alone is independent, while all other things depend on him and therefore act mediately, according to power bestowed and communicated to them by God.

The thesis is: the first cause concurs with the second in both modes aforesaid. The Doctor holds this (*ubi supra*) and (*ibid. in Report. quaest. 2*). The same is conveyed from him by Aretinus (*2 Phys. in annot. 2. Phys. quaest. 8*). It is proved first: the first cause is not distant from the second cause, since it is everywhere by its immensity, as is signified (*Psal. 15*): "If I ascend into heaven, you are there; if I descend into hell, you are present." And (*Act. 17*): "He is not far from any one of us, for in him we live and move and have our being." Therefore the first cause causing with the second acts immediately in both aforesaid modes. Second: that which operates through power inherent in it, with no interposed medium, causes immediately in said modes, as is clear from the preceding note. But the first cause operates with the second through its own power — indeed, through power independent of anything else — with no interposed medium, since it is intimately present to the second. Third: an action proceeding immediately from an agent argues both aforesaid forms of immediacy, since an effect cannot be caused immediately except through an action immediately proceeding from the agent itself — especially since the suppositum and its power are really identified. But God's action in causing with a creature proceeds from him immediately,

because both simultaneously attain the same common effect. Therefore both act in both aforesaid modes.

You will object: it is on everyone's lips that God acts through second causes as media. Therefore God causes with created things in neither mode immediately. I reply that the antecedent is to be distinguished, as Maurice (*in cap. 2. de primo principio*) hints. For if it is taken as meaning that second causes essentially depend on the first in being and operating, this is conceded. But if it is understood that God acts through power communicated to them at the beginning, this is commonly denied by Scholastics.

You will say that between both causes there is essential subordination; therefore one causes through the mediation of the other. I say that such subordination does not remove the aforesaid double mode of acting immediately, because although the second cause cannot operate without the first, the first does not cause prior to the second — but both simultaneously produce the common effect immediately, without any interposition of another power or suppositum.

Article V. Whether the First Cause Pre-moves and Pre-moves the Second Cause to Acting.

The family of Dominicans — by name Banez (*1 p. quaest. 14. art. 13*) and (*quaest. 23. art. 3*), Rip. (*ibid. quaest. 19. art. 8. dub. 1. cap. 11*), Alvarez (*3 de auxiliis disp. 19*), and others from St. Thomas (*1 part. quaest. 105*) — are of the opinion that the first cause pre-moves the second by a real and physical pre-motion to operating, such that without such pre-motion the second cannot act. These authors, however, are divided among themselves and split into two groups. For some are of the opinion that God pre-moves the created agent through a prior physical quality received in it, through which it is rendered capable of operating, and without which it is incapable and insufficient for acting. Others hold that nothing real and prior is placed and received in the creature intrinsically, but only extrinsically — which is the predetermination of the divine will physically pre-determining the creature itself to acting. To these are opposed Scotus (*4 distinct. 1. quaest. 1. propè finem*) and (*distinct. 12. question. 3. §. Quantum ad argum. Principale*) and (*distinct. 43. question. 3. §. Tertia opinio*), Faber (*in supp. 1. disp. 57. cap. 2. & inde*), and other Scotists — to whom are joined Molina (*1 part. question. 14. art. 13. disp. 6*), Suárez (*in opuscul. lib. 1. de concursu*), and the Conimbricenses (*2 Phys. quaest. 13. cap. 7. artic. 2*), and others commonly and firmly denying the aforesaid physical pre-motion and predetermination.

Note first that this controversy is equally agitated concerning the natural and necessary second agent as concerning the free and spontaneous one — not only with respect to effects attainable by the power of nature, but also with respect to works for which a supernatural power is required. In the present, however, we raise no question or difficulty about meritorious and supernatural works, since it is established by faith that there is a preventing grace, through which God freely

exhorts, excites, and morally moves free will and created will to acting well and meritoriously operating — as is established from the words of the Council of Trent (*can. 4. 5. sess. 6*) and the Roman Catechism (*de 1. art. Symb. 1 part. num. 22*): "Although it does not impede the efficiency of second causes, it nevertheless provides." And Sacred Scripture attests to this (*Psal. 20*): "You have prevented him with the blessings of sweetness." And (*Psal. 26*): "His mercy will prevent me." The Holy Fathers confirm this — especially Augustine (*1 ad Simplicianum, quaest. 2. in fine*): "We shall not be able to will or to run unless he moves and excites us." And the Author of Faith to Peter agrees (*capit. 32*).

Note second that the second cause in itself and in its own order is perfect. For it is the work of God, whose works are perfect (*Deut. 32.*): and before (*Gen. 2*): "Therefore the heavens and the earth were finished, and all the furnishing of them. And God completed on the seventh day his work which he had made." Now since a twofold perfection of a created thing is posited — as Lyra notes (*passim allegato*) — one to first act and the other to second act: the former is the essence of the thing, the latter its operation. The prior is ordered toward the posterior, since being is for the sake of operating (*2 Caeli 17*). The second cause is perfect and complete in first act and in its essential being; but incomplete and insufficient for causing an effect — and for this reason it needs the concurrence of the first cause, so that the effect may be produced. For there is essential subordination between those causes in being and in operating, such that the second cause can do absolutely nothing without the help of the first, as the Doctor rightly pursues (*2 distinct. 37. quaest. vn. §. Si hac via*) and (*§. Ad solutionem*) and (*in Reportat. quaest. 2*). Now two things are distinguished in a causing cause: action, and the effect produced through action — as heat is caused by fire through heating. One action proceeds from the first cause and another from the second cause; for just as causes are distinguished, so are actions, in the school of the Doctor who places action in the agent. The effect, however, is one for both causes. For both causes agree and co-cause the common effect, as two men simultaneously pull one and the same ship. Wherefore, the voluntary cause is free in eliciting and emitting its action — for it can elicit it or not elicit it, and can suspend it. But once the action is emitted and elicited, together with the action of the first cause the common effect is produced — so called because it is caused by both.

Note third, from the Doctor (*4 distinct. 43. quaest. 3. §. Tertia opinio*), that the essential subordination between the first and second cause is not something absolute produced prior by the first cause and received in the second cause, but means nothing other than the order and relation that is expressed by the name of the dependence of the second cause on the first. For since the second cause is dependent on the first, both in being and in operating, for this reason it is essentially subordinated to it — such that without it the second cause can in no way operate, as Scotus teaches (*4 dist. 1. quaest. 1. in fine*). Although however the first cause is called the moving and the second the moved, the first is

nonetheless not prior in flowing into and causing, but in perfection, nobility, and independence — or because it gives power to the second cause, which together with God's influx attains the common effect. And the first cause not acting, the second itself can in no way act — even though the second itself receives nothing in itself, as Lynch expounds (*1 dist. 2. quaest. 1. §. Sed in hoc occurrunt*).

The first thesis is: in the Peripatetic school, the first cause does not physically pre-move or predetermine the second cause to acting. This is deduced from Scotus (*Quol. 7. O. 1. dist. 8. quaest. 5*) and elsewhere, against Fuente (*2 Phys. quaest. 5. diff. 2. art. 1*) and the Complutenses (*ibid. disp. 11. quaest. 2. §. 2*). It is proved first from (*8 Phys. T. 32*): "Heavy and light things move themselves" — as fire upward and earth downward. And (*7. 33*): "A man moves a stick by his own power, which is intrinsic to him." You will say that heavy and light things are moved by the generator, not by themselves. And that the example of the stick moved by the hand is to the opposite: for Aristotle adduces that to prove the premise: "whatever is moved is moved by another," and adds: "as a stick is moved by the hand of a man." On the contrary: the Stagirite at that place gives an example of one learning and one who knows, who has the potency for learning and knowledge. But this potency for the act of knowing and speculating is intrinsic to him — namely his intellect, which is an intrinsic power of his soul. If therefore heavy and light things are moved as a knowing person is aroused to the act of knowing — since the knowing person moves himself to such an act through a potency innate to him — so too those things are moved from themselves, or by the power intrinsic to them, toward their proper place and center, if the impediment that retains them from being borne toward it is removed, as the same Philosopher adds. As for what is added about the stick moved by the hand — I say that this holds of local motion in those things that do not have an intrinsic active power of moving themselves locally but are moved by an extrinsic principle, as a stick is moved by a hand. But a man moves a stick by his own proper and intrinsic power. Second, from (*3 Phys. T. 18*): the acting second cause is not changed. But if before acting it were to receive in itself a prior quality, it would undoubtedly be changed. Therefore in Aristotle's view, the second cause is not physically pre-moved to operating. Nor is the Complutenses' exposition valid — that an agent is not changed through its action, since when a non-acting thing becomes an acting thing, it is plainly changed through its action, which it emits. Third: in Aristotle's school, the second cause is determined to act — as fire to burning and water to humidifying. Therefore a prior quality is irrelevant for determining these agents in their works and effects. Nor does the response of the Complutenses help — that these agents have indeed a determined power in themselves and in their order, but not in the order of the first cause. For the prior quality devised by the Thomists does not regard the first cause but the second, through which the second cause is said to be pre-moved. Again: animated things move themselves

from an intrinsic principle, as is more clearly evident in those that are moved by progressive motion. Again: water once heated reduces itself to its former coldness through its own innate and intrinsic power. Finally: (*2 Phys. T. 3*): nature is the internal principle of motion and rest. Many interpret this as referring to an active principle. If nature is not taken so narrowly, it obtains an active principle — as nature does what is better (*2 de gen. T. 59*). Therefore the aforesaid physical pre-motion and predetermination is to be expelled from the Peripatetic school.

The second thesis is: the natural second cause is neither pre-moved nor physically predetermined by the first cause. The Doctor holds this at the beginning of this article, and the common run of recent authors agrees. The first part is proved first: the second cause in its genus and order is perfect and complete, having an appropriate potency and sufficient power for operating and producing whatever effects are suited and proportioned to it, as I showed in the first note. Therefore it does not pre-require any physical quality pre-moving it to acting. The Thomists reply that the second cause indeed has the power of acting in the mode of habit and potency, but not in the mode of act sufficient for operating in its own order — rather, it receives this from God through the said quality received in it, through which its power is completed in first act and in the mode of a principle, and is rendered sufficient to act in its own order and genus. On the contrary: the second cause in first act and in its genus has whatever is required for acting — as the earth the power of germinating and fire the power of igniting — and God commands them to operate according to their power (*Gen. 1*): "Let the earth bring forth green grass." If the power were incomplete with respect to second act, that command and mandate to operate would be void and empty — since through it they could not operate, since they would require another prior power or the aforesaid physical quality pre-moving and exciting them to acting. Furthermore: a thing complete and perfect in its nature and essence obtains its complement in potency and power, since power flows from essence as from its source and root. But the second cause participates a perfect and complete essence; therefore it likewise participates a perfect power and power of acting — as an angel that participates an intellectual nature likewise participates a perfect intellect, which is its power. And according to the natures of things their potencies and powers of operating are had. If therefore the second cause has sufficient power in the mode of habit, likewise in the mode of act. Second: if the second cause pre-required the said quality for acting — once that quality is obtained and received in it — it would produce its proper and fitting effects without God's help and concurrence, since it would have whatever is required for operating; and so it would act independently, and the opinion of Aureolus and Durant, rejected above, would be true. The Thomists meet this by denying the consequence. For that prior quality does not exclude the concurrence of the first cause with the second for the efficiency of common effects. It is given to move, excite, and apply the second cause to

operation — which without that quality's pre-existing would not operate. On the contrary: the second cause is sufficiently moved to its objects — around which it labors — without the help of another, by those very objects: as sight by color and hearing by sound. And fire, once combustible material is presented to it, properly approached and disposed, burns it with no other principle newly instilled in it. Indeed, it seems vain and ridiculous that fire cannot act on the aforesaid object unless a prior quality caused by God is first in it — especially since natural qualities pre-existing are assigned for preparing and fitting the subject around which the natural agent must operate. Third: if the second cause were to receive in itself a quality through which it actually operates and without which it cannot operate, it would be an instrument receiving actual motion and the virtue from the principal cause — as is clear of a saw cutting wood and other instruments of art. But the second cause is not properly an instrument, since it participates its own proper power of acting remaining in it in being and in becoming, as the Doctor excellently shows (*4 distinct. 13. quaest. 1. art. 3*). Therefore no prior quality is to be posited in it for it to operate, since it possesses its own power of operating in its own order. The Thomists meet this by conceding that the second cause is an instrument of God, and therefore the power of acting is moved by God as principal agent — just as an instrument of art derives the power of acting from the craftsman, lasting as long as it is actually moved by him, and with his motion ceasing, its power and operation cease. On the contrary: the second cause is not an instrumental but a principal cause. For by Aristotle (*8 Phys. T. 33*) and (*12 Met. T. 34*) the principal cause is divided into the first — which is independent — and the second — which is dependent and essentially subordinated to the first. But each possesses its own proper power of acting enduring in it as long as it endures, and is productive of the terminus and effect it has respect to; while the power of an instrument is transient and only dispositive of the subject, terminus, and effect to be produced. Moreover: the said quality, since it is founded by God, resides and exists in the series of created things and as a second cause. If therefore every second cause for operating needs a prior quality pre-moving it, this quality too, in order to operate, needs another pre-existing one — and since the account is equal for the rest, there will be a process to infinity, which all must avoid (*2 Met. cap. 2*). Finally: since this quality is an accident, it cannot attain a substantial terminus, since an accident does not produce a substance. And no necessity, utility, or probability of it appears. Therefore it is to be exploded and banished from the Schools.

The second part is proved first: entities are not to be multiplied without necessity (*1 Phys. 7. 52*). An eternal decree and determination of God is sufficient — whereby he decided from eternity to found things in time — according to (*Psal. 14. B.*): "He spoke and they were made; he commanded and they were created." And through his power — which is his will — he created whatever he willed in heaven and on earth and in all the abysses (*Psal. 134*). And he gave them

the power by which, together with his influx, they would act and produce their proper effects — according to the prescription and definition indicated by Sacred Scripture (*Luc. 22*): "The Son of Man goes according to what has been defined; woe however to that man by whom he will be betrayed." Therefore it is empty and vain to add a new physical predetermination pre-determining second causes to acting. Second: (*8 Phys. T. 18*) and (*1 de gen. T. 56*): the natural second cause by its own very nature is determined toward producing its effects — with nothing newly instilled in it — as fire to heating and water to cooling of a subject presented and disposed to it. Therefore it is superfluous and excessive to imagine and devise a new predetermination affecting and pre-moving it to acting.

The third thesis is: the free second cause is neither pre-moved nor physically predetermined by the first cause to acting. This is defended by the Doctor (*2 distinct. 1. quaest. 2. §. Ad 1.*) and (*distinct. 16. quaest. vn. §. Alij dicunt*) and (*distinct. 37. quaest. 2. §. Quantum ad 1.*). And it is indicated by Augustine (*3 de libero arbitrio, cap. 3*) and (*lib. de gratia, libero arbitrio in initio*), and (*de cantico novo cap. 8*). It is proved first: the natural second cause is not affected by any prior quality, nor by physical predetermination, for its works — as was shown in the preceding thesis. Therefore neither is the free second cause. The antecedent was shown in the preceding thesis. The consequence is urged: if anything were an impediment, it would be the indetermination and indifference of the free second cause to acting. But this is not an obstacle but rather an advantage, since it is full faculty and absolute power to either alternative — and the free cause itself freely and spontaneously determines itself to whatever it wills, since it is mistress of its own acts, as (*Ecclesiastici 15*) makes clear: "God from the beginning created man and left him in the hand of his own counsel." Augustine adds (*passim postremo citato*): "That first man received free will intact, and God placed fire and water before him: to which you will, stretch forth your hand. He chose fire, he left water; see the just judge. What man chose, he received freely; he willed evil — this has followed him." Therefore the indifference and indetermination of the free cause is not passive — such as the potency of matter receptive of several forms — but active toward opposite acts, effects, and objects. Second: given a prior quality and physical predetermination, human freedom is injured and entirely destroyed. Freedom consists in the fact that, with all that is required for acting posited, the will can act or not act and suspend its act. But given such a predetermination, the will operates that toward which it is predetermined, such that it cannot operate anything else — otherwise it would not be predetermined. If therefore the will cannot do anything else except that toward which it is predetermined, it is plainly not free, since freedom regards opposites and thus acts on one alternative in such a way that it can act on the other, as the Council of Trent decrees (*sess. 6. cap. 5*).

The Thomists reply that the created will is determined by the first cause, while it determines itself to acting — in which way it remains free, since when it

determines itself to one thing, it can determine itself to its opposite. On the contrary: it involves a contradiction that one and the same will should simultaneously and at once be both physically predetermined and not predetermined to one thing. For it would be predetermined through the said quality, and would be not predetermined, because it determines itself — which manifestly implies repugnance. Third: free will performs a double function — namely, it can omit an act, or exercise it, or suspend it. But given and admitted such a predetermination, it is no longer in its power to administer that same act in this way, since the predetermination is established by the adversaries as such that it thus comes about and not otherwise. With predetermination therefore standing, its freedom of both exercise and specification is taken away, since it is forced to do only that toward which it is predetermined. The Thomists reply that the argument has force in the composite sense, but not in the divided sense — just as it is commonly conceded by Scholastics that the predestined in the composite sense cannot be damned, but in the divided sense can be damned. And it is on everyone's lips that: Peter sits — as he sits, in the composite sense, he cannot not sit; but in the divided sense he can not sit. On the contrary: predetermination carries a contradiction and repugnance with it, and does not remove it as the divided sense does. For the same will through it is predetermined and not predetermined — if it could do the opposite. Just as the same thing would be white through whiteness and not white through it, and the same thing would be predestined and not predestined — which is repugnant. For according to the adversaries, God pre-determines the created will to doing something, such that another and opposite thing to that predetermination never comes about nor can come about at any time — since that predetermination necessarily attains its effect. But with the first cause acting necessarily, as Scotus says (*1 distinct. 2. quaest. 2. §. ostenso*), the second cause also acts necessarily. If therefore that quality is a necessary cause and is not in the power of the will, it follows that the will itself cannot go out into an opposite act. And the same will would not be culpable in evil acts, since it would not be moved by itself but would be pre-moved by God toward producing those acts. And sin would be imputed and attributed not to man but to God — which is false and blasphemous.

You will object first, against the first thesis, from (*7 Phys. cap. 1*) and (*8 eiusdem operis cap. 5. T. 33*) and elsewhere: "whatever is moved is moved by another." But the second cause is moved to operating; therefore it is moved by the first cause — and hence a quality pre-moving and predetermining the second cause to operating must be admitted. Confirmation from the same (*7 Moraliū ad Eudemum, cap. 11*): the soul is to the body as a craftsman to his instrument and a servant to his lord. But the soul pre-moves the body and a craftsman pre-moves his instrument to acting. I add from (*Isa. 10*) that Sennacherib is called God's instrument against the Jews. If therefore the second cause is an instrument of the first cause, it follows that the second is physically pre-moved and

determined by the first. I reply that Aristotle is to be interpreted as speaking of the local motion of the celestial spheres, which comes from without — that is, from the intelligences deputed by God to move them — as the example adduced by him of a stick that is locally moved by a man makes clear. Hence (*12 Met. T. 48*) the number of celestial spheres is gathered from the number of local motions. All the more so since it is added (*8 Phys. cit.*) that certain things — as heavy and light — are moved not by another but from an intrinsic principle and determine themselves, and are not pre-determined by another. Or say that it is to be explained with respect to first act: "whatever is moved is moved by another" — that is, is produced. In this sense the second cause is likewise said to be a moved mover — moved, that is, produced, and a mover, that is, producing. Now since there is no process to infinity (*2 Met. cap. 2*), we must arrive at one that is from itself, unproduced, infinite, and independent — which is the first cause or God, producing, governing, and ruling all things. For beings do not wish to be governed badly (*12 Met. in fine*). And with respect to second act: because with the first cause moving and acting, the second cause goes out into act in its own order, and both together concur toward producing the common effect — not through something prior received in the second cause, but through the power communicated to it by God at the beginning of its formation, as the Doctor rightly notes (*4 distinct. in calce quaest. 1*) and (*2 distinct. 3. quaest. 8. §. Ad quaest. E. in solutione 3*). By this reasoning are also understood and received certain propositions — such as: "a cause acts in the power of the first cause," that is, through the power given to it by God in its creation. Again: "the second cause acts through the application of the first," that is, the first applying itself to operating, the second likewise girds itself to acting — and both attain the same common work with their own proper powers. For with the first exhibiting its concurrence, the second too — if it is natural — is ready to operate, with every obstacle removed. Again: "the first cause causes that the second causes" — namely through the communication of power and the exhibition of the necessary concurrence for causing. In this sense (*Philip. 2*) is taken: "Who works in us to will and to accomplish" — that is, according to Augustine (*22 Ciuitat. cap. 1*): "He makes those who will this, as he is said to know what he causes to be known by those by whom it is unknown" — through the power conferred on them and the necessary concurrence exhibited. To the confirmation I say that it is true of an instrument in the broad sense. For an instrument properly has no power of acting remaining in itself, but if there is any power, it receives it through the actual motion of the principal agent — as Scotus notes (*in 4. cit.*) and (*distinct. 13. quaest. 2. §. De tertio CC.*). That that passage admits this sense is clear, because the body is a companion of the soul, and from both the animated whole is constituted, which produces the acts of life — called the operations of the whole (*primo animae T. 64*). And the servant acts by his own power, even though he is subject to the command of his lord. Say the same of the testimony of Scripture, as is clear from (*cap. 14*) of the same book, where the crimes committed by Sennacherib are narrated.

You will object second, against the second thesis: the second cause is excited, moved, and applied by the first cause to operating, since it is a dependent, participated being, able to do nothing without the concurrence of the first cause. Therefore the second is physically pre-moved and predetermined by the first. The antecedent can be denied unless it is understood in the way I explained above. For fire approached to tinder, without any excitation and motion by another, burns it — with the first agent concurring with a simultaneous concurrence, which every second cause needs in order to operate, as the Doctor excellently explains (*2 distinct. 37. §. Ad solutionem. V.*).

You will object third, against the third thesis, many testimonies of Sacred Scripture — especially (*Iob. 12*): "Who changes the heart of princes." (*Prov. 21*): "The heart of the king is in the hand of God, and he will turn it wherever he wishes." (*Hierem. 10*): "It is not in man's way, and by God the steps of a man will be directed." The Council of Trent seems to hint at the same (*sess. 6. can. 4*), and Augustine is not far from it (*serm. 94 de tempore*) in these words: "Because God so works in us that we also work." And Scotus (*4 distinct. 49. quastion. 6. §. Dico ergo K*) says that the will of the Blessed is impeccable because it is anticipated by the divine will lest it fall into sin. I reply that these and similar things are to be adduced as true of good and meritorious works — for the effecting of which I noted in the first note that a preventing grace is required. Therefore, if any pre-motion is given, it is moral and not physical. Especially because God wills certain things absolutely, to which will nothing can resist (*Rom. 9*). Now God not concurring, a creature can do nothing — and thus God always wills to co-act toward the beatific act, but not toward its opposite, from which sin can follow. Hence in the composite sense the Blessed is impeccable, according to Scotus (*precit. F.*). And I showed at length in Moral Philosophy (*dub. 7. art. 2. 1. 3. q. 2*).

You will object fourth: the same Doctor (*mox. cit. K*) writes that it is not against the nature of the created will to be determined by the uncreated will. Therefore according to Scotus, physical pre-motion and predetermination is in accordance with the second cause and is not expelled from his school. I concede the antecedent; I deny the consequence. For the second cause is essentially subordinated to the first cause and is bound to conform to it and submit to it. Therefore when it wills, in certain works — as in the beatific act — it anticipates the created will lest it go out into an opposite act. But in other operations it is physically pre-determined by nothing intrinsic or extrinsic.

Article VI. Whether the Action of the First and of the Second Cause Is One.

There are two ways of speaking in this article. One is that of the Thomists, whom Suárez (*disp. 22. Met. Sect. 3*), Hurt (*2 Phys. disp. 10. sect. 3*), and other more recent authors follow — who hold that the action of the first and second cause concurring toward causing the common effect is one. The other is that of Scotus (*2 d. 37. quaest. vn. §. Ad solutionem*), Lynch (*ibid.*), Mayr (*d. 43. quaest. 4*) and (*1 d. 43*

§ 44. *quaest. 7*), Racon (*2 Phys. tract. de causis, sect. 3. quaest. 1. in solutione 2. obiectionis*), and all those who defend that action is in the agent — who teach that the action of the first and second agent producing the common effect is double. It is to be presupposed from what is to be said elsewhere that action is taken in two ways: for action of the genus of quality — called "acted action," which is the terminus and effect of the agent, as intellection is the terminus of the understanding and vision of the seeing — or for action of the genus of action, which is called the production, causality, and influx of the agent, as heating is the action of the heater and cooling of the cooler.

The thesis is: the actions of the first and second cause co-causing the common effect are distinct. This is deduced from Scotus (*ubi supra*) and (*in Rep. quaest. 2*). It is proved first: distinct agents participating distinct powers obtain distinct actions when they simultaneously cause the same effect — as is clear of two candles illuminating the same room and of stars illuminating our hemisphere, from which distinct lights, illuminations, and splendors are seen to proceed. And if only one power were in one or two agents and supposita, only one action proceeds from them — as in the Godhead, the Father and Son enjoying one spirative power, by one spiration breathe forth the Holy Spirit and are called one spirator. Likewise, the three Persons possessing one creative power go out simultaneously into one creation and are called one creator. But God and a creature are two agents participating distinct powers of acting; therefore their actions toward the common effect are distinct. Hurt (*precit.*) replies that the argument holds for disparate causes, but not for essentially subordinated ones, such as the first and second agent. On the contrary: essential subordination means nothing other than the order and habitude of the inferior to the superior and of the dependent to the independent — which belongs to the genus of sterile things and is irrelevant to the unity or multiplicity of action, which is sought from the unity or plurality of power and productive principle, as the argument clearly shows. Second: from distinct causes, distinct influxes, causalities, and actions emanate — as is clear from the definition of cause, which is a principle flowing of itself into an effect. But the first and second agent are distinct causes — for one is uncreated and infinite, the other created and finite — and through distinct actions they cause the same effect. Third: particular causes simultaneously attaining the same effect co-act through distinct actions — as is clear of the object and intellect co-causing the same intellection, and of father and mother begetting the same offspring. But God and a creature are, as it were, two partial causes co-causing the same common effect — as the Doctor does not deny in the mentioned passage. Therefore both causes co-act through distinct actions. I add that if the action of both is one — since divine action is independent, unparticipated, and infinite, identified with God — the created action that coincides with it, according to the adversaries, will likewise be such. Moreover: from the Scholastic Doctors and the sacred Councils, in Christ the Lord — in keeping with his double nature existing in one suppositum of his — a

double action is distinguished: divine and human. The former is devoid of merit, the latter participates in merit; the former is eternal, the latter temporal. These and similar predicates argue no small distinction between the aforesaid actions.

You will object first from Scripture: (*1 Cor. 12*): "Who works all things in all." And (*Philip. 2*): "Who works in us to will and to accomplish." Explaining this passage, Augustine (*1 de gratia Christi, contra Pelagium c. 5. 1. 2. cap. 25*) says that God concurs toward the ability, the willing, and the operating. And (*l. de praedestinatione, & gratia cap. 11*) he adds: "From him we have willing, because he calls and illumines; from him accomplishing — since it belongs to us to strive with the good gifts he has given and to will." But willing and accomplishing designate action; therefore God concurs not only toward the effect but also toward the action — and hence the action of a creature does not differ from the action of God. I reply to the first testimony: God works all things in the order of the first cause, not in the order of the second cause. For there the divisions of graces and talents are enumerated, according to which each one must work and attain the crown of glory. Therefore from that passage it cannot in any way be gathered that the action of God and of a creature is one in producing the common effect. To the second I say that the Apostle is there speaking of good and meritorious works, for the effecting of which a preventing grace is required — as Augustine's interpretation, adduced above, indicates — without which no one can hope well, believe, and act, as the Council of Trent decrees (*sess. 6. can. 5.*). Or he speaks of action of the genus of quality, which is the terminus and effect of the production of both causes — as I showed above in the presupposition. But not of action of the genus of action, which is doubled according to the doubling of causes — as the same Apostle hints there, saying: "with fear and trembling work out your salvation."

You will object second: God is the immediate cause of all created things, as I showed in the preceding article. But the action of the second cause is counted in the series of created things; therefore its immediate cause is God, and accordingly the action of the second cause is not distinct from the action of God. I distinguish the major: if they are termini and effects of it — I concede; but if they are ways to its termini and effects — I deny. As is clear of relations, which are not immediately produced by God but arise from the positing of the extremes. Likewise action — which is a relation extrinsically advening, from Scotus (*4 d. 13. quaest. 1*) — does not proceed immediately from God. You will say: if the action of the second cause does not depend immediately on the first cause, then it is independent and unparticipated — such as the action of the first cause. The consequence is to be denied. The reason is that the action of a creature cannot attain its effect except with the first cause concurring. Therefore it is dependent and participated. You will press: if this is true, then likewise the action of God is dependent, since it does not go out into effect except with the second cause co-causing. The parity is denied, since the first cause from its own

good pleasure concurs in this way — whereas if it wished it could produce the entire effect. But the second cause, unless it is helped, cannot go out into the effect; and therefore it is always dependent in being and in operating.

You will object third: if we distinguish the action of the creature from the action of God concurring toward the same effect, we fall into the opinion of Aureolus and Durant, commonly rejected — since a creature through its own power and action could attain the effect without God's help, as those authors suspect. A broad distinction between us and those Doctors is to be drawn. For they hold that the second cause through the power given to it by God at the beginning of its founding, without any concurrence of God, causes the entire effect. But we hold that absolutely no effect whatsoever can be produced by a creature unless God co-acts and flows into it.

Article VII. Whether the First Cause Determines the Second Cause as to the Specification and Exercise of Acts.

Two things are proposed and inferred in the heading of the present article. One is whether the first cause determines the second with respect to the specification of acts, or the second determines the first — as man determines God's concurrence toward the generation of man and not of something else, and so for the rest according to their species. The other is whether the first cause determines the second with respect to the exercise of acts and their singularity — as Peter begets Francis and not Anthony. From which the determination of the generation of Francis and not of Anthony proceeds — from God, or from Peter? On the first part, almost all maintain that the determination of the specification of acts proceeds from the second cause. For fire generates fire and not water — which is attributed to the generating fire, not to God concurring toward its generation. On the latter part, the Scholastics disagree among themselves. For some — whom Racon follows (*quaest. 3. de concursu Dei cum causis secundis, propositione 2. Sect. 3*) — attribute the determination of singular acts to the circumstances and conditions of the object and to singular dispositions. The rest commonly refer it to the first cause.

Note first that one thing is determined by another in two ways. One way is through an intrinsic and essential principle — as a species is determined by a differentia and an individual by haecceity — and of this in Metaphysics. The other way is through an extrinsic and effective principle — which is what is at stake here. For since the common effect is caused by the first and second cause, it is not beside the point to investigate from which cause it derives its specific and individual being — from the first or from the second cause? And this has already been illustrated with examples at the beginning of this article.

Note second that the indetermination touched on by us in the preceding article — from the Doctor (*1 d. 3. quaest. 7. §. Ad auctoritatem. BB*) — is twofold: passive and active. Passive indetermination belongs to matter, which by its very nature

is receptive of all forms as its perfections; and likewise to any subject — whether substantial, which receives common accidents in itself, or accidental, such as quantity receptive of qualities. Active indetermination belongs to the equivocal and universal cause with respect to several disparate effects — as the sun producing grass, plant, and tree — or contrary effects — as the same sun hardening clay and liquefying wax. And to the univocal cause producing several effects of the same species — as man generating several individuals of human nature. Again, to the natural cause whose indifference is determined by the object — as the intellect, which is indifferent to understanding whatever is intelligible, is determined by the object presented to it: for example, by a rose placed before it around whose consideration it is occupied; and the sun, whose power is diffused toward all sublunary effects, is determined by the proximate dispositions of the material at hand — as if in it there are prior and necessary dispositions for generating a plant, it generates a plant; if there are due preparations for generating a frog, it generates a frog; and so for the rest. Also, to the free and voluntary cause, which is indifferent to contrary acts — such as willing and not willing — and to contradictory acts — such as willing and not willing. This the Doctor notes (*9 Met. q. 15. 4. d. 12. q. 3. §. Dico ergo. M.*). Now this is the cause that of its own accord determines itself to acting or not acting — which is the most important distinction drawn between a natural and a free cause. Note third, from the tract on the knowledge of God (*disp. 3. quaest. 4*), that God from eternity foreknows all things individually and by decree of his will determines what he has done and will do in time with second causes — whether free — such that God's concurrence is certain and determined: not antecedent, nor subsequent, but simultaneous and concomitant according to the requirement of things and their determination. For God, perceiving and foreseeing the natural and free tendencies of second causes toward objects, leaving them in their own hand and power, has by his will decided to concur toward their performing of works and to co-cause according to those tendencies and powers — as Scotus rightly notes and teaches (*3 d. 17. quaest. vn. at 2. E*), and which Hilary (*9 Trin.*) and Augustine (*in Ench. 95*) indicate.

The first thesis is: the concurrence of the first cause, as to species, is limited and determined by the action of the second cause to co-causing the common effect. This is deduced from the Doctor (*1 d. 3 quaest. 7. §. Ad auctoritatem. BB*). It is proved first from the first book of Genesis, where at God's command the earth brought forth green grass and grass making seed according to its kind, and a tree bearing fruit and having each seed according to its kind. And a little later: "which the waters had brought forth according to their species, and every winged thing according to its kind." Second, from St. Dionysius (*cap. 4. de divinis nominibus*), who writes that God operates all things uniformly, while diversity is from second causes. Third, from (*2 Phys. 26*): "The sun and man generate man." Where the action of man, who is the lower cause, limits and determines the action of the sun, who is the universal cause. But God is a higher and more

universal cause, and a creature is a lower and more particular cause; therefore the action of the latter determines the action of the former as to species. Fourth: an effect produced by the first and second cause is rendered more similar to the second cause than to the first, as is clear in causes — above all univocal ones. A lion, with God cooperating, generates a lion; man generates a man similar to himself. The same happens in the free cause, which determines itself to a specific act — for example love or hatred — as is deduced from (9 *Met. T. 3*) and Scotus (*ibid.*) and (*quaest. 15 eiusdem lib.*).

The second thesis is: as to the exercise and singularity of acts, the second cause is determined by the first. This is gathered from Scotus (4 d. 43. *quaest. 3. §. Quantum ad illum art. 1*) and (§. de 2. art. N.) and (*ibid. in Report.*). It is urged first: the second cause is indifferent and undetermined to several numerically distinct acts and effects — of which it is the productive cause separately and not jointly. As Peter is indifferent and undetermined to generating Paul, or John, or other singular men — of whom he has the generative power. God meets this indifference and indetermination — and supplies the defect of whatever second cause — and limits and determines it first to the generation of Paul, then of John, and the rest. Hence, at an opportune time he willed and decreed that from St. Monica and her husband, St. Augustine would be begotten — whom he would afterwards use to defeat the heresies of that time. And from Pietro Bernardone and his wife Pica, St. Francis would be born — who would set afire a cooling world with the fire of divine love. And from such parents, St. Bonaventure would be procreated — who would illustrate the Minorite Order and bring it to better fruit. Therefore from the first cause comes the determination of the singular acts and individuals of the second cause. You will say: if the first cause determines the second to singular acts and individual effects, then physical predetermination, rejected above, is admitted. The consequence is denied. For there is a broad distinction between determination and predetermination. For the latter regards first act, or the power of the creature, in order to supply its insufficiency and complete its potency, as the Thomists say. But the former regards second act — so that this or that effect may proceed from the creature. Therefore all things were determined by God from eternity, as I noted above in the third note — but not predetermined. For that seems to take away both the contingency of things and created freedom, as was sufficiently shown above.

Second: as a king stands in his kingdom, so God stands in the world — Aristotle assenting (*in calce 12. Met.*). But a king in his kingdom determines these or those tasks to be performed by his clients and administered by his subjects. And the Centurion is an example (*Matt. 8*): "I say to this man, go, and he goes; and to another, do this, and he does it." It is also clear of a craftsman, who determines wax to this or that figure and clay to this or that vessel to be formed. Similarly then, God the supreme King of all — whose providence does not fail in its disposition, who orders all things sweetly — decrees and determines a creature

to performing this or that effect. And as the most wise craftsman he has decided that the creature make this vessel for honor and that one for dishonor — since only in his sight is the number of the elect to be placed in heavenly happiness known. Third: if anything were an obstacle, it would be above all that this function does not belong to God — especially on account of the circumstances of place, time, and the like, from which the determinations and singularities of the acts and effects of the second cause seem to be drawn. But these do not impede, since individuals and singulars abstract and prescind from these — and in the same place and time, several similar or dissimilar things can exist; and also in another and different place and time. For one who is now begotten at Nicaea could have been generated before, both here and elsewhere. Therefore the aforesaid circumstances are very remote and irrelevant to the determination of the singular effects of the second cause, and therefore this whole must be rejected and referred back to the first cause. And the same reasons hold for the spontaneous and free agent — to which I now subjoin the following. Since the individual differences of singulars escape our intellect, and the will is not borne toward the unknown, consequently the will itself does not determine itself rather to one act than to another, but is determined by the first cause.

You will object first, against the first thesis, that the account seems equal for the acts of the second cause in species as for those same acts in the individual and singular. But the second cause is determined by the first toward the latter — as was proved in the first thesis. Therefore also toward the former. The minor was proved in the first thesis. The major is urged: both causes equally and in their own order provide and exhibit their simultaneous concurrence toward the efficiency of all of them. But in co-acting, the second cause is always inferior and more contracted than the first, since it is essentially subordinated to it.

Confirmation from (2 *Phys. T. 38*) and (5 *Met. cap. 2. T. 3*): from universal causes universal effects proceed, and from particular causes particular effects emanate. Therefore if the second cause determines the first toward eliciting the former, so too toward the latter. I deny the major. To its proof I say that, even though God's concurrence is one and the same formally, it is nonetheless multiple virtually according to the multiplication of effects. Therefore it is diversely related to the acts of the second cause in species and in the individual, on account of the distinction I showed above. To the confirmation I say that Aristotle in that text does affirm that universal causes cause universal effects — as the sun causes sublunary effects both of living and of non-living things — and that particular causes attain particular effects — as this craftsman causes this artifact. But he says nothing about whether the second cause determines the first toward those effects or not. Therefore Aristotle's testimony does not harm us but helps us — especially according to Scotus's interpretation (*explaining it of universality in predicating, not in causing*), whom the Conimbricenses follow (*hoc loco cap. 7. quaest. 15. in fine art. 3*).

You will object second that an active power indifferent and undetermined by its very nature to opposite acts and effects is not determined by any agent — whether first or second. But the will of the second cause by its very nature is indifferent and undetermined to opposite acts — both in species (such as love or hatred) and in the individual (namely this love or this hatred). Otherwise its indifference, and freedom of specification and exercise — or of contrariety and contradiction — would be destroyed. Therefore the free second cause is not determined by the first as to the exercise of acts. Confirmation: given such a determination, the first cause would determine the second to evil and sin — and thus sin would not be attributed and imputed to the creature but to the creator, who would be determining the creature to that act which is evil or to which evil follows. I distinguish the major: by antecedent determination — I concede; by concomitant determination — I deny. To the distinction of the major I distinguish the minor. For the will, even if it is determined to one act, nevertheless has the power of eliciting the opposite act or suspending it. Therefore it remains entirely and fully free, as I showed at length in *Logic (l. 4. art. ult.)*. To the confirmation, the consequence is to be denied. For God determines the positive and physical act — not the absence and privation of the due rectitude of that act, which is its deformity or defect of the second cause, called the formal element of sin. Therefore sin is imputed not to God but to the creature — which, since it is bound to cooperate and act with God providing its concurrence, does not co-act but falls short — which is formally to sin, as can be seen abundantly in Scotus (*2 d. 37. quaest. vn. §. Ad solutionem. T. & V.*).

Question IV. On the Exemplar Cause.

The exemplar cause cannot be clear to us unless the idea is known to us — which seems to coincide with it. Therefore certain things about the idea itself must be discussed, so that the exemplar cause may be understood more plainly and clearly — especially because, as Augustine testifies (*4 Trin. alleg. à Scot. 1. d. 3. quaest. 4. sub R. §. Ad quaestionem igitur*), without ideas understood no one can be wise. Clement of Alexandria adds (*4 Strom.*): one who knows ideas leads a nearly divine life among men. This is indicated by Augustine (*lib. 83. qq. quaest. 46*).

Article I. Whether the Idea Is an Objective Concept.

Two more celebrated opinions shine out in this article. The first is that of Alexander (*1 p. quaest. 23. in 4. art. 1*) and his two chief disciples, Bonaventure (*1 d. 35. quaest. 1. art. 1*) and Thomas (*1 p. quaest. 15. art. 1*) — who hold that an idea is a formal concept. The second is defended by Scotus (*1 d. 35. quaest. vn. §. Ad ista*), Barg (*ibid.*), Bassi (*quaest. 2. art. 2*), Ockham (*quaest. 5*), and other Nominalists and Scotists — who teach that an idea is an objective concept.

Note first that the name "idea" has two etymologies. The prior is noted by Alexander (*2 p. suae summae adductae à Voirl. 1. d. 35. art. 1*): idea is derived from ἰδέω, which is the same as water. For just as through water diverse images of

things are represented and beheld, so through ideas various and diverse things to be made and formed by the intellectual craftsman are presented and offered to that craftsman. The later is given by Lodovico Vives (*in 7. lib. Ciuit. cap. 28*): idea derives its etymology from the Greek word which means the same as I know, I inspect, and I recognize. For one who is about to do something inspects the exemplar in the likeness of which he produces his work — as is clear of a painter who draws an image according to an exemplar proposed to him. And this is called idea, reason, form, species, and the like — of which at length in the Tract on the Knowledge of God (*disp. 4. q. 1*).

Note second, from Scotus (*4 d. 1. quaest. 4*), that something can be in the mind of an intellectual craftsman in two ways: subjectively or objectively. What is subjected to and inheres in the intellect is said to be in it subjectively — such as intellection, an intelligible species, and an intellectual habit. But what is presented and placed before the same intellect to be known and considered is said to be in that intellect objectively — such as a natural body and whatever other being is to be placed before it and understood. From this arises the division of concept into formal and objective. What resides in the intellect is called a formal concept; what is placed before it to be known and examined is called an objective concept. Now in the present it is called into doubt whether an idea is a formal or an objective concept.

Note third that the idea, taken generally, is defined as "an exemplar at which a craftsman looks as he works." "Exemplar" is placed as the genus. The remaining terms are added in place of the differentia. For in order that a craftsman may work rationally, it is necessary that he have an exemplar according to whose imitation he takes care to form and elaborate the artificial work intended by him. Now since a craftsman can look, whether within or outside his intellect, at a form in the likeness of which he intends to make his work, from this arises the division touched on by the Doctor (*4 d. 50. quaest. 3. §. Respondeo. C.*) into an internal exemplar — which is in the mind of the craftsman, as a house or health within — which is the idea of a house or health outside (*7 Met. cap. 7. T. 23*) — and an external exemplar, which is seen by the eyes, of which (*Exod. 25*): "Look, and make according to the exemplar that was shown to you on the mountain." Whether this twofold partition of exemplars is univocal or not, although philosophers do not seem to agree, they can be reconciled through the distinction of Scotus (*in fine prol.*) — who says it is not univocal with complete univocity, but is univocal with diminished univocity, as Aristotle touches on (*7 Met. T. 30*) and (*12 eiusdem, T. 13*), the explanation of which I gave in (*Epistle dialect. 1. 1. quaest. 1. art. 5. num. 17*). Furthermore, since some ideas are divine and others created, it can be doubted whether the aforesaid definition of idea is fitting to both or not. I think this is satisfied if we respond affirmatively. For although divine ideas are eternal, unchangeable, and the first forms in the likeness of which things are to be made ad extra — as the Doctor excellently pursues (*1 d. 35. quaest. vn.*) and Barg lucidly explains (*ibid.*) — they are

nonetheless true exemplars and objects known by the divine mind, in the likeness of which the divine will produces things in real being and existence, as Lyra aptly hints (*in expositione text. Ioan. 1*). And the aforesaid definition rightly applies to them; and what is subsequently attributed to them indicates the distinction that is drawn between them and created ideas.

The thesis is: an idea is not a formal but an objective concept. So Scotus (*max cit.*) in both works, and (*7 Met. in com. T. 23*). It is proved first from Aristotle (*passim nunc memorato*): "Health and a house outside the mind of the craftsman come from health and a house within the intellect of the same." From that text it is clear that it is not a formal concept, since the Philosopher there asserts that it is the what-it-is, in the likeness of which health and a house are truly constructed outside the intellect of the craftsman. Now this house is not rendered similar to the cognition that the craftsman possesses, but to that house placed before his mind — according to which he strives to produce it in the nature of things. Furthermore, Aristotle both here and elsewhere argues against Plato — not because he teaches that ideas are the quiddities, species, and characters of things, for Aristotle himself does not deny this — but because Plato posits them really severed and separated from individuals and singulars, as I showed at length in Logic (*l. 2. quaest. 1. art. 3.*). Therefore in the Peripatetic school, an idea is not a formal but an objective concept. St. Augustine agrees (*1. 83. qq. q. 26*) — who, following Plato, places ideas in the divine intelligence containing them: but intelligence and cognition or intellection coincide with the formal concept, while what contains is not what is contained. If therefore according to Augustine the formal concept or intelligence of God contains ideas, it is plainly established that in his view an idea is not a formal but an objective concept. All the more so since the same saint adds there that man was made according to one idea or reason, and a horse according to another. But there is only one formal concept or one most simple intellection of God; while there are multiple ideas according to the plurality of things to be made. Therefore an idea is not a formal but an objective concept. The same thing Dionysius (*de divinis nominibus, cap. 5*), Seneca (*1. 3. Epist. epist. prima ad Lucil.*), and Gerson (*1 de vita spirituali, lect. 1. corol. 12*) seem to maintain. Second: that to which the definition of an idea applies is an idea, as is clear from the locus from definition to what is defined. But the definition of an idea fits an objective concept and not a formal one. For the former — and not the latter — is what a craftsman intends and proposes to himself to be imitated: as a physician intends to introduce health into the patient according to the health he carries in his mind — which is health as known by him, not however his cognition of it. Third: an idea is an image and exemplar of a thing to be made, at which a craftsman looks while intending to produce in the nature of things something similar to it. But a formal concept is that through which — not that which — a craftsman looks: just as vision is that through which the seeing person sees, not that which he sees. Fourth: an external exemplar is undoubtedly not a formal concept — as is plainly clear of

an external image in the likeness of which a painter strives to draw and form something. Therefore the same must be maintained of the internal exemplar, which I showed in the third note to agree univocally with the external.

Furthermore: what is presupposed for producing something is not that which presupposes it — as is clear of a whole that presupposes its parts, which are not the whole itself but are pre-required for making the whole. But a formal concept is presupposed for an idea. For in order that a craftsman may know what is to be made not ignorantly but rationally, it is necessary that he first know it; therefore it is not an idea. Moreover: a name signifies what its inventor instituted and decided to signify. But the inventor of the name "idea" was Plato — as Augustine (*precit.*) attests — who through ideas designated the things themselves, saying that the idea of man is man himself, and the idea of a horse is the horse itself, and so for other things and specific natures. Finally, St. Paul supports this (*Hebr. 11*): "By faith we understand that the world was framed by the word of God, that from invisible things visible things might be made." Where the Literal Doctor adds that the saints place ideas in the divine mind — which are invisible forms from which all visible things proceed, just as visible artifacts come from an invisible exemplar that is in the mind of craftsmen. From all these it is clearly established that an idea is an objective concept that a craftsman proposes to himself to be imitated for the efficiency of the work intended by him.

You will object first, from (*7 Met. T. 23*): an idea is a form. But form pertains to the formal concept and not to the objective one; therefore an idea is a formal concept. I reply that Aristotle and other authors who call an idea a form are to be interpreted — not of a form that informs, which pertains to a formal concept — but of a representative and objective form, in the likeness of which a craftsman renders his work, as is clear from the text's examples of health and a house in the mind of the craftsman, in the likeness of which it is constructed outside by the craftsman himself.

You will object second that an idea is an exemplar expressive and declarative of a thing. But to express and declare is of a formal and not of an objective concept; therefore an idea is a formal concept. I distinguish the major: presuppositively — I concede; formally — I deny. In this way ideas are also called predestinations and good wills by St. Dionysius (*cap. 5.*). And by Augustine: eternal, unchangeable, and beatific reasons, and the life of the craftsman.

You will object third: an idea is either something distinct from the thing to be made or is the very thing to be made — since between the identical and the diverse nothing mediates (*10 Met. T. 12*). But an idea is not distinct from the thing to be made — since very often a craftsman works with no idea pre-existing in his mind. Nor does it coincide with it — otherwise the same thing would be the cause of itself, which is false and absurd. I concede the major. To the minor I say with Bassi (*cit.*) that the idea is the same thing to be made — not in the same

but in a different mode: namely, the thing in intentional and ideal being is the cause of itself in real being. Just as the final cause in intention is the cause of itself in execution — as the Philosopher hints (*paulò ante cit.*) and Scotus (*ibid.*).

Article II. What the Exemplar Cause Is and to Which Genus of Cause It Is Reduced.

The first thesis is: the exemplar cause is rightly defined as that which influences the exemplated thing with respect to objective being, which a craftsman holds in his mind in the likeness of which he produces the exemplated thing ad extra. This is in agreement with the Doctor (*1 d. 2. quaest. 2. §. Ad 1. quest.*) and (*dist. 36. quaest. 1. §. contra ista*) and (*1 Rep. d. 2. quaest. 1*), and is deduced from Aristotle (*7 Met. 30. 12. eiusdem, 8*). It is proved by an easy and common middle: that is aptly and fittingly defined which consists of genus and differentia, as I often repeated. But the aforesaid cause obtains a genus and differentia, as is clear to one who runs through the individual terms mentioned. And it contains nothing superfluous or deficient, as can be seen from those same terms; therefore it is well defined.

The second thesis is: the exemplar cause is a real and physical cause. Aristotle and Scotus (*in praeunte aff. cit.*) do not decline from this. It can be urged first from the final cause — which I will show in its proper place to be a true and proper physical cause. And those who hold the opposite do not deny that the same must be maintained of the exemplar cause — by name Fuente (*2 Phys. quaest. 8. diff. 3. art. 1*). Then: that on which an effect really depends in being is a proper and physical cause, as is clear from the definition of cause taken universally. But an artificial effect truly and physically depends on an exemplar cause: for a craftsman fabricates a work in the likeness of the image he has in his mind. Hence St. Augustine writes (*tract. 1. in Ioan.*): "A craftsman makes a chest. First he has the chest in his art. If he did not have it in his art, how could he produce it by fabrication? But the chest is so in the art that it is not that very chest seen by the eyes." He holds the same (*ibid. Tract. 2*). Moreover: that is a true and physical cause of something in consequence of whose being another follows, as the Doctor notes (*in com. 4. Met. T. 3*) and (*1 eiusdem T. 1*). But from the exemplar cause there follows another — namely the exemplated thing — as is plainly seen in those who perform their artificial works in the likeness of their exemplars. Therefore the exemplar cause is established as a true, real cause.

The third thesis is: the exemplar cause is reduced to the efficient cause. So Scotus (*ubi supra*) and (*1 dist. 35. quaest. 1*), and it is deduced from Aristotle (*2 Phys. T. 33*) and (*7 Met. T. 30. 9. eiusdem T. 3*), against the Complutenses (*2 Phys. disp. 9. quaest. 5*), Conimbricenses (*ibid. cap. 3. quaest. 5. art. 1*), and Alb (*1 distinct. 20. art. 1*). It is proved first from Dionysius (*4 de divinis nom.*) and Augustine (*12 Ciuit. cap. 25*) — who affirm that ideas are the efficient causes of existing things. Second: as a natural form stands with respect to its natural effects to be produced, so an ideal and artificial cause stands with respect to artificial works. But a natural

form is the efficient cause of its effects, as is clear of the rational soul and other natural forms; therefore the same must be maintained of the artificial form, which is the ideal and exemplar cause. Furthermore: the efficient cause is subdivided into the natural — which operates without ideas — and the intellectual — which requires ideas, according to which it produces its works. Again: the exemplar cause does not pertain to the material cause — inasmuch as it is found in those devoid of matter, such as an angel and God. Nor to the formal cause — which imports imperfection, namely information and being a part of a composite: but the exemplar cause, since it belongs to God, involves no imperfection per se. Nor to the final cause — since the final cause is nobler than those which are for the sake of the end, while many exemplars are less noble than the exemplated things, and the exemplated thing does not depend on the exemplar as on its end, since the exemplar tends toward the exemplated thing as toward its terminus. Therefore it remains that the exemplar cause is reduced to the efficient cause.

You will object first that ideas, by their etymology, are the same as form, as Augustine notes (*lib. 83. qq. quaest. 16.*). Therefore the exemplar cause is reduced to the formal cause. Hence Aristotle (*2 Phys. 28*) and elsewhere seems to place it in the genus of formal cause. I reply that an idea has such a denomination not by reason of an informing principle — since it is in God, from whom all information is far removed — but by reason of an effective principle: for form is the principle and origin of operations. Thus Augustine and Aristotle (*cit.*) are to be explained.

You will object second that an idea is an exemplar that gives — as a craftsman looks at it — the formal and specific being of the thing: but to give back formal and specific being to a thing pertains to the formal cause. Therefore an idea is reduced to the formal cause. I concede the prior part of the major but deny its later part, as is clear of the divine ideas, which are efficient — not formal — causes. Wherefore if an idea has something in common with form, it pertains not to the formal but to the effective principle.

Question V. On the Instrumental Cause.

Single Article. Whether an Instrument is Active.

Fuentes (*2 Phys. quest. 6. diff. 2.*), Poncius (*quest. 8.*), and Mastrius (*ibidem, quest. 5.*) gather together many things concerning the instrument, but since not a few of these are theological, and others are more conveniently examined elsewhere, I shall in this place only state and decide the proposed difficulty.

Note, from Scotus (*4. distinct. 1. quest. 1. §. Ad quaest. ergo. DD. Et quest. 5. §. Ad primam ergo. F. Et distinct. 6. quest. 5. §. Ad istam quaest. E.*) and Suarez (*disp. 17. Met. sect. 2. num. 7.*), that instrument is an equivocal term and admits of four acceptations. First, it is taken for a secondary cause as distinguished from the

first cause, in which sense God is said to act through secondary causes as his instruments, as Damascus notes above all others in his Physics, cap. 9. In this sense the first cause alone is principal, because it alone is independent. Second, it is taken for a part of a living body; in this sense Aristotle (2. *anima* T. 16.) calls the organs of the senses, or the sensitive powers, instruments by which the soul exercises its vital operations. Third, it is taken for some prior quality that disposes and prepares a subject for the introduction of a form into it; in this sense the heat of fire is called its instrument, because through it the wood is disposed to receive the form of fire. Fourth, it is taken for that which an artisan uses to perform the works proper to his art; in this sense the term derives its etymology from art, according to Scotus (2. *Reportat. distinct. 1. quest. 1. §. Item hoc vocabulum.*), and in other places previously cited. For an instrument, properly speaking, is that which is moved by an artisan to produce an artificial work, as a saw, a chisel, and things of this kind; and it is about this that the principal difficulty arises. Hence Mayr (4. *dist. 6. quest. 2.*) aptly distinguishes instrument into: artificial, which is properly called an instrument; natural, which is less properly called an instrument, such as the heat of fire; moral, which is called an instrument in a broad sense, such as a habit; and supernatural, as the sacraments are called instruments of grace and the fire of hell an instrument of divine justice. Further, into separated, as shed seed, and conjoined, as the cold of water.

Third assertion: an instrument properly so called is not active. The Doctor holds this (*ubi supra*) and (*Theor. 17.*). It is established first: the first act is presupposed to the second act, because the second proceeds from the first; but an instrument does not of itself possess a first act, that is, a pure power and capacity for acting, as is evident from a saw, which when placed in the corner of a house does nothing of itself unless it is pre-moved by an artisan to cut something; therefore an instrument is not properly active. Second, an instrument as instrument has nothing but shape and hardness; but these belong to the genus of passives. For shape is either quantity or relation, being a certain order of parts in a whole; and neither quantity nor relation is active. Nor is hardness, because it is resistive, not active.

You will object first: what is comprehended under the genus of efficient cause is active; but an instrument is contained in the category of effecting cause, which is divided into principal cause and instrumental cause, as is evident (*quest. 2. art. 1. huius lib.*); therefore an instrument is active. I respond by conceding the major; to the minor I say that an instrument is active, not of itself, but through the actual motion and influx of the principal cause. For this reason it is reduced to the genus of efficient cause, as Scotus writes (4. *dist. 12. quest. 3. §. Dico ergo D.*) following Aristotle (5. *Met. cap. 2. & 1. Phys. T. 31.*).

You will object second: natural instruments are active, as is evident from seed, which is the cause of generation. Likewise supernatural instruments, as the sacraments, are productive of grace; therefore the same must be asserted of

artificial instruments. The consequence is to be denied, for the reasons given above in the assertion, and especially because natural instruments act only dispositively and do not reach the term of the principal agent. And the sacraments are said to be productive of grace not physically but morally, according to Scotus (*4. distinctione 1. quaestione 4. §. I.*).

Question VI. On the Material Cause.

Single Article. What the Material Cause is and What it Causes.

The material cause is defined by Aristotle (*2. Phys. T. 28. 5. Met. T. 2.*) and Scotus (*ibid. in com. & Theor. 20.*) as that from which something comes to be when it is present therein, as a statue from bronze and a bowl from silver. In this definition the word "principle" is understood as the genus, and the remaining words are added so as to distinguish the material cause from the other causes. Most importantly, the phrase "when it is present therein" is added on account of privation, which departs with the advent of form; the material cause, however, remains together with the form, since it is its subject and an intrinsic part of the whole, just as bronze remains when a statue is made from it, and silver when a bowl is fashioned from it. I shall show in the following assertions what the functions and effects of matter are.

First assertion: the material cause sustains the form. This is derived from the Doctor (*2. distinct. 12. quest. 1. 2.*). It is proved first from Aristotle (*1. Phys. T. 70.*): matter is the common subject of contrary principles, which are privation and form; and when privation is absent from matter, form is present in it and persists in it so long as the composite of both persists. Second: every subject sustains that which is in the subject, as is evident from the subject of accidents; but the material cause is the subject of form, as the Philosopher writes (*1. Phys. T. 82.*), where matter is defined as the subject of all forms; therefore the material cause serves as the support of form.

Second assertion: the material cause exercises its proper influx upon the composite, though a partial and modest one. The Doctor holds this (*ubi supra*). The first part: every cause causes something, as is clear from the definition of cause, which is a principle essentially inflowing into an effect; but the material cause is truly a cause. For it is numbered among the four genera of causes; therefore it has a proper influx and causality with respect to the composite. Second: the composite is something produced and intrinsically caused by intrinsic causes, which are matter and form, as I showed (*lib. 2. quaest. 6. art. 2.*); but it cannot be totally and intrinsically caused by form alone, since it is a third thing coalescing from two parts; therefore it is partially caused by matter. Furthermore, the material cause is defined as that from which something comes to be, as stated at the beginning of this article; but the composite is made from matter as from a part — for from wood as from matter, fire produces fire by the

agency of fire — therefore the material cause exercises its partial causality with respect to the composite.

The second part is established thus: the quality of a thing's power and capacity is proportional to the quality of its entity, since power flows from entity and follows upon it; but the entity of matter is partial, imperfect, and modest, since it is the lowest of beings, as has been said; therefore its influx and causality are partial, slight, and attenuated. Whether, however, the union and eduction of form are effects of the material cause, the Moderns investigate at length. For my part, I think it sufficient to say that neither is its effect. For union is a relation, which is not produced but co-produced, arising from the positing of its terms; and form is not properly made but is educed or introduced into matter, and only the composite is properly made, as I showed abundantly (*1. 2. quaest. 1. art. 1. in responsione 1. oppositionis*).

You will object: it seems improbable and incredible that matter, so imperfect and lowly, should concur in producing so many composites remarkable in number and dignity, such as the celestial and sublunar bodies; therefore it behaves toward them only passively. I deny the antecedent; for experience demonstrates that from the smallest seed a great tree is produced, and from small grains plants, herbs, and other things of no small size are produced. Thus the power of God shines forth the more clearly in granting to matter, the lowest of beings, the capacity to partially cause so many composites.

Question VII. On the Formal Cause.

Article I. What the Formal Cause is and What it Causes.

The formal cause is defined as that through which something comes to be when it is present therein. This definition is easily understood from the definition of the material cause given in the preceding question. The words "through which" are merely added so as to differ from the other causes. For the formal cause is that through which a thing receives its specific being. And just as the material cause performs a twofold function, so likewise does the formal cause: it informs matter and partially causes the composite.

First assertion: the formal cause informs matter. This is handed down by Aristotle and Scotus in the place cited in the preceding question, assertion I, and is proved thus: form is the act that perfects and determines matter, as has been said (*1. 2. quaest. 4.*); therefore the formal cause informs matter, which is indifferent, indeterminate, informable, and perfectible.

Second assertion: the formal cause has a proper partial causality with respect to the composite. The Doctor holds this together with Aristotle (*ubi supra.*). It is established first: the formal cause is placed among the four genera of causes, as was asserted in this book (*quaest. 1. art. 2.*); therefore it obtains a proper causality distinct from the rest. Second: that through which something comes to be has a

proper causality, because causality bears upon its effect; but through the formal cause the composite is partially produced in a principal manner, as is clear from its definition given at the very beginning of this article. Again, the formal cause provides the intrinsic and essential being of a thing, in accordance with that oft-repeated saying, form gives being to a thing; but it cannot give being to a thing unless it participates in a proper causality, just as an agent without action cannot act. Furthermore, the composite is the effect of matter and form, because it is made of act and potency (2. *animae* T. 7. Et 8. *Met.* 15.); but by act is understood the formal cause; therefore the formal cause possesses a peculiar and principal influx and causality with respect to the composite.

You will object first: form confers no being upon matter, since matter has its own essence and existence independent of form, given that it can exist without form, as I taught (*l.* 2. *quaest.* 2. *art.* 8.); therefore the formal cause causes nothing whatever in matter. I distinguish the antecedent: form does not provide matter with entitative being — this I concede; with specific and perfective being — this I deny. For matter itself is determined and specified through form. One may also say that matter does not borrow intrinsic but only extrinsic being from form.

You will object second: if the formal cause were to inform matter and cause the composite, it would be a twofold cause, because it would produce a twofold effect; but it cannot be a twofold cause, as is known to all; therefore it does not inform matter nor cause the composite. The major consequence is to be denied. For it is one cause having a twofold manner of causing, just as light possesses a twofold power of causing, namely illuminating and heating.

Article II. Whether God can Supply the Causality of the Material and Formal Causes.

There is the opinion of Fonseca (5. *Met.* cap. 2. *quest.* 8. *sect.* 4. *quest.* 12. *sect.* 2.), who holds that God can supply the place of the causalities of the material and formal causes. Against him stand Scotus (1. *d.* 5. *quest.* 2. §. *contra istam.* C. Et d. 8. *quest.* 4. §. *contra istam solutionem* X.), Lychetus, Bargius (*ibid.*), Fuentes (2. *Phys.* *diff.* 5. *art.* 1.), Mastrius (*disp.* 5. *quest.* 5.), and others who commonly deny that God can exercise the causalities of the said causes.

Note that this difficulty can be treated in two ways: in its proper genus, that is, whether God can perform the functions of these causes with respect to their own proper and genuine causalities; or in a different genus, for example in the genus of efficient cause or final cause, which are without doubt attributed to God. Likewise the controversy can be about their mutual causalities. For matter sustains form and form is educed from its potency; and form informs matter and gives it specific being. Or the controversy can be about the causality with respect to the composite, for both concur in causing and constituting the composite, since they are its intrinsic and essential principles and parts.

First assertion: God cannot discharge the functions that the material and formal causes perform for one another. This is consistent with the Doctor (*ubi supra*). And (4. *distinct. 12. quest. 1. §. Ad quaest. E.*). It is proved first: God is a perfect cause causing perfectly, since he is an infinite ocean of perfections, as has been said (*tract. 2. Summa theologiae, disp. 2.*); but the material and formal causes are imperfect causes causing imperfectly. For the one is subjected to the other, and the former is perfected and actuated by the latter; therefore God cannot exercise their causalities. Second: God is neither referred nor ordered to another, since he is infinite, absolute, the terminus and end of all things; but the aforesaid causes are mutually referable: each in turn is ordered to the other, as the imperfect to the perfect, and potency to act. Third: matter and form are united to each other so as to cause the composite and to persist in it as its intrinsic and constitutive parts; but it is incompatible with the divine nature for God to belong to the essence and quiddity of the composite, as is evident; therefore it is equally repugnant for him to exercise the causalities of the said causes.

Second assertion: nor can God supply the causality of matter and form with respect to the composite. This is in conformity with Scotus in the places cited above. It is proved first: matter and form cause the composite in such a way that they entirely enter into its essence and become its essential parts, as is clear from the soul and body in a human being; but God cannot be the essence, nor belong to the essence, nor be an essential part of a composite, since otherwise he would be imperfect, given that a part is imperfect and the whole is more perfect than it. Second: a part is ordered to the whole so as to integrate, constitute, and complete it, as is evident from the parts of the human body; but God cannot be ordered to another, nor composed with another, since he is most simple, as I asserted in the passage just cited. Third: matter and form so constitute the composite that this composite depends upon them intrinsically and essentially, to such a degree that it cannot exist without them, as a human being cannot exist without soul and body; but this is repugnant to God, from whom every imperfection is infinitely distant; therefore no causality of theirs can be supplied by him, the conclusion being reached by Scotus (1. d. 2. q. 2. §. *Quantum ante M.*).

Third assertion: in the genus of efficient cause, God can exercise the causalities of the aforesaid causes. This is derived from the Doctor in the fourth place recalled above. It is proved first: every created being depends upon God in its becoming and in its being, since God alone is independent and self-subsistent; but the causalities of the aforesaid causes are within the series of created things and in their proper genus cannot be administered by God, as was proved in the preceding assertions; therefore they fall under the genus of efficient cause, which together with the final cause belongs to God, as the Doctor argues in the first passage just cited. Second: in the Blessed Eucharist God sustains accidents without a subject, just as a subject would supply if it were present, setting aside

every trace of imperfection, as the scholastics teach as a matter of faith (4. d. 10.). Such sustentation and conservation is reduced to the genus of efficient cause; therefore the same is to be asserted of the aforementioned causalities of matter and form, with Scotus concurring (1. d. 5. q. 2. §. *contra istam C.*).

You will object first, from Philippians II: the Deity is said to be the form of God; and in the same place the humanity of Christ our Lord is called the form of a servant; therefore if form is attributed to God, surely also its causality. Hence God is said to be formally wise and formally just, on account of the wisdom and justice he truly possesses and holds. I respond that these and similar expressions are said of God not properly but metaphorically, as Saint Dionysius signifies (*l. de divinis nom. cap. 8. & inde*). For just as form gives being to a thing and vivifies it, so God provides being and life to all things. When, however, it is objected that God is called formally wise and just, what is meant is that attributes of this kind truly and really belong to God himself.

You will object second: nothing can be caused by a secondary cause unless the first cause concurs therein, as was sufficiently shown above; but the composite is caused by matter and form, which, according to Scotus, really differ from the composite; therefore God exercises the causalities of these causes. I respond that the major is to be taken of efficient and final cause, not of the others, on account of the imperfection they carry with them and the repugnance demonstrated above. If there is any concurrence of God in them, it is reduced to the effecting cause.

You will object third: God can perform the causalities of the material and formal causes without any imperfection; therefore there is no repugnance. The antecedent is proved: God can conserve without form and conversely, and likewise sustain a nature without its own personal subsistence, as he did in the hypostatic union of the divine Word with the humanity assumed by him. I deny the antecedent; to the proof I say it is reduced to efficient cause. To the other point that is added, I say that it is a mere personal termination, which I showed at length (*tract. de incar.*) to involve no imperfection and no peculiar causality.

Question VIII. On the Final Cause.

The final cause is defined by Aristotle (2. *Physic. T. 29. 31.*) as that for the sake of which something comes to be. Aristotle held it in such high regard, both in the place just cited, cap. 8, and in (1. *de partibus animalium, cap. 1.*), that ignorance of it caused the ancient Philosophers to fall into many errors. Therefore, so that we may not succumb to any error, we must examine it, presupposing all that we treated of it at length in the Moral Philosophy (1. 2. q. 5.).

Article I. Whether the End is a True Real Cause.

Hurtado (*disp. 13. de anima sect. 5.*), Cavellius (*ibid. disp. 1. sect. 19.*), Fuentes (2. *Phys. quaest. 7. dif. 2.*), and Mastrius (*disp. 7. quaest. 8. art. 5.*) deny that the end is a

true physical cause and say it is a moral cause. But Scotus (*1. Met. in com. cap. 2. Et l. de primo principio cap. 2. Et 5. Met. quaest. 1.*), Antonius Andreas (*ibid. quaest. 2.*), Trombetta, the Complutenses (*2. Phys. disp. 14. q. 2.*), Suarez (*disp. 23. Met. sect. 2.*), and the others commonly affirm that the end is a true and real cause.

Note that this dispute is more a matter of words than of substance, and consists in the interpretation of real being and intentional being. Here a real being is one that has existence outside the intellect, as the heat of fire is a real being. An intentional being is one that has existence in the intellect; but existence in the intellect can occur in two ways: subjectively, as knowledge inheres in the mind and is a real being; or objectively, and this again in two ways: one way objectively, as an object to be known is presented and set before the intellect, and this too is a real being, for example a stone presented to the mind; the other way purely objectively, which is only presented to the intellect and is made by the intellect, and this is a being of reason distinct from a real being, as I showed (*in Log. l. 1. quest. 3. art. 5. & latius in Met. l. 5. quaest. 1. art. 2.*).

Assertion: the end is a true and real cause. The Doctor holds this in the places surveyed above, and Aristotle implies it (*2. Phys. c. 3. T. 29. 5. Met. c. 2.*), placing the end in the series of the other real causes. It is proved first: the definition of a real physical cause applies to the end, for the end is a principle essentially inflowing into an effect, since it moves the agent to act for the sake of its execution and possession; therefore the end is a real physical cause. Second: a real effect is caused by a real cause, for a real being is not made by a being of reason; but the effect of the end is real, such as health caused by a physician in a sick person, and happiness acquired and possessed by a blessed person. Third: cause, taken generically, is univocal with the four kinds enumerated, among which is the end; for its definition applies univocally to all of them and is predicated equally of each. Furthermore, the end is studied expressly in Physics and Metaphysics, which are real sciences. Finally, a real effect depends essentially upon the end: for just as an effect comes from an efficient cause as from a real cause, so on account of the end, for whose sake the effect is produced, such a real effect is obtained; and therefore the end is established as a true and real cause. This is clearly indicated by Saint Augustine (*quarto contra Iulianum cap. 3. Et contra Adversarium legis.*). For the end is that for whose sake everything is done that is done in any manner of service. For between service and end there is this difference: service is in those things we ought to do, while the end is that for the sake of which we do them.

You will object first: Aristotle (*1. de gener. T. 55.*) writes that efficient cause is the true cause, whereas the end is a transferred and metaphorical cause; therefore in the Peripatetic school the end is not a true and real cause. I respond that Aristotle is to be interpreted not absolutely but relatively. For the efficient cause is called every cause by antonomasia, as I observed from Augustine (*quaest. prima huius lib. artic. 2.*), because it has the most evident manner of causing and a more

real influx. Hence the final cause, in comparison with it, is called transferred and its influx metaphorical, though in truth it is a real and genuine influx, albeit intentional and of the soul, by reason of which an animal is moved to attain it, as I declared above.

You will object second: what does not really exist in act is not a real cause in act; but the end does not really exist in act; therefore the end is not a real cause in act. The major is evident, for a cause in act has its effect in act (*2. Physic. 28.*). The minor is at hand: health does not yet exist, but walking, which is its cause, does exist. I concede the major; I distinguish the minor: as regards intention, I deny it; as regards execution, I concede it.

You will press further: an intentional being cannot be the cause of a real being; therefore if the end is in intention, it cannot cause a thing in execution, which is a real being. I deny the antecedent. For the house within, which is an intentional being, is the cause of the house without, which is a real being (*7. Met. T. 23.*). So if the exemplary cause, which is intentional, truly and really inflows into its effect, why will this be denied to the end?

You will object third: a cause is a principle, as is clear from its definition; but the end is not a principle, because end and principle are opposed to one another, since a principle is that from which a thing begins and an end is that at which it terminates. I respond through the same distinction: the major being conceded, I distinguish the minor — as regards intention, I deny it; as regards execution, I concede it. Therefore a principle is not opposed to an end in intention but only in execution.

You will say: cause and effect are mutually related, since they are correlatives (*5. Met. 20.*); but the end is not so related, because it does not exist; therefore it is not a true real cause. I concede the major. To the minor I say that even if the end does not exist externally, it nonetheless exists internally, which does not remove its true reality and existence, as is apparent by analogy with the exemplary cause, which, though it is in the mind of the artisan, yet truly exists and truly and really inflows into its effect, with cause and effect mutually related.

Article II. Whether the End Causes according to Intentional Being or according to Real Being.

Philosophers seem in this present question to be disputing more about manner of speaking than about substance, just as in the preceding article. Some, such as Ockham (*2. quaest. 3. art. 2.*), Gabriel (*ibid. distinct. 1. quaest. 5. artic. 2.*), Toledo (*2. Physic. quest 14.*), and the Conimbricenses (*cap. 7. quaest. 23.*) judge that the end causes according to the real being it has from the side of things and outside the mind of the artisan. Others, such as Trombetta (*5. Met. quaest. 1.*), Poncius (*ibid. quaest. 3.*), and Capreolus (*d. 25. quaest. 1. secundi*), hold that the end causes

according to the intentional being that the artisan and intellectual agent carry in mind.

Note first that corresponding to the twofold positive and objective real being that a thing can possess, there is a twofold existence — positive real and objective real — and a twofold real action: one that proceeds from the positive real, as heating from fire, and one intentional that flows from the objective being existing in the mind of the agent, of which Aristotle makes mention (7. *Metaphysica*, T. 23.) when he says that the external house is made from the internal house, meaning that the house existing in reality is made from the house existing ideally in the intellect of the builder. Now the question is whether the end exercises its causality insofar as it exists objectively and intentionally in the intellect of the agent, or insofar as it exists from the side of things positively and really.

Note second that in any cause three things can occur: the principle which, for example fire; the principle by which, that is, the heat by which fire heats; and the approximation, which is the condition without which fire cannot heat the heatable object. The present question is whether the principle by which in the final cause is intentional being or real being, or merely a condition without which the end would not finalize. When intentional being is spoken of, this does not mean merely known or apprehended being, for that, being a being of reason, cannot cause a real being; rather, it means a real being objectively conceived, whether or not it exists from the side of things, provided it can exist — as when someone labors for the acquisition of virtue which he does not actually have but can have and possess, it exists objectively in him, toward the acquiring of which he is moved and by whose desire and love he is drawn. Accordingly, the mere fact of being known or apprehended is not the formal reason for causing but is only presupposed so that the will, which is not borne toward what is unknown, may be able to act and to acquire and enjoy the end proposed to itself in the prior light of the intellect.

Assertion: the end causes not according to real being but according to intentional being. This is derived from the Doctor (*quaest. 4. prol. §. contra istam. 4. d. 49. quest. 8. §. secundo videndum. 5. Met. quest. 1. antè §. Ad quaest. Et 1. post quaest. 57. §. Ad 1. arg.*), where these words are read: "It is not necessary for the cause to precede the effect really, but it suffices that the thing precede the effect in intention; yet this intention of the end is not the cause with respect to the effect, but the thing itself of the end under intention, and this suffices for it to cause the effect really." It is proved first: the cause is prior to the effect, as I showed (*quest. 1. art. 4. huius lib.*); but the end according to real being is not prior to the effect but posterior to it, whereas according to intentional being it is prior to the effect. Hence that celebrated saying of Scotus (*1. Rep. d. 41. quaest. vn. §. Dices ex 7. Met. T. 7.*): what are prior in intention are posterior in execution; therefore the end is a cause according to intentional being. Second: the end

causes through that by reason of which the agent is moved to act, as is clear from the definition of the end; but the agent is moved to act on account of intentional being. For the end moves under the aspect of the lovable and the desirable; but to be lovable and desirable as apprehended by the intellect is an intentional being; therefore, etc. Third: the same thing cannot be both cause and effect with respect to the same thing and in the same genus of cause; but the end according to real being is an effect; therefore it cannot be a cause unless according to intentional being. The major is evident. The minor is clear: for the end in real being is the terminus of the agent's action and the completion of the thing; therefore the end is a cause not in real but in intentional being. Finally, more often than not the end does not exist in real being, as I observed above, and yet the agent intends it and is moved to act for the sake of its attainment. I add that sometimes the end is merely apparent, and sometimes impossible, as is evident from Lucifer desiring equality with God, which is impossible.

You will object first: from Aristotle (*2. Phys. cap. 3.*), the end has the character of the best, toward which perhaps the author of Ecclesiasticus looks (*cap. 7.*) when he says: "The end is better than the beginning." But this does not apply to the end in intentional being, therefore it applies to real being. I respond that the major is to be interpreted of the end taken as completion and in real being, not of the end as cause and in intentional being. Hence the argument does not harm us but profits us.

You will object second: the end moves the agent to act, for the agent is allured by its desire and love to pursue it; and once it is attained, the agent's action ceases, as Aristotle writes (*1. de gen. 55.*). But it is a real cause, as has been said in the preceding article; therefore it moves according to real being. I respond that its motion is intentional and metaphorical, as Aristotle says in the passage just cited. And it is a real cause because not the intention but the thing under intention moves the agent to act, according to Scotus in the passage cited above.

You will ask first: whether the end is the first of all causes? I respond affirmatively, together with Aristotle (*2. Phys. T. 31. Et 12. Met. T. 36.*) and Scotus (*tract. de primo principio, cap. 2. concl. 4.*). It is established first: that which is first intended by an intellectual agent is primary; but the end is first intended by an intellectual agent, for in intention the end is prior to the things that are ordered to it. Hence a person first proposes beatitude to himself, and then devotes effort to the opportune and necessary means for attaining it. Second: that which moves another to act is prior to that which is moved; for a mover as mover is prior to the thing moved, just as a cause is prior to its effect; but the end moves the agent to act, since the agent operates for the sake of the end; after which the efficient cause unites matter and form, which cause the composite; and so the end is found to be the first in the order of causes.

You will ask second: whether the end is nobler than the other causes? I respond affirmatively, together with Aristotle in the places cited and Scotus (*ubi supra*

concl. 5.), both because the end is a mover and is not moved, as I said above, and as the Doctor notes (*quest. 4. prol. Et 1. distinct. 1. quaest. 3. §. Ad argumenta*), and also because the agent operates for the sake of the end. Hence the Commentator rightly adds (*5. Met. in com. cap. 2.*): "Completion, liberality, and goodness are not found in things except on account of the final cause; and therefore what lacks a final cause lacks all good."

Article III. Which Things Act for the Sake of an End.

This doubt can be raised about many things: God, Angel, man, brute animal, and those things constituted by nature alone. Among these, the greatest difficulty concerns the brute animal, concerning which various opinions are rehearsed by Toledo (*1. Phys. quest. 12.*). What is to be said by us in accordance with truth and with Scotus, we shall disclose through the following considerations.

Note first that some animate beings lack memory but are endowed with imagination or the estimative power, by which they seek what is suitable for them and reject what is unsuitable, and these are borne only toward present objects; while others possess memory, by which not only present but also future things are foreseen, as is evident from ants gathering grains of wheat and birds building nests, in which a certain species of prudence shines forth, as Aristotle notes (*1. Met. cap. 1.*) and Scotus (*ibid. quaest. 3.*).

Note second that there is a threefold order and degree of those that tend toward an end. The first is of those that not only apprehend the end under the aspect of the good and the suitable, but also know the relationship and proportion of sufficient means to obtain it, and these act from deliberate choice and spontaneously, such as the Angel and the human being. The second is of those that indeed perceive the end under the aspect of the suitable, but do not discern the means, nor compare them with one another as to whether they are apt, suitable, and sufficient to attain it, but are naturally carried toward it by the motion of imagination or the estimative power, such as brute animals, which are said to be driven toward an end rather than to act (*2. Phys. T. 59.*). The third is of those that do not recognize the end at all, being devoid of sense and intellect, which tend toward it naturally or by natural inclination, as a heavy body tends downward, for example a stone seeks the center.

Note third that every thing has its end (*2. Phys. cap. 8. T. 51.*), to such a degree that particular causes tend toward a particular end, as the lion toward the generation of the lion; while universal causes tend toward a universal end, as the heavens toward the everlasting production and conservation of sublunar things in species and in genus. Among these, moreover, some are proximate ends, some remote, others intermediate, and still others ultimate, of which I treated abundantly (*lib. 1. Philosophiae moralis, quaest. 3. art. 1.*).

First assertion: God acts for the sake of an end, not with respect to himself but with respect to others outside himself. This assertion is twofold, as the Doctor presents it (*1. dist. 1. quaest. 5. §. Ad argumenta*). The first part is proved first: what has no efficient cause of itself has no final cause for the sake of which it is roused to action, because the causality of the end is to move the agent to act metaphorically. But God has no efficient cause of himself, since he is non-effectable and non-causable, as the Doctor demonstrates (*cit. dist. 2. quest. 2. §. Quantum ad 1. H. & inde*). Second: in God, one thing is not for the sake of another, nor is one ordered to another, since all things are infinite and supremely perfect, formally or really; therefore with respect to the divine predicates and attributes, God does not act for the sake of an end. The second part is proved first from Sacred Scripture: "The Lord has made all things for his own sake" (*Prov. 16.*); and "I am the alpha and the omega, the beginning and the end" (*Apoc. 1.*), where Lyran adds: "God is the beginning of all effects and the end to which all things are ordered." Second: God does many things for the sake of the elect, as is evident from (*1. Cor. 13.*): "All things are yours, and you are Christ's, and Christ is God's." Hence Augustine subjoins (*lib. 83. qq. quaest. 56. & lib. de spiritu & anima, cap. 42.*): "Man consists of body and soul, and whatever is seen with bodily eyes was made for the body, the body for the soul, and the soul for God." One may add the passage from (*Rom. 8.*): "Those whom he foreknew, he predestined to be conformed to the image of his Son; those he predestined he also called; those he called he also justified; those he justified he also glorified" — that is, through glory, as Lyran explains in that passage. He who acts out of love for someone acts for the sake of an end, as is clear from the definition of the end; but God does many things out of love for man, and most importantly for the salvation of the human race: "For God so loved the world that he gave his only-begotten Son" (*Ioan. 3.*); and "On account of his exceeding great charity, with which he loved us" (*Eph. 2.*); and the Nicene Creed: "Who for us men and for our salvation descended from the heavens." Furthermore, all things are for the sake of man. Hence (*2. Phys. 24.*), cited by the Doctor (*4. dist. 43. quaest. 2. ante §. Oppositum*): "We are in a certain manner the end of all things." Again, one who wills in an ordered fashion wills the end before the means to attaining the end (*ex 1. dist. 1. quest. un.*); but God is most perfectly ordered in all his works. Finally, the final cause involves no imperfection, as the Doctor proves (*1. dist. 2. quest. 2. art. 1 & 2.*); therefore it is to be attributed to God, and accordingly God acts for the sake of an end, the same Doctor concluding (*ibid. P. Et 3. dist. 32. quaest. vn. §. Tertium patet.*).

Second assertion: the Angel and the human being act for the sake of an end. The Doctor holds this together with Aristotle (*2. Met. T. 9. in com.*): he who possesses intellect acts for the sake of something, that is, for the sake of an end. But the Angel and the human being participate in intellect and reason; therefore they act for the sake of an end. Moreover, both the Angel and the human being are capable of love, on account of which they do many things. Furthermore,

each elects suitable and opportune means for attaining the end; specifically, the physician selects and orders medicine so that the sick person may recover health; therefore he acts for the sake of an end.

Third assertion: brute animals do not properly act for the sake of an end. The Doctor presents this in the passage just cited, saying that only a rational agent acts for the sake of an end; therefore, by the contrapositive, an agent devoid of reason, such as the brute animal, does not act for the sake of an end. The same is indicated in (*1. Met. cap. 1. & ibid. quaest. 3. & 2. d. 42. quest. 1. 4. d. 45. q. 3.*), by Bonaventure (*2. d. 25. quest. 1.*), and by Mayr (*ibid.*). The same is implied by Augustine (*1. Music. cap. 3. Et 1. de lib. arb. c. 7.*). It is proved first: those who do not properly have love do not act for the sake of an end, since to act for the sake of an end means nothing other than to operate out of love of the end; but brute animals do not properly have love, which properly belongs to the will alone, which brutes lack. Second: those who act for the sake of an end know the end itself, apply apt and effective means to obtaining it, compare and discern them from others, and reason about them; but brute animals cannot do these things, since they lack mind and reason; therefore brutes do not properly act for the sake of an end.

You will object first: natural agents devoid of cognition act for the sake of an end (*2. Phys. T. 80.*); therefore this is not to be denied to brutes, which are capable of cognition. The antecedent is confirmed by the right order, beauty, providence, and everlasting conservation of things, which cannot be due to chance and accident, as Aristotle shows against certain ancient Philosophers (*ubi supra.*). I distinguish the antecedent: of themselves, I deny it; by the direction of the first cause, I concede it. For God directs all things toward their ends, by reason of which natural things are said to act for the sake of an end. In this sense the common saying is uttered: the work of nature is the work of intelligence; and: all things that come to be by nature and by art come to be by some reason.

You will object second: the swallow gathers mud, straw, and other materials necessary for building its nest and tending its young. Likewise a dog when shown bread approaches it, and when shown a stick flees. Similarly a sheep flees a wolf, a fly flees a spider, a vine flees laurel; therefore these creatures act for the sake of an end. I respond that these and similar things are done by instinct of nature and a certain shadowy reason, by a resemblance of knowledge and prudence, as Augustine rightly notes (*11. Civit. cap. 7. 11. de genesi ad lit. cap. 2.*), Scotus (*1. Met. quaest. 3.*), and Antonius Andreas (*ibid. quaest. 4.*).

Question IX. On Accidental Causes.

Scotus (*1. d. 2. q. 2. §. Iuxta tres sub N. Et 2. d. 37. §. de modo ponendi.*) teaches that chance and fortune are accidental causes, and Augustine implies it (*2. contra Pelagianos cap. 6. Et 2. ad Bonifacium cap. 7.*). Aristotle treats this at length (*2. Phys.*

c. 4. 5. 6. à T. 39. *usque ad* T. 68.), where the Parisian and other commentators write fully and learnedly about these.

Article I. Whether Chance and Fortune Exist.

Certain Philosophers, whose names Aristotle suppresses (2. *Phys. cap. 4. T. 40.*), and who Fuentes (*ibid. q. 10. dif. 1. art. 1.*) and the Complutenses (*disp. 13. q. 1.*) and formerly Delphinus (1. *de rerum eventu non longè à principio*) testify to be Stoics, eliminate chance and fortune from the world, suspecting that all things come about necessarily and are produced in a determinate manner. The opposite is defended by Aristotle in the passage cited, by Scotus (*Quol. ult.*), and by the other Philosophers and Theologians, with whom we agree.

Assertion: chance and fortune are to be admitted. The Doctor holds this (*ubi supra, & 1. d. 2. quaest. 2. §. ostenso. 11. Met. in com. T. 13. & 5. eiusdem operis, quaest. 1. §. Respondeo.*). This seems to be not so much established by reason by Aristotle as presupposed by common consent, as he likewise presupposes in Logic the tenfold number of the predicaments, as Mayr notes there, and the immobility of place and other things, as Gadius notes (*in expositione Quol. 21. fol. 213. colum. 4.*). But it can be established as follows: cause is rightly divided into essential cause and accidental cause (2. *Phys. T. 50.*); essential causes are those that influx into an effect by their own power and intention, and accidental causes are those that cause an effect beyond their intention, of which kind are fortune and chance. Furthermore, there are fortuitous and casual effects; therefore fortune and chance are to be conceded. The antecedent is evident from experience in many cases — things are sometimes done by us unconsidered and happen by chance, such as the finding of a treasure by those digging a vineyard, or the fall of a stone from a rooftop onto the head of a passerby, and other such things that occur rarely and beyond the intention of the agents.

You will object first: Saint Augustine (1. *Retract. primo*) reproaches himself because he had at some time used the words chance and fortune; therefore in the school of the Christian faithful, chance and fortune are not to be introduced. Scotus responds (*Quol. alleg. §. Quantum ad 1. B.*) that what is rejected is fortune conceived as some divine power, as a Goddess established by the pagans and common people, as Tataret adds (2. *Phys. quaest. ult. scibili primo*), as the artificer of all casual and fortuitous things; but not in the sense in which Catholics teach it, as is evident from the holy Doctor himself (4. *Civit. 18. & 19. & 1. qq. Super Gen. 9. 9.*).

You will object second: all effects have their determined cause, as Plato grants in the *Timaeus*, and Augustine concedes from Cicero (5. *Civit. 9.*); therefore nothing is produced by chance, nothing fortuitously. I distinguish the antecedent: with respect to a remote and universal cause, I concede it; with respect to a proximate and particular cause, I deny it. For many things come

about beyond the intention and awareness of particular agents, as I showed above, and in this sense the authors mentioned are to be understood.

You will object third: nothing in the universe is disordered, unorganized, or out of place, since the Lord has disposed all things in measure, number, and weight (*Sap. 11.*); therefore nothing casual exists, nothing fortuitous. I distinguish the antecedent: with respect to God, I concede it; with respect to us, I deny it. Thus the Doctor (*cit. & 9. Met. q. 9. §. Ad 1. Et infinnuat Aug. 1. 83. qq. q 24. & 27. & 1. 3. de consensu Evangelistarum c. 13.*): to God nothing is fortuitous.

Article II. What Chance and Fortune Are.

Aristotle (*2. Phys. cap. 2.*) and after him Scotus (*Quol. 21.*) and Vives (*5. Civit. cap. 1.*) are extensive and prolific on these topics; but it is difficult and hard to know through investigation what these things are, so much so that the ancient Philosophers depart into various opinions and errors. For some, of whom Democritus is regarded as the chief patron, attribute the making and fashioning of the celestial and elemental spheres to chance and fortune, but exempt from them the sublunar mixed and animate things; many others, to whom the common people of the pagans are favorable, hold fortune to be a Goddess, in accordance with the saying of Juvenal (*Satyr. 10.*): "We make you, Fortune, a Goddess, and place you in the heavens." Aristotle (*l. de bona fortuna*), to whom Bonerus seems to assent (*3. Phys. cap. 1. §. consequens autem*), thinks it is a certain impulse placed in the category of quality. The others, and chiefly Scotus in the places cited, and his disciples, teach that fortune is an accidental cause in those things that proceed from deliberate choice.

Note first, from Scotus (*11. Met. in exp. T. 7.*), that corresponding to a twofold essential agent acting for an end — namely nature and will — there is a twofold accidental cause: chance and fortune. Chance is reduced to the natural cause, and fortune to the free cause. One and the same cause, with respect to different effects, can be called an essential and an accidental cause. It is an essential cause insofar as it produces an intended effect, as a builder constructing a house is called the essential cause of the house he builds. It is an accidental cause insofar as it produces an effect not intended by it, as a builder is the accidental cause of the joy or sadness of those inhabiting the said house. Again, note that an essential cause is said to be one that influxes into an effect by its own power, or one that intends the effect it produces; and likewise an accidental cause is one that does not truly produce the effect but is conjoined to that which gives being to the effect, as a musician builds, where the musician is the accidental cause of the building because he is connected with the one who builds by his own power; or an accidental cause is one that does produce an effect but one not intended by it, and if the cause is natural it is called chance, whereas if it is free it is called fortune.

Note second that chance and fortune are sometimes used interchangeably and confused, in which sense — as Damascus also notes (2. *fidei cap.* 25.) — fortune is predicated of both animate and inanimate things, and of both natural and free things; in this sense stones of a temple and altar are called fortunate and blessed. Nor should one omit that chance has a wider scope than fortune. For what is done by fortune is also said to happen by chance, but not conversely; for what happens fortuitously happens by chance; but properly speaking, fortune applies to a voluntary agent acting by deliberate choice who does not intend the effect, while chance applies to a natural agent not intending the effect, as the Doctor observes above all others (5. *Metaphys. quaest.* 1. §. *Respondeo.*).

Note third, from the Doctor (*Quol. nuper recens. sub D.*) following Aristotle (*lib. de bona fortuna cap.* 1.), that fortune abstracts from good and bad fortune as a genus abstracts from its species, and is used for the cause that produces an unintended effect, and for the unintended effect itself produced by it; if this effect is good, it is called good fortune; if bad, bad fortune. Furthermore, concerning things that are not in our power, such as health, beauty, and the like, we are not properly said to be well-fortuned, since fortune properly concerns those things we do beyond our intention. I add that on account of a single good outcome no one is called well-fortuned, just as one swallow does not make spring, nor does one blessed day make a man blessed (1. *Eth.* 9.); nor even if someone always obtains good things, but only he who rarely beyond his intention receives good and prosperous things, or who avoids evils. But if someone in war, in profit, or in business obtains good and prosperous things for the most part, he is called well-fortuned, and conversely ill-fortuned if in the aforesaid things evils befall him for the most part. Whether these come from an intrinsic or extrinsic source is a difficulty of no small weight to be resolved below.

First assertion: the celestial and elemental spheres were not fashioned by chance and fortune. This is presupposed by the Doctor in the place cited, and is expressly handed down by the same in his commentary (11. *Met. antè T.* 8.) against Aristotle. It is proved first: an essential cause precedes an accidental cause, because the latter is reduced to the former; but nature and intellect are essential causes, while chance and fortune are accidental causes; therefore chance and fortune cannot be the primary causes of things, such as the aforesaid spheres. Second: if inferior things obtain essential causes, as the Philosophers whom Aristotle disputes against (*cit. & 2. Phys.* 44.) acknowledge, then all the more do the heavens, which are superior, well-ordered, and wonderfully disposed, and therefore chance and fortune are not the primary causes of the said spheres.

Second assertion: fortune is not the Goddess of good events devised by the pagans. So Scotus (*Quol. alleg. B.*) after Augustine (4. *Civit. cap.* 18. & 7. *eiusdem, cap.* 3.). It is proved: there would then be two goddesses, one of good events and another of bad, as the Manicheans imagined two primary productive principles

of things, one of good things and another of bad things. Furthermore, we would fall into polytheism, which I shall show to be impossible (*in Met. l. 4. quaest. vn. art. 4.*).

Third assertion: good fortune is an impulse of nature without reason toward the good that someone attains beyond his intention. Scotus rehearses this (*cit. I.*) following Aristotle (*l. de bona fortuna.*). This impulse is called the intrinsic cause of the good outcome, which inheres in the well-fortuned man and inclines him toward good beyond his intention, following upon his individual being; and so one person is well-fortuned and another is not, as is evident from experience. Nor is that impulse sufficient on its own, but extrinsic causes of the good outcome are required to concur and incline toward such good, such as the seven planets in a certain conjunction and aspect both among themselves and with the stars, in a determinate position and house; and when their conjunction is dissolved, the good effects and prosperous outcomes cease. In this way some are fortunate up to their thirtieth or fortieth year and thereafter depart as unhappy and ill-fortuned, as many writers of no little reputation observe. But according to the Theologians, and in particular Scotus (*ad finem loci nominati*), all good outcomes of a human being are to be attributed to the special providence of God, who according to the good pleasure of his will bestows his gifts on one and not on another, nor unjustly, since he is the Lord of all. More on this in Richard (*Quol. 3. quaest. 7.*) and Faber (*de praedest. dist. 57. cap. 5. ad finem.*).

Fourth assertion: fortune is rightly defined as an accidental cause from deliberate choice in those things that happen rarely. So Aristotle (*2. Phys. T. 52.*) and Scotus (*nuper cit. Quol. ult.*). It is called a cause as the genus; accidental, so as to differ from an essential cause; from deliberate choice, because of chance. The remaining particulars are added to distinguish it from nature, whose effects are intended and determinate. Chance, however, is defined as an accidental cause without deliberate choice in those things that happen rarely. The distinction between fortune and chance is clear: the former applies to free agents, the latter to natural agents, as the Doctor correctly sets out (*5. Metaphys. quaest. 1. §. Respondeo.*).

You will object first: Aristotle in some passages, such as (*7. Mor. ad Eudem. c. 18.*), seems to assert that fortune is a Goddess, as the Ancients held, and he does not reject them (*2. Phys. T. 47.*). Hence the Romans worshipped her as a divine power, and Valerius Maximus narrates that her image spoke. I respond that Aristotle there speaks in the opinion of the common people, not in his own opinion; perhaps if he had refuted it they would have inflicted death upon him. His expressed mind is clear from the passages adduced by us in the third and fourth assertions.

You will object second: the same Philosopher (*1. de bona fortuna cap. 2.*) writes that fortune is nature without reason; therefore fortune is not an accidental cause from deliberate choice, which belongs only to free causes. I respond that

the Philosopher in that place indicates that fortuitous effects are produced in us without deliberating reason, as Scotus interprets (*ubi supra*), and because he says it is an impulse and inclination toward the good, toward which the superior natural causes, namely the heavens, concur, he accordingly called it nature without reason. And he adds there: where there is much intellect, there is little fortune, and conversely, where there is much fortune, there is little intellect.

You will object third: many effects, such as eclipses of the sun and moon, occur rarely, and yet they are not attributed to fortune; therefore fortune is not well defined above as applying to those things that as a rule do not come about. I respond by conceding the antecedent and denying the consequence. For such effects are from a determinate cause, which being posited they are posited; whereas fortuitous effects are not of themselves intended or determined by the cause, but arise from other intended and determined effects incidentally, that is, having no necessary connection and bond with them.

Article III. Whether Fate Exists and What it Is.

Gregory (*hom. de Epiph.*), Castrensis (*7. adversus haereses, ver. Fatum*), Suarez (*disp. 19. Met. sect. 11. num. 4.*), and Pontius (*disp. 40.*) warn that fate is to be avoided and indeed denied entirely, as odious and pernicious to the Christian faith. I add Augustine (*Tract. 37. in Ioan.*): "If your heart were not fatuous, you would not believe in fate." For fate is described by the Ancients as a binding of causes drawing its efficacy from the motions and powers of the stars. Hence a certain Poet sings: "Your fates draw you, lest you be able to leave what has been captured," and further: "For he himself, willing and ready, will follow, if the fates call you; the other you will not overcome by any strength, nor will you tear him away with hard iron."

Against these Augustine disputes splendidly (*enarratione in psal. 31.*) in these words: "Many say: fate has made me. What is fate? The stars have made me. What are the stars? Certainly those which we behold in the heaven. And who made them? God. Who ordered them? God. Therefore you see that what you wish to say is: God caused me to sin; thus he is unjust, you are just, because if he had not caused it, you would not have sinned. Remove these excuses from sins, and say with David (*Psal. 140.*): 'Let not my heart incline to evil words, to make excuses in sins with men who work iniquity.'"

Fate is defined otherwise by Seneca (*1. 2. qq. naturalium cap. 36.*) as the inevitable order of things and the inescapable chain of events, which no force can break, because it depends upon the disposition of Jove and the settled counsel of the Gods. Toward this Virgil looks (*4. Aeneid.*): "If the fates were to permit me to lead my life under my own auspices, and to compose my cares by my own free will." Such fate is condemned in the Council of Braga I, c. 9, and refuted by Augustine (*1. haeresium cap. 35. Et 5. Civit. c. 1. & inde*), where Vives and Alfonso (*7. adversus haer. ver. Fat.*), and is refuted by reason. For in this way human freedom would

be injured; commerce and deliberation admitted in (*1. perih. cap. ult.*) would be abolished; nor would any man be worthy of praise or blame, nor worthy of reward or punishment, as Alfonso shows fully and learnedly (*ubi supra.*). For if all things happen necessarily and inevitably, there would be no contingency of things, no indifference and indetermination to opposites, and similar things; all of which are false, absurd, and heretical, and therefore fate in this acceptation, which is the customary one according to Bonaventure (*2. d. 14. quest. 3. num. 79.*), is to be detested and execrated.

Fate is described a third way by Bonaventure (*3. Phys. cap. 2.*), Auriol (*1. d. 40. art. 3.*), Gadius (*quol. 21.*), and Molina (*1. p. quest. 14. art. 13. disp. 1.*) as the order and connection of secondary causes foreseen by God, according to which God permits things to act and come about. This description is derived from the notion of the name. For fate is derived from the verb to speak, as Augustine notes (*tract. 37. in Ioan. Et 4. contra Iulianum cap. 8. Et quest. 115. novi & veteris testamenti*). Hence things are thought to come about by fate which have been foretold by someone beforehand, according to the same Augustine (*5. Civit. cap. 2. Ocontrà Faustum 2. cap. 5.*). Since, therefore, to happen by fate is equivalent to being foretold, foreseen, and predicted, according to the etymological meaning of the word, plainly the certain and determinate order of all concurring causes toward the production of effects, and their arrangement foreknown and foreseen by God, is called fate. In this way fate, taken broadly and generically, abstracting from good and bad, Boethius (*4. de cons. prof. 6.*) restricts to the good alone and specifies it for those effects that are subject to divine providence, so that fate, according to this author, is the order of secondary causes executing divine providence. To this sense a certain interpreter of Pliny (*1. 20. cap. 1.*) refers the opinion of the Ancients, saying: "Homer's chain and Plato's rings are nothing other than the series of things and the order of divine providence serving as its instrument." For the series and order of divine providence is infallible, not impairing created freedom nor destroying the contingency of things. Hence Manilius rightly sings: "Nor in so great a mass is anything more wonderful than reason, because all things obey certain laws."

You will say: what has been foreknown, foreseen, and ordained by God is firm, stable, and infallible; therefore if fate is conceded as a certain and determinate series of causes foreseen and provided for by God, plainly the effects of those causes will come about necessarily, because they will come about as God foresaw them to be future, and so fate is admitted in the same sense as the Ancients concede it. I concede the antecedent and deny the consequence. The reason is that the foreknowledge of God does not remove contingency or freedom, since it is extrinsic to things. Hence it is only inferred that things will infallibly come about, but not that they will come about inevitably and necessarily — with the necessity of the consequence, not of the consequent — as I showed (*in Log. l. 4. art. ult.*).

Article IV. On Monsters.

A monster, which derives from showing (*monstrando*), as Augustine notes (21. *Civit. cap. 8.*) — either because it shows and predicts some future event, as Cicero says (2. *de natura Deorum*), or because it points out with fingers, as it were, something wonderful and unusual that all are to behold, as others prefer — is called by Aristotle a sin of nature (2. *Phys. 82.*), a defect and deformity of the same (7. *Met. c. 9. T. 31.*), and also an evil of nature itself by Scotus (1. *Rep. d. 2. q. 3. §. Ad 1. principale.*). Most importantly it is defined as a natural effect degenerating from the right and usual disposition according to its species, gathered from (2. *Phys. cit. 4. de gener. animalium cap. 4.*) and expressed with respect to all its particulars. It is called an effect, as the genus. It is called natural, because in artificial products, if some defect occurs, it is called not a monster but an error. The remaining particulars are added in place of the differentia. For since each species has its individuals that are constituted and integrated in the customary manner from certain parts and determinate members, if any individual of a species is generated having all its members, or some more notable and remarkable ones, deviating from the right and customary mode in which the others exist, it is called a monster. This occurred in the ninety-first year of Christ, when a certain monster was found with a canine head and the other members human, which presaged that century would be exhausted of men of talent and learning, as Genebrard notes (4. *Chronol. p. 317. decimo saeculo.*). Although the Parisians (2. *Phys. q. 2. fol. 45.*) write that monsters occur in nearly all created things, I think that they properly come about in animate things, such as plants and trees — so Pliny reports (1. 7. c. 2.) that under the shade of a single fig tree an entire army lay encamped — and most of all in human beings and brute animals, as occurred in the year of Christ 1105, when a sow gave birth to offspring with a human face, a cock was found with four feet, and a two-headed child of double sex was born, as Genebrard attests (*cit. pag. 356. saeculo duodecimo.*). The principal causes of monsters can be assigned as fourfold: abundance of matter, deficiency of matter, intemperate condition of matter, defect in what contains the fetus, and mixture of animals of different species, of which Pliny makes mention (*lib. 6. hist. cap. 30.*).

First, then, a monster can be born from excess of matter, and this in two ways. Either the excess of matter occurs in all the parts and members of the animal — thus Augustine narrates (16. *Civit. cap. 23.*) that certain persons at Rome had bodies of gigantic size; and in the year 1649 in the month of July a tortoise was found at Aquae of such great size that it struck those who beheld it with amazement — or an excess of matter is found only in some member or members. Thus Genebrard writes (2. *Chronol. ad annum urbis Romae conditae 512.*) that at Rome a boy was born of a maidservant walking on all fours, also having four eyes and ears and a double masculine sex. Likewise hermaphrodites, or androgynes, are sometimes seen having both masculine and feminine sex, of

which Augustine (12. *Trin. ante cap. 7.*), Aristotle (4. *de gener. animalium, cap. 2.*), and Angelus (*verbo Hermaphroditus*) make mention.

Second, a monster arises from deficiency and smallness of matter, and this in two ways. Either matter is deficient proportionally in all the parts and members of the animal, and in this way a dwarf is born; hence Nicephorus (12. *hist. capit. 37.*) reports that in Egypt there existed a man of such tiny stature that he reached only the size of a partridge. Or it is deficient in some part and member, in which way monoculi, monopeds, and umbripeds are born, of whom Pliny speaks (7. *Hist. cap. 2.*). Hence the Parisians in the passage just cited say that in their own time a girl was born deprived of eyes and nose, having in place of nostrils only two openings.

Third, from intemperate condition of matter. For if matter is excessively hot and burning, children are sometimes born with teeth — such was Marcus Curius, according to Pliny cited above — and with beards. Thus Albert, cited by the Parisians (*ubi supra*), attests to having seen a girl born with pendulous breasts and hairy under the arms, on the head, and in the groin. But if matter is excessively cold, there are generated those who are cold and bewitched, unfit for intercourse and generation, of whom Angelus (*verbo Matrimonium impedimento 16.*) and Lyran (*ad finem, c. 1. Geneseos*) speak.

Fourth, from a defect in what contains the fetus in the womb of the mother, monsters are seen. For if the containing structure — a certain thin membrane called the afterbirth — is violently compressed or broken, then one fetus is joined to another and they emerge together from the mother's womb. Thus in the year 1623 two infants appeared joined together in the womb, of whom one bore the other, one ate and drank and spoke, while the other did not, but only emitted foam from his mouth. Scotus rehearses something similar (4. *distinct. 6. quest. 2. §. De quarto I.*).

Fifth, from the mixture of animals of different species, as occurs in Africa, where on account of the scarcity of springs animals of different species come together to drink and there mingle and mate, producing various monsters, as Aristotle affirms (8. *de generatione animalium, cap. 28.*). In this way sometimes semi-men, semi-beasts are born. Likewise a woman gave birth to a serpent, according to Lucian; and an ox to a lamb, according to Josephus (7. *de bello Iudaico, cap. 12.*).

You will ask first: whether a monster having doubled members, namely two heads, four hands, and feet, is one animal or many? I respond with Aristotle (4. *de generatione animalium*): if the heart is one, it is one animal; but if the heart is double, the animal is likewise doubled. The reason is that the heart is the origin and seat of life, and therefore from its unity or duality one or more animals are established. And this is discerned from the pulse, as Scotus adds (4. *distinct. 6. quæst. 2. §. De quarto. I.*). And in adults, from the intellect and will. For since a

human being is one animal by reason of the unity of the rational soul, which possesses one intellect and will, from these it is consequently easy to know whether the animal is one or many.

You will ask second: whether nature intends a monster? I respond that it does not intend a monster essentially but accidentally. The reason is that a monster, as has been said, is an evil, which nature does not intend essentially but accidentally on account of the impediments enumerated above. So the Seraphic Doctor seems to hand down (*2. distinct. 7. quaestio. 3.*), and in a similar case Scotus writes (*1. distinct. 41. quaest. un. §. Contra istam positionem.*). I add that nature intends what is right and perfect, in accordance with the saying: nature does what is best. But if it is impeded through the causes enumerated above, it tends toward the oblique and imperfect, of which kind is a monster.

Book V. On Quantity.

What I disputed about quantity, its essence, species, affections, and series in Logic (*lib. 3. quaest. 4.*) is to be presupposed. With these things presupposed and laid as a foundation, we take care to add here the remaining things that are desired there, especially because quantity is a property of natural body, pertaining to this branch of doctrine.

Question I. On Quantity in Common.

Article I. Whether Quantity Can Exist without External Extension to Place.

No one doubts that by the power of nature internal extension cannot exist without external extension or local commensuration, because the latter presupposes the former as an effect presupposes its cause, just as light presupposes a luminous body. Whether this can be brought about by God's supernatural power, however, is a controversy among Catholics and heretics. For Luther and Calvin (*4. instit. cap. 17.*), to whom Durant (*4. dist. 10. quaest. 2.*) seems to lend support, think it repugnant for the external extension of quantity to place to be separated from the internal extension of parts in a whole. Scotus (*4. distinct. 10. quaest. 1. art. 2. §. Dico ergo aliter M.*), Ballius (*ibid.*), Mayr (*quaest. 2.*), and the other Orthodox Doctors teach that it can be brought about divinely that the internal extension of the quantity of a quantified body should exist without external extension to place.

Note that extension, which by the force of the name is equivalent to a stretching outward, as Mayr notes (*ubi supra, quaest. 3.*), is a position of parts, and is twofold: one is internal, which is the position of parts in a whole; the other is external, which is the position of parts in a place. The former belongs to the genus of

quantity, the latter to the genus of situation (*situs*); and the former can exist without the latter. For God can bring it about that a quantified body is not measured and inscribed by place, as if it were placed outside the heavens; and if it exists within the heavens, it enjoys the former position but not the latter.

Assertion: by divine power the internal extension of quantity can exist without external extension to place. The Doctor holds this (*cit. & in Report. eadem dist.*). It is proved first from Sacred Scripture: "But he, passing through the midst of them, went his way" (*Luc. 4.*); and "But Jesus hid himself and went out of the temple" (*Ioan. 8.*), where Lyran adds: Christ by the power of his divinity renders himself invisible to them; but he could not have done this except by the separation of external extension from the internal extension of quantity, as occurs daily in the Eucharist, in which the body of Christ has no actual external extension to place but only aptitudinal extension, as Suarez also maintains (*disp. 40. Met. sect. 4. num. 14.*). Second: in essentially subordinated things the prior can exist without the posterior, as is clear from God, the sun, and man, as well as from a cause and its effect; but the internal extension of the quantity of parts in a whole and the external local and commensuratory extension of the parts of the whole in a place are subordinated to each other, with the internal extension established as prior — which is the essential reason of quantity, as I proved (*in Log. pract. art. 2.*) — and as the cause of external local and circumscriptive extension. But a cause can exist without its effect, as the Doctor writes (*4. distinct. 49. quaest. 13. & 16. §. Dicunt quidam.*). This was demonstrated in the Babylonian furnace, in which the three Hebrew children who were placed there were not burned. Third: the predicaments are unmixed, and nearly all are really distinct from one another; but the aforesaid extensions belong to different predicaments. For internal extension pertains to the predicament of quantity and external extension to the predicament of situation, as I noted above. Therefore they can be separated from each other, and accordingly the former extension of quantity can exist without the latter.

You will object first: Saint Augustine (*epist. 49. ad Dardanum*) commits these words to writing: "Take away spaces of places from bodies, and they will be nowhere; and if they are nowhere, they will not be." From these words the holy Doctor clearly implies that bodies cannot exist without local extension, which is external extension. I respond that Augustine there speaks of natural power, not of divine power, which extends to everything that does not involve a contradiction.

You will object second: a continuum is that which has extended parts, with one part outside another, and which can be divided into them (*5. Met. cap. 13. T. 18.*); but this extension of parts respects place, because it does not seem possible how the whole body and its parts can be extended except in relation to place; therefore the internal extension of quantity cannot be separated from external extension, which is local and commensuratory. I concede the major and deny

the minor. For "with God no word is impossible" (*Luc. 1.*). Hence, although this cannot be brought about naturally, it is shown to be possible supernaturally through the reasons given above in support of the preceding assertion.

You will object third: a continuous quantum cannot exist without figure; but figure by its very nature requires local extension; therefore a quantum cannot exist without local extension. I respond first that a quantum can exist without figure, which is in the fourth species of the genus of quality. Furthermore, a quantum can exist without external and situational figure, but not without internal figure, which is its intrinsic terminus, residing in the category of quantity.

You will object fourth: nothing is found without its property or passion, as a man is not found without risibility; but external extension is the passion of quantity; therefore quantity cannot exist without it, and conversely. I concede the major and deny the minor: for external extension is the effect of internal extension, and that a cause can be found without its effect was shown above. Or you may say that internal extension can exist without actual external extension, just as a man can exist without actual risibility, but not without aptitudinal external extension to place; just as a man cannot exist without the power and aptitude for laughing.

Article II. Whether Quantity Is Really Distinct from Substance.

Scotus (*4. distinct. 1. §. Ad quaest. ergo sub I.*) rehearses two opinions. One is followed by the Nominalists — Ockham (*4. dist. 4. & Quol. 4. quaest. 29.*), Gabriel (*in can. lect. 43.*), and the others of the same school — who assert that quantity coincides and is identified with corporeal substance and material accidents, so that there are as many quantities in a composite as there are substances and material accidents in it. According to these authors, therefore, material substance is of itself quantified insofar as it has parts outside of parts, and color is likewise of itself quantified insofar as it has its own parts extended per se. The other is the common opinion embraced by the Doctor in the passage cited, by Mayr, Basson, and others there, to whom the Thomists assent following Thomas, cited by the Complutenses (*disp. 13. Phys. quest. 1.*), and Suarez (*disp. 40. Sect. 2. num. 7.*), who teach that quantity is really distinct from substance and from every material accident. The same is handed down by Bonaventure (*4. distinct. 12. art. 1. quaest. 3. prope finem.*); nor does Durant dissent (*ibid. quaest. 1. ad 2.*).

Presupposed is the division of being into substance, which is being subsisting per se, and accident, which is being inhering in another. This is subdivided into absolute and relative; the former can exist without a subject, the latter in no way can, since it depends upon it both in its becoming and in its being, as I showed at length (*in Log. lib. 3. quaest. 6. art. 5.*).

Assertion: quantity really differs from corporeal substance. So Scotus (*passim alleg. Et 2. distinct. 2. quaest. 9. Et distinct. 12. quaest. 1.*) and also (*5. Met. quaest. 9.*), following Augustine (*5. Trin. cap. 10. & 8. eiusdem operis, cap. 2.*). It is established first from Aristotle, both in Logic in the chapter on quantity, and in the Metaphysics (*lib. 5. cap. de quanto*), where the Philosopher distinguishes quantity from substance. Likewise (*1. Phys. T. 15.*), disputing against Parmenides and Melissus, he writes that what are other than substance are predicated of substance, but quantity is predicated of substance; for one can say "substance is quantified," therefore quantity is separated from substance. The same in (*7. Met. T. 3. ibid. sum. 2. cap. 1. 7. 8.*), where in explicit words he adds: "Length and width and depth are certain quantities, but they are not substance. For quantity is not substance." Furthermore, the Stagirite himself not infrequently, as in the 3rd and 7th books of the Metaphysics and other places, refutes the Pythagoreans and Platonists who make numbers and quantities the substances of things. And unless he distinguished quantity from substance, just as there is per se motion for quantity, there would likewise be per se motion for substance, which he expressly denies (*5. Phys. T. 18.*). Second: things that are really different are such that when one persists the other perishes, as the Doctor acutely argues (*2. distinct. 1. quaest. 4. §. Contra istam*). But in the Eucharist the substance of bread does not remain, as faith teaches and the Council of Trent declares (*Ses. 13. can. 2.*). Yet its quantity persists, as the senses perceive and reason establishes. For one quantity of this host is discerned, in which color, taste, smell, and the other qualities reside as in a common subject.

You will say there are as many quantities as there are qualities, identified with them in reality. On the contrary: those qualities are not disjunct and dispersed but are united and ordered to one another; therefore they are united and ordered in a common subject, which is quantity really distinct from them. And this is evident in a bench and other artificial products, which are common subjects for the things placed in them. Third: no accident is identified with substance, since being is openly distributed into substance and accident as into opposed members; but quantity is an accident and is established as one of the nine predicaments of accident; therefore quantity is really separated from substance. Ockham answers (*Quol. citat.*) by conceding the major and distinguishing the minor: if quantity is taken personally, as it supposits for an individual such as Peter, he denies it — for in this case it coincides with his substance; but if it supposits simply, he concedes it — for in this case it is taken for the word or concept, which is an accident. On the contrary: if quantity supposits personally, it is taken for this or that singular quantity; but if it supposits simply, it is taken for generic or specific common quantity signified by the name, as I explained (*in Epitome lib. 1. quaest. 2. art. 3.*). In whatever way quantity is taken, therefore, it is an accident. Furthermore, however quantity is taken, it is a being in another, namely in a subject which is substance; therefore it is an accident in such a way that it can in no manner be substance. Fourth:

things that are of different genus and species differ from each other, in accordance with the rule before the predicaments: of different genera there are different differentiae, species, and individuals; but substance and quantity are of different genera, being of different predicaments — as fire is in the genus of substance, while its length and breadth are in the genus of quantity — therefore quantity is distinguished from substance. The aforesaid Ockham answers, from Damascus as cited by him, by conceding the major and distinguishing the minor: with respect to the same intention, he denies it; with respect to different intention, he concedes it; for fire insofar as it is a substance is placed in the predicament of substance, but insofar as it is quantified, it is in the category of quantity. On the contrary: either the same or different intention or consideration does not identify or differentiate things, but is borne toward them as they are from the side of things. Hence it is called the same intention because it tends toward the same object, and different because it reaches a different object; but substance and quantity are distinct things, as is clear from their definitions; therefore they really differ from each other. Damascus, however, speaks of things that differ by reason alone, as he signifies (*lib. 1. fidei, cap. 11.*), not of things that are separated from the side of things, since the thing is prior to its signification and distinction, as Augustine implies (*quaest. 2. veteris testamenti.*).

You will object first, from (*1. Phys. T. 52.*): beings are not to be multiplied without necessity; but if quantity is posited as something distinct from material substance, beings would be multiplied without necessity, since substance of itself is extended and divisible into parts without anything added to it; therefore quantity does not really differ from it. I concede the major and deny the minor and its proof. For corporeal substance is extended and divisible into quantitative parts through quantity, just as it is white through whiteness and morally formed through a habit.

You will object second: things that possess the same properties do not differ from each other, for the same property argues the same essence; but substance and quantity share the same property, for each admits of contraries, such as whiteness and blackness and others of this kind; therefore there is no distinction between them. I concede the major and deny the minor; to its proof I say that substance and quantity admit contraries in different ways. For quantity is their proximate and immediate subject in the sense of *quo*, while substance is the remote, mediate, and ultimate subject in the sense of *quod*. Or you may say that the argument is valid of a property in the fourth mode, but not of those in the other modes. For receiving contraries of this kind is a property that belongs to substance and quantity in a certain sense. But the property of substance in the fourth mode is not to be in another, and the property of quantity in the fourth mode is to be equal or unequal, as I said (*in Epitome lib. 1. quaest. 4.*).

You will object third: if quantity were really distinct from substance, in rarefaction a new quantity would be acquired, since new extension of parts occurs through it; and in condensation quantity would be lost, because through condensation parts are contracted and occupy a smaller place. But this seems inconvenient; therefore, etc. The consequence of the major can be conceded, as will be evident (*lib. 2. de intensione & remissione, quest. 2. artic. 1. affert. 3.*) And the minor is to be denied from what will be said there.

Article III. Whether Quantity Divides Material Substance into Its Parts.

Albertus (*lib. Tract. 2. cap. 4.*), Durant (*1. distinct. 34. in calce, quaest. 1.*), and others whom the Complutenses cite and follow (*disp. 13. Log. quest. 3.*) deny that corporeal substance is divisible into any parts prior to quantity. Scotus (*2. distinct. 12. quest. 2. §. Respondeo D.*), Ockham (*Quol. 4. quaest. 14.*), and the adherents of both assert that material substance is first constituted with substantial and entitative parts before it is divided into quantitative parts.

Note first, from (*Epitome lib. 2. quaest. 7. art. 1.*), that a whole is principally of two kinds, essential and integral: the former is subdivided into physical, which consists of matter and form, and metaphysical, which is constituted from genus and differentia. The latter is subdivided into homogeneous, which has similar parts of the same nature — as water divided into parts yields parts of which each is both in reality and in name water — and heterogeneous, which has dissimilar parts diverse both in reality and in name, as a body is divided into head, neck, arms, hands, and other organic parts of this kind. In the present question the controversy is only about the physical whole, both homogeneous and heterogeneous, as to whether it borrows the aforesaid parts from quantity.

Note second that extensibility belongs to material substance as its property prior to the advent of quantity. For to be extensible is one thing and to be extended is another: the first material substance has from itself, since it flows from its essential principles; the second it receives from quantity. Hence the Complutenses mentioned above are not right in thinking that our authors err in attributing to the said substance divisibility into entitative parts. For we admit in that substance the capacity for receiving quantity, and in the same substance, prior to the reception of quantity, the privation of it; but beyond quantity, we assert that material substance is divisible into entitative parts just as into essential parts, such as genus and differentia; and with the advent of quantity, into quantitative and local commensuratory and circumscriptive parts.

Assertion: material substance is prior of itself divisible into entitative parts than into quantitative parts through the benefit of quantity. The Doctor holds this (*ubi supra*), to whom Auriol, Mayr, Suarez (*disp. 40. Met. Sect. 4.*), and Fonseca (*5. Met. cap. 13. quaest. 2. sect. 3.*) adhere. It is proved first: a substantial whole is first constituted and composed from intrinsic and substantial parts before extrinsic

and accidental ones. For a thing is first constituted in itself and in its own being before it respects another, as is evident from a subject, which precedes the accidents that are based in it, and from a cause, which precedes the effect that proceeds from it; but material substance is an integral whole consisting of entitative and substantial parts intrinsic to it, as is evident from the first note. And this can be further clarified and corroborated by an analogy with quality, which possesses intrinsic degrees before it is affected by quantity; therefore material substance is first divisible into substantial parts than into quantitative ones.

The Complutenses named above respond by denying that material substance has any parts in act prior to quantity, but that parts arise from quantity, through which it is extended and divided into parts; and that substance possesses only the capacity for receiving this kind of extension of parts. Thus the substance itself prior to quantity is neither an integral whole nor does it have any actual parts. On the contrary: material substance is truly a substance, since it is a being subsisting per se residing in the category of substance, and its parts are likewise substances pertaining to the same predicament — as a part of water is water and differs substantially from another part of water — therefore either such substance receives substantial being from quantity or it does not. Not the first, because it is presupposed to already be a substance before quantity comes to it. If the second: therefore, apart from quantity, the aforesaid substantial entities preexist in that substance, for by the adversaries quantity merely confers extension upon them; but so that something may be extended, it must be presupposed and prerequired to have something that may be diffused. Since, therefore, quantity extends the said parts, it is plainly deduced that these parts precede quantity. All the more: if from some whole, say a piece of wood, God were to remove its quantity — which the adversaries cannot deny to be possible, since quantity really differs from substance, and as a matter of fact in the Eucharist the quantity of bread exists without its substance — its substantial and entitative parts would remain. This argument is confirmed with such weight of truth that it has persuaded even certain Thomists, notably John of Saint Thomas, to admit the aforesaid entitative parts, though disordered and confused. But this helps them not at all, since if God were to allow them to exist as they were previously when they were affected by quantity, they would be disposed and ordered among themselves, albeit not extended and not quantified. Nor does it help to say that they cease to be parts, for although they cease to be quantified and extended, they do not cease to be substances, since their substantial being is preserved by God while only their being as extended departs. This the Complutenses seem to scent (*passim alleg. num. 43.*) when they define quantity as an extension-conferring accident of substance. Second: a divisible accident presupposes and requires a divisible subject, as Averroes hands down (*3. coli.*), and the reason is that between what receives and what is received there is a proportion, which would not obtain unless both were

divisible; but quantity is a divisible accident whose subject is material substance; therefore material substance of itself is divisible into substantial parts. The Complutenses respond (*citat. num. 39.*) by distinguishing: in potency and privatively, they concede; in act and positively, they deny. On the contrary: material substance differs from spiritual substance in this, that the latter is indivisible — as the rational soul is whole in the whole body and whole in any part of the body — while the former is divisible: for the sentient soul is whole in the whole body and a part in a part of the body. For if it were whole in any part of the body, when that part were severed the whole soul would perish, which is false and contrary to experience; therefore material substance is actually and positively divisible into substantial parts. Furthermore, through nutrition, a new part of substance is generated that, at least by nature, precedes its quantity, and is added to the previously existing animate whole. Moreover, from (*2. de generatione T. 37.*): from a fistful of air ten fistfuls of fire are made; but this plurality is not derived from quantity, because in terms of quantity two fistfuls are equal; therefore it is derived in terms of substance, and accordingly material substance is divisible into its entities. I add: if a priest were to consecrate the half of a host and were not to consecrate the other half, the substance of the bread in the middle would cease to be in the consecrated part and would be separated from the substance of the bread remaining in the other unconsecrated half, and yet the quantity of the whole host would remain integral and undivided; therefore, given this hypothesis, there would be a division of substance into entitative parts. Nor is it satisfactory to say that it is the same quantity not according to reality but according to appearance — for that is ridiculous, absurd, and contrary to sense and experience. Nor similarly is it satisfactory to respond that there is not properly speaking a separation of one part from the other but a cessation. For if God were to preserve that part of the substance of the bread outside the host without quantity, just as he preserves the quantity without its subject and substance, without doubt there would be a true and real separation of substance into its entities, with the quantity remaining intact.

You will object first: the essence of quantity is extension of parts, and its property is divisibility, according to the common position of Philosophers; but substance is really separated from quantity, as has been asserted in the preceding article; therefore substance is not divisible into parts except through the benefit of quantity, as Aristotle implies (*1. Phys. T. 15.*). Confirmed: no indistinct principle is divisible, because every divisible is distinguishable into many; but substance, and especially matter, is an indistinct principle, since it is potency and act distinguishes and separates (*7. Met. 49.*); therefore substance is not divisible into many entities. I distinguish the major: into entitative parts, I deny it; into quantitative parts, I concede it, as I made clear abundantly above. Through the same distinction the instantiation of the confirmation is resolved.

You will object second: prior to quantity, no composition of entitative parts can exist in substance; therefore substance of itself is not divisible but only through

quantity. The antecedent is proved: the composition of substantial parts is accidental, because it does not consist of act and potency simply speaking, since one part does not provide being to the other nor constitute it. I distinguish the antecedent: of composition taken strictly, which is called essential, I concede it; of composition taken broadly, I deny it. To the proof I deny the antecedent, the reason being that material substance has substantial parts that integrate the whole substance; hence it is called not accidental but substantial, although their union is a relative accident, just as in essential composition from matter and form as well.

You will object third: matter is either simple or composite; not simple, for then it would be indivisible; nor composite, for it is not constituted from act and potency, since it is itself potency, nor from subject and accident, since it is a being per se; therefore it is in no way divisible. I respond that matter consists of entitative parts which, since they are of the same nature, do not denote a true composition such as is had from matter and form, as the argument proves; just as quality is said to be simple, even though it coalesces from many grades of the same nature.

Article IV. What Is the Subject of Quantity.

Since from what has been said quantity is an accident, and every accident requires a subject in which it inheres, it is rightly investigated in the present what is to be established as the subject of quantity. The dispute between Philosophers is about two candidates, namely matter and the composite. The Averroists and Nominalists, whom Achillinus (*lib. de elementis. cap. 17.*), Zabarella (*2. de materia, cap. 8.*), Suarez (*disp. 14. Met. sect. 3.*), and others hold, judge that quantity is proximately and immediately based in matter. The Scotists with their Doctor (*2. dist. 3. quaest. 4. §. Ad 1. rationem ante M. Et dist. 15. quest. vn. §. Dico ad quaest. A. Et 4. distinct. 12. quaest. 4. §. Ad quaest. ergo G.*) and the Thomists with their leader (*1. p. quest. 76. art. 6.*) and other places subscribe to Durant (*1. dist. 5. quest. 4. parte secunda. Et 2. distinct. 12. quaest. 2. Et 4. dist. 12. quest. 1.*), Richard (*4. d. eadem, quaest. 1.*), Bonaventure (*ibidem, art. 1. quest. 1.*), and Rivius (*de gener. cap. 4. Tract. 3. quaest. 8.*), teaching that the subject of quantity is the composite.

Note first, from Scotus (*4. distinct. 12. quaest. 2. §. Ad quaest. ergo 1.*), that accidents are of two kinds: some are relative, having their being toward another without which they can neither exist nor be mutually separated, and these are called imperfect and of minimal entity; some, however, are absolute, really distinct from the subjects in which they exist, and these are called perfect accidents, of which kind are quantity and quality, which can be separated from one another and from the subjects in which they inhere by divine power.

Note second that there is one subject of inherence and another of denomination. The former is that in which accidents are based — as the soul is the subject of inherence of intellectual cognition, because cognition inheres in

it. The latter is the subject of denomination, that which is denominated by such an accident, even if that accident does not wholly inhere in it but in a part of it — as a man is called intelligent even though intellectual cognition inheres only in his soul, or is terminated in it; likewise a bench is called a human work, because the action of the man producing it is terminated at it. Furthermore, the subject is divided into adequate or total and inadequate or partial, the explanation of which is found (*in Log. lib. 1. quaest. 3. art. 1.*). And likewise into immediate or proximate and mediate or remote, of which in the same place.

Assertion: not matter but the composite is the immediate and proximate subject of quantity and of the other accidents. The Doctor holds this (*ubi supra. Et in Report. ibid. Et Theor. 22.*). It is proved first by various testimonies from Aristotle, from which I select three that are more weighty and effective. The first is derived from Logic, chapter on substance: "When first substances are destroyed, it is impossible for anything to remain." The Philosopher speaks there of perfect and complete substances, which are the singular and individual members of the predicament of substance, and which are said to be substance in the highest degree because they underlie or are subjected to all essential and accidental predicates. For of Peter, for instance, it is predicated that he is a living substance, a rational animal, great, white, and similar things, which are truly in him and in other individuals of the same genus. And lest anyone say that these belong to the said substances by reason of the part or matter they contain, he adds in that place, closing off the way to dissolving the force of this instance: although parts are substances, they are nevertheless incomplete and are referred to the whole substance, which is individual and substance in the highest degree, because it underlies all the said predicates, all things are predicated of it, while it is predicated of nothing. If that same substance is destroyed, surely all things that are in it are destroyed, among which are the accidents and especially quantity. But matter, which is a part of it, is not destroyed, since it is incorruptible (*1. Phys. 7. 82.*); therefore quantity does not inhere immediately in matter but in the composite, according to Aristotle. The second is from (*5. Phys. cap. 1. T. 3.*): the subject of motion is the composite, for example wood or man. And (*1. de gen. cap. 4. T. 23.*), establishing the difference between generation and alteration, he says that the subject of generation is matter, of alteration the composite; for a man is altered when from sick he becomes healthy, from hot cold, and from bad good. Nor does it help to say that the whole is the subject of denomination while matter is the subject of inherence; for it is manifestly evident in the text that the Stagirite is speaking of the subject of inherence, since alteration inheres in the whole, namely motion, health, and similar things in man or another animal. The third is from (*Met. lib. 7. T. 4. & lib. 12. T. 43.*): substance precedes accident in nature, cognition, and time. He treats there principally of composite substance, for he brings examples from elements and mixed things, and most of all from plants and animals, which are composite and complete substances. And at (*T. 9.*) he promises to pass over the discourse about the third substance, which is the

composite. Nor does it help to respond with Suarez (*citat. num. 55.*) and Arriaga (*disp. 5. Phys. sect. 2. subsect. 1.*) that the argument concludes with respect to the order of intention but not of execution. For things that are prior in intention are posterior in execution, from Scotus (*1. Reportat. distinct. 41. quest. vn. §. Dices post Aristot. 7. Met. T. 7.*). And nature in its works proceeds in such a way as to begin from the more imperfect and advance to the more perfect. Hence if fire is generated in wood, the wood is first disposed by heat and dryness, which are prior dispositions for its generation, and these are followed by the generated fire, which is the substance; while those precede, being accidents. On the contrary: substance, not only partial but also total, precedes quantity and the other accidents in the order of execution; for the subject is prior in the order of execution to those things that are based in it and depend upon it for existence and conservation; but total substance is said to be the subject of quantity in this order, because it is a being simply speaking and independent of it, and its cause; especially because a thing is first completed and perfected in its own genus before it respects other things of a different genus in the order of execution; but form, by which matter is specified and perfected, is of the same genus as matter, since each is a substance; therefore matter is presupposed informed by its substantial form, and accordingly is a total substance, before it receives quantity. Hence that saying: "what are prior in intention are posterior in execution, and what are prior in generation are posterior in perfection," does not apply in the same genus but in different genera. For an accident is posterior to substance both in generation and in perfection and in execution. The prior dispositive qualities, however, are not based in the whole being generated, since it does not yet exist, but in the whole being corrupted, which truly exists. Therefore the instance of the prior dispositions has no weight for enervating the foregoing argument. Third, from (*1. anima T. 66. & lib. de sensu & sensato, cap. 1.*): sensitive operations belong to the whole composite — as weaving, building, and the like belong to man — and vision, hearing, and similar things reside in organs, such as vision in the eye and hearing in the ear; but the organs are composites of both body and soul in part. Therefore these and other accidents are based in the whole. The adversaries respond that the aforesaid accidents are in the whole as in a subject of denomination, but in a part of matter as in a subject of inherence. On the contrary: the organ of vision, which is composed of matter and form, is not only denominated seeing through the vision by which the eye sees, but also through the same vision received in it; for to sense is to be acted upon, just as to understand is (*3. anima T. 12.*). All the more: vision comes about from the visible species received in the eye and from the visual power as two partial causes integrating one total cause; but the visible species inheres immediately not in matter but in the eye, which is an organ of the whole composite. Furthermore, immanent operations, among which is vision, are the ends and perfective termini of powers (*9. Met. T. 16.*); but perfection immediately and proximately inheres in the perfectible; therefore the aforesaid operations, as well as the other accidents, are based in the whole. Fourth: quantity exists proximately in that in

which motion toward its acquisition immediately exists, as is evident (*5. Phys. 3. & 8.*); but the proximate and immediate subject of motion is the composite, as the Stagirite there clearly expresses concerning wood receiving the motion of heat and cold. Furthermore, if motion were received immediately in matter, no motion would be violent but all would be natural or neutral, as the Doctor deduces (*2. dist. 18. quest. vn. §. contrà primum. D.*). Again, according to the Averroists there is no matter in the heavens, yet there is motion and quantity in them. Moreover, if matter stripped of all form were to exist — which is divinely possible — it would be circumscribed by place on account of the quantity existing in it, which is the reason for local circumscription. And if quantity were admitted as a property of matter, it could not be separated from it, since a property formally differs only from the thing of which it is a property; and therefore in the Eucharist the quantity of bread would not be separated from its matter, which contradicts the common position of the scholastics, as is evident from the Doctor (*4. dist. 12. quest. 2.*). These and other things that can be brought forward to confirm and corroborate the foregoing assertion render it not only more probable but also more true, especially since in this matter three principal classical Doctors — Scotus, Thomas, and Durant — agree, who rarely in controversies are found to be in accord.

You will object first: Aristotle (*1. de gen. T. 31.*) writes that matter is inseparable from magnitude or quantity. And (*6. Phys. T. 32.*) he laid it down first that the primary subject of motion is divisible, which cannot be unless it is quantified, and that this is matter. I add from the same place (*cap. 1.*): from what is not quantified, what is quantified does not come to be; therefore if matter were not quantified, the composite, which is made from it together with form, would not be quantified, which is evidently false. I respond to the first place: naturally indeed matter cannot subsist without quantity, nor likewise material form and the composite from both; but Aristotle there does not decide that matter is the immediate subject of quantity. To the second place: either the Philosopher speaks of the remote and not proximate subject of quantity, or — what pleases me more — he speaks not of primary matter but of secondary matter, taken for the composite, as he previously declared (*5. Phys. T. 3. & 8.*), where he treats of points, which are indivisibles with nothing actually or potentially quantified; for from what is not quantified, that is, from a point, no quantified thing comes to be, since a quantum is divisible while a point is indivisible. But matter before form and the composite, while not presupposed and preunderstood as actually quantified, is nonetheless potentially quantified and capable of quantity. And this is clear from (*1. gen. 8.*).

You will object second: the quantity of a living man is the same as that of a dead man, as the senses confirm; but the quantity of a dead man inheres in matter, because when the soul departs at death the corpse remains, which is his matter; therefore the immediate and proximate subject of quantity is matter. Confirmed: the rational soul is not quantified and has no share in quantity;

therefore the quantity of a man resides in the body, which is his matter. I concede the major and deny the minor; for when the soul withdraws, there persists the composite constituted from matter and the form of corporeity, in which quantity inheres, according to Scotus (*4. dist. 11. quest. 3. art. 2.*). To the confirmation I say that quantity is in man, who is a third thing really distinct from soul and body, just as sensations belong not to the soul nor to the body but to the whole composite (*1. anima. T. 64. & 66.*), as Durant also saw and expressed well (*praecit. ad finem quaest.*).

You will object third: for the introduction of a new form into matter, it is necessary that matter be disposed through prior accidents, among which quantity is found; therefore quantity is placed in matter. The antecedent is at hand: matter must be prepared and disposed through prior dispositions and active qualities that act to destroy the prior form and introduce a new one into the matter. I respond that matter is disposed and prepared not through accidents that are received immediately in it, but in the composite being corrupted. Hence their action does not reach matter but the composite to be corrupted, unless matter is taken for secondary matter, just as artisans are said to work in matter, which is in reality the presupposed composite — for from stone they form a statue and from wood a bench, as from pre-existing matter.

Article V. Whether the Division of Quantity into Continuous and Discrete Is the Division of a Genus into Its Species.

Many, among whom are certain disciples of Scotus — Basson (*1. dist. 24. quaest. vn.*), Paulus Scriptor (*ibid.*), Ockham (*quaest. 2.*), and the other Nominalists whom the twin Scotists follow (*disp. 7. Log. quaest. 2. art. 1.*) and Poncius (*disp. 14. quaest. 4.*) — deny that the aforesaid division is a division of a genus into its species, judging that discrete quantity is only a shadowy and analogical species of it. But Scotus (*quost. 16. praedicam. §. Ad quaest. dicendum, & quaest. 17. Et 5. Metaphysica, in com. cap. de quanto. Et eo in libro quaest. 9. Et 1. Rep. dist. 24. §. circa quaestionem*) expressly says that all agree that number is a species of discrete quantity. Mayr, Vigerius (*ibid.*), Antonius Andreas (*5. Metaphysica, quaest. 10.*), Joannes de Magistris (*cap. de quantitate quaest. 1. dub. 1.*), Tataret, Scibilis III, the Parisians, and others, to whom the Thomists also assent, affirm this to be a true and genuine partition of quantity into continuous and discrete, as of a genus into its proper species. And this is the express mind of Aristotle, both in Logic, in the chapter on quantity, and (*5. Metaphysics, cap. 13. T. 18.*), where he divides quantity into continuous and discrete. It is established thus: every genus is divided into two opposed differences that constitute two species, as I wrote (*in Log. l. 2. quaest. 2. de genere & quaest. de differentia*), where I asserted that some differences are divisive, which divide the genus, and others constitutive, which constitute the species; but quantity is truly a genus and one of the ten supreme genera, as I showed there (*l. 3. quaest. de quantitate.*); therefore continuous and discrete are proper species of quantity. Furthermore, Arithmetic is concerned with discrete

quantity as its proper subject; but every science, as its subject, respects a genus or species; since, therefore, discrete quantity is not a supreme genus but a species of the supreme genus, it is aptly deduced that it is a genuine species of quantity.

You will say: a true species of a genus is a positive entity; but discrete quantity is described through negation, since it is said to be that whose parts do not terminate upon or are joined by a common term; therefore it is not a proper species of quantity. The major being conceded, to the minor I say that through the negation a positive entity is understood, just as is signified by incorporeal and irrational, according to Aristotle (6. *Top. cap. 3. 1. de partibus cap. 3.*). You will press further: the species of a real genus are real; but discrete quantity is not real; therefore it is not a true species of quantity. The major is perspicuous. The minor is supported by the testimony of Aristotle (5. *Met. cap. 3.*): discrete quantity consists in the order of one thing to another, and order is made by the operation of the intellect; therefore, etc. I concede the major and deny the minor, as is evident from the order of the things of the world, which is true and real even when no one is thinking of it, of which Aristotle speaks (12. *Met. propè finem.*).

You will say: a species is one per se; but discrete quantity is one per accidens, for it is constituted from many complete entities, of which one has no relation to another; therefore it is not a true species of quantity. I concede the major and deny the minor; to its proof I say that there are certain material unities and one formal unity, which make one per se, as Scotus affirms (3. *d. 22. q. vn. ante §. sed quid logice L.*) — as the binary contains two material unities and one formal unity, through which it is constituted in the being of the binary; and so it is evident that discrete quantity is one per se and a true species of quantity. This will be more evident below (*quaest. 3.*).

Question II. On Continuous Quantity.

Article I. How Many Species of Continuous Quantity There Are.

The Peripatetics, in enumerating the species of continuous quantity, depart into various positions on account of the diversity of Aristotle's texts; for the Philosopher in Logic, in the chapter on quantity, lists five species of continuous quantity, which are line, surface, body, time, and place. But in (5. *Met. c. de quanto T. 18.*) he enumerates only line, surface, body, and adds weight and also motion.

First assertion: neither place nor weight is a species of continuous quantity. This assertion is twofold. The first part is handed down by the Doctor (9. 23. *praedicam. §. Ad 2. quaesitum. Et 5. Met. q. 9.*), against Mastius (*disp. de quantitate sect. 3. q. 4.*), and by Albertus (*tract. 5. praedicam. c. 5.*). It is established first: place, from (4. *Phys. T. 30.*), is the surface of the containing body; therefore place does not constitute a species of quantity distinct from surface. Second: place formally

taken, according to Scotus (*Quol. 11. art. 3.*), is a relation externally arriving, of the containing body to the contained; but quantity belongs to the genus of absolute things; therefore place formally speaking is not a species of quantity. The second part is derived from the same Doctor (*cit. in expositione Tex.*), against Simplicius and others. It is proved: weight is equivalent to a heaviness propelling a body downward to which it is attached; but heaviness is by the common opinion of Philosophers placed in the category of quality; therefore weight does not exist as a species of continuous quantity. Furthermore, weight consists in intensity, while quantity consists in extension; but gradual intensity belongs to the predicament of quality. And sometimes things of the same quantity are of different weight, as is clear from gold, which if it possesses the same quantity as silver or another metal, is nonetheless of greater weight; therefore weight is placed in intensity, which pertains to quality.

Second assertion: three species of permanent continuous quantity are enumerated: line, surface, and body. This is defended by the Doctor (9. 17. *praedicam. §. Ad 9. dicendum. Et 5. Met. in com. c. 13.*), following Aristotle in both places, against Durant (2. d. 2. q. 4.) and Hurtado (*disp. 13. Met. sect. 6.*). It is proved: the essence of quantity is the extension of parts; but only a threefold extension of parts is found; therefore there are also three species of permanent continuous quantity. The major is evident from the definition of quantity. The minor is at hand: extension of parts is either only in respect of length, and it is a line; or in respect of breadth together with length, and it is a surface; or in respect of depth together with length and breadth, and it is a body. Second: every genus possesses its species, of which it is essentially predicated, as is clear from its definition; but continuous quantity is a subalternate genus, as is evident in Logic; therefore its species, which are the three enumerated, are to be assigned to it.

Third assertion: motion and time are proper species of successive continuous quantity. The Doctor implies this (9. 23. *praedicam. §. Ad 1. arg. primae q.*) and expressly defends it (5. *Met. q. 9. §. Concedo ergo quod formaliter sunt quanta à seipsis.*). Antonius Andreas follows (*both in Log. c. alleg. and 5. Met. q. 10. §. Respondeo.*), Joannes de Magistris, Tataret, and others, against Mastrius (*disp. 7. Log. q. 2. art. 2.*) and Poncius (*disp. 14. q. 5.*), as well as Suarez (*disp. 40. Met. sect. 3. q. 9.*). It is proved first from Aristotle in the passage cited, who divides continuous quantity into permanent and successive, assigning line, surface, and body as species of the former and motion and time of the latter. Suarez responds (*moz. alleg. sect. 9. n. 13.*) by denying successive quantity and judging all quantity to be permanent. On the contrary: not only does this response conflict with the testimony of the Philosopher just adduced, but it also contradicts reason; for every being is either permanent or successive, and each participates in its proper extension and measure; but extension and measure pertain to the predicament of quantity; therefore if Suarez does not deny permanent quantity, neither ought he to reject successive quantity. Fonseca (5. *Met. cap. 13. quaest. 8.*

sect. 3.) indeed admits successive quantity, but thinks that succession belongs to motion and time not as an essential difference but as its property. On the contrary: that by which something is constituted and essentially distinguished from another is its intrinsic and essential difference; but through succession, successive quantity is constituted and distinguished from permanent quantity, since continuous quantity is well divided into permanent and successive as a genus into its species; therefore succession belongs to it in the first mode of saying per se, not in the second mode. Aristotle implies this (*3. Phys.*) when he writes that motion belongs to the genus of continua. For since the continuum is a subalternate genus of quantity, it is aptly distributed into permanent and successive as into its species. Proved second: distinct extension of parts argues a distinct species of quantity; but motion and time have extensions of parts distinct both from each other and from magnitude, in which motion is produced and of which it is the measure; therefore motion and time are distinct species of quantity. The major is evident, for the same thing is the distinguishing and constitutive principle of a thing. The minor is shown: the parts of motion and time are flowing, prior and posterior, and never simultaneously exist, since they belong to the genus of successive things; but the parts of magnitude all exist simultaneously, since they belong to the genus of permanent things. To this argument, adduced by the Doctor in the Metaphysics in the passage recalled, two of our junior authors respond by saying that motion and time only add a new mode of extension to the parts of magnitude, opposed to permanence, insofar as its parts simultaneously persist while their parts continuously flow away. And they say this succession arises both from the imperfection of the agent unable to simultaneously induce the whole term and from the contrary resisting, by reason of which in the patient a form cannot simultaneously be introduced. On the contrary: not only do these authors conflict with Scotus, who in the passage cited plainly shows through that argument that motion and time are genuine species of quantity, but in their response they also involve a contradiction by affirming that motion and time add a new extension to the parts of magnitude; for then they also add a new quantity, since extension is the reason and essence of quantity. Furthermore, succession is of the essence of motion not absolutely taken, but of continuous motion; for continuous motion cannot be produced through a medium already traversed without succession. Hence Aristotle rightly says (*3. Phys. 1.*) that motion belongs to the genus of continua; and accordingly motion and time are not to be exempted from among the true species of quantity. Proved third: where there is a property, there is the essence from which it emanates, and a distinct property argues a distinct species; but in motion and time there is a property of quantity, namely greater and lesser, equal or unequal; therefore there is also quantity. Indeed, the property of motion is different from the property of time. For in an equal space a faster or slower motion can occur, and a shorter or longer time, and the continuity of motion is usually great when that of time is small; therefore motion and time are distinct species of successive quantity.

Suarez replies (*cit. sect. 9. num. 11.*) by saying that time is twofold: extrinsic and universal, by which the motion of the first movable and of all lower things is measured, and he concedes the argument for this; and intrinsic and particular, and he thinks the argument does not apply to this. For he says that in a fast motion I move the same mobile in the same time as in a slow motion, because in both the same parts are to be traversed, and he exemplifies with heating as eight, whether fast or slow. On the contrary: the ratio is plainly the same for both kinds of time, even though one is universal and the other particular. For each measures its own motion, of which it is the measure — the former the universal motion, the latter the particular; therefore the aforesaid distinction is irrelevant to dissolving the said argument. For the same mobile through an equal space can be moved more swiftly or more slowly, and according to its motion it is measured by short or long time. Moreover, the example of heating is to the opposite. For if heating as eight is produced more swiftly, it is measured by a short time; if more slowly, by a long time, because its parts or grades can be acquired swiftly or slowly, and accordingly its motion can be fast or slow. Moreover, setting aside the universal and extrinsic time, if an eagle were to fly with the swiftest motion from east to west in the space of one day, there would indeed be a great continuity of motion, but the eagle's own proper duration and intrinsic time would be short; therefore the argument applies to both kinds of time. Fourth: a continuum is defined as that whose parts are joined by a common term; but the parts of magnitude are joined by a point, the parts of motion by a thing that has been changed, and the parts of time by an instant; therefore since the termini of these quantities are distinguished, the quantities themselves also differ from one another. Mastrius responds with his colleague (*ubi supra*), using the distinction of Suarez just adduced, conceding this of extrinsic time but not of intrinsic time, which he judges to coincide with motion. On the contrary: the common ratio of time is univocated to both kinds of time, as Antonius Andreas notes (*5. Met. quaest. 11.*) following Scotus (*ibid. q. 10.*); for each is a measure of motion, has parts outside of parts, not simultaneously but successively; therefore it participates in a common term, which is the instant, just as magnitude, whether common or particular, has a point, and motion has a thing that has been changed. Again: distinct species of one genus have distinct differences and properties, as is clear by the rule before the predicaments; but motion and time are distinct species of successive continuous quantity, as the Doctor clearly sets out in the passage now cited not far from the beginning of his question; therefore they do not share the same indivisible parts and termini, as the authors named contend.

You will object first, against the first assertion: Aristotle (*cap. de quantitate*) places place among the species of continuous quantity. And (*5. Met. cap. de quanto*) he omits place and posits weight. The common reason is that each participates in the chief property of quantity, in terms of which both place and weight are said to be equal or unequal; therefore they are referred to in the list of species of

quantity. I respond that Aristotle there spoke not in his own but in another's position. For as his interpreters note, at that time there was a certain popular and well-known opinion listing place in the number of species of quantity, although it is not distinguished from surface, in terms of which it is said to be equal or unequal. Weight, however, is called equal or unequal not because it is a species of quantity but by reason of the quantity joined to it; in reality, however, it belongs to quality, for since it is heavy or light, which is the proper characteristic of quality, it is to be reduced to quality.

You will object second, against the second assertion: one species of one genus is not ordered to constituting another species of the same genus, because every infima species is complete and perfect; but line is ordered to constituting surface, for surface is made from length and breadth; and surface and line enter into body, which consists of the triple dimension of length, breadth, and depth; therefore line, surface, and body are not proper species of permanent quantity. I distinguish the major: formally, I concede it; materially, I deny it. For from the binary the ternary is made, and from the ternary the quaternary, and each is a species of number. Likewise, an organic body is a species of substance even though it is ordered to receiving the soul and constituting an animate composite, which falls under the genus of substance.

You will object third, against the third assertion: Aristotle (*5. Met. c. 13.*) and Scotus (*ibid.*) assert that motion and time are *quanta per accidens*; therefore motion and time are not true species of quantity, which are *quanta per se*. I respond by expounding the testimony of Aristotle: *quantum per accidens* is twofold — one that lacks extension and is extended through the extension of another, as what is white is quantified; for whiteness of itself participates in no extension but borrows it from quantity, hence what is white is said to be *quantum per accidens*. The other indeed has its own extension but is made through another, as surface through line and body through surface are made quantified; in this way time is said to be *quantum per accidens*, because its quantity is produced by motion and the quantity of motion by magnitude, as Scotus rightly interprets (*eo in loco q. 9. & 10.*), Antonius Andreas (*both in Log. in exp. c. de quantitate and 5. Met. q. 10.*), Thomas, Fonseca, and others there, whatever the recent Scotists named above may say.

Article II. Whether in a Continuum There Are Real Positive Indivisibles.

Many, among whom are numbered Ockham (*in praedicam. quantitatis, Tract. de Euch. cap. 1. & 2. Et Quol. 1. quaest. 9.*), Mayr (*1. d. 24. quaest. 1.*), Durant (*2. d. 2. quest. 4.*), Pererius (*10. Phys. cap. 6.*), Aversa (*quaest. 22. sect. 4.*), and Gregory (*2. d. 2. quaest. 2. art. 1.*), deny that there are real positive indivisibles in a continuum, and if there are any, they are negative and apprehended through imagination. They say that a point is the negation of length, a line the negation of breadth, and a surface the negation of depth. Others, such as Fonseca (*5. Met. c. 16. q. 6.*), admit

positive indivisibles that terminate but reject those that continue. The others, such as Scotus (2. d. 2. quaest. 9. §. *Ad argumenta quaest. T.*), Lychetus (*ibid.*), Tataret, both there and in Logic in the chapter on quantity (*dub. 2.*), the Parisians (6. *Phys. quaest. 1.*), the Complutenses (*disp. 24. quest. 1. §. 2.*), and others cited by them, assert that in a continuum both continuing and terminating real positive indivisibles are to be posited.

Note that an indivisible is described as that which lacks entitative or quantitative parts. There is a twofold indivisible: one substantial and another quantitative. The substantial indivisible lacks entitative parts, of which kind are the Angel and the rational soul. The quantitative indivisible lacks quantified parts, commonly called integral, such as a point in a line, an instant in time, and a thing changed in motion. A point, moreover, is found to be twofold: one that terminates continuous quantity, such as the last point of a line, and another that continues, joining the parts of continuous quantity. For the continuum is that whose parts are joined by a common term, and the contiguous is that whose extremities are together or in the same place, as can be seen (5. *Phys. T. 26. 6. eiusdem operis, T. 1.*).

First assertion: points, whether terminating or continuing, are real positive entities. The Doctor holds this (*passim praealleg.*) from Aristotle as now cited and (5. *Met. cap. 6.*). It is proved first from Augustine (1. *de quantitate animae, C. 11. Et 12.*), where in explicit words he says: "From it (that is, a point) a line begins and is terminated by it, and we see that no figure formed by straight lines can be made unless the angle is closed by it." And after a few words he adds: "No line is joined to a line except through it." Where it is openly evident that the holy Doctor teaches that real positive continuing and terminating points exist in a continuum. I know that this testimony of Augustine is adduced by Mayr in the passage named above for the opposing position. For Mayr judges that Augustine admits indivisibles in the continuum that are imaginary and conceived by our mind, but not real and positive. But even if the holy Augustine there contemplates indivisibles in the mathematical manner, as is evident from cap. 10 of the said book and from what follows — which the mathematical figures drawn by him also make manifest — and in (7. *de genesi ad lit. cap. 17.*) he shows the same thing: nonetheless he does not deny them to be positive and to be viewed physically, since he asserts that through them a line begins and ends and its parts are joined and continued, as his words which we cited above make manifest. Second: a continuum, from the chapter on quantity, is defined as that whose parts are joined by a common term, which in all opinions is a point; but the parts of any whole are not joined to a negation or privation but to a real positive entity, just as the parts themselves are real and positive; therefore since the parts of a continuum are united by a point, it is evidently shown that the point is a real positive entity. Fonseca responds (5. *Metaphysica, cap. 13. quest. 6. sect. 5.*) that there is plainly no point in act in a continuum by which its parts are simultaneously joined, since they are joined by themselves and cohere among themselves; but the said parts are fictitiously said to be joined by points, so that

these may be certain signs for making divisions of parts to infinity. On the contrary: what is placed in the definition of a real positive entity is a real positive entity, not something fabricated and made by the mind, as the Doctor clearly sets out (*4. distinct. 1. quaest. 2. §. Hic primo. B.*); but a point is placed in the definition of a continuum, expressed through the common term; therefore in truth a point exists in the continuum. Furthermore (*6. Physic. 1.*), Aristotle investigates whether the continuum is composed of points; but what composes some whole actually exists in it, just as matter and form, which constitute a whole, actually exist in it; since, therefore, the Philosopher presupposes that there are points in the continuum and asks whether it consists of them, he undoubtedly wants points to actually exist in the continuum. And that they are not fabricated, because no fabrications pertain to the construction and composition of any real whole. Finally: the terminus of a real positive entity is a real positive entity; for a positive entity is not terminated by negation, privation, or fabrication — as a being is, so too is its terminus; but the continuum is a real positive entity, since it is an accident and a species of the real genus of quantity; therefore its terminus, which is the point, is a real positive entity. Durant responds in the passage mentioned above, saying that the instance has no force because the continuum is not ended or terminated by a point but by itself; for what is ended and terminated is ended and terminated by itself and not by something extrinsic to it, such as a point. On the contrary: this response conflicts with Augustine in the passage cited, who admits positive continuing and terminating points; it conflicts also with the Philosopher, who posits that points are moved by the motion of the thing in which they exist (*6. Phys. cap. 9. T. 86.*) and that they have a position in the continuum (*1. animae cap. 4. T. 70.*), and that a perfectly spherical body touches a perfectly flat surface at a point (*3. Caeli cap. 8. T. 69.*). But motion, touch, and things of this kind belong only to a positive entity. It also conflicts with reason: a point is placed in the definition of a line, as is evident from Euclid (*1. Elem.*): "A line is a length without breadth and depth, whose extremities are two points." In the definition of a positive entity such as a line, only a positive entity is placed, as the Doctor signifies (*4. dist. 1. quaest. 2.*). Furthermore, a positive divisible, such as the continuum, is not terminated except by an indivisible. For such is the nature of continuous quantity, whose parts are joined by an indivisible and likewise ended and terminated by an indivisible.

You will say: Aristotle (*3. Phys. T. 31.*) writes that what is finite is not ended by another but by itself; therefore the continuum, which is finite, has no terminus that is a point. On the contrary: the Stagirite there treats not of the proper terminus of the continuum but of an alien and extrinsic terminus, as Toledo and the Conimbricenses rightly interpret — as if the earth is terminated by water, and water by air, and so on, the Philosopher says that if one thing must always be terminated to another, there would be no terminus. Third: just as an instant is to time and a thing changed is to motion, so a point is to the continuum; but

an instant in time and a thing changed in motion are real positive entities; therefore a point is also real and positive. Durant responds in the passage cited above by conceding the major and denying the minor, since a thing changed is not an indivisible intrinsic to or adjoined to motion, but a privation of further continuation in motion; and if time were to end, its instant would be an absence of further continuation. On the contrary: time is the measure of motion (*4. Phys. T. 101.*) and they are the same in reality, as the same author hands down there. But an instant of time, according to him, is not a privation of further duration; therefore neither is a thing changed a privation of further continuation in motion. For as time is continuous, so motion is continuous, since the former is the measure of the latter. Moreover, certain things endure through an instant, such as generation and illumination; therefore an instant of time is a real positive entity. For it would be inconvenient for positive momentary entities to have a duration that is a privation or negation, while others endure with a real positive duration.

Second assertion: the other indivisibles — a line with respect to breadth, and a surface with respect to depth — are real and positive. The Doctor gives patronage to this (*2. dist. 2. quaest. 9.*), and it is established first from Aristotle (*1. praedicam. cap. de quantitate, Et 5. Met. cap. 13.*) and Scotus there, and others who commonly treat of the aforesaid as of real positive entities. Second: the species of a real positive genus are real and positive. For a species does not depart from the genus of which it is a species; but line and surface are species of the genus of continuous quantity, as I proved (*art. 1. huius q. aff. 2.*); therefore they are real positive entities. Third: unless the aforesaid indivisibles were species of continuous quantity, there would be only one species of it, namely body; but one genus has at least two species constituted by two opposed differences into which the genus is divided, as I showed elsewhere. Fourth: the objects of real sciences are real, because real sciences are named from real objects; but line and surface are objects of real sciences, namely Geometry and Optics. Moreover, certain qualities inhere only in a surface, such as figure (*3. Met. 17.*); but the subject of a real positive entity is real and positive; since, therefore, a surface is established as the subject of real qualities, it plainly follows that it is real and positive.

You will object first: three principal testimonies from Aristotle, of which the first is from (*8. Phys. T. 68.*): points are not in the continuum in act but in potency. The second is from (*3. Met. T. 17.*): a surface is in a solid as Mercury is in rough stone; but evidently the figure of Mercury is in rough stone only in potency; therefore the same is to be asserted of a surface and a point, that they are in the continuum in potency. The third is written (*3. anima T. 25.*): a point is known through privation; therefore points and the other indivisibles in the school of Aristotle are not real positive entities. I expound the first two places through a distinction: indivisibles are in the continuum in potency with respect to existence — I deny this, for they truly exist in it, just as its parts, and no one

doubts that the parts actually exist in the continuum; with respect to division — I concede. For just as the parts of the same are said to be in it in potency, because they are not actually divided and distributed, so too are points and the other indivisibles said to be in the same in potency, because they are not actually divided. So Bonet (*libel. de quantitate*) satisfies this, and Suarez (*disp. 40. Met. Sect. 5. n. 34.*) and other recent authors follow him. To the third I say that certain positive things are known through negation or privation, as Aristotle exemplifies there with black, which is evidently a positive entity, and with primary matter (*7. Met. T. 8.*), and I showed of God (*tract. de cognoscibilitate Dei disp. 1.*). Therefore, although a point is known privatively, that is, through privation of length, it is nonetheless not to be excluded from among positive entities.

You will object second: the continuum is terminated by itself; therefore a point is not its terminus. The antecedent is proved by analogy: just as quality is ended by itself and not by something added to it, so quantity is ended by itself and not by a point adjoined to it. Confirmed: if God were to remove from a line the terminating points, it would surely be finite and terminated, not through points, since they are supposed to have been removed from it; therefore through itself, and consequently it is futile and vain to imagine real positive points in the continuum. I deny the antecedent; to its proof I say that there is a dissimilarity between quality and quantity. For quality does not have an intrinsic terminus in the way that continuous quantity does, as is clear from its definition, in which a terminus, which is a point, is expressly placed. To the confirmation: given that hypothesis, the line would be finite, not positively but privatively; and although it would not have an intrinsic terminus, it would nonetheless have an extrinsic terminus. Or the hypothesis is denied, because points are enclosed in the definition of a line, which perhaps Aristotle signifies (*1. post cap. 4. T. 9.*) when he writes that a line is made from points.

You will object third: every real positive entity is either substance or accident; for everything that exists either subsists per se and is substance, or inheres in a subject and is accident; but a point is not a substance, as Aristotle shows (*3. Met. cap. 6. T. 17.*), nor an accident, which requires a subject to support it; but since a point, being indivisible, participates in no proper subject with no part of material substance corresponding to it, therefore a point and any other indivisibles hold no place among positive entities. I respond that the major is not absolutely immediate and sufficient, because there can be something of substance or accident, of which kind are their properties and modes. Hence, although a point is not substance nor accident, it is nonetheless something of an accident, namely the terminus of the continuum; thus a point is said to be in the continuum as the term in the unterminated, as Mayr touches on (*passim praeominato*), and Canon assents (*6. Phys. q. 1. art. 1. §. sed contrà*), and Lychetus confirms (*2. d. 2. quaest. 9.*).

Article III. Whether a Continuum Is Composed of Indivisibles.

The opinion of Zeno, Pythagoras, Democritus, Plato, and many others who held that the continuum is composed of indivisibles flourished and was very strong. Among our own authors, Gerard Odo, the General, and Bonet (*libello secundo, de quantitate*) favor them. These, though they all agree that the continuum consists of indivisibles, nonetheless differ, for some, such as Plato, disagree in thinking that a line is composed of points, a surface of lines, and a body of surfaces; while others, such as Democritus, hold that the continuum is constituted from indivisible quantities, namely a body from indivisible corpuscles called atoms, a surface from indivisible surfaces, and a line not from points but from indivisible lines. The opposing opinion is defended by Aristotle (6. *Phys.* 1.), Scotus (2. *d.* 2. *q.* 9. *Et* 2. *Met.* *q.* 6.), Antonius Andreas (5. *Met.* *q.* 10.), and the other Philosophers commonly, who deny that the continuum consists solely of indivisibles and affirm that the continuum is made from parts divisible ad infinitum.

Note first that a twofold continuum can be conceived, as Canon observes (6. *Phys.* *q.* 1. *art.* 2.) following Scotus in the passage just cited (§. *Ad argumenta.* E.): mathematical and physical. The former abstracts from every sensible quality and other natural things; in this way the Doctor adds (4. *d.* 49. *q.* 16. §. *Ad* 1. *D.*) that mathematicians contemplate quantity purely as quantity. The latter is conjoined with sensible quality, motion, and other natural things. Moreover, the parts of a continuum are of two kinds: aliquot and proportional. The former are parts of a certain and determined quantity, which taken a given number of times complete the whole continuum, as if a whole board is divided into four equal parts, such parts are called aliquot; and by some they are called non-communicating parts, because one does not contain the other, nor is one included in the other, but each is entirely distinct from every other. The latter are unequal parts that keep a certain proportion to one another, as three is to six so six is to twelve; and they are called communicating parts, because one includes another, and one participates in the entity of another, as if a board is cut into two parts and these into others, and so on into smaller parts, there are always other parts remaining to be again divided, by reason of which the continuum is said to be divisible into always-divisible things.

Note second that some things are evident to us, such as first principles and what is perceived by the senses; while other things are nonevident, unknown and hidden to our senses, among which is the continuum, of which we treat in the present. For its composition and resolution seems so difficult to grasp that even the most outstanding intellects can scarcely attain it; nonetheless one must not draw back from its investigation. For Aristotle warns (1. *de lineis insecabilibus*), in encountering this difficulty, that it is absurd for someone to succumb out of laziness, because he does not dare to fully dissolve the arguments presented, and thus to foster his weakness and thereby deceive himself with still graver fallacies. For he had earlier laid down (8. *Phys.* *T.* 22.): it is the mark of the slow

and ignorant to cling to an apparent argument and abandon sense, from which our cognition arises.

The negative part, which is Aristotle's and Scotus's, is proved first: what are continua are those whose last things are one (6. *Physic. 1.*). But indivisibles do not have last things, because if they are terminating ones, they are themselves the last things; hence a line is described as a length whose extremities are two points. But it is one thing to be the last and another to have a last; the continuum indeed has a last but is not the last; since, therefore, those from which the continuum is composed are divided into what is last and what has a last, it is plainly deduced that the continuum is not composed of indivisibles. The proponents of the opposing opinion respond by distinguishing the major: with respect to parts composing it, they deny it; but with respect to discrete differences of situation or place or time, they concede it. And this they make manifest concerning individual indivisibles, such as the point, which existing in the middle of a square can terminate the diagonal coming from the right side without terminating the one coming from the left; and so in the point, albeit indivisible, right and left, before and behind, and similar things are assigned. Furthermore, in the surface, which is indivisible with respect to depth, it is easily shown: for it is terminated from within and without, for the body contained by a surface is within the surface and the containing body is outside its surface; in this way the surface as indivisible participates in extrinsic sides, by reason of which it is divided. Likewise concerning a thing that has been changed, which is the indivisible terminus of motion, even though a continuation of prior with subsequent motion is made. Finally, concerning an instant of time, which though indivisible, is nonetheless the end of past time and the beginning of future time, and in it the relations of beginning and end arise. To this response Canon (6. *Physic. quaest. 1. art. 1.*) presses and urges, saying that the aforesaid discrete differences of place and time either exhibit absolute or relative entities: not the first, because the indivisibles would then be divisible, insofar as they would be divided into several entities; nor the second, because several relations require several foundations in which they are grounded; therefore the said respects and situational differences cannot exist in a point. But this instance does not overturn the aforesaid foundation nor does it enervate its force; for conceding the first part of the minor, I deny the second, since in one and the same foundation several respects can exist, as in the same father there are several relations of paternity corresponding to the plurality of children begotten by him; and the parts of the continuum respect the same common term, which is the point to which they are joined, as Aristotle hands down (1. *praedicam. c. de quantitate.*). There is no inconvenience, therefore, in the indivisible obtaining the aforesaid respects. And this is especially confirmed, in the opinion of Democritus, by Augustine (2. *de lib. arb. c. 8.*): "However small that corpuscle is, it certainly has one part right, another left, another above, another below, another farther, another nearer, or other terminal parts." Second: what

compose the continuum touch one another with the touch of continuity; otherwise it would not be a continuum but a discrete thing; but indivisibles do not touch one another according to the whole, otherwise they would not make anything larger, nor according to a part, since they lack parts; therefore the continuum does not coalesce from indivisibles. The authors named above respond by conceding the major and distinguishing the minor: indivisibles, such as points, do not touch one another externally — they concede; they do not touch one another externally — they deny. For they touch one another with respect to extrinsic sides, so much so that with respect to one side they touch each other and not with respect to another, because one point is next to another adjacent to it. You will say that such discrete differences belong to a body in the parts of which the fundamental reasons of these differences are found, but not to the indivisible, which lacking parts cannot be their foundation. On the contrary: although they are properly accommodated to an animate body, and metaphorically to an inanimate one, as is evident from the heaven, nonetheless they are also adapted in their own way to the indivisible. For a point existing in the middle of a circle respects east, west, south, and north, the right and left side, and similar things; just as also an Angel, though indivisible and existing in a city, can look toward the said positions. Indeed, Aristotle in the definition of the continuum places a point, which respects, unites, and joins all its parts; therefore the aforesaid relations are not to be denied to the indivisible. Third: let a continuum consisting of three points be traversed by two mobiles, of which one is double the speed of the other and the other double the slowness; given this hypothesis, the faster mobile will traverse it in three instants of time, while the slower will traverse the same in one and a half instants; therefore from the position of Zeno and the others it follows that the indivisible is divisible; but this is impossible; therefore the Stoic assertion is also false and improbable. The proponents of the contrary opinion go to meet this and deny the consequence. For even if division can be effected according to the said differences, it cannot according to indivisibles, since they lack parts. Hence I deny that the transit will be in one and a half instants, since both the instant of time and the point of space to be traversed are impartible and indivisible. You will say: then the slow mobile will traverse one and the same space equally quickly as the fast mobile. The consequence is denied; for the faster will complete its course more swiftly than the slower mobile, yet the indivisible will not be divided on account of the repugnance it exhibits, just as the impossible cannot be made, so the indivisible cannot be divided. Fourth, it is established from Scotus in the passage cited: a smaller circle cannot be equal to the larger circle in which it is contained, as is seen with the eyes by drawing the said circles; but given the doctrine of Zeno, the smaller circle would be equal to the larger. For if from the circumference of the larger circle two lines are drawn tending toward the center of the smaller circle, or conversely from the center of the smaller circle to the larger, those lines passing through the smaller circle cut the smaller circle in one point or in two; not the first, otherwise the indivisible would be divided and the total angle

would be made equal to the partial angle, and two parallel lines would converge into one, which does not appear, since in their progress they recede further from each other. Nor the second, for otherwise there would be as many points in the smaller as in the larger circle, and so a part would be equal to the whole and the lesser to the greater, which conflicts with that common and true axiom: every whole is greater than its part. Bonet responds together with Gerard in the passage cited, by conceding the major and denying the minor; for given the hypothesis, though the said lines with respect to the intercepted space would be equalized, they would not be with respect to the rest, for they would be superimposed upon the smaller circle, as in a narrower and smaller container, as is seen in other similar things. And as for what is added about parallel lines, I say that this applies to disjunct and distant ones, not to superimposed ones, as occurs in the smaller circle. Fifth: the diameter of a square would be equal to the side, which conflicts with the senses. For if two lines are drawn from one side to the other side, either they cut the diametrical line in one point or in two; not in one, otherwise the side would be larger than the diameter, since one point of the side would correspond to only one point of the diameter; nor in two, otherwise the side would be measured by the diameter, insofar as it would have as many points as the diameter, and the distance between one side and another would be the same as the distance between one angle of the diameter and the other angle, which is plainly false. The consequence is denied by the authors named above: just as the larger circle has more parts and points than the smaller, as was concluded in the response to the preceding argument, so the longer line, such as the diametrical line, contains more points than the shorter line, such as the lateral line. Hence Arriaga says (*disp. 16. Phys. sect. 8. subsect. 5.*) that the diameter has certain points remaining at its sides, by reason of the position of the diameter; and therefore necessarily a line drawn from one side to the other side sometimes traverses two of its points. Sixth: the opposing opinion is numbered among the errors of John Hus condemned at the Council of Constance, as can be seen (*fols. 12.*). In addition, Augustine (*lib. de quantitate animae, cap. 11. 12.*) seems to embrace this doctrine of Aristotle about the composition of the continuum; therefore the contrary, which is the Stoics', conflicts with and contradicts the definition of the Holy Church and the authority of the Fathers, notably Augustine as now cited. One can respond that the mind of that Council was not to condemn the position of Zeno and other Philosophers about the composition of the continuum, which does not conflict with Orthodox faith and good morals. Especially because, as Arriaga attests, in the whole body of the Council the said opinion is found not except in a certain appendix, from a codex of a certain Canon of Cologne, which the Typographer testifies to be corrupt. Nor in any other preceding or subsequent Council is there mention of it. Hence Lychetus (*2. distinct. 2. quaest. 9.*) affirms that in his time many defended the said assertion, nor even now are there lacking those who defend it as a problem resting on solid foundations and fortified by effective arguments, as will be evident below. To Augustine I say that he does not expressly hold this,

since he seems to think that points are not real positive entities, as Mayr notes (*1. dist. 24. quest. 1.*). Furthermore, if he hands down that the points of a line are positive and that the line is terminated by them, nonetheless whether the continuum coalesces from indivisibles or not, he utters not a word for either side. I add that Augustine for the most part favors Plato, whose doctrine this is, more than Aristotle, who nearly in all things, not so much by reason as by will, strove to contradict him, as Bonet in the passage cited and Mayr (*1. distinct. 47. quaest. 3. art. 2.*) above all testify. Which Plato perhaps signifies in Fonseca (*1. Met. cap. 1.*) when he says: "Aristotle recalcitrates against us, just as puppies against the mother who bore them."

The affirmative part, which is Zeno's, Plato's, and the other ancients', is established first and urged first against the negative part, from (*1. Post. cap. 4.*): a line consists of points. And (*7. Met. T. 32.*): the parts of the defined are placed in the definition of it; since, therefore, a point is placed in the definition of a line, as is evident from Euclid (*1. elem.*) and Aristotle (*1. gen. 8. 9.*), it is clearly shown that a line is composed of points, and anything else that is continuous is made from indivisibles, even in the school of Aristotle. One can respond in two ways: first, that the Philosopher speaks in those places in the opinion of others; for in (*6. Phys.*) he expressly and consistently refutes those who think that the continuum consists of indivisibles; and that is the proper place for examining and deciding this controversy and adhering to one side. Second, it can be said that a point is placed in the definition of a line not as a part but as a bond or terminus of it, just as a subject is placed in the definition of an accident as something added and extrinsic.

You will object second: as one is to number, so a point is to a line (*1. Top. cap. 14.*); but a number is constituted from units; therefore a line is also composed of points. A ready and obvious response is available if one says that the parity of one and a point consists in this: just as one is the principle of number, so a point is the beginning and terminus of a line; but there is a disparity, because one is a part of number, while a point is not a part of a line.

You will object third: if a perfectly spherical body is rolled over a perfectly flat surface, it will describe a line composed of points; therefore a continuum consists of indivisibles. The antecedent is Aristotle's (*1. anima T. 13.*): a spherical body touches a flat surface at a point, as Scotus also maintains (*3. Met. ante expositionem, cap. 2.*). And mathematicians say that a line is the flux of a point, a surface of a line, and a body of a surface, which the Stagirite indicates (*1. Caeli T. 4.*) and Averroes explains (*3. Phys. comm. 60.*). The response is that, granted the hypothesis, a spherical body would indeed touch the flat surface at a point; but it is denied that a line would thereby be composed of points. For after a point there follows a part of a line, as the Doctor writes (*2. Met. quaest. 7.*); just as after an instant there follows a part of time (*2. distinct. 2. quest. 9.*). Nor does it seem inconvenient, Mayr adds (*2. distinct. 2. quaest. 12.*), for an indivisible to touch a

part in flux and as it were in the manner of the way, just as a burning coal swiftly moved back and forth between both hands burns neither, which it surely would if it were to remain in either. To what is added about the flux of a point, surface, and body, I say that mathematicians merely indicate to us the flowing and continuity of the parts of the continuum, but do not think that the continuum itself consists of indivisibles.

You will object fourth: points are proximately and immediately next to one another; therefore a line is made from points. The antecedent is shown: if two boards joined together immediately touch each other, their points immediately touch each other; therefore points are proximately and immediately next to one another. The Doctor satisfies this (*11. Met. concl. 67.*): in the same continuum, between two points there falls a part of a line, just as between two instants a part of time is interposed. To the proof I say that this applies in different and distinct continua, such as two boards joined together, but not in the same continuum, of which there is now the difficulty.

Article IV. Whether a Continuum Is Divided into Always-Divisible Things.

The solution of the present difficulty depends on the decision of the preceding article. For those who affirm that the continuum coalesces from indivisibles alone consequently assert that the continuum is divided into certain, determinate, and finite indivisibles; while those who deny that the continuum is composed from indivisibles alone must hold that the continuum is divided into always-divisible, uncertain, and indeterminate things.

Note first that in the present question there is no doubt about aliquot parts, but about proportional ones. For the former, since they are of equal quantity, are determined by a certain number; but the latter, since they are unequal, are not confined to any certain limit and number; and therefore they are said to be infinite in potency and finite toward infinity, so that neither the first nor the last can be found; but if such parts are divided, there are always others remaining to be divided and others again to be taken.

Note second that something can be infinite in two ways: first in act, which others call infinite in accomplished being and in accepted being, whose accepted things are so many that no more can be accepted — in this way a line is said to be infinite, to which nothing can be added, and so Aristotle (*3. Phys. T. 24.*) shows that an infinite body cannot be given. Second, in potency, which others call infinite in becoming and in accepting, from which if more are accepted, more remain to be accepted ad infinitum, so that there is no limit and no terminus to them. Furthermore, observe that divisible does not denote act but potency. For divisible means the same as what can be divided, and so the continuum does not have parts in accomplished being that constitute an actual infinite, but in the accepting of one after another, which make an infinite in potency.

Note third that there are as many ways of saying something is in potency as in act. Something is in potency in two ways. One way in objective potency: what does not exist but can exist, is in objective potency and in the power of the producing cause; in this way creatures were in the potency of God before they were created. Another way in indeterminate and indistinct potency, which is equivalent to not having distinct and determinate being from another; in this way a genus is said to have its species in potency, and a homogeneous whole its parts, because they are confused and indistinct. In the first way, to be in act is the same as to exist, so that whatever exists is in act. In the second way, to be in act means to have distinct and separate being from another, so that it exists and subsists with its own existence and subsistence. Hence, although parts exist in the continuum, they are nonetheless said not to subsist and to be in act but in potency, because they are not mutually disjoined and separated; for act distinguishes and separates, as Canon (6. *Phys. quaest. 1. art. 2.*) deduces from (7. *Met. T. 49.*) and Scotus explains.

The affirmative part — that a continuum is divided into always-divisible things — which is Aristotle's and Scotus's as cited in the preceding article, is proved first: a thing is divided into those from which it is composed; but the continuum is composed of always-divisible things; therefore it is divided into always-divisible things. The major is common and well-known; for as a human being is composed of soul and body, so it is divided into body and soul. The minor was shown in the preceding article. To this, the proponents of the contrary opinion respond by denying the minor, positing that the continuum consists of indivisibles. With the same ease that proposition is proposed, it is refuted by the same. Second: the parts of the continuum are either divisible or indivisible, because between divisible and indivisible there is no middle; but they are not indivisible, because they are quantified, and every quantum is divisible, since divisibility is a property of quantity; therefore they are divisible, and consequently the continuum is divisible into always-divisible things. For there is no greater reason why some parts should be divisible and not others, since they are of the same nature; therefore any given part can be cut into other parts, and so on ad infinitum. The adversaries go to meet this and say that some are divisible and others indivisible, so that there is a last part in the division of the continuum that is indivisible and inseparable, as will be plain below.

The negative part — which is that of the ancient Philosophers and certain moderns, that the continuum does not coalesce from divisible things and is not divisible into always-divisible things — is shown first: if the continuum were divisible into always-divisible things, it would consist of infinite parts, because the infinite is not divisible into finite parts, otherwise it would be finite, for what is finited is finite; but what has infinite parts is infinite; but the infinite is not given (3. *Phys. T. 35. & inde*); therefore the continuum is not divisible ad infinitum. The response according to Aristotle is through the distinction of the major: the continuum is constituted of infinite parts in potency — this is

conceded; in act — this is denied. On the contrary: the parts into which the continuum can be cut actually exist in it, for they truly exist in it, as is evident (5. *Met. cap. 13. & alibi non semel*); a quantum is divisible into what is present in it; therefore its parts are actually infinite and not just potentially. One can satisfy this if it is said, from the notable second and third observations placed above, that these parts are in the process of dividing, because the continuum is divisible and not yet divided. Hence just as its parts are not divided but divisible, so they are said to be not in it in act but in potency. This response is indicated by Augustine (2. *de libero arbitrio, cap. 8.*) and therefore is not to be despised. Second: given the hypothesis, no one could ever divide the continuum into its last parts; indeed, a leaf of a tree could not be divided by an Angel into all its parts in all eternity, which seems not only incredible but impossible to all, and absurd and a great incongruity; therefore the aforesaid division of the continuum into parts divisible ad infinitum is fabricated and imaginary. Mastrius goes to meet this (*disp. 6. Phys. quaest. 2. art. 6. ad finem*), saying there is no inconvenience, because although the senses cannot perceive this, the intellect nonetheless grasps it well, since a quantum is always divisible, which is demonstrated physically and mathematically. On the contrary: this conflicts openly with sense and intellect; for every finite thing, such as the continuum, is eventually ended and consumed by the removal of parts; therefore when it is said that the continuum is divisible into always-divisible things, this is true only up to the point where the smallest parts are reached. This seems to be scented, though with difficulty, by Toledo (6. *Phys. in T. 23.*), who says he does not understand this of real division but of a division of reason — which is to say, there is no quantity in which we cannot conceive by the intellect two or more parts separated in situation, and so on ad infinitum. Therefore such a partition of the parts of the continuum ad infinitum seems futile and vain, being as it is one that can never be achieved by any being, created or uncreated. Third: God knows distinctly all the parts into which the continuum is divisible, since nothing is hidden from him (*Hebr. 4.*): "All things are naked and open to his eyes"; therefore he knows the last parts into which the continuum can be divided, and thus the continuum is eventually ended by the last parts. The antecedent is conceded and the consequence is denied. For God knows things as they are, and because in the continuum there are no last parts, they are therefore not known by God; just as God knows the parts of time, not indeed permanent — for there are no permanent parts in it — but flowing, because they are in perpetual flux; so God knows the parts of the continuum not as inseparable, but as separable and divisible ad infinitum. Against this: "The Lord has disposed all things in measure and number and weight" (*Sapientia 11.*); therefore the parts of the continuum are finite in number, since they are among the things God made, which are finite in multitude and greatness. And consequently last impartible and inseparable parts are to be admitted in the continuum. Fourth: from the position of Aristotle, no motion of a mobile in a space would occur, which contradicts experience; therefore such parts are not

given in the continuum. The consequence of the antecedent is proved: a mobile traverses the prior parts of a space before the posterior ones, as is seen with the eyes; but in the opinion of Aristotle there are no prior and posterior parts, but infinite ones, and infinite things cannot be traversed; therefore a mobile that really moves through a space cannot move, since it cannot traverse the parts that are infinite in the continuum. The consequence of the antecedent is denied; to its proof I say that a mobile through motion traverses an extended space, which is required so that the mobile completes its motion; but whether that space consists of aliquot and proportional parts finite or infinite in number, this has no bearing on the notion of motion, just as motion occurs over the sand of the sea, though it cannot be numbered; so too a bird moves through the air in flight, because it is extended, even though it is thin and constituted from minute parts, which do not pertain to the motion but do pertain to the air itself and its extension. Fifth: in every order of essential dependence there is a terminus at some independent and first thing in that order, as Aristotle demonstrates (*2. Met. cap. 2.*); otherwise there would be a process to infinity, which is to be avoided by one who philosophizes rightly; but the whole continuum essentially depends upon its halves, just as the composite depends upon matter and form; and those halves upon these, those upon others, and so on consequently up to the last, which is impartible and indivisible. Nor does it help to say with Canon in the passage cited that the major applies in extrinsic causes but not in intrinsic causes. For Aristotle in the passage now cited proves it in every genus of causes, and the subtle Doctor explains it there. And this is also evident from relations, of which if one grounds another, one nonetheless arrives at the last one, which is not a ground of another; nor is a line such unless closed by two points, as is clear from its definition cited from Euclid (*1. Element.*). Hence it is not surprising if those who think otherwise, pressed by the greatest difficulties and bowed down by the most weighty arguments, fall into unheard-of inconveniencies and enormous absurdities, and are entangled in various contradictions, which they frankly confess they cannot truly and fully resolve — as Aristotle (*lib. de lineis insect.*), Toledo, Mastrius, and others who tenaciously follow that position acknowledge. For they are necessarily forced to admit an actual infinity of multitude, namely infinite points in a line, and actually infinite parts in any continuum, which they plainly deny elsewhere in fact. Again, they are necessarily forced to deny the common and true axiom: a power is useless that is not reduced to act, since according to them the act of the last division of parts is in no way reached in the continuum. Moreover, they are compelled to reject the evident maxim that the whole is greater than its part, when they assert that a human hair has as many parts as the whole human being, indeed as the whole universe; and many other incredible and perhaps impossible things, which it is tiresome to enumerate. I add that they greatly depress the created intellect and diminish the power of God, which could not bring out the parts of one act in all eternity, nor find the first or last of them, when he himself has founded them all and joined them together simultaneously in the continuum.

Question III. On Discrete Quantity.

I showed in the preceding question that discrete quantity is a true and genuine species of quantity; now it must be investigated what the species of discrete quantity are. For since discrete quantity is a subalternate genus, its species — which are said to be number and speech — are examined in the present.

Article I. Whether Number Is a Real or Rational Being.

Those who do not count number among the genuine species of quantity, whom I cited (*in prima quest. huius lib. art. 5.*), place number formally taken among beings of reason; while those who teach that number is a genuine species of discrete quantity consequently assert that number is a real being.

Note, from (*4. Phys. cap. 12.*), that number is distributed into numbering number and numbered number. The former is the act of the intellect counting what are numerable, as when a General numbers the soldiers of his army; the latter is the thing itself that is counted, such as soldiers counted by their general.

Furthermore, number is divided into material and formal: material number is the units aggregated together, from which number itself arises. Formal number is the formal unity resulting from the preexisting material unities, through which the formal number itself is constituted, as the formal unity of the binary is that through which the binary is formally constituted in the being of a binary. Moreover, there is one transcendental and another predicamental number. The transcendental, which is also called number in a qualified sense, is that which is attributed to many things that are not quantified by quantity of bulk; in this way the three divine Persons are said to be such, and one God, and Michael and Raphael two Angels. The predicamental is that which results from the division of a continuum, as Scotus deduces (*10. Met. in expositione T. 21. Et 4. Met. quaest. 2.*) from (*3. Phys. cap. 7. T. 68.*), and it coincides with the formal number described above. This, however, is adapted only to corporeal things that are capable of quantity.

Assertion: number is a real positive being. It is defended by the Doctor (*quest. 16. praedicam. 4. Met. quaest. 2. Et 5. eiusdem operis, quaest. 9. Et 1. distinct. 14.*), though he seems to treat it as problematic; nonetheless he promises elsewhere to determine and decide this difficulty, and he does so (*3. dist. 22. quaest. vn. antè §. Sed quidquid Logicè sub L. Et 1. Reportat. distinct. 24.*). The marginists on his Oxford writing (*passim alleg.*) also hold it. I brought this up on account of the twin Scotists who, in (*disf. 7. Log. quaest. 2. art. 1.*), holding the opposing opinion, say they do not firmly adhere to the assertion proposed, and though they would constantly defend it, nonetheless they are persuaded by the evidence of its arguments, as Canon also acknowledges (*4. Phys. quaest. 7. art. 2.*), and they declare that they freely and willingly embrace and defend it and publicly profess it. But it does not seem so firm and fortified by arguments that the contrary, which is common, as Scotus testifies (*in Reportat. cit.*) and Ockham (*1. distinct. 24.*

quaest. 2.), cannot be easily and conveniently defended, as will be clearly evident from the solution of the arguments of the opponents below. Now our assertion is established: the first species of any predicament is a real positive being, both because predicaments are series of real positive beings, and because real positive being is divided into ten predicaments (*5. Met. cap. 7. T. 14.*); but number is a true and genuine species of quantity, as has been proved (*passim memorato in initio huius artic.*); therefore number is a real positive being. Canon (*ubi supra*) distinguishes the major, saying that number is a real objective being in the intellect, but not an effective being and existing outside the intellect, such as a stone. On the contrary: apart from any act of the intellect, number exists from the side of things; therefore it is not only an object in the intellect, but truly exists outside the intellect as well. Hence Augustine adds: "Two and three are five, this is a necessary and eternal truth," and a proposition known from its terms, and therefore in no way dependent on the intellect. Others, such as Mastrius together with Bellutus, deny the minor, which is not really to be denied, both because Aristotle (*in praedicam. cap. de quantitate, & 5. Met. cap. de quanto*) and Scotus in the same place and in the places just surveyed clearly and explicitly admit it as true, and because the reasons offered below demonstrate it. Second: the object of a real science is real, both because sciences are divided as things are (*3. anima T. 38.*), and because a science takes its specification and determination from its object; but number is the object of a real science, namely Arithmetic, which is one of the mathematical disciplines, which no one doubts to be real and more evident than others; therefore number is a real being. The authors just cited respond that Arithmetic contemplates not only predicamental number but also transcendental number with its proportions and proportionalities, and yet transcendental number adds nothing beyond the numbered things, and so a being per accidens would suffice for the object of a science, as Poncius holds (*disp. 14. quaest. 4.*), nor would it be required to be one per se, of which the opposite is seen in all the individual objects of sciences. On the contrary: Arithmetic considers only that number which is caused by the division of a continuum, as I just cited from Aristotle and Scotus; but the number that arises from the partition of a continuum is only predicamental and quantitative; while the transcendental belongs to Metaphysics, whose concern is to contemplate all transcendental things; therefore the response is of no value, since predicamental number is one per se and obtains its own specific unity required for the object of a real science; and accordingly the object of Arithmetic is not a being per accidens, which does not fall under science, since it has no knowable properties demonstrable of it, as is evident (*6. Met. T. 6.*). I add: since Arithmetic is a subalternating science and principal, it contemplates number per se with its properties; but Music, which is a science subalternated to it, respects the number of sounds or number contracted through an accidental difference. Hence Suarez (*disp. 41. sect. 1. num. 16.*), perceiving the weakness of this solution, tries to adduce another, namely that number, besides the numbered material unities of numerable things, which are called material

unities, has absolutely no real specific formal unity except through the work of the intellect conceiving and fabricating this common unity of the said numbered things; and in this way number with such a unity elaborated by the intellect is established as the object of Arithmetic. But through this response Suarez falls into a greater inconvenience than the preceding one, since if the formal and adequate object of Arithmetic is and depends upon the work of the intellect, Arithmetic itself would not be a real science but a science of reason, since a science takes its entity and denomination from its object. But to make Arithmetic a science of reason is as absurd as to make Logic a real science. This inconvenience, however, Suarez and Mastrius do not wish to evade, lest they concede that number is one per se, which Aristotle clearly admits in the passage cited and (5. *Met. T. 19.*): "Six is not three twice, but once six," which means that the number six is one per se, constituted by its own unity in the being of six, and through this is distinguished from other numbers, as Scotus (3. *dist. 22. quest. vn. Sub L.*) says: "Nor is the quintet five units, but that whole that results from five units; otherwise if it were those units, it would be one just as a heap." And he premised (5. *Met. quaest. 9.*): "Number is one by its specific form, from which there is proper discreteness existing in five units as one matter, just as a human being by his specific form is one." And in the last Parisian work (1. *dist. 24. quaest. 1.*): "It is said in one way thus, that number has simply one unity, and there is one unity and formality from the last unity, according to the determinate distance." And Thomas (8. *Met. lect. 3.*): "For number is per se one insofar as the last unity gives species and unity to the number." Third: the object of sense is real, as is evident because it is sensible, and sense attains singulars, which are primarily and immediately existing real things; but number falls within the object of sense, since it is one of the five common sensibles (2. *anima T. 64.*). Canon responds (*citat.*) together with Mastrius that this is true with respect to the material being of number, not with respect to its formal being, which is through the intellect. On the contrary: number formally is from the side of things, since — without anyone thinking of them — there are four elements, three physical principles, and so on; and the intellect knows them as they are from the side of things; therefore number according to its material and formal being is a real being independently of the intellect. Finally: transcendental number is a real being pertaining to Metaphysics, which is a real science; therefore predicamental number is also a real being; for what is placed per se in a predicament, such as number, I clearly showed above to be a real being.

You will object first: Aristotle (3. *Phys. T. 68.*) writes that number is many units. And (8. *Met. c. 4. sum. vn. T. 10.*) he adds that number is not one but like a heap; therefore in the Peripatetic school number is not a real per se positive unity. I respond by expounding the passages of the Philosopher about material number, not about formal number. I add that the second testimony of the Philosopher is not rightly and faithfully cited by the adversaries; for in that passage it reads thus: "It is necessary for number to be something, by which it is one, which they

cannot now say; for by which it is one, since it is not one, but like a heap, or if it is, it should be said what it is that makes one from many, and the definition is one." This passage rather profits us than harms us. For there it makes a comparison between number and a definition, chiefly in that just as a number consists of many units, so a definition consists of many parts, yet is one; similarly a number is one, not with material unity but with formal unity, through which it is constituted in its formal and specific being, just as a human being through his form is one, as Scotus (*8. Met. in exp. T. 10. & 5. eiusdem, quaest. 9.*) says.

You will object second: for number to be a real per se unity, it must enjoy a certain unity, just as many things enjoy multiplicity, some enjoy sameness and identity, others diversity; but it participates in no unity from among the five enumerated by the Doctor (*1. distinct. 2. quest. 7. §. Sed hic restat. HH.*). For it does not obtain the unity of aggregation, which is the least, nor the unity of order, nor accidental unity, nor the unity of composition, nor of simplicity, as is evident to one who reflects and goes through each particular; therefore number is not a real per se unity. I concede the major and deny the minor. For number, since it is placed per se in the predicament of quantity and is its species, is composed of genus and differentia, as the Doctor hints (*proxime nominatus*); and accordingly it possesses the unity of composition.

You will object third: if there is a specific form of number, it is necessarily present in the numbered things, just as form is present in the matter it informs; but it cannot be made that the form of number is in all the numbered things, as the form of a ternary being in three stones of which one is in Rome, another in Paris, and a third in Turin; otherwise the form would inform many matters distant in place and situation, and an accident would be based in various and diverse distinct and distant subjects. The major is to be distinguished: inadequately, I concede; adequately, I deny, as is evident from a common real nature, which exists inadequately in one or two of its inferiors and adequately in all. See what I said (*in Log. lib. 2. quaest. 17. art. 5. & 6.*). Or if the major is conceded and the minor denied, it can be said that this is a privilege and characteristic proper to discrete quantity, just as it is peculiar to the genus of quantity to be predicated denominatively and concretely of its species, as I noted (*loco cit. l. 3. q. 5. art. 1.*). And it belongs to relation to arise upon the positing of termini, whether the termini are present or absent, as I asserted (*ibid. q. 6. art. 7.*); similarly it is natural for number to be in different subjects; and if all were identified, there would be no number, which always requires plurality and diversity of things, as the Parisians note (*c. de quantitate*) and Vigerius in his commentary (*1. dist. 24. quaest. vn.*).

You will object fourth: transcendental number adds no entity and unity beyond its material entities, as is evident from the ternary number of the divine Persons; therefore the same is to be asserted of predicamental number. The

consequence is denied; the reason for the disparity is that transcendental number is number in a qualified sense, and in the divine things all are one and the same; therefore in them there is not properly speaking number. For number properly and simply arises from the division of a continuum and is not found without the potentiality of material unities toward formal unity, as the Doctor touches on (*1. dist. 24. quaest. vn. non longè ab initio. A.*).

Article II. Whether Speech Is a True and Real Species of Discrete Quantity.

Scholastics who disagree about number in the preceding article likewise disagree in this one about speech. For those who remove number from the true species of quantity equally exclude speech from the list of true species of quantity, such as Joannes de Magistris (*cap. de quantitate*) and Suarez (*disp. 41. Met. Sect. 3.*). On the other side, those who place number among the true species of quantity also place speech in their series, such as Scotus (*quaest. 19. praedicam.*), Rivius (*cap. 6. de quantitate, quaest. 9.*), and the Complutenses (*ibid. disp. 13. quaest. vlt.*).

Note first that speech admits of many acceptations. First, it is taken for the elevation of the mind to God through pious and humble affection, as is seen in Augustine (*lib. de spiritu & anima.*). Second, for the significant vocal utterance by convention, discussed by Aristotle (*1. Perih. c. 4.*). Third, for an ornate discourse for the purpose of persuasion; in this sense Cicero (*a. de oratore*) calls speech "the queen of all things." Fourth, for an articulate vocal utterance consisting of more syllables and not more separate words, in terms of which a successive pronunciation takes place, as the word "man" and other expressions that are called speeches, suitable for composing song and harmony. And it is about speech so taken that the present discussion proceeds.

Note second that sound extends more broadly than speech so taken. For every speech is a sound, but not conversely. For a sound is a striking of air caused by the collision of two bodies; but speech is articulate, being formed by lips, teeth, tongue, and other instruments; and just as any striking of air is a sound, so any pronouncing of syllables is a voice; and accordingly there are as many voices as there are syllables that are ordered and successively uttered, from which speech is integrated, which is discontinuous and discrete, not indeed in subject or time, but in its intrinsic and essential form. Furthermore, in speech two things are most importantly distinguished: the sound, which is a quality, with its affections, namely whether it is acute or grave; and its discrete extension, which is also called expansion and prolongation; for if speech is delivered slowly and gradually, it is more extended than if it is quickly and promptly uttered; and the extension is more in one than in another, by reason of which one is short and another long, as is evident in Poets and Musicians. First assertion: speech is a true and genuine species of discrete quantity. The Doctor holds this in the passage cited, which he testifies is Aristotle's from (*cap. de quantitate*), who

furnishes it with two arguments: first, the intrinsic discrete measure is the species of discrete quantity, the proper nature and specific form of which is discreteness, as I noted above; but the parts of speech are measured by an intrinsic measure, which are its syllables, as is clear from the foundations just laid; therefore speech is to be numbered among the species of discrete quantity. Suarez (*citat.*) and Fonseca (*5. Met. cap. 13. quaest. 4. sect. 3.*) respond that the parts of speech indeed measure it intrinsically, but because they do not come together to constitute one per se quantum distinct from others, speech is therefore not counted among the true and real species of discrete quantity. On the contrary: just as from the material unities of number and its formal and specific unity there is made one per se, as I proved in the preceding article, so from the syllables of speech and its intrinsic and specific discreteness, which Scotus (*ubi supra*) writes to be unnamed, there is constituted one per se. Moreover, what is defined participates in one formal and specific nature, because a definition is a speech distinctly explaining the nature of a thing; but speech is defined as the discrete quantity of syllables; therefore it is one per se, and hence a genuine species of discrete quantity. Second: what is per se quantified by discrete quantity obtains an intrinsic and specific nature of quantity; but speech is per se quantified by discrete quantity, for it is short or long apart from the brevity or length of time; therefore it is not to be removed from the true species of discrete quantity. Fonseca responds (*passim memorato*) that all this depends on the convention and good pleasure of human beings, just as the signification of words does, and not on the intrinsic nature of speech. On the contrary: setting aside the signification of words and the will of human beings, speech still by its very nature remains short or long, compact or extended, on account of the discrete extension proper and intrinsic to it, as Scotus rightly infers (*praealleg.*); therefore the length or brevity of speech is not derived from time nor from another intrinsic thing. And so the length or brevity of speech is not sought from time or from another intrinsic thing.

You will object first: Aristotle, in (*5. Met. cap. de quanto*), recounting the species of quantity, makes no mention of speech; therefore according to Aristotle speech is not a species of quantity, whether discrete or continuous. Scotus adds (*1. distinct. 1. quaest. 2. §. Ad 1. O.*) that speech contextualized from many syllables does not make one per se, and therefore is not a true species of quantity. I respond that an argument drawn from negative authority does not conclude, especially because Aristotle had already in Logic, in the chapter on quantity, recounted speech in the list of species of quantity. Hence it was not necessary to again enumerate it, both because he had previously asserted and confirmed it by arguments — for which reason the common response that he spoke there in a famous and popular opinion is excluded, since what he states in another's opinion he does not usually fortify with arguments, as he does for speech. For this reason perhaps the Doctor writes there that he does not depart from that assertion, on account of the authority of Aristotle. To Scotus I say that he does

not there deal expressly with speech but by way of example, in which complete truth is not required, otherwise there would be not a likeness but an identity; but in Logic in the passage cited he treats of speech expressly and plainly and explicitly asserts it to be a species of discrete quantity.

You will object second: what is not per se quantified is not a true species of quantity, because a proper species of any thing is one per se; but speech is not per se quantified but by reason of syllables, in terms of which it is said to be long or short; therefore speech is not a genuine species of discrete quantity.

Confirmed: in speech there are found sound, motion, the order of syllables, and signification, which and similar things cannot constitute any species of quantity. I concede the major and deny the minor; to its proof I say that speech is quantified not only according to the syllables from which it is composed, but also according to its specific nature, which we said above to be discrete extension. To the confirmation I say that besides those enumerated, there is in speech the aforesaid discreteness, which Scotus says is its proper essential difference.

Question IV. On the Termini of Natural Things.

Article I. Whether Living Natural Things Have Certain Termini of Their Greatness or Smallness.

Paulus Venetus (*1. Phys. cap. 4.*) and other Philosophers of no small reputation, according to Toledo (*ibid. quaest. 8.*), think that living natural things are confined by no limit of their greatness or smallness. The common opinion, however, is that of Scotus (*quest. 24. praedicam. §. ad quaest. 5. Met. in expositione, cap. 15. T. 21. 2. dist. 2. quest. 9. §. Ad argumenta sub N.*), Ockham (*3. dist. 7.*), Gabriel (*ibid. distinct. 13. quaest. vn.*), Durant (*2. dist. 18. quaest. 1.*), Richard (*quol. 3. quest. 5.*), and the rest, who teach that naturally animate things are confined by certain and determinate limits of their greatness or smallness, which they cannot exceed.

Note first, from Scotus (*quaest. 19. Elench. Ad 1. quaest. Et 4. distinct. 44. quaest. 1. §. De secundo ante M.*), that the integrating parts of a natural animate whole are twofold: heterogeneous and homogeneous. The former are of different natures and hence are called dissimilar, such as bones, flesh, and the like; the latter are of the same nature and hence are called similar, as any part of flesh is flesh, just as any part of water is water.

Note second that the termini of natural things, some being intrinsic and affirmative and others extrinsic and negative, are comprehended under the quaternary number: two of greatness and two of smallness; the former is intrinsic, the latter extrinsic. The intrinsic terminus of greatness is that to which a living thing can attain such greatness but not greater — as if a human being reaches a quantity of six cubits but not seven or eight — and it is called the maximum of the kind, because among the quantities that a human being can

participate in, this is the greatest of all. The extrinsic terminus of greatness is that to which a living thing cannot attain such greatness but can have less — as if a human being cannot attain a quantity of seven cubits but can have less, namely six or five cubits — and it is called the minimum of the non-kind, because among the quantities that a human being cannot obtain, this is the least. The intrinsic terminus of smallness is that at which an animate being can exist under such a small quantity but not under a smaller — as if a human being can live under the quantity of one palm but not under the quantity of half a palm — and it is called the minimum of the kind, because among the smaller quantities that a human being can possess, this is the least. The extrinsic terminus of smallness is that at which an animate being cannot live under so small a quantity but can well exist under a larger — as if a human being cannot exist under the quantity of half a palm but can exist under the quantity of one palm — and it is called the maximum of the non-kind, because among the small quantities under which a human being cannot exist, this is the least.

Assertion: living natural things are constrained by intrinsic termini of their greatness or smallness. So Scotus (*ubi supra.*). It is proved first from Aristotle (*1. Phys. cap. 4. T. 36. Et 4. de gen. animalium, cap. 5. & 2. animae, cap. 4. T. 41.*): for all things constituted by nature there is a certain limit of growth and diminution. And (*7. polit. cap. 4.*): cities are surrounded by determinate limits, just like animals and plants. Second: every animate thing requires determinate organs and certain members for exercising its vital operations, and human beings use instruments of determinate greatness or smallness to produce artificial works; therefore there is a certain limit for animate beings with respect to greatness or smallness, which they cannot exceed. Third, from (*second animae T. 37.*): the soul is the first act of an organic body potentially having life; but its power, forces, and faculties are finite and limited (*1. Caeli T. 116.*). And experience confirms that each animate being, after reaching its proper and suitable greatness, no longer grows but gradually declines, as the natural heat fails and the radical moisture diminishes; for the natural heat acting on the radical moisture is weakened and reacting upon it is eventually consumed and ended, as we shall show abundantly in its proper place; therefore a certain limit and terminus is stabilized for animate beings with respect to greatness or smallness. And Augustine hands this down plainly and explicitly (*lib. de beata vita.*).

You will object first: it is narrated (*Gen. 6.*) that Giants flourished, who were of unusual greatness and extraordinary strength; therefore animate beings are not marked off by a certain limit of their greatness or smallness. I respond that although the Giants were tall, surpassing other men in stature, and robust in strength — according to the interpretation of Lyrar and according to some, monstrous — nonetheless they did not surpass the limit of man toward greatness. For they did not exist like a mountain, but perhaps reached the maximum of the kind, just as Pygmies reach the minimum of the kind.

You will object second: granted there is a certain limit of human greatness, a human being can still swell up and therefore grow, and can dry up and therefore shrink; therefore there is no certain terminus of greatness or smallness for living beings. Confirmed: let a human being reach the maximum of the kind; then by eating he will grow further, because through nutrition he will acquire new parts converted into his substance; therefore a certain terminus of his greatness or smallness is not to be established for him. I respond that given the hypothesis, such growth would not be intrinsic and per se but extrinsic and per accidens. To the confirmation: if he were in a stable age, it would be repaired to an equal amount with respect to the parts lost; but if he were in decrepit age, he would decline, as the parts gradually fall away and are lost, the natural heat failing.

You will object third: certain animals always grow, as is said of the crocodile. And certain plants are not confined by limits, such as the vine, the ivy, and the like; therefore living natural things are not to be assigned a certain terminus of their greatness or smallness. I deny the antecedent, whatever certain authors say, who are more fabulists than historians. The reason is that for producing a greater magnitude, a greater power is required, which cannot always increase in a living being, since life consists in moisture and heat; but these are weakened through continuous nutrition and the loss of heat and moisture; hence living beings grow old and thereafter perish.

Article II. Whether Non-Living Natural Things Have Termini with Respect to Greatness or Smallness.

This doubt can be treated in two ways: concerning what is actual and concerning what is possible. Concerning what is actual, all natural things are so ordered and disposed that they are enclosed and constrained by their termini and limits, in accordance with that saying (*Sap. 11.*): "The Lord has made all things in number, weight, and measure." Hence fire does not go beyond its sphere but is contained between the orb of the Moon and the supreme region of air. Likewise air is contained between fire, water, and earth, and so on for the rest. Concerning what is possible, however, there is controversy whether inanimate things can be confined by certain established and fixed intrinsic limits with respect to greatness or smallness. And certainly with respect to greatness there is the common opinion of Scotus (*2. distinct. 2. quest. 9. §. Ad argumenta sub N.*), Ockham (*3. quaest. 7.*), and the adherents of both — except for Landus (*1. Phys. quest. 16.*) and a few others, to whom the Complutenses now join themselves (*disp. 27. quest. 2. §. 3.*) — who deny that inanimate natural things are limited and confined by any termini toward greatness. But with respect to smallness there is more vigorous dispute. For although Scotus and Ockham teach the same, nonetheless the Thomists cited by the Complutenses (*question 3.*) and many others outside their school hold that with respect to smallness inanimate things are finite and limited, so that they reach a last terminus which they cannot go beyond toward smallness.

First assertion: inanimate things with respect to greatness are unlimited and unbounded. So the Doctor (*ubi supra.*). It is established first from Aristotle (2. *animae* T. 41.) in explicit words affirming that fire grows to infinity if combustible things are always applied to it. And it is written (*Prov. 30.*): "Fire never says it is enough," because, as Lyran adds there, from the application of combustible things its power to burn more always increases. Second: such non-living things always grow and are strengthened through things intrinsically applied to them, as with rain and precipitation falling and entering a river, if it continually grows, the river itself grows; since inanimate things grow not by internal reception as animate things do, but by external juxtaposition, and accordingly their growth has no end and no terminus. Third: if fire were to reach the maximum of the kind, and tinder were applied to it, either it would burn the tinder or it would not; not the second, otherwise an agent properly disposed and approximated to a patient rightly disposed would naturally not act, which is plainly false; if the first, therefore it would grow and be constrained by no limit. Add that from what will be said in the following question, there is a syncategorematic infinite, and God can produce finite effects to infinity, which surely indicates that inanimate things too can grow to infinity. The Complutenses respond (*cit. §. 4.*) in two ways, and say first that given the hypothesis, fire indeed would burn the tinder, but would not unite to itself the newly generated fire, and it would only be contiguous to it, making one by aggregation. On the contrary: things of the same nature, if they come together, are simultaneously united, as is evident from river water joined to sea water and other homogeneous things; but newly produced fire is of the same nature as the preexisting fire, nor can one be distinguished from the other, since one entire one appears. Moreover, a small fire can be united to another fire; therefore also a large fire can undergo the same union. For if a lesser power can produce it, all the more a greater power can cause such an effect; therefore if a small fire is united to another fire, surely a larger fire, such as the one presupposed, can undergo the same union with another fire, whether produced by itself or by another. And this is clear from experience and sense, while the opposite appears with respect to living things and cannot be rightly denied by the adversaries. They respond second: given the case, fire would be in a state of corruption and on the way to destruction. On the contrary: what has reached its peak is not in a state of corruption but of perfection, as is evident from fire existing in its sphere, from a man possessing glory, and from Christ having the highest grace; but if an inanimate thing were to reach the maximum of the kind, it would be in the highest state that it could participate in, as is clear from the Giants (*Gen. 6.*), who perhaps elevated to the maximum of the kind were most robust and most celebrated, so that they rose against God and strove to pile Pelion upon Ossa. If, therefore, the inanimate thing reaches the aforesaid limit, it enjoys a state not of corruption but of perfection; furthermore, such an inanimate thing in such a limit and state is stronger and more active, as is clear from a large fire and a burning furnace; and possessing great power it frees itself from contraries and defends itself from all

corruption more than if it possessed small power, as is clear from a large and a small fire — the latter is attacked by contraries and is defeated; but the former resists and persists victorious. Moreover, the cause of corruption in living things is that they are nourished by internal reception, by reason of which, acting, being acted upon, reacting, and being acted upon again, they eventually perish and are consumed; but non-living things grow by juxtaposition; therefore if more things are placed next to inanimate things, they are further increased and strengthened, and accordingly are freed from all corruption.

Second assertion: inanimate things with respect to smallness acknowledge no limit or boundary. This is handed down by the Doctor (*2. distinctione secunda, quaestione nona, Met.*) and is derived from Aristotle (*l. de sensu & sensili, capite tertio.*). It is established first: inanimate things are continuous, which, as has been said (*quaestione secunda huius libri, articulo quarto*), are divisible into always-divisible things; therefore no terminus with respect to smallness can be assigned to them. The consequence holds: if a minimum were given, since it would be a quantum, it would surely be divisible into other parts and halves, and so on; and accordingly it would not be a minimum, because it would still be distributed into smaller and smaller parts. The adversaries would respond that the argument concludes concerning mathematical quanta, not natural ones, since a natural thing, to retain its form, requires a certain and determined quantity, without which it cannot exist and be conserved nor perform any operations, as Aristotle seems to concede (*nunc alleg. c. 6.*) and Scotus (*ubi supra.*). Second: with respect to greatness, non-living things are not confined by a terminus, as nearly all admit; therefore neither with respect to smallness. The consequence is evident because the same reason applies to both, since they are homogeneous and capable of growth and diminution. The proponents of the contrary position would deny the parity because toward greatness there is a quantity under which a form can exist, but not toward smallness, as I noted a little before, and the Scotus cited exemplifies of a natural thing that if so small it no longer falls under sense.

You will object first: Aristotle (*1. Phys. T. 38.*) writes that there is a minimum flesh, from which no other can be extracted. And (*2. anima T. 41.*): for all things constituted by nature there is a certain terminus of greatness and smallness. I respond that Aristotle there speaks of the parts of a living being, such as flesh. In the preceding article, however, it was established that living beings participate in a terminus of their smallness and greatness. The same he also asserts in the latter place, saying that this applies to animate things, not to inanimate things like fire, which lacks a soul.

You will object second: the same Philosopher (*2. caeli, T. 17. & 1. Eth. cap. 7.*) puts in writing that each natural thing is for the sake of its operation; but unless a certain terminus of smallness is established for a natural entity, it would be reduced to such smallness that it could no longer produce any action; therefore

inanimate things are not to be denied a certain terminus of their smallness. The major being conceded, to the minor I say: if such a natural thing could no longer operate, this would not come from an intrinsic source but from an extrinsic one, as we experience with a small fire, which cannot long exist because it is attacked and weakened by air and is eventually consumed.

You will object third: if an inanimate natural thing is unlimited and unbounded with respect to being and acting, then similarly with respect to perfection, because the latter follows upon the former; hence, since God is infinite in entity and therefore in perfection, if an inanimate thing has no limit of its smallness, then neither does it have a terminus of its perfection. I respond that the argument concludes concerning perfection in a qualified sense and accidental perfection, not concerning perfection simply speaking and essential, of which kind is the perfection of God.

Book VII. On Time.

Question I. On the Nature of Time.

Article I. Whether Time Exists.

That it is an arduous and difficult matter to investigate the nature of time is indicated by Augustine in *11 Conf., cap. 15*, where, addressing God, he says: "Lord, I still do not know what time is." By time, however, we understand a certain successive duration by which natural things endure. Time can moreover be divided into actual and potential, as Scotus indicates in *Quol. 11, art. 2*; then into past, present, and future; and again into year, month, day, and hour.

Assertion: Time exists. So holds Scotus, as just mentioned, in §. *De secundo F.*, and in *2 dist. 2, quaest. 2, sub D. & 9. P.*, and elsewhere, and in *4 dist. 48, quaest. 2*. This is proved first from Scripture: *Genesis I*, "Let there be luminaries in the firmament of heaven, and let them divide the day and the night, and let them be for signs and for seasons and for days and for years." *Acts I*: "It is not for you to know the times or the moments." *Ecclesiastes III*: "All things have their season, and all things under heaven pass away in their appointed times." *Apocalypse X*: "Time shall be no more." Second, from the Fathers, expressly: *Dionysius in the book On the Divine Names, cap. 13*, and *Augustine in 11 Conf., cap. 14*: "Nothing is more familiar than time." Third: some things are permanent, others successive, and the latter endure through time. Hence time is on everyone's lips, and nothing seems more familiar to us; therefore there is no need to spend further time persuading and demonstrating the existence of time, since it is plain and clear to all.

You will object: every whole coheres from its parts, as a man from soul and body; but if time existed, it would be some whole whose parts do not exist — as

after Aristotle in *4 Phys., cap. 10*, Augustine writes in *lib. 83 quaest., quaest. 17*, saying: "the past is no longer, the future is not yet, nor the present, because it flows away" — therefore time does not exist, since its parts do not exist. I grant the major and deny the minor. For although time does not have parts that are actually permanent and simultaneously coexisting, it nonetheless participates in parts that continuously flow and stream, since it is a successive continuum, as Aristotle cited and Augustine in the place noted above indicate, and *Psalm 38, 131*, and Scotus intimates in *5 Met., quaest. 8*, and *2 dist. 2, quaest. 9, §. Ad argumenta B.*, and this is confirmed by Vives in *8 De Civitate, cap.*, with the authors cited by him.

Article II. Whether Time Is a Real Being.

Aureolus in *2 dist. 2, quaest. 2, art. 2*, Pererius in *lib. 12, cap. 13*, following Averroes in *4 Phys., com. 189*, and Galen as cited by *St. Thomas in the opusculum On Time, cap. 1*, Janduno in the present *quaest. 27*, and Antonius Andreas in *5 Met., quaest. 9*, maintain that time is the work of the soul and the fabrication of the mind. The Doctor Angelicus in *4 Phys., lect. 13*, and others of the same school support them, suspecting that time derives its completion from the intellect. The more common and truer opinion, however, drawn from the Subtle Doctor in *2 dist. 2, quaest. 1 & 9*, and in *4 dist. 48, quaest. 2*, and from Mayr, *2 d. 14, q. 10*, Canon, *4 Phys. s. art. 2*, Tatar, Joan. de Magistris, Parisiensis, Tolet, Ruvio, and others — teaches that time is a real being, apart from any operation of the intellect.

Note first that time admits of many senses. First, it is taken for the disposition and temperament of the air, in which sense we are accustomed to say that the weather is clear or cloudy, calm or overcast, healthful or unhealthful. Second, for the pleasantness and happiness of the life that some enjoy in prosperity, in which sense *Job XXI* reads: "They spend their days in good things, and in a moment they go down to hell." Third, for the opportuneness of things to be done, as *Ecclesiastes III*: "A time to plant and a time to uproot what has been planted." Fourth, for the successive duration of things — and it is time taken in this sense that we now discuss.

Note second, from Canon cited and Tatar in *4 Phys., quaest. ult., scibili I*, that time can be examined in two ways. In one way, with respect to its entity and successive continuity: in this sense it exists on the part of the thing independently of the soul and its intellect, since it existed before the soul's creation, as is plain from *Genesis I*, where mention of time is made before man was formed, who was the last of all things to be created. In another way, with respect to its discretion and partition into years, months, days, and hours: for in this way these are distinguished and divided by man as if they were separated from one another on the part of the thing, even though they are in fact conjoined and connected without any real division and partition of parts, with the perennial flux and continuous succession that belongs to the nature of time, which is essentially continuous and successive. In this sense are to be

understood *Aristotle in 4 Phys., cap. 14, T. 131, Augustine in 11 Conf., cap. 28, Scotus in 5 Met., quaest. 9*, and others, when they affirm that time formally taken is the work of the soul and a being of reason, inasmuch as since the parts of time are undivided and inseparable from one another, while the intellect divides them and separates them from one another, this undoubtedly depends on the soul and is rightly reckoned its effect.

Assertion: Time is not a being of reason, nor does it derive its completion from the soul, but is a real being existing on the part of the thing, independently of any act of cognition. So holds Scotus in the citations at the beginning of this article. This is proved first from the testimonies of Scripture adduced in the preceding article, with reference to which the Church sings at Matins in the hymn of the first Sunday of Lent: "King and maker of the times." Second, from the Fathers: Augustine in *lib. 4, 99 Super Numeros, quaest. 23*, calling God the creator and ordainer of times; and in his commentary on *Psalms 43*: "I see the times changed; the creator of times is not changed"; and in *lib. contra sermonem Arrianorum, c. 1*: "Time is certainly a creature of God"; and Damascene in *1 fidei, c. 11*, and in *2 of the same work, 6. 1 in fine*: "God is the maker of all ages." Third, from Aristotle, who in *lib. praedicam., c. de quantitate*, and in *5 Met., c. de quanto*, enumerates time among the species of quantity; quantity, however, has real species, since it is a real genus and the first among the genera of accidents, which are real; therefore time is a real being. Fourth: what has real properties is real, for a property proceeds from the nature of which it is a property — so if that nature is real, the property that follows upon it is likewise real. Now time possesses real properties, such as length or brevity, which are undoubtedly real beings. Moreover, motion is a real being, as is held as established by all; therefore so is time. The consequence holds because time is the measure of motion, as will be clear in the next article. Again, independently of any act of cognition, sublunary things endure successively; but successive duration is time. The Sorbonne as a whole reproves the opposing opinion as erroneous.

Objection I: Aristotle in *4 Phys., c. ult.* writes that time so depends on the soul that, if the soul were to cease, time would likewise cease to be; therefore in the school of Aristotle, time is a being of reason. Augustine in *1 De Civitate, c. 26*, and *11 Conf., cap. 28*, seems to hold the same view. Reply: The Philosopher speaks there in a conditional and questioning manner, and subsequently asserts positively that time is not fixed and permanent but fleeting and successive. Or I say that he considers time not according to its continuous and successive entity, but according to the assignment and division of its discrete parts, which I noted in the second note as being effected by the intellect. Augustine cited must be interpreted in the same way, as he himself indicates in his commentary on *Psalms 100*, and in *tract. 31 in Ioan.*: "Every day in this present time comes only in order not to be; every hour, every month, every year — none of these stands still; before it comes, it will be; when it has come, it will not be; when it has not yet come, it is not."

Objection II: What is composed of parts of reason is a being of reason, for such as the whole is, such are its parts; but time is composed of parts of reason. Therefore it is a being of reason. The major is clear. The minor is urged: time consists of the past, which does not exist; the future, which likewise does not exist; and the present, which does not exist except in an instant. This is confirmed by Augustine in *11 Conf.*, c. 15, who says that of the whole of time we have only one now or instant. I grant the major and deny the minor. To its proof I say that time indeed does not have permanent parts actually coexisting simultaneously, but rather parts that are fleeting and continuously flowing, since it is a successive being. Augustine expressed this in his commentary on *Psalms* 76: "While I speak syllables, if I say two syllables, the second does not sound until the first has passed; and the very syllable, if it has two letters, the second letter does not sound unless the first has gone." Hence Aristotle and Augustine indicate the fluidity of time, and do not hold that it consists in a moment and in the present, indivisible now. You will press: *Psalms* 76: "I thought of the days of old, and had in mind the eternal years." If, then, the days are eternal, since eternity is all simultaneous, they are not fleeting, nor therefore is time. I reply with Augustine that those days, of which the royal Psalmist makes mention, are the days of God, of whom it is written: "But you are always the same, and your years will not fail." Hence the same holy Doctor adds in his commentary on *Psalms* 101: "All this time from Adam to the end of the age is a tiny drop compared to eternity." He therefore speaks not absolutely but comparatively.

Objection III: Time is described as the number of motion according to before and after, as will be clear in the next article; but number depends on the soul, for it is the soul that counts, assigns, and divides the parts of time; therefore time is the work of the soul and hence a being of reason. I reply by way of explanation and distinction of the major: time is a numbering number — I deny; or rather a numbered number, or better, a measure, in Scotus's interpretation — I grant. And that this may shine forth more clearly, let the following be said.

Article III. What Time Is.

Philosophers toil greatly and in diverse ways to track down and investigate the nature and essence of time. The ancients were divided into three camps, as Aristotle attests in *4 Phys.*, c. 10. Some, among whom Plato is numbered in the *Timaeus*, hold that time means nothing other than the circulation or circular revolution of the celestial world. Others, whom Gregory follows in *2 d.* 2, q. 1, art. 1, judge that time is the heaven. Still others, such as the Nominalists, to whom Fuentes in *4 Phys.*, q. 3, diff. 3, art. 2, 3, and Suarez in *disp.* 50, *Met.*, sect. 9, adhere, think that time coincides with motion. Aristotle, however, in the passage just mentioned at *T.* 101, and all his interpreters, assert that time is the number of motion according to before and after.

Note that the succession of time proceeds from the succession of motion, and the succession of motion proceeds from the magnitude of the mobile body and

of the space to be traversed. For from the fact that the body has such a magnitude and mass, and that such an interval is to be crossed, it follows that the motion is so continuous and successive, and its measure is time — for the delay brought about in the motion of a body is measured by time. Therefore time is rightly called the measure of motion according to before and after.

Assertion I: Time is neither circulation, nor heaven, nor motion. The assertion has three parts. The first part, which is that of Aristotle, recently cited at *T. 93*, and is accepted by the Doctor in *9, 15 Praedicam., not far from the beginning, vers. Item qualibet pars*, is urged as follows: no part of a circulation is a circulation, as is self-evident; but every part of time is time — as past, present, and future are times — therefore time is not circulation. The second part, which is presupposed by the Doctor in *2 d. 2, q. 1*, is not attacked by Aristotle with a reasoned argument but is indicated by him to be absurd and foolish. It can be disproved as follows: heaven is a substance, while time is an accident; and moreover heaven can exist without time, as after the day of judgment time will cease while heaven will persist, since it is incorruptible; therefore time is not heaven. The third part is deduced from Scotus in the citations above and in *4 d. 48, q. 2*, and is supported by Augustine in *11 Conf., c. 24*, and is proved thus: first, the property of a thing is not the thing of which it is a property, just as risibility is not man; but time is an attribute of motion, since it is its measure; therefore time is not motion. Second: things whose attributes are not identical do not coincide, as is established by induction; but the attributes of motion are not the same as those of time — for motion is fast or slow, while time is short or long, great or small — therefore time is not motion.

Assertion II: Time is aptly defined as the number of motion according to before and after. This is Aristotle cited at *T. 101*, and is indicated by the Doctor in the passages cited above and in *5 Met., q. 8*. It is explained before being proved. "Number" means a continuous successive measure. "Motion" is placed as its subject, from which time flows as its attribute. "According to before and after" means according to the prior and posterior parts of motion, as has been explained in the preceding note. The conclusion thus explained is urged as follows: first, from Aristotle in the passage just cited, who offers and defends this definition of time and vindicates its expositors against the attacks and darts of adversaries; second, the definition just given possesses in its own way genus and difference, and is therefore legitimate — for "number" or "measure" is substituted in the place of genus, while the remaining terms serve as differentia. Moreover, to each being its proper measure must be assigned: to God, eternity; to the created incorruptible and permanent being, the aeon; therefore to the corruptible and successive being is to be attributed time, which is a fleeting and successive measure.

Objection I: Number is a species of discrete quantity, as is plain from *lib. praedicam., c. de quantitate*; but time is a species of continuous successive

quantity, from the same passage. Therefore "number" is improperly placed in the definition of time. Reply: with Scotus, instead of "number," "measure" should be placed, through which the nature of time is clearly perceived, namely, the measure of motion. Or it can be said that time is called a number because it has parts that are discrete not in continuous quantity — for in themselves and essentially they are continuous and successive — but in quality, that is, by the convenience and utility of men they are discrete and divided, through the operation of the intellect.

Objection II: The measure ought to be better known than what is measured, since through it we arrive at knowledge of what is measured, as the Doctor explains well in *10 Met., in the exposition of the text toward the end of c. 2*. But motion is better known than time; therefore time is badly described as the measure of motion. I distinguish the major: in the character of a measure, I grant; in the character of such a being, I deny. For it is not necessary to know the nature of such a measure in order that something be measured through it; it suffices that the measure lead to knowledge of what is measured, even if its essence remains unknown. This can be illustrated by the intelligible species, which leads us to knowledge of the object of which it is the representative, even though the nature of that species is itself unknown.

Objection III: *Genesis I* narrates that God made the sun and the moon to be for signs and seasons; and *Psalms 103*: "He made the moon for seasons" — but the moon and sun are below the primum mobile. Therefore time cannot be the measure of the primum mobile, but rather of the sun and moon. Reply: with Augustine in *2 de Genesi ad litteram, c. 14*, and *12 De Civitate, c. 14*, time in those passages is taken for the opportuneness of things to be done, and thus it is subjoined there that they should govern the day and the night — that is, that men might conduct their affairs seasonably, in sowing, harvesting, sailing, and the like. We, however, take time as the measure of the motion of the primum mobile, which is called common or universal time.

Objection IV: Time is the measure not only of motion but also of rest. For in *Joshua X*, while the sun stood still, that rest could be measured; therefore the definition of time is deficient, lacking the case of rest. Aristotle replies at *cit. T. 118*, with the agreement of Scotus in *2 d. 2, q. 4, §. Concedo, sub C.*, that motion is measured by time per se, and rest only per accidens. I add that opposites have the same treatment, as stated in *2 Top., c. 14*; but motion and rest are opposites, like a habit and its privation; therefore they are measured by the same measure of time, as Scotus explains well in the passage just cited before D.

Article IV. Whether Time Is Distinguished from Motion.

Although from the preceding article it is clear what must be said in the present one, nevertheless, for fuller instruction and for settling the various and diverse contentions of the Philosophers, I am pleased to examine carefully how time is

distinguished from motion. Some — whose names Aristotle passes over in *4 Phys.* — identify time with motion. Fuentes and Suarez, named in the preceding article, agree with them. Others, such as Janduno in this book at *q. 18*, Burley in his exposition of *T. 102*, and John of Maistre, distinguish time from motion really. Scotus, however, in *11 Met.*, in the commentary on *c. 2*, *summa 4 in fine*, writes in clear terms that time is really the same as motion, differing from it only formally. He intimates the same in *4 d. 48, q. 2*, to whom agree Mayr in *2 d. 14, q. 11*, Antonius Andreas in *5 Met.*, *q. 11*, Canon in *4 Phys.*, *q. 7, art. 3, dub. 3*, Orbellio in the same place, Faber in *Theor. 49*, and Poncius in *disp. 46, quaest. 2, concl. 1*.

Note first, from Scotus in the commentary on *11 Met.* in the passage just cited, that the present controversy is not about whether the time that is the measure of the motion of the primum mobile is distinct from the motion of the inferior orbs — for it is certain that these differ, both because they have really distinct subjects, and also because they can be separated from one another, as if God were to destroy the primum mobile while preserving the remaining heavens, then the lower heavens would exist without the uppermost, and these would be moved and endure without it. But the question is whether the time that is the duration of the first heaven differs from the motion of that same first heaven — and concerning this the opinions stated above obtain.

Note second that motion is divided into common and particular. The common or general motion is the motion of the primum mobile, by which the remaining motions of the inferior orbs are moved, drawn, and regulated. The measure of the motion of the primum mobile is common time, for by this measure the motions of the other spheres are measured. Particular motion is what belongs to any other body distinct from the primum mobile, and the measure of each of these is called particular time, which others call extrinsic time. For this reason Christ the Lord says in *John VII*: "My time has not yet come, but your time is always at hand." In this way particular times are distinguished according to the particular motions of any thing; and thus in *Genesis VI* the time of man's life is assigned: "His days shall be a hundred and twenty years." And in *John XIV* the Savior, addressing Philip, says: "So long a time have I been with you, and you have not known me."

Assertion: Time differs from motion not really but formally. The Doctor in the passages cited above and in *5 Met.*, *q. 10, §. Et concedo* supports this. The first part is proved thus: first, an attribute is not really distinguished from that of which it is an attribute, as Scotus shows in *2 d. 16, q. vn.*; but time is an attribute of motion, as stated in *4 Phys.*, *Summa 3, q. 9, T. 130*, and also in *8 of the same work, T. 10*, with the agreement of Augustine in *11 Conf.*, *c. 24*; therefore time is not really distinct from motion. Second: things that really differ and are absolute can at least by divine power be separated from one another, as Scotus proves in *2 d. 1, q. 4, §. contra statim*; but time cannot exist without motion, since it derives its being from motion, as I noted in the note of the preceding article, and as

Aristotle clearly teaches at *cit. T. 105*. Moreover, motion enters into the definition of time, for time is the number of motion according to before and after; therefore time is not really separated from motion. Hence Augustine in *5 de Genesi ad litteram, c. 5*, subjoins: "If there were no motion, whether of a spiritual or corporeal creature, there would be no time at all." And in *lib. contra sermonem Arrianorum, c. 1*: "Time cannot exist without certain motions of creatures." The second part is urged: first, from Aristotle, both in *1 Praedicam., c. quantitate* and in *5 Met., T. 18*, who enumerates time as a species of quantity distinct from motion; therefore, since they do not differ really as proved in the first part, they are inferred to differ from one another formally. Second: things that possess distinct definitions independently of the intellect, and that are inseparable from one another, are formally distinguished, as I showed from Scotus in *Log. 1, 2, q. 1, art. ult.* But time and motion possess distinct definitions: time is the number of motion according to before and after, while motion is the act of a being in potency as it is in potency. Again, time is a measure, while motion is measured by time; but measure and what is measured, subject and what is in the subject, differ at least formally from each other. Finally, motion is fast or slow, while time is short or long; and the swiftest mobile traverses in a short time a great space, which a slow mobile will not accomplish in a long time; therefore between the two there is a formal distinction.

Objection I: Scotus in *2 d. 2, q. 1, §. Ad secundam partem H.* establishes that duration and measure are not distinguished from the thing of whose duration and measure they are; and in *4 d. 48, q. 2, §. Ad q. H.*, and in the *Reportatio* on the same distinction and question, *Ad 1.*, he subjoins that time adds to motion nothing other than the relation of measure. Therefore either they do not differ from one another, or if they are distinguished, they are really distinguished — since measure and what is measured are relatives, and among relatives whose extremes are real there is a real distinction, because one has reference to the other. Reply: in that place Scotus discusses the matter probatively and speaks of the existence of the Angel and of its duration, which is the aeon; but we are speaking of time, which is the duration of a successive thing, and that the same account and parity do not hold in that case is indicated by the same Doctor in the same place, *§. contra istud sub E.*, after *Augustine 11 Conf., c. 23*. To the other testimonies I say that time adds to motion, of which it is the measure, an intrinsic — not extrinsic — character of measure, pertaining to the first and not to the third mode of relatives, as the Doctor explains in the same passage.

Objection II: Time can exist without motion; therefore time is really distinct from motion. The antecedent is shown from *Joshua X*: while the heaven stood still, a battle was fought which, according to Augustine in *11 Conf., c. 23*, lasted three hours, or according to others cited by Lyran at the end of that chapter, a full artificial day — so that the day was doubled, that is, twenty-four hours. Thus there was time without motion. I distinguish the antecedent: universal time can exist without the motion of the primum mobile — I deny; particular time, such

as was the duration of the aforementioned battle — I grant. Or it can be said that that battle lasted not by positive time but by privative time, just as a privation is measured by the measure by which its corresponding habit is measured, as I made plain above regarding rest and motion. You will say: if time is continuous and uninterrupted, how is it said in the cited passage that the sun stood still, and in *4 Kings XX* and *Isaiah XXXVIII* that it went back ten degrees? I say this is to be understood with respect to the natural order, not supernaturally, as it is narrated to have been done at that time; and especially since a small thing is accounted as nothing; and therefore there is nothing to prevent time from being called continuous and uninterrupted.

Objection III: There is one and the same time everywhere and among all, as stated in *4 Phys., T. 95, 133, 134*, through which sublunary things endure; but motions are many, in proportion to the plurality of mobile bodies; therefore between time and motion there is a real distinction. I distinguish the major: there is one common and universal time — I grant; particular and singular time — I deny. For just as each thing has its own proper essence and existence, so it possesses its own proper and intrinsic time, as I explained in the second note.

Objection IV: Time is the offspring of motion, and has a distinct being from motion, just as Augustine says in *q. 81, novi testamenti*: "Gold is born from the earth but is not earth; food is born from wood but is not wood; and a foal is born from a donkey but is not a donkey." But an offspring or effect is really distinct from its cause; therefore time is really distinct from motion. Reply: time is called the offspring of motion not as something produced by a real change, but by a simple emanation, just as an attribute proceeds from its subject of which it is the attribute; and therefore motion and time are distinguished only formally.

Article V. Whether There Is a Discrete Time Distinct from Continuous Time.

The Doctor Angelicus in *1 p., q. 10, art. 5*, Henry in *Quol. 12, q. 8*, Cajetan, and the other Thomists try to introduce into their school a discrete time distinct from continuous time, through which they think the operations of the Angels are to be measured; against whom rise up the Subtle Doctor in *2 d. 2, q. 2, §. contra & 2 Rep. ibid., q. 1*, Lychetus, Gratianus Brixiensis, Rada in *contr. 4*, and others, who deny this kind of discrete time as distinct from our continuous time.

Note first that the Thomists consider the operations of the Angels in two ways: first, all of them taken together and collected, even though one precedes another and one succeeds another — and in this way those schoolmen judge that such operations are measured by discrete time, which is nothing other than the duration of the operations of the Angels taken together. In the other way those authors contemplate angelic operations taken separately, one after another, and in this way they judge them to be measured by an instant of discrete time.

Note second that the principal measures of things are commonly reckoned to be four: eternity, the aeon, time, and the instant, which Augustine touches upon in *1, 83 quaest., q. 19*. Eternity is described by Boethius in *1 De Consolatione, prosa 6, metro 10*: "the whole, simultaneous, and perfect possession of unlimited life" — that is, eternity is a duration without beginning or end, by which God alone endures, since He alone is eternal, having no beginning or end. Hence Augustine subjoins in his commentary on *Psalms 2*: "In eternity nothing is past, as if it had ceased to be, nothing is future, as if it were not yet; but there is only the present, because whatever is eternal always is." And in his commentary on *Psalms 146, in fine*: "Eternity consists in four syllables; without beginning and without end it is." And in his commentary on *Psalms 100*, addressing God: "Your years are eternal, your years which do not change, shall be in generation after generation." The aeon is defined as the duration of a permanent being that is indefectible in act but defectible in potency. This is mentioned by Aristotle in *1 Caeli, T. 100*, and by Augustine in *1, 83 quaest., q. 72*, where he calls the aeon stable. This measure belongs to Angels, rational souls, and the remaining beings that persist in their being. Time is the duration of a successive and continuously fleeting thing. This is called mutable by Augustine in the passage just cited. The instant is the momentary duration of an instantaneous thing, such as generation, illumination, and resurrection — as in *1 Cor. XV*: "In a moment, in the twinkling of an eye." To these some add the instant of nature and the instant of origin, but in reality these are not durations but rather presuppositions and prerequisites, for what is prior in nature and origin is presupposed and required prior to what is posterior in nature and origin. The instant of nature belongs to things that are simultaneous in time, yet one is presupposed before the other — for example, animal is prior by nature to man, and the more universal are prior by nature to the less universal. The instant of origin is applied to those things of which one originates from the other, even though both are simultaneous in nature; in this way theologians say that in the divine, the Father is prior to the Son in origin — so that in the first instant of origin is the Father, in the second instant of origin is the Son, and in the third is the Holy Spirit.

Assertion: Discrete time distinct from continuous time is not to be admitted. So holds the Doctor in the passages cited above. This is proved first from Aristotle in *4 Phys., Summa 3, c. 6*, who, treating extensively and carefully of time until the end of that book, nowhere mentions discrete time, nor does he say anything about it in any of his works; therefore discrete time is to be rejected from the Peripatetic school. You will say: Aristotle thinks that the Angels, whom he calls Intelligences, are certain gods; therefore it is not surprising if the Philosopher did not wish the operations of those beings to be measured by discrete time, but definitively by the measure by which gods are measured, and for this reason introduced no other time besides continuous time into Peripateticism. Against this: Aristotle did not fall into polytheism; indeed, it may be that precisely because he did not worship multiple gods, lest he suffer capital

punishment like Socrates, he left Athens and went to Chalcis, where near death he sought pardon of God for his sins, as Fonseca attests in the proem to the *Metaphysics, toward the end of c. 1*, from others cited by him. The Philosopher accordingly acknowledged one true and sole God, whom he openly confesses to be the ruler, governor, and director of the universe, in *12 Met., at the end*; and the same Philosopher admits in the same place at *T. 47, sum. 2, c. 4* several Intelligences corresponding to the plurality of the moveable Heavens, caused by God — whom he calls the first cause, the first mover, and the first being — as Scotus shows in *1 d. 8, q. 5*, and in *Quol. 7, §. sed quia*. I add: in *1 Caeli, T. 100*, he enumerates the aeon, by which those Intelligences endure; therefore in his school there exists no discrete time. Second: beings ought not to be multiplied without necessity, but there seems to be no necessity for multiplying a discrete time distinct from continuous time; therefore discrete time is one and null. The major is Aristotle's in *1 Phys., T. 52* and is denied by no one. The minor is proved: if any reason compelled the concession of such a time, it would be especially the reason of St. Thomas, who holds that the operations of Angels do not depend on the Heaven, and for this reason are to be measured not by continuous but by discrete time. But this reason is of no weight, because the operations of Christ the Lord after His resurrection did not depend on the Heaven, and yet they were measured by continuous time. Likewise the actions of the Blessed, and after the day of judgment the operations of all men, will not be measured by discrete time, as the Thomists themselves do not deny; therefore neither are they measured by discrete time now, since they are of the same nature and species, and accordingly no other measure beyond those already described is to be devised to measure them.

You will say that those operations of the Blessed — such as vision and fruition — are measured by participated eternity. For since they are of the divine and supernatural order, a measure that is in some way divine is owed to them, which is rightly called participated eternity, since they will always be and will endure perpetually, like God. Against this: in *2 Cor. XII* it is read that St. Paul had such operations when he was caught up into Paradise and heard arcane words which it is not lawful for a man to speak. For he was then blessed with that beatitude which the scholastics call hourly and temporary; but such a happiness was not measured by participated eternity, because it did not last long but passed fleetingly; therefore neither is the beatitude of the other Blessed, which is perpetual, measured by participated eternity, since both are of the same species and order. Third: every being is either permanent, persisting in its being, or successive, continuously flowing away; the permanent is measured by the aeon and the successive by time; but certain of the operations of the Angels are permanent, such as the vision and fruition of God, while others are successive, such as their mutual locutions and their local motions; therefore the former are measured by the aeon and the latter by time; and therefore no discrete time is to be devised to measure all of them.

You will say that the operations of the Angels are permanent, one succeeding another, and having an end; therefore they are not measured by the aeon, which is the measure of permanent beings without end, but by discrete time, which is the measure of permanent beings that have an end and a terminus. Against this: a measure must be of the same genus as what is measured, as stated in *10 Met.*, T. 7, 4, and the manner of enduring of both must be uniform — either permanently or successively — and weight is measured by weight and a table by a cubit; but the substance of an Angel is measured by the aeon because it is permanent; therefore likewise its immanent operation is measured by the aeon because it is permanent, even though this has an end while the substance does not. For if God were to create an Angel that endured by the aeon as long as it existed, and if God were then to annihilate it, its substance would have an end, and yet it would not prevent it from having endured by the aeon; therefore even though the immanent operation of an Angel is terminated, nothing prevents it from being measured by the aeon. Moreover, if a substantial form were always to inform matter, it would be measured by the aeon; therefore it is also measured by the same measure of the aeon even if it is separated from matter, because it possesses the same mode of existing and enduring, whether it inheres in matter or is separated from it. Furthermore, if a motion were never to end, it would be measured by time; therefore if a permanent being has an end, it is likewise measured by the aeon. The consequence holds because the former is measured by time because it is successive, and therefore the latter is measured by the aeon because it is permanent. Again, the Angel is placed in the category of substance, as stated in *5 Met.*, T. 15, because it is a finite substance; therefore its measure resides in the category of quantity, because it is likewise finite and not transcendent, as Cajetan thinks. But such a measure is not continuous time; therefore it is the aeon. Furthermore, discrete time as devised by the Thomists is composed of its instants, since it means nothing other than several instants of it joined and aggregated together, according to them; therefore continuous time too would be composed of indivisibles, since the same reasoning applies to both — but they themselves do not admit this, and therefore they ought not to concede the other either.

Objection I: St. Augustine in *4 Super Genesim ad litteram*, c. 11, and *5 of the same work*, c. 21, cited by the Coimbrans in *art. ult.*, *4 Phys.*, *in margine*, seems to indicate discrete time, saying that God moves the spiritual creature through time; therefore, besides continuous time, another measure must be found according to Augustine, by which the operations of Angels are measured, and this is called discrete time. Scotus replies that Augustine there takes time for anything whatever that can have being after non-being, in which sense everything other than God can be called temporal, since everything created previously was not, and after creation, is. I therefore deny the consequence. For Augustine asserts nothing there that favors the Thomists.

Objection II: Some things are measured by eternity, such as God, who is without beginning and end; some are measured by the aeon, such as the Angel, which has a beginning but lacks an end; others are measured by time, such as successive and continuous motion; but the permanent and immanent operations of the Angels remain, which are not measured by eternity because they have a beginning, nor by the aeon because they have an end, nor by time because they are permanent; therefore another measure must be devised by which they are measured, which is called discrete time. Reply: the permanent operations of the Angels endure by the aeon, which is the measure of every created being whether it always persists or at some point fails; while the transient operations endure by continuous time, which is the metric and measure of all successive things.

Objection III: After the day of judgment time will be no more, as stated in *Apocalypse X*, because the primum mobile and the other Heavens will move no more; but the operations of the Blessed will endure — not by continuous time, because there will be none; therefore by discrete time, which is their measure. I reply that there will then be no extrinsic and universal time, but quite rightly intrinsic and particular time, which measures the operations of the Blessed both before and after the universal judgment. Or say that these will endure not by positive but by privative time, just as when motion ceases, rest — which is its privation — is said to be measured by privative time; and similarly motion itself, if it were to occur in a vacuum while all other motions had ceased.

Question II. On Things Subject to Time.

Article I. Which Things Are in Time.

This difficulty is examined by philosophers under another title, namely, which things are measured by time; and to be in time is the same as to be measured by time, according to Aristotle in *4 Phys.*, *T. 114*. It is certainly the case that God is not in time, since eternity is His measure — as Augustine expressed in *2 De Moribus Manichaeorum*, *c. 1*, saying: "God is not subject to time." Nor is the Angel measured by time, because it endures by the aeon, as stated in *1 Caeli*, *T. 100*. Nor likewise is the Heaven and all incorruptible permanent things, for the same reason. The whole controversy is about generable and corruptible substances. The affirmative part is defended by Thomas in *1 p.*, *q. 10*, *art. 4*, *ad 3*, Cajetan in the same place at *a. 5*, Soncinas in *10 Met.*, *q. 54*, Fonseca in *5 Met.*, *c. 13*, *q. 12*, *sect. 4*, and Tolet in *4 Phys.*, *q. 15*. The negative is championed by Scotus in *2 d. 2*, *q. 4*, §. *Concedo*, and in *Rep. ibid.*, *q. 1*, Suarez in *disp. 50*, *Met.*, *sect. 1*, Canon in *4 Phys.*, *q. 8*, Bonetus in *6 Phys.*, *c. 3*, Ruvio in *Tract. de tempore*, *q. 1*, Fuentes in *q. 3*, *3 diff. 2*, *art. 2*, and many others.

Note from the Doctor in *cit. B.* that corporeal substance can be examined in two ways: first, in itself, as it abstracts from motion and flux, and in this way it is permanent, having its whole being simultaneously; second, as it is subject to

motion, change, and other accidents that follow upon it and accompany it, in which way it is called mutable, fleeting, and temporal. All of this can be illustrated from the Heaven, which is of itself permanent and incorruptible, yet mutable through the motion by which it is always rotated from east to west. By reason of the first, the heaven endures by the aeon, which as has been said is an indefectible, permanent, and wholly simultaneous measure; but by reason of the second, it is measured by time, which is a successive measure having prior and posterior parts. What causes difficulty in the present matter is this: the generable and corruptible substance — especially the animated — at one time grows and at another decreases; some of its parts are generated and acquired through nutrition, while others that previously existed flow away and are lost; and finally the whole perishes and dies together. Hence it seems to be in time, which is said to consume and destroy all things; yet since it has its whole being simultaneously, it does not seem to be subject to time, because the permanent and the successive adequately divide continuous quantity, just as species divide their genus — as man and brute immediately and adequately distribute animal — and therefore the measure proper to the permanent ought to belong to it, which is called the aeon.

Assertion: Generable and corruptible substances are measured not by time but by the aeon. So holds Scotus in the passages cited above. The first part is urged: first, from *4 Phys., c. 12, T. 118, 119*: a mobile body is not in time as something quantified, but as the motion is quantified; therefore according to Aristotle, a corporeal sublunary substance is measured by time insofar as it has motion annexed to it, which is measured by time per se, and not as a substance existing with a permanent continuous quantity. The Coimbrans object that substance in itself lacks any measure; and so Aristotle says that a mobile body is not subject to time except insofar as it is subject to motion, by reason of which the same Philosopher admits that the sublunary body is in time. But these authors do not rightly weigh the text of the Philosopher, since Stagira does not write absolutely and precisely that a mobile body is not measured by time, but expressly says "as something quantified"; and since continuous permanent quantity, such as body, has its own measure, they therefore do not rightly expound the text, nor do they in any way dissolve the argument opposed to them. Fonseca in the passage cited replies differently, and says that a generable and corruptible body is always moved by at least an improper motion, which is the flux of its parts, which are acquired through nutrition in place of those that have been lost and previously existed in it; and for this reason, through this kind of motion and flux, it is in time, by which it suffers and is ultimately consumed. But this reply does not accord with the passage cited. For Stagira there denies that a body as quantified is measured by time; therefore such a body has no motion, even improper; for whoever removes what is posterior in actuality also removes what is prior in actuality, from which the former necessarily flows. Therefore since Aristotle takes away time from the said body — which is

posterior to motion — he consequently removes the motion itself as well, which is its cause. For when the subject is removed, its attribute is removed along with it: just as if risibility is removed, rationality is also removed; and since time is an attribute of motion, as stated in *8 Phys., T. 11*, when time is removed from a quantified body, the motion measured by time is also taken away. I add that the distinction offered by the Philosopher would be pointless: for if a body as quantified is measured by time, and the same body equally has the same measure of time as it participates in quantified motion, what would be the purpose of distinguishing the body as quantified and as having quantified motion? It should rather be said that on both views the body is measured by time — which is not what Aristotle asserts, since he teaches that a body simply as quantified is not measured by time. Second: a measure is of the same genus as what is measured, as stated in *10 Met., T. 4*; but a sublunary body is something quantified by a permanent quantity, since it is wholly simultaneous, having its parts simultaneously joined at a common boundary; therefore its measure is permanent, not successive as time is. This argument is so powerful that it led Thomas in *opus. 44, de tempore, c. 3* to our aforementioned assertion, as is clear from his words adduced by the Coimbrans in the cited passage at §. 1 — though Masius denies that that opusculum is Thomas's. But since it bears the stamp of his style, this should not be denied; rather it should be said that the force of the argument changed his opinion, as happens to him in some other matters, and as neither Augustine nor other holy and learned men blush to abandon stubbornness and tenacity in their opinions, adhering instead to reason and truth. The Coimbrans add, in order to satisfy the argument adduced, that sublunary and corruptible substances are subject to time because they are mutable and transmutable, being in a perennial flux of parts, some of which depart while others arrive and succeed. Against this: the whole substance possesses a permanent quantity, as is plain in man and stone; therefore its measure is not time, which is wholly, intrinsically, and essentially successive. Moreover, that substance is measured by time insofar as it is subject to motion and change, as those authors themselves admit; therefore not by reason of the substantial quantified substance, but by reason of quantified motion, does it have a temporal measure — which is the assertion of Aristotle, Scotus, and the others whom they are refuting. Again, although some of its parts flow away, the whole persists; and therefore it is not measured by time, just as even if some parts are removed from a stone or a tree, it is still the same stone and the same tree continues permanent, to be measured by the same measure as before, when it was constituted by those parts. Furthermore, gold and other metals whose parts almost all remain, stones, and the bodies of the Blessed after the day of judgment will always persist in their being without any flux of parts, yet they will not be subject to time, nor be contained or dominated by it; therefore neither are they now measured by it, since they always have the same measure, because they are always permanent, and the measure of permanent things is not time.

The second part is against Suarez and Ruvio cited above, and is held for Scotus and the Scotists in the passages just cited. It is proved thus: first, every measure is either eternity, or the aeon, or time, from what was said in the preceding article; but sublunary substance is not measured by eternity, as is plain, nor by time, as I showed in the first part of the assertion; therefore it is measured by the aeon. The adversaries object that a corruptible body does not deserve the aeon as its measure, since the aeon is proper only to those that are incorruptible and immortal, perpetual and without end — not to the sublunary substance, which comes to an end and is destroyed. But this does not prevent the said substance from being measured by the aeon, since just as every successive thing is measured by time — even if one lasts little and another very long — so every permanent thing is measured by the aeon, even if one endures perpetually and another is quickly destroyed and perishes. Again, if motion were eternal as Aristotle thinks, it would be measured by time, and it has the same measure of time among us, since it is in reality to end; therefore every permanent thing has the aeon for its measure, even if some are perpetual and incorruptible, such as the Heaven, and some are corruptible and subject to end, such as sublunary substance. Again, if an Angel were annihilated by God and the Heaven destroyed by the same, nevertheless the measure of each would be the aeon, even if each had an end; therefore likewise sublunary substance endures by the aeon even as it wastes away and perishes; and so Scotus appropriately and aptly names the measure of generable and corruptible substance the aeon.

Objection I: Aristotle in *4 Phys.*, *T. 20* explicitly says that those things are in time and are measured by it which are grasped, overcome, and dominated by it, as well as those that are generated and corrupted; but sublunary substances are generated and corrupted; therefore their measure is time. Reply: the major must be expounded through distinction; if sublunary substances are taken with respect to their substantial and quantitative permanent being, I deny — for in this way they have their whole being simultaneously, and all their parts are simultaneously joined by a common boundary; but if they are taken with respect to quantified motion, which is conjoined to them, I grant. For in this way they are measured by time on account of motion, which is immediately and per se measured by time. This reply and distinction is Aristotle's at *cit. T. 118*, which I explained and adduced at the beginning of our assertion, and it is confirmed by Scotus in the passage noted and in *11 Met.*, in the exposition of *c. 3, sum. 1*.

Objection II: Living natural things are said to live for so long a time and then to die, as in *Genesis V*: "The whole time that Adam lived was nine hundred and thirty years, and he died." And shortly after: "All the days of Seth were nine hundred and twelve years, and he died." And so for the rest, in whom youth and old age, novelty and old age, life and death are distinguished; therefore sublunary bodies, and above all living things, are measured by time. Reply: according to the distinction offered, the animate and all other natural generable and corruptible beings are subject to time not according to their substantial and

quantitative permanent being, but according to the motion that is conjoined to them, which is per se subject to time. This is confirmed from the Heaven, which is not measured by time as an incorruptible substance, but through the motion annexed to it, by which it is moved continuously and successively.

Article II. Whether There Is One and the Same Now throughout All of Time.

This difficulty arises from Aristotle in *4 Phys.*, *T. 104*: "In all of time the now is the same according to substance, but different according to being." Since this is obscure and difficult to understand, its interpreters diverge into various senses and opinions. Aureolus in *2 d. 2, art. 5* thinks that there is really one now throughout all of time, differing only according to disposition and character. Not far from this view seem to be Albert and Thomas, as cited by Tolet in *4 Phys.*, *q. 14*. Others, whose name Aureolus suppresses in the cited place, think that there is one now by unity of subject in which it subsists. But others, among whom are Scotus in *3 Met.*, *at the end of the exposition of T. 17*, and *2 d. 2, q. 2, §. Istam instantiam*, and in *Rep.*, *q. 1*, Antonius Andreas in *3 Met.*, *q. 3*, Canon in *4 Phys.*, *q. 6*, Bonetus in *6 Phys.*, *c. 1*, Tolet cited above, and Ruvio in *the first Tract. de tempore*, *q. 2, dub. de instanti* — these teach that there is one now quasi specifically but many numerically in all of time.

Note first that to be the same according to substance is the same as to be the same in itself and considered absolutely, while to differ according to being means nothing other than that the same is compared to diverse things — according to the interpretation of Lychetus in the passage noted from Scotus in the same place; for the now or instant takes on diverse comparisons insofar as it is the end of the past and the beginning of the future, as Aristotle notes in *4 Phys.*, *T. 106*; or, as Bonetus in the cited place expounds, to be the same according to substance means the same essence and quidditative and specific character — in which sense it is taken in *1 Praedicam.*, *c. 1*: "Univocal things are those whose name is common and the account of substance according to that name is the same." To differ according to being designates the individual and singular being, which is multiple, in accordance with multiple individual differences. Hence in time the now is the same specifically but multiple numerically.

Note second from Aristotle in *the passage cited at T. 126* that the now can be taken in two ways: sometimes for the proximate time in which something has been done or is to be done, in which sense it is frequent among men — "Peter is just now arriving" or "Peter will arrive just now." This is confirmed by Augustine in his commentary on *Psalms 55*, where, speaking of Job tempted by the devil, he says: "The tempter was permitted to tempt the holy man Job; in one instant of time he took away everything" — that is, he lost everything in a short time. And in *tract. 107 in Joan.*: "Do we not say every day, 'He is no longer here,' of one who is about to depart very soon?" By contrast, what happened a long time ago we by

no means say happened now — for example, we do not say "Christ was just now born" or "Christ was just now crucified." Properly speaking, however, the now is taken for the instant of time, which mediates between the parts of time, uniting and joining them together — just as a point is placed between the parts of a line, joining and uniting them — and it is this second kind of now that is being discussed in the present context.

Assertion: In all of time there is one now quasi specifically but many that are numerically distinct. So holds the Doctor in the passages cited above, and this is the genuine meaning of Stagira in *cit. T. 110*, who admits several nows in time. And more clearly in *3 Met., at the end of T. 17*: if according to the opinion of the Philosopher there are several nows numerically in time, then according to him there is one now specifically. Now it is proved thus: first, if there were only one now numerically in all of time, all things would be in the same now, and those that existed from the beginning of the world and those that are yet to come until its end would exist simultaneously, since they would be under the same numerical now; but how empty, false, and absurd this is, is plain to all; therefore there is not one now in all of time, but one specifically. Second: the same reasoning must apply to the now with respect to time as applies to a point with respect to a line, and to the "having-changed" (*mutatum esse*) with respect to motion, as Aristotle infers in the passage just cited; but several points are located numerically in a line, and several instances of having-changed are in motion — since between two parts of a line a point mediates, and between two parts of motion a having-changed is present; therefore likewise between two parts of time a now or instant intervenes; but there are several parts of time, and therefore also several nows or instants, yet one now and instant specifically. Third: when the subject is multiplied, the attribute that flows from it is likewise multiplied, just as when man is multiplied, risibility — which is his property — is likewise multiplied; but in motion the instances of having-changed are multiplied, since between two parts of motion a having-changed is present; therefore the now is likewise multiplied, since it follows upon the having-changed as an attribute follows upon its subject from which it proceeds. And thus there are many nows numerically, yet one specifically. Add: if there were only one now in all of time, it would be co-extensive with time itself — for time is one, and therefore one instant would also exist; but it cannot be that the now, which is indivisible, should be co-extensive with the whole of time, which is divisible to infinity; therefore it is likewise impossible that there should be only one now in all of time.

Objection I: Aristotle in the cited *text 101* seems explicitly to assert that there is in all of time only one now numerically, because the now produces time, just as a point produces a line, and he illustrates this with the example of Coriscus, who is one and the same numerically, even though he successively exists in the house and in the forum. He always remains substantially the same, even though he changes accidentally; similarly the now is always the same in time substantially,

even though it differs according to various relations and accidents. Reply: besides the interpretation already offered, which is more conformable to Aristotle and closer to the truth, as Bonetus in the cited place attests, it can also be said that the Philosopher speaks there in the manner of the Mathematicians, who think that a point flows through a line; so too the now he indicates traverses time, just as Coriscus at one time seeks the house and at another time ascends to the theatre — and similarly the now is related to the past, of which it is the end, and to the future, of which it is the beginning.

Objection II: Unless the same now persisted throughout all of time according to substance, it would certainly be corrupted; for the same thing either persists or is corrupted: but it cannot be corrupted — for it would be corrupted either in itself or in another instant, and this either preceding or subsequent, either immediate or mediate; but it cannot be corrupted in any of these ways: not in itself, otherwise it would both be and not be simultaneously; not in a preceding instant, otherwise it would be corrupted before it existed; not in an immediately following instant, since there are no immediately consecutive instants; not in a mediate instant, because between two instants there is a part of time — therefore the same now remains in all of time. Reply: generation and corruption properly belong to sublunary substance, as I noted elsewhere, and its production is measured by the instant; but an instant is not measured by an instant, just as time is not measured by time, since a measure differs from what is measured. Therefore the now and other indivisibles are said to begin and cease to be, for inception and cessation of things have a broader application than generation and corruption.

You will ask: is time the cause of the corruption of things? The common view holds that time overturns and devours all things, and thus time is called "time the devourer of all things" (*tempus edax rerum*). But time is not per se the cause of their corruption, since it belongs to the genus of quantity, which is not active; but per accidens, insofar as things that endure through time or coexist with time are corrupted either by an intrinsic principle — through the extinction of natural heat or the consumption of the radical moisture — or from without, by water or fire, concerning which we have daily experience of the coming-to-be and perishing of sublunary things; and this is indicated by Aristotle in 4 *Phys.*, T. 128. I do not omit the admonition of St. Augustine in *De verbis Domini*, *serm.* 39: "The days themselves, hastening, pass away, because this day has shut out yesterday; the days themselves do not stand still — why do you wish to stand still with them?" And in *De verbis Domini*, *serm.* 42, according to John: "Words run on and hours fly; so does our life, so does this happiness of ours — all our time passes away, and the Word of the Lord abides forever."

Book VIII. On Motion.

Aristotle treats of motion both in *3 Phys.* and in *5 of the same work*, since it is the principal attribute of a natural body, and without a knowledge of it, nature itself is unknown, as the same Philosopher warns at the beginning of *3 of the cited book*. And it is of use for investigating the Intelligences that move the celestial orbs, and for attaining knowledge of God most good and great, who is the beginning and end of all motion. For in Him we live, and move, and have our being (*Acts XVII*).

Question I. On the Nature of Motion.

Article I. Whether Motion Exists.

Although it is clearer than light that motion exists, nevertheless, on account of the objections — or rather the quibbles — of Zeno, which will be dissolved below, the present article is established. For Zeno himself, as Aristotle reports in *8 Top.*, *c. 3*, and *6 Phys.*, *c. 1*, *T. 75*, denies that motion exists; against whom stand Aristotle just cited and all the other Philosophers who admit motion, with whom the assertion is made.

Assertion: Motion exists. This is presupposed by the Doctor in *9 Met.*, *quaest. 14*, and *11 of the same work*, *sum. 4, cap. 1, in com.*, and in *2 dist. 2, quaest. 9*, and in *Rep.*, *quaest. 2, primi dist. 2, §. Ad 2. rationem*. It is evident to the senses and visible to the eye. For celestial and sublunary things are seen to move every day; and so a certain person said against Zeno, who denied motion, that argument is not to be used against him, but walking. Indeed, if anyone were now stubbornly to refuse to admit motion, he should be struck until he confessed that the one striking him was moving the rod to beat him. Moreover, each thing possesses its own power for attaining its own end; otherwise such a power would be superfluous. Hence the common saying: "A power that is not reduced to act is pointless." But a natural body possesses the power of moving itself from place to place. For since all natural things are of finite and limited perfection, they consequently move to acquire for themselves the good and perfection they lack — as an ox moves toward eating hay, a lion toward devouring flesh, a horse toward oats, man toward gold, and so with the rest; therefore motion is manifest, and it is better presupposed than proved. I add with Scotus in *4 dist. 12, quaest. 2, §. Quantum ad istam, ante A.*, drawn from *5 Phys.*, *Summ. 2, cap. 1, T. 26*: it is foolish to seek a reason where we have something more certain than reason, such as true sensation and indubitable experience. Hence the same Doctor in the *Reportatio* cited above places the existence of motion among per se known contingent propositions.

You will object first: if motion existed, the mobile would traverse, in finite time, an infinite space; but the infinite is not traversable, as stated in *3 Phys.*, *40*; therefore there is no motion. The consequence of the major is shown: if a

mobile is moved through some space, it is necessary that it traverse all the parts of that space; but the parts of space are infinite, because space is divisible into other and yet other parts to infinity. I deny the consequence of the major; to its proof I say that space is traversed by a mobile in terms of its aliquot parts, which are of determinate and finite quantity — by reason of which the space is called great or small — and not in terms of proportional parts, which are always divisible and to which one never arrives at a last one. Therefore Zeno's argument is inconclusive, for it passes from aliquot parts to proportional parts, which is a manifest sophism.

You will object second: if motion existed, a mobile could be moved either in the terminus from which or in the terminus toward which; but it can be moved in neither way; therefore motion is not to be admitted. The major is urged: it cannot be moved in the terminus from which because motion begins from it, nor in the terminus toward which because motion ends in it, and it cannot be in both termini simultaneously since it cannot be in two places at once, nor in neither of them since it moves from one to the other. Reply: the mobile is moved on the way, that is, in that interval that lies between the terminus from which and the terminus toward which; motion begins from the terminus from which and ends at the terminus toward which. The remaining objections raised by Zeno and others may be seen in Aristotle cited and his interpreters — objections so thoroughly overthrown and defeated that no one any longer has the will or the right to vindicate them from destruction.

Article II. What Motion Is.

The nature and essence of motion seems to be deeply hidden and difficult to grasp, as Aristotle indicates in *3 Phys.*, *Summ. 2, cap. 5, T. 12*, from the variety and multiplicity of opinions of the ancient Philosophers in transmitting, assigning, and explaining the definition and quiddity of motion. For some suspect motion to be alteration, some diversity, others inequality, and there are those who would have it be a non-being. Others, however, with Aristotle in the passage cited at *T. 6, cap. 2*, teach that motion is the act of a being in potency as it is in potency; and at *T. 16*, that motion is the act of the mobile as the mobile is; and at *T. 23*, that motion is of that which can act and be acted upon, as such. These three definitions of motion mean nearly the same thing and are apt, but the first is more celebrated, more precise, and better, and is therefore to be received, held, and defended against the darts of adversaries by which it is assailed.

Assertion: Motion is rightly defined as the act of a being in potency as it is in potency. So holds Scotus with Aristotle in *1 Met.*, *T. 8, sum. 4, cap. 1*, and in *Quol. 3, H*. It is explained before being proved. "Act" means an inchoate and imperfect action, as the same Aristotle explains in *3 Phys.*, *5*: for the mobile moves toward acquiring something, and therefore motion, which is the way and tendency toward that thing, is aptly an act or operation begun and imperfect. "Of a being" is added — namely, a physical being, or natural body, as Aristotle indicates in *5*

Phys., T. 10, and in *11 Met.*, *sum.* 4, T. 8, where Scotus in his commentary also notes: for the subject of motion is an existing natural body, from which mobility as its principal attribute flows. "In potency, as it is in potency" is subjoined, because the mobile has the potency toward that which it actually lacks, and insofar as it participates in such potency it is moved to acquire it for itself. For this reason God, who has all things and is most actual and most perfect, is subject to no motion. The definition of motion explained in this way is then urged as follows: first, an adequate definition is one that consists of genus and difference, as I have urged more than once above; but the above-given definition of motion is of this kind — for "act" is its genus, and the remaining terms serve as its difference; therefore it is a correct and adequate definition. Second, it is proved by Aristotle through induction across the individual motions: for there are six principal motions mentioned by Stagira in *Postpraedicam.*, *cap.* 14 — alteration, generation, corruption, increase, decrease, and local change; and all of these individually participate in the stated definition of motion, so that alteration is the act of what is alterable as it is alterable, generation is the act of what is generable as it is generable, and so with the rest; therefore the definition of motion is well given.

Objection I: The definition just given does not include every motion; therefore it is not a good one. The antecedent is proved: intellection and volition are indeed motions, but not of a natural body but of an intellectual nature. And likewise these operations belong to God, who succumbs to no motion. I deny the antecedent. To its proof I say, with Aristotle in *9 Met.*, T. 16, that those operations are not properly motion in the sense in which we speak of motion here, but rather are the terminations and ends of the powers of the intellect and will — especially in God, since they are really identical with Him; and they pertain to man insofar as they proceed from the rational soul, which is an intrinsic and essential part of man himself, who is contained under natural body.

Objection II: If motion is an act, which in Greek is called *entelecheia*, then since the soul is an act, the soul will be motion — which is false; therefore motion is not an act as stated above. Reply: motion is a second and formally accidental act, while the soul is a first and substantial act. *Entelecheia* is a name common to both of the aforementioned acts. Hence Scotus in the cited passage at *11 Met.* notes that the name *entelecheia* placed in the definition of motion means nothing other than the way to perfection, or to the good, toward the acquisition of which the mobile is moved.

Article III. Whether the Stated Definition of Motion Applies to Every Motion.

Fonseca in *5 Met.*, c. 3, q. 9, *Sect.* 1, Pererius in *lib.* 13, *cap.* 5, Andun. in *5 Phys.*, *quaest.* 2 & 3, and the Coimbrans in *3 Phys.*, *cap.* 2, *quaest.* 1, *art.* 1, hold that the stated definition belongs only to successive motion. But Scotus in *quaest.* 44

Praedicam., Antonius Andreas in *11 Met., quaest. vn.*, Canon in *5 Phys., quaest. 2, artic. 3*, Parisiensis in the same place at *quaest. 1, fol. 59*, Fuentes in *3 Phys., diff. 2, artic. 1*, and the Coimbrans in *disp. 16, quaest. 2, §. 2, num. 16* include under this definition every motion, both successive and instantaneous.

Note from the Doctor just cited that motion can be taken in two ways: first, generically, as it abstracts from every change whether momentary or temporal; second, specifically, for successive motion only — about which Aristotle speaks in *5 Phys., cap. 1*, and in *11 Met., sum. 4, cap. 3*, where he denies that generation is a motion, with which the Doctor agrees both there and in *2 d. 12, q. 1, §. Ad argumentum*.

Assertion: The definition of motion given above agrees with both successive and instantaneous motion. So holds the Doctor in the *Praedicam.* cited. This is urged first from Aristotle, who in *3 Phys., T. 6* illustrates the said definition of motion by examples from instantaneous motion — such as generation — and from successive motion, such as alteration; and earlier in the *Postpraedicam.* he presents six species of motion, among which he places generation — which is sudden motion — and alteration — which is temporal motion; therefore according to Aristotle the present definition includes both successive and momentaneous motion.

You will say, with Fonseca cited, that generation can be taken in two ways: either for the preliminary dispositions necessary for generation itself, or for the introduction of the substantial form into the pre-existing matter — and this is instantaneous, about which Stagira does not speak in the passages noted, but about what precedes it, which is a successive temporal process and which coincides with alteration. Against this: alteration and generation differ from one another as two species contained under the same genus, as Aristotle states in *Postpraedicam.* cited; therefore, since the same Philosopher in *3 Phys.* cited enumerates those very species of motion and gives examples of each, he does not take one for the other, but since they are distinct from each other, he offers distinct examples of them as distinct.

You will say, with Scotus in the present *quaest. 1*, that Aristotle there speaks of generation not properly and formally as generation is, but of its terminus, which is preceded by alteration — and so he first placed alteration, which is followed by generation taken as the terminus itself, which is produced in an instant and by which it is specified. Against this: the terminus of generation is extrinsic to generation itself, just as the terminus of any other motion is extrinsic to it, since the terminus is posterior to the motion — for motion is the way and tendency toward the terminus. Therefore, since Aristotle speaks of motion formally taken and gives examples of its species, he does not discourse about the terminus of generation nor adduce examples from the termini of the other motions — as can be seen in *T. 11*, where he distinguishes building, which is motion, from its terminus, which is the house; and in *T. 22* he distinguishes teaching, which is

motion, from learning, which is its terminus. And he does the same with generation, whose terminus is the substantial form produced in matter. Moreover, each motion has its own terminus distinct from that of the rest — alteration has quality, increase has quantity, and generation has the form drawn forth or introduced — and thus Stagira does not use "generation" for its terminus. Second: in the text cited, the Philosopher speaks of motion, and notes there at *T. 1, 2, Phys., T. 1* in the definition of nature that he will treat of motion in those places; and there he treats of motion taken universally, abstracting from simultaneous and successive motion, whose nature is the principle of both; therefore the definition given of it befits both; otherwise another general definition of motion common to both would need to be given, whereas none other has been given by him; and indeed in *11 Met., sum. 4, cap. 3*, where the Philosopher speaks of motion universally and of its individual species, he offers the same definition of motion that he had given and explained in *3 Phys., T. 6*. Moreover, the said definition is correctly adapted to both instantaneous and temporal motion: for in truth generation is the act of what is generable as it is generable, just as alteration is the act of what is alterable as it is alterable.

You will say: in the passage of the *Met.* just cited, Aristotle expressly denies that generation is properly a motion; therefore generation and any other instantaneous motion are not included under that definition. The reply must be that the Philosopher there removes generation from the series of successive motions, as he had already done in *5 Phys., T. 5*, and as I noted in the preceding note.

Objection I: From *3 Phys., T. 1*: motion belongs to the genus of continuous things, not indeed of permanent ones, but therefore of successive ones; the same is found in *4 of the same work, T. 99*, and in *5 Met., T. 18*; therefore the definition just given is adapted only to successive motion. Reply: Aristotle said this because successive motion is more open and evident, and did not deny that generation and the other species enumerated above are contained in the said definition, since he himself says there that if motion is unknown, nature is also unknown — but it is certain that nature is the principle and cause not only of successive but also of instantaneous motion.

Objection II: To be an act in potency as it is in potency suggests that motion is partly being done and partly yet to be done; but being done and yet to be done imply succession; therefore that definition is adapted only to successive motion. Reply: by those words it is only designated that motion is an inchoate and intrinsically imperfect act, looking toward a more perfect act. Hence God alone is immobile, because He alone is perfect; while other things are mobile and tending toward further perfection, whether substantial or accidental.

Article IV. Whether Motion Is Something Absolute or Relative.

Many who admit motion are divided into two camps: some think it is something absolute and locate motion in the genus of quantity, holding it to be a species of successive quantity; others think it is a certain absolute mode, as they judge concerning the six last predicaments, of which I made mention in *Log., lib. 3, q. 5, art. 1*. Scotus, however, in *2 d. 14, q. 2, §. Ad 1 arg. L.*, and in *Rep. ibid.*, and in *4 d. 13, q. 1, §. Ad huius autem*, Mayr in *2 d. 8, q. 2*, Ballesteros in *4 d. 48, q. vn.*, Vorrilong in the same place at *d. 10, termino 2*, Joan de Magistris in *3 Phys., q. 2*, and Parisiensis in that place at *§. In oppositum, fol. 47*, affirm that motion is a relative being.

Note first that in every motion two principal termini intervene: the terminus from which and the terminus toward which. The terminus from which is where motion begins; the terminus toward which is where motion ends. Then, some termini are primary — such as a habit and its privation; others are concomitant, which follow upon the primary termini and which occur in the augmentation of a quality. For the degrees that follow upon a quality in its increase, such as five or six, are called concomitant termini; the primary termini are mutually impossible in the same subject, while the concomitant ones are compossible.

Note second that motion can be taken in two ways: first, materially — that is, for the form acquired or to be acquired through motion; second, formally — that is, for the relation coming to the mobile from without with respect to the mover. In order that this may be better understood, note that six entities are found in any motion: the first is the mover, the second is the mobile, the third is the flowing form, the fourth is the flux of the form, the fifth is the relation coming from without of the mover to the mobile, and the sixth is the relation coming from without of the mobile to the mover. Now the question is which of the aforementioned entities is formally motion.

Assertion: Motion formally is not something absolute but is the relation coming from without of the mobile to the mover. The Doctor transmits this in the passages noted. This is urged first: what is absolute is what is in relation to itself, while what is relative is what is carried toward another, as I explained at length in *Epit., lib. 1, quaest. 1, art. 6*; but motion is toward another — for it is the way and tendency toward the terminus toward which, as I noted above; therefore motion is a relative being. Second: motion is described as the act of a being in potency as it is in potency; but act or action is a relative form, belonging to the genus of action and coming from without, as I taught in the passage noted at *quaest. 4, art. 10*; therefore motion is the stated relation. This reason is intimated by Aristotle in *3 Phys., T. 11*, who calls the motion of building an action, which is the act of building; and in the same place at *T. 27, 22* he calls the motion of teaching a "teaching" (*doctio*), which likewise is an action residing in the predicament of action; and in *5 Phys., cap. 1, T. 5* he names the motion of whitening a "whitening" (*dealbatio*), which is equally an action of the same genus. Third: motion is not the mover, because that is its cause; nor is it the mobile,

because that is its subject; nor is it the flowing form, since this can exist without the former, as whiteness can exist without actual whitening, as Stagira explicitly writes in the passage just cited; nor is it the flux, since flux includes succession, which does not belong to the intrinsic character of motion, as will be said in the following article; nor is it the relation of the mover to the mobile, since otherwise, as God is the mover of all things, motion would be in God — which is false. It therefore remains that motion is the relation coming from without of the mobile to the mover.

Objection I: Aristotle in *5 Met.*, *T. 8*, and Scotus in the same place and in *Quol. 11*, place motion in the category of quantity; but what is located in that predicament is absolute; therefore motion is something absolute. Confirmed from St. Augustine in *lib. 83, quaest., quaest. 35*: love is a certain motion; but love is an absolute being, since it belongs to the genus of quality; therefore so is motion. Reply through explanation and distinction of the major: Aristotle and Scotus speak there of motion materially taken — that is, for the form acquired or to be acquired through motion, as I noted in the second note. For that reason the same Philosopher treats of motion and its species in the *Postpraedicam.* but not of motion formally taken, of which I now speak. The same is to be said of the confirmation. For Augustine there subjoins that motion is toward something, intending to indicate to us that love is indeed a quality if its motion is taken materially, but is a relation if it is taken formally.

Objection II: Motion implies some perfection: for those things that are moved are moved for the sake of acquiring some perfection; but relation implies no perfection; therefore motion is not the stated relation. I grant the major and distinguish the minor: relation does not imply perfection simply speaking, I grant; in a certain respect, I deny. And especially because it suffices that through motion there be acquired an absolute form that includes perfection. Hence in the divine, the relations of origin formally designate no perfection, but really they do, since they are really identical with the divine essence, which is the infinite sea of all perfections.

Objection III: What is the cause of an absolute thing is itself absolute, since an absolute thing is produced and caused only by an absolute thing, and a relative thing is too imperfect to be the cause of an absolute thing and for the absolute to depend essentially on it, as Scotus states in *2 dist. 14, quaest. 2 in fine*; but motion is the cause of something absolute — hence we have that frequently repeated saying, "motion is the cause of heat," and the Heaven is said to exert influence on these inferior things principally through motion; therefore motion is to be expelled from the genus of absolutes. I grant the major and distinguish the minor: per se, I deny; per accidens, I grant — in roughly the same way as I said above that time is not per se but per accidens the cause of the corruption of natural things, as Joan. de Magistris holds in *1 Meteor., quaest. 3, dub. 2*.

Article V. Whether Succession Belongs to the Essence of Motion.

Some, whom Raconius follows in *disp. de motu, quaest. 2, propositione prima*, and whom two of our recent authors support in *disp. 5, quaest. 1*, assert that succession enters the essence of motion. But Scotus in *2 dist. 2, quaest. 9, §. Ad argumenta post L.*, to whom his interpreters adhere in the same place, and among the recent authors Tolet in *5 Phys., q. 1*, the Coimbrans in *3 Phys., c. 2, quaest. 2, art. 3*, Fonseca in *5 Met., cap. 13, quaest. 8, sect. 3*, and Suarez in *disp. 49, sect. 2 & 4* does not dissent — these all deny that succession is included in the essence and nature of motion.

Note that this difficulty is discussed about motion taken generically; for about motion taken specifically there is another question, particularly about local motion, to be examined and decided below in *quaest. 3, art. 2*. Moreover, it should be recalled from what was said that the succession of motion can arise in two ways: either from the divisibility of the mobile, which is continuous and divisible into prior and posterior parts; or from the divisibility of the space to be traversed, which is continuous and has parts after parts divisible to infinity.

Assertion: Succession is not of the essence of motion, nor is it its attribute.

This is deduced from the Doctor cited above and follows from what was said in *quaest. 1 of this book, art. 3*, in which I established that the definition of motion belongs to every motion. The first part is proved thus: first, from Aristotle in *3 Phys., T. 6*, who proves the stated definition of motion by induction from alteration — which is successive motion — and from generation — which is instantaneous motion; but if succession were enclosed in the essence of motion, the definition would undoubtedly not be adapted to generation, which is sudden; therefore etc. Second: God, when He works miracles, does not take away the essences and natures of things but preserves them whole and unharmed, as is plain from the Babylonian fire and from the sea upon which Christ walked; but God can bring about motion without any succession — as in the Scotist school, when the body of Christ is brought from heaven into the consecrated host in an instant, with the pronunciation of the words of consecration — therefore motion is not essentially successive. Third: by divine power what is prior can be separated from what is posterior, provided the latter does not depend essentially on the former — as substance depends on the accident that inheres in it; but motion precedes succession, as I inferred above, nor is there any essential dependence between them, since motion can be without succession and abstracts from the successive and the instantaneous; therefore succession is not intrinsic and essential to motion.

The second part is evident: for an attribute, according to Scotus in *2 dist. 16, quaest. vn.*, is really identical with the thing of which it is an attribute and is inseparable from it; but motion, from what has been said, can exist without succession; therefore succession is not its attribute. Moreover, an attribute that proceeds from the essence of a species is not an attribute of the genus — as risibility, which is an attribute of man, is not an attribute of animal; otherwise, if

it belonged to animal generically taken, it would likewise belong to all the species that fall under it, which is plainly false. But succession belongs to motion taken specifically — namely, to the continuous and temporal motion — and therefore does not belong to motion taken generically.

Objection I against the first part: Aristotle in *lib. Praedicam., c. de quantitate*, places motion among the species of successive quantity, for he says there that there are two species of successive quantity, motion and time; and he seems to repeat this in *5 Met., c. 13, T. 18*. Therefore according to Aristotle, succession pertains to the essence of motion. Reply: the Philosopher is to be expounded as speaking of motion not formally but materially taken — that is, of the form acquired through motion, which is continuous and successive.

Objection II: Motion is essentially either instantaneous or temporal and successive, for there is no middle ground between these; but motion is not essentially instantaneous — since a natural agent in operating does not move in an instant, and hence we have the celebrated maxim, "nature acts in time." Therefore it is essentially successive and temporal. Reply: motion in itself abstracts from both, just as animal abstracts from rational and irrational, and body from animate and inanimate. Nature does not operate in an instant because of the weakness and feebleness of its power. But a supernatural agent, because it possesses the greatest power and infinite potency, therefore operates in an instant.

Objection III: A measure must be of the same genus as what is measured, as stated in *10 Met., T. 4*; but time, which is the measure of motion, is successive, as is clear from its definition; therefore motion, which is measured by time, is continuous and successive. I grant the major and distinguish the minor: regarding continuous and successive motion, I grant; regarding motion in itself and taken generically, I deny. For time is the measure of continuous and successive motion, not of motion in itself and taken generically.

Article VI. How Many Kinds of Motion There Are.

There are many divisions of motion, of which some are called essential and others accidental. Among the essential ones, the first division is into instantaneous and successive motion, of which the Doctor makes mention in *2 d. 2, q. 9*. The second is into motion whose extremes are both positive, and into motion whose terminus from which is privation and terminus toward which is its habit — that is, a positive terminus — which Scotus touches upon in *4 d. 109, q. 1*. The third is into substantial motion, whose terminus is substance, and accidental motion, whose terminus is an accident — and this is indicated by the Doctor in *the commentary on 11 Met., sum. 4, c. 3*. The fourth is into natural, violent, and neutral — which Scotus indicates in *2 d. 2, q. 6, §. Ad propositum O.*, and *4 d. 48, q. 2*.

For discerning all essentially different motions, a certain and indubitable canon is available, drawn from Aristotle in *5 Phys.*, c. 4, T. 31, and Scotus in *1 d.* 2, q. 7, §. *Ad primum* T., and *d.* 13, q. vn., §. *Hic sunt A.*, and *3 d.* 14, §. *Ad 1. argum. ante E.*: motion is specified from the terminus toward which, such that there are as many essentially different motions as there are termini essentially distinct from one another. The reason is ready at hand, because motion formally is a relation, as has been said in *art. 4 of this quaest.*, and that relation is specified by its terminus, as I showed in *Log.*, l. 3, q. 6, *art. 7*. From this rule it can be conveniently seen which of the aforementioned divisions of motion are essential and which not. For indeed, if the termini of the primary division are of the same species — whether they come about in an instant or successively — the motions thereof will likewise be of the same species; thus if whiteness is produced in an instant or successively, it makes no difference — the "whitenings" of it are not essentially different, even if one is instantaneous and the other temporal. And Stagira clearly shows this in the passage just cited. The second division also does not appear to be essential, because it is drawn from the terminus in which (*terminus in quo*), which does not pertain to the essential character of motion, as will be plain in the next question. Intimating this, Aristotle enumerates motion and its species among the postpredicaments, as well as opposites and their members — contraries, privatives, contradictories, and relatives — in which motion occurs; and he touches on this not obscurely in *5 Phys.*, T. 7, where he presents a fourfold mode in which motion can occur. Therefore, whether motion presupposes a positive terminus from which, or a privative or negative one, this does not pertain to its essence and quiddity. The third, however, is essential, since the termini toward which of those motions are essentially different: for substance and accident are essentially different — as no one fails to see. The fourth is accidental, since it is drawn from the diverse relationship that the subject has to the form to be induced in it through motion: for if the subject inclines toward it, its motion is called natural; if it resists, the motion is called violent; and if it has neither inclination, it is called neutral. Therefore that division imports nothing pertaining to the essence of motion, and hence is not established as essential.

I add one essential tripartite division, according to the aforementioned canon, from *5 Phys.*, *sum.* 1, *cap.* 3, T. 10: into motion toward quantity — whose species are increase and decrease; toward quality — which is alteration, whose species are intension and remission; and toward place — which is local motion, whose species are listed in *7 Phys.*, T. 10: pushing, pulling, carrying, and rolling.

Furthermore, among the accidental divisions of motion, there are several besides those already listed: one into fast and slow motion, as stated in *4 Phys.*, T. 96; another into straight and reflex, as in *8 Phys.*, T. 64; a third into simple and mixed, as in *1 Caeli*, T. 7; a fourth into regular or uniform and irregular or difform, as in *2 Caeli*, T. 36. Concerning all of these we will speak in their proper places.

You will ask first: in what predicament does motion reside? Reply through distinction: motion materially taken is located in the predicament in which its terminus or form acquired through it is placed — so if its terminus is quantity, its motion is placed in the predicament of quantity; if it is quality, its motion is inscribed in the predicament of quality; and if it is "where" (*ubi*), it has its seat in the category of "where," as Scotus intimates in *Quol. 11, §. De quarto sub I.*, after Aristotle in *5 Phys., T. 10, 18*. But motion formally taken is located in the predicament of passion, because what relates a patient to its agent is passion, as Aristotle states in *5 Met., c. de relatione*, who establishes that the second genus of relatives is founded upon active and passive power, or upon action and passion; but the mobile, which is the patient, is related to the mover, which is the agent, through motion; therefore motion formally resides in the category of passion. So think Canon in *3 Phys., quaest. 1, art. 2*, and Parisiensis in the same place at *quaest. 2, fol. 48*, from whom Suarez in *disp. 49, Met., Sect. 2, 4* does not appear to deviate.

You will ask second: to how many predicaments per se does motion belong? Aristotle in *5 Phys., T. 10*, and Scotus in *1 dist. 3, quaest. 7, §. Ad argumenta pro 2. opinione infra R.* reply: to three only — quantity, quality, and "where." The reason is that motion per se and specifically taken — about which speech is instituted in the passage just noted — is continuous and successive, which can be effected only in those three categories; in the rest, change and not motion occurs, as the Doctor states concerning relation in *5 Met., quaest. 6, §. Ad aliud de relatione*. Hence two of our recent authors in *disp. 15, quaest. 6, art. 4*, placing motion per se in the category of substance, openly fight against Aristotle, Scotus cited, and *11 Met., summa 4, cap. 3*, and against the reason stated above.

Question II. On the Distinction and Unity of Motion.

Article I. How Motion Is Distinguished.

There is uncertainty about three things: the mover, the mobile, and the terminus toward which. Ockham in *2, quaest. 9* and his disciples acknowledge no distinction between motion and those three things just named. Others, whom the Coimbrans in *3 Phys., c. 2, quaest. 3, art. 2*, and Raconius in *disp. de motu, quaest. 3, propof. 2* follow, establish a formal distinction between motion and its terminus toward which. But the common opinion is that of Scotus in *2 dist. 1, quaest. 5, Secundum primam T.*, and *3 dist. 14, quaest. 1, §. Ad 1. ante F.*, and *4 dist. 43, quaest. 1, §. Aliter ponitur D.*, Canon in *3 Phys., quaest. 1, art. 1, propof. 1*, Tatar in the same place at *dub. 1*, Joan. de Magistris at *quaest. 2*, Parisiensis, Ruvio in *tract. 1 de motu, quaest. 4*, and Aureolus in *2 dist. 1, quaest. 3, art. 1*, who affirm that motion is really distinguished from the mover, the mobile, and the terminus toward which.

First Assertion: Motion really differs from the mover and the mobile. This is presupposed by the Doctor cited. The first part is proved: an efficient cause is

really distinct from its effect; for if it were identical with it, the same thing would be the cause of itself — which St. Augustine infers in *1 Trin.*, c. 3 as a great inconvenience and absurdity. But the mover is, as it were, the efficient cause of motion: for motion arises from the mover; therefore motion is really distinguished from the mover. Moreover, the mover can exist without motion, just as an agent can exist without action and a subject without an accident — and things that can exist and be separated from one another really differ, as Aristotle states in *7 Top.*, c. 8, 9, and Scotus in *2 d. 1, quaest. 4, §. Contra istam ante Alterum*. Motion is the relation of the mobile to the mover, as was established in the first question of this book, *art. 4*; and that relation is really distinguished from the foundation from which it proceeds, as I wrote in *Log.*, *lib. 3, quaest. 6, art. 4*. Therefore there exists a real distinction between the mover and motion. The first part of the second assertion is proved thus: what is in a subject is really distinguished from that very subject in which it is subjected, as is clear from accident and substance, from what is located and place, and universally from the contained and its container; but motion is in the mobile as in its subject, as is clear from its definition — for motion is defined as the act of the mobile as the mobile is, in *3 Phys.*, T. 9. Second: the mobile can exist without motion, for it is not necessary that the mobile always be actually moved; it can cease from motion and rest, just as anything rests in its own center; but between things of which one can exist while the other does not, a real distinction is clearly had, as stated in *7 Top.*, *cap. 1, loco 12*. Therefore since the mobile and motion are related in this way, it is evidently shown that they really differ from one another.

Second Assertion: Motion really differs from the terminus toward which. This is defended by the Doctor in the passages cited above, and is proved thus: first, what is prior to another by priority of time is really distinguished from what is temporally posterior; but motion temporally precedes the terminus toward which, since through motion that terminus is successively acquired — as is most especially the case in local motion; therefore they really differ from one another. Second: an absolute thing is really distinguished from a relation, especially one coming from without, since the absolute is a prerequisite and presupposed for the latter; but motion is a relation coming from without of the mobile to the mover, as is plain from what has been said; and the terminus toward which is most often something absolute — such as quantity, quality, or substance. Moreover, an accident is really distinguished from substance, as Stagira clearly shows in *7 Met.*, T. 4; but motion is an accident, since it inheres in the mobile, and the terminus toward which in substantial generation is substance. Finally, many things are attributed to motion that cannot belong to the terminus toward which: for motion is the way and progress toward the terminus, and is fast or slow, and so on — all of which cannot be accommodated to the terminus toward which; therefore these differ more than rationally and formally from one another.

Objection I: From *3 Phys., cap. 1, T. 4*: motion coincides with the things toward which it is; therefore according to Aristotle, motion is identical with the terminus toward which. Confirmed: a thing in becoming is not distinguished from the very thing in its completed being, just as what is imperfect does not differ from what is perfect — as is plain of man insofar as he is being generated and is generated; but motion is a thing in becoming, and the terminus toward which is the same thing in its completed being. And this seems to be what the Philosopher indicates in *5 Phys., 5*, saying that motion is not whiteness but a whitening. Reply: the Philosopher is to be expounded as speaking of motion materially, not formally taken. For he says there that motion is placed in the predicament in which its terminus is; and since there is per se motion only to three predicaments, it is placed in those three. To the confirmation: I grant the major and deny the minor. For motion is the way to making and completing the thing, not the very thing in becoming or in its completed being; for once the terminus has been acquired and the thing born, motion ceases, and with the thing persisting, motion vanishes, as stated in *1 de gener., T. 55*.

Objection II: Things that are really distinguished from one another are those of which one can be separated from the other, as I have urged more than once above; but motion cannot be separated from the mobile, just as an accident cannot be separated from its subject, and a relation cannot be separated from its terminus; therefore between motion and the mobile, and the terminus toward which, there falls no real distinction. Reply: the major does not hold in the case of relation, which is what motion is, because of the essential dependence that the relation itself imports toward its terminus, as I said in *Log.* in the passage recently mentioned. And moreover, because some — such as Tatar in *cit. dub. 2 in fine* — do not think it inconvenient that motion exist without a mobile, which Scotus seems to intimate in *4 dist. 12, quaest. 4, ante, §. Ad quaest. D.*, and in *Report., quaest. 5*.

You will ask: whether motion is distinguished from action and passion? Reply by distinguishing, with Scotus in *4 dist. 13, quaest. 1, §. Ad huius autem H.*, Canon in *3 Phys., quaest. 2, art. 2*, and Joan. de Magistris in the same place at *quaest. 3, scibili 3*: if the three things enumerated are taken materially, for the actual thing and form acquired in the patient, they are the same; but if they are taken formally, they are distinguished from one another. For action is the relation coming from without of the agent to the patient, or of the transmuting to the transmitted; passion is the relation of the patient to the agent, or of the transmitted to the transmuting; while motion is the relation of the mobile to the mover. And action and passion can exist without motion, such as the action and passion of creation. Likewise, when motion ceases, action and passion can still be elicited, as is plain in the case of heavy and light things in their own centers, in which they act and operate even though they rest in them. Moreover, God and the Blessed act without motion and change. Therefore action and passion are joined with motion principally in sublunary and transmutable things, while in the rest

they seem for the most part to abstract from it. Nor is it improbable that motion formally should not differ from passion, since they are of the same genus, as Joan. de Magistris cited intimates — from whom Suarez in the reply to the first point of the preceding article does not dissent.

Article II. From What the Unity of Motion Is Derived.

That the generic and specific unity of motion is to be drawn from both termini — the from which and the toward which — is maintained by Saxonia in *5 Phys.*, *quaest.* 6, Burley in the same place at *quaest.* 2, and Francis Sampson at *quaest.* 6. The common opinion, however, is that of Scotus in *1 dist.* 13, *quaest.* vn., §. *Ad argumenta principalia R.*, and *3 dist.* 14, *quaest.* 1, §. *Ad 1. Sub E.*, and *4 dist.* 43, *quaest.* 1, §. *Aliter ponitur D.*, Parisiensis, Tatar, Joan. de Magistris, and other interpreters of Aristotle in *5 Phys.*, *cap.* 4, *T.* 31, who affirm that the said unity of motion is to be sought from the terminus toward which. The numerical unity of motion is to be derived primarily from three things — namely, from the unity of the mobile, of time, and of the terminus toward which — as the common run of philosophers holds with Aristotle cited at *T.* 34.

Note first that unity is twofold: intrinsic and extrinsic. Intrinsic unity is that which follows upon the thing of which it is the unity; for each being is one, since unity is an attribute of being, as stated in *4 Met.*, *cap.* 2, *T.* 3. It is subdivided into transcendental and predicamental unity; the former belongs to every being, while the latter belongs only to those things that are placed in the categories, and is threefold: generic, specific, and numerical, as stated in *5 Met.*, *T.* 12. Extrinsic unity is that which is derived by reason of something one that is outside the essence of the thing — such as the objective unity of science, as stated in *1 Post.*, *T.* 43, and *3 de Anima*, *T.* 38. So too is the unity of motion with respect to its terminus toward which, which is extrinsic to motion itself, and which is threefold — generic, specific, and numerical — as Stagira indicates in *5 Phys.*, *T.* 31, through those three predicaments to which he wishes per se motion to extend, in accordance with a generic, specific, and numerical terminus toward which, placed in the said predicaments. It is about extrinsic unity that we now speak, because it is better known and more open to us, and it leads us to knowledge of intrinsic unity; and hence it has become established as a maxim among Philosophers that motions are specified by the termini toward which they tend.

Note second from Scotus in *4 dist.* 10, *quaest.* 3, §. *Ad 1. près finem, ad E.*, and *dist.* 43, *quaest.* 1, §. *Aliter ponitur Sub D.*, that numerical unity is twofold: one of identity, the other of continuity. The former follows upon the singular nature primarily from the individual difference (*haecceitas*); the latter arises from parts flowing into one whole. If the parts simultaneously persist and coexist, the unity of a permanent whole results; but if they flow away and one succeeds another, the unity of a successive whole arises — as happens in motion and in time, which is its measure. Moreover, many things intervene in motion, some of

which are necessary and some contingent. The mobile and the terminus toward which are necessary to motion, and are called by Averroes intrinsic to motion itself. The mover and time are extrinsic to it. The resistance of the mobile to the mover, the regularity and irregularity, and the uniformity and difformity of motion are accidental and contingent to it. For sometimes no resistance intervenes — as in the motion of the Heaven; sometimes the resistance of the mobile and of the medium exists — as in the motion of sublunary things; and sometimes no irregularity and difformity befalls the motion itself, as experience confirms.

First Assertion: The generic or specific unity of motion is sought from the terminus toward which. So hold Aristotle and Scotus cited at the beginning of this article, and Scotus in *1 Rep., dist. 13, quaest. vn.* This is urged thus: first, from what a thing is denominated, by that it is specified and takes its unity — as is plain from science, which is denominated, specified, and takes its unity from its object; but motion is denominated from the terminus toward which — as substantial generation is denominated from the generated substance, which is its terminus toward which; and similarly "heating" is denominated from heat, which is its terminus toward which; and "whitening" from whiteness, which likewise is its terminus toward which; therefore from the terminus toward which the generic or specific unity of motion is derived. Second: from some factor the generic or specific unity of motion must be drawn, as no one denies; but it is not taken from the mover, since several movers can concur in producing the same motion — as several pull one ship, several carry the same weight, and similar cases; nor from the medium, since the medium is per accidens related to the unity or diversity of motion; nor from the terminus from which, since the same terminus from which can be the starting point of diverse motions — such as cooling and heating; therefore it is rightly inferred that the said unity is derived from the terminus toward which. All the more so because motion is the way toward it.

Second Assertion: The numerical unity of motion is sought from the unity of the mobile, time, and the terminus toward which. So holds Aristotle in *5 Phys., T. 34*, and in *11 Met., sum. 4, cap. 3*, whom Scotus follows there, and indicates in *4 dist. 43, quaest. 2, §. Tertia opinio sub D.* This is proved: what is one by numerical unity of successive continuity requires the same subject, time, and terminus toward which; but one motion numerically is something one by the unity of successive continuity; therefore for the numerical unity of motion those three things just enumerated are required. The major is readily at hand, because such a unity is an accident that does not migrate from subject to subject; therefore it requires the same subject numerically, in which it inheres. Moreover, since it is a successive continuum, it requires the same time, since time is its measure, and measure and what is measured are of the same genus, as stated in *10 Met., T. 4*; and subsequently it requires the terminus toward which, from which it chiefly derives its numerical unity. The minor is conspicuous, since motion is an

accident, belongs to the genus of successive continuums, is measured by time, and is the way and progress toward the terminus toward which. I add: just as a specific motion derives its specific unity from the specific terminus toward which — as I showed in the first assertion — so a numerical motion derives its numerical unity from the numerical terminus toward which; as whitening derives its unity from whiteness, and this particular whitening from this particular whiteness; and blackening from blackness, and this particular blackening from this particular blackness — the former deriving specific unity from the specific terminus toward which, and the latter numerical unity from the numerical terminus toward which; therefore as many things are required for the numerical unity of motion as were enumerated above.

Objection I: If there is a motion from white to dusky, or to red, or to some other intermediate color, and again from black to the same color, there would be one and the same terminus toward which, even though there would be many motions; therefore from the terminus toward which the unity of motion is not derived. Reply: in the given hypothesis there would indeed be one and the same terminus toward which materially, yet there would be several formally — as I said in *Log., cap. 5, quaest. 1*, that if something is proved through diverse media with four premises and one conclusion, the conclusion will be one materially but twofold formally. Or it can be said that there would be two motions distinct numerically but one specifically, on account of the specific unity of the terminus toward which. Or that there would be two motions intrinsically but one extrinsically.

Objection II: Several specifically distinct motions can have the same terminus toward which — as straight and circular local motion tend toward the same "where," which is the terminus toward which; therefore the specific unity of motion is not taken from the unity of the terminus toward which. The antecedent is from Scotus in *1 d. 2, quaest. 7, §. Ad 1. T.*, and *3 d. 14, quaest. 1, §. Ad 1. ante F.*, and *4 d. 43, quaest. 1, §. Aliter ponitur D.* I deny the antecedent. To its proof I say that those motions differ not essentially but accidentally; for all local motions are of the same species, and if there is any difference among them, it is accidental. Hence just as curvature and straightness are accidental differences of a line, so circularity and perpendicularity are accidents of motion. And just as a white man and a black man are accidentally distinguished, so straight and circular motion differ accidentally — as Tatar attests in *5 Phys., q. 2, scibili 3*, from Scotus in the places cited.

You will press: Aristotle in *1 Caeli, cap. 3 & 4* proves — from the specific difference of straight and circular motion — that besides the four elements there is a fifth body, namely the heaven; therefore straight and circular motion differ from one another by an essential difference, otherwise the Philosopher would not prove that celestial body is essentially distinct from the elements. The reply must be that only an accidental distinction between those motions is

inferred, even though those bodies are essentially distinct from one another, because that argument is dialectical and *a posteriori*, not demonstrative and *a priori* — just as from an accident we arrive at knowledge of substance, and from an operation at knowledge of form; and in this way is Aristotle expounded at 5 *Phys.*, 33.

Objection III: From 8 *Phys.*, T. 49 & 82, the unity of the first mover — one, eternal, infinite, uncaused, and independent — is demonstrated through the unity of the motion of the primum mobile; therefore for the unity of motion, the unity of the mover is required. Reply: Aristotle there demonstrates the essential ordering of things to one first cause and first mover, who is God, the maker of all — on whom all created things depend in being and in operating — and does not intend that the unity of motion be derived from the unity of the mover; for the efficient cause, especially the universal one, does not specify or distinguish things, as is plain from the intellect, which is the universal cause of the sciences but by which the sciences are not specified, but rather by their objects, which are their particular causes. And all the more so because several causes can be causes of one and the same numerical effect, as is plain from things that are equivocally generated, born both by propagation and by putrefaction, as Scotus teaches in 1 *praalleg.* together with Augustine in *Epist. ad Deogratias*.

Objection IV: The progressive motion of an animal does not always require the same mobile; for with one of its parts at rest, another is moved — as when the feet are still, the head is moved; therefore for the numerical unity of motion the numerical unity of the mobile is not required. Reply: the motion of an animal is mixed, composed of the motion of pulling and pushing; but we speak of simple continuous motion, to which the unity of the subject or mobile is necessary. You will press: in 5 *Phys.*, T. 23, the motion of the first and last string of a lyre is continuous in a single time, and yet it has several mobiles — which are those several strings that are moved by a continuous simple motion; therefore the distinction just made between mixed and simple motion is invalid. The difficulty is met by saying that the Philosopher speaks of the motion of the player, which is truly continuous, and not of the motion of the strings, which is discontinuous in accordance with their plurality and diversity — as Aristotle and Scotus touch upon in 5 *Met.*, c. 6, 7, 8.

Objection V: If a dog falling from a high tower were to die in the middle of its fall, there would be one and the same numerically continuous motion, yet the mobile would not be the same, since a living and a dead dog are diverse mobile bodies; and again, a rod of which one part is dry and another part is green, if moved, would be moved by a single continuous motion even though there would be distinct mobiles according to the distinction of the parts; therefore the numerical unity of motion is not derived from the unity of the mobile. Reply: in the given hypothesis the mobile would be the same not in denomination but in

inherence, because the same mobile body, informed by the form of corporeity, persists — just as the same common accidents are possessed by a living and a dead body in which they inhere, as Scotus writes in *2 d. 2, q. 4, §. Ad 1. sub L.*, and *4 d. 12, q. 3*. You will press: Scotus in *5 Met., in com. c. 6, T. 9, in fine* writes that certain continuous things are diverse in subject according to species and form — as in a tree a dry branch alongside a green one, and in a man a withered hand joined to a living arm; therefore according to Scotus, for the numerical unity of motion the unity of the mobile is not required. Reply: in whatever way those things are related — whether living or dead — they have the same subject and the same mobile, because they are informed by a common and the same form of corporeity, even though their partial forms are distinct from one another. Therefore Scotus asserts nothing there that stands in our way, as is plain to anyone who meditates on that passage.

Article III. From What the Contrariety of Motion Is Taken.

Aristotle speaks at length and precisely of the contrariety of motions in *5 Phys., c. 5 & 6*, from *T. 46* to the last; and it is presupposed in the present context as certain that contrary motions exist — such as heating and cooling — and the question is whence their opposition and contrariety is taken. There are as many opinions of philosophers about the specification of the contrariety of motion as there were about its distinction and unity recounted above. For some of those cited think that motion derives its contrariety from both termini — the from which and the toward which; while others, among whom are Scotus in *2 d. 2, q. 7, §. Et ideo ad D. & E.* and his disciples and interpreters, affirm that the opposition and contrariety of motion is to be derived chiefly from the terminus toward which.

Note that Aristotle in the passage cited adduces five modes in which two motions can be opposed to and contrary with one another. The first is when the terminus from which of one is the terminus toward which of the other — as motion from illness and motion toward illness. The second is when the termini from which of both motions are contrary — as motion from health and from illness. The third is when the termini toward which of those same motions are contrary — as motion toward health and toward illness. The fourth is when the terminus from which of one is contrary to the terminus toward which of the other — as motion from whiteness and motion toward blackness. The fifth is when all the termini, both from which and toward which, are contrary — as motion from whiteness toward blackness, and motion from blackness toward whiteness. Among the aforementioned modes of contrariety of motion, two are properly contrary — namely the third and the fifth — as the Philosopher well concludes in the cited passage at *T. 48*: and indeed the third, because each motion respects termini toward which that are contrary to one another; and the fifth, because both motions have termini from which and toward which that are contrary, as is plain from the examples given.

Assertion: The contrariety of motion is derived chiefly from the termini toward which. So holds the Doctor in the passage cited above, after Aristotle in the passage just cited. This is urged thus: first, from what the unity and distinction of motion are taken, from the same its contrariety is also derived — because unity, diversity, opposition, and contrariety follow upon the specification of things; but motion takes its essential unity and distinction from the terminus toward which, as I proved in the two preceding articles; therefore from the same terminus toward which it derives its contrariety. Second: from what a thing takes its name and definition, from that it takes its distinction and contrariety, as Aristotle says in the passage just mentioned; but motion takes its name and definition from the terminus toward which, from the same passage; therefore it also takes its contrariety from the same terminus. Moreover, a relation is specified by its terminus, as I have urged more than once; but motion formally taken is a relation; therefore from the terminus toward which its opposition and contrariety arises.

Objection I: Aristotle in the passage just recounted approves the fifth mode of contrariety above the others, because the motions of that mode participate in contrary termini from which; and they are from contraries and toward contraries; therefore the contrariety of motions is derived from both termini from which and toward which. Reply through explanation and distinction of the antecedent: if we speak of an all-round and comprehensive contrariety of motion, I grant; but if of the most powerful and essential contrariety, I deny. For if the termini from which of two motions are contrary but their termini toward which are the same, the motions will not be contrary — as Aristotle states at *T.* 48, excluding the second mode from proper contrariety of motion.

Objection II: The same Philosopher at *cit. T.* 33 teaches that straight and circular motion differ specifically, even though they tend toward the same terminus toward which — which is "where"; therefore the contrariety of motion is drawn from both termini, the from which and the toward which. Reply by expounding the testimony of Aristotle through distinction: if straightness and circularity are taken in themselves and absolutely, I grant; but if in relation and in order to motion, I deny — just as is plain from a straight and a curved line, in which an accidental difference falls; but straightness and curvature precisely considered differ essentially; and similarly a white man and a black man differ accidentally, while whiteness and blackness differ essentially and specifically from one another.

You will ask: what contrariety exists between motion and rest? Reply with Aristotle in *cap.* 6 of the place cited: a privative contrariety. For rest is the privation of motion, just as blindness is the privation of sight, between which a privative opposition is established.

Article IV. How Motions Begin and Cease.

Taking the occasion offered by the inception and cessation of motions proposed in the title of this article for examination, it pleases me to investigate generally the inception and cessation of things, both permanent and successive, and, omitting what is trivial, to decide briefly and bring to light what St. Augustine shows to be difficult — for he labors and is agitated greatly in *13 De Civitate, cap. 11*, trying to satisfy a similar and related difficulty.

Note first that the inception of a thing means nothing other than the beginning of its duration, and its cessation means the end and terminus of that same duration — so that the inception and cessation of a thing are two extremes and termini within which its duration is enclosed. Now since, from what was said in *the preceding book, quaest. 1, art. 5, not. 2*, there are four principal measures by which things endure and through which we arrive at knowledge of them, therefore all the modes in which instantaneous and temporal, permanent and successive, divisible and indivisible things begin and cease must be stated — and once these are known and clear, it will not be difficult or arduous to attain knowledge of them, as Tatar intimates in *8 Phys., q. 3, dubit. 2*.

Note second from Scotus in *Quol. 12, art. 3, ante §. Ad 1. arg. M.* that there are two modes common to things for beginning and two equally for ceasing. The first mode of beginning is positive and intrinsic, by which a thing begins through its first instant of being, in which it is true to say "the thing is now, and immediately before was not"; and it is called positive and intrinsic because in that moment it posits the thing as beginning and as possessing its own intrinsic existence. The second is negative and extrinsic, by which a thing begins through the last instant of its non-being, by which it is affirmed that "the thing is not now, and immediately after will be." It is called negative because it denies that the thing is in that instant, and extrinsic because it is outside that very instant. The first mode of ceasing is positive and intrinsic, by which a thing ceases through the last of its being, by which it is affirmed that "the thing is now, and immediately after will not be"; the second is negative and extrinsic, by which a thing ceases through its first non-being, by which it is said that "the thing is not now, and immediately before was."

First Assertion: Successive things — such as motion and time — begin through their first non-being and cease through their last non-being. This is defended by Scotus in *2 d. 2, quaest. 9, §. Ad argumenta sub N.*, whom Gadius in *Quol. 12*, Joan. de Magistris in *8 Phys., quaest. 6, scilili 1*, Parisiensis at *quaest. 2, fol. 87*, Tatar cited, and others commonly follow. This is proved thus: first, those that have continuous prior and posterior parts that flow on without end begin and cease extrinsically — that is, through their first non-being and through their last non-being; but motion and time have prior and posterior parts in perennial and continuous flux; therefore they begin and cease extrinsically, through their first non-being and through their last non-being. The major is established because they are successive, partible, and divisible into parts infinitely partible and

divisible, for which it is incompatible to be measured by an indivisible and insectile measure, such as instants and moments. The minor is clear from the definitions of motion and time given above. Second: a measure and what is measured must be proportioned, since they are of the same genus, as stated in *10 Met.*, *T. 4*; but time and motion are continuous and successive; therefore their inception and cessation must be measured by a continuous successive measure, which is expressed through the first and last of their non-being, roughly in the way I explained in the second note.

The inception and cessation of rest are governed by the same measure. The reason is that rest and motion are opposites, and opposites are subject to the same treatment, as stated in *2 Priorum*, *cap. 1, sect. 3*, and *1 Top.*, *cap. 14*, cited by Scotus in *1 Met.*, *in com.*, *cap. 1*. Thus rest begins and ceases as does the motion opposed to it, as Scotus intimates in the passage just cited at *O.*, and in *2 d. 2, quaestio 4, §. Concedo. C.*

You will press: from *6 Phys.*, *cap. 3, T. 31*, the Philosopher seems to wish that rest begins and ceases in an instant; but what begins and ceases in a moment begins and ceases intrinsically, through its first and its last being; therefore the inception and cessation of rest are not to be measured as those of motion, which begins and ceases extrinsically. The reply must be that the Philosopher indeed raises as a question whether anything is moved and rests in a moment, but at the end of that text he concludes and establishes that motion and rest are in time; and therefore that the mobile is moved and rests in time, but in no way in an instant.

Second Assertion: Indivisibles — instants of time, instances of having-changed in motion, generation, illumination, and the like — begin through their first being and cease through their last being. So Scotus in *Quol. 12, art. 3, L.*, and *2 d. 2, q. 6, §. Ad 1. arg. H.* This is proved: such as the being of a thing is, such is its measure — since through the measure we arrive at knowledge of the being, and the measure is proportioned to it; but momentary things are indivisible and impartible; therefore they are measured by an indivisible and impartible measure, such as an instant; and things that are measured by this measure begin through their first being and cease through their last being; therefore the things named above begin and cease in this way. Moreover, whatever begins and ceases, begins and ceases either intrinsically or extrinsically, as I made plain in the second note; but instantaneous and indivisible things do not begin and cease extrinsically, otherwise they would have been successive and partible; therefore intrinsically — which is to begin through the first and to cease through the last of their being.

Third Assertion: Permanent things that have their whole being simultaneously and perfectly begin and cease intrinsically; while those that acquire being successively begin and cease extrinsically. So holds the Doctor in *Quol. 12, §. De tertio L.* The first part is evident: such is the measure as is the entity measured

through it, as stated in *10 Met.*, *T. 4*; but the inception of a permanent thing having its whole being simultaneously endures in the instant, which begins intrinsically; therefore similarly its being begins and ceases intrinsically. The second part is plain: things that endure through time begin and cease extrinsically, as I explained above; and things that come about successively are measured by time, which is the measure of successive things; therefore they begin and cease extrinsically.

You will say: permanent things are measured by the aeon, which is a measure distinct from time; therefore their inception and cessation do not occur through the extrinsic but through the intrinsic. The difficulty is met by saying that this holds of permanent things that have their whole being simultaneously, but not of permanent things whose being is successively acquired.

You will press: from *8 Phys.*, *T. 69*, the corruption of a substantial form ceases extrinsically — that is, through its first non-being — and yet it is a permanent being; therefore the stated principle is not universally true. I say this is not to be sought on the side of the substance itself and its corruption, but on the side of the mover and the mobile, whose action and passion occur successively and in time. And especially because an agent cannot at one and the same instant both corrupt the pre-existing form and introduce a new one into the same subject; and immediate instants do not exist, as the Doctor rightly pursues in the passage cited above, and Lychetus and Gadius demonstrate at length in the same place.

Question III. On the Mobile.

Article I. Whether an Indivisible Can Be Moved Locally.

The prior opinion, held by Averroes in *6 Phys.*, *com. 86*, Janduno at *quaest. 13*, the Coimbrans in the same place at *cap. 10, q. on., art. 2*, and Ruvio, denies that an indivisible can be moved per se. The latter opinion is that of Scotus in *2 d. 2, quaest. 9, §. Ad 3. principale*, Mayr in the same place at *quaest. 12*, Ballesteros at *quaest. 4, art. 2*, Tatar in *6 Phys.*, *quaest. ult., dub. 2*, Parisiensis at *quaest. 3, fol. 75*, Joan. de Magistris, and others in that place, who affirm that an indivisible can be moved locally per se.

Note first that the controversy in the present context is not about a substantial indivisible — such as an Angel or a rational soul, for these are not questioned here as capable of being moved per se — but about an indivisible of quantity, such as a point in a line, an instant in time, and a "having-changed" in motion; and not insofar as such an indivisible is joined to a continuum — for in that case it is moved by the motion of the continuum — but insofar as it is separated and detached from it; and in this way it is investigated whether an indivisible separated from a continuum can be moved by local motion, or by some other motion of alteration, generation, or corruption.

Note second that something can be moved in three ways: first, *per se*, because it is undivided from itself and divided from everything else and is moved — as man; second, through a part — in this way a whole is said to be moved because some part of it is moved, as a man is moved because his hand is moved; third, *per accidens* — in this way, with us being moved, all things that are in us are moved, and so with a vessel being moved, all things that are in the vessel are moved. Moreover, it should be recalled from what was said that the succession and divisibility of motion can be derived either from the divisibility of the mobile, which is continuous and divisible into prior and posterior parts, or from the divisibility of the space to be traversed, which is likewise continuous and has parts after parts divisible to infinity.

Assertion: If an indivisible of quantity were to be separated from a continuum, it could be moved locally *per se*. So holds the Doctor cited. This is proved thus: first, what is moved *per accidens* can be moved *per se* — as is clear from water, which is moved *per accidens* by the motion of a vessel but which would be moved *per se* if separated from the vessel, for it would then be carried to a low place and seek its own center. And this can be illustrated even from a part, which is moved *per accidens* by the motion of the whole but which could move *per se* if removed from it, as is plain from the second note. But an indivisible of quantity is moved *per accidens* by the motion of the continuum; therefore if separated from it, it would be moved *per se*. Nor does it help to say that there is a disparity because to be moved *per se* is to be moved by a motion existing in the thing itself, while to be moved *per accidens* is to be moved by a motion existing in another subject — since in a separated indivisible there would be motion, given that it is a physical being and every physical being is mobile, for mobility is its attribute. And all the more so: if a perfectly spherical body were moved on a flat surface, it would touch that surface at a point — which Aristotle thinks possible in *de Anima*, T. 13, cap. 1 — and that point would be moved locally just as the body would be moved locally; and indeed, if the body were separated from it, the point would certainly be moved, both because it is not immobile — otherwise it would be God — and because the separation of one from another indicates motion. If therefore an indivisible can be separated from a continuum — as the adversaries admit from the hypothesis given — it can certainly be moved *per se*. Again: when a circle is moved, a point existing in it acquires a new and different relation of presentness; therefore it is moved, since it is always in a different state; and if the circle were destroyed while the point persisted, such a point could be transferred to another newly produced circle, and therefore the point itself would be moved. Second: an Angel can exist in a point, as Scotus writes in 2 d. 2, quaest. 6, §. *Ad propositum K.*, whom many theologians follow, among whom are Ockham in *Quol.* 1, quaest. 4, Gabriel in 2 d. 2, q. 2, and the Coimbrans in *cit. art.* 3; and in the given hypothesis, the Angel would move the point and could transfer that very point from one place to another; therefore an indivisible such as a point can be

moved locally per se. The Coimbrans, once the case is admitted of an Angel moving a point, object that it does so not by a continuous but by a discrete and as it were leaping motion — just as a point moved in a globe is moved not continuously but discretely. Against this: an Angel cannot traverse a continuous space except by continuous motion; for it is necessary that it traverse the prior parts before running through the posterior ones, and the middle before the extreme; therefore not by discrete but by continuous motion would it move a point from one place to another. The antecedent is ready at hand: motion is called continuous if the space in which it occurs is continuous, but the space is continuous as the named authors themselves admit; therefore the motion is also continuous; even if it proceeds by leaping, because no passage is made from one extreme to the other without traversing the middle. Again: the rational soul, which is indivisible, moves the body it informs by continuous motion, and if it existed in a point of that body, it could still move it continuously through the parts of the same body; therefore an Angel, possessing greater power, can do the same. Third: an indivisible of quantity has its own gravity or levity, even if slight; but heavy and light things are moved locally, and if extracted from their proper places with every obstacle removed, they are borne to them by their own nature; and no incompatibility is seen. If therefore an indivisible were removed from the continuum, there is no contradiction in its being moved locally.

You will say with Raconius in *disp. de motu, art. 3, quaest. 5* that the aforesaid gravity or levity of the indivisible does not suffice for a point to tend downward or upward, because of its smallness and lack of extension — for motion requires extension of the mobile, of which a point is devoid. Against this: every heavy thing tends downward and every light thing upward, whether great or small — just as every man is risible, whether large or small; therefore an indivisible can be moved, even though it participates in only slight levity or gravity. To say that extension and magnitude are required on the side of the mobile is to beg the question, which I have already refuted and destroyed above.

Objection I: Aristotle in 6 *Phys.*, c. 3, 4, T. 33 expressly denies that an indivisible can be moved per se; and he repeats the same in 8 *Phys.*, cap. 5, T. 40. Therefore our assertion conflicts with Peripatetic doctrine. Reply: the Philosopher is to be expounded as speaking of continuous motion by reason of the mobile — that is, of the indivisible. For an indivisible, as indivisible, cannot be moved divisibly and continuously. And this is also affirmed of an Angel and the other indivisible substances — and not of continuous motion by reason of the space to be traversed. For since the space to be traversed is divisible and continuous, consequently on its part motion is established as divisible and continuous, even if the mobile is impartible and insectile. You will press: the same Aristotle accumulates many arguments to urge that an indivisible cannot be moved per se; but it is plain that an indivisible cannot be moved divisibly, since it is devoid of parts; therefore his meaning is to show that such an indivisible cannot be moved per se either from its own side or from the side of the space. I say that

this holds of an indivisible joined to a continuum, but not of an indivisible separated from it — which is the subject of contention — and perhaps Stagira did not know that an indivisible can be separated from a continuum; and so he speaks absolutely, while we speak conditionally and introduce the said distinction to dissolve the opposing argument. Or say with Scotus cited that his arguments prove nothing other than that the continuity of the motion of an indivisible is not derived from the indivisible itself — as is most clearly evident from his fourth argument, which runs thus: the continuity of time and of the mobile are ordered, since the continuity of time is from the continuity of motion and the continuity of motion from the continuity of the mobile; but the indivisible is not continuous; therefore from it, according to Aristotle, continuity is not derived — but from the divisible space and the continuous mobile; and so our distinction stated above holds in the sense of the Philosopher.

Objection II: Everything that is locally moved is partly in the terminus from which and partly in the terminus toward which; but an indivisible cannot be partly in the terminus from which and partly in the terminus toward which; therefore an indivisible cannot be moved locally per se. The major is supported by the authority of Aristotle and is shown: if the mobile were totally in the terminus from which, it would not be being moved but would be going to be moved; if totally in the terminus toward which, it would not be being moved but would already have been moved; and in both termini simultaneously it cannot be, since it cannot be in two places at once, nor in neither of the termini since it moves from one to the other. The minor is established because an indivisible lacks parts. Reply: the argument is true and valid of a divisible and continuous mobile, which — both from its own side and from the side of space — has divisibility and continuity; but it is futile and empty in the case of an indivisible mobile, which is not divisibly and continuously moved by reason of itself but by reason of divisible space. Or say that it is not necessary for the mobile to consist of parts in order to be moved continuously, but it suffices that with respect to space it be partly in act and partly in potency — which would belong to an indivisible if it were to traverse some space, for it would first pervade a smaller, then a greater, and then the whole.

Objection III: What is locally moved first traverses a smaller space than a greater, and a lesser than an equal, and an equal than the whole; but an indivisible cannot be greater or smaller — for this presupposes the continuity and divisibility of the mobile, which cannot be fitting to what is insectile; therefore an indivisible is incapable of motion per se. I grant the major and distinguish the minor: by reason of itself, I grant; by reason of the space, I deny. For an indivisible is moved continuously by reason of continuous and divisible space.

Article II. Whether Anything Can Be Moved Locally in an Instant.

On this very difficult and arduous article there exist two opinions opposed to one another. One is attributed to Thomas in *4 d. 44, q. 2, art. 3*, and *6 Phys.* cited by Tolet in the same place at *quaest. 3, cap. 3, in tex. 32*, Richard in *1 d. 37, art. 3, quaest. 3*, Raconius in *disp. de motu, sect. 3, q. 2, propof. 2*, and others, who think that for a body to be moved locally in an instant involves incompatibility. The other is that of the Subtle Doctor in *3 d. 2, q. 3, §. quantum ad 2. C.*, and *d. 4, q. vn., §. potest dici, Sub B.*, and *4 d. 43, q. 5, §. de secundo C.*, Joan. de Magistris in *6 Phys., quaest. 2*, Parisiensis in the same place at *fol. 75*, the Coimbrans in *3 Phys., cap. 2, q. 2, art. 3*, Ruvio in *6 of the same work, cap. 3, q. vn., near the end*, and many others, who affirm that local motion can by divine power be effected in an instant.

Note that local motion being accomplished in an instant can be taken in two ways: in one way, with the medium traversed — that is, with the interval that lies between the terminus from which and the terminus toward which traversed; in this way motion cannot be accomplished in an instant, as is plain from Aristotle in *6 Phys., cap. 3*, and *5 Met., c. 13, T. 18*, and Scotus in *2 d. 2, q. 9, sub N.* — for that space which intervenes between the terminus from which and the terminus toward which is continuous and divisible, and consequently can only be traversed successively and in time. In the other way, without the medium being traversed, so that motion is taken solely as the acquisition of a form in the terminus toward which — and the difficulty is whether anything can in an instant be brought or produced from the terminus from which in the terminus toward which. In this sense the authors of the second opinion affirm that local motion can be accomplished in an instant, against which the patrons of the first opinion resist.

Assertion: By supernatural power, local motion can be accomplished in an instant. So holds the Doctor in the passages cited above. This is urged thus: first, from *8 Phys., sum. 4, T. 78*: if there were an infinite power in a magnitude, it would move in no-time — which is the same as in an instant; therefore local motion in an instant is not impossible. Second: the reason why local motion and the form to be acquired through it cannot be accomplished in an instant is either the resistance of the contrary, or the finite power of the mover, or something else enumerated by the Seraphic Doctor in *1 d. 37, art. 2, quaest. 3*; but nothing resists supernatural power — for it is the omnipotence of God and His will, to which nothing can resist, as stated in *Romans IX*. Therefore by divine power local motion can be accomplished in an instant, or the form acquired through motion. The major is ready at hand, for where there is no resistance of the contrary, motion is accomplished in an instant — such as illumination and generation; and a stronger power acts more quickly than a weak one; therefore an infinite power, such as the divine, moves and acts in an instant, as is plain in the creation of things: *Ecclesiasticus XVIII*, "He who lives forever created all things simultaneously." And in the resurrection of the dead: *1 Cor. XV*, "In a moment, in the twinkling of an eye." The same teaches St. Augustine in *11 contra Faustum, cap. 7*, and *serm. 28 de verbis Apostoli*, and in *Ench., cap. 9*; and Bernard

writes the same in *serm. 4 in festo Sanctorum Omnium*. Again: from the most pure blood of the Blessed Virgin, in the instant in which the Virgin spoke those words in *Luke I*, "Behold the handmaid of the Lord; be it done to me according to your word," the Incarnation of the divine Word was accomplished. Finally: that one body by divine power can simultaneously exist in two adequate, discontinuous, and distant places, I proved in *1, 6, q. 2, art. 4*; but such existence of said bodies is not without local motion; therefore local motion can be accomplished in an instant.

Objection I: From *3 Phys., T. 1*: motion belongs to the genus of continua; but what is continuous is divisible, and its motion is successive; therefore local motion cannot be instantaneous. Reply: Aristotle there speaks not of the proper but of the improper and broadly taken genus — just as Goliath is said to be of the race of giants, and Bonaventure of the race of Italians. Hence he appends the word "seems," which is not the voice of one firmly asserting but rather of one questioning.

Objection II: Local motion requires some distance and space that intervenes between the terminus from which and the terminus toward which; but such traversable space is divisible, in which the mobile is moved divisibly, continuously, and successively; therefore instantaneous local motion is incompatible. Reply through distinction of the minor: if the motion takes place with the medium traversed, I grant; but if it is accomplished without the traversal of the medium, I deny — as I made plain above.

Objection III: A mobile that is moved locally is either wholly in the terminus from which or wholly in the terminus toward which; but in the terminus from which it begins to move, and in the terminus toward which it ceases to move; therefore some delay and succession intervenes for the mobile to move from the terminus from which and seek the terminus toward which, and so local motion is always successive. Reply: the mobile is moved wholly in the terminus from which and in one instant — with no medium traversed — is in the terminus toward which. The reason is that in *6 Phys., T. 28*, in instantaneous things the "coming to be" is not distinguished from the "having come to be," nor is the "being changed" distinguished from the "having been changed" — even though it is said to be prior by nature that it is moved in the terminus from which and posterior by nature that it is in the terminus toward which.

Article III. Whether What Is Moved Is Moved by Another.

Aristotle in *7 Phys., T. 1 & 2*, and *8 of the same work, T. 29*, and *12 Met., c. 8, T. 43* puts forth this proposition: whatever is moved is moved by another. Whether this is universally true or not, his interpreters contend. For Thomas in his commentary and many others receive the stated proposition as universally true. But Scotus in *9 Met., q. 14*, Antonius Andreas in the same place at *q. 1*, and not a

few moderns think that it is indefinite — that is, true in some cases and false in others.

Note that for something to be moved can happen in two ways: either from an extrinsic principle — as a carriage by a coachman, and the heaven by an Intelligence — or from an intrinsic principle — as a man by his own power. Again, something can both move and be moved — as the soul moves and is moved by itself. Moreover, something can be moved and not move — as a stone thrown by the one throwing it. And again, something can be a mover and not be moved — thus God, remaining unmoved, gives all things to be moved. Furthermore, something can be moved toward first act — that is, toward essential being — and in this way nothing can move itself toward first act, since nothing can produce itself; or toward second act — and in this way something can well be moved toward second act, since after it has received the being it obtained through production from another, it has the power of operating; and in this way, after man has been created, he has the power of understanding, willing, and exercising other operations, which are called second acts.

Assertion: It is not universally true that whatever is moved is moved by another. So Scotus in the passage cited above and in *2 d. 2, q. 10*. This is proved thus: first, from *8 Phys., T. 29, 30*, where it is stated that animals are moved by themselves — that is, by a form and power intrinsic to them. Second: water heated from itself and from its own form reduces itself to its native coldness. And likewise man moves himself by spontaneous motion and freely determines himself to act. Add what we will assert in the next article — that heavy and light things move themselves. Thus the Philosopher's statement seems to be valid only for those things that are moved by a subordinated motion — as fire is moved by the heaven, the heaven by an Angel, and the Angel by God. And so in that passage the Philosopher himself concludes that there is one first mover who is not moved by another — as a stick by a hand and a hand by the heart.

Objection I: From *7 Phys., T. 2*: what is moved such that if any of its parts rests, the whole itself rests, is not moved by itself but by another, because its motion depends on the motion of that part; for it is moved with the motion of the part and rests with its rest — and every thing that is moved is of this sort; therefore everything that is moved is moved by another. I grant the major and distinguish the minor with Scotus in *9 Met., q. 14, §. de aliis*, after Simplicius in the present context: regarding inorganic motion, I deny; regarding the organic and progressive motion of an animal, I grant — as is plain from the heart, which moves the remaining parts of the body of the animal, but with the heart at rest the remaining members rest. This reply is indicated by Stagira in *8 Phys., T. 29*, and in *the book on the common motion, cap. 1*, adduced and expounded by Ferchius in *1, 2 vestig. 3, num. 33, 34*.

Objection II: The same thing cannot be simultaneously in potency and in act; for it involves incompatibility for the same thing to be simultaneously moved in

act and not moved but to be in potency to motion; but if what is moved were not moved by another, the same would be simultaneously in act and in potency; therefore the stated saying is universally true — everything that is moved is moved by another. I distinguish the major with Scotus in *2 d. 25, q. vn., §. Ad primam T.*: the same thing cannot simultaneously be in objective potency and in entitative act, I grant; the same thing cannot be in formal and subjective potency and in virtual act, I deny. And this is illustrated in a non-univocal but equivocal agent, which is in potency to a form of another character from that which it participates — as the Doctor explains at length in *9 Met., q. 14, §. contra responsionem istam*, and *§. quod additur*.

Objection III: From *1 de Gener., T. 52, sum. 4, cap. 4*, and *1 de Anima, T. 52*, and *2 of the same work, sum. 3, cap. 2, T. 54*: the same thing cannot act and be acted upon simultaneously; but if something moved itself, the same would both act — because it would move — and be acted upon — because it would be moved by itself; therefore, etc. I distinguish the major: in the same way and by the same character, I grant; in a different way and by a different character, I deny. And this is plain from the intellect, which produces the act of intellection — by reason of which it is called active — and receives that same intellection — through which it is called passive.

You will ask: whether the mover and the moved are always together? Reply: sometimes they are together in simultaneity of supposit and of power — as the orb of the Moon with the sphere of the Sun; and sometimes in simultaneity of power only — as the Sun by its power reaches these inferior and sublunary things.

Article IV. By What Are Heavy and Light Things Moved.

Richard in *2 d. 14, art. 2, quaest. 4*, and John of Maistre in *8 Phys., quaest. 4, dub. 1*, report many and divergent opinions on this matter, among which I note and present two more celebrated ones. The prior is that of Thomas in *1 part., quaest. 18, art. 1*, Cajetan in the same place, the Coimbrans in *disp. 18, Phys., quaest. 2, §. 2*, and others, who affirm that heavy and light things are moved per se by the generator and per accidens by the one removing the obstacle. The latter is defended by Scotus in *9 Met., quaest. 14*, Antonius Andreas in the same place at *quaest. 1 & 2*, and in *dist. 2, quaest. 10*, and *dist. 25, quaest. vn., §. Ad primam sub C.*, Mayr in *dist. 14, quaest. 6*, and the other Scotists, who teach that heavy and light things are moved by themselves.

Note that to be moved by oneself is the same as to have an intrinsic active principle of one's motion — just as to be moved by another means nothing other than to be moved by an extrinsic principle. An example of the first: man is moved by himself — that is, by a power existing in him — and in *1 de Anima, T. 67*, from Plato it is said that "the soul is a number moving itself." An example of the second: a carriage is moved by another — namely by the coachman. Now

since experience makes it certain that heavy things are moved downward and light things upward, it is investigated in the present context whether this kind of motion is effected by a principle and power intrinsic or extrinsic to them; and the dispute is not about a remote and mediate principle, but about the proximate and immediate one from which the actual motion of heavy and light things proceeds.

Assertion: Heavy and light things are moved by themselves. So Scotus in the passage cited above, and before him the divine Plato as reported by Bonetus in *5 Phys.*, *cap.* 3. This is proved thus: first, from *8 Phys.*, *sum.* 2, *cap.* 2, *T.* 32: as the knower is related to contemplation and fire to combustion, so are heavy and light things related to their natural motions; but the knower has an internal and active principle of contemplation, and fire of combustion; therefore heavy and light things likewise, according to Aristotle, have an intrinsic principle of their natural motions. Moreover, it is subjoined there that if a light thing is impeded from tending upward and then the obstacle is removed, it acts and seeks the upper place; and in *4 Caeli*, *cap.* 1, *T.* 2, it is written that heavy and light things have certain impulses of motion; and at *T.* 25, *sum.* 2, it is added that heavy and light things have intrinsic principles of their motions to their proper places, while what is healable and what is capable of growth have extrinsic principles. It is plainly the case that the text speaks of active and not passive principles, since in respect of the latter there is no difference, but only in respect of the former. Again: in *4 Phys.*, *sum.* 2, *cap.* 5, *T.* 85: the dense and the rare, as heavy and light, have an active principle of motion; but as hard and soft, they have a passive principle of motion.

You will say: in *2 de Gener.*, *T.* 8, heavy and light things are not numbered among the active principles; therefore either they lack activity, or Aristotle admits contradictions in his writings. I say there is no contradiction in the writings of the Philosopher: for in *8 Phys.* cited he says that heavy and light things act with respect to their proper places and centers; but in the second book *de Generatione* he denies that they are active and productive of things similar to themselves in species — as a man produces a man and fire produces fire — as Scotus explains at length and learnedly in the passage cited. Second: an effect in act has its cause in act, as stated in *2 Phys.*, *T.* 37, and *5 Met.*, *c.* 1, *T.* 3; the reason being that nothing can be caused in act unless the cause is actually causing it — that is, actually exercising its causality; but since heavy and light things are actually moved, their effect is in act — that is, their actual motion — while the generator does not exist, either being absent or already having perished; therefore heavy and light things are not moved by the generator but by themselves. The Coimbrans in *5 Phys.*, *cap.* 4, *quaest.* *vn.*, *art.* 4 reply that even if the generator does not exist, its moving power exists — which it communicated to the generated thing; and for this reason it is chiefly said to be moved by the generator when the effect of the generator goes forth into motion. Against this: the power by which the generated thing is moved is distinct from the power of the generator

— for just as the nature of this is at least numerically distinct from the nature of that, so the power of this is distinct from the power of that; therefore the generated thing is moved by itself — that is, by the power existing in it itself. For what is investigated is not by what it could be moved, but by what it is actually moved; but it is moved by the power intrinsic to it; therefore it is moved by itself. Moreover, a certain and determinate sphere of an agent and mover is established; but in whatever distance or proximity the generator may be, the generated thing is moved by the power existing in it itself. Furthermore, if inanimate things were moved by the generator because the generator instilled a power in them, plainly even animate things would be moved by the generator, since they equally received from it the power of moving themselves — just as inanimate things; but the adversaries deny this of the latter; therefore they should deny it of the former as well, since the same reasoning applies to both alike. Second: if a small light thing is tied to a large heavy one, the latter drags the former; but the motion of the heavy thing is the cause of the descent of the light thing attached to it, through nothing other than the principle existing in that heavy thing and intrinsic to it. And all the more so — noting Scotus in *1 dist. 2, quaest. 5, ad fiem, §. Contra 1, art.* — if a heavy thing is held upward and overcomes the power of the one impeding it from going downward, once the obstacle is removed it descends downward; but that motion and descent is not effected by the generator — since it is supposed to be absent or extinct — nor by the one impeding, except per accidens, nor by any other extrinsic thing, as is plain; therefore it is effected by itself. Moreover, a heavier thing descends more quickly than a lighter one, which derives from nothing other than the intrinsic principle. These and other arguments are of such great weight that Suarez in *disp. 28, Met., Sect. 7, num. 22*, and Ferrariensis in *4 contra Gentes, cap. ult.*, and others cited by the Coimbrans in the passage cited, admit that heavy and light things are moved by gravity and levity as by an active principle — even if an instrumental one. But if these authors concede this of the instrumental principle, they ought likewise to admit it of the principal one, since the power of the instrument draws its strength from the principal; and Thomas himself confesses this in *1, 2, question 6, art. 6*, and in other places cited by the Coimbrans — especially in *2 dist. 18, quaest. 1, art. 2*, where in explicit words it is read: "Not all motions are called natural in the same way, but some on account of an active principle existing within — such as the local motion of heavy and light things."

Objection I: Aristotle in *8 Phys., cap. 2, T. 33, sum. 2* expressly says that heavy and light things are moved by the generator and not by themselves; and he asserts this especially because of the saying he advanced in *7 Phys., T. 2*: "everything that is moved is moved by another." That this was indeed his meaning, Bonetus in *5 Phys., cap. 3* abundantly and learnedly declares and proves, asserting the opinion of Plato as diverging from that of Aristotle. Reply: the Philosopher is to be expounded as speaking of the remote and not the proximate principle — about which the whole dispute is now. This distinction is deduced from *8 Phys., T. 32*:

to be in potency can occur in two ways — to first act or essential being, and to second act or accidental being — as I made plain in the preceding article, where I also explained the stated saying of Aristotle.

Objection II: What moves to first act likewise moves to second act; for what gives being equally gives what follows upon being — and as the jurists say: "who gives the principal gives the accessory." But the generator confers first act — namely, being heavy or light; therefore it also confers second act — namely, operating, which is to be moved; and hence their motion is effected by the generator. I distinguish the major: proximately and immediately, I deny; remotely and mediately, I grant. For even though the generator has conferred on heavy and light things their being and the power of moving, nevertheless it is not the proximate and immediate principle of their motion. For it suffices to have given them the principle of moving, and with that obtained, they subsequently move themselves to their proper place and center — once the obstacle is removed, even if the generator has been destroyed or is far distant.

Objection III: If heavy and light things were moved by themselves, there would be no difference between the motion of animate and inanimate things — since both animate and inanimate things would be moved by themselves; but this conflicts with truth and the authority of Aristotle in *8 Phys.*, *T. 29*, where it is read that animate things move themselves, while inanimate heavy and light things do not do so in the same way. I deny the consequence of the major, with Scotus in *4 dist. 49, quaest. 14, §. Respondeo hic*: for animate things move themselves with prior cognition, and if moved by progressive motion they can stop themselves when an object apprehended by them presents itself — as is plain from brute animals — and can also be moved in their own place and center, which does not belong to heavy and light inanimate things.

Article V. By What Are Projectiles Moved.

I find philosophers both ancient and modern who disagree in investigating and identifying the cause of the motion of projectiles. For some, among whom is Plato as Aristotle reports in *8 Phys.*, *T. 82*, hold that the motion of projectiles is produced by antiperistasis. Others — such as Mayr in *2 d. 14, q. 7*, Thomas in *3 Caeli, ad T. 28*, and Camerarius — assert that the cause of the motion of projectiles is to be sought in the medium or surrounding air, supported by Aristotle in the passage cited. Still others — such as John of Maistre in *8 Phys.*, *q. vlt., dub. 2*, Tatar in the same place at *scibili 4*, the Coimbrans in *cap. 2, quaest. 1, art. 8*, Tolet at *tex. 86*, Raconius in *disp. de motu, num. 2, art. 1*, and the greater part of recent authors — teach that projectiles are moved by a power impressed upon the projectiles themselves.

Note that in the motion of projectiles many things intervene: the projector, the projectile, and the medium, and the impulse diffused from the projector into the projectile. It is certain that the projectile is driven by the projector, and one

part of the medium is driven by the part struck by another; but the dispute is not about the first impulse, which comes from the projector while the projectile is conjoined to it, but about the impulse and motion by which the projectile is moved through the medium after being sent forth and hurled by the projector — by what, namely, it is moved: by the projector, by the medium, or by some other extrinsic thing. The common run of philosophers asserts that the impulse is a certain quality of the first species of quality, contained under the category of disposition, instilled into the projectile by the projector — by whose duration the projectile is moved, and by whose cessation its motion ceases — whether the projector is present or absent, alive or dead. For it is not of those things that depend on the efficient cause both in being and in becoming, as light depends on the luminous body, but only in becoming and not in being — as is plain from a sound emitted, whose cause, even if it perishes, nevertheless persists for at least a short time, as when the sounding body is broken the sound still exists and is heard.

First Assertion: The motion of projectiles is not caused by antiperistasis. So Aristotle in *8 Phys.*, *cap. 10*, *T. 82*, and this is deduced from Scotus in *4 dist. 6, quaest. 6, in fine E*. This is proved thus: first, antiperistasis is the siege and encirclement of a weaker and more infirm body besieged and encircled by a stronger and more potent body besieging and encircling it; but such siege and encirclement does not cause the motion of projectiles; therefore the motion of projectiles does not occur by antiperistasis. The major is known through the place from definition to defined. The minor is evident: by antiperistasis the besieged and encircled body is merely constricted and narrowed by the besieging and encircling one. Second: antiperistasis occurs because of contraries fighting against one another, of which one is stronger than the other; but antiperistasis can occur without any motion of projectiles — as in winter, when water in a well grows warm, and in summer grows cold. Moreover, antiperistases sometimes occur in clouds, as thunder indicates, even though no motion of projectiles takes place; therefore projectiles are not set in motion by antiperistasis.

Second Assertion: The medium — whether air or water — is not the adequate and sufficient cause of the motions of projectiles, but only a cooperating one. The Doctor in the passage cited does not appear to dissent from this. This is proved thus: first, with the surrounding and ambient air unmoved, a projectile is moved — as when no wind blows and yet someone hurls a stone through the air, the hurled stone is moved through it; indeed, even with the air moved, if the projectile is of great weight it is not set in motion in it; therefore it is a plain indication that the ambient air or any other medium is not the total and adequate cause of the motion of projectiles. And all the more so: if a weapon is hurled in a vacuum — which it is not improbable that it is possible to do — then, with no medium intervening, there will be motion of the hurled weapon; therefore the motion of a projectile is not derived from the medium. Second: a

wheel, a top, and things that spin rapidly in a circle are not moved by the surrounding air, as is seen with the eye. Moreover, it seems incredible — indeed, impossible — that enormous and heavy cannon balls should be moved by the surrounding air; for these demolish very strong walls and knock down high towers, and by their blows all other very robust things are overturned. And a boat proceeds against the current of a river and against an adverse wind; therefore the motion of projectiles does not proceed chiefly from the medium.

Third Assertion: The motion of projectiles proceeds from a power impressed upon the projectiles. This is indicated by the Doctor in the passage cited above, and *Ezekiel I* intimates it: "Where the impulse of the spirit was, there they went." And *James III*: "Behold, ships too, though they are great and are driven by strong winds, are nevertheless steered by a very small rudder, wherever the impulse of the helmsman directs." This is proved thus: first, for every produced effect some cause that produced it must be assigned — for nothing can cause itself; but the motion of projectiles is some effect, whose cause is neither antiperistasis, nor the ambient air, nor any other thing mentioned above; therefore from a sufficient disjunction it is the impulse of the projector, impressed upon the projectiles. Second: the greater the impulse of the projector impressed upon the projectiles, the more quickly and far the projectiles are carried — as we experience every day; therefore such an impulse is the precise cause of the motion of projectiles. Again: once that impulse is removed, the projectile is no longer moved; but while it lasts, the motion of projectiles likewise lasts; therefore it is their chief and precise cause.

Objection I: From 8 *Phys.*, T. just noted, and 3 *Caeli*, T. 28, the cause of the motion of projectiles is referred and attributed to the medium — namely, air or water. And this seems plausible, because one part of air set in motion drives another part, and so on with the rest; therefore the motion of projectiles is caused by the medium. Reply: perhaps Aristotle speaks of the cooperating cause, which no one denies to be the medium — not of the chief and precise cause, which he does not deny to be the aforesaid quality and impulse. But if he thinks otherwise on this and on some other matters, he is to be set aside, since experience and the arguments given above make the contrary known to us.

Objection II: The motion of projectiles is swifter in the middle than at the beginning and end — as is evident to all; but this arises from nothing other than the surrounding medium; therefore the medium is the cause of the motion of projectiles. Reply: this argument only proves that the medium body — whether air set in motion, its parts mutually impelled and struck — aids motion and makes it swifter and quicker in the middle, because more of its parts are impelled and set in motion in it than at the beginning and end. And in the motion of an animal, at the beginning the vital spirits are not all simultaneously joined and awakened as in the middle; at the end they nearly languish and are dissipated, and so its motion becomes slower.

Objection III: What is indifferent and indeterminate cannot determine motion toward a place upward, downward, or in a circle; but the impulse of the projector impressed upon the projectile is indifferent and indeterminate — for it does not respect an upper or lower or circular place more than another; therefore the said impulse cannot be the cause of the motion of projectiles. I grant the major. To the minor I say that the quality impressed upon the projectile is modified and determined by the projector. For this reason, at his pleasure, the projectile is rotated upward, downward, or in a circle.

You will ask: what is the cause of the cessation of the said quality? Reply: it is the resistance and violence of the subject upon which it is impressed — for since it is foreign and violent, it gradually fails, since nothing violent is long-lasting; to which is added the resistance of the medium and the opposition that weakens and depresses it; and therefore, like a sound, it lasts but a short time and quickly fails.

Question IV. On the Mover.

There remains no difficulty about the mover that has not been touched upon and discussed in the preceding sections; only a few things remain to be examined and decided about the first mover, who is God most good and most great, to be covered under a single article.

Sole Article. Whether There Is One First Mover, Immobile and Immaterial.

Aristotle speaks often about the first mover both in *8 Phys.* and at the end of *12 Met.*, where he investigates and examines its chief characteristics and peculiar attributes. Mayr in *1 d. 2, q. 3* observes that the existence of the first mover itself can be shown by a twofold medium — physical and metaphysical — and whether both together, or each separately, are sufficient for its demonstration is not a matter of unanimous opinion. For Thomas in *1 p., q. 8, art. 1*, the Coimbrans in *disp. 29, q. 6, §. 2*, and Ruvio in *8 Phys., Tract. de 1. motore*, think that the physical medium suffices to demonstrate it. But Scotus in *1 d. 2, q. 1*, and *d. 8, q. 5, §. Huius exclusiva, ante A.*, the Coimbrans in *8 Phys., c. 6, q. 1, art. 3*, and not a few others assert that the physical medium is not sufficient unless the second is added. Indeed, Bonetus in *2 Phys., c. 7* thinks that both are probable but neither is demonstrative or necessarily conclusive.

First Assertion: There is one first mover. So Aristotle in *8 Phys., T. 53*, and *12 Met., T. 55*, and Scotus both in the passage cited and in *Rep., 1 d. 2, q. 1*, and in *Tract. de I. principio, c. 3*, where Mauritius and Cavellus are found. This is proved thus: first, everything that is moved is moved by another, as stated in *7 Phys., T. 1*, and in other places cited in *art. 3 of the preceding question*; therefore since in things ordered per se the process does not go to infinity, as stated in *2 Met., T. 5, c. 2*, one must arrive at one first mover. This argument does not seem to be

effective and demonstrative, since very many things move themselves — such as animals, heavy and light things, and free agents — as I made plain in the preceding article. Moreover, if the stated argument proves anything, it urges only that there exists one first mover of the first heaven, which is not God but an Angel. Again, through it the Philosopher shows that the first mover moves by an eternal motion from the past, and that the generations of things are perennial and perpetual; but this teaching is false and contrary to orthodox faith. Therefore the physical argument of Aristotle does not evidently demonstrate the existence and unity of the first mover, who is God. Second: every being is either caused and dependent on another, or uncaused and independent and by itself. If the second, the intent is obtained — namely, the first being, the first cause, and the first mover, who is God. If the first, then either that upon which it depends and from which it is caused is uncaused and independent — and the proposition is had; or it is caused and dependent on another, and in this way I will inquire of that to infinity; but since one does not go to infinity, as has been said from *2 Met.*, *T. 5*, it is plainly inferred that there is one first mover by itself and independent of any other, unproduced and uncaused. This argument, drawn from *Metaphysics*, is more powerful and efficacious than the preceding one, as Scotus attests in *q. 3, prol.*, *§. Ad 1. arg. 2, q. V.*, and more fully in *d. 2, q. 2, q. ostensis*, and *§. Quantum ad 1. art.* And it evidently and sufficiently concludes, whatever Ruvio says in the passage cited. Add that in the *Metaphysics* it will be shown that there is only one God and that polytheism is impossible; and so it is aptly deduced that there is one first mover and one first cause and one independent being.

Second Assertion: The first mover is immobile and immutable. This is transmitted by Aristotle cited and Scotus in *1 d. 30, q. 2, §. Ad 2. q. M.* This is proved thus: first, from Sacred Scripture: *Malachi III*, "I am God and I do not change"; and *James I*: "With whom there is no change, nor shadow of alteration." Augustine in *contra epistolam fundamenti*, *c. 19*, and Damascene in *1 fidei*, *c. 3*, support this; and it is defined as a matter of faith in the Fourth Lateran Council, *c. Firmiter*. Second: what is most actual and supremely necessary can neither be moved nor changed, since change presupposes the potency to have what the subject previously did not have; but God is the most actual and supremely necessary being, possessing all perfections in act, and containing every good — according to *Exodus XXXIII*: "I will show you all good." And hence St. Anselm rightly infers in *Proslogion 3*: "God is that than which nothing greater can be conceived." Therefore He is subject to no motion or change.

Third Assertion: The first mover is spiritual and devoid of all bodily mass. This is defended by Aristotle toward the end of *8 Phys.* and in *12 Met.*, and by Scotus in *1 d. 8, q. 1 & 3*, and in *Rep.*, *q. 2*, and *d. 31, q. 3, §. Ad 1. principale*. Ferchius treats this at length and learnedly in many passages of *vestig.* *2, 1, 1, c. 3, 6, 1, 20*. This is proved thus: first, from Sacred Scripture: *John III*, God is called a spirit, who is free from matter and bodily mass. Hence the Savior says in *Luke XXIV*: "A spirit

does not have flesh and bones." Origen in *7 contra Celsum*, Augustine in *epist. 3*, and Anselm in *Monol., c. 20*, and others, support this, affirming that the opposite is a teaching contrary to the faith of the Church. Second: God is of infinite power; but infinite power cannot exist in a finite quantity — for it is not bounded by a finite limit; nor in an infinite quantity, which neither exists nor can exist, as I showed in *q. 5, art. 3, 1, 5*. Moreover, what is better and more perfect must be attributed to God, since in Him is the summit of all perfections; but it is better and more perfect that God be a spirit and incorporeal rather than material and corporeal, since the spiritual surpasses the material; therefore God is separated from all matter. More in the *Tract. de Deo uno, disp. 2*.

Objection I against the first assertion: from one and the same principle, several things cannot flow, as Averroes indicates in *8 Phys., com. 46*; but created and moved things are many, as is plain to all; therefore there is not one creator and mover of them. Reply: that saying assumed in the major is to be understood of a natural and necessary agent possessing only one power of operating — not of a free agent operating through multiple powers and faculties existing in it. But God voluntarily and freely established all things according to *Psalm CXIII*: "He has done all things whatsoever He willed."

Objection II against the second assertion: what is tied to a particular place and a particular mobile is moved — if not per se, at least per accidens — by the motion of that mobile; but God, as Aristotle testifies in *1 Caeli, T. 100*, resides in the outermost part of the primum mobile; therefore He is moved by the motion of the primum mobile, and thus God is mobile and mutable. Reply: granting the major, to the minor — the Philosopher is to be expounded as speaking of the first Angel, who is immediately present to the primum mobile to revolve it, and accordingly he enumerates as many Angels as there are moveable Heavens, as stated in *12 Met., T. 47, c. 4, sum. 2*. Or say that his meaning there is that God is not subject to the influences of the celestial orbs, and therefore he adds that He is not altered or subject to aging, and that He enjoys a pleasant and eternal life — which may He deign to grant also to us.

Books on the Heaven, the World, and the Elements, According to the Mind of the Subtle Doctor

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Preface

The excellence, beauty, and usefulness of the knowledge contained in these books is narrated and announced clearly and elegantly by Solomon (*Wis. 7*), whose words are aptly adduced and lucidly expressed by the Seraphic Doctor in the prologue to the second book of the Sentences: "He gave me true knowledge of all that exists, so that I might know the disposition of the world and the powers of the elements, the beginning, end, and middle of the times, the alternations and changes of the seasons, the cycles of the years, and the positions of the stars." All of this is piously and learnedly signified and proclaimed by St. Augustine (*lib. de utilitate credendi, cap. 16*), (*in expos. psal. 99*), and (*lib. de vera Religione, cap. 29*): "For it is not in vain and idly that one ought to contemplate the beauty of the heaven, the order of the stars, the brilliance of the light, the alternations of day and night, the monthly courses of the moon, the fourfold tempering of the year, consonant with the four elements, the great power of seeds, the species and numbers of things that are born, and all things in their own kind preserving their proper measure and motion." The Parisian masters add at the beginning of this work, citing Aristotle, that we ought never to be more reverent than when treating of divine things; for if we enter temples composed, if when about to offer sacrifice we lower our gaze and perform every gesture of modesty, how much more ought we to do this when disputing about the stars, the constellations, and the nature of the heavens, lest we affirm anything rashly, imprudently, or in ignorance. Wherefore it is our pleasure to occupy ourselves in diligent investigation and careful examination of these matters, so that afterwards, when the course of this life has been completed, we may be able to rejoice in the clear vision and perfect enjoyment of their primary Author and cause. And in accordance with those three subjects we have proposed, we shall compose three books: the first will treat of the World, the second of the Heaven, and the third of the Elements.

Book I

On the World

What we call "World," the Greeks call *cosmos*, which means the same as ornament and beauty. The term "World" is used in the present context for the totality of created things, which is mentioned in (*Ecclus. 43*): "The beauty of heaven, the glory of the stars, the world illuminated by God on high." For this reason, some authors — such as Alexander and Thomas — hold that the total subject of the aforementioned books is the universe. Others, however, such as John of Magistris and the Parisians (*1. Cali, quaest. 1*), establish their adequate subject as simple body capable of local motion. We, however, must speak consistently with what we taught in (*1.1.q.3. art. 2*) and in the prologue of the same work. We raise three questions in this book: the first concerning the Creator of the World, the second concerning the creation of the World, and the third concerning the World as created by God.

Question I

On the Creator of the World

Article I: Whether God Could Have Created the World

Passing over the various errors and diverse heresies reported and vigorously refuted by (*Alph. 1. s. verb. creatura*) and (*l. 10. verb. Mundus*), the common run of philosophers appears to hold that God could not have created the World, on account of that well-known axiom inscribed by them in (*1. Phys. T. 33*), and again in (*1. de gener. T. 11*) and elsewhere: "from nothing, nothing comes." The opposite, however, is maintained by Catholic doctors, most notably (*Scot. 2. d. 1. quaest. 6*), and also (*4. dist. 1. quaest. 1*), as well as Orbelli, Gratianus, and the rest, who teach commonly and unanimously that God was able to found the universe from nothing.

First note that creation is used in two ways. Broadly, it is used for any kind of production — in this sense, in (*Gen. 1*) man is said to be created, even though he was formed from the slime of the earth (*ibid. cap. 2*). The Apostle makes mention of this usage in (*Rom. 8*), and Augustine uses it in (*l. 83. q. 67*) and in (*l. 1. contra Adversarium legis et Prophetarum, cap. 23*), saying that magistrates and cities are created; similarly the Pope is said to create Cardinals, and a bishop to create priests. Nor was Aristotle free from this usage, as is evident from (*4. de historia animalium, cap. 3*), (*2. de partibus animalium, cap. 2*), and (*2. de generatione animalium, cap. 4*): "the female always provides the matter, the male the creative power." Secondly, strictly and properly, creation refers to production from no pre-existing subject or underlying matter — in this sense the rational soul and the Angel are said to be created.

Note secondly that creation and making are used interchangeably, as (*Ferchius, 1. 1. def. cap. 1. n. 9*) notes from (*Aug. tom. 7. operum, l. 1. contra Adversarium legis*). This is plainly gathered from the book of Genesis; for in chapter 1 the divine chronicler writes and uses now the word "created": "In the beginning God

created the heaven and the earth," and now the word "made," as in chapter 2 of the same book: "God made the heaven and the earth." Again, in chapter 1 of the same work: "Let us make man," and shortly after: "The Lord created man."

Note thirdly, from (*Mayr. quaest. 9. quolib.*), after (*Anselm in Monol. cap. 8*), that something being made from nothing can be understood in four ways. First, subjectively — as form is made from matter and accident from a subject — and because nothing cannot be the matter or subject of anything, this mode of production is impossible. Second, successively — that is, after nothing something comes to be, as day follows night and light follows darkness — which is rightly explained by (*Scot. 1. d. 5. q. 2. R.*): a creature exists after nothing, that is, after the non-being of itself and of whatever is in it. And Aristotle seems to indicate something similar in (*2. Met. T. 7*): "at the Isthmian games, the Olympian games come to be" — that is, as Scotus interprets there, the Olympian games are celebrated after the Isthmian games, just as the feast of St. Francis is celebrated after the feast of St. Michael. This mode is possible, because God can confer being upon a creature that previously had no being — just as he can create light when light did not exist before — and this is narrated in (*Gen. 1*): "God said, let there be light, and light was made." Third, conversively — so that nothing is converted into something — and this cannot happen, because one opposite does not become the other, just as privation is not a habit, and night is not day. Fourth, negatively — as when one speaks of nothing, one is said to speak about nobody — and this mode too is reckoned impossible, like the first and third; only the second mode as explained above remains, according to which God is said to create something from nothing.

First assertion: God was able to create the World. So holds (*Scot. in the places cited above and in Rep. ibid.*). It is proved first: whoever can act immediately and operate independently can create, because creation in the proper sense, as stated in the first note, is production from nothing — that is, from no pre-existing subject. God, however, can act immediately and operate independently, since he is the first being from himself and independent; therefore he was able to create the World. Second: God was able to produce prime matter, since his power is infinite and productive of all producible things; and matter is creatable, since it is the first and ultimate subject of all forms. Furthermore, God can preserve an accident without a subject, and in fact does so in the Eucharist, as faith teaches; therefore he can also produce without a subject, and to produce without a subject is to create, as is clear from the definition of creation. Furthermore, God created the World; therefore he was able to create it. The consequence holds because the argument from act to power is valid. The antecedent will be shown in the next assertion. Moreover, a more powerful and more perfect agent requires fewer conditions than a weaker and more imperfect one, as can be shown in individual agents; but a weaker and more imperfect agent, in order to act, requires a subject; therefore the most powerful and most perfect agent can act without a subject, and hence can create.

Second assertion: God created the World. So holds (*Scot. ubi supra*), and it is a matter of faith, against Simon Magus, reported by (*Aug. in catalogo, haer. 1*). It is proved first from Sacred Scripture: (*Gen. 1*): "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth"; (*Joan. 1*): "The world was made by him"; and (*Act. 7*): "God, who made the world and all things that are in it." Second, from the Council of the Lateran, *c. Firmiter, de summa Trin. et fide catholica*. Add the two Creeds, the Apostolic and the Nicene, in which it is expressly decreed that God is the creator of heaven and earth, of things visible and invisible. Third, from the Fathers, notably (*Aug. in operibus supra Gen.*) and (*contra epistolam fundamenti, c. 25*), and (*l. 2. de actis cum Felice, c. 18-19*), and (*l. de natura boni, contra Manich. c. 1*), and (*l. de fide, contra Manich. c. 43*). To these may be added (*Genebr. 1. Chrono pag. 2*). Fourth: God alone is independent from himself and through himself, needing no thing; therefore God alone founded this World from nothing. This is plainly indicated by the royal Psalmist (*Psal. 9*): "The gods of the nations are demons, but the Lord made the heavens" — where a distinction is drawn between the true God and false gods in that the true God created the heavens and all that is contained within their compass, whereas false gods did nothing of the sort, since they operate dependently upon a subject and possess limited power.

Objection I: if God can create something, he would be capable of change; but God cannot be changed; therefore he cannot create anything. The major of the sequence is proved: from not creating he would become creating, and therefore change would fall upon him. The minor has been shown in (*1. 8. Phys. q. 4. art. un.*). The major of the sequence is denied. In response to its proof, I say that by the same will by which God from eternity decreed to create the World, he created it in time; therefore he underwent no change — especially because change occurs when a subject is otherwise disposed through the reception of something newly received in it, whereas God receives nothing new through creation, but the creature alone receives being from God. Scotus illustrates this with the example of an opaque body newly produced and exposed to the light of the sun, which is newly illuminated by the sun, although the sun is in no way changed by such illumination. The same Doctor also illustrates this point in (*5. Met. q. 2*) with these words: "a voluntary agent can cause by an old will, unchanged, whenever it pleases, without any change in itself — just as if I now willed to sit tomorrow, I could sit tomorrow without any change in my will."

You will say: at least God receives a new relation of producer to the produced, just as through a new generation there is the relation of begetter to begotten. Hence (*Ambr. 1. Trin.*) says: "if the Father were to beget the Son anew, he would be changed by the acquisition of generation"; likewise, if creatures were newly created by God, he would be changed through creation. (*Aug. Serm. 102. de tempore*) adds: "Would that a sinful man might rise to repentance as quickly as God wills even to change a settled sentence." And (*ibid. Serm. 109*): "Repentance in God is said to be a change of sentence." And a little later: "the guilty one has changed; the Judge has changed his sentence." The major of the sequence is

denied; for, as will be stated below (*q. 2*), there is no real relation from God to the creature on account of his infinity, to which no addition can be made, as (*Scot. 1. d. 30. q. 2*) teaches near the end. To Ambrose I say that he speaks of things created, not of divine things, in which no change can occur. To Augustine I say that his words must be interpreted as meaning change not in God but in the sinner, and not in the cause but in the effect; and thus sorrow and the other passions are attributed to God not properly but metaphorically, as (*Lyr. in c. 6. Geneseos*) rightly interprets. Or, as others say, they are attributed to God with respect to the effect, not with respect to the affect.

Objection II: a cause that can act but does not act refrains from acting for some motive, since it awaits a suitable occasion for acting. But God did not create the World from eternity but in time, as will be shown in the next article, and no reason can be given why he created the World in time rather than from eternity; therefore he seems more likely not to have been able to create it at all. The answer is that in a free cause no other reason is to be sought beyond its freely acting will, which is the kind of will that belongs to God, which is the cause of all things created, according to (*Aug. 1. de Gen. contra Manich. c. 2*). Or, according to the same Augustine (*l. 1. contra Adversarium legis, c. 7*): "the sole cause of making these things was the goodness of God, because there was no necessity for him." Therefore he founded the World in time and not from eternity because he so willed. That this may be made clearer, we proceed to the next article.

Article II: Whether the World Was Created by God in Time

Concerning the origin of the World, (*D. Aug. 11. Civit. c. 2*) sets forth many and diverse opinions, which Vivès expresses there; and (*q. 106. novi et veteris testamenti*) and (*Genebrardus 1. 1. Chronol. pag. 31*) record them. Among these, the most celebrated is the opinion of (*Arist. 7. Phys. 1*) and (*8. eiusdem operis, c. 1*), and also (*1. Cali, T. 103*), and of his disciples, who hold that the World is eternal. All orthodox doctors oppose them, teaching that the World began in time; they were preceded by Plato and his followers, according to (*Bonet. 7. Phys. c. 2*), after (*Aug. 10. Civit. c. 31*) and (*12. eiusdem, cap. 14*), although Vivès there asserts that the Platonists disagree among themselves.

Note that "eternal" is sometimes taken for a long age or long period of time, as in (*Daniel 5*): "O king, live forever." Hence (*Horat. in Epist. cit. ab Aug. 1. 1. q. 9. super Gen. q. 31*): "He shall serve forever who does not know how to make use of little." Sometimes it is taken for that which has no beginning from the side of the past, as in (*Mich. 5*): "His going forth is from the days of eternity." Sometimes for that which has no end — called eternal from the side of the future — as in (*2. Petri 3*): "To him be glory now and in the days of eternity."

First assertion: the World was founded by God in time. This is presupposed by (*Doct. 2. d. 1. q. 3*) and other scholastics, who inquire there whether the World could have been created from eternity. It is proved first from Sacred Scripture:

(*Gen. 1*): "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth" — where (*Aug. q. 112. novi et veteris testamenti*) translates "from the beginning of time." (*Prov. 8*): "The Lord possessed me at the beginning of his ways, before he made anything." And (*Joan. 17*): "Glorify me, Father, with the glory which I had before the world was made." Second, from the Lateran Council, *c. Firmiter, de summa Trin.*: "In the beginning of time God created each nature, that is, the celestial and mundane — or spiritual and corporeal — from which the whole World is compacted." Third, from the Fathers: (*Aug. 1. contra adversarium legis et Prophetarum, cap. 2*): "that there might be a beginning from which they began to exist; for they were not always coeternal with God, but were made and received the beginning from which they would begin to exist." And (*Ath. in oratione contra idola*) and all the others. And that Pythagoras and the Stoics acknowledged this truth is reported by (*Plut. 2. de placitis*), as well as (*Virg. 2. Georg.*): "I would believe that no other days shone at the first origin of the growing world, nor that it had a different course." Fourth, the first inventors of any art and science are narrated to have flourished at some particular time, as is established in (*Moyses l. Geneseos*), (*Athan. praecit.*), and (*Joseph. 1. Antiquit.*). If, however, the World had not had a beginning, there would be no first inventors of arts and sciences, since an infinite number of men would have preceded them among whom no first could be found. Moreover, human nature would by now have been greatly diminished and exhausted, as (*Aug. 11. Civit. c. 9*) observes. I add that it was fitting for God to have founded the World in time, so as to show that he acts freely toward the outside. Finally, it was proper that the creature should not be coeval and coeternal with the Creator; it follows, therefore, that the World was designed in time.

Second assertion: Aristotle expressly holds and teaches that the World is eternal. This is deduced from (*Scot. pallu praealleg.*) and maintained by the other scholastics, except (*Vorrilong. 2. d.*), who says that this fault was imputed to the philosopher by Averroes. (*Ferch. vestig. 8. num. 1*) writes the same and says that the Stagirite was speaking in popular fashion. But the mind of the philosopher himself is made explicit in (*7. and 8. Phys.*) and in other places, and is supported by arguments not few in number, to be adduced below. Moreover, the explicit sense of any author is established when he treats of a topic from a set purpose; Aristotle, however, disputes from express intention in the places noted above concerning the eternity of the World, which he there affirms and proves by many arguments; therefore such is his mind and opinion, from which (*Anaxagoras*) and (*Democritus*) do not appear to be far distant, since the former posits an eternal chaos or matter, and the latter posits atoms likewise eternal.

Objection I against the first assertion: in (*Tit. 1*), it is written that God promised eternal life, the highest happiness, before eternal times, as (*Aug.*) reads, or before the ages of the world, as the Vulgate has it; therefore if time is eternal, motion and the World are likewise eternal. The answer, following the interpretation of (*Lyranus*), is that God from eternity promised grace and glory to his elect, which afterwards at times determined and appointed by him he communicated and

furnished through the incarnate Word. Hence it is added in that place: "But has in due time manifested his word, in the preaching, which is committed to me." Or, as (*Aug. contra Priscillianistas*) says, those times are called eternal before which there was no time, as if from the constitution of the World.

Objection II: either God was able and willing to make the World from eternity — and then we have what we intended — or he was willing but not able, which is impossible since God is omnipotent; or he was able but not willing, which is also impossible, since God would then be envious, which is repugnant to him, since he is the highest good, freely communicating himself to creatures. The answer is that God could indeed have founded the World from eternity, yet willed to create it in time, both because it so pleased him and because he wished to show that he acts freely toward the outside, as (*Aug. l. de fide, contra Manich. c. 28*) intimates, saying: "God therefore suffers no necessity, nor does he make any necessity by which he acts, but acts by the highest and ineffable will and power." And in (*1. 83. q. 9. q. 27*): "Whoever asks why God willed to make the World seeks the cause of God's will." And in (*12. confes. c. 4*): "The will of God is the cause of all things."

Objection III: motion and time are eternal; therefore so also is the World; the consequence holds because those cannot exist without this. The antecedent is proved: in motion there is no first moment of change, nor in time a first instant, since time is the measure of motion according to before and after, and therefore before this time another time preceded it, since its parts are prior and posterior. The antecedent is denied. In response to its proof, I say that the World was created in an instant, and things that begin instantaneously begin through the first moment of their being, and cease through the last moment of their being, as stated above. Therefore, for the creation of the World it suffices that motion and time began through the first moment of their being, since before they did not exist. You will press: if the World was produced in an instant, and since an instant is the end of the past and the beginning of the future, it follows that before that instant there was time, and thus no beginning of time can be had. I say that Aristotle indeed asserts that an instant is the end of the past and the beginning of the future, but does not prove this; therefore with the same ease with which he asserts it, it can be refuted. Hence (*Bonet. 7. Phys. c. 3. §. Dissolutio autem*) rightly adds these words: "Aristotle imagines that time is a kind of successive circular line, which is not true; rather it is like a semicircular line, whose beginning is one now and whose end is another now, just as in a semicircular line there are two points that terminate it."

Objection IV: if time did not always exist, it is true to say that at some point time did not exist; but "at some point" denotes time; therefore there is time before time, and thus time never began but is eternal. The major is conceded; I distinguish the minor: negatively, I concede it; positively, I deny it. For just as before creation there is nothing — that is, the negation of the creature — so

before the making of the World, "at some point" is said to exist negatively. And (*Bacco 2. d. 1. q. 5*) says that an imaginary time preceded, which the (*Doct. Quol. 11. §. de secundo sub F.*) had already touched upon.

Objection V: heaven is the habitation and palace of God, according to (*Psal. 60*): "I shall dwell in your tabernacle forever." But God is eternal; therefore so also is heaven, in which he dwells; otherwise God would have had no dwelling in which to live. The answer is that heaven is called the dwelling of God because in it he is seen and worshipped by the Blessed, not because he needs it for habitation, since he is now everywhere, and before the constitution of the world was in himself, as I taught in (*art. 4. q. 3. 1. 6. Phys.*).

Objection VI against the second assertion: (*Arist. 1. Top. c. 9. or 12*) writes that it is a problem whether the World is eternal; therefore in (*7. and 8. Phys.*) and in (*1. Cali*), the philosopher speaks not assertively but doubtfully and tentatively when he says that the World is eternal. Likewise the same philosopher in (*3. Phys. sum. 3*) thinks he demonstrates that an actually infinite quantity is impossible; but if the World had been made from eternity, according to him, there would be an actually infinite number, since an infinite number of rational souls would have proceeded, which he himself apparently holds to be immortal (*3. anima 6*); and moreover, in (*4. pol. c. 13*) he asserts that at the beginning of the World there were kings on account of the small number of peoples — which plainly shows that he thought the World began in time. The answer is that in that place and in certain others he is speaking not in his own person but in that of others, namely the Pythagoreans and Platonists; but his mind is open and manifest from the testimonies cited above, in which he discusses that question expressly. To the subsidiary point, given that hypothesis, there would be an infinite quantity not actually and categorematically, but potentially and syncategorematically, as I showed at length in (*1. 4. Phys. quaest. 5*). To the other point about (*4. pol.*), I say that he spoke there in the opinion of others; especially since he does not there say a word about the origin of the World, and if he did speak about its beginning, the proper place would have to be sought where he treats that topic from express purpose, as the places cited above attest; therefore he is rightly condemned by the University of the Sorbonne, as (*the Parisian masters 8. Phys. fol. 81. q. 2*) testify.

First query: whether the World and the things contained in it were created by God successively or simultaneously? The answer is that they were produced simultaneously and in an instant, as is evident from (*Ecclus. 18*): "He who lives forever created all things simultaneously." Moses, who describes the series of all created things over an interval of six days, speaks to the capacity of a rude people and an untutored multitude. That Augustine held the same view is reported by (*Orbel. 2. d. 12*), and is evident from (*11. Civit. c. 31*), as (*Vivès*) notes there, and from (*4. de Gen. ad lit. c. 33*) and (*l. 1. contra adversarium legis, c. 9*).

Second query: in what month and on what day was the World founded? Some, among whom are the Hebrews cited by (*Genebr. 1. 1. Chronol. pag. 1 and 2*), say that the world was created in autumn, in the month of September. This could be urged from the end of (*Gen. c. 1*), where the sacred text mentions fruits with which the trees were laden and which men would eat for their living; fruits, however, are suitable for eating and consumption only in the autumn season. The more common opinion of others, affirming that the World was created in spring, in the month of March — the same month in which Christ the Lord was conceived and died — is that of (*Aug. 4. Trin. c. 5*), (*1. 83. q. 9. q. 56*), (*q. 55*), and (*q. 107 of the new and old testament*), (*Damasc.*), and (*Genebr. cit.*); and the Church sings in the first hymn of the Sunday matins: "On the first of all the days, on which the world was founded; or on which the rising Creator frees us from death through life." This is fitting, so that salvation might be restored to the world at the same time it had received it. The passage from Genesis cited for the former opinion does not compel a different view, since the works of God are perfect and he created the trees laden with flowers and fruits simultaneously.

Third query: whether the World will perish? The answer is that it will not be destroyed as regards itself as a whole and its principal parts, as (*Ecclus. 3*) intimates: "I have learned that all the works that God has made endure forever." But as regards accidents, it will be changed, because after the day of judgment the heavens will not move, nor will there be any more time, nor will celestial influences be emitted; and especially mixed things, above all animated ones, will be corrupted.

Article III: Whether the World Could Have Been Created from Eternity

Two extreme opinions circulate on this topic. The prior is that of (*S. Bonav. 2. d. 1. q. 2*), (*Ric. ibid. a. 3. q. 4*), (*Henr. Quol. 1. q. 7 and 8*), and others who deny that the fabric of the world could have been created from eternity. The posterior is that of (*D. Th. 1. p. q. 46. a. 2*), (*Caiet.*) and (*Naz. ibid.*), (*Aur. 2. d. 1. q. 2*), (*Dur. ibid.*), (*Tatar. 8. Phys. q. 1. dub. 2*), (*Suarez. disp. 20. Met. sect. 6*), and many others who affirm that there is no contradiction in the world's having been able to be made from eternity. The Scotists, however, with (*Scot. 2. d. 1. q. 3*) and (*in Rep. q. 4*), and the Nominalists with (*Ockham in eo loco q. 8*) and (*Quol. 4. q. 1*), judge both the aforesaid opinions to be probable, dissolving the reasons and arguments of both parties, though inclining more toward the affirmative, as (*Lych.*) and (*Fab. disp. 8*) note there. I know, however, that some — like the (*Dur. cit.*) — concede this of permanent things but deny it of successive ones; the other doctors affirm it of both.

Note first: it is not under dispute whether from eternity God possesses the power of creating everything possible and creatable — for since God himself is omnipotent and nothing accrues to him in time, since he is supremely perfect and immutable, clearly such a power belongs to him from eternity. Rather, the

question is whether such a power could have gone forth from eternity into the actual creation of something. Furthermore, something being produced from eternity can be understood in two ways: either from within, that is, because it is necessarily produced — as the Word of God the Father — in which case no creatable thing could have existed from eternity; or from without, because it is not repugnant to it to be produced if the will of God, which is his omnipotence, wills to produce it and communicate being to it. This distinction is indicated by (*Scot. nuper alleg.*) and is explained by (*Suarez ubi supra, num. 5*).

Note second: that one thing precedes another by nature can occur in two ways, positively and privatively, as (*Doct. 2. d. 1. q. 2. §. Resp. A. and q. 3. §. Tenetis autem. H.*) writes. For that which precedes another in being — without whose entity the entity of the other is prior — is said to precede by nature positively; as in man, animality precedes rationality by nature positively, since the rational animal presupposes animality as genus presupposes its differentia, and animal precedes man as genus its species. But that which does not pre-exist the other but would pre-exist if the other were not there is said to precede the other by nature privatively; just as in matter, privation would pre-exist if the agent were not to introduce or draw out a form from matter, through which matter is informed. Similarly in our case: non-being, or nothing, would precede the being of a creature unless the efficient cause, by conferring that being, were to prevent nothing from preceding the being of the creature — as the (*Doct. cit.*) subtly pursues, and (*Suarez, num. 11*) accepts.

Assertion: the World could have been created by God from eternity, not only as regards permanent entities but also as regards successive ones. This is the view of (*Scot. cit.*), though the opposite does not displease him. It is proved first from (*S. Aug. 6. Trin. c. 1*), cited by (*Scot. 1. d. 9. q. un. §. Ad q. dico sub A.*): "if fire or the sun had existed from eternity, the splendor proceeding from it would have existed from eternity"; the sun is the cause of its splendor and splendor is the effect; therefore, since God is from eternity, he could have created the World from eternity, just as if the sun had existed from eternity, it could doubtless have produced splendor from eternity. Augustine adduces this argument against the Arians who denied the coeternity of the Son of God with God the Father, and who affirmed that the Son of God was a creature, though nobler and more excellent than the rest. For if a producing thing and what is produced in created things — like fire and its splendor, the sun and its light — can be coeval, then certainly in divine things Father and Son are coeternal, Augustine concludes. Otherwise, this kind of argument on the part of the holy Doctor would be feeble and ineffectual, as (*Poncius disp. 50. q. 4. concl. prima*) mistakenly concedes. Augustine therefore rightly argues: if one created thing that is produced can be coeternal with another created thing that produces it, then the Son of God can be coeternal with the Father who produced him; indeed, he is coeternal with that same producing Father. And the same holy Doctor expresses this most aptly in (*3. contra Maximinum, cap. 30*) with these words: "Just as the fire that begets and

the splendor that is begotten are coeval, so also God the Father who begets and God the Son who is begotten are coeternal." The aforesaid Doctor adds from the Platonists (*lib. 10. Civit. cap. 31*): "if a foot had existed from eternity, the footprint pressed in the dust would have existed from eternity"; similarly, since God the Father is from eternity, he begot a Son coeternal with himself, and he could have founded the World from eternity.

Nor does it avail to say with (*Poncius praealleg.*) that the hypothesis is impossible; for given the impossibility of the hypothesis, the consequence of Augustine is still valid. For, as (*Aur. passu memorato*) aptly argues, if both premises of a conditional proposition are false and impossible, yet the consequence is valid — as "if a horse had wings, it would fly," whose categorical counterpart is true, namely "that which has wings flies or is able to fly." Similarly in our case this categorical is true: "a producing thing has, or can have, its product coeval with itself; and a begetting thing has its begotten coeval with itself," as (*Scot. ubi supra*) acutely pursues.

Second: a natural and necessary cause that is properly disposed and unimpeded can have an effect coeval with itself, as (*Aug. tract. 20*) explains and illustrates: "the flame that generates is coeval with the light that it generates, nor does the generating flame precede in time the generated light; from when the flame begins, from then the light begins. Give me a flame without light, and I will give you God the Father without the Son." The same he writes in (*lib. de symbolo ad Catechumenos, cap. 3*) and (*serm. 18. secundum Ioan.*). Therefore a free cause can also have an effect coeval with itself, because liberty, since it denotes perfection, does not prevent an effect from being coeval with its cause. But God has existed from all eternity and has the principle of producing outward things freely, which is his will; therefore from eternity he could have produced a World coeval with himself.

You will say: a cause necessarily precedes its effect, and therefore the effect cannot be coeval with its cause. But God from eternity would be the cause of the World, and therefore the World itself cannot be coeternal with him. Against this: it is not necessary that a cause precede its effect in time; it suffices for a priority of nature, which does not destroy the coevality of the cause with its effect, as is evident from man and his risibility, from the sun and its light and splendor. Therefore the objection is invalid. All the more so, since the Greeks teach that God the Father is the cause of God the Son, and yet assert together with orthodox faith that the Son is coeternal with the Father. The antecedent has been shown in (*lib. 4. Phys. q. 1. art. 1*).

Third: it seems no more repugnant for the World to be eternal from the side of the future than from the side of the past, since the reasoning is equal in both cases; but from the side of the future the World can be eternal, as no one denies; therefore it could be eternal from the side of the past.

Fourth: there would have been no contradiction; therefore it was possible. The antecedent is proved: for the repugnance would have been either on God's part or on the creature's part; but contradiction would have arisen from neither source. Not from God's part, who from eternity enjoys omnipotence; nor from the part of the World, which was producible both in time and from eternity. For correlatives are simultaneous by nature, according to the chapter *de ad aliquid*. If, then, God is from eternity productive of the World, then likewise from eternity the World itself is producible and creatable. Finally, if there were some contradiction in God's inability to found the World from eternity, it would already have been discovered by some philosopher; but no philosopher has yet devised any contradiction concerning the eternity of the World — indeed, Aristotle, the prince of philosophers, firmly maintains and vigorously contends for the affirmative side, as I showed clearly in the preceding article. (*John Major*) thinks much of this argument for corroborating our proposed assertion, and it is drawn from (*Augustine 11. and 12. Civit.*), adduced by (*D. Th. opusc. 27. de aeternitate Mundi*).

It would remain to deal individually with permanent and successive things; but since the reasons adduced above prove that permanent things could have been made from eternity, and the arguments of the objections in the preceding article appear to argue the same of successive things — which, if they prove anything in fact, prove it all the more of the possible — and since (*Aristotle 8. Phys.*) and in other places establishes motion as eternal, which is successive, and likewise time, which is successive and its measure, no repugnance is discerned in successive things having been able to exist from eternity.

Objection I: many testimonies of the holy Fathers, principally (*Ambr. 1. Exam. cap. 3*): "What is so inappropriate as for the eternity of a work to be joined to the eternity of God?" (*Damasc. 1. fidei, cap. 9*): "It is not fitting that what is derived from non-being should be coeternal with what is without beginning and always is." (*Basil. hom. 1. Exam.*) judges this to be blasphemy. (*Aug. 12. Civit.*) and (*Hugo Vict. 1. de sacram. cap. 10*) indicate the same. Their principal foundation is that they were disputing against the Arians, who suspected that the Son of God was a creature and coeternal with God the Father. They argued thus: a creature is not coeternal with the Creator; the Son of God is coeternal with God the Father; therefore he is not a creature. The minor was conceded by the Arians; the major was proved by the Fathers cited, because a creature is in time, as is clear from Sacred Scripture and as I showed plainly in (*art. 2 of this question*). I respond that the cited authorities of the Fathers can be interpreted in two ways: first, as speaking of what is in fact the case, not of what is possible, which is the matter under dispute; second, as capable of being explained as referring to coeternity from itself and independent — in which sense it is absurd to suppose that a creature could have been made from eternity independently of God, for only God is eternal from himself and independent. Therefore, given the hypothesis that the World had been created from eternity, it would still not have been from

itself but dependent on God. The foundation of the Fathers is that since the Son of God is begotten from eternity by the Father and is coeternal with him, and since every creature is in time, it follows plainly that the Son of God is not a creature, as the Arians maintained. Thus those Fathers were speaking of what is the case in fact, not of what is possible, which is what the dispute concerns.

Objection II: creation is a passage from non-being to being, since it is the production of a thing from nothing; and nothing precedes the being of the creature. Therefore no creature could have been created from eternity, since non-being would have had to precede being; but that which is eternal has no antecedent from the side of the past, since nothing precedes it. Consequently, if something had been annihilated, its being would precede nothing; therefore likewise, if something had been created from eternity, nothing would have preceded its being, and therefore it would not have been eternal. The major is conceded; I distinguish the minor: positively I deny it, negatively I concede it, as was explained in the second note. To the consequence, the parallel is to be denied, because annihilation presupposes the being of the thing positively, since it is a passage from being to non-being; but creation requires only nothing, which is the negation of a real positive entity; therefore it suffices that nothing precede negatively, which does not prevent the created thing from having been able to enjoy eternity.

Objection III: if the world could have been produced from eternity, it would either have begun to be or it would not have begun to be; but neither of these is possible; therefore it could not have been eternal. The major is evident. The minor is shown: if it had begun to be, it would not have been eternal, because what begins to be is in time; if it had not begun to be, it would not have been created, for what is created begins to be, and therefore is in time. The answer, given the hypothesis, is that the World would have received being from eternity, since between "begun to be" and "not begun to be" there stands "having received being from eternity"; and nothing would have preceded it positively, but only negatively, in the way stated above.

Objection IV: from (3. *Phys. Tit.* 32) and (9. *Metaphys. Tit.* 17), in everlasting things, to be and to be able to be do not differ; but the World, from what has been said, is everlasting; therefore if it could have existed from eternity it did exist from eternity, since to be able to be coincides with its being. The answer, following (*Scot. in expeditione illius tex. cit. Met.*) and (*ibid.* 3. *Phys. quaest.* 9), is that that axiom holds with respect to being and being able to be simply and substantially, but not with respect to being and being able to be in a qualified sense and accidentally — just as the sun can illuminate everything illuminable, yet not everything illuminable is illuminated; and the moon can be eclipsed, yet it is not always eclipsed; and a wall can receive whiteness, though it is not always white. Or, better and more aptly to our purpose: in eternal things, of which kind is God alone and what is in him, to be and to be able to be are identical with respect to

what is internal, I concede; with respect to what is external, I deny. Thus in divine things, to be able to generate and to generate are identical, as are to be able to spirate and to spirate; but to be able to create and to create are not the same. For God could have created things from eternity, yet did not create them from eternity but in time. The reason is given: the power of generating looks to that which is internal; but the power of creating looks externally to producible and creatable things.

Objection V: if the World could have been made from eternity, there is no contradiction in an actually infinite number of rational souls; and there is no contradiction in an actually infinite production and existence of things, nor in an actually infinite number of years, months, days, hours, and other actual infinities — all of which things seem absurd and contradictory; therefore the World could not have existed from eternity. The aforementioned and similar consequences are to be denied. For if they had been infinite, they would have been so in potency, not in act. The reason is that, from what was said above in the question on the infinite, an actual infinite is that to which no addition can be made; but given any number of rational souls and of other things, something could be added — that is, other things could have been created, since the power of God is infinite and inexhaustible. This response is drawn from (*Scot. 2. Met. q. 6. §. Ad rationes*), and is embraced by (*Trombet. Tract. de pluralitate animarum*), although (*Baff. 4. d. 43. q. 2*) follows the contrary opinion and (*Aug. 12. Civit. c. 20*) indicates it.

Question II

On the Creation of the World

The chorus of scholastics, notably (*Scot. 4. Rep. d. 13. q. 1*), (*Mayr. 2. d. 1. q. 3*), (*Aur.*), (*Ockham*), (*Gabriel. ibid. q. 1*), and (*Gad. Quol. 12*), divides creation into active and passive, of which we shall treat in the present question.

Article I: What Creation Is

That there is creation is established from what was said and shown in (*art. 1 of the preceding question*), where I asserted that God was able to create the world and in fact did create it. What has been created was created by creation, just as what has been produced and generated was produced and generated by production and generation. Creation is therefore conceded, which is defined by (*D. Aug. 12. Civit. cap. 2*) and (*Damasc. 1. fidei, cap. 8*) as the production of a thing from nothing; and this definition, which is adapted to creation in the proper sense, is accepted by all scholastics, notably (*Scot. 2. dist. 1. quaest. 2. §. Respondeo. ante A.*) and (*4. dist. 1. quest. 1. §. Ad argumenta PP.*) and (*in Rep. ibid.*). There is, however, no small controversy among the doctors as to whether creation belongs to substance alone or also to accident. For (*D. Thom. 2. 4. part. q. 45. art. 1*) and his disciples maintain that it belongs only to a subsisting thing, which is substance. (*Scot.*,

however, 2. dist. 34. §. *iste qq. A.*) and (4. q. 1. §. *Ideo dici potest. LL.*) and (1. d. 17. q. 3. §. 6. *propter tertiam, Sub Y.*) and his followers teach that creation extends not only to substance but also to accident that is free of matter and spiritual.

Note that certain forms depend upon matter both for their being and their becoming — such are material or substantial forms, like the form of a stone, or accidental forms, like the light of the sun. Other forms, on the contrary, depend on matter neither for their being nor their becoming — such is the rational soul, which, although it is in matter, namely in the body, is separated from it after the death of man and exists and subsists by itself. This distinction is indicated by (*Arist. 2. Phys. T. 18*), who teaches that certain forms can be abstracted from matter and others cannot. Furthermore, a division of forms into natural ones — which are produced by the power of a natural agent and are said to be drawn out from the potency of matter — and supernatural ones — which are produced by a supernatural agent, namely God, such as grace and the other supernatural gifts — ought not to be omitted, and it is now in dispute whether the latter fall under creation.

Assertion: creation belongs to accident as well as to substance, when the accident is produced immediately by God. The assertion is twofold, and (*Doct.*) maintains it in the places cited above. The first part is evident from the preceding (*q. a. 1*), in which I proved that God created prime matter, the Angel, the rational soul, and the rest that are properly substances. God is an independent agent; therefore he can act without any pre-existing subject, which is to create. The second part is urged first: what is immediately produced by God is created; but certain accidents are immediately produced by God; therefore they are created. The major is evident: to create is just the same as to act without any means and pre-existing subject. The minor is proved from (*Psal. 83*): "The Lord will give grace and glory." And it is a common axiom of theologians that grace is created, as even the adversaries acknowledge, according to (*Fabro 4. disp. 2. c. 3*); and this is deduced from (*D. Paul. Eph. 2*), who calls grace a creature. For it is a supernatural gift produced by God alone; therefore it is properly created. Second: creation belongs to that which annihilation also belongs to, just as generation belongs to that which corruption also belongs to; but grace is not corrupted by sin in man, because corruption is the change of one form into another form, according to the axiom "the corruption of one is the generation of another." But when grace is lost, nothing new is generated; therefore grace is not corrupted but annihilated. Nor does it migrate from one subject to another, as no one denies; nor does any creature concur in its production, since it is not contained within the sphere of creaturely activity, since it is a participation of the divine being; therefore creation attains to it, and consequently an accident — especially an absolute accident that can be really separated from its subject — falls under creation.

Objection I: the being of an accident is to inhere, according to (*7. Met. T. 3*); but if some accident were created, it would participate in its own proper being; therefore no accident can be created. The answer is that Aristotle there teaches that the cause of natural accidents is substance, as (*Scot.*) interprets, and that he is not speaking of supernatural accidents, which Aristotle did not know.

Objection II: creation is of subsisting things; but no accident subsists by itself, for that is proper to substance; therefore no accident is created. The major is to be denied; for it suffices that they be beings simply and absolutely, and that they be capable of existing by themselves at least by divine power, as is the case with the accidents of the most holy Eucharist.

Article II: Whether Creation as Action Is a Real Being

(*Aureolus 2. d. 1. q. 2*), (*Ockham ibid. q. 1*), (*Gabriel concl. 4*), and the other Nominalists hold that creation as action is a real being. But (*Scot. 4. d. 13. q. 1. ante §. de secundo*), (*Faber 2. disp. 3. cap. 2*), (*Mayr. quest. 3*), (*Gad. quol. 12*), and others, among whom is (*S. Th.*) and his followers, hold that creation as action is a relation of reason.

Note first that certain things belong to God from eternity — such as wisdom, infinity, and the rest, both essential and notional; but certain things belong to him in time — such as being Creator, Governor, and Lord. These things are said of God not because something real newly accrues to him — for then he would be mutable — but on account of a new termination toward a creature founded and newly created in time. This can be illustrated by the example of a work that is called human, not because there is something of humanity in it, but because such a work was made by a man and the productive power of man is terminated toward that work.

Note second that creation as action is used in two ways. In one way formally — that is, for a relation of reason grounded in the divine will and in its act of willing, and terminated toward the creature. In another way fundamentally — namely, for the divine will and its act of willing, by which it produces the creature. Likewise, creation as passion is understood in two ways: formally, for the dependence or real relation of the creature toward the Creator; and fundamentally, or for the essence and nature of the creature produced and created by God the Creator.

Assertion: creation as action formally is a relation of reason; fundamentally, however, it is a real being. The assertion is twofold, and (*Doct. ubi supra*) maintains it. The first part is proved first: every being is either real or of reason, as (*Vallo tract. form. fol. 14 and 78*) notes before others. But creation as action is not a real being, because since it belongs to God, it would be either his essence or his relations of origin; and since these are eternal, creation as action would belong to him from eternity, which contradicts the truth shown in (*art. 1 of the preceding question*). Therefore, creation as action formally is a being of reason. Second: the

independent and the dependent, the infinite and the finite, are so related that the finite and dependent regards the infinite and independent by a real relation, whereas the independent and infinite regards the latter by a relation of reason — as (*Doct. 1. d. 30. q. 2. §. Ad argumenta 2. q. Q.*) shows acutely and perspicuously. Third: if no relation of reason accrued to the Creator, beyond doubt a real relation would accrue to him; and since this would be in time, the Creator himself would have something real anew that he did not have before, and thus change would fall upon the Creator himself, which is false and absurd; therefore a relation of reason is to be established. The second part is acknowledged, since creation as action taken materially and fundamentally, from the second note, means nothing other than the divine will or its act of willing, which no one doubts to be a real being; thus taken, creation as action is a real being.

Objection I: what is truly and really denominated by another thing, setting aside any operation of the intellect, that other thing is a real being; but God is truly and really denominated through active creation as creating and Creator, setting aside all operation of the intellect; therefore active creation is a real being. I distinguish the major: what is really denominated by intrinsic denomination, I concede; by extrinsic denomination, I deny. I apply the same distinction to the minor: God through active creation is denominated by intrinsic denomination, I deny; by extrinsic denomination, I concede. For God is not formally denominated creating by creation existing in him, but by creation terminated toward the creature — just as a bench is called human because the operation of man is terminated toward that bench, as is clear from the first note. You will press: if God is called Creator because he terminates the relation of the creature, then active creation is not a relation of reason. The consequence is to be denied if one speaks of creation formally taken, which is what is under discussion; otherwise if one speaks of creation fundamentally accepted, as I made clear in the second note.

Objection II: the generator and the generated in divine things are also related by mutual relation; therefore the Creator and the creature also regard each other mutually by a real relation, and thus active creation is a real relation, just as passive creation. The parallel is to be denied, since the aforesaid relations of origin are constitutive of the divine persons, whereas the relations of Creator and creature are adventitious; but something real cannot newly accrue to God, since he is immutable and infinite; therefore there is no real relation from the Creator toward the creature, but there rightly is from the begetter toward the begotten and from the spirator toward the spirated.

Article III: Whether Creation Is a Change

Some, among whom is the Seraphic Doctor (*2. d. 1. art. 3. q. 1*), hold that creation is a change. But (*Scot. 2. dist. 1. quaest. 5. §. Secundum primum s. ad 5.*) and (*4. dist. 11. quest. 1. art. 3*), (*Mayr. 2. d. 1. q. 2*), (*Faber ibid. disp. 3. cap. 2*), and other scholastics teach that creation is not properly a change.

Note from (*Scot. in 2. passu alleg.*) that change can be used in two ways. First, broadly and improperly, for any new acquisition of a thing, whether substantial or accidental — in this sense the production of any thing can be called a change. This is perhaps what (*Arist. 5. Phys. 7*) had in view when he says that something can be changed in four ways: from non-subject to subject, or from subject to non-subject — the former is generation, the latter is corruption — or from subject to subject, as alteration, or from non-subject to non-subject; and this last combination is really not a change, since its terms are neither contrarily nor contradictorily opposed. Second, precisely and properly, for the new actualization of a form that a subject receives, whereby it is otherwise disposed now than before (*6. Phys. 32 and 74*); in this way, change always requires a subject, whether the thing passes from one form to another form, or from privation to form.

Assertion: creation is not properly a change. (*Scot. praecit.*) supports this. It is proved first from (*D. Greg. 5. Mor. ad medium et finem*): "change is a progression from one to another" — that is, according to the interpretation of (*Rich.*), from one real extreme to another real extreme; but creation does not participate two real extremes, since its terminus from which is nothing; therefore creation is not properly a change. Second: change in the precise sense, as noted above, is when something is otherwise disposed now than before through the reception of some form; but through creation a thing is not otherwise disposed now than before, since the thing did not exist before but received being through creation itself. Furthermore, change requires a subject in which it occurs; but creation excludes a subject, since, from what has been said, it is defined as production from nothing, that is, from no pre-existing subject. Therefore creation is not properly a change. Moreover, creation is contained under no species of change, as is clear by induction; for it is neither generation, nor corruption, nor alteration, nor local motion, which are treated in the postpredicaments and in (*5. Phys. T. 7. and elsewhere*), and of which I made mention above in the note.

Objection I: (*D. Aug. 12. Civit. cap. 1*) writes that what was made from nothing is mutable. (*S. Damasc. 1. fidei, cap. 3*) adds that things creatable are subject to turning; therefore if created things are subject to turning and change, creation is likewise a turning and change. The answer is that these and similar authorities are to be taken of change broadly understood, not of change in the strict sense.

Objection II: there is no transition from contradictory to contradictory without change, as is plain in the case of a wall that passes from non-white to white through change or the reception of whiteness; but through creation a creature passes from non-being to being; therefore creation is a change. (*Doct. 1. dist. 39. §. Ad 1. arg. 3. q.*) answers that this is valid for successive things and not for simultaneous ones. For the wall must first be without whiteness and then be adorned with it. Since, however, a creature does not in any way exist before it is created, its creation is not a change.

Objection III: a change is when something is otherwise disposed now than before, as was stated above; but through creation a creature is otherwise disposed now than before, since before it was not and now it is; therefore creation is a change. The answer is that the definition of change is to be understood presupposing the existence of the thing; for what is subject to change is subject to the received or to-be-received form and to its privation; for this reason I noted above that change in the strict sense requires an existing subject in which it occurs. Since, however, creation is production from no pre-existing subject, it is therefore not properly a change.

Article IV: Whether Creation Is a Transient Action

(*Bilor. relati 1. p. quaest. 45. art. 3. dub. 1*) and others hold that creation, broadly taken, is an immanent action. But (*Aur. 2. distinctione 1. quaest. 2. art. 1*), (*Greg. ibidem quaest. 6*), (*Ockham 1. dist. 43. quaest. 1*), and (*Conimb. 8. Phys. cap. 2. quaest. 1. art. 3*) assert that creation is a transient action. What is to be said on this point according to Scotus and the truth will be opened up and decided by what follows.

Note that creation is not properly an action. For an action, according to the Author of the six principles (*cap. 2*), is defined as that according to which we are said to act upon what is subjected to us. And according to (*Scot. 4. dist. 13. quaest. 1. §. Ad huius autem sub H.*): "an action is a relation extrinsically accruing from the transmuting to the transmuted"; but creation, since it presupposes no subject, is not rightly considered a proper action, which presupposes a subject upon which the agent acts. Therefore, if creation is not truly an action, it is certainly neither an immanent nor a transient action, as is plain from the canon we taught and explained in (*Epit. lib. 3. quaest. 3. art. 3.*): when the genus is removed, the species is removed too. It is called an action in the broad sense — and likewise passion with respect to the created thing. Furthermore, let the double acceptance of action stated and explained in the second article of this question be recalled: fundamentally — that is, for the act of the divine will — and formally — for a relation of reason of God creating toward the creature.

Assertion: action fundamentally accepted is an immanent action; formally taken, however, it is a transient action. This is deduced from (*Scot. ubi supra*). The first part is evident because, thus accepted, it is the act of the divine will, which is from eternity really identified with God himself. Furthermore, an immanent action does not have a terminus, but is itself the terminus of production (*9. Met. Tit. 16*), where Aristotle calls immanent operations the termini of powers; but creation as action fundamentally taken does not have a terminus; therefore creation fundamentally taken is an immanent action. The second part is urged first: a transient action is one that regards the product outside the agent from which it proceeds, as its name indicates; but creation as action regards the creature, which is outside the creating God; therefore it is a transient action. First: things that are in time are called actions toward the outside, as the

scholastics commonly teach, distinguishing the works of God toward the inside and toward the outside; but creation is in time and regards a work toward the outside; therefore it is a transient action.

Objection I: creation as action is the volition of God; for God through the act of his will creates whatever he wills to create. Hence (*D. Paul. Eph. 1*) writes that God does all things according to the good pleasure of his will; but the volition of God is immanent; therefore creation as action is immanent as well. I concede the major; I distinguish the minor: the volition of God is an immanent action insofar as it regards what is internal, I concede; insofar as it regards what is external, I deny. Or say that the argument concludes with respect to creation fundamentally taken, but not with respect to creation formally taken.

Objection II: if creation were a transient action, it would be in the creature; for it would pass from God into the creature itself; but creation is not in the creature, otherwise the creature would create; therefore creation is not a transient action. The answer is by denying the consequence of the major, since only passive creation is located in the creature — especially according to (*Scot.*), who holds that action exists in the agent.

Article V: Whether Creation Is Distinct from the Created Thing

There is no difficulty about creation as action, since this — fundamentally — is the act of the divine will, and formally a relation of reason, and therefore without doubt differs from the created thing. The question is about passive creation, which is the real relation of dependence of the creature upon the Creator. For some, like (*Aur. 2. d. 1. art. 2*), defend that creation is something intermediate between God and the creature, just as a road mediates between two extremes that bound it. (*Thomists 1. part. q. 45. art. 3*) establish between creation and creature a real distinction. But (*Scot. 2. dist. 1. quaest. 5. §. Ad q. istam. M.*), (*S. Bon. ibidem art. 3. quaest. 2*), (*Ric. art. 1. quaest. 4*), and very many others teach that passive creation is really identified with the creature but formally distinct from it.

Note first from (*Scot. 2. dist. 1. quaest. 2. §. Ad 1. arg. princip. D.*) that a cause acts immediately upon its patient, not acting through some absolute or relative form as intermediate, but by a principle and power inhering in itself; therefore that which is absolute in the cause is followed immediately by what is absolute in the effect, and the rest follow from these — such as the relation of cause to effect and vice versa. Hence, creation is not something intermediate between God and the creature by which the creature is created by God, since being a relation, it does not precede but follows, arising as it does from the positing of the extremes.

Note second from (*the same Doct. cit. quaest. 4. §. Ad illam primam quest. Q.*) that creation presents several relations: one toward the creating and causing God, and this is really identified with the created thing; another toward the non-being

that precedes — and this is twofold. Either toward the non-being that immediately precedes the being of the creature by some duration, and this relation is really distinct from the created thing, since it ceases while the creature persists in its being; or toward the non-being that precedes mediately, indistinctly, and indifferently, and this relation remains as long as the creature remains, and therefore is really the same as it.

First assertion: passive creation does not mediate between the Creator and the creature. This is deduced from (*Scot. in 2. praealleg. q. 2. D.*). It is proved first: everything that exists is either from itself or from another; passive creation is not from itself, since only God is such; therefore it is from another, and thus it does not mediate between Creator and creature. Second: if passive creation were something interposed between God and the creature, it would be either something eternal or something temporal; but it can be neither; therefore it does not mediate between them. The major is evident; the minor is ready at hand, since nothing except God is eternal, and nothing temporal exists unless it is created. The Council of Sens adds its weight, decreeing that ideas do not mediate between God and the things ideated, and excluding altogether any medium between the creature and the creating essence.

Second assertion: passive creation is not really distinct from the created thing, but only formally. The assertion is twofold, and (*Doct. ubi supra, quaest. 4. §. Ad quaest. istam. M.*) maintains it. The first part is proved: things that are inseparable from one another by any power — whether natural or supernatural (except for those among which there is essential dependence, such as a whole and its parts) — are not really distinct; but passive creation and the created thing are such; therefore there is no real distinction between them. The major, beyond being explained and proved elsewhere, can also be urged from the opposite: things that are divisible and separable from each other are really distinct, as is clear from matter and form, from place and the located thing, from Peter and Paul, and the like; therefore conversely, things that are indivisible and inseparable are not really distinguished. The minor is proved: passive creation is the relation of dependence of the creature upon the Creator; but it is impossible for the creature to exist without that dependence, since it is formally a dependent being and God is independent. Furthermore, those things of which one can exist without the other really differ; the same thing cannot simultaneously exist and not exist, be and not be — for this is opposed to the first principle, and it is a safe way of arguing through contradiction, as one may see in (*7. Top. cap. 8 and elsewhere*). Conversely, those things of which one cannot exist without the other do not really differ; passive creation cannot exist without the created thing, nor the created thing without passive creation, since the former is essentially its dependence and the latter is what is dependent; therefore they are not really distinct.

The second part is proved first by the authority of (*D. Aug. 7. Trin. 2*): "everything that is said relatively is something, except the relation"; therefore since the creature is referred to God, it plainly follows that the essence and substance of the creature differs formally from the relation by which it is referred to the Creator. Second: the absolute differs at least formally from the relative, because the former is toward itself, the latter is toward another — as the same (*Aug.*) affirms at the beginning of (*lib. 3 of the same work cited*); but the essence of the creature is an absolute entity, especially if it is substantial, and passive creation is a relative entity; therefore they differ formally. Third: a distinct definition or description indicates a distinct formality, since a definition is a discourse expressing the nature and formality of a thing; but the definition of passive creation is different from the definition of the creature, because the former is formally a relative being and the latter a being that is absolute; therefore there is a formal distinction between them.

Objection I against the first assertion: between begetter and begotten there is a middle, namely generation, as (*Arist. 2. Phys. Tit. 14*) and (*3. eiusdem operis, T. 21*), (*5. Tit. 2.*), and elsewhere, teaches; therefore between creating and creature creation also mediates. The parallel is drawn because just as the creator creates through creation, so the begetter generates through generation; but the latter is established as a medium and way between begetter and begotten; therefore the former too is a medium between creator and creature. Consequence I: what a thing is made by and what it is differ, as no one denies and is plainly evident — for generation is that by which the generated thing is generated, and the generated thing is what is generated; likewise, action is that by which the agent acts, and the effect produced by it is what is acted upon; similarly, creation is that by which the creature is created, and the creature is what is created.

Consequence II: what passes away is distinct from what remains, as is clear from privation, form, and matter, and also from motion and the moved thing; for while matter persists, privation arrives and form arrives; and while the moveable persists, now motion inheres in it and now rest. But creation passes away, while the created thing and creature remains after creation; therefore creation mediates between it and the Creator. The parallel is to be denied, because in generation something is always pre-required and presupposed — in divine things the essence, in created things matter; but in creation nothing is presupposed, since it is production from nothing, and only its terminus is touched, as the (*Seraphic Doct. passu alleg.*) excellently pursues. The same must be said to the first consequence. To the second, satisfaction is given through the double acceptance of creation stated in the second note. For if creation is taken for the respect of the creature toward the non-being that immediately precedes it, in this way the created thing passes away and creation ceases, just as when the terminus is reached, motion ceases; but if it is taken for the respect of the creature toward the non-being that mediately precedes it, this remains as long as the creature remains.

Objection II against the second assertion: (*Aug. 5. Trin. cap. 5*) writes that in created things, what is not said according to substance must necessarily be said according to accident; therefore since the relation of passive creation is not substance but accident, it follows plainly that it is really distinct from the created thing. The answer is that Augustine takes accident there not for a being inhering in a subject, but for something extraneous — that is, what does not enter into the essence of a thing but follows from it. You will say: a relation is located in the predicament of accident, which truly inheres in a subject; passive creation is a relation; therefore it is properly an accident taken as a thing inhering in a subject. The answer is that the objection applies to predicamental relation, not to transcendental relation, such as passive creation, as (*Scot. 1. d. 2. q. 2*) and (*A. d. 43. q. J. §. De tertio*) indicate; for being is first divided into uncreated and created before it is divided into the ten predicaments, which are the series of created beings.

Article VI: Whether Creation and Conservation Are the Same

Some, followed by (*Aur. 2. d. 1. q. 2. a. 2*) and others, to whom (*Ric. ibid. q. 1. art. 2*) lends support, assert that creation and conservation are diverse habitudes and really distinct relations. The Seraphic Doctor in 2 is cited for this opinion by (*Gadium gnol. 12*), but I find nothing there that supports it. (*Scot., however, quol. mox alleg. art. 1*), (*Lich. ibid.*), (*Faber 2. disp. 8. c. 3*), (*Mayr. q. 4*), (*Orbel.*), and the other Scotists firmly assert that creation and conservation are one and the same real relation, entirely really distinct.

Note that since creation is the production of a thing from immediately presupposed nothing, and conservation is the continuation of the same pre-existing thing, beyond the real relation by which the creature is referred to God the Creator as effect to its efficient cause, there are implied two relations of reason: one toward the non-being that immediately precedes, by reason of which it is said to be created in the first instant in which it is created; another toward the non-being that mediately precedes, by reason of which it is said to be conserved, because that being which the thing receives in the first instant through creation persists and endures in the second and other subsequent instants, and therefore it is said to be conserved. Furthermore, observe that these two latter relations are called relations of reason not because they are fabricated by the intellect, but because one of their extremes is not real and positive, as (*Scot. in postpredicam.*) says that contradiction and privation are relations of reason because one of their extremes is negative or privative. For a real relation arises from two real positive extremes; if either is negative or privative, the relation is called one of reason.

Assertion: creation and conservation are a single real relation of the creature to the creating and conserving God. This is defended by (*Doct. cit. §. De primo A.*). It is proved first from (*D. Aug. 8. supra Gen. ad lit. c. 12*): "Air, in the presence of light, has not been made luminous but is made luminous by the illuminating sun. For

if it had been made luminous, it would remain luminous after the sun withdraws; but it does not remain luminous, as experience shows; therefore it has not been made luminous." Similarly, the creature has not been made by God but is continuously being made, because it needs God's help and sustenance, without which it would instantly be reduced to nothing, as (*Aug. 4. de Genesi cap. 14*) attests. Therefore, if the creature is always being made while it is being conserved, creation and conservation are not distinct from one another. (*Avic. 6. Metaphys. capite primo*) adds: "an effect needs the giver of its being always and ceaselessly for as long as it has being." Therefore, if to be conserved is always to receive being from the conserver, and to be created is to receive being from the Creator, no difference between creation and conservation seems to be interposed. Second: the unity and identity of a relation is drawn from the unity and identity of its terminus and foundation, as I have often stressed; but the terminus of both creation and conservation is entirely the same — namely, the act of the divine will by which it creates the creature and conserves it — and the foundation is likewise the same — namely, the existing creature; therefore creation and conservation are one and the same relation. Furthermore, there is one and the same dependence of one total effect upon one total efficient cause; therefore also there is only one dependence of the creature upon the creating and conserving God. The antecedent is clear from (*l. 1. de causis, quaestione secunda, articulo tertio*); the consequence is deduced. For conservation pertains to the efficient cause, as is evident from light, which, just as it depends on the luminous body in its coming to be and in its conservation, so also does the creature depend upon God, as (*Aug. praecit.*) plainly expounds.

Objection I: there can be creation without conservation; therefore creation and conservation are not one and the same respect and relation. The antecedent is urged: something can be created and not conserved, as in an instantaneous thing; therefore since creation can be separated from conservation, it follows that they are not identified with each other. I respond by distinguishing the antecedent: if creation and conservation are taken for the relation of dependence of the creature upon the creating and conserving God, I deny it; if conservation is taken for the relation toward the non-being that mediately precedes, then it is distinct from creation, and creation can exist without it, as I made clear in the preceding note.

Objection II: no thing presupposes itself, otherwise it would both be and not be at the same time — it would be, because it is presupposed to exist; it would not be, because it would come to be afterwards. But conservation presupposes creation: for in order that something may be conserved, it must first have been created; therefore creation and conservation are not the same respect. The objection is to be met by the same distinction with which the preceding objection was resolved and dissolved. For conservation formally taken — as the respect of reason toward the non-being that mediately precedes — does pre-require and presuppose creation; but not so if it is taken for the dependence of

the created thing, which is entirely the same as the dependence of the conserved thing.

Objection III: creation is the reception of being by a thing from nothing, and no thing receives the being that it already has; for (6. *Phys. T. 7*) it is impossible that someone go to Thebes and be at Thebes at the same time; and thus it is impossible that something receive being through creation and again receive being through conservation. This would happen if conservation were the same relation as creation. All the more so since conservation of some effect can exist without its production, just as a figure impressed in wax is conserved after it has been impressed by the seal, even if the seal is broken; therefore conservation can exist without creation, and thus they do not bear the same respect. These and similar objections, which (*Aur. cit.*) accumulates abundantly and acutely, are all resolved by the same distinction as the preceding ones.

Article VII: Whether Through Creation Some Real Relation Accrues to God

(*Ockham 1. d. 30. q. 5*), (*Gabriel*), and the other Nominalists there assert that God's relation to the creature is a real relation; against them all the Realists protest: (*Scot. 1. d. 30. q. 2*), (*Rich. cit. q. 4*), (*S. Bon. q. 1*), (*Mayr. q. 2*), (*Viger.*), (*Orbel.*), and (*Vorrilong. eo in loco*), who deny that any relation — whether eternal or temporal, potential or actual — accrues to God through creation.

Note first from (*Scot. 1. d. 31. q. 1. §. Ad q. A.*) that a real relation requires three things. First: the foundation and terminus must be real; therefore there is no real relation of non-being to non-being, nor even of being to non-being. Second: between the foundation and the terminus there must be a real distinction; for this reason there is no real relation of the same thing to itself (5. *Met. T. 20*). Third: the relation must arise from the nature of the extremes, without any mind thinking of it; for if it is made by the work of a collative power, it will be a relation of reason, not a real one.

Note second that certain things are said of God in time not because something newly accrues to him, but because they signify and connote what occurs in time; thus God is called Creator and Governor because he creates and governs creatures that are made and endure in time, as the (*Seraphic Doctor passu praealleg.*) intimates, and after him (*Subtilis 4. d. 13. q. 1. §. Ad argumenta R.*), saying that "to create signifies the relation of passion and connotes an essential divine act that is intrinsic — not absolutely, but as it regards the creature"; and certain things belong to God by extrinsic denomination, just as a work is called human not because something of humanity is in it, but because it was made by a man; similarly urine is called healthy not because health is formally in it, but because it indicates health, which is formally in man. God is likewise denominated creating from passive creation, which exists formally in the creature, as (*Scot. 1. cit. §. Respondeo sub G.*) assents: "God is called Creator not because the relation of

creation is formally in him, but because he terminates the relation of passive creation, which is formally in the creature; and because he terminates the relation of the subjection of the creature, he is called Lord." Hence (*May. cit. q. 1*) notes that four predicates belong to God from time: one on account of creation, whereby he is called agent and creator; another on account of likeness, for the creature is like God, especially man, who is said to be made in the image and likeness of God (*Gen. 1*); a third on account of inequality, for God is said to be greater and more perfect than the creature; and a fourth with respect to distinction, whereby God is said to be distinct from the creature.

First assertion: God is not referred to creatures by a relation of reason. This is defended by (*Doct. 1. d. 20. q. 2. §. Respondeo. H.*) and in (*Rep. ibid.*). It is proved first: setting aside every intellect and abstracting from any relation of reason, God is still called Creator, because by his will — which is his omnipotence — he founded the creature; therefore God does not acquire this denomination through a relation of reason; for when the cause is posited in act, its effect is posited in act and the denomination of the cause from that effect follows. Since, therefore, God creates the creature by his will, he is denominated Creator through this creation, setting aside any intellect and relation of reason. Second: if, per impossibile, God were devoid of intellect — as some appeared to think who believed God to be the sun — he would have no relation of reason, and yet he would still be Creator, Governor, and Lord; therefore these denominations are not derived from a relation of reason. Third: a relation is not terminated toward a relative but toward an absolute, as (*Scot. cit.*) proves and as I showed at length in (*Log. lib. 3. q. de relatione*); therefore on the part of God, who is the terminus of the creature's relation, no relation of reason arises. Furthermore, the relation of reason would be either ancient and eternal, or new and temporal. Not the first, because the creature to which it is referred is not eternal; nor the second, because there would be no transition from contradictory to contradictory without change, and God is immutable; therefore in time he cannot in himself receive the aforesaid relation of reason. Nor is it necessary on the part of a created intellect, since, even if no created intellect existed to cause a relation of reason, if God were to create a stone or another creature, he would aptly be called Creator; therefore no relation of reason in God is to be admitted, through which he is called Creator.

Second assertion: there is no real relation of God to creatures, whether eternal or temporal. So (*Scot. passu praealleg. H.*), and as regards both parts (*Aug. 12. Civit. cap. 15*) does not venture to decide. The first part is urged first: a real relation does not arise except when both extremes are posited — that is, foundation and terminus, since it is the disposition of extremes to each other; but from eternity there is no terminus of the relation of God to creatures, since from eternity no creature exists, as is evident from (*1. q. huius lib. art. 2*). Therefore no relation of God to creatures exists. Second: relatives are simultaneous by nature and by understanding, for they mutually posit and mutually destroy each other, as

(*Arist. C. de ad aliquid*) well pursues; but from eternity no creature was founded, as faith teaches; therefore no relation of Creator to creature is to be conceded. You will say: God is creative and the creature is creatable from eternity, as I proved in (*art. 3. prima q. istius lib.*); therefore the relation of God to creatures has the property of a relation, namely, to be simultaneous by nature and by understanding. I say indeed that God is creative from eternity — that is, has the active power of creating from eternity — and the creature had the passive power by which it could have been created from eternity; but this does not introduce a real relation, either in God or in the creature, since the creature did not exist from eternity, and an accidental and adventitious relation is impossible to God. The second part is shown first from (*Aug. 5. Trin. c.*) as also (*Mag. cit.*), where our assertion is explained with this comparison: just as a coin constitutes a price without any real entity being added to it, so God creates the creature with no relation accruing to him. And (*ibid.*): "Nothing, neither absolute nor relative, accrues to God in time." Second, from the supreme simplicity, necessity, and infinity of God, which admit of no addition of a new real entity; otherwise God would be composite, contingent, and finite — as someone who would be composed with the relation accruing to him, which is contingent and limited. Third: a relation of the third mode is not mutual, as is clear from (*5. Met. T. 20*); but the relation of creation is of the third mode and is not mutual, just as the relation of the knowable to knowledge; therefore on the part of God, who is infinite, no real relation to the creature arises. Moreover, such a relation would be either substance or accident — not the first, because substance is toward itself, whereas a relation is toward another; nor the second, on account of its potentiality and inherence, which bespeak imperfection. Therefore no real relation is to be placed in God on account of the creation of things. Hence (*Magist. passu memorato*) rightly concludes: "The appellation by which a creature is said relatively to the Creator is relative and notes a relation that is in the creature itself; but the appellation by which the Creator is said relatively to the creature is indeed relative, but notes no relation that is in the Creator."

Objection I against the first part of the second assertion: what is attributed to God is eternal, as is clear from goodness, infinity, and the rest that are predicated of God and are eternal; but the relations of Creator, Governor, and Lord are attributed to God and said of him; therefore they are eternal and belong to him from eternity. I distinguish the major: through real identity, I concede; through termination, I deny. For God is said by us to be loved — not from eternity but in time, because we exist in time. So the aforesaid relations are said of God in time because creatures are in time, whose relations God himself terminates. Or, the major is true of predicates and attributes that are internal, but not of those that are external, such as Creator, Conserver, and Lord. You will press: the creature has essential and quidditative being from eternity, about which propositions of eternal truth are given, since it is necessary being; therefore the aforesaid predicates belong to God from eternity. I say that this is

not being simply but qualified, potential and ideal being, from which no real relation arises whose terminus is God, because neither it nor its foundation exists.

Objection II against the second part of the same assertion: the relations of active and passive power, according to (*5. Met. T. 20*), are real and mutual; but the relations of Creator, Conserver, and Lord are relations founded upon active and passive power; therefore they are mutual and real, both on the part of the creature and on the part of God. The answer is that the major applies to relations founded upon the power of a finite and limited agent and patient, but not to relations founded upon the power of an infinite and unlimited agent, such as the relations mentioned. You will press: the divine relations of begetter and begotten are real on the part of both extremes; and likewise the relations of equality and likeness among the divine persons; therefore the same must be said of the relations mentioned, which are relations of producing and produced, efficient and effect, inequality and likeness. The antecedent is conceded; the consequence is denied. The reason for the disparity is that in the former, both extremes are supremely necessary and infinite; in the latter, however, one extreme is contingent and finite.

Objection III: relations of disproportion and those that are opposed exist in distinct and opposed extremes — as paternity in the father and filiation in the son; but the aforementioned relations are of disproportion and are opposed; therefore God cannot be denominated Creator from the relation that is in the creature, nor Lord from the relation of subjection that is in the servant. The answer is that this applies to relations of the first and second mode, but not of the third mode — especially when their terminus is supremely simple, necessary, and infinite, as is the case in these relations.

You will press: form denominates the thing in which it is, as is clear from whiteness, which denominates the wall white in which it inheres; therefore since God is denominated by these relations, it is rightly inferred that they exist formally in him. I say that this is valid of intrinsic denomination, not of extrinsic and terminative denomination, by which God is thus denominated. Therefore God receives no relative form in himself, nor undergoes any change, but that form is in the created work, as (*Aug. 5. Trin. cap. 15*) rightly teaches and expresses in these words: "So also, when he is said to be angry with the wicked and at peace with the good, it is they who are changed, not he — just as light is harsh to weak eyes and gentle to strong ones, through their change and not through its own."

Question III

On the Fabric of the World

Article I: What the World Is

Although investigation and scrutiny of the things contained in the World is considered by (*Ecclus. 1*) to be vain labor and a troublesome occupation, nevertheless its investigation and knowledge is intrinsically good, since it is from God, from whom all good proceeds — though it is accounted incidentally evil insofar as it is accompanied by excessive study and great affliction of soul, and by the removal of piety and prayer to God, as (*Lyranus passu nunc memorato*) interprets.

There are some who hold that the World is one composite of matter and form. Others, like Plato and his followers — according to (*Aug. 10. Civit. cap. 29*) — to whom the same (*Aug. 1. de consensu Evangelistarum, cap. 23*) does not dare to object but appears to be undecided — hold that the World is a great animal. The common opinion, however, is defended by the rest of the authors cited below, who teach that the World is one by a unity of order.

Note first that "world" admits of many meanings. First, it is taken for everything that falls under the concave surface of the lunar sphere — in this sense (*Arist. 1. Meteor. cap. 3*) says: "this world here must continually be subject to the superior revolutions." Second, for corporeal creatures, both celestial and sublunar — in this sense the author of the sphere and his interpreters divide the world into superior and inferior. Third, for the inhabitants and dwellers of the world — in this sense (*Alph. 10. adversus haereses, verbo Mundus*) accepts it, following (*Aug. tract. 3 in Ioan.*): "The world is evil because evil men are the inhabitants of the world, just as a bad house is bad not because of its walls but because of those who dwell in it." And (*ibid. tract. 4*) it is frequently used for a wicked man, as one may see in the same (*Aug. 6. contra Julianum, cap. 1*) and (*in Psal. 34, conc. 1*): "In sinners the world is said, and in those who love the world, of whom it is said in (*Joan. 1*): 'The world did not know him,' and (*1 Joan. 1*): 'The whole world is placed in wickedness.'" And the Apostle expresses it in (*Eph. 7*): "The rulers of the darkness of this world — the rulers of the world I say, of these darknesses." And before him Christ the Lord in (*Joan. 7*): "The world cannot hate you, but me it hates, because I bear witness of it that its works are evil." Fourth, for the totality of all created things, both material and spiritual — in this sense God is said to have created the world, and it is said to have been made through him; and in this sense the philosophers discourse of the world in the present context.

Note second that various descriptions of the world are brought forward by authors, which do not appear to differ much from one another. The first is this: the World is an ordered collection of the heavens, elements, and the rest of creatures contained in them. This is perhaps what (*Aug. in Psal. proxime cit.*) had in view when he adds: "The world is said to be this fabric which we see." The second: the World is the perfect and complete gathering and ornament of all things. The third: the World is the ordering and distribution of bodies preserved by God and through God. Furthermore, order is defined by (*Aug. 19. Civit. cap. 13*) as the disposition of equals and unequals, assigning to each its proper place.

First assertion: the World is not one composite of matter and form. This is presupposed by (*Doct. in com. 12. Met. T. 52*) and (*tract. de 1. principio, c. 3*). It is proved first: if the world were one composite of matter and form, all things in it would be of the same species, because they would participate the same form and the same matter of the world; but that many things are diverse in genus and species no one denies; therefore the world is not something one assembled from matter and form. Second: what shares the same form and matter has the same operations, because form is the principle of operations; but we experience in the universe diverse operations not only in number and species but also in genus — as is evident from stones, herbs, trees, brutes, and men; therefore the world is not something one coalesced from matter and form.

Second assertion: nor is the world a great animal. This is also presupposed by (*Doct. ubi supra*); and the opposite view is retracted by (*Aug. 1. retract. cap. 11*). It is urged first: every animal possesses at least the sense of touch (*3. anima Tit. 66*); but the world does not have the sense of touch, as is plain from water, air, stone, metal, and similar things devoid of touch. Therefore the world is not an animal. Second: every animal is either rational or irrational; but the world is neither; therefore it is not an animal. The major is known and conceded by all. The minor is shown: it is not irrational, otherwise it would be a brute — but the Platonists reject this, for (*Aug. 10. Civit. c. 29*) reports, on the authority of Plato in the *Timaeus*, that they believe the world to be the most blessed and eternal animal. Nor is it rational — otherwise it would be a man, and therefore capable of grace, merit, sin, beatitude, damnation, and the like, which appear most absurd. The world must therefore be denied to be an animal. This is plainly demonstrated by the determinate members and specific organs by which vital and animal operations are performed in an animal, as (*Arist. 1. Phys. Tit. 36*) signifies and (*August. l. de beata vita*) assents, which cannot be discerned in the universe.

Third assertion: the World is one by a unity of order. So (*Scot. cit.*) and (*1. dist. 30. quaest. 2. sub Q.*) and (*Quol. 19. §. De secundo F.*) and (*2. dist. 1. quest. 4. §. Et quia ante C.*), preceded by (*Arist. 12. Met. Tit. 52*); and (*Pythagoras*) taught it, according to (*Plut. 2. de dogmatibus Philosophorum*), and (*Aug. quaest. 2. veteris et novi testamenti*) touched upon it with these words: "Substances being set apart from one another, a joining being made is called World." It is proved first: the world is defined as an ordered collection of created things, as is clear from the second note; but a collection means nothing other than the order of things toward one another pointing to one first; therefore the world is one by a unity of order. Second: one must philosophize about the world just as about an army or a kingdom, as (*the Philosopher proxime adductus*) rightly pursues; but an army is one by a unity of order — namely, of soldiers toward one leader — and a kingdom is likewise one by a unity of order — that is, of subjects toward one king; therefore the world too is established as one by a unity of order of all creatures toward one God, Creator, Governor, and their ultimate end.

Objection I against the first assertion: what shares the same matter certainly has the same form; but the world possesses the same matter, since there is only one matter in species for celestial and terrestrial things; therefore it consists of one form. But that which consists of one matter and one form is one composite; since therefore the world is of this kind, it plainly follows that it is one assembled from matter and form. The major is to be denied, since the unity of a composite is derived not from the unity of matter but from the unity of form; but since in the world there are many forms, there must also be many composites.

Objection II: what is better and more perfect is to be attributed to the world, because the world is the work of God, whose every work is perfect; but it is better and more perfect for the world to be assembled from matter and form than to be one by a unity of order, because the unity of composition is greater than the unity of order; therefore, etc. The answer is that the major holds provided that the thing is capable of such perfection; but the world is not capable of the unity of composition, but only of the unity of order. Hence someone would ineptly attribute rationality to a brute, of which it is incapable. Thus, in a similar case, (*Scot. 4. dist. 49. quaest. 7. §. Ad 1. ante D.*) responds, saying that joy is not of the essence of beatitude because the essence of beatitude strictly taken is not capable of it, just as wisdom does not enter into the essence of man.

Objection III: the whole is nobler and more perfect than its parts, as I said in (*q. de toto*); but some parts of the world are alive with animal life, as is plainly seen; therefore it must not be denied that the world is an animal — all the more because God seems to be the soul of the World, as is intimated in (*1 Reg. 2*): "I will raise me up a faithful priest, who shall do according to what is in my heart and my soul"; if, therefore, God has a heart and soul, certainly his body and matter can be nothing other than the world; and so the soul of the world is God. I distinguish the major: of the whole by a totality of composition, I concede; of the whole by a totality of order, such as the world, I deny. To the other point added, (*Aug. 14. Civit.*) responds: "We do not believe that God has a soul, since he is the founder of the soul; but this is said tropically and not properly, just as he is said to have hands, feet, and other members of the body."

First query: whether there is only one world in number? (*Arist. 1. Celi 8*) answers affirmatively, and this can be urged from Scripture: (*Joan. 1*): "The world was made by him"; and (*eiusdem 7*): "The world cannot hate you"; and (*Rom. 5*): "By one man sin entered into this world"; and (*Marci ult.*): "Go into the world, preach the Gospel to every creature." Thus the sacred text speaks of the world in the singular, to show that there is only one world in number. And that this is fitting is shown by (*Alens. 1. p. quaest. 15. m. 1*), saying: "Just as God is one and the first cause is one, likewise the world is one, which is in the eyes of all his great work." (*August. serm. 8. de sanctis*) adds his support with these words: "Common nature

testifies to one Lord, because there is one world." And (*quaest. 2. novi et veteris test.*) adds: "Therefore God, who is one, made one world, so as to teach that all things are from one."

Second query: whether the world is infinite? (*Arist. cit.*) answers negatively, and (*Aug. 11. Civit. 6*) confirms this. The reason is that an actually infinite is not possible, as I showed in the question on the infinite; furthermore, what is measured is finite and limited; but the world is measured by mathematicians in all its parts; therefore the world is finite.

Article II: Whether Several Worlds Can Be Founded

Among the philosophers, (*Arist. 8. Phys. c. 1*) and (*1. Cali, T. 103*) — who hold that the World was necessarily and naturally produced — maintain that several worlds are not possible. Those who do not appear to differ from them are (*Abailard*), (*Wyclif*), and (*Luther*), reported by (*Alphonsus 7. adversus haereses, ver. Futurum contingens*), who suspected that God cannot create more things than he has created, nor make things otherwise than he made them. The common and true opinion, however, is that maintained by (*Rich. 1. d. 44. q. 4*), (*Major ibid. q. 1*), (*S. Bon. q. 4*), (*Vulpes tom. 2. p. 1. disp. 42. q. 13*), (*Conimb. 1. Cali c. 9. q. 1. a. 2*), (*Ruv. q. 2*), and the rest there, who teach that several worlds are creatable by God.

Note that it is possible to understand the existence of several worlds in two ways — namely, simultaneously or successively; and then as concentric, sharing the same center, or eccentric, sharing different centers, or one being outside the other; and furthermore, differing only in number or also in species; and moreover, several finite or infinite ones.

Assertion: God can create several worlds simultaneously or successively, though finite and limited. (*Doct. 4. Rep. d. 50. q. 1*) supports this. It is proved first from (*Athan. oratione contra idola*), (*Ambr. 2. exam. c. 1*), and (*Ansel. 1. 1. cur Deus homo c. 1 and 2*), cited and received by (*Doct. ubi supra*), who affirm that by divine power many worlds can be founded. The University of Paris lends its support, decreeing the contrary opinion to be false and erroneous, as may be seen at the end of (*4. Magist. Sententiarum*) and at the beginning of (*1. S. Bonaventurae*), where the aforesaid error is recounted among the errors condemned by (*the Lord Stephen, Bishop of Paris*). Second: God is now of the same power as then before the world was founded, since he is the same and his years do not fail; but when he created the world, he existed of infinite power, which is not exhausted in the construction of the world; therefore with his power he can achieve other producible worlds. Third: there is no repugnance in other worlds being produced, neither on God's part, who is of unlimited and infinite power, nor on the part of the worlds, which are producible and creatable. For just as this world before its construction was producible, so another and another is producible, since no stronger reason appears for this one than for others. Furthermore, although there is only one sun in number and one moon in number, yet another

sun and another moon is creatable; likewise, although only one world in number has been founded, there is no repugnance in other worlds being produced by God. Therefore several worlds are creatable by God, differing in number if the creatures placed in them differ in number, or in species if the creatures are specifically distinct. They cannot, however, be actually infinite, since from what was said in the question on the infinite, no actually infinite thing — whether in magnitude, multitude, or intensity — is possible, whatever (*Vulpes praealleg.*) protests.

Objection I: there is only one archetypal world, and one idea of it, after the likeness of which this world was fashioned and architected; therefore another world besides this one is not possible. The antecedent is known. The consequence is proved: nothing is makeable unless it has an idea in the divine mind, as is the common opinion and axiom of theologians. The answer is that the major is true of the world already founded, but not of other possible ones, of which there are in the divine mind as many ideas as there are worlds creatable and makeable.

Objection II: (*Arist. 1. Cali, c. 9. T. 95*) writes that there is one matter of the World, which in it, already made, has been completely used up and consumed; but if another world were possible, it could not be made without this matter, because another different from this is not creatable; therefore another world is not makeable either. The answer is that the major holds for Aristotle, who thinks God acts necessarily toward the outside and that he created all matter; but not for us, who assert that God acts freely toward the outside and can create another matter different from this one, according to the good pleasure of his will.

Objection III: nothing disordered or preposterous can be effected by God, since he is the most orderly and wisest craftsman; but if God were able to found another world, he would make certain disordered and ill-disposed things — there would be diverse places in species for heavy and light things, several first movers and first causes, and other things that involve repugnance. The major is conceded; the minor is denied. In response to its proof, I say that, given the hypothesis, there would be distinct places in species for heavy and light things, and each world would have its own proper center and place for heavy and light things. To what is further added, I say that for each world there would be constituted a particular first mover in its own order, just as in this world there is a first angel moving immediately the first heaven; but there would be one supreme mover and one first cause from itself and independent, and one monarch of all. This can be explained by the analogy of a kingdom, in which there are several universities, each of which has its own rector appointed to it; yet there is one primary head of such universities, just as there is one King and one Lord of all who dwell in the kingdom.

Article III: Whether the World Is Perfect

Many things about the beauty, order, and perfection of the universe are written by (*Alensis* 2. p. q. 16, 17, 18), (*Franciscus Georg. in opere de harmonia mundi*), (*Guillelmus Parisiensis in volumine de universo*), and very many others. The common and true doctrine of all doctors is that the World is perfect. For its explanation:

Note that something can be said to be perfect in two ways. In one way, simply and beyond all category — that to which no perfection is lacking and to which no perfection can be added or removed — in this way God alone is perfect, as (*Doct. 4. d. 49. q. 14. §. Ad 1. rationem M.*) observes; and this can be drawn from Sacred Scripture: (*Matt. 19*): "One is good, God"; and (*Marci 10*): "No one is good except one, God" — that is, perfect. In another way, in a qualified sense — that is, in its own genus — in which sense that is called perfect which has everything required for its being. And since being is twofold — substantial and accidental — so too there is a twofold perfection: one according to substantial being, to which no substance is lacking that pertains to its nature, as in the case of a man who has everything required for his substantial and essential being; and one according to accidental being, which is called perfect when it participates all the perfections required for its accidental being — as that person is called a perfect philosopher who possesses everything pertaining to perfect philosophy.

Assertion: the World is perfect. This is presupposed by (*Doct. 1. d. 44. q. un.*), where he inquires whether God can produce things better and more perfect than he made them, and answers affirmatively. If, therefore, God can found a more perfect world, it is presupposed that the world already made by him is perfect. The assertion is proved first from Scripture: (*Gen. 1*): "God saw all the things that he had made, and they were very good" — that is, perfect, as some interpret that passage; and this interpretation is drawn from (*c. 2 of the same book*), where it is read: "So the heavens and the earth were finished, and all the furniture of them. And on the seventh day God ended his work which he had made." For (*Bercorius in parte tertia sui rept.*) notes that "perfect" means the same as "completed," and "to perfect" means the same as "to complete." If, therefore, God completed his work which is the world, he certainly perfected it, and therefore the world is perfect. And (*Deuteronom. 32*): "The works of God are perfect." The world, however, is the work of God, as is narrated in the place cited; therefore it is perfect. (*Aug. 11. Civit. c. 21*), citing Plato, says that God was lifted up with joy at the perfection of the totality of the world. And (*quaest. 223*): "All things are perfect in their kind; one is said to be more perfect than another in a relative sense, as a man is more perfect than a brute. But God is perfect in all things, because he is, as it were, the fountain and origin of all." The same he writes in (*1. de perfectione iustitiae, contra Caelest.*). And (*Boeth. 3. de consolatione, metro 5*) adds his support. (*Arist.*), cited and received by (*Scot. Quol. 19. art. 2. F.*), who in (*12. Met. T. 52*) places the goodness and perfection of the universe in the order that the parts have toward one another and toward the one first being and first cause. Second, from (*5. Met. 21*): "each thing is perfect and every substance is

perfect when, according to the species of its proper virtue, no particle of its natural magnitude is lacking." (*Scot.*) adds there (*in exp. c. 6*) that that which lacks nothing is perfect, and calls a circular line perfect but not a straight line, because something can be added to the latter. The same he teaches in (*Theorem 23*): "that is said to be perfect of which there is nothing outside to be taken." But the world is round and of circular figure, as is seen in the sphere, and nothing is lacking to it, as will be made plain in the resolution of the objections. Furthermore, a perfect craftsman produces a perfect work, as is clear in the case of an outstanding and distinguished painter or sculptor; but God is the most perfect craftsman, from whom every art and every good and perfect work proceeds. Again, the world is, as it were, ornament and beauty, as I observed at the beginning of this book; and according to (*Dionysius 4. de divinis nominibus*), the beautiful means the same as the perfect. And this is indicated by so many genera, species, and individuals of things with which it is adorned and enriched, so that he may rightly be called blind who does not contemplate its elegance, beauty, and perfection.

Objection I: in the World there are many foul, deformed, and evil things — monsters, crimes, iniquities, injustices, calumnies, and outrages — which show that the world is not in the least perfect. Hence (*Hierem. 12*) cries out: "the way of the wicked prospers, all who transgress and act unjustly are well off." The answer is that many things which seem to us evil and very deformed greatly assist the beauty and perfection of the universe, according to the adage: "opposites placed side by side shine out more clearly." For God established opposites, as (*Ecclus. c. 3*) notes: "Against evil is good, and against death is life; so also against the righteous man is the sinner. So look upon all the works of the most high; two and two, and one against one." Moreover, a fair day is indeed beautiful, but appears more beautiful in contrast with night and darkness; likewise, the color white seems more beautiful in contrast with black, as (*Aug. 11. Civit. cap. 23*) expresses, saying: "Just as a painting in which black color is placed in its proper place, so the totality of things, if one could behold it, even in sinners, is beautiful — although when they are considered in themselves, their deformity mars them." The same he has in (*1. 83. q. 9. q. 79*) and in (*Ench. c. 11*): "Evil, well ordered and placed in its proper position, commends good more eminently so that good may please more and be more praiseworthy when compared with evils." All the more so because all those things happen so that God may elicit good from them. For God permits man to fall into sin so that on the occasion of it he may accomplish a good work — namely, conversion, repentance, and humility. Hence (*Psal. 112*) David says: "It is good for me that you humiliated me." And of Adam's sin the Church sings: "O happy fault, which merited to have so great and such a Redeemer." (*Aug. 1. 2. de peccato Orig. contra Pelagium, cap. 34*) adds: "God certainly, in the evil work of men, himself does his own good work." And (*11. de gen. ad litt. c. 21*): "God draws good from evil." Moreover, in many things the judgment of God lies hidden, which hardly any man can penetrate. Hence

(*Eccles.* 5) warns: "If you see the oppressions of the poor and violent judgments and the subversion of justice in a province, do not be surprised at this matter, because there is one that is higher on account of this." (*Aug. in annot. Iob. cap. 11*) writes therefore: "You ought not to blame God, whose works you do not comprehend." The same he commits to writing in (*libro 4. de Symb. ad Cathecumenos cap. 2*).

Objection II: in the world there are lacking many species of things that are possible and creatable by God; and there are certain things in excess, like so many pebbles, so many grains of sand, and other forms of this kind; therefore the world is not perfect. The answer is that producible species of things do not pertain to the integrity and perfection of the World, since it is perfect by reason of what it actually has. Nor is there anything superfluous in it; for all those things which appear superfluous proclaim the power and magnificence of God. Although to the ignorant and foolish they may appear superfluous, they are not so to the knowing and wise — as (*Aug. in Psal. 148*) says: "he who does not know the art of some craftsman, looking at so many instruments in his workshop, judges them to be useless and superfluous; so also, he who does not know the order and disposition of the universe, judges the things just mentioned to be superfluous — though all things are rightly disposed and ordered by God the supreme craftsman of all," as (*Aug. 1. de natura boni, contra Manich. c. 8*) splendidly shows: "They are so ordered that the weaker yield to the stronger, the feebler to the more powerful, and the less potent to the more potent; and so the terrestrial harmonizes with the celestial, as what is subject to what is more excellent. Moreover, as transient things succeed one another there is a temporal beauty of a kind proper to their kind, so that neither those things which die, nor those which were and then cease to be, mar or disturb the order, form, and beauty of the total creation — just as a well-composed speech is altogether beautiful, even if in it syllables and all sounds pass away as it were by being born and dying." And (*3. de libero arb. 23*): "No leaf of a tree is created superfluously." And if some things seem useless, noxious, and superfluous to you, consult the same holy Doctor, who in (*1. de genesi, contra Manich. 16*) says and concludes: "Use therefore what is useful, avoid what is pernicious, leave aside what is superfluous."

Objection III: if the world were perfect, it would be so principally because its parts are Angels and men; but Angels are minds above the world, and men are inhabitants and the end of the world; therefore the world is not perfect. The major is conceded; the minor is denied. For Angels are called minds above the world when the world is taken for the collection of sublunar things only; but not so if it is taken for the totality of all created things. For in this sense Angels are parts of the world, since they are counted among creatures. Men too are parts of the world and its end, because it is not unfitting in a whole for one part to be ordered toward another — as is clear from the parts of the human body, of which certain ones are ordered toward others, while all together complete the

whole. Therefore man is a part of the world and its inhabitant, and is called its end because all things were founded for his sake.

Article IV: Whether God Can Make the World Better and More Perfect

(*Richardus 1. d. 44. q. 1. art. 1*), following (*Hugo Vict.*), and (*Conimb. 1. Cali cap. 9. q. 2*), report that some hold the world to have been so made by God that it cannot be made better and more perfect. Those who appear to subscribe to this view are those who hold that God always does what is best; (*Granadus*) is cited by (*Pont. disp. 54. q. 2*) and is there refuted by him and by (*Lugo disp. 2. de Incarn. sect. 1*). The common opinion of the scholastics, however, at (*1. d. 44*), is that of (*Scot. q. un.*), (*Bon. q. 1. 2. 3*), (*Aur.*), (*Ockham ibid.*), and (*Alensis 1. p. q. 21. art. 7. m. 3*), who teach that God can make the world more perfect and better.

Note first that this difficulty can be raised both from the side of the maker and from the side of the work made or to be made; and likewise concerning this founded world, or another possible one differing from it in number or species; and again, with respect to specific or individual being, substantial or accidental. Furthermore, since the world is established as one by a unity of order, the question is whether such order and disposition can emerge more harmonious and more beautiful.

Note second that in a free and voluntary agent a twofold power is distinguished: one absolute, which is bound by no law; another ordained, by which the agent operates according to prescribed and fixed laws. In God, however, the absolute power is that which regards everything possible and involves no contradiction; but the ordained power is that by which God does whatever he from eternity decreed and ordained to be done and performed in time, as I made plain in the question on the infinite, (*art. 2*).

First assertion: God does not always do what is better and more perfect. This is deduced from (*Doct. 3. d. 13. quaest. 2. §. Ad argumenta istarum qq. sub. 1. in solutione 2.*), where he says that in the order of grace there is a supreme and most perfect grace in Christ, but not in the order of nature, since some nature can be created more perfect and more excellent. Furthermore, in the same place (*distinctione 7. quaest. 3*) he writes that if Adam had not sinned, the divine Word would have assumed human flesh; but it was better that Adam had remained in the state of innocence, since this is more excellent and more worthy than the state of the fallen; but God, if he had willed efficaciously, the state of innocence would have persisted; nevertheless the state of sin persists, though it is inferior and worse. This can also be urged from those words of Christ the Lord in (*Matt. 26*): "It were better for him if that man had not been born." But God could have prevented the birth of that man — namely, Judas — if it had pleased him, and did not prevent it; therefore God does not always furnish what is better. Furthermore (*Marci 14*): "Abba, Father, all things are possible to you; remove this chalice from

me; but not what I will." But the passion of Christ was the highest good, though Christ himself desired and willed to be freed from it. Furthermore, God is free in every work toward the outside, according to (*Psal. 134*): "All things whatsoever he willed, he made in heaven and on earth"; but if he could only produce the best thing, he would be compelled and necessitated to its production alone, which conflicts with the testimony of Scripture just adduced. You will say: the Father and the Son spirate the Holy Spirit necessarily, though also freely, as (*Scot. 1. d. 2. quaest. 7*) and (*Quol. ib.*) teach; therefore it is not surprising if God necessarily willed always to produce what is best and most eminent. I say that there is a disparity, since the Holy Spirit is the supreme and infinite good, from whose love and production God the Father and the Son do not withdraw; but whatever is created is a finite and limited good, and therefore in its production he acts freely and contingently, nor does he receive anything of perfection from the created work, nor does he need it, as (*David, Psal. 15*) attests: "You have no need of my goods." Therefore he is not constrained to always act in the best possible way.

Second assertion: the World can be made better and more excellent, not only essentially but also accidentally. The assertion is twofold, and (*Doct. in 1. passu alleg.*) maintains it. The first part is proved: God can found other possible species of things in the world, by which the world itself would be made essentially more perfect, since the power of God is infinite and inexhaustible. Furthermore, the world is essentially perfect through the creatures that it essentially contains — which are essentially perfect and essentially distant from one another, as I observed above; since, therefore, God can found other creatures that differ in species, it is clearly deduced that he can make the world itself essentially more perfect. Moreover, the divine Word can hypostatically unite to itself another intellectual nature, such as an Angelic one; indeed, the other divine Persons can do the same, as I said in (*tract. de Incar.*). The second part is proved: God can create another supreme grace equal to the grace of Christ and confer it on Peter or another man, and grant him the highest enjoyment, as (*Doct. in 3. loco cit.*) teaches. Likewise, other qualities can be intensified, since they admit of more and less; and through these the world would accidentally become more perfect. For more blessed Angels could be created, more learned men, faster horses, more beautiful birds, and other things of this kind by which the world would appear more illustrious. (*Scot. in 1. Rep. d. 44. quaest. 2*) adds that celestial bodies could be made more clear, more limpid, more subtle, and capable of receiving foreign impressions that are not corruptive but perfective. And this will one day come to pass, as (*Ela. 30*) prophesies: "And the light of the moon shall be as the light of the sun, and the light of the sun shall be sevenfold, as the light of seven days." (*Ioan.*) predicts in (*Apoc. 21*): "I saw a new heaven and a new earth." (*Hugo Vict. 1. de sacr. parte 3. c. ult.*) lends his support. And this can be confirmed from (*3. Top. 32*): things that are less mixed with their contraries are more such — as the whitest is that which is most unmixed with black; similarly better is what is

less mixed with evil. But God can remove from the world every evil and every harm, as would have occurred in the state of innocence and as obtains in the kingdom of the Blessed.

Third assertion: with respect to the order and disposition of things, the world can be made better and more excellent. This is deduced from (*Scot. praecit.*) and is proved: the elements, which are now confused and intermixed — and notably the earth, which in many people's opinion is elevated above the sea — can be depressed and returned to the lowest place, which is proper to it, and purified and distinguished; therefore with respect to order, the world can be perfected further. Furthermore, a better and more illustrious order is sought from better and nobler creatures more aptly disposed toward one another and more rightly ordered; but God, from what has been said, can found nobler and more excellent creatures and dispose and order them better, since this involves no repugnance; therefore the world with respect to the order of its parts can become better and more excellent.

Objection I against the first assertion: from the best there can come forth only the best, according to (*Plato and Dionysius S. cit. ab Aur. ubi supra*); but God is the best and greatest craftsman, since he is infinite and immense; therefore from him only the best is produced. The same (*Damasc. 2. fidei c. 29*) teaches. And it is confirmed from (*Aug. 3. contra Maximinum c. 7*): "if the Father could beget a son equal to himself and did not beget him, he would be envious"; therefore likewise if God could make the world better and more perfect and did not, he would be charged with envy, which is far from God. I distinguish the major: of a necessary agent bound to act in this way, I concede; of a voluntary and free agent bound by no law, I deny. But God is a free agent and debtor to no one; therefore it is within his power to produce good, better, and best. The Apostle signifying this in (*Rom. 9*) says: "Does not the potter have authority over the clay, from the same mass to make one vessel for honor and another for dishonor?" The testimonies of the holy Fathers and the confirmation from Augustine are to be interpreted in the same way. For God the Father begets the Son necessarily and naturally, but produces creatures spontaneously and freely. You will say: nothing disordered, preposterous, or unjust can be effected by God, since he is the most orderly, prudent, and just agent; but if the world were made more beautiful and illustrious by him, it would be done contrary to the order established by him from eternity, contrary to the rules prescribed by him, and contrary to what nature requires and reason demands. I say that none of these things follow, since God is the Lord of all, his will is the first rule, and he is debtor to none; therefore that which he wills is ordered, just, and right, and what he does not will is neither good nor just. Therefore, while this holds true of ordained power, it does not hold of absolute power, which regards everything that involves no contradiction.

Objection II against the second assertion: what does not admit of more and less cannot be made better and more perfect; but the world does not admit of more and less with respect to the substances of which it consists, since it is a property of substance not to admit of more and less, as is clear from (1. *praedicam. c. de substantia*) and (8. *Met. cap. 1*); therefore it cannot be more perfected and adorned. The major is conceded; I distinguish the minor: in specific being, I concede; in individual being, I deny, as (*Antonius Andr.*) and (*Joan de Magistris*) note there. You will say: in the world there exists Christ the Lord, God and man, than whom nothing more perfect can be made; therefore the same must be said of the rest that have been made in the world by God. I concede the antecedent — and the same of the Sacrament of the Eucharist and of certain other things of which I made mention in the question on the infinite, (*art. ult.*) — but I deny the consequence, as is clear from the grace of the just and their enjoyment, which is not supreme like that of the Savior.

Objection III: there is a supreme creature — namely, the first Angel — and an infimum — namely, prime matter. Therefore God cannot create a world better or worse than the one produced. The antecedent is urged from (*Aug. 11. Conf. cap. 3*), where addressing God he says: "You made two things, O Lord: one near to you — that is, the Angel — and another near to nothing — that is, prime matter." I distinguish the antecedent: in fact, I concede; of what is possible, I deny. In this way (*Scot. in Rep. cit.*) is to be interpreted in expounding (*Augustine*) — not only in the passage cited but also in (1. *de quantitate animae, cap. 33*): "It has been made by the justice of God that not only all things exist, but also exist in such a way that they cannot be better." You will say: the world is one by order; but order is a relation, which is not intensified nor diminished; therefore neither can the world be perfected. I say the world can be made more perfect not precisely with respect to order, but with respect to the things that are ordered, which are comprehended in it.

Article V: Whether a Creature Can Create Anything as a Principal Cause

This doubt can be treated in two ways — namely, in fact and in possibility. Concerning the first: whether any creature has created anything? (*Avic. 9. Met. cap. 4*) holds that in the creation of things there is a golden chain, saying that the first intelligence created the second, the second the third, and so forth down to the last, which founded this entire mass of the world. (*Plato in the Timaeus*) lends his support — who, according to (*Aug. 12. Civit. cap. 26*), says that lesser gods — that is, Angels — were the founders of the bodies of animals; to this the (*Cerinthians*) subscribe, according to (*Aug. in catalogo haeresium, haeresi 8*), who hold that the world was made by Angels. But the true and common teaching is that no creature has created anything. Concerning the second: whether the principle and power of creating can be communicated to any creature? The scholastics contend on this. For (*Major 4. dist. 1. in fine q. 1*), (*Dur. 2. dist. 1. q. 4*),

(*Gabriel ibid. art. 3*), (*Arriaga disp. 11. Phys. Sect. 5. subsect. 2*), and (*Raco. tract. de causis in append. sect. 1. quaest. 2*) assert that the power of creating involves no repugnance for a creature. The more probable and common opinion is that of (*Scot. 4. q. 1. q. 1*), (*Th. 1. p. q. 45. art. 5*), (*Aur. 4. q. prooemial. art. 3*), (*Ockham 2. q. 7*), (*Molin. 1. p. q. 450 art. 5. disp. 1*), (*Suarez disp. 20. Met. sect. 2. and 12*), and others, who deny that a creature can participate the power of creating.

Note first from (*Scot. cit. §. Ad q. ergo. DD.*) that a principal cause is of two kinds: one independent and from itself, acting and producing the total effect without any concurrence of another cause of the same or a different order — in this way God alone is named and is the principal cause, because he alone is from himself, independent, and needs nothing for causing; the other dependent, which acts by its own proper and intrinsic power, yet requires another superior cause to cause together with it and concur in producing the effect — such is every secondary cause, which by its own power exerts influence on the effect; and in this it differs from an instrumental cause, which acts by the power of another — that is, the principal cause — in producing the effect, as I asserted in (*lib. 4. Phys. q. 5*).

Note second that a creature taken universally is either substance or accident; substance is divided into spiritual — which is either complete, like the Angel, or incomplete, like the rational soul — and material, which is either partial, like matter and form, or total, like the composite. Accident is either relative, arising from the positing of the extremes, like paternity; or absolute, which is subdivided into material — which is drawn out from the potency of the subject — and spiritual, which is produced by God, like grace. Further observe that substance is prior to any accident that is located in it, since the subject — such as substance — precedes everything that is received in it, such as accident. This (*Scot. cit. §. Ita ergo*) pursues at length and admirably.

First assertion: in fact no creature has created anything. This is deduced from (*Doct. ubi supra, §. Ad q. ergo*) and (*§. Ideo dici potest*), where he shows that the power of creating does not belong to the creature; therefore if creation is denied to a creature *de possibili*, then also *de facto*. For whoever denies someone the first act denies equally the second act, which proceeds from the first. It is proved first from Sacred Scripture: (*Gen. 1*): the creation of all things is attributed to God — "he said, and they were made; he commanded, and they were created." And afterwards it is added: "On the seventh day he rested from all the work which he had made." (*Ecclus. 18*): "He who lives forever created all things simultaneously." And (*Hebr. 3*): "He who created all things is God." Second, from the Lateran Council, *c. Firmiter, de summa Trin. et fide catholica*: "God from nothing founded each creature, spiritual and corporeal, angelic and mundane." The Apostles' Creed and the Nicene Creed are added: "Creator of heaven and earth," and "Maker of heaven and earth, of all things visible and invisible." And the First Council of Braga, (*capite 13*), establishing that the creation of all flesh is the work of God. Hence (*Scotus in Reportatis passu alleg.*) honestly confesses that he holds

the proposed assertion more by faith than by reason. (*Suarez cit.*) subscribes to this, and (*Alphonsus lib. 5. adversus haereses, verbo creatura*) attests that the contrary is condemned as heretical — against (*Arr. ubi supra*) who says that the Council does not speak of creation in the strict sense but broadly taken, for any kind of production, whether from nothing or from a pre-existing subject. Against this: the Lateran Council especially defines God to be the founder of corporeal and incorporeal creatures; if, therefore, God is the maker of both, as is narrated in (*Genesis primo*), it plainly follows that no creature has in fact touched creation in the proper sense according to faith — since creation broadly taken is also attributed to God alone. Hence in (*John first*) it is had: "all things were made by him, and without him was made nothing." And (*Apoc. 4*): "Because you created all things." Therefore it is indicated in the said places that God produced all things, both what is made from nothing and what is produced from a pre-existing subject. Afterwards, created things by the power communicated to them by God produce their own works, with the same God concurring with them — not from nothing, but from pre-existing matter. Third, from the holy Fathers: (*Aug. 1. de gen. contra Manich. c. 6*) and (*12. Civit. c. 24 and 25*) and (*1. de lib. arb. c. 1*) and at the end of (*c. 2*): "God created all things from nothing." (*Ansel. in Monol. c. 23*): "The supreme existence is only one, which alone is the Creator." And (*Damasc. 2. fidei, cap. 3*): "God alone is maker, provider, and container of all." The same write (*Athan. 1. contra Arrian.*), (*Hilar. 8. Trin.*), and others concordantly and unanimously. Therefore (*Aur. praemem.*) attests that he adheres to the proposed conclusion, against (*Arr. cit.*) who says that this opinion was not expressly handed down by the Fathers and that they spoke of creation that is independent and from itself. But their explicit meaning is sufficiently established from the words of the same Fathers cited above, especially since they were disputing against sectarians, notably the Arians who denied that the Word was God; against them they argued thus: the divine Word is the Creator of all things, just as the Father; therefore it is God just as the Father. For if it were a creature, as those heretics maintained, it would not be Creator, possessing the power of creating, since no creature enjoys the power of creating. Therefore, although the Son of God is not from himself but from the Father, and has creative power from the Father himself, on that account he is not considered not to be Creator; and therefore the aforesaid Fathers are not treating of creation that is from itself and independent, as (*Arr.*) supposes. Third: a created agent presupposes a subject upon which to act, as (*Scot. 7. Met. quaest. 11*) notes, and (*the Stagirite*) writes as a true and well-known axiom: "from nothing, nothing comes" (*1. Phys. Tit. 41 and elsewhere*). The reason is that a created agent is dependent in its operations upon matter; but creation is production from no pre-existing subject; therefore it belongs to no creature. Fifth: to whom repugnance toward the first act belongs, to the same repugnance toward the second act belongs too, because the second proceeds from the first, and when the principle is removed the thing based on the principle is removed too; but to a creature as instrumental cause the first act — that is, the power of creating — involves repugnance, since this is from itself

and independent, belonging to God alone; therefore a creature cannot be assumed by God as an instrument of creation. The minor will be shown in the next assertion, in which it will be proved that the principle of creating cannot be communicated to any creature; and consequently, if *de possibili* creation cannot belong to a creature, then neither *de facto*.

Second assertion: no creature — whether made or makeable — can create anything as a principal cause. Such is the common judgment of theologians, notably (*Scot. cit. in utroque opere Oxon. et Parisien.*). It is proved first from (*D. Aug. 3. Trin. cap. 8*): "No creature can be called the creator of any thing." And in the same place (*cap. 9*) and (*l. 9. de genesi ad lit. cap. 15*) and (*l. 2. q. q. super Exod. quaest. 11*). And (*Athan. passu alleg. in ant. assert.*): that a creature cannot be a creator is certain to all. Second: every creature made or makeable is either material or spiritual, corporeal or incorporeal, as I explained in (*Epitom. l. 1. q. 3. art. 4*). But neither can create anything. And indeed not the material — which is matter, form, or composite. Of matter it is plain, because it is passive and the subject of every form. But form, since it is drawn out from matter's potency, operates in the way it has being; but it has being through being drawn out; therefore it also acts dependently upon the subject from which it is drawn out. Therefore in being and in operating it depends on that same subject, and hence cannot create. The same must be established of the composite, which, since it consists of matter and form, clearly participates the same manner of acting as those two. For it is the total and adequate caused thing of both, which does not transcend the limits of the actions of the said causes; but these cannot reach to creation; therefore neither can it. Of the spiritual creature — which is the Angel or the rational soul — the same must be said. First, (*Aug. 9. de gen. ad lit. cap. 15*) teaches that "no Angel can create a nature, just as it cannot create itself." But the rational soul is of lower nature and power than the Angel; if, therefore, the latter cannot create, neither can the former. The reason is given: every spiritual creature acts by intellection and volition, which are accidents; but an accident by its own proper and intrinsic power cannot reach the production of substance, which is effected by creation. Therefore no creature — whether created or creatable — can create anything. This reason displeases (*Suarez disp. 20. Met. sect. 2. num. 19*) and (*Arr. cit.*), who say that intellection and volition can be pre-required and can concur toward creating something in the manner of a directing and applying cause; since an intellectual agent must preknow what is to be done through its cognition — as it operates for an end — and through its volition must apply its executive power, by which the work intended by it is produced. Therefore just as a man understands and wills generation, and the generative power generates, so there could be given an intellectual creature which, through prior intellection and volition, would create something through the power and virtue of creating communicated and infused in it by God. But this objection of Suarez does not enervate but corroborates the argument of Scotus, since it is expressly had in (*Scot. cit. §. secunda propositio*): "an intellectual agent does not produce

immediately through its nature and substance — otherwise in divine things there would be four persons, one produced from the fecundity of nature beyond the other three, which is false and heretical." In created things, moreover, if there were an executive power, it would be subordinated to the intellective and volitive powers and inferior to them, from which creation — which is the most excellent action — cannot proceed. But man generates man not through some power belonging to him through the rational soul, but through a natural material faculty, as irrational animals perform. Hence Angels — not participating that power — cannot generate other Angels similar to themselves.

Third: no creature made or makeable can be endowed with infinite power, for the power does not exceed the nature from which it proceeds; but every creature is finite and limited; therefore its virtue and power too is finite and limited. But the principle of creating is infinite, since it is entirely independent of another — that is, of a subject and matter, since it produces a thing from nothing; therefore it cannot be adapted to any creature. Moreover, the most excellent creature, to do something wonderful, achieves it by the application of natural active things to passive ones, as is read in (*Exod. 7*) concerning the serpents produced by the Magicians of Pharaoh, and as I taught in (*Lib. 3. Phys. quaest. 2. art. 2*). Furthermore, over so many spans of years from the beginning of the World until now, there has been found no creature that has produced anything from nothing — which is not a small sign that no creature can create anything, just as from the first construction of things no part of the heaven has been corrupted, which is a sign that the heaven itself is incorruptible, as I shall show in the next book.

Objection I against the first assertion: (*D. August. hom. 80 in Joan.*), and it is drawn up in (*Can. 1. quaest. 1. Detrahe*): "What is the great virtue of water, that it should touch the body and cleanse the heart?" But the heart is cleansed through grace, which is created by God in the soul upon receiving the sacrament of Baptism; therefore baptismal water creates grace, and thus a creature can create something. The answer is that the words of Augustine are not to be taken physically but morally — that is, by virtue of the pact by which God decreed to create grace in the one receiving the sacraments who places no obstacle. Therefore God physically creates grace, not water or any other creature. You will press: the Council of Florence, in the decree of Pope Eugene, setting forth the difference between the sacraments of the old law and the new, decrees that the sacraments of the latter cause grace, but not those of the former; but grace, according to (*Scot. 2. d. 34. §. iste q. A.*), is created; therefore a creature reaches creation. I say that the aforesaid Council and others define that the sacraments confer grace on those who receive them worthily; but concerning the manner in which they cause it, they do not determine, but leave it to be disputed among the scholastics, some of whom hold they cause grace physically, others morally.

Objection II: the same holy Doctor (*1. 83. q. 9. q. 78*) writes that artisans create nothing, because they act dependently upon matter; but Angels do not depend upon matter, since they are incorporeal and immaterial; therefore Angels can create something. The answer is that indeed to act dependently upon matter is one reason why artisans cannot create; but it is not the only reason — the more powerful reason is to be from another and dependent in being and operating. Therefore, although Angels are separated from matter, yet because they are not from themselves and independent, they cannot create. You will press: a material agent can produce something from nothing — namely, form — as (*Philop.*) and (*Ferch. Vestig. Peripat.*) hold; therefore also an immaterial agent, such as the Angel. The antecedent is denied. For form is drawn out from the potency of matter; but the drawing out of form from a subject is not creation but production from something, which differs from creation, as is plain from what was said above.

Objection III: whoever can annihilate can also create, since both are held by all scholastics to be of equal power; but a creature can annihilate something. For man through sin committed by him loses grace, which is the terminus of creation and annihilation; therefore, etc. The major is conceded; I distinguish the minor: effectively, I deny it; demeritoriamente, I concede it, with (*Scot. 3. d. 23. q. un. §. Ad 1. principale L.*). What this means is that man through sin deserves that God no longer conserve grace in him; but not to conserve grace is the same as to annihilate it. You will press: when bread is transubstantiated into the body of Christ, such bread is annihilated; therefore if a creature can annihilate something, it can also create something. I deny the antecedent, since there is a great difference between annihilation and transubstantiation, as (*Alphon. l. 6. adversus haereses, her. 5*) indicates. You will urge: if the consecrated host putrefies and a worm is generated, new matter comes to be, which from what has been said is created; therefore it involves no contradiction for a creature to create something. I say that, given the hypothesis, God creates new matter, on the authority of (*Scot. 4. d. 12. q. 6. D.*), who is followed by (*Ockham cit.*) and very many others.

Article VI: Whether a Creature Can Be an Instrumental Cause for Creating Something

The prior opinion is that of (*Gabriel. Magistri 4. d. bifare §. Hic quaeritur*), (*Suarez disp. 20. Met. sect. 3. l. 7*), (*Hurt. disp. 12. Phys. sect. 7. §. 118*), and certain others, who hold that a creature can be elevated by God as an instrument for creating something. The posterior is that of (*Scot. in utroque 4. d. 1. q. 1*), (*Aur. ibid. q. proaemiali. a. 3*), (*Th. 1. p. q. 45. a. 5*), (*Mol. ibid.*), and others, who deny that any creature can be an instrument of any creation.

Note first and recall from what was said in (*1. 4. q. 5. a. unic.*) what an instrument is — twofold — and add from (*Scot. cit. §. Ad q. ergo EE.*) that if it is repugnant to some nature to be the active principle of certain actions, it cannot by any power

— even divine absolute power — be the principle of those same actions. For although God can absolutely create cold, he still cannot produce cold through heat so that heat would be the per se efficient cause of cold. And (*D. Damasc. 2. fidei, cap. 7*) intimates this, saying that although God can produce something outside the order of created things, he nevertheless cannot bring it about that man be formally a donkey. The reason is that the nature and essence of man is repugnant to the nature and essence of a donkey, since they are constituted by opposed differences — man through rationality and the donkey through irrationality. And not only do the natures of the one conflict with the natures of the other, but also their properties; therefore it is contradictory for a man to beget a donkey, or for one to participate the principles and properties of the other. Therefore, if it is conceded that an instrument properly acts toward producing an effect, it must have in itself an active form in a state of rest, before the motion, just as a secondary cause does — or at least receive in the actual motion an active virtue, by which in its own order of acting it acts toward producing the principal terminus, or toward some prior disposition. So, as a true and universal proposition, it must be established that every instrument that is truly and properly active either acts toward some prior disposition of the principal terminus, or through some form intrinsic to itself attains the principal terminus — though in the power of the principal agent, whether such active principle precedes the motion or is only present to it while it is actually being moved. But if it has neither in a state of rest nor in actual motion an active form, it plainly follows that it cannot act at all; and if it has only of its own nature a passive principle, it cannot have an active principle — otherwise, as repugnant, it would destroy its essence. It is certain and undoubted, however, that God can supply the action of a created agent and not concur with its effect — as in fact he did in the Babylonian furnace, in which the burning fire neither heated nor burned the three Hebrew youths; but it cannot happen that heat should chill, because it is a property of cold repugnant to heat; and conversely, to heat is a property of heat repugnant to cold. The cause of this can be adduced: these properties flow naturally from the essences of their things; and just as the essences are formally repugnant to one another, so likewise their properties and passions — as is evident from man, from whose essence risibility emanates, which is opposed to neighing, which is the property proceeding from the essence of the donkey.

Note second from (*Scot. 3. distinctione prima, quaestione prima. §. Non asserendo. sub F.*) and (*quaestione secunda. Ad argumenta principalia, infra C.*) that human nature — and the same must be asserted of every other nature — is in perfect obedience toward depending upon whatever supposit, through the action of a supernatural agent to whom all things are subject and who do his word, and nothing can resist his will, since he has full dominion and power over all things. Hence, just as God can do many things by absolute power that he cannot do by ordained power — that is, according to the law established and decreed by him — so too

he can accomplish many things in a creature through its obediential power that he cannot accomplish in it by letting the creature itself follow the order prescribed to it. Nevertheless, it must not be thought that through this obediential power a creature can be assumed by God to produce effects that are repugnant to it and impossible — since for the impossible no power exists, whether created or uncreated. Therefore (*Scot. in memorato loco, q. 2*) denies that one singular created nature can be assumed to a hypostatic union conjointly by three divine Persons, because this involves repugnance; it can be assumed by them severally, however, because this involves no repugnance. Although God alone and immediately can produce cold and other absolute accidents, he still cannot bring it about that heat actively concur toward producing cold, because this is repugnant to it, since heat is of such a nature that it possesses not the principle and power of chilling but only the power of heating. God can indeed establish this pact — that when heat is applied, cold is produced, not by heat effectively but by God himself — just as we say regarding the causality of the sacraments, which physically do not attain grace but only morally; that is, because God established with the Church that through such sacraments grace is produced in the one who receives them and places no obstacle — not physically by the sacraments but by God himself.

Assertion: no creature can be assumed by God as an active instrument for creating anything. So (*Scot. 4. d. 1. quaest. 1. §. Ideo dici potest LL.*). It is proved first: what has no form or active principle in a state of rest before any motion of the agent, or in becoming — while it is actually being moved — can in no way act; but a creature participates no active principle toward creating anything — neither in a state of rest, because it cannot be the principal cause of creation, as I showed in the preceding article; nor in becoming, because either it would dispose toward creation, and this is impossible, since in creation there is no subject to be disposed, as it is production from nothing, from no pre-existing subject; or it would attain the terminus of creation, and this too is impossible, since it possesses no creative power in itself. You will say: this is effected not by the creature's own power but by the power of God. Against this: an instrument, before being assumed by God for creating, from the opinion of all, has no power of creating; therefore if it is elevated by God and concurs toward creating, it must newly receive the power of creating — since the same thing remaining the same, without any change in itself, cannot at one time not be active and at another time be active. But a creature assumed by God as an instrument does not receive in itself the power of creating, of which it is incapable, since that is an active power independent of a subject — whereas every creature acts dependently upon a subject. And an instrument when it acts receives the influx from the one whose instrument it is — namely, actual motion, through which it acts in its own order; but that motion proceeds not from the instrument but from the power of the principal mover; therefore a creature cannot be elevated as an instrument of creation. Second: to whom

repugnance toward the first act belongs, to the same repugnance toward the second act belongs too, since the latter proceeds from the former, and when the principle is removed the thing based on the principle is also removed; but to the creature as instrumental cause the first act — namely, the power of creating — involves repugnance, since this is from itself and independent, belonging to God alone; therefore a creature cannot be assumed by God as an instrument of creation.

You will say: the argument concludes concerning a principal cause, not an instrumental one. Against this: an instrument properly is not active, as I proved in the preceding in the first note; and if it operates in any way, it only disposes the subject beforehand — but in creation there is no subject presupposed to be disposed, since it is production from nothing. I add: the obediential power that exists in a creature is not active but passive; therefore a creature as an instrument cannot attain the terminus of creation. Third: two causes properly influencing an effect — however this may occur, whether principally or instrumentally — each put forth its own proper action; and just as there are two causes, so also there are two actions by which the common effect is produced, as (*Doct.*) teaches at the end of the question cited; therefore if a creature is placed as the instrumental cause of creation, in its own manner and order it must put forth its own action and actively concur toward the terminus of creation; but it cannot do this, because it acts dependently upon a subject; therefore it cannot be elevated as an instrument of creation.

Objection I: no less power is required to effect the hypostatic union of the divine Word with humanity than to create something, since both are supernatural works; but a creature can be an instrument of the aforesaid union; therefore also of creation. The minor is proved: the Blessed Virgin was the instrument of the mystery of the Incarnation, for she cooperated toward it, since she was the true mother of God and man. Hence the Church sings: "Holy Mother of God." The major is conceded; the minor is denied. In response to its proof, I say that the Blessed Virgin indeed cooperated toward the humanity of Christ, but the entire most holy union of the Word with that humanity was accomplished by the power of the Holy Spirit, as the Angel had foretold (*Luc. 1*): "The Holy Spirit will come upon you, and the power of the Most High will overshadow you." The Blessed Virgin is called the Mother of God because she bore Christ, who is God and man — though she did not attain the aforesaid union. This can be explained by the analogy of a man generating a man, though he does not produce the rational soul. You will press: a priest is the efficient cause of the transubstantiation of the body of Christ, for which a supernatural power is required, just as for creation. I say he is a moral instrument, not a physical one — as was said of the sacraments that cause grace, and of the humanity of Christ performing miracles, as is written in (*Luc. 5*): "power went out from him, and he healed all."

Objection II: it is equally difficult and arduous for a body to act upon a spirit and for a creature to be elevated as an instrument of creation, since it is a well-known saying that "a body does not act upon a spirit." But the first is possible, as is evident from the fire of hell burning the souls of the damned: (*Luc. 16*): "I am tormented in this flame." Therefore also the second. The major is conceded. To the minor I say that fire acts there only objectively — that is, as an object that is not willed by the damned; and this is an intentional action, not a real physical one. Or say that the damned are tormented in hell as in a most gloomy dungeon and prison in which they are held, on the authority of (*Scot. 4. d. 44. q. 1.*). You will press: in (*4. Reg. 20*) it is narrated that the illness of King Hezekiah was cured by Isaiah through figs — which rather aggravate than heal infirmity, as (*Lyrar. eo in loco*) notes. And in (*Ioan. 9*), the man born blind received sight through clay, which harms vision. Therefore if God can do this, he can do that also. I say these did not concur to the said effects physically but morally — just as if God were to create an Angel at the prayer of St. Francis, that prayer would be not a physical but a moral cause. (*Aur. cit.*) explains this with the example of one who applies tinder to fire, and of the arsonist, who is said to be the burning cause of the house into which he threw fire — when the fire itself truly and physically burns it, not the arsonist.

Objection III: (*Aug. serm. 24. de verbis Apoft.*) writes of that passage (*Matt. 11*): "Learn of me" — says (*Doct.*): "Learn of me not to fabricate the world and create natures, nor even those other things which this hidden God, made manifest as man, accomplished"; therefore Augustine does not consider it unfitting and impossible for a creature to create something — especially if it were elevated by divine power as an instrument of creation. The answer is that Augustine is to be interpreted morally, not physically, as was said in the response to the first objection of the preceding article; or satisfaction will be given if it is said that Christ the Lord there teaches us humility, which is the foundation of the other virtues, and which — united with charity — leads us to happiness and to eternal rest for our souls. Hence the Savior himself adds: "and you will find rest for your souls." And if we knew how the world is to be created, and possessed the knowledge of all things that are in it — without humility and charity — we would be unable to attain that glory and rest. Or the same saint intimates to us that just as it is impossible for a creature to found the World, so it is equally impossible to acquire heavenly beatitude for oneself without humility.

Book II

On the Heaven

Treating of the nature of heaven, its motion, and its influence, we leave the rest for astronomers to consider and observe. Three principal questions are resolved in this book: the first concerning the nature of heaven, the second concerning its motion, and the third concerning its influence. But before taking up these

difficulties, it is our intention to explain the name of heaven. Some hold that "heaven" (*caelum*) is derived from "hiding" (*celando*), because it seems to hide from us what is effected within and above it; others — notably (*Vorrilong* 2. d. 16. art. 1) — derive its meaning from the verb *caelo*, which means the same as "to sculpt"; and certainly in it the stars are marvelously seen as if sculptured, shining and sparkling in a most beautiful field. Its condition is firm, its order certain, and its ornament perfect — so that the royal psalmist not unfittingly sings in (*Psal.* 18): "The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament announces the works of his hands."

Question I

On the Nature of Heaven

Article I: Whether Heaven Is Composed of Matter and Form

(*Aver.* 1. *de substantia orbis* cap. 2) and (1. *Cali*, ad tex. 7 and 10), drawing on Aristotle in the places cited below, holds that heaven is a simple body devoid of matter and form. The same view is held by (*Gabriel* 2. d. 12. q. 2), (*Aur.* *ibid.* d. 14. art. 2), (*Dur.*), (*Mayr.*), and (*Arr. disp.* vn. *caeles.* sect. 1), from whom (*Poncius disp.* 51. q. 1) does not depart in fine. The opposite — namely that heaven consists of matter and form — is taught by the rest: (*Alens.* 2. parte, q. 44. m. 3), (*S. Bon.* 2. d. 12. quaest. 1. art. 2), (*Ockham quaest.* 22), (*Th.* 1. p. quest. 66. art. 2), (*Suarez disp.* 13. Mes.), (*Conimb.* 1. *Cali* c. 2. quest. 4. art. 2), and (*Hurt. disp.* 1. sect. 1. §. 7). (*Scot.*, however, in *utroque opere* 2. d. 14. quaest. 1), resolves this controversy with a single distinction, saying that according to the philosophers heaven is a simple body, but according to the theologians it is composite.

Note first from (*Scot. in Rep. cit.* §. *circa istam quaest.*) that it is taken as certain that heaven is not an incorporeal substance, since it is perceived by us as quantified and sensible; but quantity is located only in a material and corporeal substance. The question, however, is whether it is a simple substance or one composed of matter and form. Furthermore, observe that heaven is sometimes taken for air — as in (*Psal.* 8): "the birds of the heaven" — that is, of the air — as (*Aug.* 12. *Conf.* 32) interprets; and (*Psal.* 146): "who covers the heaven with clouds for the rain of the earth." Hence (*Aug.* l. *de natura boni contra Manich.* c. 33) adds: "sometimes the air is called heaven, not that heaven in which the stars are, but this lower one in which the clouds are gathered in darkness and the birds fly; for cloudy sky and the fowls of the air are both so called." This is perhaps what (*Paul.* *Eph.* 6) had in view when he named "spiritual wickedness in the heavenly places." (*Damasc.* 2. *fidei*, c. 6) adds: "the custom of divine Scripture is to call the air heaven." Heaven properly, however, is the container of all visible and invisible things — on the authority of (*Scot.* 2. d. 2. q. 6. paulo ante B.) after (*Damasc.* *mox alleg.*), of which (*Virg.*) sings: "the heavens, the earth, and the deep sea"; and (*Lucan.*): "Olympus exceeds the clouds." And it is this heaven, shown to Abraham in (*Gen.* 15): "Look

up to heaven, and number the stars if you can," of which our present discussion treats.

Note second that form and matter are each used in two ways. Form is taken for the part of a physical composite which, together with matter, causes the composite; and also for the entire nature and essence of any thing — in this sense humanity is called the form of man (*Philip. 2*): "taking the form of a servant" — that is, humanity or human nature, as (*Lyr.*) interprets — and it is called the form of the whole. In this sense too, Angels are said to be simple forms — that is, devoid of physical composition. Matter likewise is taken for the matter of the part, which together with form constitutes the composite; and for the matter of the whole, or individual difference, which is called matter because it is susceptible and subject — just as matter is subject to all forms — as (*Scot. in exp. 1. Met. cap. 4*) observes. Hence (*Arist. 1. cali T. 92*) prefaced: "when I say heaven, I say form; when I say this heaven, I say matter."

First assertion: according to Aristotle and his followers, heaven is separated from matter and is a simple body, which is called the fifth essence of the Peripatetics. So holds (*Doct. in locis memoratis*). It is proved first by strong and efficacious authorities and testimonies of the philosopher (*9. Met. 17*): "heaven is eternal and is not in the potency of contradiction toward being or not being"; but what is composed of matter and form can be or not be (*1. Phys. 12*). The reason is that matter, actualized and informed by one form, inclines and tends toward another form; therefore, because of the privation annexed to it, it contrives harm — that is, the corruption of the composite in which it exists (*1. Phys. 81*). Therefore, in the Peripatetic school, heaven does not consist of matter and form. (*Ruv. in com. 1. de calo, c. 2. q. 5*), (*Conimb.*), and others cited above respond that Aristotle removes from heaven the potency separated from act — or form by which it is actualized and informed — but not the potency conjoined always with act and form by which it is actualized and informed; for this latter can coexist with what is eternal and perpetual, such as heaven. Against this: the same Aristotle there admits only the potency in heaven for accidental form — such as quality and place; but if there were matter there, it would also be indifferent and in potency toward another substantial form, toward which it inclines and tends, if not proximately, at least remotely — since no form, however perfect, can satisfy and fill the appetite of all other forms. Furthermore, if according to Aristotle heaven is a simple body, it plainly follows that it lacks matter, since the simple is opposed to the composite of matter. The same (*the Philosopher 8. Met. T. 4*), (*14*), (*12 of the same work, T. 10*), and (*ibid. T. 30*) proves that intelligences lack matter because they are sempiternal; but heaven is eternal, as is clear from (*1. Cali T. 38 and 39*); therefore it does not possess matter. Second, from (*l. de longitudine, brevitae vitae, cap. 2*): what is assembled from matter is not free from contraries; but the celestial body lacks contraries, as is clear from (*1. cali, c. 3 and 4*); therefore it is devoid of matter. You will say with (*Ruv. cit.*) that heaven has some contrariety — for in one part it is rare, in another dense, and

its motion is fast or slow. Against this: Aristotle there speaks of contraries in the proper sense, which are the primary qualities that are adverse to the life of animate beings, of whose short and long life he was treating; and it is plain that heaven lacks such contraries; therefore the aforesaid response is inapt to the text of Aristotle. Third, from (2. *de gener. c. 1*) and (8. *Met. 14*): what is composed of matter and form is transmutable into each other, as is clear in the elements, one of which is transmuted into another; but heaven is intransmutable and incorruptible (1. *cali, 81*); therefore it is exempted from physical composition. Nor does it avail to say with (*Ruv.*) that heaven is transmuted not simply but in a qualified sense — that is, from one accidental form to another, or to its privation, as from light to darkness, as is evident in night and the eclipse of the sun and moon. For Aristotle in that place speaks of substantial transmutation, through which the philosophers came principally to the knowledge of matter. For if a simple body were given, accidental transmutation could occur in it while it yet lacked matter; therefore the philosopher is to be interpreted of substantial transmutation; and consequently, in his opinion, heaven lacks matter.

Second assertion: according to the theologians and the truth, heaven is composed of matter and form. This is defended by (*Doct. in locis praememoratis*) and is proved first from Sacred Scripture (*Sap. 11*): "he who created the world made it from formless matter" — that is, as (*Lyra*) expounds, from prime matter, which is called invisible because it is not knowable by us except by analogy with form, though in itself it is knowable, as was asserted in (*Phys. 1. 2. q. 1. art. 14*). Or, as (*Aug. 2. de gen. ad lit. 11*) interprets: "he made the World from formless matter," which is called chaos extending from the earth to the empyrean heaven — as (*Scot. ubi supra*) expresses, following (*Alensen. praecit.*) — from which heaven and the other bodies were compacted. Second, from the holy Fathers cited by (*Aur. art. 2*), (*Suarez*), and (*Conimbr. praecensitis*) — it suffices to name and cite one: (*Aug. in the passage just adduced*) and also (2. *de gen. contra Manich. 7*) and (l. 2. *contra Adversarium legis et prophetarum cap. 8*), fortifying our conclusion with the authority already cited by us from (*Sap. 11*). These were preceded by Plato, Democritus, Empedocles, and other earlier philosophers who embraced and confirmed this truth, as (*D. Th. 1. p. q. 66. art. 1*) attests. Third: heaven has being in act, since it is truly seen to exist in the nature of things. Therefore either it is act, or it has act; but it is not act — whether perfect, for then it would be an intellectual nature, or imperfect, for then it would be form, which cannot be the rational soul or any of those belonging to the sublunar realm, as is plain in itself — it remains, therefore, that it is something having act. But what has act certainly possesses a potency for receiving it; and such a potency that is receptive of act is matter; therefore heaven is assembled from matter and form. Fourth: heaven is sensible and material, receiving in itself the accidents appropriate to the composite — such as magnitude, rarity, density, transparency, figure, color, and the like; therefore heaven is endowed with composition.

Objection I against the first assertion: (*Arist. 1. cali, c. 2. T. 5*) proves that celestial spheres are moved circularly because they consist of natures; but natures are matter and form, and the composite is what has a nature; therefore celestial bodies are composed of matter and form. Consequence: the same author (*ibid. T. 92*) writes in explicit words that heaven consists of matter. And (*ibid. T. 94 and 95*) he adduces the reason why another heaven cannot be made — because it is assembled from all matter, so that in its production all matter was exhausted. Furthermore (*2. de generatione c. 9. and 7. 51*) and (*12. Met. T. 22*) he affirms that the principles of sublunar and celestial, temporal and eternal, corruptible and incorruptible things are the same; therefore matter is not to be banished from heaven. The answer is that the philosopher in that text asserts that natural bodies are moveable and that celestial ones are moved with circular motion; but he makes no mention of matter there, whatever (*Conimb. in eius expositione*) may say. Or, given the hypothesis that he asserted this, he is to be interpreted not of the matter of the part but of the matter of the whole, taken for the individual difference, as I observed at the end of the second note; or of the matter with respect to place (*ad vbi and circa quam*), not of the matter from which (*ex qua*). To the consequence, I say that Aristotle there speaks of the world, which according to him is necessarily produced by God, so that another cannot be made; and even if he subsequently asserts the same of heaven, he is still not to be interpreted of the matter of the part but of the matter of the whole — for which reason he prefaced in (*T. 92*) that heaven is among those things that are singular. And then: "when I say this heaven, which is singular, I say matter." Through this distinction satisfaction is also given to the other places cited. And it can be added that Aristotle speaks of metaphysical principles, which are genus and differentia, and which are said to be in some sense matter and form — which (*8. Met. 14*) plainly observes and explicitly writes: "Not every matter is that of whose generation and mutual transmutation there is something; but of those that exist without transmutation, there is no matter of these."

Objection II: the same Stagirite (*2. animae, c. 1. T. 2*) divides substance into matter, form, and composite, and says that a natural body consists of matter and form; but heaven is a natural body; therefore it consists of matter and form. The answer is that this is to be interpreted of a sublunar body that is generable and corruptible, not of a celestial one that is ingenerable and incorruptible, and of a natural simple body such as heaven is in his opinion.

Objection III: what receives the same accidents as a generable and corruptible body participates the same matter; but heaven shares the same accidents by which a sublunar body is informed — for it is quantified, figured, colored, and subject to the senses, even according to (*Arist. 1. cali 22*); therefore it is also composed of matter and form. The answer is that this is indeed a probable argument, but is not demonstrative; for since the said accidents are common, they do not lead us to proper and evident knowledge of the nature of the celestial body. For Aristotle would say that a simple body has and participates

those same accidents as a composite body, and would therefore deny the major. Especially because their proximate and immediate subject is not matter but body — whether simple or composite — as was decided in (*Phys. 1. 5. q. 1. art. 4*).

Article II: Whether Heaven Is Distinct from the Elements

There existed an opinion of the ancient philosophers before Aristotle, who held that heaven was a body assembled from elements — though they disagree among themselves. For some — as may be seen in (*Conimb. 1. Cali, c. 2. q. 5. a. 1*) and (*Ruv. ibid. q. 4*) — hold it to be fiery; some aerial, others aqueous, and yet others earthy, or something not very different from sublunar things. The common opinion, however, is that of (*Arist. 1. Cali, c. 2 and 3*) and of later philosophers and theologians at (*2. d. 14*), who teach that heaven is a body distinct from the elements and from all sublunar things.

Note from (*S. Bon. 2. d. 14. q. 1. q. 2*) that the dispute between the Peripatetics and the holy Fathers — who agree with the ancient philosophers and hold that heaven is made of the elements or of some element — is more about words than about the matter itself. For although (*D. Aug. 2. de gen. ad lit. c. 3*), (*Ambr. 2. Exam. c. 3*), and others not few in number say that heaven is fiery, they do not appear to hold that it is truly of a fiery nature, but as regards likeness — that is, because it is luminous, like fire. Similarly heaven is called aqueous — as the same holy Doctor observes (*ubi supra, q. 1*) — because it has a certain likeness to water, namely because it is transparent like water, and also because it retains light as water does. But if this does not satisfy you, take that saying of (*D. Aug. 19. Civit. c. 3*) at the end: "We ought rather to judge of things themselves than of what each person has thought." For very many of the holy Fathers followed Plato, who held that heaven participates a fiery nature. Thus the philosophers maintained this doctrine, whose opposite Aristotle first introduced into the schools, and which the generality of scholastics subsequently embraced. And if both sides seem uncertain to you, take that saying of the Seraphic Doctor cited above: "In doubtful matters it is better to doubt piously than to define anything rashly."

Assertion: heaven is a body distinct from the four elements and from all sublunar things. So holds (*Doct. in utroque opere 2. d. 14. q. 1*), not far from the beginning; (*Gabriel ibid.*), (*Lyran. in expos. Gen. 1*), and younger sacred interpreters. It is proved first: the corruptible and the incorruptible differ by more than a genus (*10. Met. 26*); but heaven is incorruptible, while the elements are corruptible — at least with respect to their parts — and the other sublunar things are in their entirety subject to birth and death; therefore heaven differs from all of these. You will say: both the sublunar and inferior things, and the celestial and higher things, are corruptible, as is clear from (*2. Petri 3*): "the burning heavens shall be dissolved, and the elements shall melt with fervent fire." The objection is to be met with (*Lyr.*), who says that text is to be interpreted not according to substance but according to accidents. Hence the sacred text adds: "We look for new heavens and a new earth and his promises." For after the

day of judgment all things are to be changed, renewed, and purged by fire, as the aforesaid Postillator there observes. Second: what is moved by a proper and peculiar motion distinct from the motions of others is a body distinct from and diverse from them — as (*Arist. 1. cali cit.*) argues; but heaven is moved by its proper motion — namely, circular — while the elements and other bodies are moved by straight motion, upward or downward, as experience shows in fire which is borne upward and in earth which falls downward; therefore heaven differs from these. You will say: fire also moves circularly, as is seen in ignited comets which are seen by us to revolve, therefore circular motion is not proper to heaven, by which we may know its distinction from fire and the other sublunar things. I say that fire indeed moves circularly in its own sphere, yet that motion is not from an intrinsic principle — as heaven moves — but from an extrinsic one — that is, from heaven, by whose motion fire itself is drawn, just as a rope attached to a wheel revolves with it. Third: the place, position, and influence of heaven plainly demonstrate that it differs from the other things mentioned. For its place is the highest, containing and revolving all sublunar things, reconciling contraries to harmony — for it is the universal cause of mixtures, both living and non-living — separated from all contrariety. Furthermore, it pertains to the ornament and complement of the universe, that just as there are elements that contend and mixtures resulting from their strife, so there should exist a body containing them all, superior, greater, and more sublime, brightened with luminaries, endowed with fixed and wandering stars, and separated from all the dross and disturbance of sublunar things — such as heaven is. All the more so since it is the dwelling-place of the Angels and of all the Blessed, in whom God is seen and possessed. The reason of (*Arist. 1. Meteor. 3*) is also relevant: if heaven were fiery, since it is much greater and more powerful than the rest, it would by now have burned and reduced everything to ashes — and this reason, though peculiar to fire, can nonetheless be applied to the other elements. For if heaven were aqueous, it would by now have flooded and devastated everything; and the same would be asserted of air and earth, since it is of immense magnitude and power. The opinion of Aristotle must therefore be held, teaching that heaven is of a different nature from the elements and from all sublunar things.

Objection I: the same accidents argue the same subject and the same substance, according to (*1. de anima, T. 11*): "Accidents contribute much to the knowledge of substance"; but the same accidents are located in heaven and in sublunar things — namely, quantity, density, rarity, and the like; therefore heaven and the sublunar things do not differ from one another. I distinguish the major: the same accidents argue the same essence and nature from which they flow — proper ones, I concede; common ones, I deny — as is clear from sugar, the swan, and other things in which the same whiteness and other accidents are located, though they participate a distinct nature and essence.

Objection II: in (*Gen. 1*) it is read that God divided the waters that were under the firmament from the waters that were above the firmament; therefore in heaven there are waters, as (*David, Psal. 118*) clearly sings: "Waters that are above the heavens, praise the name of the Lord." And consequently heaven is assembled from the element of water. (*Seraph. nuper alleg. q. 1*) responds, and after him (*Scot. 2. Rep. d. 12. ad finem q. 1*), that by the waters that are above the heavens is meant the crystalline heaven, which on account of its transparency and diaphanousness appears to be aqueous, though in truth it is not aqueous but only similar to water by way of likeness.

Objection III: heaven is called ethereal and empyrean, and this latter is named from fire. And where Moses writes: "In the beginning God created heaven and earth," Plato writes that God first made fire and earth, meaning heaven by fire. Moreover, the entire mass of heaven is called fiery and warm; therefore heaven is assembled from fire. The Seraphic Doctor responds that heaven is called fiery by likeness, because it participates light that shines and gleams like fire. And the empyrean is called fiery not from elemental fire but from the fire of love with which the Blessed burn. Hence the first order of Angels is called Seraphim from the ardor of love and charity — just as Cherubim are named from knowledge — as (*Scot. 4. d. 49. q. 4. §. Iuxta. K.*) notes. And it is signified in (*Cant. 5*): "many waters could not extinguish his charity."

Objection IV: what is capable of contrary qualities is an element or a compound — as is acknowledged by all; but heaven is capable of contrary qualities: for Saturn is cold, the Sun hot, Mars dry, and the Moon humid; therefore heaven does not differ from sublunar things. The major is conceded; I distinguish the minor with (*Scot. q. 4. prol. GG.*) and (*1. d. 3. q. 7. Sub R.*) and (*Quol. 15. §. Ad 1. principale ante BB.*) and (*2. d. 25. q. un. sub G.*): formally, I deny; virtually, I concede.

Article III: Whether the Matter of Heaven Is of the Same Species as the Matter of Sublunar Things

Those who — with (*Dur. 2. d. 12. q. 1*) — hold that heaven is simple and devoid of physical composition are free from this difficulty. Those who, however, hold that heaven is composed of elements or of other things rightly investigate whether its matter is of the same or different species from the elements and the other sublunar things. On this matter there are two opinions: one is that of (*Alens. 2. p. q. 44 in 2*), (*Ric. 2. d. 12. q. 8*), (*Th. 1. p. q. 66. art. 2*), (*Caiet. ibid.*), and others, who hold that the matter of celestial things differs in species from the matter of terrestrial things. The other is that of (*Scot. 2. d. 14. q. 1*), (*S. Bon. d. 12. q. 1*), (*Ockham q. 22*), (*Aur. d. 14. q. 1. art. 2*), (*Racon. tract. de principiis sect. 1. art. 4*), (*Mol. tract. de opere sexdierum, disp. 5*), and (*Arriag. disp. 2. Phys. sect. 11. subsect. 2*), who teach that incorruptible and corruptible, superior and inferior bodies participate the same matter in species. These were preceded by Trismegistus,

Empedocles, Heraclitus, and others cited by (*Ruv. 1. Cali cap. 2. q. 6*) and by (*Conimbr. ibid. q. 5. art. 1*).

Note that although matter is in itself indifferent to receiving any form whatsoever, nonetheless certain forms can be separated from it by a created agent and in fact are separated — as is clear in the perpetual origin and death of sublunar things; but certain others are inseparable by the same agent, since it cannot introduce the prior contrary dispositions that would inform that matter with the said forms — as appears in some way in the diamond and others in which the bond between form and matter is necessary and almost indissoluble, such as the form of heaven; yet absolutely, one can be separated from the other if an agent were given that could overcome its power and introduce opposing and conflicting preparations and dispositions through which the matter could be prepared to receive a form different from the one it has.

Assertion: the matter of the celestial and the terrestrial is of the same nature and species. So holds (*Doct. cit. in utroque opere*). It is proved first: what participates the same definition is of the same nature and species, because the definition signified by the name designates and explains the nature (*4. Met. 28*); but the matter of terrestrial and celestial things — of corruptible and incorruptible — has one and the same definition (*1. Phys. 82*). For both are the subject of forms, whether corruptible or incorruptible; nor is any other definition of matter found in the writings of the philosopher. Again: in the foundation of nature, such as matter, there is nothing distinct — as (*Dur. nuper alleg.*) reports from Averroes, after (*Scot. q. 15. de anima, §. Ad q.*); but there would be something distinct if sublunar matter were specifically different from celestial matter — for between the two there would be a specific distinction that would destroy the aforesaid saying celebrated by all. Second: such a specific difference between this and that matter is established either on account of the nobility or on account of the incorruptibility of the form; but neither can introduce such a specific distinction of matter into sublunar and celestial things. And indeed not the nobility and excellence of form — for the rational soul surpasses and excels all other forms of these inferiors, yet the matters of this and of those do not specifically differ from one another; nor the incorruptibility of form — for one star possesses an incorruptible form distinct from the form of another star, and yet no one asserts that the matter of one specifically differs from the matter of the other. Third: common and identical accidents argue the same subject and common matter, as (*Arist. 1. anima 11*) signifies; but superior and inferior bodies share the same accidents — namely quantity, transparency, density, rarity, light, and the like; therefore also the same subject and the same matter. Fourth: there are not two first efficient causes and two ultimate ends, as (*Scot. 1. d. 2. q. 2*) demonstrates; therefore neither are there two prime matters, since the reasoning is equal in both cases. This doctrine is corroborated from Sacred Scripture. For in (*Gen. 1*) prime matter is signified by earth, as (*S. Bon. I. praecit.*) notes; or by water, as other doctors observe. It is therefore certain among all

sacred interpreters that God created only one matter, from which all things consist, as is expressed in (*Sap. 11*): "he who created the world made it from invisible matter." Pressed and convinced by this argument, (*Mol. pallu memorato*) embraces our opinion, though he honestly confesses that he held the contrary elsewhere. (*Aug. 2. de gen. ad cit. cap. 21*) adds: "from this same corporeal matter, heaven is narrated as already made." The same holy Doctor indicates this in (*2. de gen. contra Manich. cap. 7*) and (*12. Conf. cap. 7 and 8*). All the Fathers cited in the preceding article subscribe to this, who hold that heaven is assembled from the elements or from some of them; for if heaven participates the matter of the elements, and consequently of inferior things, the matter of inferior and superior bodies is of the same nature and species.

Objection I: (*Arist. 1. de gener. cap. 10. T. 54 and elsewhere*) plainly expounds that what participates the same matter in species is mutually transmutable; but heaven is intransmutable, and all sublunar things are transmutable; therefore its matter is specifically distinguished from the matter of these. The same is indicated in (*8. Met. c. 4. T. 12*): "In everlasting things, such as the heavens, the matter is not the same as in perishable things." And in (*12 of the same work, cap. 2. T. 10*): "In sempiternal things, such as celestial bodies, the matter is plainly diverse from temporal and corruptible things." The same (*S. Dionysius 4. de divinis nominibus*) signifies. The answer is that Aristotle is to be interpreted of accidental, not essential distinction. For in the matter of heaven there are not, nor can there be by natural powers, proximate dispositions and suitable preparations for another form — as there are in these inferiors — and therefore these are mutually transmutable but that is not. Or it can be interpreted of the matter *in qua*, not the matter *ex qua*. And this is explicitly intimated in the last cited passage, where he says that the everlasting undergoes change of place and motion. Or say that he speaks of matter not of the part but of the whole, taken for the haecceity or individual difference, as I observed above. Dionysius in the place cited is also to be interpreted in this way. All the more so since Aristotle posits heaven as the fifth simple body, separated from all matter, as is clear from what was proved in (*art. 1 of this q. aff. 1*).

Objection II: the matter of heaven is bound with an indissoluble connection to its form, since it is necessary and perpetual; but the matter of sublunar things is bound to form by a dissoluble and contingent bond, as the continuous and perpetual birth and death of things makes plain; therefore the one specifically differs from the other. The answer is that this is true proximately and in a qualified sense, but not remotely and absolutely. For in fact heaven is incorruptible because no created agent contrary to it is given that could overcome its power and introduce opposing and conflicting dispositions in it, through which it could be prepared to receive a form other than what it has, as I made clear in the preceding note. And (*Damasc.*) indicates this with these words: "By the will of God, heaven is incorruptible." And (*Ockham nuper alleg.*) pursues this aptly after (*Scot.*). You will press: if the matter of heaven were in passive

potency to receive another form, since active potency corresponds to passive potency, it follows that there exists in the nature of things a created agent that possesses this active power of informing such matter with a form different from the celestial form — and consequently that heaven is in fact corruptible, which is false. The sequence is to be denied; for it suffices that in the entire coordination of beings there be such an agent — such as God — as is evident from the human body duly organized to receive the rational soul, which God alone can create and infuse into it, as (*Scot. q. 1. prol.*) and (*4. d. 43. q. 3. §. Ad arg. principalia*) note.

Objection III: the matter of heaven is receptive of foreign impressions, as the common view of philosophers and astronomers at (*1. Meteor*) asserts; but the matter of the earth is also capable of such accidents; therefore they specifically differ — otherwise both would be endowed with all of them. The answer is that those accidents are common, from which a specific distinction of one from the other cannot be detected — especially since the proximate and immediate subject of accidents is the composite, not matter or form.

Article IV: Whether Heaven Is Animate

The affirmative side is supported by the weight of the authority of almost all the ancient philosophers to such a degree that (*D. Aug.*) appears undecided, as (*Scot. 2. d. 14. q. 1. §. secundum Theologos D.*) and (*Aur. ibid. q. 2. art. 2*) above all note. And it was so prevalent at that time that (*Anaxagoras*), holding that the sun was inanimate, was charged with and condemned for impiety by the Athenians, as (*Laertius in his life*) attests. But the negative side is now the most common, and the opposite is considered erroneous by the (*Seraphic Doct. 2. d. 14. art. 3. q. 2*) and condemned by the University of Paris, as may be seen in (*collect. errorum, cap. 12*) at the end of (*4. Magistri*) and at the beginning of (*1. S. Bon.*); and also by (*D. Hieron. in com. Deut. 32*) and (*Isa. 1. 45*), where it is reckoned among the errors of Origen; indeed, in the Fifth General Council those who maintain the opposite are struck with anathema, as (*Joverius tom. 2. summae Conciliorum*) reports.

Note and recall from what was said in (*2. Phys. q. 4. art. 1*) that form is divided into assisting and informing, as (*Arist. 1. de partib. 1*) indicates. An assisting form is extrinsic to the thing it assists, moves, and fosters — in this sense a sailor is called the assisting form of a ship, and a charioteer of a chariot. But an informing form is intrinsic and essential to the thing — for it together with matter essentially and intrinsically causes and integrates the whole, which is truly actualized by it and animated, if it is living or life-giving.

Assertion: heaven is not properly animate. So (*Scot. cit.*) and (*in Rep. ibid.*) and (*8. Met. in expos. cap. 18*), (*Picol. lib. de calo, cap. 19*), and others cited by recent authors. It is proved first from the holy Fathers: (*Ambr. 2. Hexam. cap. 4*), (*Basil. ibid. homil. 3*), (*Cyril. 2. contra Julian.*), (*Damasc. 2. fidei, 6*), (*Lyran. in cap. 10. Ierem*), and (*Abul. in cap. 23. Exod. q. 47 and elsewhere*), who maintain and profess the

proposed assertion, supported by (*Mayron.*), (*Ockham*), (*Gabriel.*), (*Ric.*), (*Lych.*), (*Pelbar.*), and other professors of scholastic discipline. Second, from (*Arist. 2. animae, cap. 1. T. 37*): "the soul is the first act of an organic body potentially having life"; but heaven is not an organic and heterogeneous body but a similar and homogeneous one of immense magnitude, in which a soul cannot dwell, since it requires determinate organs and members for the performance of vital operations, as was decided in (*lib. 5. Phys. q. 4. art. 1*); therefore the celestial orbs are inanimate. Third: if heaven were animate, it would be animated either by a vegetative, or a sensitive, or an intellective soul; but none of these three animates it; therefore it is inanimate. The major is evident, since only those three genera of souls mentioned are given. The minor is shown: if it were informed by a vegetative soul, it would be nourished, would grow, would generate something like itself, and would be corrupted in some of its parts — since the aforesaid operations cannot be performed without corruption. But if it were endowed with a sensitive soul, it would be sensitive, and would be endowed at least with the sense of touch, would be subject to heat, cold, and other qualities — and thus would be passible, like an animal. But if it had a rational soul, it would be capable of merit, demerit, glory, punishment, eternal salvation and damnation — all of which are most absurd things, as (*Scot. Quol. 9. §. de tertio*) touches upon. Furthermore, it has been established at the Lateran Council, *Firmiter*, that God created only two intellectual creatures — namely, the angelic and the human; but it is evident that neither of these is the celestial mass, from which no vital work is seen to proceed. For local motion absolutely is not a vital action, since it can also be performed by things lacking life and can be performed by an assisting form, as I noted in the preceding note. That our assertion cannot be demonstrated, (*Aur.*) and (*Arr. praecit.*) contend, and (*Scot.*) indicates at the end of the (*q. scripti Oxoniensis alleg.*). And before him (*Aug. 1. Retract. cap. 10*) says: "either this world is such as Plato thought, and as many other philosophers held, and I was not able to discover it by right reason, nor was I able to be persuaded by the authority of the divine Scriptures."

Objection I: (*Isa. 1*): "Hear, O ye heavens, for I speak." But to hear pertains to things animated with a sensitive or intellective soul; therefore the heavens that hear are animated. (*Psal. 135*) adds: "who made the heavens by understanding" — but those that understand, live. Add (*Ecclus. 1*): "The spirit goeth around in a circle" — that is, the sun performs its circles. But the spirit lives; therefore the sun is animated. The answer, following (*Hieron. in expos. eorum locorum*), (*Ric.*), (*Scot.*), and (*Bon. cit.*), is that these testimonies are to be taken metaphorically, as the subsequent words indicate: (*Isa.*): "and let the earth hear with its ears." And (*Deut. 32*): "let the earth hear the words of my mouth." But it is plain that the earth is not properly animate; neither, therefore, are the heavens. This is made clear by (*Daniel 3*), where inanimate things are invited to praise and bless the Lord: "O ye ice and snow, bless the Lord." But such praise and blessing is transferred and metaphorical — and so also is the hearing of the heavens. To the

other text from the Psalter, "who made the heavens by understanding" — that is, in wisdom — as (*Aug.*) interprets; for as it is had in (*Psal. 103*): "You made all things in wisdom." Or say with the same Doctor that by "heavens" are meant the saints, to whom God has given not only hearing but also the understanding of divine gifts. The same (*Damasc. 2. fidei, 6*) teaches, explaining the words of (*Psal. 95*): "let the heavens be glad, and let the earth rejoice" — he calls the Angels who are in heaven and the men who are on earth to rejoicing. To Ecclesiastes I say that its passage is to be interpreted effectively, not formally — for the sun is an equivocal and universal dispositive cause of sublunar living things. Hence (*Arist. 2. Phys. 26*) adds: "the sun and man generate man."

Objection II: (*Arist. 2. Cali T. 13*) expressly says that heaven is animate; and (*ibid. T. 61 and 68 of the same book*) attributes life to heaven; therefore in the Peripatetic school heaven is animate. The answer, following (*Scot. in Rep. cit.*), is that the philosopher attributes a soul to heaven not through information but through assistance. Or that he speaks in the opinion of Plato and the common people, lest perchance, like Anaxagoras, he should be accused and condemned. Or perhaps he holds wrongly on this matter, as on the eternity of the world and certain other things recounted elsewhere.

Objection III: (*S. Aug. lib. de agnitione vera vitae*) writes: "those who say that the heavens are rational, they themselves are rightly irrational"; therefore Augustine does not favor the opposite opinion. The answer, following (*Scot. passu alleg.*), is that the book is not Augustine's — for it does not have the flavor of his style, as is evident to those who read it. You will press: the same saint in (*lib. de duabus animabus*) writes in explicit words: "a fly, because it lives, is nobler than the sun." The same appears to be asserted in (*1. Retract. 5*) and (*2. eiusdem operis, cap. 7*). The answer is that there he speaks not assertively but doubtfully — and sometimes according to the mind of Plato, to whom he is very favorable, as is evident from his opinion about Angels, which he held to be corporeal, like Plato. Therefore he does not appear to adhere firmly to one part, just as in the similar case of (*18. Civit. cap. 11*), where having set forth opinions about the number of persecutions of the Church, he inclines no more to one than to the other. And in the same work he dissents in many things from (*D. Hieronymus*), though the latter was a saint; and in (*lib. 21*) he admits as true certain things narrated by others, while not conceding others but doubting about them, as is evident in (*lib. 22. cap. 13*); and in (*lib. de beata vita*) and elsewhere he honestly admits that he is ignorant of many things. And we can say of him what he himself says of (*S. Cyprian*) against the Donatists: "his authority does not deter me, because his humility delights me."

Objection IV: a soul is defined in (*2. anima T. 13*) as the principle of motion; but heaven is moved, as we experience every day; therefore it is animated by a soul that informs it. The answer is that heaven is not moved by an intrinsic principle

but an extrinsic one that assists it, as I made plain in the preceding note; therefore it is not established as animate.

Article V: Whether Heaven Is Fluid or Solid

Some — among both ancient and modern philosophers — fall into the opinion of asserting that heaven is fluid and penetrable, such that the stars and constellations move in it as birds in the air and fish in the water. Others, while admitting that the firmament or starry heaven is firm and solid like stone or iron, hold that the remaining heavens, in which the planets are situated, are permeable and passable — to which view the Seraphic Doctor (*2. d. 14. art. 1. q. 2*) appears to lend his support. The common opinion of the other philosophers, toward which (*Scot. 2. d. 14. q. 2*) inclines, establishes all the heavens as firm and solid, and (*S. Bonav. ibid. q. 2. a. 2*) indicates the same.

Note that in Sacred Scripture (*Gen. 1*) the firmament is especially named among the celestial orbs — so called from the firmness and solidity with which it is endowed, as (*Lyra in postilla loci mox alleg.*) observes, after (*Aug. 2. de gen. ad lit. cap. 10*) in these words: "it is called firmament not on account of its immobility, but on account of its firmness, or on account of its indivisible separation of the upper and lower waters, it may be understood to be so called." The same (*Calepinus in verbo firmamentum*) notes.

Assertion: heaven is solid — whether it is the firmament or whatever other orb superior or inferior to it. This is intimated by (*Doct. passu memorato*). It is urged first from Sacred Scripture in the place cited and in (*Iob. 37*): "You who with him spread out the sky, solid as a cast mirror." But where the words of Sacred Scripture are explicit, they are not to be twisted to another sense, as some do — saying that the firmness of the heavens does not coincide with solidity. For if the heavens are most solid, as Scripture attests, they certainly have solidity, just as white walls have whiteness in which it inheres; especially since it is added: "solid as cast brass." But it is plain that brass is solid; therefore the heavens are solid, because they are likened to brass itself in solidity. Nor is it valid to say with (*Camerarius*) that this saying was not approved by God but reprehended — for it is not Elihu who uttered that speech, but Job, to whom God was speaking, who is rebuked. Add that the same is received in Sacred Scripture, as (*Psal. 32*): "By the word of the Lord were the heavens made firm." Furthermore (*Isa. 51*) it is foretold that the heavens will melt; therefore now they are not liquid, but solid — otherwise that prophecy would be vain and void. Moreover (*Hebr. 4*): "We have a high priest who has passed through the heavens." But something fluid and liquid is not penetrated, because it yields to a hard and solid body — as is clear from air yielding to a stone thrown into it, and from water yielding to lead falling into it and giving it place. All the more since it is narrated by (*D. Paul*) as a great miracle — as if the heavens were fluid, it would not be a miracle, just as it is not a miracle for fish to pass through the sea or bees to permeate the air. Moreover, it is signified there that two bodies were in the same place

simultaneously — just as when Christ came forth from the womb of the Virgin with the virginal enclosures sealed, and from the tomb with it remaining closed, and when he entered the upper room through closed doors to his disciples. Therefore our opinion is consonant with the principal mysteries of our faith, while the opposite is dissenting from them, and (*Dur.*) — from the sectarians rejected and routed elsewhere — favors it. Second, from the holy Fathers, cited and gathered by (*Tannerus tom. 1. de creatione Mundi, q. 3. dub. 2*) — and (*Lyr.*) agrees with them; and (*Arr. disp. un. Sect. 3. subsect. 4*) subscribes, saying that their testimonies are plainer and clearer than the opposing ones. Third: what is fluid and penetrable is corruptible at least in part, as is clear from air, water, and the like; but heaven is incorruptible, as will be said in the next article; therefore heaven is not fluid and permeable. Fourth: if heaven were fluid, a vacuum would be produced. For if the stars were to move from one place to another, the place abandoned by them would not be filled by another body, as (*Scot. cit. §. Ad videndum. A.*) rightly pursues; therefore naturally a vacuum would be given, which was refuted in the question on the vacuum. Many other things I do not gather, since according to (*Aug. nuper recensito*), where there are open testimonies of Sacred Scripture — and I add, perspicuous authorities of the Fathers — it is superfluous to add further arguments.

Objection I: (*D. Ambr.*), (*Basil.*), and the Nicene Council in the Hexaemeron, and others cited by (*Arr. subsect. 2*), plainly assert that the heavens are fluid and permeable; therefore the contrary opinion contradicts the holy Fathers. The answer is that those Fathers do not speak assertively but doubtfully and dialectically; or if they truly affirm it, they are not to be followed in this — both because there are other Fathers and authors of no lesser name and authority on our side, and because Sacred Scripture and stronger and more efficacious reasons support us.

Objection II: sometimes there have been seen phenomena — such as comets and other meteorological things — above the lunar orb; but these are fluid, as is plain; therefore heaven too is fluid. The antecedent is denied. For as (*Tann. cit.*) rightly says, meteors, even if they sometimes appear to transcend the moon, do not in reality pass beyond it, but are below the moon itself — since they do not ascend except to the uppermost region of the air. Therefore the appearance of those meteors is deceptive, as they also appear to mount up to the stars. Indeed, sometimes clouds appear to exist above the sun, and the sun itself sometimes appears to be triple — the opposite of which is plainly established. Such appearances, therefore, are illusory and empty.

Article VI: Whether the Heaven is Incorruptible

Those who follow Aristotle (*1 Caeli, cap. 3, 7, 20 & 2, eiusdem operis, 1*) hold that the heaven is a fifth simple body distinct from the elements, and they affirm that by its very nature it is incorruptible and everlasting. Those who, together with the early philosophers, hold that the heaven is composed of the elements or of

some one of them, make the heaven corruptible and temporal. Those who maintain that the heaven consists of matter and form — though not of the elemental and sublunary kind — and who acknowledge it to be incorruptible, nonetheless dispute the manner in which it exists as incorruptible. For some, whom Suárez (*disp. 13 Met., sect. 11, 7, 13*), the Coimbrans (*1 Caeli, lib. 3, q. 1, art. 2*), and Ruuius (*ibid., q. 1*) cite and follow, hold that the heaven is intrinsically and by its own proper nature incapable of generation and incorruption. Others, however, such as Scotus (*11 Met., sum. 2, in the exposition of cap. 3; & 2, d. 14, q. 1; & 4, d. 49, q. 6, §. Hic duo, sunt sub B.*), Antonius Andreas (*8 Met., q. 4*), Mauritius (*Theor. 16*), Joannes de Magistris (*1 Caeli, q. 2*), Tartaretus, and the Parisian masters, teach that from its own intrinsic principles the heaven is by nature corruptible, but that extrinsically and in fact it is incorruptible and incapable of generation.

Note that this controversy can be treated in two ways: either concerning what is actually the case, or concerning what is possible — or, as others express it, either proximately or remotely. Likewise it can be treated intrinsically or extrinsically, that is, whether the heaven possesses within itself a principle of corruption, or whether there exists an extrinsic principle — such as some natural agent — that is capable of corrupting it. Whether a supernatural agent could accomplish this falls outside the dispute, since the heaven, like all other created things, subsists by God's will and is governed by his wisdom, and if he were to withdraw his hand from them they would return to nothing.

According to these two distinctions set out above, the entire difficulty is resolved and dissolved by means of the two following assertions.

Assertion I. In fact, the heaven is incorruptible. This is held by the Doctor (*cit. & in Rep. ibid.*) and is intimated by Augustine (*3 de libero arb., cap. 23*). It is proved first from the common judgment of philosophers, astronomers, and theologians alike, to oppose which is rash, in accordance with the admonition of Ecclesiasticus IV: *Ne coneris contra ictum fulminis* — "Do not strive against the stroke of lightning." This is especially so because these grounds are exceedingly solid and firm, as was shown from sacred scripture in the preceding article. Second, it is urged by the experience of so many thousands of years during which the heaven has always endured and been preserved uncorrupted in its entirety and in all its parts; for if it were corruptible, the whole or at least some part of it would already have been corrupted and consumed, the contrary of which is evident to all. Third, there exists in the nature of things no agent capable of overcoming the heaven's power and destroying it, since its power is greater than the power and force of all sublunary things. Therefore, in fact and proximately, the heaven is incorruptible.

Assertion II. In the order of possibility and remotely, the heaven is corruptible. This is defended by the Doctor (*cit., and especially 4, d. 49, q. 6, §. Hic duo cap. in solut. 2*) and may be urged first from sacred scripture. Job XIV: *Homo postquam*

dormierit, non resurget, donec atteratur Caelum — "Man after he has fallen asleep will not rise again until the heaven is worn away." And from other testimonies to be adduced below, in which it is expressly stated that the heaven will be corrupted and will perish. Second, from the Fathers — namely Basil, Ambrose (*1 Hexam., cap. 6*), and Augustine (*26 Civit., cap. 18*) — who affirm that the heaven will at some point be dissolved and destroyed. Plato and other earlier philosophers lend support, holding that the heaven is composed of elements and therefore subject to corruption. Furthermore, what is constituted of matter is subject to corruption, since privation is annexed to matter and works the destruction and corruption of the composite (*1 Phys., T. 81*); but the heaven is composed of matter, and therefore is liable to corruption. More particularly, because the form of the heaven, which informs and actuates its matter, does not contain formally or eminently the remaining forms toward which that matter inclines and tends as toward its own perfection and completion; therefore the heaven is of itself and by its intrinsic principles corruptible, as Scotus (*loco proxime memorato*) excellently pursues.

Objection I against the first assertion. Psalm CI, the royal psalmist speaking of the heavens says: *Ipsi peribunt, tu autem permanes, & omnes sicut vestimentum veterascent* — "They shall perish, but thou dost remain, and all shall grow old like a garment." Matthew XXIV: *Caeli & terra transibunt* — "Heaven and earth will pass away." And 2 Peter III: *Caeli ardentes solventur, & elementa ignis ardore tabescent* — "The burning heavens shall be dissolved, and the elements shall melt with fervent heat." Augustine (*3 de genesi ad lit., cap. 2, 63*) responds that by "heaven" is to be understood the air, and by "heavens" the regions of the air, as I noted in article I of this question. Or I respond with Scotus (*4, d. 43, q. 1, §. Ad argumenta, H., in solut. 2*) and Lyra (*in his postils on those passages*), following Gregory (*17 Mor., cap. 5*), that the heavens will be corrupted with respect to their accidental being, not their substantial being, since after the day of judgment the heavens will no longer move nor exert influence upon these lower things. Hence Isaiah XXX foretells: *Et erit lux Lunae, sicut lux solis, & lux solis erit septemplex, sicut lux septem dierum* — "And the light of the moon shall be as the light of the sun, and the light of the sun shall be sevenfold, as the light of seven days."

Objection II. What is moved by contrary motions is in fact corruptible, as is clearly demonstrated by experiment in sublunary things; but the heaven is moved by contrary motions, namely from east to west and from west to east, as will be apparent in the following question; therefore the heaven is in fact corruptible. I distinguish the major: concerning what is moved by altering and violent motions, I grant it; concerning what is moved by a neutral motion, such as the heaven, I deny it, as will be said in the passage cited.

Objection III. Not undistinguished astronomers report that in the year 1572 a new star was seen in Cassiopeia, which endured for two years and thereafter disappeared; but this could not have occurred without some substantial

transmutation; and what is capable of transmutation is certainly corruptible in fact, and therefore it cannot be denied that the heaven is subject to actual corruption. Augustine (*21 Civit., cap. 8*) meets this by saying it was accomplished by miracle. For he himself, following Varro, attests that the star of Venus once changed its color, size, and course in such a way that this had never happened before nor after. Hence that star foretold was miraculous, just as in the time of Hezekiah the sun went back ten degrees (*Isa. 38*), and when Christ suffered, the sun was darkened (*Luc. 23*); for it is probable that God produced that star anew to signify something great and lofty, as in Matthew II, when God led the Magi to the manger by a new star so that they might see the newborn Christ. Hence Augustine (*serm. 31 de tempore, which is found in the feast of the Epiphany*) adds that this star was a magnificent sign of the heavens proclaiming the glory of God. And sometimes God produces such a brilliance so that men may take counsel and make provision lest they henceforth follow a crooked path. This response is pious and theological. But another and philosophical response can be given with Clavius, Maurolicus, and other no less distinguished astronomers: that what appeared was not truly a star but a comet, whose matter was tenaciously and firmly joined and compacted with its form, and therefore persisted for so long and gradually diminished and afterwards vanished — which was a clear indication that it was condensed from air, clouds, and other sublunary materials, and therefore was not properly speaking a star at all. Accordingly, although it appeared to be in Cassiopeia, it was in truth below the moon — just as in the year 1617 two comets were seen, one fiery and bearded in the east, another white and silvery in the south, persisting for some months at the same distance and course as the primum mobile, so that they appeared to be in the firmament in which the fixed stars are found. I noted likewise above, in article V of this question, that clouds sometimes rise to the level of the stars, and the sun and moon are seen by us when yet the apparition is false and empty; so it must be said of that brilliance which appeared at that time to be in the heaven but was in reality beneath it and below the moon.

Article VII: Whether the Heaven is Nobler than Any Other Body

This question can be set in motion with respect to two kinds of body: an inanimate body and an animate one. Further, whether it concerns an animate body endowed with an imperfect soul, as imperfect animals are animated, or one endowed with a perfect soul, such as those that come to be solely through generation. For some, although they grant the point regarding imperfect animate beings, deny it regarding perfect ones; others except only man; still others hold commonly that the heaven surpasses in nobility any animate thing whatsoever, whether it comes to be through propagation, putrefaction, or by both modes.

Assertion I. The heaven surpasses all inanimate bodies in nobility. This is derived from the Doctor (*2, d. 14, in fine, q. 1*), who calls the heaven a body so

perfect that animation does not seem plainly incompatible with it. Indeed, together with other scholastics, he raises the question whether, if the heaven is considered to be inanimate, it is still nobler and more excellent than animate beings — which is a clear indication that he judges the heaven to surpass any inanimate body in nobility. This is finely transmitted by Augustine (*1 de vera Relig.*, c. 5, *ad finem*, & c. 37). It is proved first: nobler accidents point to a nobler and more excellent body — for accidents contribute greatly to knowledge of substance, as is said in the first place (*T. 11*). But the heaven is endowed with nobler accidents, such as light, spherical figure, circular motion, its supreme location, and the like; therefore it excels the remaining non-living bodies in nobility. Second, more excellent and distinguished effects point to a more eminent and superior cause — for it is the common saying of philosophers that from effects we come to knowledge of the cause. But the heaven possesses greater and nobler effects, as is evident (*1 Meteor.*, 1): *Oportet Mundum hunc subici superioribus lationibus* — "This world must be subject to the superior motions." For it contains, preserves, governs, and exerts influence upon these lower things, and is adorned with the most beautiful and radiant stars, and is the dwelling-place of the Blessed, in whom God is seen and enjoyed.

Assertion II. The heaven is surpassed in nobility by any animate being whatsoever, whether perfect or imperfect. This is defended by the Doctor (*1 d.* 8, q. 3, §. *Respondetur*; and *d. 13*, q. un., §. *Alia est, ante M.*; and *Quol. 1*, art. 1, sub G.; and *4 Rep.*, d. 49, q. 7) against Pererius (*1, 2, cap. 6*), Báñez (*1 p.*, q. 3, a. 3), and certain others. It is urged first from Ecclesiastes IX: *Melior est canis vivus leone mortuo* — "A living dog is better than a dead lion." For no reason other than that the living dog is animate and the dead lion inanimate. But the heaven, as was said in article IV of this question, is inanimate; therefore it is ranked below any animate thing. Second, from Augustine (*15 Trin.*, c. 4, & *11 Civit.*, c. 16, & *l. de vera religione*, c. 55): whatever living substance there is is rightly preferred by the law of nature to any non-living substance. And in the first book of the two souls, he says that a fly, because it lives, is nobler than the sun. Third, just as it is better to be than not to be, so it is better and more perfect to live than not to live. For the grade of life is preferred to the grade of nature; and likewise vital, animal, and rational operations excel natural and non-vital ones. Moreover, the soul is a more perfect form, and living things are moved from within, while the heavens are moved from without, as will be shown below; therefore any animate things surpass them in nobility.

Objection I. Aristotle (*1 Caeli*, T. 16, & *1 de partibus animalium*, c. 1) calls the stars and celestial orbs more excellent than all things that fall under the senses. He intimates the same (*2 Caeli*, c. 3, T. 6). And previously, (*6 Eth.*, cap. 7), he had premised that there are other things far more divine than man, such as what we behold with our eyes, namely the celestial bodies. Therefore in Aristotle's school the heaven is ranked above all sublunary things, both living and non-living. I respond: if Aristotle held the heaven to be animate — as he appears to do in the

opinion of many — he no doubt maintained that the heaven itself is nobler than all created living things; but if he thought it to be inanimate, the testimonies he adduced are capable of this interpretation: that the heaven surpasses animate things, even man, in nobility, if it is taken for the aggregate of the celestial orb and the intelligence that assists it, but not if it is taken precisely for the celestial body alone.

Objection II. A cause is nobler than its effect (*5 Met.*, 1 & 2). But the heaven is the cause of living things, and chiefly of man (*2 Phys.*, 26), who excels all sublunary living things; therefore the heaven is superior both to inanimate and to animate things. I distinguish the major: concerning a total and principal cause, I grant it; concerning a partial and less principal cause, I deny it — as is evident in the case of the intelligible species, which is a partial and less principal cause of the act of intellection, yet is more ignoble and inferior to the act of intellection itself. But the heaven is only a dispositive cause of animate beings. For, as will be said elsewhere, the heaven is not the productive and efficient cause of their souls; rather, given the prior dispositions and suitable preparations of their bodies, God draws forth and produces their souls from the potency of their matter as informing, perfecting, and completing principles.

Article VIII: How Many Heavens There Are

The opinions of philosophers and astronomers differ and conflict in establishing and settling the number of celestial bodies and orbs. For Chrysostom (*hom. 4 in Genesin*) and Andreas Caesalpinus (*3 de orbibus*, q. 4) hold that there is only one heaven containing stars which pass and move through it like birds in the air and fish in the sea, through its cavities and channels. Some, supported by Orbellus (*2, d. 14*), hold that there are three heavens: the aerial, the ethereal, and the empyrean. Aristotle (*12 Met.*, T. 47, cap. 4, *Summa* 2) enumerates eight heavens. Certain recent thinkers enumerate twelve; and Basilides, as cited by Augustine (*in the catalogue of heresies*, heresy 4), counts three hundred and sixty-five. The common opinion of astronomers and theologians, however, holds that there are ten mobile heavens, to be enumerated and named below.

Note first that "heaven" is sometimes used for the entire celestial globe comprehending all the celestial orbs; this is how the divine chronicler of Genesis speaks in chapter I: *In principio creavit Deus caelum & terram* — "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth." And Aristotle titles his books *On the Heavens and the World*, as does the author of the *Sphere* in his little book. At other times, however, "heaven" is used for individual celestial orbs, in which sense sacred scripture not infrequently speaks of the heaven in the plural — notably Psalm CXLIV: *Laudate eum Caeli Caelorum* — "Praise him, O heavens of heavens." And in the preface of the Mass the Church sings: *Caeli Caelorum* — "the heavens of heavens."

Note second that the number of the mobile heavens has been discerned by astronomers from the number of their motions. Hence they posit as many mobile heavens as there are diverse motions of those celestial orbs, since the same body cannot be set in motion by diverse motions. Now ten diverse motions have been found by astronomers in the celestial bodies, as Scotus (2, d. 14, q. 2) notes above all others, and for that reason they affirm that there are ten heavens.

Note third that stars fall into two classes. Some are called fixed because, placed in the firmament or the starry heaven, they always maintain the same proximity or distance. Others are called wandering because they do not always maintain the same distance or proximity but sometimes approach and sometimes recede, as we observe every day in the sun and moon; and such stars are called Planets.

Assertion I. There is not only one heaven. This is held by the Doctor (*loc. nuper alleg.*). It is proved first from sacred scripture. Psalm CXLVIII: *Laudare Dominum de caelis* — "Praise the Lord from the heavens." Ecclesiasticus XXIV: *Ego feci in caelis ut oriretur lumen indeficiens* — "I caused an unfailing light to rise in the heavens." And Ephesians IV: *Qui ascendit super omnes caelos* — "Who ascended above all the heavens." Second, from the holy Fathers — Augustine (10 in *Gen.*, cap. 29), Ambrose (2 *Hexam.*, 2), Damascene (2 *fidei*, 6), and others cited by recent writers — who defend the foregoing assertion. Aristotle lends support (2 *Caeli*, 59, & 12 *Met.*, Tit. 48), enumerating as many intelligences or angels as there are mobile heavens. The astronomers, both ancient and modern, give their assent, as cited by the Coimbrans (2 *Caeli*, c. 5, q. 1, art. 1) and Ruuius (*ibid.*, q. 2). Third, the plurality of heavens is derived from the plurality and diversity of motions, as I noted above in the second note. But the motion of the heaven is not one, as we observe every day in the sun, moon, the other planets, and the stars; therefore the heaven is not one but manifold.

Assertion II. Ten mobile heavens are enumerated, which our Gadius (*in com. Quol. II, fol. 117, colum. tertia*) numbers and names as follows.

X. The primum mobile, which is called the crystalline or watery heaven. IX. The zodiacal heaven, so called because its motion takes place above the poles of the zodiac and along its degrees; which motion, although slow, is nevertheless true and real. VIII. The firmament, which is also called the starry heaven, because the fixed stars are found in it. VII. The heaven of Saturn. VI. The heaven of Jupiter. V. The heaven of Mars. IV. The heaven of the Sun. III. The heaven of Venus. II. The heaven of Mercury. I. The heaven of the Moon.

That this assertion is most true and most received is transmitted by Racon (*disp. unica de caelo, sect. 1*). And it is consistent with Scotus, who, although in both works (2, d. 14, q. 2) he enumerates nine mobile heavens, would also admit a tenth; for he grants the ninth on the basis of the ninth motion discovered by astronomers — namely retrograde motion — and therefore would equally grant

a tenth on the basis of another motion, which is the motion of trepidation or approach and recession, discovered by later astronomers who are equally distinguished and experienced in that art. For the same Doctor (*3, d. 4, q. un., near the end, L.*) in a similar difficulty says that the experts are to be believed. Since, therefore, more recent astronomers have by long and careful investigation discovered the tenth motion, they have discovered a tenth heaven as well. Nor should this surprise anyone, seeing that Christopher Columbus by a long voyage discovered a new world which had previously been unknown to us. Thus from ten distinct and diverse motions, ten distinct and diverse celestial spheres and orbs are rightly inferred, which it is fitting to enumerate and explain individually. The primum mobile is moved by the motion of rapture, by which it draws all the lower orbs with it and completes its course in the space of twenty-four hours, in which the natural day consists. The zodiacal heaven is moved by the motion of trepidation and completes its course in the interval of thirty-six thousand years. The starry heaven completes its motion in one hundred years. The heaven of Saturn in thirty years. The heaven of Jupiter in twelve years. The heaven of Mars in two years. The heavens of the Sun, Venus, and Mercury each in approximately one year. And the heaven of the Moon each month.

Assertion III. Beyond the ten heavens enumerated above, an eleventh must be admitted, immovable, which is called the empyrean. Scotus intimates this (*passu pract., §. Ad argumenta, in solut. 1*), and all theologians hold it together with the Master (*ibid.*). It may be urged thus: there must be admitted that heaven to which Christ the Lord ascended (*Ephes. 4*) and in which he sits at the right hand of God the Father; but that heaven in which the Savior exists is called the empyrean; therefore an eleventh heaven must be admitted. Furthermore, two cities exist — one of the damned, another of the Blessed — which is mentioned by John (*Apoc. 21*): *Civitas in quadro posita est* — "The city is set in a square"; and this city or dwelling-place of the saints, in which the Blessed clearly see and enjoy God, is called the empyrean and is considered immovable. For if this heaven were to move, the Blessed who dwell in it would also be moved; yet it is not fitting that they should be moved and agitated, since they rest from their labors (*Apoc. 6*) and have reached their term, as Scotus and the scholastics teach.

Objection I against the first assertion. Aristotle (*12 Met., T. 48*) writes that a heaven exists for the sake of the motion of a star, and in the same heaven there are many stars; for we read in Genesis I that God made the sun, the moon, and the stars, and placed them in the firmament. Therefore there is only one heaven in which all the stars exist. Confirmation I: one and the same is the motion of all the celestial orbs, as is visible to the eye; therefore there is only one heaven. Confirmation II: entities are not to be multiplied without necessity (*1 Phys., 52*); but there is no necessity compelling us to posit more heavens, since all the stars, both fixed and wandering, can exist in one and the same heaven, namely the firmament; therefore only one heaven is to be affirmed. I respond that there is

indeed one reason why a heaven exists on account of a star, but this is not the precise and total cause; for there are many and diverse heavens to cause the diverse effects and influences upon these lower things, as will be apparent below. That this is so is clearly established, since Aristotle in the first assertion cited affirms that there are eight mobile heavens. To the passage from Genesis, the Doctor (*cit.*) responds that there "firmament" is taken for the entire celestial globe situated between it and the elemental orbs. Lyra indicates the same, saying that "firmament" is taken as containing the other lower spheres in which the Planets shine. To Confirmation I, I say there is one common motion of the primum mobile by which all the other lower orbs are swept along, but there are several proper motions by which the lower orbs themselves revolve, as was shown above. To Confirmation II, the major is granted and the minor denied, as was proved in the second assertion.

Objection II against the second assertion. It is read in 2 Corinthians XII that Paul was caught up to the third heaven, which is the empyrean, where he heard secret words that it is not lawful for man to speak; therefore there are only three heavens. I respond that the sacred text enumerates three heavens there without denying that there are other and more; for an argument drawn from negative authority does not conclude. Or, better, I say that by the three heavens are to be understood the air, the entire globe of mobile celestial bodies, and the empyrean. Or, as Lyra (*in his postil*) expounds it, by the third heaven the empyrean is taken, by the second the crystalline, and by the first the sidereal, comprehending the firmament and the remaining lower celestial spheres. Augustine (*12 de gen. ad lit.*, 6, 7) interprets the three heavens as three modes of vision: corporeal, spiritual, and intellectual.

Objection III against the same assertion. If heavens are multiplied and exceed the number eight, which Aristotle posited especially on account of the retrograde motion and the motion of trepidation observed by later astronomers, those later astronomers may have been mistaken. For that motion is barely perceptible and can be produced by the angel assisting and moving that heaven; and indeed so great an interval and distance intervenes that it cannot be reached. All the more so because it is said to occur at the rate of one degree in a hundred years. And what astronomer lives long enough to be able to observe the terminus of that motion, since his life is so brief that he cannot reach its goal? Therefore no other heavens beyond the eight handed down by Aristotle and other philosophers seem to be admissible. I respond that by careful investigation and prolonged observation, distinguished and foremost astronomers have truly discovered and established that motion. For if they are furnished with suitable instruments elaborated with such skill that they have arrived at an evident knowledge of it, even though that motion is the slowest and the smallest, greater credence is to be given to them than to others not much exercised in that art; and the first discoverers handed it on to their successors, and so in turn these have handed it on to us, nor ought it to seem

strange to anyone, since not all things were known to our predecessors but were disclosed with the passage of time, as is established in the case of certain small matters in the correction of the Council of Nicaea and subsequently of Gregory XIII. Since, therefore, three motions are observed in the firmament, produced not by the angel assisting and moving that heaven but by other angels deputed to the higher spheres mentioned, and since it is the case that each celestial body has its own motion distinct from the rest — from which their number and influence are derived — seeing that every hundred years the greatest revolutions take place in sublunary things, and that after the great Platonic year all things will return to their starting-point, as certain philosophers cited by Augustine (*12 Civit.*, c. 13) and mentioned by Scotus (4, d. 43, q. 3, §. *Sciendum. A.*) affirm.

Article IX: Whether the Heavens and the Stars are Distinct in Species

Two doubts are raised in the present article: the first is whether the heavens differ from one another in species; the second is whether the stars, both among themselves and from the heavens in which they reside, obtain a specific distinction. On the first point, Averroes (*2 Caeli*, com. 48), Jandun (*ibid.*, q. 12), and Durand (2, d. 14, q. 2) deny a specific difference among the heavens; the Parisians (*2 Caeli*, q. ult.), Joannes de Magistris (*ibid.*, q. 4), and Richard (2, d. 14, a. 3, q. 5) affirm it. On the second point, two opinions likewise prevail: the former is defended by Tartaretus (*2 Caeli*, q. 2, dub. 3), Ruuius (*ibid.*, c. 7, q. 1), and Molina (*tr. de operibus Sex dierum*, disp. 15), who establish a specific distinction between the orbs and the stars existing in them. The latter is transmitted by Racon (*disp. de caelo*, q. 2, a. 3), Mayronis (q. 8), and many others, from whom Scotus (2, d. 14, q. 2, & in *Report. ibid.*) does not seem to depart, holding that stars and the orbs in which they inhere enjoy the same species, whether those stars be fixed or wandering.

Assertion I. Celestial bodies differ from one another in species. This is not at variance with Scotus (*loco mox alleg.*). It is urged first: distinct effects in species, and diverse passions, motions, and locations, point to distinct causes, essences, and principles in species — as is established in these sublunary things, both animate and inanimate, whose diverse effects, powers, and properties lead us to knowledge of their specific distinction. But the celestial orbs have distinct effects, passions, motions, and locations: one humidifies, another desiccates; one heats and another cools; and so on — all of which assuredly indicate and mark out for us the specific distinction that exists among them. Second, the sublunary orbs differ from one another in species, as is evident in the orbs of fire, air, water, and earth; therefore the same must be asserted of the celestial orbs, since the same reasoning holds in both cases. Paul intimates this clearly enough (*1 Cor. 15*), where, asserting a specific difference among men, cattle, birds, and fish, he asserts the same to hold between celestial and terrestrial bodies, and even among the celestial bodies themselves, as the author of the work on faith addressed to Peter (c. 3) appears to explain, and as Lyra (*ibid. in Postil.*) does not

dispute. To this is added the argument of the Seraphic Doctor (2, d. 14, a. 2, q. 1), derived from the four kinds of causes, which, being lengthy though beautiful, may be seen in him.

Assertion II. The Planets obtain specific distinction among themselves but are identified in species with the orbs to which they are assigned, and the same is to be held of the fixed stars. Scotus does not depart from this (*ubi supra*), but indicates it (4, d. 49, q. 15, §. *Ad primum. C.*). The assertion is tripartite.

The first part, concerning the specific distinction of the Planets, is readily established. For in the first assertion it remains proved that the celestial orbs differ from one another in species; but the Planets reside in distinct orbs; therefore, according to the specific distinction of their orbs, they themselves likewise differ from one another in species. Moreover, the same reasoning holds for the Heavens as for the Planets. For the Planets have diverse and distinct effects and influences: Saturn moves man to sadness and avarice; Jupiter to joy and liberality; Mars to war and discord; Venus to peace and concord; and so on for the rest.

The second part is proved from Aristotle (2 *Caeli*, c. 7, T. 41), who says that the stars share the same nature with the orbs in which they inhere. The argument is adduced by the Doctor (*passu proxime alleg.*): the stars are the dense parts of the celestial orbs; but rare and dense do not change the species. Moreover, the same influences, effects, and passions proceed from the Planets and from the orbs in which they exist; therefore it is plainly established that they are of the same species as those orbs.

The third part is also settled. For the fixed stars are the dense and compact parts of the starry heaven or firmament, and the remaining parts in which no stars appear are the rare parts; but, as I said, dense and rare, like more and less, do not vary the species; therefore the fixed stars share the same specific nature with the heaven in which they inhere.

Objection I against the first assertion. The celestial orbs have the same motion, figure, and other attributes of this kind that are seen and established by us; therefore they are of the same species. I grant the antecedent and deny the consequent. The reason is that motion, figure, and other such attributes are common accidents, from which the specific distinction of things is not derived. Or I distinguish the antecedent: concerning the diurnal motion by which all the spheres are revolved and swept along, I grant it; concerning the other motion by which each heaven is individually set in motion, I deny it, as I made plain in the preceding article, in which the proper and individual motions of the celestial bodies were observed and transmitted.

Objection II. Aristotle (1 *Caeli*, c. 2) writes that besides the four elements there is a fifth simple substance, which, as I noted above, is commonly called the fifth essence of the Peripatetics; if therefore, according to Aristotle, only one

substance is posited, it is plainly inferred that the celestial orbs are of the same species. I respond that the philosopher indeed admits a fifth body distinct from the elements, but does not decide whether it is one in genus or in species. We, however, supported by the foregoing foundations and arguments together with the aforementioned authors, establish that it is one in genus but multiple in species.

Objection III against the second assertion. Stars, whether wandering or fixed, possess light; but the remaining parts of the celestial bodies lack light; therefore between the stars and the orbs in which they inhere there is a specific distinction. Confirmation: stars possess certain powers that their orbs lack — as the Moon dominates in moist things, and to it are attributed the ebb and flow of the sea, but not to its orb in which it is found. Likewise Mercury inclines man to literature, but not so its orb. Similarly, the lesser bear attracts the magnet, which the remaining stars of the firmament do not do; therefore a specific difference falls upon them. I grant the antecedent and deny the consequent. For only an accidental difference is inferred, since light is a common accident. The reason why the stars shine but the remaining parts of the heavens do not is that the former are the dense parts, which receive light into themselves, while the latter are the rare parts, which cannot retain light within themselves. To the confirmation I say that from these things only an accidental difference is derived, as is clear from men, of whom some have the power of healing the sick and others do not; some are inclined to learning and others are not — yet all are of the same specific nature. One may add that the orbs to which the stars are affixed enjoy the same powers and possess the same influences as the stars themselves, though those of the stars are greater and more efficacious — just as heat existing in the pores of iron heats and burns more than heat existing in tow, because the former is dense while the latter is rare.

Article X: Whether Eccentric Circles and Epicycles Are to Be Admitted in the Motions of the Planets

Averroes (*2 Caeli, com. 3*) and Aristotle (*2 Caeli, T. 45, & 2, T. 46*), together with Bonaventure (*2, d. 14, a. 1, q. 2*) and Richard (*ibid., a. 3, q. 2*), deny them. But Scotus (*eadem d. & q., §. De secundo*), Durand (*ibid., q. 1*), Tartaretus (*2 Caeli, q. 1, dub. 1*), and Joannes de Magistris (*q. 3, dub. 3*) affirm them, and Ptolemy and the other astronomers preceded them in admitting both eccentric circles and epicycles.

Note first that a circle is divided into concentric and eccentric. A circle is called concentric whose center is the same as the center of the world. An eccentric circle is one whose center is different from the center of the world; and this is of three kinds: one with respect to its convex surface, which is simply called eccentric; another with respect to its concave surface, called eccentric in a qualified sense; and a third with respect to both surfaces, called the deferent circle, in which the body of the Planet is moved and carried along in its motion.

The part of this circle most distant from the center of the world is called the apogee, that is, the elevation; the part least distant from the said center and opposite to the former is called the perigee, that is, the depression; and the intermediate parts are called the stations.

Note second that the epicycle is a small sphere contained within the thickness of the simple eccentric and existing above the circumference of the deferent circle. In the epicycle, astronomers describe four points and draw two lines proceeding from the center of the world enclosing that circle, one directed toward the east, another toward the west. The point touching the eastern line is called the first station, and the point touching the western line is called the second station. A Planet existing at either of those two points is called stationary. The arc between them is called the direct arc, and a Planet existing in it is called direct; the lower arc is called the retrograde arc, and the Planet in it is called retrograde.

Assertion I. Eccentric circles are to be admitted. This is defended by the Doctor (*loco pract.*). It is urged by experience: it has been established that a given Planet traverses one sign more quickly than another, even though both signs are of equal magnitude and the Planet moves uniformly. Therefore eccentric circles are to be posited. The antecedent is clear from the sun traversing the sign of Pisces more quickly than that of Leo. Moreover, some Planet at times approaches closer to the earth and at times recedes further from it, given equal clearness of the air — as astronomers have established with certain and suitable instruments — and this is evident in the sun, which is sometimes seen truly larger and sometimes smaller by us because it is sometimes nearer and sometimes further from the earth; and one eclipse in the same sign lasts longer than another, for no other reason than that the aforesaid circles exist.

Assertion II. Epicycles are also to be admitted. Scotus does not object to this (*ubi supra, & dist. 43, q. 3, §. Hic sciendum, sub B.*). It is proved: astronomers have observed that one and the same Planet traverses one and the same sign more quickly at one time than at another, which does not happen unless in the deferent there is an epicycle in which that Planet is moved independently of the motion of the deferent; and such a motion is the motion of the epicycle. Therefore epicycle circles are to be admitted. Mayronis (2, *dist. 14, q. 2*) deals with further matters.

Objection I. Aristotle (*cited at the beginning of this article*) denies the aforesaid circles; therefore such circles are neither to be handed down nor received. The antecedent being granted, the consequent is denied. For in this matter the astronomers are to be followed as experts in their art, as Mayronis (*loc. alleg.*) indicates. I add with Scotus (*in exp. 12 Met., Tit. 44*) that Aristotle was not very skilled in astronomy. Therefore it is not surprising if he did not admit the said circles; and likewise he posited only eight heavens, whereas astronomers teach there are more than eight, as I wrote above in article VIII of this question.

Objection II. If eccentric circles were admitted, there would be diverse centers in the world; for heavy things would have two places toward which they would naturally tend, and there would be more than ten mobile heavens. The consequent is denied: for the earth is the center of the world, toward which heavy things are borne by their very nature, and each heaven possesses its own center distinct from that of another; and so there would not be more total heavens beyond those enumerated, although many more partial ones exist.

Objection III. If Planets were moved in an epicycle, they would describe a circle other than that made by the orb to which they are assigned, and would be moved outside that orb itself, and would thus be moved by themselves, after the manner of animals. The consequent is denied. For such a circle is produced in a partial heaven, not in a total one, as the argument supposes.

Objection IV. The Moon is not moved by the motion of an epicycle, as all concede regarding the Sun; therefore the same must be asserted of the other Planets. The antecedent is shown by the image that is seen in the moon itself, which the common people think to be the figure of a man carrying a weight on his back, which always appears in the same way — but it would appear differently if it were set in motion by an epicycle, for sometimes its face would be seen upward and sometimes downward, and in a diverse and opposite manner. Richard (*loc. cit.*, in the beginning of this article) and the Parisians (2 *Caeli*, in fine, q. 2, fol. 116) respond that the Moon is moved about its own center only to the same extent that it is moved about the center of the epicycle, and because the motion of the one is opposite to the motion of the other, for that reason the aforesaid image in the Moon always maintains itself in the same manner and remains in the same position and appearance.

You ask first whether in the heaven there exist the six positional differences — namely right, left, up, down, before, and behind. Aristotle (2 *Caeli*, Tit. 13) responds affirmatively, and the Seraphic Doctor (2, *dist.* 14, art. 1, q. 2) and the Subtle Doctor (*ibid.*, d. 2, q. 6, §. *Alij autem A.*) understand this not properly but by way of analogy: for "right" properly belongs to an animal, in whose part the chief power of moving and acting resides; in the heaven, however, since it is devoid of soul, "right" is attributed improperly — thus the east, where motion begins, is called its right; the west its left; the Antarctic Pole its up; the Arctic Pole its down; its front is the part that receives motion; and its back the part opposite to this.

You ask second whether the heavens are colored. I respond negatively, which is derived from Scotus (2, d. 25, q. un., sub G., & 4, d. 49, q. 15, §. *Respondeo*, sub A.). The reason is that color is caused by a mixture of the primary qualities, which, since none are found in the heaven, it is aptly inferred that there is no color in it. The blue color that is itself seen in the heaven is not a true color but only an apparent one, just like that which is seen in the sea. The reason is that where there is no true color, its terminus is seen to be blue.

You ask secondly whether the heaven is heavy or light. The Doctor (*4, d. 49, q. 16, §. Alij dicunt, ante E.*) responds negatively. The reason is that where there are no primary qualities there are no secondary ones either, such as heaviness and lightness; but it was established above that there are no primary qualities in the heaven, and therefore no secondary ones either.

You ask fourth whether the heavens are contiguous. The Seraphic Doctor (*nuper cit.*) and Lyra (*in 1 Gen.*) respond affirmatively. For the universe is so ordered and disposed that its bodies are contiguous and each is proximate and immediate to another, so that no vacuum occurs between them. Hence astronomers add that the heavens are contiguous in much the same manner as the layers and parts of a single onion.

You ask fifth whether the wandering and fixed stars receive their light from the sun. Augustine (*2 de genesi ad lit., cap. 16, & in Psal. 10*) responds affirmatively, following Paul (*1 Cor. 15*) and Aristotle (*1 Caeli, T. 100*), and this is verified especially in the waxing and waning of the Moon and in its eclipse. For that reason the sun has been placed in the middle of the celestial orbs so that it may be able to pour forth and communicate its light to all the stars, just as the heart holds its seat in the middle of an animal's body so as to give life to all its parts and members — although the stars participate in some light of their own not borrowed from the sun, as is clearly seen in the said eclipse of the Moon.

Question II: On the Motion of the Heaven

Article I: Whether All the Heavens Are Moved

There existed the opinion of certain ancient philosophers — whose names are reported by the Coimbrans (*2 Caeli, cap. 5, q. 4, art. 1*) — who held that only the earth is moved while the celestial orbs are fixed and immovable. This opinion seems to me foolish, false, and erroneous, inasmuch as it conflicts with the senses and experience, and does not conflict with sacred scripture, which affirms that the earth stands forever and is immovable — as will be shown in the following book. All later philosophers and scholastics establish this (*2, d. 14*). They do doubt, however, whether the lower orbs are moved by the motion of the primum mobile, and whether they are also set in motion by their own proper motion distinct from the motion of the primum mobile. This difficulty will be decided by the two following assertions.

Assertion I. The lower celestial spheres are moved by the motion of the primum mobile. This is defended by the Doctor (*in utroque opere, 2, d. 14, q. 2*). It is urged first by experience: the wandering and fixed stars are seen by us to rise above our horizon, then to set, and afterwards to return to their rising, and again to be swept about to the west in the space of twenty-four hours; but this motion proceeds from the primum mobile, and for that reason it is called the diurnal motion and the motion of rapture, since it draws the other lower celestial

spheres along with it. Second, from (*10 Met., T. 22*): in every genus there is one thing that is the measure and standard of the rest; therefore in the genus of motion the motion of the primum mobile is to be admitted, in relation to which the motions of the remaining celestial orbs are moved, measured, and regulated. Third, things that are proximate and immediate to something are, if that thing is moved, necessarily set in motion themselves — as may be observed in many cases; but the lower celestial orbs are mutually proximate and immediate, after the manner of the parts of a single onion, as I established in the preceding question, article last, query third; therefore, with the primum mobile moved, the remaining lower orbs are necessarily moved as well.

Assertion II. The lower celestial orbs are agitated by their own proper motion from west to east. This is held by the Doctor (*ubi supra*) together with the common judgment of astronomers, and is indicated by Damascene (*2 fidei, 6*). It is proved first: the Planets do not always maintain the same proximity or distance among themselves, as we observe every day with the eye; but this cannot arise from anywhere other than the proper motion that the lower orbs possess distinct from the motion of the primum mobile, otherwise they would be moved in the same way and would equally maintain their distance and proximity. Second, each orb completes and accomplishes its particular course in a diverse manner and time — the sun in one year, Mars in two years, and the Moon each month, as I observed in the preceding question, article VIII. But this diversity proceeds from the diversity of motion of each celestial body; therefore the aforesaid bodies enjoy their own proper motion. Third, diversity of effects points to diversity of motions; but each of the aforesaid orbs obtains its proper effect, as I noted in the passage just cited, article IX; therefore each is agitated by its own proper motion. Mayronis (*2, d. 14, q. 1*) deals with further matters.

Objection I. What is moved by its own proper motion and by the motion of another must have both motions impeded and retarded; but the motion of the primum mobile cannot be retarded and impeded by the proper motions of the other orbs, since it is stronger and more vigorous than they; therefore the other orbs are not driven around by the primum mobile along with their own proper motions. Isidore (*3 Etymol., cap. 34*) meets this by conceding that the motion of the primum mobile is in some way retarded by the proper motions of the other orbs. The astronomers respond that the motion of the primum mobile is modified by the motions of the lower orbs in much the same way as we modify the motion and impulse of a body carried upward or downward.

Objection II. What is moved in a contrary direction is resisted and its power impeded; but the lower orbs are moved in a contrary direction by the motion of the primum mobile — namely from east to west — therefore their motion is opposed to it, since it is from west to east. I respond that the major holds for what is moved by a natural or violent motion, but not for what is set in motion

by a neutral and indifferent motion, which is the manner in which the Heavens revolve.

Objection III. The same thing cannot be simultaneously moved by contrary motions; but if the lower orbs were agitated by their own proper motions, they would be moved by contrary motions — that is, from east to west and conversely; therefore they are revolved only by the motion of the primum mobile. I distinguish the major: if that motion is from one point ascending and from the same point descending, I grant that it is a contrary motion and that one and the same thing cannot simultaneously be moved by contrary motions; but if the matter is otherwise, as in our case, I deny that it is a contrary motion. This can be explained by the analogy of an ant moving on a wheel by its own proper motion, and likewise of a sailor who, walking about the ship, is moved by his own proper motion distinct from the motion of the ship.

Article II: Whether the Heavens Are Moved by Angels

Two principal opinions of philosophers and theologians shine forth here. One is that of Mayronis (2, *Cal.*, Saxony (*S. Phys.*, q. ult.), Racon (q. 3 de motu caeli, art. 1), and others, to whom Avicenna (9 *Metaphys.*, cap. 1) and Aurora (2, dist. 14, art. 2) seem to give support, who hold that the heavens are moved by their own forms intrinsic to them. The other is the common teaching of Scotus (2, d. 14, q. 1), Antonius Andreas (*ibid.*), Bonaventure (art. 3, q. 2), and the rest, who teach that the heavens are moved by intelligences assigned to them by God.

Assertion I. The heavens are not moved by their own proper form. This is held by the Doctor (*cit.*). It is proved first: the motion proceeding from the heaven's own proper form would be either violent or natural; but neither is possible; therefore the heavens are not moved by their own proper form. The major is clear. The minor is readily apparent: not violent, because nothing violent is durable (1 *Caeli*, 15), and yet according to Aristotle the motion of the heavens is to last eternally; nor natural, otherwise rest would be violent for them, and thus after the day of judgment the heavens would rest violently. Second, every inanimate thing — such as the heaven is, as was said in the preceding question, article IV — is not moved locally by something intrinsic in its own place, as is evident in the case of water, air, and the rest, which are not agitated except from without; but the heaven is in its own proper place; therefore it is not moved by its own form.

Assertion II. The heavens are revolved by intelligences. This is transmitted by Scotus (*ubi supra*, § 4, dist. 48, q. 2, §. *Ad quaest.*, § 2, dist. 2, q. 6, paulò ante A.). Job IX: *sub quo curvatur, qui portant orbem* — "Under whom they bow who carry the orb" — that is, the Angels, as Lyra interprets. Since therefore the carriers of the orb are Angels, it is plainly inferred that they move the heavens. Second, from Aristotle (8 *Phys.*, T. 52, § 12 *Met.*, T. 43), who enumerates as many motive intelligences of the celestial orbs as there are mobile orbs. Augustine (3 *Trin.*, cap.

4) and Gregory (4 *Dialog.*, cap. 4) subscribe to this. Third, what is not moved from within must necessarily be moved from without, since the principle of motion is either intrinsic or extrinsic; but celestial bodies are not set in motion from within, as was shown in the preceding assertion; therefore they are revolved from without, namely by Angels constituted for them by God.

Objection I. If the heaven were not moved from within, its form would be idle, because being is for the sake of acting (2 *Caeli*, T. 17, & 9 *Metaphys.*, 15, 16). Therefore, if its form were not a principle of moving, it would be useless and superfluous. I respond by conceding that that form is not the efficient principle of local motion, yet it is nonetheless the cause of other effects that are produced in this universe; and therefore it is not in vain — especially since it is the intrinsic cause of the heaven itself, which is constituted of matter and form.

Objection II. God immediately moves the heavens; therefore Angels have not been constituted by God to revolve them. The antecedent is urged from Job XXXIV: *Quem constituit alium super terram, aut quem posuit super orbem, quem fabricatus est?* — "Whom has he set over the earth, or whom has he placed over the orb which he made?" — where Gregory and Lyra add that God immediately rules and governs all things, and so great is his power that it extends immediately to all things. I grant the antecedent and deny the consequent; to its proof I say that this is to be taken of internal direction, not of external execution. For God wills to operate through secondary causes, as I showed in the book on causes, article IV, q. III.

Objection III. To every passive power there corresponds an active power, from Aristotle (*passu memorato*); but the heaven possesses a passive power with respect to motion; therefore also an active power with respect to that same motion. I respond with Scotus (q. 1 *prol.*, ma.) that the major is to be glossed through this distinction: in itself, or in the entire coordination of being — in which sense the passive power of the organized human body corresponds to the active power of God infusing a rational soul into it when duly disposed and rightly organized. Likewise, the passive power of the heaven corresponds to the active power of the Angel for revolving it.

Objection IV. One Angel suffices to move all the heavens, since nothing resists him; therefore Angels are needlessly multiplied in proportion to the multiplication of mobile heavens. I deny the antecedent. For although no resistance from a contrary quality intervenes, there is nonetheless a resistance on the part of the magnitudes of the heavens. For they are so great and vast that one Angel could by no means move them all — just as one Angel cannot simultaneously exist in several total and adequate places; the reason being that an Angel is a finite and limited substance, and on account of this is determined to a certain place.

You ask first whether an Angel becomes fatigued in moving the heaven. I respond negatively. The reason is that fatigue is a diminution of the animal spirits, which can be replenished by rest. But an Angel is immune from weariness, because, not being an animal, he lacks animal spirits; and for the same reason the heaven itself cannot be fatigued. Scotus adds (*in Report.*, 4, *dist.* 45, q. 14, §. *Dico, ut prim.*) that fatigue never occurs unless the patient overcomes the agent in some respect, even if it is overcome absolutely; but there, there is no suffering in return, and therefore no fatigue.

You ask second through what power an Angel moves the heaven. I respond that an Angel moves not through the will, as was established at the University of Paris, but through an executive power distinct from his intellect and will.

Article III: Whether the Motion of the Heaven is Natural

The prior opinion is attributed to Bonaventure (2, *dist.* 14, q. 3, *contra Gentes*, cap. 23) and others who hold that the motion of the heaven is natural. The Coimbrans (1 *Caeli*, cap. 2, q. 3, art. 2), Aegidius (2, *dist.* 14), and Argentinas (*ibid.*, q. un., art. 1) subscribe to this. The posterior position is held by the Doctor (2, *dist.* 2, q. 6, O., & 4, *dist.* 48, q. 2, E.), Richard (2, d. 14, q. 6), Durand (q. 2), Hurtado (*in praesenti*, disp., sect. 4), Arriaga (sect. 5), and Avicenna (9 *Met.*, c. 2), who establish that the motion of the heaven is neutral and indifferent.

Note that a body is moved naturally toward the place in which it naturally rests, and conversely is moved violently toward the place in which it rests violently. Natural motion, as distinguished from violent motion, requires two conditions conjunctively: first, that the principle be intrinsic — that is, the passive principle; second, that the mobile naturally incline toward such a motion. In the absence of either or both of these, the motion is called neutral and indifferent. Thus, when it is said that a motion is not natural, this can be taken either with respect to the principle or with respect to the terminus, but most properly with respect to the terminus toward which it tends.

Assertion. The motion of the heaven is neither natural nor violent but neutral and indifferent. So Scotus (*cit.*), whom the Parisians (1 *Caeli*, fol. 111), Joannes de Magistris (*ibid.*, q. 1, dub. 3), and Tartaretus (*Scibili primo*) follow. It is proved first: every motion is either natural, or violent, or neutral; but the motion of the heaven is not natural, otherwise the heaven would sometimes naturally rest, for upon attaining its terminus natural motion ceases — as is evident in the case of a stone seeking its center, in which it rests — yet the heaven never rests but always revolves; therefore its motion is not natural. Nor is it violent, since nothing violent is durable (1 *Caeli*, 15), yet the motion of the heavens is eternal, both from the side of the past and from the side of the future, according to Aristotle; therefore it is not violent, and consequently it is neutral and indifferent. Second, if the motion of the heaven were not neutral, it would be simultaneously natural and violent; but the same motion cannot be

simultaneously natural and violent; therefore it is neutral. The major consequent is shown: for it would be natural inasmuch as it tends by its own nature toward its terminus, and it would be violent inasmuch as it recedes from that terminus — as is clear in all circular motion, such as the motion of the heaven. Third, natural motion is directed toward some advantage of the mobile body, as is evident in the case of heavy and light things seeking their places, in which they are perfected and preserved in their being — in accordance with the well-known saying that place is the preserver of the thing placed. But the heaven receives no advantage or perfection from its motion, since it always remains in the same condition; and the empyrean heaven, which is the noblest, does not move but is at rest. Moreover, if it were perfected in motion, it is not clear why it would be more perfected by motion from east to west than by motion from west to east.

One might say with Gabriel (*2, d. 14, q. un., art. 3, dub. 2*) that, although the heaven receives no proper perfection of its own from its motion, nonetheless the universe does, since through it the perennial generations, varieties, and vicissitudes of things come to pass. On the contrary: the present dispute is not about the advantage that the things of the world participate in through the motion of the heaven, but about the proper advantage that Gabriel attributes to the heaven itself — which is in truth none at all. Likewise, the question is not whether the motion of the things of the universe is natural, but whether the motion of the heaven itself is natural; to answer that it is natural by reason of the things of the universe is to go outside the question — just as to say, when water rises upward lest a vacuum be produced, that this motion is natural by reason of the natural connection of things; yet it is, as Scotus notes in a similar difficulty (*4, dist. 49, q. 14*), absolutely and simply a violent motion.

Again, the motion of fire in a sphere is not violent, because through it no place is required in which it would rest violently, as is evident in its own sphere in which it moves in a circular manner; nor is it natural, because it is borne naturally only upward. Therefore it is neutral. And the same must be asserted of the motion of the heaven. Furthermore, a surface is in a neutral potency to receive whiteness or blackness; therefore the heaven likewise is neutral with respect to motion from east or west, and conversely. Finally, in Ethics there are indifferent acts, as I showed at length in Moral Philosophy (*1, 3, q. 2, art. 3*); likewise in Physics a neutral motion is to be admitted, such as is the motion of the heaven.

Objection I. Aristotle (*1 Caeli, 5*) shows that the heaven has a natural motion, because it is a natural body. He intimates the same (*3 eiusdem operis, 1, & 8 Met., 1 & 2*). Confirmation: (*2 Phys., 78*): *unumquodque ut agitur, sic aptum natura est, & ut aptum natura est, sic agitur* — "Each thing as it is moved, so it is by nature suited; and as it is suited by nature, so it is moved." Since therefore the heaven is revolved in a circle, it follows that its motion is natural. I respond that all those passages are to be expounded concerning naturalness with respect to the

principle of the mobile body, not with respect to the terminus toward which — from which terminus naturalness of motion is chiefly derived, as I observed in the preceding note. To the confirmation I say that the philosopher is speaking of the end naturally intended by the agent. Or I say that the motion is called natural insofar as it does not proceed from a supernatural agent but from an Angel, who is a natural, created, and finite agent. Or, as regards the natural influences that it causes in these lower and sublunary things.

Objection II. From Ethics III, 1: the violent is that whose principle is external; but the principle of the motion of the heaven is external, inasmuch as it is moved by the Angel assisting it, as I proved above in article II of this question; therefore the motion of the heaven is violent. I respond that in the major the other qualifications that Aristotle there adds are to be placed — that he confers force, that is violence, upon the patient — namely when the mobile suffers violence through that motion. But the Angel, although he is the extrinsic cause of the heaven's motion, nonetheless imposes no force upon the heaven itself, nor does the heaven have any propensity toward that motion. For this reason, such a motion is neither natural nor violent but neutral.

Objection III. The heaven is not in a worse condition than a sublunary body; but a sublunary body is moved by a natural motion; therefore so too is the celestial body. I respond that the heaven is of such a nature that it is capable of being moved in a circular manner. But circular motion appears to be nobler than other motions, just as a circular and round figure excels other figures. Therefore, although the heaven is not agitated by a natural motion, it does not follow from this that it is worse and inferior to other bodies.

Article IV: Whether the Motion of the Heaven is Regular and Uniform

Note that the regularity of motion is to be derived from equal time, so that that which is moved in equal time is moved regularly; and conversely, that which is moved in unequal time is moved irregularly. The uniformity of motion, however, is derived from the motion of the parts of the mobile body: for that is moved uniformly whose parts are moved equally quickly or equally slowly; and conversely, that is moved difformly of which one part is moved more quickly or more slowly than another.

Assertion. The motion of the heaven is regular and uniform. So Aristotle (2 *Caeli*, 35) and all astronomers, and Scotus indicates it (2, d. 14, q. 3, *ante* §. *dico ad q.*, & 4, d. 48, q. 2, §. *In ista q. C.*, & d. 49, q. 13, *ante* §. *Ad rationes. G.*, & *in Rep.* 4, d. 43, q. 4). It is proved first by experience: for the diurnal motion of the primum mobile is always accomplished in the space of twenty-four hours. Likewise the sun completes its course in a year and the moon in approximately a month. Second, astronomers predict lunar and solar eclipses correctly — not only with respect to the day but even with respect to the hour and minute in which they

occur. Likewise many other things are foretold that are certain and infallible; but all these things cannot be predicted with certainty and infallibility unless the motion of the heaven were regular and uniform, as is self-evident.

Objection I. Not all the heavens traverse equal space, since the larger traverse more and the smaller less; therefore their motion is neither regular nor uniform. I respond that the aforesaid regularity of motion is to be derived principally from the motion of the primum mobile and subsequently from the proper motion of each orb, not from an alien motion and with respect to others, as is clear from what was asserted above.

Objection II. In the motion of the heaven there occur eclipses of the sun and moon; but such failures point to irregularity and difformity of motion; therefore the motion of the heaven is neither regular nor uniform. I grant the major and deny the minor. The reason is that such eclipses arise from the primordial constitution of the celestial bodies and serve for the adornment and perfection of the universe, as is evident in the case of night, day, light, darkness, and other opposites — in accordance with the saying: opposites placed side by side shine more brightly.

Objection III. Sometimes the sun stood still, as in Joshua X; at other times the same sun went back ten degrees, as in Isaiah XXXVIII; and at one point, at midday, the same sun was darkened, as in Luke XXIII. Therefore the motion of the heaven is neither regular nor uniform. I respond that all these events were miraculous and preternatural, of which we are not speaking in the present context. Hence at the time of the Lord's passion, a certain person who observed the sun darkened at the full moon and at midday exclaimed: "Either God in nature suffers, or the entire fabric of the world will be dissolved."

Question III: On the Influence of the Heaven

Article I: Whether the Heaven Exerts Influence upon These Lower Things

Setting aside certain errors that Mayronis (2, *dist.* 14, q. 4) recites and refutes, and which the Coimbrans (2 *Caeli, cap.* 3, q. 1, art. 2) and Ruuius (*ibidem, tract.* 1, q. 1) mention, following Thomas (2, *d.* 15, q. 1, art. 2).

Assertion I. The heaven and the stars exert influence upon this lower world. This is the common opinion of Scotus (2, *dist.* 14, q. 3), Mayronis (*ibid.*, q. 5), Richard (art. 3, q. 5), Bonaventure (q. 2, art. ult.), Tartaretus (1 *Meteor.*, q. 1, scibili 3), Joannes de Magistris (*ibidem*, q. 2), and other philosophers and theologians. It is proved first from Aristotle (1 *Meteor.*, c. 2): *Oportet Mundum hunc inferiorem subiectum esse superioribus lationibus, ut inde vis eius universa regatur* — "This lower world must be subject to the superior motions, so that the whole of its power may be governed from there." And (1 *de gener.*, 15, & 12 *Met.*, 33, 34). Augustine (3 *Trin.*, c. 4) gives his assent: "The coarser and lower bodies are governed in a

certain order by the subtler and more powerful ones." And (5 *de civit.*), Boethius (4 *de consol.*), Dionysius (*de divinis nominibus*, cap. 4), and Basil (6 *Hexam.*, 2) — by the motion of the sun the fourfold division of the year is produced, as Augustine (*in praefatione Psal. 150*) and Lyra (*in c. 1 Gen.*) observe above all others. For it is divided into two equinoxes — vernal and autumnal — and two solstices — estival and wintry. Moreover, the sun passing through the oblique circle of the zodiac is the cause of the generation and corruption of things. Its approach to us is the cause of the rising of things, and its recession is the cause of their perishing. And (2 *Phys.*, 26): *sol & homo generant hominem* — "the sun and man generate man." Furthermore (1 *Caeli*, 32): *Deus & natura nihil agunt frustra* — "God and nature do nothing in vain"; but God created the heaven, the planets, and the remaining stars; therefore, lest they appear useless and superfluous, it must be established that they communicate their influences to these lower and sublunary things.

Assertion II. The heaven and the stars exert influence upon the elements with respect to alteration and generation. So Scotus (*cit.*, & 3, *dist. 16, q. 2, §. Rationes iste, ante A.*). It is proved by experience: for when the sun approaches our zenith, the higher elements — fire and air — are increased and augmented; hence in summer heat and dryness abound; but the lower elements are diminished and decrease, so that in the said summer heat moisture and coldness are deficient. When the sun recedes from our zenith, the lower elements — water and earth — are increased and augmented; hence in winter water and cold abound; but the higher elements decrease, for that reason in winter heat and dryness are lacking.

Assertion III. The celestial bodies concur in the motion of sublunary things. This is held by the Doctor (*in 2 passu memorato*) and he shows it thus: when the elements conflict with one another, their motion is produced by the power of the heaven, and a mixture is caused from such conflict through the power of the heaven, as will become plain in the next book; therefore the heaven exerts influence by moving these lower things. Moreover, it is established by experience that comets are moved in a circular manner by the motion of the Heaven. Therefore sublunary things are moved by the motion of the Heaven.

Assertion IV. Imperfect and perfect animate things participate in the effects of the planets and other celestial orbs. Scotus defends this (*ubi supra, in utroque opere*). It is proved first from Galen (*lib. 3 de diebus criticis*), who directs that the conjunctions and oppositions of the planets, and especially of the Moon, are to be observed so that sick bodies may be well treated; hence the Doctor (*mox cit.*) adds that physicians ought to be astronomers so as to administer their remedies to the sick opportunely. Second, marine oysters, shellfish, crabs, and the like are found to be full at the oppositions of the sun and moon, but empty at their quadratures; therefore the planets exert influence upon animate things. Further, men called lunatics are agitated more at one time than another, since they receive greater influences from the Moon at quadrature than at opposition.

Again, in aged people heat is more vigorous at the full moon than at the new moon. Finally, evident and wonderful effects appear in the planting of trees, in their felling, in the ebb and flow of the sea, and in many other things that daily meet our eyes and are discussed at length by the Doctor.

Objection I. Genesis I says that God made the sun and the moon and placed them in the firmament of the heaven to be for signs and for times; therefore they are not causes of these lower things but only signs. And this seems to be confirmed by Damascene (2, *cap.* 6) in these words: "We say that these stars are not the cause of any of the things that have come to be, nor of the corruption of the things that perish; but they are great signs of rains and of changes in the air." I respond with the Seraphic Doctor and Lyra that they are not only signs but also causes, as the sacred text indicates when it adds that they are to give light in the firmament of the heaven and to illuminate the earth — just as the sacraments are signs and causes of grace. To Damascene I say that he denies them to be a primary and independent cause, not a dependent, created, and universally concurrent cause together with the particular causes of these lower things; for that reason Lyra (*loc. cit.*) says that Moses deliberately narrates that God made those two luminaries lest the Jewish people, prone to idolatry, should worship them as gods. Hence Deuteronomy IV: *Ne forte oculis elevatis ad caelum, videas Solem, & Lunam, & omnia astra Caeli, & errore deceptus adores ea, & colas, quae creavit Dominus Deus tuus in ministerium cunctis gentibus* — "Lest perhaps lifting up your eyes to heaven you see the sun and the moon and all the stars of heaven, and being deceived by error you adore and serve them, which the Lord your God created for the service of all the nations."

Objection II. Aristotle (7 *Phys.*, *Tit.* 26) writes that the agent and the patient must be together for action to proceed and an effect to come about; but the heaven is far distant from these lower things; therefore it cannot exert influence upon them. I respond that the philosopher is to be expounded through a distinction: togetherness of the suppose, I deny; togetherness of power, I grant. For although the suppose of the heaven is as distant as possible from the earth, its power is nonetheless proximate to it, by reason of which effects are produced.

Objection III. The same Aristotle (1 *de gener.*, *cap.* 7, *T.* 51) and Dionysius (2 *de divinis nominibus*) affirm that an agent assimilates its patient to itself as much as it can; but the heaven does not assimilate sublunary things to itself — for there is no similarity between them; therefore the heaven does not act upon these lower things. This testimony is to be expounded through a distinction: concerning a univocal agent, it is granted; concerning an equivocal agent, such as the heaven is, it is denied. Therefore it is not necessary for some similarity to intervene in order for celestial things to exert influence upon sublunary things.

You ask whether the empyrean heaven exerts any influence upon this sublunary world. The Seraphic Doctor (2, *dist.* 2, *part.* 2, *art.* 1, *q.* 2) responds problematically, adducing probable arguments for each side and ingeniously

dissolving them. The affirmative part is pleasing: both because no substance in the world is idle, and because the noblest and most perfect body possesses the most excellent power of acting and exerting influence upon its inferiors — as is the empyrean heaven.

Article II: Through What Means the Heaven Acts upon This World

Three things can be debated: namely light, motion, and occult power, which some call occult and hidden influence — all of which I shall briefly and clearly set out through the three following assertions.

Assertion I. The heaven acts upon these lower things through light. This is the common view of Scotus (*in antecedente art. alleg.*) and the other scholastics and philosophers. It is proved: by the light of the sun sublunary bodies are illuminated and warmed, and in its absence they are darkened and grow cold — we observe that by the light of the sun wax is liquefied and mud is hardened. And its heat is a dispositive cause of the generation of things, and its privation is a cause of their perishing, since life consists in heat and moisture. Moreover, trees that are exposed to the light of the sun bear fruit, while those deprived of it do not.

Assertion II. The heaven also exerts influence upon sublunary things through motion. This is held by the Doctor (*ubi supra*) with the remaining scholastics. It is proved: the approach and recession of the sun from us, and its motion in the oblique circle of the zodiac, is the cause of the rise and perishing of things. And the accepted axiom among philosophers is that motion is the cause of heat, just as rest is the cause of cold; and that heat is at least a dispositive cause of things, no one denies. Therefore the heaven acts upon these lower things by its motion.

Assertion III. The occult influences of the heavens, that is, their proper powers and virtues, by which innumerable and wonderful effects are produced, are to be admitted. This is against Pico della Mirandola (*3 contra Astrologos, cc. 20 & 6*) and certain others cited by recent writers, and is for Bonaventure (*2, dist. 14, part. 2, art. 2, q. 2*), Richard (*ibidem, art. 3, q. 5, ad 5*), Mayronis (*q. 4*), Mayronis (*q. 8*), Tartaretus (*1 Meteor., q. 1, scibili secundo*), and Scotus does not object (*passu praememoraro*), and Augustine (*21 Civit., cap. 4, 5, 7*) lends support. It is proved first from the generation of metals, especially silver, which cannot be reached by the motion and light of the heavens; therefore they come from those other faculties and powers of the heavens, which are commonly called their occult influences. First, the ebb and flow of the sea, especially the ocean, is attributed to the hidden power of the Moon, which has great dominion over moist bodies. Again, the magnet is drawn toward the arctic pole and recedes from the antarctic pole; and other such things, which appear to be produced by no other cause than the powers of the celestial bodies, called occult influences. Second, sublunary things produce many wonderful effects through their own powers that escape us, just as their specific substantial forms escape us; therefore

celestial things likewise produce wonderful effects whose powers are hidden from us — just as their specific substantial forms are hidden — as the Seraphic Doctor (*loco prarecensito*) and others excellently pursue. Finally, astronomers attribute diverse effects to the stars: some cool, like Saturn; some heat, like the Sun; some moisten, like the Moon; and others desiccate. These and similar things proceed from nothing other than the diverse powers and faculties of the heavens, which, because they are unknown to us, are called occult influences. Therefore Pererius and others (*cited by Ruuius, 2 Caeli, cap. 3, q. 2*) wrongly call these the fictions of dreamers and a refuge of ignorance, since they mean nothing other than the powers and faculties of the heavens from which wonderful effects proceed. For if the powers of sublunary things produce wonderful effects that are not known to us — as is established in the case of the powers of many stones, herbs, and plants — how much more the faculties of celestial things, which, being the noblest and most excellent, doubtless possess the most excellent and most eminent powers, from which the noblest and most excellent effects proceed? Thus, since these powers of the heavens are not denied, their aforesaid occult influences, which entirely coincide with them, are assuredly not to be denied.

Objection I. Light surpasses all qualities in nobility and causality, as we experience in the effects and works of these sublunary things that are produced by light; therefore the heaven acts through light alone. The antecedent is apparent from the flowers of plants and the fruits of trees, which acknowledge light as their parent and cause; therefore the same must be asserted of the other effects and parts of other things. I respond: although light produces innumerable effects, it nonetheless does not reach the workings of metals, which are generated in the bosom of the earth, and other effects that are more excellent and distinguished than light; and therefore other and more excellent causes are to be sought, which are called occult influences.

Objection II. Motion, as was said in book VIII of the Physics (*q. 1, art. 4*), is formally a relation, which does not belong to the genus of active things; therefore the heaven does not exert influence upon these lower things through motion. I grant the antecedent; I distinguish the consequent: as an efficient principle, I grant it; as a condition *sine qua non*, I deny it. Thus light is indeed a prior and dispositive condition for producing a substance, yet it does not effectively attain it.

Objection III. It is unworthy of a philosopher to assert things that can be proved by neither sense nor reason; but that there are occult influences of the heaven can be urged by neither sense nor reason, nor indeed by authority — for Aristotle in his writings does not mention such influences. Therefore they are not to be admitted. I grant the major and deny the minor, as is clear from the third assertion set forth above. Many truths were hidden from Aristotle; for to

God alone are all things known, in accordance with Hebrews IV: *Omnia sunt nuda, aperta oculis eius* — "All things are naked and open to his eyes."

You ask whether, if the motion of the heaven were to cease, any motion could be produced in these lower things. I respond affirmatively with Scotus (2, d. 2, q. 11, §. *Dico ergo, sub A.*, & 4, d. 48, q. 2, sub I.) against Thomas (2 *Caeli, lect. 4*) and his followers. For from Augustine (11 *Conf.*): with the heaven at rest, the potter's wheel is moved. And this was established at the University of Paris; the reason is that sublunary things, apart from the motion of the heaven, have a sufficient efficient cause of their own motion. Therefore they can be moved without the motion of the heaven.

Article III: Whether the Heavens and the Stars Exert Influence upon the Human Soul

The planetary and judicial astrologers hold that the heavens and the stars so exert influence upon the human soul by a natural and necessary influence that it cannot act otherwise than according to the influence of those same heavens and stars. But Scotus (2, d. 14, q. 3, §. *Quarto dico. H.*), Bonaventure (*ibid.*, q. ult.), Richard (q. 5, art. 3), Mayronis (q. 8), Gabriel (q. un., dub. ult.), Durand (*part. secunda*, q. 2), and the other scholastic and orthodox Doctors deny that the heavens and the stars compel the human will to produce its actions and operations necessarily.

Note, from Scotus (*mox cit.*), that the heaven and the stars act upon mixed things — whether inanimate or animate — through their influences, namely by altering them through fitting or unfitting qualities; and therefore the said celestial bodies can be said to exert influence upon the human soul remotely and indirectly, inasmuch as the aforesaid qualities can harm those mixed things, which are able to dissolve the organs and the temperament of those things. When the senses are injured, the intellect and will can become disordered in their acts and works. Hence Orbellus (2, *dist. 25, q. 2*) adds: when the organ of the imagination is injured and impeded, as is evident in those with frenzy, the intellect is impeded in its function and operation.

Assertion I. Directly and immediately the heavens and stars do not exert influence upon the human soul. This is held by the Doctor (*cit.*, & q. 11 *de anima*). It is proved first: a body cannot directly act upon a spirit; for the agent is nobler than the patient, as Augustine (12 *de gen. ad lit.*, cap. 29) transmits above all others. But the heavens are corporeal, and the human soul is spiritual (3 *anima*, 19, & 2 *de gener. animalium*, cap. 3); therefore they cannot act directly upon it. Second, the human soul is incapable of material accidents; hence the agent intellect transfers material species into spiritual ones, which the patient intellect receives (3 *anima*, 18). Moreover, from Damascene (2 *fidei*, cap. 7): the celestial bodies operate naturally and necessarily; therefore if they were to exert

influence upon the human soul, they would harm its freedom, the opposite of which we shall establish in the third assertion.

Assertion II. Indirectly and remotely the heavens can exert influence upon the intellect and will of man. This is defended by the Doctor (*passu allegato*). The first part is proved from Aristotle (*1 anima, Tit. 66*): the intellect is corrupted when something within is corrupted — that is, when the sense is harmed, especially the imagination, the intellect is indirectly harmed and disordered. Second, experience establishes that when the common sense is harmed, and especially when the imagination and the phantasy are confused, the intellect is confused and disordered in its acts and works, as is evident in those with frenzy and lunatics, who are agitated more at one time than another according to the greater or lesser influence they receive from the Heaven. The first part is urged from (*1 Polit., 3*): the sensitive appetite naturally relates to the rational part as a servant to a master. But sometimes the servant indirectly at least resists the master; therefore the same must be said of the sensitive appetite, which draws the will to itself, however reluctantly and resistingly. Hence Romans VII: *Non quod volo bonum, hoc ago, sed quod odio malum, illud facio* — "For the good that I will, I do not do, but the evil which I hate, that I do" — drawn by sensuality, as Lyra adds there. Second, the human will follows the sensitive appetite, inasmuch as the sensitive appetite moves the will effectively toward pursuing that which is offered and presented to it by that sensitive appetite, if it is advantageous and good for that will; but the sensitive appetite can be disordered and harmed by a harmful celestial influence; therefore indirectly the heaven can act upon the human will.

Assertion III. The heavens and the stars do not compel the human will to act, but leave it in full mastery of its own acts and works. The Doctor (*ubi supra*) champions this. It is proved first from the Councils of Braga I (*cap. 9, 10*) and Toledo I, in which Priscillian, his followers, and his supporters — who held that the celestial bodies through their influences defile human freedom — are condemned. Augustine (*in the catalogue of heresies, heresy 70*) mentions them. The holy Fathers lend support, specifically Dionysius (*4 de Divinis nominibus*), Basil (*hom. 6 in Hexamer.*), and Augustine (*13 Trin., c. 4*). And it can be corroborated from Deuteronomy IV: *Solem, & Lunam, & omnia Astra caeli creavit Dominus Deus in ministerium cunctis gentibus, quae sub caelo sunt* — "The Lord God created the sun and the moon and all the stars of heaven for the service of all the nations that are under heaven." But what has been created for the service of man does not dominate him in governance, power, and will, otherwise it would have been created for lordship and not for service; thus, since the heavens and the stars were created to serve man, it is plainly concluded that they impose no force upon the human will. One may add the well-known saying of Ptolemy, the most distinguished astronomer, in the *Almagest*: *Sapiens dominabitur Astris* — "The wise man will dominate the stars."

Second, from Aristotle (*1 Perih., near the end*), affirming that man has a power toward opposite things — that is, a will — in whose power it is to will, or to not will, or to not-will, otherwise counsels and negotiations would be in vain.

Fourth, what essentially belongs to something is inseparable from it, otherwise its nature would be destroyed; but the human will is essentially free — for by this it is distinguished from the intellect and the other natural powers.

Therefore the human will is not compelled to act by the influence of celestial bodies. Finally, if man's will were necessitated in its acts, when he acted badly man would not be to blame and punished, but the stars would be to be accused, which compelled him necessarily to commit evils — and so all basis for merit and demerit, praise and blame, honor and reproach would be removed.

Objection I. From Aristotle (*1 de elementorum proprietatibus*): "Kingdoms have been emptied and lands depopulated on account of the conjunction of the two great stars, namely Jupiter and Saturn." Therefore the stars by their influence necessitate men to make war and perform other works. I respond that this is to be interpreted as dispositive, not coercive: they incline but do not constrain men to undertake these or those things.

Objection II. The stars exert influence upon demons, who are pure spirits; therefore, with greater reason, upon the rational soul, which is united to a body. The antecedent is urged: it is established by sure experience that demons torment those possessed more at one time than at another — as is evident in the waxing and waning of the Moon — which proceeds from no other source than the greater influence that the Moon then emits upon them, by reason of which they more greatly vex and agitate those with frenzy and lunatics. I deny the antecedent. To its proof I say that it is not the demons that receive such influence, but the said lunatics. For the demons recognize the opportune time at which these men can more easily be agitated and tormented — namely on account of the abundance of humors — and for that reason they then more greatly disturb and afflict them.

One might say: demons are attracted and repelled by certain herbs and stones and living things, which those skilled in the magic art use; therefore it is not an obstacle that they should be capable of receiving the influences of celestial bodies. I say that this is accomplished through their tacit or express agreement, in applying active to passive things. Hence Augustine (*20 contra Faustum, c. 22*) writes and adds: "Those proud and impious spirits are nourished not by the odor and smoke, as certain vain people think, but by the errors of men."

Objection III. Some possess a more excellent intellect than others, for no other reason than that those more gifted were conceived and born under nobler and more fitting stars — as those born under Mars are more suited and fitted for war, and those under Mercury for literary study. Therefore celestial bodies act upon the human soul. I grant the antecedent; I distinguish the consequent: remotely and indirectly, I grant it; proximately and directly, I deny it. The stars indeed

assist and dispose toward goodness and excellence of intellect, but their chief cause is God creating a nobler soul from which a nobler intellect flows with the other more perfect powers. This is especially clear in the school of Scotus, which teaches that a singular substance participates in grades of perfection by reason of which one soul is nobler and more excellent than another, as was established at the University of Paris.

Article IV: Whether Astrologers, from the Observation of the Stars, Can Predict Future Things with Certainty

Just as opinions clashed in the preceding article, so too they conflict in the present one. For its resolution and decision it is helpful to make a distinction between future events that are necessary and natural, on the one hand, and those that are voluntary and free on the other — in accordance with which two following assertions are established.

Assertion I. If astrologers were to know the natural powers and faculties of the stars, they could with certainty foreknow and predict their necessary and natural future effects. So Scotus (2, *dist. 14, q. 3, §. Secundo dico. F.*). It is proved first: once the cause is perfectly known, its effect is known, because the latter essentially depends upon the former. Hence one who has a demonstration through the cause can easily have a demonstration through the effect. Therefore, if astronomers understood well and perfectly the natures and powers of the stars, they could certainly and without doubt predict their future natural effects. Second, daily experience establishes that astrologers predict many future things that are to be produced and brought about by the stars — such as their conjunctions and oppositions, eclipses, fair weather, storms, rains, droughts, abundance and scarcity of things, earthquakes, the rise and perishing of those same things, war or peace among nations, and the like. Hence Sixtus V, in the Bull he issued against judicial astrologers, excepts natural effects in these words: *Futuris eventibus ex naturalibus causis necessario, vel frequenter provenientibus, quae ad divinationem non pertinent, duntaxat exceptis* — "Excepting only future events arising necessarily or frequently from natural causes, which do not pertain to divination." Scotus (*passu praememoraro*) adds that an angel certainly foreknows such natural effects because he perfectly knows their natural causes. Therefore, if astrologers well and fully knew the essences and powers of the stars, they would without doubt predict their effects with certainty. Hence the Coimbrans (1 *Caeli, c. 3, q. 9, art. 2*) are refuted who hold that the said astrologers can only probably foreknow those effects. For since astronomy is properly a science, one who is well versed in it knows the universal natural causes belonging to it and therefore possesses scientific knowledge of them and of their effects, and thus can predict such future effects necessarily and evidently — even though sometimes, on account of an improper disposition of sublunary things or some other obstacle, they may be prevented from coming about.

Assertion II. Astrologers can at least conjecturally foreknow the characters of men, especially if they know under the dominion of which planets they were conceived and born; yet not those things that depend on their free will. The assertion is twofold, and is held by the Doctor (*ubi supra*, §. *Quarto dico. H.*). The first part is proved: those who are in diverse climates acquire diverse characters, as Ptolemy (*tract. 2 quadripart.*) observes above all others, and as we clearly observe in Italians, Germans, Gauls, Spaniards, and other nations. Hence Aristotle in his Problems writes that those who are closer to the south are for the most part of more excellent intellect and keener understanding and more capable of action, on account of the proximity of the circle of signs and wandering stars to the zenith of their heads; therefore astrologers, adroitly noting this and other things, can easily predict the characters of men. Moreover, we observe that some are devoted to Mathematics, as Plato; some to History, as Pliny; some to prose and eloquence, as Cicero; and others to the poetic art, as Ovid, who himself said: *Quidquid conabar dicere, versus erat* — "Whatever I tried to say turned out to be verse."

Second, an argument for recognizing the sons of parents is drawn from the parents themselves, because the son is part of the father (*5 Eth.*, 6) and resembles him; hence a bastard is not advanced to sacred orders, because if the father was incontinent the same is presumed of his son, as is evident from the Extravagant on the sons of priests. Therefore an astrologer well versed and skilled in his art can conjecture the character of someone if he knows his origin and the influence of Jupiter, Saturn, or another star. Third, character follows the temperament of the body, as Galen transmits in his book entitled by himself: "The temperament of the human body depends not a little on the influence of the stars. Hence those born under Jupiter are lively on account of the abundance of blood that that planet infuses; those born under Saturn are melancholic on account of the dryness and coldness communicated by that planet; those under Mars are prone to war; those who are under Venus are devoted to lust." Hence Genesis VIII: the sacred text conveys the sense that "the feelings and thought of the human heart are prone to evil from adolescence." From Ecclesiastes I: *Perversi difficile corriguntur, & stultorum infinitus est numerus* — "The perverse are difficult to correct, and the number of fools is infinite."

Fourth, the will of man pursues what the sensitive appetite presents and follows, as I was saying in the preceding article, Assertion II. But the stars directly exert influence upon the sensitive appetite; therefore, with their influences known, astrologers can conjecture the characters of men. Especially because, as we read in James I: *unusquisque tentatur a concupiscentia sua abstractus, & illectus* — "each one is tempted, being drawn away and enticed by his own concupiscence." And Virgil: *Trahit sua quemque voluptas* — "each is drawn by his own pleasure."

The second part is proved first from sacred scripture, Deuteronomy XVIII: *Gentes istae Divinos audiunt, tu autem Domine Deo tua aliter institutus es* — "These

nations hearken to soothsayers, but the Lord your God has established you otherwise." Isaiah XLVI: *Non est ultra Deus, nec est similis mei, annuntians ab exordio novissimam, & ab initio, quae necdum facta sunt* — "There is no God besides me, nor is there one like me, who announces the last things from the beginning and from the beginning those things which have not yet been done." And Isaiah XLVII: *Qui contemplabantur sydera, & supputabant Etti suas quasi stipula, ignis combusit eos* — "Those who observed the stars and counted their courses, fire has consumed them like stubble." Second, planetary and judicial astrologers are condemned and anathematized by the Church, as is evident from the second part of the Decretals, cap. 16, the Council of Braga I, cap. 9, Toledo I. And finally they are excommunicated by Sixtus V in his proper Bull against those practicing judicial astrology. Hence not without reason does Bonaventure (2, d. 14, q. ult.) call the opposite opinion heretical, diabolical, repugnant to reason and sense, and self-contradictory. Third, from the Fathers: Clement (9 recognitionum), Gregory (hom. 10 in Evang.), Epiphanius, and Augustine (7 Conf., cap. 3), where, rejecting the divinations of the mathematicians, he adduces the example of the twins Esau and Jacob, who were simultaneously conceived and born from the same womb of their mother, yet were vastly different and dissimilar in life and character. And (1 de gen. ad lit., 17) he gives the example of shrubs, plants, seeds, and herbs that are planted and sown at the same time, born at the same moment, and yet are evidently diverse. He asserts the same (5 Civit., cap. 1, at the end, & cap. 2, 3, 4, idem; and lib. 83 qq., q. 45; & 1 ad Simplicianum, in fol. 1, q.). Genebrardus (1 Chron., par. II) writes and establishes the same. Fourth, the human will is by its own nature indifferent and undetermined toward opposite objects, acts, and effects, as I pursued at length in Moral Philosophy (liber 3, quaestione 1, a. 1) and intimated in the preceding article. Therefore none of the astrologers can know from knowledge of the stars what that will is going to do. For although the stars incline that will toward performing something, they do not compel or necessitate it to carry out its operations.

Objection I. The heavens are like books in which all the future effects of men and of all sublunary things appear to be read. Thus Genesis I: the stars are said to be placed in the firmament of heaven to be signs of future things, through their various and diverse aspects, as Origen interprets. Isaiah XXXIV: *Complicabuntur sicut liber caeli* — "The heavens shall be folded together like a book." And Apocalypse VI: *Caelum recessit, sicut liber involutus* — "Heaven departed like a scroll that is rolled up." Therefore, if anyone knows and perfectly understands the characters of the celestial orbs, he will certainly predict the future events and effects of things. Confirmation: Matthew II: the Magi knew that Christ the King was born through the star appearing to them. John II: *Nondum venit hora mea* — "My hour has not yet come." And chapter VII: *Nemo apprehendit eum, quia nondum venit hora eius* — "No one laid hands on him, because his hour had not yet come." If therefore Christ the Lord was born under a star and also died under one, with greater reason the same must be asserted of

other men, whose birth, acts, character, and death depend on the stars; and consequently skilled astrologers can foreknow all these things. I respond that these passages and similar ones are to be expounded of necessary and natural effects, as I showed in the first assertion. But not of contingent and free effects, as was shown in the second part of Assertion II. Or they are to be interpreted as referring to probable and conjectural knowledge, not to certain and infallible knowledge. To the confirmation I say that this was not a true star from among the fixed or wandering ones, but something meteorological compacted by God or by an Angel for leading the Magi to the manger of the Lord, and a sign constituted divinely to indicate the nativity in the flesh of the same Lord. And the Lord was born before the aforesaid star was made; therefore Christ was not born under a fateful star. To the other testimonies of scripture I say that they signify the time predefined by God the Father in which Christ the Lord had to be born, suffer, and die, in accordance with the prophecies of the Prophets.

Objection II. An appearing comet is a sign of the death of a king or of another great man, as Aristotle and the astronomers assert. Therefore astrologers from the aspects of the stars can make true predictions. I respond that a comet is for the most part a sign and cause of bad events, because, as was said in the Meteorology, since there is a great abundance of exhalations simultaneously joined and raised to the first region of the air, falling afterwards they harm many and bring death, among whom is a king or another powerful man, whose death is especially noted and named. And then tumults and wars are stirred up, whose outcome is unhappy and inauspicious, bringing death to the king. Or say with Damascene (*2 fidei, cap. 7*) that by the command of God a comet is a foreboding of the death of kings and great men, so that they may dispose and prepare themselves as quickly as possible to render an account of the good or evil things they have committed in the present life.

Objection III. Astrologers predict many true things — such as that Caesar would be emperor, Nero would kill his mother, Alexander would perish by poison, Francis would be poor and a standard-bearer of Christ, Bonaventure most learned, and the like. Therefore astrologers are not to be excluded from the foretelling of future truths. I respond that astrologers do indeed sometimes predict many true things — whether by chance, or probably, or conjecturally — but they put forth far more false things, and therefore faith is not to be placed in them, as Augustine (*1, 83 qq., q. 45*), Bonaventure, and Mayronis (*loc. cit.*) observe above all others.

Book III: On the Elements

Aristotle treats the elements learnedly and abundantly in books III and IV *On the Heavens* and in book II *On Generation*. We, however, comprehend in this single

book what is transmitted concerning their nature, number, powers, and faculties, both in common and in particular.

Question I: On the Elements in Common

Article I: What an Element Is and How Many Kinds There Are

That an element exists, no one doubts; but what it is, all are agreed upon — except Arriaga (*disp. 4 de elementis*), who offers a singular definition of an element to be refuted below. How many elements there are, however, is a not inconsiderable dispute among philosophers. For some count infinitely many elements; others, even if they posit a finite number, do not agree among themselves — some enumerating three and others four, nor are those lacking who make only one.

Note first that "element" is taken in multiple ways. First, for the principle of any thing: in this sense, letters are called the elements of syllables, and self-evident propositions are called the elements of the sciences. Augustine (*in Psal. 9*), Aristotle (*4 Top., cap. 1, & 1 Phys., in initio, & 5 Met., cap. 3, T. 4*), and Scotus (*ibi*) touch upon this usage. Second, for more universal predicates and principles of generation, as the Stagirite writes (*12 Met., cap. 4*). Third, for a simple body that is capable of contributing to the generation and composition of a mixed body, and it is of the element so taken that we speak in the present context.

Note second that Aristotle offers two definitions or descriptions of an element, of which the first is found at (*5 Met., cap. 3, T. 4*): "An element is said to be that from which something is primarily composed, being present within it, indivisible in species into another species." Its explanation is read in the Doctor (*in com. loci pract.*), which the Doctor himself does not think to be applicable to the four elements but to prime matter. The second is transmitted at (*3 Caeli, T. 31, sum. 5*): "An element is that into which other bodies are resolved, which is present in them either in potency or in act." This is the proper and exact definition of an element and is therefore to be retained. But an element can be defined more clearly as a simple body into which other bodies are resolved. It is called a body so as to differ from matter and the rest that do not possess a corporeal character. Simple is added on account of a mixed body. It is further said, into which other bodies are resolved, so as to distinguish it from the heaven, which, although it is a simple body, is not something into which mixed bodies are resolved, since in fact it is incorruptible and irreducible.

Assertion I. An element is aptly defined as a simple body into which other bodies are resolved. Neither the last definition of Aristotle nor Scotus (*5 Met., cit., & 2, d. 15, q. un., & in Rep. ibid.*) departs from or conflicts with this. It is urged: it consists of genus and differentia. For its genus is body, and the rest are its differentia. It contains nothing deficient or superfluous and applies to the element adequately; therefore the foregoing definition is sound and fitting.

Hence Arriaga (*loc. alleg.*) is refuted, who defines an element as something that consists of only one of the primary qualities. For a substance, such as an element, does not participate in an accidental differentia, such as a primary quality, which Arriaga posits as its constitutive and distinguishing differentia. Moreover, below we shall show that the primary qualities are not the essential differentiae of the elements, and that one element possesses two qualities, and that there are four primary qualities corresponding to the four elements; therefore Arriaga is mistaken in seeking another definition of an element that departs from the common one.

Assertion II. There are only four elements: earth, water, air, and fire. So Aristotle (*locis praememoratis*), Scotus (*ubi supra* § 2, d. 14, q. 3), Augustine (*de gen. ad lit.*, cap. 2, § 8 *Civit.*, cap. 5, § 22 *eiusdem operis*, cap. 9), Basil (*hom. 2 de Mundi opificio*), Damascene (*2 fidei, capite 7*), and other Fathers and scholastic Doctors give their assent. It is proved first: there are four primary qualities residing in four distinct bodies; therefore there are four primary and simple bodies in which those qualities inhere as passions in their subjects, commonly called the four elements. The antecedent is clear: heat, cold, moisture, and dryness are called and are the four primary qualities; and indeed heat is attributed to fire, moisture to air, cold to water, and dryness to earth. The consequent holds, since from proper accidents we arrive at knowledge of substance; and therefore from the four primary qualities the quaternary number of the elements is rightly manifested. Second, there are four distinct places in which those four said simple bodies are located, since, from what was said in book VI of the Physics (*q. 3, art. 1*), there is no vacuum in the nature of things. Therefore there are the four aforesaid elements. The antecedent is shown: there are two upper places in which fire and air dwell; and there are two lower places in which water and earth remain. Furthermore, four temperaments of living things are found: the melancholic, in which earth dominates; the phlegmatic, in which water prevails; the sanguine, in which air reigns; and the choleric, in which fire burns. Therefore the four elements named by the royal Psalmist (*Psal. 148*) and by Daniel III are to be admitted.

Objection I against the first assertion. Other bodies are not composed of elements, nor are the elements themselves composed of matter and form any less than those other bodies; therefore both foregoing definitions of an element are inept. I respond that elements are prerequisite for the composition of mixed things as their efficient principles, not as their formal principles. For elements are not in mixed things formally but only virtually. The elements themselves are said to be simple, even though they are constituted of matter and form, because for the production of those very elements no prior things are required, as is the case in the generation of mixed things — as will become plain in the question on mixture and the mixed body.

One might say: in Aristotle's first definition an element is posited as existing within what it composes; and in the second the element is also said to exist in the mixed thing in act or in potency. Therefore the foregoing response carries no weight. I say that the aforesaid inexistence of the element in the mixed thing can be said to be not formal but virtual and potential. Or say with Scotus that it is not a definition of an element in the proper sense but of prime matter as Scotus interprets there. As to the other point that is added there, he speaks problematically and does not decide the dispute whether the element is in the mixed thing in act or in potency, but does so later in the work on generation and corruption.

Objection II against the second assertion. Moses, in Genesis, weaving the series of all the things created by God, and especially the elements, makes no mention of fire; therefore there are not four elements. I respond that an argument drawn from negative authority does not conclude. Hence Bonaventure (*2, d. 14, art. 1, q. 2*) notes that the divine Chronicler likewise makes no mention of air, which is not denied to be one of the elements. The reason why he did not record fire is offered by Lyra: because he was speaking to an unlearned people who could not grasp spiritual things and what is above us. Likewise, he makes no mention of the creation of the Angels, whom Augustine notes (*11 Confes., cap. 22*) to have been created by God. And Augustine writes (*1 de gen. ad lit., cap. 17, & 2 eiusdem operis, cap. 18*) that by the creation of heaven the Angels are to be understood, who are spiritual creatures; and Genebrardus (*1 Chron., pag. 2*) records this in writing. Add that Damascene (*2 fidei, cap. 7*) says that by the light created on the first day fire is to be understood, because fire is nothing other than light.

Article II: Whether the Forms of the Elements Are the Primary Qualities

Galen (*1 de usu partium, & 1 de elementis*), Philoponus (*2 de generat., com. 7*), and Alexander (*12 Met., com. 12*) hold that the essential forms of the elements are the primary qualities. The opposing opinion is intimated by Aristotle (*2 de general., T. 16, & 54*) and is defended by the Parisians (*ibid.*), Richard (*2, d. 14, art. 2, q. 1 & 2*), Aurora (*d. 15, art. 1*), and others, who commonly deny that the forms of the elements are the primary qualities.

Assertion I. The elements are not constituted in their substantial elemental being through the primary qualities. This is presupposed by the Doctor (*2, d. 15, q. un., §. dico ergo. A.*), where he maintains that the substantial forms of the elements do not remain in the mixed thing in act and formally, and that the mixed thing itself is constituted through its own proper form distinct from the forms of the elements. For that reason Aristotle (*2 de gener., loc. proxime cit.*) inveighs against the ancient philosophers because they treated of qualities but not of the substantial forms of the elements. Moreover, the same philosopher (*lib. de sensu, & sensili, cap. de sapore*) adds: "Fire heats as hot, but it does not ignite as hot." Here Aristotle clearly shows that the form of fire is not heat; otherwise

fire would ignite as hot, which he openly rejects. Thus according to Aristotle, warming indeed proceeds from the heat of fire as its instrument, but ignition proceeds from the form of fire, through which fire is essentially constituted in its being as fire. Augustine intimates this same point (*in expof. Psal. 147*): "What is hot makes hot by heat, and what is cold makes cold by cold, and what is swift is made swift by swiftness." And (*lib. de natura, & gratia contra Pelag.*): "Heat and cold are qualities of substances, and substance is contrary to substance through its qualities." Moreover, no composite substance is constituted in the being of substance through an accidental form, otherwise it would not be a being through itself but through accident, as I showed in book II of the Physics (*q. 6, art. 1*). But if the primary qualities were the forms of the elements, the elements themselves, which are substantial composites, would be constituted in the being of substance through accidental forms, such as the primary qualities, which are accidents placed in the predicament of quality. No one denies that the elements are substantial composites, as is clear from the definition of an element adduced in the preceding article. Therefore the elemental forms are not the primary qualities. Again, the passion of a thing is not its essential form, since a passion presupposes the thing already constituted through its essential form; but the primary qualities appear to be passions of the elements. From fire flows heat, or rather the power of heating, as Bonetus (*1 Met., §. Iuxta*) notes. From water coldness, or the faculty of cooling; from air moisture, or the power of moistening; and from earth dryness, or the power of desiccating. Furthermore, what can be separated from something, while that thing remains whole and unharmed, is not its substantial form, because with the form of a thing separated, the thing itself constituted through such form is destroyed; but the elements can exist without the primary qualities; therefore the primary qualities are not the forms of the elements. The major is known. The minor is shown: the fire in the Babylonian furnace did not heat or burn the three young men cast into it (*Dan. 3*). At that time, therefore, there was fire without heat, yet it did not exist without its substantial form; therefore neither is heat the form of the element fire, nor are the other qualities to be considered as forms of the remaining elements.

Assertion II. Each element possesses its own proper substantial form. This is derived from the Doctor (*ubi supra*). It is proved first: what is constituted of matter and form possesses its own proper substantial form, as is clear from what was said in the Physics (*passu proxime cit.*). But each element is constituted of matter and form, because an element is a body, from the assertions of the preceding article. Therefore each element possesses its own proper substantial form. Second, what is the proximate and immediate subject of material accidents enjoys its own proper substantial form distinct from others; but each element is the proximate and immediate subject of material accidents; therefore each element is endowed with its own proper substantial form. The major was

shown (*1, 5 Phys., q. 1, art. 4*). The minor is clear, since each element is a body constituted of matter and form.

Objection I. Aristotle (*2 de gener., 7*) says in explicit words that the principles and constitutive forms of the elements are the primary qualities. Therefore in Aristotle's school the primary qualities are the forms of the elements. I respond that those words are uttered by the philosopher in the opinion of the ancient philosophers, whom he there sharply censures, as is plain from the same Stagirite (*T. 54*). Or, if you prefer, say with the text that it is to be taken circumlocutively — using the passions of the elements in place of their essential forms, as philosophers sometimes do, especially when the substantial forms are not known to us — as is evident at (*5 Met., cap. de quanto*), where divisibility is taken for the essence of quantity, which is in reality its passion.

One might say: from (*2 de partibus animalium, c. 1*), qualities and powers of elements are the matter of a mixed thing, but the matter of a mixed thing is substance; therefore the said qualities are also substances. We must meet this by saying that those qualities are called the matter of the mixed thing insofar as they are material dispositions for making the mixed thing.

You will press: living things are nourished by things cold, hot, moist, and dry (*2 anima, 28*); but the nutriment of living things is substance; therefore the qualities of the elements also are. It is sufficient to say that living things are nourished by cold, hot, moist, and dry things — that is, by substances affected by heat, cold, moisture, and dryness — as the same philosopher signifies (*3 anima, 10*).

Objection II. From the substantial form, which is an active principle, some operation ought to proceed; but from the form of fire no operation other than heating proceeds; therefore heat and not another form constitutes fire in its substantial elemental being. I grant the major and deny the minor. For from the form of fire there proceeds ignition, by which fire ignites and produces fire, just as from heat there emerges warming, by which fire heats.

One might say: the verb "to ignite" and the noun "ignition" are not found in approved authors but are invented to elude the force of the aforesaid argument. I say they are found in Augustine (*l. 3 contra litteras Petiliani Donatistae, c. 4*). And the same Doctor observes in (*exp. psal. 104*) where the Vulgate has "the word of the Lord inflamed him," other editions read "ignited him." And Damascene (*4 fidei, c. 14*) mentions both terms. And Aristotle (*1 Meteor., cap. 4*).

You ask first whether the elements differ from one another in species. I respond affirmatively, which their passions, operations, effects, and diverse locations clearly indicate, which I have often insisted point to distinct specific natures.

You ask second whether the elements are nobler and more excellent than mixed things. I respond negatively, with Aristotle (*1 de gener., 84*) and Scotus (*1, d. 3, q. 7*,

§. *Ad argumenta*, P., & 2, d. 15, q. un., §. *Dico ergo C.*) The reason is that the form of a mixed thing is more actual, superior, and posterior in order. For those things that are posterior in generation are prior in perfection — in the same order, as Scotus rightly explains (4, d. 11, q. 3, ante §. *Ad rationes ergo AA.*).

Article III: Whether the Elements Are Incapable of Generation and Corruption

Aristotle (2 *de gener.*, 51) and Scotus (1, d. 5, q. 5, §. *sed pars, sub B. & C.*) transmit that the elements are incapable of generation and corruption. How this is to be understood will become plain from what we shall add below.

Note that something can be said to be incapable of generation and corruption in three ways. First, because it is without matter, as an angel is. Second, because it has no contrary capable of overcoming it by force, as the heaven. Third, because it has an equal power in resisting the active power of its contrary — as the elements. Again, for the present, something can be said capable of generation and corruption in two ways. In one way, with respect to part — that is, because some part of it is generated or corrupted. In another way, with respect to the whole — that is, the whole persists always, even if some part of it is lost in one place, yet in another place it is repaired and restored; in which way the whole is said to always endure.

Assertion I. The elements with respect to their parts are capable of generation and corruption. The Doctor champions this (2, d. 14, q. 3, §. *Dico ad q., sub A., & Quol. 11, ubi Gadius, fol. 19, pag. 2, colum. 1 & 3, & 3, d. 16, q. 2, §. Rationes iste, ante A.*). It is proved first from Aristotle (3 *Caeli*, 52, & 2 *de gener.*, 6), where he treats at length of generation and corruption with respect to parts. Second, when the sun approaches above the zenith of some region, the higher elements — namely fire and air — increase and grow, while the lower — namely water and earth — diminish, as is verified every year by experience; and conversely, when the sun recedes from the zenith of some region, the lower elements increase and the higher diminish. But increase and decrease do not occur without generation and corruption of certain parts of those very elements; therefore the elements according to their parts are generated and corrupted. Third, contrary agents strive with their powers to assimilate opposing things to themselves; but they cannot act upon contraries unless some generation and corruption of parts occurs, as is established in the case of fire, which is extinguished by water, and of water which is absorbed by fire. Therefore the elements are to be considered capable of generation and corruption with respect to their parts.

Assertion II. The elements with respect to themselves as wholes are incapable of generation and corruption. This is defended by the Doctor in the first passage cited above and in the third recently mentioned. It is proved first from Aristotle (2 *de gener.*, 51), who affirms that the elements are eternal and everlasting, just as the world is; but the world is incapable of generation and corruption with

respect to the whole. Therefore the same must be asserted of the elements. Another passage of the philosopher lends support (*1 Meteor.*, c. 3), where he holds it to be an absurdity that one element so surpasses another by its power as to corrupt and destroy it. Therefore according to Aristotle the elements with respect to themselves as wholes are incapable of generation and corruption. Sacred scripture gives support, Ecclesiastes I: *Terra autem in aeternum stat* — "But the earth endures forever"; therefore if the earth is everlasting, so too are the other elements. The same author intimates this in the same work chapter III: *Didici, quod omnia opera tua perseverent in aeternum* — "I learned that all your works persist forever." Lyra interprets this passage as referring to the principal works, which are the celestial and elementary bodies. Second, things that are equal in acting and resisting, and that are tempered to an equilibrium in their powers, are incapable of generation and corruption, because corruption proceeds from the unequal power and faculty of an agent surpassing the potency of the patient; but the elements are mutually equal and tempered in their powers, as the experience of so many years establishes, during which the elements themselves have been preserved uncorrupted with respect to themselves as wholes. Finally, where no created agent is found stronger and more powerful than another, there is likewise no corruption and dissolution of the other, as is self-evident; but in the nature of things there is found no created agent stronger and more powerful than the elements themselves, with the other created things assisting and preserving them; therefore the elements with respect to themselves as wholes are incapable of generation and corruption.

Objection I. What is capable of generation and corruption with respect to its parts is also capable of generation and corruption with respect to the whole, because when the parts are corrupted the whole is also corrupted, just as when the parts are generated the whole is generated; but in the first assertion it was established that the elements are capable of generation and corruption with respect to their parts; therefore also with respect to themselves as wholes. I respond that the major holds for a whole all of whose parts are lost and destroyed, not for a whole of which some parts are corrupted while others are generated. In our case, if some parts of the elements are lost in one place, some other parts are acquired and restored and repaired in another place.

Objection II. One element can so increase that it is capable of destroying another by its power; therefore the elements with respect to themselves as wholes are corruptible. The antecedent is urged: for if fire, which is more active than the rest, were always increasing while opposed to combustible material, it would at length overcome air by its force and be able to destroy it. I respond: to the extent that one element grows in one place, it diminishes to the same extent in another place. Therefore I deny the consequent of the antecedent — namely that one element can so increase as to be capable of diminishing and overturning another, as will be shown more fully below.

Objection III. The elements are constituted of matter and form; therefore they are corruptible. The antecedent is acknowledged from the definition of an element. The consequent holds: for what is composed of matter and form is liable to corruption, since matter, with the privation annexed to it, is the root and origin of corruption (*1 Phys.*, 80). I grant the antecedent; I distinguish the consequent: proximately, I deny it; remotely, I grant it. Or say that this is true of what is possible, but not in fact — just as was said of the heaven (*l. 2, q. 1, art. 6*).

Article IV: Which Element Is the Nobler

Assertion. Fire surpasses the other elements in nobility; air follows; then water; and last earth. This is derived from Scotus (*4, d. 47, q. 2, §. Ad argumentum. C.*). It is the express opinion of Augustine (*1 de spiritu, & anima, c. 15*), who says: "Fire and air are the pre-eminent bodies." And (*2 de gen. ad lit., c. 3*): "Fire is above air." And (*8 civit., c. 14*): "Just as the dignity of their places is diverse, so also that of their natures." It is urged first: what participates in a nobler property and a more excellent principle of acting is nobler and more excellent among the elements — since a more excellent passion and power of acting indicates a nobler and more excellent nature, since the latter gives rise to the former; but fire is endowed with a more excellent power, since it is maximally active. Hence Aristotle (*2 anima, T. 50*) adds that through the intervention of heat all things live and are preserved. But heat belongs most of all to fire; therefore fire is the noblest of the elements. Second, to what is more excellent and eminent, a more excellent and eminent place is to be assigned. For nature is so ordered and disposed as to give to each what is its own; but fire is given the highest place, which is above the air in the concavity of the orb of the Moon. Hence the Stagirite (*5 Top., c. 1*) writes: "Fire is the noblest body, having the highest place." And Ovid sings: *Ignea convexi vis, & sine pondere caeli, Emicuit, summaque locum sibi legit in arce* — "The fiery force of the vaulted heaven, without weight, flashed forth and chose for itself its place in the highest citadel."

Objection I. Earth is at rest in its center; but fire and the other elements are always moved and agitated — as comets, which are revolved by its motion, especially indicate to us in the case of fire. Therefore earth in nobility is to be placed before the other elements. Confirmation: earth provides food for all living things; therefore it is to be placed before the other elements. I respond that the nobility and excellence of any thing is not to be derived from its rest or motion, but from its nature, passion, and power. For it is accidental that something be moved or at rest. All the more so because no one doubts that the heavens are more excellent than earth, yet they are perpetually revolved. To the confirmation I grant that earth is more useful to living things, but not nobler. For merchandise is more useful than the sciences, but not nobler than them.

Objection II. The more excellent and distinguished temperament of living things is the sanguine, which consists of heat and moisture; but heat and moisture befit air more than the other elements; therefore air is to be preferred

to fire. I respond that the excellence and eminence of the elements are not to be derived from the nobility and excellence of a temperament, but from the nobler nature, power, and location of the elements themselves, as I have insisted above.

One might say: if location contributes to the nobility of an element, birds that dwell in air and fish that live in water would be superior to men who inhabit the earth. I respond: from location only a qualified nobility is inferred, not an absolute one, as Augustine (*8 Civit.*, c. 15) expounds it. But man absolutely surpasses all living things in nobility by reason of human nature and especially by reason of the rational soul, and because on earth he is as on a way and tends toward his homeland, which is heaven, the dwelling of the Blessed. Hence Paul (*Hebr. 13*) adds: *Non habemus hic civitatem permanentem, sed futuram inquirimus* — "We have no abiding city here, but we seek the one to come." I conclude with Augustine (*in exp. Psalmi noni*): "Since earth is as it were the final terminus, it is the last element in which men most orderly labor." Pliny (*2 Hist.*, c. 66) writes the same.

Article V: Whether the Elements Are Equal to One Another

The question can be in four parts. First, whether the elements are equal in the quantity of their mass — that is, in magnitude and extension. Second, whether they are equal in density and rarity. Third, whether they are equal in active and passive powers. Fourth, whether they participate in equal matter. All four things are to be established and decided through the following assertions.

Assertion I. The elements are unequal in magnitude and extension. This is indicated by the Doctor (*in utroque opere*, 2, d. 14, q. 3, §. *Ad q. dico. A.*). It is proved first from Aristotle (*2 de gener.*, 37): the same proportion holds of the entire element with respect to quantity as of its parts; but if some part of earth were resolved into a part of water, that part of water would be ten times larger. Likewise, if a part of air were resolved into a part of fire, that part of fire would be ten times larger; and therefore some calculate that fire exceeds earth a thousandfold. Therefore the higher elements surpass the lower ones in magnitude. Second, the container is larger than what is contained, as no one denies; but the higher elements contain the lower: fire contains air, air contains water, and water contains earth. Moreover, what is rare is more extended than what is dense and occupies a greater place, as is plain to everyone; but the higher elements are rarer than the lower, as is evident in earth and water, which are very dense and thick. The mathematicians, who measure all the elements, testify that fire surpasses air in magnitude, likewise air water, and water earth. Therefore the elements with respect to magnitude and extension are not equal to one another.

Assertion II. The elements are unequal in density and rarity. This is intimated by the Doctor (*ubi supra*, § 4, d. 47, q. 2, *near the end*). It is urged first: those things that are more material and thick are more dense, as is evident in liquids,

especially oil; but the lower elements are more material and thick than the higher ones. Hence earth is compacted and water freezes, but not so air and fire. Second, things that are more pure and unmixed are more rare, because density appears to arise from the joining together of many things that are mixed with one another; hence pure water cannot freeze, especially the sea, because in it there are not the conditions that make for freezing as in lakes and ponds; but air and fire are immune from compaction and freezing; therefore they are rarer and purer, as Mayronis (2, d. 14, q. 5) also concludes.

Assertion III. The elements are equal to one another in active and passive powers, and in matter. The assertion is twofold, which the Doctor shows (4, d. 49, q. 13, §. *Respondeo, sub B.*). The first part is proved: the elements are proportioned and tempered; therefore they are equal in active and passive powers. The antecedent is established from what was said above in article III of this question. The consequent is derived: for if one element were unequal in power — either surpassing another or being surpassed by it — the one would be corrupted by the other and dissolved, and consequently in fact the elements would be corruptible, which was rejected above. Hence there is as much heat in fire as there is cold in water, and as much moisture in air as there is dryness in earth, as Joannes de Magistris (1 *Meteor.*, q. 3) well pursues. The second part is proved, having an equal subject but, as I showed in the first part of this assertion, equal powers; therefore there exists equal matter of the elements. And so, if all the matter of any fire were gathered into one, and likewise if all the matter of any water were gathered into one place, the matter of water would be equal to the matter of fire. And the same must be affirmed of the matter of air and earth. Therefore the elements are wonderfully ordered and disposed with respect to matter, powers, and virtues.

Objection I. Sailors dropping a lead weight find the depth of the ocean to be only three miles; and geometers measuring the earth say its depth is six hundred and eighty-eight miles; therefore the higher elements do not exceed the lower ones in magnitude and extension. I respond that the argument does not conclude concerning water gathered all together into one, but concerning water dispersed and divided into what is above the earth and beneath the earth, in so many seas, rivers, ponds, lakes, springs, wells, and the like — so that it is no wonder if the ocean does not possess as great a depth as the earth, which is for the most part gathered together into one.

Objection II. If fire were larger than the other elements, since a greater power appears to exist in a larger body, it would already have devoured the other elements and laid everything waste — which is patently false; therefore fire does not surpass the other elements in magnitude. I respond that the power of fire is tempered and held in check by the moisture of the air and by the stars and heavens which are virtually cold and moist, as well as by the moisture and coldness of water, whose vapors rise to the second and sometimes to the highest

region of air. The response of Scotus (4, d. 49, q. 13, §. *Respondeo, sub B.*) seems to come to the same point, saying that this proceeds from the proportion or equalization of the others in resisting its power in acting — at least with the concurrence and cooperation of the Heaven. I add that its power is not so strong and vehement on account of its rarity in its own sphere and center.

Article VI: Whether the Elements Are Round

The principal bodies of the universe and its more distinguished parts are spherical in shape — this is Mauritius (*in margine Mayr.*, 2, d. 14, *ad finem*, q. 5) and the common opinion of philosophers.

Assertion. The elements are endowed with a round figure. This is derived from Scotus (2, d. 14, q. 3, & d. 15, q. un.) and is expressly defended by Mayronis (*ibidem*, q. 5) and other Scotists, preceded by Pliny (*lib. 2 hist. natur.*, cap. 2), Plutarch (*1 de placitis*), and Ptolemy (*in Almegis*). It is proved first: the entire world is spherical; therefore its principal parts are round, among which the elements are found.

The antecedent is sung by Manilius in the following verses: *Haec est naturae facies, sic Mundum & ipse, Inconnexo volans, teretes facit esse figuras. Stellarum, solisque orbem, lunaeque rotundum Aspicimus tumidumque quaerentes corpore lumen* — "This is the face of nature; thus flying in continuous course, nature itself makes all to have smooth round shapes. We behold the sphere of the stars, the disk of the sun, the rounded moon, and swollen bodies seeking light." Second, the celestial bodies are distinguished by a round figure, for which reason they are moved circularly; therefore the elements are also endowed with the said figure. The consequent holds: the lower orbs are conformed to the higher orbs; but the higher orbs are spherical; therefore the lower are too, as Aristotle (*2 Caeli*, cap. 4) asserts and Augustine (*2 de gen. ad lit.*, c. 19) intimates, expounding that passage of Psalm CV: *Qui extendit Caelum, sicut pellem* — "Who stretches out the heaven like a skin." Third, it is urged individually: and indeed that earth is round, Aristotle (*2 Caeli*, from T. 104 to the end of that book) attends to fully and properly — both because all parts of the earth recede equally from the circumference of the Heaven and approach its center; and also because heavy things falling from any part of the heaven are moved toward the earth at equal angles; therefore it is a clear sign that the earth is spherical. Again, the shadow follows the shape of the body from which it proceeds; but the shadow of the earth that is seen in a lunar eclipse, on account of the interposition of the earth between the sun and the moon, is spherical; therefore the earth is also round. Moreover, those who inhabit the eastern region see and are illuminated by the sun sooner than those who dwell on the western shore — which assuredly proceeds from no other source than the roundness of the earth, as Clavius and others rightly observe in their commentaries on the Sphere. That water is spherical is shown by its small drops existing above the leaves of plants, which appear round; and in the mouth of a cup water swells on account of its roundness. Moreover, those who sail the sea from afar heading toward the shore first see the peaks of mountains before

the valleys and plains — which plainly proceeds from the roundness of the earth. That air too is round is readily shown: air contains water, which, since it is round from what was just asserted, it follows that air too is round. Moreover, air is moved in a circular manner, as is established from comets, which, existing in it, are moved in a circular manner by its motion and that of the heaven. Finally, fire is spherical: both from the side of the Moon, which together with its orb is spherical; and also from the side of air, which from what has just been said is circular. It must therefore be concluded that all and each of the elements individually are spherical and circular.

Objection I. What is moved in a circular manner participates in a round figure, as Aristotle (*1 Caeli, quinta*) writes; but the elements are moved by rectilinear motion, as is evident in earth, which tends downward, and in fire, which is borne upward; therefore the elements do not obtain a round figure. I grant the major; I distinguish the minor: outside their proper sphere, I grant it; in their proper sphere, I deny it. For we observe with the eye that ignited comets are moved circularly, existing in the highest region of the air and near fire.

Objection II. When the sun rises, it is not seen by us to move in a circular manner; but if the earth were round it would be seen by us to rise circularly. Rather it appears to be born with a plane figure and to be moved by a straight motion; therefore the earth is not spherical. I respond to the major: our sense can barely perceive or cannot at all perceive circularity in the motion of the sun around the earth. The reason is that in a great circle and a very wide circuit the curvature and sphericity of a small and slender part is not discerned.

Objection III. In the earth are found mountains, valleys, plains, springs, and rivers, of which some flow from east to west and some from west to east; but if the earth were circular, neither rivers would flow in this way nor would there be mountain peaks and the like; therefore the earth is not to be considered round. Granting the major, to the minor I say that the earth is not round like a mathematical globe, as the argument proves, but round after a fashion and imperfectly, as we contend.

You ask first why the world and its principal parts are distinguished by a spherical figure. Mayronis (*nuper memoratus*) responds that this was done for four reasons: first because the round figure is the simplest; second because it is the most capacious; third because it is the most equal; and fourth because it is the most integral and perfect.

You ask second whether the elements are pure in their spheres. Aristotle (*1 Meteor., c. 3*) responds that something of pure fire is found in its sphere. The reason is adduced by Scotus (*4, d. 47, ad finem, q. 2*): fire is maximally active; hence if anything impure or foreign is carried there, it immediately consumes it or casts it out from itself. Thus fire is purer than any other element, as Augustine (*2 de gen. ad lit., c. 3*) intimates. One may add that something of pure air exists in

the highest region of the air, something of pure water in the depths of the sea, and something of pure earth in its innermost recesses, as the Parisians (*2 de gener., fol. 135*) indicate. Absolutely speaking, however, these three elements — earth, water, and air — are impure and mixed, as is evident from the vapors and exhalations that rise into the air, from the saltiness and sweetness of water, and from the rottenness and mire of earth; and other such things, which render the aforesaid elements very impure and mixed.

Question II: On the Transmutation of the Elements

Article I: Whether the Elements Are Mutually Transmutable

The difficulty is not about the accidental but the substantial transmutation of the elements — not indeed with respect to the whole, since from what was asserted in the preceding question, article III, they are incapable of generation and corruption, but with respect to their parts. For since, as was said there, the elements are capable of generation and corruption with respect to their parts, it is likewise derived that they are partially transmutable. The greater doubt is whether the elements are immediately or mediately convertible into one another. For three conflicting opinions are reported in this matter: the first is that of those mentioned by Marsilius (*2 de gener., q. 9*) and Toletus (*ibidem, q. 5*), who hold that elements are first converted into certain mixed things — such as vapor or exhalation — before they are transmuted into one another. The second is that of Themistius (*5 Phys., Tit. 9*) and Ruuius (*2 de gener., cap. 6, q. 1*), who opine that one symbolic element can indeed be immediately converted into another symbolic element, but not into a dissymbolic one. The third is defended by Tartaretus (*2 de gener., q. 2*), Joannes de Magistris, the Parisians (*ibidem*), and many others who write and teach that all and each of the elements are immediately mutually transmutable.

Note first that conversion or transmutation is twofold: one immediate, the other mediate. The former is when one is converted into another without the intervention of a third — as man into a corpse; the latter is when one is not transmuted into another unless something intervenes — as food is converted into the substance of the living being nourished, by means of chyle and blood.

Note second that the elements mutually act and are acted upon through their qualities, which do not reach their substances since they are accidents, but dispose them proximately toward their production and generation. Among the primary qualities, heat holds the chief place; it is followed by cold; then moisture; and lastly dryness in acting. In resisting, however, the order is inverted: dryness comes first, then moisture, then cold, and heat occupies the last place — of all which things more will be said below in question III.

Assertion I. The elements are mutually transmuted. This is transmitted by Aristotle (*2 de gener., T. 7, 24, & 1 Met., 2, 4*) and Scotus (*ibi, & 2, d. 14, q. 3, §. Dico*

ad q., sub A.). It is proved first: contraries are mutually transmuted because they conflict among themselves; and what gains victory over another converts it into itself — just as an animated living being converts nourishment into itself. But the elements are mutually contrary and wage continuous war; and sometimes one overcomes another — in summer fire and air overcome water and earth, and conversely earth and water in winter overcome air and fire; therefore the elements are mutually transmuted. Second, from (*1 de gener., cap. 4, Tit. 18*): the generation of one is the corruption of another, and conversely; but certain elements are generated and others corrupted with respect to parts — namely at the times just mentioned; therefore there is perpetual and perennial transmutation among them. Third, we observe with the eye that if fire is cast into water and is of lesser power, it is extinguished by that water; but conversely if fire possesses a greater power, it absorbs water. And the same must be asserted of the other elements; therefore a continuous and mutual transmutation exists among the elements.

Assertion II. Both symbolic and dissymbolic elements are immediately converted into one another. This is derived from the Doctor (*ubi supra, § 2, d. 3, q. 4, §. Contra. Sub F.*) and appears to be the explicit view of Aristotle (*locis pract.*). For he proves there the transmutation of all the elements precisely because those elements are contraries, and they are immediate contraries — as water and fire, earth and air; therefore according to Aristotle the elements are transmuted into one another immediately. Moreover, all the elements possess the power of this kind of immediate transmutation; therefore an immediate transmutation of the elements is not to be denied. The antecedent is readily apparent, since one element participates in the power by which it can immediately convert another element into itself — as water can immediately extinguish fire, and conversely fire can absorb water. Nor does it help to say with Ponce (*disp. 56, q. 5, concl. 1*) that the elements do not have sufficient powers and capacities for converting themselves immediately into one another. For nature does not fail in what is necessary; since the conversion of the elements is necessary for the consistency of the universe and the perennial generation of sublunary things, they must possess fitting and sufficient faculties for such mutual immediate transmutation. Indeed, if the elements through their prior qualities can immediately reach the production of a mixed thing — as Ponce admits — with greater right they can immediately generate an element, since this is more ignoble and inferior than that. What can do the greater can certainly also do the less. All the more so, given the proper dispositions present through their qualities, nothing prevents one from being immediately converted into another — as if the heat of fire surpasses the cold of water and its dryness the moisture of the latter, with no medium interposed the transmutation of water into fire will occur. Again, if a drop of water is cast into an enormous and burning furnace, fire immediately devours it and converts it

into itself; therefore the said mutual and immediate transmutation of the elements is to be admitted.

One might say with Ponce (*cit.*), denying the antecedent. For he thinks that a small drop of water cast into a large fire is first converted into smoke or another mixed thing. On the contrary: such a drop of water is immediately absorbed by the fire — as is indicated by the crackling sound it emits, and no smoke or anything else proceeds, since it is immediately destroyed and perishes, as is seen with the eye; therefore nothing mixed is produced. Furthermore, the qualities of the elements immediately act upon one another — as heat upon cold, moisture upon dryness; therefore the substances of the elements too, given the proper dispositions, immediately act and are mutually converted.

Objection I. An extreme cannot pass to an extreme without first passing through the mean (*5 Phys.*, 22). But fire and water are extreme elements, dissymbolic and maximally contrary, between which air mediates; and likewise air and earth are extremes between which water is interposed; therefore fire cannot be converted into water unless it is first converted into air, and likewise air cannot be transmuted into earth unless it is first transmuted into water, and consequently an immediate transmutation of the elements, at least of the dissymbolic ones, cannot be effected. I distinguish the major: if the passage through the mean is necessary, as in local motion and in the formation of man from what was noted in the first note, I grant it; but if it is not necessary, as in our case, I deny it — which the proofs of the second assertion set forth above effectively demonstrate.

Objection II. If water were immediately to convert fire into itself, fire would first have to receive the coldness of water into itself, because it is necessary that fire be disposed through it for the introduction of the form of water; but fire cannot receive the coldness of water — both because it is contrary and repugnant to it, and also because Aristotle (*2 de partibus animalium*, c. 2) expressly denies it. Therefore one element cannot be immediately converted into another. I grant the major; I distinguish the minor: fire cannot receive the coldness of water into itself as proper and connatural to it, I grant; as violent and repugnant to it, I deny — just as water receives heat, which is contrary to it; so too fire receives coldness, which is opposed to and resists it. Thus Aristotle is expounded.

Objection III. Fire is the lightest and earth the heaviest; therefore fire cannot be generated from earth. The antecedent is evident; the consequent is shown: since lightness and rarity would have to be received in earth, which is incapable of them, since it is heavy and dense. I grant the antecedent and deny the consequent; to its proof I say that its heaviness is remitted by the rarity of fire overcoming it, in such a way and disposition suitable and fitting that it can receive the form of fire — as Scotus (*1, d. 17, q. 3, §. Hic dicitur versu. Tertio sic*) notes in a similar case.

Article II: Whether Symbolic Elements Are More Easily Transmuted Into One Another Than Dissymbolic Ones

Various opinions and conflicting ones exist, as may be seen in Toletus (*2 de gener.*, q. 9) and Ruuius (*ibid.*, c. 6, q. 2). We, however, follow the common opinion which is affirmative, and which was first embraced by Joannes de Magistris (*eo in loco*, q. 2), Tartaretus (*scibili primo*), and the Parisians (q. 1, fol. 134).

Note that those elements are called symbolic that agree in some quality — as fire and air, which both participate in heat; and likewise water and earth, which both obtain cold. Dissymbolic elements, however, are those called by that name that have no quality in common — as fire and water. For fire is hot and dry; but water is cold and moist. Likewise air and earth are dissymbolic, since air is hot and moist, but earth is dry and cold. The ease or difficulty of mutual transmutation of the elements can be derived from the primary qualities or from the secondary qualities; and likewise from their activity or resistance, or from both simultaneously.

Assertion. Symbolic elements are more easily and quickly transmuted into one another than dissymbolic ones. This can be derived from the Doctor (*2, d. 14, q. 3, §. Dico ad q.*) and is transmitted explicitly by Aristotle (*2 de gener.*, c. 4, T. 25). It is proved first: it is easier and more convenient to overcome one than two — as can be gathered from Ecclesiastes IV: *Funiculus triplex difficile rumpitur* — "A threefold cord is not easily broken." And from the common saying: "Not even Hercules against two." But in the transmutation of a symbolic element into a symbolic one, only one contrary power and quality is to be overcome — there being only one resisting power and quality in them; but in the dissymbolic ones two contrary powers and qualities are to be surpassed, as is established from the note set out above. Therefore the transmutation of symbolic elements is easier and quicker than that of dissymbolic ones. The major is to be taken with other things being equal. For on account of an excess of powers and qualities of dissymbolic elements, a quicker and easier transmutation of them can be effected — as if a drop of water is cast into an enormous fire, it is more quickly and speedily converted into that fire than air into fire, or water into earth, even though those are dissymbolic and these symbolic. Second, the form is introduced more quickly and readily into matter when there is one impediment to be removed than when there are two obstacles of no small size — as may be observed in natural, moral, and artificial things. In the conversion of a symbolic element into a symbolic one, only one obstacle stands in the way — namely one contrary quality; but in the transmutation of a dissymbolic one into a dissymbolic one, two obstacles stand in the way and oppose — namely two contrary qualities. Furthermore, two warring substances can more than one; but in symbolic ones only one fights, whereas in dissymbolic ones two fight; therefore the transmutation of the latter is more difficult, while that of the former is easier and quicker.

Objection I. The same reasoning holds for the transmutation of symbolic and dissymbolic elements; therefore symbolic elements are not more easily and quickly transmuted than dissymbolic ones. The antecedent is urged: in both there are two qualities that do not persist in the transmuted element, otherwise an accident would migrate from subject to subject. I deny the antecedent; to its proof I say there is a disparity, because in dissymbolic ones there are two contrary qualities to be overcome; but in symbolic ones only one quality is to be vanquished, while the other, even if it perishes, does so not through itself but through accident — namely at the corruption of the subject — because when the subject is corrupted all that is in the subject is corrupted.

Objection II. A drop of water cast into a great fire is more quickly and speedily devoured by the fire than a particle of earth; but fire and earth are symbolic, while water and fire are dissymbolic. Therefore the conversion of dissymbolic ones is easier than that of symbolic ones. All the more so, action takes place between contraries; therefore where there is greater contrariety, there the quicker and easier action proceeds; but dissymbolic ones conflict more than symbolic ones, because the latter contend with respect to only one quality, but the former with respect to two qualities; therefore the transmutation of the latter is quicker and more convenient. I respond that our foregoing proposition is to be taken with other things being equal; but in the argument adduced there is an inequality, because a portion of earth possesses more matter than a drop of water and therefore offers more resistance and is more difficultly converted; but if the matter were equal in both, a portion of earth would be more quickly converted into fire than a drop of water. To the other point that is added, I say that although action takes place between contraries that mutually contend, nevertheless where there are more and stronger contraries to be overcome, a slower and more difficult victory is gained — as happens in the present case, because two contrary qualities in dissymbolic ones are to be vanquished, while in symbolic ones only one; and for that reason the transmutation of the latter is easier, of the former more difficult.

Article III: Whether from Two Elements a Third Can Be Produced

The title of this article can be taken in two ways: in one way, whether an element can corrupt two elements and generate a third element specifically different from them; in another way, whether through the action of a third, an element distinct from two mutually conflicting ones can be produced — or whether from two defeated elements one element can produce a third distinct from them. But either sense can be understood both of dissymbolic and of symbolic elements; and it is treated by Joannes de Magistris (*2 de gener., q. 2, scibili 2*), Tartaretus (*ibid.*), and other Scotists, and most recently by Ponce (*disp. 56, q. 6*).

Assertion I. One element can generate another element specifically distinct from it. Scotus (*2, d. 14, q. 3, & d. 15, q. un., & d. 18, q. un., §. Dico igitur. Sub K.*) does not appear to depart from this. It is proved first from Aristotle (*2 de gener., c.*

4), writing that there is a mutual transmutation of the elements. And (*ibid.*, T. 26) concluding their circular generation; therefore according to Aristotle one element can generate another. Nor does Ruuius (*in praesenti*, c. 6, q. 3) satisfy this testimony of the philosopher, saying that there Aristotle only wishes to say that from any element, as a terminus from which, another can be generated, but not that one is the efficient cause of another. For Aristotle there, adducing the reason why elements are mutually transmutable, says that it is because they are contraries fighting through their primary qualities; but such contraries are efficient and causative; therefore the Stagirite is speaking not only of the terminus from which, but of a true efficiency of them. Moreover, he teaches there that the passage is easier and quicker in symbolic than in dissymbolic ones; but such transmutation pertains to the efficient cause. Furthermore, a symbolic element truly causes a symbolic element — as fire causes fire; therefore when the question is whether a dissymbolic one can generate a dissymbolic one, such a question pertains to the efficient cause, and therefore Ruuius's interpretation is incongruous and inept. Second, the four primary qualities are as it were the seminal reasons of the elements, as Scotus (2, d. 18, q. un., ante L.) notes with Augustine (3 *Trin.*, 9). Therefore through them the elements are prepared and disposed for their aforesaid conversion, and thus one can cause another, since each of them participates in two, or at least one, of those qualities. Ruuius (*cit.*) objects that one quality does not suffice, but two are necessarily required. On the contrary: one quality, stronger and more efficacious than others — like heat — can prepare and dispose one element for the corruption and generation of another, as is evident in summer when heat is fierce and cold languishes; and conversely in winter when cold dominates and heat perishes; therefore whether one or two qualities suffices for the generation of any element. All the more because Aristotle (1 *Meteo.*, Sum. 4, cap. 1) affirms that in the crypts and caves of the earth, from the air enclosed in them, water is generated, whose efficient cause is none other than the earth, whose coldness overcomes the heat of the air and disposes for introducing the form of water. Hence springs and rivers take their origin. Since the coldness of the earth is directed of itself and tends toward expelling the heat of the air and introducing the form of water, with the concurrence of moisture and the other things prerequisite for its generation — for since the elements are not pure but mixed, the coldness of the earth is not alone in those places but is accompanied by moisture and the like, which contribute to the production of water — therefore earth is through itself the cause of the generation of water. Again, there is greater agreement and efficacy in one element for causing another than in a mixed thing for generating an element; but a mixed thing can cause an element — as flint and iron struck together generate fire; therefore it is not to be denied that one element can cause another. Ruuius (*loco memorato*) meets this and denies that fire is generated from struck iron and flint as from causes through themselves, and has recourse to universal causes and celestial powers, whose role it is to supply the deficiency of particular causes when these cannot produce

such effects — as happens in the generation of imperfect animals from putrid matter. But daily experience teaches us that fire is caused in that manner; therefore, since particular causes of those effects are plainly present, the recourse to universal and celestial causes is empty and vain. Especially because the production of fire from the said striking of iron and flint does not exceed their powers and virtues — since they are mixed things that surpass any element in nobility; therefore, since fire is seen to issue from them with the eye, no other cause is to be sought and tracked down. What Ruuius says about the generation of imperfect animals does not help him, because the putrefied earth or whatever else is adduced, being more ignoble and imperfect than those animals, cannot cause and generate them, and for that reason recourse to a universal cause is taken — but not so in the present case.

Assertion II. One element can corrupt two elements and generate a third distinct from them. Scotus (*locis prarecensitis*) does not dissent, nor does Aristotle (*2 de gener., Tit. 29*). It is proved first: the stronger power of one element can overcome the weaker powers of two elements; therefore through that victory which one element gains over the other two, a third distinct from them can be produced. The antecedent is urged: a large fire by its force can overcome some part of water and a portion of earth, from which afterwards air could be produced; therefore given the hypothesis, one element can corrupt two elements from which another distinct one is produced. Second, it sometimes happens in mixed things that one destroys two, from which a third distinct from them is generated. The antecedent is readily apparent: one of these can kill two men, from which corpses, worms, and the like are made, which are distinct from man.

Assertion III. Through the action of a third, from two mutually conflicting elements, another can be generated. Scotus (*ubi supra*) and Aristotle (*cit.*) do not oppose this. It is proved first: if water and earth should conflict among themselves and their powers be weakened, through the action of a supervening fire from those defeated ones, air could be produced, as I intimated above. Therefore through the action of a third this is possible. Second, in mixed things this occurs not rarely — as from iron and bronze, through the action of fire, gold can be produced; and from a horse and a she-ass a mule is generated, which differs specifically from them; therefore this can also occur in the elements.

Objection I against the first assertion. If one element could generate another specifically different from it, it would be either its univocal or equivocal cause; but it can be neither cause; therefore this is to be considered impossible. The major is clear because the division of cause into univocal and equivocal is adequate. The minor is shown: a univocal cause is of the same character and species as the effect it causes; an equivocal cause is more excellent than the effect it produces, since it contains it eminently and virtually; but one element

does not contain another eminently, since it is not superior and more excellent than it. I grant the major and, having admitted the first part of the minor, I deny the second part: for fire, being the noblest of elements, is generated both univocally and equivocally, as I showed above. The same is asserted of animals, which are generated through putrefaction and propagation.

Objection II. If fire and air should conflict among themselves, since both are hot, if water were produced through the action of a third, heat would persist in the water; but heat cannot remain in water since it is extrinsic and repugnant to it, and water returns to its own coldness; therefore from two elements a third cannot be produced. I respond that given the hypothesis, the heat of fire and air does not endure in the water, which expels it as its contrary; and when the subjects of that heat — namely fire and air — are corrupted, that heat itself is corrupted insofar as it was subject in them.

Objection III. The same thing according to the same respect and with reference to the same thing cannot be stronger and weaker; but if a third were generated from two elements mutually contending, the same would be both stronger and weaker; therefore it is impossible. The major is evident. The minor is shown: the same would be stronger because it would overcome another, and weaker because it would be overcome by another — since both would be corrupted, since a third would be produced from both. I grant the major and deny the minor; to its proof I say that this is accomplished through the action of a third, as remains explained and proved in the third assertion.

Question III: On the Primary Qualities of the Elements

Article I: How Many and What the Primary Qualities of the Elements Are

Some, both ancient and modern — whom Arriaga (*disp. 4 de gener., Sect. 2*) follows — posit only two primary qualities, namely heat and cold. The common opinion, however, is that of Aristotle (*2 de gener., cap. 2, T. 8*), the Parisians, Joannes de Magistris, Tartaretus, and others, who enumerate four primary qualities: heat, cold, moisture, and dryness.

Note first that the primary qualities are not inseparable from the elements. For fire can exist without heat, and water without coldness — yet not the former without the power and virtue of heating, nor the latter without the principle of cooling. Therefore the said qualities, whether they belong to the second or third species of the category of quality, are really distinct from the elements; but the powers and faculties of the elements are really identified with them, as the Doctor (*2, d. 16, q. un., §. Ideo dico*) transmits generally of all the real virtues of things.

Note second that the four aforesaid qualities are called active, not because other qualities are not active, but because the primary qualities are productive of their

like — as heat produces heat, cold produces coldness, moisture produces moisture, and dryness produces dryness; but other qualities do not do so. For heaviness does not cause heaviness, nor lightness lightness; for that reason they are called passive rather than active. Furthermore, note that moisture and dryness are called passive qualities not absolutely but relatively. For since heat and cold are more active than moisture and dryness, the latter are therefore said to be passive with respect to the former; and they are of greater resistance than the former. What is of greater resistance is called passive with respect to what is of lesser resistance — as Joannes de Magistris (*2 de gener.*, q. 1, dub. 1) notes above all others.

Assertion I. There are four positive primary qualities as enumerated above. These are presupposed by Scotus (*4, d. 1, q. 5, §. Ad primum, sub F.*) and are indicated by him (*q. 40 praedicamentali, in fine*). And they are cited by Augustine (*1 de doctrina Christiana, c. 14, & in expositione Psal. 6*). It is urged first: there are four elements, from what was asserted in question I of this book, article I; therefore there are also four primary qualities. The consequent is derived: each element participates in its own proper quality in the highest degree — as fire in heat, air in moisture, water in coldness, and earth in dryness. Second, there are four humors — phlegm, blood, black bile, and yellow bile — from which four complexions of animals arise: the melancholic, phlegmatic, sanguine, and choleric; therefore the quaternary number of primary qualities is rightly inferred. Moreover, qualities are granted to elements so that there may be mutual transmutation among them, as Aristotle (*2 de gener.*, cap. 2) well saw; but for transmutation four qualities are required — two active, which are heat and cold, and two passive, which are moisture and dryness. Finally, all qualities are fourteen in number as cited by the same philosopher (*ibid.*, T. 8); and the remaining ones are reduced to the first four, as is shown in that passage and explained by Joannes de Magistris. Therefore no more than four primary qualities are to be reckoned.

Assertion II. The primary qualities are rightly distributed — being neither derived from others nor from one another, but being those from which the other tangible and sublunary qualities arise. This is consistent with Aristotle (*2 de gener.*, T. 15) and does not conflict with Scotus (*cit.*, & *aliis suae doctrinae locis*). It is urged: the primary qualities dispose toward the generation of a thing, while other qualities pertain to the adornment and perfection of the thing; therefore just as a thing is first generated before it is adorned and perfected, so those qualities precede these ones in the order of nature and thus are not from others but are primary. Moreover, heat generates only heat, and coldness coldness, and so on for the rest; therefore they are not from one another. Again, from the mixture of these there proceed the other qualities — as the Doctor (*4, d. 49, q. 15, §. Respondeo, sub A.*) asserts of color, following Aristotle (*sect. ult. problem. de sapore, lib. de sensu, Sensibili, cap. 4, & de odore ibid., cap. 5, & 2 anima, cap. 9, de gravitate, & levitate, 4 Phys., T. 85, & de sono, Sect. undecima problem.*). Therefore, since the

foregoing definition is adequate and reciprocal, containing nothing superfluous or deficient, it is to be considered correct and fitting.

Assertion III. Virtual qualities of the elements, distinct from the four aforesaid ones, are not to be admitted. This is not at variance with the principles of Scotus and is defended by Tartaretus (*2 de gener., q. 1, scibili tertio*), the Coimbrans (*cap. 3, q. 2, art. 2*), Ponce (*disp. 54, q. 3, concl. 4*), and others both ancient and modern. It is proved first: if beyond the four actual primary qualities there were four virtual ones, there would be eight qualities; but this is contrary to Aristotle (*2 de gener., 7, 15*), who transmits that there are only four qualities. Moreover, the primary qualities are either of the second or third species of the predicament of quality; but these are only actual; therefore no virtual qualities distinct from actual ones are given. Second, other qualities besides the primary ones proceed from the mixture of the primary ones themselves, as I made plain in the second assertion; therefore if virtual qualities were admitted, they would be to be assigned among the secondary qualities. Furthermore, whatever exists is either really identified with substance or really differs from it. If the first, it is not a quality, because since quality is an accident it does not coincide with substance. If the second, therefore it is an accident, which is not divided into actual and virtual; and consequently the primary qualities are wrongly distributed into four virtual and four actual ones.

Objection I. One primary quality is produced from another; therefore the primary qualities are not well defined as those neither derived from others nor from one another, but from which the other sublunary qualities arise. The antecedent is acknowledged. For in summer, from the heat pressing and burning, dryness and aridity of the earth arise; for at that time herbs, plants, and most other things are desiccated and dried up. I deny the antecedent; to its proof I distinguish: through itself, I deny; through accident, I grant. For from the fact that heat then consumes the moisture, dryness and aridity of the earth are produced through accident.

Objection II. Water, when it is hot, reduces itself to its former coldness; therefore water has a virtual quality through which it returns to its native cold; but that virtual quality differs from those four actual ones enumerated above; therefore virtual qualities distinct from actual ones are to be admitted. I respond that water returns to its native coldness not from any virtual quality distinct from the four primary actual ones, but from its substantial form, by the power of which it is made cold — as I intimated above at the end of the first note.

Objection III. In mixed things there are virtual qualities; therefore also in the elements. The antecedent is apparent from wine and pepper, which although actually and formally they are cold, yet when taken by a man and introduced into his stomach they heat; and physicians likewise experience that certain herbs are virtually hot and others virtually cold. I grant the antecedent and deny the consequent; because such powers proceed from the specific natures of those

things and perhaps are not properly qualities and common accidents but proper ones, really identified with their substantial natures — as I noted in the first note.

Article II: What the Individual Primary Qualities Are

In the preceding article a definition of the primary qualities in common was adduced; in the present article the individual qualities are to be described. For Aristotle (*2 de gener., cap. 2, T. 8, & 4 Meteor., cap. 1*) defines each primary quality in the concrete. He says: "The hot is what gathers the homogeneous and separates the heterogeneous" — as heat gathers gold mixed with other metals into one and separates and divides it from them, as is established in the liquefaction of metals. "The cold is what gathers both the homogeneous and the heterogeneous" — as is evident in frozen water, in which wood, stones, straw, and the like are gathered together. "The moist is what is with difficulty terminated by its own terminus but easily by an alien terminus" — as water is terminated by stones and embankments as by alien termini. "The dry is what is easily determined by its own terminus but with difficulty by an alien one" — as is evident in earth and stone, which are indeed terminated by their own limit with ease, but by an alien terminus only with labor, since they must be cut and divided into parts.

Assertion. The individual primary qualities were aptly and fittingly defined. Scotus does not depart from this in his writings. It is urged: those foregoing descriptions lucidly declare the natures of the primary qualities and well explain their passions and effects; therefore they are rightly transmitted. Again, genus and differentia can be assigned in them. For all agree in the common character of quality and differ in the rest, as is clear to one running through the words and particles set out above.

Objection I. A thing ought to be defined through what is prior and more intimate to it — for a definition explains the intrinsic nature of the thing; but there are other things in the primary qualities more prior and intimate than gathering the homogeneous, joining the heterogeneous, being terminated by an alien terminus, and being determined by one's own terminus. Therefore the individual primary qualities were not well described. The major is clear. The minor is proved: to heat is more intimate to heat than to gather the homogeneous; to cool is prior to cold than to join the heterogeneous; therefore the primary qualities are better defined through these than through those. I respond that all this argument is true, but Aristotle preferred to describe the said primary qualities through other properties and inferior and posterior effects, because those other things are not so well known and easy as heating, cooling, and the like — for he would have said nothing new and worthy of knowledge, nor would he have furnished us with greater knowledge of the said qualities.

Objection II. Heat joins the heterogeneous; therefore it is not distinguished from cold by the fact that cold gathers both the heterogeneous and the homogeneous, while heat gathers only the homogeneous. The antecedent is proved: in the liquefaction of wax and resin, in which both the homogeneous and the heterogeneous are gathered into one. Again, in the generation of a mixed thing from hot and moist, heterogeneous parts are put together; and in the nutrition of a living being, food of one kind is joined through natural heat with food of another kind. Finally, by cold stones are sometimes broken and members are dissolved, as is evident by experience in winter. I distinguish the antecedent: absolutely, I deny it; in a qualified sense, I grant it. Likewise the remaining proofs that are added must be answered. For by reason of some viscous quality, through heat, heterogeneous bodies are united together with homogeneous ones. Absolutely speaking, however, such a union is not effected by heat. To the last point I say that this occurs not through itself but through accident, insofar as certain parts are too much constricted and cannot sustain themselves; therefore they are loosened and collapse.

Article III: Whether Some Primary Quality in the Highest Degree Belongs to Each Element

Assertion I. The four primary qualities in the highest degree belong to the four elements. The common opinion of philosophers and physicians is to this effect, from which the Doctor (*2, d. 15, q. un.*) does not depart. It is proved first: there are four elements, from what was said in question I of this book, art. I; therefore there are also four primary qualities belonging to them in the highest degree. The consequent holds: just as each element is distinguished specifically from another, so it also obtains a quality specifically distinct from the rest, through which it acts and exercises its operation. Second, the four primary qualities in the highest degree do not apply to mixed things, because in these they are said to be refracted and weakened; therefore they belong to the elements themselves, whose nature is simple. But from a simple thing substantially and virtually, only one quality proceeds primarily and immediately; and therefore only one simple operation is exercised.

Assertion II. Heat belongs to fire and moisture to air in the highest degree. This is derived from the Doctor (*cit., & 4, d. 47, q. 2, ad finem*). The first part is urged first: to the nobler element a nobler quality is due, since qualities are distributed in accordance with the distribution of natures; but fire is the nobler element, from what was shown in art. IV, q. I of this book, and heat surpasses the remaining qualities in nobility; therefore heat is rightly attributed to fire in the highest degree. Second, to the origin and source of heat the highest heat is due, just as to the source of light the highest light; but fire is the source of heat (*2 de gener., cap. 3, T. 23, & 2 Met., C. 1, T. 4*); therefore the highest degree of heat belongs to it. The second part is proved from Aristotle (*2 de gener., passu nunc alleg.*), attributing moisture to air, heat to fire, coldness to water, and dryness to

earth. And (7, 49, *eiusdem lib.*), adding that fire and air resist water and earth — for no other reason than that fire is hot, by reason of which it is opposed to water, and air is moist, by reason of which it is opposed to earth. Therefore according to Aristotle the highest moisture is ascribed to air. Second: the moist is that which is with difficulty terminated by its own terminus and easily by an alien one, as is established from the preceding article. But air is of this kind: for its own proper terminus is with difficulty assigned to it, while it is easily enclosed by an alien one, as is evident in bladders and bellows. I add that things that are moist are made more moist through air, as is evident in oil and other moist things.

Assertion III. Water is cold in the highest degree, and earth is dry likewise in the highest degree. This does not conflict with Scotus's works. The first part is from Aristotle (*loc. proxime cit.*, T. 23). It is proved first: water cools maximally, as is evident by experience when someone spends a period of time in it — his teeth chatter. Second, water is maximally opposed to fire, since they are dissymbolic elements; but fire is supremely hot; therefore, by opposition, water is supremely cold. The second part is transmitted by Aristotle (*ubi supra*), and can be shown from Genesis I, where earth is called arid — that is, maximally dry — as Basil (*hom. 4 Hexam.*) interprets it. Moreover, unless earth is moistened by rain or river water, it is maximally desiccated and dried up; therefore dryness in the highest degree is appropriate to earth.

Objection I against the second assertion. Water moistens more than air; therefore the highest moisture is to be adapted to water and not to air. The antecedent is acknowledged: for it is established by experience that those places are maximally moist that are full of water. Confirmation I: air becomes dry through the blowing of the winds; therefore it is not subject to the greatest moisture. Confirmation II: the Moon powerfully dominates in moist bodies; and the Moon has great dominion over water, as the Doctor (2, d. 14, q. 3, §. *Dico ad q., ad B.*) asserts of the ebb and flow of the sea; therefore water is rather to be called maximally moist than air. I respond that this occurs because water is denser and thicker than air; hence water moistens more than air, which is rare, thin, and subtle. This can be explained by the case of heated iron, which heats the hand more than fire consuming tow. The reason is that fire and tow are rare bodies while iron is dense. To Confirmation I: I say that dryness proceeds not from air but from windy exhalations. To Confirmation II: I grant that the Moon maximally dominates water; but from this it is not inferred that water is moister than air. Why the Moon should so dominate water the Doctor (*loc. nuper cit.*) investigates, as will I in the proper place.

Objection II against the third assertion. The further something is from the heaven, the colder it is. For the heaven appears to be the cause of heat — hence it was considered by some to be ignited. But earth is further from the heaven than water, since it is the lowest element; therefore the highest coldness belongs

to earth, not to water. Confirmation I: if water were maximally cold, it would be frozen; but experience testifies the contrary; therefore the highest coldness is not proper to water. Confirmation II: maritime places are warmer than inland places; but if water were the coldest, maritime places, in which there is the greatest abundance of water, would be colder; but this is evidently false; therefore. I deny the major: for greater or lesser distance from the Heaven is not the cause of greater coldness or heat, since the heaven is not formally hot but only virtually. To Confirmation I: the consequent of the major is to be denied. For the cause of the freezing of water is a terrestrial exhalation. Since however in the sea there are no such exhalations, for that reason the sea does not freeze. But marshes and ponds freeze maximally. Indeed we experience that warm water freezes more quickly than cold, the reason for which is that there is a greater abundance of exhalation in warm water than in cold. To Confirmation II: I say that mountainous places are closer to the middle region of the air, which is coldest through antiperiastasis; and likewise on account of snows that almost always remain in those places, and on account of the rays of the sun which do not directly reach them. But maritime places are very low and remote from the edge of the second region and devoid of snows; and likewise the sun directly illuminates and with its light directly looks upon them with no obstacle interposed; for that reason they are warmer.

You ask whether each element has twin qualities. I respond affirmatively, yet not both equally primarily, since one is prior to the other. For fire is hot and dry; air moist and hot; water cold and moist; earth dry and cold — as Damascene (*2 fidei, cap. 12*) transmits after Aristotle (*2 de gener., T. 23, & 4 Meteor., cap. 1*).

Article IV: Whether the Symbolic Qualities of the Elements Are of the Same Species

Some — whose names Toletus (*2 de gener., q. 7*), the Coimbrans (*q. 6, art. 1*), and Ruuius (*ibid., q. 10*) keep silent about — hold that the symbolic qualities of the elements are distinguished from one another in species. The common opinion, however, is that of Tartaretus (*de gener., q. 1, scibili 4*), Marsilius (*q. 4*), Racon (*q. 3, art. postremo*), and others who teach that the aforesaid qualities participate in the same species.

Note that some elemental qualities are symbolic and some are dissymbolic. The symbolic are those that belong under the same name to many elements — as the heat of fire and air, the moisture of air and water, the coldness of water and earth, and the dryness of earth and fire. The dissymbolic, however, are called by that name those that differ from one another both in name and in reality — as the heat of fire and the coldness of water, the dryness of fire and the moisture of air, the moisture of water and the dryness of earth.

Assertion I. The symbolic qualities of the elements are of the same species. This is intimated by the Doctor (*in utroque opere, 2, d. 15, q. un.*). It is proved first:

things that mutually intensify one another belong to the same species — as is evident in water added to water, through which water itself increases; and in light added to light, through which that same light is augmented. But the symbolic qualities of the elements mutually intensify one another — as the coldness of water intensifies the coldness of earth, and the heat of fire intensifies the heat of air; therefore such qualities are of the same species. Second, there is an easier passage of a symbolic element into a symbolic one than of a symbolic into a dissymbolic one, as remains proved in question II of this book, article II. But if the symbolic qualities did not enjoy the same species, the transmutation of dissymbolic ones would be equally easy as that of symbolic ones, because in both, both qualities would have to be overcome. Indeed there would be no symbolic element, because both of its qualities would be of a diverse species. Moreover, there would not be only four primary qualities but eight — which was rejected in article I of this question. And there would be two contraries for one, which not only conflicts with Aristotle (*10 Met., cap. 9, T. 25*) but also with sacred scripture, Ecclesiasticus XXXIII: *Duo contra duo, & unum contra unum* — "Two against two, and one against one." Therefore the symbolic qualities of the elements are of the same species.

Assertion II. Elemental heat appears to differ specifically from the natural heat of a living being, so that although the qualities of a mixed thing are similar to the qualities of the elements, they do not however participate in the same species. This is held by the Doctor (*loc. pract., §. Ad 1 in oppositum. F.*) and followed by Lychetus (*ibid.*). It is proved first: things of the same species mutually assist, foster, and intensify one another — as is evident in several lights joined and united together; but elemental heat — specifically febrile heat — consumes and extinguishes the natural heat of living beings. Hence the Stagirite (*5 Polit., cap. 8*) adds that death is the extinction of natural heat in the radical moisture; therefore elemental and vital heat are not of the same species. Second, things that produce diverse effects are of diverse species — for diversity of species is discerned from the diversity of effects that proceed from them; but native heat disposes for the conversion of food into the substance of the being nourished, and flesh is caused; but the heat of fire obtains a different effect — namely the disposition and preparation for generating fire; therefore the heat of fire is of a different species from vital heat.

Objection I against the first assertion. Things that proceed from natures specifically different are of diverse species; since natures specifically different enjoy properties specifically distinct. But the symbolic qualities proceed from natures specifically different — as heat from fire and air. But fire and air differ specifically; therefore the heat of fire and air differ specifically from one another. I respond that the major is not universally true except of properties in the fourth mode. For although the ox and the eagle differ specifically from one another, nevertheless the sight of the one and the other are of the same species. Likewise, although man and angel differ specifically, yet the intellect of man and

of an angel are not distinguished in species, as Scotus (2, d. 1, q. 6, §. *potest etiam addi. D.*) admirably and lucidly transmits.

Objection II. The moisture of water extinguishes fire, but the moisture of air does not consume fire; therefore it is a clear sign that the moisture of air and water are not of the same species. I respond: the reason why the moisture of air does not extinguish fire is that it is thinner and subtler; but the moisture of water is thicker and denser, and for that reason consumes and destroys fire.

Objection III. The heat of fire remains violently in air and in fire itself naturally; but things of the same species are not found violently and naturally in the same subjects; therefore the symbolic qualities of the elements are of diverse species. I distinguish the major: heat in the highest degree remains violently in air, I grant — for it belongs to fire alone to this degree; heat in a remiss degree, I deny. For in this manner it is adapted to air, which is hot in a remiss degree and moist in the highest degree.

Objection IV against the second assertion. Aristotle (*lib. de respiratione, cap. 7*) calls the natural heat that serves for nutrition "igneous heat"; therefore natural and igneous heat agree in one and the same species. I respond that there is indeed a kinship and similarity between both heats, as Scotus (2, dist. 15, q. un., §. *Ad primum*) notes; but they nonetheless do not enjoy the same specific nature — just as the qualities of mixed things are similar to the qualities of the elements yet are not the same in species, as the same Doctor teaches (*ibid.*). Hence Aristotle (*praealleg.*) so expounds this, as is plainly indicated (*lib. de iuvent., cap. 1*), where he says that the soul in the heart is as it were fiery — that is, has heat similar to the heat of fire — as the particle "as it were" consulted placed by him denotes.

Objection V. Igneous heat assists natural heat, as is evident in medicines affected by the heat of fire, which serve for decoction; and chickens are said to be hatched from hens' eggs placed in an oven with igneous heat, as the Coimbrans (*loc. cit., in the beginning of this difficulty, art. 2*) report. Therefore this heat does not differ specifically from that one. I respond that by this only a certain similarity and agreement is proved between the said heats, as I was just saying with Scotus — not however that they agree in the same species; just as man and brute participate in many common, kindred, and similar things, yet differ in species. To the other point that is adduced, I say that from this it is only argued that chickens can be generated equivocally from hens' eggs — just as fire is equivocally generated, namely from fire, from solar rays, and from the collision of two bodies.

Article V. Whether Two Contrary Qualities Can Exist Simultaneously in the Same Subject

The question of this article can be understood in two ways: first, whether two contrary qualities can exist simultaneously in one and the same subject in a remiss (i.e., diminished) degree; second, whether they can exist simultaneously in the highest degree. Each of these modes can be taken with respect to either natural or supernatural power.

Note that the common run of philosophers call a quality "in the highest degree" that reaches the eighth degree, so that the highest degree of heat is heat as eight, and cold in the highest degree is cold as eight; while a quality "in a remiss degree" is one that falls below the range of eight degrees, such as heat as four and cold as four. More on this when we discuss the intension and remission of quality. Moreover, for the resolution of this question, considerable assistance is provided by what I adduced and established in *2 Phys.*, q. 4, art. 7.

First Assertion. Several contrary qualities in a remiss degree can be compatible with one another simultaneously in the same subject. The Doctor holds this at (*2, d. 18, q. un.*, § *Ad argumenta M., contra Dur.*, q. 2, *Prol.*, n. 19), and others cited by the Coimbrans at (*2 de gener.*, c. 3, q. 8, art. 1). It is also deduced from Aristotle at (*2 de gener.*, T. 48), and is likewise intimated at (*3 Top.*, c. 4), (*5 Phys.*, T. 19), and (*4 Met.*, T. 27). It is argued for in the first place as follows: between two extremes there is a middle term, as between white and black there is an intermediate color, such as red or green; therefore, between qualities in the highest degree, there exist qualities in a remiss degree. For the natural passage from one extreme to the other does not occur except through an intermediate state, and so when water is heated, it does not immediately become hot in the highest degree, but warms gradually, as experience shows with the water in a pot: if fire is applied beneath it and one touches the pot by hand, it gradually receives heat, then it boils and scalds, and finally overflows the pot and extinguishes the fire. Second, between hot and cold there is tepid, as is evident from the case of lukewarm water, which John alludes to in *Apoc.* 3 when he says: "Would that you were cold or hot; but because you are lukewarm, I will vomit you out." Contrary qualities, then, can exist simultaneously in the same subject in a remiss degree. The elements in turn contend with one another by acting and being acted upon, so that their forces and powers are diminished and refracted, with the result that a mixture is produced in which their qualities are reduced to a certain moderation suited to the mixture itself (*2 de gener.*, c. 10; *2 de partibus animalium*, c. 1). For contrary qualities in the highest degree dispose a mixture toward corruption and destruction, whereas in a remiss degree they sustain and preserve it; thus, as long as the tempered qualities in an animal remain as they are, the animal lives; but if any one of them exceeds too greatly, the animal dies, as is clear in the case of burning and malignant fever, which causes the death of the very animal it afflicts. Furthermore, in artifacts, colors, odors, flavors, and other secondary qualities are blended and remain in the same subject reduced to a certain moderation. And two contrary agents contending with each other remain simultaneously, each enjoying equal force, and neither is able to

overcome the other or to drive it from its place, as is evident in the case of two wrestlers equally matched and vigorous — notably Jacob and the angel wrestling with him (*Gen. 32*). Moreover, in moral matters the habit of temperance existing in the same man can be compatible with an act of intemperance, and indeed with several other acts which, if repeated over time, can destroy the said habit of temperance and generate a habit of intemperance. Therefore the same must be asserted of contrary natural qualities, since the same reasoning applies equally to both. Finally, contrary qualities — as will be said elsewhere — are capable of intension and remission; therefore they can be so remitted that one cannot drive the other from the same subject, for instance heat as four and cold likewise as four, since, given that they are assumed to share equal force, it follows that neither can overcome and drive out the other from the subject in which it inheres.

Second Assertion. Contrary qualities in the highest degree can be simultaneously present in the same subject neither naturally nor supernaturally. This assertion is twofold, as the Doctor holds at (1, d. 17, q. 3, § *Contra istam opinionem, sub VV.*), (3, d. 1, q. 1, § *Ad argumenta, in sol. 3*), and (4, d. 49, q. 16, § *Ad 1, infra C*). The first part is proved in the first place from (2 *Top.*, c. 3): it is impossible for contraries to exist simultaneously in the same subject. The same is read at (3 *of the same work*, c. 4), (5 *Phys.*, Tit. 19), and (2 *de gener.*, Tit. 16). This is the common opinion among philosophers. Second, experience teaches us that heat drives out cold, as is evident in summer, and conversely that cold drives out heat, as is clear in winter; and the same must be asserted of the remaining contraries, as is verified daily in ourselves and in all sublunary things. From this arises the well-known maxim that contraries are cured by contraries: hot things by cold, moist by dry. Third, this cannot be brought about by uncreated power, as I shall show in the proximate part of this assertion; therefore neither can it be done by created and natural power. The consequence holds by the argument from the greater to the lesser, as I have explained in *Epitome Dialect.*, lib. 13, q. 3, art. 4.

The second part, which militates against Gabriel in (*Can. lect. 46*), the Coimbrans (2 *de gener.*, c. 3, q. 8, art. 5), Ruv. at the same place (q. 6, n. 93), and not a few others, is proved in the first place as follows: things that are mutually repugnant cannot be compatible with one another simultaneously in the same subject, because the object of divine power is everything possible, but not the impossible, which involves repugnance, as Scotus teaches at (4, d. 10, q. 1, § *Ergo ad q. F*). Now, two contrary qualities in the highest degree are repugnant to coexisting simultaneously in the same subject, as is plainly evident from their definition. For contraries are defined as those that mutually expel each other from the same subject (10 *Met.*, Tit. 14); and if the essence of contrary qualities is such as is expressed by this definition just cited, it plainly follows that they cannot simultaneously coexist, even by divine power, since God does not change the essences and natures of things, which are immutable and invariable.

You will say: if this argument were valid, contrary qualities in a remiss degree could not coexist simultaneously in the same subject, since to these also the aforementioned definition applies. But this contradicts the first assertion, in which I established that said qualities in a remiss degree can exist simultaneously in the same subject. On the contrary, according to Scotus at (*1, d. 17, q. 3, IV.*), there is something positive in the former that makes simultaneous existence repugnant to them, but not in the latter. For mutual expulsion from the same subject, and perpetual contrariety, are indicated by their definition already cited above, whereas the simultaneous coexistence of those same qualities in the same subject — or their repugnance — regards either the lowest or the highest of their degrees. For in a remiss degree they can exist simultaneously, but not in an intense and excellent degree, just as a vessel can hold so much water and no more, and similarly a person can carry so much weight and no more, and a river can be crossed up to a certain limit but cannot be swum further. Likewise, an animate creature is allotted certain determinate limits of its greatness and smallness which it cannot exceed; in the same way, contrary qualities within the range of certain degrees can be simultaneously compatible, but not at the full range of intense and supreme degrees.

Second, if contraries in the highest degree could coexist simultaneously in the same subject, then so too could contradictories, as Aristotle infers at (*4 Met., c. 4, T. 27*); but contradictory statements cannot be simultaneously verified of the same subject, as is the unanimous opinion of all philosophers; therefore neither can contraries exist simultaneously in the same subject. Gabriel, cited above, objects that this testimony is not to be understood of contrary qualities but of propositions in contrary opposition. On the contrary, the Philosopher there says that it is impossible for contraries to exist simultaneously, whether both in some respect, or one in some respect and the other absolutely; therefore he is not speaking of the incompatibility of contrary propositions, but of the simultaneous coexistence of contrary qualities, which is impossible. Add to this that propositions do not inhere in things but are stated, predicated, affirmed, or denied of subjects, whereas contraries inhere or do not inhere in subjects; therefore Gabriel's exposition does not fit Aristotle's text. And Scotus adds in his exposition of that passage that one contrary, which is more imperfect than the other, designates the privation of the other as more perfect, as black designates the privation of white; but privation is the negation of the same being; therefore, consequently, contraries exhibit the same repugnance as contradictory opposition.

You will say, with the same author cited — whom Suarez follows in (*dis. 45 Met., Sect. 4, n. 15*) — that contraries are not opposed by immediate and formal opposition in terms of the incompatibility of their very forms, but only by virtual opposition in terms of effects that are incompatible in the same subject; but God is able by his absolute power to suspend those effects, as he did in the Chaldean furnace; and therefore the opposition of contradictories does not

follow, nor would the same thing be supremely hot and supremely cold. On the contrary, it is impossible for a form to be in a subject and not confer its formal effect upon it, just as it is impossible for whiteness to be in a wall and not give to that very wall its formal being, which is to make the wall itself white. But if contraries were to exist simultaneously in the same subject — say, heat and cold — they would confer their formal being upon it, which is to be hot and cold. God can indeed prevent fire from heating and water from cooling, because he is their efficient cause in producing those effects; but he cannot bring it about that heat does not have the being of hot, and cold the being of cold, because this is their nature and essence, which cannot be altered without being destroyed. Moreover, two substantial forms simultaneously in the same matter are incompatible, as I maintained in *lib. 2, Phys., q. 4, art. 7*; therefore the same must be asserted of two contrary qualities simultaneously in the same subject.

Objection I. The reason why two contrary qualities cannot be simultaneously present in the same subject is that they are opposed to each other; but they are equally opposed in a remiss degree as in an intense degree; therefore, if they cannot exist in an intense degree, neither can they exist in a remiss degree. I concede the major and deny the minor, because in the highest degree qualities have greater force to expel one another from the same subject, which is not the case in the lowest degree, for the reason that their forces there are refracted and weakened, as I explained at length above in the second part of the assertion, in response to the objection brought there.

Objection II. Two bodies can by divine power exist simultaneously in the same place, as I affirmed in *lib. 6, Phys., q. 2, art. 3*; therefore also supernaturally, two qualities in the highest degree can exist simultaneously in the same subject. I concede the antecedent and deny the consequence. The reason is that the former is possible, whereas the latter involves a contradiction, as I showed in the second part of the last assertion.

Question IV. On the Motive Qualities of the Elements.

Article I. What the Motive Qualities of the Elements Are, How Many There Are, and to What They Belong.

The motive qualities of the elements are those by which the elements are moved upward or downward. For gravity is the motive quality toward a place downward, and levity toward a place upward. Four motive qualities of the elements are distinguished: the first is levity simply, which belongs to fire; the second is gravity simply, which belongs to earth; the third is levity in a certain respect, which belongs to air; and the fourth is gravity in a certain respect, which belongs to water. Hence, in terms of these qualities, the elements are called heavy or light simply, or in a certain respect. That which is light simply is what rises above all the other elements; that which is heavy simply is what lies beneath all the rest; that which is light in a certain respect is elevated with

respect to some but subordinate with respect to others; and that which is heavy in a certain respect is what rises above earth but is inferior to the other elements.

Assertion. Fire is supremely light and earth is supremely heavy; air is light in a certain respect, and water is heavy in a certain respect. This assertion is twofold, and is indicated by the Doctor at (2, d. 14, q. 3, § *Dico ad q. A*). The first part, concerning fire, is handed down by Augustine at (22 *Civ.*, c. 9) and Damascene at (2 *Fidei*, c. 6), and is argued first as follows: to the highest element the highest motive quality must be attributed, as the nature and order of things demands; but fire is the first of the elements in dignity and excellence, being maximally active and pure; therefore the highest levity belongs to it. Second, that which is in a higher place is supremely light; but fire is found in a higher place, namely beneath the concave of the lunar orb; therefore fire is supremely light. From the opposite side, Aristotle writes that earth is the heaviest at (5 *Top.*, c. 2), and the reason is that earth is the lowest element; therefore the lowest motive quality must be assigned to it, and this is supreme gravity; therefore earth is supremely heavy. Again, earth occupies the lowest place among the elements; therefore the lowest motive quality belongs to it, which is supreme gravity. Again, extreme motive qualities must be granted to the extreme elements, and fire and earth are the extreme elements, as is evident; therefore extreme qualities suit them, such as supreme gravity and supreme levity.

The second part is shown as follows: intermediate motive qualities are assigned to intermediate elements; but air and water are elements intermediate between fire and earth; therefore intermediate motive qualities suit them, which are levity in a certain respect and gravity in a certain respect. And this is also supported by the intermediate places which air and water occupy, interposed between the places of fire and earth. Therefore air is light in a certain respect, and water is heavy in a certain respect.

Objection I. Aristotle at (11 *Meteor.*, c. 4) affirms that portions of fire from the sphere of fire sometimes descend to the lowest places; therefore fire is not supremely light, since it is carried to the lowest places. I reply that this descent of fire is not due to fire itself, but to some heavy material compacted with it by the power of the celestial orbs; which can be illustrated by the case of comets, whose parts when dissolved are carried downward and fall to earth.

Objection II. Iron and lead are heavier than earth; therefore earth is not supremely heavy. The antecedent is confirmed by experience: for if a portion of iron or lead equal to a portion of earth is weighed, the former will outweigh the latter. Consequence I: dead bodies, if cast into the sea, tend initially to the bottom, but afterwards rise to the surface; but such bodies are earthen; therefore earth is not heavier than water. Consequence II: pumice, as Pliny attests, floats on water; but pumice itself is a stone of earth; therefore water seems heavier than earth.

I respond that the antecedent is true of earth mixed with other elements, but not of pure earth, which is plainly the heaviest, as Scotus indicates at (4, d. 49, q. 14). To Consequence I, I say that this proceeds from the corrosion of the earthen parts: once the corrupt matter is consumed and the heavier parts dissolved, the body rises to a higher place, because the bones and other members are lighter than water, as the same Doctor indicates at (§ *Respondeo ergo ante I*). All the more so because those parts are porous and full of air. To Consequence II, I say that this stone possesses the properties of the higher elements, just as oil, which floats on water — either because it is extremely porous and air is enclosed in its pores, which rises above water.

Article II. Whether the Elements Gravitate or Levitate in Their Own Places.

Some, who seem to be favored by Aristotle at (4 *Caeli*, T. 39), hold that elements gravitate or levitate in their own places. The common opinion, however, of ancient and recent philosophers — followed by Tatar. (4 *Caeli*, q. un., scibili quarto), the Parisians (q. 3, fol. 119), the Coimbrans (*ibid.*, c. 6, q. 2, art. 1), and Ruv. (q. ult.) — holds that the elements do not gravitate or levitate in their own centers.

Note first that gravity and levity are divided into habitual and actual. Habitual gravity — also called gravity in first act — is the quality by which a heavy body can be moved downward, and habitual levity is the quality by which a light body can be carried upward. Actual gravity is that by which a heavy body is actually carried downward, and actual levity is that by which a body is actually set in motion upward; and both are called gravity and levity in second act, or gravitation and levitation. Note second that an element heavy in a certain respect and light in a certain respect descends more easily than it ascends: water, which is heavy in a certain respect, flows more freely than earth and less freely than air; and so, if any part of earth is removed, air enters into that place, provided there is no obstacle. Hence water and air descend without any interposed obstruction, but do not ascend, because each element is bounded and circumscribed within certain limits and surfaces, and the heavy element is detained by the circumscribing surfaces lest it ascend, but is not prevented from descending.

Assertion. The elements in their own proper and natural places do indeed have habitual gravity or levity, but not actual gravity or levity. This is drawn from the Doctor at (4, d. 49, q. 13, § *Ad rationes principales I*). The first part is argued first as follows: where the essence and nature of a thing is, there too is its property and power, because the property and power follow upon the nature of which they are the proper attribute and capacity; but in their own places the elements possess their essences and natures; therefore also their properties and powers of moving themselves upward or downward, which are habitual gravity and levity. Second, elements can be moved outside their own center, as experience shows

when fire is sometimes observed falling from its own sphere, as is noted at (4 *Meteor.*, c. 4). But from act to potency the consequence is valid. And they retain the same power of moving themselves when they exist in their own places as when they remain outside their proper centers. Therefore, in their own places the elements participate in habitual gravity or levity, that is, gravity or levity in first act.

The second part is shown first by the experience of those who descend to the bottom of the sea: even though they have much water above them, they nonetheless feel no weight from the water. Furthermore, we do not feel any weight of air, even though a great quantity of air exists above our heads. Again, when a vessel full of water is in a well, it does not weigh down; but if we wish to draw it out full from the well, we clearly experience its weight. Therefore the elements in their own places neither gravitate nor levitate. Second, if elements, as they are in their own centers, were to gravitate or levitate, they would not rest naturally in them but would exist there violently, because they would be moved in the same places — and it is evident that when things are moved in their own natural places, they are moved from an external source, and so violently. Hence the common maxim of the philosophers is true: elements in their own proper places neither gravitate nor levitate.

Objection I. Aristotle at the passage cited at the beginning of this article seems to affirm that the middle elements, namely air and water, gravitate or levitate in their own places. For he says that skins filled with water or air gravitate, which can arise from nothing other than the fact that these elements gravitate or levitate in their own places. Consequence I: a piece of wood of a hundred pounds descends through air more quickly than a pound of lead, whereas in water the contrary holds: the pound of lead is carried to the bottom more quickly than the said piece of wood, as is evident to anyone observing.

Consequence II: air sometimes descends below earth and sometimes rises above air; therefore these elements gravitate or levitate in their own centers. I respond that Aristotle does not assert this. The reason why skins filled with water or air gravitate is that the air in them is dense, and dense things are heavier than rare things; and earthly vapors and atoms are mixed with said air, and therefore acquire some gravity. This is the exposition of the cited Aristotle. To Consequence I, I say that the piece of wood is heavier than a pound of lead, and therefore moves downward more quickly. As to why this does not occur in water, the reason is that the wood, on account of its pores full of air and on account of the density of the water, is impeded and its motion retarded — especially since the wood is dry; and I add that the wood is more airy and the lead more earthen. To Consequence II, I say that this occurs lest a vacuum arise in nature, as I showed in *q. art.*, *lib. 6, Phys.*

Objection II. The denser parts of earth are heavier than its rarer parts; therefore earth gravitates in its own center. Consequence: an empty vessel floats in water,

but if it is filled with water it sinks to the bottom; therefore this is a sign that water gravitates in its own place. I respond that this arises from the fact that the upper parts of earth are more porous, dry, and close to air, while its lower parts are denser and more moist, and therefore heavier. To the consequence, I say that when a vessel is filled with water, the air is expelled from it, and that it is carried downward not by reason of itself but by reason of the iron attached to it, or of some other heavy thing adhering to it, as is evident from the experience of an iron or lead vessel. But if the vessel were made entirely of wood, it does not sink to the bottom of the water, and is filled with water only by force.

Objection III. We experience that if some part of earth exists above our heads, at the center of the earth itself, it has some gravity; therefore earth gravitates in its own natural place. I distinguish the antecedent: if that part is separated from the other parts, I concede; but if it is joined together with the rest, I deny.

Question V. On the Elements in Particular.

Article I. Whether the Place of Fire Is Beneath the Concave of the Lunar Orb.

The Pythagoreans deny this, followed by Arr. (*disp. 4, sect. 3, n. 67*) and Poncius (*disp. 57, q. 7*). Aristotle affirms it at (*2 Caeli, c. 3, T. 18*) and (*c. 13, T. 73*), as do his interpreters there, and the Scholastics at (*2, d. 17*) — Scotus (*q. 2, § Si ratio ista B*), St. Bonaventure in the literal doubts, Gabriel (*q. 2, art. 1*), Ricardus (*q. 5*), Orbellus, and the rest in the same place — all teaching that there is a sphere of fire near the lunar orb.

Assertion. Scotus proves this at (*2 Reportat., d. 17, q. 2, § Item motus*) from the motion of the elements: water ascends above earth, air above water, and fire above air, as is perceived with the eyes; therefore the sphere of fire in the vault of the moon is conceded. Although, Scotus adds there, the small fire that exists below cannot reach that sphere, this arises from the great power of the containing body and the small power of the resisting body, which is corrupted before it reaches the said sphere. Poncius at the place cited, therefore, is wrong to say that Scotus does not prove the aforesaid assertion but merely presupposes it. The Doctor adds that the supreme region of air is the hottest; but this heat does not come from the middle region of the same air, because that region is cold, nor from the moon, since the moon too is virtually cold; therefore it comes from fire, whose sphere is placed above air. Augustine (*2 de gen. ad litt., c. 2 & 3*) supports this view, adducing nearly the same argument. Fire is carried upward, as experience shows — for an excited flame seeks a higher place; therefore, since each thing tends toward its own proper place, it is clearly deduced that the sphere of fire is above air.

You will say, with Poncius named above, that fire in burning coal and in red-hot iron does not rise, and indeed sometimes descends to devour its fuel; and if

anything rises, it is smoke, not fire. On the contrary, coal and iron are hard and dense; for this reason they do not burst into flame but glow, and if straw is applied to them, it immediately catches fire and the fire rises upward. And if fire sometimes descends to consume fuel, this is incidental, to prevent a vacuum from arising. Moreover, a flame is not merely smoke but flaming fire; and smoke participates in the nature of fire, and therefore tends upward. Aristotle's argument is added: each element obtains its own quality and property; and to fire belong supreme heat and supreme levity; therefore also the first and highest place among the elements, which is above air. Again, the other elements too have their own definite places and determinate centers; therefore fire also has its proper place, which is beneath the moon. To say, with Poncius at the place cited, that we experience this in the other elements but not in fire, is trivial, because reason persuades and compels that every body enjoys a definite and proper place — and flaming comets demonstrate this, being ignited and set ablaze by nothing other than the fire existing there. Finally, all sublunary things are tempered so that the universe may subsist; but unless fire existed in the concave of the lunar orb, as in its proper place, all things would not be tempered, since the moisture of air, the cold of water, would exceed the heat of subterranean fire, which is very small in comparison with the aforesaid; therefore the aforesaid sphere of fire must be conceded, supported and defended not only by authority but also by reason, whatever Poncius may say to the contrary.

Objection I. Aristotle writes at (*1 Meteor., c. 4*) that the fire that is said to be above us is not true fire; therefore according to Aristotle there is no proper sphere of fire in the concave of the lunar orb. I respond that Aristotle there does not deny absolutely that fire exists, but only in a certain respect — namely, burning, flaming, blazing, and glowing fire, such as we have here below, as is clear to anyone reading that text and the places cited at the beginning of this article, where he formally proves that there is a proper sphere of fire above air. You will press: if fire were beneath the concave of the moon, since it is maximally active and exceedingly swift in acting, it would already have devoured and consumed all sublunary things, as the philosopher cited infers. And for the same reason the same philosopher concludes that the heavens are not fiery — otherwise they would already have reduced everything to ashes. The consequence is denied, because fire is tempered by the surrounding air, by the moon, Saturn, and other celestial bodies that are virtually cold and moist, as Scotus notes at (*4, d. 49, q. 13, § Respondeo sub R*). Nor does there obtain parity with the heavens, which are far greater than the rest; hence the Philosopher rightly concluded that if the heavens were fiery, they would already have consumed everything.

Objection II. Fire, in order to be preserved, requires fuel, as daily experience attests and confirms; but in the concave of the moon there is no fuel or nourishment by which it may be fed and sustained; therefore no fire is there, but all fire is subterranean and destined either for human use or reserved for the punishment of the wicked. I distinguish the major: in its proper sphere, I deny;

outside its proper sphere, I concede. The reason is that in its proper place a thing is not assailed by contraries; but outside its own sphere it is, and therefore requires sustenance and nourishment in order to be preserved.

Objection III. If there were a proper sphere of fire, certain animals would inhabit it, as is evident in the case of the places of the other elements — for birds dwell in air, fish in water, and man and quadruped on earth; but no animal can live in fire, since it is maximally voracious and destroys and consumes whatever approaches it; therefore the sphere of fire beneath the lunar orb must be denied. If the major is conceded, the minor must be denied. For, as Berchorio attests at (*l. 10, Reduct. mor., c. 9*), the salamander lives in fire without any consumption of itself, just as a fish lives in water without corruption, because water is its natural place; and in the same way the salamander dwells in fire as in its own center. Or you may say that it is not necessary for animals to exist in all elements, since terrestrial living things dwell not at the center of the earth but only on its surface.

Article II. Whether Air Is Hot.

Assertion. Air is by its own nature hot. So Aristotle at (*2 de gener., c. 3, T. 16*), along with his disciples and interpreters there, Johannes de Magistris, Tatar., and the Parisians — against the Stoics, Arr. (*disp. 4, sect. 2, subsect. 3*), and Poncius (*disp. 56, q. 4, concl. 4*). This is deduced from Scotus at (*2, d. 14, q. 3, § Dico ad q., sub A*), who calls the higher elements — namely fire and air — hot, and the lower — water and earth — cold. It is argued first from the reason of Aristotle at the passage just cited: there are four possible and useful combinations of elemental qualities: one is heat and dryness; another is coldness and moisture; a third is moisture and heat; and a fourth is dryness and coldness. And one of these in the highest degree belongs to each element individually — namely, heat in the highest degree to fire, and dryness to earth; what remain are moisture and coldness, of which one must belong to water and the other to air. But coldness in the highest degree cannot be adapted to air, because two immediately adjacent elements are not dissimilar, otherwise they would mutually destroy each other, or could only exist in a mixed state; therefore the highest degree of moisture together with heat, though not in the highest degree, belongs to air; and consequently air is hot. Nor does it help to deny the major with Poncius at the cited place, since, besides the fact that it is handed down by Aristotle as just cited, it is argued as follows: the elements contend with one another, come together, and are tempered in order to produce a mixture, according to that well-known saying, "concordant discord and discordant concord." But if the four said combinations were not admitted, there would be no concordance and tempering among the elements; the middle elements would be the extreme and the extreme would be the middle — which is plainly adverse to the right order of the universe, and to its conservation and perpetuity.

Second, the moist — from (*2 de gener., c. 2, T. 8*) — is what is easily bounded by an alien boundary; but air is more easily bounded than water, since to bound water requires stones, logs, embankments, and things of that sort, which are made only with great labor, whereas air is more easily limited in bellows, bladders, and other vessels receiving and bounding the air. And things that are moist, with air predominating in them, are more moist than water and warmer, as is evident in the case of oil, which is hot — as Pliny says at (*l. 15, hist., c. 4*). Third, things that are rare are hot, for heat is suited to rarer bodies and melts and extends dense bodies; but air is rare and thin, and yields to all opaque and dense bodies; therefore air is hot. And so our assertion is confirmed and established by both authority and reason, whatever Poncius may endeavor to say to the contrary.

Objection I. Water, which is by nature cold, after having been heated returns to its original cold state, as experience confirms; but air is of this kind, for in the absence of the sun, at nighttime and in winter, it returns to a cold state; therefore air is by its own nature cold. Consequence: the middle region of air is extremely cold; for this reason rains, snows, hails, and things of this sort are produced in it, which clearly indicate the coldness of air. I concede the major. I distinguish the minor: intrinsically and by reason of itself, I deny; extrinsically and by reason of the vapors which, drawn up by the power of the sun, return to their original cold state, I concede. To the consequence, I say that this is brought about by antiperistasis: the vapors, having ascended to the said region and losing their external heat, return to their native cold, and being surrounded and besieged by the upper and lower regions of the same air, become intensely cold.

Objection II. Oil, which is airy, freezes more quickly than water; therefore air seems by its own nature to be cold. I concede the antecedent and deny the consequence. For the reason why oil freezes more easily than water is its thickness and fattiness. And things that are fat and thick freeze easily and quickly.

Objection III. The fanning of air cools our bodies in summer; therefore it is not an obscure sign that air is cold of itself. I concede the antecedent and deny the consequence. The reason is that at that time our bodies are hotter than the air, and therefore they are cooled by the fanning of the air; especially because through said fanning the hotter parts of the air recede from us and the cooler parts approach us, from which cooling results.

Article III. Whether Earth Is in the Middle of the World.

There is almost unanimous consensus among philosophers that the earth is situated in the middle of the world. The philosophers themselves, however, are in doubt whether the center of the world is the same as the center of gravity, and likewise whether the center of quantity is the same as the center of magnitude. Note that the center of the world is the point from which all lines drawn to the

circumference of the first mobile are equal; the center of gravity is the point of a straight line dividing a heavy body into two equal parts; and the center of magnitude is the point of a straight line dividing some quantity into two parts equal to each other.

First Assertion. The earth is placed in the middle of the universe. So Aristotle (*2 Caeli, c. 13 & 14, T. 100*), Ptolemy in the *Almagest*, Pliny (*l. 2, hist., c. 71*), the Parisians, Johannes de Magistris, Tatar., and others in their commentaries on the cited Aristotle; and Scotus does not dissent at (*2, d. 14, q. 2 & 3*), nor does Major at the same place. It is proved first: that is the center of the world to which heavy bodies descend at right angles and perpendicularly; but heavy bodies descend to the earth at right angles and perpendicularly, as experience confirms; therefore earth is constituted in the middle of the world. Second, unless earth were in the middle of the world, lunar eclipses would not occur, because the earth would not be interposed between the sun and the moon, since both planets could exist at a point of the zodiac opposite to it, without the interposition of the earth. Hence Manilius elegantly sings: "Unless the earth hung poised in its balanced weight, it would not drive the course of the world as the stars rise beneath, nor would Phoebus return to the east after setting in the west, nor would the moon govern its courses submerged through the void."

Second Assertion. The center of the universe and the center of gravity are the same; but the center of gravity is not the same as the center of magnitude. This assertion is twofold and is not discordant with Scotus just cited. The first part is shown as follows: the supremely heavy body has the lowest place in the world, as is evident from what has been said; but the lowest place in the universe is the place of earth, which is supremely heavy; therefore the center of the world and the center of gravity are the same.

The second part is argued thus: in certain places earth is heavier than everything else, as in places where earth is covered by water, and likewise where earth is denser. Moreover, earth is not perfectly spherical, as was established above; therefore the center of gravity does not coincide with the center of magnitude.

Objection. Earth is vast and immense — about whose magnitude geographers and cosmographers treat abundantly — but the center, as noted above, is a point which, from what has been said, is indivisible and impartible; therefore earth cannot be the center of the world. I concede the major. To the minor I say that earth is after the manner of a point — not absolutely and in itself, but relatively, that is, in relation to the celestial orbs, which are of the greatest and most immense magnitude.

Article IV. Whether Earth Is Higher than the Sea.

This is a problem found among both sacred and secular philosophers: whether earth rises above the sea or not. Some — such as Cicero (*2 de natura Deorum*),

Burgensis on (*c. 1 Gen.*), and Catharinus, supported by Thomas Aquinas (*1 p., q. 69, art. 1, ad 2*) — hold that earth is lower than the sea. Others, however — such as Lyran. in the postilla on (*c. 1 Gen.*) and elsewhere, Major (*2, d. 14, q. 4*), the Parisians (*2 Meteor., q. 2, fol. 98*), Johannes de Magistris (*ibid., q. 1*), and the Master at the place cited — seem not to diverge from this; and neither the Seraphic Doctor in his exposition of the letter, nor the Subtle Doctor at the same place (*q. 3, § Dico ad q., ante C*) — teach that earth is more elevated than the sea.

They argue first from Sacred Scripture. *Gen. 1*: "Let the waters that are under the heavens be gathered together into one place, and let the dry land appear" — where Lyran. at the cited place, and other noteworthy interpreters, say that the waters were forced into the hollows and caverns of the earth, and that God elevated said earth so that the waters would not flood and cover the whole earth, in order that terrestrial living things could live, and that plants, trees, and the like could sprout — toward which, perhaps, the royal Psalmist was looking when he says in *Ps. 32*: "Gathering the waters of the sea as in a flask." And he had prefaced in *Ps. 23*: "He founded it upon the seas," that is, the orb of the earth. And *Ps. 134*: "Who established the earth upon the waters." Second, from the Holy Fathers. Augustine (*q. 132 of his 1 on Gen.*), explaining the last passage of Scripture just cited, adds: "According to this expression it is rightly understood that earth is higher than water, being raised higher by the waters where terrestrial animals dwell." He writes the same in (*q. 111, l. 1, Contra adversarium legis et Prophetarum, c. 13*) and in his commentary on *Ps. 135*. Jerome on *Ps. 32* and Chrysostom (*hom. 9 ad populum Antiochenum*) support the same opinion. Third, that which is first illuminated by the sun is higher and more elevated; for experience teaches us that the sun first diffuses its light upon higher and more elevated places than upon lower and inferior ones. But the sun illuminates the earth before the water. For the sun first appears on the summits of the mountains before it appears on the sea; therefore earth rises above the sea. Fourth, rivers flow toward more inclined places, as is clear to everyone; but rivers flow into the sea; therefore it is an evident sign that the sea is lower than the earth. Again, it would be a perpetual and continuous miracle if the sea did not cover and inundate the whole earth — and the common maxim among theologians holds that miracles are not to be admitted without necessity. Finally, from high and lofty mountains the sea is seen as very low and depressed, which would plainly not be the case if the sea were higher than the earth.

Objection I. *Ps. 104*: "You have set a boundary that they shall not cross, nor shall they return to cover the earth." And in the same: "Upon the mountains the waters shall stand." "Thus far you shall come and no further, and here you shall curb your swelling waves." *Matt. 6*: "He descended to them from the boat." And *Luke 5*: "And as Jesus went up into a small boat." Therefore the sea is contiguous to earth and higher. I respond that the first two testimonies conclude nothing against us, for in them only this is contained: that God set limits to the sea, or made cavities within which the sea itself is contained and does not go beyond

them. And in the beginning of the world, water occupied the higher place and existed above the earth, since the natural place of water is above earth; but for the necessity and convenience of terrestrial living things, God raised the earth above the water, and placed it in the caverns and hollows of the earth, and there it remained until the time of the flood, when the waters floated above the mountains — where Augustine and Eugubian observe that the future tense is used for the past, because the Hebrews lack the imperfect tense and use the future in its place. After the flood, by God's command, the waters receded from the land, remaining where they were at the beginning, and there shall no longer be a flood devastating the whole earth (*Gen. 9*). To the remaining passages, I say that it is only inferred there that the ship is elevated above the contiguous earth; and therefore a person is said to go up to the ship, not to the sea. This is deduced from *Ps. 106*: "Those who go down to the sea in ships." And from *Jonah 1*: "He went down to Joppa and found a ship going to Tarshish."

Objection II. *Ecclesiastes 1*: "All the rivers run into the sea, and thence they return again to flow." Since therefore the rivers draw their origin from the sea as their principle, it is plainly shown that the sea surpasses the earth in height. I respond that this testimony must be glossed not immediately but only mediately. For the springs from which rivers rise are formed from vapors converted into water, as Aristotle teaches at (*1 Meteor., c. 13*).

Objection III. Those who sail on the high sea and toward land see the land itself as lower and more inclined than the sea; therefore it is an evident sign that the sea is higher and more elevated than the earth. I respond that the senses are then deceived. The reason is that earth is of a dark color, and things that are dark and obscure appear low and deep; for this reason painters, wishing to represent the depth of a well, use a dark color. Thus earth appears lower than the sea because it is of a dark color. I add that "high" is sometimes used for "deep"; hence *Ps. 68*: "I have come into the depths of the sea" — where Lyran. renders it as "into the deep of the sea." And Virgil intimates this in (*1 Aeneid*): "Scarce out of sight of Sicilian land they were spreading their sails upon the deep."

You may ask whether the earth is immovable. Aristotle responds affirmatively at (*2 Caeli, T. 102*), and it is confirmed by *Ecclesiastes 1*: "But the earth remains forever," that is, immovable, as Lyran. interprets. Hence the Church sings in the hymn for Tuesday at Vespers: "You gave the earth as immovable." The reason is that earth is the heaviest and the center of the world, and therefore stands immovable, like the center of a sphere. Pliny assents to this at (*2 hist., c. 5*). Take finally, as a complement to this work, the admonition of St. Augustine on *Ps. 145*: "Contemplate the whole heaven, all these things together very good, because God made all things very good; beauty of the work on every side, which commends to you the craftsman; you marvel at the fabric, love its maker. Do

not be occupied with what has been made, and turn away from him who made it."

Books on Generation and Corruption

Preface

After the two works of natural philosophy — the first contained in the eight books of the *Physics*, and the second in the four books *On the Heavens and the World* — Aristotle hands down a third, comprised in two books *On Generation and Corruption*, which we now undertake to treat. The proximate and adequate subject of these books, as established in the Scotist school, is the generable and corruptible body. For just as in the books *On the Heavens* the ingenerable and incorruptible body is established as their immediate and total subject, so in these books the generable and corruptible body stands as their proper and adequate object. The reason is that the whole of Physics regards the natural body as its genus, and its parts regard the species of that same body, among which the generable and corruptible body is numbered. I divide this entire matter into four books: the first is on generation and corruption, the second on intension and remission, the third on action and reaction, and the fourth on mixture and the mixed body.

Book I

On Generation and Corruption

Although in the aforementioned books Aristotle treats of the other motions already described, these books are nonetheless entitled *On Generation and Corruption* because generation and corruption are their more distinguished and noble parts; and that denomination is taken from the nobler part, as Augustine acknowledges (*2 Retract.*, cap. 4). Now since alteration precedes generation, as the Doctor teaches (*1 dist. 1, quaest. 4, §. Si tenendo*) following Aristotle (*8 Phys. 1*), the reason being that generation does not occur without prior alteration — for the action of an agent expelling the prior form is required so that a new form may be introduced into matter through that same agent's action, in order that a new composite may be generated — we therefore rightly set out alteration first, before we treat of generation.

Question I: On Alteration

Article I: What Alteration Is

That alteration exists, no one calls into doubt, since it is clearly confirmed by manifest experience. What alteration is, however, is not a matter of agreement among philosophers. For some, taking the name of alteration more broadly, and others more narrowly, describe and define alteration in various and differing ways. For a more convenient and easier grasp of this, note the following.

Note first, from the force of the word, that alteration is a motion by which a subject is rendered *alterum* — that is, altered or changed accidentally. This is perhaps what Porphyry had in mind in the *Isagoge*, in the chapter on difference, when he says that accidental difference makes a thing *alterum* and essential difference makes it *aliud*, because the former merely alters the subject insofar as it differs from another accidentally, while the latter constitutes the subject in its quidditative and essential being and distinguishes it from everything else. Alteration is chiefly used in two ways. First, broadly, for any successive motion that alters and changes a subject — in which sense air is said to be altered when it passes from dark to bright, and a man when he passes from ignorance to knowledge. Hence Aristotle (*8 Phys.*, T. 26) writes that the soul undergoes the motion of alteration in imagining and opining. Second, strictly, for a continuous successive motion having contraries — in which sense a man is altered when he passes from cold to hot, from white to black, and vice versa. In this way philosophers commonly speak of alteration with Aristotle (*1 De gen.* 1) and (*1 De caelo* 20), where it is said that the heavens are exempt from alteration because contrary qualities do not exist in them; and in (*cap.* 4, T. 24), alteration is distinguished from augmentation, diminution, and local motion.

Note second, from the same passage (*ibid.*, *cap.* 4, T. 23), where alteration is defined thus: alteration is a motion with respect to contrary extreme or intermediate qualities, the same sensible subject remaining. All the parts of this definition are now explained. It is called *motion* as its genus, because in this it agrees with the others. There is added *according to contrary extreme or intermediate qualities* as the difference, since in this it differs from improper and metaphorical alteration, mentioned in the preceding note. There is subjoined *the same sensible subject remaining*, to distinguish it from generation and corruption, in which the subject — that is, the composite — is newly brought into being or corrupted, as will be made clear in the two following questions.

The assertion: alteration is rightly defined by Aristotle as cited. Scotus does not disagree (*9 Met.*, *quaest.* 14, §. *Quarto*) and (*4 d.* 11, *quaest.* 1, §. *De primo.* 4) and in the *Reportata* (*ibid.*, §. *Dico primo*), nor do the Parisian doctors (*1 De gen.*, *in com.*), John of Mairs, Tataret, and others there. The proof: a good definition is one given through genus and difference, as I have often forewarned; and the definition just stated is of this kind, as is clear from the second note; therefore it is well given. Furthermore, by it the nature and essence of alteration is best explained, and it is distinguished from everything that is not alteration; it enjoys all the properties of a good definition and contains nothing superfluous or deficient; therefore it is to be counted among correct definitions.

Objection: the aforesaid definition of alteration seems to apply to quality of the first and fourth species; but alteration properly so called is accommodated only to quality of the third species, as Aristotle indicates in the cited passage where he mentions the passions that pertain only to the third species of quality; therefore

the said definition is not genuine and proper. I concede the major and deny the minor. For Aristotle illustrates the said definition with examples of health and sickness, which are placed in the first species of quality, and of metal, which is now round and now angular, whose seat belongs to the fourth species of quality; hence alteration does not seem to be restricted and confined solely to the third species of quality.

The Complutenses reply (*disput. 4, quaest. 1, §. 3*) by saying that alteration is located per se in the third species of quality, and per accidens in the other classes of quality, since the prior qualities — for example, by the alteration of hot and cold — bring it about that what was healthy becomes sick, and vice versa. But this reply does not remove the difficulty just raised, since the Philosopher (*1 Praedicam., cap. 4*), setting out the series of qualities per se, includes health and sickness in the first species among them; therefore health and sickness reside per se, and not per accidens, in the first species. Furthermore, a correct definition is given of things per se; since Aristotle has therefore supplied a fitting definition of alteration and exemplified it with health and sickness, it plainly follows that these are qualities per se, and not per accidens, located in their first class. What is more, the same Philosopher, compiling the catalogue of the third species of quality, does not list health and sickness, though he would have been obliged to include them there if they belonged to it per se. Moreover, certain not undistinguished interpreters of his render the word *passiones* as *affections*, a term that can be adapted to all qualities of whatever species. Finally, alteration is adequately divided into intension and remission, according to the said Complutenses (*cit. quaest. 2, §. 2*); but health and sickness are intensible and remissible; therefore Aristotle rightly places them in the first species of quality as qualities per se — with the agreement of Scotus (*Quol. 13, §. Nunc tertio. 5 & T*).

Article II: Whether, If Generation Were Impossible, Alteration Would Likewise Be Impossible

Aegidius (*1 De gen., cap. 1*) and Saxony (*ibid., q. 3*) assert as simply true that if generation were impossible, alteration would likewise be impossible. Others, however — such as the Parisian doctors (*in praesenti, dub. 3, fol. 122*), Toletus (*quaest. 1*), and Poncius (*disput. 53, quaest. 1*) — absolutely admit that alteration is possible even if generation were impossible.

Note that this dispute is not about alteration that has no contrary — for it is plainly clear that alteration of this kind is not conjoined with generation, as in the case of illumination. Nor is it about mediate quality, but immediate quality, that is, quality which immediately affects the sense, as Gadus infers and explains (*Quol. 13*) from Scotus there (*§. Nunc tertio sub S*). For when a man passes from ignorance to knowledge, there is a mediate alteration that is neither preceded nor followed by any generation simply speaking, as the Doctor indicates (*1 dist. 3, quaest. 6, §. Tertia quaestio sub X*).

First assertion: absolutely speaking, alteration can exist without generation. This is deduced from Scotus as cited. It is proven first: the prior can simply exist without the posterior, especially when there is no essential dependence between them. But alteration is prior to generation, for it is necessary that the elements first be altered so that the mixed body may be generated, and that matter be prepared and disposed to receive the new form and for the new composite to be generated; therefore, if there were no generation, alteration could still exist. Second: an accident can simply exist without a substance, as is evident in the Sacrament of the Eucharist; therefore the production of the former can exist without the production of the latter. But alteration and its terminus are accidents, while generation — though formally an accident — has as its terminus a substance; therefore, since there is no essential ordering between these two, it is aptly concluded that alteration can exist without generation existing.

Second assertion: naturally, through the argument from final cause, if generation were impossible, alteration would likewise be impossible. This seems to be the view of Aristotle (*1 De gen. 1*) and previously (*8 Phys. 1*), from which Scotus in the places cited above is not far removed. Proof first: generation does not occur without the suitable preparation and due disposition of matter; but such disposition and preparation of matter is not brought about without alteration; therefore, if there were no generation, there would be no alteration. Second: generation does not occur without the action of contraries, since the preceding composite must be corrupted in order for the new one to be generated; but this does not happen without alteration, as is clear in the case of fire altering wood through heat and converting it into its own substance so that new fire may be generated; therefore, if generation is removed, alteration is removed as well.

Objection I, against the first assertion: things that are essentially ordered to one another cannot exist, one without the other. But alteration and generation are essentially ordered. For the order fixed by nature is that generation does not occur without prior alteration; therefore, etc. I concede the major and deny the minor. For even if this holds naturally, it is not absolutely true, because sometimes alteration occurs without generation following — as is evident in the case of almonds blossoming quickly but not bearing fruit.

Objection II, against the second assertion: every form and matter requires certain dispositions and determinate circumstances, by the removal of which it is removed, and by the positing of which it is posited. But such dispositions are introduced into matter by the natural agent through alteration, so that the new composite may be generated; therefore, if generation is impossible, alteration is likewise impossible. I respond that the argument concludes with respect to what in fact happens, because they are naturally connected and this is generally what

occurs — but not with respect to what is possible, as is effectively argued by what I have adduced above.

Article III: Whether Alteration Is Distinguished from Generation

This question is raised by Aristotle (*1 De gen., cap. 1*) and by his interpreters, particularly the Parisian doctors, Tatarct, and John of Mairs (*ibid., quaest. 3*).

First assertion: alteration and generation differ from one another. The Doctor holds this (*1 dist. 3, quaest. 6, §. Tertia quaest. sub X*) and (*4 Rep. d. 11, quaest. 1, §. Dico primo*). It is proven principally in three ways. First, from the definition of each: things that receive distinct definitions are distinguished from one another; but alteration and generation receive different definitions; therefore they differ from one another. The major is evident. The minor is at hand: for generation is a change of the whole into the whole, no sensible subject remaining, while alteration is a motion according to contrary qualities, the same sensible subject persisting, as was established in the first article of this question. Second, from their terms: things whose terms are distinct are themselves mutually distinct; but the *termini a quo* and *termini ad quem* of the said transmutations are distinguished; therefore the transmutations themselves are separated from one another. The major is known from (*8 Phys., quaest. 2, artic. 2*). The minor is clear: the *terminus a quo* of generation is privative, since generation is a passage from the non-being of substance to the being of substance, while alteration is a passage from one contrary quality to another; according to Aristotle (*in Postpraedicam., cap. 4, T. 24*), the *terminus a quo* of alteration is positive. The *terminus ad quem* of generation is substance, and of alteration is an accidental quality. And that motion is specified by its *terminus ad quem* was shown in the place just cited. Third, from the subject: for in generation no subject persists, whereas in alteration the same subject endures. Again, generation is instantaneous while alteration is temporal. Furthermore, generation is production simply speaking, while alteration is production in a qualified sense; therefore generation and alteration are distinguished from one another.

Second assertion: alteration differs from the other motions. Aristotle teaches this (*cit., at the end of cap. 4*), and Scotus does not depart from him (*ibid.*). It is proven, both because the definition of alteration is separated from the definitions of the others, and because its *terminus ad quem* differs from their *termini ad quem*, as the Philosopher rightly demonstrates (*in Postpraedicam., praecit.*). The distinction between alteration and the remaining motions is therefore well established.

Objection I, against the first assertion: every motion by which something is disposed differently now than before is alteration; but generation is of this kind, since matter receiving a new form is disposed differently now than before. Nor does it help to say that matter receives a substantial form while the composite that is altered receives an accidental form — for whether the form be substantial

or accidental, the subject receiving either or both forms is altered. I respond that the major is insufficient; one must add that the subject receives a quality, and that alteration is a quality. But when matter receives a new substantial form, it is not properly said to be altered by receiving it. You will press: the subject of generation and the subject of alteration is common to both, namely matter; therefore my response is of no avail. I say that matter is the immediate and proximate subject of generation, but the mediate, remote, and partial — not total — subject of alteration, just as the composite is.

Objection II: the subject of generation and of alteration is a being in act, since in the view of Scotus matter shares in an entitative act; therefore generation and alteration do not differ with respect to subject. I respond: although the subject of each is a being in act, the distinction lies in this — that the subject of alteration is a complete and perfect being, while the subject of generation is an incomplete and imperfect being.

Article IV: Whether Alteration Is a Continuous Motion

Aegidius (*1 De gen., quaest. 16*), to whom Jandun seems to assent (*8 Phys., quaest. 5*), holds that alteration is a continuous motion with respect to intension but not with respect to extension. Others, cited by the Coimbrans (*1 De gen., cap. 4, quaest. 2, artic. 1*) and the Complutenses (*ibid., disp. 4, quaest. 10, §. primo*), defend alteration as continuous in neither way, holding that it occurs through certain pauses and discrete instants — for example, fire, in order to heat wood, produces the first degree of heat and then briefly rests, and after a slight pause causes the second degree of heat, and so on with the others. The common view of the Scotists and Nominalists, however, teaches that alteration is a continuous motion, to which subscribe Suarez (*disp. 46 Met., Sect. 3*), Toletus (*in praesenti, quaest. 6*), and Ruverio (*tract. 3, cap. 4, quaest. 2*).

Note first that the question here is not whether an alteration already underway can be interrupted — for experience testifies that this is possible and not uncommon. Fire beginning to heat wood, meeting a stronger contrary that resists and overcomes it, ceases, or for some other reason does not continue the heating of the said wood. The difficulty is rather whether alteration is by its very nature capable of being perpetual and continuous, such that sustained succession does not oppose or conflict with it.

Note second, from a double standpoint a motion can be called continuous. First, on the part of the subject, because the subject is changed and altered by the continuous flux of form — as wood is continuously and successively heated by the heat continuously produced and emitted by fire. Second, on the part of the form, which namely continuously, without any interruption, intensifies and perfects the subject in which it exists — as whiteness, through the action of whitening, whitens a wall and perfects it by continuous whitening, rendering it progressively more white, because the whiteness itself is more intense and more

perfect by the addition of several new degrees. Hence a double alteration is distinguished: extensive alteration, which regards the subject and the place through which it is diffused and extended; and intensive alteration, which regards the new degrees added to the form itself, in virtue of which the form itself is said to be intensified.

Assertion: alteration is a continuous motion, both with respect to intension and with respect to extension. This is handed down by the Doctor (*1 dist. 17, quaest. 3, §. Hic dicitur, versu. Item quarto*) and (*2 dist. 2, quaest. 9, sub N*), and it is suggested by Augustine (*1 de 83 quaest., quaest. 9*): *When hair grows, it happens without any interruption*. Proof first, from Aristotle (*5 Phys., T. 39*): every motion is continuous; and he had premised in the same book (*T. 18*) that alteration is one of the species of motion properly speaking; and (*T. 41*) he adds that a motion is not one in number unless it is continuous; therefore in the Peripatetic school alteration is a continuous motion. Second: alteration and generation are distinguished principally in that generation occurs in an instant and alteration in time, as is clear from the preceding article. But the measure must correspond to the measured; and since alteration is measured by time, and time itself is continuous, it is plainly inferred that alteration is to be enrolled among continuous motions. Third: an agent altering some subject does not desist from its action if the subject upon which it acts is rightly disposed and well prepared — as is evident in the case of dry wood properly placed near fire, which is continuously heated and burned by that same fire, and likewise in the case of fire heating the water in a pot, never ceasing if sufficient combustible material is supplied and no obstacle is interposed. Moreover, it is incredible and implausible that a necessary and natural agent, when unimpeded, should not act and should rest, having an apt and duly disposed subject. For a cause of such rest would have to be assigned, and why it acts at this moment rather than at another; and since no plausible reason can be adduced to dissolve the said motive, it is plainly deduced that alteration is a continuous successive motion.

Objection I: from (*8 Phys., T. 23*) — to say that alteration occurs continuously is to oppose things very manifestly evident. Therefore according to Aristotle alteration is not a continuous motion. I respond that in that passage the Philosopher argues against those who hold that alteration is always occurring and never ceases, so that there is never any interval to be assigned in which the subject is not being altered — for example, that water is always being heated and continuously agitated — which the Philosopher denies. For he asserts that alteration sometimes ceases, and hence that the subject of alteration is sometimes exempt from alteration itself.

Objection II: that motion whose terms cannot be continuous cannot itself be continuous. But the terms of alteration cannot be continuous, because they are contraries; therefore alteration is not a continuous motion. Hence one reads at (*6 Phys., T. 18*) that motions occurring in contraries or contradictories are not

continuous. I concede the major. I distinguish the minor: if the subject is not duly disposed and one contrary is stronger than the other, I concede; but if the subject is apt and rightly prepared and one contrary is weaker and more feeble than the other, I deny. This is how Aristotle in the cited passage is to be understood.

Objection III: if the subject does not rest briefly during alteration, then in every instant a new degree is produced, and since the instants are infinite the degrees produced or to be produced will likewise be infinite, and thus an actual infinite would be given, which has been rejected (*quaest. 5, 1. 5 Phys.*). I deny the consequent, because alteration is not effected in an instant but in time, like every other continuous motion. What is more, those instants, like points and proportional parts, exist in potency in the continuum and not in act; therefore it does not follow that an actual infinite is given, even if the stated consequence be granted.

Question II: On Generation

Article I: Whether There Is Substantial Generation

Philosophers earlier than Plato and Aristotle — namely Leucippus, Democritus, Empedocles, and Anaxagoras — deny all substantial generation, holding that all things pre-exist in act and are only moved in a certain manner, that is, through aggregation or separation, rarity or density, as is recorded (*1 Phys., cap. 4, T. 33*) and (*1 De gen. 1*) and elsewhere. This view takes its origin from the axiom *ex nihilo nihil fit* — from nothing, nothing comes to be. For if a thing were generated anew, it seems to them that such a thing would necessarily come from nothing. All later philosophers — the Academics, the Peripatetics, and their followers — oppose these, teaching that substantial generation exists.

Note first, and recall from what was said (*2 Phys., quaest. 4, artic. 1*), that substantial forms are admitted as really distinct from matter; for since we experience that various and diverse operations proceed from agents, and since matter is only passive (*1 De gen., T. 53*) and (*2 eius, T. 53*), it must consequently be maintained that those actions proceed from substantial forms. For form gives being and consequently operation. And the composite coalescing from matter and form is the *principium quod* of operations, while the form is the *principium quo* of those same operations, as I have noted elsewhere.

Note second, from Aristotle (*1 De gen., cap. 3*) and Scotus (*11 Met., Summa 4, in expositione cap. 3*), that the natural production of a substance is called generation simply speaking, and the composite generated by it is called a being simply speaking; while the production of an accident is called generation in a qualified sense, and the accident produced by it is called a being in a qualified sense. Nor does it matter that Aristotle in the same passage subjoins that the generation of earth is generation in a qualified sense, although earth itself is a substance — for

he does not say this absolutely but relatively, namely with respect to fire, whose generation is called production simply speaking because it is nobler and more excellent than the generation of earth.

Assertion: substantial generation is to be admitted. It is defended by the Doctor (*1 dist. 3, quaest. 6, §. Tertia quaestio sub X*) and (*dist. 13, quaest. un.*), by Ockham, Gabriel, and other scholastics there, preceded by Augustine (*3 contra Maximum, cap. 6*), who says *man generates man, and dog, dog*, and the same in (*ibid., cap. 14*). Proof first: natural agents produce things like themselves — fire generates fire, and man generates man, as Augustine has just cited, and before him Aristotle (*2 Phys., T. 26*); but such production is substantial generation, because by it is produced the composite, which is a complete substance; therefore substantial generation is to be conceded. This is corroborated: there are three sufficient principles of substantial generation — matter, form, and privation (*1 Phys., cap. 6, T. 7*). Moreover, accident generates accident — as heat generates heat — therefore substance too generates substance. Again, alteration is possible, and it is ordered toward substance; therefore the generation of substance is also possible. For if the means is possible, so too is the end to be acquired through that means. Second: matter desires substantial form (*1 Phys., T. 81*); but this desire cannot be satisfied except through generation, by which the substantial form is drawn out from the potency of matter by the natural agent. Furthermore, the same species is conserved and perpetuated (*2 Anima, T. 34*); but such conservation and perpetuation of the species is not effected except through the substantial generation of many individuals. For we observe that a grain of wheat is corrupted and from the corrupted grain a stalk is generated, in which many grains of the same wheat are produced, as the Savior forewarned (*Ioan. 12*): *Unless a grain of wheat falling into the ground die, it remains alone; but if it die, it brings forth much fruit*. Substantial generation is therefore to be conceded.

Objection I: if substantial generation were given, it would come to be from non-being simply speaking, since its terminus is being simply speaking, namely substance; but non-being simply speaking is nothing, and from nothing nothing comes to be; therefore no substantial generation is to be admitted physically. I respond to the major by a distinction: it would come to be from non-being simply speaking, both in act and in potency, which is nothing — I deny; it would come to be from non-being simply speaking in act but in potency — I concede, because from that which is not in act but is in potency, something can be made that is in act, as is clear from what has been established. You will press: what is generated is generated from something that is a being in act — as air is made from fire, which is a being in act; therefore generation does not occur from a being in potency. I distinguish the antecedent: from something that is a being in entitative act, which is matter possessing that act of being and existing in subjective potency, I concede; from a being that is complete and perfect in act and persisting in the generated thing, I deny — for only matter, which is an

incomplete and partial being, persists in the generated thing, as it had existed in the corrupted one.

Objection II: the whole is that which coalesces from its parts; therefore the whole is generated when all its parts are generated. For from (*1 De gen., cap. 4, T. 23*) generation is a change of the whole into the whole, no sensible subject remaining. But the parts of the whole are not generated — especially matter, which is ingenerable and incorruptible (*2 De gen., T. 51*); therefore there is no substantial generation. I concede the antecedent and deny the consequent. For it suffices for the generation of the whole that the parts be simultaneously united and constitute the whole itself, even if some part of it pre-existed — namely matter — and another part, namely form, is drawn out from the pre-existing matter; just as in the resurrection, which is a kind of regeneration, all the parts of the composite pre-exist and pre-exist, as is recorded in Scripture about Lazarus restored to life (*Ioan. 11*). You will press: form is nobler than matter; therefore if matter is not generated, neither is form. But if form is not generated, neither then is generation, and so generation is impossible. I say that form is not properly made but drawn out from the potency of matter, while the composite is what is properly made and generated (*1 Phys., T. 64*) and elsewhere.

Objection III: from (*8 Phys., T. 69*) — the same thing cannot simultaneously be and come to be; but if substantial generation were admitted, the same thing would simultaneously be and come to be, since generation occurs in an instant; therefore generation should rather be eliminated than that the said inconvenience and absurdity be conceded. I respond that the testimony of the Philosopher is to be understood of successive things, not of instantaneous things, which is what generation is.

Article II: What Generation Is

The Coimbrans (*1 De gen., cap. 4, quaest. 9, artic. 1*), Ruverio (*tract. quaest.*) and others hold that generation is essentially a change. Against them stand Scotus (*1 d. 2, quaest. 7*), Mayr (*ibid., d. 4, quaest. 1*), Vorrilong (*same dist.*), Alexander (*3 p., quaest. 7, num. 9*), Arriaga (*disput. 1 De gen., Sect. 1*), and the Complutenses (*ibid., disput. 2, quaest. 2, §. 4*), who deny that generation precisely and absolutely essentially includes change.

Note first that generation is used in three ways. First, for the production of any being whatsoever, whether substance or accident — in which sense Aristotle (*5 Phys., T. 7*) writes: *Generation is a change from non-subject to subject* — that is, from privative to positive, as from non-man a man is generated, and from non-white a white thing is generated. Second, for the production of a living thing only — in which sense generation is described as the production of a living thing from a living principle conjoined with life, unto the likeness of nature. In this sense St. Augustine (*2 contra Maximum, at the end*) says that Adam was not generated but made by God. Third, for the production of substance alone, whether that which

is generated by it be living or not. It is in this third sense that philosophers treat of generation in the present question, following Aristotle (*1 De gen., T. 23*), who defines it in these words: *Generation is a change of the whole into the whole, no sensible subject remaining*. This definition does not differ from the others given by the same Aristotle, as Poncius shows in this place.

Note second that these three — origin, production, and generation — stand in relation to each other as the more general and the less general. Every production is an origin, but not every origin is a production; for the divine attributes originate and spring from the divine essence, yet are not produced. Likewise, a passion originates from the nature of which it is a passion, but properly speaking is not produced from it. Furthermore, every generation is both a production and an origin, but not every production and origin is a generation. For the Holy Spirit is produced and originates, but is not generated, as I showed at length in the (*Tractatus de Deo trino, disp. 1, quaest. 5*).

First assertion: generation is not essentially a change. The Doctor holds this (*ibid.*) and (*dist. 5, quaest. 2, §. Ideo tenendo E & F*) and (*dist. 13, quaest. un., §. Ad argumenta ante Q*). Proof first: change, from (*5 & 6 Phys.*) as cited by Scotus (*2 dist. 1, quaest. 5, §. Secundum primam opinionem T*), is when a subject holds itself differently through the reception of something new; but generation is not of this kind, because what is generated did not previously exist, and through generation it acquires a total being anew; therefore generation is not essentially a change. You will say: through generation matter is changed by receiving a new form that it previously lacked; therefore generation is essentially a change. Against: if matter did not pre-exist but were produced and generated together with the form, then generation would exist without change — and so generation is not essentially a change. Furthermore, although matter is indeed changed by the reception of the new form, it does not follow well that generation is formally a change, as Fonseca pursues at length (*5 Met., cap. 13, quaest. 9, sect.*).

Second: the generation of the divine Word does not essentially include any change, as no Catholic denies; therefore generation, taken precisely, is not formally a change. For change presents imperfection, which is far from divine things; therefore, since generation belongs to God the Son, it is rightly deduced that generation in its essential being does not include change. You will say: there is a disparity, because the generation of the Son of God is eternal and infinite, whereas the generation that belongs to created things is temporal and finite, and hence essentially a change. Against: although they are distinguished from each other in these respects, nevertheless they share a common univocal notion — just as God and creature agree in the common univocal notion of being. Therefore, just as divine generation does not include change, so too created generation does not.

Third: if the sacramental species are corrupted and from them a worm is generated, since no matter pre-exists there, generation is then had without any

change; therefore generation does not in itself include change. You will say: given that hypothesis, what occurs is not generation but the pure drawing out of form from matter, and so it does not follow that generation can exist without change. Against: whatever is produced in created things is either created or generated; a worm, in the given case, is not created, because it is not made from nothing; therefore it is generated, because it is produced from matter newly created by God. Furthermore, when a form is drawn out from the potency of matter, generation is had, because by it the composite is brought into being. Again, if the sole drawing out of form were distinct from generation, there would not be generation; but the worm is truly generated from the said species; therefore it is generated by true generation and not by some other action distinct from it.

Second assertion: generation is formally the production from the substance of something, or a relation intrinsically accruing to the generating thing with respect to the generated. This is Scotus (*3 d. 8, quaest. un.*). Proof first, from (*5 Met., cap. de relatione, T. 20*), where are listed the relations founded on active and passive power, among which active and passive generations are numbered. Second: that by which certain things are mutually referred to one another is formally and intrinsically a relation; but through generation the generator and the generated mutually regard each other; therefore generation is the aforesaid relation. The major is clear from what was said in the (*Logic, quaest. de relatione*), and the minor is evident from the same place. Third, from the common sense of theologians and universal agreement: the generation of the divine Word is the relation by which the Word itself is constituted in personal being; therefore if generation in divine things is formally a relation, so too in created things, since the same reason holds in both.

You will say: relation belongs to the genus of the sterile, as I have repeatedly emphasized above; but generation in the generating thing is active; therefore generation is not formally a relation. I concede the major and distinguish the minor: generation is called active as a productive and effective principle of the generated term, I deny; but extrinsically, because it results from that in which such a productive principle formally resides, I concede.

You will press: action, which according to Scotus is a relation, is the *principium quo* of the term's production — as heating is the principle by which fire heats; therefore the same must be maintained of generation. It must be replied that action, which belongs to the genus of action, is a relation extrinsically accruing, while generation is a relation intrinsically accruing; hence it is no wonder if the former is productive, but the latter is not.

Objection I: from Aristotle (*1 De gen., cap. 4, T. 13*) — *generation is a change of the whole into the whole, no sensible subject remaining*; and (*cap. 5 of the same book, T. 25*) — *generation is a change from substance in potency to substance in act*; and (*8 Phys., cap. 7, toward T. 57, 58*) — *generation is a change from non-being to being*. But what enters

into the definition of something in the nominative is essential and quidditative to it; change enters into the definition of generation; therefore change is intrinsic and essential to it. I respond that generation is rather described than defined by Aristotle; for the Philosopher describes and explains it through certain circumstances. Since from that which generation is in created things, change follows it. But absolutely and precisely generation is not a change, as is proven in the first assertion.

Objection II: the same Stagirite (*5 Phys., T. 51*), inquiring into and asserting the difference between alteration and the other motions on the one hand and generation on the other, subjoins that generation is a change. But if change were not intrinsic and essential to generation, the said difference would be null. It therefore seems that according to Aristotle, change is enclosed in the essence of generation. I respond that this is indeed one difference, but not the proximate and precise cause — in much the same way that in the matter of creation I asserted that artisans cannot create because they work through a body, though this is not the chief motive but rather that they are not independent; likewise generation is distinguished from alteration and the other motions because it is a change, yet this is not the precise cause — rather, it is because motion is successive while generation is instantaneous; and because through motion an accident is produced while through generation a substance is generated; and generation is a production from the substance of the producer.

Objection III: three principles of natural generation are posited — namely matter, form, and privation; but where privation is a principle, there is change, for matter passes from privation to form; therefore generation is a change. Hence Scotus (*2 d. 1, quaest. 3, §. Tenentes autem ab F*) subjoins that generation necessarily includes change. I concede the major and distinguish the minor: per se and essentially, I deny; per accidens and concomitantly, I concede. This is how Scotus in the cited passage is to be interpreted — for created generation carries change with it, because privation of the form always precedes and matter passes from privation of the form to the form itself. Nevertheless, absolutely and precisely generation includes no change.

Article III: Whether Generation Is Instantaneous

Some — among whom are Thomas de Vio (*Nip., quaest. 36, artic. 6*) and Hervaeus (*tract. de unitate formarum, q. 17*) — not distinguishing the action of alteration from the action of generation, maintain that generation is successive and occurs in time. But Scotus (*2 d. 2, quaest. 9, sub L*), Mayr (*ibid., d. 19, quaest. un.*), Lichetus (*d. 16, at the end*), the Coimbrans (*1 De gen., cap. 4, quaest. 12, artic. 1*), Ruverio (*ibid., tract. 1, quaest. 5*) and others, recognizing that the action of alteration is distinct from the action of generation, teach that generation is instantaneous.

Note that generation is taken in two ways. In one way, for the prior disposition of the subject together with the introduction of the newly produced form into

that same subject — in which sense generation thus taken can be called successive and temporal, because its dispositions and preparations are successive and temporal. In another way, for the sole introduction and production of the substantial form into aptly disposed and duly prepared matter — and in this sense generation is momentary.

First assertion: alteration and generation are two actions distinct from one another. This is defended by the Doctor (*1 d. 3, quaest. 6*) below and (*4 Rep. d. 11, quaest. 1, §. Dico primo*). Proof first, from Aristotle in the (*Postpraedicamenta, cap. 4*) distinguishing alteration from generation, and (*3 Phys., cap. 2, T. 6*) and (*5 of the same work, cap. 1, T. 9*) and elsewhere confirming the same. The reason is that alteration is between contrary terms — as from hot to cold, and from moist to dry — while generation is between contradictory terms — as from non-substance to substance; therefore according to Aristotle they are distinct actions. Second: distinct principles receive distinct actions and principiations, as is clear from (*1 Phys.*); but substance and accidents are distinct principles, since they are distinct members of being; but generation is attributed to substance, as (*2 Phys., T. 26*) — *the sun and man generate man* — while alteration is attributed to accident — for it is by heat and cold, health and sickness that a man is altered, and a wall by whiteness and blackness, which are accidents; therefore alteration is a different action from generation.

You will say: if this argument concluded, substance would be immediately active and operative, although action and operation are commonly attributed to accident alone. I reply to this objection by conceding that substance is the active principle of substantial generation. For although substance does not operate except through prior accidents disposing and suitably preparing the subject for the introduction of the substantial form into it, nevertheless substance itself is the productive and generative principle of substance, as I will clearly and effectively demonstrate below. Third: distinct terms argue for distinct ways by which one tends and moves toward them; but the terminus of generation is substance and the terminus of alteration is quality; therefore generation and alteration are established as distinct ways and actions by which the said terms are made and acquired.

You will say: this is effected through natural resultance — for from the fact that the subject is aptly disposed through alteration, the new form is drawn out, the old form expelled, a new composite comes to be, and the old one is corrupted. Against: quite apart from the fact that such resultance occurs through true efficient causation — as is clear in the case of a passion that arises from its subject and of a relation that is co-produced once the extremes are posited — that drawing out is a different action from alteration, because it tends toward a different terminus, namely the substantial form. And it was decided in (*8 Phys., quaest. 2, artic. 1 & 2*) that motion is distinguished according to its *terminus ad quem*. Furthermore, alteration can occur without generation; therefore the

former is distinct from the latter. The antecedent is clear, since the former is prior and the latter posterior, and I showed above that the prior can exist without the posterior. Moreover, if the agent altering desists from alteration — as when the one whitening a wall ceases from its whitening — then there is undoubtedly alteration without generation; and hence the one is an action distinct from the other.

Second assertion: generation is instantaneous. This is handed down by the Doctor at the citations near the beginning of this article, and it is suggested by Augustine (*3 Trin.*). Proof first, from (*5 Phys., T. 9, 10*): there is no motion per se toward substance; but the terminus of generation is substance, and motion occurs in time because it is successive; therefore generation, which is a change distinct from motion, occurs in an instant. Second: the measure corresponds to the measured, for they must be of the same kind; but generation and its terminus are indivisible, since it is permanent; therefore its measure is impartite and indivisible — namely, an instant. Third: unless generation were instantaneous and momentary, the same matter in number would be simultaneously informed by several forms, and one and the same individual would share in diverse species and would be a multiple and diverse individual, singular thing, and supposit — since it would be under the form of water, fire, and the like — as Mayr rightly inferred in the beginning of this article cited. Furthermore, illumination occurs in an instant, as Scotus notes (*5 Met., quaest. 7, §. Ad 2 argumentum*). And the Body of Christ is brought or produced in an instant in the consecrated host through the sacramental words; therefore likewise generation occurs in an instant.

Objection I: in the (*Postpraedicamenta*) generation is placed among the species of motion; therefore, since motion is successive and temporal, generation is likewise successive and temporal. The same is read (*3 Phys., cap. 2, T. 6*) and (*6 of the same work, T. 54, 55*): *what is changed is changed in time, not in an instant*.

Confirmation I, from Anselm (*in Monol.*): a substance that is gradually destroyed is produced with less and less being. Confirmation II, from Scotus as just mentioned: certain illuminations are successive; the same must be maintained of generation. I respond that in those places *motion* is taken generically, as it abstracts from motion taken specifically and from change — just as in the chapter on quality, *disposition* is taken generically, insofar as it encompasses both *habit* and *disposition* properly and specifically taken. To the last testimony I say either that the Philosopher there speaks of local change, or of change insofar as it encompasses the prior dispositions of the subject about to undergo change of form. Anselm for the first confirmation, and Scotus for the second, are to be interpreted in the same way.

Objection II: a created agent is of finite and feeble power; but to act in an instant requires supreme and infinite power. For this reason Aristotle (*8 Phys., T. 10; 12 Met., T. 29*) subjoins that God alone acts in an instant; and Scotus (*2 dist. 1, quaest.*

2) and (4 *dist.* 1, *quaest.* 1) that every creature acts in time. I respond that this is true if we speak of action independent of the subject — but not of action dependent upon matter that is aptly disposed and duly prepared, as I observed above.

Objection III: if generation were in an instant, it would be subjected either in matter or in the composite from matter and form — for since it is an accident it requires some subject in which it inheres; but it seems to be in neither. For it is not in the whole being generated, which does not yet exist; nor in matter, because it seems to be in a thing already accomplished. I respond that generation, insofar as it is an action, is in the generating thing, and insofar as it is a passion, it is in the generated thing. This is to be shown at length below, when we treat of action and passion.

Article IV: What the Terminus of Generation Is

Since every change proceeds from a *terminus a quo* to a *terminus ad quem*, and generation, from what was said above, is a change, it is rightly inquired here after its terminus. Passing over its *terminus a quo*, which all concede to be the privation of the substance to be produced, we investigate its *terminus ad quem*. On this there is not one view among the philosophers. For some, whom Hurt (*disp.* 1 *de gen.*, *sect.* 7, §. 74) follows, hold that the terminus of generation is the union of matter and form. The rest hold that it is the composite from matter and form — though they disagree among themselves: some, like Ruverio (*tract.* 1, *cap.* 4, *quaest.* 3) and the Coimbrans (*ibid.*, *quaest.* 15, *artic.* 2), hold that the terminus of generation absolutely is the whole constituted from matter and form, without regard to its suppositional character; others, to whom the Complutenses adhere (*disp.* 2, *quaest.* 3, §. 3), teach that the whole coalescing from matter and form, together with its existence and subsistence, is to be constituted as the total and adequate terminus of generation. Nor are there lacking those who, recognizing two actions — one of the form and another of the composite — determine the terminus of the former to be the form and the terminus of the latter to be the composite.

Note first, from Scotus (7 *Met.*, *quaest.* 10), Anthony Andrew (*ibid.*, *quaest.* 9) and (2 *dist.* 17, *quaest.* 1), that the terminus is bipartite into partial and total. The former is called the *quo* and formal terminus; the latter is called the *qui* and total, adequate terminus of generation. Thus the rational soul is the *quo* and *homo* is the *qui* terminus of human generation; in the same way the intellect is the *quo* terminus of intellection, and man is called the *qui* terminus of that same intellection. Likewise, filiation is the *quo* terminus and the son is the *qui* terminus of the father's generation. Furthermore, the Doctor observes in the same place that if the form is produced by a production distinct from the production of the whole, then a distinct action is required to produce it from the action by which the whole is generated; and since every action is a relation, and relations are multiplied according to the multiplication of terms, hence it is

that there is a peculiar and proper terminus of the production of the soul, which is called the formal terminus, distinct from the production of the whole, whose terminus is said to be total and adequate.

Note second, from the same Doctor (*1 dist. 4, quaest. 2, §. Respondeo B*) and (*§. Ad 1 argum. E, in responsione 2*): to each *quo* there corresponds its *quod* — just as every abstract has its concrete, as *humanity* has *man* and *whiteness* has *white* — and this is affirmed even in divine things, as *Deity* has *God*, although several *quods* can correspond to one *quo* inadequately, as several human supposita correspond to humanity: for this man is man through humanity, and that man is man through humanity, even though the proper *quod* of man in general is man, and the proper adequate *quod* of a particular man is this man. For just as man is man through humanity, so this man is this man through this humanity. Hence it is not without reason that the question arises whether the total terminus of generation is the whole including both existence and the essence of matter and form, or simultaneously the suppositional and hypostatic subsistence of the whole composite.

First assertion: the formal terminus of generation is established to be the form. This is Scotus in the places recalled at the beginning of this article. Proof I: there are three principles of natural things (*2 Phys., T. 52*) and thereafter — matter, privation, and form; but matter is the common subject of privation and form, and privation is the *terminus a quo*; therefore form opposed to it is the *terminus ad quem* — not total, since it is a part of the whole, but partial and formal. Second: form is nature (*2 Phys., T. 10*), and generation is called natural because it is a way to nature — not a way to matter, since matter pre-exists, nor to the composite, since the composite is that which *has* nature; therefore it is a way to form as to its formal terminus, from which it takes its denomination. Third: that from which something is constituted and specified in its essential being is its formal terminus; but form is of this kind; therefore it is the formal terminus. The major is clear: the formal terminus is called the *quo* terminus, by which the thing is determined in its essential and quidditative being. The minor is evident, in keeping with the common maxim: form gives being to the thing — namely essential and specific being.

Second assertion: the total terminus of generation is not the union of matter and form, but the composite from them. Both parts are suggested by the Doctor in the places cited above. The first part is proven first: the total terminus is generated per se, as Aristotle frequently emphasizes, notably (*7 Met., T. 26*); but the union of matter and form is not generated, since it is a relation, from what was said (*2 Phys., quaest. 5, artic. 2*), which arises from the positing of the extremes. Second: the copula and bond of terms is not a terminus, as I showed in the (*Epitome of Dialectics, lib. 1, quaest. 1, artic. 2*) in treating of the verb, which is the bond of the subject and predicate of a proposition; but union is the bond by which matter and form are united to make up the composite. Third: union is

formally an accident since it is an extrinsically accruing relation; but the terminus of generation is substance — for in this especially does generation differ from alteration, that the terminus of the latter is an accident while the terminus of the former is substance, as I abundantly explained in the second article of the first question of this book. Furthermore, union precedes the terminus of generation: for the parts are first united with one another before they constitute and cause the whole, since causes precede their effects at least in nature; but matter and form are the intrinsic causes of the composite; therefore union is by no means the terminus of generation.

You will say: besides union in the generated whole, nothing new is caused through generation. For matter pre-exists, and form is either introduced or drawn out from the potency of matter; and if it were already produced separately and united to matter, there would be a new composite through the new union of both; therefore union should be considered the terminus of generation. The antecedent is denied, since the composite is generated, which, from what was asserted in the (*Physics*, lib. quaest. 6, artic. 2) cited above, is really distinct from matter and form taken jointly.

The second part is common among the scholastics (*in 2 cit.*) and is perspicuously handed down by Aristotle (*1 Phys.*, T. 6, 7) and (*1 Met.*, cap. 1) and also (*7 Met.*, T. 26), writing that it is not matter, nor form, but the composite alone that is generated; therefore in the Peripatetic school the total terminus of generation is the composite. Second: what is made per se and generated is established by all as the total and adequate terminus of generation; but only the composite is made per se and generated — for matter is ingenerable and incorruptible, and form is either drawn out from the potency of matter or introduced into it; therefore the composite is the adequate terminus of generation. Third: in accidental generation the accidental form is not made per se — as whiteness is not — but the whole accidental thing — as the *white thing* — nor is music made, but the *musician* (*7 Met.*, cap. 8, T. 26, 27). Therefore likewise in substantial generation it is not the substantial form that is generated per se but the whole substance. Furthermore, two partial causes constituting one total cause enjoy their total and adequate effect, as is clear; but matter and form are two partial causes making up one total cause, whose effect and terminus is the whole. Finally, the first terminus of generation in intention is the composite; therefore the last terminus in execution is that same composite. For what is first in intention is last in execution. Moreover, the total terminus of corruption is the privation of the whole composite — as is clear in the death of a man, in which it is not the soul, nor the body, but the man who dies and is corrupted, who is constituted from soul and body; therefore conversely, in the generation of that same man — which is opposed to his corruption — the total terminus of that same generation is determined to be the man himself, coalescing from soul and body.

Third assertion: the whole including essence and existence, but not suppositional subsistence, is held to be the total and perfect terminus of generation. This is indicated by the Doctor in the places cited above and also (*2 d. 4, quaest. 3*) and (*3 d. 4, quaest. un.*). Proof I, from Aristotle, who in the passages adduced above and elsewhere, speaking of the composite, says that the composite is a third something constituted from matter and form precisely — but the whole so constituted contains precisely essence and existence, and does not denote suppositional subsistence, as it is the terminus of substantial generation. For the whole accidental thing, which is the terminus of accidental generation mentioned by the Stagirite in the (*Met.*) just cited, includes no suppositional subsistence, yet it obtains the true notion of a total terminus; therefore the same must be maintained of the total terminus of substantial generation. Second: actions and generations are of singulars (*1 Met., cap. 1*), but singulars do not precisely include suppositality — as Aristotle there exemplifies with experienced and knowing artisans, from whom their works proceed not as they subsist but as they exist. Hence Scotus (*4 dist. 12, quaest. 3, §. Ad principales rationes, AA*), explaining the said testimony of Aristotle, says that there it is not had that actions are of supposita but of singulars; and he adds that there one can say that actions are of supposita as ultimately denominated. Again, suppositional character was unknown to Aristotle and became known to us through the mystery of the Incarnate Word, in which we are taught that Christ as man is not supposed by a human but by a divine suppositality and personality, even though he is a perfect man and truly generated by the Blessed Virgin. Furthermore, the notion of suppositality formally presents not something positive but something negative, as the Doctor holds problematically (*3 dist. 1, quaest. 1, §. Non asserendo, Ad E*) and (*Quol. 19, artic. 2*); therefore the total terminus of generation does not precisely include suppositality.

You will say: suppositality is the ultimate terminus of substantial nature; therefore it is a real positive terminus of it, not a negative one as Scotus holds in the cited passage. The consequent is denied. For privation is the principle and *terminus a quo* of real and positive generation, and yet it is the absence and negation of form in an apt and capable subject. Likewise, a point is the terminus of a line, which is something real and positive, even though the point itself — in the view of the Nominalists whom I cited and refuted (*5 Phys., quaest. 2, artic. 2*) — is a negation of length.

Fourth assertion: form is produced by an action distinct from the action by which the composite is produced. Proof first, from Aristotle (*7 Met., T. 26*) and Scotus (*ibid., in com.*), teaching that the composite is made and generated per se, while the form is neither generated nor made per se but only per accidens; but the action per se differs from the action per accidens; therefore according to Aristotle and Scotus the action by which form is produced is different from the action by which the composite is generated. Second: the action of the form is called the drawing out, or introduction, into pre-existing matter; the action of

the composite is called generation; and the latter follows upon the former, for the form is first drawn out or introduced into matter before the composite is generated; therefore these actions are distinguished from one another. Third: action in the Scotist school is a relation extrinsically accruing; and a relation is distinguished according to the distinction of terms; and the terminus of the drawing out or introduction is the form, while the terminus of generation is the whole, really distinct from matter and form taken jointly. Moreover, the *quo* terminus and the *qui* terminus differ, as is clear from the first note: form is the *quo* terminus and the composite is the *qui* terminus; therefore the actions by which these are produced are distinguished from one another.

You will say: Scotus (*2 dist. 17, quaest. 1, §. Ad 1*) writes that the form drawn out from the potency of matter is produced by the production of the whole; therefore the action by which the form is produced does not differ from the action by which the composite is produced. I say that form is produced by the production of the composite, because the drawn-out or to-be-drawn-out form cannot exist without the composite; and it is said to be generated by the generation of the composite insofar as it is a part of something that is generated per se. In this way it is said to be generated per accidens, as Lichetus rightly explains there. Hence, although form of this kind is produced by a different action from the action of the composite, yet because it does not issue outside the whole itself, it is therefore said to be produced by the production of this whole — conversely, because the form to be introduced can be created outside the composite or outside matter, and before the whole comes to be, it is for this reason said to come to be by its own proper action, distinct from the action of the composite.

Objection I, against the first assertion: (*2 Phys., T. 70*) and (*8 Met., T. 12*) — form and end coincide; but if the end or terminus of generation is the form, it is therefore its total and adequate terminus. Confirmation from (*2 Phys., T. 10*): form is nature; and (*ibid., T. 14*): generation is the way to nature — not indeed to matter, which pre-exists, nor to the whole, which is not nature but that which *has* nature; therefore it is the way to form as to its true and proper terminus. I respond that this is to be understood of the partial principal end and *quo* terminus — not of the total and adequate end and terminus, which is the composite. I add, from the Doctor (*7 Met., quaest. 10, §. Ad 1 rationem*), that form is the end of generation because it is that by which the composite completes generation, and it is the per se end of matter. To the confirmation I say, from the same (*ibid.*) and (*5 Met., quaest. 1, §. Quod additur*), that generation is called a way to nature both because it tends toward the natural composite, which is its *qui* terminus, and because it tends toward form, which is nature and its *quo* terminus. Hence generation is called natural in two ways — from its total terminus, which is the whole, and from its partial and formal terminus, which is the form.

Objection II, against the third assertion: what is generated is not form or quiddity but the whole constituted from matter and form (*7 Met., T. 27*). Therefore in the Peripatetic school the *qui* terminus of generation is the supposit. Confirmation: the *qui* terminus of generation is complete and perfect and its ultimate end; therefore it is the supposit, inasmuch as the supposit is the ultimate terminus of substantial nature. The consequent is denied, because the quiddity or nature composed from matter and form is one *quo* to which there corresponds its *quod* — namely, that which has that nature — as to humanity there corresponds man, who precisely is not a supposit. For Christ is a true and perfect man, even though he lacks a proper supposit, the divine Word supplying it. Hence to this humanity of Christ, which is one *quod*, there corresponds its *quod* — namely, this man precisely, without any suppositality — just as to the Deity there corresponds God precisely, without the divine personalities, as the Doctor makes clear (*in 2 not.*) cited above. To the confirmation I distinguish the antecedent: in the notion of nature, I concede; in the notion of supposit, I deny. For generation tends toward the complete and perfect nature, prescinding from suppositality — which, since it formally presents a double negation, both as *quo* and as *quod*, formally denotes no generation.

Article V: Whether an Accident Can Generate Substance

Three leading opinions are on record in this article. One is mentioned by Soncinas (*7 Met., quaest. 7*), Ruverio (*2 Phys., tract. 4, quaest. 6*), and Fonseca (*5 Met., cap. 2, quaest. 6, sect. 2*), to which Maior (*4 dist. 12, quaest. 1*) seems to be favorable, affirming that an accident can immediately generate substance. The second is handed down by St. Thomas (*3 p., quaest. 77, artic. 3*), Cajetan (*ibid.*), and very many others, holding that an accident can attain the production of substance in the power of substance. The third is that of the Scotists with their leader (*4 dist. 12, quaest. 3*) and of the Nominalists with their guide Ockham (*2 quaest. 23*), denying that an accident generates substance either as principal or as instrumental cause. Not far from these are Durandus (*4 dist. 12, quaest. 2*), Arriaga (*disp. 11 Phys., sect. 2, subsect. 4*), and not a few others; and Richard seems to indicate this (*1 dist. 3, quaest. 1, ad 7*), although he seems to hold the opposite in (*4 dist. 14, artic. 3, quaest. 2*). And before them, St. Bonaventure (*ibid., artic. 2, quaest. 1*).

Note first that among created things some are passive, emitting no action and having no efficiency — among which matter, relations, and things of this kind are placed, to which may be added artificial forms that seem inert. Hence Aristotle (*2 Phys., T. 13*) says that if a bed were buried it would not germinate a bed but wood, because the said forms are not active. Others are active — their series is woven in the book of Genesis — and some of these produce things like themselves, as man produces man; while others produce things unlike themselves, as earth germinates growing grass, and the sun generates gold in the bosom of the earth. And since some accidental forms are active — as heat

produces heat — while some are not active — as quantity — and others are substantial — as the forms of plants and animals — the question arises whether these latter are active just as accidental forms are, or whether the actions and effects, both accidental and substantial, proceed not from the former but from the latter. Scotus discusses this at length (*1 dist. 7, quaest. un., §. Ad argumenta prima V*).

Note second that a substantial agent sometimes acts immediately — as fire generates fire in tow immediately as soon as it is applied to it — and sometimes mediately, through prior preparations and apt dispositions for introducing its form into the subject. Thus fire, through prior heating and drying, disposes green wood to receive its fiery form. This is indicated by Aristotle (*2 Anima, T. 60*), saying that the soul uses natural heat, by which food is disposed to be converted into the substance of what is nourished. Hence alteration precedes generation, since the subject is first altered and disposed before the form is introduced into it by the generating agent. For this reason fire has a heating power by which it disposes the subject, and an igniting power by which it introduces its form into the duly disposed subject.

Note third, from Ockham as cited, that for the knowledge and resolution of this controversy, experience is of great help. For we experience that heated iron does not burn tow placed near and applied to it — which clearly shows us that heat is not the cause and principle of igniting and burning — but if fire itself is present in the iron, lying hidden in its pores, it immediately ignites and burns the tow applied to it, because that same fire has in itself the power and faculty of producing its like, which power is really identified with its substance and nature, as Scotus proves (*2 d. 16, quaest. un.*) and Lichetus and Gratianus Brixianus explain there. Moreover, daily experience teaches us, and we see with our eyes, that plants, herbs, trees, and animals procreate their like. Hence Aristotle (*2 Phys., T. 26*) subjoins: *the sun and man generate man*; but it is clear that man and the other living things mentioned above are substances. Therefore not only the form — which is a partial substance and the *principium quo* — but also the composite — which is a total substance and the *principium quod* — is active, with the assent of the Stagirite (*1 Anima, T. 64*).

First assertion: an accident is not the immediate productive principle of substance. This is opposed to Pererius (*6 Phys., cap. 13*) on behalf of Scotus in the cited passage and (*2 Met., quaest. 7, §. Ad quaestionem*). Proof first, from (*7 Met., cap. 7, T. 32*) as adduced by the Doctor (*now cited, in M*) and (*2 Rep., d. 25, quaest. un., §. Dicunt saltem*): substance precedes accident, and for the generation of substance an accident is not pre-required; but if an accident were the generative principle of substance, it would without doubt be required for it, because a principle necessarily precedes its principiate and a cause its effect; therefore, since Aristotle there asserts that an accident need not precede substance — indeed, substance itself is prior to accident in nature, knowledge, and time, according to

the same Philosopher (*ibid.*, *cap. 1, T. 4*) — for it is the subject of accident, which must precede, and therefore accident can in no way generate substance. Second: an accident is of a lower order, and is more ignoble and inferior to substance; hence it is called *ens entis* — being of being — and a being in another; therefore, since substance is nobler than accident because it is a being existing through itself, it is not produced by accident as its immediate active principle. The antecedent is conceded; the consequent is shown: every effect is either univocal and equally noble as its cause, or equivocal and its cause is then nobler and more excellent, because an equivocal cause virtually contains its equivocal effect; but to contain something virtually argues greater nobility and excellence — hence God, who is most perfect, is said to virtually and eminently contain all things. Pererius replies in the cited passage by saying that an accident is less noble in the notion of being, but not in the notion of productive principle — for in this respect an accident surpasses substance in nobility. Against: the nobility or ignobility of a thing is taken from its entity, because the former follows the latter, as is clear from the Angel and man, who are nobler than the other created things because they share in a nobler entity and nature; therefore if according to Pererius substance excels accident in entity, it likewise does so in its principle and power of acting. Furthermore, the way to know things in their entities and essences is derived from their powers, potencies, and effects, as Christ the Lord warns (*Matt. 7*): *By their fruits you shall know them; for a good tree brings forth good fruit, and a bad tree brings forth bad fruit.* And his Apostle proclaims (*Rom. 1*): *The invisible things of God from the creation of the world, understood through the things that are made, are clearly seen — his eternal power and divinity.* And philosophers unanimously pronounce this saying: causes are known from their effects — and from this Philosophy has taken its origin, as is clear from (*1 Met., Sum. 1, cap. 2*). Therefore if an accident is surpassed by substance in entity, it is likewise surpassed in power and the ability to act; and hence the said distinction of Pererius is vain and futile for dissolving the aforesaid argument. Third: the more noble and excellent being of a thing is its essential and quidditative being; but if an accident were to possess its own essential and quidditative being of substance, it would be more ignoble and inferior than substance itself — since it would be accidental being, which is a lower being than substantial being; therefore, since an accident confers virtual being — which is the being of an active principle, following upon the essential being of the accident — it cannot immediately attain the production of substance.

You will say: substance is generated and results from the action of accident — for after alteration, generation follows, as I made plain in the first question of this book; therefore the immediate production of substance is rightly attributed to accident. Against: resultance presupposes action, just as a relation that results from extremes presupposes the production of the extremes — for the extremes must be produced first so that the relation may subsequently arise from them. Therefore if substance results after the action of accident, it requires not only

the dispositive action of accident itself but also the action of the generating thing, which is generation; hence the generation of substance is attributed not to accident but to substance. I add that alteration is a distinct action from generation, since the terminus of the former is accident — namely quality — while the terminus of the latter is substance, as was decided and established above.

Fourth: an accident cannot be the immediate corruptive principle of substance; therefore neither can it be its productive principle. The consequent holds, because equal power is required for both. The antecedent is shown: one thing cannot corrupt another unless it has greater proportional power; but an accident is inferior and less, both in entity and in power, as I showed before, and substance resists more than an accident acts; therefore accident has no dominion or authority over substance.

You will say: it seems incredible that all the coldness of water cannot extinguish the smallest spark of fire, and that all the heat of fire cannot absorb the tiniest particle of water — on the grounds that the former are accidents and the latter substances. I say this is neither incredible nor impossible — just as the power of any creature, even the highest, cannot attain the creation of any creatable thing however small, and if all the forces of all created things were joined together they could not create a single rational soul, nor divide all the proportional parts of a single continuum, nor bring about such things as exceed the capacity of them all. It should therefore be neither surprising nor absurd if all accidents joined together cannot immediately produce or destroy the smallest substance, since these things do not fall within the sphere of their activity.

Second assertion: nor does an accident generate substance in the power of substance. The Doctor as cited is its patron, as are also many of the external schools who follow him — notably Hurt (*disp. 9, sect. 3*) — against Suarez (*disp. 18 Met., Sect. 2*) and the Thomists. Proof first: the power of substance by which the Thomists say an accident attains the production of substance is either substance or accident, since between these there is no middle. If the first, then the intended conclusion is obtained, because it is substance and not accident that generates substance. If the second, then the Thomists fall willingly into the very opinion they endeavor with all their strength to refute — namely, that an accident generates substance. For they seem to dissent from the authors of the first view only in words: those hold that accident produces substance; while these hold that accident in the power of substance generates substance. But if anyone asks them what it means to produce substance in the power of substance, they frankly and openly respond that the said power of substance is an accident placed in the category of quality — and so accident immediately generates substance, which is precisely the position they themselves reject. Second: the said power of substance is either in the accident or outside it. If the first, then nothing in the accident is not accident or something of accident, and

the first argument recurs. If the second, then nothing acts by its proper action through what is outside itself — just as no one walks through an ambulatory power existing in another but through one's own power existing in oneself; therefore accident in no way attains the production of substance through the power of substance itself.

You will say that this power is something virtually distinct from the accident, by which it is elevated to produce substance, even though it is nobler and of a higher order — just as when a creature is assumed by God as an instrument for creating something. Against: that virtually distinct thing from the accident devised by the Complutenses, pressed by the force of the aforesaid argument, is either accident or substance, since between these, as said, there is no middle; but it is neither, since through them it is distinguished from both; therefore it is nothing, and something is fictitiously supposed to be because of the need to escape the argument. Nor does its elevation help at all, since that which is by its nature incapable of producing substance cannot be made apt and capable of such production — just as Scotus says that a fly cannot be elevated to create an angel; and not incongruous with this is that saying of Christ the Lord (*Matt.*) recently cited: *Do they gather grapes of thorns, or figs of thistles?* An accident therefore does not overstep the limits of its power, which extends only to the production of accident.

You will say again: this holds for an accident separated from substance, but not for accident joined to the substance to which it is subordinated and conjoined. For many things conjoined to others operate in ways they cannot when separated from them; and thus a united power is stronger, and wonderful things are brought about by applying actives to passives, as I showed (*1 3 Phys., quaest. 2*). Against: nothing is newly added to a conjoined accident except conjunction and subordination, which, since it is a relation, does not belong to the genus of active things; therefore if a separated accident does not possess the power of producing substance, neither does it when conjoined to substance itself. For conjunction cannot confer on it a power of which it is incapable — just as a fly does not acquire the power of writing even when assumed and conjoined to the hand of a man, because it is of itself incapable of writing.

But if you object and say that an accident is an instrumental cause of substance, and substance is the principal cause — against: an instrument does not attain the terminus of the principal cause but acts only dispositively, as I handed down (*1 4 Phys., quaest. 5, artic. un.*). Furthermore, if substance generates substance as principal cause, then it is per se active, since it exercises per se influence on the substantial effect — which Cajetan and other leading Thomists deny.

You will say: an accident is a partial cause and concurs together with substance toward the generation of substance — just as the intelligible species and the intellect are two partial causes of intellection. Against: one partial cause does not act unless the other partial cause concurs simultaneously — thus the intellect

does not understand without the concurrence of the intelligible species, and the father does not generate offspring without the simultaneous concurrence of the mother; but an accident exerts its action before substance does, for alteration — which is the action of accident — precedes generation — which is the action of substance; therefore accident cannot be a partial cause of substance. Moreover, substance can generate substance without accident — for if a subject were aptly disposed and duly prepared, with no accident intervening, the substantial agent would introduce its substantial form into it — as fire immediately ignites tow and dry wood. Therefore accident cannot be a partial cause of substance, since the latter cannot produce its effect without the other partial cause.

Third assertion: substance generates substance. The Doctor is its author as cited above. Proof first: earth generates grass, water generates fish, a plant generates flowers, a tree generates fruit, and animals procreate their like, as we daily observe; but all of these are substances, as may be seen in the catalogue of the predicament of substance, and as narrated by the divine Chronicler in the Pentateuch. St. Damascene supports this (*3 Fidei, cap. 15*): *Action is the efficacious motion of substantial nature.* And a little after: *Those whose nature is the same have also the same action; and those whose action is one, their substance also is one.* And below: *The holy Fathers have concordantly said that those of the same substance have the same action.* Aristotle assents (*2 Phys., T. 26*): *The sun and man generate man;* but the sun and man, to whom generation is attributed, are substances. He argues (*1 De gen., T. 54, 55*) against those who removed all efficiency from substantial forms. (*2 Anima, cap. 1*) defines the soul as *the first act of an organic body having the potency of life;* and (*cap. 3 of the same book*) the soul is the principle by which we live, sense, understand, and are. But the soul is substance and the immediate cause and origin of the aforesaid operations; and united to the body it constitutes the whole to which the remaining actions belong — principally generation (*1 Met., cap. 1*): *Generation is of singulars — of Socrates, Plato, and the other individuals of human nature.*

You will say: these and similar authorities prove only that substance is the radical and remote principle of generation, not the immediate and proximate one. Against (*7 Met., T. 32*): *For the generation of substance it suffices that substance pre-exist — as if an animal is to be generated, it is enough that an animal precede, with no quantity or quality existing;* in this way substance immediately and proximately generates substance; therefore the aforesaid testimonies are understood of the proximate and immediate principle. Furthermore, God acts immediately through his substance, since he is incapable of accident; therefore the same is applied to the created agent. Indeed, from created substance there proceed immediately its proper passions and powers, which are really identified with it, as the Doctor shows (*2 dist. 16, quaest. un.*). And the herb that is formally cold is virtually hot; likewise wine is virtually hot and in winter formally cold; and water that has been heated returns to its native coldness — and these and similar things proceed immediately from substance, since there are no accidents pre-

existing that could produce said effects; substance therefore is the immediate and proximate principle of acting.

Second: an accident immediately produces an accident — as heat produces heat; therefore substance immediately generates substance. The consequent holds, since substance is not of a lower and worse condition than accident — indeed it is of a nobler and more excellent one; therefore if the latter is capable of immediate action, so too is the former. You will say: the rational soul and the Angel surpass all sublunary living things in nobility, and yet these latter generate but the former do not; likewise, although substance is more excellent than accident, it does not rightly follow that if the latter is the immediate principle of operating, so too is the former. Against: the reason why Angels cannot generate their like is that generation presupposes something from which it arises, but Angels are created, and creation is production from nothing — that is, with no subject presupposed. Therefore there is no obstacle to substance being the immediate principle of acting — especially because there is a greater excellence in the rational soul and the Angel such that no created agent can attain the production of them, as Scotus states (*quaest. 1, Prol.*); but this does not take away the principle of acting from sublunary substances. Third: that is the proximate productive principle of substance to which the substantial effect is assimilated — since the agent endeavors to assimilate the effect to itself as much as it can, and it is a celebrated maxim that the work of nature is to generate its like; but the generated substance is assimilated to the generating substance — as a son to his father or mother; therefore substance immediately and proximately generates substance.

You will say: the argument concludes for the radical and principal principle, not for the proximate and immediate one, which is accident in the generation of substance. Against: substantial form immediately gives being — for it is the first act conferring formal and essential being on matter and determines and specifies it; therefore it also immediately gives the power to operate. Hence the soul, which is the chief among forms, is the immediate principle of vegetating, sensing, and understanding (*2 Anima, cap. 2*). Finally, assimilation of effect belongs to the proximate, not the remote, cause — to the particular, not the universal; hence Aristotle states (*1 Met., T. 1*) that generation per se is of this man — of Socrates — and of man only per accidens. Likewise, the generated man is not assimilated to the sun but to the generating man, who is his particular and proximate cause; therefore substance is the immediate principle of generation.

Objection I: Aristotle (*1 De sensu et sensili, cap. 4*) writes that fire acts as hot, not as fire; but heat is an accident; therefore heat is the generative principle of fire, which is a substance. Confirmation I, from (*1 De gen., T. 51*): action is exercised between contraries; but contrariety belongs to accident and not to substance. Confirmation II: the heat of iron produces fire, which is also generated from reflected solar rays and from the friction of two bodies; but fire is a substance.

Confirmation III: imperfect animals — as frogs, flies, gnats, and fleas — are generated from the hot and the moist; therefore an accident is the effective principle of substance. I respond that fire has two actions: one is heating, which arises from the heat of fire; the other is igniting, which proceeds from the substance of fire. Therefore when the Philosopher says that fire acts as hot, he is to be understood of the first and not the second action, and I showed in (*lib. de elementis, quaest. I, artic. 2*) already. To confirmation I: action occurs between contraries dispositively, not effectively; hence contrary qualities dispose but do not actively concur toward generating substance. To confirmation II: fire is not produced by the heat of iron but by fire lying hidden in its pores. To the other experiences I say that light and the other accidents are dispositively related, not actively, in the generation of fiery substance. To confirmation III: the same is to be said; but from what those said animals are procreated I will show in its proper place.

Objection II: substance operates through its potencies and faculties; but potencies are accidents — namely qualities, since they are numbered in the second species of quality; therefore an accident attains the production of substance. Confirmation from (*9 Met., T. 3*) and (*12 Met., T. 26, 28*): act and potency are of the same genus — that is, of substance or of accident; therefore generation of substance belongs to accident. I concede the major and distinguish the minor: if potencies are taken as facilities and agilities for acting, I concede; but if they are taken as active principles and powers of acting, I deny — for in this sense they are really identified with the substance of which they are the potencies (*2 dist. 16, quaest. un.*). To the confirmation I say that passage is to be interpreted, with Scotus there, of objective potency and entitative act — not of active potency and formal act.

Objection III: if the consecrated host is duly heated and moistened, a worm is generated — which is not generated from substance, because according to faith no substance of bread exists in it; therefore it is generated from accident alone — from heat and moisture. I respond that given the hypothesis, God would create new matter from which the said worm would be generated from pre-existing matter. For the author of nature supplies the defect of the secondary cause when it fails. I replied in the same way in a similar case (*lib. 2 Phys., quaest. 1, artic. 3, ad 3*) with Scotus (*4 dist. 12, quaest. 6, D*) and (*Quol. 10*).

Article VI: Whether Substance Can Generate Accident

Our two masters, Noperi (*disp. 7 Phys., quaest. 6, artic. 3, 4*) and Poncius (*ibid., disp. 38, quaest. 3*), assemble this question fully and carefully. I for my part dispatch and resolve this difficulty quickly and briefly, setting aside verbosity and chaff. The question can be raised in two ways: whether substance can produce accidents in itself, or also whether it can produce accidents in another subject. On this matter two chief opinions prevail among philosophers. The first is that of the Thomists, cited and followed by the Complutenses (*disp. 10 Phys.*), who

hold that substance is in no way productive of accidents — whether in itself or in another subject. The latter is that of Scotus and his disciples (*dist. 36, quaest. un.*) and (*4 dist. 12, quaest. 3*), with whom agree Suarez (*disp. 18 Met., sect. 2*), Hurt (*dist. 9 Phys., sect. 3*), Arriaga (*disp. 11, sect. 2, subj. 5*), and many others, teaching that substance is the immediate productive principle of accidents.

Note first, from Scotus (*1 Post., quaest. 25, §. Ad quaest., vers. Sed alio modo*) and Sarnano (*quaest. 1 univers., p. 16, 17*), that something can proceed from another in two ways. In one way through transmutation or through motion and change — in this way natural effects are produced from their causes, which are really distinguished from one another by real and mutual distinction; and the action by which such effects are made is described as a relation extrinsically accruing to the transmuting thing with respect to the transmuted, as I wrote in (*Epitome, lib. 1, quaest. 4, artic. 9*). In another way through simple emanation — as are the passions that arise from the essences and natures of things: as risibility, capacity for tears, and the other properties that flow from human nature, as well as its potencies, powers, and faculties; and likewise the divine attributes, which are said to spring from the divine essence and which are formally distinct from it and from one another, as I showed in the (*Tractatus de attributis, disp. 3, quaestione secunda*). To these may be added those things that arise through natural resultance and consequence — as relations, which arise once the extremes are posited: thus, given two white walls, a relation of similarity arises between them, and a relation of dissimilarity between other black walls.

Note second that from one and the same essence and nature there arise several passions and potencies, in a certain order observed among them — as admirability, risibility, and capacity for tears from humanity, and from the rational soul the intellect and the will — not because one is the cause of the other, but because one presupposes the other and one requires the prior action of the other. Hence that maxim is celebrated: *nothing is willed unless previously known*, and likewise: *nothing is in the intellect that was not first in the sense*. For the higher and spiritual potencies presuppose the actions of the lower and material powers and virtues, on account of the natural order and necessary connection that they have with one another in the present state. But these powers and faculties are really identified with the substance from which they flow, and are therefore really substances and formally distinct (*from what will be said in the book on the soul*).

Note third that some actions are vital — namely vegetation, sensation, and intellection — while others are not vital — as illumination, lightning, and the like. Likewise, some are immanent and others transient, of which more will be said in the proper place.

First assertion: substance immediately produces accident. This is Scotus's view as cited, which he proves from (*7 Met., T. 31*), where it is read that for generating substance it is necessarily required that substance precede, just as a cause

precedes its effect — so that if an animal is to be generated, an animal pre-exists as its cause; but for the production of an accident — such as quantity and quality — it is not necessary that quantity and quality precede, because their proximate cause is the preceding substance. The same is suggested (*4 Meteor., cap. ult.*) And St. Damascene is cited by the Doctor in the fourth passage adduced above. Poncius in the cited passage sets little store by these testimonies. But since they are from the most authoritative authors whose footsteps he professes to follow, they are not to be scorned — especially because they are supported by most powerful arguments and most certain experiences. In the first place, in efficient and effectable accidentals one must stop at the first, since a regress to infinity is always to be avoided; but we experience heat generated by fire, and cold by water, and this heat by that heat, and the heat in a hand caused by hot iron; therefore, if this heat is caused by that heat, and that heat by the heat of fire, it follows that this last heat is immediately caused by fire, since no other cause precedes besides fire. Furthermore, it is clearly proven by evident experience that heated and boiling water is reduced to its native coldness, the cause of which can be none other than the substance of that same water — for if God were to remove from it everything else except the heat, the substance of that same water remaining together with the said heat, that same water would become cold, caused by no other efficient cause than the same water itself, since nothing else is supposed to exist besides the substance of water and the heat caused in it by fire.

The Complutenses reply (*disput. 10, quaest. 7, §. 7*) that this happens per accidens and not per se — namely, to remove the impediment that is heat, which prevents coldness from issuing from water through natural consequence, from the force of the first and preceding act of being. For water from its primeval constitution is such as to be cold, since coldness results from its nature; hence if it is heated, it afterwards returns to its prior coldness. Against: once the heat that impeded water from becoming cold is expelled, when water has become cold, by what is this newly produced coldness in water caused? Not by the heat, which perished, since it is its contrary; nor by the preceding coldness of the same water, since it was consumed by the supervening heat; no other cause is possible than from its substance. For the prior coldness that water received at its production was caused by its substance — just as the heat of fire, the humidity of air, and the dryness of earth; therefore the posterior coldness too, removed by the heat of fire, is produced by the very substance of water. Especially, since the posterior coldness is numerically distinct from the prior one: a new effect obtains a new cause, that is, one having a new causality — even though the cause itself remains the same in itself — as is clear in a plant producing new flowers and in a tree producing fresh fruits each year. Moreover, if at its first creation God were not to concur toward such coldness, but did so after some interval of time, then the coldness produced would not be from the preceding act of being but from a subsequent act of being; and likewise if the first act of being were

interrupted and a second came to be, from this second and not from the first would the coldness proceed. Add that since every accident is *ens entis* — being of being — and presupposes a subject, consequently every accident would flow from a prior act of being; but the said authors, with the Thomists, do not admit this, so it ought not to be admitted by them either.

From these considerations it follows that the passion — which in the Thomist school is an accident — is produced by an action different from the action of the substance and subject from which it proceeds, both because it is an accident, according to the Thomists, really distinct from the subject in which it inheres, and because it is a different terminus from its subject, which requires a true and proper action by which it is produced. Moreover, if heat is produced by another agent — such as the sun — it is plainly caused by a different action from the action of fire, since they are distinct agents; therefore when it proceeds from its own substance, it is brought about by another real action. And this is especially clear if the subject is first produced, and after some interval of time its passion comes to be — for through the prior action the subject receives being, and through the posterior action its passion comes to be. However, in the view of Scotus it must be said otherwise, since he teaches that a passion is really identified with its subject and only formally distinguished from it. For action is a relation of the transmuting thing to the transmuted, which cannot occur between a subject and its passion — for it obtains only between things that are really separated from each other.

Second assertion: one accident is the cause of another accident — not as an instrumental but as a principal cause. Both parts are handed down by the Doctor in the fourth place cited above. The first part is proven first: the heat of fire — which is an accident — produces heat in water; the light of the sun — likewise an accident — causes heat in the air and in the earth; and it is commonly said that motion is the cause of heat, and motion is an accident; and whiteness disperses and blackness concentrates vision; and moreover by all are conceded active qualities, which are the immediate causes and principles of none but other accidents. Second, from (*2 Caeli, cap. 3, T. 17*): being is for the sake of operating; but accidents are, since being universally taken is divided into substance and accident; therefore accidents are active and operative. Hence very many of them are immediate principles of others — as, besides those just listed, many hold that contemplation causes delight, knowledge causes desire, the intention of an end causes the willing of means and their attainment, and the knowledge of principles causes assent to conclusions; therefore the active power of accident ought not to be denied.

The second part — which argues against Fonseca (*5 Met., cap. 2, quaest. 6, Sect. 6*) and the Coimbrans (*2 Phys., cap. 70, quaest. 18, at the end of artic. 3*) — on behalf of Scotus as cited and others whom the Complutenses cite and follow (*praealleg., quaest. 8, §. 2*) — is proven first: that which acts by its own power is a principal

cause, as is clear from the description of a principal cause in contrast to the definition of an instrumental cause; but an accident acts by its own power, as is clear in the case of heat, which by its own power produces heat — and the same must be maintained of cold and of other active qualities; therefore accident produces accident as a principal cause. You will say: an accident acts in the power of substance, since it is its power and is subordinated to it as an instrument to a principal agent. Against: if an accident is separated from its subject — which we know to be possible, indeed to have been done in the Eucharist — it acts by its own power; for the whiteness of the consecrated host disperses vision, and if it is heated its heat heats, without any concurrence of the subject, since it does not exist there; therefore accident is established as the principal cause of the production of accident, whether it be joined to or separated from its subject. Moreover, that subordination of accident to subject does not take away the intrinsic power that the accident possesses — just as the subordination of man to the sun and to God does not take from man his own power and potency which they share for bringing forth their own effects. Second: the principal cause endeavors to render the effect it produces like itself — for this belongs to a natural agent; but an accident produced from an accident is assimilated to the producing accident — as heat to heat and moisture to moisture — especially because the produced accident does not exceed the powers of the producer, since they are of the same species and are proportionate. Finally, if substance is the principal cause of generating substance — as the said authors do not deny — it does not seem incongruous that accident should cause accident as a principal cause.

Third assertion: substance can generate accident both in itself and outside itself. Both parts are suggested by the Doctor as cited and (*2 dist. 9, quaest. 2, §. Ad argumenta 2 quaestionis, Q*). The first part is proven first: fire is hot with a heat emanating from itself and existing and residing in it; and the same must be maintained of the humidity of air, the coldness of water, and the dryness of earth. And it is especially evident in water, which when heated returns to its coldness produced by itself and received in itself. Second: sensation — which is an accident — is produced by sense and resides in it; hence sense is divided into active and passive. Likewise intellection — which is likewise an accident — is caused by the intellect and remains in it; hence the intellect is distributed into agent and patient, which is really substance, from what will be said in the book on the soul.

The second part is shown, first, from wood heated by the heat of fire, from a hand heated by the same, and from hot and boiling water — for in these alien subjects heat is received, which is also produced by the sun and resides in air and earth; therefore an accident can be produced outside its proper subject — especially because the sun, which is only virtually hot, induces heat in sublunary things, by which they formally become hot. The same can be said of pepper, wine, and other things that cause heat in the stomach and other subjects.

Second: in the view of Scotus (*2 dist. 9, quaest. 1, §. Ad quaest. istam B*), one angel speaks to another through the infusion of the concept of the object about which he speaks; but the concept is an intentional accident; and it is not incompatible that any intellection should be received in an intellect that did not produce it, since it is a quality and hence an absolute accident really distinct both from the one producing it and from the one receiving it. Moreover, what is sufficiently in first act, unimpeded, can pass into second act and introduce it into a suitable and aptly disposed subject; but substance is a sufficient principle and immediate efficient cause of accident, as I showed above, and outside it there is a capable subject, as is clear from fire heating a hand and water in a pot; therefore substance can immediately cause an accident outside itself. For accident is produced in a twofold manner — by substance and by accident — whatever Poncius may contend against Mastrius.

Fourth assertion: an accident is properly conserved by the substance to which it is suited and congruous. This is indicated by the Doctor in the fourth passage cited and is proven: substance is the place and seat of accident, since it is its subject and cause; but a place is conservative of the thing located in it, and a cause conserves its effect as much as it can, as is clear from fruits produced by a tree, from the offspring of animals, and the like. Furthermore, an accident depends in being and in coming to be upon substance; hence it is called *being of being*; therefore it is properly conserved by substance. Moreover, outside its proper subject an accident perishes — as heat in water, cold in fire, and moisture in earth; but in its proper subject an accident is conserved — as heat in fire, cold in water, moisture in air, dryness in earth, and light in a luminous and bright body; and hence there is an immense conflict among sublunary things, so that each may preserve its accident. What is more, an accident not only serves substance by disposing matter for the introduction of its form into it, but is also its ornament and perfection; and each thing preserves its aids and ornaments — which is what accidents are with respect to substance.

Objection I, against the first assertion: substance, from what was asserted in the preceding article, produces substance; therefore it does not produce accident. The consequent holds, because each thing produces effects according to its own genus; therefore just as an accident does not attain the generation of substance in the Scotist school, so likewise substance does not generate accident, which is of a different kind from it. Confirmation: from one simple essence there do not proceed many and diverse principles and operations; but substance is a one simple essence, which subsists in the indivisible; therefore from it there cannot proceed so many powers, potencies, and faculties, which are accidents of the genus of quality. I concede the antecedent and deny the consequent; for its proof I say it holds in univocal causes but not in equivocal ones — as heat is produced from the light of the sun, from fire, and from motion; and also certain imperfect animals are generated through putrefaction and propagation. To the confirmation I deny the major: from one divine essence, which is most simple,

many attributes emanate; from one rational soul, several potencies; likewise from one root, several shoots; and from one cause, several effects can be produced. It is therefore not surprising if from one substance there proceed several accidents.

Objection II, against the second assertion: an instrument is defined as that which acts in the power of the principal cause, as is clear from a pen forming letters and words in the power of the writer; but an accident operates in the power of substance — as light heats in the power of the sun, and heat heats in the power of fire; therefore accident is an instrumental cause in causing accident.

Confirmation: as a thing stands to being, so it stands to operating, according to the common adage of the philosophers; but accident, depending upon substance in being since it inheres in it, therefore also depends in operating, and hence is an instrumental cause in the production of accident. I concede the major and distinguish the minor: through actual motion — as a saw is actually moved by the one cutting wood, I deny; through the actual power it has in itself, I concede; thus an accident is not properly an instrument of substance, because it is possessed of its own and intrinsic power in a state of rest, which an instrument lacks, as the Doctor hands down (*4 dist. 1, quaest. 1, DD*) and (*quaest. 5, F*) and (*dist. 6, quaest. 6, E*). To the confirmation I say the major can be interpreted as follows: if a thing is natural, its operation is natural; and if a thing is free, its operation is free — but it does not rightly follow that if a thing has being from another, it therefore operates through that other's own and intrinsic power. For it suffices if it has given and communicated to it the power of operating — as a father gives being and the power of acting to his son, by which the son afterward operates without the father. Hence the said adage is to be interpreted in much the same way as that of (*2 Met., cap. 1, T. 4*): *As a thing stands to being, so it stands to being known*. For knowledge conforms to the thing it is about; likewise operation follows the thing whose operation it is; therefore if the thing is natural, the operation is natural, and if it is free, the operation exists as free. Likewise, if the operation proceeds from sense, it is sensation; and if it proceeds from intellect, it is intellection.

Objection III, against the third assertion: qualities called active are sufficient active principles without the cooperation of the substance in which they reside; therefore substance does not exercise influence on their effects and operations. The antecedent is shown: if heat is separated from fire in which it inheres, it would undoubtedly heat without fire; therefore even when it is conjoined to fire, it heats without any concurrence of fire itself. Confirmation: the sacramental species, if heated, can of themselves return to their prior coldness without the aid and influence of a subject, since they lack a proper subject; therefore active qualities act on their own without the intervention and concurrence of the substance in which they are subjected. I deny the antecedent; for its proof I say that given the hypothesis, it would quickly pass away and perish — just as light quickly perishes when separated from the luminous body, which is a plain

indication that the subject exercises influence together with the aforesaid accidents toward their effects. To the confirmation I say this is brought about by the surrounding air and other surrounding things, or by the author of nature supplying the defect of the creature through the force of the preceding miracle, since the said accidents exist without a subject by divine power — just as if they are corrupted and something is generated from them, God will produce and create new matter from which it may be generated, as I was saying above with Scotus (*4 dist. 12, quaest. 6, D*).

Question III: On Corruption

Article I: Whether Corruption Exists and What It Is

That corruption exists — quite apart from the fact that it is confirmed by the experience of the death of living things and other sublunary things, whose corruption is observed with the eye — is clearly and lucidly shown from the generation of natural things, which newly come to be and are not produced without the destruction of preceding things. For in order that the agent may introduce a new form into matter, since two forms are simultaneously incompatible, it must expel the preceding form — which cannot be accomplished without the dissolution and corruption of the prior composite. It is therefore evident that corruption is to be admitted, which Scotus presupposes (*4 dist. 12, quaest. 6*) and in other places. Moreover, generation and corruption are opposed changes: the former is positive and acquisitive, the latter privative and deprivative. And it is written by Aristotle (*1 Top., cap. 14*) that the science of opposites is the same; therefore since I showed in the first question of this book, article I, that generation exists, it is consequently clear from the opposite that corruption exists as well — for upon admitting one opposite, the other opposite is also to be admitted. What corruption is does not seem so evident and plain, yet from what was said (*ibid., artic. 2*) the present difficulty can readily be resolved. For according to Aristotle (*5 Phys., cap. 3*), corruption is a change from substantial being to substantial non-being — as from the being of man to the non-being of man. According to the mind of Scotus, however, corruption is the relation of the corruptor to the corrupted, and this is clear from its opposite. For just as generation is precisely the relation of the generator to the generated, so corruption is the respect of the corruptor to the corrupted. The other things that were said above about generation are, in like manner but in reverse order, to be said about corruption. The same is to be understood and done with the objections and their solutions — nor do I judge anything further need be added.

You will ask first: is corruption natural? I respond that corruption can be called natural insofar as it proceeds from natural and intrinsically acting causes in the mixed body — in which sense Scotus (*2 dist. 19, quaest. un., §. Concedo A*) writes that the death of Adam, even in the state of innocence had he remained there, would have been natural, because the natural heat acting on the radical moisture

and counteracting and suffering in turn is finally consumed and extinguished, from which natural death follows — as is seen in the old and decrepit; but properly speaking it is not natural, because neither does matter desire per se the corruption of the form it has, but only per accidens, insofar as it cannot receive a new form without the prior one being expelled. And conversely, death is called violent insofar as it proceeds from extrinsic causes harming and destroying the living mixed body — as one who perishes by poison or by the sword is said to die a violent death.

You will ask second: is corruption intended per se by nature? I respond negatively. For nature does not intend per se the destruction of itself, nor evil — which is what death is, called the evil of nature. Hence Aristotle (*1 Eth. 1*) and Dionysius (*de divinis nominibus 4*) submit that no one operating intends evil. Likewise, monsters are said to come about not per se but per accidens. And privation (*1 Phys., T. 73*) and thereafter is called the principle of natural things per accidens.

Article II: Whether the Generation of One Is the Corruption of Another

This celebrated and frequently chanted saying from (*1 De gen., cap. 3, T. 17*) — *the generation of one is the corruption of another* — is widely trumpeted among philosophers; how it is true will become quite clear from what follows.

Note, from Scotus (*2 dist. 1, quaest. 3, §. Ad 1 argum. principale, K, in solutione 3*), that the said maxim is not to be understood of the first nor of the last generation. For the first generation is the production of the whole first composite, after which, precisely and immediately, the destruction neither of itself nor of another follows — since it is presupposed to be the first generated thing; nor is it about the last corruption and generation, since the mixed body last generated, even if it is dissolved into elements, will nonetheless no longer generate any further mixed body — as will happen after the Day of Judgment, when all sublunary generations will cease and time will be no more (*Apoc. 10*).

Assertion: the aforesaid proposition — *the generation of one is the corruption of another* — is not true formally, nor identically, but concomitantly and illatively. This assertion is divided into two parts and deduced from Scotus in the passage cited above. The first part is proven first: things that are in privative opposition are not true, neither formally nor identically — as is evident, since neither is the seeing person blind, nor is the blind person seeing, whether formally or identically; but generation and corruption are in privative opposition, since generation is a progression from substantial non-being to substantial being, and corruption is a transition from substantial being to substantial non-being; therefore the said proposition is true neither formally nor identically. Second: things that receive diverse definitions are not the same formally, as I have repeatedly emphasized; but generation and corruption receive diverse

definitions, as I indicated above. Furthermore, generation can exist without corruption — as the generation of the divine Word, and the first generation at the beginning of the world; and the last corruption at its end, as I intimated in the preceding note; therefore the said proposition is not true in an identical nor in a formal sense.

The second part is proven first, from Sacred Scripture (*Ioan. 12*): *Unless a grain of wheat falling into the ground die, it remains alone; but if it die, it brings forth much fruit* — where the perennial generation of wheat and its concomitant and consequent corruption is seen. Second: for an agent to generate something, it must necessarily expel the prior form and introduce a new one into matter, since two forms cannot simultaneously inform the same matter in number; and through the expulsion of the prior form corruption occurs, and through the advent of the new form generation is had; therefore concomitantly and illatively the generation of one is the corruption of another, and vice versa — the corruption of one is the generation of another, as is clear from the continuous change and vicissitude of things.

Objection I: generation and corruption are not distinguished from one another; therefore the said proposition is formally or at least identically true. The antecedent is plain: for they are one and the same change, since fire acting on water generates air from that same water, and thus there is only one change — for from one, as one, only one proceeds. I deny the antecedent and its proof: for they are two changes, according to the double *terminus ad quem*. For one is from the being of water to the non-being of water — and corruption occurs; another is from the non-being of air to the being of air — and generation is had. How from one several things can proceed has been explained above.

Objection II: when a man dies, his form — which is the soul — does not perish, since it is immortal; nor does matter, since it is ingenerable and incorruptible (*1 Phys., T. 82*). Therefore the aforesaid maxim is not always true. I respond that in the death of man, the man is corrupted — who is something third distinct from the soul and the body; and a cadaver is generated, which consists of matter and the form of corporeity; and from the cadaver worms are generated, and from the worms earth, as daily experience shows. Objection III: in nutrition the form of the nourishment is corrupted and no other form is generated, since the rational soul persists; therefore the maxim just rehearsed is not universally true. Confirmation: sometimes something is generated without the corruption of anything — as when a man is nourished from the sacramental species; therefore the said proposition fails in some cases. The antecedent is denied: for when food is corrupted, blood is generated, and from blood, flesh — as will be made clear when we treat of nutrition. To the confirmation I say that when the sacramental species are corrupted, God creates new matter from which new forms are drawn out and new composites conforming to the said species are made, as is clear from the (*Tractatus de Eucharistia*). What is more, this holds in the case of

contrary accidents: for if cold is corrupted, heat is generated, and conversely, if heat is corrupted, cold is generated — as is clear in winter and summer; but in other accidents it does not seem to hold: for light ceases without another accident being produced. However, generation of accidents is not generation simply speaking but only in a qualified sense (*4 d. 11, quaest. 3, sub P*).

Article III: Whether in Corruption Dissolution Occurs All the Way Down to Prime Matter

The Doctor Irrefragabilis (*4 p., quaest. 17, m. 4*), Albert (*2 p. Summa, de homine*), and their common disciple Aquinas (*1 p., quaest. 16, 17*) and many others, positing a single form in any composite — whether animate or inanimate — hold that in every corruption dissolution is effected all the way down to prime matter. On the other side, the prince of the subtilists (*4 dist. 11, quaest. 3, artic. 2*) and the leader of the Nominalists (*Quol. 2, quaest. 11*), recognizing several forms in every living whole, deny that in the death of any living thing dissolution is effected all the way down to prime matter. Assenting to this are those who hold that the proximate and immediate subject of accidents is matter — among whom are counted Suarez (*disp. 14 Met., Sect. 3*), Toletus (*1 De gen., quaest. 7*), and several other recent thinkers.

Note first that some composites are simple — as the elements — while others are mixed, which are subdivided into inanimate — as stone — and animate — as man. And since all of these are subject to corruption, it is certain among all that matter persists because it is incorruptible; that the prior form perishes; and that the posterior form is produced through new generation — which occurs because of the simultaneous incompatibility of two forms in the same matter in number. The question, however, is this: in the corruption of any sublunary thing, does some substantial or accidental form remain in matter, or none at all? — such that corruption falls proximately and immediately on matter, because it is informed by a single substantial form, and no accidental form is received immediately in it, so that nothing at all in the generated thing pre-existed in the corrupted one. Or, rather, if a plurality of substantial forms is admitted in matter, does one of them, being corrupted, leave another remaining in matter? Or, if the plurality of substantial forms is denied, is some accidental form admitted as immediately inhering in matter, which persists in matter after the corruption of the substantial form, in the same matter informed by a new substantial form? The former sense is defended by the authors of the first view; the latter is pursued by the patrons of the second view.

Note second, from Scotus as just cited, that in every animate whole there are two substantial forms: one, called the form of the mixed body and of corporeity, which constitutes the mixed body in the being of a body; and another, called the soul, which constitutes the mixed body in the being of an animated and living thing — from what is to be proven in the book on the soul. These forms are subordinated to one another, and one presupposes the other. For the form of

the mixed body is ordered to the soul and the soul requires it; so much so that the form of the mixed body, with respect to the matter it informs, is called an act, but with respect to the soul to which it is subordinated, it stands as matter. This Aristotle aptly suggests at the close of (*4 Meteor.*), admitting intermediate and subordinated forms, the last of which is absolutely form and act, while the others seem to play the role of matter — as the Doctor acutely proves in the passage noted (§. *Aly concedentes*, T. 5).

Note third that, given the plurality of forms in a natural living thing, some accidents follow one form and others follow another. From the fact that the composite shares in a soul, it lives, senses, understands, and performs the other works of life; and from the fact that it has the form of the mixed body and of corporeity, it is quantified, figured, white or black, and so on. Hence if the soul is separated from the body, vital actions no longer proceed from that body; yet other accidents persist in that same body — such as quantity, quality, a scar, and things of this kind that existed while the said body was informed and alive with a soul — which is a plain indication that the form of corporeity still remains in it, which those aforesaid accidents accompany, and those accidents inhere and reside in this whole composed from matter and the form of the mixed body; and if the said form perishes, both that whole and consequently the aforesaid accidents must be destroyed — for when the subject is destroyed, all things that are in the subject are destroyed.

Assertion: in the corruption of that which possesses only one form, dissolution is effected all the way down to prime matter; but in others that have several forms, if they are corrupted, dissolution down to prime matter does not occur. This is indicated by the Doctor in both works at the place reviewed above, by Ballol (*ibid.*, *quaest.* 4), Anthony Andrew (*8 Met.*, *quaest.* 3), John of Mairs (*1 De gen.*, *quaest.* 2), Tataret, the Parisian doctors, and others in the same place. The first part is common and is easily and evidently proven: what is composed of one matter in number and one form in number is dissolved only into those same things — just as a proposition composed of a single subject and predicate is dissolved into those same things only, because there is nothing else remaining into which it could further be dissolved; therefore the whole that consists of one matter and one form, if dissolved, is dissolved immediately into these two alone; and matter is incorruptible, while the form united to it perishes; therefore when the composite of these perishes, dissolution is effected to matter. Furthermore, in such a composite either a substantial or an accidental form persists, since between these there is no middle; but not the prior form — otherwise corruption would not occur, for the substantial form must perish if the substantial whole is to be dissolved — nor the posterior, because since the accidental form is subjected in the whole alone, when the whole is destroyed everything that is in it is destroyed — including the accidental form; and so in such a whole, if it is destroyed, dissolution occurs to matter alone.

The second part is proven first, from Aristotle (*De gen.*, T. 24): the same accidents that were in the corrupted thing remain in the generated thing; but such accidents do not inhere immediately in matter, as has been said elsewhere, but in the composite from the surviving form, called the form of the mixed body and of corporeity; therefore the whole animate thing, if corrupted, does not undergo dissolution to prime matter. Furthermore, (*2 Anima*, T. 6): the soul is the first act of an organic body; but the body is not matter, since it is a third something coalescing from matter and form; therefore when an animate thing is corrupted, dissolution is not made immediately to matter, since the form of corporeity still persists, through which the body is constituted in the being of a body. You will say: there the Philosopher through *body* in the definition of the soul understands matter furnished with organs, not a whole composed from matter and some form. Against: before the soul is united to the body, the body must be produced and formed — and in its formation nature labors and sweats greatly; so it first exists under the form of a seed, then under the form of an embryo, and then under the form of a body duly disposed and suitably organized, into which the soul is introduced or drawn out. But before the advent of the soul such matter was not without form — for matter is never found bare and stripped of all form; and after the living thing informed by a soul is corrupted, the said body remains inanimate, possessing some form that is not the soul — which perishes if it is material, or departs if it is spiritual; therefore there is another form, called the form of the mixed body or of corporeity.

Second: all our knowledge takes its origin from the senses; hence that much-repeated saying: *nothing is in the intellect that was not first in the sense*. But sense, rightly disposed and well applied, does not err. And we observe in a dead man the same quantity, figure, scar, the same members, parts, hair, and things of this kind that were in him when alive — which clearly indicate and openly manifest that it is one and the same body, with the unity and identity of the form of corporeity, which also existed when he was alive; therefore in the corruption of a man and of any other animate thing, dissolution does not occur down to prime matter. You will say: they are not the same but similar and related. Against: quite apart from the fact that this conflicts with sense and experience — for we feel the very same heat that after the departure of the soul still remains in the dead body, and we see numerically that same color of which it was a participant while alive — a productive cause of such newly produced effects must be assigned, and none whatever can be given. For it cannot be the heavens, nor God, nor any other particular natural agent, since none is apparent, no necessity is compelling, no reason urges, no authority commands — indeed, the opposite is evidently seen. For the same dead herb preserves the same color, odor, flavor, and power, which physicians use to heal wounds and cure diseases; therefore in the corruption of animate things there is no immediate dissolution into prime matter.

Third: during the three days of the death of Christ the Lord, his body was the same that was born of the Virgin, that hung on the Cross, that rose again, that remains in heaven now, and that is consecrated in the host — as St. Ambrose and other Fathers cited by Bassol write. But it was the same not through the soul, which descended to the underworld, but through the form of corporeity with which it was endowed while alive; therefore there is another form called the form of the mixed body or of corporeity. From these and many other arguments to be adduced in (*1 & 2 De anima*), the negative conclusion is drawn: in the death of inanimate things, an immediate and proximate dissolution into prime matter does not occur.

Objection I, against the first part of the assertion: from (*1 De gen., T. 24*) — when air is generated from water, the same diaphaneity and humidity remain in that air; and (*2 De gen., T. 25*) — the transmutation of symbolic elements is easier than that of dissymbolic ones, because symbolic qualities remain while dissymbolic ones do not; therefore according to Aristotle, in the corruption of simple and inanimate things, an immediate and proximate dissolution into prime matter does not occur. I respond that the same accidents in number do not persist but only in species. And the transmutation of simple bodies is quicker and easier in symbolic ones than in dissymbolic ones, because, as I stated in (*lib. de elementis*), in the former smaller things need to be overcome and in the latter greater ones. You will say: the aforesaid testimony was adduced by me to prove the second part of the foregoing assertion; therefore the same accidents in number persist in the generated that were in the corrupted — not only the same in species — otherwise that authority would serve the opposite rather than the proposed conclusion. I say it is valid only for animate mixed bodies, not for simple and inanimate ones that enjoy only one form.

Objection II, from (*1 De gen., cap. 4, T. 24*): corruption is a transmutation of the whole into the whole, no sensible subject remaining; therefore no accident persists in the generated thing that was in the corrupted one — otherwise some sensible thing would remain, which the Philosopher there expressly denies. What is more, the same Stagirite in (*Praedicam., cap. de substantia*) had previously stated that when primary substances are corrupted, it is impossible for anything to remain; therefore in any corruption of a natural thing, nothing remains but bare matter. I respond by an interpretation of that passage — namely, that corruption of one specific whole into another specific whole is meant: as when an animal is corrupted, this specific thing called an animal is corrupted and there is produced another specific thing informed by the form of corporeity and called a cadaver. You will press: if that mixed body which retains the same accidents persists in the corruption, then some sensible subject remains — which Aristotle there plainly denies. I say that the same accidents endure not indeed in the specific whole already corrupted — for both it and what was in it are corrupted — but in the generated thing, which is another specific thing that has the same accidents following the form of the mixed body, as I observed

above. The same is to be said to the other testimony: when individual things are corrupted — such as are primary substances — all things that are in them are likewise corrupted. Nevertheless, if there were some primary substance or some substantial whole whose form persists in it, then in that very thing would also remain the accidents that accompany that said form and are subjected in that whole.

Objection III: if there were several forms in the same composite by reason of which the whole, when corrupted, would not be dissolved into prime matter, it would plainly follow that the composite is not one per se but only per accidens. For that which accrues to a thing already constituted in act from matter and form is a being per accidens; and this inconvenience and absurdity is judged by all to be incurred by those who adhere to the negative part of this question; therefore the affirmative part rather than the negative is to be subscribed to. The sequent major is to be denied: for the argument concludes about disparate and perfect forms, not about subordinated and intermediate ones. For the form of corporeity is subordinated to the soul and is imperfect; hence without the soul it does not preserve the whole from corruption — indeed the whole, when the soul perishes or departs, is in continuous corruption, as is clear from a cadaver.

Book II: On Intension and Remission

This book is completed in two questions, of which the first is on intension and remission, the second on rarefaction and condensation. Regarding the first, a triple doubt can be raised — concerning substance, quantity, and quality; and indeed the difficulty concerning quantity was set out and resolved already, both in the (*Logic, quaest. de quantitate*) and in (*Phys. 1, 5, quaest. 1*). The remaining two are to be examined and settled in this place.

Question I: On Intension

Article I: Whether Substance Admits of More and Less

Philosophers on this article are found to be divided into two camps: some — as Toletus (*3 De anima, quaest. 18*), the Complutenses (*disp. 12 Log., quaest. 5*), and Durandus (*2 d. 32, quaest. 3*) — defend the negative position; while others — as Anthony Andrew (*11 Met., quaest. un.*) and (*in expos. 1 sex principiorum*), John of Mairs (*cap. de substantia, quaest. 3, dub. 1*), and Cajetan (*1 p., quaest. 85, artic. 7*) — embrace the affirmative; to whom assent Scotus (*8 Met., quaest. 3*) and Maurice there.

Note first, from the Doctor just cited, that to admit of more and less in any form means nothing other than to be greater or smaller than another — not in greatness of mass but in greatness of perfection in the nature of the thing, or in the complement of perfection. Hence every specific form shares a certain

latitude of degrees, communicated to its individuals according to more and less. For one individual possesses more of its degrees than another, by reason of which it is said to be more excellent and perfect than the other — and to understand this better, note the following.

Note second that degrees are of a twofold difference — specific and individual. Specific degrees are intrinsic and essential, by which a species is constituted in the being of such a species: and one species is nobler than another — as man is constituted in the being of man by his intrinsic, essential, and specific degree, and is distinguished from a brute and from anything else that is not man. The individual degree is a portion of perfection by reason of which one individual is more perfect than another — as Peter surpasses Andrew in nobility with respect to the perfection degree itself, and hence exerts and produces more noble and excellent actions and operations. And to make clearer what this degree is:

Note third that the degree or intrinsic mode of a form is described by the Scotists — notably by Anthony Andrew (*8 Met., quaest. 6*) and Trombeta (*tract. formalit., part. 2, fol. 35, pag. 2*) — as: a portion of perfection of the specific form, beyond its quidditative concept, essentially including the specific form within its essential concept, included really within the concept of the individual. These words, though many, are set down not for prolixity's sake but for clarity and explanation. It is called a *portion* because it is not the whole form but its perfection; it is placed *beyond its quidditative concept* because the specific nature abstracts and prescends from every perfection degree, though it is predicated of every degree as a superior of every inferior. There is added *included really within the concept of the individual*, since every individual of such a specific nature includes some degree of it. Another more common description of degree or mode is also given: *what is added to a thing does not vary the thing*. For since a degree does not enter into the essence of a thing but follows it, therefore whether it is added to it or abstracted from it, the specific nature itself is not changed essentially but only accidentally — just as if a fourth degree is added to whiteness having three degrees, the whiteness itself is not changed in its essence but only perfected with respect to that degree newly accruing and perfecting it.

Assertion: substance admits of more and less — not with respect to specific being but with respect to individual being. The Doctor assents (*ibid.*) and (*1 d. 17, quaest. 3*). Proof I, from Aristotle (*1 Praedicam., cap. de substantia*), asserting that primary substance is more substance than secondary. If you say this is to be understood with regard to the reception of accidents — that is, because primary substance more substands accidents than secondary — you do not satisfy the point, because substance, named from subsisting, does not lie under accidents, as is clear in the case of God. Furthermore, quantity stands under more accidents than quality, and yet the former is not said to be more of an accident than the latter; nor, if one quantity receives more accidents than another — as singular quantity than universal — is it for that reason called more quantity.

Therefore the said interpretation does not seem to conform to the text and mind of Aristotle. There is also the Parisian Article, in which these words are read: *If anyone should say that the soul of Christ in pure naturals is not more perfect than the soul of Judas. Error.* But a soul is a substance, and one is more excellent and noble than another, as the University of the Sorbonne sanctions; therefore it is not to be denied that substance admits of more and less. Nor does it avail to say that the article is to be interpreted with respect to accidental being and not with respect to substantial being — namely, that the soul of Christ excels the soul of Judas because it participates in more excellent knowledge and nobler habits; for that is not the mind of those doctors who drew up the said article. No one denies that in gratuitous gifts and nobler accidents the soul of Christ surpasses the soul of Judas — but that canon stands about natural and substantial things, as is plain to one examining and reading it.

You will say: the said article does not cross the Seine — just as the Cologne article does not cross the Rhine and the Oxford one the Thames. Against: in a similar case Scotus argues (*2 d. 2, quaest. 6, §. Contrà hoc, near the beginning*): a view publicly condemned in some university, even if it is not heretical, is suspect; therefore, since the most celebrated Parisian senate has established the aforesaid canon, the opposite position seems suspect, or at least not so probable and plausible. Nor does St. Augustine depart from this (*1 lib. de sermone Domini in monte, cap. 23*), saying: *All natures in their own order, beautiful are they in their degrees.* If therefore substantial natures possess degrees and one is eminent over another, it is plainly deduced that they admit of more and less, in the view of Augustine. The Master (*2 dist. 32*) and Richard (*ibid., artic. 4, quaest. 1*) suggest the same. Nor does Aristotle dissent (*2 de generatione animalium, cap. 3*), saying: *as the soul is more or less perfect, so it prepares the body.* Scotus subjoins (*3 dist. 9, quaest. un.*) that the nature of Christ is the best and his soul is the most perfect of all. Hence Simplicius rightly commends Archytas (*in Praedicam., cap. de quantitate*) as a patron of the assertion set out above.

Second: a nature capable of being communicated to several things according to more and several reasons and degrees admits of more and less; but substance can be participated by many according to various reasons and diverse degrees; therefore it admits of more and less. The major is proven from the opposite: for if it were communicated to several things in one equal degree, all its subjective parts and inferiors would be equal and alike — which is false and contrary to experience, since among men one is subtler, more clever, and stronger than another; among trees one is more fruitful; among plants one more flowering; and among herbs more vigorous; and so with the rest. The minor is clear in the case of human nature, which is participated by many singulars and individuals, and of fiery nature, which is communicated unequally to many individual fires — one being more active than another; and if two are joined together at the same time, they heat and burn more quickly and swiftly — which proceeds from the greater number and plurality of degrees which they together united possess.

You will say: all of this proceeds from the various and diverse dispositions and preparations of the subjects upon which the said natural agents act — as is clear in the case of dry wood, which is more easily kindled and burned by fire than moist and wet wood; and in the case of apt and duly disposed organs, by using which one person operates more conveniently, more readily, and better than another using the same badly affected and impeded organs. Hence Scotus (*1 Post., quaest. 2, §. Ad quaestionem dicitur*) subjoins that the intellective soul does not per se admit of more and less but per accidens, by reason of a body better disposed and more aptly complexioned; hence one person is more eminent and clever than another. Against: given all the requirements for acting, a natural necessary cause necessarily acts as much as it can; and if two trees are planted at the same time in the same soil and are cultivated in the same manner by the same farmer, yet one will be more vigorous, larger, and more fruitful than the other; and twins procreated from the same parents and instructed by the same teachers and nourished with equal food operate differently — one is good and devoted to learning, the other evil and ensnared in vices — even if both have been equally disposed and are equal in everything; nevertheless they produce various and diverse actions, and one excels the other; but this eminence and excellence proceeds from nothing but a more excellent nature and a nobler soul; and therefore substance is capable of receiving more and greater degrees. As for Scotus in the passage cited above, he speaks in someone else's view and not in his own, as he frequently does in that work — hence he writes: *Ad quaestionem dicitur*.

Third: a nature illuminated and capable of being communicated to several things is capable of many degrees; for whatever is unlimited and infinite is a participant in degrees, as is clear from the divine nature, which is communicated to three Persons, containing and possessing infinity of degrees of perfection; but a specific substance is unlimited and indeterminate with respect to more singular and individual things; therefore it is possessed of many perfection degrees. You will say: it is limited and contracted through various and more haecceities, not through the multitude and variety of perfection degrees. Against: more excellent and excellent actions do not proceed from haecceities and singularities — which are conditions of the agent, not principles of acting — but from natures endowed and adorned with principles and powers of acting; therefore nature and not singularity is the participant in degrees, even though it is contracted and limited by individual differences. Furthermore, a more perfect nature is one communicable to more individuals than to one alone, according to Augustine (*4 Trin., cap. 1*); but a specific substance is divisible into and communicable to several individuals. Moreover, one species of substance is more perfect than another — as an Angel than a man, and a man than a brute; therefore also one individual of the same species surpasses another in nobility and perfection. Finally, it serves the adornment and beauty of the universe that individuals be unequal in virtue, nobility, and perfection — just as are the

species of things, one of which we plainly see and experience to be more excellent and eminent than another.

Objection I: Aristotle (*1 Praedicam., cap. de substantia*) writes that it is proper to substance not to admit of more and less; and (*8 Met., T. 10*) subjoins that species stand as numbers — and to number nothing can be added or subtracted without changing the species; therefore the same must be maintained of substance — which would not be true if it were capable of receiving degrees. I respond by a distinction and interpretation of those passages: with respect to specific being, I concede; with respect to individual being, I deny. This the same Philosopher seems to smell out (*3 Met., T. 11*) and (*10 of the same work, T. 26*), recognizing equality of perfection within a species. You will say: Scotus (*quaest. 15 Praedicam., near the end*) says that primary substance is called maximally substance not because it possesses degrees but because it substands more accidents than secondary substance. It must be replied that Scotus there only wants primary substance to contain more than secondary substance — just as a species contains more than a genus — which is true; and if the nomenclature of substance is derived from subsisting, without doubt primary substance substands more than secondary; but not if it derives its notion from *per se* subsisting, as I was arguing above.

Objection II: what accrues to a thing already constituted in its being is an accident — for it is called an accident because it befalls a thing, and does not constitute it nor enter into its intrinsic being; but the said degrees accrue to a primary substance already constituted in its singular and substantial being; therefore they are not substantial and intrinsic to it but accidental and extrinsic. I distinguish the major: if it is of another genus and really distinct from that to which it accrues, I concede; but if it is of the same genus and really identified with it, I deny — as are perfection and individual degrees, with the assent of Scotus (*1 d. 17, quaest. 3, §. Ad istam q., YY*) and (*Quol. 6, §. Contra ista, ad M*). And this can be illustrated from the degrees of whiteness, which accruing to it perfect it and are not said to befall it. Therefore to the distinction of the major I distinguish the minor.

Objection III: if substance were capable of degrees, there would be *per se* motion toward substance — which Aristotle denies (*5 Phys., T. 10*); therefore, etc. I respond with Scotus by denying the sequent. For although toward substance there is no *per se* continuous and successive motion — because substance does not acquire the said degrees temporally and successively as quality does — yet there is a *per se* change toward it, because at the instant in which an individual substance is produced, such perfection degrees are co-produced and follow upon it.

Article II: Whether Quality Is Intensified and Remitted

It is the common view of philosophers that quality is intensible and remissible — and for this to be rightly and conveniently grasped, note the following.

Note that accretion is twofold: extensive and intensive. The former is that by which quality is extended through the parts of the subject in which it inheres — as heat is diffused to heat all the parts of wood. The intensive is that by which quality is perfected and increased by the reception of new degrees — as heat having four degrees, if a fifth is added to it, is intensified and increased; conversely, if some degree is removed from that heat, it is remitted and diminished. Note further that the terminus of extensive accretion is mass-quantity, while that of intensive accretion is quality — which some call the quantity of virtue or perfection. Moreover, in quality two kinds of parts are found: essential or specific, which are not intensified or remitted, since essence subsists in the indivisible and does not admit of more and less; and material and individual, which are capable of intension and remission.

Assertion: quality is a form capable of intension and remission. This is defended by the Doctor (*8 Met., quaest. 8, quaest. 3*), in which many useful and subtle matters are treated, and (*1 dist. 17, quaest. 3*), and it is common to the other scholastics there. Proof first, from Aristotle, who (*Lib. Praedicam., cap. de qualitate*) writes that it is proper to quality to admit of more and less; and what he teaches (*4 Phys., T. 84*) and (*4 Top., T. 20*) in these words: *if simply, the simply follows; if more, the more follows — as to white there follows that it is white by whiteness; therefore to more white there follows that it is more white by whiteness*; and therefore if a form in a subject is capable of intension and remission, it is likewise capable of intension and remission in itself. Second: we observe air to be more luminous, a wall more white, we sense water to be warmer, snow colder, we hear song sweeter and a man more learned — and such things manifestly and evidently show us that quality is capable of intension and remission. Furthermore, it is impossible for any form to be participated by many things according to a multiple reason and variety of degrees unless it admits of more and less: for to be able to have a plurality of degrees means nothing other than to be able to be intensified and remitted; but quality is of this kind — for now cold is more vigorous, since it possesses more degrees of coldness; and light is likewise more intense and heat more burning — for no other reason than that it participates in more degrees. I conclude therefore that quality is intensible and remissible — with the agreement of Augustine (*Ad Bonifacium*) and before him the Apostle (*Ad Philip. 1*): *I pray that your charity may more and more abound*; and (*Apoc. 22*): *Let the just man be yet justified*.

Objection: if quality could be intensified and remitted, one whiteness would be more whiteness than another — since an intense whiteness would possess some degree lacked by a remiss whiteness; but this seems false; therefore so too the latter. The major sequent is denied: for given the hypothesis, it would indeed be a greater whiteness, but not more whiteness — because *more* is said of

participants in a form, not of the form that is participated by many. Or say that *greater* is valid with respect to individual being, not with respect to specific being.

Article III: In What Manner the Intension of Quality Occurs

This is a great and arduous difficulty, both on account of the subject matter itself and on account of the multiplicity of opinions — which are adduced and refuted by Albert (*1 dist. 17*), Mayr, Maior, and other scholastics there. I set forth and examine four more celebrated and important ones. The first is attributed to Godfrey (*Quol. 11, quaest. 3*), Burley (*Tract. de intensione form.*), and Durandus (*dist. 17, quaest. 7, num. 25*), who hold that the intension of quality is effected through the corruption of the pre-existing quality and the production of the subsequent one — so that if there were whiteness as four and whiteness as five accrues, the former as four ceases and this latter as five remains; in remission the opposite occurs — the more perfect quality is corrupted and the less perfect persists, as whiteness as four remains and whiteness as five is corrupted. The second is defended by Aegidius (*Quol. 2, quaest. 14*), affirming that quality is intensified through the removal and purification from its contrary — which is to say that a quality is intensified when its contrary is diminished: as heat is intensified when cold ceases, and heat itself is remitted when cold increases. The third is that of St. Thomas (*2 2, quaest. 24, artic. 3*) and his disciples, who hold that the intension and remission of quality occurs through greater and lesser rooting in the subject — so that a quality is more intense which more perfectly affects the subject in which it inheres, and more remiss which is participated by the subject more imperfectly. The fourth is handed down by our Doctor (*1 dist. 17, quaest. 3*), St. Bonaventure (*ibid., part. 2, quaest. 2*), Alexander (*Summa de virtutibus, collat. 69*), Ockham (*quaest. 6, dist. praealleg.*), Richard (*artic. 2, quaest. 2*), and the others commonly, who teach that the intension of an accidental form occurs through the addition of degree to degree in the same part of the subject.

Note that the latitude of degrees — which, from what was said and noted in the first article of this question, is twofold: extensive and intensive — makes one unity, not indeed an essential one as from genus and difference or from matter and form, nor an accidental one as from accident and subject, but a homogeneous unity coalescing from similar parts — just as from heterogeneous and dissimilar parts a heterogeneous unity is constituted, such as an organic body composed from head, neck, and the other members; so from many degrees simultaneously united there is one quality — such as one whiteness and one heat — with the unity and totality of homogeneity. You will say: several individuals and singulars do not make up one individual and singular — as two stones do not make one stone, nor two men one man; likewise two individual and singular degrees do not constitute one individual and singular quality. I say this holds for complete and perfect individuals, of which one is not referred to or ordered toward another, as the examples adduced clearly show; not so for

other incomplete and imperfect ones — for from these singulars a complete singular whole is made: as from this matter and this form, from this body and this soul, this living and animated thing comes to be; likewise from several degrees simultaneously joined and co-existing and singular there is made one singular and individual total whole — something homogeneous and similar — which precedes the composite from matter and form, because as the Doctor rightly observes (*1 Reportat. dist. 17, quaest. 6, §. Ad rationem dico*), if such a composite is dissolved, its extremes and both its parts still enjoy a composition of the same kind and a homogeneous unity.

First assertion: the intension of quality occurs with the preceding entity of it remaining. This is Scotus's view as cited in both works (*quaest. 3, §. Ad q. igitur*). Proof first, from Aristotle (*1 De gen., T. 31, 35*), affirming that augmentation is an addition to a pre-existing magnitude. This is also indicated by the word *intension* — for unless the pre-existing quality persisted, through the production of a new entity, not the quality itself would be intensified but it would simply be produced anew — just as when water is produced it is not said to be augmented, but when another water is added to it already produced and pre-existing, as is clear from one river flowing into another — as the Durance into the Rhone and the Ticino into the Po — in which it manifestly appears that the augmentation and intension of water presupposes the permanence of the pre-existing water; likewise the intension of quality requires the preceding quality to persist — as heat as six pre-requires pre-existing heat as five. Furthermore, intension is the same as perfection, and to be intensified is the same as to be perfected, as Augustine suggests (*Ad Bonifacium*) in these words: *Charity merits to be increased, that when increased it may merit to be perfected*. What is asserted of charity is to be maintained of other qualities — whether material or spiritual; therefore when quality is intensified and perfected, it is not destroyed, but would be destroyed if the pre-existing quality were to perish through the advent of new quality.

Second: if another quantity of mass is added to a preceding one, the prior persists with the posterior — as is seen with the eye: if a new part is added to a plank, both the old and new parts remain together. The same therefore must be asserted of the quantity of perfection, since the reason is equal in both, with the agreement of Augustine (*6 Trin., cap. 7*): *In those things that are not great in mass, to be greater is the same as to be better*.

Third: a cause exercising influence on an effect must necessarily exist, according to the saying: *a cause in act has an effect in act*; but the preceding quality — such as an intellectual or moral habit — is the cause of an act, for habit concurs as a partial cause to produce the act, as the authors of the first view do not deny; therefore the pre-existing habit persists with the advent of the act, which is a new quality added to it. And this is especially clear in the case of supernatural habits — notably grace, which never ceases, whether in the way or in the homeland, as the Postillator on (*1 Cor. 13*) rightly says.

Fourth: the same reasoning must be used for intension as for remission of quality, as the opponents too concede; but in remission, if the more perfect quality — such as the highest degree of cold — is corrupted by a double highest heat, there is not afterwards found that from which a remiss degree of cold is produced; for not from heat, since heat is not per se productive of cold; nor from a universal agent, to which one ought not have recourse without necessity and compelling reason — as Scotus and Maior especially note in the present question — especially since sense and experience teach us the opposite, as happens in our matter. For we observe warm and boiling water gradually remitted, and we sense by hand its heat decreasing little by little without any intervening productive cause. Moreover, things of the same reason mutually help and preserve each other, as is clear from two fires joined together reinforcing each other; but the heat of fire and of the sun, and likewise the first and second degrees of heat are of the same reason; therefore when one accrues, the other is not destroyed. And this is clearly shown from two torches lit, whose lights placed together in the same hall illuminate and light it more greatly, and if one is taken away the light of the other remains — though not as intense. Likewise two lights cause in one opaque body two shadows, and if one of them is taken away only one shadow remains. Therefore in the intension of quality the preceding quality is not destroyed. These and other things that the Doctor and his disciples marshal plainly and openly show the opposite view to be false, improbable, and impossible.

Second assertion: quality is not intensified through the removal of the contrary quality. This is Scotus's view (*ibid.*, §. *Contrà istam opinionem ante XX*). Proof first: there can be intension or remission without any admixture of a contrary — as is clear in the case of habit, which is the last predicament, which admits of more and less, as a horseman is more armed than a foot soldier, even though nothing is contrary to it. Therefore intension does not proceed from purification and removal of the contrary. You will say: from (3 *Top.*, cap. 4, locus 9) — *more white is that which is less mixed with black* — therefore a quality is intensified when the contrary is removed from it. I say this is to be understood causally and concomitantly, not formally and precisely, as if the intension of quality demanded the removal of the contrary. Second: quality can be intensified with no contrariety intervening — as light in air is intensified, to which nothing is contrary; and I asserted that some portion of pure element can be found under the concavity of the lunar orb and at the bottom of the sea when I treated of the elements; therefore also a pure quality without mixture of a contrary quality — such as the highest heat or the highest cold. Moreover, supernatural habits are intensified — as charity and glory in the Blessed, in whom nothing contrary whatsoever exists; therefore the intension of quality does not proceed from purification of the contrary.

Third assertion: nor is quality intensified through greater rooting in the subject. Scotus as cited agrees, (*before* §. *Ad istam q. sub VV*) and all hold this — except the

Thomists, some of whom, seeing the improbability of the Thomistic view, withdraw from it and say that St. Thomas and Scotus disagree only in their manner of speaking and in words. Others endeavor to defend that opinion — which, since it has no appearance of probability and truth, they go off in various and diverse modes of explanation, which being vain and futile, I am reluctant to adduce and refute. Now the said assertion is proven. I: that rooting of an intensible quality in the subject either is distinguished from the intensible form or is not. If the latter, then the intended conclusion is obtained — since when the rooting is greater or lesser, the quality will likewise be greater or lesser — which the opponents reject. If the former, then it is distinguished either as an absolute or as a relative form. If absolute, it is either quantity — and this is not so, since quantity does not admit of more and less — or it is quality, and the opponents fall into the doctrine of Scotus which they are impugning. If relative, likewise the proposed point is obtained, because a relation does not admit of more and less except by reason of the foundation on which it rests. Hence a white wall is said to be more similar to another white wall because of the greater whiteness by which it is affected and in which its greater similarity is founded — a relation by which it is referred to another white wall. You will say: it is a greater existence that the quality participates in the subject. Against: existence is really identical with the essence of which it is the existence, as is shown in the (*Metaphysics*); therefore if the existence of quality admits of more and less, so too does its essence and entity. Furthermore, existence is common to every produced thing outside its causes; therefore if intension occurs through greater existence, every thing that exists would undergo intension — which is false. Moreover, existence belongs to a thing at the beginning of its production — but intension does not, as is established as certain by all; therefore intension is not to be sought from the existence of quality.

Second: sometimes an intense quality is less rooted in the subject than a remiss quality; therefore the intension of a form is not sought through greater rooting in the subject. The antecedent is proven: redness arising from shame is more intense than redness caused by nature, such as in the sanguine temperament — yet the latter is more rooted in the subject than the former; therefore greater rooting in the subject is irrelevant to the intension of quality. Hence there are refuted those who hold that greater rooting means the quality more firmly and tenaciously existing in the subject — since a tertian fever is more intense than what is commonly called a hectic fever, even though the former is more easily removed from the subject than the latter, which persists in it until death. Also refuted are those who affirm that the said greater rooting is the greater union of quality with the subject. For fire and its heat are more closely united with the tow that they heat and burn than with iron — even though they subsequently inhere more tenaciously in the latter. Union, as said elsewhere, is formally a relation, which does not admit of more and less; therefore the intension of a form does not proceed from a greater union of quality with the subject. Finally,

not to be heard are those who understand by greater rooting the more perfect participation of the form by the subject in which it is subjected, and who add that it is a new mode accruing to the subject. For the subject is such through such a form — as a wall is white through whiteness — and is more such through the same greater form — as a wall is more white through a greater whiteness received in it. Moreover, the acquisitive motion tends toward the *terminus ad quem* by which it is specified; but the intension of a form is an acquisitive motion, since the form is intensified and perfected by it; therefore intension does not derive from the perfection and participation of the subject, nor from a new mode of the subject. Most of all, because the intension of a form can occur without a subject and its mode — for if the consecrated host is heated and new heat is added to it by the approximation of fire, it will become warmer with no subject existing; therefore the intension of quality does not derive from a greater participation of the subject or a new mode of it.

Fourth assertion: the intension of an intensible form is caused through the addition of degree to degree. Scotus is its patron as cited (*ibid.*, §. *sexto*, T. 3) and (*in Rep.*, *quaest.* 6). Proof first, from (4 *Phys.*, T. 85) and (1 *De gen.*, T. 31, 33), where it is read that augmentation is effected through the addition of a new entity added to the pre-existing one. And this is clearly apparent from the refutation of the others. Second: we clearly observe water increasing by the addition of new water, quantity by the accession of new quantity, light by the advent of new light, and so with the rest; therefore the same must be maintained of the intension of any intensible form, since the same reason runs in this and in those. Third: we experience that a weight presses and loads more if a new weight is added to it — lead presses more if other lead is joined to it; heat heats more if other heat is conjoined to it; and water boils and seethes more if another fire is placed under it; therefore when a new degree is added to the preceding one, intension occurs. Fourth: to a new merit God grants new grace, which is united to the preceding grace. Hence the Council of Trent (*cited by Arriaga, disp.* 3, *sect.* 1, *subsect.* 3) decrees that grace is increased through good works. And the Church, in a certain prayer, prays God to give grace to both the just and the unjust, saying: *We beseech you, O Lord, pour your grace into our minds*. But to the just and holy God gives new grace through their new good works; therefore if grace grows by the addition of new degrees, the same must be said of the other qualities, both spiritual and material.

Objection I, on behalf of Godfrey: the terms of a motion are incompatible (5 *Phys.*, T. 20). But the preceding quality and the subsequent quality receive the terms of their motions, since they are produced by two productions; therefore intension is effected through the corruption of the preceding quality and the production of the subsequent one. Confirmation: local motion, sound, and voice are intensified through the corruption of a pre-existing part and the acquisition of a new part; therefore the same must be affirmed of the other qualities. I respond by explaining and distinguishing the major: of first terms, such as form

and its privation, I concede; of concomitant terms, such as the prior and posterior degrees of an intensible form, I deny. To the confirmation I concede the antecedent and deny the consequent; the reason is that those are successive things whose parts never coexist simultaneously but continually pass away — with the prior ones corrupted, the posterior ones succeed being produced; but these latter are permanent; therefore the prior and recent degrees exist and remain simultaneously.

Objection II, on behalf of the Thomists: (*4 Phys., T. 84*) — *from hot there becomes more hot, without any new hot being made in matter that was not hot when it was less hot*; therefore through the intension of heat, no new heat accrues to the preceding one. Confirmation: like applied to like does not augment it — as tepid added to tepid does not increase and intensify the pre-existing tepid; therefore quality is not intensified by the application of a new degree. I respond that the testimony is to be interpreted not simply but in a qualified sense: when something becomes hotter, it does not become hot absolutely — since it is presupposed already to be hot — but it becomes more hot, because heat is intensified by the addition of new heat. Just as when a white wall is whitened more, it does not become a white wall — since it was already white — but becomes more white. This is deduced from Scotus (*praecit., in Rep., quaest. 6, ad 2*). To the confirmation I deny the antecedent with the same Doctor (*ibid., in solutione 3*) — for the smallest drop of water added to another drop intensifies it, as experience shows; likewise the smallest degree of heat applied to another degree of heat undoubtedly increases it. Therefore if a degree of heat in warm water is joined to another degree of heat, that degree is intensified.

Objection III: one rational soul is more perfect than another, and one angel surpasses another in perfection; and yet neither soul nor angel possesses a latitude of degrees of this kind; therefore neither does quality participate in such degrees. It must be replied that both the soul and the angel enjoy their own degrees — but differently — for to them there belong substantial perfection degrees, all simultaneously at the first moment of their creation; whereas these are accidental degrees to be acquired through motion and an interval of time.

Article IV: Whether the Degrees of Intense Quality Are Homogeneous

Suarez (*disp. 46 Met., Sect. 1, T. 30*) and Hurt (*hoc loco, disp. 5, sect. 2, §. 98*), to whom Durandus seems to have gone before (*1 d. 17, quaest. 7, num. 25*), deny that the degrees of an intense form are similar and homogeneous. The opposite is taught by Scotus (*1 d. 17, quaest. 3*) and (*in Rep., quaest. 6*), Mayr (*ibid., d. 18, quaest. 2, artic. 1 & 2*), Orbellis, and the other Scotists, Ockham (*quaest. 7*) and Gabriel there and other Nominalists, and also Vazquez (*Tom. 1, in 1. 2, disp. 28, cap. 6*), Arriaga (*hic, disp. 3, sect. 3*), and the rest from outside both schools.

Note and recall from what was said elsewhere that a whole is twofold — heterogeneous and homogeneous: the former coalesces from parts of a different kind, as the human body from head, neck, and the other members that make up and perfect it; the latter from parts of the same kind — as all water, all of whose parts are water, and all fire, all of whose parts, if separated from each other, are fires, even though when conjoined they do not obtain the denomination of the whole — and most especially when separated, because they cease to be parts and put on the notion of a whole. But such parts are not subordinated to each other, nor is one act and another potency, but they are capable of being united with one another and make up a whole said to be one with the unity of continuity and homogeneity — which is bipartite into extensive, as that which is quantified in terms of mass-quantity, and intensive, as that which is quantified in terms of the quantity of virtue and perfection.

Assertion: the degrees of an intense form are similar and homogeneous. This is Scotus's view as cited in both works, and it is common and true. Proof first: the parts of water, fire, and the other homogeneous things are similar and of the same kind; therefore the parts and degrees of intense quality are homogeneous and similar. The antecedent is clear, because they share the same name and the same notion — just as individuals of the same species do; and this is made clearer if they are separated from one another, for then they put on the notion of the whole — since it is then true to affirm and say: this is water and that is water; likewise this is fire and that is fire. Even more so, because they enjoy the same property and power — for the parts of water and all the water cool and moisten; and the parts of fire and all the fire heat and burn. And simultaneously they are united and help and protect each other against contraries and mutually sustain each other. Second: the same reasoning must be used about that which is quantified by the quantity of virtue as about that which is quantified by mass-quantity, as was shown above; but that which is quantified by mass-quantity has homogeneous parts, as is clear from a plank and other continua, whose parts are joined by a common term; therefore the same must be affirmed of that which is quantified by perfection quantity — as is clear from light, heat, cold, and other intense qualities, whose parts and degrees are similar and of the same kind. Third: if there are two bronze globes of equal weight, they will be equal in heaviness; but if simultaneously united they will press more heavily, as experience shows; and if separated from each other they will press less heavily, each always preserving its own equal heaviness; therefore if the degrees of heaviness are similar and homogeneous, likewise the degrees of the other qualities will be similar and of the same kind — as is clear from two lit lamps which, joined or disjoined, retain their degrees of light as similar and of the same reason. Fourth: if a person dear to and acceptable before God has three degrees of grace and afterward performs good works — with a remiss act and lesser effort, however — another degree of grace is owed to him by which the preceding degrees are intensified — just as water added to water is intensified,

even though the subsequent be less than the pre-existing, as is clear in rivers entering the sea and in rain by which those rivers swell, all of whose waters are similar and homogeneous; therefore this same thing is to be said of the degrees of any intense quality.

You will say: this does not hold for operative and productive qualities producing effects of the same kind — as heat produces heat and light produces light — but does hold for those not productive of effects like themselves — as grace does not produce grace, and glory does not produce glory. Against: that one thing is productive of another, or not productive, does not remove or posit homogeneity or heterogeneity. For the Angel and the rational soul do not generate their like, yet they are assimilated; and the heavens are homogeneous even though they do not generate other heavens; light generates luminosity, all of whose degrees are similar and of the same reason — so say the same of fire, heat, and others of the same form. I conclude therefore that the degrees of intense quality — whether prior or posterior — are homogeneous and similar.

Objection I: if the degrees were similar and homogeneous, an intense quality and a remiss quality would be of equal perfection and power — but this cannot be defended; therefore neither can that. The sequent major is proven: if the degrees of quality are extended, they are equally perfect as if intensified, because through extension they do not lose their power and perfection, nor through union do they acquire new perfection and vigor. I deny the sequent major; for its proof I say that united and intense degrees are more efficacious and excellent than disjoined and remiss ones — because a united power is stronger than the same power dispersed. And nature simultaneously joined and bound together prevents a vacuum from being made by the first angel, even though there is no power on earth that can be compared to it (*Job 41*) — which I mentioned (*lib. 6 Phys., quaest. 3, artic. 2*). In this sense perhaps Ecclesiastes (*ch. 4*) subjoins: *A threefold cord is not easily broken*.

Objection II: several degrees in the same part of the subject intensify quality; therefore several parts of quantity mutually penetrating likewise intensify quantity — but this is not conceded; therefore neither should the former be admitted, if the degrees are homogeneous; but it is admissible if they are heterogeneous. I concede the antecedent and deny the consequent: because quality, since it admits of more and less, is capable of intension; while quantity, since it does not admit of more and less, is not capable of intension but of extension.

Objection III: an agent cannot overstep the limits of its own power and activity, as all philosophers hold for certain; but if the degrees of quality were homogeneous, a natural agent would act beyond its power and exit the sphere of its own activity. For example, white as two could cause two degrees of whiteness in another white thing of similar kind having likewise two degrees of whiteness, thus making it white as four; and then it could bring about other degrees —

even the eighth and highest — which seems inconvenient and absurd; therefore the said degrees of intense quality are not homogeneous. I concede the major and deny the minor. For the similar and equal in power does not act on its similar, nor on its equal in potency and power, as experience shows. For white as two, since it already has and possesses two degrees and does not tend and incline toward them — because once the terminus is acquired, motion ceases — but only toward those others that a stronger and higher agent can introduce. Therefore no inconvenience follows from establishing homogeneous degrees — indeed, if heterogeneous degrees were posited, inconveniences clearly follow, as what I adduced above plainly shows.

Objection IV: through a more intense vision God is seen more perfectly and clearly by the Blessed; but if the degrees are homogeneous and equal, one Blessed having two degrees of vision would see God equally perfectly and clearly as another having four degrees — because one degree is not more perfect and greater than another but they are of equal power and perfection; therefore, etc. I concede the major and deny the minor; the reason is that although the degrees are equal in power and perfection, they are not so in number. Therefore one who has more degrees of beatific vision is more blessed than one who has fewer — just as he is richer who has more money and possessions than another who has fewer.

You will ask: which qualities are intensible and remissible? I say principally the qualities of the first species — such as acquired habits, as knowledge, and infused ones, as grace — and those of the third species, as love, hatred, joy, sorrow, and the like, of which more is said in the *Logic*.

Article V: Whether the Degrees of Quality Are Distinguished from One Another

Assertion: the degrees of intense quality really differ from one another. This is suggested by Scotus (*1 d. 17, quaest. 3*) and (*in Report., quaest. 4*) and thereafter, against some whose name Mayr (*d. 18 of the first, quaest. 2, artic. 2*) suppresses. Proof I: things that really differ are those of which one can be produced without the other being produced — for this is the principal and manifest indication of real distinction; but the first degree can be produced without the second degree being produced, since after the production of the first degree the agent can be impeded by the contrary and desist from the production of the second degree; therefore the degrees really differ from one another. Second: among things of which one can remain and persist in being while the other is corrupted, there is a real distinction — as is clear from the definition of real distinction given elsewhere; but one degree can remain and another be destroyed — since the first degree can persist in its being and the second degree can be corrupted, as occurs in the remission of quality, when namely the great and intense heat of boiling water is remitted and cold is intensified as the water returns to its coldness; therefore, etc.

Objection I: really distinct things do not make one per se, unless one is by way of potency and the other by way of act; but intense quality is something one coalescing from a plurality of degrees; therefore the degrees from which it coalesces are not really distinct. I distinguish the major: about those that make one with the unity of composition, I concede; about others that constitute one with homogeneous, integral, and gradual unity, I deny.

Objection II: if there were several really distinct degrees, with the multiplication of those degrees, quality would likewise be multiplied — since with the multiplication of inferiors, the superior is multiplied; but intense quality is not multiple but one; therefore neither are the degrees really distinct from one another. I deny the major. For the posterior can be plurified without the plurification of the prior; thus with one cause existing, there are several of its effects, and under one genus several species are comprehended; and one species has several individuals. Hence, although intense quality is one with the totality of homogeneity, it is nevertheless multiple with partial multiplicity — just as the sea is one in total and many in partial.

Article VI: Whether Intension and Remission Differ from One Another

Every intensible form is likewise remissible. What can be intensified can likewise be remitted, and vice versa. Hence intension is the acquisition or acquisitive motion of degrees of quality, while remission is the loss or privative motion of degrees of quality. This is clear in the case of water's heat, which becomes more heated and boils and seethes when fire is placed under it, and when the fire is removed the heat gradually diminishes and it returns to its prior coldness.

Assertion: intension and remission are distinguished from one another. This is suggested by the Doctor in the places cited above. Proof first: motions are distinguished according to their terms, from what was said (*lib. 8 Phys., quaest. 2, artic. 1 & 2*); but intension and remission have distinct terms — since the terminus of intension is positive while the terminus of remission is privative, as is clear from the description of each given above; therefore intension and remission differ from one another. Second: intension and remission differ from one another just as generation and corruption do; but generation and corruption differ from each other, as is clear from the first book of this treatise (*quaest. 2, 3*); therefore likewise intension and remission. The major is clear from the beginning of this article: for intension is the acquisition of new degrees, while remission is the loss of certain pre-existing degrees.

Objection I: Aristotle (*5 Phys., T. 18*) numbers remission among positive motions; therefore intension and remission do not differ as a positive and a privative motion. I respond that the Philosopher is to be understood not precisely and formally but connotatively and fundamentally — insofar as remission

designates some surviving degrees, according to which remission can be called a positive motion.

Objection II: intension and remission stand to each other as generation and corruption, from what was asserted above; but corruption is the destruction of the whole into the whole, no sensible subject remaining, as I showed in the place just cited; therefore also connotatively and fundamentally remission is not a positive motion. I respond that remission is a partial corruption — that is, of some degrees only — but not a total corruption, as is rightly deduced in the argument.

Question II: On Rarefaction and Condensation

That rarefaction and condensation exist is plain to our eyes. For we observe fire being rarefied, water condensed, oil, milk, and things of this kind. What they are, what they include, toward what they tend, and where they reside is not so obvious and accessible; hence we have established the following articles to illuminate and decide these matters.

Article I: Whether Through Rarefaction New Quantity Is Produced and Through Condensation Old Quantity Is Lost

Four principal opinions of philosophers, discordant and discrepant, are reported and examined, of which the first is that of certain ones whose names the Doctor reticences (*4 d. 12, quaest. 4, §. Quantum ad istam*), who hold that rarefaction is effected through tiny and subtle corpuscles entering into the pores of the rarefied thing, and condensation through the departure of the said bodies from the pores of the condensed thing. To these assent Arriaga (*disp. 16 Phys., sect. 10, subsect. 2*) and Poncius (*disp. 55, quaest. ult., concl. 5, num. 47*). The second is that of Godfrey (*Quol. 11, quaest. 3*) and Burley, related by the marginalists — Scotus as just cited (*§. Hic est una opinio*) and Pomponatius (*1 De gen., quaest. 10*) — who hold that through rarefaction the whole preceding quantity is corrupted and a new larger one is produced in the rarefied thing. The third is that defended by Bassol (*4 d. 12, quaest. 3*), Marsilius (*1 De gen., quaest. 15*), Hervaeus (*Quol. 1, quaest. 5*), and not a few others, who affirm that in rarefaction some part of new quantity is produced and in condensation some part of the preceding quantity is lost. Toletus follows this (*4 Phys., quaest. 11*) and thinks it to be true and that of Aristotle, whose patron is also Scotus (*ibid., sub B, §. Quantum ad istam*) and (*in Repor., quaest. 5, §. Dico tamen*). The fourth is handed down by John of Mairs (*1 De gen., quaest. 4, scibili primo*), Mayr (*4 d. 12, quaest. 4*), Ruverio (*1 De gen., cap. 5, tract. de rarefactione, quaest. 1*), the Coimbrans (*quaest. 17, artic. 3*), and very many others, asserting that in rarefaction no total or partial quantity is acquired but only a greater local extension, and in condensation a lesser one. From these our Doctor in the places cited above does not seem to be very far distant.

Note first that rarefaction and condensation are taken in two ways. First, broadly, for any loosening and dilation, or constricting and compression, of any rarefiable and condensable thing — in which sense a sponge full of air or water is said to be rarefied, and when the air or water is expelled from it, it is said to be condensed. But this acceptance is common and improper — and was the only one recognized by many of the ancients, who held that there were empty pores in a body, which we maintain to be filled with thin and subtle body. Second, strictly, for the enlargement of joined parts occupying a larger place, or for the compression of those same connected parts occupying a lesser space. And it is of rarefaction in this acceptance — which is the proper one — that the discussion is in the present place. For in this way wax is rarefied by heat and condensed by cold, and likewise whatever else is rarefiable and condensable.

Note second that there are three principal causes of rarefaction and condensation. One is heat and cold, as St. Bonaventure notes (*2 d. 14, quaest. 3, n. 67*). For we experience heat to rarefy what is rarefiable and cold to condense what is condensable — as I was just explaining about wax, which, when placed near fire, rarefies, and when placed near snow, is densified. The same is also clear in the case of chestnuts, acorns, gunpowder, and other such things, which through heat and fire are rarefied and seek a larger place, and also instantly crack and are reduced to sparks and ashes. Moreover, it is clear from water in a pot, which when cold is contained in a small place, but when it heats it rarefies and tends to a larger place, and boiling and seething it leaves the pot itself. The second cause is generation — principally of elements, some of which increase and rarify in summer, as fire and air; while others decrease and condense — as water and earth; while in winter the opposite occurs, since the former diminish and the latter increase. The third is local motion, by which air is assailed by winds and, reduced to a narrow place, is condensed; when these cease, it spreads into a more ample place and rarefies.

Note third that material accidents are drawn out from the potency of the subject. For what is actually cold was potentially cold, and what is actually hot was potentially hot — and so this is to be affirmed of the rest — in much the same way as substantial forms are drawn out from the potency of matter, as was shown in (*lib. 2 Phys.*); likewise accidents are drawn out from the potency of their subjects by a natural agent. Hence quantity — which is the first accident following upon corporeal substance, drawn out from whose potency it is — is proportioned and adequate to it; so much so that as it increases, quantity increases, and as it decreases, quantity decreases. Therefore in rarefaction the said substance is increased and so too its quantity, and in condensation that same substance is diminished and similarly its quantity is lessened; and Toletus as cited above affirms that Aristotle (*4 Phys., T. 84*) expressly held this doctrine.

First assertion: rarefaction does not occur through the ingress of subtle bodies into the thickness of the rarefiable body, nor condensation through the egress

of the said bodies. This is touched on by the Doctor in the passage mentioned (§. *Quantum ad ista, sub B*). Proof first: a body can be rare without the said subtle bodies; therefore rarefaction does not occur through bodies of this kind. The antecedent is plain: for certain parts of the heavens are sparse, which do not shine, while others are dense, which shine — namely the stars. But in the former, no such subtle bodies exist, since the heaven is a simple body alien to the ingress or egress of those bodies — incorrupt and separated from their origin, transit, and destruction. You will say: the heaven from the beginning of its volition was so constituted that some of its parts are sparse and others dense; but sublunary bodies that are rarefiable and condensable require or respect bodies of this kind that are subtle and tenuous. Against: if those bodies are not necessary for rarefying one body, they are not necessary for another — just as if quantity is not the cause for individuating and singularizing a celestial substance, it is not the cause for sublunary and terrestrial substance either. Likewise, if greater rooting in the subject is not the cause of the intension of grace and glory of the just, nor of another quality — such as whiteness or blackness. Therefore if the said bodies do not cause rarity in the heavens, they cause it neither on earth. Second: rarefaction would be the juxtaposition of those subtle bodies — for one would be applied to another, by reason of which it would be rarefied; but this is false — just as the doctrine of the ancient philosophers who held that generation is an aggregation of atoms. Furthermore, those bodies are capable of rarity and density, since they are of the same kind as the other rarefiables and condensables; therefore a cause of their rarity and density must be assigned — which is not had through other bodies, else one would proceed to infinity; therefore another cause, to be named below, is to be established. Moreover, without the ingress of such bodies, wax enclosed in a vessel rarefies and is condensed by cold — for given that the vessel is sealed and stopped on all sides so that those bodies cannot enter the same vessel, still rarefaction of wax occurs from the surrounding heat, and when that heat ceases, condensation of the same wax; therefore it is vain and futile to admit those bodies as the cause of rarity and density in rarefiables and condensables, since rarity and density can exist without them. Finally, if a body were extended or compressed according to all its parts, and God were to prevent any subtle body from being introduced within the said parts or from leaving outside them, that same body would rarefy or condense without those tenuous corpuscles entering or leaving; therefore those bodies are irrelevant to rarity and density.

Second assertion: in rarefaction the whole preceding quantity is not corrupted and the new subsequent larger one is not produced. This is Scotus's view as cited. Proof first: the subject persisting, its passion and property likewise persists — as, with man remaining, his risibility also remains; but in rarefaction the physical composite, which is the subject of quantity, persists, as sense and experience show; therefore its passion and property — which is quantity — likewise persists; and therefore in rarefaction the old quantity does not perish

nor does a new larger one succeed. Second: with accidents persisting, their subject persists — for accidents do not migrate from subject to subject, nor can they by their own nature exist without a subject; but in rarefaction the accidents that were in the subject before it was rarefied persist — such as color, odor, flavor, and other things of this form, as is clear in rarefied wax; therefore so too does their proximate and immediate subject, which is quantity. To this also pertain the arguments I adduced to prove that in an intense quality the preceding quality is not corrupted but persists with the addition of new degrees.

Third assertion: in rarefaction some part of quantity is newly generated unto the pre-existing, and in condensation some part of quantity is lost. The Doctor holds this as cited — especially toward the end. Proof first, from the definition of rare and dense, which all unanimously and commonly receive from Aristotle (*4 Phys., cap. 9, T. 8, 4*) — *the rare is that which under great dimensions has little matter; the dense is that which under small dimensions has much matter*. This is corroborated from (*4 Phys., T. 84*): *the rare is that which was more in potency to be dimensional, and has become actually more dimensional*; but it cannot be actually more dimensional except through greater quantity — just as a river cannot be greater except through more water in it, nor a larger burning furnace except through more fire burning in it. Therefore when rarefaction occurs, a new part of quantity accrues to the pre-existing quantity of the rarefied thing, and when condensation is effected, some part of the quantity of the condensed body is lost.

Hurt replies (*cit.*) by a distinction, saying that the said testimony does not hold in first and remote act, but in second and proximate act — which is circumscriptive and local dimensional extension, not the internal extension of the parts of the rarefied body and quantitative extension. And into the same thing seems to fall what Ruverio and others say about there being a new mode, not a new quantity. Against: where the formal effect is, there is its formal cause — as is clear, for wherever there is animation, there is a soul, and wherever there is whitening, there is whiteness; therefore if in rarefaction there is new dimension and extension, there is likewise new quantity; but the cited authors concede that in rarefaction of a rarefied thing there is new and greater dimension and extension; therefore there is also new and greater quantity — since the formal effect is not separated from the formal cause, nor the mode from the modified thing. Furthermore, quantity is defined as *being per se extended and the position of parts outside parts*; but in rarefaction there is found a greater extension of parts and a greater position of those same parts, as sense and experience show; therefore also a greater quantity.

Second: the intension of a form does not occur without a new degree added to it, as I proved in the preceding question, article III; therefore the extension had through rarefaction is not effected unless through a new part of quantity joined to the pre-existing one. The consequent is clear *a pari*: for just as a form is intensified by the addition of a new degree, so it is extended by the addition of a

new part of quantity. The opponents who deny the parity reply because quantity is extended with nothing added to it — as is clear from a sponge, skin, and the like, which are extended and constricted unchanged and unaltered without receiving and accessing anything new. Against: quite apart from the fact that those opponents adduce this parity to prove that intension is effected through the advent of new degrees and they bring examples from extension and rarefaction taken broadly — of which I made mention in the place just recalled — they are attacked as follows: that motion by which a body passes from dense to rare is acquisitive of something — and of nothing else but quantity, since it becomes greater, which pertains to quantity; therefore in rarefaction some quantity is acquired that was not previously in that body. You will say: some quality is produced by which that same body rarefies. Against: rarefaction does not tend toward quality but toward quantity — as Aristotle testifies (*1 Praedicam., at the end of cap. de qualitate*) — and given that some quality is produced, this does not prevent some quantity from also being generated, since a new extension occurs, which pertains to quantity. Moreover, in nutrition some part of substance and quantity is generated unto the pre-existing nourished thing, as the opponents do not deny; therefore likewise in rarefaction some quantity is adjoined to the rarefied thing, through which the body is further extended and increased. You will say: there is produced not new quantity but a certain mode subsequent to quantity. Against: that mode has already been rejected by us as vain and futile. Furthermore, if it existed, it would be placed in one of the ten categories — but not in the three prior ones, as the aforesaid authors themselves acknowledge, nor in the rest, which are constituted not through modes but through relations extrinsically accruing, from what was asserted in (*Log., lib. 3, quaest. 8, artic. 1*). Moreover, that mode does not differ from local extension, as the above-mentioned philosophers indicate; therefore it is refuted by the same reason by which local extension was rejected above.

Furthermore, it is not without probability that in rarefaction only the said *ubi*-type extension is acquired — which I have defended in many courses, and it does not seem very alien to Scotus, who seems doubtful and uncertain in the places mentioned; and no ignoble disciples of his openly and earnestly defend it and conveniently and easily meet the opposing arguments.

Objection I: from (*4 Phys., cap. 9, T. 84*) — in rarefaction nothing new is acquired by the rarefied body and in condensation nothing pre-existing is lost. For the same wax that was contracted and dense from cold is dilated by heat and spread to occupy a larger space and place. I respond by interpretation and distinction of that testimony: in rarefaction and condensation nothing new comes or departs with respect to the matter, the parts subjected to it — I concede; with respect to quantity and other accidents — I deny; for there, as the Coimbrans observe (*1 De gen., cap. 5, quaest. 17, artic. 1*), Aristotle hands down the definitions of rare and dense, saying *rare is that which under great dimensions has little matter, and dense that which under small dimensions participates in much matter*. Therefore

the said testimony serves us rather than harms us: for the same matter or body remaining, through rarefaction a greater dimension is acquired — which pertains to quantity — and through condensation, the same subject persisting, some of its dimension perishes — which is proper to quantity.

Objection II: if new quantity accrues to a rarefied body unto its old pre-existing quantity, since both are accidents they require a subject in which they inhere; therefore either one is in the other — and thus a penetration of dimensions is given, which is impossible — or one withdraws from the subject as Godfrey holds, or rarefaction does not occur through all the parts — which is against the hypothesis; and since no other way appears in which rarefaction occurs, it is rightly deduced that neither a whole new quantity nor a part of it is acquired by the rarefied thing, nor is either of them lost in the dense thing. I respond that a part of quantity in the rarefied thing is adjoined to the pre-existing quantity in much the same way as water is added to water and fire to fire. For I affirmed above that intension and extension are assimilated: just as the former occurs through the addition of degree to degree, so the latter through the addition of part to part. Therefore no inconvenience is inferred from what has been adduced and narrated.

Objection III: if rarefaction tended toward new quantity, it would not be distinguished from augmentation, since the latter likewise tends toward new quantity, and the identity of a motion is sought from the *terminus ad quem*; but both of the said motions would have the same *terminus ad quem* — namely quantity; therefore no difference would be intercepted between the said motions — which is false. The major sequent is to be denied: for augmentation is the accretion of the subjected matter and of quantity simultaneously — as is clear in animate things that grow through internal reception and in inanimate things that increase through juxtaposition; whereas in rarefaction there is only the addition of some quantity, as I made plain above.

Objection IV: if the consecrated host — which is not incompatible — is rarefied by heat applied to it, it would acquire some quantity that it did not previously have, in which the Body of Christ would not exist — since the Body of Christ exists only in the consecrated parts; but it seems inconvenient that there should be some part of the host in which the Body of Christ does not exist; therefore through rarefaction new quantity does not accrue to it. I concede the major and deny the minor. For just as other accidents accrue to the consecrated host — such as heat, division, fracture, and the like — in which the Body of Christ does not exist, so likewise no one should wonder that in the new quantity acquired through rarefaction there is no Body of Christ the Lord — as Hurt notes (*disp. 4, sect. 2*) after Scotus as cited.

Article II. Whether Rarity and Density Belong to Quantity or Quality.

Those who recognize no new quantity in rarefaction assign rarefaction and condensation to the category of qualities. Those who hold that in rarefaction the whole quantity or a part of it is acquired anew, and that in condensation it is lost, refer rarity and density to quantity. For the explanation and resolution of this difficulty:

Note, from Scotus (*in praedicam. quaest. 3. §. Notandum in cap. de qualitate*) and from Anthony Andrea (*in expos. sex principiorum, cap. 6*), that rare and dense are taken in two ways. In one way, they denote the extension of parts, and this in turn has two modes: either as the extension of parts in place, which is position, or as the extension of parts within a whole, which belongs to quantity — quantity being divided into that which has positional arrangement of parts and that which lacks such positional arrangement, as may be seen in the *Predicamenta*, in the chapter on quantity, where this division of quantity is set forth. In the other way, rare and dense denote the extension of the parts of matter, produce an effect that is presented to the senses, and are perceived by sense itself; in this manner they constitute a quality residing in the third species of quality.

The assertion is: rarity and density belong to the predicament of quantity. This is the position of the Doctor (*4. distinct. 12. quaest. 4*). It is demonstrated first from Aristotle, who in the *Predicamenta*, in the chapter on quality, excludes rare and dense from the genus and series of quality. Second, extension of parts within a whole belongs to quantity, as is evident from the definition of quantity; and in rarefaction the parts are extended within the whole, as was shown in the preceding article; therefore rarity and density are placed in the category of quantity. Third, motion is specified by its terminal point, as has been stated elsewhere; and the terminal point of rarefaction is new quantity, by reason of which the parts of the rarefied body are extended in relation to one another and to a larger place. Moreover, in the preceding article I maintained that in rarefaction a certain part of quantity is produced anew, which is attached to and generated together with the pre-existing quantity. Furthermore, rarity and density are located either in the predicament of quantity, or of quality, or of position: not in the category of position, since it is an extension of parts toward a place; nor in the predicament of quality, because they presuppose quality — and what presupposes a thing is not that thing itself, just as an accident that presupposes a subject in which it inheres is not itself that subject. Rarity presupposes quality, for instance heat, by which what is dense becomes rare, as I observed above. Therefore rarity and density reside in the predicament of quantity.

One objects, citing Aristotle (*4. Phys. 84. and 7. of the same work, 11*), who enumerates rarity and density among tangible qualities. The same view is held by Augustine (*lib. categ. cap. 12*), Damascene (*in Phys. cap. 22*), Porretus (*lib. sex principiorum, cap. 6*), and very many others. I reply that these and similar

authorities are to be understood in accordance with the distinction set out in the foregoing note, namely insofar as they are tangible and passive qualities, but not insofar as they exhibit a positional arrangement of parts within a whole or in place.

One objects secondly that nothing is contrary to quantity, on the authority of Aristotle in the chapter on quantity; but rarity and density are contraries, as the same Philosopher indicates (*4. Phys. 85. and 2. de partibus animalium, cap. 1*); therefore they are counted in the catalogue of quality. I grant the major, and distinguish the minor: considered in themselves, I deny it; considered by reason of the things contained in them, I grant it. For within them are contained heat, cold, and the other qualities. The cited passages of the Philosopher are to be interpreted accordingly.

Article III. Whether a Large Thing Can Be Made from a Small One without Rarefaction and without the Addition of New Matter.

Almost everyone, with a few exceptions, denies that this can be accomplished by natural power. Regarding supernatural power, however, the opinion of the Doctors is not uniform. For St. Gregory of Nyssa (*orat. 1. de resurrectione*), Peter Lombard (*2. dist. 18*), Durand, and others at the same place embrace the affirmative; while Mayr, Bassol, the Carthusian, and the Ariminensian follow the negative at the same distinction cited above. Maior, Gabriel (*ibid. quaest. vn. art. 3. Dub.*), and the Conimbricenses (*1. de gen. cap. 5. quaest. 18*) defend both as probable, though they incline toward the negative.

The assertion is: a large thing cannot be made from a small one, even by divine power, without rarefaction or the accession of new matter. This is touched upon by the Doctor (*2. dist. 18. quest. vn. in fine*). It is demonstrated first: what is enclosed within the essential definition of something cannot be removed from it by the supernatural and absolute power of God without destroying it — just as if the rational were removed from a man, which enters his essential and quidditative definition, his nature is taken away. Now in the definition of the great is posited a greater quantity than in the definition of the small; for the great and rare is defined as that which has little matter and much dimension, and the small and dense as that which has much matter and little dimension, as is evident (*4. Phys. 84*). It is therefore impossible for a small thing to become large without rarefaction, by which new quantity is acquired as stated in the preceding article, or without the arrival of new matter — as water grows when more water is added to it, and fire increases when another fire is joined to it.

Second, in no way and by no power can a formal effect exist without its formal cause, just as an animate thing cannot exist without a soul, nor a white thing without whiteness. But largeness is the formal effect of magnitude, which is quantity; for a thing is large by reason of its magnitude, just as a quantum thing is quantum by reason of quantity, and a white thing is white by reason of

whiteness. Therefore a large thing is not made from a small one unless new quantity is added, which is had through rarefaction, or new matter, through which augmentation comes about. Whence Augustine (*10. de gen. ad lit.*): "What is more absurd than to suppose that there exists any body which, while retaining the quantity belonging to its nature, grows in all directions unless it is rarefied?"

Third, the very same manner of philosophical reasoning is to be applied here as to the rib of Adam from which Eve was formed (*Gen. 2*), to the oil of a certain widow multiplied (*4. Reg. 4*), and to the loaves in the Gospels (*Joan. 6 and Matt. 14*). These did not increase without the accession and intervention of new matter. For, as Augustine rightly adds (*in Ioan.*): the evangelical loaves were multiplied by the blessing of Christ the Lord in much the same way as crops are increased from sown seeds; and that they grow by the addition of new matter no one calls into question. The same must therefore be affirmed in the present case.

One objects first: it is a greater and more excellent work to create from nothing than to make a large thing from a small one; but the former is possible, as I showed in the book on the creation of the world; therefore so too is the latter. I reply: the first is possible because it involves no contradiction; the second, however, is impossible because it entails being quantum without quantity, just as being white without whiteness.

One objects second: what is not included in the essence of matter can without any contradiction be removed from it; but largeness or smallness is not of the essence of matter, since, as has been stated elsewhere, quantity is neither coeval with matter nor a passion of it, but belongs to the composite. Therefore there is nothing to prevent a small thing from becoming large without rarefaction and without quantity. I grant the major. To the minor I say that matter cannot be made large or small without quantity; the reason being that greater or lesser belongs to quantity, since through quantity a thing is called large or small, just as through likeness a thing is called like, and through unlikeness unlike.

One objects third: if a small thing cannot be made large unless new matter is added to it, and if the matter that arrives is greater, it does not seem to be made from the original matter but rather from the newly arriving matter — thus if a great quantity of water is poured into a little wine, it is no longer wine but water. Likewise, a body of Eve suitable and proper in size would not have been made from Adam's rib, since God's works are perfect. The inference is to be denied; for from a small seed a great tree is produced, and from a tiny spark a great fire. This is signified by the Savior (*Luc. 3*) concerning the grain of mustard, which though small grows into a great tree. As for the further objection, I say that it pertains to mixture, which is treated in Book IV.

Book III. On Action and Reaction.

Those things which I discussed in Logic on action and passion must be presupposed and previously understood, especially in the Epitome (*lib. 1. quest. 4. art. 9*). The remainder is here to be carefully and precisely examined and decided. Two questions are raised in this book: the first on action, the second on reaction.

Question I. On Action.

Article I. Whether Action Is in the Agent or in the Patient.

The first opinion is that of Henry (*Quol. 4. quest. 4*), Capreolus (*2. distinct. 1. quaest. 2. art. 3*), and many others, who hold that action is lodged in the patient. The second opinion is held by Scotus (*4. dist. 13. quest. 3; 2. dist. 3. quaest. 5. lit. s; 3. dist. 3. quest. 6. in fine; quest. 9. lit. O; and lib. de anima, quest. 3*), Anthony Andrea (*9. Met. quest. 4; and in exp. lib. Sex princ.*), two recent authors (*disp. 7. Phys. quaest. 3. art. 1*), and from the Thomists Cajetan (*1. p. quaest. 25. art. 1*), who teach that action resides in the agent.

Note first, from Scotus (*Quol. 13*), that action is commonly divided into immanent and transient action. Immanent action is described as that whose term remains in the agent, for example, the act of speaking and the act of intellecting, which is directed to intellection as its term — an intellection that inheres in the intellect which produces it through the said act of speaking and intellecting. Similarly, the production of vision is an immanent action, because vision, which is its term, remains in the eye as in its subject. Transient action is defined as that whose term goes outside the agent, as house-building is a transient action whose term is the constructed house, which stands apart from the builder. The division of action just stated is thus derived from consideration of the term: if the term remains in the agent, the action is called immanent; if it comes to be outside the agent, it is called transient. The Canon (*3. Phys. quaest. 2*) observes that an action of this kind takes its name only from its effect or term, and gives the example of charity, which, though it is a noble action, nonetheless takes its name from love, which is its effect. Nor should we omit the division into action that leaves a work behind it, that is, a permanent work — as building leaves a constructed house — and action that leaves no work behind it, that is, no permanent effect, such as singing and lyre-playing, whose term and effect quickly passes and flows, since these consist in a transient motion, as is evident in the utterance of words and the emission of voice. Aristotle mentions this (*1. Eth. 1 and 6. of the same work, 4; 1. Magn. mor. cap. ult.; and 9. Met. T. 16*).

Note second that action can be used in two ways. In one way, for the relation that comes from outside to the transmitter, in relation to the transmitted — this is properly action of the genus of action, according to which the agent is formally denominated agent. In another way, for the enacted action, that is, for

the thing produced by action, which is called action of the genus of quality, as Scotus writes (*1. dist. 17. quaest. 2. §. Qui vellet, ante N.; and 9. Met. ante exp. in cap. 4. T. 41*). This latter is itself held to be twofold: either the form or thing produced by action remains in the agent and is called immanent action, such as intellection, of which (*9. Met. T. 16*); or the form or thing produced by action goes beyond the bounds of the agent and resides outside it, and is called transient action, such as the constructed house, of which at the end of the preceding note.

The first assertion is: action taken formally in the first sense, as a relative form, is lodged as subject in the agent. This is Scotus's position (*ubi supra*), and it is proved first from (*3. Phys. 20*): "An agent is that from which something else proceeds; a patient is that which proceeds from another." Therefore action is that by which the agent is formally denominated agent, which is the relation of the transmitter to the transmitted, and this relation exists in the agent. Again, from (*8. Met. T. 16*): "Active potency is the principle of transmuting another insofar as it is another." Therefore action is the transmutation of another insofar as it is another — since it is the act of transmutative active potency residing in the agent. Whence in the book *On Sleep and Waking*, chapter I, it is added: "The act belongs to the same thing as the potency; but the potency of acting is in the agent; therefore action too inheres in the same thing."

Rubius objects (*3. Phys. quest. 6*) saying that those testimonies show only that action is from the agent, not that it is in the agent — which is what is under dispute among the philosophers. I reply: in (*2. de anima, 24 and 29*) it is expressly stated that the act is in that of which it is the act; therefore the cited passages cannot rightly be interpreted as referring only to being from the agent and not being in the agent as in a subject. Nor does it help to suggest that those texts speak of immanent action and not transient action, since in those very passages transient action is also discussed — action which terminates in immanent action. For vision, intellection, and the remaining immanent actions presuppose and presume transient actions through which they are produced, as I made clear above in the foundational principles.

Second, that which formally denominates the agent is lodged in the agent as subject, as is evident from whiteness, by which a wall is formally called white, inhering in the wall itself. But the agent is called and formally denominated agent by action, as fire is a heating agent by heating and water a cooling agent by cooling. Therefore action is lodged in the agent as subject. Nor does the response of certain thinkers help here — those who say that the agent is denominated by action only by extrinsic denomination. For although the objects toward which actions are directed are denominated extrinsically — as a seen wall and a cognized stone — nonetheless vision is formally in the eye and cognition in the intellect, by which the intellect is formally denominated

cognizing and the eye seeing. Therefore the agent is denominated agent by action formally and by intrinsic denomination, not by extrinsic denomination.

Third, where the foundation of a relation exists, there too the relation is formally found — as in Peter the foundation of paternity is present, namely the power of generating, and in that same subject paternity is present through the son generated by him. And this holds even in divine matters, for paternity is formally in God the Father, in whom is the power of generating the Son. Now in the agent is found the foundation of action, which, as was stated, is a relation coming from outside of the agent toward the patient, and its foundation is the active transmutative potency. Therefore action itself, which is founded in that active potency, is also in the agent.

Fourth, two opposed forms cannot exist simultaneously in the same subject, as is evident from heat, cold, and other things that are incompatible in the same subject at the same time. But action and passion are two opposite forms or entities: for that reason the same thing cannot be simultaneously, with respect to the same thing, both agent and patient — for instance, both heating and heated, both cooling and cooled. But it is established that passion is in the patient; therefore, by the opposite argument, action is in the agent. Moreover, something that was not an agent becomes an agent, as fire, which was not heating wood, becomes the thing heating wood and consequently changes. But to be changed is to be otherwise disposed through the reception of something new; and the heating fire receives nothing in itself except heating, which is its action. Therefore action has its seat in the agent. Whence certain thinkers not unreasonably infer that Aristotle held the world to have been created by God from eternity, because he was unable to conceive of God being able to act in time without a new action coming upon God himself — which would make him mutable. Lest he make God mutable, he posited him as the craftsman of things from eternity, as may be seen (8. *Phys.*) and in other places in his teaching; and thus he is thought to have held that action resides in the agent.

The second assertion is: action taken in the second sense, insofar as it is a form that does not go outside the agent, remains in the agent; but insofar as it passes outside the agent, it is lodged in the patient. This assertion is twofold, and is held by the Doctor cited above. The first part is proved from (9. *Met. T. 16*): "Operations that are the ends of potencies, such as vision, intellection, and the like, are located in the same potencies from which they proceed." But the potencies are in the agent; therefore its actions taken in this sense are there too. Second, the perfection of any subject remains in that of which it is the perfection — as vision in the eye, contemplation in the intellect, and grace in the will. But action taken as the enacted thing is the perfection of the agent of which it is the action; and for that reason the agent tends toward it as its end, from the Aristotelian passage just cited. Therefore it inheres in the agent.

The second part is proved: the form that is produced by motion proceeds from the agent and is received in the patient, as heat produced by heating proceeds from fire and is received in the wood, from which the wood itself is heated; similarly the coldness of snow is received in and inheres in the hand; likewise building inheres in the built thing and weaving in the woven thing, on the authority of the Stagirite (*3. Phys. 19*). Finally, motion is in the movable thing, as was stated in the book on motion. Therefore action of this kind is lodged in the patient.

One objects first: Aristotle (*3. Phys. from T. 18 through T. 24*), treating of action and passion, says most particularly at T. 19 and 20 that teaching and learning are in the learner — but teaching is the action of the teacher, and the learner is the patient, the one receiving the teaching. Therefore action is lodged in the patient. He asserts the same at (*2. de anima T. 139*) and in other places. I reply that the Philosopher is to be interpreted as speaking of enacted or produced action, which is of the genus of quality, not of productive action, which is of the genus of action and is what we are discussing here. And this is plainly indicated by the Stagirite at the cited T. 22, where he distinguishes action from passion, teaching from learning.

One will say: Aristotle (*3. Phys. T. 21*) plainly writes that action and passion are one motion; but motion is in the movable thing, which is the patient; therefore the said interpretation and distinction does not fit the Philosopher's text. I say that they are one motion materially, not formally. For he says there that action and passion are one motion, just as the motion of one ascending and one descending is one motion, and just as the distance from one to two and from two to one is one distance. But it is established that the motion of one ascending and one descending is not one formally, since they are opposite motions, but rather materially, by reason of the space traversed and interposed. It is likewise clear that they are not one motion subjectively, for the subject of the ascending is the one ascending and the subject of the descending is the one descending, and these two are not formally the same.

One objects second: from (*9. Met. 16*), action is divided into immanent and transient; but if all action were in the agent, this division would be empty and vain, since all action would be immanent and no action transient — which conflicts with Aristotle and the common opinion of philosophers. I reply that this partition of action is not one of a univocal into its univocates, but of an equivocal into its equivocates, and is derived from consideration of the term: if the term resides in the agent the action is called immanent, if it proceeds outside the agent it is called transient, as I noted in the first remark.

One objects third: action is motion (*3. Phys. 22*), for to act is to move, and the agent is the mover; but motion is not in the agent but in the patient. For motion is the act of the movable insofar as it is movable, from the cited location (*7. T. 18*). Therefore action is not located in the agent. I reply by explaining and

distinguishing the major: with respect to action taken as a form passing outside the agent, I grant it, in accordance with the second part of the second assertion. With respect to productive and formally understood action, I deny it.

Article II. Whether Action at a Distance Is Possible.

Two chiefly divergent opinions of the scholastics are read in this article. One is that of the Angelic Doctor (*1. p. quaest. 8. art. 1*), Cajetan, Bannez at the same place, Suarez (*disp. 18. Met. sect. 5*), and many recent thinkers, who deny that action at a distance is possible. The other is handed down by the Subtle Doctor (*1. dist. 37. quaest. vn.; 2. dist. 9. quest. 2. B.; 4. dist. 44. quaest. 2. Ad 3. principale*), Mayr, Bassol, Lychetus, Pilus, Ockham, Gabriel, Maior, and the other Scotists and Nominalists, who affirm that action at a distance occurs.

Note that an agent sometimes acts upon what is near and what is far in a single action — as fire by heating heats the air close to it and a hand distant from it; but sometimes acts upon what is near by one action and upon what is far by another, as the sun illuminates neighboring orbs by its light and by another power and action generates a man distant from it (*2. Physic. 26*): "the sun and man generate man." From this it is deduced that in an agent of this kind there exist a twofold principle and potency of acting: one by which it acts on what is near, another by which it acts on what is remote — as the sun by its heating power heats sublunar things and by its generative power generates gold in the womb of the earth. The reason why an agent operates first on what is near rather than what is far is given as twofold by the Doctor. One is that nearer things are more proportioned and more readily disposed than more remote things to receive the act and influence of the agent — thus we observe that the sun first illuminates mountains and hills before plains, and first heats the earth before generating ore in the bowels of the earth. The other is the weakness and feebleness of the agent: since it cannot immediately induce a form into pre-existing matter, it must first prepare and dispose that matter by one action and then introduce the form by another. Hence (*9. Metaphysica, 15*) Aristotle adds that a sublunar agent first alters before generating, which occurs on account of the imperfection and weakness of its potency, which first attains what is more imperfect before what is more perfect, and first the middle before the extreme, and first the proximate before the remote. If it possessed a perfect potency, it would introduce its form immediately and directly into disposed matter.

The assertion is: action at a distance is possible. So Scotus (*cit. and in Reportata, 1. dist. 37. quaest. 2*). It is proved first: there exist several agents that act at a distance; therefore action at a distance is not to be denied. The inference holds. The antecedent is shown as follows: the sun is distant from the earth and yet generates gold in its bosom, as all philosophers admit; and it does not produce that gold by its motion, light, heat, or any other quality — both because these do not reach that far, and also because they are accidents which, as has been stated, cannot generate a substance. Again, a magnet attracts iron distant from itself,

amber attracts straw, and a woman by the casting of her eyes fascinates a man. Whence (*Gal. 3. 0*): "O foolish Galatians, who has bewitched you?" The basilisk kills a man by its gaze and hiss. Again, according to Isidore, cited by Berchorius (*lib. 10. reduct. mor. cap. 63*), if a wolf sees a man before the man sees the wolf, it induces hoarseness in that man and deprives him of his voice — as the poet puts it: "the wolf saw him first." Furthermore, the torpedo fish stuns the hand of the fisherman without transmitting numbness through the rod or net. Finally, sympathetic powder produces remarkable effects at a distance. Therefore action at a distance is to be admitted.

The opponents reply that even the sun penetrates with its light into the depths and bowels of the earth and generates minerals there, just as it brings forth living things and everything else, both perfect and imperfect, on the surface of the earth — which is why it is called the father of living things and the universal cause. Arriaga (*disp. 7. Phys. sect. 6. subsect. 1*) adds that both the sun and other agents act upon a medium through occult and unknown qualities; and even if the effect of the cause occurs at the extreme and remote point, it still does not occur without action in the medium — a medium which is sometimes incapable of the action by which the effect is produced at a distance, as happens in the numbness caused in the hand of the fisherman and not in his line and rod. The same must be affirmed of fascination and similar phenomena.

On the contrary: the earth, as was stated elsewhere, is dry and cold; even if its surface is heated by the sun, that heat cannot reach its interior. For if the far greater and more powerful heat of a burning furnace cannot reach the earth's interior, as is established by certain experiment, then certainly neither can the heat mentioned reach that bosom. All the more so in summer, when heat burns most, the earth is colder in its interior, as the waters of springs and wells make plain to us — for they then grow cold, and warm in winter. As for what Arriaga adds: it is of no weight; for apart from the fact that those qualities behave only dispositively and not actively with respect to the generation of a substance such as gold or any mineral, they produce no effect in the medium in the experiments adduced, as is plain — even if it is perhaps necessary that they pass through the medium, they do not operate within it, as Arriaga himself seems to sense when he says that the medium is incapable of it, just as the light of the sun pervades the heavenly bodies without heating them, because they are not receptive subjects capable of receiving heat. Since therefore the effect is observed in what is distant while no effect is discerned in what is proximate, positing an effect in the medium is groundless and gratuitous, since there can be no productive cause of it.

Second, it is established by certain experiment that the bottom of a kettle is cold while the water contained in it boils. Similarly, if oil is poured into paper and the paper is placed above burning coals, eggs placed on the paper can be fried and mushrooms cooked while the paper itself remains intact. Therefore an

agent can act at a distance without acting upon the medium immediately adjacent to it. Arriaga, in the passage cited, is troubled by the first experiment and can scarcely comprehend it; he would doubtless deny the second as well if it were presented to him. But the former is from Aristotle (*Sect. 24. problem. quaest. 3 and 8*) and from highly approved authors, and is not without probability and reason. For if in winter the surface of the earth is cold while its interior is warm, as warm and steaming waters indicate, why can it not likewise happen that the water near the bottom of the kettle is cold while that at its rim is heated by the fire beneath and boils? Moreover, in summer the lowest region of the air is warm while its middle band is cold, even though the sun reaches both with its rays. Therefore the said experiment is not foreign to truth. As for the second, it is obvious to sight, and what Arriaga adduces against it is of no weight — so much so that it would be tedious to cite and refute it.

Third, the imagination or phantasy resides in the head and moves the appetite, which is in the liver, and other faculties distant from it in location. And it also imbues with extraneous qualities those things that are far from it, as Hippocrates and Avicenna especially note (*lib. de anima, sect. 4. capit. 4*). Whence the celebrated adage: "imagination causes the fall."

Fourth, projectiles are moved by a force impressed by the one who throws them, and when actively set in motion they recede and move away from the thrower. Again, if God did not exist everywhere, he could still act where he does not exist, since his power is his will, which can operate equally in what is near and in what is remote and at the extreme point, but not in the middle if he so wills. To say with Molina (*1. part. quaest. 8. art. 1. disp. 2*) that God may indeed at his pleasure act at this or that time and place, and freely determine himself to act as he wills, but that his influence cannot be present at the extreme point unless he also imparts it in the middle, is asserted without ground — since the will of God, being most free, is not bound to the middle or to the extreme, but can at his good pleasure act at the extreme without acting at the middle, especially since the order of things can be changed and inverted by God himself, and he does invert it when he wills, being an agent above nature. Furthermore, in created things a potency that acts on the middle can be distinguished from another that acts on the extreme. For if the sun did not illuminate the earth, it could still generate gold in the earth's bosom. And in fact it illuminates the heavenly orbs without heating them, while it floods the sublunar things with both light and heat. Finally, one angel can speak to another angel at a distance without causing anything in the medium; therefore action at a distance is possible.

One objects first: Aristotle (*7. Met. 9*) writes that nothing mediates between the mover and the moved; and (*1. de gen. 43 and 78; 1. Met. cap. 2*) he adds that the agent acts immediately upon what is proximate and mediately upon what is remote. Therefore action at the extreme is not possible unless it is had first in

the middle. I reply that the Philosopher there is discussing an agent that operates through prior qualities. For in that case the action occurs first in the medium before the extreme, as the sun first illuminates the earth before heating it, and first heats it before concurring in the generation of sublunar things. Absolutely speaking, however, it is not necessary that an agent act first on what is near before what is remote, except for the two reasons set out in the preceding note.

One objects second: each agent enjoys its own proper sphere of activity, beyond which it cannot operate, since its power is limited and finite. And this is easily and clearly shown by induction: a single candle cannot illuminate an entire city, nor can a small fire heat a large house. And if an agent could act at a great distance, it would have no sphere of activity, since it would not appear why it should act on this distance rather than that one, on a lesser or greater remoteness. Therefore action at a distance is not to be granted. I grant the major and deny the minor. For in accordance with the greater or lesser power of the agent, action occurs at a lesser or greater distance and interval — as a magnet attracts iron and fire heats and burns at such and such a distance and not beyond. And therefore a sphere of activity is rightly assigned within which the agent can act and beyond which it cannot.

One objects third: the sun cannot illuminate the earth unless it first illuminates the air. Likewise it cannot generate frogs and other imperfect animals unless the earth is first disposed and duly prepared by moisture and heat. Therefore an agent cannot act at the extreme unless it first acts on the middle. I reply that indeed the sun, before it generates by its generative power, adapts the underlying matter by its illuminative and heating power, as I noted above in the remark. But absolutely speaking this is not necessary, because if the sun does not act through the first potency it can act through the second. Whence the sun indeed illuminates the heavenly orbs but does not heat them; the sublunar orbs it both illuminates and simultaneously heats, while generating minerals in the interior of the earth without reaching it by either light or heat.

One objects fourth: Anselm (*in Monol. c. 22*) plainly writes that God is everywhere because he operates everywhere. Therefore an agent cannot act unless it is present to the thing to be made, just as God does not operate unless he is present. The antecedent is supported by the authority of sacred Scripture: (*Ps. 136*): "If I ascend into heaven, you are there; if I descend into hell, you are there." And (*Acts 19*): "He is not far from each one of us; for in him we live and move and have our being." I reply that Anselm does not there give the precise cause, just as Augustine (*1. 83. 99. quaest. 78*) does not give the more powerful cause when he says that craftsmen cannot create anything, because they work from pre-existing matter. For the reason why God is everywhere is his immensity; thus Anselm's argument proceeds by way of an extrinsic locus, and its consequence is not formal but material, because God's attributes are really

identical with each other. Moreover, since his will is his omnipotence, Scotus accordingly adds that if, per impossibile, God were not everywhere, he could still act where he was not present, and thus would act at a distance.

Article III. Whether Action and Passion Require Contact between Agent and Patient.

The common teaching of the philosophers holds that action and passion of agent and patient require contact. In what manner this is to be understood and how it occurs will be illustrated and explained in what follows.

Note first that some agents and patients are spiritual, such as God, the angel, and the rational soul; while others are corporeal, such as heaven, the elements, and mixed bodies. Moreover, some agents act upon others by real action — as fire heats fire by heating, which is a real action — while others do so by intentional action: thus whiteness acts upon the sense of sight or the eye by producing in it its own species, which is an intentional action, as will be discussed in the book on the soul.

Note second that for the action of an agent upon a patient, contact is necessary; for each must in turn touch the other. Two kinds of contact are distinguished: formal, also called mathematical contact, which is that by which bodies touch each other through their surfaces, as two planks joined together, whose last parts touch; and virtual contact, also called physical contact, which is that by which an agent touches something else through its own power, as the sun touches the earth through its light. This teaching is intimated by the Doctor (*4. dist. 44. quest. 2. §. Ad argumenta sub Q.; and dist. 45. quaest. 2. G. ad finem*).

The assertion is: formal contact is not necessary for an agent to act upon a patient; virtual contact suffices. This is defended by the Doctor (*cit.; 2. dist. 9. q. vn. C.*), and is deduced from the preceding article and is easily proved: proper contact occurs through quantity, that is, between those things whose last parts touch each other (*de gen. cap. 6*); but a spiritual agent lacks quantity, as well as matter and other things that belong solely to material things. Therefore for an agent to act upon a patient, mathematical contact is not necessary. Moreover, many agents, especially sensible ones, act through prior dispositions — as fire first heats and dries wood before introducing its form into it; while others, which act at a distance, first prepare the underlying matter through prior qualities before producing the intended effect, as the sun disposes the earth by light and heat for the generation of many things. It is therefore sufficient for the production of an effect that the agent touch the patient by physical and virtual contact.

One objects: from the common opinion, quantity is not of the genus of active things; therefore neither in sensible nor in spiritual things is contact through quantity required for an agent to act upon a patient. I grant the antecedent and

distinguish the consequent: quantity is not required as a principle and reason of acting, I grant; as a condition of the agent, I deny. For corporeal agents must participate in quantity, by reason of which contact occurs, and thereafter action. One will press further: if by divine power whiteness were separated from substance and quantity, it would be able to produce its species in the eye; therefore quantity is not required as a condition of the agent. The antecedent is urged: just as the eye can see whiteness separated from substance and quantity, so whiteness itself could produce its species in the eye, since no contradiction is involved. The inference from the antecedent is to be denied. For the action of a material thing necessarily requires extension, which comes from quantity. Given that hypothesis, whiteness would not alter the eye, nor could the eye see it, as is evident from the body of Christ the Lord in the Eucharist, which cannot be seen by us.

Article IV. Whether the Same Thing Can Act upon Itself and upon Its Like and Unlike.

Under the proposed heading a twofold difficulty is woven together: one, whether the same thing can exercise action upon itself; the other, whether like things can act upon each other. These two problems are to be dealt with and decided briefly by means of what we shall presently set forth and hand down, leaving aside the opinions of others.

Note first that some actions are perfective and others corruptive. A perfective action is one by which the agent is perfected, as the intellect is perfected by intellection and the will by volition. A corruptive action is one by which the agent is corrupted, as a man perishes through excessive study and ceaseless labor, and a stone is corrupted by excessive moisture. Furthermore, action is divided into univocal — by which an agent produces a form of the same nature as the form it itself possesses, as ignition is called a univocal action through which fire produces fire — and equivocal, by which an agent produces a form of a different nature and species from the one it possesses, as the intellect generates intellection, which differs from it since the intellect is a substance while intellection is an accident.

Note second that dissimilar things are those that participate in dissimilar qualities, as the hot and the cold; while similar things are those that possess similar qualities, as two hot things or two cold things. Some things can be similar in quality yet dissimilar in degree of that quality, as what is hot at degree two and what is hot at degree four; others are similar both in quality and in degree, as things hot at degree four; others are similar in both respects but dissimilar in acuteness and efficacy of acting, as iron that is hot at degree two and tow that is also hot at degree two. For since heat in iron is in dense matter, it acts more easily and quickly; while heat in tow is in rare matter, and acts more slowly.

The first assertion is: an agent can act upon itself by a perfective action but not by a corruptive one. This is indicated by the Doctor (*1. dist. 28. quaest. 3. §. praeterea. infra C.*). The first part is proved: water that has been heated acts upon itself when it returns to its native coldness, which is its perfection and passion. Again, the intellect acts upon itself, producing in itself the intellection of itself and of other objects. Therefore by perfective action an agent can act upon itself. The second part is shown: nothing destroys itself; on the contrary, everything preserves itself as best it can, as the Apostle intimates (*Ephes. 5*): "No one ever hated his own flesh, but nourishes and cherishes it." For that reason each thing flees its contrary, resists it, and as far as in it lies fights against it and, if possible, vanquishes it. If something is corrupted in itself, that is per accidens — as fire, consuming oil, is itself corrupted when the oil fails; and animated living things ultimately die through nutrition, because finite power is weakened by ceaseless action and at last consumed.

The second assertion: the same thing does not act upon itself by a univocal action, but it does so rightly by an equivocal action. This is intimated by the Doctor (*2. dist. 25. quaest. vn. §. Ad 1. rationem*). The first part is proved: nothing can generate itself, from Augustine (*1. Trin.*): "Nothing is more absurd than for something to cause itself." Therefore nothing can act upon itself by a univocal action; otherwise it would produce the same form that it already has in itself, which is inconvenient and absurd. The second part is proved: the same thing can by acting receive what it lacks, since it is capable of it; and an agent by equivocal action lacks the form it strives to produce and receive in itself, as the intellect lacks the intellection it strives to have. Therefore by equivocal action an agent can act upon itself.

The third assertion: that which is similar in quality and degree does not act upon what is similar in the same quality and same degree; but it does act upon what is similar in a different degree. This assertion is twofold and not at odds with the Scotist school, against Marsilius (*1. de gen. quaest. 19*) and Toletus (*ibid. cap. 7. quaest. 13*). It is proved first from Aristotle (*1. de gen. 50*), who says that the agent acts upon the patient as upon something other; but what is similar in quality and degree has no patient that is other and in some way dissimilar and contrary, since it shares the same quality and degree. Therefore, etc. Second, an agent acts from the victory it has over the patient (*1. de gen. cap. 7; l. de motibus animalium*); but what is similar in quality and degree does not surpass the other, since both are equal. Therefore one cannot act upon the other.

The second part is shown: an agent endeavors to assimilate the patient to itself as much as it can (*1. de gen. 51*), and to render the patient perfect just as the agent itself is. Therefore what is similar in quality can act upon what is dissimilar in degree only. And all this can be confirmed by the experience of a hand heated by the warmth of the sun, which can be heated further by the heat of fire, which is more intense and efficacious than the warmth of the sun, by reason of which it

heats the hand yet more. For this reason, one agent can act upon another for two causes: by contrariety, and by a certain similarity, as Augustine indicates (*serm. 19. de sanctis*) saying that physicians heal the sick in two ways — by contraries, following the saying "hot things are cured by cold," and by similars, applying like to like; thus the flesh of scorpions anointed with oil cures scorpion stings, theriaca made from the flesh of a serpent counters serpent bites, and drinks infected with poison, taken in drink, expel them.

One objects first: heat at degree four in iron, which is dense matter, heats more than heat at degree four in tow, which is rare matter; therefore the former can act upon the latter; and consequently what is similar in both quality and degree can act upon what is similar in the same quality and degree. I reply that heat existing in iron certainly heats more easily and quickly than heat in tow, for the reason given above; but I deny that the one acts upon the other, because for an agent to act upon a patient it must surpass it in something, otherwise there would be no end of the action, but after a complete struggle between contraries and after victory is won and the patient is assimilated to the agent, the action would begin anew.

One will press further: the heat of iron generates fire, while the heat of tow does not; therefore the heat in iron is more active. This could be corroborated by the light of the sun, which generates fire in a concave mirror but not in the air; therefore the same must be said of the heat of iron and of tow. I must reply that it is not the heat of the iron that produces fire but fire lurking in its pores. To the other I say that in the said mirror there are dispositions by which the sun produces fire, while such dispositions are not present in the air.

One objects second: hands equally warm, when joined together, become warmer than if they had been kept apart, as experience proves; therefore like acts upon equally like. I reply that this greater warmth proceeds from the heart, not from the heat of the hands; for the heat of the hands is usually tempered by the surrounding air, and therefore when the hands are joined they receive it better and preserve better the same heat coming from the heart itself. Perhaps in this way is to be understood that saying from Ecclesiastes IV: "If two lie together, they keep warm; but how can one keep warm alone?" And the adage: "virtue united is stronger than when dispersed."

One objects third: from (8. *Top. cap. 7*), a greater power exists in a larger body than in a smaller one; therefore the power in a larger body can produce a greater effect than that in a smaller body. I reply that this is to be interpreted extensively, not intensively. One will say: (3. *Phys. cap. 3. T. 42*), if one element were of infinite mass, it would burn the remaining elements and convert them into itself; and Aristotle attributes this not to greater intensity of active qualities but to infinite mass and quantity of matter. I reply that if infinite mass were not impossible, neither would infinite intensity be impossible; and so that infinitely

large fire would destroy the other elements. But since the former is impossible, so too is the latter, as I have argued elsewhere in the question on the infinite.

Article V. Whether Action Always Proceeds from a Proportion of Greater Inequality.

This article is proposed and debated under another heading, namely whether, for an agent to act, its activity must be greater than the resistance of the patient — on which there exist two opinions among philosophers. The first is that of Burley (*3. Phys. com. 16*), Vallés (*contr. 44*), and Toletus (*1. de gen. quaest. 13. 15*), who hold that action does not always proceed from a proportion of greater inequality. The second is the common one of the other philosophers, notably Niphus (*1. de gen. com. 195. quaest. 3*), Ramusio (*cap. 9. quaest. 3*), Poncius (*disp. 54. quaest. 3*), and the Complutenses (*disp. 8. quaest. 3. § 3*), who affirm that action always proceeds from a proportion of greater inequality.

Note first that an agent and patient can be compared to each other in two ways. In one way, when the activity of one is greater than the resistance of the other — and this comparison is called a proportion of greater inequality. In another way, when the activity of one is less than the resistance of the other — and this comparison is called a proportion of lesser inequality. The question at hand is whether for action a greater activity of the agent than the resistance of the patient is required, or whether a lesser activity of the agent than the resistance of the patient may suffice.

Note second that resistance is commonly understood to mean nothing other than the obstacle or impediment by which the patient prevents the agent from acting upon it — as heaven resists fire lest it be heated and burned. Two kinds of resistance are distinguished. One is called positive resistance, by which the patient reacts upon the agent through a contrary quality — as fire heats water and water in turn cools fire, and fire dries water while water moistens fire. The other is called privative resistance, which is properly resistance, and formally is nothing other than non-suffering, that is, privation of passion — and so to resist formally means nothing other than not suffering from the action of the agent, in which way iron resists cold because through this it does not suffer that cold. Resistance of the patient can arise for two reasons. The first is the weakness of the agent's power, as a large stone resists a boy who cannot move it or lift it, because his power is small. The second is the deep-rootedness and firmness of a form in a subject: because the form is tenaciously united and bound to matter, the agent cannot expel it so as to introduce another — as the diamond resists fire and other natural agents, which cannot corrupt it. This entire teaching is derived from Scotus (*2. dist. 2. quest. 9. Ad 4. Z.; and 4. dist. 1. quest. 5. §. Ad 1. ergo q. F.*). Furthermore, resistance can be recognized from the fact that a thing is hard and dense. For everything hard and dense resists what would corrupt it; while, conversely, what is rare and soft does not resist, as is evident from wax, which receives the imprint of whatever agent impresses it.

The assertion is: the action of contraries always proceeds from a proportion of greater inequality. This is not contrary to the principles of Scotus. It is proved first: if the activity of the agent were equal to the resistance of the patient, no action would result. Therefore action presupposes a greater activity of the agent than the resistance of the patient. The antecedent, apart from being confirmed by experience — of cannon balls, by which the strongest walls of cities are not damaged, and of other similar things which we observe daily before our eyes — is further argued: action proceeds from the victory that the agent has over the patient; therefore a greater power of the agent is required than the resistance of the patient. For it is necessary that the agent surpass the patient; otherwise no action would result.

Second, to resist properly and formally is not to suffer; therefore if the patient does not suffer from the agent's power, neither does the agent act upon the patient, and thus no action follows. But if action proceeds, it proceeds only from a proportion of greater inequality.

One objects first: from (*1. de gen. cap. 9*), whatever agent shares in matter can be acted upon by the power of the patient; therefore it is not necessary that the agent be more active than the patient is resistive. The inference is argued: otherwise there would be no reaction or re-suffering, which is to be admitted in the following question — and the example of water thrown into fire makes this plain, for the fire consumes the water while the water itself weakens the same fire. I grant the antecedent and deny the inference. To the proof I say that reaction occurs not with respect to the whole but with respect to a part, as will become clearer at the cited location.

One objects second: a drop of water hollows out the hardest stone, and a rope cuts and wears away the smooth stones of a well; but the resistance of the stone is greater than the activity of the drop of water and the rope. Therefore it is false that action always proceeds from a proportion of greater inequality. The inference is: a small stone falling from a height injures a large stone in some degree; but the resistance of the large stone is greater than the activity of the small stone. Therefore it is not necessary that the agent be more active than the patient is resistive. The Doctor (*2. d. 2. q. 9. P.*) replies that the first drop of water does not hollow out the stone, nor does the second, but many drops together gradually soften the stone, and then the last drop, by virtue of the preceding ones, hollows out the stone — so that in this way the water is more active than the resisting stone, as that much-repeated saying indicates: "A drop hollows out a stone, not by force but by frequent falling." The same must be maintained of the rope that wears away the stone. To the inference I say that this proceeds from the great force, long descent, and weight of the stone, as well as from its own power.

Question II. On Reaction.

Article I. Whether Reaction Exists.

Libri Theorem (43. *cap.* 4) records certain thinkers who deny reaction, and they are divided into two groups: some among them, including Maior (1. *d.* 17), cited by Rubius (*tract. de reactione cap.* 9. *quaest.* 9), deny reaction absolutely. Others, such as Niphus (1. *de gen. com.* 195. *q.* 3), reject only reaction between contrary qualities — for instance, when fire heats water, they deny that water reacts upon fire through coldness, but admit reaction through moisture. The more common opinion of the other philosophers, however, is that reaction and re-suffering are to be admitted. For the comprehension of this:

Note that reaction is a reciprocal action, that is, an action of the patient by which the patient acts upon the agent. Two kinds of reaction are distinguished: one according to a contrary quality, as when fire acts upon water through heat and water reacts upon fire through coldness; another through a dissimilar quality of a different nature, as when fire acts upon water through heat and water reacts upon fire through moisture. Reaction, therefore, falls between things that participate in elemental and corruptive qualities; and for this reason there is no reaction between spiritual and incorporeal things, because spiritual things lack elemental qualities. Furthermore, reaction does not properly occur when the patient is at too great a distance; likewise when it is very weak and disproportionate. Finally, reaction does not arise in intentional agents: when an object produces its species in a potency, the potency does not react upon the object; nor does reaction arise when the light of the sun heats the earth, since the earth does not react upon the light.

The assertion is: reaction and re-suffering are to be granted. This is handed down by the Doctor (1. *d.* 17. *q.* 3. §. *contra istam positionem. sub RR. Tertia*; 4. *d.* 44. *q.* 1. *Quantum ergo. D. concl.* 3.; 3. *d.* 16. *q.* 1. §. *Ad q. ad C.*; 2. *d.* 15. *q.* *vn.*; *d.* 19. *q.* *vn.* §. *Concedo sub A*), where treating of the state of Adam in innocence, he writes that if Adam had persevered in that state, unless transferred to heaven by divine power, he would ultimately have been worn down by old age and died — giving as the reason that natural heat acting upon the radical moisture and converting nourishment into the substance of what is nourished itself suffers and in reacting re-suffers, and in re-suffering is weakened, and at last consumed, and natural death occurs. The proposed assertion is proved as follows.

First, from (1. *de gen.* 52. 53), where in order to illuminate reaction Aristotle brings forth the example of water poured into wine, which diminishes the power of the wine so that it becomes diluted and watery, while the wine itself is re-acted upon by the water. Galen affirms the same (3. *de causis symptomatum, c.* 3). Second, mixture exists, by which a mixed thing is generated; therefore reaction is to be admitted. The antecedent is obvious. The inference is proved: a mixed thing is produced through the fracture and remission of qualities; and

that fracture and remission comes about through mutual removal, namely hot acting upon cold and conversely. Moreover, the elements continually struggle among themselves, which is why sometimes heat, sometimes cold, moisture or dryness prevails and dominates; and that struggle involves reaction and re-suffering. Therefore reaction and re-suffering are to be admitted. Experiences confirm this: snow compressed in the hand cools the hand and is itself warmed by that hand. Likewise, cold water thrown into warm water in a kettle cools it and makes it lukewarm. Furthermore, red-hot iron thrown into cold water heats the water itself, while its heat is diminished by the coldness of that water. Reaction and re-suffering are therefore not to be denied.

One objects first: either the agent and patient are of equal power or of unequal power — not the first, because the agent does not act except from predominance and victory over the patient (*Arist. l. de motu animalium*); nor the second, because what is weaker and less powerful cannot act upon what is stronger and more powerful. Therefore reaction and re-suffering are to be rejected. I reply that given the hypothesis, the patient can react upon the agent according to a part, though not according to the whole, and thereby by the power of the patient some proximate and posterior part of the agent is weakened and debilitated. For if water is thrown into a great fire, though it may not extinguish the whole fire, it extinguishes some part of it, or at least in some way weakens it. Or one may say that in that case the patient acts upon the agent not indeed by a perfect but by an imperfect action.

One objects second: the same thing cannot be moved by contrary motions (8. *Phys. cap. 6*); but if reaction were admitted, the same thing would be moved by contrary motions. Therefore it is not to be admitted. The major is plain; the minor is shown: the same air would be heated by fire and cooled by water; therefore it would undergo contrary motions. I distinguish the major: with respect to the same consideration, I grant; with respect to different considerations, I deny. The minor is to be distinguished accordingly: for the air would be heated with respect to fire, and cooled with respect to water. Moreover, there is no inconvenience in two contraries being simultaneously in the same thing in a remiss degree and not at the highest, as I showed in the book on the elements (*quaest. 3. art. 5*).

One objects third: an agent endeavors to assimilate the patient to itself as much as it can; but if reaction were admitted, the agent would not assimilate the patient, since the reaction of the patient upon the agent would impede that assimilation. I grant the major and deny the minor. To the proof I say that perfect assimilation is impeded, but not imperfect assimilation. For though the agent, as far as it can, strives to assimilate the patient to itself, it is nonetheless checked and impeded by the action of the patient — just as the motion of the first mobile is held back and slowed by the motions of the inferior orbs.

One objects fourth: a drop of water thrown into a burning furnace is immediately absorbed by the fire; therefore it is an evident sign that reaction does not occur, since otherwise that water would react upon the fire, which does not appear. I reply that in the foregoing note I observed that reaction requires proportion between agent and patient, and such proportion is not found between a small quantity of water and a great fire. The power of the water is very small; therefore it is no wonder if it does not react upon the fire. Or one may say that the said drop of water does react slightly upon the great fire, as is evident from the crackling sound that fire emits when it absorbs that water.

One objects fifth: contradictories cannot simultaneously be true of the same thing, since one is the negation of the other; therefore neither can contraries simultaneously be true of the same thing, as Aristotle indicates (*10. Met. T. 9*), since one is the privation of the other — as heat is the privation of cold, and cold is the privation of heat. I grant the antecedent and deny the inference. To the proof I say that contraries properly so called are positive entities placed in the predicament of quality, which is the catalogue of real positive entities, as I made plain in the location recently mentioned, art. I.

Article II. Whether a Quality Existing in a Medium Is Intensified.

Patrons of both sides, both affirmative and negative, are not undistinguished, as is remembered by modern authors, notably the Conimbricenses (*1. de gen. cap. 9. quaest. 1. art. 1*) and Rubius (*ibid. quaest. 8*).

Note that altering qualities are of two kinds. Some are directed directly toward something else, as heat directly heats water proximate to it; others tend indirectly toward something else, as the light of the sun turning back from a wall set before it. Now a reflex act of a quality can come about in two ways: first, because of an object standing in its way, by reason of which it turns back, as a visible species from a mirror to the eye, and an audible species from a concave place to the ear. Second, by reason of the obstruction of a contrary quality standing in its way and surrounding it, as the coldness of water, surrounded and impeded by the heat of the surrounding air so that it cannot extend further, turns back. Notice further that the intensification and increase of a quality situated in a medium can be investigated in two ways: whether it is intensified by the principal cause producing that quality, or by the opaque body standing in its way.

The first assertion is: a quality existing in a medium is intensified through reflection. This is deduced from the Doctor (*2. d. 13. quaest. vn.*). It is proved first: a homogeneous thing confined in a narrow place is intensified, as is evident from water, which if too great in a narrow place becomes deeper; and qualities capable of intensification are homogeneous; therefore, impeded from spreading through the parts of the subject in which they exist into a wider place, they are intensified — and hence a quality existing in a medium is intensified through

reflection. The major is clear; the minor is proved by the example of light existing in a small room, which is more intense than it would be in a large house — for it illuminates and makes the room brighter than a large house, as experience shows.

Second, power and action upon what is near is stronger and more efficacious than upon what is remote, and the degrees that an agent would produce in more remote parts it produces in nearer and more proximate parts; but through reflection a quality is not extended toward what is distant but turns back to the same medium. All the more so: united virtue is stronger than when dispersed; but through reflection the degrees of quality are more united. Therefore through reflection a quality is further intensified.

The second assertion: the intensification of a quality is not produced by the body standing in its way, but by the principal cause that produces that quality. This is held by the Doctor (*ubi supra*; 4. d. 10. *quaest.* 9. §. *Ad argumenta. D.*). It is proved first from (8. *Phys. T.* 31), where Aristotle gives the example of the motion of a ball bouncing back from a wall set in its way — whose motion of bouncing back is not caused by the wall but by the one who propelled the ball, and the greater the impulse, the greater the rebound. Therefore by the same reasoning, the cause of the intensification of a quality is not the opaque body standing in its way, but its principal cause — as when light is intensified in a medium, the cause is not the opaque body but the luminous body, say the sun or a lamp, producing that light.

Second, a visible species produced and turning back through a mirror set opposite to it is produced not by the mirror but by the object of which it is the species and image (2. *de anima, cap. de visu*). Therefore light, which is intensified by a body standing in its way, is not produced by the body resisting it, but by the luminous body; and the reason can be given that what produces by a direct line also produces by a reflected line, on account of the impediment of an opaque body, as Scotus intimates (9. *Met. quaest.* 15. §. *Ad tertium*; and explicitly 2. d. 13. *quest. un. §. Quantum ad 3*).

One objects first: the same thing remaining the same always produces the same thing (2. *de gen. T.* 56); but a quality situated in a medium remains the same, and so does its productive cause; therefore such a quality is not intensified through reflection. I reply that the adduced axiom from the major is to be interpreted thus: if it remains always in the same mode and nothing accedes to it — and to the minor I say that the quality in the medium is indeed the same, yet a new degree is added to it through a produced reflex act, and thus it does not always remain in the same mode.

One objects second: an agent is not more intense in nearer parts than in more remote ones; for fire does not appear hotter in what is near than in what is remote; for a quality at degree two does not produce an effect in nearer parts

except at degree two. Therefore through reflection it cannot produce an effect at degree four; and so a quality is not intensified through a reflex act. I reply that the argument holds of a quality acting along a direct line, but not of one acting along a reflected line, which is what we are discussing here.

Article III. Whether a Quality Is Intensified through Antiperistasis.

This article is instituted and decided by many recent thinkers (*1. de gen. cap. 9. quest. 1. art. 2*), Rubius (*quaest. 7*), and Poncius (*disp. 54. quest. 5*). For its comprehension and understanding:

Note that antiperistasis is a Greek term meaning in Latin the same as the surrounding resistance of a weaker contrary by a stronger surrounding and encircling contrary — or, which comes to the same thing, an antiperistatic action is the strengthening and intensification of a weaker contrary quality by a surrounding and opposing contrary quality. This is evident in summer in the water of a well, which is colder than in winter; and conversely, the same water in winter is warmer than in summer, on account of the presence of contraries.

The second assertion: a quality is intensified through antiperistasis. This is consistent with Scotus's writings and dissents from Cardinal Cardano (*2. de subtilitate, near the end*). It is proved first: the waters of springs and wells are warmer in winter than in summer, and conversely colder in summer than in winter; and this intensification occurs through antiperistasis. The major is established by experience. The minor is proved: the reason why well water is warmer in winter than in summer is that warm exhalations remaining in the earth, on account of the retreat of the sun and the coming of winter, are enclosed by cold, which then prevails intensely in the upper parts of the earth; and conversely well water is colder in summer because the coldness of the earth is besieged by the heat that then prevails and burns most intensely. Therefore a quality is intensified through antiperistatic action.

Second, the belly of an animal is warmer in winter and digests nourishment better, as Hippocrates affirms (*aphoris. 15*); and this occurs through antiperistasis, since the natural heat and vital spirits are encircled by the cold that prevails at that time.

Third, in summer the middle region of the air is colder, and for this reason hailstones are generated there, which arises from nothing other than the heat of both the uppermost and lowest borders of the air surrounding it. Therefore a quality is intensified through antiperistasis.

The second assertion: the cause of antiperistasis is not per se the surrounding contrary but only per accidens. This does not diverge from the Doctor, nor do his disciples dissent. It is proved first: what is productive of something is not destructive of the same thing, as is established by induction from natural agents; but a surrounding contrary is corruptive of the contrary quality that is

intensified — as is evident from fire with respect to water and its coldness. Therefore it cannot be the productive cause of that same quality.

Second, from opposing and contrary principles and causes there proceed only opposing and contrary effects, as is evident from hot and cold, moist and dry; otherwise the same and what is different would share the same principles and causes. But the surrounding contrary is a principle opposed to and fighting against the intensified quality that is opposite and contrary to it. Therefore it is not a per se cause but a per accidens cause — that is, because it impedes the quality from extending and progressing further.

The second assertion: the cause of the antiperistatic effect is sometimes intrinsic and sometimes extrinsic. Neither Scotus nor his followers seem to depart from this. It is proved first from (*1. Meteor. sum. 3. cap. 2*), where the Philosopher writes that underground places are warmer in winter because the surrounding cold drives back and impedes the heat, left there from warm exhalations, from departing — by reason of which those places are rendered warmer than in summer.

Second, the reason why the belly of an animal is warmer in the winter season is that its pores are closed and the native heat is once more besieged by the external cold. Therefore the cause of antiperistasis is sometimes internal and sometimes external.

One objects first: Galen (*3. de simplicium medicamentorum facultatibus cap. 7*) writes that it is a false apprehension of sense that leads one to judge water to be colder in summer and warmer in winter — since water is absolutely cold in both winter and summer. The inference is: water appears cold in summer because it is touched by warm hands, not because it is really more cold. I reply that Galen was mistaken in this, as experience shows. That in winter spring water is warmer is indicated by the steam seen rising from it; and all persons of good health discern and maintain that the said water is warmer in winter than in summer. To the inference I say that, though the hand is warmer, we still experience a greater coldness of water in summer than in winter, as is evident from hands equally warm.

One objects second: condensation and rarefaction are causes of greater warmth and coldness. For what is denser is warmer, and what is rarer is colder; therefore no other causes of antiperistasis need be sought beyond condensation and rarefaction. The antecedent is proved: the air exhaled from the lungs is warmer than air that exits through a narrower mouth, as is confirmed by experiment; and this happens only on account of condensation and rarefaction. The inference: air set in motion by a fan refreshes and cools us in summer; and this proceeds from nothing other than the condensation and rarefaction of the air. Therefore condensation and rarefaction are causes of greater warmth and coldness. I reply: although condensation and rarefaction contribute greatly to

causing warmth and coldness, I deny that they are the precise causes. To the cited experiment I say that this happens and proceeds from the coldness of the surrounding air, which renders a person's breath cold. As for the air being equally warm or cool whether it exits from a wider or narrower mouth, this is clearly established if one places one's hand over one's mouth — one will feel equal warmth from both. To the inference I say that it arises because the air that touches us is warm, and through the fan it moves away and another air, colder than the preceding, succeeds it; for this reason it cools us somewhat for a time.

Book IV. On Mixture and the Mixed Body.

Aristotle (*1. de gen. cap. 10*), after the disputation on action and passion, proceeds to the treatment of mixture; following in his footsteps, in this book we shall briefly pursue what the philosophers discuss concerning mixture and the mixed body.

Question I. On Mixture.

Article I. Whether Mixture Exists.

Certain thinkers cited by Aristotle (*1. de gen. cap. 10. T. 82*) deny that mixture is possible; opposed to these are Aristotle himself and the other philosophers at the same place, who affirm that mixture is to be admitted.

Note that mixture is taken in two ways: first, for a heap of many things that are brought together, retaining their own forms and their entire being — in the way that grains of wheat in a granary, sheep in a flock, and coins in a purse are mixed. Second, for the coming together of elements from which, once altered, a mixed body is produced through the action of a third cause, namely the heavens, as Aristotle intimates (*1. Meteor. cap. 2*). It is in this sense that we speak of mixture here, which Scotus (*1. Rep. disp. 3. quaest. 3*) divides into perfect and imperfect mixture, explained and declared by him in that place.

The assertion is: mixture is to be admitted. Defended by the Doctor (*cit.*), presupposed by the same (*1. Met. in exp. cap. 2. sum. 3; and 2. dist. 15. quest. un.*). It is proved first: a mixed body exists, as is visible to the eye; therefore mixture also exists. The inference holds from the concrete to the abstract: if there is a white thing, whiteness also exists; and if there is a man, humanity exists. Therefore if the mixed body is granted, mixture is equally to be granted, since the mixed body is made mixed by mixture. Second, certain imperfect animals are generated from putrid matter, such as gnats and fleas; and their production is a mixture from water, air, and the like, as experience shows of obscure and foul places in which those animals are generated and dwell. Third, artificial mixture exists; therefore natural mixture is to be granted. The antecedent is evident from juices extracted by distillation, and from herbs, trees, and the like;

likewise from figures and images fabricated. The inference holds. Add also the mixture of wine and water in the sacred synaxis.

One objects first: if mixture were possible, either through mixture the elements and their parts would mutually interpenetrate, or their juxtaposition would occur; but Aristotle refutes both (*1. de gen. cap. 10*) against certain ancient philosophers. Therefore mixture is impossible. I reply that neither of the alternatives proposed in the argument follows; but, as the Doctor says (*2. d. 15. quaest. un.*), from altered and corrupted elements, through the action of a third cause, a mixed body is generated, which I pursued at length in the book on the elements.

One objects second: if mixture existed, it would be either natural or violent; but neither is possible. Therefore mixture is impossible. The major is clear. The minor is shown: through mixture heavy things would ascend and light things descend, and they would fight and contend among themselves to form the mixed body; but the ascent of heavy things and the descent of light things is violent. Nor can mixture be violent, since the generation of a mixed body is natural. I reply that mixture is natural, not with respect to the elements as the argument proves, but with respect to the natural agent that intends to produce a mixed body according to its genus and species.

One objects third: wine mixed with water retains its own form and its own substantial being; therefore in mixture the elements need not be corrupted. The antecedent is proved by Genesius (*lib. de natura hominis*), who says that a sponge soaked in oil, and water mixed with wine, will extract pure water. Therefore in mixture the forms of what is mixed persist. I reply that the argument is true of imperfect mixture, as happens in diluted wine, but not of perfect mixture, which is the subject of discussion here. Thus are to be interpreted Aristotle (*1. de gen. 7. 84*) and Scotus (*4. Repert. passu alleg.*).

Article II. What Mixture Is.

The Stagirite (*1. de gen. cap. 10. T. 90. in fine*) defines mixture in these words: "Mixture is the union of altered miscibles." This definition suffers many criticisms from certain thinkers, notably Scaliger (*exercitat. tertia*); therefore, in order to vindicate it from them:

Note from Scotus (*2. dist. 15. quest. 1. §. Ad 1. in oppositum. F.*) that the participle "altered" placed in the description of mixture denotes that in mixture the alteration of the miscibles precedes. For as I said of generation, which alteration precedes, the same must be affirmed of mixture. For the production of a mixed body, it is necessary that the elements struggle among themselves, be altered, remitted, and fractured according to their parts; and thereafter through the action of a third cause the mixed body is produced. Furthermore, mixture is called a union or transmutation: for the elements are transmuted into the mixed body, and therefore mixture can more precisely be defined as the generation of

a mixed body from altered miscibles. Three conditions are required for proper mixture. The first: the miscibles must be active and passive; and therefore there is no mixture between medicine and health, since health is not mixed with the body. The second: the minimum of one miscible must be mixed with the minimum of another; otherwise there would be juxtaposition, not mixture. The third: a large quantity of one must not be separated from a small quantity of another; otherwise augmentation or destruction would result — thus a drop of water thrown into a great fire does not mix but utterly perishes.

The assertion is: mixture is rightly defined as the union of altered miscibles. This is supported by Scotus as cited above. It is proved first: what is constituted by genus and difference is rightly defined; and the said definition is of this kind; therefore it is a good definition. The major is clear. The minor is shown: union or transmutation is the genus; the remaining words serve as the differentia, as I made plain in the foregoing note.

Second, a legitimate definition contains nothing superfluous and nothing deficient, and reciprocates with the defined, as I said in the Logic in the article on definition; and such is the definition of mixture, as is evident to one who runs through all its parts as set forth above. Therefore the said definition is a correct one.

One objects first: a definition is not given through something equally unknown or less known, since it was invented to make a thing clear; but the cited definition is given through something equally unknown, for it expresses "altered miscibles," which are equally unknown as mixture itself. I grant the major and deny the minor. To the proof I say that Aristotle first explains what a miscible is and what miscibles are, before he describes mixture, and therefore it is defined through what is better known.

One objects second: a circle is to be avoided in a definition; but in the cited definition a circle is committed. Therefore the definition is not valid. The major is obvious. The minor is argued: mixture is expressed through altered miscibles, and altered miscibles are expressed through mixture. I grant the major and deny the minor. For the altered miscibles are placed as material and dispositive cause — or as others say, as efficient cause; and therefore there is no circle, because mixture is expressed through altered miscibles, but altered miscibles are not explained through mixture as the argument intends.

One objects third: mixture is not constituted from altered miscibles; therefore mixture is not the union of altered miscibles. The antecedent is proved from (3. *de gen. animalium cap. 11*), where Aristotle says that birds are generated from air, fish from water, and beasts from earth. Therefore for the production of a mixed body it is not necessary that the elements be mixed, since one element suffices for the generation of a mixed body, on the authority of Scotus (*ubi supra*). I deny the antecedent. To its proof I say that Aristotle there signifies the predominance

of the element air in birds, of water in fish, and of earth in beasts, but does not deny that elements concur in the production of the mixed body. Or I say that the Stagirite is only assigning the place in which those animals dwell: for birds dwell in the air, fish in water, and beasts on land.

One asks: whether mixture is to be distinguished from generation. I reply affirmatively. For it differs from it as the superior from the inferior: every mixture strictly taken is a generation, but not every generation is a mixture, just as a genus is wider than a species.

Question II. On the Mixed Body.

Article I. What Is the Cause of the Mixed Body.

Certain recent thinkers hold that the effective cause of the mixed body is the miscibles themselves, that is, the four elements struggling among themselves. But Scotus (2. d. 15. q. vn.) and the Abbot (2. de animalib. Tract. 1. c. 8) teach that the principal cause of the mixed body is the universal agent, and the dispositive cause is the elements struggling among themselves.

Note that mixed bodies, which seem to be produced through alteration, are of two kinds. Some are animate, which cannot by any means be produced by the elements or by the heavenly bodies, since both elements and mixed bodies and heavenly bodies lack soul; and therefore they cannot be principal causes of living things, but can only be dispositive causes, by reason of which the universal agent can introduce a form into matter that is disposed and prepared. Others are inanimate mixed bodies, which cannot be generated by the elements, because either the elements themselves are corrupted, or their forces and powers are so fractured that they can in no way be the principal effective causes of those mixed bodies; but they are generated by the heavenly bodies, as I stated elsewhere concerning gold, silver, and the like.

The assertion is: the principal productive cause of mixed bodies is not the elements struggling among themselves but the universal agent. This is the position of the Doctor (*passu prarecensito*). It is proved as follows. First, the elements, on account of their mutual and ceaseless struggle, either remain corrupted or weakened and fractured with respect to their powers and faculties; but a mixed body cannot be caused in act by what is corrupted, because what is corrupted does not exist, and an effect in act requires a cause in act (2. Phys. 38). Therefore the mixed body cannot be produced by corrupted elements, nor by weakened ones, since a weak agent cannot attain a firm and valid effect, such as a mixed body. It is therefore necessary that the mixed body be made by another, stronger and more powerful cause, namely the universal agent. Second, every cause is either univocal or equivocal; but the elements cannot be the univocal cause of the mixed body, since the mixed body is of a different nature from them; nor can they be the equivocal cause, since an equivocal cause is more

noble than its effect, since it contains it virtually — but mixed bodies surpass elements in nobility. Therefore elements are not their principal causes. Third, a mixed body is either animate or inanimate; but elements can produce neither an animate nor an inanimate mixed body, as is clearly established from the foregoing note.

One objects: when a particular cause of some effect can be assigned, one need not have recourse to the universal cause — for that would ill befit a philosopher who inquires into the proper and peculiar causes of things; but a proper and particular cause of the generation of the mixed body can be given, namely the elements struggling among themselves. Therefore to have recourse to the universal agent, such as the heavens, is improper. I grant the major and deny the minor. The reason for the denial is clearly shown in the proof of the assertion.

Article II. Whether Elements Are in the Mixed Body.

In this article three more celebrated opinions of the philosophers prevail. The first is that of Avicenna (*1. suae sufficientiae, c. 1*) and Philoponus (*1. de gen. ad text. 74*), who affirm that the elements exist in the mixed body according to their integral and perfect substantial forms, but according to their fractured and remitted qualities. The second is that of Averroes (*3. Caeli, com. 67*), Achillini, and others, who hold that the forms and qualities of the elements remain in the mixed body in remiss and diminished being. The third is defended by Scotus (*2. d. 15. q. vn.; and in Reportata ibid.*), Mayr, Lychetus, and others at the same location, who maintain that the elements do not formally persist in the mixed body, but virtually and potentially only.

Note first that, for the controversy to be more clearly and distinctly grasped, the heading of this article can be taken in two ways. In one way: whether the substantial forms of the elements remain in the mixed body in act — and this sense is examined in the present article. In another way: whether the qualities of the elements persist in the mixed body in act, whether at their maximum or in a remiss degree — and this sense will be considered in the next article.

Note second that in mixture three things intervene. The first is mutual alteration through the action and passion of contrary qualities. The second is the action of active qualities upon passive qualities — as is the action of heat and cold upon moisture and dryness. The third is the production or generation of the mixed body, which is posterior to the alteration and to the action of active qualities upon the passive ones. In this way is produced the disposition and preparation, so that thereafter mixture or the generation of the mixed body occurs.

Note third that there are four entities in any mixed body. The first is the entity of matter, which is the same as the matter of the elements; for matter is the common subject of the forms both of the elements and of the mixed bodies. The second is the entity of form, which is essentially distinct from the forms of the elements; for just as any mixed body is essentially different from the

elements, so any form of a mixed body is distinguished from the forms of the elements. The third is the entity of the whole mixed body, which results from matter and form united together, as I proved (*1. 2. Phys. quaest. 4. de composito*). The fourth is the entity of accidents, which follow upon the mixed substantial composite.

The first assertion is: the substantial forms of the elements do not remain in the mixed body in their formally perfect being. This is the position of the Doctor cited above. It is proved first from (*1. de gen. T. 84; and 2. de partibus animalium, cap. 10*), where Aristotle denies that the elements persist in the mixed body. Second, if the substantial forms of the elements actually existed in the mixed body, the mixed body would be a quintuple substantial suppositum; but this is judged by all philosophers as a great inconvenience and absurdity. The entailment of the major is clear, because according to the quintuple substantial form a quintuple suppositum is had. The minor is argued: for the mixed body would not be a being per se but per accidens, having several disparate substantial forms. Third, each thing is one because it is of one species; but if the integral and perfect substantial forms were in the mixed body, the mixed body itself would be of different species, just as the elements are; and it is plainly false that one and the same thing participates in diverse natures specifically distinct. Therefore, etc.

The second assertion is: the substantial forms of the elements do not endure in the mixed body in a remiss and fractured being. This is defended by the Doctor (*passu memorato*). It is proved first from Aristotle (*1. praedicam. cap. de substantia*), who says that substance does not admit of more and less — that is, with respect to its specific and essential being, as I made plain in that place. Therefore since the forms of the elements are substantial, they are in no way found in the mixed body in a remiss and fractured being.

Second, it seems incredible, and indeed impossible, that over a great interval of time, at the bottom of the ocean, the form of fire in an imperfect being should not yet have perished and been corrupted by the contrary form of water, which is there most efficacious and of the greatest power. Therefore it is better maintained with the common opinion that the said forms of the elements, whether at their maximum or in a remiss degree, in no way remain in the mixed body.

The third assertion: in the mixed body there exists only one substantial form, by which the mixed body is constituted in its being as a mixed body and is distinguished from everything that is not the mixed body. Scotus (*ubi supra*) supports this. It is proved first: one mixed body is essentially distinct from another — as stone from tree, man from lion; and this essential distinction is derived from the proper form belonging to one and not to another, since matter is the common subject of each form. Therefore in one mixed body only one substantial form is found. Second, unless the mixed body were constituted by

only one substantial form, the mixed body would not be generated but merely altered; but it is commonly maintained that through mixture something substantially new is generated, which is called the mixed body. Therefore the mixed body is constituted by its proper form, by reason of which it differs from the elements. Third, from each mixed body there emanates one principal proper quality, as risibility from man and roaring from a lion; and this passion or property arises chiefly from the form of the mixed body. Therefore in the mixed body there exists only one substantial form constitutive of the mixed body.

One objects first: Aristotle (*1. de gen. 84*) writes that the miscibles remain in the mixed body; but the miscibles are the elements; therefore the elements are in the mixed body, and these cannot exist without their forms. Therefore one rightly concludes that the elements remain in the mixed body according to their substantial forms. The inference is confirmed first: the same Philosopher (*ibid. T. 38*) adds that a drop of wine thrown into an amphora full of water is not mixed but destroyed, for the reason that the miscibles remain in the mixed body, but a drop of wine thrown into a large quantity of water does not remain. The inference is confirmed second: from (*5. Metaphysica, cap. 3. T. 4*): "An element is that from which, as something inherent, something comes to be." Therefore if the elements are inherent in the mixed body, it follows that they remain in it according to their substantial forms. I reply that Aristotle is to be interpreted as meaning that the elements are in the mixed body according to conformity, not according to substance. This will be made clearer in the next article. Or I say that he said this not in his own opinion but in that of others — namely Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and other thinkers who held that the elements actually and formally exist in the mixed body. To the first confirmation I say that a drop of wine thrown into a great quantity of water is indeed not mixed but destroyed, because no conformity and no similar quality remains in the wine; but in the mixed body there are present conforming and similar qualities to the qualities of the elemental forms, by reason of which the elements are said to be in the mixed body virtually and potentially. To the second confirmation I say, with Scotus (*ibi in com.*), that that definition of element applies not to the four common elements but to prime matter alone. Or say that the mixed body is made from elements, which are presupposed to exist, in order for the mixed body itself to be generated from them.

One objects second: from (*1. de gen. in fine*), mixture is the union of altered miscibles; but if in the production of the mixed body the elements are altered, it is plainly inferred that they endure in the mixed body according to their substantial forms. The inference is confirmed first: the mixed body is moved by the predominant element; but one thing cannot move another unless it actually exists; therefore since the predominant element moves the mixed body, it must not be denied that the elements are formally and actually in the mixed body. The inference is confirmed second: from (*3. Caeli, T. 67*), the elements from

which the mixed body is formed persist in the mixed body itself. I reply that this is true by way of presupposition, not formally — which is to say: the alteration of the elements is presupposed for the generation of the mixed body, as I made plain in the preceding question, article II. To the first confirmation I say that the said predominance is not according to the proper quality of the element existing in the mixed body, but according to conformity — that is, in the mixed body there resides a predominant quality that is more similar to one element than to another, as in the choleric temperament there is a predominating temperament more similar to fire than to water or another element. To the second confirmation I say that Aristotle speaks there in the opinion of Empedocles and other ancients who held that view.

One objects third: each thing is composed of those things into which it is resolved, as is evident from man, who is composed of soul and body and is resolved into them; but the mixed body is resolved into elements; therefore it is composed of elements. The inference is confirmed: as letters are to syllables, so elements are to mixed bodies; but syllables are composed of letters; therefore mixed bodies too are constituted from elements. I distinguish the major: of separative resolution, as the cited example shows, I grant the major; of productive resolution, I deny the major. I grant the minor. For if what is generated is resolved into what is corrupted, and what is corrupted into what is generated through the production of the subsequent form and the corruption of the preceding form — as when a man is resolved into a corpse and worms — in this kind of resolution the preceding forms do not exist in what is newly generated and produced. To the confirmation I deny parity: the reason is that letters are integral parts of syllables, while elements are active and dispositive principles for the generation of the mixed body.

One objects fourth: we experience that from a mixed body, say wood placed near fire, if it has been soaked, water exits; but that water is not produced by fire, since fire is destructive and not productive of water; therefore that water was inherent in the wood, and consequently elemental forms exist actually and formally in the mixed body. The inference is confirmed first: from roses and other flowers, water is extracted by distillation; therefore the form of water is actually in them. The inference is confirmed second: from iron and stone struck together, fire is struck out; therefore fire was formally and actually in the stone. I reply that the water that exits from wood exists in the pores of the wood itself and is expelled from it by the heat. And this is shown by the fact that only soaked wood emits water, not dry and parched wood. And if water flows from green wood, it is not formally elemental water, but a certain humor and sap, which is a kind of mixed body. To the first confirmation I deny that rose water and similar distilled things are elemental water, as their powers and properties indicate. To the second confirmation I say that fire is not actually in the flint but potentially, just as a natural form, before being drawn out of matter by an agent, is said to be in matter potentially.

One objects fifth: if elemental forms did not actually compose the mixed body, the mixed body would not be a mixed body but a simple one, like any element; but the mixed body is distinct from any element, since the latter is simple while the former is mixed. Therefore elemental forms are found in the mixed body. I reply that it is called a mixed body not because it has a form composed of the forms of the elements, but because for its generation it is necessary that the elements be previously mixed. Wherefore according to form, a mixed body is as simple as any element, and it presupposes the mixture of elements, by reason of which it is called a mixed body.

Article III. Whether the Elements Remain in the Mixed Body According to Their Qualities.

No one is ignorant that the elements exist in the mixed body in some manner, both on account of the authority of Aristotle (*1. de gen. 84*) and elsewhere, and on account of the arguments set out in the objections of the preceding article. The difficulty, however, is in what manner and by what mode the said elements persist in the mixed body. Almost all philosophers agree that the elements are in the mixed body virtually; they dispute among themselves, however, about what it means for the elements to be virtually in the mixed body. For Thomas Aquinas (*1. p. q. 76. art. 4*), Cajetan at the same place, and Vega (*1. de arte medendi c. 6*) maintain that the elements are virtually in the mixed body means nothing other than that their qualities are found in the mixed body in a remiss and fractured being. Scotus (*2. d. 15. q. vn. §. Dico igitur B.*), however, and his disciples at the same location, and from among the Thomists Javellus (*8. Met. quaest. 4*), Soncinas, and many others teach that for the elements to virtually remain in the mixed body means nothing other than to be contained eminently in it — just as the vegetative and sensitive souls are virtually and eminently in the rational soul — or, which amounts to the same thing, the elements are in the mixed body according to conformity and proportion of power.

Note first that for the elements to be in the mixed body according to proportion and conformity of power can be understood in two ways: in one way, at their maximum — and this sense is defended by no one. In another way, in a remiss degree — and this is the sense that Scotus and the other authors named above maintain.

Note second, from the Doctor (*4. Met. in exp. T. 27; and 1. d. 7. q. vn. §. Ad argum. principalia sub X.*), that medium is twofold. One is called a medium through the negation of extremes: thus virtue is in the middle, because it recedes from the extremes — as liberality mediates between avarice and prodigality, since it recedes from both. The other is called a medium through participation in the extremes, that is, one composed from the extremes, though not by a proper composition but by conformity to extremes — in which way the color red is intermediate between white and black, not because it participates partly in the nature of whiteness and partly in the nature of blackness, since redness is a

quality as simple as whiteness and blackness, but because it has a greater conformity with the extremes than the extremes have with each other. For redness agrees more with whiteness and blackness than whiteness and blackness agree with each other. Likewise the elements are said to be in the mixed body through conformity, because the mixed body agrees more with the elements than the elements agree among themselves. And the elements are said to be in the mixed body according to the proportion of power, because the qualities of the mixed body are more proportioned to the qualities of the elements than the qualities of the elements are to one another.

The assertion is: the elements are in the mixed body not because their qualities exist in it in a remiss and fractured being, but according to conformity and proportion of power. This is supported by the Doctor (*ubi supra*). It is proved first from Aristotle (*1. de gen. T. 84*), who says that the elements are not found in the mixed body actually, but their power — which is not, however, identical with it but similar and akin to it, as I shall presently show. Second, when a subject is corrupted, all things in the subject are corrupted — which is accepted as a commonly received maxim by all philosophers. But the elements are corrupted in the generation of a mixed body with respect to their substantial forms; therefore also with respect to their qualities; and therefore no quality of theirs remains in the mixed body, except according to similarity and conformity. Third, accident does not pass from subject to subject, as philosophers also commonly admit. Therefore the qualities of the elements, which are accidents, do not pass from the elements into the mixed body, and thus they are not lodged in the mixed body as subjects. Furthermore, the heat of fire, if excessive, is destructive of the mixed body. The same must be affirmed of the coldness of water and the other qualities of the elements; but the qualities inhering in the mixed body preserve and sustain it as much as they can. Therefore it is evidently established that the said qualities are not elemental.

One objects: Aristotle (*2. de partibus animalium, cap. 2*) maintains that the elements exist in the mixed body according to their powers and qualities; he had already stated the same (*1. de gen. T. 84*). Therefore in the Peripatetic school the qualities of the elements persist in the mixed body. I reply that these and similar testimonies of the Philosopher are to be interpreted not according to identity but according to similarity and conformity — or not formally but virtually, in roughly the same way that the sensitive soul is virtually contained in the intellective soul.

One objects second: in a mixed body, say a man, there is heat; in a stone there is cold; in a fish there is moisture; and in wood there is dryness; and these qualities are elemental; therefore the elements exist in the mixed body according to their qualities. The inference is confirmed: those qualities are found more excellently in the elements than in mixed bodies; therefore they are found in both. I grant the major and deny the minor; for they are of a different nature, whose cause is

that elemental heat alters and disposes toward the production of fire, while the heat of the mixed body alters and prepares for the generation of flesh, as the Doctor rightly observes (*nuper cit. G. §. Ad primum*). The same reply is to be given to the confirmation. For just as the form of the mixed body is more perfect than the form of the element, so the quality of the former excels the quality of the latter.

Article IV. Whether Temperament to the Exact Balance Can Exist in a Mixed Body.

Avicenna, Averroes, and others, cited by recent thinkers, deny that it is possible for temperament to the exact balance to exist in any mixed body. Fernelius (8. *Physiolog. c. 4*), Vallés (1. *contra. c. 7*), and many others, however, affirm that temperament to the exact balance can exist in man and in other mixed bodies.

Note, according to Galen and other physicians, that temperament taken universally is the harmony or concordance of the four primary qualities reduced to a certain mean, so that according to the diversity of forms a diverse temperament and proportion of those qualities is had. According to the mind of Scotus, however, temperament is the suitable disposition of the fitting qualities by which the form of the mixed body is preserved in its matter. For if those qualities in the mixed body are well-tempered, the mixed body is preserved; but if excess or defect occurs in any principal part of the mixed body, unless aided by medicine, the death of the animated living thing ensues. Temperament is commonly divided into uniform and non-uniform: the uniform is that in which all the said qualities are in equilibrium — that is, in complete equality and balance — and is called temperament to the exact balance because in it the said qualities are weighed, as it were, in equal measure and weight. The non-uniform is that in which the aforesaid qualities do not enjoy equal degree, but one or two predominate and dominate. This latter temperament is subdivided into simple and composite: the simple is that in which only one quality dominates; the composite is that in which two qualities exceed and surpass the other two, and it is fourfold according to the fourfold combination of qualities. The first is the igneous or choleric, in which heat and dryness dominate. The second is the aerial or sanguine, in which heat and moisture abound. The third is the aqueous or phlegmatic, in which coldness and moisture prevail above the others. The fourth is the terrestrial or melancholic, in which coldness and dryness exceed. Temperament in which there is an excess of one or two similar and conforming qualities is called temperament to justice, because such qualities correspond to the requirements of the nature of the mixed body and its parts — as the brain is cold, the heart warm, the mouth dry, the flesh moist, etc. For just as in (3. *Eth. 3*), in a well-ordered republic rewards are distributed according to the merits of each, so in the order of mixed bodies the rule of justice is observed, so that the temperament of all is not the same, but varies according to the nature of each mixed body and its parts.

The assertion is: temperament to the exact balance is possible in a mixed body. This is touched upon by the Doctor (*4. d. 49. quaest. 13. §. Respondeo sub B.*) and defended by Tataretus (*2. de gen. quaest. 2. dub. 1. in fine*). It is proved first from Aristotle (*sect. 5. problem.*), who affirms that mixed living bodies tempered to equality fall ill easily and are easily healed, while those not tempered to equilibrium rarely fall ill and are difficult to cure. Second, qualities can participate in an equality of degrees of intensification or remission, just as they can also participate in their inequality, as is evident; therefore the said temperament to the exact balance can be granted. Indeed, it is probable that Christ the Lord possessed it, since he was the most healthy and perfect of all, and his complexion was the most noble and excellent; and perhaps Adam, in the state of innocence, when the lower part was obedient to the higher. Third, if one contrary exists, so too can the other (*1. T. 44; and 2. of the same, T. 18*). Therefore since there exists a mixed body unequally tempered, likewise there can exist a mixed body equally tempered, and thus temperament to the exact balance is not incompatible with a mixed body.

One objects first: from (*1. de gen. cap. 10. n. 89*), in every mixed body one element predominates and its power is more intense and eminent in it. Therefore given such predominance, no temperament to the exact balance exists. Scotus himself (*nuper cit.*) seems to hold this view. I reply that although in fact and for the most part this may occur, with respect to what is possible there is nothing preventing the existence of a mixed body in equilibrium. Thus are to be interpreted the cited testimonies of the Stagirite and of Scotus.

One objects second: in man and other animate beings there are parts greatly diverse in temperament — such as the liver, heart, brain, nerves, and the like — so that from these temperament to the exact balance cannot result. Therefore the said temperament is impossible. I reply that although in any particular part of the mixed body this temperament to the exact balance may not be possible, it is not incompatible with the entire mixed body, if all its parts are compared to one another and the degrees of qualities in each are considered together. And this can be explained by the weights of a clock, of which one, though not equal to another, are all ordered to equilibrium so as to complete a total and regular motion.

Article V. Whether the Same Thing Can Naturally Be Reproduced.

The occasion for examining this difficulty is provided by Aristotle (*2. de gen. cap. ult.*) who says that generations are circular — meaning that in generations there is a return and repetition, not indeed to the same things numerically but specifically, as some of his interpreters explain the passage — and therefore the common body of philosophers inquires whether the same thing numerically can be reproduced. On this question I find three opinions, two extreme and one middle.

The first is that of certain philosophers, notably the Platonists, cited by Scotus (*4. d. 43. quaest. 3. §. Hic sciendum. A.*) after Augustine (*12. Ciuit. cap. 13*), who hold that after the great year — that is, after thirty-six thousand years — all things return the same numerically, not only according to substance but also according to accidents, because all the heavens will return to the same position. Given the hypothesis of Ptolemy in the *Almagest* that the starry heaven moves one degree contrary to the diurnal motion per hundred years, it follows that the motion of that same heaven from west to east will be completed in the space of thirty-six thousand years.

The second is that of Thomas Aquinas (*4. contra Gentes cap. 81*), Capreolus, Paludanus, and others (*4. d. 43*) and Suarez (*3. p. disp. 45. sect. 6*), who deny that any corrupted effect can naturally be reproduced the same numerically.

The third is that of Scotus (*4. cit. q. 3. §. Tertia opinio*), Richard (*q. 1. art. 3. ad 6*), and many others, who teach that by natural power certain effects can numerically be reproduced.

Note that this controversy can be examined either with respect to natural power, as is investigated in the present article; or with respect to supernatural power, as regards permanent being, treated in the following article; or as regards successive being, treated in the last article.

The first assertion is: not all things will return the same numerically. So Augustine (*praecit.*) and Scotus (*ubi supra*). It is proved first from sacred Scripture: (*Rom. 6*): "Christ, raised from the dead, will never die again; death no longer has dominion over him." (*1 Thess. 4*): "We shall always be with the Lord." (*Ps. 11*): "You, O Lord, will keep us; you will guard us from this generation forever." Scotus adds from the same Psalm cited: "The wicked walk in circles" — that is, they speak of circular returns. And (*Apoc. 10*): "Time will be no more."

Second, if such a circulation of things were admitted, no beatitude would exist, because man would return to his former miseries and calamities. For either the blessed man thinks he will never return to his former state full of labors and sorrows — and so he is blessed by a false opinion — or he thinks he will indeed return to his former state — and so he fears, and is not blessed, since the blessed person is secure in eternal happiness.

Third, science would be recollection, which Aristotle refutes (*1. post. T. 4*), saying that it is impossible for the noblest habits to exist in us without our knowing it. Moreover, free acts are not necessarily subject to the causality of the heavens; therefore neither the same men numerically nor their same acts numerically would return, as the Platonists suspected, according to Augustine (*praealleg.*), who writes: "Plato and the Academy taught their disciples through countless ages past — and the same Plato, and the same city, and the same school, and the same disciples were found again." Scotus adds more (*cit.*).

The second assertion: it is probable that by the powers of nature certain things can return the same numerically. This is supported by Scotus (*passu memorato*, §. *Tertia opinio*). It is proved first from (1. *Caeli*, T. 22; 8. *Met.* T. 11): "If the agent is the same and the matter is the same, the effect will be the same." But the same agent and the same matter of the same effect, once produced and reproduced, can exist — as if a hand is placed near fire and is heated, and then the heat perishes when the hand is removed, and if the same hand is placed near the same fire again, the same heat numerically follows. Therefore sometimes the same effect numerically can return.

Second, the agent and matter have as much power for the corrupted effect as they previously had for producing that same effect, because a cause virtually contains its effect; and the agent and matter are indifferent to producing this or that effect, or one already produced. Therefore there is no incompatibility with the reproduction of some effect.

Third, if water is distributed into many parts, its numerical identity perishes; for each part of the water is water, and each makes one whole really distinct from another. But if those parts are again united, the same water numerically as before returns. Likewise a fever remits and the same fever returns. Again, the parts of a perfect animal can be naturally repaired; therefore so too can the whole animal. The inference seems clear. The antecedent is shown: if an ear is cut off from a man, once separated from that man it perishes, because the soul no longer vivifies it; but if it is reunited to the same man — as Christ did for Malchus (*Matt.* 27) — the same ear returns alive with the life it previously had. Furthermore, as I maintained in the book on causes, the same effect numerically can be produced severally by several causes of the same order, nor is it necessary for them that there be the same numerical action, since action is extrinsic to the effect.

One objects first: (*Eccles.* 1): "There is nothing new under the sun; nor can anyone say: See, this is new; for it has already been in the ages before us." The inference is confirmed: the heavens beginning their motion from one point return to that same point; therefore they will cause the same numerical effects; and thus the same things as before will return. The inference holds: the same natural causes applied in the same way and unimpeded produce the same effects, according to the saying (2. *de gen.* 26): "The same thing remaining the same always produces the same thing." I reply that this is to be interpreted of God's decree, his intellect and will — because from eternity he determined all things that he produces in time, and all these things are present to God, not indeed in real existence but in objective being. To the confirmation I deny that the heavens return to the same point from which they began to move, as Scotus notes (*cit. sub B.*), citing Thebit, and as other astronomers carefully observe against the Platonists.

One objects second, against the second assertion: from (2. *de gen.* 6. 11. T. 70): "Those whose substance perishes do not return the same numerically"; (5. *Phys.*

c. 4. T. 37): "The same health does not return numerically"; and in (*l. praedicam. c. de oppositis*): "From privation to habit there is no return" — and a similar point is made (9. Met. T. 14). Therefore one and the same corrupted thing numerically cannot be restored. I reply that the first testimony is to be interpreted as applying for the most part, but sometimes there is nothing to prevent the same thing numerically from returning — so Scotus answers (*cit. q. 1.; and in Report. q. 2. ad 2.*). To the other I say it is more to the opposite point: for if health continued through the day remains the same, why should health that was present in the morning and interrupted at midday and returned in the evening not be the same? To the third it is to be interpreted of immediate return, not mediate, as I explained (1. 2. Phys. q. de privatione).

One objects third: a whole depends upon the union of its parts, but the same union once interrupted does not return; for what is interrupted does not return the same — for if the same returned, that would be a repetition, which is incompatible with identity. I reply that for the numerical identity of an effect the same union is not required, since neither the same action nor the same cause is required, as I showed at length in the book on causes cited above. Whence the Doctor (*in 4. nuper alleg. §. Aliter. D.*) explains this of the same location numerically, which can be acquired by straight and circular motion.

Article VI. Whether Supernaturally the Same Numerically Permanent and Corrupted Effect Can Be Restored.

Marsilius (2. de gen. q. 18), Durand, and a few others (4. d. 43) hold that no compound and mixed permanent body, other than man, that has once perished can ever be restored; and before them the Sadducees held this, as we read (*Matt. 22*), denying the universal resurrection of men. The opposite is maintained by Scotus (4. d. cit. q. 1), Bonaventure (*ibid. q. 5*), Bassol, Mayr, and other scholastics at the same place, and Thomas Aquinas (*Quol. 4. n. 5*), who teach that all permanent things that have perished can by divine power be restored the same numerically.

It is argued first from Scripture: (*Job 19*): "I know that in the last day I shall rise again from the earth." And (*1 Cor. 15*): "We shall all rise." And it is an article of faith, as is evident in the Apostles' Creed: "The resurrection of the flesh," and in the Nicene Creed: "I await the resurrection of the dead."

Second, from Augustine (22. Ciuit. c. 20; and *serm. 19. de verbis Domini*): "If we were reduced to nothing, God could make us exist, just as he makes us exist though we never previously existed." He says the same (*serm. 19. de sanctis*). And Gregory (*hom. 18. in Euang.*): "It is far less for God to restore what he made than to have created what did not exist."

Third, there is no incompatibility on the part of God, whose power is infinite; nor on the part of corrupted things, which of themselves do not imply a

contradiction in being produced again — just as before they were produced they were producible. Whence Augustine (*in exp. Ps. 62*): "If God made us who did not exist, it is a great thing for him to restore us when we did exist." And in the book on the words of the Apostle (*serm. 10*): "It is more to make what never existed than to restore what did exist." And on time (*serm. 52*): "Abraham considered that God, who granted that one be born from old people who did not yet exist, could also restore from death one who had been."

One objects first: from (6. *Eth. c. 3*), Agathon's saying is accepted by Aristotle: "God alone is deprived of this — to make undone what has been done." Therefore it is incompatible that corrupted things the same numerically can be called back to the present. I reply that indeed God cannot make it so that things that have been done were not done; but it is not rightly inferred that God cannot cause these same things to be present again through reproduction. For just as through the first making they were made, then destroyed, so through another making they can be restored the same numerically — as is evident from (*Joan. 11*) concerning Lazarus, who, having died, was called back to life by the voice of Christ the Lord, saying "Lazarus, come out," and immediately he who had been dead came forth.

One objects second: the same thing cannot have a double existence and a double duration, as is obvious; but if the same thing numerically could return, it would enjoy a double existence and a double duration — namely one it had through the first production, and another it would participate in through the second production. I distinguish the major: simultaneous and continuous, I grant; interrupted and discontinuous, I deny — as is evident from Christ the Lord, who after death rose and lived again.

One objects third: if God acted externally of necessity, he would have no less power than he now has acting freely; but if he acted externally of necessity, he could not restore the same thing numerically; therefore neither can he do so acting freely. I reply that the hypothesis is impossible. Given one impossible and absurd thing, many follow (1. *Phys. T. 10. 13. 25*). Or, if the major is granted, he could still restore the same thing numerically, provided the same matter and the other requisite conditions were disposed as in the case of man. This according to Aristotle is held by Scotus (*ubi supra*).

Article VII. Whether by Divine Power the Same Numerically Successive Being Can Return.

Those favoring the negative are Thomas Aquinas (*Quol. 4. art. 5*), Rubius (*de gen. tract. de reproductione quaest. 4*), and the Complutenses (*ibid. disp. 13. quaest. 2*), who hold that it involves a contradiction for the same numerically successive being to be restored. Those favoring the affirmative are the Aureolus (4. *d. 43*), Bassol at the same place, Mayr (4. *d. 44. quaest. 3*), who are preceded by Scotus (4. *d.*

43. *quaest. 1. §. Ad argumenta L.*), who maintain that the same numerically successive being can be divinely restored.

It is proved first: what does not imply a contradiction can be done by God, from the common assertion of the scholastics, especially Scotus (*nunc cit.*; *d. 10. q. 2. §. Dico ergo F.*). But for the same numerically successive being — for example motion or time — to be reproduced implies no contradiction; therefore it is possible. The major is conceded by the adversaries. The minor is proved: the same numerically permanent being can be restored; therefore so too can a successive being. The antecedent is admitted by those same opponents. The inference is proved: just as a permanent being is virtually contained in its cause, so too is a successive being, as will be more apparent from the resolution of the objections adduced below.

Second, motion is specified by its term, as was well decided in the book on motion; but God can reproduce the same numerical term of motion; therefore he can also reproduce the same numerical motion. The major is clear. The minor is shown: God can restore the same numerical body that has the same numerical location and the same local presence; therefore also the same numerical motion through which it acquired such a local presence.

Third, if the same extremes of a relation are restored, the same numerical relation will arise and return, as is evident from Christ the Lord who has the same numerical relation of filiation to the Virgin Mother after his death as before his death, as Scotus notes (*ubi supra*). But motion, formally understood, is a relation coming from outside to the movable thing with respect to the mover, as remains proved from the book on motion cited above. Add that if the same subject numerically can be restored, so too can its accidents, which follow upon that subject. For when the principal is given, the accessory elements are also given, as jurists write; and by the adversaries the same substance numerically can be restored; therefore also its accidents, among which are numbered motion and time.

One objects first: what is intrinsically and essentially continuous cannot be restored the same, because if it is interrupted its continuity is destroyed; but a successive being is continuous (*5. Phys. cap. 4. T. 39*). Therefore a successive being cannot be restored the same numerically. I deny the major. For if a continuum is interrupted it will indeed cease to be; yet nothing prevents God from restoring the same thing numerically, which will then be continuous as before — since its parts will preserve the same continuity in relation to each other.

One objects second: the same numerical motion cannot be restored unless the same numerical time is restored, since time follows from motion just as light follows from the sun; but the same time cannot numerically return, because real, positive time is essentially ordered to imaginary time, which cannot be changed or restored by God; therefore if true time ceases to be, it cannot be

restored. I reply that even if the major were materially true, it is not formally true, because time does not come from motion but motion comes from time. Yet if the major is admitted, the minor is denied: because a proper and real being — such as time is — does not essentially depend on non-being, such as imaginary time is.

One objects third: it requires no less power to preserve an existing thing from perishing than to restore a corrupted one — as the adversaries do not deny; but God cannot preserve a successive being from being corrupted, for otherwise it would not be successive but permanent, which is impossible. Therefore, etc. I reply that the major holds if it is understood of a thing according to the being that it has; and because a thing either has permanent being or successive being, if God can in his own mode preserve both, he can also restore both. But if the major is taken otherwise — namely that a successive being should remain and be conserved not successively but permanently, as the argument presses in the instance and as is indicated in the minor proposition — then the major is false.

Book on Meteors.

Meteors are certain imperfect mixed bodies that are generated in a high place. For in Greek *μετέωρον* means in Latin "sublime," as is rightly observed by Zabarella, Tataretus (*1. Meteor. quaest. 1*), Scibilis (*1. in fine*), Joannes de Magistris (*quaest. 2. scibili z.*), and the Parisian (*ibid. in exp. Text. not. 1*). The science of meteors is therefore the cognition of sublime things, namely those that are produced and observed in a high and elevated place — that is, in the highest or in the middle region of the air. Although some meteors occur in a low and humble place, and certain others are treated by Aristotle in his work, nevertheless, since those that are seen in the heights are more numerous, more noble, and more excellent, they take their name and title from them. In this book five questions are raised: the first on meteors in general, the second on fiery meteors, the third on aerial meteors, the fourth on aqueous meteors, and the fifth on terrestrial meteors.

Question I. On Meteors in General.

Article I. On the Causes of Meteors.

The efficient cause of meteors is the heavens, through their influence and motion. The remote material cause is the four elements, especially water and earth; the proximate material cause is vapor and exhalation. The formal cause is that by which a meteor is constituted in its essential being and distinguished from everything that is not itself. The final cause is the good of the universe.

Vapor is a moist and warm exhalation that issues from water and moist places. For when water is heated by the power of the sun, a certain smoke is drawn up, which is called vapor, and from it little clouds, clouds, rains, hails, and things of that kind are formed — as we experience when the water of a kettle is heated: for by the power of the fire's heat a certain smoke is raised from the water itself, which is called vapor by the philosophers, and is mentioned by the Doctor (*2. d. 15. quaest. vn. §. Dico ad quaest. sub B.; and in Report. d. 14. quest. 3; and 1. d. 2. quaest. 3. Report. §. Ad 1. principale*).

Exhalation is a warm and dry exhalation drawn out from the earth and dry places by the power of the solar rays. For from heated earth, which is porous, something resembling smoke seems to be extracted, which is called exhalation. From it are formed fiery meteors, which by others are called ignited impressions; if the parts of those meteors are very closely bound together and drawn by the force of the sun to the highest region of the air, they generate comets; but if the parts are not joined by any bond but are scattered among themselves, they produce gusts or winds.

The assertion is: there are two kinds of meteors — one formed from vapor, the other from exhalation. So Aristotle (*1. Meteor.*) and the other philosophers

commonly, from whom Scotus (*cit. and in his other works*) does not depart. It is proved: there are only two proximate materials of meteors; therefore there are only two kinds of meteors. The antecedent is evident from what was just said: either meteors participate in warm and moist matter, or in dry and warm matter — which is to say, they are formed either from vapor or from exhalation. Moreover, in the next article it will be shown that vapor and exhalation differ specifically and essentially from each other; therefore the twofold genus of meteors just enumerated is established.

One objects: there are as many kinds of meteors as there are combinations of their constituent parts, as is evident from the number of qualities and other things; but there are four combinations of meteors — for they are formed either from warm and moist, or from dry and moist, or from moist and cold, or from warm and dry. Therefore four kinds of meteors are to be numbered. The major is to be denied, both because what is cold cannot be raised on high, and because warm and dry things cannot come together in one; and therefore from these no meteors properly speaking are formed.

Article II. Whether Vapor and Exhalation Are Essentially Distinct.

The heading of this article can be understood in two ways. In one way: whether vapor and exhalation differ from each other essentially or only accidentally. In another way: whether they are separated essentially or only accidentally from the elements. On this question two positions of the philosophers prevail. The first is that of Averroes and Philoponus (*2. de gen. com. 18*) and the Louvain masters (*l. 1. tract. 2*), who hold that vapor and exhalation differ from the elements and from each other only accidentally. The second is defended by Joannes de Magistris (*1. Meteor. quaest. 4. dub. 3*), Tataretus (*ibid. quest. 1. scibili 4.*), and others, who affirm that vapor and exhalation are separated essentially both from the elements and from each other. Scotus (*4. d. 12. quaest. 4. §. Quantum ad istam opinionem. Sub B.*) supports them.

The first assertion is: vapor and exhalation are essentially distinguished from the elements. This seems the express mind of Scotus (*nunc memorati*). It is proved first from Aristotle (*1. Meteor. cap. 9*), who says that vapor can be changed into water; but what is changed into another thing is essentially distinguished from that into which it is changed, as may be seen in the perpetual and daily alternation and change of things. For nourishment is turned into flesh, and flesh is essentially different from nourishment that has been turned into it. And the same judgment is to be made of everything else.

Second, every mixed body is essentially different from the elements, as I showed in the book on the elements; but vapor and exhalation are certain mixed bodies, though imperfect; therefore, etc.

Third, what is produced from another as from its matter is distinguished from that from which it is produced. For the same thing cannot be both efficient and

effect with respect to the same thing; but vapor and exhalation are formed from the elements, as I made plain in the preceding article; therefore they are essentially distinguished from them.

The second assertion is: between vapor and exhalation there is an essential difference. This is not contrary to Scotus (*ubi supra*). It is proved first: diverse passions argue essential differences, as I rarely noted in the foregoing; but vapor and exhalation have diverse properties. For vapor moistens and easily dissolves into water or air; while exhalation dries and easily turns into earth or fire. Therefore they essentially differ from each other.

Second, what seeks different places indicates a different essence, as I said when treating of the elements; but vapor can be raised only to the middle region of the air, while exhalation ascends to the highest border of that same air, as appears in comets. Furthermore, a not negligible indication is that they proceed from different elements: for vapor arises chiefly from water, and exhalation chiefly from earth. Therefore an essential distinction between them is to be acknowledged.

One objects first: Aristotle (*2. de gen. cap. 4*) says that smoke, which is exhalation, is made from earth and air; therefore exhalation is not essentially different from the elements of which it is composed. I reply that exhalation is made from them as from its matter, as I said in the preceding article. It does not therefore follow that it is not essentially distinguished from the elements. For perfect mixed bodies are made from elements, from which they are essentially different — as no one denies.

One objects second: the same Philosopher (*1. Meteor. cap. 3*) writes that vapor is a concretion of water, that is, separated parts of water; therefore in the Peripatetic school vapor is not essentially different from the element water. I reply that Aristotle indeed maintains that vapor is a concretion of water and is raised again by the power of the sun, but does not mean that vapor coincides with water — on the contrary, it is essentially distinguished from it, as I intimated above.

Article III. In What Place and at What Time Meteors Are Formed.

Note first that the place of fire is all that space contained within the concave surface of the lunar orb down to the convex surface of the air. The place of air is the interval that extends from the concave surface of fire to the convex surface of the sea and earth. The place of water or sea is from the concave surface of air to the convex surface of the earth. And the place of earth is from the surface of the water and air to the center of the earth itself.

Note second that three regions of the air are numbered: the highest, the middle, and the lowest. The highest is from the surface of the sphere of fire down to that part of the air that cannot be heated directly by the eminently warm heavenly bodies. The lowest is from that part that cannot be heated by those bodies down

to the earth. The middle is from that part that cannot be heated by reflection of the solar rays down to that which can be heated directly by fire and the aforesaid orbs. The highest is warm, both on account of the native heat of the air and on account of the external heat of the fire adjacent to it. The lowest is also warm, on account of the reflection of the sun's rays and on account of the warm exhalations. The middle is cold, because it cannot be heated directly by fire and the aforesaid heavenly bodies, and also because of antiperistasis and the great abundance of vapors returning to their natural coldness.

The first assertion is: meteors are not formed in the sphere of fire but in the sphere of air, water, and earth. Scotus (*in both works*, 2. d. 27. q. 2) does not disagree. Regarding fire, it is proved: if anything extraneous is raised to fire, it is immediately consumed and burned on account of fire's great activity; and fire is the lightest of all things, while all meteors have some heaviness since they are mixed bodies, though imperfect; therefore they cannot reach its orb.

Regarding air it is a matter of common knowledge. For we hear thunder, see lightning, and experience thunderbolts and other things of this kind, which are evidently known to occur in the air.

Regarding water it is not obscure, since it is sweet, or salty, nitrogenous, bituminous, and moist — from which qualities and affections a great disposition for the generation of meteors is had. Hence, by the power of the sun, we observe vapors being raised from water on high.

Regarding earth it is easily shown: for it is cavernous, spongy, and bituminous; and therefore from it, by the heat of the sun, exhalations are carried upward; and thus winds blow and earthquakes are sometimes heard.

The second assertion is: meteors are generated at all times, but especially in spring and autumn. The Doctor (*cit.*; and *ibid. dist. 4. quaest. 3*) does not dissent. It is proved first from Aristotle (*1. Meteor. cap. 4*), where he expressly upholds the proposed assertion. Second, it is established by experience concerning comets, which are observed by us in autumn and not at other times. All the more so: in winter and summer there is not so great an abundance of vapors and exhalations as is seen in spring and autumn. For in winter cold and moisture prevent the sun's heat from carrying vapors and exhalations upward; and the heat of summer dries out the earth and consumes vapors, preventing them from tending to a higher place.

One objects first: the air is by its own nature warm; therefore its heat prevents vapors raised to its middle region from returning to their natural coldness; and consequently neither is its middle region colder, nor is there so great an abundance of vapors in it. I reply that the air by its natural warmth cannot prevent this, for the reasons we set forth above in the second note.

One objects second: nothing violent is perpetual (*1. Caeli* 7. 28); but the coldness of the middle border of the air is extrinsic and violent to it; therefore it is not perpetual — yet it endures always. Therefore it is a sign that the vapors existing in it are not reduced to their original coldness. I reply that the maxim of the Philosopher is to be interpreted of sublunar mixed bodies, not of the elements and their places; for between these there exists a perpetual struggle and perennial conflict for the generation of mixed bodies and the good of the universe.

Question II. On Fiery Meteors.

Article I. What Fiery Meteors Are.

Fiery meteors, also called ignited impressions, are many, corresponding to the multiple form and figure they take from warm and dry matter disposed and affected in different ways. They are called fiery because they are kindled and inflamed by fire or by the burning heat of the sun. Among the fiery meteors the most notable are: pyramids, columns of fire, burning sheaves, lit candles, blazing lances, leaping goats, firebrands, twisting dragons, perpendicular fire, lambent fire, will-o'-the-wisps, Saint Elmo's light, the stars Castor and Pollux, comets, lightning, thunderbolts, and things of that kind. Since the matter of these meteors is smoky, warm, and dry, it can easily be kindled and inflamed by fire or the sun. If the matter is wide and long, sheaves, torches, and lit candles are produced; if it is extended greatly in length and emits sparks, leaping goats and flying lances result; if it does not emit sparks, a firebrand is formed; if it runs through the middle, shooting stars and traveling fires are produced. If the matter is thin and slightly inflamed, meeting no obstacle, a will-o'-the-wisp results, which moves as something fleeing moves and follows it, as is sometimes observed in cemeteries. If it coalesces from fat and viscous matter, light arises; if there is only one, it is called Saint Elmo's light; if two appear simultaneously, they are called Castor and Pollux.

The first assertion is: fiery meteors are formed in the air. Handed down by the Doctor (*2. dist. 14. quaest. 3. §. dico ad quest. Sub A.*). It is evident from experience. For in summer such ignited impressions are observed by us — some exist in the highest region of the air, such as comets; some in its middle region, such as lightning and thunderbolts; and others in the lowest, such as lambent fire and the will-o'-the-wisp.

The second assertion is: fiery meteors are sometimes moved by circular motion, sometimes by straight motion. The Doctor (*praecit.*) does not disapprove. The first part is confirmed by experience concerning comets, which are moved by the motion of the heavens, which is circular. The second part is obvious from shooting stars, which are carried downward. Likewise, the light passing through the smoke of an extinguished candle descends downward to relight the

extinguished candle; and sometimes fiery meteors appear in the lowest border of the air.

The third assertion is: the said meteors are produced chiefly in summer, whether by day or by night, but are seen by us only at night, because the light of the sun, being greater, overshadows their lesser light so that they cannot be perceived by us. The Doctor (*cit.*) does not oppose this. The reason for the proposed assertion is that these meteors are generated from warm and dry exhalations; and warmth and dryness prevail more in summer than at any other time.

The fourth assertion is: meteors of this kind differ from each other accidentally. This does not conflict with the writings of the Doctor. It is argued: they differ by more and less, for some are more inflamed than others; and more and less do not vary the species, as I said in the Logic, in the question on quality. Again, they differ in heat and color, which are accidents. Furthermore, they differ according to the greater or lesser quality of matter and according to diverse figure — all of which argue only an accidental difference.

The fifth assertion is: such meteors are placed in the category of substance. The school of the Subtle Doctor does not depart from this. For meteors are imperfect mixed bodies, as I noted above, which are substances, and thus reside in the category of substance.

Article II. On Comets.

The philosophers, both ancient and modern, dispute very vehemently and sharply about the nature of comets, as may be seen in Plutarch (*3. de placitis, cap.*) and Albert (*lib. 3. tract. 4. cap. 8*). Among the various and diverse opinions, I select two principal ones for examination. The first is that of ancient philosophers who held comets to be of a heavenly nature, and these are themselves divided. Some think that a comet is a conjunction of several wandering stars, which appear tail-like to us because they are close to the sun. Others hold that it is only one wandering star. Nor are there lacking those who affirm that the coma of a comet consists of elemental matter while the comet itself is composed of heavenly matter. The second opinion is received and defended by Aristotle (*1. Meteor. cap. 7*), the Parisians, Tataretus, Joannes de Magistris at the same place, and others, who teach that a comet is formed from the sublunar matter of exhalations.

Note that Aristotle (*cit.*) describes a comet as a great abundance of exhalations, whose parts are very closely packed and coagulated together, carried to the highest region of the air by the power of the sun. Various and different comets are generated according to the variety and diversity of matter and figure. For if the parts of the comet are rare, a hairy comet is formed; if some part is dense and extended lengthwise, a tailed comet results; if some parts are rare and the rest thick, a bearded comet emerges. Furthermore, one comet is black, which

portends the death of many; another is red, which foretells the death of princes, wars, and storms; another is white or silver, which predicts abundance of things. Comets appear in autumn because a great quantity of exhalations is required for their formation, and a considerable interval of time is needed for such an accumulation to be raised to the first region of the air and for the parts to join together and be kindled by the fire there. A comet endures for at least fifty or seventy days; sometimes six months; sometimes a year, or even two.

The first assertion is: a comet is not one of the wandering stars, nor a conjunction of several planets. This assertion is twofold and presupposed by the Doctor (*cit.*). The first part is argued first: wandering stars always move in the circle of the Zodiac, but a comet is not moved in this way, as astronomers observe; therefore it is not to be numbered among the wandering stars. Second, if a comet were a wandering star, several comets could never be seen at the same time; but we did observe them in the year 1617, when in the east appeared a bearded comet and at midday under our zenith a white or silver comet. Therefore a comet is not to be ranked among the wandering stars.

The second part is shown: if conjoined planets were distinct, they would appear to us; but the parts of a comet when separated are not seen by us, as experience confirms. Second, many times planets are conjoined to each other and yet no comet is produced: therefore it is evident that a comet is not a conjunction of several planets.

The second assertion is: a comet is not of a heavenly nature but of a sublunar one. This assertion is also twofold, which the Doctor (*ubi supra*) does not reject. The first part is proved first: what is heavenly is incorruptible, as I showed in the book on the heavens; but a comet dissolves and is corrupted after the interval of time assigned at the end of the preceding note. Therefore a comet does not participate in a heavenly nature. Second, what grows and diminishes does not possess heavenly nature, since growth and decrease indicate corruption; but a comet is increased by the addition of new matter and decreased by the subtraction of pre-existing matter and its dissolution. Therefore a comet does not take on a heavenly nature.

The second part is Aristotle's at the passage cited above, and is proved first from St. Damascene (2. *fidei* c. 7) in these words: "Comets arise frequently, along with certain signs of the deaths of kings, which are not from those stars that were made from the beginning of things, but are established by divine command at the opportune time, and are then dissolved again." Second, when comets appear, famines, storms, and things of this kind occur; and this arises from nothing other than the matter that is raised by the force of the sun from the earth, leaving the earth itself dry and parched. Therefore a comet consists of matter and sublunar nature.

One objects first: Albumazar testifies that a new star once appeared above the sphere of Venus; and Hali reports that he saw another in the fifteenth degree of Scorpio when the sun was in the fifteenth degree of Taurus. Likewise, in the year 1574, in Cassiopeia, a great star was seen which vanished after two years; and stars of this kind are comets; therefore a comet is of a heavenly nature. Certain thinkers reply, among them St. Damascene (*cit.*), that those stars were miraculously created by God to warn men and to make them take heed and abandon evil ways. It can better be said that those stars did not truly exist in the heavens but below the moon, as certain astronomers of those times observed, and that they were comets which appeared to be in the heavens because of the great distance that existed between them and the earth. Nor is this improbable, since clouds and some other meteorological phenomenon also appear to us to be in the heavens, or at least to reach the heavens, though in reality it is not so.

One objects second: what is moved by circular motion has a heavenly nature, since circular motion is a passion of the heavens; but a comet is moved by circular motion, as is evident to any observer; therefore it is of a heavenly nature. I deny the major. For fire is moved by a circular motion, though it is not endowed with a heavenly nature. Moreover, circular motion is not a property of the heavens in the fourth sense; therefore it belongs to other things as well.

One objects third: if a comet were composed of sublunar matter, it would endure little; but it is established from what was said that it persists for a long time. Therefore it is a sign that it is not composed of sublunar matter. The inference is confirmed: the middle region of the air, which is cold, would impede such exhalations from ascending upward to the highest region of the air. Therefore a comet does not draw upon sublunar matter. I reply that the reason why a comet sometimes endures long has already been given — namely because its parts are tenaciously bound together. To the confirmation the reply is much the same: since the parts are very light, dry, and warm, they overcome by the power of the sun the coldness of the middle region of the air and tend toward the highest, where they remain for some time, as I noted above.

One asks: whether the star that appeared to the Magi (*Matt. 2*) was a comet or something else? Chrysostom (*hom. 6. in Matt.*) and Nicenus (*dialogo de anima*) say it was an angel in the form of a star. I myself, with Lyran (*in Postil.*), think that it was some meteorological phenomenon compacted by divine or angelic power, which was moved by an angel to lead the Magi and show them the manger of the Lord — just as the Hebrews were led through the desert by a column of fire by night and by a column of cloud by day (*Exod. 13*).

Article III. On Thunder.

Anaxagoras and Empedocles hold that thunder is the extinction of fire proceeding from the coldness and moisture of a cloud. Aristotle, however (2. *Meteor. cap. ult.*), asserts that thunder is a sound emitted in a cloud by reason of

the warm and dry exhalation enclosed between the sides of the cloud, which, seeking to exit, violently moves the cloud itself or breaks it, thereby producing a crash, and a sound is heard that is called thunder.

Note that for the sound of thunder to be emitted, a dense, cold, and watery cloud is required, and in it a warm and dry exhalation is enclosed, which, lest it perish, seeks an exit; finding none on account of the surrounding contrary — namely coldness and moisture — it shakes the cloud or breaks it. But if the exhalation enclosed in the cloud is small, it indeed moves the cloud but does not break it, and therefore a small sound is produced and heard. But if the exhalation is great and breaks the cloud, a great sound is heard, like the tearing of cloth or paper.

The assertion is: thunder is not the extinction of fire in a cold and watery cloud, but the sound emitted from the violent striking of a warm and dry exhalation enclosed between the sides of a cold and moist cloud. So Aristotle (*praecit.*), from whom Scotus in his works does not depart. The first part is proved first: if thunder were the extinction of fire in a cloud, such an extinction would not be clear and bright but smoky and dark, which conflicts with experience. Second, thunder precedes the extinction of fire in a cloud; therefore thunder is not the extinction. The antecedent is proved: clouds collide against each other before the exhalation is kindled and inflamed; and for this reason in the following article it will be shown that lightning is posterior to thunder. I add that iron and flint are struck against each other before fire is struck out; therefore thunder too is emitted before fire is extinguished in the cloud.

The second part is proved first by analogy: smoke enclosed in wood, seeking an exit and finding none on account of the presence of a contrary, bursts the wood itself and emits a crash. Therefore it is apparent that exhalation enclosed within the sides of a cloud and besieged by coldness and moisture exerts force, from which the sound called thunder arises. Second, a flame of fire, impeded by surrounding coldness, emits a sound. Therefore likewise the said exhalation, in order to exit, shakes the parts of the cloud and emits a sound. Finally, fresh chestnuts thrown into fire crack and emit a sound: the same must be maintained of exhalation enclosed in a cloud, and also of other things enclosed violently in the head or belly of an animal, which, forced to exit, make a crackling sound. Therefore the said exhalation is thunder.

One objects: Aristotle (*2. post. T. 10*) and elsewhere not infrequently uses this definition of thunder: "Thunder is the extinction of fire in a cloud"; therefore in the Peripatetic school this definition is not to be rejected. I reply that Aristotle cited it as a commonly received one and one common at that time, not as proper and true — since in this passage, which is the proper one, he plainly rejects it as false.

One asks: which thunderclaps are to be feared? I reply that if lightning flashes and thunderclaps occur simultaneously they are to be feared, because there is great violence from a great abundance of kindled exhalations that are discharged most swiftly from the cloud; but if there is some delay between the lightning flashes and the thunderclaps, they are not to be feared, because no great force is applied, since a great quantity of kindled exhalations is not present.

Article IV. On Lightning.

Anaxagoras holds that lightning is fire proceeding from the heavens. Empedocles thinks it is fire kindled by the solar rays. Aristotle (*2. Meteor. cap. ult.; and 3. of the same work, cap. 1*), however, asserts that lightning is a kindled exhalation affected by fiery heat.

Note that certain philosophers draw a distinction between lightning, a lightning flash, and ignition. They call an exhalation that exits a cloud while inflamed "lightning." They call an inflamed exhalation borne through a cloud a "flash." And they call an exhalation very greatly kindled and inflamed, which, cast down most swiftly upon bodies, strikes those bodies, a "thunderbolt." Whatever may be said about this distinction, it is certain that lightning is that flash which, exiting from a cloud, is clear and bright.

The first assertion is: lightning is not fire emanating from the heavens, nor fire kindled by the solar rays. This assertion, which is twofold, does not oppose the school of Scotus. The first part is proved first: in the heavens there is no fire, as was shown in the book on the heavens; therefore no fire exits from the heavens that would be called lightning. Second, it does not appear why this fire should arise in one cloud rather than another; likewise why such fire should gleam in one part of the heavens rather than another. Therefore it is improbable to suppose that lightning is fire coming from the heavens.

The second part is argued: when the sun neither shines nor sends its rays into a cloud and into the earth — as happens at nighttime — lightning still occurs. Therefore it is plainly established that lightning is not the said fire kindled by the sun.

The second assertion is: lightning is a kindled exhalation tinged with fiery color, exiting violently from a cloud. The Doctor does not oppose this. It is argued first from analogy: from the striking of two bodies fire is excited, by which sometimes great forests are kindled and burned. Therefore from the collision of two clouds an exhalation is kindled, which is called lightning by the philosophers. Second, from thunder lightning follows, just as from the striking of a stone fire is struck out. Therefore lightning means nothing other than a kindled exhalation excited from the collision of clouds and departed from them.

One asks first: is thunder always produced when lightning is seen? I reply affirmatively. The reason is that exhalation is never inflamed without a collision of clouds, and thus thunder occurs. Why then is thunder not heard yet lightning is seen? The reason is that sight sees farther than hearing hears, and sight is more noble than hearing; or because that sound is small and on account of the distance of the clouds cannot reach our ears.

One asks second: does thunder occur before lightning? I reply affirmatively. The reason is that the shaking and collision of clouds occurs before the exhalation is kindled, just as the striking of iron and flint occurs before fire exits from the flint.

One asks third: why is lightning seen before thunder is heard? I reply that the reason is that sight in seeing is swifter and more active than hearing in hearing. This is evident in the firing of cannon, where the flash is seen before the sound is heard. Likewise in rowing, the oars are seen to move before their splash is heard.

Article V. On the Thunderbolt.

Popular opinion holds that a thunderbolt is a stone delivered by fire. The philosophers, notably Aristotle (*3. Meteor. 1*), maintain that a thunderbolt is a kindled exhalation, moved violently, discharged downward from a cold and watery cloud.

Note that a thunderbolt is produced when a great and subtle exhalation is violently emitted and expelled by the coldness of a cloud. It is divided into the penetrating and the burning. The penetrating is that which, by reason of its excessive subtlety, pervades porous bodies, leaves them intact, and consumes hard things that offer it stronger resistance — as it melts the sword while the scabbard remains intact; keeps the wine in a broken cask; and consumes the silver in a purse without consuming the purse. The reason is that it breaks hard things that resist it, while soft things, not resisting it, it barely injures. The burning is that which burns the bodies upon which it falls — as sometimes a man struck by a thunderbolt is reduced to ashes; and in this way lofty towers and the pinnacles of high temples are burned. Furthermore, thunderbolts are of different kinds — dividing and blackening — and this division, like the preceding, is taken according to the effects that the thunderbolt produces. If a thunderbolt divides one body from another, it is called the dividing kind; if without burning it affects a body with blackness, it is called the blackening kind.

The assertion is: a thunderbolt is not a stone delivered by fire, but a great subtle kindled exhalation violently discharged downward from a cold cloud. This does not conflict with the writings of Scotus. It is proved first: a thunderbolt penetrates many bodies, as I noted above; but if it were a stone, it could not penetrate dense and opaque bodies on account of its thickness and hardness. Therefore a thunderbolt is not a stone delivered by fire. Second, with no

external sign or blow apparent, an animal struck by a thunderbolt dies; but if a thunderbolt were a stone, it would leave the mark of the blow. Therefore since nothing apparently is left by the touch of a thunderbolt, one rightly concludes that a thunderbolt is not a stone but the subtle exhalation described above. And if sometimes a stone falls together with the thunderbolt, that stone is nothing other than a cloud converted and hardened into a stone — just as in the human body a stone is sometimes formed. Indeed, Albert (*1. 3. tract. 3. cap. 23*) writes that in the middle region of the air metals are sometimes produced, namely iron.

One asks first: why does a thunderbolt consume bones but not flesh? I reply that the reason is that flesh is soft and does not resist it; but bone is hard and resisting, which is why the thunderbolt consumes it. This can be explained by reference to cannon balls, which in their explosion break hard things but leave soft things unharmed. Add that the said effect proceeds from the penetrating thunderbolt, which pervades and permeates porous and soft bodies.

One asks second: why is wine sometimes consumed in a cask while the cask itself remains intact? I reply that the reason is that the said exhalation of the thunderbolt is very warm and dry, and it consumes the wine, which is moist; but it does not injure the cask, because it passes through its pores on account of its extreme subtlety.

One asks third: why, when a cask is burned, does wine still persist? I reply that the reason is that the thunderbolt in that case is of the burning kind; for by reason of its burning, from the viscosity a certain membrane is formed, which, congealed with the wine, prevents the wine from spreading. The said wine can last four days until that membrane is ruptured; but if anyone should drink from it, he will die, because through the thunderbolt the wine is rendered poisonous.

One asks fourth: why, before a thunderbolt falls, does a wind sometimes blow beforehand, sometimes accompany it, or follow it? I reply that the reason is that the parts of the air are stirred by the speed of the thunderbolt, or because some parts of the exhalation are not kindled and thus produce wind.

One asks fifth: why are fruits touched by a thunderbolt poisonous? I reply on account of the matter of the thunderbolt, which is poisonous and sulphurous. Whence a thunderbolt gives off a sulphurous odor.

One asks sixth: why, if a poisoned man is touched by a thunderbolt, does he lose his poison? I reply that the reason is that contrary effects proceed from contrary agents — as wind sometimes extinguishes a candle and sometimes relights one already extinguished; and similarly wind sometimes opens a door and sometimes closes it.

One asks seventh: why does a man sometimes struck by a thunderbolt not die, whereas other animals if struck by a thunderbolt perish? I reply that this arises

from his excellence. For man is the most excellent and noble of all animate beings; and similarly it is related that the eagle is not touched by a thunderbolt, being the queen of birds.

One asks eighth: why does a fetus in its mother's womb die while the mother herself does not die? I reply that the reason is that the fetus is tender and weak, but the mother is not — she is strong and robust — just as the bud of a vine perishes from cold and frost while the vine itself lives.

One asks ninth: why, if a sleeping man is struck by a thunderbolt, does he die with his eyes open; but if he was awake, does he die with his eyes closed? I reply that the reason for the first case is that when a sleeping man is struck he opens his eyes to see the object striking and harming him; but having no time to close his eyes, he remains with them open. The reason for the second case is that a man who is awake, hearing the crash of thunder and seeing the great lightning flash and all the terrible things around him, closes his eyes lest so great an evil harm him further — and thus he remains dead with his eyes closed.

One asks tenth: what is the remedy against a thunderbolt? Pliny (*l. 2. c. 15*) replies that one should take laurel, which is never struck by a thunderbolt, or something from the sea calf. I myself think the better remedy is to seek underground places, because it has been observed that a thunderbolt can reach the earth to a depth of five feet. Hence we observe that higher places are more exposed to the thunderbolt, according to the saying: "Envy seeks the highest things; the highest winds blow; the highest things are struck by the thunderbolts of Jove."

Question III. On Aerial Meteors.

Article I. On the Vortex and Other Aerial Appearances.

Many aerial impressions are observed by us on a clear night, among which are especially numbered the vortex, the opening, the area or corona, and red or blood-colored hues.

Note first that the material cause of the aforesaid meteors is an exhalation carried upward, and the efficient cause is the stars and all luminous bodies that shed their light upon the parts of the exhalation; the formal cause is the light; and the final cause is the beauty of the universe. The manner in which those meteors are formed is as follows: since exhalation has certain dense parts and certain rare parts, if the light of some heavenly body falls upon them, it affects them differently. For if in the middle the exhalation is dense and the surrounding parts are rare, and if the light of some heavenly body shines over them, and if the density is great, a vortex is produced — for what is dense and not illuminated by light appears black or deep. Whence I have noted elsewhere that painters, when they wish to represent the depth of a well, place black in the middle and surround it on all sides with white. But if the density of the exhalation is small, it is called an opening; and if the density of the exhalation is

illuminated on all sides by the light, it is called an area or corona, which the Greeks name *ἄλων*. But if the exhalation is small and in some manner inflamed, red and blood-colored hues appear.

Note second that there are two kinds of colors: true colors, which arise from the mixture of the primary qualities, of which Aristotle speaks (*1. de sensu, et sensili*); and apparent colors, which are produced from light diversely modified, as is evident from the colors on the neck of a dove exposed to sunlight, of which (*in the second and third book on Meteors*). To this category belong the blood-red and other colors that appear in the air.

The assertion is: the aforesaid meteors are observed by us chiefly in summer on a clear night. This is evident from experience and can be confirmed from the first note, in which we noted the manner of their production; and the school of the subtle Doctor is not contrary.

One asks first: why are the aforesaid meteors seen by us only at night? I reply that the reason is that by day the light of the sun, being greater, overshadows the lesser light of the other heavenly bodies so that those impressions cannot be seen by us — just as by day we do not observe stars for the same reason.

One asks second: why, when such meteors appear, are certain voices heard similar to human voices? I reply that the reason is that at that time many exhalations exit from the earth, which, passing through a narrow passage, emit a sound, as is evident from wind blowing and gusting through a narrow place. Sounds of this kind appear to be human according to the imagination of the hearer, just as the sound of a bell seems to signify what the hearer imagines.

One asks third: why do these impressions appear to be in the heavens? I reply that this happens because our eye cannot recognize the distance that exists between the heavens and those impressions and figures. As is established from clouds, which appear to be in the heavens, though in reality they are not. Add that the common people call the sky "airy," "cloudy," "clear," and the like.

Article II. On Other Aerial Impressions.

Among aerial apparitions are numbered rods and parhelia, which are now to be explained by us. Certain perpendicular lines are observed by us, which by the common name are called rods or ropes — which are nothing other than solar rays proceeding perpendicularly from the sun through a discontinuous or perforated cloud, or through a cloud that is indeed continuous but rare in one part and dense in another; in this way such lines are produced and are called rods or ropes.

Parhelia are those meteors which, according to the etymology of the name, are beside the sun, or parhelions — that is, beside the sun: from *παρήλια*, as if *παρὰ ἥλιον*, which means "beside the sun." For such a spectacle is described as an image of the sun expressed in a cloud, because it is produced when a cloud is at the

side of the sun and through the reflection of the solar rays to that cloud, a likeness of the sun emerges. Hence sometimes two suns have been seen, and sometimes three — not because in reality there are several suns, but because the image of the sun itself was imprinted in several clouds in the manner I have just explained.

Article III. On the Rainbow.

Philosophers disagree about the nature of the rainbow in various and diverse senses, as may be seen in Plutarch (*3. de placitis, cap.*) and Albert (*lib. 3. tract. 4. cap. 8*). Some hold that the rainbow is the likeness of the sun expressed in a concave cloud. Others write that the rainbow is a vapor raised upward from the earth, which is spherical because it is drawn from the spherical earth and is congealed above by the cold; and when the sun is opposite to it, the rainbow is produced. Avicenna and Algazel think it is formed from the air moistened by rain, which the air receives as a certain shimmer by reason of the moisture, and thus the rainbow appears. The more common opinion of the philosophers is that the rainbow is a dewy cloud struck by the solar rays.

The first assertion is: the rainbow is neither a cloud nor the sun, but a dewy cloud struck by the solar rays. The Doctor does not disagree in his writings. The first part is proved: when the sun is shining, the rainbow is not always present; similarly, when a cloud exists in the air, the rainbow is not always seen. Therefore neither the sun nor the cloud is the rainbow. The second part is evident from what was said, especially in the foregoing note: for given a dewy cloud and the sun's rays shining upon it from the opposite side, the rainbow is produced.

The second assertion is: the colors that appear in the rainbow are not true colors but merely apparent and representative ones. This is consistent with the teaching of Scotus. It is proved: true colors, as has been stated elsewhere, arise from the mixture of the primary qualities; but in the rainbow there is no mixture of primary qualities — for in it there are the light of the sun and the cloud, which do not retain primary qualities. Moreover, the same reasoning must be applied to the colors of the rainbow as to the colors on the neck of a dove exposed to sunlight; but the colors of the latter are apparent, as experience teaches. Therefore so too are the colors of the former. Furthermore, the colors of the other meteors, as was maintained above, are apparent; therefore so too are the colors of the rainbow.

One asks first: is the rainbow the most noble of meteors? I reply affirmatively; and this is deduced from sacred Scripture, especially (*Ecclus. 1*): "See the rainbow and bless him who made it; it is very beautiful in its brightness."

One asks second: is there a lunar rainbow? I reply affirmatively, though it rarely occurs. For, as the Philosopher observes, over the space of fifty years only two lunar rainbows have been seen at night.

One asks third: did the rainbow exist before the universal flood, given that God says in (*Gen. 4*): "I set my bow in the clouds, and it shall be a sign of the covenant between me and the earth"? I reply that it did exist, because its cause existed — namely the sun and a dewy cloud — and consequently also its natural effect, which is the rainbow. But the rainbow is said to be a sign that there will no longer be a universal flood, by God's institution and will. It also appears to be a natural sign of rain if it shines in the morning, and truly a sign of fair weather if seen in the evening. Furthermore, sometimes several rainbows appear — that is, two or three.

Article IV. On the Milky Way.

On the milky way, which is as much as to say the milky circle or the Milky Way — which is called by rustics and the uneducated the Way of St. James — philosophers dispute very much and in various ways. The Pythagoreans hold that the milky way is that burned part which was made by certain planets deviating from the Zodiac, which through the white color appears white and milky. Anaxagoras and Democritus think that the milky way is those stars which at night, without the interposition of the earth, are illuminated by the light of the sun — in which way that part, illuminated by the sun's light, appears white, while the remaining parts, on account of the earth's shadow, do not appear white. Nor are there lacking other ancients who suspect that the milky way is produced by the reflection of our vision toward the sun. And Aristotle (*1. Meteor. c. 8*) asserts that the milky way is a great kindled exhalation sustained continually in the air by constant fuel, like a comet. The more common opinion of the other philosophers, however, is that the milky way is an enormous quantity of tiny stars, which on account of their smallness cannot be seen by us individually.

Note that the parts of the heavens are of three kinds. Some are rare, which cannot be illuminated, since they cannot retain light in themselves; therefore they appear to be of a sky-blue color. Others are dense parts, which on account of their density receive light in themselves; from their number are the stars, which appear to us as bright or at least white. Still other parts are intermediate, being neither very rare nor very dense. Therefore sometimes between them and us exhalations and vapors are interposed, which appear to make them larger; and if such vapors and exhalations are absent, they appear smaller — though in reality they always remain of the same quantity and figure.

The first assertion: the milky way is not a part burned by the heat of wandering stars deviating from the Zodiac; nor is it that part which at night is illuminated by the light of the sun. The Doctor does not contest this.

The first part is proved first: the heavens as a matter of fact are incorruptible and are not subject to any external impressions, as was abundantly shown in the book on the heavens. Therefore the milky way is not burned by the deviation of certain planets from the Zodiac. Second, a burned part appears not white but

black, as is established from coals and other things burned by fire; but that part called the milky circle is not black but white. Therefore, etc.

The second part is argued first: the sun runs its course in different ways; therefore if the milky circle arose from illumination, such a circle would change at night just as the illumination of the sun changes; but the milky way remains in the same position and place, as all observers and astronomers note. Second, the shadow of the earth does not impede the light of the sun: for as astronomers observe, the shadow of the earth reaches only to the sphere of Mercury.

Therefore the other parts of the firmament are not impeded by the interposition of the earth from being illuminated by the splendor of the sun and becoming white like the milky circle; but the opposite is evident. Moreover, the sun greatly exceeds the earth in size, as is evident from the appendix on the sphere near its end. Therefore the earth cannot prevent the other parts, besides the milky way, from being reached by the light of the sun.

The second assertion: the milky circle is not produced from the reflection of our vision toward the light of the sun; nor is it a great exhalation continuously sustained in the air by constant fuel; but it is an enormous multitude of tiny fixed stars in the firmament, which on account of their extreme smallness cannot be seen by us individually, and therefore that part appears to be of a white color. This does not oppose the teaching of Scotus.

The first part is proved first: even if there were no reflection of our vision toward the sun, the milky circle would still exist; for it is impossible that it should depend on our vision, which is entirely extrinsic to it. And if all mankind perished, no one doubts that such a milky way would persist. Therefore it is by no means caused by the reflection of our vision toward the sun. Second, in water and in a mirror, in which there is no reflection of our vision toward the sun, the milky way appears. Therefore it is wrongly supposed that such a circle is caused by the reflection of our vision toward the sun.

The second part is shown first: any exhalation whatsoever, whether great or small, does not endure always, since after some interval of time it falls to the earth, as is evident from a comet; but the milky circle always remains wholly intact. Therefore it is evidently established that it is not some meteor. Second, each meteor grows or diminishes and is of a sublunar nature; but the milky way always remains the same, in the same position and place, with the same figure and quantity. Therefore it cannot be an exhalation residing in the air.

The third part is shown first from the diligent observation of astronomers, who are more to be believed than Aristotle in accordance with that maxim: in his own art the expert is to be believed. Astronomers have observed the said circle to be of a heavenly nature and therefore subject to no corruption. Second, we experience that parts that shine with light from afar appear white, as is evident from the sea, mountains, and towers struck by the solar rays. On the contrary,

what is not flooded with light appears black, as is evident from night, underground places, and the like. Therefore since the milky way is very far from us and appears white, and since that whiteness does not arise from the sun as is established from what was said, one concludes that it is nothing other than an enormous quantity of tiny stars.

One objects first: a not inconsiderable exhalation in the manner of a hairy comet appears in the air, which is called the milky circle; therefore just as a comet is an exhalation and of a sublunar nature, the same must be maintained of the milky way. I reply: if the argument held, one would conclude that just as a hairy comet does not always appear but eventually fails and is no longer seen, so too the milky way after some interval of time would cease to exist — which conflicts with experience. For from the creation of the heavens until now, the said circle has always persisted in the same mode.

One objects second: the milky way sometimes appears larger and sometimes smaller; therefore it participates in an elemental nature, which now grows and now diminishes. I reply that the said circle always exists in the same position, with the same quantity and figure, provided no obstacle is interposed; but when an obstacle is interposed — namely when in the air there is a great abundance of exhalations, which appear to make it larger — that is the occasion of this appearance. And this we experience with the sun, moon, and the other heavenly bodies, which on account of excessive exhalation or vapor interposed between us and them appear larger, though in themselves they always persist in the same mode and with the same magnitude.

Question IV. On Aqueous Meteors.

Article I. On Cloud and Rain.

The proximate material of an aqueous meteor is vapor, which is raised upward by the power of the sun and, if condensed by cold in the middle region of the air, becomes a cloud. For a cloud means nothing other than a vapor condensed by the surrounding cold. But a cloud dissolved into water is rain. Since heavy things tend downward, and when the external heat that existed in the condensed vapor perishes, the cloud becomes heavy and consequently, dissolved into various droplets, is borne downward and it rains. Three kinds of cloud are distinguished: white, black, and red or blood-colored. The white cloud is light, containing no water, and is sterile; for that reason it is easily scattered and disappears by winds or the heat of the sun. The black cloud is full of water; it is fertile, and pours out into water or rain. The red cloud takes its redness either from red places from which it is drawn, or from other things that ferment in the air. But if after rain there remains some cloudiness borne over the earth, it is called a cloudlet, which is a sign of clear weather. Rain is divided into shower and nimbus: a shower is when smaller and more frequent drops fall to earth; a nimbus is formed when the drops of rain are larger and denser. The drops of

rain are round because they are watery, and water is round and homogeneous, as is evident from drops that remain on the leaves of cabbage or other things.

One asks first: in what place do clouds reside? I reply that they exist in the middle region of the air, as is evident when a man standing on a mountain sometimes observes clouds and cloudlets in the valleys.

One asks second: why do frogs, locusts, and other imperfect animals sometimes fall together with rain? I reply that they are generated by the universal agent through the dispositions found in some matter transported to the middle region of the air — just as we have stated elsewhere that in it stones, metals, and things of that kind are sometimes generated. This is observed in obscure and foul places, in which many imperfect animals are generated, such as flies, gnats, and fleas.

One asks third: what are the signs of rain and fair weather? I reply there are many. First, a sign of rain is the redness of the sun in the morning; and conversely, a sign of fair weather is its redness in the evening. Second, when the sun and moon are pallid in color, that is a sign of rain. Again, if at the rising of the sun only black clouds cover the sun itself and immediately vanish, that is a prognostic of rain; but if those clouds persist long, it is a sign of fair weather. Again, the singing of frogs and the crowing of crows in the morning indicates rain; their singing in the evening foretells fair weather. Furthermore, if fleas and flies bite more sharply, they portend rain. More examples are in Virgil (*1. Georg.*).

Article II. On Other Aqueous Impressions.

Among aqueous meteors are numbered snow, dew, frost, ice, and hail, about which we must now briefly speak.

Snow is a cloud immediately conceived by cold. For before a cloud dissolves into water, it is compressed by the vehement surrounding cold, and thus falls to the earth in the manner of wool-flowers.

Dew is a moderate vapor raised a little from the earth, which, on account of the smallness of the heat raising it and the coldness of the supervening night, is borne downward only during the temperate season and appears in the morning.

Frost is likewise a small vapor raised a little from the earth, which on account of the surrounding cold is compressed and, in the manner of snow, falls and appears in the morning at wintertime, yet in clear weather.

Ice is water congealed in pools, marshes, or rivers, on account of the admixture of some terrestrial exhalation. For since the earth is dense and is mixed with water, with the approach of cold, the water itself turns into frost or ice.

Hail is rain transformed into frost through the antiperistasis of heat coming from the earth; and for this reason it is probably defended that hail is produced in the lowest region of the air. For when it descends, a noise is heard in the air,

which indicates that it is generated nearby. It occurs in summer and autumn because the heat going out from the earth, when joined with the coldness arriving from the middle region of the air, is compressed, and rain water becomes hail.

One asks first: why does it rain in valleys when it snows in the mountains? I reply that the reason is that in valleys there is warmth, which melts the snow; but in the mountains cold prevails, which compresses the snow itself. For the same reason it does not snow at sea, because in the sea there are warm vapors and exhalations that immediately dissolve the snow.

One asks second: why is snow white? I reply that this proceeds from the aerial parts that exist in it, as well as on account of the coldness remaining in it. For that reason those who inhabit cold regions are white; while those who inhabit warm ones are black. And if snow sometimes appears to be of another color, the reason is that it is melting; therefore it departs from whiteness.

One asks third: does crystal form from snow? I reply affirmatively. For it is hardened by frost over a long period of time, and from this more strongly congealed state crystal is born, as Augustine writes especially (*in exp. Ps. 147*). Scotus does not depart from this (8. *Met. in com. cap. 2*).

One asks fourth: in what region is crystal formed? I reply that it is produced in the middle region of the air. And this is sufficiently apparent in mountains, which, existing in the second zone of the air, at their summits are burdened with the said snow almost at all times.

Article III. On Honey, Manna, and Sugar.

Virgil (4. *Georg.*) calls honey a heavenly gift: "Immediately the heavenly gifts of aerial honey." From him Pliny and others seem not to be far removed, who think that honey is the sweat of the heavens, or the saliva of the stars, or the juice of the air purging itself. It seems to distil upon the surface of flowers and leaves, which bees collect, prepare, and compose in a wondrous way. Hence honey hangs on trees in Arabia and India in the manner of salt. Indeed, it is reported that at Avignon in the year 1341 a great abundance of honey fell from the heavens and existed on the leaves and branches of trees in the manner of gum. It is made from moist vapors with the admixture of very minute terrestrial particles.

Manna is a certain white liquid that is called a honeyed morning dew, and it is made from the mixture of terrestrial particles raised upward, cooked by aqueous moisture. By the common people manna is understood to be that food which God provided for the Hebrews in the desert, which was round in the shape of coriander, as is evident (*Exod. 16; and Sapient. 16*). Whether this differs in species from natural manna, some dispute; but I subscribe to the negative position. For a different agent and a different action do not constitute effects

specifically different, as is evident from a man created by God and generated by another man; likewise from fire produced by fire and by the sun, which are of the same species. If any difference does exist between them, it is to be regarded not as essential but as accidental — such as variety of flavors and the sustenance of different persons.

Sugar is generated in much the same way as honey and manna, by heavenly influence, with the assistance of certain instruments and canes, fire being applied beneath, by which it is reduced to density and whiteness.

Article IV. On the Sea.

Aristotle treats of the sea (2. *Meteor.*) not because it is a meteor — since it was established by God (*Gen.* 1), and any great gathering of waters is called a sea (*Joan.* 6), regarding the sea of Galilee which is that of Tiberias, though it is and is called the lake of Genezareth, as Lyran (*in Postil.*) notes — but because it has an admixed saltiness, which is numbered among meteors. The sea receives various divisions; the chief one is into the Ocean Sea, which surrounds the earth on all sides and, according to what it encompasses, takes various and diverse names; and the Mediterranean Sea, which bursting from the Ocean between the Pillars of Hercules spreads through the middle of the lands and was under Julius Caesar divided into thirty parts, as the Parisians testify at this location. More details may be found in the geographers.

It is moved by many motions. First, it is assailed and disturbed by winds, according to their variety and multiplicity. Second, it moves from east to west, as sailors experience, especially the Portuguese, who in one month go to the Indies, but do not return without the interval of three months. This motion perhaps arises from the motion of the first mobile. For just as fire and air in their spheres are moved in this way, as is evident in comets existing in them, so too is the sea — though not as evidently, since water is a coarser and lower element, not so subject to our eyes with respect to the whole. Nor does this seem improbable, since the earth alone is firm and stands forever, as was stated (1. *de elementis, quaest.* 5. *art.* 4. *in fine*), while the rest are rotated and borne around by divine motion. Third, from north to south: the reason is that the earth is higher in some parts and lower in others; and therefore the sea flows to a lower place. Moreover, in the north more water is generated on account of the greater abundance of coldness and moisture; while in the south it is diminished and lost on account of excessive warmth and dryness. Add that rivers — more copious and large in the north, fewer and smaller in the south — burst into the sea.

Fourth, the motion of flux and reflux, whose cause is held to be the moon — as Scotus writes after Ambrose (4. *Exam. cap.* 7) and Basil (*ibid. hom.* 6): (2. *dist.* 14. *quest.* 3. §. *Dico ad quaest. ad B.*). Each day the sea flows and ebbs twice by the power of the Moon. For when the Moon ascends above the hemisphere, from the point of the east to the southern point it flows; from the southern point to

the point of the west it ebbs. And from the point of the west to the point directly opposite the southern point it flows again; and from that point to the other point it ebbs again. Furthermore, the Moon by its special influence, through its middle light, is the cause of the elevation of certain parts of the sea: for the said light is refracted upon encountering a denser medium; and the more it approaches the perpendicular and direct line, the more it is refracted.

Moreover, that the Moon dominates over moisture is manifestly confirmed by experience. The saltiness of the sea is a terrestrial, dry, and scorched exhalation separated by the heat of the sun and the blast of the winds, as is evident by analogy from lye, sweat, and urine, which are likewise salty — just like sea water.

One asks first: why are some springs salty? I reply that this is produced from the saltiness of the earth, or because such springs pass through underground passages from the sea.

One asks second: why are rivers not salty? I reply that the reason is that in them there is no scorched and dry exhalation; or if there is any, it is purged by the earth; or perhaps because rivers continually flow to the sea and never remain still, so as to be scorched by the heat of the sun.

One asks third: whence do springs originate? Some respond that certain springs arise from rain waters received in the cavities of the earth; others reply that they come from the sea, as seems to be the famous and wonderful spring of the Closed Valley near the Isle of Venus near Avignon, where Petrarch, captivated by love for Laura, composed his songs. Others, including Aristotle, think they arise from cold air and corrupted vapors.

Question V. On Terrestrial Meteors.

Article I. On the Earthquake.

Two things above all are investigated concerning the earthquake: what an earthquake is, and what its cause is. Passing over the various and diverse opinions of the ancients, cited and refuted by recent thinkers together with Aristotle (*2. Meteor. cap. 7*):

The first assertion is: an earthquake is a shaking of the earth arising from an exhalation enclosed in its interior, which seeks an exit and, not finding one, shakes the earth — from which there results a pulsation or tremor, which are its species. The Doctor does not contradict this. It is proved first from Aristotle, who, having rejected the opinions of the ancients at the location just cited, establishes this conclusion. Second, just as on account of the exhalation enclosed in a cloud the cloud itself bursts and a crash is emitted, called thunder, so on account of the exhalation enclosed in underground places and having no exit, the earth is moved and a sound is produced, called the earthquake. Third, the same manner of reasoning is to be applied to a breath enclosed in the earth that cannot exit, as we apply to gunpowder enclosed in cannons: when kindled

and inflamed, on account of the narrowness of the space and its levity, it exits with a great noise and a roar is produced. The same must also be said of exhalations enclosed in the belly of an animal: for the belly is inflated by them, and such a breath, exiting, emits a sound called flatulence.

The second assertion is: the cause of an earthquake is a warm and dry breath enclosed in the bowels of the earth. So Aristotle (*praecit.*), from whom Scotus does not depart. It is proved first: when there is a great abundance of exhalations enclosed in the bosom of the earth, earthquakes occur, as is established by experience, especially in spring or autumn. Therefore the cause of an earthquake is a warm and dry breath enclosed in the bowels of the earth. Second, cavernous and spongy regions frequently undergo earthquakes; therefore it is an evident sign that such a breath enclosed in them is the cause of the earthquake itself.

The second assertion: there are two species of earthquake, namely tremor and pulsation. So Aristotle (*ubi supra*), and the Doctor does not disagree. It is proved: either from the exhalation enclosed in the earth, the earth is agitated in a circle — that is, now in this direction, now in that — and an earthquake arises called tremor; or from the exhalation detained in the earth, the earth itself is pushed upward and an earthquake arises called pulsation. Therefore there are the two species of earthquake just named.

One will say: it is incredible that a thin and slight breath such as the said exhalation should have such power as to move and shake the enormous mass of the earth, overturn houses, and cast down mountains, as happens in an earthquake. Therefore another cause of the earthquake must be sought. I say that this should be no cause for wonder; since we experience that winds, though thin, nevertheless move enormous rocks, uproot trees with their roots, and devastate large buildings. Likewise, exhalations enclosed in a body inflict great pains, produce sicknesses, and if not treated bring death. Therefore it is very probable that when there is a great abundance of these exhalations, the said effect is caused.

One asks: how many effects does an earthquake have? I reply that its principal effects are four. The first is observed when the water of a well becomes more turbid and gives off a foul odor. The second is when that well water boils and is borne upward. The third is when the sea swells without the blast of winds. The fourth is when there is an untimely calm in the air.

Article II. What Wind Is.

It is difficult to know and hard to comprehend what wind is, as the sacred pages indicate (*Ps. 134*): "He produces winds from his treasures" — that is, from places hidden to men, according to the interpretation of Lyran at that place; or from the hidden causes of nature, as Augustine intimates at that location in these words: "Because a wind blows, old man, because of what cause it blows or from

what treasury of reason it has come forth, you do not know." And (*quaest. 59. novi testamenti*): "Whence a wind comes or where it goes, we do not know." And a little before: "Wind is heard but not seen." For that reason the philosophers diverge into various and diverse opinions. Some think that wind is air moved and agitated. Some maintain that it is the impulse of flowing air. Others say it is the flux of air. Aristotle (*1. Meteor. cap. 13*) hands down that wind is a warm and dry exhalation moved laterally or sideways around the earth.

Note that by the power of the sun there are raised from earth or water not only vapors to the middle region of the air, which are converted into rain, but also exhalations — which, if they are not bound by any bond, are driven by the middle region of the air (which is cold), and since they are light they cannot tend downward; and therefore they are stirred sideways. Wind begins to move around clouds, being first driven by them, and then comes to us, to the sea, and to the earth. Hence when no wind is blowing, we observe clouds moving, because the wind blows to them first; and then at the beginning it is stirred a little, and afterward blows violently, because other exhalations are added to it which cause greater wind.

The first assertion is: wind is not air in motion, nor impulse, nor the flux of that same air. The Doctor does not disagree. It is proved first: when cannons are discharged, the air is vehemently stirred and agitated, and yet at that time there is no wind. Therefore it is a plain sign that wind is not air in motion. Second, when towers collapse headlong, the air is most greatly stirred; and yet at that time no wind is present. Moreover, air is moist and warm, as I stated in the book on the elements (*quaest. 5. art. 2*); but wind is warm and dry. Furthermore, air is an element, while wind is an imperfect mixed body; for it is listed by all among meteors, which are imperfect mixed bodies. Therefore wind is not air in motion, nor any of the things adduced in the proposed assertion.

The second assertion is: wind is a multitude of warm and dry exhalation raised from the earth and rolled around the earth itself. The Doctor does not depart from this. It is proved first: at that time great winds blow when a great abundance of exhalation exists, as is established by experience when comets appear. Therefore wind means nothing other than a warm and dry exhalation moved obliquely around the earth. Second, wind very greatly dries when it blows around the earth. For we experience that by the blowing of winds the earth is rendered dry and arid, and moist things become dry. Therefore wind is a warm and dry exhalation. Again, in us the intestine is sometimes inflated by warm and dry exhalations, which are commonly called winds. Therefore in the world, winds are nothing other than exhalations of this kind, warm and dry.

One objects first: air is the most mobile of things from any extrinsic agent; but wind too is easily moved by the extrinsic agent — for it is driven in this or that direction. Therefore moved air and wind coincide. The inference is confirmed from Damascene (*2. fidei, cap. 8*), who says that wind is the movement of air. I

reply that wind can be called moved air, not per se and formally, but only denominatively — because when wind blows the air is moved. To the confirmation I say that Damascene is to be interpreted accordingly; for a little later the same saint adds: "Wind is a multitude of warm and dry exhalation moved around the earth."

One objects second: wind is driven by a cloud; but air is also driven by a cloud — indeed, wind is produced by the agitation of air, especially by bellows and fans. Therefore wind is the same as air in motion. I reply by the same distinction by which the preceding objection was dissolved: it follows only that wind is moved air denominatively, not formally.

One objects third: from the sea arise many winds, from which vapors ascend, not exhalations; therefore wind is rather vapor than exhalation. I reply that in the sea, on account of the admixture of earth and the scorching of water by the power of the solar rays, many exhalations arise, as is evident from its saltiness. Therefore I deny that no exhalations are raised from the sea; and since they have vapors mixed with them, the winds that proceed from them are moist and warm.

One asks first: why do some winds move in a circular manner? I reply that two causes can be assigned. The first is that they are stirred by the influence of the planets, which revolve in a circle; therefore the winds too are set in circular motion. The second is that the exhalations, which are the matter of winds, are driven downward by the coldness of the middle region of the air; and since they are light and warm and cannot be borne downward, they are therefore moved circularly.

One asks second: why do winds move more quickly at the end than at the beginning? I reply that the reason is that at the end there is a greater multitude of exhalations; therefore as the exhalation increases, so too does the blowing of the winds.

One asks third: why do greater winds blow from the south and north than from the east and west? And why do winds prevail more in spring and autumn than in summer and winter? I reply that this occurs through the absence of the sun. For the sun by its absence does not consume the vapors and exhalations existing in the south and north; therefore they abound more there than in the east, where vapors and exhalations are dissipated by the presence of the sun. Similarly, winds prevail more in spring and autumn because at those times a greater abundance of vapors and exhalations is had than in summer and winter.

One asks fourth: why are some winds cold and others warm, since they arise from a warm and dry exhalation? I reply that winds are intrinsically warm and dry, as is evident from the definition of wind just given; but extrinsically they are cold and moist. This can arise from the places from which they proceed. For that reason the north wind is cold, because it proceeds from a cold region; while

the south wind is warm, because it flows from a warm place. Furthermore, some winds render the air clear, such as the north wind — Aquilo — because it is near us, and therefore expels clouds; while others make it cloudy, such as the south wind — Auster — which comes from far away and therefore brings clouds and rain to us.

Article III. How Many Kinds of Wind There Are.

On the number of winds there is no little dispute among the philosophers. For some establish only four winds; others twelve; others twenty-four; while the common opinion counts thirty-two winds.

They are divided into general winds, which blow everywhere, and provincial winds, which blow mainly in some province or region. Then into ordinary winds, which blow in the customary manner, bringing no harm to sublunar things, and turbulent winds, which blowing beyond measure cause the greatest damage to those same sublunar things — for sometimes they overturn buildings and uproot trees, and for that reason are called tempests and storms.

Furthermore, they are distributed into cardinal or principal winds, which blow from the cardinal points of the world, and collateral or intermediate winds, which are interposed between the principal winds. The principal winds are four, and there is reference to them (*Matt. 24*): "from the four winds," and Augustine cites them (*in exp. Ps. 59*): Subsolanus, Auster, Favonius, and Septentrio.

Subsolanus is that which blows from the east, so named because it blows under the sun. To the right of Subsolanus is Vulturnus, and to its left is Eurus. Auster is that which blows from the south, so named because it draws forth or nourishes clouds. To it are joined two others, of which one is called Euro-Auster because it has Eurus on one side and Auster on the other; the other is called Austro-Africus, because on one side is Auster and on the other Africus. Favonius is that which blows from the west, so named because it warms the grasses of the earth; to its right is Africus and to its left Chorus, so called because it produces, as it were, a chorus of winds. Septentrio blows from the north, or under the Little Bear. To its right is Circius, and to its left Aquilo, which constricts waters and scatters clouds.

It is probable that winds are comprehended in the twelvefold number just reviewed. This is evident from the experience of sailors, who seem to encounter no other winds besides those enumerated — though perhaps other winds are found; at least those described are the principal and better-known ones.

One asks: how many turbulent winds are there? I reply there are three, which are called Ecnephias, Typhon, and Praester. Ecnephias is a great warm and dry exhalation, which, bursting the cloud in which it is enclosed, is violently borne downward; therefore it brings shipwreck to sailors and no little damage to other living things. Typhon is an exhalation more subtle than Ecnephias, which, passing through a narrow opening, violently tends downward and brings great

troubles to mortals. Praester adds nothing to the said Typhon beyond kindling and inflammation.

Books on the Soul.

Preface.

Having completed the treatise on natural body taken in general terms, in the eight books of Physics; and on the ungenerable and incorruptible body, in the four books On the Heavens and the World; then on the generable and corruptible body, in the two books On Generation and Corruption; and subsequently on the imperfectly mixed body, which is examined in the four books of the Meteorology — orderly method now demands that we treat of the animated body, which is dealt with principally in the three books On the Soul. That the treatment of the soul is one of the chief parts of philosophy, St. Augustine teaches above all others in book II of On Order, chapter 8, with these words: "There are two questions above all in philosophy: one concerning the soul, and the other concerning God. The first causes us to know ourselves; the second, our origin. The first is more agreeable to us; the second, more dear. The first renders us worthy of eternal life; the second makes us blessed." The first is diligently examined by the royal Psalmist (*Ps. 118*), "My soul is always in my hands"; the second is sought out by the same (*Ps. 33*), "I sought the Lord and he heard me." We shall constitute five books on the soul: the first will treat the prolegomena to the science of the soul; the second, the soul in itself; the third, the vegetative soul; the fourth, the sensitive soul; and the fifth, the intellective or rational soul.

Book I. On the Prolegomena to the Science of the Soul.

Just as in our other works we have been accustomed to investigate certain preliminary matters before entering into the inner chambers of the subjects to be treated, so at present we set forth a prelude to the science of the soul, so that afterwards all the remaining matters pertaining to it may be approached more conveniently and easily.

Question I. On the Object of the Science of the Soul.

Article I. Whether the Soul Is the Object of the Books On the Soul.

The first opinion is that of Albert, Thomas, praised in the present context, question 3; Toledo, question 4; Ruverius and Poncius in the proem On the Soul — all holding that the total and adequate subject of these books is the soul itself. The second is that of Apollinaris, *ibid.* question 3, and the Coimbrans in the proem, who think they resolve this difficulty by a single distinction: namely, that if the books On the Soul are taken together with those called the Parva Naturalia, which are as it were a kind of appendage to them, then the total

subject of the whole must be set down as the animated body; but if they are taken separately from those, they say the adequate subject is not the animated body but the soul. The third opinion is that of Scotus (*1 Met. quest. 1*); John of Masters (*1 On the Soul, quest. 1*); Tataretus, *ibid.* at the end; the Venetian commentator; Piccolomini; the Complutenses, *quest. unica*; and many others teaching that the total and adequate subject of these books is the animated body.

Note and recall from what was said in the Logic, book I, question 3, article 1, what the subject of a science is and how many kinds it has, and also what and how many conditions are necessarily required for it. Then observe that these books share the same subject as those inscribed On the Parva Naturalia — which treat of sense and the sensed object, of sleep and waking, of the length and shortness of life, and such matters — since it is one continuous work, as Toledo rightly notes, cited, conclusion 2, given that in all of these the same principles and properties of the natural body are considered.

First assertion: the soul is not the adequate subject of the Books On the Soul. This is suggested by the Doctor (*Quodl. 9, § de 2. ante F, and 4 d. 44, quest. 2, § Ad quest. A*). It is proved first: the adequate subject of these books is that which possesses all the conditions necessary and required for it; but the soul is not such, therefore it is not the adequate subject of the said books. The major is evident. The minor is proved: the properties considered in this science do not belong to the soul, such as having the power of seeing, hearing, being angry, showing compassion, and the like. Nor does the response of Toledo and the Coimbrans avail, cited at Question I, Article I, that the aforementioned distinction suffices to resolve the proposed difficulty. For these passions and operations are also predicated of the soul, because the soul itself is their principle. This response, moreover, is not to the point, since the question is not about the subject by which (*subiectum quo*), which is the soul, but about the subject which (*subiectum quod*), which is the animated body. I argue thus: the soul is never said to be nourished, to be angry, to see, to hear, to weave, and so forth of this kind (*Aristotle, 1 On the Soul, T. 64; Scotus, 4 d. 44, quest. 2, A*). And this is especially evident in the separated soul, which lacks these passions and actions. Moreover, the subject of the whole of physics is not the form of the natural body but the natural body, according to Scotus, or mobile being, according to St. Thomas; therefore likewise the subject of these books is not the form of the animated body, which is the soul.

Second: the partial subject of some total science ought to be a species of the subject of that total science; but the soul is not a species of natural body or mobile being; therefore the soul is not the subject of these books. Toledo, at the cited passage, responds by denying the major, since in a science one does not always treat of species of its generic object, but sometimes of principles and causes, as in the present case one treats of the soul, which is the principle of animated things. The Coimbrans add that it is sufficient for the subjects of the

parts of any science to be included in some way in the subject of the whole; otherwise one would say that mobile being is predicated of sense and the sensible object, of respiration, and of the motion of animals, which is false. Against the second response of Toledo, where he says the subject of these books is the same as that of the *Parva Naturalia* — granting this — I argue thus: Aristotle ought to have treated of the nobler species of natural body, which is the animated body; but he did so nowhere except in these books and in the aforementioned *Parva Naturalia*, as is evident to anyone who reads all of Aristotle's works. Therefore either Aristotle's treatment is deficient, or Toledo's response is empty and vain. For if he treated of the principles and causes of the animated body, he was also obligated to treat of that in which such principles and causes inhere and of which they are predicated, which is the animated body. As for what the Coimbrans add, it is not to the point, because our major is taken of the specific subject of a part of a total science, as in *Logic* the demonstrative syllogism stands to the syllogism taken generally — not of just any thing contained under the subject, such as respiration, the motion of animals, and the like.

Third: the subject of a science is presupposed to exist (*1 Post. T. 2*); but the soul is defined (*2 On the Soul, c. 1*); therefore the soul is not the adequate subject which of this work. Toledo responds that science presupposes of its subject what the name signifies, not what the thing is. He adds further that it befits a science to define its subject, though not to demonstrate it. Against this: the prior knowledge of what the name signifies is common to all constituents of a demonstration, both to the property and to the principles and the subject; therefore not only the nominal definition but also the real definition must be foreknown about the subject, since its definition is the principle and cause for inquiring into the knowledge of the property and its inherence in the subject — which is to be understood of demonstration a priori, not a posteriori. All the more, because Toledo, book II, question 3, asserts that the definition of the soul is offered by Aristotle through a priori demonstration.

Second assertion: whether these books *On the Soul* be taken separately from or together with the *Parva Naturalia*, the soul is not their total subject. This is indicated by the Doctor at the passages cited in the first assertion, and is proved first: they constitute the same book and continuous work, and for that reason are considered the sixth book of natural philosophy. Therefore the aforementioned distinction and separation is vain and inept. Second: where the same properties are found, there is the same subject, as everyone agrees; but in these and in those books the same properties and attributes are examined, as is evident to any reader. Therefore that distinction is futile and vain.

Third assertion: the animated body is established as the total object of these books. The Doctor holds this expressly (*Met. at the cited passage*), and Aristotle does not dissent (*1 On the Soul, T. 19*). It is proved first: in the whole of physics the

total subject is the natural body (*lib. 1 Phys. quest. 3, art. 4*); therefore in the science of the soul, which is a part of it, the subject is the animated body. The antecedent was shown at the cited place. The consequence is derived: the immediately subjective part of any genus is a species of it; but the animated body is the proximate subjective part of natural body — for natural body is divided into animated and inanimate by Aristotle (*T. 19, just cited*) — and this is visible in the tree of Porphyry. Therefore the animated body is rightly determined to be the adequate subject of these books.

Second: all the conditions required for the total subject of these books belong to the animated body; therefore it cannot be denied that it is the adequate subject of the said books. The antecedent is easy to prove. For of the animated body it is presupposed whether it exists and what it is; its properties are demonstrated in these books; and everything treated in them is referred to it, as is evident by induction through each of the individual items.

You will object first: that is the subject in a science of which the definition is sought and assigned (*1 Post. c. 1, 9*); but in these books the definition given is not that of the animated body but of the soul (*2 On the Soul, c. 1*), and Aristotle proposes this at the beginning of the first book and acknowledges that he has accomplished it in the book *On Sense and the Sensible*. Therefore the soul is the total subject of the aforementioned books. I respond through a distinction and explanation of the major: concerning the subject by which and the principal partial subject, I grant it; concerning the subject which and the total subject, I deny it. The Philosopher treats in this work of the soul not precisely in itself but in its relation to the animated body, which is the whole. Therefore it is ineptly inferred that the soul is the subject of these books because it is defined in them — just as one would wrongly say that motion is the subject of physics because it is defined by physics. And the same would have to be affirmed of place and time, which is manifestly false and absurd.

You will object second: the science of the soul is nobler and more excellent than the other sciences, for no other reason than that it treats of the soul, which excels in nobility among physical things; but if the animated body were the object of these books, the science of the soul would not excel the others, because that part which treats of animals would surpass the others, since in the category of substance a lower thing like an animal is more excellent than the animated body. I respond: the science of the soul is called more excellent both because it treats of the soul and especially of the rational soul, and also because it treats of the animated body, which is nobler than the soul itself which is its part — for the whole is more excellent than its parts taken separately or together, as is established with Scotus (*3 d. 22, quest. unica, § Ad 1. argumentum alterius opinionis sub I*).

You will object third: these books are inscribed "*Peri Psyches*," that is, *On the Soul*; therefore the soul is established as their subject. I respond that the

inscription and denomination is generally taken from the subject by which and from the nobler part, which is the soul. Thus St. Augustine acknowledged that he gave the title of his books *On the City of God* from the more excellent part (2 *Retract.* c. 43). Moreover, the same saint notes that a part is sometimes used for the whole (*lib. 3 de consensu Evangelistarum*, c. 24). Thus "soul" is used for "man" at (*Romans 13*): "Let every soul be subject to higher powers," that is, every man, according to the interpretation of the same Augustine (*tract. 105 in Joann.*) and Lyran, *ibid.* in the *Postilla*. Therefore it can not improperly be said that soul is taken for the animated body.

Article II. Whether It Belongs to Physics to Treat of the Soul.

In this not inconsiderable difficulty, there are three modes of speaking among the Peripatetics. The first is that of Simplicius in the prologue to the *Physics* and Themistius *ibid.*, holding it to be the task of a mathematician to treat of the soul. This is to be understood in a sound sense. For they do not think it belongs to Music or Geometry to treat of the soul; rather, since the soul as regards the vegetative degree is in matter, and as regards the intellective degree is free from matter, it is said to be a matter for mathematics, because of the soul one has an abstraction like that of mathematics, namely intermediate between physics and mathematics — although it is not proper mathematical abstraction, since mathematical abstraction concerns only accidents, whereas this concerns substance, since the soul is a substance. The second opinion is defended by Boethius in the prologue to the *Categories*; Philoponus, 1 *On Generation*; Toledo, 1 *On the Soul*, question 2; and Ruverius, question 1 — who use this distinction: namely, that if the soul is considered according to the being it has in common with the body, it is a subject for physical consideration; but if it is viewed according to its proper intellective being, it belongs to Metaphysics. The third opinion is that embraced by Scotus (*Quodl.* 9, § *de secundo ante D*); Lychetus and Gadius *ibid.*; with whom Alexander concurs in the beginning of the *Meteorology*; Averroes (2 *Phys. com.* 26); Avicenna; and many others, teaching that the treatment of the soul, with respect to all its degrees, belongs to physics.

Note first, and recall from what will be said below, that there are three kinds of soul: the vegetative, the sensitive, and the intellective. The first is in plants, the second in brutes, and the third in man. Philosophers have gathered that these are multiple from their diverse operations. The vegetative is known by growth, the sensitive by cognition, and the intellective by intellection. Where the sensitive is, there the vegetative is virtually; and where the intellective is, there the vegetative and sensitive are virtually contained — but not the converse. All souls together with matter constitute living and animated composites, just as the other forms do by informing their subjects, although there is some difference among them. For the first two operate dependently on matter, so that without matter itself they can neither exist nor operate, since the living composite is the immediate and proximate operative agent (*Aristotle*, 1 *On Sleep and Waking*, c. 1;

and 1 *On the Soul*, T. 66). But the intellective can elicit certain operations without the body, such as intellection and volition, which proceed from it and inhere in it itself (2 *On the Generation of Animals*, c. 9). And therefore it is said to be immaterial not only from its entity but also from its operation, which it produces without matter.

Note second: the soul can be considered in two ways. In one way, according to its own essence and operations, whether dependent on matter or free from matter — and thus the soul is a subject for physical consideration. In another way, according to its general and transcendental predicates — and thus it belongs to Metaphysics, as Scotus establishes in a parallel case (*quest. 1 prol. § contra istam rationem*). Nor does it help to say with some that the soul according to its essence belongs to physics and according to intellection to Metaphysics. For truly, if its essence is treated by physics, then its operations too are examined by the same science, as is clear in Metaphysics, in which one treats of God and the Angels and their operations. Nor does it please me what others say — that as regards the sensitive degree it is the province of physics, and as regards the intellective degree, of Metaphysics. This is indeed a futile and vain distinction, since the intellective degree, too, informs the body and through this constitutes man, or the rational animal. Nor do those who distinguish the intellective from the rational degree please me, since in man the rational and intellective degrees are exactly the same.

First assertion: the vegetative and sensitive souls are subjects for physical consideration. This is indicated by the Doctor (*Quodl. 9, § de secundo*). It is proved first from Aristotle (1 *On the Parts of Animals*, c. 1; and 2 *On the Generation of Animals*, c. 3; and also 6 *Met. T. 2*), teaching that the parts of physics are to treat of the aforementioned souls. Second: it is the task of physics to treat of all natural forms (2 *Phys. T. 1*) and of those subject to coming to be and passing away (1 *Phys. T. 82*); and such are the souls just named; therefore their treatment belongs to physics.

Second assertion: physics likewise treats of the rational soul, considered according to its substance and essence. This is touched upon by the same Doctor, *ibid.* It is proved first from Aristotle, who in book III *On the Soul* is almost entirely occupied with inquiry and discourse on the rational soul. Second: the rational soul is the form of the organic body, because it truly informs the human body; therefore it falls under physics. Moreover, the definition of the soul given by Aristotle (2 *On the Soul*, c. 1) is rightly adapted to it. Furthermore, the science that contemplates the whole certainly also meditates on its parts; but physics contemplates the whole man; therefore also his parts, among which the chief is the rational soul. Add the decree of the two Councils, the Lateran and the Vienne, in the Clementine, c. de summa Trinitate, defining that the rational soul is the true and proper form of the human body.

Third assertion: the operations of the rational soul that are free from the body belong to the province of physics. The Doctor holds this explicitly (*Quodl. cit. ante D*). It is proved first from (*7 Met. T. 8*) and other passages cited by Ferchius (*1. 2 vestigatione 6, c. 2*), in which it is clear that the said operations belong to physics. The Council of Vienne, under Clement V, de summa Trinitate et fide Catholica, adds weight, where those are condemned who hold that the rational soul, under the intellective degree, is not the form of the body; and Alphonsus a Castro (*2 adversus haereses, verbo anima*) reports that a certain Peter John fell into this heresy. Second: as regards the intellective degree, the rational soul is the true form of the human body and is distinguished from the other souls; and the definition of nature, which is the principle of motion and rest, belongs to it; therefore as regards the intellective degree it falls under physics. Third: the doctrine that considers the essence of something also considers its properties and operations, as I showed elsewhere; but physics treats of the essence of the rational soul; therefore also of its intellective degree and intellection. Especially since the soul in the body understands all things dependently on the body — hence that celebrated text (*On the Soul, T. 39*): "the one who understands must contemplate the phantasms." And in the state of separation, even if not actually, at least potentially and by aptitude, it regards the body. Similarly, the accidents of the Eucharist, although not actually in a subject, this does not prevent them from being natural accidents inclined to inhere in a subject.

You will object first: Aristotle (*2 Phys. T. 3*) writes that there are three things with which physics is concerned: namely, nature, natural being, and being according to nature. He adds the same (*1 On the Heavens, T. 1*). But the soul is not a nature, according to Simplicius, because it is not a principle of motion and rest; nor is it a natural being, since it is not a composite; nor being according to nature, because only operation and passion are called beings according to nature. Therefore the soul does not belong to physics. I respond that, whatever Simplicius may say, the soul is a nature, as is clear (*2 Phys. T. 7 and 13; and 8 of the same work, T. 27*), where the Philosopher says that animals have in themselves the principle of their motion, and affirms that this comes about through nature. Zabarella, Mercenarius, Toledo, and Faber (*Theor. 33*) establish this same point.

You will object second: physics treats of corruptible and generable forms (*1 Phys. T. 83*); but the rational soul is ungenerable and incorruptible (*1 On the Soul, T. 6; and 2 On the Generation of Animals, c. 3*), since it is not educed from the potency of matter. Therefore its consideration does not belong to physics. I respond first by conceding the major; but for that reason the rational soul is not excluded from its consideration, since the text does not say that physics treats only of material forms. I respond second: although the rational soul is not subject to generation and corruption, nevertheless, since it is ordered to matter or body, which it informs, it is on that account a physical form and falls within the number of physical things. This Aristotle seems to sense when he says (*2 Phys. 26*): physics

extends to the soul which, although it can be separated from matter, nevertheless exists in matter, since it informs that very matter.

You will object third, from (*1 On the Parts of Animals, c. 1*): physics does not treat of every soul, but only of the soul inseparable from matter; but the rational soul is separable from matter; therefore physics does not treat of it. I respond with Alexander and his followers that in that place the Philosopher's question is not only about the soul of animate beings — since he treats at length of this in the books *On the Soul* — but about the soul insofar as it encompasses intelligences, which in a broad sense are called souls, and are commonly called intelligences, the movers of the celestial spheres; and since these are abstract substances, the same Philosopher rightly excludes them from physics. Hence at (*2 On the Heavens, c. 2*), the intelligence moving a heaven is called its soul. And at (*1 On the Soul, c. 1, T. S*), giving examples of souls, he says: "as the soul of the horse, of man, and of God." It is however held for certain by all that God is not informed by any informing soul. The same is suggested at (*6 Metaphysics, c. 1, T. 2*). Or one must respond secondly: physics does not treat of every soul as regards its common and general aspects, I grant; as regards its essence and physical properties, I deny — as Tataretus rightly observes in the present context, and as Scotus seems to touch upon (*Quodl. 2*).

You will object fourth: physics contemplates those things that are in the natural body; but the intellective degree is not in the natural body, especially when the rational soul is separated from the body; therefore at least as regards the intellective degree, the rational soul is not examined by physics. I respond: physics considers not only body and what is in the body, but also the parts of the body, whether conjoined or separate; and therefore nothing prevents the intellective degree and the state of separation of the rational soul from being capable of inspection by physics. Or say that physics is occupied with the proper predicates and attributes of the soul, not with its common and transcendental ones, as I made clear in note 2 above.

Question II. On the Nature of the Science of the Soul.

Article I. Whether the Science of the Soul Is a Science.

All those things are to be recalled to memory which were noted concerning science, its meanings, divisions, and necessary conditions in the *Logic*, book I, question 2, article 2; and book V, question 4. With these recognized and presupposed:

The science of the soul is a science. This is presupposed by the Doctor and defended by the other philosophers. It is proved first: there is a science of the animated body, because it is a knowable object having demonstrable properties; but the science of the soul concerns the animated body, as was decided in article 1 of the preceding question; therefore the science of the soul is a science.

Second: if there is a science of the genus, there is also a science of the species, because the scientific object is both generic and specific, since both participate in demonstrable properties; but of the natural body, which is the genus, there is a science, namely physics, as I showed (*lib. 1 Phys. quest. 1, art. 1*); therefore also of the animated body, which is its species. Furthermore, certain and evident cognition of the soul and the body informed by it is acquired through its proper cause, as will be evident in the course of these books. But certain and evident cognition of a necessary thing through its proper cause is science properly so called, as I showed at length (*Log. lib. 5, quest. 4*). Therefore the science of the soul is placed among the true sciences.

You will object first: what is not sensible either per se or per accidens is not knowable, since our intellect perceives only what falls under sense (*1 Post. 14*); but the soul falls under sense neither per se nor per accidens; therefore it is not knowable, and accordingly there is no science of it. The minor is argued: substance, such as the soul, is not sensible, for sense concerns accidents per se and per accidens the composite, of which the soul is a part. I respond that the major is not universally true, since of God and the Angels there is science, even though they are in no way sensible. Moreover, it can be said that the soul is sensible, not by reason of its nature but by reason of its effects, which fall under sense. Especially because according to us the science of the soul is not of the soul precisely, but of the animated body.

You will object second: the same thing cannot be both knowing and known; but if there were a science of the soul, the same soul would be both knowing and known, since there would be a science of it as a known object. The major is evident, because the same thing cannot be at once agent and patient. I respond that the major holds for the same respect; not however for different respects. Insofar as the soul contemplates itself, it is said to be agent; insofar as it reflects upon itself, receiving such cognition in itself, it is said to be patient and known. Or I say: the major holds for univocal agency, but not for equivocal agency, as happens in the present case.

You will object third: science is of the whole, since the object of science is generic or specific; but the soul is a part of the animated composite; therefore there is no science of the soul. I respond that the major holds for total science, not for partial science, such as that which is precisely of the soul. Or say that the science of the soul is not of the soul alone but of the animated body, as was already decided above.

Article II. Whether the Science of the Soul Is Nobler and More Certain Than the Other Sciences.

Aristotle in the proem of this work numbers the science of the soul among things good and honorable; and from his words its interpreters took occasion to examine and decide this difficulty, which can be raised in two ways. First,

whether the science of the soul is more certain and nobler among the parts of the whole of physics. Second, whether the science of the soul is more certain and more worthy than the other sciences, such as pure mathematics and metaphysics.

Note first: a science can be called more worthy and more honorable than others in two ways. In one way objectively, that is, because its object is worthier than the objects of the other sciences. In another way entitatively, that is, because it is generated through nobler and worthier demonstrations — in which sense that science is more excellent which is acquired through demonstration *propter quid* than that which is generated through demonstration *quia*. Furthermore, note from (*1 Eth. c. 8*) that good is threefold: useful, pleasurable, and honorable. The useful is what is sought for the sake of another, as a bitter potion is a useful good because it is taken by a sick person for the sake of recovering health. The pleasurable good is that whose presence brings delight, as the beatific object, which is contemplated by the blessed, who enjoy it. The honorable good is that which by its own excellence draws and allures the lover, as science, by reason of its excellence, attracts the one who knows it to its attainment. Hence Cicero said: "If virtue could be seen with the eyes, it would excite a wonderful love of itself."

Note second: a science can be said to be more certain in two ways — either simply, because it proceeds from more certain principles and from a more evident object; or according to proportion, and in this sense any science is equally certain, because every science must proceed from true, certain, and necessary things. Furthermore, note that every science, whether of good or of evil, is good, because any science is a perfection of the intellect; whereas on the contrary, error and ignorance are an imperfection of the intellect, and all ignorance seems evil — hence that saying: "Every evil person is ignorant."

First assertion: the science of the soul is among good and honorable things. This is suggested by the Doctor (*quest. 3 prol.*). It is proved first from Aristotle, who at the beginning of book I On the Soul places the science of the soul among honest and honorable goods. Second: what perfects our intellect and is desired for its own sake is an honest and honorable good; but the science of the soul is such, since it investigates the nature of the soul, its capacity, properties, and powers. Therefore the science of the soul is rightly numbered among honorable goods. Add that through the science of the soul man arrives at knowledge of himself, which is greatly commended by the ancients, and that often-repeated saying is received: "Know thyself." David pursued this carefully (*Ps. 119*): "My soul is always in my hands."

Second assertion: among the parts of physics, the science of the soul holds the first place. This is deduced from Scotus at the passages cited by us (*lib. de Caelo, quest. 1, artic. 7, Aff. 2*). It is argued first: the nobility and excellence of a science is derived from its nobler and more excellent object, as I noted not infrequently in the preceding discussions; but the object of the science of the soul is worthier

and more excellent than any other object of physiologia, because every animated thing surpasses any inanimate thing, as I showed at the passage just cited. Second: man surpasses all physical things in nobility, as St. Augustine affirms above all others (*1. 34 contra Faustum, c. 2*); and the science of the soul treats of man, as is evident from books I–III On the Soul.

Third assertion: Metaphysics surpasses the science of the soul in nobility, and mathematics in certainty. This is deduced from Scotus, *ibid.* The first part is proved first from (*6 Met. T. 2*), where Metaphysics is called Theology and the Queen of the sciences. Second: Metaphysics is concerned with God as its chief partial object; likewise with the Angels; and furthermore Metaphysics treats of first principles and proves the principles of the other disciplines; therefore it excels the science of the soul and the other sciences. The second part is argued first from (*2 Metaphysics, T. 16*), where the Philosopher writes and asserts that the mathematical disciplines surpass the other sciences in certainty. Second: that science is more certain which proceeds through more certain demonstrations; but the mathematical disciplines proceed through more certain demonstrations, namely demonstrations *propter quid*, while the science of the soul proceeds through demonstrations *quia* and *a posteriori*, that is, from effect and operation. Third: more certain to us is the cognition of accidents than of substance, both because in our present state we cannot have a quidditative concept of substance itself, as is drawn from the Doctor (*1 distinct. 3, quest. 3, K; O. distinct. 22, quest. 1*), and pursued by Faber (*Theor. 9–8*); and also because the objects of the senses are accidents, among which is quantity, which is the subject matter of mathematics. Therefore the science of the soul is surpassed in certainty by mathematics.

You will object first: in book VIII of the Physics one treats of the first mover, who is God, and in the book On the Heavens one treats of the intelligences moving the celestial spheres; but God and the intelligences are nobler than the soul and the animated body; therefore the science of the soul does not pre-empt all parts of physics. I respond: physics does not treat of God and the Angels *per se*, but *per accidens*, insofar as they move the celestial bodies; whereas the science of the soul treats *per se* of the soul and the animated body, investigating its essence, powers, faculties, and operations.

You will object second: the science of the soul is concerned with what each person experiences in himself — for it is about the soul, vital operations, and such things, which are evidently in us. Hence Augustine, cited by Ruverius here, question 1, adds: "I do not know whether one who does not know that he has a soul actually has one." Therefore the science of the soul is more certain than the other doctrines. I respond that the argument concludes for a *posteriori* science, not *a priori* — and it is by reason of a *priori* science that mathematics and metaphysics are said to be more certain than the science of the soul. I add the caution of Augustine (*in Ps. 73*): "How do you know that one is alive, whose soul I do not see? You will answer: because he speaks, because he walks, because he

operates. Fool — from the works of the body I recognize a living being; from the works of the soul can you not recognize the Creator?"

Book II. On the Soul in Itself.

Aristotle follows in this work the same method he prescribes to be observed (*1 Post. c. 1*), namely, presupposing of the subject whether it exists. Indeed in the present case he does not examine whether the soul exists, since its operations and effects — namely, vegetation, sensation, and intellection — are evident to all. Therefore, leaving aside the question whether the soul exists, one rightly investigates what it is, beginning from its essential and quidditative predicates, which are common and universal. Three questions are moved in this book: the first is on the essential predicates of the soul; the second, on the parts of the animated body; and the third, on the powers and faculties of the soul.

Question I. On the Essential Predicates of the Soul.

Article I. Whether the Soul Is a Substance.

Certain authors, related by Ferchius (*vestigatione 6, c. 1, n. 2*), following Galen (*1. 2 de locis affectis, c. 6*) and Alexander, think the soul is a *krasis*, that is, a temperament of the four primary qualities — which, being an accident, they must accordingly acknowledge to be an accident. Aristotle attests that Empedocles and other ancients held this view (*1 On the Soul, T. 54*). And Theodoretus (*1 de divinis decretis*) recounts that certain sectarians, namely Carpocrates and Epiphanes, inclined toward this error. Not far from them seems to be Plato in the *Timaeus*, who holds the soul to be a number of sounds and harmony (*as Augustine indicates in de vera Religione, c. 42*), although perhaps Plato himself spoke metaphorically. The common opinion, however, is that of Aristotle (*1 and 2 On the Soul, c. 1*), Scotus, and others teaching that the soul is a substance.

Note that substance is used in two ways. First, for the foundation and base of any edifice, whether corporeal or spiritual — in which sense (*Hebrews 11*): "Faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen." Second, for what subsists per se — and in this sense it is properly substance, which is divided into partial and total, or into matter, form, and the composite (*6 Metaphysics, T. 2*): the former are partial substances; the latter is a total and complete substance.

Assertion: the soul is properly a substance. So Aristotle at the passages named above; St. Augustine agrees (*1 contra Secundinum, c. 13*); and the Doctor assents (*3 d. 22, quest. unica, § Ad 1. principale, R*). It is proved first: what constitutes a composite substance is itself a substance, because a composite substance does not coalesce from substance and accident — otherwise it would be a being per accidens; but the soul constitutes the living and animated composite substance,

since it is the chief part of the animated composite; therefore the soul is a substance, although partial and incomplete. Second: through the soul the animated body is distinguished from the inanimate body — for as is seen in the tree of Porphyry, body is divided into animated and inanimate; and that distinction is not accidental, because it is a substantial division; therefore the soul, which is the constitutive and distinctive differentia of the animated from the inanimate, is truly a substance. Third: what exists per se and subsists independently of the body is a substance, as is clear from the definition of substance; but the rational soul exists per se and subsists when separated from the body, as no Catholic denies. Therefore the rational soul is a substance — and the same must be affirmed of the vegetative and sensitive souls.

You will object first: a substance is a being existing per se; but the soul does not exist per se, since it exists in the body; therefore the soul is not a substance. I respond — with the major conceded — by distinguishing the minor: by inherence, I deny it; by information, as a part in its co-part, I grant it.

You will object second: a substance is a being that underlies accidents, derived as it is from "to underlie"; but the soul does not underlie accidents — since the proximate and immediate subject of accidents is, as was said elsewhere, the whole composite, not the soul; therefore the soul is not a substance. I respond that although this etymology of substance is true in some cases, it is not true in all, for God is a substance yet underlies no accident. Therefore it is better to say that substance is derived from subsisting per se. Or I grant the major and deny the minor: for the soul is the subject of its own proper accidents, such as intellection, volition, and the like — though not of common accidents, such as material accidents. Or say that the soul is the subject by which (*subiectum quo*) of accidents, not the subject which (*subiectum quod*).

You will object third: a substance can at least by divine power be separated from everything with which it is joined; but the vegetative and sensitive souls cannot, even by divine power, be really separated and segregated from the bodies they inform, since they are generated with their generation and corrupted with their corruption and destruction; therefore it is an evident sign that the said souls are not substances. I respond that the reason the aforementioned souls cannot be really abstracted from bodies is that they depend in their coming to be and in their being on matter. Hence, just as the other material forms cannot be separated from matter for the same reason, so similarly the vegetative and sensitive souls perish with the perishing of their bodies. All the more so because, as Ferchius (*cited lib. 3*) notes, there are not lacking those who think that even the said souls can be really separated from the matter and bodies they inform.

You will object fourth: the soul is that by the perishing of which the animal perishes; but by the destruction of the animal's temperament the animal is destroyed, as is evident; therefore the soul is a temperament of the primary qualities. Confirmation: the soul is the principle from which diverse passions

and affections proceed — such as hatred, love, and the like — which arise from diverse temperaments: the choleric are prone to anger, the melancholic to sadness, the sanguine to joy, and the phlegmatic to illness. I distinguish the major: as form, I grant it; as disposition, I deny it. The animal's life depends on both, but most of all on the soul. To the confirmation the same distinction must be made. For from the varied disposition of matter arise diverse temperaments, and diverse effects proceed.

Article II. What Kind of Substance the Soul Is.

Most of the ancient philosophers, thinking that nothing exists in nature besides matter and body — whether coarser or more subtle — hold the soul to be a body; as Augustine sometimes followed (*5 Confess. c. 13; and lib. 6 of the same work, c. 1*). Into the same opinion those seem inclined who suspect the soul to be a particle of the divine essence and substance — a view which Alphonsus a Castro recounts and refutes (*secundò adversus Haereses, verbo Anima, haeresi 4*). But Aristotle (*1 On the Soul, c. 5, T. 72*), his interpreters, and all later philosophers teach that the soul is a substance distinct from matter and body.

First assertion: the soul is not matter, nor body, but a partial substance distinct from them. This assertion is threefold and is deduced from Scotus (*2 d. 9, quest. 2, § Ad argumenta 2. quaest. P; and Quodl. 9*). The first part is proved first: matter is common to both sublunary and celestial bodies; therefore the soul is not matter. The antecedent was proved in the book *On the Heavens (quest. 1, art. 1 and 3)*. The consequence holds, because sublunary and celestial things would be of the same species, since they would share matter, which is of the same species in these as in those, as I proved there in article 3. Second: the soul is an active principle, since vital actions proceed from it; but matter is only a passive principle, being the subject of forms (*1 Phys. T. 82*); therefore the soul is not matter. Third: if the soul were matter, there would be no distinction between animated and inanimate things, since all of them share matter; but all acknowledge an essential difference between animated and inanimate things; therefore the soul is not matter.

The second part is suggested by Augustine (*1 de immortalitate animae, c. 7; and 1. 83 quaest. 54*), saying: "The soul is better than the body." It is proved first: what is in another is distinct from what is not in another — for the same thing, simultaneously and with respect to the same, cannot be both in another and not in another, otherwise there would be a contradiction; but the soul is in the body, and the body is not in the soul nor in something distinct from the soul, as Aristotle argues convincingly at the cited passage. Therefore the soul is not a body. Second: the act of a body is not a body, because the same thing cannot simultaneously be informing and informed, actuating and actuated; but the soul is the act of the body, since it informs and actuates the body, as will be clearer in what follows. Moreover, a body can remain without the soul, as is seen in a corpse; therefore the soul is not a body. The consequence holds, because if the

soul were a body, while the body persists the soul too would persist — the opposite of which we experience.

The third part follows from the preceding parts. But since a separate article is to be established below to prove and decide this, I judge that it is to be passed over here.

Second assertion: the soul is not of the substance of God. This is presupposed by the Doctor *ibid.* and shown first from Sacred Scripture (*Gen. 2*): "He breathed into his face the breath of life." If therefore the soul is the breath of life, it is not the substance of God nor of his substance, just as the breath proceeding from a man's mouth is not the substance of man nor of his substance. Second: if man were of the substance of God, he would be equal to God himself, just as the Son of God, who is of the substance of God the Father, is equal to him and participates in his attributes and predicates, and would thus be all-knowing, all-powerful, and immutable like God — which is false, since, as Job testifies (*Job 13*): "Man does not remain in the same state." Third, from the Council of Braga, c. 5, defining thus: "If anyone believes that human souls or Angels are from the substance of God, as Manichus and Priscillian held, let him be anathema." Furthermore, the rational soul is created, as the sacred text cited signifies (*c. 1*): "God created man in his own image and likeness." And the image and likeness of God is posited in the soul and its powers and acts, as was said elsewhere; and creation properly is making from nothing, as is clear from (*2 distinct. 1, quest. 1*). It is therefore concluded that the soul is not from the substance of God.

You will object first: matter is receptive of accidents; but the soul receives sensible and intelligible accidents; therefore the soul is matter. The major can be denied. For the proximate and immediate subject of accidents is the composite, from what was asserted in (*5 Phys. quest. art. 4*). And when accidents that are peculiar and proper are subjected in the soul, it must be said that the soul is their subject by which (*subiectum quo*), not the subject which (*subiectum quod*), such as is the composite. All the more, because being a common subject of accidents does not argue identity of things, since such accidents do not pertain to the quiddity and nature of the things themselves, but are entirely extrinsic.

You will object second: what are material are bodies or at least corporeal; but the vegetative and sensitive souls are material and divisible into not only integral and quantitative parts but also entitative parts; therefore they are bodies or corporeal. The major can be denied. For accidents that follow upon the substantial whole are called material even though they are not bodies. Therefore the vegetative and sensitive souls are called material and corporeal because they depend in their being and coming to be on matter and body — just as material accidents do.

You will object third: St. Augustine (*22 City of God*) writes that Aristotle held the soul to be a fifth body, beyond the four elements and far superior to them. And

this can be deduced from (2 *On the Generation of Animals*, c. 3). Therefore in the Peripatetic school the soul is a body. I respond: Augustine reported this from the opinion of Cicero (1. 1. 99. *Tusc.*), falsely imputed to Aristotle, as is evidently clear from Aristotle himself (1 *On the Soul*), where he is entirely occupied in refuting the ancients who held the soul to be an accident, or matter, or body. To the testimony of the Philosopher I say that he only intends there that through natural heat the soul converts nourishment into the substance of the living and animated body.

Article III. Whether the Soul Is Subsistent.

Vazquez (3 p. disp. 32, c. 4); Molina (1 p. art. 2, q. 29, disp. 3); and Fonseca (5 *Met.* c. 8, q. 5) hold that the soul enjoys no proper subsistence of its own, but that only the composite enjoys total and complete subsistence. Scotus however (*Quodl.* 4, § *contra illud*, M; and *Quodl.* 5, § *Ad primum istorum*, V); Lychetus, Gadius, and others *ibid.* teach that the soul enjoys its own partial and incomplete subsistence.

Note from the Doctor (*Quodl.* 9, § *de secundo sub A*) that subsistence is divided into total and partial. Total subsistence is the twofold negation of incommunicability, both as a quo and as a quod — that is, a substance which subsists per se through total subsistence can be communicated to another neither as a form nor as a total nature, because it is rendered entirely incommunicable and independent, both actually and aptitudinally — which is to say, the substance that subsists thus depends on another neither actually nor aptitudinally. Partial subsistence is non-inherence in another, which belongs to a partial substance that neither actually nor aptitudinally inheres in a subject — and in this it is distinguished from an accident, whose proper characteristic is to inhere in another. Aristotle suggests this in the Ante-predicaments, saying: "Substance is not in a subject; an accident, on the contrary, is in a subject."

Assertion: the soul does not subsist through total subsistence, but only through partial subsistence. This is defended by Scotus, *ibid.* The first part, which is against Origen (1 *Peri Archon*, c. 5), is proved first: the soul is a partial substance; therefore its subsistence is partial. The antecedent is known, because the soul is part of the animated body. The consequence holds, because subsistence follows upon substantial entity: if the latter is partial, the former likewise is partial; if it is total, the former too will be total. Second: the rational soul when separated from the body tends by natural desire toward union with the body; and such natural inclination arises from nothing other than the fact that it subsists partially and desires total and perfect subsistence, which belongs to the composite alone; therefore the soul does not subsist through complete and perfect subsistence.

The second part is proved first from St. Athanasius at the Council of Nicaea against Arius, defining that substance, as distinguished from accident, is a being that has the capacity to subsist. Second: every substance is subsistent, since it is

defined as a being subsisting per se; but the soul is a substance, as is clear from article 1 of this question; therefore the soul has its own partial subsistence.

Third: what is in another by information and as a part acquires its own partial subsistence — since if it is separated from the whole, it still subsists per se; but the soul is in the body by information and as part of the physically animated body; therefore the soul subsists through partial subsistence.

You will object first: what subsists per se can be separated from that in which it is; but the vegetative as well as the sensitive soul can in no way be separated from the bodies they inform; therefore at least these souls do not participate in partial subsistence. I respond that the major is to be glossed: provided it does not depend on matter in its being and coming to be — as is the case with the aforementioned souls. Just as creatures subsist per se if they are substances, even though they cannot exist without God, because they depend on him in their being and coming to be. Similarly, substantially entitative parts subsist per se, even though one cannot exist without the other.

You will object second: what subsists per se is created, because subsistence is had through a proper and peculiar action, such as creation; but the vegetative and sensitive souls are not created, since they are educed from the potency of matter; therefore they do not subsist per se. The major is to be denied. For grace is created, yet does not subsist per se, since it is an accident whose characteristic is to inhere in a subject.

You will object third: if the rational soul enjoyed its own proper subsistence, through the union of humanity with the divine Word the very subsistence of the soul would have been destroyed, because the humanity of Christ was assumed to subsist through the subsistence of the divine Word; but this is not conceded; therefore neither is the other to be admitted. The consequence of the major is denied, because that humanity was united to the Word in the unity of incommunicable, suppositional, and personal subsistence — not in partial and incomplete subsistence, such as the partial subsistence of the rational soul is.

Article IV. What the Soul Is.

Having rejected the opinions of the ancient philosophers who held mistaken views about the soul, Aristotle brings forward in the middle the definition of the soul (*lib. 2, c. 1*), saying: "The soul is the first act of an organic body having the potency for life." This definition must be explained and defended against the attacks of adversaries, above all the Platonists, by whom it is assailed.

Note first from Scotus (*4 distinct. 1, quest. 2*) that definition is used in two ways. First, for the declarative account of any being whatsoever, whether real or of reason, whether positive or negative and privative, that acquires the name of being. Second, properly for the declarative account and statement of a real positive being, universal per se, and composite, with physical or metaphysical composition. In this sense the soul cannot be defined, since it lacks both kinds

of composition and is itself a part of a physical composite. Hence the aforementioned definition of the soul is called exact and essential — so much so that no better or more exact one has hitherto been found.

Note second, for greater understanding of the said definition, that all its words and particles must be explained. It says "act," on account of matter, which is potency. "First" is placed, both on account of accident, which in relation to substance is called second act, and also on account of operation, which is second act. "Of an organic body" is added — not meaning matter affected by organs, as most interpreters take it, since matter is not a body but part of an organic body; nor is matter organic, otherwise that particle "organic" would not be rightly placed. Therefore, by those words "of an organic body" is meant not a mathematical body but the composite of matter and the form of the mixed substance, which, rightly disposed and duly organized, is the suitable subject for the soul — as Aristotle indicates, saying that the soul is the act of the body, that is, the form of the body. But about this more fully below, when we shall treat and inquire whether the soul informs bare matter or whether it requires in matter the form of corporeity beforehand. "Having the potency for life" is added, which can be more correctly expounded of life in first act according to (2 *On the Soul*, T. 36): "To live for living things is to be," than of life in second act, which is the vital operation emanating from the soul itself, as Aristotle warns (9 *Eth. c. 7*): "We are our operations, and we are by living and acting actually."

Assertion: the definition of the soul set forth above is rightly given by Aristotle. This is indicated by the Doctor (1 d. 17, *quest. 2*). It is proved first: for a good definition three things are required. First, that the definition distinctly and clearly explain what the defined term designates confusedly. Second, that the definition be mutually convertible with the defined. Third, that it contain nothing superfluous or defective. But these three conditions belong to the said definition, as is evident to one going through each of the individual particles adduced and explained in the first note. Second: a correct definition is had through genus and differentia, or through quasi-genus and differentia, in those things that do not have their own proper genus and differentia, as is clear in the Epitome (*lib. 2, quest. 7, art. 2*); and the definition of the soul is given through quasi-genus and differentia. For "act" is placed as genus, and the remaining particles serve the role of differentia. Add that no better or more exact definition has hitherto been found, even by those who attack it; therefore the said definition is to be retained.

You will object first: Aristotle, after assigning the definition of the soul, adds that he has defined the soul *en toutoi*, that is, "in figure," as some interpret it; but a definition in figure is not essential and exact, but only descriptive and in rough outline; therefore the aforesaid definition of the soul is not legitimate. I respond by not accepting that interpretation, but embracing the translation of Argyropylos, who renders *en toutoi* as "in common." And indeed rightly, for it

suits the text of Aristotle, who defines the soul taken in common and generally — and this is not hidden from Scotus at the cited passage. This is confirmed from (*lib. 1 de Historia Animalium, c. 1*), where the Philosopher proposes to treat of the proper differences of animals, of which he says one must treat "in figure," that is, in common, and then of each of their genera more exactly. He writes the same (*1 de Praedicamentis, c. 5; and 1 Eth. c. 3; and 10 of the same work, c. 6; and 7 Met. T. 7*).

You will object second: the definition of the soul must belong to every soul, as the laws of a good definition require; but the said definition does not fit every soul, such as the rational soul, which, when abstracted and separated from the body, is not the act of a body; therefore it has not been properly given. I respond — with the major conceded — by denying the minor. For even if the rational soul does not actually inform the body when separated from it, it is sufficient that it can inform it and tends toward it.

You will object third: the aforesaid definition belongs to things other than the soul; therefore it is not appropriate and fitting. The antecedent is argued: it belongs to an Angel assisting a body, in which it moves the body itself and exercises other vital operations. I deny the antecedent. To its proof I say that an Angel does not inform a body but assists it and moves it in the manner in which a sailor moves a ship and a charioteer a chariot.

You will object fourth: the soul is the most powerful perfection of the animated thing; therefore the soul is not a first act but a second, because second act is more perfect than first, according to that: "each thing exists for the sake of its operation." Hence Aristotle (*1 Eth. c. 12; and lib. 10 of the same work, c. 6 and 7*) teaches that happiness, which is the ultimate end and the greatest of all perfections, consists in operation, which is second act. I grant the antecedent and deny the consequence. To that maxim I say it is to be interpreted of the formal end, not of the objective end.

Article V. Whether the Second Definition of the Soul Is Legitimate.

All Peripatetics acknowledge that the second definition of the soul is good, given by Aristotle (*2 On the Soul, c. 2, T. 19*) in these words: "The soul is that by which we live, sense, are moved in place, and understand." More clearly: "The soul is the principle of living, sensing, moving in place, and understanding." Although all interpreters of Aristotle receive this definition as correct and true, yet they disagree among themselves about the manner in which it is to be received. For Aegidius, in the cited text, thinks it is a fourfold definition contained in one, corresponding to the fourfold species of souls. Simplicius thinks it fits the rational soul alone. The common opinion of the other philosophers holds it to be a single definition only, adapted not to the rational soul alone but to the soul taken generally.

Note: Aristotle, in order to clarify the first definition of the soul, devised the second definition proposed by us at the beginning of this article. For from the fact that the soul is the principle of living, sensing, moving in place, and understanding, it is easily understood that the soul is the first act of an organic body having the potency for life. For from operations and effects we arrive at cognition of the cause. This later definition, moreover, is not to be taken copulatively — for in that case it would belong only to the rational soul — but disjunctively, which is to say: the soul is the principle of living, or sensing, or moving in place, or understanding. Furthermore, note that the principle placed in this definition is not the principle which (*principium quod*), since this belongs to the animated composite, but the principle by which (*principium quo*). Therefore it is rightly said that the soul is that by which we live, sense, are moved, and understand. Furthermore, this principle is not extrinsic, like a charioteer moving a chariot or a sailor a ship, but intrinsic and an essential and chief part of the physically animated composite.

Assertion: the aforesaid definition of the soul is not fourfold contained in one, but is a single definition, not fitting the rational soul alone but the soul taken generically. This assertion is threefold, suggested by the Doctor (*1 d. 17, quest. 2, § contra istam, FF; and 2 d. 16, quest. unica*). The first part is argued first from Aristotle in the present context, who explicitly asserts that he is giving another definition different from the preceding one, which is its manifestation and declaration; therefore there is only one definition of the soul, not four. Second: there are not four species of souls, for the soul is distributed only into vegetative, sensitive, and intellective; therefore there are not four definitions of the soul contained in one. The antecedent is evident. The consequence is derived because, according to the number of souls, the number of definitions is assigned.

The second part is proved first from Aristotle, who at the cited passage acknowledges that he is defining the soul in common; therefore he is not providing a definition fitting the rational soul alone, otherwise he would be departing from his stated purpose. Second: the said definition, as I noted above, is not to be taken collectively but disjunctively; but taken disjunctively it is not adapted to the rational soul alone; therefore etc.

The third part follows from what was said in the two preceding parts: if there is only one definition of the soul, and it belongs not only to the rational soul, it is rightly inferred that it fits the soul in common.

You will object first: something other than the soul is the principle of living, moving in place, and understanding; therefore the said definition of the soul is not fitting and legitimate. The antecedent is proved from (*Acts 17*): "God is declared to be the principle in whom we live, are moved, and have our being." I deny the antecedent. To its proof I say it is to be explained of the extrinsic principle — not of the informing and intrinsic principle of the said operations.

Or say with Lyran, in the Postilla, that God is the efficient cause, while the soul is the formal and intrinsic cause.

You will object second: the soul is the principle of vital operations; therefore the soul is their principle which (*principium quod*). The antecedent is evident; the consequence is proved: that is the principle which to which operations and actions are truly attributed; but vital actions are attributed to the soul; therefore it is their principle which. I grant the antecedent and deny the consequence. To its proof I say that actions belong ultimately to the supposits as their denominative subjects, and therefore the animated composite is the principle which, while the soul is the principle by which.

You will object third: the rational soul, when separated from the body, is truly a soul, yet is not the principle of vegetating, sensing, and the other vital operations; therefore it is wrongly said that the soul is the principle of the said actions. I respond: in the state of separation, even if the rational soul is not the actual principle of the aforesaid operations, it is nonetheless their potential and aptitudinal principle — which is sufficient for it to be called and to be the principle of the same operations.

You will inquire whether the said definition is essential and quidditative, or accidental and descriptive? I respond that it is descriptive, since it is given through a principle and a potency of operating, which presupposes the essence and nature already constituted in its essential and quidditative being, from which the powers, faculties, and potencies of operating flow. Aristotle suggests this when he testifies that he attributes the prior definition through hidden and obscure things, but the later one through clear and manifest things — namely, effects and operations — which are more apparent to us than causes and their principles, since they are more sensible and nearer to our senses. This will be further illustrated and made clear from the following article.

Article VI. Whether One Definition Can Be Demonstrated Through the Other.

Averroes, in the present context, thinks that in the aforesaid definitions of the soul the Philosopher uses no demonstration, and that one definition cannot be demonstrated through the other. The generality of philosophers, however, holds that Aristotle does demonstrate one through the other; yet they contend among themselves about the manner of demonstration. For Aegidius, Cajetan, and Albert hold that the first is demonstrated through the second by an a priori demonstration. The others, such as the Parisians in the exposition of the text; Tataretus *ibid.*; Ruverius (*lib. 2 de anima, quest. 10*); and the Complutenses (*disp. 3, quest. 3, § 2*), teach that the former is demonstrated through the latter by a demonstration quia and from the effect.

First assertion: Aristotle in giving the said definitions of the soul uses demonstration. This is indicated by the Doctor (*1 d. 17, quest. 2, § Contra istam conclusionem ante FF*). It is proved first: Aristotle at the beginning of chapter 2 of the present work book II On the Soul, promises that he will bring forward a definition of the soul that will serve as a middle term for demonstrating the other definition set forth in the first chapter of the same book. Therefore Aristotle demonstrates one definition through the other. Second: through the effect of something its cause can be demonstrated by a demonstration quia and from the effect; but the later definition of the soul is from effect and operation — namely, vegetation, sensation, and intellection. For in this way the demonstration is constructed: Everything that is the principle of living, sensing, and understanding is the first act of an organic body; but the soul is such a principle of vegetating, sensing, and understanding; therefore it is the first act of an organic body.

Second assertion: the first definition of the soul is demonstrated through the second, a posteriori. This is suggested by the Doctor just cited, where he says: "From this, that the soul is that by which we live and sense, it is concluded that the soul is act and the form of the thing acting thus." It is proved first from Aristotle (*2 On the Soul, c. 2*), asserting that the second definition of the soul is had through things more knowable to us, which are effects and operations — and according to these the demonstration quia and a posteriori is made. And *ibid.* (*T. 36–37*), setting forth individually the actions and operations of the individual souls; therefore the later definition is given through the operations and effects of the soul — namely, vegetation, sensation, change of place, and intellection; therefore the prior definition is demonstrated through the later one by a demonstration quia and from the effect. Second: a thing is constituted in its substantial and essential being before being in its operative and effective being; but to be the act of an organic body is the essential being of the soul, and to be the productive and operative principle is something consequent; therefore the prior definition of the soul is demonstrated through the later one by demonstration quia. And this is corroborated: just as being relates to operating, so the principle of being relates to the principle of operating; but to be the first act of an organic body is to be the principle of being — for in this way it constitutes, actuates, and animates the body; whereas to be the principle of vegetating, sensing, and the like is to be the origin and efficient cause of operations. Furthermore, because a thing has such being and is of such essence and nature, for that reason it has such a principle of operating — and not the reverse. Therefore, because the soul is the first act of an organic body, for that reason it is the principle of vital operations; therefore the second definition demonstrates the first a posteriori and from the effect.

You will object first: Aristotle at the beginning of chapter 2 promises that he will seek and give a definition that distinctly expresses the cause of the thing; therefore the later definition shows the former a priori and demonstrates it by a

demonstration from the cause and propter quid. And this seemed fitting — that Aristotle should provide the definition proceeding from effect to cause rather than from cause to effect — and Cajetan above others teaches that he has done this. Some respond that that text is to be expounded of the final cause, for the end of the soul is operation: sight exists that we may see, the intellect that we may understand, and the soul that we may operate. With this granted, it can be said that Aristotle there brings forward a demonstration through the final cause. Or say that the later definition of the soul contains the cause, because vital operations proceed from the soul as from a cause, at least a radical one, and concerning these demonstrations are made from the effect and a posteriori.

You will object second: it is prior for a thing to be in itself and to have being in itself than to regard another, because a thing is constituted in its being before being ordered to another; but to be the principle of vital operations is for the soul to be in itself precisely and absolutely, whereas to be the act of an organic body is to be in order to another distinct from the soul itself; therefore the second definition rightly demonstrates the first a priori. I distinguish the major: of complete and total beings, I grant it; of incomplete and partial beings, I deny it. For an incomplete and partial thing implies an order to another, so that from the two a whole may be made — and thus from soul and body the animated whole is composed.

Article VII. How Many Species of Souls There Are.

There exists a great variety and disagreement of opinions among philosophers about the species of souls. Some, whom Plato in the *Timaeus* and Anaxagoras seem to favor, suspect there is one soul in species, which through various organs and diverse dispositions elicits various and diverse operations — vegetating in the body of a tree, sensation in the body of a brute, and intellection in the body of a man. Some, to whom Aegidius and Cajetan adhere in the present context, imagine there to be four species of souls: vegetative, sensitive, locomotively motive, and intellective. Others constitute two souls specifically distinct: the sensing and the understanding. But the generality of philosophers, with Aristotle (*2 On the Soul, T. 30 and 31*), establishes three species of souls: vegetative, sensitive, and intellective. From what source, however, this threefold number is drawn is not one and the same mind and sense for all, as will be made plain below in conclusion 2.

First assertion: there are three species of souls. This is suggested by the Doctor in both works (*2 d. 15, quest. unica*). It is proved first from Aristotle (*2 On the Soul, T. 30 and 31*), recording only three souls: the vegetative, sensitive, and intellective. St. Augustine agrees (*8 de Civitate, c. 8*) and hints at the following reason in his commentary on Ps. 144. Second: there are as many specifically distinct species of souls as there are their essential differences, since through diverse essential and quidditative differences distinct species are constituted essentially; but there are only three specific and essential differences of souls,

namely vegetative, sensitive, and intellective; therefore there are only three species of souls. Furthermore: there are three diverse operations proceeding from three really and essentially distinct principles; therefore three species of souls are numbered. The consequence holds from effect to cause. The antecedent is shown: for there are vegetation, sensation, and intellection, which are really distinct and found in subjects really and essentially distinct; therefore their constitutive and distinctive principles are really and essentially distinct, as the Subtle Doctor argues fully and acutely in a parallel case (*1 d. 26, quest. unica*).

Second assertion: the specific threefold number of souls is not derived from the three ways in which the soul raises itself above matter. This is deduced from the Doctor *ibid.* and opposed to St. Thomas (*1 p. quest. 77, art. 1*). It is proved first: if the specific distinction of souls were taken from the diverse manner of raising itself above matter, there would be more than three species of souls — but this the adversaries do not admit; therefore neither should they grant the former. The major is argued: a dog, for example, raises itself above matter in a nobler way than a midge or fly; yet the dog is comprehended under the same genus of sensitive soul as the midge and fly. Furthermore, an elephant likewise raises itself above matter in a more excellent way than an oyster, since, as Athenaeus testifies, the elephant is very docile and almost capable of learning; yet notwithstanding this, the said animals are taken under the same genus of sensitive soul. Second: a diverse and varied mode of things does not vary or diversify things, and therefore does not argue specific or generic difference, since a mode, as was said elsewhere, is described as what, added to a thing, does not vary the thing; therefore from the said mode no essential and specific distinction of souls is gathered.

You will object first: the rational soul is not one in species; therefore there are not three species of souls. The antecedent is admitted: the rational soul is part of a species, since it and the human body constitute man, who is a species. Add that the vegetative soul is multiple and distributed into various genera — of roots, herbs, plants, and trees. Similarly the sensitive has under it innumerable winged, aquatic, and terrestrial creatures. Man, however, is the lowest and most specific species. Hence the soul does not seem rightly to be divided into two subalternate species and a third that is lowest. I respond that, properly and strictly speaking, neither the rational nor the other irrational souls are species, but parts of species and quasi-species — because a part is sometimes used for the whole, as at (*Gen. 6*) man is called "flesh," and at (*Ezekiel 13*) "soul." As for what is added about the rational soul being the most specific species while the other souls are subalternate species — this is no obstacle. For discrete quantity is divided into number and speech, the latter being the lowest species. Likewise, when, where, and position, although they are highest genera, have few species and no intermediate subalternate ones. Again, animal is divided into brute and man: the former into many species, the latter into only one that is the lowest.

You will object second: there are four genera of animate things — vegetative, sensitive, locomotively motive, and intellective — as Aristotle acknowledges in the present context; therefore there are also four genera of souls. For if animate things are fourfold, then souls too are fourfold, since a thing is not animated unless animated by a soul. I grant the antecedent and deny the consequence. The reason is that the fourfold division of animate things is derived not from diverse souls but from diverse potencies really distinct from one another. For it can happen — and indeed in fact does happen — that certain animals do not move from place to place, such as those affixed to rocks, and do not have the local motive potency; while others do move from place to place and possess the local motive potency, like a dog. But the threefold specific distinction of souls is derived from three essential and specific differences, of which I made mention above.

You will object third: what vegetate also sense; therefore the vegetative and sensitive do not differ essentially from one another. The antecedent is proved: certain trees attract certain juices; others expel them. Again, certain ones flee the company of others, as the olive flees the oak, the vine the laurel and the cabbage, the fern the reed; while others mutually cherish and embrace one another, as the vine the olive and the elm. Add that when the vine is cut, it seems to shed tears; therefore what vegetate do not differ in species from what sense. I respond that these and similar things are produced through sympathy or antipathy, as Pliny notes and records (*1. 26 hist. nat. c. 1*). But things that vegetate live, as is read at (*John 12*): "Unless a grain of wheat falling into the ground die"; and (*1 Cor. 15*): "What you sow is not quickened unless it first die." Augustine confirms this (*1 de Civ. c. 20*), adducing that (*Ps. 77*): "He killed their vines." And at (*11 of the same work, c. 6*) he adds that plants live by vegetative life, distinct from sensitive life; whose reason Aristotle gives (*3 On the Soul, c. 12, T. 66*): "The matter of plants is extremely earthly; and therefore is incapable of sense." Furthermore, in sentient beings sleep and waking are found, which we experience to be absent in plants. As for what is added about the vine emitting moisture — I say this occurs not because it has sense, of which it is devoid, but because of the abundance of the said moisture; hence at another time (spring excepted), if its shoots are cut, it emits no moisture.

You will inquire whether the aforesaid division of souls is univocal? Aristotle responds (*2 On the Soul, c. 1*) that it is univocal, and there compares it to a figure that participates in one common univocal concept belonging to all figures and to individual ones — so the common univocal concept of soul is established as belonging to all souls.

Article VIII. Whether the Soul Is Indivisible.

Thomas Argentinas (*1 d. 1, quest. 8*) reports that Gerard Odo holds all souls — whether vegetative, sensitive, or intellective — to be divisible. On the contrary, Simplicius and Ammonius (*3 On the Soul, com. 20*) hold that all souls are

indivisible. St. Thomas (*1 p. q. 76, art. 8*), Cajetan *ibid.*, and others of the same school hold that the souls of imperfect animals are divisible, while the souls of perfect animals are indivisible and incapable of division. The Subtle Doctor, however (*4 d. 1, q. 5; and d. 44, q. 1, art. 1*) and many others assert and decide that all souls besides the rational are divisible and capable of being cut.

Note first: a thing can be divisible in three ways. First, divisible into essential parts — in which way a composite is divided into matter and form, from which as essential parts it coalesces. Second, into potential parts, that is, into potencies, powers, and faculties — in this way the rational soul is distributed into intellect and will as its potencies and powers. Third, into integral parts — in this way the human body is distributed into head, arms, and the other members.

Furthermore, note that there is another division, explained elsewhere by us, into entitative and quantitative parts. For a material substance has in itself substantial parts — called entitative — prior to being affected by quantity, by virtue of which it is divisible into integral and quantitative parts. In the present discussion, the question is whether the soul coalesces from such entitative and quantitative parts, into which it is formally divisible and capable of being cut.

Note second: a nobler and more perfect soul requires more excellent and superior dispositions for its introduction and information of the body; more organs are required for the exercise of vital operations by the soul of a horse than by the soul of a frog and a midge. Similarly, more things are required for the infusion of the rational soul than for the production of the soul of a horse. Hence perhaps Aristotle (*de Senectute, c. 1*) adds that the souls of the *entoma* — that is, annulated animals — are indivisible, because if they are cut through the middle they still live, which does not happen with perfect animals. Again, if some parts of plants or branches of trees are cut off and planted, they still become green and germinate — perhaps for this reason, that the seminal power in them is diffused through all their parts; not so, however, in the other animated things, which have a determinate and fixed place in which their seed is preserved, as Aristotle suggests (*2 On the Soul, T. 20, sum. 1, c. 2*).

Assertion: all souls, both vegetative and sensitive, whether of perfect or imperfect animals, are capable of being cut and divisible — except the rational soul, which is incapable of being cut and indivisible. This assertion is twofold, maintained by the Doctor at the passages cited at the beginning of this article. The first part is proved first: what is material and corporeal participates in the properties of material and corporeal being, because where there is the nature of a thing, there consequently are its passion and affection, since these follow from and spring out of that nature; but the sensitive and vegetative souls are material and corporeal in everyone's opinion; therefore they participate in the properties of material and corporeal being, of which kind is quantity, whose property is divisibility. Second: what is educed from a divisible and cuttable subject is itself divisible and cuttable, since it receives its nature and property from something

divisible and cuttable; but the vegetative and sensitive souls are educed from the potency of matter, which is divisible and cuttable; therefore the souls themselves are divisible and cuttable. Moreover, the said souls are corrupted by the corruption of the bodies they inform — for they are mortal and corruptible; therefore also divisible. Again, it is confirmed by experiment in plants and trees: if some parts — such as branches — are cut from them, they still live and sprout. This is plainly a clear sign that the same souls are divisible and capable of being parted.

The second part is proved first: every immaterial and incorporeal thing is impartible and indivisible, as are God and an Angel; but the rational soul is immaterial and incorporeal, as faith teaches and the reasons to be adduced in the last book argue; therefore it is incapable of being cut and indivisible. Second: the rational soul is whole in the whole and whole in each part of the body, as will be shown in the next article; therefore it is indivisible. The antecedent and consequence are clear, since it is proper to an indivisible thing not to be ascribed and attributed to any particular part. Add that it is not educed from the potency of matter but is created — which plainly indicates that the soul itself is impartible and indivisible.

You will object first: every soul that informs is divisible; but the rational soul is an informing form; therefore it is divisible. The major is shown: the informing soul is received into the matter it informs; whatever is received is received according to the mode of the receiver; but the matter into which the soul is received is divisible; therefore the soul is likewise divisible. I deny the major. To its proof I say that that axiom is to be interpreted thus: whatever is received is received according to the mode of the receiver — that is, according to the aptitude, capacity, and proportion of the receiver; not however that what is received assumes the nature and property of the receiver, otherwise an accident, which is received in a substance, would be a substance and subsistent, just as the substance itself is subsistent. Likewise, if the rational soul is received in a mortal body, it would be mortal, just as the body is mortal — which smacks of error and heresy.

You will object second: if the rational soul, because it is spiritual, is indivisible, then likewise the sensitive soul will be indivisible, because it is spiritual, as is gathered from Sacred Scripture (*Gen. 7*): "All in which there was the breath of life died." And (*Ecclesiastes 3*): "The spirit of beasts descends downward." I respond that "spirit" is used broadly there — just as at (*Ps. 148*) wind is called spirit, according to the interpretation of Lyran in the Postilla: "Fire, hail, snow, ice, and the spirit of storms."

You will object third: a part cut off from a man still lives; therefore the rational soul that is present in that part is divisible. The antecedent is proved from the tongue of St. Paul, which was avulsed from his body and spoke. Also from St. Denis, who carried his body in his hands for two miles. The same is narrated of

St. Mithrius, patron of Aix. Moreover, if a member is amputated from a man, it still lives and moves. This is especially experienced of the heart, which if it is torn from a man still palpitates. I respond that those movements occur through heat and vital spirits, which also persist for some time in the parts that have been cut off, as is evident of the heart. For the vital spirits existing in the said parts excite motion, even though the soul is not truly still there. To what is added about the tongue of St. Paul and the heads of SS. Denis and Mithrius — I say this was accomplished miraculously and by the power of God, who can do all things.

You will object fourth: if a worm is pricked in the tail, it withdraws itself entirely, which is a sign that its soul is incapable of being cut and indivisible — otherwise it would not collect itself entirely but would only remove and withdraw the part that is pricked. Since then it feels pain in the whole body, it is plainly inferred that its soul is impartible and incapable of being cut. St. Augustine seems to sense this (*de quantitate animae*, c. 31). I respond that this happens because it possesses a continuous body and soul, and by natural sympathy — so that if one part is harmed, the other parts feel pain — as Augustine notes (*1. 21 contra Faustum*, at the end of c. 8–9), and Aristotle is not far from this (*de Iuventute*, c. 1). To the testimony of Augustine I say that he speaks there doubtfully; but assertively at the passage just cited against Faustus, where he favors our view.

Article IX. Whether the Soul Is Whole in the Whole and Whole in Each Part of the Body.

Although from the preceding article this difficulty seems to have been decided and settled, nevertheless for greater ease and a richer doctrine, it pleases us to investigate this matter particularly and to confirm it with authority and reason. Those who maintain that all souls are divisible consequently deny that the whole soul is in the whole and the whole in each part of the body. Those who assert that the rational soul is indivisible and impartible certainly affirm that it is whole in the whole and whole in each part of the body — but not so for the other souls. I am aware, moreover, that certain philosophers, such as Xenocrates, hold the soul to be in the head; others, like Parmenides, in the chest; some in the heart, like Andreas Caesalpinus (*5 Peripatetic Questions*); and there are those who think the soul exists in a fixed and determined place of the body, like a spider, so that according to opportunity it may range and traverse all the parts of the body to perform the functions of life.

Note that sometimes the soul is said to be in the head or in the heart, not because it truly exists only in those parts and informs only those parts — but because in them it exercises better and nobler vital operations, on account of better organs and more excellent dispositions that are present in those same members. In this way intellection is said to occur in the head and not in the foot, because in the head there are organs suitable for producing intellection. Similarly, the nobler vital actions are said to arise from the heart, both because

it is the source of heat and because it is the workshop of the vital spirits. Hence Christ the Lord says (*Matt. 15*): "Out of the heart come thoughts," etc.

Furthermore, note that the subject of the soul is twofold: total and adequate, which is the whole body, which is informed by the whole soul; and partial and inadequate, which is any member and part that is animated by the soul.

First assertion: the rational soul is whole in the whole body and whole in each part of the body. So Scotus (*1 d. 8, q. 1, § Ad q. respondeo, D; and 4 d. 1, q. 5, § contra opinionem istam B*). It is proved first from St. Augustine (*1. 1 contra Manich. c. 19*): "Just as God is whole in the whole world, and whole in each part of the world, so the rational soul is whole in the whole man and whole in each part of man." He writes the same (*de immortalitate animae*) and (*6 Trin. 6*) and (*1 contra epistolam fundamenti, c. 16*); and Damascene (*1 fidei, c. 17*) agrees. Second: what is simple and spiritual is whole in the whole and whole in each part of that in which it is, because what is simple and spiritual lacks entitative and quantitative parts; but the rational soul is simple and spiritual; therefore etc. Third: what is indivisible and impartible is not divided upon the division of parts — otherwise there would be a contradiction. But the rational soul is indivisible and incapable of being cut, as I showed in the preceding article; therefore it is whole in the whole and whole in each part of the body.

Second assertion: the vegetative and sensitive soul is whole in the whole body and part in each part of the body. This is suggested by the Doctor (*4 d. 44, quest. 1, § Quantum ergo, D*). It is proved first: the aforesaid souls are material and corporeal; therefore a part is in a part and the whole in the whole body. The antecedent is at hand, because they extend and are divided upon the division of the whole and parts of the body they inform. Second: the said souls are mortal and corruptible; therefore divisible, upon the division of the matter they inform; and therefore each of them is whole in the whole body and part in each part of the body that it informs.

You will say that those souls extend not by reason of entity but by reason of quantity. Against this: where the whole irrational soul is, there is the whole quantity; and where a part of the soul is, there is a part of the quantity. For in this, corporeal substance is distinguished from incorporeal, because the former has entitative and quantitative parts, of which the latter is devoid. Furthermore, it seems absurd to say that the soul is whole, according to essence, in each part, and that the soul is divided upon the division of quantity. For if a part of the quantity is not the whole quantity, neither is a part of the soul the whole soul. For the same thing, according to the same respect, cannot be at once whole and part.

But if you say that for no other reason is the divisible soul whole in the part, according to essence, except because it has parts of the same nature — against this: this does not prevent the divided soul from being according to its essence in each part. For just as part of water, which is of the same nature as the whole

water, is not called the whole water, so neither is a part of the soul called the whole soul with respect to its substance and essence.

Third assertion: any soul whatsoever, whether divisible or indivisible, informs the whole organic body. The Doctor holds this (*1 d. 38, q. 3, § sed tunc, H; and 4 d. 43, q. 2, § Respondeo, cap.*); Faber (*Theorem. 82, c. 1*); and others commonly, against Albert and Plato — as Alcinous testifies (*de doct. eius c. 23*) — who think the soul exists only in a principal member, such as the heart. It is argued first from Aristotle (*2 On the Soul, c. 1, T. 6*), who, defining the soul, says it is the act of the organic body. But a part of the body, such as the head or the heart, is not a body but a member of the body; therefore according to Aristotle the whole organic body is the total and adequate thing capable of being perfected and informed by the soul. He suggests the same *ibid.* (*T. 9*), saying: "As sight is to the eye, so the soul is to the whole animal." And (*T. 20*) he adds: "The soul is in all the members of the body, just as the power of germinating in a plant is diffused and spread through the whole body." Second: where the potencies and powers of the soul are, there the soul is by information; but in the whole body the potencies and faculties of the soul are present; therefore in the whole body the soul exists by information. The major is clear, because the soul and its powers are formally distinct from one another; and what are formally distinct cannot even by divine power be separated. The minor is at hand, because each part of the animate is nourished, grows, senses, and exercises other vital operations. Third: the informing soul is a quidditative and constitutive part of the living and animated body; but if the soul itself did not inform the whole body, it would not be its essential and quidditative part; therefore it informs the whole body. The major is clear, for just as from matter and a non-living form there is made one whole *per se*, which is the natural composite, so from the soul and the organic body there is made the whole living and animated thing. The minor is shown: according to the adversaries, the soul is not in the whole body according to its substance, but only in one chief part of the body; therefore it constitutes only in essential being that part which it informs — especially because form confers formal and essential being by presenting itself to the subject matter.

You will say that the soul is virtually in the other parts of the body, which is sufficient for it to be called the form of the living and animated body. Against this: although God by his power is in a body and an Angel in the celestial sphere he moves, nevertheless he is not said to be an essential part of it and to inform it, but only to assist it; and he is in all things through presence, power, and essence, but not through information, as the generality of scholastics teach. Therefore the aforesaid response is empty and null.

You will object first, against the first assertion: if the whole intellectual soul were whole in each part of the body — as in the eye — then, if the eye itself were cut off, the man would die, and thus the said soul would not remain in the other parts; but this conflicts with experience, since we see that men still live when

their hands, arms, and feet are cut off. Therefore the rational soul is not whole in each part of the body it informs. I distinguish the antecedent: the whole soul is in the eye as in an inadequate subject, I grant; as in an adequate subject, I deny. This is deduced from Scotus (*1 d. 28, quest. 3, § sed tunc est aliud, H*). But if a principal member — such as the heart or the head — is cut off, the man cannot live and the rational soul cannot persist, because the suitable and necessary dispositions for its persistence are no longer present in the other less principal parts; but when those parts are removed, it still persists — as Scotus excellently sets forth (*4 d. 11, quest. 3, a little before II*). But annulated and segmented animals when cut still live, because they require lesser dispositions, for they are continuous and participate in parts that are nearly homogeneous and similar, as Aristotle notes (*de Iuventute, c. 1*).

You will object second: if the rational soul were whole in each part of the body, then each part of man would be a man, because in each part there would be the whole and perfect soul; but where there is a perfect soul, there is a perfect animal — and there would be as many men as there are parts of his body, which is manifestly false. The consequence is denied. For the soul denominates only its adequate subject, which it informs adequately — namely, the organic body, which is heterogeneous and dissimilar (*as is clear in Aristotle, lib. 1 de Historia Animalium, c. 1*). The parts of the body are denominated in some way — namely, animated — by the denomination taken from the soul, by which they are informed.

You will object third: a simple and indivisible thing is adequate only to an indivisible and incutable thing; but the rational soul is indivisible; and each part of the body is cuttable and divisible; therefore the rational soul cannot inform a body that is divisible and partible into essential and integral parts. I distinguish the major: of quantitatively indivisible, I grant; of substantially indivisible, such as the rational soul, I deny — as is clear from the Angel, who, although indivisible, exists definitively in a divisible place, as the Doctor rightly sets forth (*2 d. 2, q. 6*).

You will object fourth: St. Jerome, explaining those words of Christ the Lord (*Matt. 15*): "Out of the heart come thoughts," writes that the soul has its seat not in the brain, as certain philosophers think, but in the heart, according to Christ's teaching. Therefore the soul is located in a fixed and determined part of the body. I respond that this is to be interpreted inadequately, not adequately. The soul is said to be in the heart because the heart is the workshop of the vital spirits, the source of heat, and the root of vital operations. Hence that saying of the Philosopher is celebrated: "The heart is the first thing living and the last thing dying." Again, just as a plant is said to have its life in its root, so an animal has its life in the heart as its principal member.

Article X. Whether There Are Several Souls in the Same Living Thing.

James Zabarella (*1 de Facultatibus Animae*, c. 8) and Gandavensis (*7 Phys. q. 8*) posit in a brute two souls — the vegetative and the sensitive — and in man three: the vegetative, the sensitive, and the intellective. Plato preceded them (*in the Timaeus and 9 de Repub.*) and Galen (*8 de Usu Partium*, c. 1), distinguishing the said three souls even by location — the intellective in the brain, the sensitive in the heart, and the vegetative in the liver. Ockham (*4 quest. 7; and Quodl. 2, quest. 10*); Mair (*2 d. 17, quest. unica*); and Mirandula (*1. 33 de Eversione Singularis Certaminis*, sect. 2) place in man two souls — the sensitive and the intellective. And formerly certain sectarians, such as the Manicheans (*as Augustine reports, 6 contra Faustum*, c. 8), held one soul to be good, produced from the good principle from a particle of God, and another to be evil, fashioned from the evil principle. The general Council of Constantinople (*act. 10, can. 11*) mentions and rejects this. The common opinion is that of Scotus (*4 d. 11, q. 3*); Alexander of Hales (*2 p. q. 62, m. 2*); Thomas (*1 p. q. 76, art. 3*); and the other theologians and philosophers, teaching that in one living and animated thing there is only one soul.

Note from Scotus, cited; Tataretus (*2 On the Soul, quest. 1, dub. 3*); and John of Masters *ibid.* (*q. 2*): whenever two forms stand in such a relation that one virtually contains the other, they are incompatible in the same subject simultaneously. The said authors add that one form virtually containing another means nothing other than that the form itself is the principle and cause of all the effects and operations that the other form can produce — as the sensitive soul virtually contains the vegetative because it operates whatever the vegetative operates. Similarly, the intellective virtually contains the sensitive and vegetative, because it accomplishes whatever both of them accomplish and acts. For what is nobler and more excellent than another virtually contains that other and has the power and potency of producing whatever the less noble and lower can accomplish — and something more. This is clear of the rational soul, which by virtue contains the other souls, since it does all that the others do and much more. Likewise of God, who virtually and eminently contains creatures — doing what creatures do and all other things that involve no repugnance.

Assertion: in one animate thing there is only one soul; and indeed in man there is one intellective soul, which virtually contains the vegetative and sensitive; and in a brute there is one sensitive soul, which virtually contains the vegetative. The Doctor holds this *ibid.*; and before him, St. Augustine (*de Spiritu et Anima*, c. 4; *and thence lib. 11 de Gen. ad litt. c. 35*), with these words: "In one body one soul, and three powers: intellect, will, and memory." It is proved first from Sacred Scripture (*Matt. 10*): "Fear not those who kill the body but cannot kill the soul." And (*John 10*): "I lay down my soul for my sheep." But if there were three souls in man, Christ would not rightly have said "the soul" in the singular but "the souls" in the plural; and each man has his own soul, just as Christ has his; therefore in each man and each animate there is established only one soul. Second, from the Lateran Council (*c. Firmiter, de Summa Trinitate et Fide Catholica*) and the VI General Council, in which it was decreed that the divine Word assumed the

parts of human nature, which are body and rational soul. And it is defined in the General Council, in which those who hold the opposite are struck with anathema. Third, from the Fathers. For besides Augustine just cited, Nicenus (*de Creatione Hominis*, c. 12) confirms the said assertion with this comparison: "Just as one cithara player, through the diversity of strings on one cithara, produces diverse sounds, so one intellectual soul, existing in one body, through distinct potencies and various organs, produces diverse actions and operations." Gregory the Great (*hom. 12 in Ezech.*); Lactantius (*1 de Ira Dei*, c. 11); and Hugh of St. Victor (*lib. de Spiritu et Anima*) concur. Fourth, from Aristotle (*1 On the Soul*, c. 4, T. 66; and c. 5, T. 91; and 2 of the same work, T. 31), teaching and saying that just as the triangle is in the quadrangle, so the vegetative and sensitive are in the intellectual. But it is established that the triangular figure does not exist formally in the quadrangular; therefore neither does the vegetative and sensitive exist formally in the intellectual.

Fourth: if there were three distinct souls in man, one would not impede the action of another, since distinct forms have distinct powers and potencies, of which one depends on another neither in being nor in operating. But experience teaches us that sense sometimes impedes reason — as Scotus testifies (*3 d. 15, quest. unica, sub H*) after Augustine (*14 Civ. c. 16*): "A vehement sensible delight impedes the use of reason." And Aristotle (*7 Eth. c. 9*): "Immense pleasure very often steals away the intellect of the wise." Hence, a few sentences later, our Doctor cited adds: "If in Martyrs exposed to the greatest torments their intellect had the use of itself, that was from the special grace of the Creator." It is therefore evident that in man there is one soul adorned with many potencies and virtues. Add that vehement and intense contemplation retards the actions of the senses and impedes nutrition, as is established of those who are given to and intent on great study and speculation; therefore without doubt one and the same soul performs all these functions.

Sixth: given the hypothesis, man would be a threefold individual — for through the vegetative soul he would be a plant or tree; through the sensitive, a brute; and through the intellectual, a man — and he would be under diverse species and not distinguished from them, which is absurd. Hence Aristotle (*1 On the Soul*, T. 91) adds that there cannot be one animal where there are several souls. Moreover, if in man two souls were admitted, then since Christ the Lord was truly and perfectly man, at his death the vegetative and sensitive souls would either have been corrupted, or remained in the sepulcher with his body, or descended with the rational soul to the limbo, or would have existed separately in some fixed place. Not the first, because he would have seen corruption, which conflicts with (*Ps. 15*): "You will not allow your holy one to see corruption." And what he once assumed he would at some point have let go, which contradicts St. Damascene (*3 fidei*, c. 26): "What he once assumed he never let go." Not the second, because the body of Christ would not have lain dead but living in the sepulcher. Not the third nor the fourth, since otherwise the vegetative and

sensitive could be really separated from the body, like the intellective — which is commonly rejected as false and absurd.

You will object first, from Aristotle (*2 de Gen. Animalium*, c. 3): man first lives the life of a plant, then the life of an animal, and finally the life of a rational being. But there Aristotle speaks of priority of time, and not of the operations of those souls but of their very essences, as Zabarella holds — and this is drawn from the words of the cited text: "An animal and a man are not made simultaneously, nor an animal and a horse simultaneously." Therefore according to Aristotle, in man there are three really distinct souls according to substance and essence. St. Thomas (*1 p. q. 118*), Toledo (*2 On the Soul*, quest. 7), and the Coimbrans (*de Gen. quest. 21, art. 3*) respond that the vegetative and sensitive are first in time, and that, on the advent of the intellective, they are corrupted — since the order of nature demands that one proceed from the imperfect to the perfect. Against this: if this response were valid, an individual of a genus would exist in reality outside its species for some interval of time, or man would be first in time a plant, then a brute, and finally a man. The first is false, since there is found in the nature of things no individual that is not immediately the individual of some species. The second does not please, both because the divine Word would at some point have been a plant, then a brute, and finally a man — which no theologian asserts — and also because it is not evident by what the lower souls would be corrupted. For an imperfect is not corrupted by a perfect unless contrary qualities are induced, with whose presence the preceding form cannot persist. Nor do they seem to be incompatible with one another, because it can be said that one with respect to the other plays the role of matter, and the other has the place of form, and thus they are intermediate and subordinate forms. Therefore I respond otherwise: Aristotle is to be expounded not of essence but of operation. The reason is that more things are required for producing the operations of the rational soul than for exercising the works of the vegetative and sensitive, and more for the sensitive than for the vegetative. Therefore the Stagirite rightly infers: man first lives the life of a plant — that is, he first administers the operations of the vegetative, not that man is first a plant or tree before being a brute, as Philoponus interprets it, followed by Albert (*Summa de Homine*), though Zabarella dissents *ibid*. And the same Aristotle suggests this (*2 de Gen. Animalium*): "Man, before he becomes more mature, has the upper part of the body greater than the lower; and the more he grows, the lower parts become longer than the upper. While he is an infant he crawls on all fours; then he stands erect and walks on two feet; and when decrepit he is said to walk on three, because he uses a staff." The contrary happens.

You will object second: where there is an operation, there is its principle and root, since there cannot be an effect without some cause; but in man there are operations of the vegetative and sensitive souls — for man vegetates and senses; therefore in man the vegetative and sensitive souls are present formally, as principles and causes of the said operations. I distinguish the major: formally or

virtually, I grant; always formally, I deny. For the warming of the earth comes from the sun, and yet neither heat nor warming is found formally in the sun but only virtually; so similarly in man there are vegetations and sensations that proceed from the rational soul, which virtually contains the vegetative and sensitive souls, as Scotus indicates (*Collatio 1*).

You will say: man formally vegetates and senses; but what contains another virtually is not formally such — as God, who virtually contains creatures, is not formally a creature; and the sun, which virtually contains heat, is not formally hot; therefore the aforesaid response is invalid and vain. I say there is a disparity, because God so virtually contains creatures that he can produce and create them; not so the rational soul, which virtually contains the vegetative and sensitive souls, since it cannot produce and cause them. The soul is said to virtually contain them because it can act and operate what they act and operate — namely, to vegetate, to sense, and the like. Or I say that God does not formally have the vegetative and sensitive potency as the rational soul and man do — especially since he himself is incapable of this, just as the sun is incapable of heat and the other contrary qualities.

You will object third: contrary operations and opposing effects cannot come from one and the same source, as Scotus argues (*3 d. 15, quest. unica*) from Avicenna (*6 Naturalium, c. 2*). But man experiences in himself opposing actions and contrary effects — for sense conflicts with reason and vice versa, as St. Paul testifies (*Gal. 6*): "The flesh lusts against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh." And Aristotle confirms this (*2 Magna Moralia, c. 9*), saying: "The irrational part impedes the rational from acting." I distinguish the major: of an agent with a single power and potency, I grant; of an agent with several powers, faculties, and potencies, I deny. But the rational soul is distinguished by several powers and potencies, as is clear from intellect, will, and the other potencies and faculties of the soul. St. Augustine excellently suggests this (*18 tract. in Joann.*) with these words: "Through the eyes one can see, through the ears hear, through the hands work — diverse members, diverse offices of members; that member cannot do what this one can; yet on account of the unity of the body, the eye sees for itself and for the ear, and the ear hears for itself and for the eye."

You will object fourth: man is mortal and corruptible — not, however, through the rational soul, which is immortal and incorruptible; therefore through the vegetative and sensitive souls, which are found in him. I respond that it is not for the assigned reason that man is mortal and corruptible, but because of the body, which is corruptible, according to that (*Wisd. 9*): "The body that is corrupted weighs down the soul."

Article XI. Whether, Besides the Soul, There Is a Form of Corporeity in the Animate.

The negating part is embraced by St. Thomas (*1 p. q. 76, art. 4*); Cajetan *ibid.*; Ferrariensis (*2 contra Gentes, c. 58*); Argentinas (*4 d. 13, q. 1, art. 1*); Gregory (*2 d. 17, quest. 2*); and many others teaching that in any living and animate thing, only the soul informs matter, presupposing no form of corporeity. These however are divided in two: some, like St. Thomas (*2 On the Soul, ad text. 4*), hold that the soul informs matter affected by organs for the administration of the works of life; others, like Gregory, think the soul informs matter connoting suitable organs for exercising the functions of life. The affirmative part is defended by Scotus (*4 d. 11, q. 3, art. 2*) and his disciples; Richard (*2 d. 17, art. 1, q. 5*); Mair (*d. 16*); Bacon (*3 d. 19, quest. unica*); Piccolomini; Zabarella; and not a few others, asserting that the soul informs matter through an antecedent form of corporeity, and therefore in any animate thing, besides the soul, there is a form of corporeity.

Note first: the form of corporeity — which is also called by others the form of the mixed substance and of the cadaver — is really distinct both from matter and from the soul. For the form of corporeity constitutes matter in the being of a body, while the soul constitutes the body in the being of a living and animated thing. Therefore in any living and animated thing, according to Scotus, there is a twofold form: one is the form of corporeity, and the other is the soul. The former stands in the manner of matter; the latter plays the role of form, because the first is subordinated to the second. This teaching is not obscurely set forth by Aristotle (*4 Meteor. near the end*), affirming that there are intermediate and subordinate forms, of which the prior ones are underlying and subordinated to the posterior ones, while the last plays the role of form and the rest have the place of matter. And therefore not without reason do some call the form of corporeity the "vicarious" form, because in the absence of the soul it holds its place.

Note second, from Scotus cited: being simply can be taken in two ways. In one way as opposed to non-being — in which sense any being whatsoever, whether substance or accident, is called being simply, and non-being does not merit the name of being simply; hence Aristotle (*1 de Gen. T. 12*) adds that from non-being simply nothing comes to be (*as also at 1 Phys. 33*): from nothing, nothing comes to be. In another way, as opposed to being according to something — and thus only substance is being simply, and accident is being according to something. For substance is constituted first in substantial being, and afterwards receives accidents into itself, since it is the base and foundation of other beings. Furthermore, it is to be recalled from what was said (*1 de Gen. q. 3, art. 3*) that in corruption there is no resolution all the way down to prime matter. For many accidents that were in the generated thing persist and remain in the corrupted thing, as was there abundantly explained and proved.

Assertion: the soul does not inform pure matter, whether it be affected by organs or connotes organs suitable for the functions of life, but presupposes the form of corporeity. So Scotus *ibid.* It is proved first from Aristotle (*1 On the Soul*,

T. 6): "The soul is the act of the organic body" — that is, the substantial and essential perfection of the body; therefore the soul does not inform pure matter but requires the form of corporeity beforehand. For the perfection of something presupposes the perfectible; but the soul is the substantial and essential act and perfection of the body; therefore it presupposes the body already constituted in the being of a body — otherwise it would not be the act of the body but the efficient cause of the body itself. Furthermore, the soul does not inform a body unless it has first been organized. For it is the teaching of all that the soul bestows life on the organized body, and that some interval of time passes in order that the same body be suitably and duly organized; but matter is not a body but part of a body.

You will say with Suárez (*1 de Anima, c. 2*) that the body is not the subject of inherence but of composition, and indeed not of actual but of potential composition. Against this, from (*4 Top. c. 11*): the body is part of the animal, and the whole animal is composed of body and soul; but the parts of a whole are presupposed to exist actually so that the whole may come to be; therefore the body is truly and fully a body with its own proper form of corporeity before being united to the soul. Furthermore, the body is what is informed by the soul; but it cannot actually be informed by it unless it actually exists; therefore the body participates in its own form of corporeity independent of the soul. All the more so, because after the separation or recession of the soul from it, the body persists in the being of a body with all its parts, form, figure, and other accidents, as is seen with the eye. Therefore the body possesses its own proper form of corporeity. And this is plainly shown by the fetus before it is animated, in which the said form, figure, and other aforementioned things are plainly visible — which cannot be produced by the soul not yet educed or introduced. St. Augustine lends support (*13 Civ. c. 24*), speaking of the creation of the rational soul which God breathed in (*Gen. 2*), says: "He gave and placed it in man, that is, in the body." And he adds: "This second body, which God fashioned from the dust, to which a soul was given so that it might become an animate body — that is, a man in a living soul." And (*lib. 83 quest. 54*): "Whatever is vivified by the soul is a body." And the same Doctor expresses the form of the cadaver (*lib. 10 contra Faustum, c. 10*).

Second: several substantial changes require several substantial forms, since the formal terminus of a substantial change is a substantial form; but in the production and generation of any animate thing, several substantial changes are required. For from non-being of a body a body comes to be, and from non-being of an animate thing an animate thing comes to be. But the formal terminus of the prior change is the form of corporeity, and the formal terminus of the later change is the soul. Therefore the soul requires and presupposes the form of corporeity. For we experience that animate things first produce a body through the seminal principle, devoid of life; and then that same body is animated and lives through the soul educed by the generator or introduced by

the creator. And therefore the process goes from the form of the seed to the form of the embryo, from the form of the embryo to the form of corporeity, and from the form of corporeity to the soul by which it is animated and lives. From this process of nature it is clearly established that the soul presupposes the form of corporeity, without which the soul would not inform or vivify the body subjected and presupposed to it.

Third: many accidents that were in the generated thing remain in the corrupted thing — for if a man is wounded and dies, the same scar persists in his dead body that was there while he was alive; and such a scar and the other accidents visible in the said body are subjected in the composite of matter and the form of corporeity, since the subject of accidents, as was asserted and proved elsewhere, is not matter but the composite coalesced from matter and form.

You will say that those are not the same accidents but similar and akin ones. Against this: a sense well disposed and suitably approximated to its proper object is not deceived about it; but the eye sees in the cadaver the very same wound, the very same figure and quantity; in an apple cut from the tree, the same color, odor, and flavor; and in another branch of the same tree, one green and another dry; and similar things that cannot be denied except by a perverse person. Furthermore, if they are not the same accidents, their certain and determinate efficient cause must be assigned — especially since they sometimes arise from the blow of a sword, of lightning, or of artillery; and since in reality no such cause can be assigned, it must be affirmed that those very same accidents remain in the corrupted thing that were in the generated thing, and accordingly their proximate and immediate subject is the body informed by the form of corporeity.

Fourth: what is formally unextended and incorporeal cannot formally confer extended and corporeal being; but the rational soul is unextended and incorporeal; therefore it cannot bestow extended and corporeal being; but man is formally extended and corporeal; therefore this extended and corporeal being is received from an extended and corporeal form, of which kind is the form of corporeity. Especially because, after the departure of the rational soul from the body, the human body still remains extended as it was when it was informed by the rational soul itself; therefore the said extended and corporeal being comes from the form of corporeity.

You will say with Cajetan and other Thomists that the rational soul is equivalent to an extended and corporeal form, and virtually confers extended and corporeal being. Against this: a form cannot produce an effect repugnant to itself — otherwise fire could freeze and water could heat; but to be extended and corporeal is repugnant to the intellective soul, which is unextended and incorporeal; therefore it proceeds from another form than the rational soul. Furthermore, an informing form cannot confer on what is informed any other being than the formal being that it itself has, since it confers upon the subject

matter its formal and essential being; but the formal being of the rational soul is unextended and incorporeal; therefore it does not give the body corporeal and extended being. Fifth: in the three days, the body of Christ was without the rational soul, because Christ the Lord was truly dead; but that very body was the same body then as the one that came out of the Virgin's womb, that hung on the cross, and that rose from the dead — as the holy Fathers assert, chiefly Ambrose, and it is placed at (*d. 2 de Consecr.*); but it was not the same body through the rational soul, which had descended to the limbo; therefore through the form of corporeity. Cajetan responds that it was the same by the identity of the suppositum of the divine Word. Against this: if the body itself had been let go by the Word, so that it was no longer made a suppositum by the Word itself, it would still have been a body and that very same one that came forth from the Virgin, lay in the sepulcher, and rose again, and appeared to the Apostles — not by the identity and unity of the divine suppositum; therefore by the identity and unity of the form of corporeity.

You will say with Suárez that it was the same body sensibly, because the same sensible accidents remained in it, namely the same quantity, figure, wounds, and the like. Against this: accidents do not persist in something unless the same form persists, since accidents reside not in matter but in the composite; therefore it is not rightly said to be the same body sensibly. Furthermore, it is not rightly said in the Eucharist that the substance of bread and wine remains because the same accidents of bread and wine persist. Therefore that body was not the same sensibly, as Suárez imagines.

You will object first: being is from form, and one being is from one form — hence that often-repeated saying: "Form gives being to the thing"; but the animate is one; therefore it is from one form, which is the soul. I distinguish the major: completely and adequately, I grant; incompletely and inadequately, I deny. Which is to say: the ultimate form, which is the soul, confers the ultimate complement, and the whole animate is denominated and specified from it. But nothing prevents it from receiving another being from another subordinate form, by reason of which it is constituted in the being of a body — as is plainly apprehended when the soul is separated from the body, for then the body remains constituted in the being of a body without the soul that informed it. This can also be illustrated from the metaphysical specific difference, which completely and adequately constitutes the lowest species, from which the species itself is denominated — although other higher differences are required and presupposed beforehand, and the same species is denominated from them, as Scotus indicates (*Theor. 12*) and Mauritius explains there.

You will object second: from two acts there is made one per accidens (*2 On the Soul, T. 7; and 7 Met. T. 49*); and two forms are two acts, for a form actuates matter; therefore if two forms were to inform the same matter, the living and animate thing having two forms would be one per accidens, which is false. I

distinguish the major: from two acts not subordinated to one another there is made one per accidens, I grant; from two acts of which one is subordinated to the other, I deny — as I explained sufficiently in note 1.

You will object third: if the form of corporeity were granted, it would be admitted on account of some operation, because form exists for the sake of operating; but this kind of form does not operate, since only the soul is the principle of operations; therefore such a form of corporeity is idle and vain. I grant the major and deny the minor, for it helps in producing material operations. Hence a cadaver placed upright descends downward like any other heavy thing. Likewise it avails for the exercise of organic operations, which are said to belong to the whole conjoined being; for without the body, vegetation, sensation, and the like cannot be accomplished.

You will object fourth: a more perfect form virtually contains the less perfect, and the superior the inferior — as the quadrilateral contains the triangle (*2 On the Soul, T. 31*). Therefore the soul, which is nobler, virtually contains the form of corporeity, which is more ignoble and inferior. I distinguish the antecedent: of the containing of the inferior in the superior by excess of perfection, I grant — as man is contained in an Angel; for that reason Gregory (*hom. 29 in Ev.*) writes: "Every creature has something man has — to be with stones, to live with trees, to sense with animals, and to understand with Angels." Of the containing of the effects of the inferior, I deny. For in this way the soul cannot confer corporeal and extended being, but requires and presupposes it.

You will object fifth, from (*1 de Gen. 2, 3, and 4*): the subject of generation and substantial transmutation is not a being in act but in potency — that is, simple matter; but given the form of corporeity preceding the soul, it follows that the subject of generation is a being in act, or a composite of matter and form, of which kind is the body; therefore the said form of corporeity is not to be conceded. I respond that Aristotle there speaks of the generation of inanimate mixed substance, not of the generation of animate mixed substance, which is the subject of discussion here.

Question II. On the Parts of the Animated Body.

Although in plants and trees it is not difficult to know which parts are living and animated — since it is established that all those parts share in a soul that grow green, increase, and germinate, among which are counted leaves, flowers, fruits, branches, bark, roots, and the like — nevertheless there exists no small controversy about which parts in animate beings enjoy a soul. For animate beings have bones, flesh, blood, nails, hair, and the like, of which we must now treat.

Article I. Whether Blood Is Animated.

The prior opinion is that of Cajetan (*1. 2, q. 54*); Medina (*3 p. q. 5, Part. 2*); Toledo (*2 On the Soul, q. 4*); the Complutenses (*disp. 6, q. 1*); and Báñez (*1 de Gen. c. 4, q. 8, art. 3, not. 2*), affirming that blood is animated. The later opinion is that of Scotus (*4 d. 8, q. 1, sub B; and 3 d. 3, q. 2, § Sed contra hoc arguitur; and in Report. 4 d. 10, q. 4*); Alexander of Hales (*2 p. q. 25, m. 7*); St. Bonaventure (*4 d. 44, q. 1*); Richard *ibid.* (*art. 1, q. 2*); Mair (*d. 43, q. 4*); Bassol (*d. 44, q. 1, art. 2*); St. Thomas (*1 p. q. ult. art. 1 ad 3*); Suárez (*2 On the Soul, c. 3*); Cavellus (*disp. 1, sect. 9*); Galen (*lib. 2 de Elementis*); Fernel *ibid.* (*c. 2*); Seneca (*lib. 2 de Naturalibus quaest.*); and many others, denying that blood is endowed with a soul.

Note first: blood admits of many meanings. It is taken first for progeny — hence it is commonly said: "he is of my blood" and "my blood-relative." Hence St. Augustine (*22 contra Faustum, c. 35*) adds: "The wife of Abraham was procreated from the blood of her father." And Virgil sings (*6 Aeneid*): "The Trojans of high blood." Second, for life — in which sense the Church in the hymn for one Martyr at vespers sings: "Shedding his blood for you, he possesses the eternal gifts." And the Poet (*2 Aeneid*): "He poured out his life with his blood." The same Augustine suggests (*de Sermone Domini in Monte, c. 23, lib. 2; and lib. 4 quaest. ex Leuit. c. 17, quest. 57*). Third, for sin — thus David sings (*Ps. 50*): "Deliver me from bloods," that is, from sins or iniquities, according to the interpretation of the same Augustine *ibid.*; for "blood" is called iniquity, because iniquity is committed through blood. Towards this St. Paul (*1 Cor. 15*) perhaps looks, saying: "Flesh and blood shall not possess the kingdom of God." Fourth, for the warm and moist humor generated in the liver, diffused in the veins and arteries for the nourishing of the members and the sustaining of life. And it is of blood so understood that we speak in the present discussion.

Note second: a thing can be a part of a living animal in two ways. In one way strictly — and thus that part is said to be of the body of an animal which is informed by the soul and is truly living and animated, and pertains to the primary constitution of the animal's body, such as flesh, bone, and the like. In another way broadly — and thus whatever part contributes to the integrity and preservation of the animate is called a part, according to the Doctor (*in 4 at the cited passage*). And blood is counted among the parts of the human body, inasmuch as the human body itself is nourished, fostered, and sustained by blood. Such parts, however, are said to pertain to the secondary constitution of the animated body. For this reason the Council of Trent (*sess. 13, can. 1 and 2*) commemorates the blood of Christ the Lord among the parts of the body. The Council of Ephesus suggests the same (*can. 5*), and in the letter to Nestorius. Aristotle lends support (*3 de Historia Animalium, c. 2*), counting blood among the similar parts of the animal, and indeed the most important, because through blood life is restored and preserved, and when it is consumed the animal naturally dies. Furthermore, observe that among the similar parts of an animal, some are solid and pertain to the consistency of the other parts, such as bones; some are fluid and contribute to the tempering, nourishment, and preservation

of the animal itself, such as humors, among which are blood and the vital spirits, through which vital operations are performed and species are conveyed to the internal organs, just as through air they are conveyed to the external ones; while others serve for the ornament of the animal, such as hair, nails, and the like.

Assertion: blood is not animated. The Doctor holds this at the passages cited above. It is proved first from Aristotle (*2 de Partibus Animalium*, c. 3, at the end), asserting that blood is in the veins like water in a vessel; but water does not have the same form as the vessel in which it exists; therefore blood is not informed by the same form as the veins in which it is contained; but the veins in everyone's opinion are animated; therefore blood is not animated. The same is gathered from (*8 of the same work*, c. 5) and (*3 On the Soul*, T. 45). Second, from Augustine (*lib. 3 quaest. q. 57 in Levit.*): "This temporal life is contained in the body principally through blood"; but what is contained does not seem to participate in the same form as what contains it, as is evident of wine contained in a cask and similar things; therefore, since blood is contained in the body, it does not possess the same form as the living and animated body.

The Complutenses respond at the beginning of the cited article that the said testimonies are to be interpreted of containment not taken strictly but broadly — just as marrow is in the bone and bone is in the flesh, even though both the marrow and the bone are animated; so similarly blood exists in the veins, which does not prevent it from being animated. Against this: Aristotle and Augustine are to be expounded of that containment of which they explicitly speak — and they speak of vase-like containment, saying that blood is held in the veins as in a vessel; but what is taken in something as in a vessel participates in a different form from the very vessel in which it is contained, as was shown above by examples. Furthermore (*4 Phys. T. 41*), Aristotle says that place contains the located thing; but it is evident that the located thing is of a different form from the place; therefore the same Philosopher there is to be understood of proper containment taken strictly. As for what the Complutenses add about the marrow in the bone and the bone in the flesh — it is not valid, because those are contained in these and these in those not as content in container, but as part in co-part, like form in matter; and such parts pertain to the primary constitution of the animated body, as I observed above. Furthermore, marrow is nourished by blood and is continuous with the bone, from which it is preserved, and it has the quality of flesh, most agreeable and delightful to the taste. So the comparison brought forward by the cited authors is impertinent, and they do not adequately address the adduced authorities.

Third: the nourishment of an animate thing does not possess the same form as the animate thing itself possesses; but blood is the nourishment of the animate; therefore blood is inanimate. The major is from Aristotle (*8 de Partibus Animalium*, c. 5) and is the dogma of physicians, who affirm that when blood fails, the animal is nourished by the other humors — namely phlegm, black bile,

and yellow bile — though not as well and conveniently. The reason is given because nourishment passes into the substance of the nourished thing, and therefore is corrupted and there is a certain generation; for nutrition is partial generation, as Scotus teaches (*4 d. 44, q. 1, art. 1*). And the generation of one thing is the corruption of another. For this reason Christ the Lord (*John 12*) warns: "Unless a grain of wheat falling into the ground die, it remains alone; but if it die, it bears much fruit." The minor is given by the same Aristotle (*3 On the Soul, T. 45*). The sign of this is that when blood fails, the animal fails and dies — like a lamp from which the oil is withdrawn, whose light perishes, since oil is its fuel by which it is nourished and preserved.

The aforementioned authors respond by distinguishing and saying that this holds of nutritive blood, not of natural blood. Against this: the distinction of a twofold blood is voluntary and gratuitously devised. It conflicts, first of all, with the generality of physicians and philosophers. It is also contrary to reason. For both the one and the other blood are of the same species, and differ only accidentally — namely, the natural blood is pure and well-digested, while the nutritive is impure and undigested. But this is an accidental difference, just as is seen in pure wine and watered wine, in gold and silver pure and impure and mixed with dross. Fourth: the animated parts are connected and continuous with the other parts of the same animated body, since the animated body itself is one continuum constituted and compounded from all of them. But blood is disconnected and discontinuous from the other parts of the said animated body — both because it is flowing and permeable through its members, and also because it is expressly asserted by Aristotle (*2 de Partibus Animalium, at the end of c. 3*) with these words: "Blood is not continuous and akin to flesh, but is contained in the heart and veins, as in a vessel." Therefore blood is devoid of soul and life.

The same cited philosophers interpose and say that blood, though not immediately, is nonetheless mediately continuous with the other members of the animal, since blood participates in certain coarser parts called fibers, which are continuous with the veins, and the veins with the flesh. Against this: the fibers are of flesh, bone, and nerve; therefore blood is not continuous with them, since those can exist without this, because this is fluid while those are persisting and permanent, hard and solid in some way. Furthermore, coarse and dense do not differ essentially from rare and tenuous, as I showed elsewhere; therefore if the said parts are animated, so too are all the others — and therefore wrongly is blood distinguished into natural, which is animated, and nutritive, which is inanimate. And subsequently into its coarser parts, which are connected with the veins, and its finer and fluid parts, which are separated from them — since blood taken in any way whatsoever is of the same nature and species, and can be entirely separated from the animal's body, while the latter with all its parts and members remains and subsists in the being of a body, though not in the being of a living and animated thing.

Fifth: there comes to bear a theological argument. In the consecration, under the species of bread the body of Christ the Lord comes by virtue of the words, and by concomitance his blood comes, as the Council of Trent has sanctioned (*sess. 13, c. 3*). But if blood were animated, under the species of bread the very blood of Christ itself would come by virtue of the words. For animated parts pertain to the primary constitution of the animated body, as I observed in the second note. Therefore it is concluded both philosophically and theologically that blood lacks soul and life.

Nor does it help to say, with Arriaga and the Complutenses *ibid.*, that this is to be expounded of solid parts, not of fluid parts, of which kind blood is. For this begs the question. For it is certain that blood is a fluid part, and the question is whether it is an animated part or not; and the said authors respond that it is a fluid part, and therefore comes under the species of wine by concomitance. For what is being asked is whether a fluid part enjoys a soul; if it were animated by virtue of the words of consecration, it would be the blood of Christ — which the said Council denies and defines as being by concomitance only. I add, against those same authors, that if his body is given in the manner of food, then certainly his blood is given in the manner of drink, as is clear from (*Matt. 26*): "Drink from this, all of you. For this is my blood of the new testament, which will be poured out for many."

You will object first: what is a part of an animate thing is animated; but blood is a part of an animate; therefore blood is animated. The major is evident, because since the animate is a certain whole informed by a total form, its parts must participate in the same form, which is the soul. The minor rests on the testimony of Aristotle (*3 de Historia Animalium, c. 2*), counting blood among the homogeneous and similar parts of the animal. I distinguish the major: of a part pertaining to the primary constitution of the animal, I grant; of a part pertaining to the secondary constitution and integrity of it, of which kind blood is, I deny. This distinction was introduced and abundantly explained in the second antecedent note. To the distinction of the major, the minor is to be distinguished and explained accordingly.

You will object second: what exercises the works of life is living and animated; but blood performs the works of life; therefore blood is animated. The major is evident from effect to cause. The minor is at hand: blood is moved, palpates, and seethes. Hence the Stagirite (*1 de Historia Animalium, c. 1; and 3 of the same work, c. 19*) explicitly asserts that blood is animated. I add that (*Lev. 17*): "The soul of all flesh is the blood." Augustine concurs (*lib. 2 contra Adversarium Legis; and epistola 146; and lib. de Spiritu et Anima, c. 2*); and Damascene (*2 de Fide, c. 12*). I grant the major and deny the minor. To its proof I say that such operations do not proceed from within but from without — that is, from the soul, which is in the animated members, not in the blood — just as when water boils, that boiling proceeds not from the water but from the fire placed under it. To Aristotle I say

he is to be expounded of animation not properly but metaphorically, in the manner in which a living stone and quicksilver are so called. To the passage of Sacred Scripture it is thus understood: the soul is in the blood as in nourishment by which the animal is sustained, fostered, and preserved. Hence Augustine, commenting on that text (*q. 17*), adds: "Life is in the blood, because it depends on it in many ways — for it is nourished and fostered by it; but it is not formally in it as in an animated body." This is sufficient for it to have been rightly prescribed that sins of souls be expiated through the offering of blood on the altar. Damascene and the others, if adduced, are to be interpreted accordingly.

You will object third: what is hypostatically united to the divine Word is animated, since the Word assumed only animated parts; but blood is united to the Word hypostatically, as John (*3 de Celebratione Missarum*) teaches; therefore blood is animated. I respond that the major is not universally true. For from Scotus (*3 d. 2, q. 1, l. 2*): even a rational nature that is not living could be assumed by the Word — indeed even parts taken separately. In fact, in the three days the parts of Christ's body were hypostatically united to the same Word, even though they were not then animated, because Christ was truly dead.

You will object second additionally: fat is blood congealed by cold, as Galen testifies (*2 de Temperamentis*); or according to Aristotle (*1 de Gen. Animalium, c. 2*), fat is blood digested through good nutrition. But fat is animated; therefore so is blood. I grant the major and deny the minor. For just as seed — as will be said in the next article — is not animated, so too fat is not. For it is a superfluity left over from nutrition, and an excrement, as Aristotle affirms (*1 de Gen. Animalium, c. 18 and 19*). Moreover, when food fails, this very thickness and fatness serves as nourishment for the members of the living and animated body, as Rondelinus says (*1. 3 de Piscibus, c. 14*).

Article II. Whether Seed and Milk Are Animated.

Two things are proposed to be examined and decided in the title of the present article: the first is whether seed is informed by a soul; the second, whether milk likewise is — and both are to be settled.

Note first, from Scotus (*2 d. 18, quest. unica, F*): seed is described as an imperfect body not intended by nature for its own sake, but for the sake of another — namely, so that another similar in species may be generated. It is explained: it is called an imperfect body because the natural agent through seed intends to produce a perfect body. It is added: not intended for its own sake but for the sake of another, because seed is the superfluity of a living animate thing — what is left over, namely, after its nutrition has been had. The final cause is designated by the addition: so that another similar in species may be generated. For the end of seed is the generation of another thing similar in species to the generated. Moreover, two processes are noted: one ascending, the other descending. The prior goes from the imperfect to the perfect — namely, from the form of the

seed to the form of the embryo, from the form of the embryo to the form of the duly organized body, and from the form of the body to the form of the soul. The later process goes from the perfect to the imperfect — that is, from the form of the soul to the form of the cadaver, from the form of the cadaver to the form of the worm, from the form of the worm to the form of earth — and thus it is resolved all the way back to prime matter.

Note second: there is some difference between blood and seed. For in blooded animals, seed is produced from well-digested blood. So that this may be understood, observe the manner of its making: food is first broken down by the animal's teeth — hence physicians say the first digestion takes place in the mouth. Then the same food, thus broken down, is sent to the stomach, where it is cooked and the second digestion takes place. For the food thus cooked in the stomach is called chyle; and if any of it has been purged, it is sent to the bowel; but what has been good for the living thing is carried through the mesenteric veins to the liver, where it is cooked again and the third digestion takes place, and there it acquires its redness from the liver itself, which is red. Afterwards it is transferred through the cava and portal veins to all the parts and all the members of the animal, and existing in them is converted into the substance of the animate — and this is its nutrition. But if anything remains, it turns either into fat or into seed, which is transferred to the suitable vessels and those that preserve it, and from it generation takes place.

Note third: milk does not differ essentially from menstrual blood, but only accidentally — that is, in fatness, color, sweetness, and the like — as Aristotle teaches above others (*4 de Gen. Animalium*, c. 48), calling milk blood well digested and not corrupted. Clement of Alexandria concurs (*lib. 6 Paedagogi*, c. 6), saying that milk is blood according to substance, with only the color changed by a strong spirit. This is suggested from the fact that milk for the most part is derived from the menstruum. For in females, when the fetus is conceived, the menstrual flux ceases, so that from it the fetus itself may be nourished and increased. And the more it ceases, the greater the fetus grows, and the milk is consumed. For it is attracted through the veins and transferred, and is deposited in the breasts, where it is cooked again and receives whiteness, sweetness, and the other accidents. I said "for the most part derives from the menstruum" because it sometimes happens that milk flows from males, who do not undergo the menstruum. For it is reported that on the island of Lemnos, from a goat's udders so much milk was milked that a cheese was made from it, as Aristotle narrates (*3 de Historia Animalium*, c. 20).

First assertion: seed is not actually animated. So Scotus (*4 d. 44, q. 1, a. 2 ad 1, Q; and 2 d. 20, q. 2 sub C*), preceded by Aristotle (*2 On the Soul*, c. 1, T. 10; and *2 de Gen. Animalium*, c. 1); Albert (*2 p. Summa de Homine*, praised q. 7); Met. (q. 19); Fernel (*7 Physiolog.* c. 13); and many others, against Plato in the *Timaeus*, Paracelsus (*lib. de Semine*), and certain others. It is proved first: what is contained in something as

in a vessel does not possess the same form as the vessel — as is clear of water in an amphora and wine in a cup; but seed is in certain members of the animal as in a vessel, for nature has provided certain vessels in which seed is contained. And therefore seed is not intended by nature for its own sake as a suppositum, but for the sake of another similar in species to be generated, as I made plain in the first note explaining its definition. Second: the nourishment of an animate thing is not animated, as I showed in the preceding article concerning blood; but seed is the residue of nourishment of a living being, as I declared above in note 2; therefore seed does not actually participate in a soul. Third: seeds of herbs, plants, and trees kept at home do not live; therefore neither do the seeds of animals. The antecedent is established by experience, for they are not nourished nor do they grow. Furthermore, seed cut off from an animal does not live, as the adversaries themselves concede; therefore neither does seed while joined in the animal. The consequence holds, because both seeds participate in the same form and the same properties and accidents. Fourth: if seed were animated, either it would have the same individual soul as the whole suppositum lives by, or a different one. Not the second — otherwise there would be two different souls in one and the same individual suppositum, which is false. If the first, it follows that in generation no new form is induced from the potency of matter, but only the prior one is enlarged and extended to inform another body. And I thus argue this: the seed cut off from the animal is truly seed and in no way loses its character of seed; indeed, placed in a suitable location, it seems more to have the character of seed, since it then performs that function for which it was established by nature. Therefore it is informed by the same form it previously had — otherwise it would no longer be seed, because it would receive another form. But the prior form cannot be corrupted unless another comes anew, for the corruption of one thing is the generation of another.

Second assertion: milk lacks a soul. The Doctor does not dissent *ibid.* It is proved first from Aristotle (*4 de Gen. Animalium*, c. 8), affirming and calling milk blood well digested and not corrupted. Second: milk and blood differ only accidentally, from the third note; but blood lacks a soul, as was proved in the preceding article; therefore so does milk. Third: milk for the most part is the menstruum well purified, with filth and sediment removed, as I made sufficiently manifest at the passage just cited. But the menstruum does not differ essentially from blood; therefore neither does milk. And accordingly, since the menstruum is inanimate, likewise milk is inanimate.

You will object first, against the first assertion: what has the power of producing an animate thing is actually animated; but seed has the power of producing a living and animated thing, as daily experience teaches; therefore seed is actually animated. I respond that the major can be denied. For the sun in the opinion of many has the power of engendering a frog, even though the sun itself lacks a soul. But if the major is conceded, the minor is to be distinguished: seed

participates in the principal power of generating an animate thing, I deny; the dispositive power, I grant.

You will object second: seeds of herbs, plants, and trees are nourished, grow, and germinate when kept at home, as is evident of garlic, onions, and the like. But nourishment, growth, and germination are vital operations proceeding from a living and animated thing; therefore seed is actually living and animated. I distinguish: certain things are both seeds and fruits at once — of roots, stalks, and plants, such as the just-mentioned ones — and that these live and are animated, I grant. Others are seeds only, and that these enjoy a soul and life, I deny. Hence Aristotle (*2 On the Soul, c. 1 and 2; de Gen. Animalium, c. 1*) adds that no seed is animated and lives.

You will object third, against the second assertion: diverse actions and distinct properties argue a distinct nature and essence, as no one denies; but milk and blood possess diverse actions and also distinct passions — for blood is red and hot, while milk is white and cold; therefore it does not follow that if blood is inanimate, milk likewise is inanimate. I grant the major. To the minor I say that this argues only an accidental difference, not a substantial one — about which the contention stands.

Article III. Whether Hair and Nails Are Animated.

The first opinion is that of St. Thomas (*4 d. 44, quest. 1, art. 2, quaestiuncula 3*); Javellus (*2 On the Soul, quest. 10*); Báñez (*1 de Gen. c. 4, quest. 8, art. 4*); and others affirming that hair and nails are animated. The second opinion is that defended by Fernel (*2 Physiolog. c. 2*); Galen (*lib. Artis Medicae*); Fracastorius (*lib. de Anima*); Toledo (*2 On the Soul, quest. 4, c. 2*); with whom Scotus (*4 d. 8, quest. 1*) seems to concur — all denying that hair and nails are endowed with a soul.

Note first, from Isidore and Bercharius (*lib. 2 Reductorii, c. 61*): hair, so called from "head hairs," are also called locks, tresses, and various other names. In their production nature proceeds thus: from the animal's nutrition there remain certain sediments and excretions, thick and dry, along with sooty vapors enclosed in the narrow pores of the skin and retained in confined channels, which take on the elongated shape of those channels and press themselves outward and come into the light in orderly fashion. And although they are excrementitious, they nonetheless contribute to the ornament and elegance of the animal, as St. Augustine notes above others (*in Ps. 34, concl. 1; in Ps. 51*). In much the same way nature seems to comport itself in the formation of nails. For the veins, nerves, tendons, and ligaments of the fingers emit, from the residue of nourishment, a certain excretion, thicker, drier, and harder, at the extremities of the fingers, hands, and feet, and there it solidifies and hardens more, and at length turns into and becomes nails — which in some way contribute to the protection and ornament of the animal, as St. Augustine notes (*lib. 22 de Civ. Dei, c. 24*).

Note second: some, although they willingly concede that hair is not animated and alive, nevertheless deny this of nails, because in these are seen certain fibers and small veins or quasi-roots, in much the same way as such small veins appear in the roots or fronds of trees, through which nourishment is conveyed to those parts being nourished. All the more so because by their being struck and torn out we are affected by no small pain — which would certainly not occur unless nails enjoyed a soul. But the opposite is more probable and likely, and therefore is to be held. For the said indications do not compel. Even in certain stones and other non-living things certain fibers and small veins are seen, yet they are not considered to be living. Likewise, in the pulling out of hair we are tormented by pain — yet the adversaries concede that hairs are inanimate. For such pain is caused from the contiguity of parts with one another, not because they possess life — just as if iron is thrust into flesh and retained there, when it is pulled out it causes pain.

Assertion: both nails and hair lack soul and life. This is in accord with Aristotle and Scotus cited above. It is proved first: what is not a part of the animal according to potency and substance is not animated; but nails and hair are not parts of the animal either according to potency or according to substance; therefore they are not animated. The major is evident: for what is not a part of a natural body plainly does not participate in the form of the natural body; likewise what is not a part of a living body cannot enjoy a soul and life. The minor is at hand, since the said hair and nails serve for the ornament and assistance of the animal, and therefore are not animated. Second: what is superfluous, to be expelled, and an excrement of the nourishment of the animate is not animated. But hair and nails are such, as I showed in note 1. Therefore they are inanimate. The major is known: because the parts of the animate are not expelled from it, and what passes into the nourishment of the animal is not rejected by it — which is not preserved in hair and nails. The minor is from Aristotle (*lib. 3 de Historia Animalium, c. 11*). Third: in living things there is always some work of life, since the work of life is the necessary effect of the animate; but hair and nails produce no work of life — for they grow by juxtaposition, as experience confirms of the bodies of certain deceased persons, and as is seen in the body of Blessed Angela of Clavasio, Cunei, and Blessed Anthony of Strona, Assisius at rest, in whom nails and hair grow. But such accretion comes about by juxtaposition, in much the way that water is increased by the addition of water. Furthermore, when nails and hair are cut, provided that the flesh is not touched and harmed, no pain is inflicted on the animal; therefore they are not animated.

You will object first, from Aristotle (*1 On the Soul, T. 79; and 3 of the same, c. 13*): hair is called a part of the animal. And (*3 de Historia Animalium, c. 11*): in certain animals, nails reach such hardness that they do not differ from bones; but bones are animated; therefore so are nails. I respond to the two prior testimonies: hair is a secondary and excrementitious part of the animal, not a primary and per se

intended by nature. Therefore they lack souls. To the third testimony I say that the similarity of the Philosopher holds with respect to hardness, not with respect to animation. Therefore I grant that nails sometimes harden as much as bones, but I deny that nails are animated as bones are.

You will object second: when the heat of the animal fails, hair likewise fails and falls out, as is established in the aged. Therefore hair is animated — otherwise it is not apparent from what cause their falling would occur. I respond that this comes from the connection and contiguity that they have with the animal's flesh. Hence when heat and moisture fail, hair likewise fails.

You will object third: nails and hair grow, as daily experience shows; therefore they are animated. The consequence holds, because growth is a sign of soul and life. I respond that nails do not grow by internal absorption — which is required for something to be truly and intrinsically animated. I add that the animate grows according to a triple dimension, while hair and nails grow only in length — which undoubtedly means they are neither animated nor living.

You will object fourth: teeth are animated, as all philosophers affirm with Aristotle (*3 de Gen. c. 4*), and indeed rightly, since they are notable parts in the fabric of the animal. Therefore the same must be affirmed of hair and nails, since the same reasoning is evident in both. Confirmation: nails have certain fibers and small veins through which nourishment passes and they are nourished; but what is nourished is without doubt animated; therefore soul and life are not to be denied to them. I grant the antecedent and deny the consequence. The reason is that teeth are bones, by the common opinion of philosophers — not so nails, as is evident from their section. To the confirmation I say that even if fibers and small veins appear in nails, they are nonetheless not animated — as is clear of stones in which such fibers and veins are seen, even though they lack soul and life, by the common consent of all.

Article IV. Whether the Organic Parts of an Animal Have Forms Specifically Distinct.

This doubt is usually proposed under another title: whether there are partial forms? On this there are two extreme opinions. One is that of Alexander of Hales (*1 p. quest. 59, m. 2*); St. Thomas (*2 contra Gentes, c. 64; and 1 p. quest. 76, art. 5 ad 3*); Ruverius (*2 On the Soul, c. 3, quest. 7*); and the Complutenses (*disp. 6, quest. 2, § Secundo*) — and others — denying that the members and organic parts enjoy forms distinct from the soul of the animal by which the whole animal itself is informed and lives. The other is that of Scotus (*4 d. 11, quest. 3; and 7 Met. quest. 10*); Anthony Andreas *ibid.* (*quest. 17*); Mair (*2 d. 16, quest. unica*); and many others, affirming that the members and organic parts of the animal participate in distinct partial forms from the form of the whole and from the soul by which the animal lives.

Note: the organic parts of the animal are of a twofold difference — some are homogeneous and the rest heterogeneous. The former are similar, of the same nature and denomination — so the parts of bone are and are called bones, and the parts of flesh are and are called flesh. The latter are of diverse nature and name — such as the head, neck, arms, feet, and the like — which have diverse complexions, properties, and operations. Among these members, some are principal — such as the heart, brain, and the like — while others are less principal, such as the hands, feet, and the like.

Assertion: the organic parts of an animal possess forms specifically distinct from one another and from the common form, which is the soul. The Doctor holds this *ibid*. It is proved first from Aristotle (*3 de Partibus Animalium, c. 4*), affirming that the heart is the first part of the animal — which is to say, the heart is produced earlier than the other members of the animal's body, before the soul comes to inform its body. In that prior moment the heart has its own form, because nothing sublunary and substantial exists that lacks its own substantial form; but then the heart does not participate in the form of the soul, since the soul is supposed not yet to exist. Therefore it enjoys its own proper form of the heart, by reason of which it is distinct from the forms of the other parts of the animal's body.

Some respond — whose names Mair (*at the cited passage*) passes over, and the Complutenses (*cited*) follow — that the heart and the other members of the animal have among themselves a distinction not essential but only accidental. Against this: no matter, whether total or partial, is found naturally without form; but in the heart there is partial matter, as is evident; therefore also a partial form; and this is not accidental, because since matter is a substance, certainly its form is a substance too; and therefore since one substance differs from another substance substantially, it is plainly inferred that the said distinction is not accidental but substantial. Again: the total and adequate thing capable of being perfected is the organic body — hence (*2 On the Soul, c. T. 6*) the soul is defined as "the first act of the organic body." But the organic body coalesces from dissimilar and heterogeneous parts, among which the heart holds the chief place. The whole organic body and its parts are required and presupposed before they are informed by the soul. Therefore since this body is a substance and its parts are substantial, it is soundly concluded that they differ substantially from one another.

Second: diverse temperament, figure, and operation argue a diverse form and substance — for through these we arrive at knowledge of the latter. Hence Aristotle adds (*1 On the Soul, T. 11*): "Accidents contribute greatly to knowing the substance." But the organic parts of the animal participate in diverse temperament, are distinguished by distinct figure, and elicit different operation. For the heart is hot and is the workshop of the vital spirits; the brain is cold and

the source of the animal spirits; flesh is moist and soft; bone is dry and hard; and so of the rest. Therefore they possess diverse partial substantial forms.

The aforementioned authors respond and say that this proceeds from accidents and dispositive qualities. For dispositions are present in the head and in its organs for sight, hearing, and the other sensations — but not in the feet and other members of the animal's body. Therefore such diverse operations do not arise from diverse substantial but from diverse accidental forms. Against this: diverse accidents reveal and manifest diverse substantial forms, since substance is hidden from us and matter is passive; therefore operation is attributed to form and to the whole composite; therefore, seeing various and diverse accidents and operations, we detect distinct substantial forms and composites — as Aristotle rightly discusses (*1 On the Soul, T. 64 and following*). Hence a plant has a diverse figure from a tree, a tree from man, man from a lion, and so of the rest. And likewise they act and operate diversely — which plainly proceeds only from forms specifically or generically distinct.

Third: if any organic part of the animal is cut off from it, it still retains its own form that it had when conjoined with the other members and parts. For if a bone is moved, it appears as the very same bone, with the same form and figure that it previously had. But that form does not proceed from the soul, as is evident, because the soul is separate and segregated from it. Therefore each organic part of the animal possesses its own proper substantial form. It does not help to say that this proceeds from accidental forms that are subjected in matter. For matter, from what was said, is not the proximate and immediate subject of accidents; and matter is never found without some substantial form. Therefore if any organic part separated from the whole animal is found, it enjoys its own proper partial substantial form. Add that this is also seen in artifacts — for the image of a painter possesses several specifically distinct forms, such as white color, black, and the like; therefore this is also not improperly affirmed of natural things, with this difference, however, that those forms are accidental while these are substantial.

You will object first: a dead hand and a living hand are equivocally a hand, as Aristotle testifies (*4 Meteor.; 7 Met. T. 35*). But if the hand had a peculiar form distinct from the soul, a hand would not be equivocal to the dead and the living, because both would participate in the same form of the hand. Therefore the organic parts do not possess forms specifically distinct. I respond that the hand and any other organic member of the animal can be considered in two ways. In one way, insofar as the hand implies an order to the soul actually informing that hand — and in this way the living and dead hand are equivocal, since the living hand is informed by a soul which the dead hand lacks. In another way, absolutely, insofar as it has the form of a hand — and in this way both are univocated in the form of the hand. Through this distinction the testimony of Aristotle is expounded.

You will object second: there seems to be a greater distinction between animate organic parts than between inanimate organic parts; but animate organic parts possess one common form, namely the soul; therefore so do inanimate ones. The major is argued: because the former have distinct operations — the eye vision, the ear hearing, and so of the rest — which argue distinct souls from which they proceed; the latter elicit one common action and operation; yet notwithstanding this, only one form is participated in by them. Therefore etc. I deny the consequence of the major. For one soul, through distinct powers and potencies, can elicit and exercise distinct operations; therefore from diverse operations one does not rightly infer diversity of souls. But truly, from diverse temperaments and passions, diversity of forms is soundly derived according to the diverse organic parts, as is clearly shown by what we adduced above.

You will object third: what is continuous does not have parts possessing diverse forms — as is clear of wood, gold, and the other continuous things participating in exactly the same common form; but the body of an animal is continuous, for all its parts are continuous with one another, as is seen with the eye. Therefore such parts do not enjoy distinct forms. I respond that the major, on which the adversaries press, is not entirely true. For a branch of a tree is continuous, even though one part of it is living and another dry, sometimes. Similarly, sometimes the feet of the human body are dry, while its other members are healthy and living. To the minor it can be said that the body of an animal is not simply continuous, but mixed and intermediate between continuous and contiguous, because its parts are bound and connected together among themselves.

You will object fourth: if such organic parts had forms specifically different, they would constitute one per accidens and one by aggregation, for from several disparate acts there is made one per accidens. But in the common opinion the composite of the animal is one per se; therefore its parts do not possess specific forms. I deny the consequence of the major, since those partial forms are subordinated to the common form, which is the soul. And therefore from them one per se is well made.

You will object fifth: each substantial form together with matter constitutes a suppositum; therefore if in it there were several substantial forms, it would be deduced that it, coalesced from them, would be a multiple suppositum and hypostasis — which is false, as no one denies. I respond that not just any substantial form constitutes a suppositum, but only the total, complete, and perfect form. Therefore it is wrongly inferred that from several partial forms specifically distinct from one another, one suppositum is multiple.

Article V. On the Parts of the Human Body.

A synopsis of the individual parts of the human body is commonly called anatomy, which I have now decided to touch upon, leaving its exquisite treatment and diligent and careful investigation to its masters and professors. I

begin rather from the parts of the human body than from the parts of the natural body taken generally or of any other animate and animal, because the said parts of the human body are nobler and more excellent, and because its fabric is more admirable and more divine.

By some, the whole human body is divided into three cavities: the first is called the head, the second the thorax, and the third the limbs. By others, a fourfold distribution is made of those parts. The first is into essential and integral parts. The former are those that essentially constitute the whole — such as body and the rational soul in man, and in any other natural composite, matter and form. The integral parts, which integrate, perfect, and adorn the whole, are the head, neck, arms, hands, etc.

The second distribution is into spermatic, nutritive, and excrementitious parts. The spermatic parts are those fashioned from the seed by progenitors, and are called primigenial because they were produced from the beginning of the fetus. The nutritive parts are those generated through nutrition and connected to the prior or primigenial parts. The excrementitious parts are those that proceed from superfluous nourishment — such as seed, milk, hair, etc.

The third distribution is into containing, contained, and impulse-producing parts. The containing parts are those that hold other parts within their compass — such as membrane, skin, hide, and the like. The contained parts are those held under others — such as the liver, heart, lungs, and the rest. The impulse-producing parts are those that excite the other parts — such as the vital spirits that pulse the arteries.

The fourth is into heterogeneous or dissimilar parts, which are of diverse nature — such as flesh, bone, etc. — and homogeneous or similar parts, which are of the same nature — such as flesh and its parts, which are flesh, just as water and its parts are water. But the most important similar parts are reckoned as seven: bone, cartilage, ligament, tendon, membrane, skin, and flesh. To these can be referred the four humors, spirits, seed, and milk. Bone is a terrestrial, dry, cold, and hard substance, and also animated. For it is nourished and grows by internal absorption. In bones the whole fabric of the body is supported and sustained. For they are the buttresses and foundations of the other parts and members of the animal's body. Cartilage is a substance softer than bone, which can be bent and folded. Some cartilage is situated at the extremities of bones, as is evident of the cartilage of the nose; other cartilage is not attached to the extremities of bones, such as the cartilage of the ear. Ligament, as its name indicates, is a certain substance connecting or binding bones, lest they be moved from their proper places. Tendon is derived from "tending," because, as its very name indicates, it stretches the member to be moved like a cord, and is intermediate between ligament and nerve — for it is softer than ligament and harder than nerve. Membrane is the covering that sheaths the parts and members of the body. Skin is the membrane that covers the whole body or some part of it. It is

divided into outer skin — called the epidermis — which is visible to our eyes; and inner skin — called the dermis — which we do not see quite so easily. Flesh is a certain soft substance in the body produced from blood. It differs from fat, because although fat too is made from blood, it is nevertheless produced by cold through a kind of congealing; while flesh is formed by heat through drying.

The four humors are blood, phlegm — that is, pituita — black bile, namely melancholy, and yellow bile, that is, choler — all of which serve nutrition and are simultaneously mixed, as the generality of physicians asserts, against Aristotle (*2 de Partibus Animalium*). Spirit is a certain subtle substance, and is called spirit because of its tenuous quality and readiness to act. These spirits are observed at the incision of a vein, for by the power of the spirits themselves blood exits from the cut vein. They are divided into innate and inflowing. Innate spirits are subtle substances produced from the beginning of the fetus for its consistency. Inflowing ones are those that flow in together with the blood and assist the innate spirits. Furthermore, the inflowing spirits are subdivided into natural, vital, and animal. The natural ones flow together with the blood in the vein and assist nutrition. The vital ones are those that proceed from the heart as from the source of life. The animal ones are those that derive their origin from the brain and contribute to the performance of sensations. Scotus treats of these to some extent (*4 d. 49, quest. 16, § Alius intellectus*), saying that they are diffused through the whole body and through those pores where there is no solid flesh.

The principal dissimilar parts are reckoned as four and are called the muscle, vein, artery, and nerve. The muscle is a heterogeneous part woven from a covering, flesh, fibers, and ligaments. It is divided into broad, deep, and oblong muscle. The vein is a heterogeneous part woven from a single covering, a receptacle of nutritive blood. It is divided principally into the vena cava and the portal vein — and into many others, the smallest of which are called capillary veins. The artery is a dissimilar part invested with a double covering, a receptacle of vital blood. It arises from the heart. Two arise from the very heart — from the left side of it — one of which is called the venous artery and the other the aorta. The venous artery is carried to the lungs and provides them with arterial blood and purges the sooty residues. The aorta is that which enriches the other parts of the body with vital influx. The nerve is a heterogeneous part, a vehicle of the animal spirits, through which the soul seated in the brain governs and regulates the whole body. It takes its origin from the brain — against Aristotle, as physicians teach, who, as more experienced, deserve trust, especially since this is seen in anatomical dissection.

Now it remains to declare the parts insofar as they are rightly disposed by nature and aptly ordered. Three parts are observed principally in the fabric of the human body: the head, the thorax, and the limbs. The head is divided into the hair-bearing part — so called because it is adorned with hair — and the non-hair-bearing part, because it lacks hair. This encompasses the forehead, eyes,

nose, cheeks, temples, lips, ears, and the rest. The former is subdivided into the sinciput, that is, the anterior part of the head; the vertex, that is, the summit of the head; and the occiput, namely the posterior part of the head. They are then subdivided into containing and contained parts. Again, the containing parts into common — such as the skin and the membrana carnea — and proper; the latter are distributed into external ones, such as the pericranium and the cranium, in which the brain is preserved as in a helmet; and internal ones, which are the two meninges encompassing the whole brain — of which one, because it is harder, is called the dura mater; the other, because it is more delicate, is called the pia mater. The contained parts are the cerebrum and cerebellum. The former is in the anterior part of the head and is larger; the latter is in the posterior part of the same head and is smaller, as its name indicates. In the brain there are observed certain cells in which the senses reside, of which mention will be made individually in its proper place when we treat of the senses.

In the thorax there are two skins — the epidermis and the dermis. There are certain fat tissues, the serratus muscles, the mastoid, and the bronchus. Also visible are two breasts, especially in females. The diaphragm presents itself, which is like a wall interposed and contains in itself the vital operations by means of a certain universal membrane, which according to its relationship to different places receives different names. Insofar as it regards what is below, it is called the septum and the peritoneum; insofar as it regards what is above, it is called the pleura and the subcinging membrane; and in the head, the meninx. Then follows the heart, which is the beginning and source of life, consisting of two parts — one broader, called the base or head; the other narrower and pointed, called the cusp or apex. In the heart itself are found two ventricles, the same number of auricles, and four small vessels. In the right ventricle are seen two veins — the vena cava and the portal vein; in the left, two arteries — the venous artery and the aorta. And to the heart are given the two said auricles, perhaps so that its heat may be moderated and cooled as by two bellows. Then come the lungs, whose material is soft and spongy; they expand and then contract, since they are conceded by nature for respiration. Like the bellows of an organ they expand to draw in cold air, and contract to expel warm air. David perhaps suggests this (*Ps. 118*): "I opened my mouth and drew in the spirit." And Augustine expresses it (*lib. 4 contra Iulianum, c. 14*): "The lungs are like bellows, by which we alternately inhale and exhale vital breaths." And in the commentary on (*Ps. 102*): "The lung of the breast, the liver, is a kind of bellows of the panting spirit that we breathe, the spirit of the received air, which is expressed in voice and sound when we articulate words." Nor are the rough artery — which serves for respiration and for forming the voice — and the esophagus — which is the channel through which nourishment is transmitted to the stomach — to be omitted. The muscles of the larynx and neck, the uvula, the spine, twenty-four ribs (twelve on one side and twelve on the other). The liver follows, in which the

natural faculty resides and the rooting of the veins; the spleen, and the rest, which are explained by the anatomists.

The limbs — also called the lower belly — are divided into containing and contained parts. The containing parts are the epidermis and dermis, and the adipose and carnosae membrane. The contained parts are numbered: the navel, the omentum (that is, the membrane that adheres to the bottom of the stomach), the intestines — one of which is called the duodenum, because its length is measured by twelve fingers; another is called the jejunum, because since it is longer than the colon, it never seems full; the third is the ileum; the fourth, the cecum; the fifth, the colon; and the sixth, the rectum, which expels excretions by a straight passage. Their binding is called the mesentery. There follow the urinary canals, the bladder, the spermatic vessels, and the rest, of which the anatomists treat abundantly.

Question III — On the Powers of the Soul in General

Now that the soul has been examined in itself and in general terms, and the parts of the animated body as well, the orderly method of inquiry requires that we investigate the soul's powers, forces, and faculties, with the help of divine grace. For to exist is prior to what follows upon existence, as the Doctor touches upon (*4. dist. 10. quaest. 7. §. Respondeo A. 2.*).

Article I — By What the Powers of the Soul Are Produced

There are those who hold that the powers of the soul are produced by the generator of the animated composite, as by their proximate and immediate principle. The common opinion of the Philosophers, however, maintains that the forces, faculties, and powers of the soul are produced immediately and proximately by the soul itself.

Note first, following Scotus cited just below (*in exp. 9. Met. cap. 2.*), that certain powers belong to inanimate things — such as the power of fire to heat and of water to cool — while others belong to animate things, such as the nutritive and augmentative powers. Among the latter, some arise from the soul, as the intellect and will arise from the rational soul; others arise from the body, such as the power of local motion; and still others arise from the whole composite, such as the vegetative and sensitive powers and the like, of which Aristotle makes mention (*1. animae, 64.*) and Scotus (*12. Met. in expof. T.13.*), saying that powers other than the intellect and will are organic and belong to the whole composite, and that in separation they do not remain except as in their root.

Note second, that by the soul's powers we understand the immediate principles of vital operations — thus the intellect is the proximate and immediate principle of intellection, the will of volition, and the sense of sensation. Hence the Doctor adds (*3. d. 34. q. vn. ante §. His suppositis sub H.*) that a power is that by which the capable being is capable and strong. Now, something can be produced

by another in two ways: either through motion and change, in which case the product is really distinct from the producer, as effects are from their causes; or through simple emanation, or real resultance, as powers arise from the soul and from the whole animated composite — just as the heating power arises from fire and the cooling power from water. In this way the divine attributes are said to blossom forth from the divine essence. Scotus describes this twofold mode of production (*1. post. quest. 25. §. Ad quest. vers. Sed alio modo*), as does Sarnanus (*quest. 1. univers. pag. 16. 17.*).

Note third, that from one and the same simple soul, multiple powers arise — as the intellect and will proceed from the rational soul — in a certain order. For the intellect proceeds from the intellective soul prior to the will, after the manner of several effects essentially ordered from the same cause and proceeding from it, of which one presupposes another — not because one is efficiently caused by the other, as motion is said to cause heat, but because between the two there is a natural presupposition, and one is more immediately close to the cause or at least presupposes fewer conditions. Thus we understand before we will — not because intellection is the cause of volition, but because intellection requires fewer prior conditions than volition does. And so the intellect naturally emanates from the soul prior to the will, as the Doctor indicates (*1. distinct. 2. quest. 7. O.*) and in many other places.

First assertion: Some powers arise immediately from the soul, others from the whole composite, and all arise mediately and remotely from the generator. This assertion is twofold and is held by the Doctor in the places cited above. It is also suggested by Saint Augustine (*lib. 1. contra Iulianum, cap. 3.*), saying: "If we seek the origins of wills, what presents itself but natures, which God has established as good?" The first part is proved as follows. That is the immediate and proximate principle of something which, when first posited, immediately brings about the thing, and when first removed, immediately takes it away. Now, when the soul is posited, the inorganic powers are immediately posited; and when the whole composite is posited, the organic and material powers are immediately posited — which seems evident to everyone. Therefore, the soul and the whole composite are the immediate and proximate principles of all the aforesaid faculties and powers.

Second: the soul is not more ignoble than the forms of the elements, since it is the principle of life; and the animated composite is not inferior to the inanimate composite. Now the forms of the elements, and the elements themselves, are the proximate and immediate principles of their own powers — fire of its heating power, water of its cooling power. Therefore, likewise the soul, and the living animated whole, are the immediate principles and origins of the said forces and powers.

The second part is explicitly defended by the Doctor (*1. post. quest. 56. §. Ad 1.*) and is supported by the common maxim of the Philosophers: whoever gives

being gives what follows upon being. And by the legal maxim: whoever gives the principal gives the accessory. Now the generator produces the animated being, and therefore mediately and consequently produces its forces and faculties. Furthermore, whoever produces a corporeal substance also produces its passions and accidents — such as quantity, quality, and the like. Now the generator produces an animate being similar to itself, and therefore consequently produces the forces and powers that accompany and follow upon it.

First objection: Aristotle writes (*7. Phys. 1.*) that nothing is moved by itself. But if the soul and the animated being were to produce their own powers and faculties, they would be moved by themselves toward the production of those powers. Therefore those powers do not proceed from them. I respond and say that Aristotle's dictum holds of things produced through motion and change, but not of those which proceed through simple emanation — such as the forces and powers of the soul and of the whole animated composite, as I made clear in the second note.

Second objection: From one, as one, only one can proceed, on the authority of Averroes (*8. Phys. com. 46.*). But the soul is a single, simple substance, and the animated being is likewise one. Therefore multiple forces and powers cannot proceed from them. I respond by way of distinction: from one having only a single principle, only one can proceed — this I concede; from one having multiple principles, I deny it. Thus from the single sun there arise the power of illuminating and the power of heating, and from one cause multiple effects proceed.

Article II — Whether the Powers of the Soul Are Distinct from One Another and from the Soul Itself

The first opinion is that of Ockham (*2. quest. 24. v.*), Gabriel, Gregory, and other Nominalists, who hold that the powers of the soul are entirely identical with the soul itself — so that the rational soul is not distinct from the intellect and will which are its powers, but is itself the intellect and will, connoting the operations of those powers. For the soul, insofar as it understands, connotes the intellect; and insofar as it wills, connotes the will.

The second opinion is that of Alexander of Hales (*2. p. q. 65. m. 2.*), Thomas (*1. p. quest. 77. art. 1.*), Toledo (*2. anima, quest. 9.*), Rubeius (*ibid. cap. 3. quest. 1.*), and many others, who hold that the powers are really distinct from one another and from the soul.

The third opinion is defended by Scotus (*2. dist. 16. quest. vn. & 4. dist. 44. quest. 2.*), Tataretus (*2. de anim. quest. 2. art. 2.*), John of Magistris, Poncius (*disp. 58. quest. 11.*), and very many others, who teach that a formal distinction intervenes between the soul and its powers.

Note first — and recall from what was said above in the preceding article (*ex Scot. 4. dist. 10. quest. 7. §. Dico A.*) — that just as man is composed of soul and body, so he participates in certain spiritual powers which arise from the rational soul alone, such as the intellect and will, and in certain material powers which belong to the whole composite, such as the visual power and the like, as Aristotle writes (*l. de sensu, Sensato, cap. 1.*). And indeed, among those belonging to the whole composite, some are said to be more corporeal — namely, those which follow upon the nature of the mixed body — while others seem to approach more nearly the nature of the soul, inasmuch as they follow upon and accompany the animated body. With this distinction in place, we must accept what the same Doctor teaches (*in 4. dist. 44. quest. 2.*): that inorganic powers — so called, perhaps, because they do not require a bodily organ for the exercise of their operations — are really identical with the soul but formally distinct from it; whereas organic powers, which do not belong to the soul in themselves but only radically and partially, and belong rather to the whole composite of soul and body, are really distinct from the soul, since the soul can exist without them. Hence the soul in the state of separation possesses no organic power and cannot exercise the act of any organic power that involves a body.

Note second, following the same Doctor in the passage just mentioned (§. *Rationes ista A.*), that the word "power" is taken in one sense as a principle of operating — and thus from (*5. Met. T. 17. & 9. eiusdem T. 2.*), power is divided into active and passive. In another sense it is taken as distinguished from act: and in this sense not only are power and act of the same species, but even of the same numerical instance, from (*9. Met. 11. & 3. Phys. 8.*). For that individual which is now in act is the very same that was previously in potency — for example, as objective potency. It follows from this that it is entirely false that power, taken in the first sense — which is described as the principle of transforming another, insofar as it is another — should be of the same genus as act. For substance produces an accident, which is of a different genus from the substance itself (*ex 7. Met. in fine*). Wherefore the Thomists do not argue correctly when they infer: acts and operations are accidents, therefore the productive power is also an accident. For even according to Saint Thomas, substance produces substance — though not immediately, but through the mediation of accidents. It is thus possible for a power to be a substance while the act is an accident.

First assertion: The soul and its powers are not entirely identical. This is handed down by the Doctor in the places cited above. It is proved first from Aristotle (*1. animae 91.*): in one living being there is one soul, but multiple powers. And (*2. eiusdem, cap. 3. T. 27.*): there are three genera of souls, but five genera of powers. And (*ibid. T. 9.*): if the eye were an animal, its form would be the visual power. Saint Augustine supports this (*1. de spiritu, & anima, cap. 4.*): one soul, many powers and forces. And in the same place he compares the soul to the triune God, following the threefold number of the powers — intellect, will, and memory. The same saint adds (*lib. 1. contra Iulianum, cap. 3.*) that intellectual

natures are the origins of wills. Now the origin is evidently distinct from what originates from it, as a tree from its fruit and a root from its shoot. And (*l. 4. contra eundem, c. 4.*) he adds that created nature is always good, but the will is good if it performs good works and evil if it does evil. Augustine therefore distinguishes the will and the other powers of the soul from the soul itself.

Second: what is entirely identical and undistinguished from another has everything predicated of the one also predicated of the other — as if man and rational animal are identified, whatever is said of man is also said of the rational animal. But what belongs to one power of the soul does not belong to another: the intellect understands, but the will does not understand; the will wills, but the intellect does not will.

Third: what emanates from another does not coincide with that from which it emanates — just as an effect is not identified with the cause by which it is caused. But the powers of the soul emanate from the soul itself, as has been proved in Article I of this Question. Therefore, and so on.

Fourth: a natural principle differs from a free principle. The intellect is a natural principle, and the will is a free principle. Therefore the intellect and will, which are powers of the rational soul, are distinct from one another. The major premise is evident because a natural principle is determined to one outcome, while a free principle is indifferent and undetermined toward opposite acts and opposite objects. Moreover, in the Trinity itself, the Word is produced through the intellect and the Holy Spirit through the will. Therefore, if the intellect and will did not differ, the Holy Spirit would proceed through the intellect just as well as through the will, and similarly the Word would be produced through the will just as through the intellect — which is plainly false and erroneous, as I showed in the treatise on the Triune God (*disp. 1.*). Therefore the distinction between the soul and its powers and faculties must be upheld.

Second assertion: The powers and forces of the soul do not really differ from one another or from the soul itself, but only formally. This assertion has two parts, and its chief advocate is Scotus in the places cited above.

The first part is proved first from Aristotle (*2. anima, T. 17.*), who calls the powers parts of the soul and its perfections. For if the powers were really distinct from the soul, they would not be its parts — since the soul is a substance, and powers really distinct from it would be accidents, in the Thomistic view. Furthermore, the same Aristotle raises the question whether the intellect is separable from the soul. If the powers were really distinct from the soul, there would be no such question, since an accident is without doubt really separable from its substance. Aristotle adds many other considerations in the same place. From all of these it is plainly deduced that Aristotle in no way posited a real distinction between the soul and its faculties. Toledo, failing to notice this (*praecit.*), thinks the opposing opinion is the Peripatetic one. Second (*ex 1. Phys. 52.*): entities should not be

multiplied beyond necessity — unity is better than multiplicity, and nature provides what is better (2. *de gener.* 50.). But if the soul and its powers were really distinct, they would be many entities really distinct from one another. Since it is better and more excellent for the soul to be one real thing identified with its powers, it is clearly to be inferred that no real distinction is to be introduced between the soul and its powers.

Third: if the powers were really distinct from the soul, they could at least be supernaturally separated from it and placed in a stone or some other subject — so that a stone would have an intellect, and the soul would be like a trunk, stripped and deprived of all power and faculty, and would therefore not be the principle of vegetation, sensation, or intellection. This conflicts with the nature of the soul as it was described and defined above. Moreover, the soul, which is a substance, would not be immediately active and operative, but would act and operate only through accidents. But I have shown elsewhere that substance is immediately active and operative. Therefore its forces and powers are not really separated from it. Finally, the soul would not immediately be beatified, because it would not immediately see God or enjoy him, but only through the mediation of accidents — which, according to the Thomists, are the intellect and will. But this and similar consequences have been rejected in the treatise on beatitude.

The second part follows from what has been said. For in the first assertion I proved that the powers are not entirely identical with the soul. And in the first part of this second assertion I showed that no real distinction intervenes between the soul and its powers. Therefore a formal distinction must be affirmed. Furthermore: what possesses distinct formalities and definitions, and what cannot be separated from one another even by divine power, differ formally — as I have shown at length elsewhere. Now the soul and its powers are of this kind, as is clear from what has been said. Therefore they differ formally.

First objection: Augustine (12. *Civit. c.* 6. & *l. de spiritu, & anima, c.* 4.) and Isidore (11. *Etymol.*) offer these words: "The soul is vital when it vegetates, is sense when it senses, is spirit when it contemplates, and is soul when it understands."

Therefore the soul is in no way distinct from its powers, except as regards distinct names and connotations, as those Fathers seem to indicate quite plainly. I respond that perhaps those Fathers held that the soul and its powers are one and the same reality but differ formally. Hence in the passage from the City of God Augustine confuses fear, sadness, and other affections of the mind with the will — which are established as distinct from the will itself. The testimonies of Augustine cited in the first assertion show the same thing.

Further instance: The same holy Doctor, speaking to God in (7. *Conf.*), says: "For the will and power of God is God himself." Therefore, if in God the power and the attributes are identified with one another and with the divinity, the same must be asserted of the soul and its powers. I say that both are identified really

but distinguished formally, as I pursued at length in the treatise on the One God (*disp.* 2. 9. 2.).

Second objection: Aristotle (*l. praedicam. c. de qualitate*) places natural powers in the category of quality. Therefore Aristotle considers natural powers to be accidents; and accidents are really distinct from the substance in which they inhere. Therefore the powers of the soul, which are accidents, are really distinct from the soul itself. I respond that Aristotle must be interpreted as speaking of powers taken not as principles of acting and operating — for in that sense they reside in the predicament of those things of which they are principles — but as natural aptitudes and readiness for acting and operating. For that reason he gives the example there of the runner and the boxer, who have this kind of ease and readiness for running and boxing.

Third objection: The visual power is really distinct from the auditory power. Therefore what is affirmed of these should equally be affirmed of the other powers. The antecedent is proved because someone can be blind without being deaf. Therefore there is an auditory power without a visual one, and consequently the one is really distinct from the other — since, as was said, a clear sign of real distinction is when one can be separated from another. I concede the antecedent and deny the consequence, because the powers now mentioned are powers of the whole composite, not of the soul alone, as I noted above in the first note. Or I say it holds of proximate powers but not of remote ones. For one who is blind lacks the proximate power of seeing, but not the remote power — as is evident in the case of the blind men healed by Christ the Lord (*Matt. 11. Caeci vident, Surdi audiunt, &c. & Ioan. 9.*), the man born blind who says: "When I was blind, now I see."

Article III — Whether the Distinction of the Powers Is Derived from the Distinction of Acts and Objects

In this article I encounter two ways of speaking, of which the earlier is followed by Bannez in the same place, Toledo (*2. de anima, q. 8.*), the Complutenses (*disp. 7. q. 1. §. 2.*), and Rubeius (*c. 3. q. 8.*), all of whom affirm that the powers of the soul differ by their relation to acts and objects. The later way is embraced by Scotus (*Quol. 13. post HH. & 2. dist. 16. q. vn. & 3. d. 24. q. vn. in fine, & 1. Met. q. 6.*), Iandun (*2. de anima, q. 8.*), Hervaeus (*Quol. 1. q. 10.*), Mercenarius, Mayr, Lychetus, and many others, who deny that the powers are distinguished essentially and intrinsically through acts and objects.

Note first that the controversy here is not whether the powers are distinguished in an absolute sense by acts and objects — everyone takes that for certain — but about the mode by which the powers are distinguished according to acts and objects. The Thomists hold that acts and objects distinguish powers a priori and essentially, so that they belong to the very essence and quiddity of the powers — not because they are intrinsic forms of the powers, as Toledo says (*cit.*), but that

there is a certain relation to acts and objects, such that each power in its essence includes a relation to its act and object, and this is the differentiating factor of each power, which varies with the variety and diversity of objects. The Scotists, on the other hand, hold that acts and objects do not distinguish the powers essentially, intrinsically, and a priori, and that the relation to acts and objects does not belong to their quiddity and essence; rather, the powers are constituted in the being of powers through their own proper and intrinsic differences, which are manifested through the acts and objects toward which they terminate.

Note second, following Scotus (*1. d. 39. q. art. 2. C.*), that disparate powers can be related to one another in three ways. Either they are entirely disparate and contradistinct, or they are subordinate. If they are subordinate, they are either in the same genus — such as a higher and a lower cognitive power — or in different genera, such as cognitive and appetitive. In the first way, disparate powers have entirely distinct objects, since none of them operates per se with respect to the same object around which another power is engaged — such as the external senses: sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch. In the second way, disparate powers possess primary objects that are subordinate to one another, so that the superior power can per se have an act regarding whatever the inferior power can, and thus the primary object of the superior power contains under it the object of the inferior power. Hence the primary object of sight, in its generality, is contained under the primary object of the common sense. In the third way, powers are so related that the appetitive power is commensurate with the cognitive in operating with respect to whatever objects — so that the primary object of both would be the same and under the same formal aspect on the part of the power. But if the appetitive has an act with respect to some cognizable things and not others, then the object of the appetitive will be inferior and more contracted than the object of the cognitive — as is the case with the intellect and the will. If, however, the will is posited as having an act regarding everything intelligible, the same object would be posited for both intellect and will, and under the same formal aspect. But if this is not the case — if the will only elicits an act regarding things intelligible that are an end or ordered to an end, and not regarding purely speculative objects — then the object of the will is in some way more contracted and limited than the object of the intellect.

First assertion: The essential and intrinsic distinction of the powers is not derived from their acts and objects, but only from what is extrinsic and manifesting. This is defended by the Doctor in the places cited above.

The first part is proved first: what is posterior to a power is not its essential constitutive and distinguishing principle, since what is prior, as prior, does not receive its being from what is posterior. But acts are posterior to powers, because acts arise from them. Therefore from acts the intrinsic and quidditative distinction of the powers is not drawn. The Complutenses and Rubeius respond (*cit.*) that although a power is prior to an act in the genus of efficient cause, it is

not prior in the genus of final cause, since act and operation is the end of the power, on the authority of Aristotle (9. *Met.* T. 16.). Against this: the end is an intrinsic cause, just as the efficient cause is; but the dispute concerns the formal, intrinsic, and essential cause. Therefore the response is inadequate.

Furthermore, as was said in the treatise on causes (*q. de causa finali*), the end causes according to intentional being; but in the present inquiry we investigate the real being from which the real, essential, and quidditative unity and distinction of a power is drawn — and this is not the being of the final cause, whether according to intentional being or real being.

Second — which is nearly the same as the first argument, and is drawn from Scotus (2. d. 1. q. 5.) — the first act precedes in itself and per se, by nature, and afterward follows the being of the principle of the second act. But powers are first acts and productive principles of second acts. Therefore powers do not per se primarily and essentially differ through second acts. The major premise is supported by the Doctor in the place cited: every being that is the principle of some action performs such an action because it is such a being and of such a nature — as is evident of the sun, which is the principle of generating many mixed bodies, and whose quidditative and essential distinction from those mixed bodies is certainly not that power or principle of producing them, but is the form and essence of the sun itself, by which it is essentially and quidditatively distinct from the said mixed bodies. The minor premise is evident and sufficiently clear from what was said in the preceding article, in which it was made apparent that the powers of the soul are not accidents but are really identified with the very substance of the soul.

Third: what is extrinsic and outside the formal nature of something does not distinguish it essentially and intrinsically from other things, as is evident. But act and object are outside the formal nature and quiddity of a power. For even if, per impossibile, there were no object, the power would still exist. Moreover, the object is a partial cause of acts, and one partial cause does not intrinsically and quidditatively include another partial cause. Furthermore, the term is outside the nature of the ground and of what terminates; but the act and object are the term of the power. Therefore a power does not derive its essential and quidditative unity and distinction from act and object.

The second part is established first by the authority of Aristotle (2. *animae*, T. 33.) and of the Doctor both in the places cited and in (2. *distinct.* 3. *quaest.* 8. §. *Ad argumenta sub N. in solutione ult.*), both affirming that powers are distinguished by acts, and acts by objects — which is understood a posteriori and as manifesting, as is clear from what is read there. Second: through long inquiry and evident experience it has been established that from acts and objects the extrinsic and manifesting unity and distinction is derived. We observe by experience that one who meditates also judges and reasons, but one who cannot meditate can neither judge, reason, deliberate, nor reason discursively — as is the case with

brutes. From this we rightly conclude that those acts belong to the single intellectual power, whose primary and adequate object is everything intelligible. Likewise, whoever can will can also refuse to will, love, and hate; and one who cannot will can also not refuse to will, love, and hate. We further infer that there is but a single power that elicits all these acts, which is called the will. Similarly, a certain animal is nourished but does not generate; from this we conclude that the generative power is distinct from the nutritive power. The same must be judged of the remaining powers in relation to their acts and objects. Thus manifestly and a posteriori we arrive at knowledge of the distinction of the powers through acts and objects.

Second assertion: The powers are not distinguished by their relation to their objects, but through their own intrinsic and formal principles. Scotus favors this in the places cited above.

The first part, which is opposed to Cajetan and Toledo, is proved first, as an argument against them: those authors assert that the powers are absolute entities of the second species of quality, and then they maintain that they are relative entities including a relation in their essence. They therefore plainly contradict themselves. Nor does it help to say that a power is something absolute with a relation. For that cannot be the case. As Scotus excellently proves against Henry (2. d. 16. q. vn. G.), what is absolute cannot per se constitute a unity with what is relative. But a single operation per se has a single principle. Therefore it is impossible for a relation to enter into the intrinsic and essential nature of that principle. Now intellection and volition are each a single act per se; therefore each has a single power and a single principle per se.

Second: what is a single principle per se is prior to the operation and can exist without it without contradiction — just as a cause can exist without its effect. But a relation can neither exist nor be understood without its term, which in our case is the operation. Therefore the relation and relation of a power to its act and object is not included in the essence of the power.

Third: a respect is not per se of the nature of a receptive and passive power. Therefore neither is it of the nature of an active power. The consequence is perspicuous. The antecedent is proved because matter, which is a passive power, receives form immediately through its essence and not through a relation. Therefore a relation in no way enters into the essence of a passive power. Furthermore, what is per se a part of a composite constituting a per se unity with it is not per se a part of a relation, because a relation does not make per se unity with what is absolute. But the passive power, which is matter, together with form constitutes a whole that is an absolute being. Therefore also in the active power, of which we speak, no essential relation or disposition is included.

You will say, with Rubeius (*praecit.*), that in substance and in any absolute being, some transcendental respect is not repugnant — as in a creature there is a

relation to God who creates it, and in knowledge there is a relation to the knowable object, as Aristotle (*lib. praedicam. c. de ad aliquid*) seems to indicate. Likewise it is not unfitting for an essential relation and disposition toward its act and object to inhere in an active power. Against this: being, taken universally, is distributed adequately into absolute and relative, as two distinct members of it — just as animal is divided into rational and irrational. Therefore what is intrinsically and essentially absolute does not include relation. For what is absolute is toward itself, and relation is toward another. And if any relation is contained in what is absolute, it is subsequent to and concomitant with the absolute, because a thing is toward itself before it is toward another. And so the relation of identity or diversity follows upon substance, and the relation to the knowable accompanies knowledge, which is a quality. The same must be said of the relation of the creature to the Creator and of other such relations — they are not of the essence of those whose relations they are.

The second part is proved first from the refutation of the opposing opinion. Since no other distinction appears by which the powers could essentially differ from one another, it is perspicuously inferred that they differ by themselves — that is, by their own proper entities — in approximately the same way as the divine processions differ by themselves, as Scotus teaches (*1. dist. 13. quest. vn. §. Ad quaest. respondeo O.*).

Second: the formal principle of one power is not the formal principle of another power, setting aside any act and object. Therefore one power differs from another through its formal principle. The antecedent is evident: the formal principle of the intellect is not the formal principle of the will, and vice versa, with any other thing — act or object — set aside.

Third: every absolute being differs from others through its own proper and intrinsic difference, as is evident by differentiation. But powers — whether they are qualities, as the Thomists hold, or are really substances, as the Scotists hold — are absolute beings. Therefore they possess proper and intrinsic differences through which they essentially differ from others.

Fourth: a cause is first constituted in its essential and formal being before the relation of the caused thing comes to it. Therefore powers, which are causes of acts, are first constituted in their essential being before they receive the relation of the acts which they elicit. Now a thing derives its unity and distinction from that from which it derives its entity. Therefore, since powers precede acts and objects according to their essential and quidditative being, it consequently follows that they draw their essential distinctions not from acts and objects, but from their own intrinsic and formal principles.

First objection, for Toledo's view: A thing is constituted by that through which it is essentially distinguished from another. But a power differs from other genera of the same predicament by its relation to act and object. Therefore a power

essentially includes the said relation. The major is evident. The minor is at hand: since a power, which is in the genus of quality, differs from other genera in nothing else except that it is the immediate formal principle of acting and operating. I concede the major and deny the minor. In response to its proof, I say that a power, according to its formal being, is not in the predicament of quality or in any other predicament of accident, but is placed reductively in the category of substance — just as the passions of substance are placed in the predicament of substance. Or if it be conceded that a power is nothing other than an immediate principle of operations, it is nonetheless denied that through such a relation to act and object and to the thing around which it operates, the power is constituted in its essential being. For a power is constituted in its essential and quidditative being prior to the arrival of that relation of an act toward the power itself. Moreover, because Toledo concedes that a power is an absolute being — since, according to him, it is a quality — every absolute being is in its absolute being prior to receiving the relation that comes to it, as I have insisted above.

Second objection: No one can conceive of a power without understanding its relation to act and object, as Aristotle (*5. Met. 12.*) indicates — he who, defining power, defines it only through act and object. Therefore if the intellect does not otherwise understand the nature and essence of a power except through conceiving the relation to act and object, that very relation surely belongs to its essence. I respond by denying the antecedent: every absolute being is conceived first in itself before it is conceived in its order to another, as the Doctor teaches (*2. d. 1. quest. 6. §. dico tunc.*). Wherefore that relation is not of the formal concept of a power, but follows upon and accompanies its entity. Otherwise a power would be located in the category of relation, not in the predicament of quality, as the Thomists assert.

You will say that neither act nor object is the essence or difference of a power, but that from these the difference of the power is derived — which is a certain relation to act and object: not a relation that is an accidental relation, but a principle of relation that is rightly called an essential relation. Against this: it is false that the intrinsic and essential difference of a power is derived from act and object, since act, as was said, is posterior to power — and from what is posterior as such, the essential difference of what is prior cannot be taken. Moreover, although an act is prior in intention, it is posterior in execution, since it is its end — from which an extrinsic difference is drawn. Furthermore, it is false that an essential relation is the difference of a power. For, apart from the fact that there seems to be a contradiction in this assertion when it is said that the relation is the difference of the power and then that it is not the relation but the principle of the relation — since the principle of a relation is not the relation but rather its cause — if you respond that this holds of essential relation but not of accidental relation, the objection stands: it is not apparent how a relation can be the cause of a relation. For since both are relations, one cannot be the cause

of the other, since relation is not of the genus of active things. And if you wish to call the principle of an act an essential relation, you say this without justification and without any foundation — it is an evasion of the argument.

If you reply again that some absolute accidents have no extrinsic respect and are not defined by reference to something outside themselves, while others, although absolute, include some order and respect toward the outside — such as powers, acts, habits, and things of this form — and these cannot be defined without some extrinsic element: not because those external things and respects are of their essence, but as the essential principle of those respects; against this: what does not enter into the essence of something can be defined without it. But that respect and relation, as conceded, does not enter into the essence of a power. Therefore it can be defined without such a respect and relation to act and object. The major is established from the function of a good definition, which is to explain distinctly the nature of a thing and not what is outside the nature of the thing — otherwise the definition would be defective. Since, therefore, it is admitted that that relation is outside the essence of the power, it must certainly be conceded that the power can be defined without it. As for the dictum of Aristotle cited above, it has already been expounded as concerning the extrinsic, manifesting, and a posteriori distinction.

Book III — On the Vegetative Soul

Question I — On the Nature of the Vegetative Soul

Now that we have treated the individual souls, the vegetative soul presents itself first for investigation — both because it is more common and universal, and because its operations precede the operations of the remaining souls. Hence Aristotle adds (*2. de gen. animalium, cap. 3.*): "Man lives first the life of a plant, then the life of an animal, and afterward the life of a rational being."

Article — What the Vegetative Soul Is and How Many Kinds It Has

First assertion: The vegetative soul is the first act of an organic body that potentially has vegetative life. This is consonant with Aristotle and Scotus as cited above (*1. 2. q. 1. art. 4.*), where all its parts were explained except the last, which is added here to establish the distinction between it and the sensitive and intellectual souls. It can also be defined a posteriori: the vegetating soul is the principle of living — that is, of vegetating — and is described more explicitly in these words: the vegetating soul is the principle of nourishing, augmenting, and generating. This description of the vegetative soul is likewise evident from what was said in the article cited just above (*art. 5.*). It is distinguished from the other souls in that it is only the principle of vegetating, while the others are not only the principle of vegetating but also of sensing, local motion, and understanding.

Second assertion: The vegetative soul is specifically multiple. This is presupposed by Aristotle and Scotus. It is supported first by the fact that specifically distinct operations argue for specifically distinct forms (*ex 1. animae, 13.*). Now there appear to be multiple operations specifically diverse among vegetating things, since one plant produces one power and operation, another produces another. Likewise, diverse fruits come from diverse trees, as experience establishes. Therefore specifically distinct vegetative souls are found in them. Second: bodies diversely organized and configured indicate souls specifically distinct. For each soul requires suitable organs and appropriate members for the exercise of its operations, and vegetating things possess diverse bodies, distinct members, parts, and shapes — as we observe in the cherry, pine, poplar, and the rest. Therefore multiple vegetative souls specifically distinct are found. This reasoning is suggested by Aristotle (*1. anima, cap. 3. T. 53.*) and Scotus (*1. d. 2. quaest. 7. in responsione ad 1. principale. & 3. d. 4. in principio corporis q. & 4. d. 11. quaest. 3. art. 2. CC. §. Ad rationes pro 1. opinione.*). Antonius Andreas (*7. Met. q. 17.*), Faber (*Theor. 73. cap. 4.*), and Lychetus in his commentary on the first of the Sentences cited above also support this.

First objection, against the first assertion: Aristotle (*2. anima, 43.*) defines the vegetating soul thus: the vegetating soul is the principle of generating what is similar to itself. Therefore the definition we have given of the vegetative soul conflicts with Peripatetic doctrine. I respond that Aristotle gives the definition of the vegetating soul from its most excellent work, which is to generate what is similar to itself, and does not describe it absolutely as I have done above. Wherefore Aristotle declared only one thing there, whereas I have attempted to bring forward everything that contributes to a clear understanding of the vegetating soul.

Second objection, against the second assertion: The diverse members of a single living being do not argue for diverse souls, since, as was said, one soul animates and vivifies multiple organically distinct parts. Therefore diverse specific diversity of vegetative souls is not rightly inferred from diverse organic bodies. I respond that this holds of members that integrate and constitute one body, but not of members and parts from which diverse bodies are composed and coalesce. For in that case, from diverse bodies having diverse members, vegetative souls specifically distinct are found.

Question II — On the Powers of the Vegetative Soul

Article I — How Many Kinds of Power the Vegetative Soul Has

There are those who assign four forces and faculties to the vegetative soul — namely the nutritive, augmentative, generative, and natural heat. The common opinion of the Philosophers, however, maintains that there are only the three enumerated above, excluding natural heat from their number.

Note first that in the investigation and examination of any matter, two orders can be observed: that of nature and that of doctrine. We follow the former in the present inquiry, treating the nature and quiddity of the vegetating soul, then its powers, and finally its acts. Aristotle follows this order in treating the soul in general — investigating first its essence and definition, and afterward its powers, acts, and object. The latter order he employs in the same place (*T. 33. of the second de anima*), where he first takes up the object, acts, and powers of the vegetating soul, and then examines its essence and nature.

Note second that food is described by Aristotle (*2. anim. 7. 43.*) as the contrary through whose transformation the animated being receives growth and one is generated from another. Three conditions are required for food in the proper sense, as touched upon by Scotus (*4. d. 44. q. 1.*) and explicitly by the same Philosopher just cited. The first is that it be contrary to what is nourished, because since nourishment must be converted into the substance of the nourished being, it must be contrary — since change does not occur unless there is in some way a contrary. Though there is no lack of those who think, as the same Philosopher notes (*ibid. T. 44.*), that it ought to be similar to what is nourished. The opposing view is more probable, however, because in nutrition one is overcome by the other and transformed into its substance — and victory is achieved over what is contrary. The second condition is that it be among those contraries whose change is such that the change of one augments the other. Therefore, since from white black comes to be, and in that case there is no augmentation, the one is not food and nourishment for the other. The third condition is that the change not be reciprocal. For food is indeed converted into the substance of the nourished being, but the nourished being is not converted into the substance of the food.

Note third, following the same Aristotle (*cit. 7. 47.*), that food can be considered in three ways. First, according to substance — and in this way it is the object of nutrition, since substance is restored through substance. Second, according to quantity — and in this way it is the object of the augmentative power. Third, insofar as it is the residue and surplus of nutrition — and in this way it is the cause of generation: not of something numerically the same, but of something else similar in species. I say it is a surplus — not like excrement, but as something remaining after the nutrition and restoration of the individual. For after the individual has been sufficiently nourished, if anything remains, it is not converted into its own substance but is transmitted to the seminal vessels that preserve it for the generation of something similar in species.

Assertion: There are three powers of the vegetating soul, as enumerated above; natural heat is merely its instrument. This is derived from the Doctor (*in 4. cit. q. 1.*). The first part is proved first: there are three things required for the animated vegetating being; therefore there are three powers. The antecedent is supported as follows. For a vegetating being to live and be preserved, it must be nourished

— and so it requires a nutritive power. Furthermore, such a living being cannot exist under a very small quantity; therefore it requires a determinate and fixed quantity and magnitude, and thus necessarily has an augmentative power by which it may properly increase. Finally, one and the same individual cannot be perpetual, although it is eager for perpetuity; and so it necessarily has a generative power, through which the generator generates something similar to itself and is perpetuated in species. Second: there are three acts and three distinct objects with which the vegetating animated being is engaged; therefore the three powers enumerated above exist. The antecedent is shown: the acts are nutrition, augmentation, and generation. Likewise, food according to its substance, as it is quantified, and as residue of the vegetating being. The second part is proved: the vegetating soul uses natural heat to exercise its vital operations, just as fire uses it for heating — and such heat is an instrument of fire. Therefore likewise natural heat is an instrument of the vegetating being. Furthermore, heat is an accident, and the powers of the soul are really identified with the very substance of the soul, as has been asserted and proved elsewhere. Therefore natural heat is not a power of the vegetating soul, but its instrument.

First objection: The augmentative power cannot exist without the nutritive. Therefore two powers distinct from one another should not be posited. The antecedent is evident: nothing can grow unless it is nourished. I concede the antecedent and deny the consequence. For although the augmentative force presupposes the nutritive — since the one is always conjoined with the other — it does not follow that they are not distinct from one another. For the volitional power presupposes the intellective, even though they differ from one another. Likewise, the heating power presupposes the illuminating power, even though it is the common opinion of the Philosophers that these two differ from one another.

Second objection: The nutritive power can exist without the generative — as is evident in the case of certain living beings that are nourished but do not generate, since they are sterile, such as eunuchs. Therefore these powers are not found to be distinct in the vegetating soul. I respond that although certain animals cannot generate, it does not follow from this that the generative power does not belong to the vegetating soul. For this either happens due to some impediment, or due to imperfection and defect, as is evident in those that arise from putrid matter.

Third objection: The object of the nutritive, augmentative, and generative powers is the same. Therefore there is only one power of the vegetating soul. The antecedent is proved: food is the same object of those faculties, as I indicated in the third note. Therefore those powers are not separated from one another. I deny the antecedent. In response to its proof, I say that the object is the same materially but formally distinct, as I made plain in the passage cited. And so Aristotle must be interpreted in the same way (*2. anima, c. 4. T. 42. & 2. de*

gen. animalium, c. 4.), saying that the faculty of nourishing, augmenting, and generating is the same — that is, really and materially, but not formally and essentially.

Article II — How the Aforesaid Powers Are Distinguished

Although from the preceding book (*l. 2. quaest. 3. art. 2.*), the knot of this difficulty seems already nearly solved, many nonetheless suspect and attempt a different mode of resolution here. For Iandun in the present place (*quaest. 13.*), Albert (*2. parte summae de homine, quaest. de motu nutritiuo, art. 2.*) — to whom Thomas (*1. p. q. 78. art. 2.*), Cajetan, Javellus, and Ferrara seem to give their assent — and Fernelius (*1. 5. physiolog. cap. 5.*) hold that the faculties and powers named above are really distinct from one another and from the soul. But Philoponus (*2. anim. ad T. 47.*), Suessanus (*in com. T. 42.*), Vallesia (*2. contr. c. 20.*), Durandus (*1. d. 3. part. 2. q. 2.*), and not a few others do not acknowledge a real distinction among these powers.

Note first that we know of three operations of the vegetating soul, drawing their origin from the three powers assigned above — namely nutrition, augmentation, and generation. For since natural heat always acts upon the radical moisture and strives to consume it, certain parts of the living being are consequently lost, and these are repaired and restored through nutrition. Furthermore, since the living being endowed with the vegetative soul is small in the beginning of its formation, it must acquire for itself a fixed and proper quantity and magnitude, which is effected through augmentation. Finally, since the individual is subject to corruption and death, lest the totality of sublunary living things should perish, there is generation, through which each thing is preserved and perpetuated in its species.

Note second that accretion in a vegetating being can be taken in two ways: in one way, as the acquisition of greater quantity in the living being — and in this sense an animated being is said to grow up to a certain limit; in another way, as the acquisition of new quantity, whether greater, lesser, or equal — and in this sense augmentation always occurs in the living being. For just as the living being is always nourished as long as it lives, so new quantity is added to it through nutrition.

Note third — and recall from what was said in the preceding book (*l. praecedente, q. 3. art. 2.*) — that some powers are of the soul alone, such as the intellect and will; others belong to the whole composite, such as the faculties of vegetating and sensing, which, since they arise from the whole animated being as from a partial root, originate partly from the soul and partly from the body — as Aristotle suggests (*1. anima, 64.*) and after him Scotus (*12. Met. in expof. T. 13.*); and these, in the state of the soul's separation from the body, do not remain in the soul itself except as in a root — not a total root, but only a partial one. The same is indicated (*9. Met. in expof. T. 2.*).

First assertion: The nutritive power does not really differ from the augmentative, but only formally. This is derived from the Doctor (2. d. 16. q. vn.). The first part is supported first by the arguments we adduced in the passage cited just above (l. 2.) to prove that the powers of the soul taken generically are not really separated from the soul and from one another. Second: nutrition cannot take place without augmentation occurring. Therefore the sign is that the powers described above are not really distinct. The antecedent is shown: nutrition is the acquisition of new substance and new quantity; and so one operation cannot occur without the other. Consequently, just as the said operations are inseparable, so too are their powers and forces.

The second part is proved first: because they are engaged with distinct objects formally. For the nutritive force regards the substance of food, while the augmentative regards its quantity. Therefore between them there is a formal distinction. Second: they have diverse definitions, which formal distinction requires. Therefore they differ formally. The antecedent is at hand: the nutritive is the power of transforming food into the substance of the nourished being by means of natural heat; while the augmentative is the power by which the animated being is augmented through reception inward, likewise through the mediation of natural heat.

Second assertion: Between the nutritive and generative power there is no real distinction but only a formal one. This is suggested by the Doctor in the passage cited above. The first part is established first by the authority of Aristotle (2. *animae*, 42.), saying that the power of nourishing and generating is one — that is, really. Second: nutrition is a partial generation, as I indicated above; therefore the power that generates the whole and the power that generates a part do not possess a real distinction. The arguments adduced in the passage just mentioned also belong here.

The second part is shown first: nutrition regards the proper individual, whereas generation regards another individual numerically distinct. Therefore those powers differ formally. Second: nutrition is a partial generation, and generation is the total production of a living being. Moreover, the animated being is always nourished as long as it lives, but does not always generate. Therefore a formal distinction between these powers must be conceded.

Third assertion: Organic powers, which are said to belong to the whole composite, differ really from the soul and body; but from the whole composite itself they differ only formally. This is consonant with the doctrine of Scotus in the places cited above. The first part is indicated by Aristotle (1. *animae*, 64.) and thereabouts, where he plainly teaches that anger, weaving, and things of that kind are to be attributed not to the soul but to the whole composite. Therefore, if the principle and cause of those actions and works is not the soul but the whole made up of soul and body — which differs really from both — it is plainly inferred that those powers are really distinguished from the soul and body

themselves. Furthermore, the real separation of certain things without doubt argues for a real distinction between them, as is plainly shown by the description of real distinction adduced and explained elsewhere. But body and soul are really separated, as is evidently established in the death of a man, in which the soul is really separated from the body. Therefore the powers named above are really separated from the body and soul themselves.

The second part is well known, since powers belonging to the soul alone or to the body alone differ from them only formally. Therefore the same must be affirmed of powers belonging to the composite alone — since there is equal reason for both. The antecedent was shown in (*l. 2. q. 3. art. 2.*), where the powers of the soul in general were treated and the formal distinction was decided.

First objection, against the first assertion: A vegetating living being does not always grow, yet it is always nourished throughout the whole course of its life. Therefore the nutritive power is really distinct from the augmentative power. The antecedent is at hand: every animated being is limited and defined by a fixed term of its magnitude or smallness, as was asserted elsewhere. I distinguish the antecedent: a living being does not always grow by accretion taken in the first sense — I concede; taken in the second sense — I deny, as I made plain in the second note.

Second objection, against the second assertion: Every animated being is nourished throughout the whole time of its life, but does not always generate, as experience testifies. Therefore the nutritive faculty really differs from the generative. I concede the antecedent and deny the consequence. For this indicates only the formal distinction that I established between those powers. And that the animated being does not always generate certainly comes from some obstacle or defect, as is evident in eunuchs.

You will ask what powers serve the nutritive power. I respond, following Augustine (*1. de spiritu, & anima, cap. 20.*) and Damascene (*2. fidei, cap. 16.*), that four quasi-handmaids can be assigned to it: the attractive, the expulsive, the retentive, and the digestive. The attractive is that by which food is drawn toward the animated being lest it flow away and impede the nutritive operation. The expulsive is that which discharges waste and harmful food outward. The retentive is that by which beneficial food is retained and converted into the substance of the nourished being. The digestive is that which, by the mediation of natural heat, digests the attracted food.

Question III — On the Acts of the Vegetating Soul

Article I — Whether the Acts of the Vegetating Soul Are Distinct from One Another

The number of three powers of the vegetating soul has been handed down and explained in the preceding article. Now the number of acts of that same

vegetating soul must also be assigned — and it is likewise threefold: nutrition, accretion, and generation. The question is whether these acts coincide or differ from one another. Certain persons — such as Marsilius (*1. de gener. q. 10.*) and Albert of Saxony (*ibid. q. 9.*) — think they are distinguished only verbally and in name alone. The rest, however, commonly acknowledge a distinction among the said acts.

Note that as long as an animated being grows, it is also nourished — because accretion presupposes and requires nutrition. This is evidently clear in plants, trees, and animals, which in the beginning are small but gradually increase in all their parts. Moreover, natural heat continuously acts upon the radical moisture, and therefore the parts that are lost must be restored and repaired through nutrition, with new ones generated in their place.

First assertion: Nutrition is distinguished from augmentation. This is defended by the Doctor (*4. d. 44. quest. 1. in calce art. 1. paulo post L.*). It is proved first: acts are distinguished at least a posteriori by the objects around which they are engaged. Now nutrition and augmentation possess diverse objects. Therefore they are distinguished from one another. The major is evident from what was said (*l. 2. quaest. 3. art. 3.*). The minor is shown: nutrition is occupied with the substance of food as its object; accretion is occupied with its quantity. Now it is established that substance and quantity are distinct objects, concurring effectively in producing distinct acts. Second: augmentation is a motion that occurs in time, while nutrition occurs in an instant (*ex 5. Met. 18.*). But occurring in time or in an instant argues a distinction. Therefore, since the said acts occur in this way, a distinction intervenes among them. Third: prior and posterior differ. For the same thing cannot be simultaneously prior and posterior with respect to the same thing. But nutrition precedes augmentation — for an animal must first be nourished before it grows, since accretion follows nutrition just as quantity accompanies substance. Therefore a distinction is found among the acts named above.

Second assertion: Nutrition differs from generation. This is derived from Scotus (*cit.*). It is proved first: an animated being is nourished as long as it lives, as I noted in the preceding remark. But generation does not always occur but only at a fixed and determinate time, as experience testifies. Therefore nutrition and generation are not identified. Second: things that participate in distinct definitions are distinguished from one another, because the definition expresses the nature of the thing — and in accordance with the distinction of natures, distinct definitions are assigned. Now distinct definitions of nutrition and generation are given. For generation is the origin of a living being from a living being, with a principle of life joined. Nutrition, on the other hand, is a partial production — that is, a partial generation of a part — to a pre-existing whole animated being that is to be nourished. Therefore a distinction between nutrition and generation must be posited.

First objection: Nutrition and augmentation occur in an instant. Therefore these acts do not differ from one another. The antecedent is supported: by the same nourishment by which the animated being is nourished, it also grows. For an addition to something cannot be made without accretion also occurring for it. But through nutrition a new addition of parts occurs; therefore accretion also occurs. I deny the antecedent. For nutrition is a change that is instantaneous, whereas augmentation is a motion that is temporal. Add also that generation and illumination are momentaneous, even though they differ in other respects.

Second objection: Nutrition is a partial generation of new parts alongside the pre-existing and prior parts, as Scotus teaches in the passage cited above. Therefore nutrition is not distinguished from generation. I concede the antecedent and deny the consequence. For nutrition regards a part, while generation regards the whole. Furthermore, nutrition regards the proper individual, while generation regards another individual newly to be produced. From this the distinction between the acts named above is apparent.

Article II — Whether Something New Is Generated Through Nutrition

The Doctor (*4. d. 44. quaest. 1.*) recalls the opinion of the Master of the Sentences — namely, the author of the *Historia Scholastica* (*cap. 37.*) and of Hugo of St. Victor (*Tract. de Sacram. parte 6. cap. penult.*) — who suspect that nothing of food passes over into the substance of human nature. For they hold that what belongs to the truth of human nature is only what we receive from our parents at the beginning of generation; while the food we consume is merely a kindling of natural heat — so that the food itself nourishes and adheres to the natural heat in approximately the same way that oil adheres to a wick, lest the light of the lamp go out.

Against this opinion almost all Philosophers and Theologians rise, teaching that food passes over and is transformed into the substance of what is nourished through nutrition. Although there is some disagreement among them. For Thomas holds that nourishment is changed into the substance of the nourished being with respect to the parts of matter but not with respect to the parts of form. Scotus, however, in the passage cited above affirms that food is transformed into the substance of what is nourished, both according to the parts of matter and according to the parts of form.

Note first that in the animated being, some parts are said to be according to matter, and others according to form. The former are those which directly flow in and out, having no longer within themselves the power of converting food into their own substance. They are called parts according to matter — not because they lack form, since no matter or part of matter is found stripped of form, but because just as matter does not act, so likewise these parts do not act but are passive and corrupted. The latter are called parts according to form,

because they have the power of converting food into their own substance. For just as form acts, so these parts act — they are not in the proximate disposition for flowing in and out; rather, by their own power they restore and repair the lost parts.

Note second that this difficulty can be raised not only about soft and alimentary parts, but also about solid and spermatic parts. About the former it is taken as certain that they are newly generated alongside the pre-existing ones. About the latter it is affirmed by Aristotle (*1. de gener. c. 5.*). The reason is that all parts, both hard and soft, are nourished and augmented, and likewise diminished and decreased. Therefore the same judgment must be rendered about both. I add that all are mortal and corruptible, and therefore subject to augmentation and diminution, as our daily experience teaches.

First assertion: Something new passes into the substance of the nourished being through nutrition. Scotus supports this in the passage cited above. It is proved first: the vegetating principle has the power of converting food into the substance of the nourished being. Therefore something new is generated for the nourished animated being through nutrition. The antecedent is supported from nature: for such a principle has been granted by nature so that the parts lost and consumed by natural heat acting upon the radical moisture may be repaired. The consequence holds: for the limbs of an animal are larger when the animal has already lived for some years than when it was generated a few days before. Such accretion of parts and members does not come about without a new acquisition of new substance and quantity. Therefore, and so on.

Second: unless something new were added to the nourished being through nutrition, a miraculous multiplication and augmentation would occur — just as the loaves of the gospel were multiplied and augmented in the desert (*Ioan. 6.*). But no miracle is admitted without necessity. Therefore through nutrition some parts are generated for the nourished living being.

Third: unless the parts of the living being were repaired through nutrition, it must be conceded that the primordial and spermatic parts are immortal and incorruptible, while the alimentary parts are mortal and corruptible — and thus of a different genus from one another, since the corruptible and incorruptible differ in genus (*10. Met. in fine.*). But it is absurd for there to be in an animal some incorruptible flesh and some corruptible flesh. For this flesh and that flesh do not differ specifically from one another. Therefore it must be admitted that through nutrition some parts are newly generated for the nourished being.

Second assertion: Through the conversion of food into what is nourished, a new form of flesh comes into being — rather than the matter of the food being informed by the pre-existing form of flesh, its own form having perished. The Doctor supports this (*ubifuprà, A.*). It is proved first: an extended and divisible form is extended to the extension of matter and divided along with its division,

and does not regard matter indivisibly and without extension — otherwise it would be indivisible, simple, and unextended, like the rational soul, which is false. Therefore, when the matter of a nourished animated being is augmented, its form is also augmented; and when some part of the form is corrupted, some part of its matter also perishes. Consequently, when some part of matter is generated alongside the prior matter through nutrition, in the same way some part of form is generated alongside the prior form; and just as that part of matter is newly produced, so likewise that form is new, which informs new matter — otherwise it would not now be extended any more than before. The antecedent is clear from Aristotle (*1. praedicam. cap. de quantitate*), where it is stated that the whiteness existing in a surface is as extensive as the surface.

Second: if after nutrition there are more parts of matter in the whole than before, either the new part of matter exists in the whole without a form — which is absurd, since nothing of matter can exist without form by universal agreement — or it exists under a new form, and the intended conclusion is had; or it exists under the prior form, and then either that form ceases to perfect the part of matter it previously perfected — in which case the same part of form migrates from one part of matter to another, which is absurd — or that prior part of form simultaneously perfects both the old and new part of matter, thus perfecting at the same time two perfectible things, each of which is adequate to it. For a part of matter is the adequate perfectible of a part of form; and consequently, since those two parts of matter are two adequate perfectibles of that part of form, it is manifest that the form cannot inform both the prior and the posterior part of matter simultaneously.

Third: an extended and divisible form is educed from divisible and extended matter and subject; therefore, just as the whole soul is educed from the whole subject and the whole matter, so a part of the form and soul is educed from the corresponding part of matter. Consequently, through nutrition a part of matter is not generated without at the same time a part of form also being generated for the nourished animal.

First objection: The rational soul informs every part, even one newly added to the human body, without requiring a new form to be produced. Therefore the same must be affirmed of the parts that come to any animal through nutrition — namely that they are parts according to matter, not according to form. The parity of the antecedent must be denied, because the rational soul is indivisible and immaterial, while the other souls and forms are divisible and material. And so one part of form informs one part of matter, while the whole form and soul informs and animates the whole matter in which it is found.

Second objection: Aristotle (*1. de gener. cap. de accretione, T. 34.*) writes in explicit words that the parts of an animated being persevere according to species, while the parts according to matter flow in and out. Therefore in Peripatetic doctrine, parts according to matter, not parts according to form, are acquired through

nutrition. I respond that the passage of the Philosopher must be expounded according to the sense of the note premised above, in which the parts according to matter and according to form were clearly explained. Nor is there anything further to add by way of commentary on that testimony.

Third objection: If parts were newly produced alongside the animated being through nutrition, the animated being would be one thing by contiguity or continuity, or at least one by aggregation. But this is rejected by all Philosophers. Therefore nothing new is added to the nourished being through nutrition. I respond that it only follows that the animated being is one by generation, because the parts acquired through nutrition succeed in the place of the lost ones and restore the animated being.

Article III — Whether the Same Individual Persists from the Beginning of Its Origin to Its End

Those who embrace the part of the Master of the Sentences affirm that the same individual, which is continually nourished, persists from the beginning of its birth to its last period — because the same radical moisture and the same parts remain that were received from its progenitors. Those who follow a different path from the Master are not without some difficulty and struggle with the question of how the individual remains the same from the beginning of its origin to the end, if its parts are always flowing in and out.

Thomas, weighing this difficulty, affirms that it is the same individual, because its parts according to form endure, even though they pass away according to matter. But the Subtle Doctor in the place cited above, holding that the parts of an individual flow in and out not only with respect to matter but also with respect to form, teaches that the same individual remains from the beginning of its life to death, because the whole remains even though its parts are continually changed and repaired.

Assertion: The animated individual that is nourished and augmented remains the same from the beginning of its origin to its death. This is defended by the Doctor in the passage cited above. It is supported first from Aristotle (*1. de gener. cap. 5.*), who affirms that the subject which is nourished and grows always perseveres the same until its dissolution. And (*3. polit. c. 2.*): a city is always said to be the same, even though some are always born and others die. Second: that same thing persists throughout the whole course of its life which endures according to the whole — because the true and real identity of something is derived from the identity of the whole. Now the same individual persists throughout the whole course of its life according to the whole, even though some parts flow away — as is evident of a tree, which is said to be the same even though some of its parts are cut off; and of the same river, even though its parts continually flow away. Therefore the same individual persists from the beginning of its origin to the end of its life, even though its parts flow in and out.

Third: the identity of something is derived primarily from the identity of matter and form. But the whole matter and form persevere in one and the same individual. Therefore the same individual persists. The major is well known, because those are intrinsic and essential parts of the whole. The minor is clear: for even though its parts are altered and become impure, as is evident of the parts of an old man, nonetheless the same parts endure according to the same matter and form. Moreover, from what was said above, the elements are generable and corruptible according to their parts, but ingenerable and incorruptible according to themselves as wholes. Therefore the same must be affirmed of the individual living and animated being.

First objection: If the said assertion were true, the individual would be the same not by reality but by equivalence. But what is investigated here is the true and real identity of the individual. The consequent is shown because in the place of the lost parts, other parts newly acquired succeed — just as we said of place, which is the same by equivalence, as I asserted elsewhere when treating ex professo of the place of the ambient body. For as those bodies that are ambient recede, others equivalent to them come in their place; and since these are equivalent to those, the body is said to be in the same place by equivalence. I deny the consequent. In response to its proof I say there is a disparity: because by the force of wind, all the prior parts of the ambient air recede together, while others come in place of the prior ones. But in an animated being this does not happen in the same way, because only certain small and lean parts of the living being perish, while almost all the remaining parts of the same living being endure. For this reason the same individual truly persists — just as, even though hair, nails, and other parts of the fingers are cut away, the same individual always remains. The same must be affirmed of the parts that flow in and out of the animated being through nutrition.

Second objection: If all the parts of the animated being flow, the principal parts — such as the heart — would not be the seat of the soul, as Philosophers affirm with Aristotle, since such parts would also be subject to flowing in and out. But this appears false, since the same heart, the same head, and the other chief members remain. Therefore, and so on. I deny the consequence of the major. For the reason why the heart is called the seat of the soul is not that its parts are immune from flowing in and out, but because it participates in more excellent and noble dispositions for the exercise of the nobler works of life.

You will ask first whether the same numerical individual can be restored. I respond negatively: for there is no return from privation to habit by ordered power. By the absolute power of God, however, it is not repugnant — as is evident from John XI concerning Lazarus, and Mark XVI concerning Christ the Lord. The reason is that there is no repugnance either on the part of God or on the part of the corrupted thing, which, as it was possible before it existed, so after its being is lost it still retains the possibility of being made anew.

You will ask second what life is. I respond, with Aristotle, that it is the permanence of the vegetating soul along with natural heat and radical moisture in an organic body — or one that virtually contains the vegetating soul. And death, conversely, is the cessation of that same soul in the organic body. There are two kinds of death: natural death, which comes about from the exhaustion of the radical moisture consumed by natural heat; and violent death, which comes about through the sword, poison, and innumerable other ways.

You will ask third what health is. I respond that it is the proper temperament of all the parts of the animated being. And correspondingly, disease is the intemperate condition of all the members, or of some member, of the animated being — and if the affected part is a principal one, death follows unless an appropriate remedy is applied.

You will ask fourth what respiration is. I respond that it is the drawing in of cooler air to expel warmer air, for the tempering of the heat of the heart. All animals that have lungs breathe; the rest, which lack them — such as fish — do not breathe.

You will ask fifth what is the most noble work of the vegetative soul. I respond that it is generation, according to that saying (2. *de anima* T. 34.): "The most natural, or most noble, work is to generate something like itself." And (4. *Met.*): "Each thing is perfect when it is able to generate something like itself."

You will say: God cannot generate another God. Therefore that maxim is not universally true. The Doctor responds (1. *Met. in expof.* 6. 1.): another God cannot be made or generated, because a plurality of Gods is repugnant.

You will urge: an Angel can be made, but it cannot generate something like itself. I say this is not true when the product is so perfect that it requires an equivocal cause for its production — as is the case with an Angel.

Article IV — Whether Both Parents Concur Actively in the Generation of Offspring

It is not in doubt that the father takes an active role in the production of the fetus. The question is whether the mother also actively concurs in the formation of offspring. On this matter, Thomas (3. *p. q.* 32. *art.* 4.), Durandus (3. *d.* 3. *q.* 1.), and Capreolus (*ibid.* *d.* 5. *q. vn.* *art.* 4.) assert that the mother acts only passively in the procreation of the fetus. The Subtle Doctor, however (3. *d.* 4. *q. vn.* & *Quol.* 15. *art.* 2.), the Seraphic Doctor (*ibid.* *quaest.* 1.), Mayr, Bassolis, Lychetus, and very many others — preceded by Hippocrates (1. *de genitura*), Galen (*l. de spermate*, & 1. 2. *de virtutib. naturalibus cap.* 3.), and other physicians — teach that the mother actively concurs in the generation of offspring.

Note that the question is not whether the mother is the principal active principle of generating offspring — since all admit that she is not such a

principal principle — but the whole dispute is whether she is a less principal active principle.

Furthermore, observe that in the formation of the fetus, following Scotus in the place cited above, many motions intervene. For first the seed is shed by the generator and transmitted to a place suitable for generation; then it is condensed there, and likewise figured, organized, and perfected. Hence the question is whether the mother takes an active or only a passive role in the said motions.

Assertion: The mother actively concurs in generating offspring, though less principally. This is held by the Doctor in the passage cited above (*¶ 1. d. 17. q. 2. §. sed tunc sub LL.*) and is indicated by Saint Augustine (*Tract. 2. in Ioan.*). It is supported first: male and female are of the same species, as Aristotle writes (*10. Met. 15.*); and those of the same species participate in the same active principle and the same power of generating. Therefore since the father takes an active role in the formation of offspring, the same must be affirmed of the mother in the manner explained above. Second: what assimilates offspring to itself actively concurs in the formation of that offspring, because the efficient cause strives to render the effect similar to itself. But offspring sometimes resembles the mother more than the father. Hence perhaps Aristotle says (*9. Eth. cap. 7.*): "Because mothers know more certainly that children are their own, they labor more in their generation, and therefore love them more." Therefore the mother cooperates in begetting the fetus. Third: seed is considered by all to be the active principle of offspring. The mother emits seed for the forming of the fetus, as physicians testify — and anatomists observe that in females there are certain spermatic vessels that preserve the seed. Therefore the mother must not be denied a less principal active power for begetting offspring.

First objection: Aristotle (*1. de gen. animalium, c. 19. ¶ 10.*) teaches that the mother acts only passively in the begetting of offspring. Therefore in the Peripatetic school the mother is not an active principle of offspring. Some respond that Aristotle speaks of the more principal active principle, not of the less principal one which is in question here. But this response contradicts Aristotle, who in explicit words — both in the place cited and elsewhere — teaches that the mother behaves only passively in the generation of the fetus, and illustrates this with an example (*passu cit. cap. 2.*). You will press: the same Philosopher (*7. Mor. ad Eudemum cap. 3.*) says that mothers love children more than fathers do, because they consider them more their own work. And (*8. Eth. cap. 12.*) he premised that parents love children as something from themselves, while children love parents as something from which they spring. It must be said that those passages are to be expounded with reference to the furnishing of matter and to upbringing, not with reference to the activity of the generation of the offspring itself. Wherefore in this and in certain other matters noted

elsewhere, Aristotle must be departed from, and the physicians followed as more experienced — as Scotus admonishes in the passage cited.

Second objection: If the mother were to act actively in the formation of offspring, she would emit seed just as the father does. For seed is considered by all to be the active principle of the fetus. But the mother does not emit seed (*Arist. 1. de gen. animalium, cap. 12.*); and what the mother herself pours forth appears to be a watery and rare humor that has no seminal character. Therefore the mother is not an active principle of offspring. I concede the major and deny the minor. In response to its proof I say that it is true seed, though not as perfect as the father's seed.

Third objection: What merely supplies matter to offspring does not cooperate in its production. But the mother only supplies matter upon which the father's seed acts. Therefore the mother does not actively concur in begetting offspring. I concede the major and deny the minor in part — for the mother, though less principally, partially cooperates in generating offspring, as has been sufficiently proved above.

Article V — Whether Things Generated Through Putrefaction Are of the Same Species as Those Generated Through Propagation

Averroes (8. *Phys. com.* 46. & 1. *de gen. cap. 1.*), Iandun (7. *Met. quaest.* 15.), and some others deny that those generated from seed are of the same species as those generated without seed. Scotus, however (1. *dist. 2. quest. 7. §. Ad 1. argumentum principale. R.* & 3. *dist. 14. quaest. 3. §. contra. Propè initium*), Antonius Andreas (7. *Met. q. 8.*), Faber (*Theorem. 71.*), and the rest, both within and outside his school, assert that those generated through putrefaction and those generated through propagation participate in the same species and nature.

Note that among sublunary living beings, some are perfect — such as man and the lion — and these must not be thought to be procreated from putrid matter, since so many parts and organs are required for their constitution and integrity that only a proper, univocal, and excellent cause can produce them, especially their souls, which — as will be said below — are produced by God. Others are imperfect — such as plants, mice, and the like — which are generated either from seed or without seed; and these are what the present doubt concerns, not the former. What is said in the second Politics about certain men generated from the earth or in another manner is not from Aristotle but from Euripides and Ovid, and is fabulous.

Assertion: The living beings said to be generated equivocally are of the same species. This is held by the Doctor in the passage cited above (& 7. *Met. in exp. cap. 6.* & T. 23. & *ibid. in exp. cap. 9. T. 90.*). It is proved first from (7. *Met. T. 23.* & 5. *de historia animal. c. 1.* & 6. *eiusdem, cap. 15.*), where Aristotle writes that there are some that come from mud and sand, even of those genera that are also

generated from intercourse. Therefore according to Aristotle, those generated equivocally are of the same species. Second, from Saint Augustine (*3. Trin. cap. 9.*): something generated through putrefaction propagates others that in turn propagate, and so the generator and the generated are univocal. Therefore those propagated from seed and those produced from putrid matter possess the same specific nature. The antecedent is evident from birds, bees, and many others, which, having been generated by chance, afterward produce and emit seed from which others of the same nature and species are procreated. Third: those that have the same body, the same power, passions, and accidents are contained under the same species — for these plainly manifest the same specific nature, as Aristotle indicates (*1. animae, T. 53.*). Now those generated from putrid matter and those generated from seed have the same organic body, the same nature, properties, and accidents — as is evident from a mouse generated by putrefaction and a mouse generated by propagation from another mouse. Likewise from plants that grow by chance in the mountains and those sown elsewhere by scattering their seed into the ground. Moreover, fire generated by another fire is of the same species as fire produced from flint or from the rays of the sun. Therefore animated beings too are contained under the same species, whether generated from putrid matter or procreated from seed.

First objection: Aristotle (*1. de gen. animalium, cap. 1. & 5. of the same work*) in express words writes that those generated from putrid matter are not of the same species as those arising from seed — as from the union of lice, nits are procreated; from the union of flies, little worms; and from the congress of fleas, a certain kind of worm resembling them. Therefore our assertion conflicts with Aristotle. I respond that Aristotle there only enumerates those generated from putrid matter, some of which are infertile, while others are fruitful, generating things similar to themselves and participating in the same species — as was sufficiently shown from the same Philosopher above.

Second objection: Those generated from diverse matter are of diverse species — otherwise anything would be generated from anything. But those generated through putrefaction and those generated through propagation possess diverse matter, because the former arise from putrid matter and the latter from seed. Therefore they participate in a diverse species. I deny the major, because the specific unity or distinction of things is derived not from matter but from form, as has been evidently demonstrated elsewhere.

You will ask what part of the animal body is first formed. Hippocrates and Galen respond that it is the liver. Aristotle, however, writes that it is the heart, which is the source of natural heat and vital spirits. Hence the saying is celebrated: the heart is the first to live and the last to die. The eye, on the contrary, is said to be the last to live and the first to die.

Book IV — On the Sensitive Soul

A separate question on the nature of the sensitive soul is not raised here, since from what was said in the first two books on the soul in general it is easy to understand what must be affirmed in the present matter. The sensitive soul is defined in two ways: first, *a priori*, thus — the sensitive soul is the first act of an organic body that potentially has vegetative and sensitive life; second, *a posteriori* — the sensitive soul is the principle of vegetating and local motion. All the parts of both definitions given above were abundantly explained in the passage cited just above.

Question I — On the Production of the Sensitive Soul

Article I — Whether the Soul of Imperfect Animals Is Produced by the Heaven

The Seraphic Doctor (2. *dist.* 8. *quest.* 1. *art.* 2.) and his teacher, the Doctor irrefragabilis Alexander of Hales (7. *Met. ad Text.* 23.), hold that the souls of imperfect animals are produced by the Heaven. The contrary opinion is defended by the Subtle Doctor (4. *dist.* 12. *quaest.* 2.), Bassolis in the same place, and the others of the same institute and school, who teach that the souls of the said animals in no way emanate from the Heaven as their efficient cause.

Note that by imperfect animals, of which there is talk in the present context, are understood primarily those animals generated from putrid matter — some of which are produced on land, some in the sea. For Aristotle (1. 6. *de historia animalium*, *cap.* 16.) narrates that eels come from putrid slime. Pliny also reports this of oysters (10. *historiae naturalis* 68.). And from corroded wood come moths; from the moisture of the air come butterflies, cicadas, ants, and the like.

Assertion: Imperfect animals and their souls are not produced by the Heaven, except dispositively. The Doctor supports this in the passage cited above. It is supported first: a living being is not produced by what is not living, as has been said repeatedly in the foregoing. But the Heaven is not living, as was asserted elsewhere; and these animals are living. Therefore they are not produced by the Heaven. Second: what is nobler is not effected by what is more ignoble, according to the well-known saying that no one gives what he does not have. But the Heaven is more ignoble and imperfect than any imperfect animal — for every animated being is superior to any inanimate one, since the grade of life is more excellent and distinguished than the grade of nature. Therefore the Heaven is not the maker of these animals, except dispositively. Third: the Heaven acts upon these lower beings only through light, heat, and motion, as I said when treating of the influence of the Heaven. But light, heat, and motion — since they are accidents — cannot attain the production of those souls, which

are substances. Therefore another efficient cause of the said animals must be sought.

First objection: Scotus (*1. dist. 7. quaest. vn. §. una indeterminatio. E. & 2. dist. 1. quest. 6. §. Dico. Sub B. & dist. 9. quest. vn. §. Ad quaest. infra B. & 4. dist. 49. quest. 16.*) says: if the Heaven were to produce a worm from this matter... Therefore in the Scotist school the Heaven is the principle and efficient cause of those animals. I respond that the cited testimonies of the Doctor must be interpreted according to the distinction already given — namely dispositively, not effectively.

Second objection: It belongs to the same cause to dispose matter and to introduce or educe form from the disposed matter. But the Heaven is the dispositive cause of matter for the introduction of the sensitive soul of these animals; therefore it is also the inductive or eductive cause of the same soul. I deny the major. For accidents in our view are the dispositive causes of substance to be produced, yet are not its efficient causes. Likewise, the man who generates disposes matter but does not create the rational soul.

Third objection: In Genesis 30 it is said that from looking upon variously painted rods, variously colored offspring were produced by flocks. And Augustine (*l. 1. 99. Super Genesim, quaest. 92.*) narrates from Hippocrates that a certain woman, resembling a beautiful image that she had in her bedroom, gave birth to a very beautiful boy unlike either parent or the type. Saint Jerome adds in the present context that Spaniards use this art, placing handsome horses before mares at the time of conception. Quintilian adds that a matron was accused of adultery because she had given birth to an Ethiopian child — but was freed from the charge when an image of an Ethiopian was found in her bedroom. I respond with Lyra in the Postil on the said passage that these and similar things are attributed to the power of the imagination — according to the proverb: imagination causes the event.

Fourth objection: In certain islands very remote from the mainland there live certain animals that arrived there neither by swimming nor by transport, since the distance is great, and there are fierce beasts there — such as lions, tigers, wolves, and the like. Nor is it satisfactory to say that they were created there by God from the beginning of the world — for they would have perished in the universal flood. Therefore we must have recourse to the Heaven as their efficient cause. In confirmation, Pliny (*l. 8. hist. cap. 42.*) — indeed Augustine himself (*21. Civit. cap. 5.*) — and Virgil report that mares conceive from the blowing of the west wind. Aristotle (*6. de hist. animalium*) in Syria and Pliny (*cit. c. 44.*) in Africa add that mules give birth. Marcus Varro, Dionysius, and many others hand down the same. Augustine responds (*16. Civit. cap. 7.*) that those beasts were transported there by human industry for the sake of hunting, or were carried there by the ministry of Angels. As for the fact that in some regions mules are fertile and in others not, this is attributed dispositively to celestial influences —

just as in some regions certain animals are born and live, while in others they do not. Perhaps with this in mind Virgil sings (*1. Georg.*): "Here grain crops, there the vine flourishes more happily." The same must be said in response to the confirmation. If Pliny holds otherwise, his account is treated as a fable, on the testimony of Justin (*l. 43. suae hist.*). Especially because those animals are perfect and cannot be produced except through seed or immediately by God, as I showed in the last article of the preceding book.

Article II — Whether the Sensitive Soul Is Produced from the Seed of the One Who Sheds It

Very many Philosophers hold that the sensitive soul is produced by the seed of the one who sheds it. They think that seed is the efficient cause of the organization and animation of perfect animals. Scotus, however (*2. d. 18. quest. vnic. §. Restat nunc videre. E. & §. Dico igitur. 1.*), Lychetus, Gratianus of Brescia in the same place, Faber (*Theor. 69.*), and others affirm that seed is in no way the cause — not even of organizing so many diverse members, let alone of producing the soul itself — except dispositively. That is to say, seed only disposes toward a further and more perfect form; while God immediately educes the sensitive soul from that matter disposed by the seed, and together with the organized body the sensitive soul constitutes the whole and perfect animal.

Note that among the sensitive souls of animate agents, some are equivocal — they generate animate things of a diverse character and species, as the mare and the ass generate a mule, which participates in a species diverse from others. The rest are univocal — they produce offspring of the same species, as man generates man and the lion generates the lion. Among these, some are oviparous, generating things similar to themselves through eggs; while others produce their offspring through seed — of which Augustine makes mention (*l. 3. 99. in Leuiticum, quest. 38.*).

First assertion: Seed is not the efficient cause of the sensitive soul, nor even of the organization of the body, except only dispositively. The assertion is tripartite, and is defended by the Doctor in the passage cited. The first part is proved first: a living being is not produced by what is not living — as I have said and proved many times in the foregoing. But seed is not living in act, as is evident (*1. 2. quaest. 2. art. 2.*), where I showed that seed and milk are devoid of soul. Therefore seed is not the productive principle of the sensitive soul. Second: an effect in act has a cause in act, as is established from the book on causes. But when the sensitive soul is produced or has been produced, seed no longer exists, because it has already been corrupted. For in the place cited (*1. 2. quaest. 2. art. 2.*) seed is transformed into the embryo, and from the embryo it passes into an organized body, from which the sensitive soul is educed. Therefore seed is not the cause of the sensitive soul. Third: just as a mixed body is not effectively generated from corrupted elements — for what is corrupted,

since it no longer possesses being, also cannot participate in the power of acting, and a mixed body is, as was said elsewhere, produced through the action of a third thing, that is, of a universal agent — so likewise it must be affirmed that corrupted seed does not cause the sensitive soul.

The second part is shown: what is uniform and homogeneous is not the principle and cause of the diversity of effects, as is evident from fire and water, which are uniform and homogeneous. But seed is uniform and homogeneous, as is evident to the observer. Therefore it is not the maker of so many diverse organs and dissimilar parts that are seen in the organic body of a whole and perfect animal.

The third part is supported: every cause has its effect, since nature permits nothing idle. But seed is a cause intended and furnished by nature for generating something similar in species, as I noted in the passage cited just above. Therefore some effect must be attributed to it — which is not the sensitive soul, nor the organization of the body, but the disposition toward organization and toward the introduction of the sensitive soul.

Second assertion: God is the maker of the sensitive soul and of the organization of its body. The Doctor holds this in the place cited, and Augustine assents (*l. 83. qq. quaest. 10.*), saying that the body is from God. If, therefore, the body is from God according to Augustine — which is the lesser work — consequently the sensitive soul, which is the more excellent work, is from God as well.

Furthermore, the said assertion is proved as follows: when no sufficient productive cause of some effect is found among created things, recourse must be had to God, who is the author of nature and supplies what secondary causes cannot accomplish. But no efficient cause of the sensitive soul and of the organization of its body is found in the nature of things, as I showed in the prior assertion. Therefore it must be affirmed that God is the maker of both effects. This is corroborated by Averroes (*2. Caeli*), who in difficult and arduous matters has recourse to God. Indeed, Galen adds that the power of seed is divine — as if to say that God operates by his power through seed as the dispositive cause. And Augustine (*22. Civit. cap. 23.*) calls the power of seeds marvelous. And he adds there that God, joining and connecting the incorporeal and corporeal natures — the former set over, the latter set under — in wonderful ways, makes the animated being.

First objection: If the sensitive soul were immediately produced by God, it would therefore be created, like the intellective soul. But the sensitive soul is not created. Therefore it is not immediately produced by God. I deny the consequence, for there is a distinction between the production of the sensitive and the intellective soul. The intellective is made from nothing, and therefore is created; the sensitive, however, is educed from the potency of matter — that is, from the suitably organized body — and therefore is not created.

Second objection: If the brute does not concur in the production of the sensitive soul, then it is not the parent of the brute generated by it. But commonly the generating brute is called the father of the generated brute. Therefore it attains the production of the sensitive soul. I deny the consequence. For just as the man who generates does not produce the rational soul, yet is called the father of the child generated by him, so also a brute is called the father of what it has begotten, even though it has not attained the production of its sensitive soul. For it is sufficient that, through the seed shed by the progenitor, proper preparation and disposition be made for the organization of the body of that soul and for educating it from that body. Aureolus explains this excellently (*1. dist. 31. art. 2. propositionem secundam*).

Third objection: If seed is not the active principle of the sensitive soul and its body, then from any seed any animal could be generated, since it does not actively concur in the production of the animal. But this conflicts with experience — for from human seed a lion, an ox, or another animal is not generated. Therefore, and so on. I deny the consequence of the major. For, as I noted above, seed is the dispositive principle. Therefore human seed disposes in one way, while leonine and bovine seed disposes in another. Wherefore it does not follow that from any seed any animal is generated, because of the various and diverse dispositions that the various and diverse seeds provide.

Question II — On Sensible Objects

Article I — What the Common Sensible Is and How Many Kinds There Are

So that what we propose in the title of this article may be more conveniently and readily perceived and understood, I observe that the sensible is the object around which sense is engaged. And sense is a vital power that perceives the sensible object. The sensible is divided into the per se sensible and the per accidens sensible. The latter is what is not perceived by sense in its own right but by reason of another — such as substance, which is sensed through its accidents. The former is what is attained by sense as such — such as color, sound, and the like. Furthermore, the sensible is distributed into the common sensible and the proper sensible. The common sensible is what is attained by several external senses — such as magnitude, figure, and the rest enumerated below. The proper sensible is what is perceived by only one external sense — such as color by sight and sound by hearing. Five kinds of proper sensible are enumerated, corresponding to the fivefold external sense — namely the visible, audible, gustable, olfactible, and tangible.

Assertion: There are five common sensibles — motion, rest, number, magnitude, and figure. This is what Aristotle holds (*2. animae, cap. 6. T. 64.*), against Galen (*1. de dignoscendis pusibus*), who excludes motion from the number of sensibles. And it is derived from Scotus (*4. dist. 45. quaest. 3. Ad 1. sub F. & d. 12.*

quaest. 2. §. Hic sunt. B. & q. 3. §. Ad principale. CC.). It is proved first: there are as many distinct common sensibles as there are diverse objects that are perceived by several senses, as is established from the description of the common sensible given in the preceding note. But there are five distinct objects that can be attained by several senses. Therefore there are five common sensibles as named above. The major is perspicuous. The minor is at hand: for the things attained by several senses are motion, rest, the discretion of things, quantity, and their image — which are the five common sensibles just enumerated. Second: a plurality and multitude of things must be reduced to certain principal headings in order to remove confusion and indistinction among them — as is done with universals, predicaments, and the like. But there are many common sensibles, as experience establishes. Therefore they must be reduced to those five just enumerated. Whatever the Perspectivists add — such as situation, distance in relation to motion, roughness, smoothness, curvature, and straightness — is conveniently and aptly reduced to figure. And so the said quinternary number of common sensibles must be retained.

First objection: Motion is in continuous flux — indeed, it is considered by many to be flux itself. But flux is perceived not by sense but by reason. Therefore motion does not belong among the common sensibles. I concede the major and distinguish the minor: according to its formal and perfect nature — I concede; according to its material and imperfect nature — I deny. For men plainly see people walking, water flowing, stones falling downward, and the like, which daily experience teaches us.

Second objection: Living beings devoid of reason do not count, as Aristotle writes (*Sect. 30. problematum.*). Therefore number is not attained by them, and consequently number should not be included among the common sensibles. I respond by explanation and distinction of the antecedent: brutes do not count by adding, subtracting, and repeating in the way that men do — I concede; they do not reckon — that is, they do not know discrete things, such as three stones, three men, and the like — I deny. For just as our bodily eye discerns many things distinct and separate from one another, so also the eye of the beast recognizes what is distinct and diverse.

Third objection: Rest is the privation of motion. But privation is not discerned by any sense. Therefore rest is not discerned by sense; and so rest is improperly numbered among the common sensibles. I respond that rest in the present context is not taken as the lack of motion but as the subsistence of a thing in a place, in which the privation of motion is grounded.

Article II — Whether the Common Sensible Produces a Species of Itself Distinct from the Species of the Proper Sensible

Ferrariensis (*2. de anima, quest. 11.*) and Michael de Palatio (*ibid. cap. 6.*) hold that the common sensible does not impress a species of itself in sense distinct from

the species of the proper sensible, but that the common sensible is attained by sense through the very same species of the proper sensible. Thomas (*2. de anima, lect. 13. & 1. p. quaest. 78. art. 3. ad 2.*), Bannez in the same place, and not a few others — whom the Complutenses follow (*disp. 9. de anima, quest. 2. §. 2.*) and Poncius (*disp. 59. quaest. 9.*) — hold that the common sensible is perceived by sense through a modified species of the proper sensible. Scotus, however (*4. dist. 12. quest. 3. §. Ad principales rationes. CC.*), Bassolis (*ibid. quest. 2.*), Iandun (*2. de anima, q. 18.*), the Gandavensis (*quaest. 17.*), and many others affirm that the common sensible is known by sense through a species distinct from the species of the proper sensible — so that the common sensible produces its own proper species in sense, distinct from the species of the proper sensible.

Note, following the Doctor just cited, that the common sensible, although it causes its own proper species, nevertheless cannot cause it without the accompanying proper sensible. Not because the common sensible does not precede the proper sensible — so that the one could be separated and detached from the other — but because it is not prior in acting upon the sense. The reason for this is perhaps that sense regards its proper object first before anything else, and therefore cannot receive any other act unless it first receives the act of its proper object. Wherefore sense does not perceive a secondary object, as it is a common sensible, unless the primary object — which is the proper sensible — has first been perceived. Just as a singular thing is perceived before a universal in the order and series of confused cognition, as I made plain elsewhere.

Assertion: The common sensible generates in the sense a species of itself distinct from the species of the proper sensible. Scotus supports this in the passage cited, as the reader of his text will see — whatever Cavallus may say (*in annot. 3. ad quest. 6. de anima num. 10. concl. 3.*). It is supported first from Aristotle (*2. animae, ad finem cap. 6.*), saying that the common sensible moves and alters sense — which cannot be accomplished except through a species and likeness of itself distinct from the species and likeness of the proper sensible. Second: diverse and distinct objects produce diverse and distinct images and likenesses — both because they are their seeds and effects, and because many diverse objects representing themselves appear plainly in a mirror. But the common sensible is an object distinct from the proper sensible, as is established from the preceding article. Therefore it produces a distinct species from the species of the proper sensible. Third: distinct sensations arise from distinct sensible species, because distinct causes produce distinct effects. Now distinct sensations arise from the common sensible and from the proper sensible. For if a tower is seen from afar, its magnitude is indeed perceived by sense, but the color of that very tower is not seen at all. Magnitude, however, belongs to the genus of common sensibles, and color belongs to the number of proper sensibles. Therefore the species of the common sensible, distinct from the species of the proper sensible, must be posited. Add also that the universal is distinguished

from the singular, as is clear from the description of each given elsewhere. Therefore the species of the one is distinguished from the species of the other.

Against this the Complutenses (*cit.* §. 4.) object and say that the species of both sensibles is the same, but is modified and determined toward representing the common or the proper sensible. Against this: a mode, as was asserted elsewhere, does not alter the thing of which it is a mode. But the common and proper sensible are things and distinct objects. Therefore they have distinct species, not merely modified ones. Especially because one can be had without the other — as I demonstrated above of magnitude and color and their species.

First objection: Magnitude is quantity, which belongs to the genus of the passive. Therefore, since magnitude belongs to the number of common sensibles, it plainly follows that it does not generate a species of itself in sense distinct from the species of the proper sensible. I respond that magnitude, which is quantity, is passive with respect to real action, but not with respect to intentional action, of which we speak here.

Second objection: Both sensibles — common and proper — can be known through a single species. Therefore another species, one for the common sensible and another for the proper sensible, is not to be devised and multiplied. The antecedent is at hand: for the proper sensible determines and modifies the common sensible; therefore the latter can be attained through the species of the former. I deny the antecedent. In response to its proof, if it is admitted in any way that the common sensible is determined and modified by the proper sensible, still, since they are objects distinct from one another, distinct species emanating from them are required in order for them to be known by sense.

Article III — Whether, Besides the Impressed Species, the Presence of the Sensible Object Is Required for External Sensation

In this article it is presupposed, from what will be said below, that sensible species are given — described as images or likenesses of sensible things, concurring partially in eliciting sensation. Given these, the difficulty can be raised in two ways. In one way, concerning natural power: the affirmative part is defended by Auriolus (*in prol. art. 3.*), Buridan (*2. de anima, quest. 21.*), and thereabouts, and others whom Mayron suppresses by name (*quest. 18. prol.*); the negative part is embraced by Scotus and his followers (*Quol. 13.*). In the other way, concerning supernatural power: two opinions also exist here. The first is that of Ockham (*Quol. 6. quest. 6.*) and Gabriel (*2. dist. 3. quaest. 2.*), who hold that it is impossible for an external sensation to occur without a present object. The second is defended by Scotus (*4. dist. 10. quaest. 9. §. Ad quaestionem. B.*), Maior (*1. dist. 3. quaest. 1. concl. 1.*), Molina (*1. part. quest. 55. art. 2. disp. 2. m. 5.*), Rubeius (*2. de anima quest. 13.*), and very many others, who affirm that no contradiction is involved in having an external sensation of an absent object.

Note, following Scotus (*1. dist. 2. quest. 7. §. Sed hic restat. sub FF. & 2. dist. 3. quest. 9. §. Ad quest. igitur. C. & Quol. 13. art. 2. §. circa secundum. I.*) — to whom Durandus (*quest. 3. prol.*) and the common run of Philosophers assent — that cognition is twofold: one is intuitive, the other abstractive. The former is of an object present and actually existing in itself, or existing eminently in another. An example of the first: the vision of an eye seeing a color actually existing. An example of the second: the vision of a blessed soul seeing creatures eminently contained in God. The latter is of an object not existing in itself, or absent, or not virtually contained in another — such as the cognition of a rose in winter, or of another thing known that neither exists nor is present nor is eminently contained in another. Whatever Auriolus says to the contrary, who does not accept the common description of intuitive and abstractive knowledge. Nor should the distinction of intuitive cognition into immediate and mediate be rejected, as the Conimbricenses (*2. de anima, cap. 6. q. 3. art. 1.*) hold — for as was said elsewhere, God's cognition of future contingents is indeed intuitive but not immediate, only mediate; and the cognition that blessed souls have of creatures when they see them intuitively in the Word does not appear to be immediate, since they do not always see them in themselves and in their own proper existence and presence. Nor does it help to say with the same Authors cited that cognition in another known thing is not intuitive — as Caesar is known in his statue. For even if this is true, because such cognition is in a figure and likeness of him: nonetheless the said cognition of creatures in the Word is had of them as virtually contained in the Word itself. And this is not how the cognition of Caesar in his statue or image or in any other representative of him stands.

First assertion: It is impossible by natural power for external sensation to occur unless the object actually exists and is present to the sense. The Doctor holds this (*cit. & 7. Met. quaest. 13. §. Aliter, & 1. Report. dist. 3. quaest. 4.*). It is proved first from Aristotle (*2. de anima, T. 60. sum. 4. cap. 1.*), who establishes the distinction between the object of sense and that of intellect: the object of sense is the singular existing in itself, while the object of the intellect is the universal abstracting from actual existence. Therefore in the Peripatetic school, external sensation is not accomplished unless the object actually exists and is truly presented to that sense.

You will say that the singular does not per se import actual existence, since the singular means nothing other than a nature determined and contracted through haecceity — which is its individual difference and the constitutive and distinctive principle from anything else that is not an individual and singular. And this is clearly apparent in any series of predicables, at the base of which the singular resides, separated and abstracted from all existence. Against this: the singular abstracted from actual existence is not known by sense but by the intellect, and not by intuitive cognition but by abstractive cognition — which is not what is at issue in the present context. Furthermore, intuitive cognition is called the cognition of vision; but an object is not actually seen unless it actually

exists. Therefore external sensation does not bear upon an object unless it is actually present. Second: the species of the sensible object does not know the object unless the sensible object itself is present. Therefore the presence of the actually existing object is required for it to be caused. The antecedent is established by experience: for the species received in the eye from a wall, if the wall is not actually present, no longer appears — just as is also seen in a mirror. For what is not actually present to the mirror is not seen in it. Therefore the same must be affirmed of external sensation, which is not produced by sense unless the object actually exists and is present to it.

You will say, with Aristotle (*1. de somnis, cap. 2.*), that a certain quality accompanies external sensation — as is evident when we come from the light of the sun into the shade, for a certain light then remains that seems to be seen in the eye. And Augustine confirms this (*11. Trin. cap. 1.*), saying: "Often when we gaze for a long time at the sun or any luminous body and then close our eyes, certain bright colors appear to us, variously changing themselves and diminishing more and more in brightness, until they cease. These are the remnants from the brighter light that shone more clearly and distinctly when it was joined to the luminous body." Augustine therefore thinks that external vision occurs with the luminous body absent. Against this: that happens because of a lesion to the sense — since the sense suffers from a vehement sensible, as is evident when we gaze with fixed eyes at the light of the sun. For certain motions, alterations, and agitations occur, by reason of which certain sensations seem to be produced in us that in reality are not produced, but it is the deception of the imagination judging that the vision still persists around the same object — as sometimes happens in those who are sleeping, dreaming, sick, delirious, seized by fear, and deceived, who seem to hear sounds and see terrible things that are not there, as Aristotle indicates (*2. anima, T. 138.*). Therefore such sensations are false, deceptive, and erroneous. Nor does it appear that Aristotle and Augustine, when rightly weighed, hold otherwise.

Second assertion: By supernatural power, external sensation can be produced through an impressed species, with the sensible object absent. This is what Scotus holds (*4. d. 10. quest. 9. I. Ad quaest. ergo. B.*). It is proved first: what is absolute can exist without what is relative, because what is absolute is prior to what is relative. But external sensation is an absolute entity, since it belongs to the genus of quality; while the presence of the sensible object is a relation. Therefore external sensation can occur without the presence of the sensible object. You will say that a relative cannot exist without its term and correlative — just as there cannot be a father without a son. But external sensation regards the external sensible object present and actually existing, as is evident from its definition given in the preceding note. Therefore external sensation cannot occur without a present object. Against this: although this holds for relatives according to being, it does not hold for relatives according to saying and those of the third kind, as I observed in its proper place. For science and the knowable

are relatives of the third mode, and science can exist with its knowable object absent — indeed, all science abstracts from any existence of its object. Likewise it does not seem incongruous for there to be an external sensation of something not existing, since it belongs to the class of relations of the third kind. Second: God by his absolute power can effect whatever secondary causes can effect, as has been sufficiently discussed elsewhere. Therefore he can supply the causality of the present sensible object, and consequently sensation will rightly occur without the object being present — with God, of course, causing what the sensible object would cause if it were present. Moreover, for sensation only the sense and the sensible species are required, as will be evident below. But God can produce any species of any sensible object — just as he produced intelligible species in the minds of the Angels. Therefore this falls within the scope of divine power.

First objection, against the first assertion: Scotus writes (*Quol. 13. art. 2.*) that God cannot produce intuitive knowledge without the real presence of a really existing object — and cannot cause me to see a stone with intuitive vision unless the stone is really present in its own proper presence and existence. The same he commits to writing (*4. d. 49. quaest. 1.*). The opposite, however, the same Doctor seems to affirm (*4. dist. 10. quaest. ult.*), saying that God by his power can cause vision of the body of Christ in a non-glorified eye, even though that body is not present to that eye. I respond by making a distinction, expounding the Doctor — namely that in the prior passages he speaks of God's ordered power, while in the latter he speaks of his absolute power. And in this way there is no contradiction in the writings of the same Doctor.

Second objection: After the projection of a thrown object, when the thrower is absent, a certain quality called impulse remains in the projectile. Therefore the same can occur in external sensation — namely that it be provided even with the sensible absent. The parity must be denied. For the latter depends in its becoming only on the thrower; the former, however, depends in its becoming and in its being — and therefore, unless the sensible object actually exists, it cannot be.

Third objection, against the second assertion: No power can exceed the limits of its object, since as was said, powers are specified by objects. But the object of sense is the singular existing and present. Hence the celebrated saying among Philosophers: sense is of singulars and intellect of universals. Therefore even supernaturally, external sensation cannot occur unless the object exists and is present to the external sense. I concede the major. As to the minor, I say that the object of sense is indeed a singular — but not a present singular; rather, a singular absolutely, as I made plain in the first assertion.

Fourth objection: The external sense has been provided by nature so that we may sense objects present to it — tasting honey by taste and touching actually by touch. But if sensation could occur with the object absent, we would taste honey

without honey and touch the tangible without the tangible, which is impossible. In confirmation: external sensation is intuitive, which regards a present object — and in this it differs from abstractive cognition. Therefore it is not had except of a present object. I respond by the distinction already given: by ordered power — I concede; by absolute power — I deny. To the confirmation I say that, given the hypothesis, it would be intuitive, not immediate but mediate, as I explained in the preceding note.

Article IV — Whether Sense Can Err Regarding Its Proper Sensibles

The Epicureans — as Marcus Tullius reports (*in 23. qq. Academicis*) — hold that sense never errs regarding its proper sensibles. The Academics, on the contrary — as Augustine reports (*Tomo 1. suorum operum*) — hold that sense always errs regarding its proper sensibles. The common opinion of the other Philosophers holds that sense sometimes errs and sometimes does not err regarding its proper sensibles, given certain conditions.

Note first that the question here is not whether formal error belongs to sense — for that kind of error belongs to the second operation of the intellect, which judges falsely that something belongs to something that in reality does not belong to it, as when it is said that man is a stone. The question is rather whether the error of apprehension is proper to sense itself — which occurs when the sense itself apprehends something otherwise than it is, as when it apprehends the sun to be of two feet in size, whereas astronomers demonstrate it to be of a much greater size. Now judgment, taken broadly, is considered by Aristotle (2. *Top. cap. 2.*) and indicated by Scotus (1. d. 3. *quaest. 4.*) to be accommodated to both sense and intellect.

Note second that four conditions are required for sense not to be deceived regarding its proper sensibles. The first is that the organ of sense be rightly disposed — in default of which a sick person perceives sweet things as bitter and bitter things as sweet. The second is that no obstacle be present in the medium — in default of which a face or hand appears red if seen through interposed red glass. The third is that there be a due distance between the sense and the object — hence a tower too distant from sight appears to be of black color, though it is in fact of white color. The fourth is that the object of sense be proportionate to the power — that is, that it be able to move the sensitive power — which is why atoms are not seen by us except through the rays of the sun passing through a window.

Assertion: Sense does not simply err regarding its proper sensible, though it can err in apprehending this or that otherwise than it is. This is suggested by the Doctor (1. d. 3. q. 4. §. *De tertiis. sub G.*). The first part is supported first from Augustine (15. *Trin. c. 12.*): "Far be it from us to doubt the truth of what we have learned through the bodily senses. For through them we have learned the sky, the earth, and what is known to us in them, etc." Second: sense has whatever is

required for truly knowing its object, provided the conditions enumerated in the second note are observed. Therefore, absolutely speaking, sense does not err with respect to it. The antecedent is at hand, since it is a natural power duly approximated, unimpeded, and rightly disposed. Third: the sciences are founded on the cognition of sense — according to the well-known saying (*l. de sensu, & sensato, c. 1.*): "Nothing is in the intellect that was not first in sense." But in the sciences there is no error, as is evident in logic (*quaestione ult.*). Therefore neither does sense err regarding its proper sensible. And this does not conflict with our faith, which is also acquired through the ministry of the senses — as is evident (*Ioan. ult.*): "Because you have seen me, Thomas, you have believed." And (*1 Ioan. 1.*): "What we have heard and seen with our own eyes and our hands have handled, concerning the Word of life." Aristotle supports this (*8. Phys. 22.*), saying that one whose thought is dull is one who withdraws trust from the senses.

The second part — which is Scotus's (*1. Met. q. 4. §. contra unum.*) — is proved first from Aristotle (*2. animae 161.*), affirming that sense is rarely deceived regarding its proper sensible. Therefore Aristotle holds that sense sometimes errs — when it apprehends an object otherwise than it is. For instance, when fingers are crossed and the hand touches one ball, touch apprehends two balls, though in reality there is only one ball. Second: the intellect sometimes corrects sense, as Scotus notes (*4. Met. in exp. T. 21. & 1. d. 3. q. 4. §. De tertiis cognoscibilibus. G.*). Therefore sense sometimes errs, as is evident in Augustine (*15. Trin. c. 12.*): the eye is deceived when an oar in water appears to be broken, and to a person sailing, a tower appears to move. The same Doctor holds this (*12. de genesi ad lit. c. 25. & 1. 83. qq. q. 9. & l. 3. contra litteras Petiliani Donatistae, c. 21.*). The antecedent is excellently shown by the Doctor in the first passage cited — chiefly about the staff that appears broken to the eye in water, though it is intact and straight. The intellect reasons thus: nothing harder is broken by contact with something soft that yields to it; but the staff is harder than the water that yields to it, as both sight and touch clearly experience. Therefore if an error should occur in sense, the intellect is able to correct it.

First objection, against the first part of the assertion: A rightly disposed sense, duly approximated to its proper sensible, still errs. Therefore sense is deceived regarding its proper sensible. The antecedent is shown: the eye sees the rainbow close to it and the neck of a dove in the light of the sun, and in both cases it apprehends true colors, which are however apparent colors, as I showed (*1. Meteor. q. 3. a. 3.*). I respond that sense indeed sometimes errs, but the intellect can correct it, as the Doctor treats this lucidly in the place cited.

Second objection, against the second assertion: Sense perceives the object through a sensible species, and the sensible species is a natural image representing the object as it is. Therefore sense never errs. I respond that the argument holds true if all the conditions adduced and explained in the second note are observed, but is false if any of them is absent.

You will ask first whether sense can perceive several things at once. I respond affirmatively. For sight can see multiple colors, and hearing can hear multiple sounds. It perceives one thing better than many. Hence that saying is celebrated: "A sense that attends to many things is less effective toward each one."

You will ask second whether a vehement sensible injures sense. Aristotle responds affirmatively (*2. anima, c. 2.*), and experience confirms it — as is evident in one who gazes with fixed eyes at the sun at midday, whose vision is harmed; and in the gunner who becomes deaf from the vehemence of the noise of cannons. The reason is that sense requires for sensation a due temperament, which is dissolved by the great force and frequent assault of sensibles. But why does this not happen to the intellect, which is instead perfected by what is most perfectly intelligible? The reason is that the intellect is spiritual, while sense is corporeal — its temperament is overturned and altered by a vehement sensible.

You will ask third whether a sensible placed upon the sense produces sensation. I respond that for touch and taste, yes; for the other three, no. Thus the visible placed upon the eye impedes vision. The reason is that those senses require a medium in order to exercise their sensation.

Question III — On the External Senses

Article I — What the External Senses Are

The external senses are described as material faculties fixed to an external bodily organ. This amounts to the same as the definition of sense given by Saint Damascene (*2. fidei, c. 18.*): sense is a power of the soul that apprehends or knows material things. They are called external not because they protrude at the extremities of the body — for Aristotle affirms (*1. de sensu, & sensato*) that sight is not at the extremity of the pupil — but because they appear outwardly to us, or because they are altered by external objects with no other thing interposed: sight by color, hearing by sound.

Assertion: There are five external senses — sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch. These are mentioned by Aristotle (*2. animae, T. 128.*) and Scotus (*2. d. 3. q. 8. Ad 3. & q. 6. de anima.*). They are also enumerated by Damascene (*fidei, c. 12.*), Augustine (*11. Civit. c. 16. & 1. de gen. contra Manich. cap. 14. & 11. Trin. ante c. 2. & 12. de gen. ad lit. c. 16.*). It is proved first: material and corporeal powers are enumerated according to the number of organs, as no one denies. But there are five distinct organs, as is evident to the eye and will be more apparent below when we treat of each in particular. Therefore there are five external senses, through which, as through the body's messengers, diverse things are reported — as Augustine says (*Tract. 99. in Ioan.*). Second: powers are distinguished and manifested according to the distinction of objects, as has been shown elsewhere. But there are five formally distinct objects of externally sensible things — namely the visible, audible, olfactible, gustable, and tangible — which Augustine

hands down (2. *de lib. arb.* c. 3.) and explains (1. 83. qq. q. 64. & l. *de duabus animabus*, c. 2. & in *exp. Psal.* 147.). Moreover, there are five media of sensing — namely earth, water, air, fire, and flesh — through which external sensation is produced, as Aristotle teaches before others (*in praesenti.*). Therefore there are five external senses.

First objection: Not all animals possess external senses. Therefore five external senses are not given. The antecedent is proved: certain animals — such as the mole — lack sight, on the testimony of Pliny (1. 2. *hist. natur.* c. 69.); and others lack hearing — such as bees, as Aristotle reports (1. *Met.* c. 1.). I concede the antecedent and deny the consequence. For it is not necessary that all animals possess these five senses — just as it is not necessary that all animals have the power of local motion. It suffices that some enjoy all of them, as is established from the case of man, the lion, and similar beings.

Second objection: Taste and touch do not differ from one another. Therefore five external senses should not be admitted. The antecedent is shown: taste is a kind of touch — for we do not taste flavors unless we touch them. I respond by distinguishing the antecedent: taste taken broadly is a kind of touch — I concede; taken strictly — I deny. For they possess formally distinct objects and a distinct definition, as is clear from the assertions made above.

Third objection: Sight regards corruptible and incorruptible things, sublunary and celestial things. But one and the same power cannot regard all these things. Therefore sight is not one sense but multiple, according to the multiplicity of objects. If the major be conceded, I say as to the minor that all these things fall under one formal objective aspect — which is visibility. Therefore from the unity of the formal object the unity of the visual power is rightly deduced.

You will ask first from what origin the external senses derive. The physicians — notably Galen (1. 6. *de placitis Hypocr. & Platonis*) — respond that the external senses arise from the brain, because when the pathway that proceeds from the brain is blocked, external sensation is impeded. Therefore, they say, it is a clear sign that the external senses proceed from the brain.

You will ask second whether the external senses of all living beings are of the same species. I respond affirmatively. The reason is that their formal object is entirely the same, though there is some accidental difference among them — namely in perfection. For the sight of the eagle is more perfect and acute than the sight of the ox and other animals.

You will ask third whether the senses of man exceed in perfection the senses of brutes. Hippocrates responds by making a distinction. If the discussion concerns the substance of these senses, in man they are more perfect, because they arise from more perfect causes — namely the rational soul and the human body, and from the whole composite, which is man, who excels and surpasses all other living beings. But if discussion concerns the accidental being of those senses,

some animals possess more excellent senses than man, on account of the better dispositions of their organs. And Canellus suggests this (*in 6. quaest. de anima, concl. 2.*), saying that man surpasses all other animals absolutely in all senses, even if in certain respects he is surpassed by some. Hence the following verses are composed: "In hearing the boar surpasses us, in sight the lynx, in taste the ape, the vulture in smell, the spider in touch."

You will ask fourth what order the external senses observe among themselves. I respond that in the order of origin, the first is touch — because it is the foundation of life — then taste, smell, hearing, and sight. In the order of dignity and perfection, sight holds the first place, followed by hearing, smell, taste, and touch.

Article II — Whether the External Senses Need a Medium to Produce Sensation

This difficulty was touched upon in the third question of the preceding question and nearly resolved. Now, however, it must be examined exactly and decided clearly. Two divergent opinions of the interpreters of Aristotle exist on this matter, of which the first is defended by Averroes (*in praesenti com. 116.*), affirming that all external senses require a medium for producing external sensation. The second is supported by Alexander, who holds that the first three senses — sight, hearing, and smell — require a medium for producing sensation, but not the other two — taste and touch.

Note that the medium of a sense is that through which the sensible object acts upon the power and organ of sensation. Now it can act — or alter the sense — either according to real being, which is called being in reality, as when fire heats touch; or according to intentional being, by diffusing the sensible species into the sense itself, as is evident of the visible object, which sends its species into sight through which sight itself sees the color presented to it and the object. Furthermore, sensation can be produced by the sensible placed upon the sense — imperfectly, or perfectly. And this distinction reconciles many who disagree with one another about Aristotle's axiom (*2. anima, c. 7. T. 75.*), saying that a sensible placed upon the sense does not produce sensation — that is, imperfect or perfect, as Toledo especially observes (*ibi q. 2. 1. 3. 0. 35.*). And in this sense Scotus perhaps speaks (*quaest. 4. de anima*), and Canellus explains it (*ibid. in suis annot.*).

First assertion: It is probable that the first three external senses — sight, hearing, and smell — do not exercise sensation without some medium being present. It is proved first from Aristotle (*2. anima, c. 6.*), who plainly teaches that the said senses require a medium. Second: there is the common saying, written out (*in 2. de anima, c. 7. T. 75.*): a sensible placed upon the sense does not produce sensation — which is established by experience. For with hands placed over the eyes and ears and nose blocked, sight, hearing, and smell are impeded — which

are the sensations of the said senses. Therefore these senses require a medium for producing sensation. Third: for seeing, light and air are necessary — and so if either is absent, vision is not accomplished. Therefore sight requires a medium for producing vision.

Second assertion: It is likely that taste and touch do not require a medium for eliciting their sensations. It is proved: no touching or tasting takes place unless the tangible is immediately touched by touch and the gustable by taste — as experience makes plain of food digested in the mouth and of the hand immediately touching the primary qualities. Likewise of two planks immediately touching one another. Furthermore, if the hand be placed over a fire, it is improbable that the skin senses heat through the mediation of air and that the fire itself does not exclude the medium air, if it is present. And the same is evident in taste. For no one can taste honey if a medium is interposed between taste and honey. Therefore these two latter senses do not require a medium to produce sensation.

First objection: From Aristotle (*2. anima, c. 7.*), proving that there are five external senses because there are five media through which quintuple sensation is accomplished. Therefore if Aristotle's argument is valid, it must be admitted that all external senses require a medium for exercising their sensations. I respond that Aristotle there speaks of the internal receptive media in the organs and sensories of the external senses — such as the sensible species concurring in producing sensations. But we are here treating of external media that must be interposed between the sensible object and the exterior sensitive power, and which we have asserted above to be unnecessary for taste and touch.

Second objection: The same Philosopher (*proximè cit. T. 75.*) proffers this maxim: a sensible placed upon the sense does not produce sensation. Therefore every sense necessarily requires a medium for the production of its sensation. I respond that the proposition cited is not universally true — taste and touch are excepted, as was asserted and proved above.

You will ask whether the external senses perceive their own sensations — that is, whether sight sees its own vision and hearing hears its own hearing. I respond negatively. The reason is that the external senses are not comparative and reflexive powers with respect to their own acts, and therefore do not attain their own sensations. Especially because sensations are not sensible objects but media through which the sensible objects themselves are sensed and perceived by the senses.

Article III — Whether the External Senses Can Perceive a Spiritual Object

Although all in fact concede that the external senses cannot attain any spiritual object — and they affirm the same of any other material power — some, among

whom is Arriaga (*disp. 5. de anima, sect. 2.*), and Poncius does not seem far distant (*disp. 59. q. 5. in fine concl. 2.*), admit this as possible and think that no contradiction is involved. The common run of Scholastics, however — expressly Scotus (*4. d. 49. q. 11. §. Ad argumenta ante K.*) and the rest of both his school and the other — teach that external and internal sense is in no way able to perceive spiritual things.

Assertion: Neither in fact nor as possible can external senses attain anything spiritual. The assertion is bipartite, and is defended by Scotus in the place just cited. The first part is proved first by the experience of sight, which does not see the rational soul, nor an Angel, except in a body assumed by it — and the same must be judged of the other senses. Second: the intellect bound to the senses cannot perceive except material things. Hence that saying exists: "Nothing is in the intellect that was not first in the sense." And (*3. de anima, T. 39.*): "One who understands must contemplate phantasms." But such phantasms are sensible and material things, which the agent intellect renders spiritual. Therefore sense does not bear upon spiritual things.

The second part is supported first: every power cannot exceed the limits of its total and adequate object. But if sense could attain something spiritual, it would exceed the limits of its total and adequate object. Therefore that is impossible. Poncius responds (*cit.*) that this is a *petitio principii*. For what is asked here is whether a power can be elevated by God to consider something outside its object. Against this: it cannot be that the object of a power is adequate and not adequate, total and not total. But if sense could perceive something spiritual, its object — which is the sensible — would be adequate, because it is a sensitive and material power; and it would not be adequate, because it would overstep the limits of the sensible itself and be elevated to the spiritual and immaterial. Therefore that is repugnant. The major is at hand, because powers and habits are specified by their total and adequate objects (*2. anima, T. 33.*). Furthermore, an organic power cannot be non-organic — otherwise it would be organic and non-organic, which implies a contradiction. But sense is an organic and material power; and if it were elevated to perceiving a spiritual object, it would be non-organic and spiritual — as is evident from the intellect, which is a non-organic and spiritual power perceiving an immaterial and spiritual object. Second: God cannot be seen with the bodily eye — hence he is called invisible, on the authority of Augustine (*1. contra Adimantum. c. 28. & tract. 24. in Ioan.*): "He is not of such a substance as can be seen by eyes." Therefore if sight cannot perceive God or any other spiritual thing, the same must be affirmed of the other senses.

First objection: Everything created is in obediential potency to God, for doing whatever God wills. Therefore since sense is a created being, it is in obediential potency for perceiving a spiritual object, and consequently it is not repugnant for an external sense to be able to attain something spiritual. I respond that obediential potency, as was said elsewhere, is not active but passive. And the

omnipotence of God admits of everything possible — but not of the impossible, such as sense attaining the spiritual and immaterial.

Second objection: Job 19: "In my flesh I shall see God my Savior." To which Augustine (22. *Civit. cap. 29.*) seems to give his assent. But this testimony is taken of material vision and the bodily eye. Therefore it is not repugnant for sense to perceive spiritual things such as God. I respond that that and similar passages must be interpreted of Christ the Lord, who according to his humanity can be seen by the bodily eye, but not according to his divinity, which is seen by the eye of the mind and intellect.

Question IV — On Intentional Sensible Species

This question is placed between the preceding and subsequent ones, because sensations cannot be rightly perceived unless knowledge of these intentional sensible species is had. Therefore it is properly woven in between those two.

Article I — Whether Intentional Sensible Species Are Given

The first view is held by Ockham (2. *quest. 7.*), Gabriel (2. *dist. 3. quaest. 2.*), and Durandus (*quest. 6.*), to whom the other Nominalists agree in sense and assent, rejecting both sensible and intelligible species. The second view is defended by Scotus (1. *dist. 3. quaest. 6.*), Bargius, Lychetus, Vigerius, Faber, Vulpes, and the rest of the Theologians and Philosophers who admit both sensible and intelligible species.

The various senses in which the word "species" is taken must be recalled from what was set forth in the Epitome of Dialectic (*lib. 1. quaest. 3. art. 4.*). In the present context, however, species is taken as an objective representation — or image and likeness of a thing — which is a quality deputized for the object, concurring partially in producing sensation. This is called the impressed species because it is impressed upon the sense, and is also called intentional because it is intended by the sensitive power in order that sensation may occur. The sensation itself is called the expressed species, which is the formal expression of the sensible object and by which sense is formally cognitive. What I have said about the sensible species must likewise be affirmed in the same way of the intelligible species.

Assertion: Sensible and intelligible species must be conceded. This is handed down by the Doctor in the passage cited, though in (*quest. 17. de anima*) he seems to defend the opposite. Augustine preceded him (10. *Conf. cap. 8.* & 12. *Civit. cap. 7.* & 7. *de gen. ad lit. cap. 21.* & 1. *contra epistolam fundamenti, cap. 19.*). It is proved first from Aristotle (2. *animae, T. 121.*), affirming that sense is the receptive of species. And (*T. 124.*) and (3. *eiusdem operis, T. 28.*) and thereabouts, teaching both sensible and intelligible species. Second: the reason why a sensible placed upon the sense does not produce sensation is that a medium is required through which the species is conveyed to the sense to produce sensation. Therefore for

producing sensation, a sensible species is necessary. The antecedent, apart from being proved in the preceding article, can still be urged: unless a sensible species is had in the sense, even if a medium is interposed between sense and the sensible object, sensation is not accomplished. Therefore for sensation itself, the sensible species is necessary. Third: the sensitive power cannot produce sensation by itself alone — otherwise sense would always sense, as the eye would always see. But it is evident that sense does not always exercise its sensation unless it has the species of the sensible thing; indeed, if the species is lost, sense can no longer sense. Therefore sensible species must be given. Fourth: a power that is indifferent and undetermined must be actuated and determined by something that actualizes and determines it — as is evident from matter, which is actuated and determined by form. But the sensitive power is indifferent and undetermined toward sensing this or that sensible thing. Therefore it must be determined and activated by a sensible species received in it. To this are added the experiences — chiefly of sight — since in water, mirrors, and other transparent bodies, from behind some opaque body blocking, images, figures, and the like appear. Moreover, through optical instruments, objects duly approximated and rightly disposed are better and more clearly seen by the eye than without them — by reason of which sight is augmented, which cannot be accomplished without species. Furthermore, in the discharge of a cannon, the ignition of the powder is first seen and afterward its strike and boom is heard, because the species of the sound is afterward conveyed to hearing — as I observed (*1. Meteo. q. 2. a. 4.*). Moreover, in the case of an odor, it is conveyed first to those nearby and then to those farther away. And such sensations are not produced by senses without sensible species. Therefore sensible and intelligible species of this kind must be conceded.

First objection: Aristotle (*l. de sensu, & sensili c. 2.*) reproaches Democritus and other ancient Philosophers who affirm that sensible species are received in sense so that sensations may be produced. Therefore Aristotle refutes the said sensible species. I respond that the Stagirite argues against those ancient Philosophers — not because they admitted such species, but because they held that sense is only a passive power and does nothing at all toward the production of sensation. We, however, hold that sense is indeed receptive of species, yet actively concurs, together with the sensible species, in producing sensations.

Second objection: What leads to cognition of the object must be known prior to the object, since it is the medium through which the object itself is known. But the sensible species is not known by the senses — for sight does not see the species of color, nor does hearing hear the species of sound. Therefore such species are superfluous. I respond that the major holds of the medium that is known — such as a creature through which God is known; for the creature itself must be known prior to God. But it does not hold of the medium of knowing — such as the species, which is the means of knowing and the likeness of the sensible object. And this is evident from a mirror, which represents diverse

objects; yet it is not necessary that the mirror be known first before the objects represented in it are seen.

Third objection: If sensible species were given, many accidents differing only in number would be multiplied in the same subject — such as in the same medium and the same organ. But this seems repugnant. Therefore so does the former. I concede the consequence of the major and deny the minor, as I made clear and proved in Logic in the question on relation — where I showed that in the same father there are multiple paternities in number, and in the same medium multiple lights distinct only in number. And this will be more apparent in the Metaphysics, where it will be shown that accidents are not individuated by their subjects.

You will ask first by whom the sensible species are produced. I respond that they are produced by the objects of which they are likenesses and images.

You will ask second in what subject the sensible species inhere. I respond that they inhere in the medium and in the organ of the sensitive power. For such species are conveyed from objects through the medium to the sense in which they reside.

Article II — What the Sensible Species Are

Some hold that sensible species are the natures and quiddities of objects. Others think they are atoms or corpuscles emitted from objects to the senses. Nor are there lacking those who affirm that they are formal likenesses of objects. The common opinion of the other Philosophers holds that sensible species are representative and effective images of objects, concurring partially in the production of sensations.

First assertion: Sensible species are not the natures and quiddities of objects. This is derived from the Doctor (*1. d. 3. quaest. 7. §. Ad auctoritatem Philosophi. AA.*). It is proved first: if the species were the natures of objects, since they are in sense, the natures of objects would consequently be in sense — and so the natures of the lion, the dog, and the rest would remain in sense. But how false this is is evident of itself and from that saying of Aristotle (*3. anima, T. 38.*): "Not the stone but the species of the stone is in the intellect." Therefore such species are not the essences and natures of objects. Second: what is outside the sense according to its own nature is not in the sense — since one and the same thing cannot simultaneously and with respect to the same be both in sense and outside sense. But the nature of the object is outside the sense — a tree, for instance, is outside the eye; while the species of the tree is in the eye, just as the intelligible species of the stone is in the intellect. Third: nothing can exist without its own essence — for nothing is more intimate to a thing than its essence. But a species can exist without the object — as the species of a corrupted object is in the phantasy. Therefore the species is not the very nature and essence of the object.

Second assertion: Sensible species are not atoms or corpuscles transmitted from objects to the sense. This is drawn from the Doctor (*Quol. 13. §. Ad argumentum principale. LL. & Quol. 14. in fine 6. de tertio & §. Ad ista. HH.*). It is proved first: multiple bodies cannot simultaneously exist in the same place, as I said in the treatise on place. But multiple species simultaneously exist in the same place — in the same medium and in the same organ, as was said and proved elsewhere. Therefore sensible species are not the said corpuscles conveyed from objects to sense. Second: what inheres in another is not a body but an accident, and a body is a substance that is a being subsisting through itself. But sensible species inhere in the medium and in the sense, which is the receptive power of them. Therefore they are not the said corpuscles.

Third assertion: Sensible species are not formal likenesses of objects, but representative, effective images concurring partially in producing sensations. The assertion is bipartite and is held by Scotus in the passage cited. The first part is supported first: the formal likeness of an object is nothing other than the very cognition of the object itself — which is called the expressed species. But there is a wide distinction between the species and the cognition of the object — that is, between the impressed and the expressed species — as I indicated above. Therefore the sensible species, or impressed species, is not a formal likeness of the object. Second: what is a cause of something cannot with respect to the same be its effect — otherwise the same thing would be the cause of itself. But the sensible species is a partial formal cause of the formal likeness of the object, or of the cognition of the object itself. Therefore it cannot be the formal likeness of the same object.

The second part follows from what has been said. For the species is a deputy of the object, performing its function — namely representing the object itself, and together with the sensitive power causing the sensation. Therefore the sensible species is a representative likeness of the object of which it is the species.

Objection: Sensible species are formally similar to sensible objects. Therefore they are their formal likenesses, of the same nature — since likeness is founded on identity. I distinguish the antecedent: representatively, effectively, and intentionally — I concede; really, physically, and formally — I deny.

Second objection: Various colors appear in the air and on a wall through reflection — as when light is reflected toward green plants, the wall takes on color; and when a red silk veil is hung in a window with the sun shining, the whole house becomes red. Therefore the sensible species is a formal image of the sensible object. I concede the antecedent and deny the consequence. For it can be said that this occurs not because species are seen by us, but because the air is diffused mixed with species — just as through green glass everything appears green. Or say with Scotus (*2. d. 13. q. vn. §. Quantum ad 3. art. F. G.*) that sometimes a species is visible — as he explains concerning the gleam emitted

from an eye moved in the dark, which is visible, though it is only the species of light.

Article III — Whether Species Are Divisible

The present difficulty can be raised both of sensible and intelligible species, which in what follows are to be established and decided in two assertions. For its declaration and decision, two notes are premised.

Note first that a species can be said to be indivisible in two ways: in being, or in representing. In being, if its nature, essence, and entity are incomposite and indivisible — as are God, an Angel, and the rational soul. In representing, however, if the whole species represents the whole object and a part does not represent a part. Conversely, it is divisible if the whole species represents the whole object and a part represents a part — and this is understood only of the sensible species, not of the intelligible species, which has no parts.

Note second that a natural agent duly approximated to a patient, rightly disposed and unimpeded, acts throughout the whole sphere of its activity, according to its whole power and virtue. Thus if water cools and moistens the earth in so much space and no more, the whole water is said to cool and moisten the whole of that earth and each of its parts — and not one part acts upon another and another upon another, and so on. Just as the light of a lamp illuminates the whole room and not one part illuminating another: so a species is diffused through the whole medium and space appropriate and proper to it, in which the object of which it is the species can be sensed, and is contained within the range of its power and activity, with no obstacle interposed.

First assertion: Sensible species are divisible. This is derived from the Doctor (2. d. 13. q. vn.). It is shown first: what is material is divisible, since everything material is quantified, and everything quantified is divisible (5. Met. c. de quanto.). But sensible species are material — for they are emitted from a material and corporeal object. Therefore sensible species are divisible. Second: what is educed from the potency of a divisible subject is divisible, since from what is divisible only what is divisible proceeds. But sensible species are educed from the potency of a divisible and material subject, as is evident by induction. Therefore they are divisible.

Second assertion: Intelligible species are incomposite and indivisible. The Doctor does not depart from this in the passage cited above. It is proved first: what inheres in an incomposite and immaterial subject is incomposite and indivisible, since what is indivisible does not receive what is divisible. Hence an Angel, being indivisible and immaterial, does not receive material and divisible accidents. But intelligible species are subject in an indivisible and immaterial subject — namely the intellect. Therefore they are incomposite and indivisible. Second: everything immaterial and spiritual is impartible and incomposite, since it lacks entitative and quantitative parts. But intelligible species are

immaterial and spiritual — for they are produced by the agent intellect, which is spiritual, and received in the patient intellect, which is likewise spiritual. Therefore intelligible species are indivisible.

First objection, against the first assertion: Light and heat are produced indivisibly from the sun and from fire, and not one part from another part, but the whole light from the whole sun and the whole heat from the whole fire. If sensible species were divisible, one part would plainly be produced from one part of the object and another from another part, and the whole species from the whole object — which does not seem plausible. Therefore sensible species are not divisible. The major can be denied: for one part of light beams from one part of the sun. And this is clearly shown when the sun is eclipsed — for then we enjoy only one part of its light. Likewise when a part of fire is taken from the whole fire — then it neither illuminates nor heats as much as before, on account of that part taken away and removed from it. But since such species are intentional and emanate from objects suddenly, continuously, and not discretely and successively, and almost imperceptibly, therefore one part is not said to be produced from another, but the whole species from the whole object, in the manner explained in the second note.

Second objection: A small part of an object seen from afar is not seen at all; but the whole object is very much seen. Therefore a part of the object does not cause a part of the species, but the species is produced absolutely from the whole object — and so sensible species are not divisible. I respond that the reason why a small part of an object, if it is very distant, cannot be seen by us, while the whole object is seen by us, is that the visible object must be proportionate to the visual power. Since a small part of an object is disproportionate to sight because of the undue distance, it cannot therefore be seen. But the whole is proportionate to sight itself, and therefore is seen by us. And this can be illustrated by atoms, which are not seen by us because they are so tiny — while other bodies not so small are certainly seen by us.

You will ask whether species admit of more and less. I respond affirmatively — for they are qualities, whose passion it is to admit of more and less. Hence some represent objects more clearly, and others more obscurely.

Question V. On Sight

A full and perfect knowledge of sight cannot be had without knowledge of light and illumination, which pertain to its object, as Scotus especially establishes (*1 Met. 9.2. §. Ad aliud, quod*). Therefore, the things said about light must be investigated first, and then the remaining matters pertaining to this same sense must be treated.

Article I. Whether light is an accident or a substance.

Thomas (*1 p. 9.67. art. 3*) recounts the opinion of those who think that light is the substantial form of luminous bodies — an opinion that perhaps coincides with the one Aristotle mentions (*2 anima, c.7.T.69*), namely that light is a body. The common view, however, held by Aristotle in the place just cited, by Scotus (*2.d.13.9.vn*), by Mayr in the same place, by Alensis (*3.p.9.69. m.2. art. 3*), and by others, is that light is an accident belonging to the category of quality.

Note I, from Gabriel (*2.d.13 9.vn*), that the name "light" was imposed chiefly to signify that by which colors are made manifest so that they can be seen — that is, that by which the visible in potency becomes actually visible. It is also transferred to everything by which the knowable is made manifest, as in Ephesians I: "All things that are reprove are made manifest by light," and thereafter: "Everything that is made manifest is light." In this sense God, the angel, faith, grace, and glory are called lights.

Note II, that these three — lux (light as source), luminosum (the luminous body), and lumen (illumination) — stand in such relation that lux is the origin of lumen, the luminous body is the subject of lux, and lumen is the species or effect of lux. Thus lux illuminates the body in which it resides, then renders itself luminous, and afterwards illuminates other things. Observe further that three things emanate from a luminous body: the ray, the splendor, and the brilliance. A ray is that which proceeds from a luminous body terminated at some object. Splendor is a ray reflected off an opaque body. And brilliance is light mixed with darkness. On all these matters in full detail, see the writers on optics.

First Assertion: Light is not a substance. So hold Aristotle and Scotus in the places cited above. This is proved, first, because what is per se sensible is not a substance, since, as I said above, substance is sensible only per accidens; but light is per se sensible, being directly seen by our eyes; therefore light is not to be numbered among substances. Second, what is an accident of something is not a substance, for substance happens to nothing (*1. Phys. 27*); but light is an accident of the sun and of fire. The sun can indeed be darkened, as in Matthew XXIV: "The sun shall be darkened, the moon shall not give her light." Likewise, fire in its proper sphere does not shine, since it is exceedingly rare there. Moreover, the fire of hell is said to be filled with darkness; therefore light is not a substance.

Second Assertion: Light is not a body, but an accident belonging to the category of quality. This is defended by Aristotle and Scotus in the places cited above. The first part follows from the prior assertion: for if light is not a substance, it is not a body either. What does not possess the higher essential predicate does not possess the lower one either, as is plain from the dictum de nullo; therefore, if light is not a substance, it is certainly not a body, which is comprehended under substance, as is clear from the Porphyrian tree. Furthermore, if light were a body, two bodies would naturally be in the same place simultaneously, namely

light and air, since light is in the air. Again, a body is made up of matter and form; but light is devoid of matter; therefore it is not a body.

The second part is inferred from the assertions above: since light is neither substance nor body, it follows that it is an accident — and nothing other than a quale, because through light luminous bodies are denominated as having a certain quality; therefore light is a quality.

First Objection: Aristotle (*5. Top. cap.3*) writes that light is fire; but fire is a substance; therefore light is a substance. And in section XI of the Problems, question XIII, he calls solar rays and light "bodies." Favorable to this view are Augustine (*3. de lib. arb. cap. 5*) and (*7. de gen. ad lit. c. 1*), John of Damascus (*2. fidei, 6.7*), Hugo of St. Victor (*1. defacram. c. 9*), and the Seraphic Doctor (*2. d. 13. art. 2. 9. 1*), who defends this as a probable position, adducing and resolving the testimonies and arguments on both sides. I reply that Aristotle either spoke in the opinion of others, whom he attacks in the passage from *De Anima* just cited, or used "light" to mean the luminous body — as in *Genesis I*, where "light" is said to be created on the first day, meaning the luminous body which was made manifest through light as its nobler quality. The Fathers cited above can be interpreted in the same way. Or, on this point they need not be followed, since it is not a matter of faith, and on our side we have authors of no lesser authority.

Second Objection: What produces a substance is itself a substance, because in the Scotist school a substance is generated only by a substance; but light and illumination generate substance, such as gold and things of that kind; therefore light is a substance. I grant the major. I distinguish the minor: dispositively, I grant it; efficiently, I deny it. This distinction was stated and explained elsewhere.

Third Objection: What is nobler than material substance is itself a substance, because nobility follows the thing whose nobility it is; but light surpasses material substance in nobility, on the authority of Augustine (*2. de lib. arb.*): "Light holds the first place among bodies." Therefore light is a substance. I grant the major. I distinguish the minor: absolutely, I deny it; in a qualified sense, I grant it. This is how Augustine must be interpreted. For as I have said elsewhere, active qualities surpass matter in nobility in a qualified sense; but absolutely speaking, matter, even passive matter, is more excellent not only than qualities but even than any other accidents.

Fourth Objection: Nothing is contrary to light and illumination; but to a quality something is contrary, as is plain from the enumeration of the properties of quality; therefore light and illumination are not qualities but substances. I grant the major. I deny the minor. Not all qualities have a contrary — for example, sensible and intelligible species do not — since having a contrary is not a property of quality in the fourth mode.

Article II. Whether illumination is both a real and an intentional quality.

Thomas (*1. part. quest.67.art.3*), Cajetan, Bañez (*de anima, quast.1.§.B*), Ruvo (*tract. de sensu, cap.7. quast. 2*), and very many others assert that illumination is a real and purely physical quality. Scotus, however (*2. d. 13. quest. vn. §. de 2.dico*), Dib., the Complutensians (*disp. 10*), C. Faber (*Theor.66*), Piccolomini (*l. d. visu cap.8*), Zabarella (*1.1. de visu, cap.9*), Cavallius (*disp. 2. de anima, sect.9.dub.1*), and the rest of the same school teach that illumination is not only a real quality but also an intentional one. For easier and more convenient understanding of this:

Note I, from the Doctor just cited under B, that "intention" is used in two ways. In one way, for the act of a vital power tending immediately to an object — in this sense, when the intellect perceives a real object it is simply called a first intention; but when it compares one known object to another, it is called a second intention, as I explained at length in my Epitome (*1.1. quast.1. art.10*). In the other way, for the medium and representative principle of an object, by means of which the cognitive power tends toward the object itself and effectively concurs in a partial way toward producing the vital act. It is intentional being understood in this second sense — the sense in which it is participated by sensible and intelligible species — that is under discussion here.

Note II, that something can have real and intentional being simultaneously: for example, a sign, on the authority of Augustine (*1. de doctrina Christiana, cap. 1*), has real being because it is perceived directly by sense, and has intentional being because it is the medium through which one is led to the knowledge of another thing. In the same way, illumination participates in real being because it is per se sensible, and acquires intentional being because it is the species of a place. This same Augustine expressed when he said (*tractatu 35. in Ioan.*): "Light both shows other things and shows itself."

Assertion: Illumination is a real quality and also an intentional one. The assertion is two-part, defended by Scotus and agreed to by Augustine just cited. The first part is shown, first, because illumination is placed in the third species of quality — namely, it is a passible quality; but every passible quality placed in the genus of quality is real; therefore illumination is a real and physical quality. Second, what has real effects is itself real, as is evident; but illumination has real effects — it illuminates, heats, liquefies wax, hardens clay, and so forth; therefore illumination is counted among real qualities.

The second part is proved, first, from Averroes (*2. anima, conc.73 and 75; de sensu et sensato, not far from the beginning*), who affirms that illumination is a species received in the eye so that the eye itself may see; but a species has intentional being, as I noted at the end of the first notation; therefore illumination is an intentional quality. Aristotle himself (*2 anima, T. 68*) suggests the same when he says that light is per se sensible, a thing that has no other species than

illumination. And in the book on sense and its object (*cap.* 2) he adds that illumination is a species received in the eye by which sight sees. Second, if illumination did not have intentional being, when placed upon a sense it would impede sensation — which conflicts both with experience and with Aristotle in the passage just cited — for if illumination is received in sight or in hearing, it in no way hinders vision or hearing. Furthermore, illumination persists as long as the luminous source is present, lacks a contrary, and coexists with another illumination — all of which are marks of a sensible species.

First Objection: Illumination denominates the subject in which it exists — for example, illumination existing in air denominates the air as luminous — but what has intentional being does not denominate the subject in which it exists: the species of whiteness inhering in the eye does not denominate the eye as white; therefore illumination is not an intentional quality. I grant the major. I distinguish the minor: with respect to that which has only intentional being, I grant it; with respect to that which has both real and intentional being simultaneously, I deny it. Such is illumination, as is plain from the second notation. Or I say with Scotus in the place cited, that intentionals and many others do not acquire proper denominative names — for example, the subjects of odors, flavors, and colors — as Mauritius notes (9. 29. *Universalium fol.* 55. *columna secunda*). Therefore it is no wonder if the species of whiteness in the eye does not denominate the eye as white.

Second Objection: What has a real effect is real, since a real effect proceeds only from a real cause; but illumination causes a real effect, namely it heats; therefore illumination is a real quality. I reply that illumination is indeed a real quality, as I showed in the first part of the Assertion; and it is also an intentional quality, as the arguments I brought forward in the second part demonstrate.

Third Objection: What is per se sensible does not have intentional being, since the intentional is not cognized by sense — the visible species is not seen by the eye; but illumination is per se sensible, since it is seen by our eyes; therefore illumination is not an intentional quality. I reply that the major holds for that which has only real being, but not for that which possesses both real and intentional being, as illumination does.

Fourth Objection: If illumination produced throughout the whole medium were an intentional species, it would represent the sun, or its light, or both, in the magnitude, position, and figure that they actually have — just as the species of any other object represents what it is a species of. Therefore, from any part of the medium, or from any position, it could be seen by the eye, which contradicts experience. I reply that illumination is not the species of just any object, but only of light — as Scotus saw well. Therefore the objection and the rest that certain more recent thinkers urge against us fail.

You will ask I, how many kinds of ray are there? I reply that there are three: direct, reflected, and refracted. A direct ray is one that is diffused through a diaphanous medium until the power of the luminous body ceases to advance further. A reflected ray is one that, upon encountering an opaque body, rebounds and retreats in the opposite direction. A refracted ray is one that is diffused through a medium neither entirely transparent nor entirely opaque, and is bent along the perpendicular line.

You will ask II, how many kinds of illumination are there? I reply that there are two: primary and secondary. Primary illumination is that which proceeds immediately from the light source. Secondary illumination is the shadow of primary illumination. There is moreover a difference between shadow and darkness: shadow is the privation of primary illumination, whereas darkness is the absence of both primary and secondary illumination.

You will ask III, whether the illumination received in the eye is itself seen by the eye? I reply in the negative. For only the illumination that is outside the eye is seen. The reason is that the visual power does not extend to what is within the eye; otherwise, the sensible placed upon the sense would produce sensation — which was denied above as applying most especially to sight. Yet Scotus (*d.45. quast. 3. §. de 2 art. 1.4. Sententiarum*) seems to allow that the act of vision can be seen by sight.

Article III. Whether illumination is necessary both on the part of the object and on the part of the medium for the act of seeing.

Avicenna (*6. naturalium, parte 3. cap.1*) asserts that illumination is necessary only on the part of the object. Averroes (*2. de anima, com. 67*) thinks that illumination is necessary only on the part of the medium, in which he is followed by the Complutensians (*disp. 10. quast.5. §. 2*). The common opinion, however, held by Scotus (*2. d. 13.9.vn. §. De secundo dico sub C* and *1.d.3 quast.6. §. contra istam opinionem*), the Coimbrans (*2. de anima, cap.7. quest.4. art. 2*), and others, is that illumination is required for seeing color both on account of the medium and on account of the object.

Note I, that the diaphanous is used in two ways. In one way, for what is merely transparent and lacks light of its own — such as water and air. This is how the diaphanous is described by Aristotle (*2. anima, cap. 7*): that which is visible not by its own light but by the light of another. In the other way, for what participates in light, even if it is not translucent — in this sense the stars are said to be diaphanous as participating in light. Scotus notes (*4.d. 49. quest. 15. §. Ad primum. 6*), from the same Avicenna cited, that light, illumination, and color have different receptive subjects, and that something can less readily be receptive of light and illumination together than of light and color together. For the subject of lux is opaque and dense; the subject of lumen, on the other hand, is permeable and transparent. Hence the denser part of the heavens is luminous,

namely the star. The subject of color, however, is dense, because color only exists in a bounded transparent body. To understand this better and more easily:

Note II, that color is described by Aristotle in two ways: in (*2. anima, cap. 7*), color is that which actually moves the diaphanous; and in (*1. de sensu et sensato, cap. 4*), color is the boundary of the transparent in a bounded body. More plainly: color is a secondary quality arising from the mixture and tempering of the primary qualities. Color is moreover divided into true and apparent — of which I made mention in (*1. Meteor.*) when discussing the rainbow. Furthermore, some colors are extreme, such as white and black; others are intermediate, such as green, red, and so forth.

Assertion: Illumination is required in order to elicit vision, on the part of both object and medium. The assertion is two-membered, upheld by the Doctor in the places cited above and in the Report there. The first part is proved, first, from Aristotle (*2. anima, cap. 7. 7.73*), who affirms that color is the boundary of the transparent and that an object suffused with light is seen — so that in the Peripatetic school illumination is required for seeing a colored object. Second, it is confirmed by experience: in the dark of night, if some object is illuminated with light we see it, but what lacks light we in no way see, as the Doctor explains (*2. d. 7. quast. vn. §. De secundo ante 1*). Furthermore, if the eye is illuminated but the object lacks light, the object is not seen — so the object, in order to be seen, must be bathed in light. Moreover, if an object is drenched in greater light it is seen more clearly, and if illuminated with lesser light it is seen less distinctly, as is evident; therefore illumination is necessary for perceiving an object.

The second part is shown, first, from the same Aristotle (*cit. T. 67*), who concludes that nothing is visible without light, and that every color is visible through light. And in the third book of the same work (*T. 18*): "Light makes colors that exist in potency to be colors in act." I reply therefore that the reason why a sensible placed upon a sense does not produce sensation is that for sensation — above all for sight — a medium is required, as is clear from what has been said; and sight cannot reach its object unless the medium is illuminated in some way.

Therefore illumination is also required on account of the medium. Moreover, for the object to be perceived by sight, a species that is impressed upon it is necessary; but a species of the visible thing cannot be impressed in the eye except through the medium — for the species must necessarily be transmitted through the medium to the eye. Therefore illumination is in every case necessary on the part of the medium.

First Objection: Color is per se visible (*2. anima T. 66*); therefore no illumination is required to see it. I reply that color is by its own nature visible in potency, but actually visible through light, on the authority of Aristotle (*3. anima, T. 18*).

Second Objection: For hearing, smelling, touching, and tasting, illumination is not required; therefore neither is it required for seeing an object. I grant the

antecedent and deny the consequent. The reason can be offered that sight is the most excellent of the external senses, and therefore requires more conditions — just as more is necessary for the formation, education, and perfection of a human being than for the production and preservation of other animals.

Third Objection: Experience shows that those who are in darkness can see an object suffused with light at a distance from them, even though there is no illumination in the medium or in their eyes. Moreover, if illumination were required in the medium, the dimmer and more imperfect it were in the medium, the less and more imperfectly the object would be seen; but this does not happen, so long as the illumination in the existing object does not fail or diminish — therefore illumination is not necessary on the part of the medium. I reply that there is indeed some illumination in the medium, which we do not see because of its minuteness — just as atoms, when the sun shines in our hemisphere, are not seen by us because of their smallness. That such illumination necessarily exists in the medium and reaches the organ of sight is plain from what has been said: vision requires a medium and the species of the object; otherwise the sensible placed upon the sense would produce sensation. Furthermore, an agent acts only within the sphere of its activity, and if the visible object, even suffused with light, is too distant from the eye, it is not seen, because that illumination cannot reach the eye itself. The sea likewise surges when stirred by wind only as long as the wind lasts and only to the limit the wind moves it, and no further — a sign that the power of the wind is not diffused and extended to other parts of the sea. The same is plain when a stone is thrown into water, which surges in proportion to the force impressed upon it by the thrower. As for what is further alleged, I say that the little is reckoned as nothing, and because the illumination of the medium is faint it is not seen to contribute to the increase of the vision of the object; and because the sight is not then distracted by objects in the medium, it turns with all its effort toward that extreme luminous object, and its power thus united is stronger and produces a more perfect vision. Therefore illumination is always required in the medium and in the organ for seeing, since sight above all demands this — given what has been said most especially about the sensible placed upon the sense not producing sensation.

Article IV. What the object of sight is.

Some writers, whose names Mayr (2. d.13. 9. 2) withholds, think that light is the total and adequate object of sight. Others, whom Arriaga (*disp.5. de anima, sect. 3. subsect. 2*) follows, think it is color. Still others, among whom are Scotus (2. *Report.d. 13. 9. vn*) and his disciples, assert that the adequate object of sight is something common, abstracting from and prescinding both from light and from color.

Note I, that illumination, lux, and color are absolute entities, or qualities really distinct from one another, inhering in subjects that are not distinct. Lux is the

quality really inhering in the luminous body, by which a body is formally denominated luminous. Lumen is the quality whose subject is the luminous medium, extending to the extension of the medium itself, which through it is formally called luminous. Color, however, is a secondary quality consequent upon the mixture of a colored body, caused by the varied and diverse commingling of the primary qualities, really inhering in a bounded body, by which that body is formally called colored. Note further that illumination can be seen without color, and lux without lumen — but not the reverse. Scotus adds (*1. d. 3. quast. 6. §. contrà istam opinionem ante C*) that color in some way contains lux, because lux is in a bounded body, and therefore in one and another illumination causes different representative species — one in greater illumination and another in lesser.

Note II, from the same Doctor (*1. d. 3. quast. 3. §. Ad rationes in oppositum. E* and *Quol. 8. §. Ad ista. H*), that the essential and formal character to which a sense such as sight relates as its objective form is not relative but absolute, as Aristotle suggests (*2. anima, T.66*). Therefore the visible, being relative to the visual power, is not formally and primarily of itself the object of sight, but of itself secondarily — just as the mobile is not the formal and adequate object of all of natural philosophy, because it is not the essential and quidditative form of natural body but rather its primary property and affection. A circumlocution can be made by taking the property for its root and essential form, as Aristotle himself does in (*5. Met. c. de quanto*), defining quantity through divisibility, which is a property of quantity itself; and in (*2. degener. 7*) he says that the forms of the elements are the primary qualities, which, being accidents, cannot be the constitutive forms of the elements, which are substances.

Assertion: Neither illumination nor color is the primary and adequate object of sight, but something more common and abstract, embracing both — which is unnamed, but may be called the visible, in the way I was explaining in the second notation. The conclusion is three-part, defended by the Doctor in the places cited above and in Collations XI, XII, and XX. The first part is proved: illumination does not contain everything that falls under the visual power; therefore illumination is not well established as the total object of sight. The antecedent is at hand, since color is visible, yet is not illumination. The second part is shown in nearly the same way: sight is directed toward many things that are not colors nor colored, namely the celestial bodies; therefore, since color does not encompass all that sight attains, it is rightly deduced that color is not its primary and adequate object. The third part is gathered from the two prior ones and is strengthened by them: since the total and adequate object of sight is neither illumination nor color, it is soundly inferred to be something more universal than these, abstracting from them both and prescinding from them, which may be named the visible — comprehending and being commensurate with everything that falls under the visual power and is regarded by it.

Objection: Aristotle (*2. anima, T.63*) plainly establishes that the object of sight is color and that of hearing is sound; therefore the contrary opinion opposes the Peripatetic school. The same seems to be the mind of Scotus (*1. d. 3. quast. 3. §. contra istud. B and E and before §. sed restat*). The reason can be offered from the same Doctor (*ibid. quast. 6. antè C*): color contains lux, since it is in a bounded body; but containment is required for the object of any power or habit, as I have shown at length elsewhere; therefore color is the object of sight. I reply that Aristotle must be understood as speaking of the partial, not the total, object. For in that place he means that illumination pertains to the visual power, even though it is not color but a quality distinct from color, as I explained in the first notation. Scotus must be understood in the same way. Furthermore, that containment of color is not virtual, potential, or formal — the kind required for the object of a power or habit — of which Scotus speaks in the Prologue (*9. 3*).

Article V. Whether sight is the most excellent of the external senses.

That sight excels the other external senses is affirmed by Aristotle (*1. Met. cap. 1*) and confirmed there by Scotus in his exposition of that passage and (*4. d. 1. quast. 2. N*); Bercharius (*4. parte, l. 1. cap. 7*) and the other authors assent. The reason is that sight is the most capable of cognition, the most discerning, and the herald of love, and it seems to be immaterial since it is immuted by intentional immutation and receives intentional species. This same point is suggested by Augustine (*1. 4. contra Iulianum cap. 14*), saying that the last three senses — smell, taste, and touch — are more corporeal and in a certain way more coarse. The same holy Doctor notes that sight is taken in the sense of a general sense (*1. 2. qq. supra Exod. quast. 72*) on the basis of Exodus XX: "The people saw the voice," and in Genesis XXIV: "When Jacob saw that there was food in Egypt," though he was absent from Egypt. One may add that sight perceives at the greatest distance, and that its object is wider and more excellent, since it extends to both sublunar and celestial things. Hence its deprivation causes the greatest sadness and grief — to which perhaps Tobias was referring when he said (*5*): "What joy is there for me, since I do not see the light?"

You will say: Aristotle (*lib. de sensu, sensato, in fine, cap. 1*) writes: "The blind from birth who have hearing are wiser than the deaf from birth who have sight." I say that sight serves more for science through discovery, while hearing serves more for acquiring science through teaching.

You will say again: Pope Leo in his Easter sermon prefers touch to sight with respect to the certainty of cognition. I say this must be interpreted not absolutely, but with respect to a certainty to be experienced more fully through both sight and touch than through sight alone.

You will press: touch demonstrates more differences than sight. For touch is directed toward contraries, while sight is perceptive of only one contrary, namely white and black (*2. anima, T.107*). I say that there are more visibles than

tangibles. And a tangible quality is also visible, but not the reverse; and so sight perceives more than hearing.

You will urge: that sense is nobler which we love more and whose opposite we hate more (*lib. 2. priorum, cap.21*); but we hate the opposite of touch more, because the opposite of touch destroys the animal, whereas the opposite of sight does not. I say that this rule fails by an instantiation on its own terms. For it is better to live well than simply to live, yet we hate the opposite of living more than the opposite of living well, because the opposite of living destroys both living and living well. Hence Aristotle (*7. Top. cap.2*) limits that rule thus: "unless when one includes the other." For the rule does not hold when what is more to be chosen includes what is less to be chosen — as living well includes living. Likewise, sight includes touch, and the opposite of touch destroys both touch and sight.

Article VI. Whether vision is accomplished by the reception of a species in the eye from the object.

The opinion of Empedocles, of Plato (*in opificio Dei, cap.8*), and of other Academics once prevailed, holding that vision is accomplished by extramission — that is, by a certain light and brilliance emitted from the eyes toward the visible object. The contrary view is taught by Aristotle (*2. anima, T.74* and *lib. de sensu et sensili, cap.2* and *1. Top. cap.12. 14*), the Scotists, the Thomists, and the other Peripatetics, who affirm that vision is accomplished by intussusception — that is, by the species of the visible object received in the visual power, concurring partially together with the visual power toward producing vision.

Note that there are four kinds of visible objects: some are diaphanous and devoid of light, such as water; some participate in a certain amount of light but have something opaque, such as the glow-worm, which shines on one side but not at all on the other; others enjoy a firm light that is diffused to illuminate other things, such as luminous bodies; and the remaining kind possesses a faint light which is in some way diffused to illuminate other things, such as illuminated and irradiated bodies.

Assertion: Vision is accomplished by the reception of an impressed species in the eye, which is the partial principle for producing vision itself. This is deduced from Scotus (*1. dist.3. quast.4. §. De tertiis cognoscibilibus sub G*). It is proved, first: sensible species required for the production of sensation are given, as I proved in question IV of this book, article I; but vision is a sensation; therefore, for vision to be produced, the sensible species of the visible object must necessarily be received in the eye. This is corroborated by the fact that in a mirror, behind the person looking, an object is seen; but this kind of vision is not accomplished by extramission of the visual power, since sight emits nothing there, as is evident — therefore vision is accomplished by intussusception and not by extramission. Second, it is improbable and incredible that so great a light and

brilliance should issue from small eyes as to illuminate the most distant heavens and the other objects that fall under sight; but if vision were accomplished by extramission, so great a light would need to issue from the eyes to illuminate those objects — which appears not only improbable but impossible. Third, the light of the sun, though great, cannot be reflected except to the first region of the air; therefore the light of the eye cannot be reflected to the heavens, since it is far smaller, weaker, and feebler. It is impossible for a small light from the earth to reach the heavens, given the great and immense distance. Add that, although some eyes emit some light — such as the eyes of cats and wolves — other eyes, namely human ones, are entirely devoid of light. Vision, therefore, is not accomplished by light emitted from the eyes toward visible objects.

First Objection: Aristotle (*3. Meteor. cap.3*) seems to allow that sight emits light toward the visible object, through which vision is accomplished; therefore Aristotle does not dissent from the doctrine of Plato. Confirmation I: in the same place he mentions Antipheron, who claimed always to carry before him and see his own image and figure, and even by day and night to perceive many phantasms, which he could not have seen except by extramission. Confirmation II: from (*5. degener. animalium, c.2*): small and sunken eyes see better and more sharply than large and wide ones, and indeed with the eyelids contracted the eyes themselves see objects more clearly and distinctly; therefore vision is accomplished by extramission. I reply that Aristotle there speaks not in his own view but in the opinion of Plato. For in the places cited at the beginning of this article, treating this difficulty systematically, he rejects that position of Plato and establishes his own view, supporting it with proofs — especially in (*lib. de memoria et reminiscencia, cap.2*). To confirmation I, I say that the man saw those objects not with his own eyes but with a disordered imagination, as the same Aristotle expressly states in the passage just cited. Thus the frenzied, with their troubled senses, speak both of those present and those absent whose images they carry in their phantasy. To confirmation II, I say that in that case the sensible species and the visual power are united, and because united power is stronger, therefore sunken eyes see better and more distinctly than wide and large ones. The same must be said of contracted eyelids.

Second Objection: Augustine (*6. de Musica*) in express terms teaches that vision is accomplished by a brilliance issuing from the eyes toward visible objects. Confirmation: the eyes of those who cast the evil eye transmit something harmful into those upon whom they gaze. Hence Paul (*Galat. 3*) adds: "O foolish Galatians, who has bewitched you?" Therefore, as the evil eye is cast by the emission of a harmful quality, vision likewise is accomplished by emission. I reply that Augustine belonged to the Platonic sect and favored it greatly; therefore on this and certain other matters he should not be followed. The same holy Doctor recounts a remarkable occurrence in (*lib. de cura pro mortuis gerenda, cap. 12*), telling of a man named Curma from the township of Tullia near Hippo, who, while ill, lost his senses and lay nearly dead for several days; upon reviving,

he testified that he had seen many things, and first opening his eyes, he said: "Let someone go to the house of Curma the blacksmith and see what has happened there." When they went there, the blacksmith was found dead, just as he had foretold. This happened either by chance, or by report, or by revelation. Consult Richard (*quol.3. quast. 12*). As for the other point, we are speaking of what helps for seeing, not of what harms it.

Third Objection: A near object is seen better than a distant one, as experience shows; but if vision were accomplished by reception of a species, a distant object would be seen just as clearly and distinctly as a near one, because the species represents the near object and the distant object to the sight in the same way. I reply that a natural agent acts more quickly and more powerfully on what is near than on what is far, as is plain from fire, which heats nearby things more quickly than remote ones. Therefore, following the form of the argument, granting the major, I deny the minor: for the species, being a natural agent, represents and acts upon what is near more perfectly and distinctly than upon what is far, as is plain from a mirror, which represents nearby things more clearly than distant ones.

Fourth Objection: We observe that from our eyes in the dark there shines some splendor; indeed the eyes seem to be fiery; therefore vision is accomplished by extramission. I reply that this happens because the eyes are small polished and smooth bodies, participating in the crystalline humor. It must not, however, be denied that certain animals, such as cats, see by this kind of brilliance at night; yet this is not true absolutely, nor do the eyes participate in the nature of fire, for otherwise the heat of fire itself would dissolve their temper.

Article VII. In which part of the eye vision is accomplished.

Philosophers dispute vigorously about in which part of the eye vision is accomplished. Some think that vision is accomplished in the reticular tunic, others in the arachnoid, some in the vitreous humor, others at the junction of the optic nerves; but most commonly it is held to be in the crystalline humor, or the pupil of the eye.

Note I, that the eye is constructed from five tunics, three humors, and seven muscles. The first tunic or membrane is called the specular, so named because it is pellucid and shining, like a mirror. The second is the reticular or retina, which is composed of many veins and arteries in the manner of a net — hence it is called retina and reticularis. The third is the uvea, because it has the likeness of the flowers of the grape. The fourth is the cornea, because it bears the image of a horny plate — it is lucid and glassy. The fifth is the albugineous, because it acquires a white color. The first humor is the crystalline, because it is lucid like crystal. The second is the vitreous, because it is similar to glass. The third is the aqueous or albugineous, because it has the likeness of water and of the white of an egg. The crystalline humor is placed in the middle, surrounded by the

specular tunic; then follows the vitreous humor, encompassed by the reticular tunic; then comes the aqueous humor, encircled by the remaining tunics. There are then seven muscles in the structure of the eye, by which the eye itself is held in place and strengthened. Moreover, in the eye is noted a round figure, suited for seeing from every part and in every direction, wherever and whatever the visible object may be.

Note II, that two nerves, called optic or visual, derive from the brain, as Augustine touches on (*7. de gen. ad lit. cup. 17*). These nerves maintain the following order: departing from the brain and lying apart from one another, they afterwards unite, and before reaching the eyes, separate from one another again. Through these nerves animal spirits are transmitted from the brain to the eyes so as to assist vision, and through these same nerves the species are conveyed from the external senses to the internal senses; and therefore they contribute greatly to seeing.

First Assertion: Vision is not accomplished at the conjunction of the optic nerves. This is deduced from Scotus (*1. d. 3. quest. 4. §. De tertiis sub G* and *4. d. 10. quest. 9. antè §. Hic dicitur*). It is proved, first, from anatomical observation: the aforementioned nerves sometimes do not unite together, as Vesalius testifies (*1.4. de fabrica corporis humani, cap.4*); and yet vision is not impaired, but takes place as it would if such nerves were united — therefore vision is not accomplished at the conjunction of those nerves. Second, when one eye is closed while the other remains open, vision becomes sharper, because, as Aristotle notes (*sect. 1. problem, quast.4*), the visual power is united into one and thereby vision is rendered more perfect — which would not occur if vision were accomplished through the union of those nerves.

Second Assertion: Vision is caused in the eye, and in that part called the pupil or crystalline humor. Scotus does not depart from this (*ubisupra*). It is shown, first, from Aristotle (*1. de historia animalium, cap 9* and *1.4. of the same work, cap.8* and *5. de gener. animalium cap. 1*), who affirms that vision is accomplished in the aforementioned crystalline humor. Second, so marvelous a construction of the eye is arranged and ordered for constituting and preserving sight; therefore vision is accomplished in that part of the eye which is most apt and fitted for seeing, which is the crystalline humor or pupil. Hence the pupil is greatly commended in sacred Scripture, for example in Psalm XVI: "Keep me as the apple of your eye," and Zechariah II: "He that toucheth you toucheth the apple of my eye," and Lamentations II: "Let not the apple of your eye cease." Therefore vision is generated in the pupil or crystalline humor, since this part is in the middle of the eye itself — bright, clear, and diaphanous — and most suited for seeing.

First Objection: The visual power is only one in each animal; but the eyes are two; therefore vision is produced only at the conjunction of the optic nerves — and this consequent is deduced because if such nerves are severed, sight is

weakened or entirely lost. I reply that the visual power is one, distributed into two eyes, just as a tree is divided into two branches. Nature in her providence created two eyes in one animal so that it can see from both sides; and if one is injured, the other sound and intact exercises vision. As for what is additionally alleged, I say that those nerves are indeed necessary for seeing — just as the specular tunic, the muscles, and the other things enumerated above — yet from this it does not follow that vision is generated at their conjunction.

Second Objection: In that which is devoid of life, vision or any other vital operation is not accomplished; but the crystalline humor lacks life; therefore vision is not caused in it. I grant the major. I deny the minor. For this is true of the fluid humor, but not of the quasi-congealed humor, such as the crystalline humor is.

Third Objection: What is colored cannot be apt and fitted for vision to occur in it, for otherwise vision would be false — since everything would appear to us to be of the same color as that in which vision occurred, just as one who looks through red glass sees everything as red; but the crystalline humor is colored; therefore vision cannot occur in it. I grant the major. I deny the minor. For although the crystalline humor is pellucid and bright, it is not colored — because light, brightness, and splendor are not colors, as is established from what has been said above.

Article VIII. Whether in a mirror the object is seen, or its image.

Assertion: In a mirror the object is seen, not its image. So hold Scotus (2. d. 13. *quest. vn. E* and 4. d.10. *quast.9. sub D*), Mayr (*quest. 15. 19. prologi*), Toledo (2. *de anima, cap. 27. quast.34*), Ruvo (*Tract. de sensu visus, quast.ult*), Antonius Andreas (*supra sex principia, cap.6*) in part, and many others — against Thomas (*quast.8.de veritate, art.5*), Capreolus, and the other Thomists, who affirm that in a mirror both are seen, namely the object and its image. It is proved, first: in a mirror is seen that which falls under the object of sight, because a power does not extend beyond its object; but the species of an object is not contained under the object of sight, since its object is illumination and color, as was said in article IV of this question; therefore it is not the species of the object but the object itself that is seen in the mirror. Second, what is discerned in a mirror is discerned by reflected vision, since it is reflected from the opaque surface of the mirror, as everyone notes, especially the writers on optics; but it is the object itself, not its species, that is reflected; therefore the object is seen in the mirror. Furthermore, an image is diffused through the whole mirror; but what is seen is not seen in the whole mirror, as is evident to the observer; therefore the object itself is seen in the mirror.

First Objection: If the object were seen in the mirror, it would plainly be seen in its proper place, position, and magnitude — but experience testifies to the contrary; therefore in a mirror the object is not seen but its image. Mayr in the

passage cited responds that one who sees himself in a mirror directly looks upon himself through a reflected act, although the external sense judges that the species is there, because it is accustomed to seeing things along a straight and not a reflected line.

Second Objection: In a flat mirror placed horizontally, the upper part of the thing seen appears above and the lower below. And in a broken mirror, simple things are seen as double, and in certain mirrors one object is seen as multiple; therefore in a mirror the image of the object is seen. One may say that this diversity, duplicity, and multiplicity arises from the position or structure of the mirrors, and also from the manner in which the image by which the thing is viewed returns. More may be found in the writers on optics.

You will ask whether the sight of a man and that of an eagle differ in species. I reply in the negative, with Scotus (*2.d.1. quest.6. §. potentiam addi licet. D*): for just as the intellect of a man and an angel are of the same species because they share the same object, even though their natures differ in species, so the sight of man and eagle acquire the same species, even though their natures are distinguished in species.

Question VI. On Hearing

Article I. Whether sound is the object of hearing.

Assertion: Sound is the total and adequate object of hearing. This is taught by Aristotle (*2. anima, 77*) and Scotus (*1. d. 3. quast. 3. ante §. sed restat E*). It is shown, first: that about which a power is primarily and per se concerned is its primary and adequate object, as I have made plain elsewhere from the first of the Posterior Analytics; but hearing is primarily and per se concerned with sound. For hearing is defined as the external sensitive power that perceives sound alone. Therefore sound is the total and adequate object of hearing. Second, the visible, in the way I explained in the preceding question, article IV, is the adequate object of sight. Therefore the audible likewise is established as the adequate object of hearing — and this is sound.

First Objection: What is a common sensible is not the object of hearing, since the external senses, of which hearing is one, have proper sensibles; but sound seems to be counted among the common sensibles, as Aristotle signals (*2. anima, 85*) when he says that sound is a motion — and motion is placed among the common sensibles; therefore sound is not the object of hearing. I grant the major. I deny the minor. In proof of the minor, I say that Aristotle must be interpreted causally, not formally — as will be evident in the following article.

Second Objection: What is not perceived by hearing is not its object; but sound is not perceived by hearing; therefore it is not its object. The major is plain, since a cognitive power is perceptive of its object. The minor is shown: either the numerically same sound would be perceived by many, or a different and

numerically distinct sound by each. Not the first, because the numerically same accident, such as sound is, does not migrate from subject to subject, nor does it inhere in different subjects. Nor the second, because it is the numerically same sound that is perceived by many. I grant the major. I deny the minor. In proof of the minor I say that it is the numerically same sound that is perceived and attained by many, through distinct species received in them. For just as the same object is seen by many through distinct sensible species, so the same sound is heard by many through distinct species received in their ears.

You will ask what place hearing holds among the external senses. I say it holds second place. For after sight, hearing follows. Since it is the organ of learning, on the authority of Aristotle (*l. de sensu et sensili*), it is valuable for leading the civil life. And "faith is by hearing" (*Rom. 10*) — so that if sight is nobler, hearing seems to be more useful.

Article II. Whether sound is a motion or a quality distinct from it.

The common view of philosophers holds that sound is not a motion but a quality distinct from it and consequent upon motion. For easier understanding and explanation of this:

Note that some bodies are sonorous — such as hard bodies, for example brass — while others are silent and produce no sound, such as soft bodies, for example wool. Three bodies moreover are required for producing sound: the striker, the struck, and the intercepting medium. Furthermore, four conditions are necessary for sound to be produced: the first is that the striker and the struck be hard bodies, for lack of which butter and honey produce no sound, being soft. The second is that they be smooth and flat. The third is that they be concave. The fourth is that the motion of the striker and the struck occur quickly, for if it is accomplished slowly no sound is produced.

Assertion: Sound is not the motion of rebounding air, nor what is sensed through the ear, but a sensible quality arising from the collision of two bodies, or from their division, received in a body suited for receiving it. The assertion is three-membered, in agreement with Scotus, defended by the Scotists (*2. de anima, cap. de auditu*), expressly by Cavallius (*disp. 2. sect. 10*). The first part is proved, first: motion is a common sensible, from what was asserted elsewhere; but sound is a proper sensible, since it is perceived by hearing alone; therefore sound is not a motion. Second, the properties of sound differ from the properties of motion. For sound is grave or acute; motion is not — it is fast or slow. Furthermore, motion belongs to no category, being counted among the post-predicaments; but sound resides in the category of quality. Again, motion is formally a relation, from what was said in (*1. de motu*); but sound is a quality, which is an absolute entity. Finally, sound is caused by motion (*2. anima, T.78*); therefore sound is not a motion. The second part argues against Poncius (*disp. 60. quest. 2. conclusione 2*) and is proved: if the ear is afflicted and pricked with

pain, it is felt by the ear itself, yet pain or the like is not sound. Likewise motion, crash, and things of that kind are sensed through the ear, yet motion is not sound according to Poncius there — and conversely. The third part is shown: that by which something is denominated as having a quality is a quality, as is plain from the description of quality; but through sound something is denominated as having a quality — for a bell that sounds well is called good; therefore sound is a quality. Again, vision is a sensible quality; therefore so is sound, or the act of sounding. The antecedent is known from what has been said and will be more fully evident in the next book when we treat of intellection and the mental word. The consequence holds because the reasoning is the same for both, just as it also is for smelling, tasting, and touching. The remaining particulars of the definition of sound given above are sufficiently clear and evident from the stated notation.

First Objection: Aristotle (*2. anima, T.85*) defines sound with these words: "Sound is a stroke and motion of rebounding air"; therefore according to the Philosopher, sound is a motion. I reply that this must be interpreted causally and not formally — meaning that motion is the cause of sound, just as it is the cause of heat. For from the motion of two bodies colliding with one another, sound is produced. That this is the mind of Aristotle is clear from another passage, where he says that odor is an evaporation, even though evaporation is not formally odor but its cause.

Second Objection: Sound does not denominate the subject in which it exists; therefore sound is not a quality. The consequent is plain: through quality the subject is denominated as qualified, from (*lib. predicam. cap. de qualitate*). The antecedent is at hand: the air in which sound inheres is not denominated as qualified through it. If the antecedent be granted, the consequent is denied. The reason is that intentionals do not denominate the subjects in which they inhere; and since the species of sound is conveyed through the air as a medium, it follows that it does not denominate the air. Moreover, I noted in the preceding question, article II, that there are quite a few accidents that do not denominate the subjects in which they exist.

You will ask I, what is required for hearing? I reply: a striker, a struck body, a medium, and a species that is conveyed through the medium to hearing.

You will ask II, whether hearing takes place as quickly as sight? I reply in the negative. The reason is that sight is not only nobler than hearing but also swifter in acting. Hence I observed in (*1. Meteor.*) that in thunder we perceive the light or lightning before we hear its crash.

You will ask III, what media are suited and fitted for producing sound? I reply: air and water. And indeed air is the more principal and fitting medium; and thus in air an integral and perfect sound is heard, but not in water on account of its density. That sound is heard in water is attested by Aristotle (*1.4. de historia*

animalium, c.8), saying that fishermen do not speak while fishing lest they be heard by the fish, which, if they perceive the sound of words, immediately flee. The same Pliny writes (1.9. *hist. cap.* 2), affirming that fish breathe, sleep, and hear — and therefore flee from the oars of triremes.

You will press: Aristotle (2. *anima*, *cap.* S.T.81) says that water is not receptive of sound; therefore air is the only subject and medium of sound. I say that Aristotle must be interpreted as speaking of the principal medium and subject, which water is not but air is. Hence in air sound is heard clear and distinct; not so in water, where sound is heard indistinctly and imperfectly. That this is how Aristotle must be interpreted is evident from the same text (*ibid.* T.79), where he plainly teaches that sound is heard in both air and water.

You will ask IV, whether bees lack hearing? Aristotle (1. *Met.* 1) replies in the affirmative; and yet when a sound is made the bees themselves return to the hive. Scotus responds in his exposition of the text that this happens not because they truly hear the sound, but because the air moves them. It seems plausible that they lack perfect hearing; yet they are not entirely devoid of imperfect hearing, as experience seems to show.

Article III. On Echo.

For the origin and nature of Echo to be well and fully grasped, two notations must be placed before us.

Note I, that sound is twofold: direct and reflected. A direct sound is one that travels directly to hearing with no obstacle interposed. A reflected sound is one that, upon encountering an intervening body that resists it, rebounds — and thus Echo is produced, or the reflected voice, when the direct sound rebounds from a cavernous and hollow body back to the place from which it came. Moreover, owing to the diverse and many windings, the voice is reflected many times — and thus, as Pliny testifies (1.36. *hist. nat. cap.*15), at Olympia in the portico, one voice was returned the same seven times.

Note II, that there are two passages in an animal proceeding to the inner parts: one is straight, through which food is transmitted to the stomach, and is called the gullet. The other is oblique, winding, and circular, through which respiration takes place, and it is very narrow. Hence if anything enters it, the animal coughs and never rests until it exits. Therefore, when phlegms descend from the brain and enter this passage, the animal dies of the disease called apoplexy. Through this passage one reaches the lungs, which are like bellows of the heart, through which warm air is emitted and cold air is drawn in. When air is expelled by some force through this passage — commonly called the rough artery — voice is formed, with the assistance of the other natural instruments necessary for forming it: namely the uvula, palate, tongue, teeth, lips, and the like. Hence Aristotle (2. *anima*, *in fine cap.* 8) defines voice with these words: "Voice is a stroke

of air drawn in through respiration, with the imagination of signifying something." Augustine suggests the same in his exposition of Psalm III.

First Assertion: Echo is a reflected voice, which, upon meeting a cavernous body that resists it, returns to the one who uttered it. This is not opposed to Scotus, and is defended by the Scotists in the place just cited, who prove it there by the likeness offered by the Philosopher: as a ball rebounds from a wall toward the one who threw it, so Echo strikes a winding and cavernous body and resiles toward the one who uttered that voice — but the stroke of a ball rebounding from a wall is reflected; therefore Echo returning from some cave to the one who uttered it is a reflected voice. It is further shown from the Doctor (2. d. 13. 9. vn. §. *Quantum ad 3. D*): an agent unable to act further along a straight line acts along a reflected line, as is seen in the sun acting through light when an opaque body is set against it. Therefore, if someone emits a voice that does not travel further directly on account of an opaque, cavernous body, it follows that the same voice returns to the one who uttered it — by which means Echo is produced, as is evident from experience in valleys and cavernous places. Hence Ovid sings: "She repeats the sounds, sends back the words heard. Before, she says: I shall die ere you have power over me — she returned nothing but: you have power over me." And: "He waits for sounds to which she may send back his words."

Second Assertion: Hearing is accomplished in that part of the ear called the innate air. The Doctor does not dissent from this, and it is defended by his followers in the place cited above. It is proved, first, from Aristotle, both here (7.83) and in (2. *de partibus animalium*, cap. 10), where he expressly sets forth these words: "We admit that the sensory organ of hearing is air." Second, from Galen (1. 8. *de usu partium*, cap. 6.14): hearing is accomplished in the part which is most apt and fitted for hearing; but that subtle substance called the innate air is more suited for hearing to occur in it, because the more spiritual and noble a part is, the nobler and more excellent is its operation — and the said part is such; therefore hearing is accomplished in it, of which Ovid wonderfully sings (3. *Met.*): "She lies hidden, is seen in no light. She is heard by all — sound is it that lives in her."

Objection: What is inanimate cannot produce a vital operation; but air is inanimate; therefore in that part called air, hearing — which is a vital operation — is not accomplished. I grant the major. I distinguish the minor: of air properly so called, I grant it; of air improperly taken and by analogy, I deny it — such as the air of which we are speaking here.

You will ask I, what is required for hearing to be accomplished? I reply: beyond the cartilaginous parts that appear externally, and the other windings like a cochlea, and moreover the two nerves proceeding from the brain to the organ of hearing, there are three small bones, one of which is in the manner of a hammer, another in the manner of an anvil, and the third like a stirrup.

You will ask II, why all who are deaf from birth are also mute. I reply that the reason is that through defect of hearing they are unable to learn any language.

Question VII. On Smell

The object of smell is odor, just as from what was said in the preceding question, article II, the object of hearing is sound. Smell is described as the external sense that perceives odor alone, which among the said external senses occupies the third place — as the Peripatetics affirm with Aristotle (*2. anima, c.9.T.92*).

Article: Whether odor is a substance or a quality.

Heraclitus, as Aristotle testifies (*lib. de sensu et sensili, c.*), and Plato in the Timaeus suspect that odor is a certain smoky substance. Aristotle, however, in the place just cited, Alexander in the same place, and all the Peripatetics teach that odor is a secondary quality arising from the tempering of the primary qualities with the dry predominating, which through the action of heat immutes the olfactory power.

Assertion: Odor is not a smoky substance but the prescribed quality. Scotus and his disciples do not seem to depart from this (*2. anima, c.9.7.92*). It is proved, first: the object of each of the external senses is an accident, as is plain by induction; but odor is the object of smell, as the common opinion of philosophers affirms; therefore odor is not a smoky substance. Second, the object of an external sense is a proper sensible, which is per se sensible; but what is per se sensible is an accident, from what has been said elsewhere; therefore since odor is a per se sensible entity, it follows that it is an accident — namely the quality described above.

First Objection: What nourishes an animal is a substance, since nutrition is a generation and a substantial action; but odor nourishes an animal — for Pliny reports (*1.7. hist.nat.c.2*) that in the Indies certain peoples live on odor alone. Aristotle is also cited as saying that a certain man lives on air and sun. And Olympiodorus adds that a man can lead a life on odor and air. I grant the major. I distinguish the minor: of odor taken precisely alone, I deny it; of odor together with substance conjoined, I grant it. And if Pliny and the others named think otherwise, they are not to be believed.

Second Objection: The same Aristotle (*sect. 12. problem. question.5*) asserts that odor is an exhalation; but an exhalation is a vaporous substance; therefore odor is a smoky substance. I reply that either the Philosopher must be interpreted according to the distinction we have just offered, or he did not speak formally but subjectively — meaning that odor is inhered in the exhalation, which is a smoky substance.

You will say: the odor of an apple that is spread around and diminished by handling is either a smoky substance, or, if it is an accident, it passes from

subject to subject, which cannot happen. I say that the odor does not separate from the apple, but rather that the finer and more subtle parts of the substance evaporate — in which parts the odor is carried.

You will ask I, what are the media through which odor is conveyed? I reply: chiefly air, as we experience with the odor of flowers, which is wafted to us through the air. Then water, as is plain from fish, which smell their food before eating it.

You will ask II, from what are odors produced? I reply: from odorous bodies, through the mixture of the primary qualities with the dry predominating. Hence in spring and summer, because dryness prevails, odors are most strongly exhaled; conversely, in winter there are no odors, on account of excessive moisture. But if an odor is produced in damp places, it is fetid and harmful, and sometimes so noxious to an animal as to kill it.

You will ask III, in what part does smelling occur? I reply: in the mamillary caruncles or tubercles, because these parts are most suited for smelling to be accomplished in them — whatever Galen may object, who thinks it occurs in the anterior part of the brain.

You will ask IV, whether odor acts according to real being or according to intentional being? I reply: sometimes it acts according to real being, as is plain when the odor of incense reaches the nose; but sometimes according to intentional being — hence we smell the odors of flowers at a great distance. And Pliny (*lib. 10. hist. capite 6*) tells that vultures and crows smell the stench of dead bodies from many miles and therefore proceed to them. Thomas and Jerome testify the same.

You will ask V, whether the sense of smell is more perfect in man than in brute animals? Aristotle responds (*2. anima, cap.9* and *lib. de sensu, sensato, cap.4*) that the sense of smell in man is duller and less perfect than in other animals. This is confirmed by experience. Dogs sense and know the tracks of hares, partridges, and other animals through smell, and also seek their own masters even when absent by the sense of smell. But man cannot perceive and sense these and similar things. The reason is that his olfactory faculty resides near the brain, which is the coldest and most moist of organs. Cold and moisture depress the sense of smell; and since man is an animal with a large brain, he must participate in a less perfect sense of smell.

Question VIII. On Taste

Article I. What taste is, and how many kinds of flavor there are.

Taste is described as the external sense that perceives flavor alone. Its adequate object is indeed flavor, just as the total object of smell is established to be odor. Flavor, moreover, is defined as a secondary quality arising from the tempering

of the primary qualities and the mixing of dry earth together with moisture, with heat cooking them together. Three things, moreover, are required for flavor: the first is terrestrial dryness, as experience shows; the second is aqueous moisture — for what is mixed with aqueous moisture is rendered savory; the third is heat, through whose mediation the terrestrial is cooked together with the moist. Eight species of flavor are enumerated by Aristotle (*lib. de sensu et sensili, cap.5*): namely sweet, bitter, oily, salty, pungent or sharp, astringent, sour, and acidic. Sweet is found in honey and figs; bitter in opium and wormwood; oily in milk and butter; salty in salt and seawater; sharp in lemons; astringent in sorb-apples; sour in oil; and acidic in vinegar. It is disputed between Aristotle and Galen, however, which of the aforesaid are the extreme flavors. Aristotle writes that they are sweet and bitter; Galen asserts that they are sharp and acidic. This controversy can be resolved and reconciled in the following way and distinction: if the flavors are considered with respect to taste and according to their own nature, Aristotle rightly says that sweet and bitter are the extreme flavors. But if they are considered with respect to the tempering of bodies, Galen speaks well when he says that sharp and acidic are the extreme flavors, as may be seen in (*lib. 4. de simplicium medicamentorum facultate, cap.10*).

First Objection: Ashes are bitter, yet there is no moisture in them; therefore flavor is not aptly defined as a quality arising from the mixing of moisture with dry earth. I reply that ashes are more insipid than savory, and if there is any bitterness in them, it proceeds from the matter of the burned wood. Or I say that in flavor, aqueous moisture is for the most part mixed in, although this does not always happen, as in the case of ashes.

Second Objection: Extreme sensibles injure the sense; but sweet flavor does not offend the sense, as is plain; therefore sweet flavor is not extreme among flavors. I reply that intense sensibles do indeed for the most part injure sense; yet this does not occur in flavors, since they are secondary savory qualities. Although if a flavor is excessively sweet it sometimes harms an animal.

You will ask I, whether taste acts according to real being or according to intentional being? Aristotle responds (*2. anima 102*) that it acts according to real being, because for taste no external medium is required. It is necessary that food be applied immediately to taste.

You will ask II, in which part does taste occur? I reply: in the tongue, especially at its tip (*1 de hist. cap. 11* and *2. de partibus, cap.17*). For when we wish to sample something briefly, we roll it to the tip of the tongue; but when we do not wish to taste something else, we transmit it immediately to the stomach.

Article II. Whether taste differs from touch.

Paulus Venetus (*2. anima, cap.10*) and Aegidius Romanus (*ibid. in com. T.103*) confound taste with touch, to the extent of wanting them to be one and the same sense adorned with two names. Aristotle, however, (*in the place just*

mentioned T.112 and 128 and *lib. de sensu et sensibili, cap. 4*) and the Scotists and his other interpreters teach that taste is distinct from touch.

Note that touch is taken in three ways. In one way, for the contact of two bodies whose surfaces immediately touch one another — we say that one board touches another because their surfaces touch. This is what Aristotle has in view (*5. Phys. lib. 26*) when he says that those bodies touch each other whose extremities touch one another. In the second way, for the contact of a vital power perceiving an object — in which sense, because taste and touch attain their objects immediately without any external medium, taste and touch are not said to differ in this respect. In the third way, for the tactile power, which is concerned with tangible qualities — and in this way touch is separated from taste and the other senses.

Assertion: Taste is an external sense distinct in species from touch. This is not displeasing to Scotus (*2. dist.3. quast. 8. ad 3*), who enumerates and accepts five external senses distinct from one another, as I showed in question III, article I of this book. It is proved, first: from the distinction of objects, the distinction of powers is argued and gathered a posteriori, from what has been said elsewhere; but taste has an object distinct in species from the object of touch — for the object of taste is flavor, and the object of touch is the tangible qualities; therefore taste differs from touch. Second, diverse organs indicate diverse senses, because the number of senses is ascertained from the number of organs; but the organ of taste is distinguished from the organ of touch — for touch is diffused through the whole body, while taste resides at the tip of the tongue. And moreover, taste is sometimes lost while touch continues intact and whole; therefore they differ from one another.

First Objection: Aristotle (*lib. de sensu et sensibili, cap. 2*) in plain words says: "Taste is a kind of touch, and the tasteable is something tangible"; therefore according to Aristotle taste is not separated from touch. I reply that Aristotle must be interpreted as speaking of touch in the second sense — not of touch in the third sense, as I made plain in the preceding notation. Or he must be understood not formally but suppositively, because taste always presupposes touch, as Cavallius notes (*in annot. quast.6. Scot. de anima*).

Second Objection: Taste attains water; but water is not savory, since water is an element devoid of flavor; therefore taste is concerned with tangible qualities, just like touch — and thus the one is not distinguished from the other. I reply that what is tasted is not pure water but mixed water, which taste perceives and senses. Therefore this argument does not trouble us.

Question IX. On Touch

Touch is described as the external sense that perceives tangible qualities. Touch is, as Aristotle says (*3. anima, T.66*), the most necessary of all for leading the life

of an animal — for fleeing harmful things and embracing advantageous ones. Its object seems to be the tangible qualities. Those who have softer flesh are endowed with greater intelligence; those who have harder flesh are slow and dull (*2. anima, 94*).

Article I. Whether touch is one or multiple senses.

The Philosopher and Simplicius, notable Peripatetics (*2. de anima, 7.108*), to whom Thomas (*1. part. quast.78. art.3. ad 3*), Poncius (*disp.60.quast.4. concl. 5*), and many others assent, think that touch is only one sense. Others, however — such as Avicenna (*6. naturalium, parte 2*), Averroes, Toledo (*in the place just cited*), Scotus (*quaestione 1. de anima*), John of Magistris, and other Scotists in the same place — think that touch is a twofold sense.

Note that something can be one in two ways. First, with intrinsic and formal unity: in this way each thing enjoys its own unity according to its own entity. Second, with extrinsic and objective unity: in this way that is one which is concerned with only one object, and that is multiple which is concerned with many objects. By this distinction the proposed and present difficulty is resolved.

It may be said that touch is one with intrinsic unity, but multiple with the multiplicity of objects. The first part is shown: being and one are convertible, since one is a property of being; but touch is a being; therefore it is one with intrinsic and transcendental unity. Add further that every power is one, not only with the common unity that is transcendental, but also with the proper unity by which it is such a power, distinct from every other power and from anything else. But touch is a sensitive power, since it is numbered among the five external senses. Therefore touch is one with the unity intrinsic to it. The second part seems to be that of Aristotle (*2. anima, T.107*), who says that touch is not one but many. And it is proved: a power that acquires many objects is not one but multiple, since from what was asserted elsewhere, a power is multiplied in proportion to the multiplication of objects; but touch participates in many objects — namely the tangible qualities, one of which cannot be reduced to another; for heat is not reduced to cold, nor dryness to moisture. Therefore, since touch is perceptive of such qualities, it follows that it is multiple with objective multiplicity. Moreover, from what will be said in the next article, the sensory organ of touch is established as the whole body of the animal, which is multiple with the multiplicity of parts — so that it seems not wrongly attributed a multiple touch as well.

You will say: that power is one whose object is one, as I have urged more than once; but the object of touch is one — namely the tangible; therefore touch is only one sense. I grant the major. I deny the minor. For although the tangible is called by one name as the object of touch, in reality it is not one object — since there is not found any tangible that is univocal to all tangible things. The reason

is that tangible qualities do not agree in any common univocal. Hence Aristotle in his *Logic* places contraries among the post-predicaments.

You will press: if multiple senses of touch are admitted, the fivefold number of external senses will not be valid — which conflicts with the common doctrine asserting that there are only five external senses. I deny the inference. For touch is one sense with intrinsic unity — which suffices for there to be no more than five external senses enumerated — even though there may be many touches with extrinsic and objective plurality, as I explained above. Or say that there is one touch really, but two formally — just as, according to some Scotists, the intellect is one really but twofold formally, namely agent and patient.

Article II. Where the sensory organ of touch is located.

Themistius in his paraphrase (*c. 39*) and Simplicius (*2. anima, T.116*) locate the organ of touch in the heart. Alexander and Philoponus (*7. 124*), however, establish the sensory organ of touch in flesh and skin. Scotus (*q.2. de anima*), Galen (*1. de usu partium, cap.16*), and others commonly teach that touch principally resides in the nerve proceeding from the brain, with flesh as its internal medium.

Note from anatomy that a certain nerve proceeds from the brain, which is diffused and spread through the whole body of the animal and is divided into various and diverse branches and branchlets — in much the same way as in the leaves of trees, especially fig trees, certain small veins and fibers appear and are seen, through which vital spirits are conducted and appear to vivify the parts and members. Note further that there is a twofold medium: one internal, which is a part joined to the remaining parts of the living being — such as flesh; and another external, which is not a part of the living being but is outside the living being itself — such as the air or water that are external media for seeing and hearing.

Assertion: The organ of touch is the aforementioned nerve, and its internal medium is flesh. This is defended by the Doctor in the place cited and by his disciples there. It is proved, first, from Aristotle (*2. anima, T.109* and *de partibus*), who affirms that flesh but not the said nerve is the sensory organ of touch. Second, that is rightly considered the sensory organ of touch which is most suited for touching; and such is the aforesaid nerve. For when an unpleasant object touches that nerve, we feel more intense pain than if it touches the other parts; therefore the sensory organ of touch must be placed in that nerve, and in flesh as its internal medium.

First Objection: Aristotle (*1. de hist. animalium, c 4* and *2. de partibus animalium cap.*) decides that the sensory organ of touch is flesh; therefore in the Peripatetic school the organ of touch is not a nerve but flesh. I reply that Aristotle there speaks recitatively, not assertively. For the same Philosopher, treating systematically of the sensory organ of touch (*2. anima cit. T.109*), plainly denies

that flesh is the organ of touch. He does the same in (*2. de partibus animalium, cap. 10*). Indeed in (*lib. de sensu et sensili. cap. 2*) he locates touch in the heart, because he thinks the nerves arise from the heart — though anatomy shows that the nerves themselves proceed from the brain.

Second Objection: If flesh is pricked, pain is felt; therefore the organ of touch resides in flesh and not in a nerve. I reply that the sensory organ of touch is in flesh not by reason of itself, but by reason of the nerve hidden beneath the flesh. Or say that it is in flesh as in its internal medium, not however as in its proper organ.

Third Objection: Certain parts of an animal feel intensely when touched — such as the heart and lungs — yet they are devoid of nerves; therefore it is evident proof that the sensory organ of touch is not to be placed in the nerves. And moreover, certain animals lack nerves and yet possess the sense of touch just like other animals do — since no animal can exist without enjoying touch. Such are fish; therefore it is plainly shown that the sensory organ of touch is not a nerve. I reply that those parts mentioned above do not have nerves so patent and evident as the rest, but they nonetheless truly have nerves, as is plain to the observer. For there small nerves or certain fibers are seen, in which touch is accomplished. As for what is alleged of fish, the same must be said on the authority of the Stagirite (*3. de historia animalium, cap. 5*), who attributes proper and true nerves to fish.

Question X. On the Internal Senses

That there are internal senses is the common doctrine of all philosophers. For it is confirmed by experience that brutes remember what they have seen, heard, and smelled. A dog knows its master, hears his voice, and remembers him even after some time has passed. Likewise it remembers a place in which it was beaten and flees from the one who struck it. Furthermore it abandons harmful things and follows advantageous ones. Again, a sheep apprehends a wolf as its enemy, and a mouse a cat. From these and similar things it is easily and plainly deduced that animals devoid of reason, as well as those endowed with reason, have internal senses.

Article I. How many internal senses there are.

Philosophers dispute greatly about this article, to such a degree that their opinions seem as many as their heads. First, Alexander of Hales (*2. parte, quast. 70. m. 2*) and Tataretus (*2. de anima, quast. ult. dub. 2*), as well as Poncius (*disp. 61. quast. 1. concl. 1*), affirm that there is only one internal sense, which acquires various and diverse names, and is called multiple with respect to the many operations it exercises and the manifold disposition of organs — on account of which it seems to be multiple, while in reality it is only one, having many offices and operations. Some, among whom is Fonseca (*5. Met. sect. 13*).

quast.7), think there are only two internal senses: namely the common sense and phantasy. Some count three internal senses — namely the common sense, phantasy, and memory. Many add a fourth: the estimative power. Others, beyond the four just enumerated, establish a fifth, namely the cogitative power, as can be seen in John of Magistris (*2. de anima, quast. 8. dub.3*).

Note I, that they are called internal senses for two reasons. The first is that they are moved and immuted neither by external objects, as sight and the other external senses are. The second is that they exist within the brain. For their organs are contained in the brain itself, and hence are not seen by us from without.

Note II, from anatomy, that the brain is divided into two halves, one on the right side and one on the left. It is also divided into the anterior part of the head, called the sinciput, and the posterior part of the same head, called the occiput. Moreover, in the anterior part of each half there are two sinuses and concavities; and in the posterior part, which is the occiput, there is found another sinus or ventricle. In the first sinus resides the common sense, which perceives all the objects of the external senses and discerns them as present and judges about them. In the second sinus dwells the phantasy or imaginative power, which not only perceives all the objects that the common sense and the other senses attain as present, but also as absent — and it apprehends, discerns, and estimates them, namely whether they are suitable or unsuitable. In the third sinus, however, is located the memory, which preserves the individual species of all the objects that are transmitted from the external senses through the common sense and through phantasy to the memory itself, which dwells in the occiput — as John of Damascus testifies (*2. fidei. cap. 20*). Note further that the aforesaid sinuses and their passages are full and filled with vital and animal spirits, through whose mediation the sensitive powers are assisted in their operations as occasion demands.

First Assertion: There are neither only one nor only two internal senses. This assertion is two-part, which does not conflict with Scotus in the following assertion, whatever Cavallius may say (*quast.9. de anima, concl.4*). The first part is proved, first, from Aristotle (*2. anima, 7.55*), who affirms that there are many internal senses. And in the book on memory and recollection, he adds that beyond the other internal senses, the sensitive memory must be admitted; therefore in the Peripatetic school there is not only one internal sense.

Augustine (*lib.2.de lib.arb.cap.7*) is favorable, expressly teaching many internal senses. Second, what belongs to the common sense does not belong to phantasy, since they perform different offices. For the common sense is immuted by the external senses; when these cease from their operation, it is unable to — Third, some easily perceive things and with difficulty remember them; therefore it is not the office of the same sense to perceive objects and to remember them — and thus there is not only one internal sense.

The second part is shown, first, from the same Aristotle in the passages adduced in the first part of this assertion, in which, beyond the common sense and phantasy, he admits the sensitive memory. Augustine has the same view (*1.1. Musica.cap.4* and *2. de lib. arb. c 5*). Therefore there are not only two internal senses. Second, distinct definitions of the internal senses argue for distinct senses, as I have often urged; but distinct definitions are offered for the common sense, phantasy, and memory, as is plain from the second notation; therefore the twofold number of internal senses is not valid.

Second Assertion: There are neither more nor fewer than three internal senses: the common sense, phantasy, and memory. Scotus does not seem to depart from this. For in (*1.dist.3. quest. 6. §. Contra istam paulo ante F*) he mentions the common sense; and a little later, phantasy; and in (*4.dist. 43. quast. 3*), the sensitive memory. Augustine suggests the same, not only in the places cited in the superior assertion but also in (*11. Trin.7*), where he explicitly enumerates the three aforesaid internal senses. Aristotle preceded them, both in the places cited and in (*2. anima, T.145* and *3. of the same work, T.31*). It is proved, first: the internal senses are as many as the internal sinuses and organs of those senses. From the ternary number of these, the ternary number of those is rightly gathered. But there are only three internal organs — or three sinuses and concavities — mentioned and explained in the second notation; therefore there are only three internal senses as enumerated. Second, the estimative power and the cogitative power, which some distinguish from the aforesaid senses, coincide with phantasy. For phantasy estimates and judges about objects both present and absent, as is plain in dreams. And it meditates and thinks; therefore other internal senses beyond those three named above need not be devised.

First Objection: Saint Augustine (*lib. de spiritu et anima, capite 4*), having enumerated the five external senses, acknowledges one internal sense, which he calls imagination; therefore in the opinion of Augustine only one internal sense should be established. I reply that there Augustine admits one internal sense — namely phantasy — but does not deny the other two, which he expressly posited and taught in the places just cited. Hence the holy Doctor in that passage affirms one and does not reject the other two.

Second Objection: Aristotle (*lib. de memoria et reminiscentia*) writes that phantasy and memory are affections of the first sensitive — but the first sensitive is the common sense, according to the same Philosopher; therefore phantasy does not differ from the common sense, and consequently there are not three internal senses. I reply that the Philosopher must be interpreted not really and formally, but presuppositively and effectively — meaning that phantasy and memory presuppose the operation of the common sense, just as the common sense itself requires and presupposes the operations of the external senses. And therefore properly and precisely, phantasy and memory are not affections of the common sense.

Third Objection: What acquires the same object are not distinct powers, because the unity of objects indicates the unity of powers; but phantasy and the common sense participate in the same object — for whatever the common sense perceives, phantasy attains as well; therefore they are not distinct powers. I reply that the argument concludes with respect to disparate powers, such as the external senses; but not with respect to subordinate powers, such as the common sense and phantasy. For these are ordered to one another in such a way that whatever the inferior sense attains, the superior sense attains as well, and something more. Therefore it is no wonder if the common sense cognizes all the objects of the external senses, which are likewise perceived by phantasy, which is a superior power.

Article II. Whether the internal senses are active.

The opinion of Jandun (*2. de anima, qua.16*) and Papollaris (*ibid. q.13*) and others is that there are passive internal senses really distinct from active ones. The second opinion is that of Albert (*lib. de apprehensione in initio* and *in summa de homine*), who affirms that the internal senses are only passive, while the sensible species are active and productive of sensations. The third is defended by Plotinus (*sixth Ennead, cap. 4*) and Simplicius (*in expof. 7.51. 52*), who think the internal sense is only active and the total principle of sensation. The fourth is deduced from Scotus (*1.d.3.quest.7* and *2.de anima quest.12*), Cavallius in the same place, Tataretus, John of Magistris, and many others, who teach that the internal sense is the principal partial active principle of sensation, while the sensible species is the other active principle, less principal — and that both together constitute one total and adequate principle of sensation.

First Assertion: The internal senses are not really divided into active and passive; but the same senses are called active and passive from different respects. This is drawn from the Doctor just cited. It is proved, first, from Aristotle (*2. anima ad text.127*) and following, where he says that sensing is being acted upon, and afterwards adds that when the sense senses it acts; therefore according to Aristotle, the same sense is active and passive, though in different ways. For it is active insofar as it produces sensation, and passive insofar as it receives sensation in itself, or because it first receives the sensible species before it senses. Furthermore, the same Philosopher (*ibid. ad Text.124*), inquiring why plants do not sense, replies: because they lack the sensitive power — but the sensitive power is active, since it produces sensation; therefore with respect to different things the same sense is active and passive. Second, if the senses were really distinguished into active and passive, there would be more senses than have been enumerated in the preceding article; but no senses other than the aforesaid are commonly counted; therefore the senses are not distributed into active and passive. Again, there are no organs distinct from those of the passive senses for the active senses; therefore neither is there any real distinction between those senses. Furthermore, the same agent from different

considerations is called patient, as is plain with the eye, which as it sees is called active, but as it receives vision or the sensible species is called passive. Therefore the same must be affirmed of the internal senses. Moreover (*1. Phys. T.40*): entities are not to be multiplied without necessity; but there is no necessity for multiplying the internal senses into active ones really distinct from passive ones; therefore the aforesaid division of senses into really distinct active and passive is vain and void.

Second Assertion: The sensible species received in the organ is not the total principle of sensation, such that the sensing power behaves purely passively with respect to it. This is drawn from the Doctor cited and (*3. dist.4. quast. un*). And Aristotle (*in the place cited above* and *lib. de sommo et vigilia, cap.1*) says that sensation is the action of the whole conjoined — that is, of the whole animated composite — to whose efficient production the sense or sensitive power concurs actively. It is proved, first: if the species alone were the total cause of sensation, if it were divinely separated from the sensitive organ it would of itself, without the organ, produce sensation — because a sufficient cause, acting per se and requiring nothing to concur toward its action, wherever it is placed, when not impeded, can act. Therefore a species separated from the sensitive power would emit sensation — which is as absurd as is sufficiently and abundantly plain to anyone even slightly versed in philosophy. The antecedent is known: for if heat, for example, were separated from fire, it would heat; and whiteness and the other accidents in the Eucharist have their effects, even though they exist without a subject; therefore the same would occur with the sensible species, if by divine power it were separated from the sensitive faculty. Second, given the hypothesis, the medium through which the sensible species would pass would sense — but this is false, since if the medium is air, it can in no way sense; therefore the same holds for what was deduced from it.

You will say, denying the inference of the major, since for sensation an apt and capable subject is required — the kind the medium through which the said species is conveyed is not. On the contrary: such an apt and suitable subject for sensation works nothing toward its accomplishment but only receives the species; but the medium likewise receives the species in the same way; therefore it would sense as well. Third, the powers of the vegetative soul are active — namely the generative, nutritive, and augmentative, as is established from the preceding book; therefore the sensitive powers, which are the senses, are likewise productive principles of sensation, since the reasoning is the same in both cases. Furthermore, a vital operation proceeds from a vital principle — for in this it is distinguished from other non-vital operations; but sensation is a vital operation, as is plain; therefore it is produced by the sense, which is a vital power. Moreover, what denominates something in any way flows from it: but sensation denominates the sense — for through sensation the sense formally senses and through it is said to sense; therefore sensation originates from the sense as from its productive and effective principle.

Third Assertion: Nor is the sense alone the productive cause of sensation; the sensible species is also required as the other partial cause of it. Scotus lends support (*1. distinct.3.quast.7*). It is proved, first, in nearly the same way as sensation is to intellection in the character of vital operation: but intellection, from what will be said elsewhere, is not accomplished by the intellect alone but also by the intelligible object, according to Augustine (*2. Trin. 2 and 9 of the same work, ultimo*): "From the object and the intellect, knowledge is begotten." And the same (*ibid., cited by the Doctor in the place cited above*): "From the visible and the one seeing, vision is begotten." Therefore from the sensible species and the sense, sensation arises. The major is plain because, setting aside the rest that belongs to intellection as intellection, in the character of an operation proceeding from a power of the soul or of the whole animated being, they proceed along the same path — which Aristotle indicates when he says: "sensing is being acted upon, just as understanding is." But if the sense were simply the total cause of sensation, sensing would not be being acted upon but acting and operating, nor would anything else be required for exercising sensation. Second, given the natural cause of some effect, and with it not impeded, the action immediately follows; but given the sense held back by nothing, if the object or its species is not present, the sense cannot sense; therefore it is not the total cause of sensation.

You will say: the object or its species is required not in order to act, but in order to dispose and determine the sense for sensing. For the power must first be informed by the species before it acts and operates. On the contrary: whether the object is placed in the character of a sine qua non cause, or in the character of a term, or in the character of a disposer and exciter, I argue: there are only four genera of causes (*2.Phys. 28 and 5. Met.2*). Therefore, those existing perfect in themselves, unimpeded, and sufficiently approximated, the effect caused by them follows, if they are natural causes. Therefore if the sense is the total cause of sensation and its receptive subject — since it always exists in act and exists as a natural cause — it would always have actual sensation, and would always cause it, which is false. Third, what assimilates the effect to itself concurs actively in producing it; but the sensible object assimilates sensation to itself — indeed sensation is rendered more similar to the sensible object than to the sensitive power; therefore the sensible object or its species is the partial active cause of sensation. Finally, a universal and indeterminate cause must be determined to acting by another cause, as is plain in the case of the sun, which would not cause sublunar effects unless inferior and sublunar causes determined it to producing this or that effect; but the sense is indifferent to any sensation of any sensible object whatsoever; therefore it must be determined by the objects themselves or their species. This determination, however, is action properly so called, and its effect can be nothing other than sensation; therefore both the sense and the sensible species concur in producing sensation.

Fourth Assertion: Sensation formally is an action. The Doctor holds this (7. *Met. quast. 14. §. Contrà responsionem* and *quast.18. §. Respondeo* and *quol.13. 15*). It is proved, first, from Aristotle (2. *anima*, 37. 7. 125 and *lib. de sensu et sensili, cap.2* and 9. *Met.16*), who calls sensations and intellections operations and immanent actions. Second, what is produced by a vital principle is a vital action — just as an action that emanates from a non-vital principle is a non-vital action; but sensation proceeds from a vital principle, namely the sense, which is a vital power; therefore sensation is an action. It can also be called a passion insofar as it is received in the sense, by reason of which the sense itself is called passive, as I noted above. The Scotists moreover use this distinction: namely that sensation is an action of the genus of quality, not however of the genus of action.

First Objection: An agent and a patient intellect are given (3. *anima 17*); therefore an active and passive sense must also be conceded, since the reasoning seems the same in both cases. For as the intellect stands to intelligibles, so the sense stands to sensibles; but the intellect is divided into agent and patient; therefore the sense also must be distributed into active and passive. I grant the antecedent. I deny the consequent. The reason of disparity is that an agent intellect is given to render the material species spiritual — the sense does not stand thus, since it receives a material species, the sense itself being likewise material. Therefore the same parity does not run with respect to intellect and sense.

Second Objection: Aristotle (2. *anima*, 140) teaches that sense is acted upon when it senses; therefore the sense is only passive, because to sense is to be acted upon. I reply that Aristotle must be interpreted not formally but prerequisites — meaning that for the sense to formally sense, it is necessary that it receive the sensible species, by reason of which it is said to be acted upon. Or also, in that it receives sensation in itself, just as a wall receives whiteness through which it is formally called white. Therefore, from different respects, the sense is called passive and active, as I noted above. Hence the same Philosopher, in order to suggest to us that the sense is not only passive, adds (2. *anima*, 7.125): "to smell is not to be acted upon by the odorous, because it is to sense" — by which words he intimates that sensing is not formally to be acted upon.

Third Objection: Sensation is a vital action that proceeds only from a vital principle; but the sensible species is not a vital principle; therefore the sensible species is not a productive principle of sensation. I reply that the objection holds for the principal principle; but not for the less principal principle — of which kind the sensible species is. Therefore sensation is called a vital operation not on account of the sensible species, but on account of the sense, which is the principal active principle.

Article III. In which part of the animal the internal senses are located.

Aristotle and Galen dispute most acutely about the seat and location of the internal senses, especially the common sense. Aristotle (*2. de gener. animalium, cap.4*) and elsewhere locates the common sense in the heart, in which he is favored by Jerome (*Ad Fabiolam*), Averroes (*2. de partibus animalium, cap.7*), and Jandun (*quast.9. de sommo et vigilia*). Galen, however (*8. de usu partium, cap. 3*) and following, establishes the common sense and the other internal senses in the brain. In agreement are Bercharius (*1. Reduct. moralis, cap.6*), Cavallius (*quost.10. de anima, concl. 2*), Poncius (*disp.61. concl.2*), and many others.

Note I, that Aristotle and Galen agree on some things and disagree on others. Both agree that the common sense resides where the principle and origin of sensing is. Furthermore, both admit that the source of the nerves is the principle of sensing, since through the nerves the animal participates in sensitive and motive faculties. However, these two authors disagree in that Aristotle considers the heart to be the principle and workshop of nerves, veins, and arteries; while Galen thinks the brain is the origin and source of the nerves, and therefore places the common sense in it.

Note II, that in matters that fall under sense and experience, it is better to follow those who have experience than those who lack it — as Scotus does (*3. dist. 4. quast. vn. §. Ad argumenta, pro opinione prima*), where, recounting the opinion of the Philosopher about the mother with respect to the fetus — namely whether she bears herself actively or passively in the formation of the fetus — since the Philosopher himself thinks the mother behaves only passively in the formation of the fetus, our Doctor abandons the Philosopher himself and follows Galen as the experienced one, because the way of those who have experience is safer and more certain, especially when the reasons on the opposing side can be easily dissolved. Therefore in the present case it is no wonder if philosophers commonly abandon the view of Aristotle and embrace the opinion of Galen, since through anatomical dissection it is plainly evident and seen that the origin of the nerves and the principle of sensing proceeds not from the heart but from the brain.

Assertion: The common sense and the other internal senses reside not in the heart but in the brain. Scotus is cited (*quast. 10. de anima*), and it is proved, first: where the sensory nerves take their origin, there the internal senses have their seat — as the Stagirite himself also acknowledges; but the sensory nerves take their beginning from the brain, as is seen from experience in anatomical dissection; therefore the internal senses are located in the brain. Second, if the heart of an animal is suddenly removed from its other members, we still observe some sensation being produced in the head of the same animal. For it is related that some people, with their hearts cut out, still spoke — and speech is a sensation, which can only arise from a sense; therefore the internal senses are placed not in the heart but in the brain. Third, when the head and brain are injured, the internal senses are damaged and sensations are impeded; and

remedies are applied not to the heart but to the brain. Moreover, those who indulge in excessive study suffer pain not in the heart but in the head. Therefore the internal senses are to be located in the brain.

First Objection: What is the principle of sensation must be a part continuous with the other parts and members of the animal, so that sensation and motion may properly occur; but the brain is a part discontinuous from the others, being in the head as in a vessel; therefore the internal senses do not reside in the brain. Confirmation: what does not sense cannot be the origin and seat of the internal senses; but the brain does not sense — for if it is touched, it does not feel pain; therefore the brain is not the place of the internal senses. I grant the major. I deny the minor. For the parts of the brain are continued with the nerves and the other members through which sensation is accomplished, as is plain in anatomical dissection. To the confirmation: I grant the major, I deny the minor. For although the brain does not sense so intensely on account of its tempering, which is soft, it nonetheless truly senses; and if a wound in it is great, the animal is afflicted with intense pain.

Second Objection: The heart is the principle of life. For in it are the vital and animal spirits; therefore the heart is the principle of sensation, and consequently the internal senses reside in it. I reply that the heart is indeed the principle of the vital spirits, but not of the animal spirits, since the animal spirits proceed from the brain, as experience confirms. Therefore, according to the physicians and truth, the heart is the seat of the vital spirits, the brain of the animal spirits, and the liver of the blood.

Third Objection: The heart is located in the middle of the body of the animal, like a king in the middle of his kingdom; therefore the heart is the principle of the internal senses. I reply that even if it be admitted that the heart occupies the middle seat in the body of the animal, from this it does not follow that it is the origin of the internal senses. For the belly is in the middle of the animal, and yet no one affirms that the aforesaid senses take their origin from the belly itself. Indeed, the brain is established as their principle because it is in the head — as in a citadel, and like the sky in the world. Therefore the objection brought forward has no force.

Fourth Objection: Men who are out of their senses are called *excordes* or *vecordes*; therefore men who are sound of mind are to be called *cordati* — for no other reason surely than that the heart is the origin and source of the internal senses. I reply that although this is sometimes conceded, men more frequently are said to be without a brain, and the common saying is held: "a beautiful head, but without a brain." And: "when the head aches, all the other members ache."

Fifth Objection: Matthew XV: The Lord Christ says: "Out of the heart proceed evil thoughts" — and thoughts pertain to phantasy, which is one of the internal senses; therefore the internal senses arise from the heart. I reply with Lyra in his

postilla that this passage must be interpreted of the spiritual heart, which is the intellect — which, with the will not resisting, is inclined to evil and is called the origin of evils.

Article IV. Whether the internal senses engage in discursive reasoning.

Some, listed and refuted by Alphonsus de Castro (*lib.3. adversus haereses, verb. Bestia et Brutum*), into whose error and heresy Laurentius Valla (*lib. de dialect. cap.9*) and Plutarch seem to fall by attributing reason and discursive reasoning to brutes, think that the internal senses — whether of a brute or of a human being — are capable of discursive reasoning. Others, whose leader is Avicenna (6. *naturalium. parte 4. cap.2*), followed by Thomas (1.p. *quest.78. art.4*) and Cajetan in the same place — though they deny that brutes engage in discursive reasoning — nonetheless think that the cogitative power of man is capable of discursive reasoning. The more common view, however, is that of Scotus (2. *distinct 42. quast.4. §. Ad primum R. in solutione 2*), Lychetus, and Gratian of Brescia in the same place, who teach that the internal senses both of brutes and of human beings are devoid of reason and discursive reasoning.

First Assertion: Brutes are incapable of reason and discursive reasoning. So Scotus in the place just cited. It is proved, first, from sacred Scripture, Psalm XXXI: "Do not become like the horse and the mule, which have no understanding." But where there is no understanding, there can be neither reason nor discursive reasoning. Sacred Scripture, however, testifies that beasts lack understanding; therefore they likewise lack reason and discursive reasoning. Then Psalm XLVIII: "Man when he was in honor did not understand; he is compared to the beasts of burden and is made like them." The likeness that sacred Scripture draws between man and beasts consists in this: that he did not understand — therefore the difference that holds between man and brute is established in this, that man possesses reason and understanding, while the brute lacks it, of which a man falling into sin also becomes devoid. Then he does not understand, like a beast of burden — to which at that point he is compared. Second, from Augustine (1. *Musicae, cap.2* and 1. *de lib. arbitrio, cap.7* and 8): "Man surpasses the beasts by reason." Third, Aristotle (2. *anima, T.157*): "Nothing can be persuaded to brutes, because they are deprived of reason." And (*lib. de memoria, reminiscencia, cap.4*): "No animals recollect except man, because they neither syllogize nor reason." Fourth, for an animal to engage in discursive reasoning, it must necessarily cognize the principles of reasoning, because without principles one cannot have those things that are deduced from them; but the internal senses cannot cognize the principles of discourse; therefore they do not possess reason and discursive reasoning. The major is plain. The minor is evident: the principles of discourse, from what was asserted in logic, are two: the dictum de omni and the dictum de nullo — and since these are universals, and the senses attain only singulars, it is plainly inferred that no sense of brutes is suited for

discursive reasoning. Fifth, reason and discursive reasoning belong to rational beings; but brutes are irrational. They are constituted through the difference opposed to rationality, since the animal is divided into rational and irrational; therefore brutes cannot reason and syllogize. Moreover, to whom discursive reasoning belongs, to the same person belong understanding, and likewise will, prudence, and the other habits; but neither will, nor prudence, nor the other moral or intellectual habits are adapted to brutes, since their souls are material and corporeal. Likewise they would be capable of grace and sin, merit and demerit, punishment and eternal glory — all of which and similar things are far from brutes; therefore reason and discursive reasoning cannot be accommodated to brutes, as Augustine elegantly expounds (*lib.83.99. quest.j. 13*).

Second Assertion: The cogitative power of man does not possess discursive reasoning. This is drawn from the Doctor in the place cited and (*1. dist.34 quest.6.¶. Contra istam opinionem ad A*). It is proved, first: the same must be said of the cogitative power of man as of the cogitative power of a brute, because both are material and corporeal; but the cogitative power of a brute is devoid of reason and discursive reasoning, just as its other senses are, as I showed in the preceding assertion. Therefore so is the cogitative power of man, since the reasoning is equally clear in both. Second, a ratiocinative and discursive power cognizes universals, because discourse is composed of universals, as Scotus well pursues in the first book cited above, and this is supported by the two principles mentioned in the prior assertion; but the cogitative power of man cannot perceive universals, since only the intellect attains universals — according to the common saying: "sense is of singulars and intellect of universals"; therefore it is incapable of reason and discursive reasoning.

First Objection: What is capable of prudence and other habits is capable of reason and discursive reasoning; but brutes are endowed with prudence and other habits, which cannot inhere unless in those capable of reason and discursive reasoning. For in (*1. Met. 1*) bees are said to be prudent; indeed serpents, by the mouth of the Lord Christ (*Matt.10*): "Be prudent as serpents." And Genesis III: "The serpent was more cunning" — that is, more prudent — "than all the beasts of the earth." And Proverbs VI: "Go to the ant, O sluggard, consider her ways, and learn wisdom." Therefore brutes are not to be exempted from reason and discursive reasoning. I grant the major, I deny the minor. In proof of the minor, I say that those testimonies must be interpreted of prudence taken not properly but improperly — meaning that the aforesaid animals participate in a certain shadowy prudence and the vestige of certain intellectual habits. So Augustine (*11. Ciuit. cap.27*) and Scotus (*1. Met. quast 3*) intimate.

Second Objection: Some animals are teachable and docile; therefore they engage in discursive reasoning as well. The antecedent is plain from Aelian, Athenaeus, and Bercharius (*lib 14 reductorij moralis, cap.6*), who relate marvelous things about certain brutes — namely the dolphin, the lion, and the elephant,

which forms and traces letters — and such things do not seem to be able to be accomplished without reason and discursive reasoning. I grant the antecedent, I deny the consequent. In proof of the consequent I say that all these things happen by natural instinct and a certain habituation, and perhaps there is in them a certain likeness and vestige of reason, as Augustine in the place just cited seems to suggest.

Third Objection: A dog placed at a crossroads, when a hare has passed through one of those three roads, having explored two of them, comes to the third, which it traverses, and catches the hare; therefore the dog engages in discursive reasoning. The consequent holds: for the dog seems to argue thus — "the hare did not pass through the first road, nor the second; therefore the third." But this deduction is discursive; therefore reason and discursive reasoning are not to be removed from certain animals. I reply that the dog enters the third road not because it reasons but because it smells the odor of the hare. For having smelled the first two roads, as experience confirms, and not sensing the odor of the hare in them, it smells the third, and sensing the odor of the hare itself, it pursues, catches, and kills the hare. In the same way can be dissolved the objection of Bacon (*2. dist.25. art. penultimo*) about the fox, the ape, and the other cunning animals, which seem to perform wondrous things. Nor should what Augustine says (*1. Musicae cap.3*) be passed over: "In brutes there is no art, because there is no reason."

Question XI. On the Sensitive Appetite

Scotus makes mention of the sensitive appetite (*quast.4. prol. §. Dico igitur sub B* and *1. distinct.17. quast. 2. §. Hanc viam sequendo T* and *2. distinct.6. quest.2. §. In ista quest. D* and *E* and *Quol.2.B* and *2. dist. 17. quest. vn.§. Istam quaestionem B*). This animal seeks good things and avoids evil things, receives what is suitable and flees what is unsuitable. For the sensitive appetite is defined as the sensitive power by which an animal pursues good and what is suitable, and flees evil and what is unsuitable.

Article I. Whether the sensitive appetite is distinguished from the cognitive power.

Thomas (*1. p. quast.78. art.2* and *3*), Cajetan, and others in the same place acknowledge a real distinction between the sensitive appetite and the cognitive power. Scotus, however (*3. distinct. 17. quest.vn*), Cavallius (*disp. 2. de anima sect. 2*), and others in the same place establish not a real but a formal distinction between the appetite and the knowing power.

Note from the Doctor just cited that appetite is divided into innate and elicited. The former is the natural inclination and propensity of any thing — in this sense a heavy thing desires a place downward, and a light thing upward. The latter is an active faculty by which a living being desires what is suitable for it

and pursues it, and turns away from what is unsuitable and flees it — as I was saying above in describing the appetite. It is further subdivided into natural and free. The former is that by which an animal naturally and necessarily desires what is good for it. The latter is that by which a rational animal spontaneously and freely desires and wills something, which it can not will and cease from pursuing. Of the latter there is no difficulty here; it is of the former — which is called the sensitive appetite, mentioned in Genesis IV: "Its desire shall be under you, and you shall rule over it"; Romans VII: "I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind"; and Galatians V: "The flesh lusts against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh." It is about this that John of Damascus writes, cited by the Doctor in the first book (*dist. 17. quest. 2. paulo ante §. Ad argumenta, quae falta sunt, et ante V*), saying: "It is led, it does not lead" — meaning that the sensitive appetite does not dominate its own action, which is to lead; but with respect to its action it is determined by an agent to a definite operation, and this is to be led — in the interpretation of Scotus in the place cited above.

First Assertion: The sensitive appetite is distinguished from the cognitive power — not indeed really, but formally. The assertion is two-membered, as Scotus suggests in the place just cited and (*quest. 1. de anima, §. Ad 1*), where he says: "Where there is the sensitive, there is the appetitive; yet one power is sensitive, another appetitive." The first part is shown, first: the free appetite, which is the will, is distinguished from the intellect, which is the spiritual cognitive power; therefore the sensitive appetite, which is the natural and necessary appetitive power, is likewise distinguished from the material cognitive power. The antecedent is conceded by all who maintain real distinctions among philosophers. The consequent holds because the reasoning is the same in both cases. Second, the sensitive appetite follows the sense, just as the property of laughter follows the human being; but the property of laughter is distinguished from the human being as a property from its subject — as will be made plain in metaphysics. Furthermore, a thing is first known before it is desired, because the appetite — both sensitive and intellective — is not directed toward what is unknown; therefore since the cognitive power is prior to the appetitive, and everything prior is distinguished from the posterior, it is plainly inferred that the sensitive appetite differs from the knowing power. And moreover, the moral virtues are placed in the sensitive appetite, from the Doctor (*3. dist. 15*), and not in the cognitive power; therefore the one is distinguished from the other.

The second part is established from what was said in book II, question II, article II, where I showed that the powers of the soul differ from the soul itself and from one another not really but formally. And likewise how the powers of the whole animated composite — of which kind these powers are — are distinguished from the composite itself and from one another; and I judge that nothing else need be added here, beyond what was said and proved there.

Second Assertion: There are as many appetites as there are senses. This is defended by the Doctor in the third book cited, and it is indicated in (*12. Met. T.39*), where it is said that every intelligible is desirable; therefore every suitable sensible is also desirable — just as every being is knowable. And so, since every sense is cognitive, it is also appetitive; and there are as many appetites numbered as there are senses. Furthermore, distinct apprehensions are had from distinct senses, as is plain with respect to the individual external senses — for one apprehension belongs to sight, another to hearing, another to smell, taste, and touch; therefore one appetite belongs to sight, another to hearing, and so forth for the rest. Moreover, just as each thing participates in its own entity, so it has its own inclination, and consequently its own pleasure: sight thus inclines toward the beautiful visible thing, desires it, is pleased with it, and delights in it; therefore according to the multiplicity of senses, appetites are multiplied. Again, in matter there are as many appetites as there are forms to be received in it, as I said in the question on matter. Finally, in the rational soul, because there is one intellect, there is also in it one appetite, which is the will. It is concluded therefore that appetites are numbered in proportion to the number of senses.

First Objection, against the first assertion: Aristotle (*3. anima, T.29*) does not seem to distinguish the sensitive appetite from the cognitive power; therefore the contrary opinion contradicts the Peripatetic school. I reply that Aristotle does not establish a real distinction between the cognitive and appetitive power, but does establish a formal distinction, as I asserted above in the second part of the proposed Assertion.

Second Objection: Different offices and purposes argue for a real distinction between those whose offices and purposes are thus diversified; but the cognitive and appetitive powers exercise different offices and regard different ends, as is plain; therefore a real distinction is interposed between them. I reply that the major is to be understood of a formal distinction, not however of a real distinction — which the Thomists strive to introduce into those powers and faculties.

Article II. Whether the concupiscible appetite is distinguished from the irascible.

Gabriel (*3. dist.25 and 26. quest.1. art. 3. dub.1*), Suárez (*5. de anima, cap.4*), and Poncius (*disp.61. quast.2. concl.2*) think that the twofold appetite proposed at the beginning of this article differs only rationally — that is, with respect to diverse acts. Scotus, however (*3. distinct.34. quest. vn. §. Notandum sub G and in Report. ibid.*), and Thomas (*1. p. quest.81. art.2*) and the disciples of both, preceded by Plato (*4. de Report.*), Aristotle (*1. magnorum mor. cap. 13*), and Galen (*6. de usu partium, cap. 18*), think that between the concupiscible and irascible appetite there falls a real distinction.

Note and recall from what was said in book II of this work, question III, article IV: that the distinction of powers is gathered a posteriori and manifestly from distinct acts and objects; and that I showed above that the multiplicity of the external and internal senses is to be derived from the multiplicity and diversity of organs; and that the difference of material from immaterial powers consists in this, that the latter derive their origin from the soul alone — as is plain of the intellect and will proceeding from the rational soul — while the former proceed from the whole animated composite, and therefore persist when this composite persists and perish when it perishes. Furthermore, when the mind of any Doctor is expressed and clear through his words, it should not be pulled and twisted toward an alien and contrary sense, as the Doctor signals (*1. distinct 8. quest.5. §. De intentione C*). But it is plain in Scotus cited above that the concupiscible and irascible appetite are really distinguished — as Cavallius well saw (*disp.2. de anima, sect.7*). Therefore Poncius in the place cited undeservedly strives to draw Scotus to the opposite opinion, as he also does concerning the appetite, saying that according to Scotus there is only one appetite — whereas Scotus himself plainly and clearly teaches that appetites are multiplied in proportion to the multiplication of senses and cognitive powers. The arguments that Poncius adduces for himself, being of no weight and force, I am reluctant to report and refute — since truth, like light, drives away darkness, and the two cannot persist together at the same time. I therefore think that Poncius and Suárez as well either have not read Scotus, or if perhaps they have read him, have understood him badly.

Assertion: Between the concupiscible and irascible appetite there intervenes a real distinction. So Scotus in the place cited above. It is proved, first: where there are distinct organs, there are distinct organic powers, as is established from the external and internal senses, which acquire distinct organs; but in the sensitive part, the concupiscible and irascible have distinct organs. For the same thing cannot be moved simultaneously by different motions in the same organ. The pain of the concupiscible is with contraction, while the pleasure opposed to it is with dilation; but the pain of the irascible occurs with heating, because anger is an enkindling of the blood around the heart; therefore these two appetites are really distinguished. Second, what presupposes and what is presupposed really differ from one another — as three presupposes two, and those three that presuppose and those two that are presupposed are really distinguished from one another; but the irascible presupposes the concupiscible, and the object of the former presupposes the object of the latter. The same is also affirmed of the acts of each, as the Doctor excellently pursues in the place cited, saying:

"Whenever the irascible has its act, two dislikes are there: one of the concupiscible and another of the irascible. The disliked of the concupiscible is to lack food, from which disliking sadness follows in the concupiscible, which as it were recoils from the disliked but does not repel it. There is also another disliked there — namely that which takes away food — which pertains to the

irascible, not by a recoiling act but by a repulsive one. But while it is not actually repelled, there is sadness pertaining to the irascible." More in Scotus there. Again, if some good is desired by the concupiscible under the aspect of something impossible to obtain, there will be pain of the concupiscible, but not of the irascible — because from the second book of the Rhetoric: "No one is angry about what is impossible." Moreover, the object of the concupiscible is good absolutely; but the object of the irascible is the arduous good, which is offensive and to be avenged; therefore a real distinction stands between those two aforesaid sensitive appetites.

First Objection: The passions of both appetites are the same; therefore there is one and the same appetite, utterly undistinguished. The antecedent is proved from Cicero (4. 99. *Tuscul.*): "Hatred is inveterate anger." But hatred pertains to the concupiscible and anger to the irascible. Likewise from John of Damascus (2. *fidei*, c.16): "Anger consists of sadness." But it is plain that anger is attributed to the irascible and sadness to the concupiscible. I deny the antecedent. In proof of the antecedent I say that this is true causally but not formally — meaning that protracted anger causes hatred, yet is not formally hatred. Likewise anger causes sadness, namely when the angry person is unable to take vengeance on the one who offended.

You will say: in the one who loves, the blood seethes just as in the angry person; therefore love and anger are not diverse passions. I say that this happens in different ways. For the blood boils in the one who loves with sweetness and pleasure; but in the angry person, with bitterness and displeasure.

Second Objection: By the same weight and gravity, a stone falls downward and removes what prohibits and impedes, and by the same motion breaks a thread and seeks its center. Again, the same heat of fire heats water and resists cold. Furthermore, the same imaginative power apprehends good and evil; therefore the same appetite regards what is suitable and unsuitable, advantageous and harmful. I grant the antecedent, I deny the consequent. The reason is that the irascible internally struggles against the concupiscible, as is plain in the just, who restrain their concupiscences and are angry in containing and suppressing them. But the natural impulse of a stone and its inclination toward a downward place does not struggle against itself in the same way, with the same power driving off impediments. As for what is alleged about the imaginative power, I say that the concupiscible too is directed toward what is suitable and harmful; but not toward what is arduous and offensive, as the irascible is.

Third Objection: In the rational appetite, the concupiscible does not differ from the irascible; therefore neither does it in the sensitive appetite, since the reasoning seems the same in both cases. I grant the antecedent. I deny the consequent. The reason the Doctor offers (*pasfu alleg.H*) is that the sensitive appetite resides in the sensitive and corporeal part; but the rational appetite keeps its seat in the intellective and spiritual part, which is inorganic. Therefore

there is only one rational appetite, distinguished with respect to different offices — just as a portion is distinguished into a superior and inferior portion; and also the same intellect regards both principles and the conclusions drawn from them. Therefore, although there is one spiritual cognitive power, there are nonetheless many material cognitive powers, as is clear from the external and internal senses. For what is dispersed in inferiors is united in superiors.

You will ask which of the aforesaid appetites is to be preferred. Henry (*quol. S. quastion.15*) responds that the concupiscible excels the irascible, for the reason that the concupiscible is directed toward good absolutely, while the irascible is directed toward good in a qualified sense — insofar as it is useful and offensive. And the irascible exists for the sake of the concupiscible: for one is angry because a good is being removed from his concupiscible. Add further that the concupiscible is directed toward the end and the irascible toward the means to the end. Or say that the irascible surpasses the concupiscible in nobility, because the latter is prior and the former is posterior in generation. And those that are posterior in generation are in the same order more perfect, as is plain with the will, which is posterior in generation to the intellect and nobler than it. And moreover, the irascible tends toward the arduous good that is offensive — in which the brave and magnanimous especially shine — which the concupiscible does not, being common to brutes. Again, what are more common are reckoned less noble; but the concupiscible is more widely diffused than the irascible; therefore the latter seems to surpass the former. Finally, patience is the noblest fortitude, which resides in the irascible. The irascible therefore seems to be to be placed before the concupiscible.

Article III. In which part the sensitive appetite resides.

The Peripatetics together with their chief locate both appetites — the concupiscible and the irascible — in the heart, as the Coimbrans report from Vesalius (*disp.6. Eth. quast.2. art.2*). The leader of the physicians, Galen (*de locis affectis lib.3*), thinks that the concupiscible appetite has its seat in the liver and the irascible in the heart. Some more recent thinkers — such as Hurtado (*disp.17. Sect.12*) and Arriaga (*disp.5. sect.4*) — place the appetite, both concupiscible and irascible, in the brain. The Scotists, however, who with Scotus (*3 dist. 34.quast.un*) hold that there are as many appetites as there are senses, consequently assert that the aforesaid appetites exist wherever the senses exist.

Assertion: Both appetites enumerated above are to be located in the brain. This does not conflict with Scotus in the place cited above, and it is easily deduced and shown from what has been said and asserted above. For in question X of this book, article III, the senses reside in the brain; therefore so do their appetites. The consequent holds because from the first article of this question, senses and appetites do not really differ from one another but only formally. And what differs formally are inseparable and occupy the same place; therefore since the sense remains in the brain, so too do its appetites. Furthermore, the free and

rational appetite, which is the will, does not acquire a different location from the intellect — for both remain in the same rational soul; therefore the same must be asserted of the sensitive appetite, inasmuch as it is not separated in place from the sense, of which it is the appetite. Again, the natural appetite, suited also to inanimate things, is not separated in place from the thing of which it is the appetite — as is plain from the appetite of a stone for its center, which follows the stone wherever it is; therefore the same must be affirmed of the sensitive appetite, which follows and accompanies the sense of which it is the appetite.

First Objection: From sacred Scripture, Deuteronomy VI: "You shall love the Lord your God with your whole heart" — from which and similar passages, such as Matthew XV: "Out of the heart proceed evil thoughts," etc., it is not obscurely deduced that the sensitive appetite resides in the heart. I reply with Lyra in his postilla that those testimonies must be interpreted of the spiritual heart, which is the will — the root and cause of love and hatred, of merit and demerit — and not of the material heart, as the adversaries contend, in which they place the sensitive appetite.

Second Objection: The heart is the principle and source of life; therefore in it the sensitive appetite must be located. I grant the antecedent. I deny the consequent. For although from what has been said the heart is the origin of life and of the vital spirits, it is not however the origin of the animal spirits and sensations, of which the brain is the root and origin.

Third Objection: Certain passions — such as joy and sadness, love and hatred — are attributed to the heart; therefore the sensitive appetite does not depart from the location of the heart. I grant the antecedent. I deny the consequent. For although the heart has such passions, it does not have the other passions that belong to the other parts of the animal. Therefore the heart indeed enjoys its own appetite, but not that appetite which is adapted to the sense. For I showed above that each thing enjoys its own appetite.

Book V. On the Rational Soul.

Having treated of the vegetative and sensitive souls, it remains to discuss the intellective soul, its powers, faculties, and acts, through the following questions and the next articles. Five questions are treated in this book. The first concerns the nature of the rational soul. The second concerns its intellect. The third concerns the will. The fourth concerns the motive power. And the fifth concerns the state of the separated soul.

Question I. On the Nature of the Rational Soul.

Article I. Whether the Rational Soul Is Created.

The origin of the rational soul is arduous and hidden in the sight of God, so much so that St. Augustine, great in genius, remains undecided about it (*10. de Genesi ad lit.*, cap. 23) and in his *Retractations* frankly confesses that he does not know its principle. Perhaps with an eye to this, St. Bernard, cited by Alphonsus (*lib. 2 adversus haereses, verbo Anima*), adds: "From my own self I know that God is incomprehensible, because I do not comprehend myself." Since, then, the soul is so difficult to know, innumerable errors have arisen, both among pagans and among Christians, some of which Augustine recounts (*3. de lib. arb.*, cap. 21), and others are named by the aforesaid Alphonsus de Castro. I shall bring forward and set out only four. The first is that of those who hold that the rational soul is a certain particle of the divine essence. The second is that of those who think the rational soul is propagated by traduction — that is, by seminal power — in the same manner as other souls are produced. The third is that of Avicenna, who, according to Scotus (*4. dist. ..., quest. 1*), holds that the rational soul was created by an angel. The fourth is that of Origen (*1. Periarchon*, cap. 7), of Plato in the *Timaeus*, and of others whom Augustine cites (*11. de Civit.*, cap. 23), who suspect that all souls were created from the beginning of the world, that they sinned by withdrawing from their Creator, and that by various degrees of progress, corresponding to the diversity of their sins, they deserved various bodies — as though fetters — ranging from the heavens down to the earth. The Catholic Faith, however, teaches that the rational soul was produced by God from nothing.

First Assertion: The rational soul was not produced from the substance of the divine essence. So holds Scotus (*2. dist. 17, quest. 1, §. Responsio A.* and in *Report. ibid.*), St. Bonaventure, Richard, and other Scholastics in the same place, preceded by Augustine (*7. de gen. ad lit.*, cap. 2; *lib. 2. de genes. contra Manich.*, cap. 11; and *1. de vera Religione*, cap. 9). It is proved, first, from sacred scripture: Genesis 1, "Let us make man in our image and likeness." This image of God resides in the soul, specifically in intellect, will, and memory, as Lyranus interprets in that place. If, therefore, the soul was made by God, the act of making cannot fall upon God, nor can change, since God himself is incapable of being made and immutable: Malachi 3, "I am God and I do not change." Therefore the soul does not come from God's substance. And in chapter 2 of the same book: "He breathed into his face the breath of life." On this point Chrysostom (*hom. 11. in Gen.*) and Eucherius (*1. in Genesin*) explain that the breath which God breathed into the face of man is the soul of that man, and therefore that soul is not from the substance of God. For just as the breath that comes from a man's mouth is not from the substance of the man himself but from the surrounding air, so the soul proceeding from God as a breath is not from God's own substance. Augustine adds (*1. contra adversarium legis et prophetarum*, cap. 14): "That breath of God which animated man was made by him, not from him, because neither is a man's breath a part of the man, nor does the man make it from himself, but from air inhaled and exhaled."

Second, from the Council of Braga I, cap. 1, in which the aforesaid error was condemned in these words: "If anyone believes that human souls or angels have come forth from the substance of God, as Manichaeus and Priscillianus said, let him be anathema." Leo I likewise decreed this (*Epist. 71, cap. 5*).

Third, the divine essence is indivisible and impartible, since it is spiritual and supremely simple, utterly devoid of all composition, as I demonstrated in the Tract on the One God (*disp. 1*). Therefore the rational soul cannot be a particle of the divine substance.

Fourth, if the rational soul were produced from the divine substance, it would be produced from it either as from matter or as from form. But both modes are incompatible with the divine essence, since matter and form have partial and incomplete being, whereas the divine essence is most perfect and utterly absolute.

Fifth, the properties of the divine essence would belong to the rational soul, and so the rational soul itself would be infinite, omnipotent, blessed, and the like. Conversely, the attributes and characteristics of the rational soul would belong to the divine substance, and so it would be capable of merit and demerit, happiness and damnation, and the like — all of which are impossible and offensive to pious ears.

Second Assertion: The rational soul was produced neither from a seminal reason nor by an angel, but immediately by God from nothing. The assertion has three parts, which Scotus suggests in the works cited above. The first part is proved, first, from St. Augustine in a book of the New Testament: "I think it improper to say that the soul is generated from the body, so that the soul should be born from a soul." And in the book on the Ecclesiastical Dogmas he adds: "Souls are not sown together with bodies." Second, the corporeal and material cannot produce the spiritual and immaterial. The seminal reason, however, is corporeal and material, while the rational soul is spiritual and immaterial, according to Luke 23: "Into your hands, Lord, I commend my spirit." Augustine also teaches this (*2. Trin. 8* and *lib. 83. 99 quaest. 1*). Therefore the rational soul does not come about by traduction and propagation. Moreover, the incorruptible does not come from the corruptible, nor the immortal from the mortal. But the rational soul is incorruptible and immortal, while the seed is corruptible, as is its power. Furthermore, the form that comes to be together with a natural composite is corrupted when that composite is corrupted. But the rational soul persists and stands on its own when separated from the composite and does not perish when the composite perishes. Therefore the rational soul is not produced by traduction and propagation.

The second part has been shown and proved in Book I on the World, question 3, articles 5 and 6, where I demonstrated that no creature, whether spiritual or material, is capable of creating anything as a principal or instrumental cause.

Since, then, the angel is a creature, it consequently cannot bring about the creation of a rational soul. The chief reason is that to create anything requires an agent independent of all else, whereas a creature — whether an intelligence or anything else — is dependent; therefore it cannot be the creative cause of anything.

The third part is argued, first, from the sacred text: Isaiah 27, "Every breath I have made." The reference there is to the spiritual breath, which is the rational soul, concerning which Genesis reads: "He breathed the breath of life into his face." If, then, God alone produced it, not from something — as is said of the body, which he formed from the slime of the earth — then it is from nothing. Ecclesiastes 12: "The dust shall return to its earth as it was, and the spirit shall return to its Lord who gave it" — supplementing: through production from nothing. Hence Wisdom 2 adds: "We were born from nothing." Second, from Augustine (*lib. 1. contra Adversarium legis et Prophetarum, cap. 15* and *lib. de spiritu et anima*), who offers these words: "The soul is not an element, nor is it made from elements, but is made from nothing, and is known to its Creator alone." He writes the same in the epistle to Optatus and in (*1. 83. 99 quaest. 1*). Jerome agrees (*in cap. 12. Zachar.*), as do other Fathers and Scholastic Doctors in the same place (*2. dist. 7*). Nor does Aristotle seem to dissent (*2. de gener. animalium, cap. 3*) when he says: "The mind comes from without." The Council of the Lateran, the Clementine on the highest Trinity and the Catholic Faith, also give their support: "God from the beginning created both kinds of creature from nothing, the corporeal and the spiritual, the angelic and the worldly, and then the human, constituted as though common, from spirit and body."

Third, whatever is produced is either drawn out from the potency of matter or is created. But the rational soul is not drawn out from the potency of matter; therefore it is created. The major premise is evident from a sufficient enumeration of the parts. The minor is shown as follows: to be drawn out from the potency of matter, as stated elsewhere, means nothing other than to depend in its coming-to-be and in its being upon matter. But the intellective soul depends neither in its coming-to-be nor in its being upon matter, since it is of such a nature that, separated from matter itself, it can exist and subsist on its own. Finally, the manner of operation reflects the manner of being. Now the rational soul operates independently of matter: it understands and wills without matter, as is evident in the state of separation. Therefore it was produced from nothing.

Nor should one omit the fitting argument of the Seraphic Doctor just mentioned, reasoning as follows: the soul is the image of God tending toward God as its ultimate end, in whose clear vision and enjoyment it is to be beatified, and whom it is bound to love with its whole heart. Therefore it proceeds immediately from God himself and is created from nothing.

Third Assertion: The rational soul is infused by God into the body at the very instant when the body is duly prepared and organized, such that it never existed before its organization. This is indicated by the Doctor in the place cited above, and the opposite position is listed among heresies by the aforesaid Alphonsus and by Augustine (*lib. haeresium, cap. 70*). It is proved, first, from Leo I in his epistle (*92. to the bishop of Asturica*), who decrees as follows: "We consistently and truthfully preach that the rational soul did not exist before it was united to the body." Damascene (*2. fidei, cap. 12*), Nyssenius (*lib. de homine, cap. 29*), and other orthodox Doctors agree. Second, between the efficient and formal cause there is this principal difference: the former can exist prior to any effect, as is evident from God, who existed from eternity without any creature produced from eternity; the latter, however, cannot exist without its formal effect, as is clear from natural and material forms. Now the rational soul is a form that informs, as will be said in the following article. Therefore it did not exist before the body from the beginning of the world, but is created by God simultaneously with the body when it is suitably organized. Furthermore, the works of God are perfect (*Deut. 32*). But the soul, while it is not actually informing a body, is imperfect, because it is a part. Therefore it was not created before the body.

Again, if the soul had been created from the beginning of the world, since it possesses intellect and memory, it would now recall that state. For it is impossible, as established in (*1. post., c. 2*), that habits should exist in us and yet be hidden from us. Since, however, the soul retains no memory of such a state, it was in no way present at that time. Moreover, if it had been created then, it would have had the same powers it now participates in, and since powers are not in vain, it would have acted and performed good or evil works through those powers. But this conflicts with Romans 9, where it is explicitly said of Esau and Jacob: "For the children being not yet born, neither having done any good or evil, that the purpose of God according to election might stand, not of works, but of him that calleth." There is also the definition of the Council of Braga I, cap. 6, which decrees: "If anyone says that human souls sinned previously in a celestial dwelling and that for this reason they were cast down into human bodies on earth, as Priscillianus said, let him be anathema."

Objection I. It is written in Genesis 2 that God rested from all the work which he had accomplished, over six continuous days. Therefore God creates nothing further, and accordingly every soul is presupposed to have been created before God rested from the work he had completed from the beginning of the world. I respond with St. Jerome and Lyranus that this passage is to be understood as referring to new kinds and species of things, which God creates no further beyond those he established at the beginning of the world. That God still operates in the world, however, is established from John 5: "My Father works even until now, and I work." And I showed this at length in the Book on Causes.

Objection II, pressed further. Job 40: "Behold Behemoth, whom I made with you." By Behemoth, however, Lyranus understands the Demon in his postilla on that place. And Job is said to have been made simultaneously with the Demon. But the Demon was created at the beginning of the world. Therefore the soul of Job too. And what is said of the soul of Job must be affirmed equally of all other souls, and therefore human souls were created at the beginning of the world simultaneously with the angels and the heavens. I say that "with you" is not to be taken in the sense of association and simultaneous temporal origination, but with respect to similarity in intellectual nature, inasmuch as the soul of Job and all other human souls share in intellectual nature, even as the angels do. This is how Lyranus interprets it, with whom Gabriel agrees (*2. dist. 17, quest. 1, art. 3, near the end*). A fitting reason is also offered as to why souls ought not to have been created simultaneously with the angels and the heavens: the latter receive a perfect nature, whereas souls receive an imperfect and partial nature, tending by their own nature toward the body as their counterpart, and from both together one complete and perfect human nature is constituted. Since the human body is produced through the generation of parents, God accordingly creates the soul when the body is suitably organized, and infuses it into that body, from which union man arises.

Objection II. A man, like every other animal, is generated by means of a seminal reason. But the soul of a brute is not created from nothing. Therefore neither is the soul of a man. I distinguish the major premise: with respect to the production of the body, I grant it; with respect to the production of the soul, I deny it.

Objection pressed further. The composite and the form of the composite are produced by the same act of production, since the form is not produced except because the composite is produced (*7. Met. T. 22*), and especially because matter does not come to be, nor does form come to be, but only the composite comes to be (*1. Phys. T. 64*). But man is not created; he is generated. Therefore his soul likewise is not created. I say that the objection holds for a form that is drawn out from the potency of matter, but not for a form that is introduced into matter, as is the rational soul, which is produced by a distinct act of production separate from the production of the composite.

Objection pressed yet further. If the rational soul is produced by a distinct act of production from that of the composite, it would be produced before the composite, since a part is prior to the whole. But it was asserted above that the soul does not precede the composite, nor exist prior to it. I say that it precedes not in time but only by nature, which is sufficient to preserve everything that has been set forth above.

Article II. Whether the Rational Soul Is an Informing or an Assisting Form.

Averroes (*de anima*, com. 5) imagines that the rational soul is a single form assisting all people, and tries to show that Aristotle holds the same view, as may be seen at length and with learning in Aureolus (2. *dist.* 16, *quest.* 1, *art.* 1), who treats it at length; and Scotus touches on it (2. *dist.* 3, *question* 6, §. *Ista positio ante B.*), calling it a fiction of that cursed Averroes. And Alphonsus (*lib.* 2. *adversus haereses*, *verbo Anima*) says it is the error and heresy of a certain Peter John. No less serious appears to be the error of Pythagoras and his disciples who posited Metempsychosis — that is, the transmigration of souls from one body into another body. Plato gives this view his support in the *Timaeus* and in the last book of the *Republic*, according to Augustine (10. *Civit.*, c. 30 and *serm.* 139. *de tempore*), where he refutes that opinion, and (11. *de gen. ad lit.*, cap. 29) calls it ridiculous and harmful. And Alphonsus, cited above, includes it among the heresies of the Albigensians in heresy 8. The true and Catholic doctrine is that of Scotus (4. *d.* 43, *quest.* 2, §. *Respondeo A.* and 2. *dist.* 17, *quest.* 1), St. Bonaventure (*ibid.* *dist.* 18, *art.* 2, *quest.* 1), Richard (*dist.* 17, *art.* 1, *quest.* 3), Aureolus, and others, teaching that rational souls are multiplied in correspondence with the multiplication of human bodies, that one soul does not migrate from body to body, and that the soul is a true informing form.

Note I, and recall from what was said in Book II, Physics, question on Form, that form is divided into two kinds: assisting and informing. The assisting form is that which assists and directs something, as a charioteer directs a chariot and a sailor directs a ship. The informing form is that which gives being to a thing — its specific, quidditative, and essential being — by reason of which one thing differs from another in species, as a dog from a lion and a plant from a tree.

Note II. Aristotle indeed asserts that certain informing forms are mortal and corruptible, as experience shows through the perennial generation and corruption of sublunary living things, vegetating and sensing, which we observe daily now arising and now perishing. But whether the same holds for the rational soul is a matter of doubt, as I shall show below. We may, however, set forward and distinguish three propositions: the first is that the rational soul is an informing form; the second is that the rational soul is non-organic and incorporeal; the third is that the rational soul in itself and by reason of its own nature and essence is incorruptible and immortal. Concerning the first two Aristotle does not seem to be in doubt, as will appear from the arguments we shall adduce to prove and confirm the next assertions. Concerning the third, the same Philosopher was undecided. For this reason, following various and differing principles, he spoke variously and in differing ways, as will appear from what is said below.

First Assertion: There is not one rational soul assisting all and each of the members of mankind; rather there are as many individual human souls as there are individual and particular men, and one soul does not migrate from body to body. This is suggested by the Doctor in the passages cited above and is

forcefully defended by the Seraphic Doctor just cited, who calls the opposing view false, heretical, and most pernicious.

The first part is proved as follows. Every man has his own soul, by which he is a man and this man, distinct from all others. Therefore there is not one soul common to all men and assisting them all. The antecedent is shown: man is a species that is predicated in the what-sense of many individuals differing in number, which are its singular and individual instances. But each singular and individual instance participates in a complete singular and individual nature, which in animate beings consists of body and soul. Therefore each man has his own soul, just as he has his own human body, and accordingly there is not one common soul assisting all.

Second, one soul exercises its actions and operations through its own powers and faculties. But it is evident from the individual instances of human nature that various, diverse, and mutually opposed actions and operations proceed simultaneously — as is apparent daily in business, letters, arms, and the like. Therefore, in proportion to the number of human individuals, just so are human souls numbered.

Third, if there were one soul assisting all men, then since only the soul is capable of knowledge, either all men would be learned and educated, if that soul enjoyed knowledge and learning, or all would be ignorant and unknowing, if that soul were devoid of knowledge and learning. Likewise, since good and evil, merit and demerit, beatitude and misery, glory and punishment are derived from the will of the soul, all would be good, blessed, and glorious according to the goodness, blessedness, and glory of that soul; and conversely, evil, miserable, and unhappy according to the wickedness, misery, and unhappiness of that same soul. But these and similar consequences conflict with truth, and most especially with orthodox faith. The Fourth Lateran Council under Leo X, session 8, adds in these words: "We condemn and reprobate all who assert that the intellective soul is one and the same in all men."

Furthermore, the assisting form only moves and directs the thing it assists; it does not cause vegetative, sensitive, and intellective functions in it, as is evident from the charioteer, the sailor, and the angel moving the heavens. For the chariot, the ship, and the heavens do not vegetate, sense, and understand, as a man vegetates, senses, and understands by having a rational soul. Therefore there is plain and evident indication that the soul of man is not an assisting form, nor one that is the same in all.

The second part is proved, first, from Augustine (*1. 2. de Symbolo ad catechumenos, cap. 9, Tom. 9 of his works*), who offers these words: "Certain persons have introduced the view that souls are assigned to bodies according to merits, and that there are revolutions and cycles, which David reproaches in Psalm 11: 'The wicked walk in circles.' Those who believe such things are wicked." Second, if a

soul were to pass from one body to another, it would recall that passage and that state, and would recount what it did in that state and during that transition, just as St. Paul did (*1 Cor. 12*) when he was caught up to the third heaven and heard secret words which it is not lawful for a man to utter. And Aristotle (*1. post., cap. 2, T. 5*), refuting the view that knowledge arises through recollection, adds that it is impossible for habits existing in us to be hidden from us. If, then, a soul remained in one body and afterward migrated to another body, it would plainly recall that state and the deeds it performed there, as well as that migration. But since no recollection whatsoever is had of these things, it is plainly shown that such a transmigration of souls is empty and void.

Third, according to orthodox teaching, when a man dies, his soul is at its terminus: either it flies to heaven, or it is led below to be purged in purgatory, or for its demerits it is punished with eternal torment in hell. It is therefore a fiction and a dream to believe in the aforesaid transmigration of souls.

Second Assertion: The rational soul is an informing form. Handed down by the Doctor in the places cited. It is proved, first, from the Council of Vienne under Clement V, on the highest Trinity and the Catholic faith, chapter unicum, in these words: "We condemn as erroneous and hostile to the truth of the Catholic faith, upon the approval of the aforesaid holy Council, any doctrine rashly asserting or calling into doubt that the substance of the rational or intellective soul is not truly and essentially the form of the human body." The Fourth Lateran Council under Leo X defines the same. From Aristotle (*2. de anima, cap. 1, T. 6*): "The soul is the first act of an organic body." By "act" is understood "form," for this saying is on everyone's lips: from act and potency a whole is made, that is, from matter and form a composite is made. Under that definition of the soul the rational soul is comprehended, which is truly a soul and the most noble of all souls. This is most evident from the second definition of the soul given there (*cap. 2, T. 24*): "The soul is the principle by which we live, sense, move, and understand." Therefore, since the other souls are, according to Aristotle and in truth, informing forms, the rational soul is likewise an informing form.

Third, form is defined by all as that which gives being to a thing, actuates matter, determines, specifies, and perfects it. But the rational soul gives to man his being as a living, sensing, and understanding thing. For by it man lives, senses, and understands, and is distinguished from everything that is not a man. Therefore it is his informing form.

Fourth, every man, and any man whatsoever, is master of his own acts, so that it is within his power to will, or not to will, or to decline to will. But if the rational soul were not an informing form, man would be in no way master of his own acts, as is plain in the case of a chariot, whose assisting form is the charioteer, and the heaven, whose assisting form is the angel assigned to it by God.

Objection I. Aristotle (*2. de generatione animalium, cap. 3*) openly writes that the soul arrives at the body from outside and from without. Therefore it is an assisting form, not an informing one. I respond that Aristotle is to be understood as saying that the rational soul is not drawn out from the potency of matter, as other forms and souls are, but is introduced and infused into the body — which is the same as being created by God, as orthodox faith teaches us.

Objection pressed further. The same Philosopher says (*1. de anima, T. 92*) that one cannot imagine which part of the body the soul occupies. Therefore it does not inform the body but only assists it. I say that the aforesaid Philosopher is there only indicating that the soul is not confined to any part of the body, but is whole in the whole body and whole in each part of the body, as I have asserted elsewhere.

Objection pressed yet further. From (*3. animae, T. 4 and 6*): the intellect is unmixed and separated from matter. Therefore the soul is an assisting form. I say this is to be understood not with respect to being but with respect to operation — that is to say, the intellect operates without matter, since it is immaterial and purely spiritual.

Objection II. Ferchius (*1. 4 defens., c. 4, n. 42*) maintains and argues from (*1. anima, T. 63, 65*) that Aristotle posits a circulation of rational souls. Therefore Aristotle does not contradict Pythagoras regarding the transmigration of souls from one body to another. I respond that nothing is found in those texts that favors the Pythagorean error. Therefore, with equal facility as those passages are adduced by Ferchius, they are refuted.

Objection III. The spiritual cannot be the form of a material being, since the former cannot be extended to the extension of the latter, as it is indivisible and inextensible. But the rational soul is spiritual and immaterial. Therefore it cannot be the informing form of the human body, which is material and organic. I deny the major premise. Nothing prevents a spiritual form from informing a body that is material, just as there is no incompatibility in spiritual accidents being received in a material and corporeal subject.

Objection pressed further. An angel, which is spiritual, cannot inform matter. Therefore neither can the rational soul, since the reasoning is equally applicable to both. Scotus responds (*Quol. 9*) that there is a disparity: the angel is complete and perfect in its entity and nature, whereas the rational soul is incomplete and imperfect and is a part of the human species. For this reason the soul can inform matter and perfect the human body, from which together with the soul a man coalesces as a complete and perfect species.

Article III. Whether the Rational Soul Is Immortal.

The Sadducees, Epicureans, and not a few others, whom Alphonsus refutes (*lib. 2. adversus haereses, haeresi 7*), make the rational soul perishable and mortal. Lucretius agrees with them, according to Augustine (*lib. de utilitate credendi, ad*

Honoratum, cap. 4), and Pliny (7. *hist. naturalis*, cap. 55). Nor does Galen seem to depart far from this view in the book entitled *That the Morals of the Soul Follow the Temperament of the Body* (cap. 3. 4), where he considers the soul to be the temperament of the four primary qualities, which is dissoluble and corruptible. The remaining Philosophers, in the Academy, in the Lyceum, and in the other schools, teach the incorruptibility and immortality of the rational soul, which is one of the chief foundations and pillars of orthodox faith and Christian religion.

Note that immortality can be understood in three ways. First, as meaning complete immutability and perfect necessity, in which sense St. Paul, speaking of God (1 *Tim.*, last chapter), says: "Who alone has immortality" — that is, according to Augustine's interpretation (*Tract. 23 in Ioan.*), who alone has immutability, because he alone has true eternity. Hence God alone is immutable and supremely necessary, while all other things are mutable and contingent, for they subsist and are conserved solely by the will of God and his sustaining power. Second, immortality means that which lacks the principle of corruption and mortality, namely matter with the privation annexed to it. In this sense, things that are separated from matter — such as an angel and the rational soul — are incorruptible and immortal. Third, immortality means that which by its own inherence and assistance renders something incorruptible and immortal; in this sense Adam, had he remained in the state of innocence, would have been incorruptible and immortal by means of original justice bestowed upon him by God.

Assertion: The rational soul is immortal. It is proved, first, from sacred scripture. Ecclesiastes 12: "Man shall go to his eternal home." Wisdom 11: "God created man inexterminated, and made him in the image of his own likeness." The image of God in man, however, is placed not in the body but in the soul. Since, then, man is inexterminated with respect to the soul, it plainly follows that the soul itself is incorruptible and immortal. Matthew 10: "Do not be afraid of those who kill the body, but cannot kill the soul." And John 10: "He who hates his soul in this world preserves it for eternal life." From these and other testimonies of scripture, the immortality of the human soul is clearly and openly established.

Second, it is defined in the Third Lateran Council, session 8, which reads: "We condemn and reprobate all who assert that the intellective soul is mortal and call this into doubt, since it not only truly, essentially, and per se exists as the form of the human body, but is also immortal, as is manifestly evident from the Gospel."

Third, from the Fathers: Augustine, who composed a book on the immortality of the soul; Nazianzus (*lib. de anima*); the Nicene Father (*orat. catech.*); Gregory (4. *Dialog.*, c. 45); and all the rest, unanimously teaching the immortality of the rational soul. All Theologians and Scholastic Doctors subscribe to this. All Philosophers agree; all Poets, all peoples and nations under heaven, with one

mouth and voice proclaim the immortality of the soul. Hence the Complutensians (*disp. 16. de anima, q. 2, §. 2*) consider this universal and unanimous consent of all to be the voice of nature, clearly and plainly proclaiming the immortality of the soul, such that it is naturally and evidently demonstrated. This, to be sure, urges and presses the point, but it does not demonstrate and compel. Therefore not everyone assents and agrees; indeed many dissent and resist, as I noted at the beginning of this article and will become yet more apparent below.

Objection pressed further. St. Chrysostom (*hom. 4. de providentia*) explicitly says: "One who doubts the immortality of the soul might also doubt whether midday is daytime." Therefore, according to Chrysostom, it is known and evident that the soul is immortal. I say that he is speaking there to the faithful, for whom the soul's immortality is made known and manifestly established not by natural and demonstrative reason but by sacred Scripture and most especially the Gospel, as the aforesaid Third Lateran Council decrees. And Augustine noted beforehand (*13. Trin., cap. 9*) that immortality is known not through reason but through the Gospel, as Christ teaches in Matthew 10: "Do not be afraid of those who kill the body, but cannot kill the soul."

Fourth, in every well-ordered state a judge and governor is established who bestows rewards upon the good and just and punishes the evil and unjust. But the world is like an admirably disposed and most rightly ordered state, in which there exist the good and the evil, the just and the unjust. The former, however, are for the most part afflicted and oppressed, while the latter prosper, rejoice, and fare well. Hence Jeremiah 12, weeping, says: "Why does the way of the wicked prosper? Why do all those fare well who transgress and act unjustly?" Therefore there must be God as ruler and governor, a just judge and equitable rewarder of all the good and evil, who after death assigns to each the rewards fitting to their merits. And this would not come about unless the soul were immortal, since these things occur in the present life; otherwise God would be accused of injustice, as if punishing the just and rewarding the impious.

This argument is indeed pressing, but it is not compelling. For someone might come forward and say that it is not demonstrated that God is the ruler of the universe, the present or future rewarder of good and evil. For God is not bound and constrained to offer and repay this or that, since he is absolutely no one's debtor and can make vessels for honor and for dishonor according to his own pleasure, without any injustice. Add that some think God necessarily acts outwardly and remove divine care and providence from sublunary things — an opinion they would not hold if it were shown by evident reason that God is the ruler and governor of the world and the rewarder of all things according to the laws of distributive and punitive justice. But if what the argument intends is conceded, one must respond that virtue and justice carry with them their own good and reward, since their beauty and pleasure are so great that, as Cicero

testifies, if they could be seen with the eyes they would move all to love them. Evil and sin, however, carry their own punishment and torment on account of their ugliness and baseness, for it is as a worm gnawing at the bowels of the sinner. Hence Augustine adds (*1. Conf. 12*): "You have commanded it, Lord, and so it is, that every disordered soul is its own punishment." And David had already experienced this (*Psalms 90*), saying: "My sin is always before me" — on which Lyranus comments: "It is horrible to me, like an adversary standing continually against me in my presence."

Objection pressed further. St. Chrysostom, cited by the Complutensians and the Conimbricenses, writes: "Just as it is known that God is just, so it is evident that the soul is immortal." And Clement, in the third book of *Recognitions*, testifies that he learned this truth from St. Peter. I say that these Fathers are to be interpreted with the presupposition of faith: for the immortality of the soul is known from sacred writings, especially from the Gospel, as the Lateran Council declares in these words: "It is manifestly evident from the Gospel." The Council of Vienne under Clement V confirms this, and Augustine supports it (*epist. 3. ad Volusianum*), saying: "Who is there now so extremely ignorant, or what woman, who does not believe in the immortality of the soul and in the life to come after death?" Note here the word "believe," which pertains to faith, not to knowledge. All the more so because faith and knowledge of the same thing cannot coexist simultaneously, since the former is obscure and enigmatic while the latter is clear and evident. Moreover, the aforesaid Conimbricenses (*art. 5*) themselves assert that this proposition concerning the immortality of the soul is a matter of faith, as indeed it is. Therefore it is not demonstrated, since through demonstration one obtains knowledge; otherwise, concerning the same thing there would be simultaneously faith and knowledge, which involves a contradiction.

Nor does it help to say that this is not contradictory, because concerning God one simultaneously has both knowledge and faith — for we believe that God exists and demonstrate that God exists from effect. Therefore, it is not contradictory that immortality of the soul be acquired both by faith and by knowledge. Indeed, one who acquires knowledge that God exists does not simultaneously have knowledge and faith concerning the very existence of God, but only knowledge, as I showed in the *Summa Theologica*, Tract on the One God (*disp. 1*) — just as one who saw Christ crucified did not have faith concerning that crucified one. So too one who demonstrates that God exists has not faith but knowledge of him as existing. Likewise, if the immortality of the soul is properly known, it is not simultaneously believed. Now the said Authors assert that it is believed. Therefore it is not demonstrated and known through a necessary and evident middle, as properly speaking knowledge requires.

Fifth argument: A per se subsisting and spiritual form is incorruptible and immortal. But the rational soul is such. Therefore it is incorruptible and

immortal. I distinguish the major premise: concerning a complete and perfect form subsisting with total and complete subsistence, as an angel, I grant it; concerning a partial form subsisting with partial and incomplete subsistence, as is the rational soul, which is a part of the body and which together with the body constitutes the composite that is man, I deny it. For the point to be proved is precisely that a partial form can exist and subsist on its own without the body and endure and live forever.

Objection pressed further. A form that is unmixed and separable from matter is incorruptible and immortal, since corruption and mortality arise from matter with the privation annexed to it (*1. Phys. T. 51*). But the rational soul is separable from matter and from all else, just as the eternal is from the corruptible (*2. animae, T. 21*). Therefore by its own nature it is incorruptible and immortal. I say the major premise holds of a form that is separable from matter with respect to both being and operation; but not of one that is separable only with respect to operation, as is the rational soul, whose intellect in understanding does not depend on the body as sight depends on the organ. This is how Aristotle is to be interpreted, as appears from the same (*1. de anima, T. 66*): "The intellect is corrupted in us when something interior is corrupted." But more on the mind of Aristotle below. One may also say that the human intellect in its operation depends on the body and the sense, according to the Philosophers' axiom that nothing is in the intellect that was not first in the sense. For all our cognition and understanding takes its origin from the senses. Therefore our intellect depends on the body in both being and operation.

Sixth argument: A natural appetite and desire is not in vain and superfluous (*1. caeli, T. 32; 3. animae, T. 46*). But man naturally desires to exist and live always. For this reason, to the extent he can, he flees death, with an eye to which St. Paul perhaps adds: "We do not wish to be unclothed, but to be further clothed" (*2 Cor. 5*). Therefore the soul is immortal, since such a desire for eternal life is made known to us naturally. This is corroborated by the fact that man by his own nature desires happiness (*1. Eth., c. 17*), and it is evident that happiness is everlasting. Therefore the soul is equally immortal.

It is possible to reply that this argument is insufficient and ineffective, since it is not evident, nor is it evidently proved, that always existing and living belongs to man. Indeed the opposite is observed, for man is seen to grow old, to be corrupted little by little, and at last to die. But when the whole is corrupted, the parts must necessarily be corrupted. Therefore, although man may desire to live always, nevertheless everlasting life is not possible for him, nor can it be necessarily proved to belong to him — just as a brute avoids death and flees what causes its death, even though it is subject to corruption and death. Therefore the immortality of the soul is not necessarily shown from appetite, whether innate — which is a natural inclination to the preservation of life — or elicited — which can be directed toward something impossible apprehended as

good and fitting, and toward something erroneous if there is delusion in the apprehension and pursuit of what is desired and sought after.

Objection pressed further. The natural appetite is upright and good, since nature always tends toward the good. Hence that saying: no one looking to evil acts, but rather turns from evil and does good. If, then, someone proposes perpetual life to himself, he desires and pursues it with a natural appetite not leading to the impossible or to what contradicts and opposes itself. I say that one who desires something with an elicited appetite must first consider whether that thing can come to be or not — otherwise it will be the appetite of one who errs and is foolish. But an everlasting life of man is impossible, as is established by experience concerning all and each of the men who are born, live, and afterward die. To the inference, it is said that the natural felicity acknowledged by Philosophers is not everlasting, since some place it in goods of the body, some in goods of fortune, and others in goods of the soul, all of which decline and come to an end, as I showed in Moral Philosophy. But supernatural beatitude, which consists in the clear vision and enjoyment of God, is known to us by faith, not demonstrated.

Seventh argument: From its operation the form is argued and recognized, since form is active and matter passive. But the operation of the rational soul is intellection not only of singulars but also of universals. For it understands principles, transcendental and predicamental terms, real and rational beings, their combinations; it reasons from what is known to what is unknown; from principles and premises it draws conclusions; it syllogizes both demonstratively and dialectically; it knows that it knows and understands that it understands. These and similar acts distinguish the rational soul itself from the vegetative and sensitive souls, which only perceive material singulars, and render it like to God and the angel. Therefore, just as God and the angel, endowed with intellect and intellection, are immaterial and immortal, so too the soul. This argument is considered by many to be demonstrative and irrefutable, but it seems to Scotus and his disciples to be soluble and dialectical. For God and the angel are independent of matter in both being and operation, whereas the human soul is not — according to that passage (3. *de anima*, T. 30): "One who understands must contemplate phantasms." For it is the informing form of man, attached to the senses, which are the first guides of our cognition, and therefore dependent on the body.

Objection. Scotus (*Quol. 9, art. 2, near the end*) demonstrates from intellection, which is the operation of the rational soul, its immateriality and immortality, and adds that it is a common middle term for showing the immateriality and immortality of both the angel and the soul. Therefore, say the Conimbricenses, by natural demonstrative reason — even according to Scotus — the immortality of the soul is proved. I say that in that place Scotus only shows that the receiving subject of intellection, which is a spiritual action, is the intellective soul, which is

spiritual, and that from intellection, which is an immaterial operation, the immateriality of the soul is argued. But the same Doctor there does not say that the immortality of the soul is proved necessarily and by a demonstrative middle, as the Conimbricenses wrongly infer, but only by a probable and dialectical one, as he says (*4. d. 43, q. 2*), confirmed from Augustine (*13. Trin., cap. 9*) in these words: "By human reasoning only a few, richly endowed with genius and at leisure for study and versed in the most subtle disciplines, have been able to arrive at investigating the immortality of the soul alone." And Gregory (*4. Mor., near the end*), having employed certain probable arguments to persuade in this matter, says: "Let one who is unwilling to believe on account of these arguments believe on account of faith." And St. Paul (*Acts 17*), preaching the resurrection of Christ the Lord — which cannot occur without the immortality of the soul — before certain Athenian Philosophers of keen intellect and using natural reason, among whom was St. Dionysius, was thought to be an announcer of new demons. And in that same chapter 26 he was considered mad by Festus. And what Paul there says about the resurrection and about a grain falling into the earth is only probable, in no way capable of being demonstrated and made evident. I add that the Lateran Council defines the immortality of the soul to be manifest from the Gospel. But what is known from the Gospel is not shown by necessary and evident reason — it is believed by faith. The Council of Vienne under Clement V, in the section *porro*, establishes the same thing. Lyranus (*in cap. 14. Iob*), Cajetan (*in cap. 9. Rom. and in cap. 4. Ecclesiastes*), Vatablus (*ibid.*), Scaliger (*exerc. 907*), ALL. (*disput. 10, sect. 1, subsect. 2*) subscribe to this, and Ruverius (*tract. de anima separata, q. 4*) finds it not displeasing, along with others of outstanding standing in the law. Hence the Toletan (*3. animae, c. 5, q. 16*) and the Conimbricenses (*Tract. de anima separata, disp. 1, art. 3, near the end*) are undeservedly not afraid to censure the aforesaid Authors for rashness, when rather they themselves appear to incur rashness by daring to consider those men worthy of censure.

Objection I against the foregoing assertion. Leviticus 21: "He shall not go in to any dead soul" — that is, the priest shall not. If, then, the soul dies, it is assuredly mortal, since the consequence from act to potency holds. **Corollary I:** Ecclesiastes 3: "There is one end for man and for the beasts, and the condition of both is equal." But the souls of brutes are mortal. Therefore so too is the soul of man. **Corollary II:** Job 14 seems to foreclose the way and the hope of rising again, when it says: "But man when he shall be dead and stripped and consumed, where, I pray, is he?" If, then, nothing of a man remains after his death, his soul is mortal, as his body is mortal and the whole man is mortal. Augustine responds (*3. 99 in Levit., q. 81*) that by the presence of the soul the temporal life by which something subsisted took on its name, just as elsewhere the soul of every blood is said to be its blood. And from the same Leviticus (*cap. 24*), the same Augustine (*ibid. q. 78*) calls the soul the very life of the body, which life comes through the soul, and thereby wishes to show that a murderer strikes

the soul of a man and by striking deprives the man of life. To the first corollary, Lyranus responds and says that it is a tacit objection of the impious — specifically of the Sadducees, who deny that the angel and the soul are immortal and deny the resurrection of the dead. Or say that it is to be interpreted as referring to the composite: just as the composite of a brute is dissolved and dies, so too the composite of a man — but not the soul. For the soul of a brute is drawn out from the potency of matter and is therefore mortal; but the soul of a man is created by God and is therefore immortal. To the second corollary, the same must be said — namely, that when a man dies, the whole dies and is corrupted, but his soul remains incorrupt, since it is incorruptible and immortal, as is urged and indicated there through the future resurrection.

Objection II. The Sixth General Synod (*actione 11, in the epistle of Sophronius*) seems to sanction and define that invisibles and immaterials — among which number are the angel and the rational soul — are incorruptible and immortal not by nature but by grace. Therefore the soul is not incorruptible and immortal by its own nature. St. Bernard (*5. de consideratione ad Eugenium*) seems to hold the same view, especially concerning the angel. I respond that the aforesaid Council is speaking of immortality taken in the first sense, which belongs to God alone, as I noted in the preceding note. Hence the Church sings daily from (*1 Tim. 1*): "To the King of ages, immortal" — but not of immortality taken in the second sense, which the angel and the rational soul possess, since they are devoid of matter and of the privation annexed to it, which is the cause of mortality and corruption (*1. phys. §*).

Objection III. If the rational soul is immortal, it is so above all because it is not drawn out from the potency of matter but created, and because it is spiritual and immaterial. But there are certain forms that are not drawn out from the potency of matter but are created, and are spiritual — such as grace — and yet are corruptible. For grace is corrupted by mortal sin. Therefore the same seems to have to be said of the human soul. I grant the major premise; I distinguish the minor. With respect to efficient cause, I deny it; with respect to meritorious cause, I grant it. That is to say, the sinner merits that God no longer conserve grace in him. For this reason grace is not properly speaking corrupted; it is annihilated through the withdrawal of the divine concurrence. Or say that the discussion concerns a spiritual form subsisting per se, as is the rational soul, not a spiritual form inherent in a subject, such as grace, the act of understanding, and the act of willing, which are accidents.

Article IV. What Aristotle Holds Concerning the Immortality of the Soul.

Aristotle's interpreters fight bitterly over the question of the soul's immortality. Alexander (*de anima*), Justin Martyr, Nyssenius (*lib. de anima*), Nazianzus (*contra Eunomium*), and not a few others affirm that Aristotle made our soul perishable, corruptible, and mortal. On the contrary, Theophrastus, Ammonius, St.

Bonaventure (2. d. 19, q. 1), St. Thomas (2. contra Gentes, cap. 79), and many others hold that Aristotle considered our soul to be immune from all corruption and mortality. But Scotus (3. d. 27, q. un., §. *Istis igitur, sub G.* and 4. d. 43, q. 2, §. *de 2. propositione*, and §. *potest dici*); Heraeus (*Quol. 1, q. 11*); Niphus (*opusc. de immortalitate animae, c. 1*); the Conimbricenses (*tract. de anima separata, disp. 1, art. 2*); Cavellius (*disp. 1. de anima, sect. 12*); Poncius (*disp. 62, q. 3, concl. 2*); Bassolis (4. d. 43, q. 3, art. 3); and the other Scotists consider that Aristotle was undecided about the immortality of the soul and did not adhere more to one side than the other, but leaned now toward one and now toward the other view according to the occasion of the matter he was treating.

Note, from Bassolis just cited, that toward establishing the immortality of the soul according to Aristotle, certain passages and arguments drawn from Aristotle himself are helpful, adduced by those who in his school favor the affirmative side; and that toward defending the mortality of the soul in that same Philosopher's view, his own principles and foundations are helpful, as adduced by those in his Lyceum who adhere to the negative side. All of these arguments, on both sides, will be adduced and weighed by us below. Furthermore, it must not be omitted that Aristotle said many things not assertively but in a spirit of inquiry and doubt, and also in keeping with the opinions of the ancient Philosophers and the common view. Hence (2. *caeli, T. 60*) he writes: "About these things we have the greatest doubts; the Philosophers have always found brief sufficiencies sufficient where they could not attain to greater things, so as not to contradict the princes of Philosophy." And a little later: "The Egyptians and Babylonians tell of other stars, from whom we have many credulous reports about each of the stars. And hence the Philosophers sometimes acquiesce for the sake of their probable persuasions, sometimes for the sake of the assertions of their own principles, beyond necessary reasoning."

Arguments for the mortality of the soul are here proposed and refuted, drawn from the writings and principles of Aristotle.

The first argument: from (8. *Phys.* and 1. *caeli*), the world was made from eternity, and the generations of men are infinite. But their bodies, since they are corrupted at death, do not remain. If, however, their souls are immortal — since infinite generations have preceded — there would actually be an infinite number of human souls. But this contradicts (3. *Phys., T. 35*), where the Philosopher of set purpose refutes the actually infinite, whether in magnitude or in multitude. Lest, therefore, he admit an open contradiction, it is inferred that he holds the soul to be mortal and corruptible. It may be replied that an actual infinite does not follow, since the infinite is defined as that to which no addition or subtraction can be made. But given whatever souls you please, yet others can always be given, to infinity — which is not an actual and categorematic infinite, which Aristotle rejects, but a potential and syncategorematic one, which he does not deny.

Second argument: What has a beginning likewise has an end (*1. caeli, c. 12, T. 126*). But the intellective soul begins to exist (*12. Met., c. 3*). Therefore it ceases to exist and is accordingly mortal. It may be said that Aristotle is speaking there of the composite, which is generated and corrupted, not of the soul, which properly speaking is not generated — for if it is an irrational soul, it is drawn out from the potency of matter; but if it is a rational soul, it is created and introduced into matter aptly prepared and well disposed.

Third argument: When the composite is corrupted, it is resolved into elements; and if anything of it remains, it belongs to matter (*7. Met., T. 60*). Therefore no form remains uncorrupted at the corruption of the whole. But the rational soul is a form. Therefore it is mortal. It may be said that the Philosopher is speaking there indefinitely, just as in (*1. phys., T. 83*) he proposes to treat of generable and corruptible forms, while also treating in its proper place of the incorruptible form that is the rational soul. Therefore to that testimony I say it is true of the composite from matter and a form drawable from the potency of matter, but not of a form that is introducible — as is the rational soul.

Fourth argument: From privation to habit there is no return (*c. de oppositis, post praedicam.*), and the same thing numerically cannot return (*2. de gener., c. ult.*). If the soul were immortal, when a man dies it would be separated from his body and would then either be reunited to the body — and this the Philosopher does not know, since the future resurrection is not demonstrated naturally — or it would persist in this separated state, and since it inclines toward the body because it is its intrinsic form, it would be in a violent state. But nothing violent is perpetual (*2. caeli, cap. 3, T. 18*). Therefore it is inferred that the soul is mortal. It may be said that the soul separated from the body no longer desires union with the body, because, as Avicenna says, its desire for it is satiated from having once been joined to the body. Therefore it does not exist violently outside the body.

Fifth argument: The soul cannot understand anything without phantasms (*3. anima, T. 39*). But a soul that cannot understand except through phantasms cannot be segregated from the body. And what cannot be separated from the body is mortal. Therefore the intellective soul is not exempted from mortality. It may be said that this is true motivationally and by way of occasion, but not simply and absolutely, as I have explained elsewhere.

Sixth argument: If the soul enjoyed immortality, it would likewise enjoy perpetual happiness. But in (*12. Met., T. 39*) one reads: "God is always blessed; man, for a short time." Hence in (*1. Eth., cap. 10*), Solon is reproached because he holds that true happiness belongs to man after death. And indeed in the same work (*3. cap. 6*), after death nothing good or evil remains. It may be said that there the discussion is of the happiness had in the present life, fitting to man constituted of soul and body, and situated in created and finite goods, as I recalled above. This happiness does not belong to the soul separated from the

body. This same reply may satisfy the remaining two last testimonies and all those accumulated by Toletus (*2. de anima, q. 15*).

Arguments for the immortality of the soul are here adduced and resolved — authorities and reasons drawn from Aristotle in various and diverse places in his doctrine.

The soul is established as incorruptible (*1. anima, T. 65*) and as something divine and impassible (*ibid. T. 66*). Therefore the soul is considered immortal by Aristotle. It is responded that the Philosopher is not speaking there assertively but doubtfully, as indicated by the word "seems" that he places there, and the particle "perhaps" placed by him shortly after the text just cited. Or say that he is speaking relatively, not absolutely — that is, with respect to the organic faculty, which uses an organ; and because the organ is corrupted, that organic faculty is also corrupted. Hence there the Philosopher says: if an old man had the eye of a young man, he would see as well as a young man; but because the eye of the old man is not as whole and adequate as the eye of a young man but gradually decreases and is corrupted, he is therefore unable to see equally well. The intellect, however, since it is an inorganic faculty for the purpose of understanding and does not employ an organ, is therefore said to be incorruptible in its operation and understanding — even though in being, simply speaking, it is corruptible. Hence the same Philosopher adds in that place: "The intellect is corrupted in us when something interior is corrupted."

Second: A distinction is established between sense and intellect (*3. anima, 7*) in that a strong sensible corrupts the sense — as is evident if one gazes with fixed eyes at the sun shining at midday — while a most perfect intelligible does not injure but rather perfects the intellect, as when the intellect understands God. Therefore, if the intellect is impassible, incorruptible, and immortal, the soul is certainly immortal, since the intellect proceeds from it as its power and faculty. But a spiritual faculty cannot emanate from a material and corporeal essence and nature. It is satisfied if one says this happens not per se but per accidens — that is, by reason of the organ, which is harmed by a strong sensible and by means of which the operation proceeds that comes from the whole composite (*1. anima, 64*). But the intellect, since in understanding it does not use an organ and is a faculty of the soul alone, is therefore not harmed in understanding by an excellent intelligible, and is said to be separable in operation but not in being, since the soul is an intrinsic and essential part of the composite, or of man. The same reply is to be made to (*2. de anima, c. 17, 11* and *c. 2, 7, 21*).

Third: The soul was not produced before the body. But the intellectual soul itself can remain after the body, (*12. Met., c. 3, 7, 17*), because it exercises an action separated from the body, namely contemplation. I respond that the Philosopher is speaking there conditionally and not absolutely, as the conditional particle "if," which he repeats there, indicates: "if anything later remains"; and a little later: "if the soul be such, not all of it, but the intellect."

Fourth: The vegetative and sensitive souls are produced by the power of the seed and drawn out from the potency and womb of matter; not so the rational soul, which comes from without and approaches from outside, communicating nothing with the body, and therefore can exist without it (*2. de generatione animalium, cap. 3*), and thus is incorruptible and immortal. I respond that this was said dialectically and in the way of opinion, not assertively and demonstratively. For neither there nor elsewhere does Aristotle adduce any necessary and demonstrative reason. And whether the soul is produced by education or by creation is a matter of great doubt in Aristotle himself, as Scotus pursues at length and with care (*in 4. cit., §. potest dici, M. N. O.*).

Fifth: Matter is that by which a thing can be or not be, since it desires all forms. But the rational soul is devoid of matter, since it is spiritual. Therefore it is immortal. The major premise is Aristotle's (*7. Met., T. 22*); the minor is the same author's (*3. animae, 4*). I respond that the major premise holds for a composite from matter and form, which is properly speaking generable and corruptible, whose cause of corruption is assigned to matter with its appetite for the forms it lacks — not, however, for the soul; otherwise, since other souls are not composed of matter, they would be incorruptible and immortal like the rational soul, which is false.

Sixth: The brave man must desire death and expose himself to it for the Republic, according to the judgment of natural reason (*3. Eth., c. 11* and *9. of the same work, c. 9*). Therefore the immortality of the soul is shown by natural reason. The consequence holds: for no one, for whatever good proposed to himself, whether particular or common, ought to or can desire non-being; since, as Augustine says (*3. de libero arbitrio*), non-being cannot be desired, since desire is directed toward some being. But if the soul were not immortal, one dying would desire his own non-being, since death is the privation of the life of the whole animated composite. The response must be that the brave man ought to die for the common good for two reasons: first, because the common good is to be preferred to the particular good, such as the life of the brave man; and second, because an intense good, even though momentary, is better than a diffuse good, even if lasting a long time. The brave man acquires for himself a great good by performing the great act of virtue when he dies for the Republic — a good of which he would be deprived if he lived long in idleness and vice.

Question II. On the Intellect of the Rational Soul.

Article I. Whether There Is an Agent Intellect and What It Is.

The opinion of Philosophers concerning the agent intellect is concordant in the affirmative, with a few exceptions who are followed by Durandus (*1. d. 3, parte 2, quest. 5*). What it is, however, is a matter of disagreement among them, as may be seen in the Seraphic Doctor (*2. d. 24, art. 2, quest. 4* and *ultima*), Aureolus (*d. 17, art. 1*), Henry (*Quol. 8, quest. 12*), and the Conimbricenses (*3. de anima, cap. 5, quest.*

1, art. 1). Some, such as Alexander (2. *anima*, cap. 20) and others, hold that the agent intellect is God. Some, such as Avicenna (9. *Met.*, cap. 4), consider it to be a separate substance or angel, which they call the *Cholcodaea*. Others, such as Zimara, think it is an essential part of the soul. But Scotus (*Quol.* 15), Lychetus, Gadius there, and the other Philosophers (3. *anima*, cap. 5) commonly and unanimously teach that the agent intellect is a faculty and power of the rational soul.

Note, from Aristotle (3. *de anima*, cap. 3, T. 18), that the intellect is divided into two: the agent and the patient. The former is what renders material species spiritual. Hence it is said by Scotus, cited above, to transfer things from one order to another — that is, from the material order to the spiritual order. And by Aristotle just cited, the agent intellect is described as that "whose function it is to make all things" — that is, to make all things spiritual out of material ones. The latter, which is called both passible and possible, is what receives intelligible species in itself, and is therefore called patient, since it is the receptive faculty of species, or also because it receives the intellection of any intelligible object whatsoever. Hence it is described by Aristotle in the same place as that "whose function it is to become all things" — that is, whose office it is to receive all intelligible species and the intellections of any thing whatsoever.

First Assertion: There is an agent intellect. Handed down by the Doctor (*Quol.* 15, art. 1 and 2) following Aristotle cited above. It is proved, first: what is in passive potency for the reception of some perfection needs an active principle by which it can acquire that perfection. For nature does not fail in what is necessary; and to every passive potency there corresponds an active one, since these are correlatives, one of which being posited, the other is also posited. But the rational soul possesses a passive potency to receive the intellection of any thing, since it is like a blank tablet on which nothing has been written. Therefore it has an active principle by which it can obtain intellection for itself. This active principle of intellection is called the agent intellect. Therefore the agent intellect is to be admitted.

Second: The soul cannot of itself receive a material species of an intelligible object, because body does not act on spirit, nor is it received in spirit. Therefore, since an intelligible species received in the patient intellect is necessary for understanding — since "one who understands must contemplate phantasms" (3. *animae*, 39) — the agent intellect must be admitted, which renders the material species spiritual so that it can be received in the patient intellect.

Third: The vegetative soul participates in vegetative powers — namely, the nutritive, augmentative, and generative — and the sensitive soul in powers and faculties of sensing, which are the external and internal senses. Therefore the intellective soul also possesses its own powers and faculties, among which is the intellect; and since it is united to the body and attached to the senses, which only represent material species that cannot be received in it, the agent intellect

is assigned to it, which performs the office of transferring material species to the level of spiritual ones.

Fourth: The soul is the image of God (*Gen. 2*). But this image shines most especially in its powers — namely, intellect and will — as Augustine teaches (*14. Trin., cap. 8* and *15. of the same work, cap. 7 or 14*). Therefore the agent intellect, which purifies and renders spiritual the material species offered to it through the senses — which only perceive and represent material things — is not to be denied to it. Add also that everything produced and every effect has its own principle and cause. But intellection is a quality — something produced and caused, since it is the terminus of the intellectual faculty (*9. Met., 16*). Therefore its principle and cause is the agent or patient intellect.

Objection pressed further. If the agent and patient intellect are admitted, similarly a sensory agent and patient, a voluntary agent and patient, and so on for the rest would have to be admitted. But this division of the latter is not conceded. Therefore neither should the former be, since the reasoning appears equal for both. I say there is a disparity, because the agent intellect disposes and prepares its own object — rendering material things spiritual, making the unintelligible intelligible, and the non-universal universal, and abstracting it from material and singular conditions. But the senses and the other named faculties do not do this; they operate concerning their own objects without any disposition and preparation of those objects — as sight concerning color and hearing concerning sound. Therefore the division of sense into agent and patient is not admitted, nor any similar division of the other faculties and powers.

Objection. One intellect could exercise the aforesaid functions. Therefore either intellect is superfluous. The antecedent is shown: one and the same sight produces vision and receives it in itself; likewise one and the same intellect produces intellection and receives it in itself. Therefore the division of the intellect into agent and patient is empty and useless. I say it is probable that one and the same intellect can perform all those functions, as the Doctor hands down in the *Quodlibet* mentioned. Nevertheless the parity does not hold for sense and the other faculties, as I noted above, because the other faculties are engaged with their objects as already disposed and prepared; but the intellect, since it is spiritual and cannot of itself receive the material, and since it is bound to the senses that only attain the material and singular, provident nature for this reason gave the intellectual soul the agent intellect, which can perform all those functions. What Durandus, cited above, accumulates and objects is of no moment and can easily be dissolved from these assertions.

Second Assertion: The agent intellect is neither God, nor an angel, nor an essential part of the soul, but a faculty and its natural power. The assertion has four parts, which is inferred from the Doctor and vigorously defended by the Seraphic Doctor just cited. The first part is proved: first, from Aristotle at the

beginning of (3. *de anima*), calling the intellect "a part of the soul." But God cannot be a part of the soul, since a part involves imperfection and God is most perfect. Therefore the agent intellect is not God. Second, intellect and intellection are identical with the very essence of God. But the intellection of man is an accident, and his intellect is really identified with his substance. Therefore the agent intellect cannot be God. Third, there are many agent intellects, corresponding to the multiplicity of men. But God is one (*Deut. 6*): "Hear, O Israel, the Lord your God is one." Furthermore, God influences and illuminates every man with a general and common influx. Therefore all would participate in equal knowledge and science, if God himself were the agent intellect. Moreover, man would not be essentially understanding and rational, but extrinsically and by denomination — all of which and similar conclusions are plainly false and absurd. Therefore by no means is God to be considered the agent intellect.

The second part is ready to hand: both because the angel is not the agent intellect but the one possessing intellect; and because the angel is a complete and perfect substance incapable of being an informing form. Therefore it cannot be the agent intellect.

Objection. One might say it is an assisting form. On the contrary: an assisting form is considered assisting when the thing it assists cannot perform the functions the assisting form performs, as is evident from the sailor with respect to the ship and the charioteer with respect to the chariot. But man is essentially and intrinsically intellective only through intellect, just as he is volitional through will and sensitive through sense. Therefore the angel is not well established as the agent intellect of man, assisting him.

The third part is shown as follows: the soul is indivisible and impartible, as has been said and proved elsewhere. Therefore the agent intellect is not an essential and quidditative part of it. Moreover, the sense is not an essential part of a brute but its faculty and power. Therefore the same is to be thought of the agent intellect with respect to man.

The fourth part is argued: what emanates from the nature of something is its property, power, and faculty — as is evident from the heating power emanating from fire and the illuminating power proceeding from the sun. But the agent intellect arises from the intellective soul, and generally from intellectual nature. Therefore it is its power and faculty. Furthermore, each thing enjoys its own force and faculty: the vegetative possesses the nutritive, augmentative, and generative power; the sensitive participates in the powers of sensing, both external and internal. Therefore the intellective likewise possesses the power of understanding, since it is more excellent and superior to the other forms. Finally, the angel possesses intellect because it has an intellectual nature. Therefore man also enjoys intellect, since he is reasoning and intellective.

Objection I. The intellect is divine and impassible (*1. anima, T. 66*) and unmixed and separated from matter (*3. of the same work, cap. 1, T. 4*). But these belong to God. Therefore the agent intellect is God. **Corollary:** The agent intellect makes all things from the same (*3. anima, cap. 3, T. 18*). But God is the maker of all things, according to John 1: "All things were made through him." Therefore the agent intellect is God. I respond that not everything separated from matter is God; otherwise the angel and anything else spiritual would be God. The agent intellect is said to be unmixed in operation because it does not use an organ, unlike material faculties, which belong to the whole composite, as Aristotle clearly sets forth (*1. anima, 64*). To the corollary I say that the agent intellect makes all things — namely, sensible things, intelligible things — but not absolutely, as God, who is the maker and author of things sensible and insensible, visible and invisible.

Objection II. Aristotle (*3. anima, at the beginning*) calls the intellect "a part of the soul." Therefore the intellect is not a faculty and power of the soul itself. Scotus responds (*2. dist. 16, quest. un., §. Ideo dico*) that the intellect is called a part not in the essential sense but in the perfectional sense, emanating from the essence of the same soul — since one faculty does not include the perfection of another faculty, and for this reason the faculties of the soul are described as its parts.

Objection III. What is pure potency is not a power and faculty of the soul, because the forces and powers of the soul are real positive entities. But the intellect is pure potency, since it is like a blank tablet on which nothing is written (*3. anima, 14*). Therefore it is not a force and faculty of the soul. I respond that the intellect is called pure potency not in its entity but in its intellectual capacity — that is, because it is in potency to understand any intelligible things whatsoever and is capable of receiving the intellections of them.

First query: What is the distinction between the agent and patient intellect? The Thomists posit a real distinction. Most Scotists posit a formal distinction. It can be probably said that it is one and the same power of the soul, distinguished only by a different relation and function — for insofar as it transfers from the sensible to the intelligible, purifies material species, and causes intellection, it is called the agent intellect; but insofar as it receives intelligible species and the intellections of intelligible objects, it is called the patient intellect. Since entities are not to be multiplied without necessity (*1. Phys., 12*), if only one intellectual faculty suffices to perform all the aforesaid functions, a double one is needlessly asserted. But one intellect alone is sufficient to perform them all — just as one will, one sight, and one common sense suffice — and so another faculty, specifically a second intellect, is multiplied uselessly and without foundation. This is because one alone, not really but only formally distinct from the soul, suffices, as I said and showed concerning the faculties of the soul taken generally (*1. 2. quest. 3, art. 2 of this work*).

Second query: Whether the human intellect differs in species from the angelic intellect. It can be said probably with Scotus (*2. dist. 1, quest. 6, §. potest etiam addi D.*) that they do not differ in species. For although human and angelic nature are distinguished in species, it is not necessary that this distinction be interposed between their respective faculties and powers. For although man and eagle differ in species, it is nevertheless not necessary that their visual powers differ in species, since they are engaged with the same formal object, not distinct in species.

Article II. What Is the Object of the Intellect of the Rational Soul.

The first opinion is that of St. Thomas (*1. part., quest. 12, art. 2 and quest. 84, art. 7*), Cajetan there, Capreolus (*1. dist. 2, quest. 1*), and others of the Thomists, who hold that the adequate object of the human intellect is the quiddity of material reality. The second is that of Aegidius (*Quol. 4, quest. 10*) and certain others who think that the total object of the intellect of the rational soul is being as true. The third is defended by Scotus (*1. dist. 3, quest. 3 and 4; 4. dist. 49, quest. 8, §. Respondeo B.*; and *Quol. 14, art. 2*), Lychetus, Gadius, and the rest of his school, teaching that the total and adequate object of our intellect is being taken generally.

Note I that the object of the intellect is one thing when it is the object of natural inclination — toward the cognition of which the intellect tends by its own nature, so that any being whatsoever falls under the object of the intellect, and this is called the object from the nature of the faculty — and another thing when it is the object of natural attainment, which is attained or understood by the power of the intellect itself. Moreover, the object is divided into terminative — to which the intellect is terminated — and motive — which moves and excites the intellect to knowledge of itself. This latter is subdivided into the natural motive, which is the quiddity of the sensible thing that naturally moves our intellect to its cognition, and the supernatural, which by divine assistance it knows, as when through the light of glory it clearly beholds God.

Note II that vital faculties are of three kinds. Some are disparate, having no order among themselves, as the external senses whose objects are also disparate, distinct, and diverse — such as color, sound, and smell. Some are subordinate, maintaining some relation among themselves; and these are either of the same order — as the sensitive cognitive faculties, both external and internal, as well as the intellect — and faculties thus ordered with respect to their object are such that the higher knows whatever the lower knows and something more: the intellect attains whatever is perceived by the sense and much else besides. The remaining faculties are of a different order — one cognitive and the other appetitive — namely intellect and will, whose object seems to be the same according to Scotus (*4. dist. 49, quest. 1, §. Ad 1. quaest. ante T.*), whom Faber follows (*disp. 9, cap. 7*): for whatever is intelligible is likewise willable.

First Assertion: The first and adequate object of our intellect from the nature of the faculty is not the quiddity of material reality. The Doctor holds this in the places cited at the beginning of this article. It is proved, first: the total and adequate object of any faculty neither exceeds nor is exceeded by the faculty, as is clear from the description of the adequate object given elsewhere. But our intellect, beyond the quiddity of material reality, understands spiritual things — namely God, the angel, and things of that kind — as from Aristotle (*12. Met., last chapter*) Ferchius notes before others (*vestig. 2, cap. 12, num. 12*). Therefore the quiddity of material reality is not rightly decreed to be the total object of our intellect from the nature of the faculty.

Nor does it help to say with Javellius (*3. de anima, quest. de obiecto intellectus possibilis*) that when St. Thomas asserts the object of our intellect from the nature of the faculty to be the quiddity of material reality, he is to be interpreted for the present state of the way and of conjunction, not for the state of the homeland and of separation, in which he posits being taken commonly. For even in the present state we know God from effects, and our own soul, and the angel assisting the heavens, as is evident from Aristotle and other Philosophers who acknowledged the moving intelligences of the celestial spheres. Nor does the aforesaid distinction square with the mind of Thomas, since in (*1. part., quest. 85, art. 1*) he writes in explicit words: "It is connatural to us to know natures that have being only in matter." And the proportion which Thomas himself requires between our intellect and its object does not belong to the state of separation but only to the state of conjunction. Therefore the aforesaid distinction of Javellius is of no moment.

Second: The natural desire of any thing toward acquiring something is not in vain (*2. Met., 1*). But the intellect desires to know not only material things but also spiritual ones. Indeed, we daily strive to hunt from visible and material things the cognition of invisible and immaterial things, according to Romans 1: "The invisible things of God, understood through those things that are made, are clearly seen — his eternal power also and divinity." Therefore the total object of our intellect from the nature of the faculty is not the quiddity of material reality.

Objection. The argument concludes of the separated intellect, not of the conjoined one, of which the Thomists speak. On the contrary: no faculty can attain, even when separated and elevated, what lies outside its object — just as sight, even by divine assistance, cannot attain sound, smell, or anything else outside its object. If, then, the total object of our intellect from the nature of the faculty is the quiddity of material reality, in whatever state it is placed or elevated, it will be unable to perceive anything but the quiddity of material reality, since everything else beyond this lies outside the limits of its total and adequate object. Add that the pagan Philosophers mentioned by St. Paul, cited above, did indeed acknowledge God, but were either ignorant of or undecided

about the state of the soul's separation, as is clear from the preceding question, article 3, paragraph 4.

Furthermore, Metaphysics treats of transcendent being, which prescribes from material and spiritual reality, from the finite and infinite, from God and creature. But no one denies that Metaphysics is acquired by the forces of nature. And in (*10. Eth., cap. 10*), the Philosopher places happiness in the contemplation of abstract substances. Therefore from the nature of the faculty, the adequate object of our intellect is not the quiddity of material reality.

Second Assertion: The true is not the first and adequate object of our intellect either. Defended by the Doctor in the passage cited above, and proved, first: of the total object of something, properties or characteristics are demonstrated, as Scotus teaches from (*1. post., quest. 3. Universalium*). But the true is a property of being (*4. Met., 5*) — not a subject but something in a subject from which it emanates. Therefore the true is not to be established as the total object of our intellect.

Objection. The argument holds for the object of science, not for the object of faculty, which is what is in question here. On the contrary: faculty and science are engaged with the same thing — as intellect and Metaphysics with being — even though the faculty is more universal and common, since it extends to more things than science does; for the intellect regards not only being but all other things contained under being, both universals and singulars. Nevertheless, the faculty does not tend primarily to a property of its subject but to the subject itself falling under it: thus sight sees the wall, smell the rose, taste the apple, and so on. Therefore likewise the intellect regards and contemplates not the true but being, and whatever is comprehended under it, as its subject.

Second: A faculty does not surpass its adequate object — as hearing does not extend to anything but sound, and smell to anything but odor. But the human intellect considers and contemplates not only the true but also the good, indeed every intelligible thing. Therefore the true is not its total object.

Objection. Whatever the intellect regards, it considers under the aspect of the true, just as the will tends toward the good under the aspect of the good. On the contrary: the intellect is not thus limited so as to contemplate only the true, but whatever is knowable and intelligible. And beyond the true, there are other intelligibles — namely being, good, one, and whatever is captured within the compass of being. Therefore the intellect is not to be constricted and limited to the sole consideration and contemplation of the true. Moreover, the will presupposes and pre-requires the operation of the intellect, according to that saying chanted not once: nothing willed that is not first known. But the will can will what is not true, and not only the possible but also the impossible, as has been said elsewhere. Therefore the intellect, which is a prior faculty to the will,

can understand what is not true, and accordingly the total object of the intellect is not the true.

Third Assertion: The motive object of the human intellect for the present state is the quiddity of the sensible thing; but the adequate object from the nature of the faculty, taken generally, is being. So Scotus cited above and (*quest. 19. de anima*). The first part is argued, first, from that common axiom drawn from Aristotle (*lib. de sensu et sensili, cap. 1*): "Nothing is in the intellect that was not first in the sense." But the sense represents only the quiddity of the sensible thing. Therefore the motive object of our intellect in the state of the way is the quiddity of the sensible thing.

Second, from another axiom drawn from the same author (*3. animae, T. 39*): "One who understands must contemplate phantasms." But phantasms are sensible species offered by the imagination to the intellect. Therefore the motive object of the human intellect is the quiddity of the sensible thing.

Objection. If the quiddity of the sensible thing is the object of our intellect for the present state, since the quiddity of the sensible thing seems to coincide with the quiddity of the material thing, the opinion of St. Thomas, which was attacked in the first assertion of this article, is wrongly impugned. I say there is a wide distinction between the position of Scotus and that of Thomas: the latter holds that the quiddity of material reality is the object of the human intellect from the nature of the faculty; the former holds that the quiddity of the sensible thing is the motive object of the said intellect, not from the nature of the faculty. The reason why in the present life our intellect is so attached to the senses supplying sensible species through which it is aroused to understand is the mutual connection of the faculties, in which the higher cannot act without the prior actions of the lower: thus the external senses, then the internal ones, and then the agent and possible intellects put forth and exercise their actions. Or perhaps this manner of understanding did not exist in the state of innocence, since it is penal and befell us on account of sin, as Scotus reports from Augustine (*15. Trin., cap. 27*) in (*Quol. 14, §. de secundo P.*) in these words: "What is the cause that you cannot gaze with a fixed eye upon that light itself? Unless it be infirmity — and who made that infirmity for you? Unless it be iniquity."

The second part is proved, first: what has community and virtual containment is the adequate object of our intellect, as the Doctor excellently pursues in (*1. cited above*). But being taken generally participates in community — since it is predicated of any inferior whatsoever, either formally or identically — and in virtual containment, since under being all things are comprehended, whether created or uncreated, whether universal or singular. Therefore being thus accepted is the adequate object of our intellect.

Second: Every faculty has its own total and adequate object, as is evident from the external senses, each of which is engaged with its own total object — as sight

with the visible prescinding from light and color, hearing with sound, smell with odor, and so on. Therefore since the intellect is one of the faculties of intellectual nature, it possesses its own adequate object, which is every intelligible thing, or being taken commonly.

Objection. The object of any faculty is real univocal being, as is clear by induction from the individual objects of each faculty and power. But being is not univocal, since it is predicated of real being and of rational being, between which there is nothing univocally common. Therefore being is not to be established as the adequate object of the human intellect. I say that real being, univocal to God and creature, substance and accident, is established as the adequate object of the created intellect; and that rational being is reduced to it, as negations and privations are reduced to positive being, as I indicated in *Logic* and will become clearer in *Metaphysics*.

Objection I. The lowest intellect has the lowest object, because a faculty and its object must be uniform and conformable. But the intellect of the rational soul is lowest, since it is exceeded by the angelic and divine intellect. Therefore its object is the quiddity of material reality. **Corollary:** Between a faculty and its object there must be proportion. But our intellect, being joined to the body, has no proportion with immaterial and spiritual things, especially with God, who is infinite and immense. Therefore the quiddity of material reality is decreed to be the adequate object of our intellect. I grant the major premise; I distinguish the minor: in entity and perfection, I grant it; in capacity and receptivity, I deny it — for it is of infinite capacity, like the angelic intellect. To the corollary I grant the major and distinguish the minor: there is no proportion in entity, I grant it; in intelligibility, I deny it. For there exists a proportion of the motive to the moveable, on the authority of Scotus (*4. dist. 49, quest. 11, §. Respondeo B. and C.*).

Objection II. Faculties are distinguished according to the distinction of their objects (*2. animae, T. 33*). But the intellect and will are distinct faculties — since the former is a natural and necessary faculty, while the latter is indifferent and free with respect to opposite acts and objects — and the object of the latter is the good. Therefore the object of the former is the true. I respond that the major premise holds for disparate faculties, not for subordinate ones, as intellect and will are, even though of a different order, as I explained in note II. Therefore both have being as their object and are of equal scope, as Gadius (*Quol. 16, fol. 168, pag. 2, col. 3*) and Faber (*de paenitentia, disp. 9, c. 7*) teach, and it seems to be a problem in Scotus.

Objection III. If being were the total object of the human intellect, the intellect could know any particular being whatsoever. But the intellect cannot know by intuitive cognition the substance, God, and things of that kind. Therefore being is not the adequate object of our intellect. I respond that the sequel of the major premise is true of the object from the nature of the faculty, not of the motive object. Therefore, since God and the other entities just named do not move our

intellect either through themselves or through their species, it does not rightly follow that the human intellect can by its own power arrive at clear cognition and vision of God and other spiritual entities.

First query: Whether an intelligible species is required for understanding. I respond affirmatively: for just as a sensible species is pre-required for sensing, so an intelligible species is necessary for understanding, which determines the intellect to understand this particular thing — of which it has the species — rather than that — of which it carries no species — so as to concur actively with it in producing intellection.

Second query: What and how many are the causes of intellection? I respond that there are two: namely, the intellect and the intelligible species, as two partial causes integrating and constituting one total cause for producing intellection.

Third query: What is the principal cause of intellection? I respond that it is the intellect, and therefore intellection is named from the intellect, and vital action from the vital principle, which is the intellect itself — in roughly the same way as was said in the preceding book concerning sensation and sense, with only the words changed.

Article III. What the Mental Word Is.

There is a fierce battle among the Scholastics as to what the mental word is. Bonetus (*5. Met.*) and Aureolus (*1. dist. 27, parte 2, art. 2*) hold that the word of the created intellect is the known object. Aegidius Romanus (*Quol. 4, quest. 13*) thinks it is the intelligible species. Augustine seems to favor this view (*11. Trin., near the end of cap. 2*): "The species of the body which is seen and the impression of its image upon the sense, which is vision, or the sense thus formed." Thomas (*1. part., quest. 34, art. 1, ad 2*) and his disciples, cited and followed by the Complutensians (*disp. 21. de anima, quest. 2, §. 2*), hold it to be a term produced by intellection, and therefore that they differ from each other at least formally. But Scotus (*1. dist. 27, quest. 3* and *dist. 3, quest. 7, §. Ad auctoritatem*), Lychetus, Bargius, Vigerius, Vorilongus there, and Gadius (*Quol. 14*), to whom Suarez (*1. de Trinitate, cap. 6*), Vazquez (*1. part., disp. 38, cap. 1*), and Ruverius (*tract. de actu intellectus possibilis, quest. 3*) assent, teach that the mental word is actual intellection.

Note I that "word" is used in various ways by authors. First, for a voice conjugated through tenses, in which sense grammarians take and use it. Second, for the Person of the Son of God: so it is taken in John 1: "In the beginning was the Word." Third, for the concept of a known thing, in which sense one thing is called the mental word and another the vocal word, which is the sign of the internal word that is the mental word — as the Stagirite signifies (*1. Periherm., cap. 1*): "Vocal sounds are signs of those things that are in the soul" — that is, of concepts and intellections which are in the mind or intellect.

Note II that intellection coincides with spiritual knowledge and cognition, in which three things intervene: namely, action, passion, and quality. For just as in the production of heat three things are found — the heating action, the heat-passion, and heat — so in intellectual cognition three things are likewise found: the intellect-action, the intellect-passion, and intellection. The first is an action of the genus of action; the second is a passion of the genus of passion; the third is a quality of the predicament of quality, produced through diction — which we call intellect-action — just as heat is produced through heating. This latter is called by the Scotists an action of the genus of action; the former, however, an action of the genus of quality — or more properly it is to be called the terminus of the action rather than the action itself. Likewise intellection is described as the terminus of diction or intellect-action, because through the latter the former is produced, and the intellect-action is terminated and completed in it, as Aristotle sets forth (9. *Met.*, T. 16) and Averroes there.

Note III that some actions are true and real, through which something real is produced — such as heating, through which heat is produced, and illumination, through which light is generated. Others are analogical and grammatical, through which nothing real is produced — such as vision, intellection, and the rest, which are described as immanent and intentional actions, as Averroes expresses (2. *anima*, com. 41).

First Assertion: The mental word of the created mind is neither the known object nor the intelligible species. This assertion has two parts, defended by Scotus in the passages cited above. The first part is proved: an object is denominated known and understood by a cognition and intellection existing in the intellect and extrinsic to the object — just as a wall is denominated seen by a vision existing in the eye and terminated at the wall itself. Therefore the mental word is not the known object. The antecedent is evident. The consequence holds: the word is produced by the intellect, but the object precedes the operation of the intellect itself. Therefore this word is not the known object. Furthermore, what is only denominated by something through extrinsic denomination is not produced by it, as is clear from a painted Caesar, who is indeed denominated painted by the painting but is not produced by the painting itself. But the object is denominated known by cognition and understood by intellection, as I was arguing just now. Therefore it is not established as the mental word.

Objection. There is a disparity: the known thing is present to the knowing intellect, about which it judges — not so with the painted thing, which is not presented to the painting, which is why nothing mediating is caused. But the intellect understanding a thing, even if it is not present in the being of real existence, is nevertheless present in objective and intentional being. Hence, even though nothing real is produced outside, nevertheless something is produced in intentional being after intellection, which terminates it. On the

contrary: if the intellect judges about the known thing and deliberates about it, such judgment does not pertain to the mental word but to the second operation of the intellect, and discourse to the third. Therefore there is no valid response. Moreover, what is produced after the intellection of a thing is either real being or rational being. Not the former, as Aureolus admits; not the latter, otherwise only rational being would be the mental word, which is false, and soul-science — which is a real science about it — would not treat of it, since that is the task of Metaphysics or Logic. Furthermore, a thing is said to be from eternity in known and objective being, but the word of the created intellect is not said to have been from eternity, since none existed but was created in time, as faith teaches. Therefore the mental word cannot in any way be the known object.

The second part is shown as follows: the cause of something cannot be the effect of the same thing; otherwise the same would be the cause of itself, which is absurd. But the intelligible species is a partial and less principal cause of the mental word, as Scotus proves in the passage cited. Therefore it is not the word of the created intellect. Moreover, the intelligible species is called the impressed species, which as the cause of the word of the finite intellect precedes that word itself, which is called the expressed species. Therefore the intelligible species is in no way the mental word — unless one were to say that the same thing is cause and effect with respect to the same, which is impossible.

Second Assertion: The created word is not a term produced by intellection, but is actual intellection. The conclusion has two parts, supported by Scotus in the passages above. The first part, which is opposed to the Thomists, is proved, first: "to sense is to suffer" (2. *anima*, T. 52); likewise "to understand is to suffer" (3. *of the same work*, T. 2). Therefore intellection is a passion — not of the genus of passion but of the genus of quality, as I observed above. But if through intellection a mental word were produced, intellection would be an action of the genus of action, like diction, through which the mental word is begotten — as Augustine rightly saw (9. *Trin.*, *cap. ult.*): "Knowledge is truly begotten and volition proceeds." Since, then, intellection is the terminus of diction, through it nothing further is produced.

Objection. Intellection is a true productive action of the created word, just as the intellection of God the Father is a true act through which the Word of God, who is his Son, is produced. On the contrary: besides the fact that this conflicts with Aristotle, just cited, who asserts that intellection is a passion — which the Scotists place in the predicament of quality — and the divine Word is generated by God the Father not through the act of understanding but through the act of speaking, as I taught from Scotus in the Tract on the Triune God (*disp.* 1, q. 5) — it also contradicts the same Philosopher (9. *Met.*, T. 16), who compares speculation and any immanent operation, in whose series intellection of life and vision of sight are placed, to life and vision. But it is evident that life and vision are not productive of any term, as the same Stagirite notes there. Therefore

intellection is not a productive action of the created word or of any other term. And in (6. *Eth.*, *cap.* 4) there is nothing to the contrary. Nor does it help to say with St. Thomas (1. *part.*, *quest.* 85, *art.* 2, *ad* 3) that this holds for external sensation, not for internal sensation — since the Philosopher there is speaking expressly of the vision of sight, which is external sensation. And it is gratuitously denied of internal sensation, since in both the same reasoning appears. All the more so since the same Doctor (*opusc.* 48, *cap.* 1) frankly admits that sensation and intellection are not actions of the genus of action. Therefore they are not productive of any term.

Second: Immanent actions have no term, from Aristotle in the passages mentioned. But intellection is counted among immanent actions, even by St. Thomas, cited just above. Therefore through intellection no term is produced that is the word of the created intellect.

Nor does it help to say that an immanent operation, while it has no term outside, does have a term inside — or, as Averroes says in the passage cited, that it tends not to a real but to an intentional term. Since Aristotle, in the passage reviewed, plainly teaches that such an operation is the work, term, and end of the one operating, and that the agent proceeds no further — because having acquired this term, its motion comes to rest, just as one who is whitening a wall, once the wall has been whitened, no longer whitens it. So one who understands a thing, having obtained its full intellection, rests in that very intellection, and the action is terminated there — otherwise there would be a term of a term, indeed intellection itself would not be the term but the way to the term, which accords neither with Aristotle nor with truth. And another term would be vain and empty: for what does one who understands intend and will, if not the intellection of the intelligible thing? Therefore having obtained its intellection, one does not move to another term, but truly stops and remains in it.

Furthermore, that intentional thing which the Adversaries devise and say is produced through intellection and is its term and the mental word — is it real being or rational being? Not the latter, because it is directly produced by the intellect, not reflexively, as rational being is made. Nor do they distinguish it from real being; which is why they call it intentional being, distinguished from real being. Again, if they wish the word caused by intellection to be intentional being because it remains in the intention and in the mind of one understanding — by the same token intellection is intentional being, because it resides in the intellect and is its quality and perfection, of which there is no other term, since through it it is truly denominated as qualified and is fully perfected, and its action has its ultimate end there. Moreover, the same seems to have to be said of intellection as of love, since intellect and will are faculties of intellectual nature tending to acquire its perfection. But the terminus of will is love, of which there is no other term. Therefore likewise the terminus of the intellect is intellection, through which no other term called the mental word is obtained.

The second part is proved, first, from St. Augustine (*serm. 20. de sanctis*): "The voice is a sound, a sign of thought; but the word is thought itself." And (*tract. 13. in Ioan.*): "When you conceive a word to utter, you wish to say something, and the very conception of the thing in your heart is already the word — it has not yet gone forth, but it is already born in the heart and remains there, that it may go forth." The same (*tract. 23*). And Damascene (*1. de fide orthodoxa, cap. 18*), Irenaeus (*2. haeresium, haeresi 47*), and Anselm (*in Monol. 31*) are in agreement.

Second: What is produced by the created intellect is the created word. For the word is called generated knowledge, as is evident in Augustine (*9. Trin., 12*): "From the knower and the known, knowledge is born." But intellection is produced by the created intellect — hence in (*9. Met., 16*) it is described as its work and terminus. Therefore it is the mental word.

Third: The created word is not the known object, nor the intelligible species, nor the terminus of intellection. Therefore by sufficient distribution, it follows that it is actual intellection.

Objection I in favor of Aegidius, from Augustine (*8. Trin., 7*): "The word of Carthage is in the memory." But by "the word of Carthage" nothing else can be understood than the intelligible species, as the same Doctor plainly signifies in the passage cited at the beginning of this article. Therefore the intelligible species is the created word. I respond that both passages of Augustine are to be explained causally, not formally — that is to say, the word is caused partially by the intelligible species, as Augustine himself declares (*9. Trin., 12, cited just now* and *11. of the same work*).

Objection II. The word is produced, and is the terminus of production. But intellection is not produced. Therefore intellection is not the mental word. The major premise is conspicuous. The minor is admitted, because intellection is an action, and an action is not acted upon but is that by which something else is acted upon and produced. I grant the major and to the minor I say that this concludes of an action of the genus of action, not of an action of the genus of quality, as intellection is, as I noted above.

Objection III, from (*1. Eth., 3*): Happiness and other operations are not qualities. But there it is added (*cap. 7*) that happiness consists in contemplation, which does not seem to be far from intellection and knowledge, especially intuitive. Therefore intellection is not a quality, and accordingly is not the mental word. I respond that the aforesaid testimony can be explained in two ways. In one way: Aristotle is speaking there of productive operation and action, which plainly is not a quality. In another way: he is disputing against Plato, who holds that every good is a quality, the opposite of which the Philosopher maintains by saying that elicited acts are good, even though they are not qualities.

Question III. On the Will.

After the intellect, the will proceeds immediately from the intellectual nature and rational soul. And in acting and operating, it presupposes and pre-requires the action and operation of the intellect, according to that saying chanted not once: "The will is not carried to the unknown." And just as the sensitive appetite follows the sensitive cognitive faculty, as I asserted in Book IV, question 11, so the will, which is described as the rational appetite, accompanies and follows the intellect, which is a power and intellectual faculty. Now I have already said and taught many things about the will in Moral Philosophy, Book III, questions 1 and 2. Therefore I shall here add and append a few things that remain.

Article I. Whether the Will Is Distinguished from the Intellect.

Aureolus and Durandus (*1. dist. 3, quest. 4*) affirm that intellect and will are entirely one and the same power and faculty of the human soul, adorned and marked out by distinct and different names and functions. But the other Scholastics, recognizing a distinction between the aforesaid powers and faculties, dispute and contest vigorously over the nature of this distinction. For St. Thomas (*de veritate, q. 22*) with his followers asserts that intellect and will are really distinct. But Scotus and his disciples (*2. dist. 16, quest. un.*) establish a formal distinction between the two faculties just named. And this assertion has been proved in Book I, question 2, article 2, where, treating of the faculties of the soul taken generally, I taught that they differ from the soul and from one another not really but formally.

Particularly, however, it can still be argued from St. Damascene (*2. fidei, cap. 22*), who defines the will in these words: "The will is itself the simple faculty by which we will." But the intellect is the faculty by which we understand. Now, distinct definitions argue formal distinction, as has been asserted elsewhere. Therefore, since intellect and will have distinct definitions, it follows that they are formally distinct. Moreover, a distinct manner of acting implies a formally distinct faculty, as seems to be admitted by all. But the will participates in a manner of acting distinct from the intellect — since the latter acts naturally and necessarily, while the former acts spontaneously and freely and is indifferent with respect to distinct acts and opposite objects. Therefore between the two named faculties there is a formal distinction. Furthermore, in the divine realm the Son is produced and generated through the intellect, and the Holy Spirit proceeds and is spirated through the will. But this argues a formal distinction between intellect and will. Therefore if in the divine realm these faculties differ formally from each other, likewise in creatures.

Objection I in favor of the first position. The volitional faculty is equally cognitive, since the will cannot will anything unless it knows it. Therefore there seems to be no distinction between the intellect, which is cognitive, and the will, which is volitional. I distinguish the antecedent: formally, I deny it; pre-requisitively, I grant it. That is to say, the intellect first shows the known object to the will before the will wills it — in roughly the same way as a servant carries

a light before his master so that the master, illuminated by that light, may see what is to be done and command what is to be carried out. So the will, illuminated by the light of the intellect, chooses what is to be performed and commands the lower faculties to exercise their operations concerning those things.

Objection II in favor of the second position. Psalm 118: "Give me understanding, and I shall learn your commandments." And Matthew 15: "Are you also still without understanding?" Therefore man is devoid of understanding, and if he has it, he receives it from God, and accordingly it is really distinct from his soul. I respond with the interpretation that the passage is to be expounded in the mind of Augustine there (*conc. 18*): "Give me understanding," supply: "make me understand," according to Daniel 8: "I sought the meaning." And afterward it adds: "Make me understand that vision." And Psalm 31: "I will give you understanding" — that is, I will make you understand what is to be done and carried out by you.

Objection III. Aristotle (*3. Eth.*, 3) writes that intellect and will are the same principle of the rational soul. Therefore in the Peripatetic school, the will is distinct from the intellect. I respond that the two aforesaid faculties are one principle as really identified, but two principles as formally distinct. This is how Aristotle is to be interpreted in the passage mentioned.

Objection IV. Subordinate acts do not argue distinct principles and diverse faculties, as is established from illuminating and heating, which proceed from one sun. But intellection and volition are subordinate acts — since volition is subordinated to intellection, which is why that saying is celebrated: "Nothing willed that is not first known." Therefore will does not differ from intellect. I respond that the major premise holds for subordinate acts proceeding from the same faculty, not for acts proceeding from distinct faculties — as intellection and volition are. And the example adduced is to the opposite purpose, since illuminating and heating arise from diverse faculties: heating from the heating faculty and illuminating from the illuminating faculty. Hence in the celestial spheres there is illuminating without heating, while on earth both actions are had — namely illuminating and heating.

Article II. Whether the Will Is Nobler than the Intellect.

Some, whose names are suppressed by Bassolis (*4. dist. 49, quest. 3*), assert that intellect and will are of equal perfection and dignity. But the Thomists and Scotists, recognizing some pre-eminence and superiority between the aforesaid powers and faculties, contend and dispute sharply concerning their dignity. The former, with St. Thomas (*1. p., quest. 82, art. 3*), hold that the intellect surpasses and precedes the will. The latter, with the Subtle Doctor (*4. dist. 49, quest. 4*), hold that the will is to be preferred and set before the intellect.

Note and recall from what was said elsewhere — as Scotus indicates (*1. dist. 3, quest. 3*; and *2. dist. 24, quest. 1, ad 2*) — that the adequate object of the intellect and of the will is entirely the same, with respect to the same formal aspect. For both faculties are of equal scope, and whatever is intelligible is likewise willable. Hence the greater excellence and eminence of the one over the other is not to be drawn from their common object, but is rather manifested and declared from the more excellent and worthy acts, which proceed from the one and not the other of the aforesaid faculties, as will be plain in the next assertion.

Assertion: The will surpasses and excels the intellect in nobility and dignity. So Scotus, cited just now (§. *Iuxta hoc quasi ex latere*). And before him Alexander of Hales (*3. part., quest. 80, m. 1*), St. Bonaventure, Richard, and others of the same class and order. It is proved, first, from St. Anselm (*lib. de conceptu virginali, cap. 4*), calling the will "queen in the realm of the soul" and reason "her handmaid." But the queen is worthier than the handmaid. Therefore the will is more excellent than reason or the intellect. And St. Bernard (*lib. de libero arbitrio*) affirming that the will is mistress and reason is her attendant. But the mistress is more excellent than her attendant. Therefore so too the will is more excellent than reason, which coincides with the intellect.

Aristotle also gives his support (*9. Met., T. 10*), where he says that the will determines the intellect to this or that understanding and commands it to contemplate this and not that. For since the intellect is a natural faculty, and accordingly has no mastery over its own act — given the appropriate object, it must necessarily be determined by the will to go forth into the act of this or that intelligible object — as Scotus excellently pursues in his exposition of that text.

The Thomists object, specifically the Complutensians (*disp. ult., quest. 5, §. 3*): the will moves the intellect by applying it; while the intellect moves the will by preceding, directing, and ruling it. On the contrary: the intellect indeed represents things to be speculated about and done, but does not command; it directs but does not prescribe; it shows but does not compel. Otherwise, since it is a purely natural and necessary faculty, it would destroy freedom, and there would be no merit or demerit — for in things that occur naturally and necessarily, we neither merit nor demerit, by common consent. Moreover, command is an act of the will, as I showed at length in Moral Philosophy (*lib. 3, quest. 2, art. 4*).

Furthermore, the intellect is said to direct and rule not in the manner of a lord and king, who truly wills and commands what is to be done in his kingdom, but in the manner of a counselor who offers and presents to his lord what is to be performed — and it then lies in the lord's hand and power to do what is offered and presented to him. Therefore only the will in the realm of the soul has mastery of its own acts and commands the intellect to speculate on this or that, and can convert or avert it from such speculation and intellection, as Scotus

excellently pursues (*2. d. 42, quest. 4*). The mastery and command of the soul is therefore wrongly attributed to the intellect.

Second: The faculty whose act is worthier and more excellent is considered nobler and more distinguished by all, because the nobility or ignobility of a faculty is detected from its acts. But the act of the will, namely love, surpasses the act of the intellect, namely intellection, in perfection and nobility. Hence in sacred scripture the love of God and neighbor is greatly commended, but not the knowledge of them. And ever on the lips of St. John was that saying: "Little children, love one another." And Canticles 8: "Love is as strong as death." And the Poet sings: "Love conquers all things."

Hence the first angels are called Seraphim from love, and the second Cherubim from knowledge. Therefore the intellect is to be placed after the will. Moreover there is that saying from Hugh of Saint Victor (*in Ang. Hierar., cap. 7*), from Dionysius: "Love excels knowledge. The one pertains to the will, the other to the intellect."

Objection from the Adversaries. They respond and say that all that is true in the way, not in the homeland. On the contrary: the love of God and neighbor is of the same nature and species both in the way and in the homeland, even though in the homeland it is in a higher and more excellent degree. Therefore if it excels in the way, so too in the homeland, since there is no reason why the opposite should occur in the homeland. Moreover, if the Seraphim were named from the love of the way, which was the cause of their merit by which they rejoice and exult in heaven and hold the first seat among the celestial spirits, without doubt the love of the homeland surpasses the knowledge of the homeland — since it was by this love that they merited those supreme seats, not by the knowledge of the way. Therefore the love which was the cause of such happiness and glory, not the knowledge, is to be preferred and to excel in the homeland.

Again, it is a greater sin to hate God, and those who hate God more have sinned more and are more punished in hell. Therefore, by the opposite reasoning, those who loved God more merited more. The Seraphim loved God more and therefore merited more and acquired greater glory — not by reason of knowledge but by reason of love. Therefore love is to be preferred to knowledge both in the way and in the homeland, just as the hatred of God is established as the greatest sin both in the way and in hell among all the other sins.

Third: A nobler habit argues a nobler faculty, as the Adversaries do not deny. But the habit of the will surpasses the habit of the intellect in nobility, as is evident from (*1 Cor. 10*): "Faith, hope, charity — and the greatest of these is charity." Hence Augustine adds (*in exp. Psalm. 107*): "You find nothing more eminent than charity in the divine books." And (*15. Trin., cap. 19*): "Among the gifts of God, there is no greater gift than charity, nor any equal to it." Therefore, since charity

resides in the will, it is plainly deduced that the will surpasses the intellect in eminence.

Nor does it help to say with the Thomists that the light of glory, which belongs to the intellect, is more excellent than charity, and that charity excels only in the way and not in the homeland. For besides the fact that this has already been rejected from what was said in the response to the preceding objection, the aforesaid testimonies speak absolutely, and the distinction of way and homeland is devised to escape the force of the argument, as is clear from what St. Paul (*ibid.*, *cap. 13*) appends: "If I speak with the tongues of men and of angels and have not charity, I am become as sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal. And if I have prophecy and know all mysteries and all knowledge, and have not charity, I am nothing." Hence Augustine rightly concludes from this passage of Paul (*in exp. Psalm. 141*): "Therefore charity shows itself to be the more excellent way." And a little later: "Nothing is more excellent than the way of charity, and only the humble walk on it." All the more so: if the will is perfected in the way by a nobler habit than the intellect, likewise in the homeland — since an equal proportion holds both here and there. And to assert that the light of glory surpasses charity is said gratuitously, and confirmed by no basis, testimony, or reason. I add that charity unites more closely to God than the light of glory, as Hugh of Saint Victor teaches before others (*lib. de angelica Hierarchia*): "Love excels knowledge, and where knowledge stands outside, the affection of the lover penetrates — not because something is loved that is not known, but because it is loved more perfectly than it is known." The reason is that charity tends per se and immediately to God and his essence, which is the beatific object. But the light of glory, which is given to the blessed to elicit the beatific vision, does not so dispose itself — for the beatific vision to come about, the divine essence must be united to it in the nature of an intelligible species and object, as Thomas teaches (*1. part., quest. 22, art. 2*). Therefore charity is more perfect in both the way and the homeland than any other gift bestowed by God.

Fourth: What is posterior in generation is prior in perfection, as is evident in natural things. For nature proceeds from the imperfect to the perfect, and the rational soul, which is posterior in generation, is prior in perfection to the other preceding forms. But the will is posterior in generation to the intellect — for from the rational soul the intellect emanates first and afterward the will. Therefore the will surpasses the intellect in nobility and dignity.

The Complutensians respond (*cited, near the end of §. 2*) that this holds for one and the same thing, where what is prior in generation is posterior in perfection — but not absolutely and simply. For act is prior to potency both in priority of origin and of perfection. Likewise substance is prior to accident and to its own properties, not only in generation but also in perfection. On the contrary: this assertion — that what is prior in generation is posterior in perfection, and conversely, what is posterior in generation is prior in perfection — is recorded

in Scotus (*4. dist. 11, quest. 3* and *dist. 16, quest. 2, §. Ad rationes ante Q.*) and is understood by way of generation and in the same genus. In the genus of substantial forms, the last form is more perfect than those preceding — as the soul surpasses the forms of blood, embryo, and the like. In the genus of absolute accidents, the last is more perfect — as quality surpasses quality that is generated prior to it. So in the genus of faculties, the sensitive surpasses the vegetative, and the volitional the intellective — because the latter is ordered toward the former, and the acts of the intellect are directed toward the acts of the will: for to understand is for the sake of willing, and vision is for the sake of fruition.

But what the aforesaid Authors add — namely, that the intellect is act and the will is potency because the former is moving and the latter is mobile — is plainly false, because both are faculties proceeding from the rational soul. And the intellect does not move the will either physically or morally, but only representatively and counselingly, in the way that has been explained above. Indeed the will moves the intellect by command and precept, converting or averting it toward whatever it wills and pleases it. Moreover the will is formally free and mistress of its own acts and of the other faculties subject to it; it is the cause of merit and beatitude. Hence Augustine (*13. Trin.*) offers that saying: "Blessed is he who has whatever he wills and wills nothing evil." Therefore the will excels the intellect in perfection and dignity. This also seems to have been sensed by the Angelic Doctor (*1. part., quest. 82, art. 3*), who says: "Although the knowledge of those things which are below us is more excellent than the love of them, yet the love of those things which are above us is nobler than their knowledge." Hence the same Doctor adds there that charity, which is in the will, is more excellent than the intellectual habits.

Objection I. The beatific action and operation surpasses all other actions and operations (*1. Ethic., 1*). But the knowledge and intuition of God is the beatific action and operation, as is evident from John 17: "This is eternal life, that they may know you." And this seems to be what the Stagirite asserts (*10. Ethic., 10*), placing happiness in the contemplation of abstract substances. Spiritual knowledge, vision, and contemplation are the action and operation of the intellect. Therefore, since from the nobler operation the nobler faculty is detected, it is plainly shown that the intellect precedes and surpasses the will.

First corollary: Wisdom, which is a habit of the intellect, is simply the noblest and most excellent (*4. and 6. Ethic. and 1. Metaphysica, 1*). **Second corollary, from (*1. pol., cap. 1, 3*):** The intellect rules and commands the appetite. Therefore it is the noblest of the faculties of the soul.

I grant the major premise. To the minor I say that the vision of God is indeed the worthiest and most excellent among the operations of the intellect — but not when it is compared to the fruition of God; for the latter surpasses the former, and in it the formal beatitude of the blessed principally consists. And

this is the operation of the will. The same must be said in reply to the first corollary. To the second: the discussion there is of the sensitive appetite, over which the intellect in a certain manner seems to rule and command, since it is seeing and knowing.

Objection pressed further. One who sees and knows excels the blind and ignorant. But the intellect sees and knows, while the will is blind and ignorant. Hence arose that saying: the will is not carried to the unknown — for it is necessary that the intellect illuminate the will and show it objects so that it can will or not will or decline to will them. Therefore the intellect is to be set before the will. If the major premise is admitted, to the minor I say that the will is not blind and ignorant, but non-seeing and non-knowing — because the will itself is not capable of vision and knowledge, but of volition and fruition, which surpasses cognition and vision.

Objection pressed yet further. St. Augustine (*lib. 22. contra Faustum, cap. 37*) writes: "In the reason of man, in part active, in part passive, contemplation is certainly to be preferred." I satisfy this by saying it holds within the range of the acts of the intellect, but not outside — as is evident from the fruition of the divine essence, which is an act of the will surpassing all acts of the intellect.

Objection II. The faculty that regulates the rest is nobler and more eminent than they, because the rule surpasses in nobility what is regulated. But the intellect regulates the will — for the will, when it follows the upright dictate of reason, operates well, while on the contrary it operates badly and is to be censured. Therefore the intellect is eminent over the will. If the major premise is granted, to the minor I say that the intellect indeed regulates the will by way of counsel, while the will rules the intellect by way of command. For the will is like a King and the intellect like a Jurist. And no one doubts that the King surpasses in nobility the Jurist who offers counsel to the King himself.

Objection pressed further. The will depends on the intellect — for nothing is willed that is not first known, but not vice versa. Therefore the will is ignobler than the intellect. If the antecedent is granted, the consequence is denied. For the composite depends on matter and form, yet each of these is more excellent than it. Likewise the intellect in understanding depends on the phantasm, yet the former surpasses the latter. Therefore the prior operation of the intellect, which is pre-required and presupposed for the operation of the will, neither diminishes nor harms the greater excellence and nobility of the will over the intellect.

Objection III. The faculty that has a more abstract and simple object is more excellent and pre-eminent. But the intellect has a more abstract and simple object than the will — since the object of the former is being as true, and of the latter being as good; but the true is more universal and common than the good. Therefore the intellect excels the will. I grant the major; I deny the minor. For I

observed above from Scotus that the object of the will extends as broadly as that of the intellect — namely, being taken in its full latitude and amplitude.

Question IV. On Memory.

Since memory, taken universally, is divided into sensitive and intellective, it pleases me to establish two articles in this question — in the former, discussion will be of sensitive memory; in the latter, of intellective memory.

Article I. Whether Sensitive Memory Exists and What It Is.

The Subtle Doctor in both his works (*4. dist. 45, quest. 3*) proceeds problematically in the decision of this article, proposing and resolving the arguments of both sides, both affirmative and negative, yet leaning toward the affirmative — to which Bassolis there, Vorilongus, and others adhere, preceded by Aristotle (*lib. de memoria et reminiscentia*) and Alexander of Hales (*2. p., quest. 69, art. 1, m. 3*), whom all recent authors follow.

Note I that memory admits of many acceptations, as may be observed in Bercharius (*partesecunda, verb. Memoria*), Aureolus (*1. dist. 3, art. 2*), and Scotus (*quest. 3, ante §. Ad argumenta in oppositum principalia, sub H. and in Report., quest. 4*), where he says that memory is most importantly taken in three ways. First, insofar as it is the conserver of species concerning past things as past, and Aristotle discusses memory so taken in (*lib. de memoria et reminiscentia*). Second, insofar as it is the conserver of species concerning absent things, whether those things exist in their own being or not but have been past. Third, insofar as it is a partial and less principal productive principle of some knowledge — in which sense an intellect having such a current species is called fruitful memory, because in this way it can go forth into the act of knowing and understanding. Scotus discusses this sense extensively in the cited passage (*quest. 7*).

Note II, from Scotus in the fourth book at the places cited above, that a double object of memory is established: the remote and the proximate. The remote is that concerning which the one remembering at some point had an act — as one recalls a deceased friend with whom he long lived in familiar and holy intimacy. The proximate is a past act — as when I recall a past lesson that I recited. Such an act is described as the near object of memory. But these belong to both kinds of memory, both sensitive and intellective, even though principally to intellective.

First Assertion: Sensitive memory exists in the brute and in man. The Doctor holds this with Aristotle in the passage cited above and (*1. Metaphysica, 1*): "Those endowed with taste and touch alone lack memory, such as shellfish." Therefore all other animals that possess all the senses participate in sensitive memory. It is proved, first: there is a distinct cavity and organ in the back of the head of an animal in which the memorative power and faculty resides, as I handed down in

Book IV, question 10, article I. And this is evident from anatomical dissection and indicated by Damascene (2. *de fide*, cap. 20).

Second: Brutes produce many effects, perform very many acts, and accomplish numerous works that evidently and plainly show that they possess sensitive memory. For they foresee and provide for themselves what is necessary to sustain and preserve their life — as the ant in summer gathers grains of wheat to eat in winter. A dog fawns upon and is attentive to the one who gives it bread, whom it recognizes when that person, having been absent, returns; but it hates and flees from the one who carries a stick and strikes it. A bird constructs its nest, lays eggs, feeds its chicks, and defends them from enemies. The elephant and some other animals are capable of being trained. These and similar things could not be accomplished by brutes without memory. Therefore sensitive memory is not to be denied to them.

Objection. All the things enumerated that brutes accomplish do not proceed from the fact that they possess memory, but from the apprehension of something pleasurable or distressing. The ant finds pleasure in collecting grains of wheat; the dog is distressed when struck with a stick. Likewise the bird takes pleasure in constructing its nest and feeding its chicks, but is distressed at their removal and destruction. Therefore all those things can be said to be done by brutes through industry and the guidance of nature, not because they are practiced in memory. This, however, while not impossible and not improbable, it is nevertheless better to attribute memory to them, as more effectively and evidently suggested and demonstrated by what has been adduced for its defense than by its opposite, as Scotus admits, cited just now, at the end of the first article, in defense of Aristotle.

Third: Those that use reason and the intellect participate in intellectual memory. Therefore those capable of sense and endowed with imagination do not lack sensitive memory. The consequence holds: memory is retentive and preserving of species; intellectual memory retains and conserves intelligible species; therefore it belongs to sensitive memory to retain and conserve sensible species. But we experience that brutes have such sensible species. Therefore they also have sensitive memory. Finally, nature does not fail in necessities (3. *animae*, 45). But memory is necessary for brutes, so that goods once known and past they may pursue again, and evils and harmful things once past they may avoid again — and so as not to fall again into the adverse encounters that have been experienced — and to preserve and maintain their life. But unless they had species of past things and recalled them, they could not foresee and avoid future harms and dangers threatening them.

Second Assertion: Sensitive memory is described as the retentive power of past sensible species. The same thing is arrived at by the definition of sensitive memory given by Aristotle (*lib. de memoria*) and by Scotus, cited above (§. *Contra istam quaestion. C.*). This assertion and definition is easy to prove, since it consists

of genus and difference expressed through the preceding particles, and contains nothing diminished or superfluous, as is evident to one who reflects.

Objection I against the first assertion. Memory regards time as past, as Aristotle testifies (*lib. de memoria*). But time is the number of motion according to before and after (*4. Phys., 101*), which cannot be brought about without a comparison of one to another. But comparison is not of the senses but of the intellect. It follows therefore that memory does not belong to the sensitive part. I respond with Aristotle (*cited*) that in the same sense in which magnitude is perceived, time is also perceived, even though it is successive. For continuous motion is successive and perceptible by sense (*2. animae, 64*). And although time is a number, it is nonetheless also perceived by sense, since number is referred to among per se sensibles, as is evident in the passage just cited (*T. 64*).

Objection II. If there were sensitive memory, it would be convertive and reflexive upon itself and its own act, because the sensitive faculty would recall a past act, which belongs to a recollective faculty. But this pertains to the intellect, which alone is established as the reflexive and comparative faculty — comparing one object to another object, one of its acts to another act, and reflecting upon itself. Therefore sensitive memory is not to be admitted. It may be said that sense knows its own act — as sight knows vision — and that the recollective faculty knows a past act, because the recollective power differs from the sensing power: partly because it has a distinct organ from the latter, as is evident in anatomy; and partly because all animals are indeed sensitive but not all are recollective, as I observed above from Aristotle (*1. Met., 1*). Moreover, the sequel of the major premise can be denied. For although sense knows the prior and posterior, the present act concerning a present object and the past act through the species retained of an absent object — as is clear from the imagination — nevertheless it does not rightly follow that sense itself is a reflexive and comparative faculty, because it does not reflect upon itself nor does it compare one to another, as the intellect does, which is the collative and comparative faculty, as the Doctor rightly saw (*in Rep., cited, ad 2*).

Objection III. An ant generated this year, which has not yet experienced winter scarcity, gathers and piles up grains of wheat just as one three years old. Likewise a one-year-old bird constructs its nest just as another four years old. Therefore the ant and bird lack memory, since they cannot recall what they have not experienced. And accordingly, if they do anything, it is to be attributed not to memory but to natural instinct. I respond that this can indeed not improbably be attributed to natural instinct, but it is more fittingly and truly adapted to memory, as is made plain by what is accomplished by perfect brutes, especially those capable of being trained.

Article II. Whether Intellectual Memory Exists and Whether It Is Distinguished from the Intellect.

Some, cited by Scotus in the article above (*art. 24*), seem to deny intellectual memory and acknowledge only sensitive memory. But the common opinion is that of Scotus there, Bassolis, Vorilongus, Cavellius (*disp. 3, sect. 2*), Poncius (*disp. 63, quest. ult.*), and others admitting intellectual memory distinct from sensitive. Whether intellectual memory is a third faculty distinct from the intellect and will, however, is disputed by the Scholastics. Some, cited by Ruverius (*Tract. de actu intellectus possibilis, quest. 5, dub. 3*), hold that they are distinct faculties. Others, such as Bassolis (*4. dist. 45, quest. 1, §. Ad propositum*), Ockham (*quest. 12*), Durandus (*1. dist. 3, quest. 3*), Argentina (*2. dist. 39, quest. un., art. 1*), and St. Thomas (*1. part., quest. 79, art. 7*), teach that intellectual memory does not differ from the possible intellect. And Scotus does not dissent from them, both in the passage cited and in (*Quol. 15*).

Note that for remembering there is required some past act, which together with its object is established as the object of memory. But three things in memory must be representative: first, the intelligible species, which represents the thing of which there is memory. Second, the intention, which represents the past act of knowing. Third, the time in which we knew that thing. There are likewise three things represented: the known thing, the time in which the thing was being known, and the act of knowing the thing itself.

Assertion: Intellectual memory properly exists. So Scotus, cited above, and (*1. dist. 3, quest. 6*). It is proved, first, from Aristotle (*lib. de memoria et reminiscencia, near the beginning*): "We remember certain intelligible things — as that a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles — and this because we learned and speculated about it." But the act of learning and speculating is past, which belongs to intellectual memory. Therefore in the Peripatetic school intellectual memory is to be admitted. And it is indicated in (*3. anima, 8*). Augustine gives his support (*10. Conf., cap. 8* and following), as does Gregory (*near the end of 4. moral.*); and it accords with sacred scripture (*Luc. 16*): "Son, remember that you in your lifetime received good things, and likewise Lazarus evil things."

Second: Intellectual memory belongs to that faculty to which the act of recalling belongs. But the act of recalling belongs to the intellectual faculty. Therefore so does intellectual memory. The major premise is evident, since by an act we come to know a faculty. The minor is evident from the act by which someone understands that he once demonstrated that a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles, as I was just saying from Aristotle, and from the act by which a sinner recalls that he has not kept the commandments of God. These and similar things do not belong to sensitive memory, since the sense is incapable of demonstration and knowledge. Therefore they are adapted to intellectual memory, and so intellectual memory is to be admitted.

Objection. Nothing is in the intellect that was not first in the sense. Therefore if there is any act of remembering, it is to be attributed not to intellectual but to sensitive memory. I say that the antecedent is to be explained representatively

and by way of occasion, not per se and effectively. For the intellect does not understand unless the sense presents and offers phantasms or sensible species to it; yet the efficient cause of the act of understanding is not the sense but the intellect. Likewise, although intellective memory pre-requires and presupposes sensitive memory, nevertheless the former is distinguished from the latter with respect to being and the act of remembering.

Third: It is the intellect that clearly and distinctly knows and distinguishes the past from the future, compares the past with the present, and turns itself to its own past act upon which it reflects. But these things cannot be accomplished without intellective memory, since the sense cannot compare one to another, nor reflect upon its own past act. Therefore intellective memory is to be admitted.

Objection. Sight perceives itself seeing and knows its own vision, as the Doctor says (4. dist. 45, quest. 3, §. *De secundo art.*) from (2. *de anima*), cited by him. Therefore sense is a convertive and reflexive faculty upon itself, and accordingly sensitive memory suffices for the act of remembering. I say that sight accomplishes this because vision is in some manner colored, not because sight is a reflexive faculty — except improperly and imperfectly, as Bassolis notes there.

Fourth: In the sensitive part there is sensitive memory, as established in the preceding article. Therefore in the intellective part there also remains intellective memory. The consequence holds: the intellect can perceive whatever the sense perceives, and much more, since it is a more excellent and eminent faculty. But the sense possesses memory; therefore the intellect does too. Again, the separated soul possesses memory, as is recorded in Luke 16, cited above. Therefore so does the soul when conjoined. Finally, intellective memory is attributed to God and the angel, who are intellective. Therefore it is not to be denied to man, who possesses an intellective soul.

Second Assertion: Intellective memory is not distinguished from the possible intellect either really or formally. Deduced from Scotus in the passages just named. It is proved, first: it belongs to the nature of intellective memory to be the preserving place of intelligible species, their treasury and storehouse. But the patient intellect performs this function, as Aristotle testifies (3. *anima*, T. 7), calling the patient intellect itself "the place of forms" — namely of species — and (T. 18) "the intellect that becomes all things," meaning that this intellect receives in itself all intelligible species and all acts of understanding, which it produces, some of which are past and which the intellect itself remembers. Therefore intellective memory does not differ from the patient intellect.

Second: Entities are not to be multiplied without necessity (1. *Phys.*, 52). But one and the same intellective faculty suffices for understanding and for remembering. Therefore memory is not separated from the intellect. The major premise is admitted by all. The minor is shown: the same intellect altogether

apprehends and understands, judges, affirms, denies, and reasons. Therefore the same intellect receives intelligible species and retains and conserves them; and the same intellect produces the act of understanding and conserves it, receives a habit, and uses it when the occasion arises. It exercises various and different functions: for insofar as it produces the act of understanding, it is called intelligence; insofar as it has the species together with the present object, it is called fruitful memory; likewise when it recalls its past acts of understanding, it is called the recollective and memorative faculty, and absolutely memory.

This can be illustrated by one and the same vessel, which receives water into itself, retains it, and conserves it. And by the same imagination, which perceives both present and absent things; and by the same common sense, which attains all the objects of the external senses. Moreover, the same intellect knows things in the being of real existence and in known and objective being, and knows time, its parts and differences; and it investigates, penetrates, and surveys all beings both past and present. It is therefore concluded that the same faculty altogether is both intellective and memorative, just as it is apprehensive, judicative, and discursive.

Objection I against the first assertion. Aristotle in (*lib. 6. de memoria et reminiscentia*) hands down only sensitive memory, and Damascene (*2. fidei, cap. 20*) agrees. Therefore intellective memory is not to be imported into the schools. I respond that Aristotle indeed admits sensitive memory but does not deny intellective memory — indeed he explicitly teaches it not far from the beginning of his text there cited, which we adduce in our favor in the first assertion. Though he handed down much more about sensitive memory than intellective. Damascene, cited, can be explained in the same way.

Objection II. Memory is of the past as past. But the intellect is not of the past as past, because the past is singular, which is not understood by the intellect. Therefore and so on. I grant the major; I deny the minor and its proof. For the intellect, although said absolutely to be of universals — because universals are perceived by the intellect and not by the sense — yet the intellect itself understands singulars, not only present but also past. And universals can also be past, namely those that existed in the minds of past men, such as Aristotle, Scotus, and others.

Objection III. If intellective memory existed, the Blessed who at some time sinned while living in this world would recall, or at least could recall, their sins committed. Either, then, they would take delight in recalling them and be evil, or they would detest and grieve over them and be miserable. But neither is to be admitted. I may say, with St. Gregory (*in Psalm. 87*), that in the Blessed the recollection of sins is not unto sorrow and punishment but unto joy and exultation, and to the magnification of divine mercy, because they were freed from those sins. Or say that a vehement pleasure and delight, as established in (*7. Eth., cap. ult.*), excludes all misery. Since, then, the Blessed are affected by the

greatest delight in infinite and eternal beatitude, they are immune from all misery that could follow from the memory of past evils and sins.

Objection IV against the second assertion. St. Augustine (*11. de genesi ad lit., cap. 35*) writes that in one body there is one soul and three powers: intellect, will, and memory. But intellect and will are two faculties distinct either really or formally. Therefore memory is a third faculty distinct from those two. I respond, following Scotus (*1. dist. 3, quest. 9, §. De tertio C.*), that Augustine is to be explained as referring not to three distinct faculties — as Augustine himself declares (*14. Trin., cap. 8*) — but as taking memory for the reception and conservation of species, intellect for actual intellection, and will for the act of willing. St. Thomas interprets him in the same way (*1. p., quest. 79, art. 7*).

Objection pressed further. The image of the most holy Trinity shines in the soul, and man is said to have been made in the image and likeness of God for no other reason than because, just as in the divine essence there are three really distinct persons, so in the soul there are three aforesaid really distinct faculties. Scotus responds (*1. dist. cited, §. De tertio*) and says that the aforesaid image consists in first and second acts simultaneously, which Augustine expresses (*15. Trin., near the end of cap. 6*) in these words: "In man there is found a Trinity: the mind, that is the soul, the knowledge by which it knows itself, and the love by which it loves itself." More in Scotus in the passage cited, and I treat this in the Tract on the knowability of God.

Question V. On the Motive Power of the Rational Soul.

Article I. Whether the Rational Soul Can Move Itself and the Body Which It Informs.

Man enjoys a twofold motive power: one organic and material, which belongs to the whole composite, and by which man moves himself with progressive motion, as do all other animals; the other inorganic and spiritual, which belongs to him by reason of the soul, and which — since it is peculiar and proper to the soul — is attributed to the soul itself even when separated from the body.

Assertion: The rational soul possesses a motive power by which it can move itself from place to place and the body which it informs. This is Scotus (*2. d. 42, quest. 4, §. Ad quaestionem secundam N. and d. 16, quest. un.*), preceded by Augustine (*1. 83, 99, q. 8*). It is argued, first, from the soul of Christ the Lord, which, as is held in the Apostles' Creed, descended to the lower regions. But the soul of Christ is a rational soul, since Christ himself was a true and perfect man. Therefore the rational soul can move itself locally. This can be corroborated from the angels, to whom the soul is likened, who — as is had in sacred scripture — executing the commands of God descend to earth and ascend to heaven.

Second: What belongs to the inferior and more imperfect belongs to the superior and more perfect, by the argument from the lesser to the greater. But

the motive power belongs to the sensitive soul — since living things are moved locally, and the soul is the principle of vegetating, sensing, and moving from place to place. Therefore the motive power is accommodated to the soul.

Third: To every passive potency there corresponds an active one, as Scotus excellently pursues (*in prol.*, *quest.* 1). But the soul is in passive potency to existing in this or that place, since it cannot exist everywhere. Therefore there belongs to it an active potency by which it can acquire this or that place. Moreover, the body informed by the soul is moved from place to place, while the body not informed by the soul is not moved with progressive motion. Therefore the soul possesses a motive faculty and power by which it can move itself and the body which it informs.

Objection. Act and potency at the same time in one and the same thing with respect to the same are opposed. Therefore the same soul cannot simultaneously be in act and in potency with respect to its own motion. But if the soul could move itself, it would simultaneously be in potency and in act — in act because nothing can move itself unless it is in act; in potency because it would tend toward the motion and place it strives to acquire. I distinguish the antecedent: of objective act and potency, I grant it; of subjective act and potency, I deny it. For the same Peter who has a receptive potency for whiteness receives whiteness itself, which is his accidental act. Therefore, the soul moving itself to some location can be said to be in virtual act and in formal potency.

Article II. Whether the Motive Power Is Distinguished from the Other Faculties and Powers of the Soul.

Some, among whom is Ferrariensis (2. *contra Gentes*, c. 82), confound the motive power with the imagination and the practical intellect. Others, cited by Ruverius (3. *de anima*, *Tract. de voluntate*, c. 13), hold that the motive power is the sensitive appetite together with the executive faculty, so that they are two partial principles integrating one total principle of moving. But the common opinion is that of Mayronis (1. d. 43, *quest.* 2), Durandus, and other Scholastics, teaching that the motive and executive power differs from the intellect, will, and the other powers and faculties of the soul.

Note that the motive power is sometimes without prior cognition, and is called the natural motive power, which is found in the heart when it is dilated or contracted, and likewise in animals fixed to rocks. But sometimes the motive power acts with appetite and with prior cognition for the purpose of pursuing what is beneficial or fleeing what is harmful, and this is called the progressive power, by which an animal moves from one place to another. This is what the present difficulty concerns. This power is divided into the organic and the inorganic. The organic belongs to corporeal animate beings, and the inorganic or spiritual is adapted to spiritual living beings, namely the angel and the rational soul.

First Assertion: The motive power is not the imaginative sense, nor the practical intellect. Inferred from the Doctor (*4. d. 10, quest. 7, §. Respondeo*). The first part is shown: all animals possess some sense, at least touch (*1. Met., 1*), since touch is the sense necessary for an animal, as I said in the question on touch. But some animals lack the motive power, as is evident from those fixed to rocks. Therefore the motive power is not a sense — whether imagination or another sense.

The second part is evident: God is most especially endowed with intellect, yet is devoid of motive power. Moreover, the intellect, if it is speculative, rests in the sole contemplation of the thing; if practical, it is directed toward the guidance of action. But both kinds of knowledge are generated without the motive power. Therefore in no way is the motive power the intellect, whether practical or speculative.

Second Assertion: The motive power is not the sensitive appetite. Scotus does not disagree (*cited* and *2. d. 42, quest. 4, §. Ad quaestionem 2. N.*). It is proved, first: all animals participate in the sensitive appetite, even though some lack the motive power, as I was saying in the first assertion. Therefore the motor force is not the aforesaid appetite. Second: the appetite seems to be nothing other than an inclination and propensity of a thing toward having and possessing something — which is not what the motive power is; otherwise all those enjoying such an appetite would possess the motive power, which is false. Therefore the aforesaid appetite is not the motive power.

Third Assertion: The motive power is an executive faculty formally distinct from the other faculties of the soul. Scotus does not disagree (*cited above*). It is proved, first: the motive power in angels is distinct from their intellect and will. Therefore also in men, since the same reasoning applies in both cases. The antecedent is proved by the Parisian article: "If anyone says that the angel moves the heavens through intellect or will — error." Brutes are devoid of intellect and will, yet they are not without motive power. Therefore this is distinguished from the other faculties of brutes. Furthermore, someone might wish to move but will not move, since his will is not impeded but his motive power is. Therefore this differs from the will and the other powers and faculties of the soul.

Objection I. Aristotle (*3. animae, from text 44 to 15*) seems entirely engaged in establishing that the imagination together with appetite is the motive and executive power. Therefore in the Peripatetic school no other principle of progressive motion in an animal is to be devised. I respond that Aristotle indeed writes that imagination assists the progressive faculty by way of directing, and that appetite aids it by way of weight and propension — but that it is not itself the motive and progressive power, which I taught in the third assertion.

Objection II. The same judgment is to be rendered concerning the motive power of the angel as of the rational soul. But the former does not differ from

the intellect and will of the angel. Therefore neither does the latter. The major premise presents no difficulty. The minor is evident: the angel moves locally through the command of its will. I grant the major and deny the minor and its proof, as I showed at length in the Tract on Angels. And in the third assertion I adduced the articles of the Sorbonne University to confirm and corroborate this.

Objection III. What can be done by fewer means is done in vain by more (*1. Phys., T. 52*). But the rational soul can move locally without a third faculty distinct from the intellect and will. Therefore no other faculty distinct from them is to be asserted. The major premise is denied by no one. The minor seems evident, since only three faculties of the soul are commonly enumerated: intellect, will, and memory — as may be seen in Augustine (*11. de Genesi, ad lit., c. 35*). I grant the major and deny the minor. For the reasons set forth above show sufficiently evidently and effectively that a motive power distinct from those enumerated must be admitted.

Question VI. On the Separated Soul.

The state of the separated soul is the state that the rational soul has when it is separated from the body. For when it is joined to the body, the body weighs it down — the body that is mortal and corruptible, according to Wisdom 9: "The body which is corrupted weigheth down the soul." The soul itself, however, is immortal and incorruptible. Therefore the state it enjoys when separated from the body is called the state of the separated soul, of which the Scholastics treat: Scotus (*4. d. 45, quest. 2*), Major (*ibid. quest. 4*), Mayronis (*d. 46, art. 2, quest. 1. 2. 3. 4*), Aureolus (*d. 45, quest. un.*), St. Bonaventure (*d. 50, art. 1*), Richard (*art. 1, 2*), Bassolis (*d. 43, quest. 3*), and the rest in that place.

Article I. Whether the State of the Separated Soul Is Natural.

St. Thomas (*1. p., quest. 89, art. 11*) and his disciples there, and Henry (*Quol. 7, quest. 13*), assert that the state of the separated soul is violent or contrary to nature, as Thomas testifies (*4. contra Gentes, cap. 79*). The Conimbricenses (*Tract. de anima separata, disp. 2, art. 2*) think that the aforesaid state is neither natural nor violent, but beside nature. But Scotus (*in the passage cited, §. De tertia propositione K. and Quol. 3, quest. Ad argumentum principale MM.*), Lychetus, Bassolis, and others hold that such a state is natural.

Note I, from Scotus (*1. d. 3, quest. 3, §. Sed restat G.*), that a state is described as a stable permanence confirmed by the laws of divine wisdom. It is divided into the state of the way and the state of the homeland. The former is the state in which God has established what is to be done by us as long as we live in this age. The latter is the state in which the same God has decreed what is to be accomplished after this life, in Heaven. In the present state, the internal senses do not perceive things unless the external senses have first attained them, and

the intellect does not understand unless with the prior cognition of the said senses. Hence there is the common saying of the Philosophers: nothing is in the intellect that was not first in the sense; and one who understands must contemplate phantasms. Therefore the higher faculties presuppose the operations of the lower faculties, and there is a union and harmony among them in operating, which does not seem absolutely necessary, since angels do not understand in this way, nor do the Blessed in Heaven endowed with a glorified body. Perhaps this befalls us in this life on account of original sin, as Augustine signifies (15. *Trin.*, *ult.*): "What is the cause that you cannot gaze with a fixed eye upon that light itself? Unless it be infirmity. And who made that infirmity for you? Unless it be iniquity."

Note II, from the same author in the fourth book cited above, that natural inclination is twofold: one toward the first act, which is the inclination of the imperfect toward the perfect, and which accompanies the essential potency. The other is toward the second act, which accompanies the accidental potency, since it is of the perfect toward communicating its perfection. The opposite of the former is violent and not perpetual, because it posits a perpetual imperfection, which Aristotle considered an inconvenience, as it removes all perfection from the universe. The latter, however, imports nothing violent, even if it is perpetually suspended, since it does not entail imperfection. This latter inclination belongs to the soul with respect to the body. Furthermore, it is to be recalled from Book III, Physics, question 1, article 2, what the natural, the violent, and the neutral or beside-nature are. With these presupposed and premised:

First Assertion: The state of the separated soul is neither violent nor beside nature. The assertion has two parts and is inferred from the Doctor cited. The first part is proved, first, from (3. *Eth.*, c. 1): the violent is defined as that whose principle is outside, with no concurrence of the patient — that is, where the patient does not resist. But the soul does not resist the state of separation, since that state is nobler and more perfect — as it belongs to the angel and to God. For in that state it understands and perceives things more clearly and distinctly. Hence there were Philosophers who said that the soul was attached to and mingled with the body as a punishment for sin.

Second: Nothing violent is perpetual (2. *caeli*, c. 3, T. 17). But in that state the soul exists perpetually, since it is immortal and incorruptible. Therefore that state is in no way to be reckoned violent.

Third: If the soul existed violently outside the body, the resurrection of the dead would be natural — for it would tend naturally toward union with the body and could thus unite itself to the body on its own, just as a stone when not impeded and existing above tends by its own nature toward its center. But the resurrection is supernatural, capable of being accomplished by God alone, as the Theologians cited above teach. Therefore the aforesaid state is not violent.

The second part is argued, first: that is beside nature or neutral for something which neither profits nor harms it. But the state of separation profits the soul, because it is perfected, exists freely, no longer bound to the senses and conjoined to matter, and perceives objects more openly and clearly. Second: what is neutral and beside nature is neither natural nor violent. But in the next assertion it will be shown that the aforesaid state is natural. Therefore it is not neutral and beside nature.

Second Assertion: The state of the separation of the soul can be called natural. The Doctor holds this in the passage cited. It is proved, first: that state is natural in which the soul is perfected and ennobled. For the natural is that toward which a thing tends by its own nature, as being its ultimate perfection and highest happiness, which it acquires in that state in which it is assimilated to the angel — since it understands without a phantasm and without dependence on the body. That state is therefore to be considered natural.

Second: What is not natural is not lasting (*2. caeli, 15*). But this state is lasting. Indeed, if God at the Resurrection were not to join the soul to the body, the soul itself would persist forever separated from the body. For no created agent can unite it to the body, as the aforesaid Scholastics teach. Not incongruously, therefore, that state is described as natural.

Objection I. A part outside the whole remains violently, since it is ordered toward constituting and completing the whole. But the separated soul is a part outside the whole — namely man. Therefore in the said state it is disposed violently. I distinguish the major: concerning a part that receives its perfection from the whole, I grant it; concerning a part that communicates its perfection to the whole, I deny it — such as is the rational soul.

Objection II. The soul naturally tends toward union with the body. Therefore the state of the soul outside the body is violent. The antecedent is proved from St. Augustine (*22. de Civ., c. 26*), citing Virgil (*6. Aeneid*) singing from Plato: "Again they begin to wish to return into bodies." And the same Augustine (*12. de gen. ad lit., c. 1*), adduced above from Orbellus (*d. 49, quest. un.*), writes that in the soul separated from the body there is a certain natural appetite for administering a body, by which it is in some way held back from tending with its whole intention toward God. Add Scotus (*4. d. 49, quest. 3, F.*): "Some appetite for the body exists in the soul as toward what is properly perfectible by it." I distinguish the antecedent: concerning the inclination toward the first act, I grant it; concerning the inclination toward the second act, I deny it. So are to be expounded the testimonies of Augustine and Scotus adduced for the confirmation of the antecedent. Or I say that the soul enjoys a twofold natural inclination: one when it is united to the body, so as to acquire its perfection through the use of the senses; the other when it exists separated — for in that state, free from matter, it is more perfected and already satiated, from the union with the body once accomplished, toward which it no longer inclines. Just as a

fetus that has emerged from the womb no longer tends back toward it — as, following Avicenna, the Doctor defends (*4. prememorato*). Or say that the soul indeed inclines toward a body rightly disposed and well organized, but not toward a body ill-disposed, corrupted, and reduced to ashes, as happens in the state of separation. Add what I said in Book II, Physics, question 2, article 4, doubt 3.

Objection III. Death is contrary to nature, since it destroys it. But death occurs through the separation of the soul from the body. Hence adverse qualities clash so that the soul may exit from the body, and so great is the pain and horror of man at that time. I respond that death and the other things just enumerated do not regard the soul, which is immortal and incorruptible, but the whole composite which is man, who perishes, is dissolved, and returns to the earth.

Article II. What Belongs to the Separated Soul.

First Assertion: Material and organic faculties do not belong to the separated soul. Defended by the Doctor (*4. d. 45, quest. 3, §. Ad quaestionem sub M.*). It is proved, first, from Aristotle (*1. animae, T. 64* and *lib. de sensu et sensili, c. 1*), asserting that organic and corporeal faculties belong to the whole composite such as man is, not to the soul which is its part. Second: the aforesaid faculties are constituted from the perfection of the mixed body and of the soul united to it. But when the soul is separated, the body is corrupted, together with those things that follow upon it — among which are the said faculties. Therefore the soul separated from the body is devoid of those aforesaid powers and faculties.

Second Assertion: Inorganic and immaterial faculties reside in the separated soul. So the Doctor, cited just now. It is proved, first: things that are really identified with each other cannot be separated from each other, even by divine power — since separability is a plain sign of real distinction, as I have frequently insisted in the foregoing. But spiritual faculties are really identified with the soul and with each other, as I showed (*1. 2. de anima, quest. 3, 4, 2*). Therefore they persist in the separated soul.

Second: The subject remaining, those things that are in the subject also remain, unless some corrupting cause is present. But in the state of separation the soul persists, which is the subject of the said faculties. Therefore the very faculties persist, since no cause can be adduced that corrupts and destroys them.

Third: A form is not found without its operation and principle of operating — as the form of fire without heating and its principle of heating and causing, and water without cooling and its principle and efficient cause, as is evident (*2. caeli, T. 17*). But the rational soul is a form — indeed the most perfect of forms — and its operation is intellection and volition, and the principle of each is intellect and will. Therefore in the state of separation, which is a state of perfection, the soul is not deprived of any of these.

Fourth, it is shown individually, concerning all the powers and faculties of the same soul: first, concerning the recollective and memorative power (*question 4 of this Book, article 2*); concerning the motive power (*ibid. question 5, article 1*); concerning the intellect and will, it is plainly evident, since the highest happiness is situated in the acts of these very faculties — namely in the vision of the intellect and the fruition of the will. Therefore these faculties remain in the separated soul.

Third Assertion: Intelligible species and intellectual habits not entailing imperfection remain in the state of separation, as do also the habits of the will. This assertion has two parts, to which Scotus gives his support (*4. d. 45, quest. 1, §. Alia opinio*). The first part is opposed to Poncius (*disp. 56, quest. 2, concl. 1*) and is proved, first, from (*3. animae, T. 6*): "The soul is the place of forms" — namely of intelligible species. But a place is preservative of what is in it. Therefore, since the intellect is the place of intelligible species and remains both in the state of conjunction and of separation, it is deduced that the said species persist in the separated soul.

Moreover, from Boethius (*5. de consolatione, prosa 5*): "Whatever is received is received in the manner of the receiver." But the soul is altogether immortal and incorruptible, from what has been asserted in the present Book, question 1, article 3. Therefore species received in it remain when it is separated from the body. And Avicenna (*naturalium, parte 1, cap. 6*) adds that the soul separated from the body understands more clearly and distinctly — which it could not do unless in its separated state it conserved species, since they concur partially in producing the acts of understanding. St. Jerome gives his support (*in prologo Bibliæ, c. 7, ad Paulinum*): "Let us learn on earth those things whose knowledge may persevere for us in Heaven." But knowledge, being of a conclusion, presupposes demonstrative premisses; the premisses pre-require terms, which are not perceived without the aforesaid species. Now if the knowledge acquired by us in this state with such great labor and sweat were not to remain in the other state, our study would be unworthy and vain, and our toil in seeking and exploring it fruitless, as the Doctor adds (*in the passage just cited C.*).

Second: Intelligible species are repugnant to neither state — whether of conjunction or of separation. Therefore they persevere in both. The antecedent for the state of conjunction is admitted by Poncius and others recalled by Aureolus and other Scholastics in the passage cited above. For the state of separation it is shown: the said species, even though in their coming-to-be they depend on phantasms, do not depend on them in their being. For they can exist — indeed they actually do exist without them — since they are in the intellect, which in its being does not depend on matter and material things (*3. animae, 6*). Therefore these species persist and endure in the soul.

Third: Such species are not instantaneous qualities but continuous and permanent, and nothing is contrary to them. Therefore if they here remain in

the intellect after the acts of understanding, they remain also there — since that state is not of worse condition, indeed of more perfect condition than this; otherwise the soul would be saddened at their admission, in the acquisition of which it spent so much time and study. The antecedent is admitted, since neither the intellect is opposed to them — as it is their seat and subject — nor the object, since from this the species take their origin. And nothing is both productive and simultaneously destructive of one and the same thing.

Fourth: If the inferior faculty accomplishes something, the superior likewise can accomplish it — as if sight perceives color, likewise the common sense and the intellect perceive and know it. But the imagination, which is an inferior faculty, conserves species of absent things, as is evident in dreams. Therefore the intellect also retains and conserves species of known things when it is separated from the body.

Moreover, the separated soul possesses memory and reminiscence, from what was said in question 4, article 2 of this book, which cannot exist without intelligible species retained and conserved in the intellect. Hence the rich man of the parable (*Luc. 16*) recalled his five brothers who were still living in this world.

The second part is evident: charity, which is a habit of the will, perseveres in both states, according to (*1 Cor. 13*): "Charity never fails." Moreover, a perfect state calls for a perfect habit. But charity is a perfect habit — indeed the most perfect and excellent among all habits, whether intellectual or moral. Therefore it remains in the separated soul. Hence from this an argument is drawn to prove the first part of this assertion: if moral habits persist in the will of the separated soul, likewise intellectual habits that do not carry with them imperfection repugnant to that state persist in the intellect of the same soul.

Fourth Assertion: The separated soul can understand something new that it did not understand in the body. So Scotus (*cited above, quest. 2, §. Ad quaestionem C. and in Report., §. Ad 2. quaestionem*). It is argued, first: from a natural agent duly approximated to the patient when not impeded, an effect is produced, as is evident from fire burning straw placed near it. But the separated soul is endowed with the agent and patient intellect, to which an angel or some other object previously unknown but now known and understood presents itself. For the sufficient and total principle for generating knowledge and intellection is the cognitive faculty and the object in itself or in a species representing it. Therefore, since the separated soul has all of this, it is plainly shown that it can acquire for itself knowledge of something previously unknown to it.

Second: The soul of a child that died after a short time of life has no knowledge of any object — for in the body it exercised only vegetative and sensitive operations. But that soul separated from the body is not like a stump incapable of intellection, because it possesses agent and patient intellect. Therefore it can

acquire for itself intellection of some object. And if the soul of a child can do this, it is not to be denied to the soul of an adult or any other, since they are of the same nature and essence.

Third: What participates in a nobler and more eminent mode of being has a greater and more favorable manner of acquiring its own perfection. But the separated soul has a more excellent and superior mode of being, since it is separated from matter and from the imperfect state — for in that state it understands without the senses and phantasms to which it was bound when joined to the body. Therefore it is fitting that it can acquire for itself cognition of a previously unknown object.

Poncius objects, following St. Thomas (*4. d. 50, quest. 1*), that species are infused by God or by an angel, through which the soul arrives at cognition of unknown objects. On the contrary: without necessity and compelling reason, recourse is not to be had to God or abstract substances. For it ill befits a philosopher, when natural reasons and effective arguments are at hand — as in the present case — to have such recourse. For the separated soul has a sufficient principle for going forth into the act of understanding, since it possesses the intellect and a present object. If, for example, an angel presents itself to it, will the soul not be able to know it? If in the state of the way, through the motion of the heavens, it attained knowledge of it, will it lose that knowledge in the homeland and, when the angel is presented to it, not know it? For from object and cognitive faculty, knowledge is produced, as Augustine testifies (*9. Trin., c. 12*), from whom no Scholastic dissents. Moreover, the soul when conjoined can acquire for itself the species of things and understand them; and in the separated state, enjoying the same intellect and the other faculties belonging to it, will it be ignorant of them and be unable to attain some of them anew? This is assuredly false and absurd — that something having a natural and unimpeded principle of acting, and all else necessary for acting, should not act unless God or an angel exerts a special influence. The soul would be worse than inanimate things, which by a common influx perform their own works — as fire heats, water cools, and air moistens.

Objection. This comes from the soul's mode of understanding, since the soul itself understands in dependence on phantasms, and in that state it lacks phantasms — and therefore it then cannot understand anything unless species of things are furnished to it by God or an angel. On the contrary: that mode of understanding is not natural to the soul but befell it from original sin, as was said above. Moreover, if it arises from the connection of the lower faculties with the higher, and of the senses with the intellect, yet the higher faculty can accomplish something without the concurrence of the lower — as the imagination acts in dreams with the other senses, both external and internal, at rest. Therefore, since the intellect is superior, abstracted from the senses, it will be able to understand present and proportionate objects without a new influx and concurrence of God or an angel.

Furthermore, a man traveling in a carriage can travel on foot outside the carriage. And a man walking on a ship can likewise walk outside the ship — because in both cases he possesses the power of walking. So the soul in the body can acquire certain species of things and understand them; it can also do this outside the body, because in both states it participates in the same power of understanding.

Second: Sensible species from present sensible objects are caused in the sensitive and material faculties, for they are their natural similarities and images, and are offered by the imagination to the agent intellect, which transfers them from material being to spiritual being, as I said and explained in the proper place. Just as, therefore, the material objects themselves cause and present the said species to the senses, so they also present them to the agent intellect of the separated soul, which having that power in the state of separation, it plainly follows can have the same effect of transferring them from material being to spiritual being. And accordingly by those means, since they are spiritual, the soul can without doubt know and understand the objects represented through them.

Third: An angel can know something new through species derived from objects, as Augustine implies (*lib. de cura pro mortuis, c. 13*) and Gregory affirms (*12. Mor., c. 13*), from whom St. Thomas does not dissent (*1. p., quest. 89, art. 8*), conceding that an angel sometimes descends from heaven to investigate and examine certain things. Therefore the separated soul can do the same. Moreover, sensibles move the sense — as color the eye and sound the ear. Therefore spiritual things likewise move the intellect. Furthermore, an accident when conjoined acts — as the whiteness of a wall disperses sight. Separated from its subject, it likewise affects the sense — as the whiteness of the consecrated host disperses the same sight as if it were in its subject. Therefore the same must be asserted of the intellect of the separated soul as of the conjoined soul.

Objection I against the third assertion. (*1 Cor. 13*): "Knowledge shall be destroyed." But knowledge is one of the five habits of the intellect (*6. Eth., 3*). Therefore intellectual habits do not remain in the state of separation. I respond that the testimony of St. Paul adduced for the major is to be understood with respect to the partial and imperfect mode — not with respect to the substance of knowledge itself — as the Apostle himself declares a little later: "Now I know in part; but then I shall know even as I am known." For we shall no longer see God and the rest of the objects represented in his essence in an enigma and in a mirror, but face to face. Lyranus agrees with this, both there and in the epistle of Jerome to Paulinus (*cap. cited in the third assertion*).

Objection II, from (*3. animae, 39*): "As sense is related to sensibles, so is the intellect to intelligibles." But sense cannot know sensibles unless they exist as present. Therefore the intellect cannot know intelligibles unless they are present through phantasms. But in the state of separation there will be no phantasm,

since the soul will then be devoid of all the senses, as has been proved in the first assertion. Therefore the separated soul neither retains nor conserves intelligible species. I respond that Aristotle is to be understood of the state of conjunction, which alone he knew — not of the state of separation, in which the soul does not need a phantasm, since it has intelligible species already acquired, which are preserved in the possible intellect as in their treasury.

Objection III. The soul is united to the body so that through the use and service of the senses it may acquire cognition of things. Therefore in the state of separation, since it lacks all senses, it cannot acquire any knowledge of things — otherwise the soul's union with the body would be in vain. I deny the consequence. For the soul can acquire knowledge of things by a twofold path — namely in the state of conjunction and also in the state of separation — just as a goal can be acquired by two means, for example health by bathing and by a drink. If it is acquired by bathing, it does not follow that it cannot be obtained by a drink, but in either way. Likewise the soul can acquire for itself cognition of things both in the state of conjunction and in the state of separation.

Objection pressed further. Between the knower and the known there intervenes some proportion, as between the receiver and the received. But between the separated soul and a material object there is no proportion — since the latter is sensible and the former is not at all. And the spiritual cannot receive the material, nor can the latter act upon the former. Therefore the soul in that state can acquire no knowledge of a thing. I say that the agreement and proportion is not intercepted in entity but in intelligibility — that is, just as a material thing is intelligible, so the soul is intellective and understanding. Just as between the infinite God and the finite intellect there is no proportion in entity, but there certainly is in intelligibility — that is, just as God is knowable, so the created intellect is cognitive.

**Moral Philosophy of Fr. Bonaventure Columbi
of Nice, Minor Conventual, Doctor and
Professor of Sacred Theology. According to the
Mind of the Subtle Doctor.**

Moral Philosophy of Brother Bonaventura Columbi, Conventual Minor, Professor of Sacred Theology

Occasion of Writing

I have resolved to commit this Moral Philosophy to the press, both on account of its very great usefulness, delight, and dignity, which I described in the preceding pages, and also on account of the scarcity of writers in the Scotist school who have consigned it to print. For the older Scotists scarcely touched it as a matter of settled practice, and the more recent ones taste it but sparingly and superficially. This is perhaps because moral philosophy is easy to grasp, not heavily laden with speculative questions, or because what is treated therein is handled and examined almost entirely in Theology, especially in Book III of the Sentences and in the second part of the Summa Theologica. For this reason I have judged it fitting to examine and sift it clearly and precisely, yet briefly, so that those devoted to Scotist teaching may have a complete and finished philosophical course covering the whole of Scotism, together with the express passages and testimonies of the Subtle Doctor, either stated by him directly or derived and collected from him.

Preface

The first author and sower of Moral Philosophy is reported by Augustine (*8 City of God, ch. 3*) to have been Socrates, who, having set aside the study of natural things, gave himself entirely to moral questions and applied all his care and diligence to correcting and composing human conduct. And indeed it is the constant sense and consensus of all that the human race is ruled and governed by natural and moral law. Aristotle, moreover, wrote in (*1 Politics, 2*) that the man who is instructed by perfect law and follows it is the best of all living creatures; but the man drawn away from right law and good morals is the worst of all animals. And Seneca in the Natural Questions says: Virtue is not acquired except by a preceding guide and teacher; but vice is born without any instructor. Therefore Ethics — which, as a heavenly discovery and gift, is the true norm and mistress of good morals — is to be embraced and cultivated with great zeal; it lays open the way to virtue and closes the door to vices, it teaches how to moderate and restrain the passions of the soul, it shows what is just and what is unjust, urging us toward the one and bidding us flee the other, and at last it leads us onward to everlasting happiness and heavenly beatitude, in which may he deign to make us partakers who possesses the highest glory and infinite blessedness.

Book I: On the Prolegomena of Moral Philosophy

Three questions are set out and examined in this prelude. The first concerns the existence and names of Moral Philosophy. The second concerns its division and nature. The third concerns its object and the matter with which this Philosophy is engaged.

Question I: On the Existence and Names of Moral Philosophy

The first thing we investigate and examine concerning any proposed subject is whether it exists, as Aristotle instructs (*2 Posterior Analytics, 1*). Gladly accepting and eagerly following this instruction and precept, we have resolved to treat and explain briefly the existence of Moral Philosophy before we approach its other attributes and predicates.

Article I: Whether Moral Philosophy Exists

The assertion is that Moral Philosophy exists. The Doctor holds this position (*verf. Ideo dicitur sub E, and § Ad argumenta BB, and 4, dist. 14, q. 3, § Hic dicitur F*). It is proved, first, from the common consensus of the Philosophers, who unanimously and harmoniously teach and publish such a Philosophy. In support are Augustine (*8 City of God, ch. 5*), Plutarch (*2 On the Opinions of Philosophers, ch. 1*), and Aristotle (*in the fifth volume of his works*). Second, from the celebrated division of Philosophy into rational, natural, and moral — received by the Stoics, Peripatetics, and other Philosophers — against the flood of which it would seem imprudent and rash to set oneself. And from the common partition of science into speculative and practical, the latter of which is subdivided into active and productive, which Aristotle mentions (*6 Metaphysics, ch. 1*) and notes beforehand (*2 Metaphysics, T. 3*): the end of speculative science is truth, while the end of practical science is a work — which is either manual, pertaining to productive science, or moral, pertaining to Ethics. Moreover, just as Grammar was devised for speaking correctly, Rhetoric for speaking well, and Logic for arguing aptly, so Moral Philosophy — whose end is that we become good (*10 Ethics, 9; 1 Metaphysics, 2*) — must be conceded for the purpose of living well and happily.

First objection. Aristotle (*2 Metaphysics, T. 3*) and Scotus, defining Philosophy in the same passage, say: Philosophy is the science that contemplates truth. But Ethics brings about works rather than contemplating truth, as is evident from (*10 Ethics, 9*). Therefore, since the definition of Philosophy does not apply to it, Moral Philosophy ought not to be admitted. I reply that the said authors are speaking in that passage of speculative philosophy, not of practical philosophy, which is what Ethics is, as the text shows plainly and clearly a little further on:

the end of speculative science is truth, the end of practical is a work. Augustine demonstrates this learnedly and solidly (*11 City of God, ch. 25*), speaking of the Platonists: They establish a tripartite discipline of wisdom, of which one part is called Logic, another Physics, and the third Ethics. The Latin names of these are already confirmed in many writings, so that they are called rational, natural, and moral.

Second objection. There is one object common to all disciplines, as may be seen (*3 Metaphysics, T. 10*); since then the division of Philosophy and science is taken on the basis of things (*3 On the Soul, 51*), it does not seem that a Moral Philosophy distinct from the other disciplines needs to be devised. I reply that there is one common and transcendent object — namely, being — which Metaphysics alone contemplates, as Aristotle affirms (*4 Metaphysics, 1*). But beyond being, there are particular objects which the other sciences consider, as the Philosopher illustrates in the passage just cited with the example of the mathematical sciences, which are distinguished from Metaphysics by their particular objects. This he had already taught beforehand (*1 Ethics, ch. 6*), saying: There are many sciences even of those things which fall under a single name.

Article II: By What Names This Science Is Called

Just as Logic has several names, some proper and some figurative, as I made clear (*in the Epistle to the Dialectic, Book I, q. 1, art. 1*), so Moral Philosophy is assigned a great many terms, as Aristotle's commentators observe in the proem to the Ethics.

The assertion is that some names of this science are improper, others proper. This assertion is twofold and is derived from Scotus (*in the passages cited in the preceding article*). The first part is evident from the fact that, given the various and diverse functions and offices which moral philosophy performs, many names are adapted to it. It is called the mistress of life, the rule of morals, the medicine of the soul, and the beacon of the will, as Raconius develops elegantly (*in his first Proem to Moral Philosophy*). The second part is manifest. It is called civil philosophy, the origin of which is derived from the word City, of which the individual households, poor and rich, are parts, as the Philosopher writes (*4 Politics, 21*). It is also called practical philosophy, because it properly directs praxis, which is the operation of the will that can be conformed to the right dictate of reason, as I said (*in Logic, Book I, q. 3, art. 5, dub. 1*). It is again named Ethics, or moral philosophy, since it treats of morals, custom, and acquired habit, as Scotus notes above all others (*4, dist. 14, q. 3, § Hic dicitur F*), and as Aristotle intimates (*1 Magna Moralia, ch. 7*).

Objection. One thing participates in only one name, as is the case with man and other things to which Adam assigned names (*Genesis 2*); but Moral Philosophy is one by reason of the unity of its formal object, concerning which see the third question. Therefore it is to be designated by one name and not by several. The

major premise is denied. For nothing prevents one art or science, by reason of the diverse functions, offices, attributes, and predicates with which it is occupied, from acquiring several names, as is evident in the case of Logic and Metaphysics, which are distinguished by many terms, as has been delivered in the proper places. Dionysius supports this, who composed an entire work on the divine names, even though God is one and utterly simple. Jerome agrees (*Epistle 136*), who from the sacred text collects and sets out ten Hebrew names attributed to God himself. And concerning the Demon, Bernard understands that saying from the sixth Aeneid: "One to whom a thousand names belong, a thousand arts of harm."

Question II: On the Division and Nature of Moral Philosophy

Article I: How Many Species Moral Philosophy Has

To begin with, Ethics is divided into Monastic, Domestic, and Political philosophy. Monastic philosophy is concerned with the moral actions of the private individual; the word "monk" means alone or solitary. Domestic philosophy is engaged in the well-ordered governance of the household. Political philosophy is occupied with the right administration of the city and the governance of the commonwealth. Political philosophy is further subdivided into Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy. Monarchy is that form in which all things are subject to and governed by the command of one. Aristocracy is that in which all things are managed and governed by a few men distinguished by virtue and equity. Hence the Philosopher says in the first book of the Metaphysics that those endowed with intelligence ought to take precedence over others. Democracy is that in which the People has the power of governing and moderating all things.

First assertion: the common division of Moral Philosophy into Monastic, Domestic, and Political is correct. This is presupposed by the Doctor in the cited passage. It is proved, first, from Aristotle, who divided all his works on Moral Philosophy into ten books on Monastic philosophy, two on Domestic, and eight on Political. The stated division is therefore consistent with the doctrine of Aristotle. Second, moral operation is exercised around three goods: either about the private individual, and it is Monastic; or about the household, and it is Domestic; or about the city, province, or kingdom, and it is Political. Ethics is therefore rightly divided into the three named species.

Second assertion: Monastic philosophy precedes Domestic and Political in time, and Political philosophy is later than the two preceding in time, but excels them in dignity. The Doctor does not disagree in the same passage, and Aristotle accepts this (*1 Economics, ch. 1*). This assertion contains two parts. The first part is argued thus: a man must first know what is necessary for his own instruction

and governance, which belongs to Monastic philosophy, before he undertakes to regulate and order a household, which pertains to Domestic; and he must first become suited to governing a household before he is fit to administer a commonwealth. And in urging this, the Apostle Paul says (*1 Timothy 3*): If any man cannot govern his own household, how shall he have care of the Church of God? Moreover, besides God, love of oneself precedes love of others, as the Doctor teaches (*4, dist. 50, q. 2, § Respondeo*). And Aristotle indicates this (*2 Politics, 3*). Hence that common proverb: The first charity begins with oneself. David may have had this in view when he said (*Psalms 118*): My soul is continually in my hands. Gregory adds, concerning Job, chapter 8: Kings are those who know how to rule their own bodies, who temper in themselves the movements of desires, who regulate their thoughts under the law of virtue. They are kings because they preside over themselves; they know how to govern themselves. Solon the Athenian likewise says: Rule, where you have first learned to obey. For when you have learned to be ruled, you will know how to rule.

The second part is shown thus: the common good must be preferred to the particular good, since the former is more divine, as Scotus intimates (*1 Reportata, dist. 10, q. 1*) after Aristotle (*2 Magna Moralia, ch. 17*). Now Political philosophy labors about the common good, whereas Monastic and Domestic look to particular goods. Political philosophy therefore excels the others in dignity. Hence a man of noble birth scorns all things, even at the cost of himself and his entire household, in order to provide for, preserve, and defend the commonwealth from hostile assault.

Third assertion: Political philosophy is rightly divided into Democracy, Aristocracy, and Monarchy; and the last of these surpasses the other two. This assertion, which is divided into two parts, is not at odds with Scotus in the cited passage. The first part is argued thus: either all citizens are engaged in the governance of the commonwealth, and it is Democracy; or only those more outstanding in virtue and intelligence hold the care of the commonwealth, and it is Aristocracy; or one supreme figure stands above and presides over all, and it is Monarchy. There are therefore only three political species enumerated. Furthermore, just as in Logic every proposition is either universal, or indefinite, or particular, so governance is either entrusted to the people, or to those more excellent by virtue, or to one alone. If the first, it is Democracy; if the second, Aristocracy; if the third, Monarchy. No more and no fewer than these three political species need therefore be enumerated.

The second part is shown, first, from (*3 Politics*) and (*12 Metaphysics, 55*): Entities do not wish to be badly governed; therefore let there be one prince over all. Second, from the Fathers: Chrysostom (*Homily 34 on 1 Corinthians*): God gave us one head, namely Adam. For why are we all born from earth, since he did not make woman from earth? Because it would not have sufficed to impel us toward concord that we are similarly of the same essence, unless we also had the same

first parent. And Jerome, both (*in his first book against Julian*) and (*in his letter to the Monk Rusticus*): Cranes follow one in repeated order; there is one Emperor, one judge of a province; Rome as it was founded could not have two brothers as kings at the same time. Third, the Prince is the image and exemplar of God on earth and the moderator of things, as some report from Seneca; and Monarchy represents the dominion of God, which is one alone, according to that saying of (*Matthew 6*): No one can serve two masters. (*Jeremiah 12*): Many shepherds have destroyed. And (*John 10*): There shall be one fold, one shepherd. Moreover, (*2 Physics, 22*): Art imitates nature; but the governance of nature tends toward one, as the parts and members tend toward one body and the soul that vivifies and governs it, and the body and soul toward one animated composite; all the powers of the soul and of the whole animated compound are subjected to one — namely to the will or rational faculty. Among land beasts the Lion reigns, among aquatic creatures the Whale, among birds the Eagle, and over all living things man presides, as is evident from (*Genesis 1*): Have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the birds of the air, and over all living things that move upon the earth. Finally, the Lord of all is one God, as we read (*Apocalypse 19*): King of Kings and Lord of Lords.

First objection against the first assertion: Aristotle (*1 Magna Moralia, ch. 1*) numbers Ethics under Political philosophy. Therefore Ethics does not differ from Political philosophy, or at least is not more general and universal than it. I reply that Aristotle is there speaking by the figure of synecdoche, taking the part for the whole — that is, taking Political for all of Ethics. For designation commonly proceeds from the nobler part. Thus books are titled "On the Soul" even though their subject is the animated body, as I there taught. Similarly, Augustine (*2 Questions on the Gospels, q. 7*) uses "soul" in place of "man." And (*3 On the Harmony of the Evangelists, ch. 24*) he adds that it is the custom of Sacred Scripture to use the part in place of the whole. Therefore Moral Philosophy is called Political, because Political is its apex and towers above its other parts.

Second objection against the third assertion: In (*1 Kings 8*) the Israelites are rebuked by God because they asked him for a king. Therefore Monarchy, whose head is a King, is not more excellent and worthy than the others. I reply that the Israelites were not reproved by God for having asked for a king absolutely, but because they wished to exchange God himself, who was their King and who governed them through judges, for a king who would possess the kingdom as his own and transmit it to his sons by hereditary right. Therefore Augustine adds (*on Psalm 17*): It is well known that the people asked for a king not according to God's will but according to their own. And (*Book 5, Questions, q. 26*) citing Deuteronomy 17: To those desiring a king, God did not command it but permitted it.

Third objection: By nature we are not slaves but free. For God made man and left him in the hand of his own counsel (*Ecclesiasticus 8*). Therefore Democracy,

in which public liberty exists, is to be preferred to the others. I reply that the fact that we are free in the acts of our will does not prevent us from being subjected to and obeying one person for the good governance of the city, kingdom, and empire — one who has the power to restrain the wicked and reward the good. This Chrysostom expounds no less luminously than eloquently (*Homily 23 on Romans*): Since equality of honor and condition frequently produces conflicts and dissensions, God established many princeships and many subjections — of husband and wife, parent and child, old and young, slave and free, ruler and subject, teacher and student. And why do you marvel that he did this in man, when he did the same in our body? But this indeed to a lesser degree, that to a greater — here the commanding members, there the subjected ones. The same is to be seen in beasts, as in bees, cranes, and flocks of wild sheep. And even the sea is not without this discipline; there too many species of fish are governed and march under one, and they undertake their long migrations in this way. For that liberty which is dissolute and lacking in moderation is everywhere the cause of evil and confusion. You ask: who was the first king of all? I say, with Augustine (*1 Questions on Genesis, q. 121*), that in Israel it was Saul, as is evident from (*1 Kings 10*): And all the people cried out and said: Long live the king. I said "in Israel," for before Saul, kings are related to have flourished in other regions (*Genesis 14*), where Abraham defeated the kings who had taken Lot captive. And it is admitted among the chroniclers that Ninus, son of Belus, subjugated the peoples of all Asia, and he lived before Saul. Therefore Saul was not simply the very first who claimed the name of king for himself, as is clearly evident from the text just cited in chapter 8: Appoint us a king to judge us, as all the nations have. See further in Genebrard (*1 Chronology, pp. 17–18*).

Article II: Whether Moral Philosophy Is a Science

That Moral Philosophy is a true single habit of the intellect is something no one fails to know. It is indeed a habit by which the intellect judges what is to be embraced and what is to be avoided. But since, as was stated (*in Logic, Book I, q. 2, art. 1, Note 2*), five habits of the intellect are established and distinguished, it is rightly put in question which of those five habits is to be assigned to Moral Philosophy.

The assertion is that Moral Philosophy is a science. So holds Scotus (*q. 4 of the Prologue, § Ad argumenta principalia circa BB*). It is proved, first, from Aristotle (*2 Metaphysics, ch. 1, T. 3*) and (*6 of the same, ch. 1, T. 1*), where speculative and practical sciences are enumerated, among which Moral Philosophy holds a not insignificant place. Hugh supports this (*Book on the Formation of Novices*): The way to God is that science which pertains to instruction in living rightly and honorably. And Ockham demonstrates this at length (*Quodlibet 2, q. 14*). And Aegidius concludes (*1 On the Rule of Princes, ch. 3*): Through the intervention of this science man governs himself and acquires himself. Second, Moral Philosophy is a habit acquired through demonstration; therefore it is a science.

The consequence holds from (*1 Posterior Analytics*, 2) and (*6 Ethics*, 3). The antecedent is proved: many demonstrations are made in Ethics — for example: every supreme good is the ultimate end; but God is the supreme good; therefore he is the ultimate end. Again: everything consonant with reason is to be pursued; but virtue is a good consonant with reason; therefore it is to be pursued. Third, Ethics is one of the five habits of the intellect, as all concede; but it is not art, since art is a productive habit exercised through a bodily organ; nor is it the habit called understanding, which is acquired by the mere explication of terms; nor is it wisdom, which contemplates the highest causes; nor is it prudence, since boys can be proficient in Mathematics and Ethics even while lacking prudence — a point whose reason Aristotle gives (*6 Ethics*, 8): prudence is concerned with particulars, which become known to us through experience, of which boys have none. And some persons are adorned with Ethics and other disciplines yet are stripped of prudence, managing their affairs badly, as Raynaud notes specifically concerning Solomon (§ 4 of the *Prologue*, n. 41), and before him Aeneas Sylvius (*Epistle* 104).

First objection: Moral Philosophy, according to Augustine (*19 City of God*, ch. 3), is called the art concerned with life, or the art of honorable life; but art is a habit distinct from science (*6 Ethics*, 3). Therefore Moral Philosophy is not a science. I reply by explaining Augustine as using "art" in the broad sense, as Aristotle takes it (*1 Metaphysics*, 1), where he calls the mathematical disciplines arts, which are established as sciences proper — not in the narrow and proper sense of "art," which rightly differs from science, as the argument proves.

Second objection. The same Philosopher writes (*6 Ethics*, 8) that the habit of acting with right reason with respect to what is good or bad for man is prudence; but Moral Philosophy is of this sort; therefore it is prudence. I reply that the major premise is to be taken only with respect to things that are good or bad according to particular circumstances, since prudence concerns singular actions to be carried out and administered at the proper time and place, as Aristotle clearly intimates in the passage just cited — not with respect to what is good or bad in general, which pertains to Ethics. I add that prudence is one of the moral virtues, about which in its proper place; whereas Ethics considers not only the moral virtues but also many other things, as will be apparent in their treatment.

Third objection: Science concerns eternal things (*1 Posterior Analytics*, 6); but Ethics concerns temporal and mutable things, for it is concerned with human acts, which are subject to change, as no one is unaware. Hence Job says concerning man (*Job* 14): He never remains in the same state. Therefore Moral Philosophy is not a science. I reply by exposition and distinction of the major: taking it as non-complex, I deny it; taking it as complex, I concede it. To the distinction of the major, the minor is to be distinguished piously with Scotus, as I accomplished (*in Logic*, Book I, q. 2, art. 2).

Article III: Whether Moral Philosophy Is Practical

Having passed through all that I carefully adduced and extensively explained in Logic at the passage now cited, art. 5, dub. 1 and 2, the present difficulty is resolved promptly and easily.

The assertion is that Moral Philosophy is practical. This is defended by Scotus (*q. 4 of the Prologue, § Contra istam positionem, sub E*) after Aristotle (*1 Ethics, 3*) and (*10 of the same work, ch. 10*), and by Clement (*2 Paedagogus, ch. 13*), who calls it the study of right reason — that is, practical reason — which directs morals. It is proved, first: every science that directs praxis is practical; every science that does not direct praxis is speculative; but Ethics directs praxis; therefore it is practical. The major is common. The minor is manifest: Ethics directs the operation of the will, which is true and proper praxis, as the Doctor, with universal agreement, teaches in the cited passage (*§ Dico igitur*). Second: every science is either speculative or practical (*6 Metaphysics, 1*); but Moral Philosophy is a science, as I proved in the preceding article; it is not speculative, however, since it tends toward a work and its end is that we become good, as stated in the passage just cited. Therefore Moral Philosophy is to be classed among the practical disciplines — not productive or manual disciplines, but active ones, whose principle in the agent is choice. For the same thing is both doable and choosable (*6 Metaphysics, a little before T. 2*).

First objection: the end of practical science is a work (*2 Metaphysics, ch. 1, T. 3*); but in Moral Philosophy there is no work present, since its subject is praxis, which denotes no work. Therefore Moral Philosophy is not practical. I concede the major and distinguish the minor: there is no manual work, I concede; there is no moral work, I deny, as I declared abundantly in the passage recently cited.

Second objection: every science exists for its own sake, as Aristotle not obscurely intimates (*1 Metaphysics, 2*); but Moral Philosophy does not exist for its own sake, since it is directed toward moral work. Therefore it is neither speculative nor practical. I reply that this is a feeble argument with no force. For if it proved anything, it would only show that Ethics is not speculative — which we willingly admit — not that it is not practical, as may be seen in the text just cited, where the Stagirite explicitly and openly writes that the science which exists for its own sake is nobler than one that exists for the sake of something else. Therefore I absolutely deny the major — that is, that every science exists for its own sake. This is piously and learnedly indicated by Chrysostom (*Homily 13 on Romans*): What profit will it be for one who knows what is to be done, if he does not bring it to action? Certainly none; indeed, from that knowledge greater condemnation arises. And Aristotle forewarns this (*10 Ethics, ch. 9*) and (*1 Eudemian Ethics, ch. 3*).

Question III: On the Object of Moral Philosophy

Article (Sole): What the Object of Moral Philosophy Is

Philosophers who investigate and treat moral questions dispute greatly and strenuously about determining the object of Moral Philosophy; Raconius attempts to reconcile them (§ 2 of the Prologue to his moral discipline). For some are of the opinion that its object is virtue. Some, like Pontius, hold that it is natural happiness. Others hold that it is the human moral action. Others still hold that it is man as one who is to be imbued with good morals. For the declaration and decision of this question:

Note first that some actions are natural and necessary, while others are free and contingent. The former proceed from man naturally and necessarily — such as nutrition, growth, and generation, which are common to all living creatures. The latter proceed from him freely and contingently — such as love and hatred. Note further, from the Doctor (*q. 4 of the Prologue, art. 1, § Dico igitur*), that there is a twofold act of the will: elicited and commanded. The elicited act proceeds immediately from the will itself and resides in it, as the act of loving. The commanded act is the act of another power, subject to the will by its command — such as the act of the sensitive appetite restrained by the will, concerning which God says to Cain (*Genesis 4*): Your appetite will be under you, and you will rule over it.

Note second that the act of the will can be examined in two ways. First, in the genus of being, insofar as it is a being or a real physical act proceeding from the will; its consideration belongs to Psychology, which treats of the will and consequently of its acts. Second, in the moral genus, insofar as the action is judged worthy of praise or blame, commendation or reproach; Moral Philosophy disputes concerning this. Furthermore, recall what I said (*in Logic, Book I, q. 4, art. 1*) about the divisions of an object and the conditions necessary for it and required for it.

First assertion: virtue is not the proximate and adequate object of Moral Philosophy. This is derived from the Doctor (*q. 3 of the Prologue, § Ad 1 argum. 1 quaest.*) and (*§ Ex his dictis in fine*). It is proved, first, because virtue does not contain everything that is comprehended in Ethics — such as the good, the end, happiness, and other such things, about which we shall treat individually in this work. Therefore it cannot be its total and adequate object. Second, the primary and adequate object of a science is not ordered toward something else that is treated in it; rather, all that is handled therein is in some way referred to it. But virtue is ordered toward happiness as toward its end and term; therefore it is not the total and adequate object of Ethics.

From this the opinion of those who hold that natural happiness is the total object of moral discipline is also refuted, since happiness is its end, not its total object. I add that a real science — and Ethics is such — is not concerned with an accident as its object; but formal happiness is an accident — namely, the perfect operation of an intellectual nature. Moreover, natural happiness does not contain virtually or potentially all the truths that are attributed to this science;

and many things are treated in it that do not accord with natural happiness, and therefore it is not determined to be its total and adequate object.

Second assertion: nor is the human action as morally directable the formal object of Moral Philosophy. This is gathered from the same Doctor in the cited passage. It is proved, first, because the formal and total object of any science is its object "that" — that is, what is examined and sifted by the science — but the human action as morally directable is not the object "that" but the object "by which," meaning that through the action and through practical knowledge the moral philosopher knows that one must live well and honorably, and he exercises himself in good morals in order to attain happiness. Such a human action is therefore not the primary and proximate object of moral doctrine. Second, the moral action does not contain all that is considered in Ethics — especially the good, the end, happiness, and similar things. For these are not actions, nor are they reducible to action. Moreover, as (*in Logic at the cited passage*) we rejected the act or operation of the intellect as directable from the object of Dialectic, so equally the moral action as informable by good morals is to be repelled from the object of Ethics. Besides, the object of a real and principal science, such as Ethics is, is not an accident, as the Doctor assents and as is evident from the object of physics and other sciences; but an action — whether it belongs to the genus of quality or to the genus of action — is an accident; therefore it does not stand as the formal object of Moral Philosophy.

Third assertion: man as one to be instructed and moralized in good morals is the formal and adequate object of Moral Philosophy. The Doctor hints at this (*q. 3 of the Prologue, § Ad 1 argum. 1 quaest., in the solution to the third*). Aureolus defends this explicitly (*in the last question of the Prologue*). And Aristotle touches upon it (*1 Ethics, 4*). It is proved, first, from the refutation of the others. Since it is accepted by all as certain that Moral Philosophy has some formal object to be established, and this is not virtue, nor natural happiness, nor anything else, as has been proved above, it is evidently established that it is man as one to be imbued with good morals. Second, it is argued from analogy: the object of physics is the natural body, and the object of medicine is the healable body; therefore the object of Ethics is the moralizable man. Third, the said object participates in all the conditions necessary and required beforehand for the proximate and formal object of Ethics. For in Ethics one presupposes and precognizes whether moralizable man exists and what he is; his knowable attributes are demonstrated; and all that is discussed in Ethics is directed toward him, as is apparent to anyone who reads and runs through it. Therefore such is the object of moral discipline.

First objection against the second assertion: the human action as morally directable has all the conditions required for the formal object of Moral Philosophy; therefore it is its formal object. The antecedent is proved: the principle, parts, and properties of the human action are free choice and the

habits that incline toward and influence honorable acts. For all these things are examined and sifted in moral science; and so forth. I deny the antecedent. To its proof I say that the action is the object "by which," not the object "that," as is shown clearly in the second assertion.

Second objection against the third assertion: in Ethics, it is not precognized of man whether he exists and what he is, nor are his knowable attributes demonstrated. For that is the task of Psychology, not of Ethics; therefore moralizable man is not the formal object of Ethics. I deny the antecedent, since man is considered differently by Ethics and by Psychology. For Psychology regards him as a natural body animated by a rational soul; Ethics regards him as one to be instructed in good morals. Therefore he can fall under the consideration of each science under a different formal aspect, as the Stagirite affirms in an analogous case (*1 Ethics*, 7).

You will ask: what is the end of Moral Philosophy? I say it is the honest life and true happiness to be conferred upon man, as Seneca intimates (*Epistle 88*), Aureolus demonstrates (*in the last question of the Prologue*), and Aristotle indicates (*1 Ethics*, 4 and 5).

Book II: On the Good, the End, and the Happiness of Man

Those who investigate and treat moral questions examine and agitate three topics proposed by us before they touch upon the remaining matters pertaining to Moral Philosophy — both because the Prince of the Peripatetics observes this order, and also because, when the good is presented, the end fixed, and happiness set before man, he himself is moved willingly and roused eagerly to seek out the means that are fitting, opportune, and efficacious for attaining them, as Aristotle indicates (*1 Ethics*, 2) and Eustratius notes (*in the Preface to the first book of the Ethics*). There are, moreover, four questions in the present book: the first on the good, the second on evil, the third on the end, and the fourth on the happiness and beatitude of man.

Question I: On the Good

Article I: Whether the Good Exists

From the twofold good mentioned by the Doctor (*2, dist. 7, q. unica*) the present difficulty can be raised — namely, concerning the good that is convertible with being, which is called transcendental good and is examined and sifted by Metaphysics; and concerning moral good, which Ethics examines and considers.

First assertion: transcendental good is conceded. This is the position of Aristotle (*4 Metaphysics, T. 18 and 28*), of Scotus, and of the other Philosophers in the same place. It is proved, first, from Sacred Scripture (*Genesis 1*): God saw all the things that he had made, and they were very good. And (*Exodus 33*): I will show you all good things. Second, an attribute is convertible with that of which it is an attribute, as is evident from Porphyry (*in the Isagoge, ch. on the property*); but transcendental good is an attribute of being (*4 Metaphysics, cited*). That being exists, no one denies; therefore transcendental good also exists. Third, the good is what all things desire (*1 Ethics, 1*), and in its pursuit almost all are engaged; whence arises that common saying cited by Scotus (*5 Metaphysics, ch. 2, in T. 3*): No agent acts with a view to evil per se. Transcendental good must therefore be admitted.

Second assertion: moral good exists. This assertion is also common, like the preceding. It is proved, first, from Sacred Scripture (*2 Chronicles 24*): He did what is good before the Lord. (*Matthew 5*): That they may see your good works. (*Titus 2*): Present an example of good works. And of Saint Lawrence the Church sings: Lawrence performed a good work. Second, an act elicited by the will in conformity with right reason is morally good, as will be apparent below; but the act of a prudent and wise man is conformed to the right dictate of reason; therefore moral good is not to be rejected. Furthermore, the celebrated division of good into natural and moral is received by all. And many, Socrates most notably, having set aside natural good, turned toward moral good and placed all their care in obtaining it, as I observed in the preface to this discipline. Moral good is therefore fittingly admitted.

First objection: (*1 John 2, 16*): All that is in the world is either the concupiscence of the flesh, or the concupiscence of the eyes, or the pride of life. But all these are evil, because they are sins and transgressions of divine law. Therefore no good is to be conceded. I reply that the said testimony must be explained according to the interpretation of Augustine (*6 Against Julian, ch. 1*), taking "the world" to mean the wicked man in whom the mentioned sins reign. And concerning this, the same John says at the beginning of his sacred discourse: The world did not know him. And in the same work (*ch. 14*): For the prince of this world comes. But since besides the wicked and reprobate man there is the good and just man, it is not rightly inferred that there is no good. Aristotle also saw this well (*3 Politics, 7*): The good and just must rule and have authority over all. And (*4 Ethics, 3*): Only the good man is to be honored.

Second objection: from the same John (*ch. 19 of the same*): The whole world is placed in wickedness. Hence Saint Anthony, as is evident from his life, once saw the entire world ensnared and entangled in the snares of the devil, from which few are freed. Add the outrages, crimes, and abuses committed in the world. Therefore there does not seem to be any good in the world. The answer must be given from Augustine (*on Psalm 34, sermon 1*) and (*Treatise 3 on John*), and from

Alphonsus (*Book 10 Against Heresies, on the word "World"*): in that passage the world is taken to mean the wicked and depraved inhabitants of the world, who are marked by countless evils and crimes. Therefore holy men, unless aided by God, would undoubtedly perish, entangled in the nets and snares of evildoers in the same world. Hence it is written of the just man (*Wisdom 4*): He was taken away, lest wickedness should change his understanding, or deceit deceive his soul. And (*Psalms 123*): The snare is broken, and we are delivered. Therefore, even if there are evils, there are also goods. For if one opposite exists, the other opposite also exists or can exist, as Aristotle excellently pursues (*4 Metaphysics, T. 20*).

Article II: How Many Species of Good There Are

Good is divided first into transcendental good, of which I made mention in the preceding article, and predicamental good, which is diffused by Aristotle (*1 Nicomachean Ethics, ch. 9*) and (*1 Eudemian Ethics, ch. 5*) into the ten genera or predicaments. The reason for this division can be given: whatever exists is either located in a genus and is predicamental, or is outside a genus and is transcendental, as I showed abundantly in Logic and Metaphysics, Books 1–2.

Second, it is distributed by Plato (*1 On Laws*) and indicated by Augustine (*2 On Genesis against the Manicheans, ch. 4*; *1 On the Nature of the Good, ch. 1*; and in the *second commentary on Psalm 26*) and by Scotus (*1, d. 1, q. 4, § Negationem*), following Aristotle (*1 Ethics, 6*), into divine good, which is called good through essence — such as God alone, concerning whom (*Matthew 19*): No one is good but God alone. And (*9 Ethics, 4*): God is the good, since he is himself whatever he is. And created good, which is called good through participation, which is everything created. The cause of this partition is that, as is evident from the Metaphysics in the treatment of being, being is adequately divided into uncreated and created being.

Third, by Scotus (*1, d. 1, q. 1, art. 3 and 4*; and in the *Reportata, ibid., q. 1*), into true good, apparent good, and preordained good. True good is that which is genuinely fitting and suitable to a thing. Apparent good is what indeed appears good but in reality is not good. Preordained good is what someone sets before himself as good, even if it is neither true nor apparent good. For the will can, by its own free choice, preordain something to itself as good, as will be shown in its proper place.

Fourth, by the same Doctor (*2 Reportata, d. 7, q. 3*), into natural good, which is fitting to some nature; gratuitous good, which renders man pleasing to God and flows into his meritorious act; and moral good, which is conformed to the right dictate of reason.

Fifth, by Augustine (*8 City of God, ch. 8*; *Book on Spirit and Letter, ch. 11*) and Scotus (*4, d. 46, q. 4, A*; and *d. 15, q. 4, B*), following Aristotle (*1 Rhetoric, ch. 5*), into intellectual or spiritual good — such as the virtues and gifts of God, concerning which (*Ecclesiasticus 31*): His goods are established in the Lord. Bodily good —

such as health and beauty, (*Psalms 44*): In your beauty and grace. Hence Augustine adds (*15 City of God*): The beauty of the body is a gift of God, it is good; but for that reason he grants it also to the wicked, lest good appear to be the property of the wicked alone. I do not omit the saying of Diogenes, who, seeing a young man of handsome face but shameful morals, said: O what a fine house, and what a bad guest. The good of fortune — such as wealth, concerning which (*Matthew 25*): The master of the household called his servants and handed over his goods to them. One may add eternal good — such as beatitude, concerning which (*Matthew 17*): Lord, it is good for us to be here. And (*Ecclesiasticus 39*): Good things have been created from the beginning for the good.

Sixth, by Aristotle (*1 Ethics, 3*) and Scotus (*3, d. 34, q. un., § His suppositis ante K*), into honorable good, which is sought for its own sake and instructs the rational nature — such as intellectual and moral virtue; useful good, which is sought for the sake of something else — such as wealth, for obtaining dignities; and pleasant good, whose presence brings delight to the one who possesses it — such as a fruit that is beautiful to the eye and delightful to behold, of which sort was what God produced in the paradise of pleasure (*Genesis 1*).

Objection: there is only one good, and that the supreme, as is evident from (*Luke 18*): No one is good but God alone. Therefore all the divisions of goods presented above are vain. I concede the antecedent and deny the consequent. For there is only one good through essence; but there are many goods through participation. This response is furnished by Damascene (*2 On the Faith, ch. 29*): God alone is good by nature — that is, through essence; other things, however, are good through participation.

Article III: What the Good Is

Some, among whom Suarez (*Disputation 10 of the Metaphysics, 24*) seems to agree, and Faber (*in the Supplement, 4, d. 14, ch. 5*), hold that good exhibits only a relation of reason of the suitability of one thing to another. Others, following Coimbra (*Disputation 1 on the Ethics, art. 1*), hold that the good designates formally a certain absolute aspect of the thing whose good it is. Scotus, however, (*1, d. 17, q. 2; and Quodlibet 18*), together with Gad and Lychet in the same passage, teach that the good formally exhibits nothing other than a real relation of integrity or suitability of the thing whose good it is.

Note first, from the Doctor in the cited passage (*§ De primo, C*), that good is twofold — primary and secondary. Primary good, which is also called essential good, is the integrity or perfection of a thing in itself, which designates the negation of imperfection and diminution. Thus human nature is called good because it has everything required for its essence; and this is transcendental good, which is convertible with being (*1 Ethics, 6; and 4 Metaphysics, 28*). And it is really identified with being, as an attribute with the thing of which it is the attribute. And good thus understood is divided into good through essence —

such as God — and good through participation, which is everything created. Secondary good, which is called supervenient and accidental upon being, is the integrity of its suitability to another to which it ought to be suited, or of another to itself; and these two suitabilities are interconnected, as one may see in Augustine (*8 Trinity, ch. 3*): Good health without pain and fatigue; and the good countenance of a man evenly proportioned, cheerfully composed, and brightly colored. One can see in this authority the prior suitability when it says: good health is without pain and fatigue. And the posterior suitability when it adds: and the good countenance of a man evenly proportioned, cheerfully composed, and brightly colored.

Note second that there are three kinds of agents: natural without cognition — such as fire, whose good is to heat and to ignite, and whose good it is for matter to underlie form and to concur partially in the generation of the whole. Natural with sensitive cognition — such as the horse, whose good is to eat oats, and for the ox to eat hay. Intellectual or free, which acts freely and rationally, and this alone can operate morally well or badly, since it is endowed with will and possessed of judgment, by which it judges something to be right and conformed to right reason; whereas the rest are drawn by the impulse of nature and necessarily determined by their objects. Moral goodness, moreover, is derived from the relation and disposition of the will to right reason. Therefore that act is good which is conformed to right reason, and conversely that act is evil which is deformed with respect to right reason.

Note third that there is a twofold rule: intrinsic and extrinsic. The intrinsic rule is right internal reason, which judges and dictates concerning human acts and works as they ought to be performed. The extrinsic rule is considered by some to be the divine intellect, which from eternity knows all things — when, where, and how they ought to occur. It is better established as the divine will, to which the created will must be conformed, as the Doctor teaches (*1, d. 48, q. un.*). But in order for a moral act to be good, not only is the capacity for judging the suitability of the act required, but it is also necessary that one actually judge rightly concerning the act; otherwise a sleeping person who possesses the capacity for judgment would act morally well, which is absurd. Furthermore, for the goodness of an act many circumstances are required; the chief ones are the circumstance of end, of manner of acting, of time, and of place, concerning which see learnedly and eruditely in Angelus, on the word "circumstance." For the rational agent acts for an end, chooses means suitable and opportune for its attainment, and therefore if his end is good, his act is correspondingly good. Hence the force of that admonition: Whatever you do, do it prudently, and look to the end. Then follows the manner of acting, so that the act is performed with due decency and honesty — if, for example, bread is given to the hungry for God's sake, the act is good; but if the giver were to throw it at the head of the needy person, the manner is improper. Hence the common saying: Add measure to all things. And Horace sings: There is a measure in things; there are,

in short, definite limits, beyond and short of which right cannot exist. Next is the circumstance of time, so that the act be done at the due time — for example, one must fast during Lent, but not at all on the Lord's Day. Next, the circumstance of place, so that the act be done in a fitting and proper place — for example, the Mass is to be celebrated in a church and a suitable location. From these and other circumstances an act becomes morally good; but if any of the said circumstances is lacking, the act is bad. Hence Dionysius adds (*4 On the Divine Names*): Good comes from an integral cause, and evil from any defect whatever. And Aristotle (*2 Ethics, ch. 5; and 3 of the same work, ch. 3*): All circumstances must simultaneously concur in any moral act in order for it to be morally good. And the Doctor adds in the passage just cited: The defect of even one circumstance, whichever it may be, suffices for the act to be morally evil. For this reason we read in Sacred Scripture (*James 2*): He who has offended in one point has become guilty of all.

First assertion: good, whether transcendental or moral, is not relational. This is derived from Scotus, who is cited below for each part. The first part is proved, first, because the terminus of creation and production is not a being of reason nor a relation of reason, since a real positive action obtains a real positive terminus; but transcendental good is the terminus of real positive creation and production, as is evident from (*Genesis 1*): God saw all the things that he had made, and they were very good; and (*Proverbs 3*): He made all things good in his time. Therefore transcendental good is not a relation of reason. Second, uncreated good is a real positive being: for God is the supreme good, than which nothing greater can be conceived, as is evident from Anselm (*in the Proslogion, ch. 2*) and Augustine (*1 On Christian Doctrine, ch. 7*). Therefore created good likewise; the consequence holds, for if the divided term is real and positive, the dividing members are real and positive, as I showed (*in the Epitome of Dialectic, Book 2, q. 7, art. 1*). But good, taken precisely and universally, is a real positive being, since it is an attribute of real being convertible with it. Third, appetite is directed toward a real positive being, since it is a real positive power; but the good is that toward which the appetitive power tends; hence it is defined (*1 Ethics, ch. 1*): the good is what all things desire. Augustine (*in the Book on the Nature of the Good*), Basil, and the other Fathers, who treat of good as a real positive being throughout, give their support. The second part is proved, first, from (*Psalms 118*): Teach me goodness and discipline and knowledge. And therefore: It is good for me that you have humbled me. Second, real science per se does not treat of beings of reason; otherwise it would not be real but rational; but Ethics is a real science and treats of the good per se, as is evident from its course. Third, a morally good act is praiseworthy, and if done in the grace of God it is worthy of reward and eternal life; but God does not save man through a being of reason, but through real positive good works which follow upon him. I add that even without anyone thinking about it, a man acting according to the right dictate of reason is

morally good, and one acting contrary to right reason is morally evil. Therefore moral good is not a relation of reason.

Second assertion: moral good is the suitability of an act of the will in conformity with right reason. So holds Scotus (*1, dist. 17, q. 2, § Quantum ad istum art. ante P*). It is proved, first, because that the positing of which brings about something is the essence and formal character of it, as has been inculcated and approved by all in many other places; but when the suitability and conformity of an act of the will to right reason is posited, the formally moral good act is established; and when that suitability is taken away, the act is evil. Hence Aristotle (*6 Ethics, ch. 3*) says: Right choice requires right reason to which it must be conformed. Second, praxis — which is the moral act — is defined as the operation of the will that is apt to be done in conformity with right reason so that the act may be right, as I showed abundantly (*in Logic, Book I, q. 2, art. 5, dub. 1*). Now what is placed per se in the definition of something is essential to it. Moreover, good comes from an integral cause, according to Dionysius cited above, and evil from any defect whatever; but the cause is not integral unless the said suitability is present, together with the other circumstances. Therefore moral goodness of an act consists in the said suitability.

Third assertion: moral good is not something absolute but a relation of suitability and conformity. So holds Scotus in the cited passage. It is proved, first: moral good is formally situated in the conformity of the act of the will to right reason, as I showed in the preceding assertion; but such conformity is a relation, as no one denies. Therefore moral good is also a relation. Second, from the act of the will conformed to right reason and the due circumstances there arises that suitability of the moral act, just as from the positing of any two extremes a relation arises, as I explained abundantly (*in the Epitome of Dialectic, Book I, q. 4, art. 8*).

One may say, with Raynaud following certain recent authors (*Discipline 4 of Moral Philosophy, art. 1, nn. 13–14*), that it is not a relation but a connotation. On the contrary: connotation follows upon morality, as Becanus rightly sees (*1–2, Tract. 1, ch. 4, q. 5, n. 4*); for a thing is first constituted in its formal — that is, essential — being before it connotes anything else. Hence I said (*in Logic, Book I, q. 3, q. 1, art. 5*) that the concrete in the direct case signifies the form, and in the oblique case the subject. Moreover, given the hypothesis that there were no connotation, morality would still exist, since the aforesaid conformity would be present. Furthermore, between absolute entity and relative entity no middle term is interposed, since whatever exists either exists in relation to itself and is absolute, or exists in relation to something else and is relative. But morality, as the authors just cited show, is not an absolute entity; therefore it is rightly inferred to be the said relation of suitability and conformity of the will to the right dictate of the mind.

First objection: measurability is a relation of reason (*5 Metaphysics, ch. 15*). Therefore that suitability is also a relation of reason, since it is an order of the regulated to the rule and of the measured to the measure. First confirmation: morality adds nothing real to the physical act, since the moral act depends on the will just as the signification of words depends on the pleasure of the one imposing them. Second confirmation: God is called creator not through anything real newly accruing to him from the creation of a thing; likewise he is called the Lord of a servant, and a husband and wife are called spouses through a relation of reason or through extrinsic denomination. Therefore the same should be affirmed of morality. I deny the antecedent: for measurability is a true and real property of quantity, just like divisibility and the other attributes of quantity mentioned and explained (*in the Epitome, Book I, q. 4, art. 6*). To the first confirmation I also deny the antecedent. For it is ridiculous that good or evil works should depend on the thought of the intellect, and that rewards be conferred through a good being of reason and punishment be avoided through an evil being of reason that man makes. To the second confirmation I say there is a disparity, because God, being infinite, can receive nothing new that is real; but the physical act of the will, being finite, is capable of a new reality, which is morality. I add that such denominations, even if they are extrinsic, are nevertheless not beings of reason, as I have shown elsewhere against Vasquez.

Second objection: Aristotle (*1 Ethics, ch. 1*), cited by the Doctor (*4, dist. 49, q. 9*), Bonaventure (*5 Metaphysics, ch. 3*), and Seneca (*Epistle 118*), accepts the definition of the good handed down by the ancient philosophers: the good is what all things desire. The same is found (*3 Topics, ch. 1*). Therefore no other definition of the good is to be introduced, as we did above. I reply that the said definition is approved as a good one, since it is given not a priori but a posteriori — that is, through the property, which is desirability — just as (*5 Metaphysics, ch. 15*) quantity is defined through divisibility, which is its property.

Third objection: good is a quality (*10 Ethics, ch. 3*) and following. Again, virtue and vice are qualities residing in the predicament of quality; therefore the good is not formally a relation. I reply by explaining Aristotle and the common opinion through a distinction: good and virtue are qualities fundamentally, whether taken for the physical act or the physical habit, I concede; formally and essentially, as a suitability and conformity of the act of the will with right reason, I deny. For, as the Doctor says (*in the cited Quodlibet*), beauty is not formally a quality in a beautiful body, but an aggregation of all things befitting such a body — such as magnitude, shape, and color, as well as all their proportions to the body and its members. So too the moral goodness of an act is a kind of comeliness of that act, including an aggregation of due proportion — namely with respect to the power, object, time, end, place, manner, and the like, concerning which Scotus (*in the first cited passage*) and somewhat more below (*in the question on moral virtues, art. 2*).

Article IV: Whether the Exterior Act Adds Any Goodness to the Interior Act

Although the treatment of this controversy pertains to the book on human acts, it is nonetheless my pleasure to examine and decide it here, so that knowledge of the good may be spread more broadly and widely. On this question two opposed Scholastic opinions prevail. The former is that of the Thomists, cited by Faber (*in the Addition to Book 4, dist. 14, disp. 2, n. 4*), and of the Nominalists with Ockham (*Quodlibet 1, q. 20*), who hold that the exterior act has no goodness distinct from the goodness of the interior act. The latter is Scotus's (*Quodlibet 18, § De tertio*), Gad's, and others cited there, who teach that the exterior act participates in its own moral goodness distinct from the goodness of the interior act. Aureolus holds the same opinion (*2, dist. 32, q. un., art. 1*), and Richard does not disagree (*dist. 40, art. 4*).

Note first that this question is raised concerning the interior and exterior act of the same subject, time, and object. For with respect to different subjects, the interior act of Plato can be good even though the exterior act of Socrates is not good; and Plato can now at this moment elicit a good internal act, and after some interval of time put forth an exterior act devoid of goodness; and live chastely with his wife now, though previously he lived unchastely with a concubine. Furthermore, note with Gad in the cited passage (*fol. 181*) that in this inquiry we are not investigating whether the interior act is intensified or extended through the exterior act, since they are distinct acts and one does not intensify or extend the other.

Note second, from the Doctor (*Prologue, q. 4*), that there is a twofold act: elicited and commanded. The former is called interior, the latter exterior. The interior act is the act of the will that proceeds immediately from the will itself; hence it is called elicited, because it is elicited spontaneously and freely by the will. The exterior act is that which is commanded by the will — as hearing a lesson is an act by which the will commands the hearing faculty to hear what the teacher explains. In the present question we ask whether the act commanded by the will acquires another goodness distinct from the goodness of the elicited act of that same will.

The assertion is that the exterior act has another moral goodness distinct from the goodness of the interior act. So holds Scotus in the cited passage. It is proved, first, because things that are prohibited by God through distinct negative precepts take on their own distinct character of being illicit and malicious — otherwise they would be forbidden not by two precepts but by one only. But the interior act is forbidden by a distinct negative precept different from the precept by which the exterior act is forbidden, as is evident from (*Exodus 20*): You shall not commit adultery — the exterior act. You shall not covet your neighbor's wife — the interior act. And (*Deuteronomy 5*): You shall not steal — the exterior act. You shall not covet your neighbor's property — the

interior act. This is also hinted at by the Apostle (*2 Corinthians 9*), who, speaking of the exterior act, says: He who sows sparingly will reap sparingly — which would not be true unless the exterior act participated in some goodness distinct from the goodness of the interior act, as Richard rightly infers in the passage cited above. Second, from Augustine (*12 Trinity, 12*): The sin of thought is far less than if the thought be carried out in deed. And (*13 Trinity, 5*): Through evil will alone someone is made wretched; but more wretched through the power by which the desire of evil will is fulfilled. And a little before: He would call that man blessed because he lives as he wishes — although he would already be wretched in doing so — yet he would be less wretched if he were unable to have any of the things he perversely desired. It is evident that the holy Doctor is speaking not of the wretchedness of punishment, but of the wretchedness of fault. For one whose desire is not fulfilled is more afflicted than one whose appetite is satisfied, according to that of (*Proverbs 13*): Hope that is deferred afflicts the soul. And this is clear from (*Psalms 9*), cited by the same Doctor: The sinner is praised in the desires of his soul, and the one who does iniquity is blessed — where the first verse clearly refers to the interior, and the second to the exterior act and sin completed in deed. If therefore the bad exterior act adds malice to the bad interior act, then by equal and contrary argument the good exterior act adds goodness to the good interior act. Boethius adds his support (*4 On Consolation, Prose 4*). And Aristotle agrees (*9 Metaphysics, T. 19*), saying that in good things the act is better than the power. Third, moral goodness is the integrity of those things which, according to right reason, ought to befit the moral act; but a different integrity belongs to what, according to the dictate of right reason, ought to befit the interior act and to what ought to befit the exterior act. Therefore the goodness of the exterior act is different and distinct from the goodness of the interior act. The major is evident from the preceding article. The minor is proved: some exterior act can be performed only successively, and also some exterior act can only be done by unwilling or benefiting one's neighbor — which is not true of the interior act. Since therefore certain circumstances apply to the external act which do not suit the internal act, it is rightly concluded that each has a distinct moral goodness. Fourth, that to which, if it is only mentally held, no reward is due, but if it is completed in action, praise and reward are due, participates in a distinct goodness. Now to one who has the teaching of the Catholic faith, if he does not teach, the aureola of Doctors is not given; if one desires to die for Christ, unless he actually dies for him, he does not receive the aureola of martyrdom; likewise if one is not a virgin in mind and body, uncorrupted, the aureola of Virginity is not due. Moreover, civil and canon law do not reward men except for good external works performed and exhibited by them, nor do they punish them except for evil external works; but of internal acts they leave judgment solely to God, who searches hearts. It must therefore be acknowledged that the external act enjoys a proper goodness distinct from the goodness of the internal act. This is openly

indicated by that Scripture text (*James 3*): He who does not offend in word, this is a perfect man — which everyone knows to pertain to the external act.

First objection: Augustine (*3 On Free Will, ch. 3*) writes that if someone has the will to lie with another's wife and the opportunity is not given him, before God he is as guilty as if he had completed it in deed. Chrysostom agrees (*Homily 26 on Matthew*): The will alone is rewarded for good or condemned for evil. Bernard agrees (*Epistle 77*): What is more complete than that the will is reckoned for the deed? And elsewhere: the will alone burns in hell. Nor does Gregory disagree (*Homily 4 on the Gospel*). I reply that these and similar testimonies of the Fathers only prove that in the bad interior act there is sin without any external act, according to that word of the Savior (*Matthew 5*): He who has looked upon a woman to lust after her has already committed adultery with her in his heart. And that the primary and originating malice comes from the interior act — hence Christ the Lord says (*Matthew 15*): Out of the heart come evil thoughts, thefts, adulteries, and so forth. But they do not deny that sin and malice are found in the exterior act joined to the interior act, since there are distinct precepts prohibiting each, as I noted above. And commonly sin is distributed into sin of the heart, of the mouth, and of the deed.

Second objection: what is not voluntary is not good or evil, since goodness or malice derives its origin from the will. Hence that celebrated saying of Augustine (*in the Book on True Religion, ch. 14*): Sin is in no way a sin unless it is voluntary. But the exterior act separated from the interior act is not voluntary, since it derives its goodness or malice from the interior act. Therefore the exterior act participates in no goodness distinct from the goodness of the interior act. I reply: granting the major, I distinguish the minor. It is not voluntary subjectively — as sadness is subjectively in the will — nor objectively — as the object willed is called voluntary, I concede; it is not voluntary imperatively, I deny. For it is commanded by the will, to which the other powers are obedient. Therefore each act is called voluntary, with this distinction however: the interior act is voluntary primarily and immediately, the exterior act secondarily and mediately.

Third objection: the truth of the act of understanding and the truth of the object understood is the same; therefore the goodness of the act of willing and the object willed is the same; but the exterior act with respect to the interior act stands like an object, since the will by an elicited act conformed to right reason wills the exterior act to come about; and so forth. The antecedent is proved in two ways: first, just as the truth of the principle is immediate, so the actual knowledge of it can be called immediate, and that of the conclusion mediate. Second, the knowledge of principles comes from the terms, and the knowledge of conclusions from the principles — so to these as objects truth belongs. Confirmation: where one thing exists on account of another, there is only one thing; but the exterior act borrows its goodness from the interior act; therefore

the exterior act enjoys no goodness distinct from the goodness of the interior act. The major is argued by the Nominalists: the act with respect to the end and with respect to the means to the end is the same. Again, the habit of principles and of conclusions is the same. I distinguish the antecedent: objectively and denominatively, I concede; formally and intrinsically, I deny. For truth is one thing in the mind, another in the thing, as I noted (*in Logic, Book IV, q. 4, art. 3*). Similarly, goodness is one thing in the interior act, another in the exterior act, because they have a different suitability and conformity to the right dictate of reason. Now the proof of the antecedent counts in our favor: for the truth of the conclusion differs from the truth of the principles — the former is mediate, the latter immediate. Hence Aristotle (*6 Ethics, ch. 4*) establishes distinct habits of principles and conclusions: of principles there is the habit of understanding, of conclusions the habit of science. To the confirmation: the major rather helps us than hinders us. For even though the exterior act is good on account of the interior act, it is still not deprived of its own goodness. For the conclusion is true on account of the premises, yet the conclusion itself enjoys its own truth distinct from the truth of the premises, as I was just saying.

Fourth objection: sin, according to Anselm (*1 On the Virginal Conception, ch. 27; On the Fall of the Devil, chs. 15–16*) and Scotus (*2, dist. 35*), is the privation of due justice; but in the exterior act there is no other privation of due justice distinct from the privation of due justice in the interior act. Therefore in the exterior act there is no other malice distinct from the malice of the interior act. The major is evident to Scotists. The minor is shown from the same saint: justice or injustice resides only in the will; therefore it cannot be in the exterior act, which does not have its seat in the will. First confirmation: where there is one aversion and one concupiscence, there is one formal character of sin; but in the interior and exterior act there is only one aversion, because there is only one will, which alone can be averted from the end or converted toward the end. For aversion, according to (*2, dist. 37*), is the disordering of the will with respect to something ordered to the end by divine precept, around which it ought to be ordered. Second confirmation: what Augustine (*Book 83 Questions, q. 38*) sometimes calls by name "cupidity" and in the same place "concupiscence," he calls the poison of charity. Since therefore charity is located only in the will, so too malice or sin. I reply by explaining Anselm as speaking of actual justice, which is the rectitude of the act conformed to right reason; and this is twofold — primary, which applies to the elicited act, and secondary, which belongs to the commanded act. By this distinction, to the argument in form: I concede the major; I distinguish the minor concerning primary and habitual justice, I concede; concerning secondary and actual justice, I deny. To the first confirmation I concede the major; I distinguish the minor with Scotus in the cited passage: concerning formal and virtual aversion, I concede; concerning aversion taken for whatever malice effectively separating one from the end by willing or obtaining, I deny. For this aversion can exist in the commanded act of the will. For just as

referability or orderability to the end can be called conversion, so irreferability and in-orderability can be called aversion. To the second confirmation: if concupiscence is taken for improper will, I admit that it can be formally or causally found in sin; but if it is taken for all immoderate appetite or command of the delectable, I acknowledge it as belonging not only to the elicited and interior act, but also to the commanded and exterior act. This is touched upon by the Gloss (*on ch. 20 of Exodus*): He who adds a deed to the will adds iniquity to iniquity. And the sacred text confirms this throughout, imposing punishment on evil works (*Apocalypse 18*): As much as she has glorified herself and lived in pleasures, and so forth. And establishing reward for good works (*Matthew 25*): Possess the kingdom prepared for you from the constitution of the world; for I was hungry, and you gave me to eat; I was thirsty, and you gave me to drink. And (*Matthew 16*): He will render to each according to his works. Add Athanasius (*in the Creed*): Those who have done good will go into eternal life; those who have done evil, into eternal fire.

Question II: On Evil

Article I: Whether Evil Exists

Chrysologus rightly sets the tone for the discussion of evil (*Sermon 131, toward the end*) when he says openly and explicitly: We cannot know how good things are good unless we know them through the knowledge of evils. This is intimated (*Genesis 3*): You shall be as gods, knowing good and evil. Augustine pursues this (*2 On Genesis against the Manicheans, ch. 9*) and (*in the Book on True Religion, ch. 20*). The reason is that one opposite cannot be fully and well known unless the other opposite is known — for opposites fall under the same discipline; that evil is opposed to good is noted above all by Aristotle (*in the Postpredicaments, ch. on Opposites*). Therefore, from the knowledge of the good already had in the preceding question, knowledge of evil will be conveniently gathered in this question.

Note, from Scotus (*2 Reportata, dist. 34, q. 1*), that just as privation is known through the habit — as darkness through light — so evil is discerned through good, and by passing through evils one arrives at goods. Hence someone sings: He has not merited sweet things who has not tasted bitter things. Now the Philosopher asserts (*5 Metaphysics, 21*) that good and perfect coincide; and perfect is taken in two ways. In one way, perfect is that to which nothing is wanting — called perfect simply and with essential and primary perfection. In another way, something is called perfect in a qualified sense and with secondary perfection. Similarly, good is twofold: good with primary goodness and good with secondary goodness. Good in the first mode has no contrary — whether positive or privative — since contraries naturally occur in the same subject (*2 Topics, ch. 20*). What therefore is not apt to be in another has no positive or privative contrary. But good with primary goodness, insofar as it is primary, is

not apt to be in another, since being primary it exists from itself and independently — which is supremely necessary, needing nothing else, being self-sufficient, and what is self-sufficient is supremely good. Thus that good only has a contradictory opposite — namely, non-good. But good with secondary goodness participates in a privative opposite. For evil is the privation of good, according to Damascene (*2 On the Faith, ch. 4; and Book 4, ch. 2*), just as darkness is the privation of light.

The assertion is that evil exists in the universe. So holds Scotus in the cited passage (*art. 1, § Viso igitur*). It is proved, first, from Sacred Scripture (*Genesis 2*): of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. (*Proverbs 1*): They run to evil. (*Ecclesiasticus 4*): An evil eye toward evil things. And (*Matthew 6*): Deliver us from evil. Second, from Chrysostom (*Oration on Saint Philogonius*): Where there are perpetual and successive evils. And (*Homily 40 on Matthew*): Whatever is not good is evil. Salvian (*Book 6 On the Governance of God*): Since there are two greatest evils — if a man either destroys himself or offends God. Augustine (*on Psalm 34*) and Jerome (*on ch. 6 of Jeremiah*). And that this is the opinion of the Peripatetics and ancient Academics is attested by Augustine (*19 City of God, ch. 4*), which is clearly visible (*2 Magna Moralia, ch. 8*). Nor should we omit the admonition of Diogenes, related by Laertius (*Book 4*). Seeing a young man naturally evil throwing stones into the sky, he said: Bravo, you will not hit the mark — signifying that those who lead a wicked life will in no way be heirs of heavenly goods. Third, an inferior that is regulable and conformable to its superior rule can deviate from it, and sometimes does deviate, either on account of something opposing it or another cause, as is evident in natural agents, to which monsters sometimes happen — which are called evils or sins of nature — and in free agents acting contrary to God's precepts and laws prescribed to them by God as King and Judge, who are said to commit moral evils or sins, which are punished by the ministers of justice. Therefore, since every creature, whether natural or free, acknowledges a first and supreme rule and its own particular orders and laws fixed for it, those that decline from and fail to conform to them are established to be evils. Fourth, natural and rational appetite pursues the good and flees the harmful evil; one is adorned with perfection, the other deprived of it; one is beautiful, the other ugly; as the seeing man differs from the blind, the healthy from the sick, and countless other examples, on which Chrysostom treats abundantly and learnedly (*in the first passage cited*). Finally, there is almost no one who does not undergo some evil and experience it daily. Hence Tyrius most aptly adds: What age or time is there that is not assailed by some evil? Is it not the case that as soon as one is born, freshly drawn from the moist places of his mother, he drips with mud and filth, fills everything with crying and tears? Afterward, if he grows to the flower of age, he is driven by a certain fervor and intemperance. If he reaches puberty, on account of the ardor of spirit and vehemence, he cannot be contained in duty by any counsels, any admonitions.

If he gradually reaches old age, he dies and withers. In the end, nothing else remains but a useless, morose, and difficult hostelry of the soul.

First objection: an infinite good does not admit of any evil alongside it — just as if there were an infinite body, no other body could be alongside it in the same place, as I said (*in Physics, on the question of the infinite*). Therefore, since there is an infinite good — namely God — no evil is given. I reply with Scotus (1, *dist. 2, q. 2, § Ad 1 argum. DD*) that the antecedent is true of a natural and necessary agent, as certain Philosophers supposed, but not of a free and voluntary agent, such as God is, who, although he is the supreme and infinite good, nevertheless permits evil for the sake of the good, as Augustine teaches (*in the Enchiridion, ch. 6*). Hence the Royal Psalmist says (*Psalm 118*): It is good for me that you have humbled me.

Second objection: the works of God are perfect (*Deuteronomy 32*); all things were made through him (*John 1*). Therefore, since good and perfect are identified — as Scotus holds in the cited passage — it is plainly concluded that there is no evil. I reply that those scriptural passages are to be explained of works immediately and solely produced by God, who saw all the things that he had made, and they were very good (*Genesis 1*) — that is, perfect, as some translate it, and aptly, since as stated, good and perfect coincide — but not of works to whose production a secondary cause concurs, which sometimes fails in its operation. Hence through natural causes the evil of nature happens, and through free causes the evil of morals. This Augustine confirms (*in the Book on the New Song, found in his collected works, Vol. 9*): For the first man received free will rightly ordered, and God placed before him, as is read (*Ecclesiasticus 15*), fire and water — stretch out your hand to whichever you will. He chose fire, he left water. Look at the just judge. What man chose, he received freely; he willed evil, and that evil followed him.

Article II: How Many Species of Evil There Are

Although the partitions of evil seem to appear from the divisions of good adduced in the preceding question, article 2, those are nevertheless broader and more extensive than these. For though there is a supreme good, there is no supreme evil, as Scotus proves (2, *dist. 37, § Ad aliam quaest. H*; and 4, *dist. 50, q. 2, § Respondeo A*), Vorrelon (*ibid., dist. 34, concl. 1, part 2*), and Suarez (*Disputation 11 of the Metaphysics, sect. 2, n. 1*), and as I will show below when I treat the cause of evil, and as is found (7 *Ethics, ch. 12*). Moreover, the distribution of good into absolute good and relative good is indeed approved, as the Doctor intimates (*Quodlibet 16, art. 1, sub C*). But the division into evil that is evil in itself and evil that is evil to another, accepted by Vasquez (1–2, *disp. 95*) and Suarez (*in the cited passage, n. 5*), is not to be adopted; in the first place, Augustine (2 *On the Morals of the Manicheans, ch. 8*) openly rejects it, saying: Evil in relation is in itself good; and venom in itself is good, but to another it is evil, because it is harmful. Then, as will be said in the next article, evil formally is the privation of good; therefore

nothing is absolutely evil. Again, evil is the unsuitability of a thing, and unsuitability is a relation, just as suitability is likewise a relation. Therefore the said division is invalid. All the more since a relation — whether real or of reason — does not belong to the genus of active things; therefore evil is not evil because it is evil to another.

Now the celebrated division is from Augustine (*1 On Free Will, ch. 1*) and the Scholastics — notably Scotus (*2 Reportata, dist. 34, q. 1, § Secundo*): into the evil of nature, which is the privation of natural perfection — thus a monster (*2 Physics, 7 and 82*) is called evil, the sin of nature — and the evil of morals, which is the privation of conformity of the act of the will to the right dictate of reason.

Also common is the division from the same Augustine (*in the cited passage*) and (*Against Adimantus, ch. 24*), approved and found in Scotus (*2, dist. 37, § Ideo possit; and 4, dist. 50, q. 2, § Respondeo A*): into the evil of punishment and the evil of fault. The evil of fault is the privation of due rectitude that ought to be in the second act of the will and is not; which, according to Scotus (*in the second passage cited*), is sin formally. The evil of punishment is the privation of a due good arising from fault, as the damned are deprived of beatitude and punished in hell on account of sins committed by them.

First objection: when the divided term is removed, the dividing members into which the divided term is distributed are likewise removed, as is evident from what was said (*in the Epitome, Book 2, q. 7, art. 1*). But evil does not exist, as Dionysius says (*4 On the Divine Names*). Therefore no division of evil exists either. I concede the major and deny the minor, as is evident from the preceding article. Concerning Dionysius I say that he is to be interpreted as speaking of evil formally — which is not a positive thing, but a privative one, as will be shown in the next article.

Second objection: besides the evils enumerated there is demeritorious evil, which is opposed to the good of grace, of which the Doctor makes mention (*2, dist. 37*). Therefore the divisions of evils presented above are insufficient. I reply that demeritorious evil is reduced to the evil of fault, which is sin, on account of which the sinner demerits in the sense that God no longer preserves grace in him. Especially since grace and sin, in the school of Scotus, are not properly and formally opposed. Therefore there is no need to establish demeritorious evil as a member opposed to grace and distinct from the evil of fault.

Article III: What Evil Is

Cajetan (*1 part, q. 48, art. 1; and 1–2, q. 18, art. 5*), Medina (*ibid.*), and Vasquez (*Disputation 45, ch. 9*), following the Pythagoreans — as Aristotle indicates (*2 Metaphysics, ch. 1*) and Thomas witnesses (*1 part, q. 49, art. 1, ad 1*) and Major (*2, dist. 43, q. 3*) — assert that the evil of nature, which they also call evil simply, is something privative; while the evil of morals, which they also call evil in a qualified sense, is something positive, and consequently they determine that sin

formally is something positive. The opposite is defended by Scotus (2, *dist.* 37, § *Iste gg.*), Alexander of Hales (2, 2, q. 94, m. 2), Henry (*Quodlibet* 1, q. 25), Aureolus (*dist.* 35, art. 2), and others who commonly teach that evil formally consists in the privation of good.

Note that, although these three — evil, vice, and sin — are sometimes used interchangeably, as is evident in Alexander (2, 1, q. 18) and following, there is nonetheless some distinction among them. For evil is more broadly diffused than vice and sin, and they seem to stand in relation as more common and less common, as higher and lower. For evil is opposed to good, whether natural or moral; but vice is opposed to virtue — hence Basil says (*in the Monastic Constitutions*, ch. 3): Vice is nothing but the desertion of virtue. And Augustine adds (4 *On Free Will*, ch. 14): What you have found to be lacking to the perfection of nature, call that vice. But sin, as Aureolus notes in the cited passage, adds above evil a reference to the agent, since that which is the privation of what is due in the being of the agent as agent is called sin — though it is most commonly taken as opposed to grace through demerit, insofar as it is a falling away from the first rule and divine ordinance, as in (*Psalms* 36): Decline from evil and do good. Or as it is an aversion from God and a conversion to the creature. Thus Augustine writes (*toward the end of Book 1 On Free Will*): All sins are contained in this one genus — that someone is turned away from divine and truly permanent things and converted toward mutable and uncertain ones. And (*Book 2*, ch. 19): The will turned away from the immutable and common good, converted to its own proper good. And (*in the Book on True Religion*, ch. 3): Aversion from earthly things and conversion to the one true God. Aureolus adds in the cited passage that fault regards the free agent, so that fault properly is not found except in one who possesses free choice; and thus when a man acts badly he is to be blamed, and if he acts well he is to be praised, because he is endowed with free choice. Moreover, observe that in these things just described two things can be considered: the material, which is positive, and the formal, which is privative — which I noted and expressed specifically concerning sin (*in the book on causes*, q. 3, art. 3, note 3), as may be seen there and below in article 5.

The assertion is that evil, taken formally, is the privation of good. So holds Scotus in the cited passage. It is proved, first, from Scripture: (*Psalms* 12): Evil is called a declining — Decline from evil and do good. Transgression — (*Matthew* 15): Why do you transgress the commandments of God? Prohibition — (*Psalms* 33): Restrain your tongue from evil. Defect — (*Psalms* 118): My soul has fainted for your salvation; and in negative precepts a negation is added: You shall not steal, you shall not kill, and so forth. From all this it is concluded that evil formally exhibits nothing positive. Second, from the Fathers: Dionysius (4 *On the Divine Names*): Evil does not exist, nor is it a being among existing things; but it is the privation of perfection, of the proper and fitting good. Damascene (2 *On the Faith*, ch. 4): Nothing is evil except the privation of good, just as darkness is the privation of light. Augustine (*Book 83 Questions*, q. 7): The name of evil is derived

from the privation of species. And (*in the Enchiridion*, ch. 11): What else is what is called evil, except the privation of good? Ambrose (*Book On Isaac and the Soul*, ch. 7), Anselm (*Book on the Concept of Virginal Conception*, ch. 5), and others cited by recent authors hold the same. Third, that is the precise and formal character of evil by the positing of which, with everything else removed, evil is posited; and by the removal of which evil is removed; but when the privation of good is posited, evil is posited, and when anything else is removed, evil is not removed unless that privation is removed; therefore evil is the privation of good. The major is clear. The minor is proved: if the act of the will is conformed to right reason it is always good; but if the act itself deviates from such rectitude it is evil — hence Dionysius says in the cited passage: evil is from any defect whatever. For an act is never called evil except when it is deprived of the perfection and goodness it ought to have; and this is evident concerning natural evil — for example blindness, which is the evil of the eye and which cannot be found without privation. Moreover, if evil were something positive, it would be either something corporeal or incorporeal, as Augustine argues (*Book 83 Questions*, q. 7). But neither is established to be the case, since God created both, and not evil taken formally. For, as the same Augustine asserts (*12 City of God*, ch. 7): An evil will has no efficient cause but a deficient one. Aristotle agrees (*6 Ethics*, ch. 3): Right willing necessarily seeks right reason to which it is conformed; and conversely, willing is evil when it is not conformed to right reason; and therefore evil formally is the privation of that conformity, perfection, and goodness — whether it is the evil of nature or the evil of morals, as Suarez rightly concludes (*Disputation 11 of the Metaphysics*).

First objection: there are many distinct species of sins — such as theft, homicide, and so forth; but such species cannot be assigned through privations but through positive acts; therefore evil is not rightly defined as the privation of good. First confirmation: many vices are opposed to one act of justice — such as theft, homicide, and adultery — which differ in species; and so forth. Second confirmation: if theft were the privation of the due rectitude of justice and the defense of a neighbor's goods, but one is not always bound to defend a neighbor's goods unless one has care of them by duty — therefore and so forth. I reply with Scotus (*Quodlibet 18*, § *Ex isto Y*): having conceded the major, I deny the minor. For evils in their own way differ just as the goods that ought to be in them differ — so that if the goodnesses and rectitudes that ought to be in them differ in species, the evils opposed to them likewise differ in species; and if those are distinguished in number, so the evils are numerically distinct. For privations differ just as the habits of which they are privations: thus deafness and blindness differ in species in a privative way, just as hearing and sight are distinguished in species in a positive way. And this and that blindness are numerically distinguished in a privative way, just as this and that sight are numerically distinguished in a positive way. And from the greater or lesser goodness of which an act is deprived, a greater or lesser evil, a more or less grave sin and

transgression of the law, is inferred. To the first confirmation I deny the antecedent. For theft is opposed to the right dictate of reason that each person should have and possess what is his own; but whoever steals takes from another what is his own; therefore theft is the privation of such rectitude. Homicide, however, is opposed to the right dictate of reason that each person should enjoy his own proper life, and it is formally the privation of that rectitude, because it takes life from one's neighbor. From this the answer to the second confirmation is evident. For theft does not conflict with the defense of a neighbor's goods, but with the right dictate of reason that each person should hold and possess what is his own.

Second objection: moral good and moral evil are contrary opposites; therefore evil is not the privation of good. The antecedent is from Aristotle (*2, ch. on Opposites; and 2 Ethics, ch. 8*). The reason is that between good and evil a middle term is interposed — namely, the neutral or indifferent — but between privatively opposed things no middle is given. Confirmation from the same Philosopher (*ch. on Opposites*): from privation to habit no return is given; but from evil to good — as from vice to virtue — a return is had. Therefore and so forth. I reply by distinguishing the antecedent: taken materially, I concede — thus justice and injustice are contrary qualities, as are virtue and vice; taken formally and precisely, I deny — for thus, as Aureolus notes in the cited passage from Aristotle (*10 Metaphysics, ch. 3, T. 16*), one of the contraries includes the privation of the other. And evil is not called evil precisely on account of the positive, but on account of the included privation. Or say that this holds of evil taken as harmful, as Augustine mentions (*12 City of God, ch. 4*), but not of evil taken as the privation of a suitable good. Aristotle in the passages cited is to be thus interpreted. To the proof I say that no middle is interposed when the subject is capable of the form; but a middle is given when the subject is suited to receive the form but does not yet have it — as a puppy after the ninth day is either seeing or blind; but before the ninth day it is neither seeing nor blind, but simply not seeing. Or say that this is true in natural things, not in moral ones; and by this distinction the confirmation is answered — for although in natural things no return from privation to habit takes place, as from death to life, nonetheless in moral matters a return can be made, as from the unjust to the just and conversely; and likewise from evil to good and vice versa.

Third objection: every deed, word, or desire contrary to the law of God is something real and positive; but every sin, especially of commission, is a deed, word, or desire; therefore every sin is something real and positive. The major is evident. The minor is from Augustine (*in the Book against Faustus, ch. 25*). I reply that the argument concludes concerning sin taken materially, not formally, and that Augustine is to be thus explained. For the same Augustine, commenting on the words of John — "without him nothing was made" — says that sin is nothing, and when men sin they become nothing, which he derived from (*Psalm 72*): I was brought to nothing, and I knew it not.

One may say: if sin is nothing, God would punish the sinner for nothing — which seems false and absurd. I say that God does not inflict punishment on the sinner for nothing in a negative sense, but for nothing in a privative sense — that is, for the privation of due rectitude that ought to be in his act and is not. Just as a teacher beats the student who did not apply himself to his lesson, even though he was obliged to do so; and the master chastises the servant who did not preserve his goods, even though he was obliged to keep them safe; so God punishes the sinner, who, when he was bound to observe God's commandments, transgressed them.

You will insist: in hatred of God there could not and ought not to be any rectitude or conformity to right reason, because it is precisely and absolutely evil. Therefore God does not punish the sinner for the privation of due rectitude that ought to be in the act and is not. I say that the act of the sinner's will, by which he wills evil to God, informed with that malice, could and ought to have been informed with due goodness and rectitude — that is, with love for God — because a man is bound to love God himself as creator and supreme good; and by hating him he fails and merits punishment, departing from the first and superior rule fixed and established for him.

Article IV: From What Evil Arises

To begin with, the error of the Pythagoreans and the heresy of the Manicheans, who suppose two first principles — one the cause of goods and the other the cause of evils — is to be banished. Against these Augustine inveighs sharply and vehemently (*Against the Letter of the Foundation, from ch. 30 to the end; 2 On the Morals of the Manicheans; 2 On Genesis against the Manicheans, chs. 1 and 9; in the Enchiridion, chs. 10, 12, 24*) and elsewhere throughout, especially (*1 On Free Will, ch. 1*), where he says: We believe that all things that exist are from one God, and yet that God is not the author of sins. Alphonsus also refutes them excellently (*Book 10 Against Heresies, heresy 2*). Plato agrees (*in the Timaeus and in Book 11 of the Republic*), arguing against Hesiod and Homer, who assign ten causes of evils. And Augustine testifies (*8 City of God, ch. 14*) that according to Plato all the gods are good and exalted. Add (*1 Timothy 4*): Every creature of God is good. And (*Genesis 2 and 3*): Every tree that God planted in paradise is good. Hence Augustine adds (*1 On Genesis against the Manicheans, ch. 13*) that poisonous herbs were created for the punishment and testing of mortals. And (*in the Enchiridion, ch. 11*): God acts well even out of evil. And it is established as a matter of faith in the Council of Braga, ch. 7, whose words Alphonsus adduces (*in the cited passage, on the word "creature," heresy 2*). Moreover, whatever exists is good, because what exists is a being, and being and good are convertible, as Metaphysicians teach and Augustine affirms (*in the Enchiridion, ch. 24*), and the author of (*On Faith to Peter, ch. 4*) agrees. Furthermore, good and evil are opposed privatively, as was stated above; but the good is positive, having a good principle — which is God; therefore evil, which is privative, obtains no productive principle — just as

blindness, darkness, and other privative things properly have no principle and efficient cause, since they do not properly come to be. For this reason Augustine (*14 City of God, ch. 12*), speaking of the food by eating which Adam fell into sin, adds that the food was not evil or harmful except because it was forbidden. And (*in the Book on True Religion, ch. 13*): The devil, insofar as he is an angel, is not evil, but insofar as he is depraved by his own will. Moreover, if there were a true first principle of evils, it would be either from itself or from another — not from another, for then it would not be a first principle but would depend on a prior other; nor from itself, for to be from itself is to be independent and the supreme good, as Scotus infers (*2 Reportata, dist. 34, q. 1, § Ad aliam quaest. H*). Finally, a supreme evil is impossible, because nothing can be found that lacks all good, as the Doctor notes in the cited passage with Augustine (*1, 83 Questions, q. 6*). Therefore a twofold first principle — one of goods and another of evils — cannot exist.

First assertion: the evil of punishment is from God. So holds Scotus (*2, dist. 4, § Dico possit sub DD; and 4, dist. 50, q. 1*) and Vorrelon (*ibid., art. 2*). It is proved, first, from Scripture (*Jeremiah 11*): Behold, I will bring evils upon them from which they cannot escape. (*Amos 3*): There is no evil in the city that the Lord has not done. (*Micah 1*): Evil comes down from the Lord. And (*Baruch 2*): The Lord brings evils upon us. Hence God pronounced the sentence of punishment against Adam, Eve, and the serpent (*Genesis 3*). It is proved second from Augustine (*1 Retractions, ch. 26*): Therefore the punishment of evils, which is from the Lord God, is an evil. And (*1 On Genesis according to the Letter, ch. 13*). And he condemns the contrary opinion as heretical (*in the Book on Heresies, heresy 65*). Salvian writes (*in the Book on the Governance of God, in the beginning*): We are indeed punished by God, but we ourselves cause ourselves to be punished. And since we ourselves cause ourselves to be punished, who can doubt that we ourselves punish ourselves by our own crimes? Because whoever gives the cause by which he may be punished, punishes himself, according to that saying: each is bound by the cords of his own sins. Third, a just and upright judge, according to the laws prescribed, punishes the wicked and rewards the good — for he must judge according to works whether good or evil; but God is the just judge of the living and the dead, and we must all appear before the tribunal of God, so that each may receive according to what he has done in the body, whether good or evil. Therefore the evil of punishment is from God. Hence (*Ecclesiasticus 11*): Death and life are from the Lord God. And Alphonsus (*Book 10 Against Heresies, on the word "evil"*) reports that a certain Coluthus was condemned as a heretic for having asserted absolutely that God is not the maker of any evil — since from the sacred pages cited above it is clearly established that God is the cause of labors, afflictions, calamities, and the other things that are evils of punishment. For through these evils are corrected, and the good become better, as Augustine excellently pursues (*3 Against Julian, ch. 8*).

Second assertion: the evil of fault is not from God, but from the created will. So holds Scotus in the recently cited passage (*sub H; and § Ad solutionem istorum. T*) and following. This assertion has two parts. The first part is defended by Augustine (1, 83 Questions, q. 4), and the contrary opinion is refuted as heretical by Alphonsus (*Book 10 Against Heresies, heresy 1*). It is proved, first, from Scripture (*Matthew 7*): A good tree cannot produce evil fruit; but God is supremely good — indeed, No one is good but God alone. (*Romans 11*): If the root is holy, so are the branches; but God is holy (*Isaiah 6*). Therefore the evil of fault is not from God. Second, the evil of fault is punished by God, as I showed in the first assertion. Therefore it is not from God. Hence (*Hosea 13*): Your ruin is from yourself, O Israel; from me only is your salvation. Third, Scotus argues in the cited passage before X: God cannot be averted from himself — neither formally, because he cannot fail to love himself, since he is the supreme good knowing no higher rule; nor virtually, because nothing other than himself is necessary, but whatever is outside himself is willed freely and contingently by him; but sin — which is the same as the evil of fault — is an aversion from the immutable good and an inordinate conversion to a mutable good, according to Augustine (*in the work on Free Will*). Therefore the evil of fault is not to be attributed to God. The second part is proved, first, from Sacred Scripture (*Psalms 33*): But the countenance of the Lord is upon those that do evil. And (*Romans 7*): But what I do not will, that evil I do. Second, from Augustine (12 *City of God*, chs. 6, 7, 8, and 9; 1, 2 *On Marriage*, ch. 20; 3 *To Boniface*, ch. 9; 1 *On Grace against Pelagius*, ch. 20; 1, 83 Questions, q. 4; and 1 *On Genesis according to the Letter*, ch. 9), where speaking of the Demon he says: From itself it has an evil will; from God — that is, from him — it has a good nature. And (*On Correction and Grace*, ch. 6), speaking of man, he says: The first depravity, by which God is not obeyed, is from man, because by his evil will departing from the rectitude in which God first made him, he became depraved. Third, the cause of the evil of fault is that which falls away from the first rule fixed for it and from the commandment likewise established for it; but the created will is of this kind, as is evident from (*Genesis 1*) concerning our first parents and the other transgressors of divine law. Fourth, what is punished on account of the evil of fault is its cause; for the sinner and transgressor must be punished; but the created will is punished, as Augustine affirms (11 *On Genesis according to the Letter*, ch. 20): It must be believed that the evil of one's own will is to be punished by the fire of eternal punishment. Furthermore, the will alone is the source and origin of good and evil, of merit and demerit; for in its power alone it lies to operate well or badly. Hence Augustine adds (8 *On Genesis according to the Letter*, ch. 17): The will is the cause of sin, and no other cause is to be sought. And (13 *City of God*, ch. 14): From the evil use of free will the chain of calamity had its beginning. The same is written (1 *Magna Moralia*, ch. 10).

Third assertion: the evil of nature does not come from the first cause but from the secondary cause. This is derived from the Doctor in the cited passage. It is

proved, first, from (*Genesis 1*): God saw all the things that he had made, and they were very good, or perfect, as some translate it. And (*Ecclesiasticus 34*): The works of God are perfect. And elsewhere: God made man upright. Second, from Augustine (*1 On Genesis against the Manicheans, ch. 21*): God made all things not only good, but very good. He writes the same (*1 On Free Will, ch. 1; and Book 2, chs. 1 and 2; and 1 Questions on Exodus, q. 143*). Third, Aristotle (*2 Physics, T. 27*): The sun and man generate man; if a monster should occur, it is attributed not to the sun, which is the universal cause, but to the man, who is the particular cause, on account of excess or deficiency of matter, or other causes discussed (*in Physics, in the book on causes, q. 6, art. 3*). Fourth, a monster is a sin of nature, whose cause is a deficient cause, as above all Alexander of Hales observes (*3 part, q. 26, m. 7, art. 1*); but God is the perfecting and unfailing cause, since he is first among all things, regulable and conformable by no one. Therefore the evil of nature is to be ascribed not to God but to the creature.

First objection: (*Job 41, 4*) speaks of the Demon: This is the beginning of God's fashioning, which he made to be mocked by his angels. (*1 John 3*): From the beginning the devil sins. And (*John 8*): He was a murderer from the beginning. Therefore the Demon is the principle and cause of evils. I reply that, from the very moment the Demon was created by God, he turned away from God himself and converted to love of himself, since he coveted equality with God; therefore he is said to be the beginning of God's fashioning. For he who rose like the morning star fell and was made an object of mockery and derision for the angels, as is evident from the cited text of Job: So that he may be mocked by his angels. And (*Psalms 73*): That dragon, which you have formed to mock at it. Moreover he is called a murderer from the beginning, because from the time man was created, he cast man into death through envy, persuasion, and temptation, as Scripture attests (*Wisdom 2*): Through the envy of the devil death entered into the world. Thus Scotus replies (*2, dist. 5, q. 2, § Ad 1 principale ante R*) together with Augustine (*11 On Genesis according to the Letter, ch. 21*). Or say, also with the same Augustine in the same passage, that this is to be explained of God's foreknowledge: although God foreknew that Lucifer would voluntarily and freely fall into sin almost immediately after his creation, God nevertheless willed to create him for the exercise and progress of the good. So it is said (*Ecclesiasticus 24*): From the beginning and before the ages I was created. And (*Apocalypse 3*): The Lamb who was slain from the origin of the world.

Second objection: (*Exodus 4*): I will harden the heart of Pharaoh. And (*Ezekiel 14*): I will deceive that prophet. And (*Isaiah 64*): The Lord has mingled a spirit of error among them. And (*ch. 63*): Why have you led us astray, Lord, from your way? But to harden, to deceive, and to lead someone into error is the evil of fault; since God does this, it is plainly inferred that God is the cause of the evil of fault. Alphonsus replies (*Book 10 Against Heresies, heresy 1, on the word "evil"*): God is said to harden the heart of Pharaoh not because he imbues it with malice, but because he permits it to be hardened, deceived, to fall into error and

into a reprobate sense. This is consistent with the exposition of Augustine (*in the Book on Predestination, chs. 5, 6, 15*): I will harden — that is, I will not soften. He writes the same (*5 Against Julian, ch. 3*). Just as when a master conducts himself so indulgently and complaisantly toward his servant that he does not punish his vices and crimes, he is said to make the servant worse and more depraved.

Third objection: it is read (*3 Kings 12*) that by the will and instigation of God the wicked and depraved king Rehoboam reigned. And (*Job 34*): God causes the hypocrite to reign. And (*2 Kings 16*): God commanded Shimei to curse David. Therefore God is the author of the evil of fault. I reply that these and similar authorities, which can be adduced, are dissolved and explained by this distinction — namely, that they are to be understood not effectively but permissively; that is, God permits that a bad prince and king should govern and reign, because of the sins of the people, as is evident from the passage of Job cited. And (*2 Thessalonians 2*): Because they have not received the love of truth, that they might be saved, therefore God will send them a strong delusion to believe a lie, so that all who have not believed the truth may be judged.

Article V: How Evil Proceeds from the Created Will as from a Good

That evil arises from good is openly handed down by Augustine (*1 Against Julian, ch. 3; and Book 3 Against the same, ch. 24*), Ambrose (*Book on Isaac and the Soul, ch. 7*), and Scotus (*2, dist. 37, § Ad aliam quaest.*). But by what means this happens is a disputed point among the Scholastics. Three modes of speaking are set forth and discussed in this article by Scotus in the cited passage, which his annotators attribute to Saint Bonaventure (*2, dist. 34, 44*), from which the same Scotus, in the cited passage (*§ Propter igitur*), having examined and pondered them well and carefully, acknowledges that he collects the true solution to this difficulty.

The first mode of speaking is that found and defended by the Seraphic Doctor in the cited passage (*dist. 34, qq. 2, 3, 4, art. 2*), asserting that evil comes from good accidentally — with accidentality on the part of the cause — just as the Philosopher says (*5 Metaphysics, T. 2; and 2 Physics, T. 33*) that Polycletus is accidentally the cause of the statue. The second is that of the named Doctor (*ibid., d. 44, q. 3, a. 1*), asserting that the good is the accidental cause of evil — with accidentality taken on the part of the effect — that is, when the will per se intends something positive in the effect, to which it happens that something deformed or evil is conjoined, which the will does not per se intend. The third is that of the same Doctor (*ibid., q. 2, art. 1*), holding that evil proceeds from the good not as from an efficient cause, but as from a deficient one.

Note first, from Scotus in the cited passage (*§ Propter igitur*), that since in evil two things are involved — namely, the physical act, which is positive and is called the material element of sin, and the privation of due justice, which is the formal element of sin — the first has an efficient cause, because everything positive besides God has another as its efficient cause; but the second obtains no cause

except a deficient one. For the created will, which is bound to conform itself to God and to observe his commandments, if it does not conform and does not observe them — as Scotus asserts (*in Reportata 2, dist. 37, § Ad 1 q. dico*) — is said to fail, which is formally to sin and to do evil, according to that of (*Psalms 50*): I have done evil before you. From this evil we are begged to be delivered (*Matthew 6*): Deliver us from evil. For from the fact that the free cause does something positive, to which some defect is annexed, it fails or sins — as Augustine affirms (*3 Against Julian, ch. 26*): Just as when someone plucks the fruit of another, he commits theft, departing from the law of God commanding "you shall not steal." In this sense Scotus adds in the cited passage that most authorities can be explained — especially Dionysius (*Book on the Divine Names, ch. 4*): No one acts looking to evil. And Aristotle (*3 Ethics, ch. 5*): The virtuous man chooses good things per se, and evil things per accidens — meaning that he does not intend evil per se, but only per accidens — that is, casually and fortuitously. So that this may be better grasped:

Note second that one thing can arise from another per accidens in three ways. First, on the part of the cause — namely, because it is conjoined per accidens to a cause that truly produces such an effect; as music builds per accidens, since music is irrelevant to building, because a man does not build as a musician, but as a builder, insofar as he possesses the art of building, not insofar as he possesses the art of singing. In this way sin proceeds from the will not insofar as the will is the will — otherwise it would suit the divine will, which is impeccable — but insofar as it is defectible and capable of going astray, which happens to it from the fact that it is from nothing, as Augustine thinks (*12 City of God, chs. 6, 7, 8, 9; 1 On Grace against Pelagius, ch. 20; and Book 14 of the same work, ch. 13*): Man, from the fact that he is from nothing, fails and sins. And (*in the Book on Marriage, ch. 20*). The same is found in the author of (*On Faith to Peter, ch. 3*): All creatures are good, and because they were made from nothing, they fail. Second, on the part of the effect — which happens when the effect is not per se intended by the cause — as the finding of a treasure by one who is digging a vineyard. So evil is said to be caused per accidens by the will, because the will does not per se intend it, as I was saying in the preceding note. Third, by reason of what is extrinsic — in the way that being capable of laughter is accidental to rational, and rational to animal, because they are outside the essence of animal, as I observed (*in the Epitome, Book 3, q. 4, art. 4, n. 17*). So evil comes from the will per accidens, not insofar as the will is the will, but insofar as it is the created will — that is, insofar as it is finite and limited and is defectible and peccable by being from nothing — as the Doctor acutely deduces in the cited passage (*Q and R*) and before him Augustine (*14 Trinity, ch. 4*).

Note further that the soul and every nature are good, as is evident from (*1 Timothy 4*): Every creature of God is good. But the created will, which arises from rational nature, is good if it operates well; it is evil if it operates badly, as Augustine excellently and illustriously pursues in the cited work against Julian.

First assertion: evil derives its origin from good. So hold Augustine and Scotus cited at the beginning of this article, from whom Suarez (*Disputation 11 of the Metaphysics, sect. 3, n. 15*) seems to dissent. It is proved, first: a defect comes from a deficient cause — as a limp from a limping person, blindness from one lacking light, privation of form from matter, and so forth; but the deficient cause, as a being and a cause, is something good — as a blind man, according to human nature, is a positive being and good; matter is a part of the composite and the subject of the form; and the other things created by God are good, as Augustine notes (*in the Book on True Religion, ch. 23; and 19 City of God, ch. 13*). Therefore evil is from good. Second, evil must necessarily originate from one of two sources — from evil or from good — but not from evil. For such evil would either be from another — and that other from another, and so on to infinity, which is absurd — or from itself, and so it would be first and supreme evil, which is impossible, as was shown above. Moreover, evil is the privation of good, as Augustine testifies (*in the Enchiridion, ch. 11*), which the holy Doctor illustrates with the example of illness, which is the privation of health. Now privation presupposes and requires beforehand a subject in which it exists and from which it proceeds, as is evident from privation, which has its subject in matter; but the subject is good, because it is a being. Therefore it follows that evil is from good.

Second assertion: evil is from good, insofar as it is a finite and limited good — which is the created will. The Doctor holds this (*in the cited passage, § Propter igitur*). It is proved, first, by the testimonies of Augustine cited in the second note: for the reason why the will sins, says Augustine, is that it was produced from nothing; and what is from nothing is finite and limited. Second, what is defectible is peccable, because sin is a failure from the immutable good, as Augustine testifies (*1 On Grace against Pelagius, ch. 10; Book on True Religion, ch. 3; 14 City of God, ch. 9*); but the will, as created and finite, is defectible and frequently falls away from the divine commandments by transgressing them, according to that of (*1 John 1*): If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us. Third, every subject and servant can deviate from the precept and law of his Lord, because he is bound to conform himself to him; but every created will is subject to God and is obligated below him by God's precept commanding (*Matthew 10*): If you wish to enter into life, keep the commandments. And it must be conformed to him, as the Doctor expounds (*in the cited passage, § Ista qq. ante A. post B; and § Ad argumenta 4 q. in solutione 2*).

First objection: from good nothing proceeds except good, just as from evil nothing but evil; but the will is good, since it is from God, from whom every good proceeds. Therefore from the created will no evil is caused. The major is supported by the celebrated testimony of the Savior (*Matthew 7*): A good tree cannot produce evil fruit, nor can a bad tree produce good fruit. Gazing upon which, Horace — cited by Augustine (*5 Against Julian*) — adds: Then nature obeys, when without a teacher it has perceived what nature desires; for what is good cannot desire badly. Augustine replies (*5 Against Julian, ch. 3; and 4 Against*

the same, ch. 4): By the good tree is to be understood the good will, which is conformed to divine law, operates well, and elicits good acts, and produces the good fruits of meritorious work; and by the bad tree is to be understood the bad will, which, deviating from divine commandments, operates badly and produces the evil fruits of sins. Therefore it is not human nature that is called a good or bad tree, but the will that proceeds from it is called good or bad — since it is free and indifferent, and thereafter determines itself to operating well or badly. Or say with Scotus in the cited passage (§ *Ad argumenta principalia 1 quaest.*) that Christ the Lord understands by the tree the interior act, and by the fruit the exterior act — for there he rebukes the hypocrites, who, though inwardly bad, wish to appear outwardly good; and the same Savior warns us to recognize them by their exterior works, saying: By their fruits you shall know them.

Second objection: the created will is peccable because it is defectible, and sins because it fails, as is established from the second assertion, defended by Augustine (*12 City of God, ch. 7*). If therefore this reasoning holds, God can sin, because God can fail; for to fail is the same as to not effect (*2 Physics, T. 30; and 5 Metaphysics, ch. 2*); but God can not act, because he acts freely with respect to what is outside himself; therefore he can fail and sin. I concede the antecedent and deny the consequent. For although "to fail" nominally and grammatically sounds the same as "not to effect," yet really and morally it means the same as deviating from a superior rule to which one owes obedience. But God, being the first rule, in no way can fail and sin.

Third objection: in precise causes, if the negation is the cause of the negation, the affirmation is the cause of the affirmation (*1 Posterior Analytics, T. 30*) — as if having lungs is the cause of breathing, not having lungs is the cause of not breathing. When God causes rectitude in an act, he is the cause of its rectitude — that is, so that the created will in its own order of causation should cause rectitude in that same act. Therefore conversely, if God does not cause rectitude in an act, he is the cause of its obliquity and defectibility, which is sin. I concede the major. To the minor I say with Scotus (*in the question before X*) that if God were not to cause the rectitude that ought to be in the act of the created will, and this on account of the freedom of his own will and not on account of a defect of the created will which spontaneously does not concur, then he would not be the cause of sin — because there would be no privation of due rectitude, and thus no sin of the created will. For without the concurrent causation of the first cause, it cannot do anything; and thus in that case it would not sin. For when two causes concur simultaneously, the defect is attributed to the cause that does not act when it is bound to act; but since God is not bound to act, if the secondary cause then does not operate, no defect or sin is imputed to him.

You will ask first: why does God permit evils? Augustine replies (*3 Against Julian, before ch. 8*): God does this in order to draw good out of evils. And (*4 Against the same, ch. 7*): Christ uses every kind of evil well for the utility of the good. And (*3*

On Marriage, ch. 20): God operates well from evils in all things. And (*in the Book on Correction and Grace, ch. 10*): because he created all things very good, and foreknew that evils arising from goods would occur, and knew that it pertained more to his omnipotent goodness to bring good even from evils, than to permit no evils to exist.

You will ask second: whether one sin is the punishment of another sin? I reply with Augustine (*3 Against Julian, ch. 3*) and Scotus (*in the cited passage, § Ideo possit dici DD*): affirmatively. The reason is that punishment is formally the privation of a good suitable to the will and to the one who wills; but when someone sins, he is deprived of a good suitable to him, either according to the affection for advantage or the affection for justice, as the Doctor shows (*ibid., § Ad q. 3, C*). Hence Augustine rightly adds (*1 Confessions, ch. 12*), addressing God: You have commanded, Lord, and so it is — that every disordered soul is a punishment to itself.

One may say: if sin is the privation of due rectitude, which is fault distinct from punishment, how is one sin the punishment of another sin? I say, with Scotus (*toward the end of the cited distinction*), that punishment is taken in two ways. In one way, punishment is the privation of a good suitable to the intellectual nature — such as the privation of the vision and enjoyment of God — and this is a pure privation, which comes from God neither effecting nor failing but deserting — that is, leaving in its defect the nature that fails, and in all the defects consequent upon that defect, within which very many privations of perfections suited to such a nature are included. This in the damned is called the punishment of loss. In the other way, punishment is something positive unsuitable to the nature — as vehement heat applied to flesh is unsuitable to it; and punishment thus understood comes from God inflicting it, which in the damned is called the punishment of sense, of which Augustine makes mention (*1 Retractions, chs. 25 and 26*).

Question III: On the End

The treatment of the end is given precedence over the other causes, says Aristotle (*1 On the Parts of Animals, ch. 1*), because the end is the reason, and reason is the principle in things constituted both by nature and by will. Now Moral Philosophy treats above all of the end, because — as Augustine testifies (*9 City of God, ch. 1*) — we will all other things for the sake of the end, but the end itself only for its own sake. For virtues and other moral works we employ as means toward attaining the end or happiness, as Aristotle not obscurely indicates (*1 Ethics, ch. 2*) and Scotus openly teaches (*4, d. 49, q. 8, toward the end*). Having presupposed and precognized what I said in Physics about the final cause, I have proposed in the present work to examine and sift the rest of the same matter with a little more precision and accuracy.

Article I: How Many Species of End There Are

The etymology of "end" is not to be dismissed, derived as it is from "cord" or "rope" — since the boundaries and termini of lands were constituted by cords; hence we read (*Psalms 16*): The cords have fallen to me in fine places. And elsewhere: He divided the earth by cords of distribution. The reason may be that just as we draw by a cord what we desire, so for the attainment of the end we desire, we apply ourselves to labor, virtue, and other good works. Nor should the fourfold acceptation of end be omitted, which Scotus preludes (4, d. 49, q. 9, *toward the end*), to be better examined by us below as a more fitting and opportune place. Many divisions of the end are adduced and expressed by Suarez (*Disputation 23 of the Metaphysics, sect. 2*), Raconius (*in the Prelude to Logic, sect. last, ch. 2; and Tract. 2 of Moral Philosophy, disp. un., q. 2*), and Fuentes (2 *Physics, q. 7, diff. 1, art. 1*). I select and explain the more important and outstanding ones.

The first is the very common division into the end of the agent and the end of the work, touched upon by Scotus (1 *Metaphysics, q. 7, toward the close*). The former is that which the operating or knowing agent proposes to attain for himself — as if someone studies Philosophy for the sake of vain glory, this is his end; this is also called the extrinsic end. The latter is that toward which the work or science is directed and for the sake of which it was devised, which is called the intrinsic end — as the end of Logic is the discernment of truth from falsity. It can be divided into mediate or remote — as the combination of letters in Grammar and the knowledge of terms in Logic — and immediate or proximate — as the knowledge of correct speech in Grammar and the knowledge of the syllogism in Logic. And further into total or adequate, and partial or inadequate, which can easily be perceived from what I said (*in Logic, Book 1, q. 2, art. 1*).

The second is the division of the end of the work into the end for whom (*finis cui*) and the end of which (*finis cuius*), which Aristotle presents (2 *On the Soul, ch. 4, T. 37; and 2 Physics, ch. 2, T. 23; and ch. 7, T. 71*) and Scotus (2, d. 6, q. 2, § *In ista quaest. A*). The end for whom is that for whom someone wills some good for the sake of which he acts — as the sick person is the end for whom the physician, through medicines, wills to induce health. The end of which is the good itself that someone wills for another — as health is the end of which, which the physician through medicines cures in order to provide it to the sick person. The former regards the love of concupiscence, because it is for the benefit of another; the latter regards the love of friendship, because it is for its own sake and tends toward nothing further, as the Doctor asserts (*ibid.*), and Suarez follows (*ibid., n. 3*).

The third is the division into objective end or end that (*finis qui*) and formal end or end by which (*finis quo*), which Scotus mentions (12 *Metaphysics, ch. 2; Tract. On the First Principle, ch. 2; and 4, d. 49, q. 6, sub C*). The former is the object to be obtained and enjoyed — as the objective end of beatitude is God. The latter is the operation by which such an object is attained and possessed — as the

fruition by which the Blessed enjoys God. From this originated the division of beatitude into objective and formal, of which more at its proper place.

The fourth is the division into end to be made — which is effected by the one operating and intending, and which sometimes remains in the agent after the action is completed, as health induced into the sick person, and sometimes does not persist in the agent, as harmony after singing and the sound of the cithara after playing the cithara — and end of production, which is that toward which the operation of the produced thing is ordered, and which is required beforehand before the operation; as form is required before it is sustained by matter, and the subject before accidents. This is touched upon by Aristotle (*1 Ethics*, ch. 6; and *1 Magna Moralia*, ch. 3) and explained by Bonet (*3 Physics*, ch. 3).

The fifth is the division into ultimate end and non-ultimate end. The latter is also called the subordinate end and intermediate — the one for whose sake something is done, yet which is still referred and ordered to something else; as the giving of money for succouring the poor and for obtaining the grace of God. The ultimate end is that for whose sake something is done without being referred to anything further. This partition of the end is derived from Scotus (*2 Metaphysics*, ch. 2; and 4, d. 49, q. 2; and *ibid. in the Reportata*, q. 7, toward the end). Now the ultimate end can be subdivided into the ultimate end in a qualified sense — that is, the last in some order and series, as health intended by the physician, for the sake of whose restoration to the sick person he devotes all his care and effort — and the ultimate end simply, to which in the end all things are reduced, such as God, according to that of (*Proverbs 16*): The Lord has made all things for himself. The objections that can be made in the present article will be proposed and dissolved more conveniently and aptly in the following article.

Article II: Which of the Said Ends Is the Final Cause

The Scholastics are not in agreement or accord on establishing which of the kinds of end enumerated above properly possesses the nature of the final cause. So that we may separate what is more certain and probable from what is less certain and doubtful: we observe that it is certain and undoubted, as held by all from (*2 Physics*, T. 29 and 31), that the end is defined as that for whose sake something is done. But the question is put in doubt as to which of the enumerated ends the said definition applies. And certainly it seems certain that it applies to both ends of the second division — since the agent acts for the sake of the end, and the agent's work is directed toward the end precognized and proposed by that same agent. For a man acts for the sake of beatitude, and his works are directed and directed toward attaining it, and they participate in the proper and formal character of the end.

With respect to formal and objective end, nearly the same causation is had. For the operation of the agent — especially the intellectual agent — which is called its end, exists for the sake of it, or so that the agent may be perfected through it,

as is evident from Aristotle (*9 Metaphysics, T. 16*) and Scotus in the same passage. But the objective end is for the sake of the operating agent, and the formal end is that in which the agent may rest, by attaining the object through its operation, possessing it, rejoicing in it, and enjoying it. For the agent is perfected by the possession and possession of such an objective end, and rests fully and completely in its vision and enjoyment — which the Royal Poet clearly expresses (*Psalm 16*): I shall be satisfied when your glory shall appear. But the greater and more difficult doubt concerns the end for whom and the end of which, and also concerning the intermediate and ultimate end.

Now with respect to the first proposed and examined theme: Ockham (*2, q. 3, art. 1*), Gabriel (*ibid., dist. 1, q. 5*), Henry (*Quodlibet 2, q. 2*), and others hold the opinion that the end for whom, and not the end of which, participates in the proper nature of the final cause. But the common opinion of the other Philosophers attributes to both ends the proper formal character of the final cause.

With respect to the second doctrine about the ultimate and non-ultimate end, Vasquez (*with 1 part, disp. 82, ch. 1; and 1–2, disp. 4*) rejects the said division as illegitimate and vain, and attributes causality of the final cause to the ultimate end alone. But the common sense and consensus of the others is that both ends possess the proper character of the final cause.

First assertion: the end for whom and the end of which have the proper character of the final cause. This is derived from Scotus (*2, dist. 6, q. 1, F*). It is proved, first, from Aristotle (*2 On the Soul, ch. 4, T. 37*), who admits the said division of the end, while in (*2 Physics, 29*) assigning the common definition of the end, he said that the end is that for whose sake something is done. If therefore the members of a good division equally participate in the nature of the common divided term, and the definition of the latter applies to them, undoubtedly each end is properly the final cause. Second, for the sake of the end man is moved to act, as no one denies; but he is moved not only for the sake of the end for whom but also for the sake of the end of which — for in each there is goodness — and man is aroused not only to have objective beatitude but also to have formal beatitude. Likewise, the physician is moved to procure health and strives through his work to confer it on the sick person. Now health is the end of which, and the sick person is the end for whom; each is therefore properly an end. Indeed, not a few recent authors hold, following Scotus in the cited passage and Aristotle (*5 Metaphysics, ch. 2*), that the two coalesce into one. The reason is that the agent intends both ends adequately; for the physician wills health to the sick person — the sick person is the end for whom, and health the end of which — which Aristotle plainly teaches in the recently cited passage, saying: Why does the man walk? In order to be well. Here both ends are grasped — namely the man and health; the former is the end for whom, the latter the end of which;

with this distinction however: the end for whom is the principal end, and the end of which the less principal one.

Second assertion: both the ultimate end and the non-ultimate end are truly ends. This is gathered from Scotus (*1, dist. 1, q. 4, § Ad argumenta; and 4, d. 14, q. 2, H and R*). It is proved, first, from (*2 Metaphysics, ch. 2*): In ends there is no proceeding to infinity. And (*2 Physics, T. 89*), cited by the Doctor (*Quodlibet 16, F; and 4, dist. 49, q. 9, M*): Just as the principle is in speculative matters, so the end is in practical matters. As in the speculative sciences, what is the principle of one science is the end or conclusion of another, and conversely what is the end or conclusion of one is the principle of another — as is evident in subordinate sciences, of which (*in Logic, Book 5, q. 4, a. 7*) — so likewise in practical and moral matters, one thing is ordered toward another and is an end in such a series of things; and because such things are not supremely good, they are therefore ordered toward another, which is the last and supreme good of all. Moreover (*2 Physics, 24*): Man is the end of artificial things, whose ultimate end is God, as the Apostle intimates (*1 Corinthians 13*): All things are yours; but you are Christ's, and Christ is God's. And Saint Augustine (*Book 83 Questions, q. 56; and Book on Spirit and Soul, ch. 42*): The body and soul together constitute man; whatever is seen with bodily eyes was made for the body; the body was made for the soul; but the soul for God. Again (*2 Physics, ch. 7, T. 71*): The end of generation is the form; but the form is further ordered toward the composite as the total and ultimate end of the same generation. Add that one thing can be done for the sake of another, and then further ordered toward another — as someone eats to sustain his body, then in order to serve God. Finally, many recent authors — Suarez in the cited passage, n. 5, Fuentes (*q. 7, diff. 1, art. 1, n. 3*), and the joint Scotists (*Disputation 7 of Physics, q. 8, art. 1*) — hold that from the end of which and the end for whom, and likewise from the formal and objective end as partial ends, one total end is composed. For in the attainment of each, the conjunction of one with the other toward the desired and beloved takes place — as health is conjoined with the healthy man, and the healthy man can be said to be the complete and total end of the agent. Similarly, man through vision and fruition is united to God, and becomes blessed — by which he is said to have his end or his ultimate perfection, since he is conjoined with the best possible for him, as the Doctor writes (*q. 1 of the Prologue; and in Reportata 4, dist. 49, q. 7, in the last solution*). And this is shown by the Savior (*John 17*): I pray, Father, that they may be one, as we also are one — meaning by the unity of charity and love, as the Doctor teaches (*1, d. 5, q. 2*) and I expressed at length (*in the Tract. on the Trinity, disp. 3, q. 5*). Aristotle intimates (*5 Metaphysics, ch. 2*), saying that man walks for the sake of health — where he comprehends both the man, who is the end for whom, and the health, which is the end of which. The same is established concerning the formal and objective end. For man operates in order to see God and enjoy him; where God clearly seen and possessed is called the ultimate end of man.

First objection against the first assertion: the end is that by the having of which the appetite of the one desiring rests — just as by the attainment of the terminus, motion ceases. But by having the end of which, the appetite of the desiring person does not rest, because it is desired not for itself but for the sake of something else — as health, which is called the end of which, is desired for the sake of man. For it is not loved per se but for the sake of another; but the end is that for whose sake all other things are sought (*2 Metaphysics*, 8). Therefore the end of which is not properly an end. Hence Scotus (*4, dist. 49, toward the close of q. 2; and d. 50, q. 2, sub F*) adds that the operation does not seem to be for its own sake but for the sake of the object. And Suarez (*Disputation 24 of the Metaphysics, n. 16*) adds that the formal end is ordered toward the objective end. Confirmation: just as instrument is to principal cause, so end of which is to end for whom — for just as an instrument cannot act without the principal cause upon which it depends, so the end of which is not desired except for the sake of the end for whom, as I explained above concerning health, which is not desired except for the sake of the end for whom — that is, the man. Therefore the end of which does not enjoy the proper nature of the end. I concede the major. To the minor I say that both ends are conjoined simultaneously, so that the intention of the one desiring may come to rest — because they stand as perfection and perfectible; for the end of which is the perfection of the end for whom, as health is the perfection of man. This does not, however, prevent the end of which from being properly an end. For the agent is moved by it to act, as is clear from what has been said. To Aristotle I say that he is speaking of the ultimate end, or also of whatever end toward which means are ordered — with respect to which means, it is rightly called an end. From this the testimony of Scotus cited above is also answered. To the confirmation: the parallel is to be denied, because an instrument — as stated in *Physics* — is not properly active except in the actual movement of the agent. But the end of which is active in its own genus, since the agent acts by its proper action for the sake of attaining it.

Second objection: the end for whom is the subject — as health subsists in man; therefore the end for whom is not properly an end. The consequence holds from (*2 Physics*, 24), where we read that we are in some way the ends of all things. Confirmation: if such is admitted as a true end, it would accordingly have to be conceded that man is the end of God, because we desire him for ourselves — especially since from what was said above, the formal and objective end together make up one total end. But this is false and absurd; therefore so is the other, and accordingly the end for whom is not properly an end. I reply that if the end of which is compared to the end for whom, the latter is indeed its subject or object, and in this respect is not called the end nor does it exercise the causality of the final cause; but insofar as means are brought to bear for its attainment and the agent operates for the sake of obtaining it, it does. To Aristotle I say that he offered this not diminishingly but diversifyingly; for he had just previously mentioned the end of generation, and because man is the

end of artificial things, Aristotle says: We are in some way the ends of those things that are made by art — as Fomse rightly notes in the cited passage, (*q. 10, sect. 1*). And that this is true is evident, because the Philosopher adds that he treated of two ends in his book of Philosophy — which, although it does not survive among us, is nonetheless expressly found in (*2 On the Soul, ch. 4*). To the confirmation I deny the implication, because God is not ordered toward us, but we are ordered toward him; and in order to attain him through vision and fruition we observe his commandments and direct our works toward him. Therefore we love God, because he wills to be loved by us as the supreme good to be possessed by us; and we refer all things to him as to our last and consummate perfection, as Richard notes above all others (*3, dist. 26, q. 2, art. 7*).

Third objection: what tends toward something else is not an end — nor the last and outermost point of a thing — as I stated (*in the Epitome, Book 1, q. 1, art. 2*). But the intermediate end tends toward something else, as is established from its description stated above. Therefore the intermediate end is not properly an end. The major is supported by the testimony of the Philosopher (*2 Physics, 29*): The end is that for whose sake everything is done by the agent intending it. First confirmation: it is contradictory to say that something is both a means and an end, since a means tends toward another while the end is for its own sake. Therefore an intermediate end is not given. Second confirmation: God does not will one creature for the sake of another; for the divine will is not moved by a created object to will one thing for the sake of another. Therefore only the ultimate end enjoys the proper nature of an end, and the rest participate only in the character of means. I distinguish the major: if it has no proper goodness for the sake of which it is desired and loved by the agent, I concede — as bitter medicine, bloodletting, and such like; if it is endowed with its own goodness, on account of which it is desired per se, I deny — as moderate bodily exercise. For in this way one good can be loved on account of another — as chastity on account of health, and health on account of God. In this sense (*Ecclesiastes 2*) writes: I abstained from wine, that I might turn myself to wisdom. Where abstinence from wine is for the sake of wisdom, and wisdom for the sake of God. And Aristotle in the cited passage says that artificial things are for the sake of man, and man for the sake of God, who is the last end of all things. This agrees with that of (*1 Corinthians 13*): All things are yours; but you are Christ's, and Christ is God's. To Aristotle I say either that he is speaking of the ultimate end simply, or also of the ultimate end in a qualified sense, toward which all the means necessary for its attainment in that series are ordered. To the first confirmation: the antecedent is true reduplicatively but not specifically; for what is a means with respect to the ultimate end can be an end with respect to others — as abstinence from wine is a means toward wisdom as its end, and then wisdom is a means toward attaining beatitude. To the second confirmation I say that this holds for God, because every creature is only a terminating object of his intellect and will; but not for us, who are moved by created objects, and the

goodness of one can move us toward another goodness, and terminate our appetite not simply but in a qualified sense, as I shall show more below.

You will ask whether the aforesaid ends are loved by one or by a double act. I reply with Scotus (4, d. 49, q. 5, § *Ad quaest.*), Rada (2 *Controversies*, contr. 11, 2, a. 4), and Faber (2, disp. 32) that those ends are loved by two acts; for the end of which is loved with the love of concupiscence, and the end for whom with the love of friendship; and they differ in their disposition and object, as Faber explains (*ibid.*, ch. 3). Again, the intermediate end is ordered toward the ultimate end, and they seem to stand as cause and effect, which are really distinct from each other. Therefore the agent is directed toward them not by one but by several acts.

Article III: What Is the Constitutive Character of the End

This difficulty is proposed under another title — namely, whether the will can will evil under the character of evil — and can be debated in two senses: first concerning the constitutive character of the end in first act; second concerning the constitutive character of the same in second act. The former sense is examined in this article; the latter will be discussed in the following one. Now in the present question two opinions prevail. One is that of Alexander of Hales (1 part, q. 17, m. 4; and q. 34, m. 1), Thomas (1–2, q. 1, art. 1; 3 *Against the Gentiles*, chs. 2 and 3), and Suarez (*Disputation 13 of the Metaphysics*, sect. 5), asserting that the constitutive character of the end in being an end is goodness alone. The other is that of Ockham (2, q. 13, dub. 3) and other Nominalists, affirming that not only the good or evil, but also the indifferent toward good or evil, can be the objective character of the end, which the will can fix for itself and preordain as an end.

Note that the Scotists are divided and split into three parties on this question: for some, like Mastrius and Bellutus (*Disputation 7 of Physics*, q. 8, art. 2), follow the former opinion. Others, like Faber (1, disp. 13, ch. 7; disp. 9 on *Penance*, ch. 8), embrace the latter view. Still others, like Vorrelon (2, d. 43, diff. 2), consider both opinions probable; and Bruliferus, Gad (*Quodlibet 16*, fol. 169), and the Doctor himself (*ibid.*) seem to hold the same. And this I already asserted (*in the Tract. on the Angels*, disp. 11, q. 4).

Note second: in the school of the Subtle Doctor, being generally accepted is indeed the object of the intellect, as is evident from Scotus (1, d. 3, q. 2, § *Ad rationes in oppositum*, C and E). But whether the same is the object of the intellect and of the will, he speaks obscurely and dubiously there, and does not seem to firmly assent to either side; he proceeds in nearly the same way in this as in that difficulty, as is clear to one reading the text attentively. For in the passage just cited he adds the conditional particle "if"; but (2, d. 6, q. 1, § *Quia tamen*, A) he explicitly and absolutely says that every being is the object of the will, though he does not speak as absolutely there, as is evident from that phrase "can otherwise be answered to the question." Hence in the Reportata (2, same dist. and q.),

responding to the arguments for the opposite opinion, in the fourth solution he still left in doubt the said difficulty — whether hatred of God is possible.

Note third, from (*4 Reportata*, d. 49, q. 9), that there is a twofold appetite of the will: natural and free. The natural appetite is the inclination by which the will by its very nature inclines toward the good fitting to itself, which is said to desire and will by the affection for advantage and the appetite of concupiscence. Thus each thing is said to desire its own perfection, and (*1 Physics*, 81): matter desires form. The free appetite is that by which the will freely determines itself to willing something, whatever that may be — whether possible or impossible — which is said to will by the affection for justice and the love of friendship. If it is possible, it can efficaciously will it and apply sufficient and appropriate means for its attainment; but if it is impossible, it can will it inefficaciously and with approbation — as the evil angel is said by the Doctor in the cited passage to have desired equality with God. Now through the said distinction this controversy is completely and fully resolved. For by the affection for advantage the will always tends toward the good; but by the affection for justice, although it tends toward the good in most cases, this is not always so, as the Doctor writes (*4, disp. 49, q. 9, Resp. § Ad aliud cum dicitur*).

First assertion: the constitutive character of the end prescribes from good and evil, and is indifferent to each. This is derived from the Doctor (*2, disp. 6, q. 1, § Quia tamen, A*), saying that the will has as its object the whole of being. And (*4, d. 49, q. 1, § Ad 1 q. ante T*): whatever the will regards as its volible object under the most common character, because it is an immaterial power and consequently regarding the whole of being, or something of equal extension with being. And (*ibid.*, q. 10, § *Respondeo sub E*) he adds that the will can pour forth an act of willing or not-willing concerning beatitude or misery, and that there are indifferent acts — this is the constant doctrine (*2, d. 41, q. un.*). It is proved, first, from Augustine (*1 Retractions*, ch. 9 and ch. 22): Nothing is so much in the power of the will as the will itself. Which Scotus (*1, d. 1, q. 1, § Contra 1 art.*) and elsewhere explains of the elicited act of the will. And (*in the Enchiridion*, ch. 14): Either the will does not exist, or it must be called free. If therefore the will freely regards any object — whether good or evil — it is consequently indifferent to willing or not-willing this or that; and therefore the constitutive character of its end prescribes from each, and is indifferent to each. Second, for whatever object is presented to the will, it can will it, not-will it, or refuse it. If the first, the intended conclusion is had — namely that the will indifferently regards any object, whether good or evil; if the second, the will is not free, which conflicts with Sacred Scripture (*Ecclesiasticus 15*): I have placed before you fire and water; stretch out your hand to whichever you will. Third, what has its object abstracted from good and evil does not precisely and adequately regard good alone, as is evident of the intellect, whose object is being in its whole breadth (*1, d. 3, q. 3*), and which therefore does not contemplate truth or good alone; but the object of the will is being, which is more common than good and the other

transcendentals. Therefore the will by its objective character does not regard goodness alone. The antecedent is argued by the Doctor (*in the passage recently cited, § Ad rationes in oppositum*): for the will can will whatever object is presented to it by the intellect. If therefore the intellect contemplates every being, surely this is not to be denied to the will — since the appetitive power equals the cognitive power in operation with respect to all objects. See Faber (*in 4, disp. 9 on sins, q. 1, n. 7*).

Second assertion: the will can will evil under the character of evil. This is indicated by Scotus (*in the cited passage*) and explicitly asserted by the same in collation 17 toward the end, where speaking of the evil angels he adds: Either they will hatred of God under the character of evil — and the intended conclusion is had, namely that evil under the character of evil can be willed; or it is willed under the character of good — and then they would be erring, because hatred of God is per se evil, and love of God is per se good; or they cannot will — the opposite of which we experience in sinners and the damned. The same is nearly found (*2, d. 43, q. 2, ante A*). Then it is proved from Scripture (*Psalms 73*): The pride of those who hate you ascends always. And (*John 15*): He who hates me also hates my Father — where Scotus (*2, d. 42, q. 1, § Ad 1*) comes to the aid that no one can hate one divine Person without virtually having hatred for another Person also. Since therefore hatred of God is per se evil, and the will can will it — as the damned do — it is plainly established that the will can tend toward evil under the character of evil. Moreover, some people desire death and kill themselves, driven by despair, even though they know that death is a certain evil averse from and adverse to beatitude; and depraved men often will evil with no consideration or proposed goodness, but spurred by malice alone, and because evil pleases them thus — hoping for no good nor benefit therefrom. Furthermore, from (*1, d. 1, q. 1*) a threefold end is assigned: true, apparent, and preordained or prefixed — and this last is what the will proposes to itself with no regard for goodness, usefulness, or honesty, but spontaneously and freely. Therefore the will can, by its own free choice, will evil as evil. Aristotle indicates this (*2 Magna Moralia, ch. 7*).

Third assertion: Scotus appears to be undecided as to whether hatred of God is possible and whether the will can will evil under the character of evil. So holds Cavellus (*1 Metaphysics, q. 2, Scholium 3*), adducing many passages from both sides, from which he concludes that Scotus remained undecided. This is evident to one reading the Doctor's writings. For (*1, d. 1, q. 4, § Ad argumenta*), meeting the testimony of Augustine (*in the Enchiridion, ch. 73*): The wretched not only do not wish to be wretched, but cannot at all wish to be so — he says this is to be interpreted not of the actual and elicited act of the will, but of the natural, habitual, and aptitudinal act, by which the will naturally inclines toward its own perfection — just as every other power and nature does. Hence in the Reportata (*4, d. 49, q. 9*) he gives the example of prime matter, which naturally desires form, just as every imperfect thing desires its own perfection. And there he adds

that all will beatitude not by an act of friendship but of concupiscence; for the disordered will of the damned and of the worst wayfarers does not will that act for its own sake, nor that act in itself — indeed, it does not will it to exist, nor God to exist, who is the beatifying object. The same he writes (*in Reportata 1, d. 1, q. 2, § Ad 1 principale; and 2, d. 6, q. 2, M and N; and in the Reportata of the same dist. and q., § Ad 1 rationem; and 2, d. 43, q. 1, § Respondeo. D*) — saying that God formally cannot be hated by any will. And he cites himself (*4, d. 49, q. 9*). And in the same (*2, cited q. 2*) he speaks conditionally and dubiously. But he seems to speak absolutely in (*Quodlibet 16, F*), saying that the end does not have the character of something to be not-willed, because it includes neither malice nor a defect of the good. Hence this — namely, not-willing the end — includes a contradiction, just as seeing a sound does. This also seems to be intimated by Augustine (*4 Questions on Numbers, q. 24*): Nor does anyone sin for the sake of sin itself, but for the sake of what follows from it. And (*in the Enchiridion, ch. 14*), cited by the Doctor in both the works on the fourth, it is stated that it is in the power of the will to elicit the act of willing or not-willing, both concerning good and concerning evil — because no willing is necessarily elicited by the will, whether concerning beatitude in general or in particular, as is evident from the same first cited passage and from the same place of the fourth (*F*). And although the same Scotus there concludes that we cannot will misery with respect to the inclination and natural appetite, he nevertheless does not absolutely affirm that the will is determined to either act; and responding to that argument — in what there is no defect of good or evil, it is necessarily willed — he determines that proposition to be false, because the will with respect to any act is free and necessitated by no object. Then he adds that the will can suspend its act when beatitude is shown to it. Again (*3, d. 33, q. unica, § Ad rationem igitur, C*) he writes that the object of the will is the good. Augustine had already premised this (*1–2 On the Sermon of the Lord on the Mountain, ch. 34*): The will is not except in good things. This must be met with the Doctor (*2, d. 23, q. un., A and D*): it is to be interpreted of the object of the will that is not adequate and motivating, but only with respect to inclination and natural appetite, and as in most cases. And he writes the same (*4, d. 49, q. 10, § Ad 1 arg. E and M; and ibid. in the Reportata, q. 9, § Ad aliud cum dicitur*). Finally, toward the end of collation 17 he seems to admit hatred of God, which is per se evil. This can be answered: if one says that hatred of God is possible not formally but interpretively — just as the Doctor says (*2 Reportata, d. 6, q. 1, toward the end*) that the evil angel desired equality with God not formally — since such equality is impossible — but interpretively and with an inefficacious will, which is called velleity. So Gad replies in the passage cited above. Therefore the joint Scotists cited above, even if in their first conclusion they explicitly wish to defend Scotus in saying that the good is the adequate object of the will, yet in the end of the second conclusion and in the first solution, pressed by the cited passages of the Doctor, they honestly confess that Scotus is undecided in this matter — although they think the matter

inclines more in their direction. Whether this is true, let the fair-minded judge decide from what has been adduced up to this point.

First objection: Dionysius (*On the Divine Names*, ch. 4), cited by the Doctor (2, d. 43, q. 2, at the beginning): No one acts looking to evil. Aristotle (1 *Ethics*, 1): The good is what all things desire — cited by the Doctor (4, d. 49, q. 9). And (2 *Physics*, 31; and 7 *Metaphysics*, ch. 10): End and good are mutually convertible. Augustine gives support (1–2 *On the Sermon of the Lord on the Mountain*, ch. 34): The will is not except in good things. And Anselm (1 *On Concord*, ch. 21): The will cannot not-will the supreme good. Therefore the objective character of the end is true or apparent goodness. I reply that all those passages are dissolved in two ways. First, they are true as in most cases, not always; for some are so wicked and depraved that, although they know they are acting badly and with evil for an end, they do not for that reason desist from acting badly and perversely, as the Doctor notes (*in the passage just cited*, § *Ex his*, sub *N*). Second, they are verified with respect to natural appetite, not with respect to free appetite — that is, in virtue of the affection for advantage, not of the affection for justice — as Scotus asserts (*in 4 cited*, § *Respondeo*; and § *Ad 1*).

Second objection: as the intellect stands toward true and false with respect to assent or dissent, so the will stands toward good and evil with respect to willing or not-willing. But the intellect cannot assent to the false; therefore neither can the will will the evil. Hence Bruliferus, cited by Gad from Scotus (2, d. 6, q. 2, *N*; and *in the Reportata ibid.*, § *Ad aliud cum dicitur*), says that hatred of God is not possible, because it is evil — unless on the part of his justice, not in itself but in its effect, as punishing the damned, inasmuch as they do not will his vindicating justice. The parallel is to be denied, because the intellect is a natural power while the will is free; and therefore although the will with free appetite and with an elicited act wills the good in most cases, it nevertheless is not necessitated to do so, but freely and absolutely can not-will — not only negatively but also contrarily — as the Doctor writes (*ibid.*, § *Ex his*, sub *N*; and § *Ad 1 argumentum in oppositum*, *M*); although he concedes that Aristotelian assertion (2 *Physics*, T. 89): As the principle is in speculative matters, so the end is in practical matters — with respect to objects, not with respect to the powers. The reason is given by Scotus (1, d. 1, q. 4, § *Ad argumenta*; and *Quodlibet* 16, a. 1, *F* and *G*): necessity exists in the intellect from the evidence of an object necessarily causing that assent in the intellect; but no goodness of an object necessarily causes an assent of the will. For the will freely assents to whatever good object, and thus freely assents to the greater good just as to the lesser. Those of our recent authors cited who do not perceive this attempt to defend the contrary against the Doctor.

Third objection: what is not comprised under the object of some power, toward it the power is not directed — as is evident of sound, which, being outside the object of sight, does not at all pertain to sight, as Scotus infers (*Quodlibet* 16, a. 1, *ante F*). But evil is not comprehended under the object of the will, because evil is

not desirable or volible; only good, because it is suitable, is desirable and volible. Therefore the objective character of the end is goodness. I concede the major and deny the minor. To its proof I say it holds of natural appetite, not of free appetite; and as in most cases, not always — as the Doctor affirms (*in the 4 cited*). To the testimony of Scotus drawn from the Quodlibet I say either that it is to be explained in the way I just said, or that he is speaking dubiously, as his words indicate. Cf. *Hic potest dici*, and there (G) he adds that the will moves and determines itself to an object not necessarily but freely.

One may say: the volible by free appetite and the love of friendship is desirable; but evil as evil is not desirable — not in itself nor for itself — because, as was stated above (*q. 2, art. 3*), evil formally is a privation, which designates nothing positive formally. Moreover, a power has no act or object that is unsuitable to it; but evil is unsuitable, since it harms that in which it is. Therefore in no way can evil as evil be willed by the will. I say this holds for natural inclination and the affection for advantage; not, however, for the free act and the affection for justice. For the damned desire not to exist (*Apocalypse 9*): They shall desire death, and it shall fly from them. Looking to this, Augustine (*1 On the Misery of this World*) says: O Death, how sweet you are to those to whom you were so bitter; they alone desire you who have most vehemently hated you. And the evil angels desired equality with God, which is impossible (*2, d. 6, q. 1*). For from (*2 Magna Moralia, ch. 10*): Men even will things they know to be impossible — such as to rule over all men and to be immortal. Likewise that sin from malice exists — and that thus the first angel and Adam sinned — the Doctor holds with probability (*2, dist. 43, q. 1, sub C*). Or this holds of efficacious will, not of inefficacious and conditional will, as the Doctor asserts there. To the other I say it is true of the power and natural inclination immersed in the depths of evils, as is evident of the obstinate in evil — as Vorrelon notes in the cited passage — but not of free power and elicited act, by which a man can will good or evil, as Augustine delivers from Sacred Scripture in the Enchiridion: God made man so that he could will well or badly.

Article IV: What Is the Causality of the End

The final cause is indeed difficult to know, as I forewarned (*in Physics, in the book on causes*); but its causality is even more difficult; hence on account of its great difficulty — not rightly perceived and scrutinized by the Scholastics — they dispute greatly and contend in establishing and fixing it, as may be seen in our recent Scotists (*Disputation 7 of Physics, q. 8, art. 3*), Fonse (*5 Metaphysics, ch. 2, q. 10, art. 3*), Suarez (*Disputation 23 of the Metaphysics, sect. 4*), and Fuentes (*2 Physics, q. 7, diff. 3, art. 1*). For some, like Hervaeus (*Quodlibet 1, q. 8*) and Pererius (*1, S, ch. 3 of Physics*), hold that the causality of the end consists in the fact that the end provides and communicates goodness and lovability to the means — for the sake of attaining that end — as the end of medicine is health, which provides to the means ordered toward obtaining it their desirability and lovability, even

though it may cause not a little nausea and discomfort to the sick person. From these Aversa (*9, 13 of Physics, sect. 1*) does not seem to be far removed, holding that the causality of the end lies in the ordering of the thing toward its proper end. The common run of Philosophers, however, locates the causality of the end in the motion of the agent to act for the attainment of the end; those who do not cohere among themselves — with some placing it in a real motion preceding the action of the agent, and others in a metaphorical motion concurrent and accompanying the agent's action. The other part thinks it consists in the action of the agent, not distinguishing the causality of the end from the action of the will elicited toward and for the sake of the end. Thus, with Suarez in the cited passage and the Coimbrans (*Disputation 14 of Physics, q. 5, § 2*), hold the joint Scotists cited above and Fuentes (*Book 1, q. 7, diff. 3, art. 2*).

Note first: just as in the efficient cause three things are involved — the principle, the effect, and the action through which the agent acts and the effect is produced (and the action is called the medium between the agent and its effect — as in the production of heat there is the heat producing, the heat produced, and the heating by which the heat is produced by the heat that produces it) — so likewise in the final cause three things are distinguished: the principle of finalizing, the finalization, and the effect produced through that finalization. What the principle of finalizing is and what its effect is are neither obscure nor subjects of any contention among the said authors; but the entire knot of difficulty consists in finalization — what is understood by it and what it is: whether it is an attraction, excitation, and allurement; whether it precedes, accompanies, or follows the action of the agent; whether it is real or intentional; and whether it is indeed the action of the agent itself directed toward the end.

Note second: there are two kinds of motion — one real and another intentional. Real motion is taken here as that which occurs outside the intellectual agent — as a stone is moved by the one projecting it through real motion. Intentional motion is that which exists in the intellectual agent — as a known stone is said to have intentional being in the mind of the one knowing it, insofar as it moves the intellect to the knowledge of itself; similarly sensible and intelligible species have intentional being, and likewise light, as I said (*in Book 4 On the Soul, q. 5, art. 2*). Hence the celebrated adage: the object moves the power to the knowledge of itself. This motion, by which the object moves the power to knowledge of itself, belongs to the efficient cause; for the object or its vicarious substitute is a partial productive cause of the knowledge of that object, according to that of Augustine (*9 Trinity, last ch.*): Knowledge is born from the object and the power — which I proved at length (*in the cited passage, q. 10, art. 1*). Beyond this intentional motion, however, by which the intellect is moved by objects to the knowledge of themselves, there is the motion of the same objects presented by the intellect to the will, by which the will itself is said to be allured, drawn, and moved by the goodness, desirability, and lovability of those objects toward loving, pursuing, and attaining them — choosing and employing the means by which it can

possess and enjoy them. And it is of this motion that we treat in the present passage, which is called by Aristotle (*1 On Generation, ch. 7, T. 55*) and the other Philosophers metaphorical; not because it is not absolutely real but fictitious and imaginary — since the good, whether true or apparent, truly allures and draws the will toward its love and possession — but comparatively, that is, with respect to the motion of the efficient cause, which is said to move physically. This Parisian and Coimbran authors note (*14 Physics, diff., q. 2, T. 5*). And I said elsewhere from Augustine that the efficient cause is called cause by a special propriety (*antonomastice*), and action and effect are attributed to it, as is evident (*1 On Causes, q. 1, art. 1*).

Note third: although by common consent all concede that the final cause precedes the other causes, they disagree, however, about what precedence and priority this is to be taken as. For many, whom our two recent Scotists follow, hold that the end precedes the other causes only in the priority of nobility and perfection; whereas others, to whom the Coimbrans (*2 Physics, ch. 17, q. 20, art. 2*) adhere, hold that it precedes the other causes not only in nobility but also in origin — as is evident from (*3 On the Soul, ch. 3, T. 54; and 1, dist. 2, q. 2, § Ostenso, S*), where Scotus cites Avicenna (*6 Metaphysics, last ch.*) saying that if there were a science of each cause, the one that concerned the final cause would be the noblest. For it precedes the efficient cause in causality, because it moves it to act. And he had already intimated this beforehand (*q. 4 of the Prologue, § Contra istam positionem, ante E; and d. 25, q. un., § Contra conclusionem, B*): The end is the moving principle and moves prior to every other cause. This is not to be understood merely of the priority of perfection, as the Doctor seems to mean (*2, d. 37, q. un., § Ad solutionem istorum, V*), saying: matter does not materialize prior to the efficient cause effecting — for there Scotus is speaking of the simultaneous concurrence of cause 1 and cause 2 in producing a common effect, just as matter, form, and the efficient cause simultaneously cause the composite, which is the common effect of the said causes, and each cause concurs simultaneously in its own genus for the production of the same composite. Nevertheless he does not there deny that cause 1 precedes cause 2 by its preceding grace, according to that of (*Psalm 1*): Lord, you have anticipated him with the blessings of sweetness. (*Apocalypse 20*): I stand at the door and knock. Therefore although the causes act and concur simultaneously with their causalities in producing the common effect, nevertheless the final cause and its causality precede the other causes, because it moves the agent to act. Hence the Doctor there perhaps deliberately makes no mention of the end, but only of matter and the efficient cause — since (*1, d. 2, q. 2, S*) he explicitly and clearly asserts with these words: It — that is, the final cause — as regards causality, precedes the efficient cause. And the reason he gives is that it moves it to act. And (*2, d. 25, q. un., ante C*): The end moves prior to every other cause. The reason is from (*1, d. 1, q. 5, § Ad argumenta*): the causality of the final cause is to move the efficient cause to act. And this is premised (*q. 4 of the Prologue, ante E*):

The end is not a cause except insofar as, loved and desired, it moves the efficient cause to effecting. The same is repeated (*ibid.*, d. 8, q. 5, *ante C*): The end is not a cause except insofar as it moves the efficient cause to giving being — it moves, I say, as loved and desired. The same is found (*1 Reportata*, dist. 1, q. 3, *toward the close*; and 2, dist. 25, § *Ad 1 principale*).

First assertion: the causality of the end does not consist in the communication of the goodness and lovability of the means; nor in the ordering of the thing toward its end. This assertion contains two parts and is grounded in Scotus who is now to be cited. The first part is derived from the Doctor in the cited passage and (2, d. 6, q. 1), where he asserts that the angel desired equality with God, whose attainment is impossible, and there are no means available for its attainment. Again, the will — as stated in the preceding article — can tend toward evil under the character of evil, for the obtaining of which no good means are chosen; and if the end will be bad, its means can participate in no goodness from it. Moreover, means even before the causality of the end are endowed with their own goodness and lovability, because they have their own entity; but every being is good, since being and good are convertible.

Furthermore, sometimes means exist while the end does not; and what does not exist cannot provide any goodness to what does exist. For a thing must exist in order to act and communicate its goodness to another. Moreover, someone can choose means contrary to the end he intends — as one who wills beatitude chooses fornication, which is opposed to beatitude, as the Doctor pursues (4, dist. 49, q. 10, § *Ex his ante N*). Finally, when someone fixes for himself an end having no goodness; and when the end is only apparently good; and when someone intends the end but does not choose the means, but neglects them: therefore the causality of the end can exist without the communication of goodness to the means for obtaining such an end. And accordingly the causality of the end does not consist in such participation of the goodness of the means.

The second part is touched upon and confirmed by the Doctor (1, d. 8, q. 5, § *Contra istam opinionem*), saying from (5 *Metaphysics*, ch. 2): the agent for the sake of the loved end provides being to another by ordering it toward it; therefore the causality of the end is not posited in the ordering of the thing toward the end — since such ordering is had from the agent, whose causality is posterior to the causality of the end, as is evident from the third note. Then the causality of the end is in the intellectual agent proposing such an end to itself, by which it is moved toward its attainment; but the ordering or order of means toward the end is on the part of the thing — for medicines are ordered toward health, good works toward God, powers toward acts, and acts toward objects, and meritorious acts toward eternal happiness. Moreover, such an ordering of the thing toward the end can exist without the causality of the end, as the Apostle shows (1 *Corinthians 13*): All things are yours; but you are Christ's, and Christ is God's. Therefore in such an ordering the causality of the end is not situated.

Second assertion: the causality of the end is not the action of the agent as it comes from the end. This Scotus undoubtedly defends (2, *dist. 25, q. un., § Contra conclusionem, B*), where he explicitly says that the causality of the end is one thing, and the causality of the efficient cause another. But the causality of the efficient cause is the action of the agent; therefore in the school of Scotus the causality of the end is not the action of the agent. The same is gathered from the passages cited above. The fundamental reason is that the causality of the end is to move the agent to act, insofar as the end is loved and desired; whereas the causality of the efficient cause is that by which the agent actually and effectively acts and produces the effect intended by that same agent. Therefore the causality of the end is not the action of the agent. Moreover, the same thing with respect to the same cannot be both the causality of the end and its effect — just as the same thing with respect to the same cannot simultaneously be prior and posterior, provide being to something and receive being from the same thing. But the action of the agent is reckoned among the effects of the final cause, as will be shown below; and the reason is that the end moves and allures the agent to act, as I was explaining above. Then, if the action of the agent is confused with the causality of the end, just as the agent effectively concurs to act, so too the end would effectively act, and thus it would not differ from the efficient cause — which is refuted above — and Scotus excellently refutes (2, *dist. 25, q. un.*): the causality of the end is prior to the causality of the efficient cause, since the end first moves the efficient cause to act before the efficient cause acts; but to move the agent to act is the causality of the end from (1, *dist. 1, q. 1, § Ad argumenta*). Therefore the causality of the end is not the action of the agent — since that follows upon the causality of the end itself. Nor does it help to say that the causality of the end and of the efficient cause are distinguished virtually with the Coimbrans, or with others that they are really identified and formally differ. For since the causality of the end can exist without the causality of the efficient cause, it is plainly inferred that they really differ, according to the laws of real distinction assigned by us elsewhere. Finally, if objective truth can move the intellect to knowledge of itself — as no one denies — there is no reason why objective goodness cannot also excite and move the will to love and affection for it. This the said authors are also compelled to concede in their second reply.

Third assertion: the causality of the end is a metaphorical motion by which the agent is moved to act for the sake of attaining something. So holds Scotus in the passages cited above. It is proved, first, from Aristotle (1 *On Generation, ch. 7, T. 55*), affirming that health — which is the end of a cure — moves the physician metaphorically and figuratively to treat the sick person. For the motion of the end is the motion of one alluring and drawing by the mode of love. And this can be corroborated by that of the Poet: Each is drawn by his own pleasure. And (*James 1*): Each is tempted by his own concupiscence, drawn away and enticed. Second, the causality of a cause is that by which the cause actually causes — as the agent actually acts by its action, which is its causality; but with the said

motion posited, the end actually causes, and with it removed the end does not cause — just as with the action removed, the agent does not act. Therefore the causality of the end is the said causality. Third, the causality of the end is not the lovability of the means, nor their orderability toward the end, nor the action of the agent. Therefore by sufficient enumeration it is concluded that it is the said metaphorical motion.

One may say, with Cajetan (2–2, q. 17, art. 5), Fonse (*ibid.*, sect. 4), and the Coimbrans (2 *Physics*, ch. 7, q. 21, art. 2, aff. 2), that the causality of the end is that for whose sake something is done. On the contrary: that is not the causality of the end but its essence and definition; and it is one thing for the end to be a cause, and another to be its causality — as is established from (2 *Physics*, ch. 3, T. 31; 2 *Metaphysics*, ch. 2, T. 8; and 1 *Ethics*, ch. 7). All the more so because through it what is explained is not the causality of the end, but the final cause itself, which is thus defined: that for whose sake something is done. And this is most evident in the efficient cause — the efficient cause is the principle of acting, but its causality is not what acts but that by which it acts. Otherwise the Philosophers would have had no need to strive greatly in the investigation of the causality of the end, since it would be immediately at hand — namely, the definition of the end itself. Hence Scotus (*in the cited Prologue*, F) adds: The effect has nothing from anything causing it, because it is apt to cause, unless it actually causes. And a little later he concludes: The end does not actually cause as final cause except as, when actually loved and desired, it moves the efficient cause to act.

Therefore, in order for the end actually to cause, it must move the agent to act through actual motion; but this is not had through its definition, because the definition prescribes from actual causality and the actual existence of the thing. Therefore it is concluded that metaphorical motion is the causality of the end.

First objection: if metaphorically moving the agent to act were the causality of the end, then whatever metaphorically moves and allures the agent to act would be the final cause; and conversely, what does not allure the agent to act would not be the final cause. But there is some end that does not allure the agent to act — such as the end preordained by the agent, if it were evil, especially according to us, who from the assertions above have determined that evil under the character of evil can be desired and intended by us; and something can allure without being an end — as God is allured by his own goodness, even though it is not his end, because he is distinguished from it. All the more, as Scotus notes (1, *dist.* 1, q. 5, § *Ad argumenta*; and *dist.* 8, q. 5, § *Contra istam opinionem*): nothing has a final cause except with respect to that which has an efficient cause. But the divine goodness is uncaused and uncausable (*from 1, dist.* 2, q. 2, S). Therefore it cannot be the final cause of God himself. Pressed by this argument, Fonse and the Coimbrans cited above limit and narrow the metaphorical motion of the end to the created agent only, not to the uncreated agent — such as God is. And therefore they conclude that such causality of the end is peculiar to the created agent; and they add that the universal and adequate causality of the end is: that

for whose sake something is done — which in the last assertion we reject. We, however, are not constrained by these straits, nor do we narrow ourselves by these limitations, asserting the said motion to be adequate. Therefore to the argument in form: I concede the major. To the first part of the minor I say that it holds of natural appetite, not of free and elicited appetite — which, as I showed in the preceding article, can have an act not only concerning evil but also concerning the impossible. To the second part I say, according to Scotus (*1, dist. 1, q. 5*), that God is not the final cause with respect to himself, because with respect to him there is no efficient cause — since he is uneffectable and uncausable; and accordingly with respect to him there is no final cause either. But it is commonly said that God acts for the sake of an end — not of himself, but of the effect he produces. Into this those who are unwilling seem to fall, including the Coimbrans (*ibid., q. 22, art. 2, ad 1*).

Second objection: the final cause is the first of all causes — not only in the priority of perfection but also in the priority of time, or at least of nature, as Scotus holds (*ibid., in the Prologue; and dist. 2, q. 2, S*) with Avicenna (*6 Metaphysics, last ch.*). But if metaphorical motion is its causality, it in no way precedes the other causes. For before the end moves the will to act, the object must be known by the intellect, and it must partially concur to the knowledge of itself; and since the will is a blind power and is not directed toward the unknown, the intellect represents to the will the object thus known, so that I noted in the second note. Hence the Doctor adds (*2, dist. 25, q. un., sub B*): In agents acting with purpose, the end does not move unless it is known by the agent acting with purpose, which is the free intellectual agent. Therefore the efficient cause precedes the final cause, if metaphorical motion is its causality — which conflicts with the common philosophical pronouncement adduced in the major and explained in the third note. I reply: the major having been conceded, to the minor — although the known object is required for the will to be directed toward it, the end is nevertheless said to be prior in intention and posterior in execution, with respect to free actions and effects, not with respect to necessary and natural ones, which precede — just as the natural power precedes the free power in being, so too in operating, as the argument proves. Therefore the end is the first cause in orderly and voluntary matters, which proceed from a free and voluntary agent from choice and liberty. Hence Scotus (*1, dist. 41*) adds: One who wills in an orderly way wills the end before the means to the end. And in the entire ordering of things, God — who is the end and principle of all — first willed to confer glory on the predestined before founding the world and bestowing grace on them. It is therefore evident that the end is the first cause in operable, ordered, and rational matters, which must sometimes be precognized and provided for — as things to be done and operated on — so that the one acting may act rightly and operate well.

Third objection: some things tend toward the end without any prior knowledge of the end — as stones seek the center and all heavy things fall downward, and

light things rise. Therefore the said motion is not the causality of the end. The Coimbrans (*ibid.*, *art. 3, ad 4*) meet this by conceding the consequence concerning agents lacking cognition and appetite — holding that such motion, though it be adapted to the created agent, is not adapted to all, namely those devoid of cognition. But if such a created agent acts for the sake of an end — as the Coimbrans maintain — its causality of the end is to be assigned, which through them is not metaphorical motion, nor does it seem to be anything else — since in reality such an agent does not act for the sake of an end, as I have said elsewhere. Therefore I deny that the said agents act for the sake of an end, since they tend toward their proper places by their natural impulse.

Fourth objection: the end allures and draws the agent in the same way as one who exhorts and advises someone to do something — proposing and inviting him to do it — just as a moral cause does; but the motion of one exhorting and advising pertains to the efficient cause (*2 Physics*, 6, 3, T. 29). Therefore the aforesaid motion is not the causality of the end. I reply by denying the parallel of the major. For one who exhorts and advises actively acts, even if morally by persuading, the pursuit or avoidance of the thing to be done; but the end only as desired and loved moves the agent to act, as Scotus writes in the passages cited.

Fifth objection, for the joint Scotists cited: the Doctor (*1, dist. 2, q. 2, S*) says that there is not in actual motion the causality of the final cause unless the agent is moved by desiring and wanting the end; and that the end moves the agent means nothing other than the agent moves the end. Hence those authors conclude that the motion of the end does not precede the causality of the agent. They confirm this from (*2, d. 37, q. un., V*), where it is found that all causes simultaneously cause the effect — and that it is contradictory for an effect to be caused in one genus of cause and not in another, as being material without being an effect. Therefore it is contradictory for the end to finalize prior to the efficient cause's effecting. Therefore according to Scotus the final motion does not precede the action of the agent. I reply that that passage of Scotus rather militates against them than for them; for there the Doctor explicitly says that the causality of the end precedes the causality of the efficient cause, because it moves it to act; but the mover precedes the moved. If therefore according to Scotus the end moves the efficient cause to act, the causality of the former precedes the causality of the latter without question; for precisely because the agent acts, the end moves it to act; therefore the motion of the end, which is its causality, undoubtedly precedes the causality of the efficient cause. Hence he concludes there: Because in God nothing is causable and effectable, consequently with respect to God himself there is neither an end nor its causality; for what is finalizable is effectable; therefore since God, nor anything in God, is effectable, likewise it is not finalizable. To the point then added — that this is not taken effectively, otherwise the end would be the efficient cause, as the Doctor argues (*2, dist. 25, q. un., B*) — but alluringly (*allicitive*) — that is, because it allures and attracts the will to love of itself — as Scotus clearly expounds

(*Tract. On the First Principle*): The final cause is said to be prior, inasmuch as it begins by alluring the will; and by this reasoning it excels the other causes in causing. To the confirmation I answered abundantly in the third note.

Sixth objection: the cause in act has the effect in act (*2 Physics*, 27), since cause and effect are correlatives, which are simultaneous by nature. But before the agent acts, there is no effect caused — since every effect depends on the agent, without whose action nothing can be done. Therefore the causality of the end is not prior to the causality of the efficient cause, since through it something would be caused, and there would be some effect preceding the efficient cause — which is certainly repugnant. Therefore, since nothing can be done before the action of the agent, it is undoubtedly inferred that before the agent the end causes nothing, and the causality of the latter is the same as that of the former.

Confirmation: before the efficiency of the agent, there is only the objective goodness of the end and the end known by the intellect. But the known end causes nothing in the will of the agent except by representing the end to it, and its objective goodness pertains to first act. Therefore the causality of the end is no other than the causality of the efficient cause. Hence the end is called a cause only because the agent acts for its sake. Hence (*3 Metaphysics*, ch. 2, T. 3; and *1 On Generation*, ch. 7), it says that when the action ceases, the end also ceases.

Therefore unless the agent acts, there is no end. If moreover the end were to cause before the agent acts, it would not be true that the end is the cause of the agent's acting — since before the agent acted, something would already be caused by the end; and nothing can be caused without an efficient cause.

Therefore there is no prior causality of the end, but it is altogether the same as the causality of the efficient cause. Fonse replies (*ibid.*, sect. 5, in the solution to the first objection) that the Aristotelian pronouncement adduced for the major indeed holds for the other causes, but not for the final cause. The reason for the disparity he gives is that the final cause alone causes as a desired thing, and thus causes even when not existing; whereas the other causes do not influence the effect unless they actually exist. But the said axiom is not to be excepted for the final cause; since — as Fonse holds (*q. 21*, sect. 1) — it is a true cause, and the same author holds that it causes in virtue of real being; it plainly contradicts for a cause to cause and not exist. For whatever effect comes to be depends on the cause, since the cause is its influencing principle — as is evident from the general definition of cause. Especially because causality and the caused proceed from what exists, and nothing is caused except from what exists; otherwise the effect would depend on nothing, which is impossible. I add that the same author there holds it probable that the final cause causes in virtue of intentional being.

I, however, having conceded that proposition, say to the assumed that before the agent effectively concurs toward the effect, the final cause is actually in intentional being — in respect of which being it causes, as I said in *Physics* — and its effect is actual, which consists in alluring and attracting the will to act and to pursue the intended and proposed end shown by the intellect. Therefore I

concede indeed that every effect depends on the efficient cause effectively, but not alluringly and invitingly — for in this way the effect depends on the end that allures and lovingly draws the will to act. This Scotus not obscurely intimates (2, *dist. 25, q. un., R*) and more openly (*Tract. On the First Principle*): The final cause is said to be prior inasmuch as it begins by alluring the will; and by this reasoning it excels the other causes in causing. Therefore before the act elicited by the will, the end has its causality — which is the allurement and attraction of the will to operate — and what is allured and attracted is its effect. Hence when it is inferred: before the agent there is no effect — I distinguish: there is no effect effectively, I concede; there is no effect alluringly — which is being metaphorically moved — I deny. But the supporters of the opposite opinion confuse the effect proceeding from the cause effectively and alluringly, and therefore do not distinguish the causality of the end from the causality of the efficient cause — which Scotus in the cited passage proves to be distinct (*ante C*). To the confirmation I deny the antecedent. For besides the known end and the objective goodness, there is the metaphorical motion, which precedes the elicited act of the will; hence through the prior motion the agent acts and strives to posit the end in real being and to possess it; once possessed, it enjoys it and ceases to operate concerning it, from (3 *Metaphysics, cited*). It is not surprising, however, if sometimes the will fails to attain it. For either the action is impeded and interrupted, or it does not apply suitable and efficacious means for its attainment; or on account of its freedom it can fail to pursue it — indeed to flee it — even though in most cases, moved and allured by it, it is directed toward obtaining it.

Sixth objection: the same substantial union — as it comes from matter — is the causality of matter, and as it comes from form — it is the causality of form. Therefore similarly the same action — as it comes from the end — is its causality; and as it comes from the efficient cause — it is its causality. First confirmation: the same action is the causality of the first cause and of the second cause. Therefore the same must be asserted in our matter. Second confirmation: through the same act of understanding, the intellect is moved by the thing understood and moves that same thing; similarly the will through the same action is moved by the end and the end moves the will to love of itself. Therefore the same action, as it comes from the end, is its causality, and as it comes from the agent, it is its causality. I reply by denying the antecedent — as I said in *Physics*: just as there are diverse causes, so there are diverse causalities and unions. Through this the answer to the first confirmation is also clear. For the action of the first cause is one, and the action of the second cause is another, even though the effect of each is the same and common. To the second confirmation the parallel is to be denied. For the intellect together with the object necessarily produces understanding; but the will freely elicits its act — so that it can not elicit it and suspend that very act.

Article V. Whether all actions of an agent are effects of the end.

Since some actions of an intellectual agent look toward obtaining the end — an end called "the end in intention," such as desire, intention, and love — while others look toward the means to the end, such as choice, use, deliberation, and the investigation of means; and still others look toward the end once obtained, which is called "the end in execution," such as joy, complacency, and enjoyment — the Scholastics therefore not unreasonably inquire whether the end exercises its causality with respect to all the aforementioned acts, or only with respect to the first, the second, or the third group.

For most of those whom the Scotists cite and follow (*indivis. disp. VII. Phys. quaest. VIII. art. III*) judge that all acts of an agent fall under the causality of the end. Others, however — whom Fuentes adduces and defends (*2. Phys. quaest. VII. dist. IV. art. I. & II.*) — hold that the causality of the end is exercised only with respect to the means, insofar as these are to be ordered toward obtaining the end itself.

Note I (*ex Scot. 4. dist. 49. quaest. 8. § Ad argumenta. T.*): the end is taken in four ways. In one way, as the final cause, which is defined (*2. Phys. 29.*) as that for the sake of which something comes to be — in which sense God is the end of all things, because he has wrought all things for his own sake (*Prov. 16*). In a second way, as the ultimate perfection toward which a thing is ordered, such as beatitude, which consists in the vision and enjoyment of God, who is our end, since he is our ultimate perfection and fulfillment. In a third way, as the highest good to which an agent is united through its operation — as the blessed, through vision and enjoyment, attain God, the beatific object, who is highest and most perfect. In a fourth way, as the ultimate resting point in which the agent finally reposes, remaining in its contemplation and completion as in the perfect possession of the supreme good. These four senses of the end the Doctor (*in Rep. eadem dist. quaest. VII.*) reduces to three, and Vorrlong (*ibid. dist. 50.*) does the same. For the latter two appear to constitute but one sense, since the highest good and the ultimate are simply identical. Hence the Church sings on the sixth Sunday after Pentecost: "O God of virtues, of whom all that is best belongs entirely." Unless perhaps they differ by a distinction of reason, as the Doctor indicates (*1. dist. 1. quaest. 1. § De tertio D.*).

Note II (*ex Scot. 4. quaest. prol. § contra istam positionem. sub E. & Orbel. ibid. 9. 5.*): the end is considered in three ways — as known, as loved, and as possessed. The end as known does not move the agent efficiently to act, although it is necessary that the end be known by the intellectual agent in order that it may act on its behalf; yet the end does not act upon it efficiently, since it is a cause distinct from the efficient cause. Add to this that, as the Doctor argues (*2. dist. 25. quaest. un. B.*), if the end were to move the agent efficiently, then since every efficient mover is an efficient cause, the end would be an efficient cause; and since an efficient cause acts of itself for the sake of an end, the end would move for the sake of an end, which is absurd. The end as loved, or intended, or desired, is

properly called the final cause. For (*ex 1. dist. 3. quaest. 5. § contra istam opinionem*) the end is not a cause except insofar as it moves the agent to give being; and it moves as loved and desired, because the agent acts out of love for it. The same is found (*1. d. 2. q. 2. §*) and in the prologue cited before E. The end as possessed and held is the terminus of the agent, and is called the ultimate in execution; on the side of the agent it is called the formal end, and on the side of the object the objective end; and in the conjunction of both there is the consummate and perfect happiness which is followed by joy and delight, as will be made plain in the next article.

Note III (*ex 1. dist. 1. quaest. 3. § quantum ad 1. A.*): intellect and will agree in certain respects and differ in others as regards their complex acts. They agree in that, just as the intellect has a twofold complex assent with respect to complex truth — one pertaining to principles, another pertaining to conclusions — where the former is assent for its own sake, because we know principles through themselves, that is, simply by having their terms made explicit, while the latter is assent for the sake of something else, since we give assent to a conclusion on account of the premises which are its causes (as I showed at length in *Log. lib. 5. quaest. 1. art. 8.*) — so likewise the will has a twofold act by which it assents to the good: one by which it adheres to a good for its own sake, that is, not referring it further to any other good, as when an ordered will loves God for his own sake and rests in him alone; another by which it loves one good for the sake of another good, as health for the purpose of aiding the sick and serving God better. This agreement or comparison between the intellect and will is drawn from (*6. Eth. 3.*) where the Philosopher says: "What affirmation and negation are in the mind, pursuit and avoidance are in appetite." And he then adds: "Just as in the mind there is a twofold affirmation — one for its own sake, one for the sake of another — so in appetite or will there is a twofold pursuit or adherence, for its own sake and for the sake of another."

They differ, first, because the acts of the intellect are necessary and natural, partially caused by the objects with which they are concerned, from which they are distinguished and specified, and from which they derive their evidence, so that each is evident through the evidence of another. The acts of the will, however, are spontaneous and free, not dependent on the objects willed; and the will refers one thing to another, or not, or on account of another, since it is within its power to will or not to will this or that.

They differ secondly, because the two aforementioned assents of the intellect are adequate and immediate, so that no intermediate act is interposed between them — one that would be neither of principles nor of conclusions, neither evident of itself nor through another. But the assents of the will admit of an intermediate. For an object apprehended in an absolute way can be proposed and shown to the will, and the will itself can will it precisely, neither for its own sake nor for the sake of another good, and without intending to enjoy and

possess it. Indeed, the will can command the intellect to examine what kind of good that is, and how it is to be obtained, and how to adhere to it as it pleases. The fundamental reason for this difference is the natural necessity of the intellect, and the freedom and indifference of the will. Furthermore, Scotus (*ibid.*) and Vorrlong (*dist. 1. diff. 2.*) conclude that three acts of the will are to be enumerated: use, which is an imperfect act of the will tending toward one thing for the sake of another; enjoyment, which is the perfect act of the same faculty directed at something for its own sake; and a neutral act, which is an act of the same power directed at something neither for its own sake nor for the sake of another. Following upon enjoyment come delight, joy, and the like, which are not actions but passions of the will, as will be demonstrated in its proper place. Finally, it is gathered that there is a twofold genus of acts of the will, which the Doctor adduces and sets forth (*quaest. 4. Prol.*): some are proper and are called elicited acts, such as the intention of the end and the pursuit of means; others are commanded acts, so called because they are performed and exercised by the command of the will, by other powers distinct from the will.

Note IV: there are things that are properly made for the sake of an end, such as a house for dwelling and a ship for sailing, and the rest, which a voluntary agent regards as the termini and effects of its operations; but there are other things that are not properly made but rather simply are, and by which the agent produces its effects — as heating is that by which fire heats, and cooling is that by which water cools (as I explained in *Epitome lib. 1. quaest. quarta, artic. 9.*). In this sense, intention, elicitation, and the other actions of the will are said to be effects of the end in an improper sense, insofar as they are the means by which the agent operates. Hence Aristotle (*Met. cap. 2.*) adds that, among the means which serve for the attainment of the end, some are works — namely, actions — while others are instruments by which the craftsman carries out and completes the works he has intended and proposed. Now, as to effects in the proper sense, no one I have seen doubts that they are to be counted among the effects of the final cause. But the whole controversy centers on effects taken in an improper sense; and since, from what has been said, these are of three kinds — some preceding the intention of the end, some preceding the pursuit of means, and others following the attainment of the end — the first and the third are the subject of almost the entire dispute among philosophers. For regarding the second kind, there is scarcely anyone who removes them from the series of effects of the final cause, although Arriaga (*disp. 8. Phys. Sect. 7. num. 76.*) suppresses the names of certain supporters of the contrary position.

First Assertion: simple love of the end, and the other acts that precede the election of means for attaining the end, do not fall under the causality of the end. This is derived from the Doctor (*præcit. § Ad argumenta F.*), where he expressly states that the end does not move the agent to act except as loved and desired. Therefore, love and desire of the end precede its causality and are accordingly not contained within its scope. The same is found (*4. distinctione 49.*

quaestione 8.), where he says that God is the final cause of all things in no other way than because things are loved for his sake. Likewise (*1. distinctione prima, quaestione tertia*), he admits the neutral act and holds there that the highest good can be the beatific object without the character of an end. And (*2. distinctione 41. quaestione un.*) he affirms and proves that there are acts that are indifferent, not only in act but also in habit and in virtue. And I showed above, from the same Doctor, that it is an open question whether the will can tend toward evil under the aspect of evil.

Nor does it help to respond, with our more recent authors (*cit.*), that Scotus is speaking there of a particular, not a universal, causality of the end. For anyone reading those passages will recognize that he is speaking of it taken universally — which he establishes as a metaphorical motion, and no other kind does he ever set forth. And in (*quaest. IV. prol.*) he speaks plainly and universally of the end as known, intended, loved, desired, and so on. Hence the cited authors themselves candidly admit at the very beginning of article VII that they gathered this from (*1. distinctione prima, quaestione tertia*). Nor does it help them any more to add that Scotus speaks of the end as taking the principal role, because the end causes insofar as it attracts and excites the agent to act. For these authors (*artic. III. disp. VII.*) hold that the causality of the end is an action of the agent. Therefore, according to Scotus, such acts preceding the election of means are not comprehended under the causality of the end. This can also be argued from (*2. Phys. T. 29. & 5. Met. cap. 3.*), where the end is defined as that for the sake of which other things exist. Therefore, in the teaching of the Philosopher, what is done for the sake of something is an effect of the end, and conversely, what is not done for the sake of the end is not an effect of the end. But love, intention, and the other preceding acts are not done for the sake of the end, because to be effected for the sake of the end is the same as to be done out of love of the end; consequently, to be done out of love of the end would itself be to be done out of love of the end, which is empty and absurd.

But if you say that "for the sake of the end" coincides with the goodness of the end, which excites the agent to pursue it — I judge this to be false, since the agent is not always moved by the goodness of the end, but acts according to its own will and judgment, especially when the end is evil, which the will wills under the aspect of evil. Moreover, the end causes with respect to intentional being, as was said in the Physics. For this reason it is called prior in intention. Therefore, the intention of the end itself is not captured under its causality; otherwise, since a cause is prior to its effect, there would be something prior to the end itself — namely, that which is the cause of the intention, proposal, and love of the end — and consequently the end would not be the first cause, nor would it be prior in intention. Furthermore, if to act for the sake of the end is to act for the sake of the goodness of the end, then since brute animals are drawn by the goodness of the end, they would be acting for the sake of an end — which was rejected in the cited passage. Again, objective goodness causes not in the

genus of final cause but of efficient cause; for the causality of the end belongs only to the free intellectual agent. Therefore, since the object that for the most part moves the intellectual agent is devoid of mind and will, the effecting of that object ought not to be counted among the effects of the end. Finally, the effect of any cause is the terminus of its causality; but love cannot be the terminus of the end, since the end causes as loved and desired. And the metaphorical motion, which is the causality of the end, is a motion of love and desire; but the causality of any cause is not the effect, but that by which the effect is produced — as I made plain in the last note. Wherefore Suarez (*allegatus*) does not aptly write that love, intention, use, and choice are enclosed within the effects of the final cause, since they are not its termini, nor what is effected, but rather that for which the effect of the end — that is, the end in execution — is brought about.

Second Assertion: use, choice, and the remaining elicited or commanded acts of the will, whether internal or external, are numbered among the effects of the final cause. The assertion is twofold and is derived from the Doctor (*ubi supra*). The first part, concerning use, is plain from (1. *dist. 1. quaest. 3. ante § De 2.*), where Scotus says that use is an imperfect act of willing a good for the sake of another. For that which is done for the sake of an end is contained under its causality, as is plain from the definition of the end; and use is for the sake of the end — for a person acts by seeking suitable and fitting means, commands the external powers, applies his own or others' limbs to the attainment of the end, and orders and disposes them toward its possession. Moreover, use depends essentially on the end; for no one would labor and make use of necessary means unless he intended, pursued, and aimed at the end. Therefore, use is comprehended within the series of effects of the final cause.

The second part is virtually conceded by almost all philosophers and is easy to prove. For the elicited act and the other aforementioned acts are done for the sake of the end and are ordered and referred to it, and means are loved for the sake of the end — as bloodletting and bitter medicine are prescribed for the sake of health. Furthermore, the end moves the agent to elicit the act of willing the end, to employ the necessary means for obtaining and possessing it, and to direct all toward it. And, moreover, choice, command, and the other operations depend essentially on the end by which the agent is excited and moved. Therefore, the aforementioned acts are aptly counted among its effects.

Third Assertion: acts consequent upon the attainment of the end do not fall under its causality. This is drawn from the same Doctor (*ubi supra*), especially from (1. *dist. 1. quaest. tertia*), where he assimilates the acts of the intellect to the acts of the will in that some are for the sake of another, such as use, while others are for their own sake, such as enjoyment, which is had of the end once attained and possessed. Since therefore enjoyment and complacency are not ordered or referred to anything else — unlike those which are included under the causality of the end — it plainly follows that enjoyment and the remaining acts

consequent upon the attainment of the end are not to be counted among the effects of the end. Moreover, when the action of the agent ceases, the causality of the end also ceases (*ex primo de generatione, cap. 7. T. 55.*). When the end has been obtained, the action of the agent ceases: in the crafts, once a house is built, the builder no longer works at its construction, and the physician, once health has been restored to the patient, no longer tends to him; and in natural things, a heavy body, falling downward and arriving at its center, moves no longer but comes to rest (*ut scribit Doct. 4. dist. 49. quaest. 8. § Secundò videndum. sub E. & 1. dist. 1. quaest. 1. § De 4. E.*). With an eye to this, Augustine (*in Psal. 56.*) says: "But when you have arrived at him, you seek no further — he is your end." All the more so in the view of the adversaries, who hold that the causality of the end is the same as the causality of an agent, being the same action viewed merely under a different aspect. Furthermore, if such acts are effects of the end, then the end has not yet been attained, because the causality of the end is directed toward acquiring the end, for the sake of which the agent acts. But it is contradictory for the end to be both attained and not yet attained at the same time — which would be the case if such acts were being done for the sake of the end. For every causality is directed toward producing an effect and acquiring a terminus anew; and a new relation requires a new terminus. Since, therefore, once the end is attained — especially if it is the ultimate end — no further end remains to be acquired, it is rightly inferred that such acts are not to be ascribed among the effects of the end. Likewise, the end is prior in intention and posterior in execution. If therefore the end is obtained, the operations had with respect to the end as possessed are not enclosed under the causality of the end — because the end has already exercised its causality, and otherwise it would not be the last in execution but there would be something else still to be attained, toward which its causality would be ordered. Furthermore, from what was said in the first article of this question, the formal end is one thing — such as enjoyment — and the objective end is another — such as God. But if enjoyment were taken under the causality of the end, it would not itself be an end but would still be directed toward an end, because the end causes for the sake of another. Yet enjoyment, being the ultimate formal end of man, is not referred to anything else but stands with the objective union and conjunction of the end, by reason of which man is perfectly beatified and ultimately reposes, as Augustine signifies (*lib. 2. 99. Evangeliorum quaest. 39. Tomo 4. Suorum operum*): "The great repose is the reward of the labors of the just, which are performed in the service of the Church." Moreover, the said division of the end is received by Suarez (*cit. sect. 2. n. 5. & num. 12.*), who writes that both ends together complete one final cause. If therefore each is a final cause, neither is an effect of it — for the same thing cannot simultaneously be both cause and effect. Finally, enjoyment is the ultimate formal perfection of man, by which he is united to the highest good, or God, his beatific object; it is therefore not ordered to anything else, for otherwise it would not be the ultimate perfection. And thus Suarez and our

more recent authors do not rightly claim that there is one end made up of both, and that one is ordered to the other — a view I also reported above in article II.

You will object first, from (1. *dist. 1. q. 5. § Ad argumenta. Et d. 2. q. 2. § Iuxta tres conclusiones N. Et d. 8. q. 5. § contra istam opinionem.*): what is unendable is uncausable — that is, what has no end has no efficient cause, because every agent acting of itself acts for the sake of an end; and what has an efficient cause also has a final cause. But love, desire, and whatever other acts precede the election of the end have an efficient cause. For apart from God, all things are caused or causable by an efficient cause; these acts, therefore, are to be referred among the effects of the final cause. The confirmation comes from (2. *d. 40. q. un.*), where Scotus says that all human acts have regard to the end. The reason is that the agent acts for the sake of the end, is attracted and moved by the end toward attaining it. Therefore such acts are under the causality of the end.

I respond: Scotus speaks there of those things which are caused as the "what" (*ut quod*), not of those which are caused as the "whereby" (*ut quo*), as I noted above in the last note. And he speaks of those things which do not precede the action and choice of the agent — otherwise the action would be acted upon and the making made, which is not conceded. To the confirmation, I say that the Doctor is to be explained as referring to the second acts — choice, use, and the rest mentioned above — and not to the first acts, which are the subject of the present controversy. Especially because this is not found in Scotus; indeed the opposite is the case, since he establishes that there are indifferent acts that cannot be referred to an end, as Vorrlong (*dist. 1. primi diff. 2.*) also asserts.

You will object second: a man exercising the first act of love operates for the sake of the end, since he is moved by its goodness, for the sake of which he acts; therefore such love is contained among the effects of the end. First confirmation: that act of love proceeds from some cause — for whatever exists, God excepted, comes from another. Yet it seems to proceed from no cause other than the will, which directs all its acts to the end, since it is an agent of deliberate choice. Therefore, the first love is numbered among the effects of the end. Second confirmation: whatever is captured under the object of some power is regarded by it as one of its effects, as is evident of the object of the intellect, which is the true, and of the object of sight, which is color, and so on. Therefore the good, which is the object of the will, moves it to act for the sake of the end; and consequently that love of the end, by which the will is excited by the end to act, falls under its causality. Third confirmation: the act of love toward God is elicited by the will for the sake of the end, as is plain from (*Psal. 118*): "I have inclined my heart to perform your justifications forever, because of the recompense." Therefore every act of love, whether first or later, is counted as an effect of the end.

I deny the antecedent. For since man is a free agent, he can by his own deliberate judgment direct that action to no end at all, since, from what has

been said, there are indifferent and neutral acts — especially because that motion is the causality of the end, which precedes the action of the will; and hence the end is said to move as loved and desired, and that love precedes the efficient activity of the agent. To the first confirmation, I say that the act proceeds from the end, not from the will, which is at that point moved by the love of the end; and the motion of the end is not the motion of the will, since the will is drawn to act by its appetite and desire of the end, for the sake of attaining that same end. To the second confirmation: granted but not conceded is the antecedent; I deny the consequence. For I indicated above that the object of the will is every being, and its scope extends as widely as the object of the intellect. To the third confirmation, I say it holds for efficacious love, which is elicited by the will, but not for love of complacency, which is inefficacious and precedes elicited and efficacious love, as is plain from (1. *dist.* 8. *quaest.* 5. 2. *dist.* 6. *quaest.* 1.).

You will object third: the act consequent upon the attainment of the end is for the sake of the end, since it is a perfect act (*ex 1. d. 1. q. 3.*) by reason of which man is united to his end, and, enjoying, rejoicing, and delighting in it in the most perfect manner, abides with the end itself as now present, which he previously desired and burned with love for — and he can say those words of Canticles 3: "I held him, and I will not let him go." Just as the blessed hold, see, enjoy, and delight in God. Therefore, the said consequent acts are for the sake of the end and are contained within its causality. I deny the antecedent. For since "to be for the sake of the end" means the same as "to be for the sake of love of the end," love directed at the end as acquired and possessed would itself be for the sake of love, which is ridiculous and absurd. For the end has already exercised its causality; once the end is attained, since the causality of the end is the motion by which the agent is moved to attain the end, once it is attained such causality ceases — just as when an efficient cause has produced its effect, its action ceases, and once the terminus is acquired, motion ceases. Otherwise, if the agent were still being moved to act for the sake of the end, it would neither have it nor possess it, which is false given the hypothesis. I add that enjoyment, which is the perfect act, is the ultimate formal end; it is therefore not for the sake of the end, otherwise it would not be the ultimate end, but an end under an end. Nor does it help to say that it is for the sake of the objective end, because the objective end is likewise ultimate; and in its own genus one end is not ordered to another, since the end is divided equally into formal and objective end, as was established in the first article of this question.

If you say that there is a twofold action — one imperfect, tending toward the attainment of the end, and this ceases once the end is attained; another perfect, by which the agent reposes in the end, and this does not cease once the end is possessed — thus Suarez (*disp.* 23. *Met. num.* 16. *Sect. cit.*), Ruuius, and others explain Aristotle from (*Div. Thomas 4. dist.* 48. *quaest.* 2. *artic.* 2.), bringing in as corroboration and illustration the example of the motion of the Heavens, which,

once its end is attained — namely, the imitation of divine goodness — ceases; whereas love does not end with the attainment of the end but becomes more perfect in the union and enjoyment of the end as held and possessed.

On the contrary: this is begging the question, not dissolving the argument. For the very thing at issue and under debate is whether the act by which the agent acts with respect to the end as possessed is caused by the end or not. To this it is answered affirmatively, and when the reason is asked, the reply is forthcoming: because it is an act that endures with the end. But this is precisely what is being sought and investigated — namely, whether the act by which the agent operates with respect to the end as possessed depends on the end. We, however, say that it does not depend on the causality of the end at all, since the causality of the end has its own terminus ad quem and does not extend beyond it; otherwise the end would not be the ultimate end. Nor is the distinction adduced suited to the testimony of the Philosopher, because from (3. *Phys. cap. 2. T. 6.*): "Motion is the act of a being in potency, as in potency" — that is, an imperfect act directed toward acquiring perfection — and when the agent enjoys its ultimate perfection, there is no further motion; and when motion ceases, the action of the agent directed toward acquiring a terminus likewise ceases. Moreover, Aristotle speaks of the motion of generable and corruptible things, not of the circular motion of the Heavens, which is neutral and from without, and not for the imitation of divine goodness, but for the sake of the perpetual generations and corruptions of sublunary things, which have no limit until the day of judgment — at which point the motion of the Heavens ceasing, the generations and corruptions of sublunary things will also cease, as I said in *lib. de Caelo, quaestione secunda, articulo quinto*. Add to this that the agent is moved toward obtaining a thing which it lacks; once it has that thing, it reposes in enjoying it. Hence (*Apoc. 14*): "That they may rest from their labors." And the Church sings, "May they rest in peace," which David had wished (*Psal. 4*): "In peace, in the selfsame, I will sleep and rest."

Article VI. Whether means to the end are formally good.

Most of those whom Suarez follows (*disp. 23. Met. Sect. 6. num. 11.*) deny that means are good of themselves, except by reason of the end to which they are ordered. Others, however — among whom are Faber (*de peccatis disp. 9. quaest. 1. cap. 8.*), Fuentes (2. *Phys. quaest. 7. diff. 4. art. 3.*), and Hurtado (*dist. 13. de anima sect. 4. § 26.*) — hold that means directed to the end participate in a proper goodness and are contained under the object of the will.

Note I: means can be considered in two ways. In one way materially, as they are such entities without any consideration of or reference to the end — and in this sense no one denies that means possess some goodness. In another way formally, insofar as they are directed toward the end, for the sake of which they are taken up and loved by the agent; and it is of means considered in this way

that the whole proposed difficulty concerns, as both Fuentes and Suarez aforementioned note.

Note II, from what was said in the question on the good (*art. 2.*): there is a threefold good — the honorable, the delightful, and the useful. Means, however, are not referred among honorable and delightful goods, since these are desired for their own sake while means are desired for the sake of another. But although useful things are for the sake of others, they are not on that account deprived of their own proper goodness, just as relative things, although they respect another, are not stripped of their own proper entity and goodness. Thus means are said to have goodness — not absolute, but relative. Indeed, even if they were to possess no goodness and perfection at all — as the divine relations still fall within the object of the will, as Scotus teaches (*in Report. 1. dist. 1. quaest. 3.*), saying: "The will can have a predetermined end which has no character of good."

Assertion: means ordered to the end enjoy a proper goodness distinct from the goodness of the end, and they are comprehended under the object of the will. This is derived from the Doctor (*1. dist. 1. quaest. 3. § Quantum ad 1. A. & ibid. quaest. 4. § Ad argumenta.*): "The will assents just as freely to a greater good as to a lesser." (*Quol. 16. q. Dei F. 4 dist. 49. quaest. 10. § Ex his. Et ibid. Reportat. quaest. 9 collat. 17.*): "The will by its freedom and deliberate choice tends both toward means and toward the end." Aristotle gives support (*3. Top. cap. 1.*): "The end is more eligible than the things that are for the end." And shortly after: "What is for its own sake is better, more honorable, and more praiseworthy — friendship than riches." And (*1. Magn. mor. 3.*): "The end is better than the things that are for the end."

Now the assertion is proved by arguments. First: the object of the will extends just as widely as that of the intellect (*ex 2. dist. 6. quaest. 1.*); and the object of the intellect is every being — whether means, end, or anything else. The reason is that everything intelligible is also volible. Therefore, since means are beings, they are certainly goods and are contained under the object of the will. Second: every power and faculty which acts with respect to one object not absolutely but relatively — that is, in relation to another — acts with respect to both; but the will acts with respect to means not precisely, but in relation to the end. Therefore the will regards the means, and consequently means are comprehended under its object. The major is from the Philosopher (*2. de anima, T. 146.*), who affirms that the common sense is distinguished from the other senses precisely because it recognizes the difference among the objects of the various senses; and every power that establishes a difference between various things must necessarily know them. Therefore, since the will chooses the better and more fitting means, it plainly follows that it wills them and that means fall within its object. This argument is drawn from (*Quol. 16. art. 2. sub K.*). Third: as the principle is in speculative matters, so the end is in practical matters (*2. Phys.*); but the intellect attains not only the premises but also the conclusion by a

distinct cognition — the former through the habit of principles, the latter through the habit of science. Likewise therefore the will tends toward the end and toward those things which are ordered to it, of which kind are the means. Fourth: if any reason were to exclude means from the object of the will, it would chiefly be because they are not good, lovable, or desirable, as the proponents of the opposite view contend. But this reason is groundless, because, from what was said above, the will by its own will and deliberate choice can tend toward the good and the evil, the neutral, the referable and the unreferrable, the possible and the impossible, as is established from what has been said. All the more so because means are good by their own proper goodness, without any respect to the end. For the works which one performs toward attaining glory are good, and one of them is better than another; and accordingly God assigns a greater or lesser reward in accordance with the better or less good works performed. Likewise, the virtues of natural or artificial things are good — such as the virtue of wine, of which Timothy made use (at the Apostle's suggestion) to assist his health. Also, natural heat is good not only in itself, since it is a good quality, but also for the nourishment of the animal, which uses it as a means and instrument for sustaining and nourishing itself. Again, since goodness is the fittingness of a thing, and one means is more fitting than another, and one is preferred to another after deliberation, it follows that means are good and are captured under the object of the will. Pertinent here is the statement of Scotus (*1. dist. 41. quaest. un. § Potest aliter dici A.*): "One who wills in an ordered way wills the end before the things that are for the end, of which kind are the means, which are also willed, though the end is willed before the means that look to the attainment of the end itself."

You will object first, from (*2. Phys. c. 3. T. 31. & 6. Met. c. 1. necnon 1. Eth. 1.*) cited by the Doctor (*4. dist. 49. quaest. 4. § Iuxta hoc verf. Aliter dicitur.*): "The end and the good coincide." Therefore, according to Aristotle, means, which are not the end but are for the end, are not good of themselves, but only insofar as they regard the end. Hence the same author adds (*2. Eth. 7.*): "The good of a thing is that for the sake of which it acts." Since therefore the agent acts for the sake of the end and not for the sake of the means, it follows that means are not good except by participation in the goodness of the end, and accordingly are not comprehended under the object of the will. I respond that the assertion of the Stagirite is to be interpreted of the honorable and delightful good, which is desired for its own sake, and not of the useful good, which is desired for the sake of another — of which kind are means which serve for attaining the end. And this is confirmed by the other testimony of the same Philosopher, saying that the good is that for the sake of which the agent acts. For means, although they look to the end for the attainment of which they are taken up by the agent, are not on that account deprived of intrinsic goodness — just as a creature respects God, yet possesses its own proper entity and goodness distinct from that respect. Wherefore the goodness of means is indeed directed to the end, but it is not the

goodness of the end itself, differing from it as a relation from its terminus and an act from the object toward which it tends.

You will object second: means are chosen and taken up by the intellectual agent for the sake of the end. For this reason the agent chooses these rather than those means, and uses these before those, for the sake of attaining the end, by whose goodness it is excited and moved to act; it deliberates about them, investigates them, and selects the more efficacious and fitting ones for its attainment.

Therefore means derive and borrow their goodness from the end. First confirmation: when the end ceases, the means to the end also cease; therefore means participate in no goodness different from the goodness of the end.

Second confirmation: once the end is acquired, its means are of no use at all — for instance, bitter medicine, bloodletting, and the rest prescribed for obtaining health: once health is given up, these are not only useless but even harmful and evil. Therefore if there is any goodness in means, it is derived from the goodness of the end. I concede the antecedent but deny the consequence.

Rather, the opposite of what is proposed is inferred — for means are chosen as more fitting, convenient, and apt precisely because the means themselves enjoy a proper goodness distinct from the goodness of the end; otherwise any means would suffice for attaining the end, and one would not be more apt and expedient than another for it, which contradicts daily experience. Although therefore the goodness that is first and absolute in itself is the goodness of the end, nonetheless there exists a second goodness of means as such, distinct from the goodness of the end — as the Doctor (*Quol. 16. sub F.*) clearly explains, saying: "Just as there is an order in truth between a principle and a conclusion, which has a participated truth from the principle, so there is an order between the end and the being that is for the end in goodness or desirability, because a being ordered to the end has a participated goodness with respect to the end." To the first confirmation: if the end ceases to exist, the order or relation of the means to the end ceases as well; but the intrinsic goodness of the means does not cease — just as if a son dies, his father's paternity with respect to the son perishes, yet the person in whom the paternity inhered does not perish. To the second confirmation: I say that some means participate no intrinsic and formal goodness, but only an extrinsic one derived from the end, and these are good by the goodness of the end alone — such as bloodletting and similar things; while other means, besides their order and relation to the end, enjoy intrinsic and formal goodness, and these are good even with the goodness of the end removed — as sunlight, even if it is not good for one who is dim-sighted or an owl, is in itself good and benefits one who walks and works. Likewise, although the heat of fire is not good for one suffering from a burning fever, it is nonetheless good for the fire itself, since it is the power by which it heats. Thus what does not benefit one person because of an interposed obstacle is of benefit or ornament to another.

You will object third: when one loves a neighbor for the sake of God, there is no goodness in the neighbor to be loved except that which is derived from God, the ultimate end of man. Therefore a means, as a means, whatever it may be, borrows all its goodness from the end. First confirmation: what is a being by participation is also good by participation, and derives its entity and goodness from being and goodness by essence. Since therefore every created being is good by participation, it consequently receives its goodness from God, who is good by essence — the goodness that David prayed for (*Psal. 118*): "Teach me goodness, discipline, and knowledge." Second confirmation, from that adage: "Whatever men do, intention judges them all." If therefore actions are good because the end is good, and conversely actions are evil because the end is evil, it is plainly gathered that means borrow their goodness from the end, of which they are the means. I deny the antecedent, for every created thing is good by its own proper and intrinsic goodness, as is plain from (*Gen. 1*): "God saw all that he had made, and it was very good." And (*Matt. 7*): "A good tree makes good fruits." Even if God is good by a goodness that is independent and ultimate, the creature is nonetheless good by a goodness that is dependent and finite, and ordered to God as the ultimate end of all things. To the first confirmation: I distinguish — what is good by extrinsic goodness, I concede; what is good by its own proper and intrinsic goodness not respecting the end, I deny. Thus, with Scotus, Gadius responds (*Quol. 16. art. 1.*). To the second confirmation: I say this holds for what is ordered to a good end according to the judgment of right reason; otherwise it fails, since it does not follow that: "The end is good, therefore the means are good," because they can be evil — as when one wishes to fornicate for the sake of God, which God's law prohibits; or when someone wishes to counterfeit coin in order to aid the poor, which a statute of the prince forbids.

You will ask first: whether negations and privations are captured under the object of the will? The answer is affirmative. For Scotus (*4. dist. 50. quaest. 2. § Ad 2. quaest. F.*) and Vorrlong (*ibid. art. 3. diff. 1.*) assert that the damned desire non-existence, in accordance with (*Apoc. 9*): "They will desire death, and it will flee from them." But death is the absence of life. Likewise the will can will the impossible (*ex 2. dist. 6. quaest. 1.*), and the impossible is the negation of being. Moreover, certain philosophers blinded themselves so as not to see evils and fall into them, as I showed in the sermon on the man born blind. Again, the wicked love darkness and hate the light, as is clear from those words of Christ the Lord (*Ioan. 3*): "They loved darkness more than light." The reason is ready at hand: the will is free of itself and can tend by its own will toward good or evil; and evil is a privation of good, as was shown above. I add that we do not supremely love negations, as the Doctor argues (*1. Reportat. distinctione tertia*); and negation is known through affirmation (*ex 2. Perih. in fine, & 4. Met. T. 2.*). For the most part, however, a man desires negations and privations not precisely for their own sake, but to avoid greater evils. Hence the Doctor (*4. allegato, § Respondeo*) says:

"When there are two evils, in choosing the lesser evil one flees the greater evil, because there one evil has the character of good with respect to the other, as is plain from (5. *Eth.* 6. *in fine.*)."

To avoid punishment, therefore, the damned desire non-existence. Moreover, someone desires to exist without infirmity and pain so as to enjoy health; and someone desires death in order to obtain eternal life — as the Apostle says (*Philip. 1*): "I desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ." Although by the affection of self-interest and natural inclination he recoils from death: "We do not wish to be unclothed, but further clothed" (2. *Cor.* 5).

You will ask second: whether relations, both real and of reason, can be contained within the object of the will? Some, whom Suarez mentions (*cit. num.* 20.), answer negatively. Others, making a distinction, grant it of transcendental relations but deny it of predicamental ones — to which Suarez (*ubi supra*) subscribes. I, however, adhere to the affirmative position. For all those relations are beings which, just as they fall under the object of the intellect, so likewise fall under the object of the will, since both have an equal scope. The reason is that one can will to be a father or a Pope; but precisely considered, fatherhood, the papacy, and things of that kind are relations. All the more so, since just as relations possess entity, they likewise possess goodness — for every being is good, as is plain from the Metaphysics. Nor does Suarez's distinction between transcendental and predicamental relations avail, since the former, besides being-toward-another, participate in absolute entity; it is not with respect to being that they are relations, but with respect to the order and reference they bear to another. And if transcendental relations are good, predicamental relations are so with even greater reason, since beyond transcendental being they participate in something else, by reason of which they are placed in a genus. The same is also to be affirmed of relations of reason, as the Conimbricenses hold (2. *Phys. cap.* 7. *quaest.* 23. *art.* 2 & *log.* 5. *cap.* 2. *quaest.* 11. *sect.* 4.), which in their own way enjoy being that they receive from the intellect, and by reason of that being can be desired by the will. For just as they are intelligible, so also are they volible — especially since the will has the power to form a being of reason taken broadly, as I said in *Met.* 6. *de ente rationis.* q. 2 *art.* 2. *Assertionem* 2.

ARTICLE VII. Whether there is an ultimate end in a qualified sense.

This question can be understood and examined in two ways. In one way, it concerns the ultimate end in a qualified sense, that is, the ultimate end within some series and genus of things, which is the subject of the present article. In the other way, it concerns the ultimate end absolutely, that is, the ultimate end of all things, which we shall discuss in the following article.

Assertion. There is an ultimate end in a qualified sense. So holds Scotus (4. *dist.* 49, q. 3, before §. *Hic dicitur*; and q. 4, §. *In ista quaest., sub A*; and *ibid. in Rep., quaest.* 3, §. *ratio ad oppositum*; and plainly elsewhere). This is proved, first, from Aristotle, who posits both in the book of the Categories and in (5. *Met., tit.* 14) ten supreme

genera, and in (10. *Met.*, *cap.* 2) adds: "In each genus there is one thing that is the measure and standard of the others." And earlier, (2. *Phys.* 24; and 1. *Pol.* 5; 1. *Eth.* 1): "Man is the end of things." Second, where there is a first efficient cause in some order, there is also a first final cause; for as the Doctor writes (1. *dist.* 1, *quaest.* 4), the efficient cause and the final cause are joined together, so that unless there is an efficient cause, there will be no final cause, and conversely. Hence in the book of Genesis, the individual creations and generations of things are narrated according to their genus and species, especially of man, who was created by God and for the sake of God. Third, things possess not one but many powers; according to the variety and multiplicity of species, there are diverse virtues, potencies, and operations, which tend toward diverse effects and ends. Since these do not occur by chance—as the common run of philosophers together with Aristotle argues against Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and Epicurus—therefore each thing obtains its own particular end, toward whose attainment it is intended and directed by God. Furthermore, artisans according to their diverse arts propose and intend diverse ends for themselves: thus the physician has as the end of his treatment the health to be conferred on the sick person, and once that health is introduced, his treatment ceases. The same is clear regarding instruments, some of which are invented for cutting and others for writing; and concerning natural things, Ecclesiastes says (*cap.* 3): "All things have their season, and all things pass through their appointed times under heaven." To this point belongs what the Philosopher teaches (2. *Met.*, *cap.* 2): in essentially subordinated causes especially, one does not proceed to infinity. Since, therefore, all things are mutually ordered and disposed by God in number, weight, and measure, it follows that each thing obtains its own proper and particular end, toward which it is directed and ordered by the creator of those very things.

You object, first, from (7. *Phys.*, *cap.* 1 and 8 of the same work): the world is eternal; therefore the order and series of things is eternal, and so there is no ultimate end in a qualified sense in any series of things. I reply by granting the antecedent and denying the consequent. For by that argument one only concludes to an infinite number in accidentally ordered things, but this does not remove the ultimate end in a qualified sense, or the particular end of each thing, as Scotus teaches (1. *dist.* 2, *quaest.* 2, §. *Quantum ad 1, before I*).

You object, second: the parts of a line are infinite, on the authority of Aristotle (2. *Met.*, *loc. cit.*); therefore there is no certain and determinate end of each thing. This is confirmed from the same author in the same place, who concedes that matter is infinite. If, then, God, who is infinite, has no end, the same must be asserted of matter, and so not every thing has its own particular end. I reply that Aristotle is speaking not of aliquot parts but of proportional parts, which are said to exist in potency and in being divided, not actually divided and separated from one another—and these present no difficulty in the present context. To the confirmation, I say that matter is called infinite not in entity and perfection, as

God is, but in capacity and receptivity, or indifference, for receiving any form whatsoever; just as the rational soul, although limited in entity, is nevertheless called unlimited and infinite in capacity, because it can see the infinite God and enjoy him perpetually, as will be shown in its proper place.

ARTICLE VIII. Whether there is an ultimate end absolutely.

One can inquire whether there is one or several ultimate ends absolutely, whether there can be several, and whether it can be demonstrated that there is only one ultimate end absolutely.

Note, from the Doctor (*q. 1, Prol., D*): the ultimate end can be considered in two ways. First, precisely as the most perfect final cause in the genus of being, which is the measure and standard of all things by approach to it or withdrawal from it—and of the end so understood we speak in the present context. Second, as the ultimate end attainable by operation, that is, by vision and enjoyment—and concerning the end so understood, theologians disagree. For in this sense, God alone is the ultimate end of human beings and angels. For only these can behold God and enjoy him; the remaining creatures, since they lack mind and will, cannot exercise the aforesaid acts toward God, as Scotus confirms (*1. d. 1, q. 5, in solut. 4, s. dubij*).

First assertion: there is only one ultimate end absolutely. So holds Scotus (*1. dist. 2, quaest. 2, §. Iuxta tres conclusiones, N*). This is proved, first, from Scripture: Proverbs 16, "The Lord has made all things for himself"; and Apocalypse 1, "I am the Alpha and the Omega, the beginning and the end." Augustine subscribes to this (*1. De doctrina Christiana, cap. 23; 19. Civit.*); likewise Aristotle (*12. Met. 10*); Trismegistus (*in Pimander*); Plato (*4. De legibus*); and others widely embracing this truth. Second, an infinite regress is not admitted (*2. Met. 2*); therefore there is one ultimate end of all things. The consequent is supported by Scotus (*1. Rep., d. 2, quaest. 2, §. Ex hoc sequitur*): the first agent acts for an end that is not other than itself, because it is the end; and when an agent acts for an end other than itself, the end is a being nobler than the efficient cause. Third, creatures are so ordered and disposed among themselves that one exists for the sake of another: as (*1. Pol., cap. 5*) all corporeal things are in a certain way ordered to man, and man to God, as the Apostle acknowledges (*1. Cor. 13*). And this is seen in the entire universe of things, in which earth is ordered to water, water to air, air to fire, and so on up to the outermost heaven, where a marvelous connection and ordering of things appears. And just as the first in the catalogue of material things is heaven, so the last is earth; and if an admirable order shines forth in corporeal things, it does so with even greater right in spiritual things, in which there exists greater perfection and dignity. Hence Scotus adds (*in Rep., passage cited*): "The good of the universe consists in a twofold order: in the order of the parts among themselves, and in the order of the parts to some first; if primacy of this kind were removed, the nature of the good in the universe would be destroyed." I add that particular and singular things are reduced to common and universal ones;

and if being is the ultimate in ascending, in descending it is the individual; and in physics the ultimate resolution of things is to prime matter. It stands, therefore, that there is an ultimate end absolutely.

Second assertion: it is demonstrated that there is one ultimate end absolutely. Scotus holds this (*loc. cit.*; and *1. Rep., d. 2, q. 2*). It is also gathered from Scripture: Matthew 6, "No one can serve two masters"; and Isaiah 28, "The bed is too short for one to stretch out on, and the covering too narrow for both." Augustine favors this (*18. Civit. 18*). This is proved, first: it is demonstrated that there is one first efficient cause and one first cause (*8. Phys., cap. 1 and 2; Met., cap. 2; and 12. Met., cap. ult.*)—thus: everything that exists is either producing or produced; for what exists is either from itself or from another. If from itself, then it is unproduced and is the first efficient cause. If from another, then either that other is from yet another, and so on, until one arrives at a first that is unproduced and uncaused. In parallel fashion, then, it is demonstrated that there is one ultimate end absolutely: for either one thing is ordered to another, and again onward to an ultimate that cannot be further ordered or referred to anything else—and the intended conclusion is reached—or one proceeds to infinity, which in essentially subordinated causes is impossible (*2. Met., loc. cit.*). Therefore, one ultimate end absolutely is demonstrated. Second, every agent that acts per se and intellectually acts for an end. It either operates for an end other than itself—and so is imperfect, because it is ordered to something else and perfected by it (for it is ordered to the end so that it may be perfected by that end, its appetite satisfied, and its intention brought to rest; but this cannot be applied to God, who is far removed from all imperfection and perfectibility, especially since God does not act for an end in which he is beatified, but so that the creature may attain its end)—or it operates for an end that is identified with itself, and one has the ultimate end absolutely, which is God, as the Scriptures cited in the preceding assertion attest. Third, the end exists for the sake of no other and is said to have the character of what is best; it is the first and noblest of all causes, from what was said above. But God is the most perfect and most eminent, existing not for the sake of another but for his own sake, since outside of God there is nothing more perfect and more eminent, and he contains every good and perfection. Therefore it is demonstrated that there is an ultimate end absolutely. Moreover, every perfection is to be attributed to God; but being the first efficient cause denotes the greatest perfection; therefore so does being the ultimate end absolutely, which is God himself.

You object, first, against the first assertion: there are particular ends in the individual orders of things; therefore a common end of all things is not necessary. The antecedent is obvious, since each thing has its own end distinct from that of any other thing. For according to the distinction of things, there are distinct ends, as is clear of heavy things, which tend downward, of light things, which are carried upward; herbs sprout, plants flower, trees bear fruit, and so on, as discussed in the preceding article. I grant the antecedent and deny the

consequent. For even though in the categories there are individuals and their individual differences, this does not thereby remove the common and universal things and their generic and specific differences. Similarly, once the particular ends of any things whatsoever are admitted, so far from removing a common and universal ultimate end, it must rather necessarily be conceded. The reason can be given that things are so connected and ordered among themselves that one is referred to another, and all are finally recalled to one ultimate end absolutely, as Scotus plainly shows (*4. d. 49, q. 3, arguing ad oppositum*).

You will say: from these considerations it is inferred that there is one end of created things, which is the good of the universe, its composition, order, and conservation; but this reasoning carries no weight. For if God were to create other worlds, one of them would not be ordered to another, and so there would not be one universal and common end of them. I say indeed that the union and order of things belonging to one world is not the ultimate end; for just as the first cause does not enter into the totality of created things, so likewise the ultimate end is not something created, but is the uncreated and unproduced God, who is from himself and through himself, as Scotus notes (*1. d. 2, q. 2, sub 1, K*).

You object, second, against the second assertion: a demonstration consists of necessary premises (*1. Post., cap. 1, tit. 8*); but the argument adduced in the first assertion proceeds from contingent premises. For a caused middle term is assumed, which is contingent, since every caused thing is contingent, inasmuch as it is freely caused by God, according to the Psalm (*134*): "Whatever the Lord willed, he did in heaven and on earth." Therefore it is not shown that there is one ultimate end absolutely. I grant the major; to the minor I say that it is a demonstration a posteriori. For this inference is valid: there is an effect, therefore there is a cause, because relatives are simultaneous by nature and are said to be convertible. Or say that it is a demonstration a priori, thus: everything that can be effected is from an effective agent, and since one does not go to infinity, one must arrive at a first efficient cause and first of all causes in ascending, and in descending at the ultimate end, as the Doctor indicates (*1. Rep., d. 2, q. 2, §. Ad 2. rationem*).

You object, third: in accidentally ordered causes, an infinite regress is admitted by Scotus (*loc. cit.*); therefore it must be granted in essentially ordered causes as well, since the reason is the same in both. I grant the antecedent and deny the consequent. The reason for the disparity is given by the Doctor (*ibid.*): essentially ordered causes are actually causing, and one in causing depends on another; this is not so in accidentally ordered causes—Paul would generate Francis even if Peter did not exist, and so on for the rest, about which Scotus speaks well and acutely (*loc. cit.*), whom Fonseca follows (*2. Met., cap. 2, quaest. 7, sect. 5, ad 1*).

You object, fourth, from (*8. Met., cap., tit. 10*): things are related as numbers are; but there is no ultimate number, therefore neither is there an ultimate end. This

is confirmed: in mathematics one proceeds to infinity toward further and further conclusions; therefore in ends too one goes to infinity. I reply that in one respect there is parity and in another disparity. The parity is this: just as one thing depends on another, and a secondary cause on the first, so one number depends on another—as twelve on six, and eight on four. The disparity is that in numbers there is no stopping point, but in things there is, as is clear from what has been said, and as the Doctor explains (*in Rep. cit.*, §. *Ad argum. principale*). To the confirmation, this holds for accidentally ordered things, but not for essentially subordinated ones. Hence there is that saying of Solon, cited by Aristotle (*1. Pol., cap. 5*): "No end of the best has been set for mortals." And Ecclesiastes 1: "The eye is not satisfied with seeing, nor the ear filled with hearing."

ARTICLE IX. Whether the ultimate end concurs with particular ends in causing finally.

The status of this difficulty is to be understood in the following sense: namely, whether just as the first cause concurs efficiently in the production of all effects of any secondary cause, so too the ultimate end influences finally and concurs in bringing forth the effects of all particular ends. On this matter there appear to be two opinions among the Scholastics. One belongs to those who assert that the ultimate end concurs with particular ends in causing finally only remotely and mediately, among whom may be counted Durandus and others who, in the genus of efficient causality, hold that God gave creatures the power of acting and does nothing further concerning them, not concurring in their effects except through the power and potency of operating bestowed on them, as I reported (*lib. de causis, quaest. 3, art. 1*). The other belongs to those who hold that God cooperates immediately and proximally in all effects of secondary causes, and who likewise think that the ultimate end influences proximally and immediately together with the other particular ends.

Assertion: the ultimate end concurs with all particular ends proximally in causing finally. This is deduced from the Doctor (*1. dist. 1, quaest. 4; and d. 2, quaest. 2, §. Iuxta tres, N; and 4. dist. 49, quaest. 8, §. Ad argumenta, E*). This is proved, first: the same reasoning applies to the first efficient cause and the ultimate end. For the first cause and the ultimate end coincide, as was shown above; but the first cause concurs immediately and proximally in all effects of secondary causes; therefore the ultimate end likewise concurs proximally with particular ends in causing finally. Second, every possible perfection is to be attributed to God, since God is that than which nothing greater and more perfect can be conceived; but to act proximally and immediately with secondary causes is a perfection, and it is attributed to God by nearly all Scholastics; therefore to finalize proximally together with their particular ends belongs to the ultimate end. For the final cause is not like the material and formal causes, whose causalities are far from God, since they are imperfect, as

the Doctor observes (*in 1. dist. 2, quaest. 2, §. Quantum ad 1, before M*).

Furthermore, secondary causes are subordinated to the first cause; but in essentially subordinated causes, the inferior ones do not cause without the superior ones, because they depend essentially on them in causing. Therefore the ultimate end concurs proximately with particular ends in causing finally.

You will say, with Suárez (*disp. 24, Met., sect. 2*): this is true of the actions of a creature insofar as they are from God himself, but not of actions insofar as they are from the creature. For in this latter way, the first cause concurs only virtually, implicitly, and mediately—not always immediately with an immediacy of suppositum. So Suárez thinks he can reconcile the two opinions presented at the beginning of this article. But his distinction is empty and his reconciliation null; for by the admission and teaching of Suárez himself, the action of God and of the creature is the same. Therefore God always relates to it in the same way, especially since, insofar as the action is from the creature, it is always dependent and essentially subordinated; therefore it always needs the same immediate concurrence and assistance of God. And since the suppositum and power of God are not separated from him, if he acts immediately with an immediacy of power, he certainly operates immediately with an immediacy of suppositum, since God is everywhere in his suppositum and power, as I showed (*loc. cit.*). I add that the reasoning is the same for the efficient cause and the final cause, since the same God is the efficient cause and the end of all things. For God does not act for his own end—otherwise he would be imperfect—but for the creature's end, since he orders the creature to its end, as the Doctor observes (*p. d. 1, q. 5, §. Ad argumenta*).

You object, first: the causality of the end is a metaphorical motion, by reason of which the agent is moved to act on account of the goodness of the end proposed to it; but inanimate and irrational things cannot be aroused to act by such motion, since they lack intellect and will. Therefore God does not concur immediately with all particular ends in causing finally. I grant the major; to the minor I say that such things do not properly act for an end, for the reason given, but rather are acted upon and led toward the end, or toward what is advantageous for them. Therefore they are not moved metaphorically by the end in the way that intellectual agents are.

You object, second: in order for an agent to operate for an end, it must foreknow the end, since the will does not tend toward the unknown, as from the Doctor (*1. dist. 1, quaest. 4, before §. Ista quaest. and §. contra*). But often an intellectual agent neither knows the end nor intends it; indeed, it chooses and performs the contrary. I reply that it suffices if one knows the end confusedly and in general, and even habitually, though not actually, as the Doctor teaches (*1. distinct. 1, quaest. 4, §. posset; and in Rep. ibid., §. Ad 1. principale*).

You object, third: God concurs neither efficiently nor finally in the perpetration of vices and sins; but many intend and tend toward evils, according to Proverbs

1, "Their feet run to evil." Therefore, and so on. One must respond from what was said (*in Phys., loc. cit.*): sins are not formally effects but defects and withdrawals from God; consequently, God in no way—that is, neither efficiently nor finally—concurs in them. Especially because God has made all things for his own sake, but not from the intention of the sinner, who establishes for himself another ultimate end of his action, or a predetermined end, as Fonseca observes (5. *Met., cap. 2, quaest. 12, sect. 6, in the solution of the arguments*). Hence it is that some place their happiness in goods of the soul, some in goods of the body, and others in other created things—all of which must be brought forward and weighed in the next question.

QUESTION IV. On Beatitude.

ARTICLE I. What beatitude is and how many kinds there are.

That beatitude exists—which is also called the supreme good and happiness—no one doubts. For this is clear from the natural appetite that all have for acquiring happiness. For all, says Augustine (13. *Trin., cap. 5; in Ps. 32, conc. 2; and Ps. 118, conc. 1*), want to be happy and do not want to be wretched. And in the first place cited, he adds that a certain mime said in the theater that he knew what everyone wanted—namely, beatitude—as the Doctor cites (1. *dist. 1, quaest. 4, §. Quantum ad istos*). Aristotle agrees (7. *Polit. 13*): "All desire to live well and to be happy." Furthermore, the good is what all things desire; and beatitude is not only good, but is the accumulation of all goods, as Cicero writes (3. *Tusc. qq.*): "With all evils removed, it is the complete assemblage of goods." Again, each person desires his own perfection. For there is a common inclination toward the good and a flight from evil; and beatitude is the ultimate perfection of the rational creature, as the Doctor attests (4. *dist. 49, q. 2*).

But what beatitude is does not appear so clear, nor can it be clearly and evidently established unless we set forth and explain the meanings and divisions of beatitude. For the term "beatitude" is equivocal, as Scotus notes (4. *cit., quaest. 2, §. Ad quaest., CC*) and Alphonsus (3. *adversus haereses, haer. 4*). Therefore its principal meanings must be adduced, along with Vorillong (2. *d. 4, term. 1, art. 4*). In one way, beatitude is taken for the way and disposition toward true happiness, and this disposition can be twofold: remote, about which the Philosopher says (1. *Eth.*): "Children of good character are called happy insofar as they are remotely disposed toward beatitude"; and proximate, which David mentions (*Ps. 1*): "Blessed is the man who has not walked in the counsel of the ungodly, nor stood in the way of sinners"; and the Savior (*Matt. 5*), assigning eight beatitudes; and John 7: "This is eternal life, that they may know thee, the true God." In another way, beatitude is taken for liberation and rescue from present or threatening evils. Hence Virgil sings (1. *Aeneid*): "O thrice and four times blessed!" Third, for a certain participation in the supreme beatitude through knowledge and love, which is either active, about which (1. *Eth. 5*), or contemplative, about

which (*10. Eth. 3*). And in this sense, the author of *De fide ad Petrum* says that the angels were created good and blessed. Fourth, for the supreme state in which God is clearly seen and possessed by the blessed. Looking to this, David says (*Ps. 83*): "Blessed are those who dwell in your house, O Lord; they will praise you forever and ever." Beatitude is defined by Boethius (*2. De consol., Prosa 2*) as "the state made perfect by the aggregation of all goods." By Augustine (*13. Trin.*) and Isidore: "He is blessed who has whatever he wills and wills nothing evil"—that is, he is blessed who has every good that he can rightly will. Therefore he is blessed who perfectly possesses God. Vorillong notes three things in the above-quoted definition of Boethius. First, the state—since beatitude is invariable and immutable; hence the same Boethius says elsewhere: "Why did you so often call me happy, O friends? He who has fallen was not standing on a firm step." Second, the aggregation of all goods—for he who has God possesses every good, according to Exodus 33: "I will show you all good." Third, the perfection and completeness of the state—for the blessed lack nothing, because they have whatever they desire. Akin to this is the definition of beatitude given by Aristotle (*1. Eth. 7*): "Happiness is an activity of the soul in accordance with reason, or not without reason, according to virtue, in a perfect life." By "activity of the soul according to reason" is understood the operation of the intellect and the will, which are the powers of a rational and intellectual creature. "Not without reason" is added—meaning "according to virtue," namely, an action consonant with reason, which is made savory through wisdom and vision, and inflamed through the ardor of love and charity, which is had through the enjoyment of God. "In a perfect life" is added—that is, in a perennial and eternal life. For as (*1. Eth., loc. cit.*): "One swallow does not make a spring," so one day and an interrupted operation does not make a person happy and blessed.

The first division of beatitude, which Augustine touches upon (*lib. De catechizandis rudib., cap. 22*), is into natural and supernatural. Natural beatitude is a state free from all evil of punishment and guilt. In this sense, Augustine (*4. De Gen. ad lit., cap. 3*) says that the angels at the beginning of their creation were blessed with natural beatitude, because they possessed complete natural endowments and were in grace, as I showed at length (*Tract. de Angelis, disp. 2, quaest. 3*). Supernatural beatitude is the clear vision of God and its perfect enjoyment.

The second division is into contemplative and active, which Aristotle treats (*1. Eth. 5; and 10. Eth. 8*). Contemplative beatitude consists in the knowledge of God, and active beatitude in the love of the same God.

The third, from Augustine (*Tract. 6 in Joan.; and in Ps. 118, conc. 1*), is into beatitude in hope—which coincides with beatitude taken as a disposition, of which I made mention above, about which Ecclesiasticus 31 says: "Blessed is the man who is found without blemish, and who has not gone after gold"—and beatitude in reality, which is true happiness, which the saints enjoy in heaven.

The fourth is into objective and formal beatitude. Objective beatitude is God, whom the blessed clearly see and perfectly enjoy, as is clear from (*Ps. 3*): "But you, O Lord, are my protector, my glory." Formal beatitude is the clear vision and perfect enjoyment of the same God, by which the blessed are united and joined to the beatific object, which is their best and supreme good.

You object, first: Job 14, "Man born of woman, living a short time, is filled with many miseries"—which Heraclitus, beholding, always wept. Hence Saint Paul (*Rom. 7*): "Unhappy man that I am, who will deliver me from this body of death?" Therefore no natural beatitude exists. I reply that not all enjoy natural beatitude, but only those who devote themselves to the contemplation and love of God, and who possess intact natural endowments are called happy—not with happiness absolutely, but in a qualified sense, that is, with that happiness and beatitude that can be had in the present life, even though it is for the most part joined and intertwined with labors and sorrows, which the authors cited and others, reflecting on this, rightly regarded as unhappiness and misery. Hence Ecclesiastes 1: "I have seen all things that are done under the sun, and behold, all is vanity and vexation of spirit."

You object, second: Wisdom 9, "The body that is corrupted weighs down the soul"; and 2 Kings 14, "We all die, and like water, we flow away." But since beatitude is a perfect life, and in the present life there is continual and perpetual dying—as the poet sings (*Aen. 2*): "Everywhere grief, everywhere wailing, and many an image of death"—there appears no shadow of beatitude, whether absolutely or in a qualified sense. I reply that although for the most part, with respect to the body, human beings undergo nearly innumerable labors and afflictions, nevertheless with respect to the soul—to which beatitude properly, essentially, and principally belongs—if a person has been devoted to the knowledge and love of God, he is called blessed with natural beatitude, about which we are presently speaking.

ARTICLE II. On objective beatitude.

Since the more celebrated and copious division of beatitude is into objective and formal, it must be examined broadly and precisely by us in this and the next article. So many were the opinions of the philosophers about objective beatitude that concerning this topic, more truly than concerning any other matter, amid the various controversies and diverse human opinions advanced and debated, one could apply the common saying: "So many heads, so many opinions." See Aristotle (*1. and 7. Eth.*); Ambrose (*2. De officiis*); and especially Augustine (*19. Civit., cap. 1*), who reports that Marcus Varro counted 288 opposed opinions about objective happiness and beatitude, which can be reduced to three headings: namely, goods of fortune, goods of the body, and goods of the soul—of which Aristotle makes mention (*7. Polit. 1*). For all acknowledge that beatitude consists in some good; they dispute, however, whether it consists in

goods of fortune, or of the body, or of the soul—about each of which we must treat briefly in the subsequent discussions.

DOUBT I. Whether beatitude consists in goods of fortune.

Goods of fortune, which are also called external goods, are principally four: riches, power, honor, and glory. Two kinds of riches are distinguished by Aristotle (*1. Pol. 6*): one is called riches of natural things, which are granted to us by nature for our use and advantage, such as fields, estates, and livestock. The other is riches of artificial things, which human industry has invented for the exchange of goods, such as gold, silver, and things of this sort, which Aristotle mentions (*1. Rhet. 5*). Power, or sovereignty and dominion, is that by which some command, govern, and rule over others. Honor is the reverence shown to someone in testimony of his virtue or excellence. Glory is a clear reputation with praise, or a widespread fame about someone accompanied by praise, according to Augustine (*tract. 105 in Joan.*).

First assertion: happiness does not consist in wealth and riches. This is deduced from Scotus (*4. dist. 49, quaest. 1, §. Ad 1. quaest.*) and is defended by Bassolis (*ibid., art. 2*), following Aristotle (*1. Eth., cap. 5*). This is proved, first, from Scripture: Psalm 62, "If riches abound, set not your heart upon them"; Matthew 6, "Do not store up treasures for yourselves on earth"; and Luke 12, "Make for yourselves purses that do not grow old, an unfailing treasure in heaven, where no thief approaches, nor moth corrupts." Second, from the Fathers: Augustine (*1–2. De serm. Domini in monte, cap. 21–22; and lib. De disciplina Christiana, cap. 1*): "Money does not make you happy"; and (*in 2. enarr. Ps. 29*): "The more they have, the more they lack; they are ravaged by desires, dissipated by cravings, tortured by fears, and wasted by sadness." Chrysologus in a certain sermon: "The guardian of gold and keeper of silver has no security and knows no rest." And Gregory on the Gospel: "Those alone are true riches that make us rich in virtues. If, therefore, brothers, you desire to be rich, love true riches; if you seek the summit of true honor, strive toward the heavenly kingdom; if you love the glory of high positions, hasten to be enrolled in that celestial court of angels." Third, from the philosophers—notably Crates: "Begone, you most wretched riches! I will drown you before you drown me." Bias: "I carry all my possessions with me." Seneca (*epist. 111*): "It is base to place the happy life in gold and silver." And Aristotle (*2. Rhet. 16*): "Riches are scarcely anything other than fortunate madness." Fourth, beatitude is the end of man, for in it man finds rest—thus David desired (*Ps. 4*): "In peace, in the selfsame, I will sleep and rest." Hence the Church sings of the blessed: "He fell asleep in the Lord." But in riches man does not find rest: Ecclesiastes 5, "The miser will not be satisfied with money, and he who loves riches will reap no fruit from them." And there is the well-known verse: "The love of money grows as much as money itself grows." And another (*Aen. 3*): "To what do you not drive mortal hearts, accursed hunger for gold?" Fifth, happiness does not exist for the sake of another, since it is the ultimate end; but money

serves man for use and assistance. Hence Xenophon (*De inst. Cyri*, 8) says: "I do not consider those happy who possess and guard the most money, for in that case, those who guard the walls would be the most fortunate, since they guard everything that is in the cities." And Boethius (3. *De consol.*, *prosa* 3): "Always be rich, at least in precaution, lest riches be seized." Furthermore, riches are corruptible and capable of being lost, and the wealthy are often reduced to great poverty. Moreover, riches are less noble than man, since they are inanimate earthly mixtures, over which any living and animated thing excels in nobility. Therefore happiness is not to be sought in riches and money. Nor should we pass over what Jerome adds (*in Ps.* 83): "Every rich man is either unjust or the heir of the unjust."

Second assertion: beatitude does not consist in power, sovereignty, and dominion. This is gathered from the Doctor (*loc. cit.*). It is proved, first, from the sacred page: Wisdom 6, "The powerful will suffer powerful torments"; and Psalm 75, "He has broken the powers of bows, the shield, the sword, and war." Second, from Curtius (*lib.* 4): "An excessively heavy sovereignty is dangerous, and it is difficult to maintain what you cannot hold." Agrippa adds, speaking to Augustus in Dio (*lib.* 53): "It is necessary that whoever holds great power be consumed by many cares and agitations, perceive the least pleasures, and constantly see, hear, and feel the most troublesome things." Lembus subscribes, in a funeral oration for Guidobaldo, Duke of Urbino: "Over empires and riches, fortune and often chance hold dominion; sometimes by a small offense, as by a hailstorm, all the fruits of an entire year—and indeed, all the advantages of an entire life—are taken away." Third, what is subject to continual struggle, perpetual fear, unceasing anxiety, and hatred is not happiness, which is free from all afflictions and evils, as is clear from its definition; but power, sovereignty, and dominion succumb to these and to nearly innumerable calamities, sorrows, and labors. Hence so many sentries are posted, so many guards and fortifications are employed, and trust is given neither to parents nor to relatives. For the prince fears all and guards himself from all who seek his life. Hence, as Brusio reports (*lib.* 3, *cap.* 13), Saturninus, when urged by his soldiers to assume imperial power, said: "You do not know, soldiers, how great an evil it is to rule: swords hang over your necks by force, spears surround you on all sides; even the guards are feared, even the companions are dreaded; meals are not taken according to one's pleasure, nor journeys according to one's authority, nor wars according to one's judgment, nor arms according to one's inclination." And a certain prince, indicating to a flatterer the unhappiness and imminent danger of a king, suspended a sword by a single thread, with its point directly above the head of the man praising the king—by which he signified that the king's very life depended on the single thread holding the sword. And experience teaches us that those who rule over others fall into many dangers: Philip of Macedon, presiding over a war, lost an eye and afterward his life; his son Alexander perished by poison; Caesar was pierced by daggers; and the same is clear from

the histories of others who, while ruling in the world, exchanged life for death by an ill-fated end. Hence Seneca aptly adds: "The creator of the world, God, has placed these things together: hatred and sovereignty." And Chrysostom concurs (*in Matt.*): "For great power is always subject to greater fear, just as the branches of tall trees, even if a light breeze has blown, are shaken; so also those standing on the summit of high positions are disturbed even by the rumor of a slight message; but the humble, as if in a valley, are for the most part in tranquility."

Third assertion: neither is the highest happiness placed in honor. So Aristotle (*1. Eth. 5*), and the Doctor does not contradict (*passage cited*). This is proved, first, from Psalm 48: "Man, when he was in honor, did not understand; he has been compared to senseless beasts and has become like them." Second, from Chrysostom (*in Matt.*): "The greatness of honor begins to be a goad of punishments for those who do not live worthily of the honor." Anselm (*in Simil., cap. 71*): "Those who seek the honors of this world act like children who chase butterflies." And Seneca (*to Lucilius, epist. 82*): "Riches, honors, power, and the rest—things that are dear in our estimation—draw us away from what is right." Second, formal beatitude is in the blessed person, and objective beatitude is conjoined with the formal, so that the blessed person is united and joined by vision and enjoyment to the beatific object, as Scotus says (*4. d. 49, q. 2*). But honor is not in the one honored, but in the one honoring, as Aristotle attests (*1. Eth. 5*). Third, beatitude does not exist for the sake of another, since it is the ultimate end, as Augustine asserts (*lib. 2, De serm. Domini in monte*); but honor exists for the sake of another, that is, as a testimony to virtue, excellence, and dignity. Third, honor depends on the judgment and will of human beings, which is weak and inconstant, as is clear from Christ the Lord, who before he suffered, entering Jerusalem, was honored and acclaimed by the people, and shortly afterward was demanded by the same crowd to be crucified. Hence Chrysostom well says in a certain sermon: "Honors are inseparably accompanied by anxiety; the pomp and favor of the world is smoke and a breeze that suddenly vanishes." Nor should that often-quoted saying be omitted: "Honors change character."

Fourth assertion: neither can beatitude consist in worldly fame and glory. This is drawn from Scotus (*loc. cit.*). The first part, concerning fame, is proved from Seneca (*in Tragoedia, lib. 4*): "Despise fame; fame scarcely favors truth." Someone else adds: "The fame we pursue is wind, smoke, shadow, nothing." And Virgil (*4. Aen.*): "Rumor, than which no other evil is swifter; it thrives by its mobility and acquires strength as it goes." Tertullian writes the same (*Apol. 7*). Since, therefore, fame is inconstant and changeable, while beatitude is perpetual and unshaken, it is rightly concluded that happiness is not to be placed in fame. The second part, concerning glory, is supported from 2 Corinthians 10: "Let him who glories, glory in the Lord." Our glory, therefore, is nothing unless it is referred to God, as Augustine teaches (*lib. 1, De serm. Domini in monte, cap. 13; and lib. 1, cap. 1*). And the same Paul urges this (*loc. cit.*): "Whether you eat or drink, or whatever you

do, do all things for the glory of God." Bernard agrees (*in a sermon*): "It is certainly not the mark of an upright mind, but of a perverse one, to seek glory without exercising virtue, and to wish to be crowned without having competed lawfully." Nor should Ovid be despised (*4. Trist. 3*): "Glory travels a difficult road through steep places." I add that very often glory is counterfeit and vain, renders people proud and insolent, and depends for the most part on the judgment and whim of others. Therefore the highest happiness is not to be established in worldly glory. Boethius agrees (*3. Consol., prosa 6*): "How often deceitful, how often base is glory!"

You object, first, from (*5. Eth. 5*): "All things are obtained with money"; and Ecclesiastes 10: "All things obey money." Therefore happiness consists in wealth and resources. I reply that those quoted testimonies are to be understood of things that are marketable and that human beings esteem highly—not of virtue and wisdom and true good, which cannot be possessed by riches and money. For "all gold in comparison with it is a small grain of sand." Add that by the said passages it is indicated that money is merely a means for acquiring happiness, if one makes good use of it, as Abraham and other wealthy persons did, who were crowned with glory and honor. Hence Chrysologus adds (*serm. 121*): "Abraham was rich not for himself but for the poor, and he desired not to possess wealth but to distribute it." And the same is indicated (*4. Eth. 1*).

You object, second: through power and sovereignty, man approaches God more closely than through the rest of the things he can possess. Hence the powerful, kings, and rulers are called gods, as is read (*Exod. 13*): "You shall not speak against the gods." Indeed, dominion seems to have been commanded by God (*Gen. 1*): "Have dominion over the birds of the sky, the fish of the sea, and the beasts of the earth." Therefore beatitude lies in dominion and sovereignty. I reply that although by dominion man is made like God, nonetheless beatitude is not found in it; just as man is said to be made in the image and likeness of God through the rational soul, even though beatitude does not consist in the soul. The same is asserted of sovereignty, by reason of which man draws close to God; nevertheless, happiness is not found in it, as the second assertion shows.

You object, third: human beings especially desire honor and glory, as Cicero says (*pro Arch.*): "All are drawn by the desire for praise, and all the best are especially led by glory, and nothing among human beings is esteemed more than honor and glory." Hence Proverbs 15: "Good fame fattens the bones." And Augustine (*lib. De doctrina Christiana*) adds: "So let the teacher choose a good life that he also does not neglect a good reputation." Therefore beatitude consists in fame and glory. I distinguish the antecedent: concerning fame and glory that is fleeting and futile, which is called worldly, I deny it; concerning fame, honor, and glory that is true and divine, I concede. For thus it is written (*Ps. 115*): "Your friends are exceedingly honored, O God; their sovereignty has been greatly

strengthened." I add what is said (6. *Pol.* 4): "Most people desire gain more than honor."

DOUBT II. Whether beatitude consists in goods of the body.

Among goods of the body, the principal ones counted are health, beauty, and strength, which the Doctor mentions (4. *distinct.* 11, *quaest.* 4). Good health, or soundness, consists in an equality or balance of humors, as Scotus writes (*in both works*, 2. *distinct.* 12, *quaest.* 2, §. *Ad 1. rationem, sub G*). Beauty, according to Augustine (22. *Civit.*, *cap.* 19), cited by the Doctor (4. *distinct.* 49, *quaest.* 15), is "a congruence of parts together with a certain pleasantness of color." Strength is a virtue placed in the confrontation of dangers and the endurance of labors, as the Stagirite indicates (3. *Eth.* 6), and the Doctor agrees (3. *distinct.* 36, *quaest.* *un.*, §. *Quantum ad primum*).

Assertion: true happiness is not placed in the aforementioned goods of the body. The Doctor touches on this (*loc. cit.*, §. *De secundo*). And Lactantius defends it (*lib.* 1, *cap.* 18). This is proved, first: those things that do not satisfy the appetite and do not fulfill desire are not the object of beatitude, for that object satisfies and fully satiates the appetite. But the aforesaid goods of the body do not fulfill the appetite, since they do not exist for their own sake but are ordered toward activity. For being is for the sake of operating (2. *Caeli* 17). And even if a person possessed only those goods, he would still hunger, thirst, and need other necessities for sustaining life. Second, true happiness is a firm and fixed good, as is clear from its description; but the aforesaid goods are inconstant and unstable, as is evident from Psalm 37: "There is no health in my flesh"; Proverbs 31: "Beauty is vain"; and Judges 16: "His strength departed from him." This is further confirmed: for when sickness befalls a person, it dissipates his strength, destroys his beauty, and overturns his health. Third, good health is an equality of humors, which is an attribute of quantity, and therefore belongs to the category of sterile things; or if it is a proportion of humors, it is formally a relation, which has minimal entity. Strength, moreover, shines forth in enduring labors and confronting terrible things, which produce sadness rather than joy, pain rather than pleasure, and evil rather than good. Furthermore, in these things man is surpassed by beasts: the lion is the strongest, the peacock the most beautiful, the fish the healthiest; the eagle surpasses man in sight, the wolf in hearing, the dog in smell, the horse in speed, and the stag in length of life, as Augustine excellently discusses (*serm.* 34, *De verbis Domini*). Moreover, the body is ordered to the soul, as matter to form, and it is corruptible along with the things that accompany it; hence Paul cries out (*Rom.* 7): "Unhappy man that I am, who will deliver me from this body of death?" And Wisdom 9: "The body that is corrupted weighs down the soul." Therefore Augustine rightly adds (*serm.* 46, *De Sanctis*): "Let no one believe himself to possess any happiness or any true joy in this world."

You object, first: beatitude consists in what is sought for its own sake, because it is the ultimate perfection; but health is sought for its own sake. For through it we take pleasure and rejoice; hence Augustine (*lib. De bono coniugali, cap. 22*) says: "It is better to have the short and hunched stature of Zacchaeus with health, than Goliath's with fever." And Plato (*in Gorgias*): "The best thing is to be well, then to be handsome, and afterward to possess wealth gained without fraud." Plutarch adds (*in healthful precepts*): "Health is the most divine thing and by far the sweetest seasoning." If the major is conceded, the minor must be denied. For in truth, health is for the sake of activity. Hence man does not rest in it, especially since a person can be healthy yet poor and lacking in nearly everything, as happens not infrequently. Nor do I omit what is said (*1. Magn. Mor. 4; and 1. Eth. 9*): "The blessed person must be of perfect age. For a child, as a child, is not blessed." And this is touched upon (*Eph. 4*): "Until we all attain to the perfect man."

You object, second: beauty is loved by all and judged worthy of sovereignty. Hence that celebrated line: "The beauty of Priam is worthy of sovereignty." And Psalm 44: "In your splendor and beauty, go forward, advance, and reign." And of Christ the Lord it is read in the same place: "Beautiful in form beyond the sons of men." And Proverbs 31: "Strength and beauty are her clothing." I reply indeed that beauty is the principal ornament of the body, as is clear from that verse: "Therefore the Lord has clothed you with beauty." Nevertheless, beatitude is not found in it, since it is in the body, which is ordered to the soul, as I noted above; just as the excellence and preeminence of a person is not situated in his stature but in the nobility of his soul, its virtues, and its glorious works.

DOUBT III. Whether happiness consists in pleasure.

Many place true happiness in bodily and spiritual pleasure, among whom Epicurus and his followers are counted, as the Coimbra commentators report (*disp. 3, Eth., quaest. 2, art. 3*), from Torquatus in Cicero (*2. De finibus*) and Seneca (*lib. De vita beata*); also Augustine (*lib. De utilitate credendi ad Honoratum, cap. 4; serm. 13, De verbis Apostoli; and tract. De Epicureis et Stoicis, cap. 4, Tom. 6*). Certain Jews, as Alphonsus attests (*lib. 3, adversus Haer., haer. 2*), suppose that happiness consists in the delights of the flesh, of whom perhaps Solomon made mention (*Wisdom 2*): "Let us crown ourselves with roses before they wither; let no meadow escape our revelry." And Paul (*Gal. 6*): "He who sows in his flesh will from the flesh reap corruption." Also Augustine (*in Epist. ad Rom., cap. 13*). These are followed by Cerinthus, as the same Alphonsus affirms (*loc. cit.*), who, given over to lust and steeped in wicked morals, imagined that after the resurrection the kingdom of Christ would consist in desires and enticements of the flesh. The Saracens agree, as Scotus touches upon (*quaest. 2, Prol., §. De sexto*), expecting and maintaining as beatitude what befits swine—namely gluttony and sexual intercourse. This is also criticized by Avicenna (*9. Met., cap. 7*), although he perhaps does not dissent from their sect.

Assertion: the Catholic religion does not establish true happiness in bodily pleasure and fleshly delights. This is presupposed by the Doctor (*loc. cit.*) and defended by Pelusiotus (4. *Epist.* 55). This is proved, first, from the sacred page: Job 21, "They spend their days in prosperity, and in a moment they go down to hell"; Wisdom 2, "Believing they had found happiness in pleasure, they confess they have found misery"—"Therefore we have erred, and the light of truth has not shone on us"; 1 Corinthians 15, "Flesh and blood cannot possess the kingdom of God"; and Luke 16, "He feasted splendidly every day; the rich man died and was buried in hell." Second, from the Fathers: Augustine (5. *Civit.*, cap. 20, and the places previously named); Chrysologus (*serm.* 66); Jerome (*epist. ad Damasum Papam*): "Pleasure always carries a hunger for itself, and once past, does not satisfy." The same is written by Ambrose (*in Luc.* 6); Isidore (*De summo bono*); and Chrysostom (*orat.* 6, *De facto*). Third, from Seneca (*epist.* 39): "Some plunge themselves into pleasures, from which, once they have become accustomed to them, they cannot abstain, and for this reason they are the most wretched." Cato the Elder agrees: "Pleasure is the bait of evils, by which human beings are caught like fish on a hook." Cicero favors this (2. *De finibus*): "No one is worthy of the name of human being who would wish to spend an entire day in pleasure." Furthermore, bodily pleasure overwhelms the mind, depresses the intellect, and removes reason, so that a person immersed in it cannot accomplish anything excellent or distinguished, as Aristotle says (7. *Eth.*, cap. 11). Hence Salvian rightly adds (2. *De Ecclesia Cath.*): "Pleasures are impediments, not aids; not supports, but burdens." Moreover, true happiness includes the highest peace and rest, as I intimated above; but "the life of man upon earth is a warfare" (*Job* 7). Likewise, "the flesh lusts against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh" (*Gal.* 5). Hence Augustine (*lib.* 2, *De serm. Domini in monte*, cap. 18) says: "Let us pray that the will of God be done on earth as it is in heaven; for when the body, like the earth, and the spirit, like the heaven, shall have consented in supreme and total peace, we shall not mourn. For there is no other mourning of this time than when these two fight against each other and compel us to say: 'I see another law warring against the law of my mind,' and to attest our grief with a tearful voice: 'Wretched man that I am! Who will deliver me from this body of death?' (*Rom.* 7)." Therefore happiness does not consist in pleasure, as the Stagirite also recognized (1. *Eth.* 5; and 8. *Pol.* 3), adding: "Happiness is an end which all think comes not with pain but with pleasure."

You object, first: Aristotle (10. *Eth.*, cap. 2) writes that it is ridiculous to ask someone why he wants to take delight; the reason is that everyone by his very nature desires delight; and (7. *Eth.*, cap. 11): children and beasts pursue pleasures. Therefore, in delight and bodily pleasure, which is greater than the rest, happiness consists. This is confirmed: just as the greatest unhappiness is found in bodily pains, so the highest happiness is in delight and bodily pleasure. Hence it is compared to honeycomb in sacred Scripture, and whoever has once experienced it abandons everything else, making light of it, and rests in it. I

reply that although nearly all take delight in the pleasures of the flesh, and the appetite for it is most intense, nevertheless beatitude is not located in that pleasure, since it lasts only a moment and afterward sadness follows, and the more libidinous animals are of shorter life. Indicating this, Paul says (*2 Cor. 16*): "He who commits fornication sins against his own body." Moreover, delight is a passion, while beatitude consists in action, as will be said below. I add that Aristotle (*2. Magn. Mor., cap. 7*) teaches that bodily pleasures are to be condemned.

You object, second: Isaiah 45, "My servants shall eat, but you shall go hungry; my servants shall drink, but you shall thirst"; Luke 17, "I dispose for you, as my Father disposed for me, that you may eat and drink"; Psalm 35, "They shall be inebriated with the abundance of your house." And certain people from Matthew 19, as Jerome attests (*lib. 4, in Matt.*), and Apocalypse 20, after a thousand years, think the kingdom of Christ will be in the pleasures of the world and the delights of the flesh. I reply that these and similar testimonies are to be expounded of spiritual food and drink, just as in Tobias 12, the angel Raphael says: "I eat an invisible food, of another kind." And so those passages are to be taken not carnally but spiritually, as Alphonsus (*cited above*) shows at length. Especially because man does not exist for the sake of food and drink, but the reverse; hence Cicero says: "I do not live to eat, but eat to live." And Saint Augustine (*lib. 2, De serm. Domini in monte, cap. 14*): "Nor should we evangelize in order to eat, but eat in order to evangelize." And (*cap. 25*): "Whatever thing is sought for the sake of another is without doubt inferior to that for the sake of which it is sought." And shortly after he concludes: "If we seek the Gospel and the kingdom of God for the sake of food, we make food the higher thing."

DOUBT IV. Whether happiness consists in goods of the soul, or in some other created thing.

Since from the foregoing it is perfectly clear that objective happiness does not consist in goods of fortune or of the body, it remains to inquire and consider whether it lies in goods of the whole composite, or in goods of the soul, or in some other object. For it is held as certain that man was created by God so that he might understand the supreme good, and by understanding might love it, and by loving might enjoy it, and by enjoying might possess it, as Panigorola affirms (*2. Quadr., serm. Dominica 2*). For all—not only Catholics but also pagans—plainly acknowledge that there is in man an inclination toward the good, just as toward knowing the true, and that this inclination is not had in vain.

Note that in man there are certain powers and faculties that are material, called potencies of the whole composite, such as the external and internal senses; and certain others that belong to the rational soul alone, namely the intellect and the will. Again, I observe that created things are either simple and spiritual, such as the angels, or composite and material, such as the elements and the rest of the

things contained in the universe, about which I treated extensively in general and in particular in the Physics.

First assertion: true happiness does not reside in the sensitive and material potencies, nor in the spiritual and immaterial ones. This is deduced from Scotus (4. *distinct.* 49, *quaest.* 8; and *ibid.* *quaest.* 1 and 2), and divides into two parts. The first part is proved, first, from Augustine (1. *De serm. Domini in monte*, cap. 8): "In man, the principal and excellent part commands the rest, not those things which we have in common with beasts"—such as the bodily potencies and powers. And (*ibid.*, cap. 9): "Your reward, which is unshaken and eternal, is not to be placed in things that are changeable and temporal." But the sensitive potencies are changeable and corruptible; therefore, beatitude is not to be sought in them. Second, such potencies are defectible and perfectible, as I said (3. *De anima*); but beatitude is "a state made perfect by the aggregation of all goods." Moreover, they do not fill our appetite: "The eye is not satisfied with seeing, nor the ear filled with hearing" (*Ecclesiastes* 1). And "the leech has two daughters"—namely the irascible and the concupiscible—"which say: 'Bring, bring!'" (*Proverbs* 30). Therefore true happiness cannot be found in these, as Aristotle also concludes (1. *Eth.* 9).

The second part is proved, first, from Augustine (*lib. De natura boni contra Manich.*, cap. 7): "Among the things made by God, so great a good is the rational nature that there is no good by which it is made happy except God." Second, such potencies are subject to many defects and errors: the intellect often errs and does not rest in knowing created things; hence *Ecclesiastes* 1: "He who increases knowledge increases sorrow." The will, in turn, succumbs to malice and is not satisfied in desiring and willing created things; hence David, affected by this annoyance, speaking to God, says (*Ps.* 16): "I shall be satisfied when your glory appears." Furthermore, as Augustine notes (*in cap. 21 of Job*): just as temporal goods are common to the devout and the impious, so intellect and will are shared by both; therefore happiness is not to be sought in these.

Second assertion: in no created thing, whatever it may be, is the supreme good found. This is taught by Scotus (4. *dist.* 49, *quaest.* 1, §. *Ad 1. q.*; and §. *De secundo*). This is proved, first: *Ecclesiastes* 1, "Vanity of vanities, and all is vanity and vexation of spirit"; Psalm 143, "Man is become like vanity; his days pass away like a shadow"; 1 John 2, "Love not the world, nor the things that are in the world"; and in the same place: "Whatever is in the world is either the concupiscence of the flesh, or the concupiscence of the eyes, or the pride of life." Second, from Augustine (*lib. 1, De serm. Domini in monte*, cap. 2; and 1–2 of the same work, cap. 21; and in the epistle cited from John): "The world passes away, and its concupiscence. What do you wish? To love temporal things and pass away with time, or to love Christ and live forever?" And Bernard (*serm. De Dedicatione*): "The greedy mind of man can be occupied by created things, but cannot be satisfied by them." And Aristotle (2. *Pol.* 5): "The nature of desire is infinite; therefore, nothing less than

God will fill the soul that is capable of God." Third, happiness is a perfect good; but no creature is perfectly good, because "no one is good except God alone" (*Luke 14*). Moreover, the soul is capable of the infinite, for it can understand the infinite and love it; therefore, no matter what finite thing is given, its desire is not fulfilled—just as prime matter, with any form received in it, always retains the appetite for having other forms, as I said (*in Phys., quaest. de materia*). Finally, even if the appetite for having things pleases, experience disappoints, as Paul Aretius discusses at length from Gregory (*36. Mor.*) (*lib. 3 of his works*).

Third assertion: true happiness and perfect beatitude is found in God alone. This is defended by the same Doctor (*loc. cit.*). This is proved, first: Exodus 33, "I will show you all good"; Psalm 32, "Blessed is the nation whose God is the Lord"; Psalm 82, "Blessed are those who dwell in your house, O Lord." Second, from Dionysius (*De caelesti Hier., cap. 10*) and Augustine (*lib. De natura boni contra Manich., cap. 7; and lib. contra Adimantum, before cap. 19*): "All beatitude is fixed in God alone, unshaken." The same Augustine (*in Soliloquia, cap. 1, Tom. 9*) attests to this. Third, God is that than which nothing greater can be conceived, from Anselm (*in Monol.*)—infinite, independent, containing all goods, especially riches and glory: Psalm 111, "Glory and riches are in his house"; honor and glory: Psalm 8, "You have crowned him with glory and honor"; principalities and dominions: Psalm 44, "You shall make them princes over all the earth"; wisdom and knowledge: Colossians 2, "In whom are all the treasures of the wisdom and knowledge of God." The same appears to be taught by Thomas (*1. part., quaest. 36, art. 3*). And Augustine excellently says (*Tract. 10, in Epist. Joan., ad medium*), and Cicero (*5. Tusc.*).

You object, first: in the knowledge, or vision, and enjoyment of the beatific object consists true and complete beatitude, as the Scholastics unanimously and concordantly hold (*4. distinct. 49*). But God is not seen, nor can he be seen or possessed by us: 1 John 4, "No one has ever seen God, nor can he be seen." This is confirmed: he is blessed who has God perfectly; but no one has God perfectly unless he loves him perfectly; and God cannot be perfectly loved, because he cannot be perfectly known: 1 John 4, "How can he love God, whom he does not see?" I reply by granting the major and distinguishing the minor: in this life, I concede; but in the other life, which we hope for after the universal resurrection, I deny. The same applies to the confirmation, for no one in this world can be blessed, as the arguments I adduced in the preceding doubts show—against the Beghards and Beguines cited by Alphonsus (*loc. cit., haer. 4 and 5*). This is explicitly stated by Saint Paul (*1 Cor. 13*): "Now we see through a mirror in an enigma, but then face to face."

You object, second: between the blessed person and the beatific object there must be some proportion, as between the knower and the known, the lover and the loved. But between God and man no proportion intervenes, since God is infinite and unlimited, while man is finite and limited. Therefore God is not the

objective beatitude of man. I grant the major and distinguish the minor: concerning geometric proportion, I concede; concerning the proportion of the one understanding to the understood, of the one seeing to the seen, I deny, as the Doctor asserts (4. *cit.*, *quaest.* 11, §. *Respondeo*, C).

You object, third: Aristotle (1. *Eth.* 8; and 7. *Pol.*, *cap.* 1) asserts that external goods are necessary for happiness, among which are money. But if God were the beatific object, riches would not be required, since God is "rich toward all who call upon him." Therefore happiness is not placed in God. I reply that Aristotle is speaking about happiness in a qualified sense, namely of the political man, who is greatly honored by the republic and presides over it; for the preservation of its glory and magnificence and for repelling its enemies, external goods, and especially riches, are of the greatest help, as is explained (2. *Magn. Mor.*, *cap.* 9; and 7. *Eth.*, *cap.* 13). But otherwise, if one speaks of happiness absolutely, it is not placed in these things, since it does not depend on chance and fortune, but on virtue and wisdom, which shine more brightly in adversity than in prosperity, as the Stoics argue against the Peripatetics mentioned by the Coimbra commentators (*disp.* 3, *quaest.* 4, *art.* 1). Nor does this response conflict with Aristotle, who holds (10. *Eth.* 8) that beatitude consists in the contemplation of abstract substances, the first and highest of which is God. Hence Augustine rightly adds (3. *contra Maximum*, *cap.* 23): "Nothing makes you good and blessed except the unchangeable good, which is God alone. For a good angel, a good man, and other good created things are not so good that whoever has obtained them is blessed; nor is any life blessed unless it is eternal."

ARTICLE III. On formal beatitude.

Many things are investigated and treated concerning formal beatitude by the Doctor and other Scholastics (4. *distinct.* 49). For the sake of distinction, I distribute these into the following doubts, as I did in the preceding article.

DOUBT I. Whether formal beatitude consists in operation.

This difficulty is treated concerning beatitude not only created but also uncreated, and not only natural but also supernatural. The common opinion of the philosophers (1. *Eth.* 7; and 10 *Eth.*, *cap.* 6)—although, as Scotus observes (*passage just cited*, *quaest.* 1, *before* §. *Ad quaest.*, *sub H*), the philosophers did not determine in what object or under what formality beatitude resides—holds that it consists in operation. I find only in Raconius (*Tract.* 3, *Mor.*, *disp.* un., *quaest.* 2, *art.* 3), citing Capreolus (3. *disp.* 13, *quaest.* 2), who reports that John de Ripa held that formal beatitude consists in the uncreated vision by which God sees and contemplates himself. The opposite, however, is defended by all the Doctors cited above, who judge that formal beatitude inheres in the one who is formally blessed.

Note, first: beatitude is of two kinds—one of the way and another of the homeland. Beatitude of the way is that which is had or can be had in this world,

and it is twofold: true and false. True beatitude consists in the knowledge and love of God, keeping his precepts, and bearing willingly and patiently the labors and sufferings of the present life. Thus Christ says (*Matt. 5*): "Blessed are those who mourn, for they shall be consoled." And (*John 7*): "This is eternal life, that they may know you"—that is, as Alphonsus interprets (*3. adversus Haer., verb. beatitudo, haer. 4*): the way to eternal life. The same is taught by Cyril (*lib. De fide ad Rheginas*) and others cited by Alphonsus. False beatitude is that which is placed in some created object from those named in the preceding article. Beatitude of the homeland is the supreme and ultimate perfection that can be had by an intellectual creature; and this is divided by the Doctor (*in the §. De secundo, recently mentioned, AA*) into beatitude absolutely and in a qualified sense. The former is a secondary perfection immediately conjoining the blessed person to the noblest extrinsic perfective object. The latter conjoins one to a less noble perfective object. Again, beatitude absolutely can be taken either for the conjunction to the extrinsic perfective object, or for the proximate foundation of that conjunction: the former is a relation, while the latter is an operation in the category of quality, as the Doctor writes (*loc. cit., §. Ad argumenta, in the solution of the 4th, EE*).

Note, second, from the same Scotus (*ibid., §. De secundo, Y*): it is held as certain among the philosophers that beatitude is a good that is sufficient, excluding all deficiency and want; likewise a perfect and complete good, free from all imperfection and diminution; likewise an ultimate good without any respect or ordering to another better and more perfect good; and finally a good such that, once possessed, things are completely well for the one possessing it. Conversely, misery is a complete want and absence of secondary perfection, a diminution of secondary good, and an exclusion of what is loved for its own sake when it is possessed. In short, misery is that by which things are completely bad for the one possessing it.

First assertion: happiness does not reside in the uncreated vision of God. This is deduced from the Doctor (*loc. cit.*). It is proved, first: happiness must inhere in the one who is formally happy (*from 1. Eth. 13*), just as whiteness must be in that which is formally white; but the uncreated vision is not in the blessed person but in God. Therefore, through the said vision, man is not formally blessed. Second, what is really and formally moved must receive something, because change is the reception of something new in a subject that was not there before, as I said (*in Phys., lib. De motu*). But a person goes from being not blessed to being blessed through beatitude received in himself, and this cannot be the uncreated vision, which is not receivable in a subject, since it is not an accident. Third, all would be equally blessed, because that uncreated vision is infinite and always behaves in the same way. Therefore the opinion of John de Ripa is singular and diverges from the common position, just as his view about the constitutive properties of the divine persons, which he thinks are absolute, as the Marginists of Scotus cite (*1. dist. 26, quaest. un., §. Tertia opinio*). The Doctor, however,

excuses him from error and heresy in that place, and shows his opinion to be probable and plausible.

Second assertion: formal beatitude consists in the operation of the blessed person. The Doctor holds this (*loc. cit.*) and proves it, first, in both works, by many passages from Aristotle, especially (1. *Eth.*, *cap.* 8 and 9): "Happiness is the best operation." And (10 *Eth.*, *cap.* 8): "The gods, who are the happiest, do not sleep, but operate." Also (2. *Pol.* 3; 2. *Magn. Mor.*, *cap.* 10; and 12. *Met.*, *cap.* 6, T. 61): "If he does not understand, what will be notable about him, what venerable? He would be like one sleeping." Second, Augustine (1. *De doctrina Christiana*, *cap.* 6) says that happiness consists in enjoyment, which is an operation of the will. And (*in his exposition of the Epistle to the Galatians, near the end; and lib.* 2, *De serm. Domini in monte*, *cap.* 33): "Since the blessed life is completed by action and contemplation, action desires the functioning of faculties and powers, and contemplation desires the manifestation of things." Third, Aristotle (2. *Caeli* 17): "Being is for the sake of operating." Therefore the intellectual creature, since it exists for the sake of the most perfect operation, which is beatitude, was created for this purpose—both because living things surpass non-living things by the grade of life, and intellectual beings surpass those lacking reason by the grade of intellectual life, which consists in operation, namely intellection and volition; and because the beatitude of the way is placed in operation, as is evident from the eight beatitudes related and explained by Christ the Lord (*Matt.* 5). The same must be asserted of the beatitude of the homeland—both because beatitude is the conjunction of the intellectual nature with its best, which is attained by operation, and because eternal life is expected by you in the same manner in which the angels participate in it: (*Matt.* 22) "They are as the angels of God in heaven." But the angels are beatified through operation: (1 *Peter* 1) "Into which things the angels desire to look"; and (*Matt.* 18) "Their angels see the face of the Father"; and (1 *Cor.* 13) "Then face to face."

You object, first: beatitude is the accumulation of all goods and the aggregation of all perfections, as is clear from Augustine (13. *Trin.* 5): "He is blessed who has whatever he wills and wills nothing evil"; and Boethius (3. *Consol.*, *prosa* 2): "Beatitude is a state made perfect by the aggregation of all goods." But many other things are goods besides operation; therefore happiness is not placed in operation. This objection does not directly prove that happiness does not consist in operation; hence Scotus (*in Rep.*) omits it, as consulted. Or say that the blessed person enjoys all goods because he attains God through operation, in whom all things are contained formally or eminently.

You object, second: beatitude is a union or conjunction of the formally blessed person with the beatific object, as appeared above in the second assertion. But union or conjunction is a relation, while operation is an absolute entity in the category of quality; therefore, and so on. This is confirmed: an absolute thing can exist without a relation founded in it, because it is prior to it, and everything

prior, as prior, can exist without its posterior. Since operation is an absolute being, it can exist without that relation, and so there would be beatitude without the beatific object, and a blessed person without union with and attainment of the beatific object. I reply that the union is the medium by which the blessed person is conjoined with the beatific object—or as the Doctor says (*passage cited, in Rep., at the end of q. 1*)—causally; for it is a causal predication, and consists in the ultimate operation, which is the proximate foundation of the said union. To the confirmation, I concede the antecedent; to the consequent I say that intrinsic beatitude, which consists in operation, designates the terminus, or the beatific object, and concomitantly denotes that union, which, since it is an extrinsically supervening relation, does not arise unless the extremes are brought together.

You object, third: beatitude is permanent; hence it is called a perfect state. But operation is transient, or in process of becoming; therefore beatitude is not found in operation. First confirmation: an agent is not made more perfect through its operation in producing some effect; but beatitude is the best perfection of the blessed person; therefore, and so on. Second confirmation: the blessed person receiving beatitude is changed, since from being not-blessed he becomes blessed; but an agent as agent is not changed (*from 3. Phys., tit. 9*). Third confirmation: the blessed person is not the cause of his own beatitude, otherwise he would beatify himself; but he is the efficient cause of his own operation; therefore, and so on. I reply by granting the major and distinguishing the minor: concerning operation or action in the category of action, I concede; concerning operation or action in the category of quality, as is the operation under discussion here, I deny. To the first confirmation, I distinguish the major: concerning essential perfection, I concede; concerning accidental perfection, I deny. To the second confirmation, the same must be said. To the third, I say that two causes are required for beatification: one from the blessed person and another from the beatifying God. The blessed person is a partial cause of his formal and intrinsic beatitude, but is not the total or partial cause of extrinsic and objective beatitude.

You object, fourth: a habit is more perfect and nobler than an operation—both because it is more lasting and more permanent than an act, and a good that lasts longer is better than one that lasts only briefly (*from 3. Top. 1*); and because a habit is the cause of an act, and therefore one who has a habit operates more promptly, easily, and pleasurably, and a cause is nobler than its effect. Therefore, and so on. I reply from the Doctor (*cit., FF and SS*) by denying the antecedent. For an act, other things being equal, is more perfect than a habit, because through it the beatific object is attained. I said "other things being equal" because it could happen that a habit is so intense and an act so remiss that the habit surpasses the act. To Aristotle's testimony, I say it is to be understood as holding other things being equal, as is clear to one reading his text: for oaks and crows, though long-lived, are not superior to man. Especially in our matter, in which

the act is equally permanent as the habit. To the other point, I say this is true of a total cause, but not of a partial cause, which is what a habit is.

DOUBT II. Whether happiness resides in the essence or in the potencies of the soul.

Henry (*Quol. 13*), cited by Scotus (*4. distinct. 49, quaest. 2; and in Rep., ibid., quaest. 1*), thinks that formal beatitude is in the essence of the blessed person and in his potencies—indeed in the essence more principally and immediately, but in the potencies less principally and mediately, or by overflow: that is, from the essence beatitude overflows into the potencies, in much the same way as the beatitude of the soul overflows into the body. He adds, moreover, that the perception of happiness is more immediately in the potencies than in the essence of the soul, because love is a kind of transformation into the thing loved, as Hugh of Saint Victor teaches with Dionysius (*De caelesti Hierarchia 7*), in his commentary. For through love one despises himself and transforms himself into the other whom he loves. And so according to Henry, God by circumincession, or by indwelling, is in the creature, through which the creature itself is quasi-deified, just as a glowing coal becomes quasi-fire. But the opposite is taught by Scotus (*loc. cit.*) and with him the other Scholastics, both ancient and modern—notably Vázquez (*1–2, disp. 8, cap. 1*) and Raconius (*disp. un. De beatitudine, quaest. 2, art. 3, suppos. 2*)—who defend that formal beatitude is immediately and proximately in the potencies.

Note, first, from the Doctor (*loc. cit., §. Ad quaestionem ergo, 1; and §. Ad argumenta, O*): perfection is twofold—one of the essence and another of the potency. The perfection of the essence is prior to the perfection of the potency, just as the essence precedes the potency; the former is essential and pertains to first act; the latter is accidental, and is second act, or operation, in which I asserted in the preceding doubt that happiness consists. These perfections, however, are of different orders and regard different perfectibles. The essential perfection is nobler in its own order, that is, in the series of first acts; the latter excels among second acts. For happiness is not absolutely the noblest perfection, but only in a qualified sense—namely, in the genus of second acts, as the Doctor writes (*cit., §. proxime cited, O*).

Note, second, from (*2. dist. 16, quaest. un.*): the potencies of the soul are not formally the soul itself, nor are they accidents really distinct from the soul and from each other, but they differ formally from each other and from the soul, which is their foundation and root from which they sprout and flow, as I said (*1–2. De anima, quaest. 3*). Therefore the essence of the soul is not a suitable and immediate subject receptive of operations, just as the trunk of a tree does not immediately produce flowers or fruits, but its branches are their immediate efficient causes. Similarly, man does not see immediately through the body, or through the soul, or through a third entity, but through the visual potency, as the Doctor clearly expounds (*loc. cit., §. Ad istam 2, sub M; and in Rep., ibid., §.*

praeter hoc): "It is a greater good for the soul to see God through the intellect than through the essence, because seeing is not suited to be a good of the soul except through the intellect. Similarly, it is not suited to have the beatific object as beatific except through the potency that attains it through operation."

Assertion: formal beatitude is immediately located in the potencies, not in the essence of the rational soul. The Doctor holds this (*passage cited*). This is proved, first: formal happiness consists in operation, as I showed in the preceding doubt; but operation does not reside immediately in the essence but in the potency—as intellection in the intellect and volition in the will (*from 2. De anima 6; 9. Met. 10*). Therefore, and so on. Second, the essence of the soul, apart from its potencies, is not operative; for the soul is not formally intellectual and volitional except through the intellect and the will—just as an animated body does not operate except through its organs: it sees through the eye and hears through the ear. But the immediate recipient of vision is not the body but the eye; similarly, the suitable, immediate receptive subject of formal beatitude is not the essence of the soul but its potencies.

Third, a whole is not a suitable and immediate receptive subject of a quality except through quantity, by reason of which it is said to receive the remaining accidents. For quantity is called the subject-by-which, and the whole is called the subject-which, as I explained and proved elsewhere at length. Similarly, the soul is not a suitable and immediate subject capable of formal beatitude except through its powers and faculties, which are given to it for acting and receiving perfections suitable to it. I add that the indwelling imagined by Henry pertains to first act, as the Doctor proves (*loc. cit.*); but man is blessed through second act, by which he is conjoined with the beatific object—otherwise a sleeping person would be blessed, as Aristotle argues (*recently cited*). Indeed, Henry himself admits that man is beatified through love, which is a second act and an operation immediately inhering in the will. Finally, misery, which is opposed to beatitude, does not reside immediately in the soul, as the Doctor (*mentioned above, §. Ad istam q., H*) argues, and the philosophers he cites there confirm. Therefore the same must be asserted of formal beatitude.

You object, first: a nobler perfectible demands a nobler perfection, as is clear in the natural order of things, in which nobler natures enjoy nobler perfections; and in the moral order, in which distributive justice gives a greater and nobler reward to the one who performs greater and nobler works of virtue than to another who exercises lesser and lower works. But the essence of the soul is a nobler perfectible than its potencies, since the former is substance and the latter are accidents; and substance surpasses accident in nobility (*7. Met. 1*). Since, therefore, beatitude is the noblest perfection of an intellectual creature, it is aptly deduced that beatitude resides more principally and immediately in the essence than in the potencies of the soul. This is confirmed: an overflow goes from the prior into the posterior; but the beatific object first enters into the

essence before the potencies, because it is in the latter by overflow. I grant the major and distinguish the minor: in the order of essential perfections and in first act, I concede; in the order of accidental perfections and in second act, I deny. But formal beatitude is second act and excels among second acts (*from the Doctor cit.*, §. *Ad argumenta*, O). To the confirmation, I say the major holds of first act but not of second act. The indwelling—if any such universal or particular one belongs to the rational nature—pertains to first act, which can exist without second act but not conversely, as Scotus writes (*cited above*, §. *Ad istam 2, sub A*).

You object, second: whatever is the immediate recipient of an accident, if it could exist per se and separated from everything else, could immediately receive it—as is clear of quantity, which is the immediate recipient of whiteness, and when separated from material substance can immediately receive it, as happens daily in the most holy Eucharist. If, then, the potency immediately receives beatitude, and it were separated from the soul, it would certainly receive it; and so the potency would be blessed without the soul, which is false and absurd. This is confirmed: beatitude is immediately located in that in which its prior disposition immediately inheres, for glory is consummated grace. But the prior disposition of happiness, which is grace, has its seat in the essence, and from it overflows into the potency, just as the glory of the soul overflows into its body. Therefore, and so on. I grant the antecedent; to the consequent I say that the objection has force for those who hold that the potencies of the soul are accidents really distinct from the soul and from each other—but not for us, who maintain that the potencies of the soul are really identified with the soul and formally distinct, and are therefore inseparable from it. Moreover, even granting the consequent, no absurdity follows, for quantity has whiteness even when separated from corporeal substance. And the Doctor teaches this (*loc. cit.*, §. *Ad quaest.*, sub L). To the confirmation, I grant the major and deny the minor. For grace is immediately in the will, which alone can be called formally pleasing, and which alone can elicit a pleasing and meritorious act, as the Doctor notes (*cit.*, §. *Ad istam 2, G*).

You object, third: if happiness is more immediately and principally in the potency than in the essence, the intellectual nature would be blessed per accidens—just as wood is hot through the heat received in it. But this seems unfitting, because beatitude is the noblest perfection. Therefore beatitude is more immediately in the essence than in the potency. I concede the consequent of the major. For indeed nature is beatified through operation, which is an accident, as I showed in the previous doubt. But it is not per accidens if "per accidens" is taken to mean something accidentally and disorderly conjoined, as when a musician is white; for in that sense, an accident does not accidentally belong to an accident (4. *Met.*, cap. 4). And the Doctor explains this (*cited above*, §. *Ad quaest. ergo, N*).

DOUBT III. Whether beatitude consists simultaneously in several operations.

Richard (4. *dist.* 49, *quaest.* 6, *art.* 1), Saint Bonaventure (*ibid.*, q. 5), and Alexander of Hales (2. *p.*, q. 22, *m.* 1) place formal happiness simultaneously in the operations of both the intellect and the will. Scotus, however (*ibid.*, q. 3), and Thomas (*same dist.*, q. 1, *in solut.* 2 of the *quaestiuncula*), and the followers of each, hold that happiness is situated principally in only one operation.

Note, first, from the Doctor (*cited above*, §. *Ad quaest.*, A): beatitude is used in two senses. First, for the aggregation of all goods pertaining to it, and in this sense beatitude is not in one operation, since every potency of the soul can in its own way attain the beatific object—the intellect through vision and the will through enjoyment—and indeed the whole man is beatifiable, as will be evident below. Second, for the consummate perfection and ultimate operation by which things are absolutely and simply well for the blessed person; and in this sense beatitude is established in only one operation. For just as the beatific object is one in reality and in its formal character, and in it as an extrinsic perfective the nature is well and perfectly so, and only insofar as it is attained by this nature absolutely and immediately through operation, so the operation is only one concerning that object.

Note, second, from the same author (*ibid.*, A): a potency's attaining the beatific object immediately can be understood in two ways. Either the word "immediately" excludes a medium of the same order in attaining the object in its own order—as a potency is said to immediately attain the object present through its own operation, that is, not through any other medium than through the operation itself. Or "immediately" excludes a medium of a different character and order—that is, nothing exists that attains the beatific object more immediately, perfectly, and intimately. This distinction can be illustrated by the example of the first and secondary cause, both of which immediately attain the same patient, so that neither agent acting on the patient is a medium through which the other attains the common effect—though the first cause attains it more immediately, that is, more intimately and perfectly, since the entire attainment of the secondary cause is in virtue of the first cause acting independently. Similarly, the intellect and the will both immediately attain the beatific object, yet in different ways. For the intellect attains it by seeing, and the will by enjoying. Likewise, the intellect initiatively, and the will embracingly and quietly. For the intellectual nature does not rest in the vision of the beatific object alone, but tends further—namely, to enjoy it with the will.

Assertion: formal, intensive, and complete beatitude consists in a single operation. So holds Scotus (*cited above*). This can be supported, first, from Psalm 26: "One thing I have asked of the Lord, this I will seek." Second, from Damascene (2. *Fidei*, cap. 11): "Moreover, without worry or care, we would have one work, which is the work of angels—to praise God unceasingly and continually." Augustine indicates the same (*in Ps.* 86; 147). Aristotle agrees (1. *Eth.* 7 and 8; 13): "Happiness is the best operation, according to the best virtue, and in

a perfect life." Second, in every order there is one first and one last, which precedes and excels the rest, in which one stops and goes no further (2. *Met.* 2). Hence all Peripatetics admit one first cause, one first mover, one prime matter, one ultimate end—whether intrinsic and formal, or extrinsic and objective. Therefore in the genus and order of beatifying operations, there is one operation in which the blessed person intensively rests. Third, from (8. *Met.*, *cap.* 5): "Species are like numbers"—that is, one species is more perfect than another through the more perfect difference constituting it, as can be seen in all the divisive differences of genera and the constitutive differences of species, about which I treated in the Epitome under the article on difference. Therefore in the series of beatifying operations, one is more excellent than another, in which the blessed person ultimately rests. Fourth, what more perfectly and intimately attains the beatific object is more excellent and noble, as I touched upon above; but the operation of the will attains the beatific object more perfectly and intimately, for through it things are completely and perfectly well for the blessed person, and he tends no further, as will be shown in the next doubt. Hence Anselm (*lib. Cur Deus homo*, *cap.* 1) adds: "The order is perverse to wish to understand so that one may will; rather, one should understand so that one may will, love, and enjoy."

You object, first: beatitude consists in the union and conjunction of the blessed person with the beatific object, as I showed above. But the blessed person is united with the said object not only through an act of the will but also through an act of the intellect—that is, through both vision and enjoyment. Therefore beatitude is placed simultaneously in both acts. I reply that indeed the blessed person is beatified through both operations, yet with this order and distinction: more perfectly and intimately through the operation of the will than through the operation of the intellect.

You object, second: to whomever it belongs to be moved toward acquiring a terminus, it certainly belongs to rest in the terminus. But both the intellect and the will tend toward the beatific object as the terminus of both; therefore beatitude is found in both operations. I reply that although it properly belongs to the appetitive potency—whether sensitive or intellectual—to tend toward the terminus, as the Doctor notes (*loc. cit.*); nevertheless, granting the major, I distinguish the minor: equally perfectly and intimately, I deny; unequally and disparately, I concede. For the will tends toward the beatific object more perfectly and intimately than the intellect.

You object, third: one must philosophize in the same and equal way about the plurality of forms required for first act as for second act. But for the first act of a beatifiable nature, several things are required—namely, the intellect and the will. Therefore the same must be asserted of happiness in second act. This is confirmed: a nature cannot be perfectly and integrally beatified if anything remains in it that is still to be beatified; but if it were not beatified in all its

potencies and operations, something would still remain to be blessed. The intellect, however, is beatified through vision, and the will through enjoyment. Nor is beatitude perfect and complete unless man is beatified in both soul and body. Therefore happiness consists in many operations. I grant the major and distinguish the minor: equally, I deny; unequally and in a certain order, I concede. For just as there is an order among the beatifiable potencies, and one precedes another, so too the operations are ordered, so that the operation of the intellect is prior and the operation of the will is posterior—and in the latter, as the more perfect and nobler, happiness exists embracingly. This is similar to subordinated forms, of which the last gives essential completion to the composite, as I said (*lib. 2. De anima*). To the confirmation, I say this holds of extensive beatitude, but not of intensive beatitude, which we are now treating.

You object, fourth: Augustine (*13. Trin. 5*): "He is blessed who has whatever he wills"; but the blessed person wills not only enjoyment but also vision, and indeed all things that pertain to integral and perfect beatitude. Therefore the highest happiness is not placed in one operation. I reply that this is to be understood not divisively but unitively, and not in themselves but in him who formally and eminently contains all things. And this pertains to extensive beatitude, not intensive beatitude, which is under discussion at present.

DOUBT IV. Whether beatitude resides in an act of the intellect or of the will.

Thomas (*4. dist. 49, quaest. 1, art. 1, solut. 2; quaest. contra Gentes, cap. 23 and 26*); the Coimbra commentators (*disp. 3, Eth., art. 2*); Raconius (*disp. un. De beatitudine, quaest. 2, art. 3*); and not a few others hold that beatitude consists principally and essentially in an act of the intellect, and in an act of the will only as a kind of extrinsic perfection supervening on vision—in much the same way as beauty and comeliness comes upon a young person. Scotus, however, (*in both works, dist. cited, quaest. 4*), Bassolis, Vorillong, and the rest of his disciples in the same place, hold that the highest happiness consists essentially and principally in an act of the will, and originatively and less principally in an act of the intellect.

Note, first, from the Doctor (*cit., §. In ista quaest., before A*): all who hold that beatitude is situated in operation assert that such an operation proceeds from a spiritual and immaterial potency, such as the intellect and the will. For since beatitude is the best and noblest operation, it cannot come from sensitive and material potencies, as Aristotle also rightly saw (*1. Eth. 9*)—these being potencies of the whole composite; for just as they are inferior and more imperfect in being, so also in operating. Moreover, these potencies cannot through their operations attain the beatific object, which is God, who can be perceived neither by the bodily eye nor by any other senses, whether internal or external (*from what was said in the Tract. De cognoscibilitate Dei, disp. 3*). And if in any way these powers and faculties are beatifiable, this happens through the overflow or resultance of the beatitude of the soul into the body; for thus there will be total extensive beatitude, as the Doctor says (*q. 3 cit., §. Ad argumenta pro 1. opinione, F*,

in solut. 3). And so here the only question investigated is whether beatitude resides in a spiritual operation—of the intellect or of the will.

Note, second, from the same (*ibid.*, §. *Iuxta hoc, K and N; and in Rep., quaest. 2, §. Dico; from 9. Met., tit. 15*): something can be prior to another in two ways—by generation or by perfection. What is prior in generation is more imperfect than what is posterior in generation; and conversely, what is posterior in generation is prior in perfection, as we experience in natural things. For the body is first under the form of blood, then of an embryo, afterward under the form of a duly organized body, and finally is completed by the soul in the being of a living and animated thing, which is the last produced and the most perfect of all the preceding. The aforesaid principle, however, is to be understood within the same order, but not in a different order. For accidents are posterior to substance in generation, because they follow upon it; nevertheless they are more imperfect than substance, as is clear (*7. Met.*). Although things posterior in generation depend on the prior, they are nonetheless more perfect, as is evident (*9. Met., tit. 15*): thus the end depends on the means, which are nonetheless less perfect than it; form depends on matter; corporeal quality on quantity—yet in these cases the posterior and dependent things are more perfect. What is absolutely perfect, however, is entirely independent. For just as it is first in generation, so also in perfection, from the same Philosopher just cited. But where the two aforesaid kinds of primacy do not coincide, the stated dictum fails. Therefore, although the will depends on the intellect in acting, because it cannot will except a previously known object, one should not on that account think that its operation is more imperfect, or that the will is inferior to the intellect, as I showed (*lib. 3. De anima, q. De voluntate*).

Note, third: formal beatitude embraces many things extensively, as I touched upon above and gathered from various places and testimonies of sacred Scripture. First, knowledge or vision of God: (*John 10*): "This is eternal life, that they may know you"; (*1 Cor. 13*): "We shall see him as he is." Second, love of God: (*Proverbs 8*): "I love those who love me"; (*Canticles 3*): "I found him whom my soul loves." Third, delight, which (*from 1. dist. 1, quaest. 4*) follows upon enjoyment: (*Ps. 15*): "Delights at your right hand forever"; (*Ps. 26*): "That I may see the pleasure of the Lord." Fourth, joy: (*John 16*): "Your joy no one will take from you"; (*Matt. 25*): "Enter into the joy of your Lord." Fifth, retention and apprehension: (*Canticles 3*): "I held him, and I will not let him go"; (*1 Cor. 9*): "So run that you may comprehend." Sixth, security and perpetuity: (*Ps. 83*): "They will praise you forever and ever"; (*Matt. 25*): "The just will go into eternal life." Finally, the accumulation of all goods: (*Exod. 33*): "I will show you all good"; (*Luke 10*): "All things have been delivered to me by my Father." And this is clear from the definition of beatitude, which is "a state made perfect by the aggregation of all goods."

Assertion: beatitude consists principally and essentially in an act of the will. So holds Scotus (*loc. cit.*). This is proved, first: (1 *John* 4): "God is love, and he who abides in love abides in God, and God in him"; and (15): "This is my commandment, that you love one another." Hence Jerome, in his Commentary on Galatians, book 3, chapter 6, speaking of the Apostle John, adds: "He was accustomed to say nothing else at each assembly but this: 'Little children, love one another.' At last the disciples and brothers who were present, wearied by hearing the same thing always, said: 'Master, why do you always say this?' He answered with a sentence worthy of John: 'Because it is the Lord's commandment, and if it alone is fulfilled, it suffices.'" And the love of God is commended and commanded to us more than his knowledge; by reason of which it is indicated that happiness is located principally in an act of the will.

Second, Augustine (1. *Trin.* 13): "It will suffice to be illumined and to enjoy him alone." And (*ibid.*, cap. 5): "He is blessed who has whatever he wills." And (1. *De doctrina Christiana*, cap. 6): "The supreme reward is that we enjoy him." But volition and enjoyment are acts of the will; therefore happiness is principally placed in them. Anselm indicates the same (*lib. Cur Deus homo*, cap. 1). Nor does Aristotle dissent, who, as Maior notes after Scotus (*quaest.* 4, *Prol.*, §. *contra hanc conclusionem*), includes love in contemplation—that is, purity of life, which is understood in terms of love. And Bonet (4. *Theol.*, cap. 3) adds that the Stagirite comprehended love in contemplation as in its source. Hence the same Philosopher adds (12. *Met.*, tit. 36): the first intelligence moves the other intelligences in the manner of something loved.

Third, that potency is principally beatifiable which merits and exercises good works, because God will render to each according to his works, as is clear from the Athanasian Creed. But the will alone merits and performs good works; the remaining potencies do so at the command and under the direction of the will. Hence Augustine (11. *Civit.*, cap. 28): "A man is not called good because he knows what is good, but because he loves it." And Saint Bernard: "The will alone burns in hell, because it alone has demerited." Hence the Pharisees are rebuked (*Matt.* 12), who approaching Christ said: "Master, we wish to see a sign from you." Just as sin, then, is only voluntary, so merit and good work proceed only from the will; and therefore man is principally beatified in its act.

Fourth, what more perfectly and intimately attains the beatific object—in the act of that potency happiness is essentially established, as even the opponents concede, for the reason adduced by Aquinas (*loc. cit.*). But the will by its act more perfectly and intimately attains the beatific object. For it tends toward it immediately as toward the ultimate end, since the ultimate end as such is its proper object. For that is more to be willed which is more naturally desired by the appetite; and of this kind is what is nearest to the ultimate, which is absolutely more naturally desired.

Fifth, what is ordered to another is less perfect than what exists for its own sake, and attains less closely the object and end toward which it tends, as is clear of means directed and ordered to an end. But the act of the intellect is ordered to the act of the will; for we know in order that we may love, not the reverse. Hence Augustine (19. *Civit.* 14): "The rational soul has been given to man so that by his mind he may contemplate something, and according to this may do something"; and afterward: "so that he may know something useful, and according to that knowledge may order his life and morals." And earlier (11. *Civit.* 28) he had said: "In human beings who love rightly, love itself is more loved."

Sixth, the habit of the will is nobler than the habit of the intellect: (1 *Cor.* 13): "The greatest of these is charity." And its opposite is worse, namely hatred of God; hence the Seraphim, named from the ardor of charity and love of God, are the first among the celestial spirits. Therefore I wonder at the Coimbra commentators (*loc. cit.*), who, while placing heavenly beatitude in the contemplation of God alone, afterward assert that happiness in the present life consists in meritorious works and acts of charity. For if the latter is placed in works of the will, so also must the former be, since the latter is the way and disposition to the former. If, then, in good acts (*Matt.* 5) the happiness of this world is found, as the Coimbra commentators concede, consequently the beatitude of the other life must also be placed in the act of the same will.

You object, first: (*John* 7): "This is eternal life, that they may know you." But to know pertains to the intellect. Therefore happiness is principally in the act of the intellect. This is confirmed: Augustine (1. *Trin.*, *penult. cap.*): "Vision is the whole reward." But vision is an act of the intellect, just as love is an act of the will. For just as bodily vision is an act of the eye, so incorporeal vision is an act of the intellect. Aristotle seems to touch upon the same (12. *Met.*, T. 39): "The act of the intellect is life, and if the act is eternal, the life is eternal." I reply that this passage is to be expounded of the knowledge of faith, which is called eternal life and the happiness of the way, as is clear from the preceding and following words; Cyril and Augustine interpret the said passage in this way (*quaest.* 113, *Vet. et Nov. Test.*), whom Alphonsus follows (3. *adversus haereses*, *haer.* 4).

Or say with Scotus that in that Gospel passage it is not stated that eternal life consists in knowing. For if the Thomist were allowed to add "by knowing there is blessed life," the Scotist would likewise be allowed to add "by loving and enjoying there is blessed life." Or I say that there is indeed the blessed life of the intellect—but not of the will and of the whole man; and the principal one is that which is in the act of the will. By this, satisfaction is given to Augustine adduced in the confirmation: vision is indeed the whole reward of the intellect, but not of the whole man—only of his intellectual potency, which is beatifiable through vision. But the will is beatifiable through enjoyment, which is more excellent than vision. Therefore happiness consists essentially in enjoyment, not in vision.

You object, second: (*10. Eth. 10, or 8*): "The happiness of abstract substances consists in speculation," which is an act of the intellect. Therefore, since we shall be similar to them, according to Christ's word (*Matt. 12*): "They are as the angels of God in heaven," it is aptly concluded that our happiness too is placed in the act of the intellect. This is confirmed from (*1. Eth. 10*): "Beatitude is a sufficient good." But the vision of God is of this kind, as is clear from (*John 14*): "Lord, show us the Father, and it suffices us." One could reply that there is a twofold happiness—speculative and practical—as Aristotle seems to indicate (*10. Eth., at the beginning of cap. 7; and 7. Pol. 3*). Speculative happiness is situated in speculation, and practical in enjoyment. Therefore the intellect is beatified through speculation or vision, and the will through enjoyment. But happiness is placed more principally in the latter than in the former. Furthermore, one can say from the preliminary notes that the Philosopher comprehends both knowledge and love under contemplation. Or also, as the Doctor says (*at the end of the Prologue*), the Stagirite did not recognize that we can attain God by an act of love and enjoyment; hence he placed happiness in the act of the intellect. To the confirmation, I say that vision is a sufficient good for the intellect, through which the intellect itself is blessed; but it is not a sufficient good for the entire intellectual nature, nor is it the more perfect good. Indeed, love is a more sufficient and more perfect good, because once it is possessed, the one possessing it is less in need, and in it he rests entirely. To the scriptural testimony, I say it is to be expounded of sufficiency with respect to the instruction of faith, which is called the happiness of the way tending toward the happiness of the homeland—not of the sufficiency that is had in the terminus, through enjoyment, which is an act of the will, in which man is quasi-deified.

You object, third: beatitude is the first thing willed; for what we first desire is happiness. But an act of the will is not the first thing willed, because no potency concerns its own direct act as an object, although it can deal with a reflexive act. Therefore happiness does not principally reside in it. This is confirmed: an act of the will is ordered to the end; but happiness is not ordered to anything else, since it is the ultimate end of the blessed person. Therefore, and so on. I distinguish the major: beatitude is the first extrinsic thing willed, which is the beatific object—speaking of objective beatitude—I concede; formal beatitude is the first thing willed as something extrinsic, I deny. For formal beatitude is an intrinsic perfection of the blessed person, which he himself desires, just as each thing desires its own perfection, as Scotus notes (*cit., before §. In ista quaest.*). To the confirmation, the answer is clear from what was said (*quaest. 3, De fine, art. 2*).

You object, fourth: beatitude is the conjunction of the intellectual nature with the ultimate end through its own operation. But the will is not conjoined with the ultimate end through its own operation. For it is not conjoined through desire, which concerns an absent thing; nor through delight, which presupposes the attainment of the end in which one takes delight and rests. Hence Paul exhorts the faithful to acquire happiness (*1 Cor. 9*): "So run that you may

comprehend"; and (1 *Tim.* 6): "Lay hold on eternal life." Since, therefore, the intellect is an apprehensive and comprehensive power, it is proved that happiness is placed in it. I grant the major and deny the minor. For although the will is not conjoined with the beatific object through desire—because beatitude concerns a present thing, and desire concerns an absent thing—nor through delight, which is a passion following upon the beatific act, as the Doctor says (*quaest.* 4, *Prol.*, §. *contra hanc conclusionem*)—hence Augustine (9. *Trin.*, *cap. ult.*): "The appetite of the yearning one becomes the love of the one enjoying"—nevertheless, although by a primacy of origin the blessed person first rests in the act of the intellect, seeing the beatific object and perpetually attaining it, as the Apostle cited indicates, nonetheless by a primacy of perfection he rests in the act of the will, which is the ultimate and most perfect operation of the blessed person.

DOUBT V. In what act of the will does beatitude consist?

Since in the preceding doubt it was decided that beatitude consists principally and essentially in an act of the will, in the present doubt it remains to inquire and discuss what that act is in which happiness is located. All the Scotists, together with Scotus—a man deserving of every praise and armed with truth (*dist. cited*, *quaest.* 5)—assert that it is the enjoyment of the beatific object. In order to understand this correctly:

Note, first, from the Doctor (*loc. cit.*, §. *Ad quaest.*, *A*): the positive act of the will, taken generally, is divided into an act of willing and an act of not-willing. The act of willing is subdivided into an act of willing for its own sake, or for the good of the thing willed, and an act of willing for the sake of another, that is, for the good of the one willing. The former is called the love of friendship, or the affection of justice; the latter is called the love of concupiscence, or the affection of advantage. The latter is not enjoyment, but the former is. For to enjoy is to cling in love to something for its own sake—that is, for the sake of the beloved object. To perceive this better:

Note, second: enjoyment is taken in two ways, as the Doctor indicates (1. *dist.* 1, *quaest.* 5, §. *Ad auctoritatem*; and §. *Ex his patet*). In one way, improperly, in which sense it is said of the sensitive appetite and of other things that in any way attain objects. In another way, properly, and in this sense it belongs only to the will, whose proper act is love, as is clear from Augustine (*cited above*). Enjoyment is further divided into disordered and ordered. Disordered enjoyment is that by which someone enjoys an object that he ought to use for the purpose of enjoying something else—as when a sinner enjoys a creature, although he should use it for loving God and enjoying him. Hence Augustine adds (*lib.* 83. *qq.*, *quaest.* 30): "It is perversity to use what should be enjoyed, and to enjoy what should be used." In this way, the first angel sinned by immoderately desiring beatitude for himself, as the Doctor asserts (2. *dist.* 6) together with Anselm (*lib.* *De casu diaboli*, *cap.* 6). Ordered enjoyment is an act of the will tending toward an

object to be loved for its own sake. And it can be twofold: one of the way and another of the homeland; the former is imperfect, the latter perfect.

Note, third, from the Doctor (*4. dist. 49, quaest. 5, §. Ad quaest., E*): it is more probable that beatific enjoyment differs in species—formally by themselves, but causally from the relations of causes. For if they did not differ in species, they would differ only in degree. And if it were conceded that they differ only in degree, then the enjoyment of the way could be intensified to such a point that it would become the enjoyment of the homeland; and so someone in the state of a wayfarer could be blessed, which is false. Again, to cause the enjoyment of the homeland, the vision of God is presupposed, which is not required for the enjoyment of the way. Hence Scotus (*cit., sub E*) adds that the distinction between these enjoyments is derived from the distinction of unions, just as from different approximations of the agent to the patient, the effect varies. For an agent that is opposed and approximated to a patient along a direct line acts differently than an agent that acts along a reflected or refracted line. Knowledge, however, is like a kind of approximation of the object to the will. Hence, if the enjoyment of the wayfarer were increased to infinity or the highest degree of wayfarer enjoyment were reached, it would never equal the enjoyment of the homeland, and conversely. The reason is that since one species surpasses another in nobility, what is asserted of the individuals of one species must also be asserted with respect to the individuals of the other species; for the series of one differs in being and perfection from the series of the other.

First assertion: beatitude does not consist in an act of not-willing. So holds Scotus (*cit., sub B*). This is proved, first: not-willing for the most part tends toward evil, while willing tends toward good. But happiness not only is directed toward the good, but toward every good—indeed, toward the supreme good. Therefore happiness is not situated in the act of not-willing. Second, the beatific act is primary, per se intended, and immediate to the ultimate end, by which the blessed person is immediately and perfectly united to it. But not-willing is a secondary and occasioned act, and almost always presupposes willing, as Anselm indicates (*lib. De casu diaboli, cap. 3*): "No one abandons justice except by willing something that is incompatible with justice." Therefore happiness does not consist in the act of not-willing. Third, beatitude, from what has been said, consists in the best and most perfect operation. But willing is more perfect than not-willing, just as an affirmative proposition is more perfect than a negative one (*from 1. Perih., cap. 4*). Therefore happiness is not located in not-willing.

Second assertion: neither is happiness placed in the act of concupiscence. The Doctor teaches this (*cited above, before C*). This is proved, first: happiness consists in an act that is good of itself and perfect, as is clear (*1. Eth. 10*). But the act of concupiscence is not per se good, since it can be evil, as is evident from the first angel, who desired equality with God. Hence Augustine (*lib. 83. qq., q. 30*): "To use what should be enjoyed, and to enjoy what should be used, is sin." Second,

happiness is the first and immediate act of the ultimate end; but concupiscence is an act posterior to the act of friendship. For I desire good for Peter because I love Peter, to whom I desire such good. Third, the affection of advantage presupposes the affection of justice. For the latter governs and moderates the former; and concupiscence belongs to the will on account of the affection of justice. Moreover, the act of friendship is directed toward an object that is good in itself; but the act of concupiscence regards one's own advantage. And it is nobler to exist for its own sake than for the sake of another. Therefore happiness is not established in the act of concupiscence.

Third assertion: beatitude consists in the act of willing, which is the enjoyment of God present in himself. The Doctor holds this (*cited above, before D*). This is proved, first: Augustine (*1. De Doctr. Christiana, cap. 4, 5, and 6*): "The supreme reward is that we enjoy him." And this is clear from the definition of enjoyment given by the same Augustine (*ibid., cap. 1*), received by the Master and the other Scholastics: "To enjoy is to cling in love to something for its own sake." Second, happiness resides in the best act of the will; but enjoyment is the best act of the will; therefore happiness is found in it. The major is evident: for the love of friendship is the best operation of the will, by which the blessed person is most intimately and perfectly conjoined with the beatific object. Moreover, the best operation exists in the best and noblest potency. For according to the nobility of the potency one has the nobility of the act; and from what has been said, the will holds primacy among the potencies of the soul—both because it is free and the cause of merit, and because good is better than non-good, and also because charity, which resides in the will, is a nobler habit than faith, which remains in the intellect. Therefore happiness consists in the act of willing.

You object, first: enjoyment is common to both the blessed and the non-blessed; therefore happiness is not found in enjoyment. The antecedent is proved: both the wayfarer and the comprehensor enjoy, for both love God for his own sake; and if someone does not love God for his own sake, he can nevertheless love him—for nothing prevents him from loving God as good in himself with the love of friendship, just as the comprehensor does. Yet the comprehensor is blessed, while the wayfarer is not. Therefore, and so on. I distinguish the antecedent: perfect enjoyment, through which the intellectual nature is beatified and immediately approximated and intimately united to God, I deny; imperfect enjoyment, through which the beatific object is loved by the same creature that does not see it or attain it, I concede. The latter belongs to the wayfarer and the non-blessed; the former to the comprehensor and the blessed. That these differ in species from each other, I noted and showed above.

You object, second: it is not repugnant that someone not existing in grace and charity should clearly see the divine essence and enjoy it; but without charity no one can be blessed, since according to Augustine (*15. Trin., cap. 9*): "Charity alone divides between the children of the kingdom and the children of perdition."

Therefore happiness is not placed in enjoyment. The antecedent is clear from (*1. dist. 1, quaest. 4*), where Scotus says that a blessed person could see God without enjoying him, and could see one divine person without seeing another. I reply that in the given hypothesis, he would not be blessed, because one is not blessed from enjoyment unless the enjoyment is as great as befits a comprehensor—so that it is of that species according to some degree. But no enjoyment without charity can be as great as is required for beatification.

You object, third: all things inferior to the will are in their own way beatified in a qualified sense through the act of concupiscence. Therefore the will likewise can be beatified in the act of concupiscence and in the affection of advantage; but enjoyment pertains not to concupiscence but to the love of friendship, from what was noted above. Therefore, and so on. I concede the antecedent and deny the consequent. The reason is that those inferior things, because of their imperfection, can only attain their own advantage. Hence if there is any enjoyment in them, it is found in the act that they can have; and since they cannot have a more perfect one, they necessarily rest in it. But the will, since it possesses both acts, and the act of friendship is more perfect than the act of concupiscence, consequently happiness is found not in the former but in the latter. Just as the following inference is invalid: "The intellect understands whatever the internal and external senses perceive; therefore the optimal operation of the intellect consists in the sensitive cognition that the said senses possess." This consequent is invalid, as is clear from Aristotle, who places happiness in the contemplation of abstract substances, whose cognition does not fall under the senses.

You press the point from Augustine (*9. Trin., cap. ult.*): "The appetite of the yearning one becomes the love of the one enjoying." Therefore, and so on. I say this is rightly understood: for if it is understood of the appetite by which the wayfarer desires good for himself, such an appetite never becomes the love of the one enjoying, because in that case it is an act of concupiscence, which cannot become an act of friendship. But if it is taken of the appetite by which the wayfarer wills that God be good in himself, because he loves him for his own sake with the love of friendship, then that appetite, which is an imperfect love of friendship in the way, becomes perfect in the homeland and becomes the perfect enjoyment by which man is beatified.

You object, fourth: hope is succeeded by retention. For what we hope for in this life, we hold in the next; hence Canticles 3: "I held him and will not let him go." But retention is an act of the will, and yet it is not enjoyment. Therefore beatitude is found in retention, not in enjoyment. I reply that retention does not belong essentially to beatitude, but accompanies it, just as delight and security, about which we shall speak below. For although retention succeeds hope, it does not follow validly that happiness is formally placed in it. For the enigmatic

vision is succeeded by the clear vision of God, in which beatitude essentially does not reside, as was proved above.

DOUBT VI. Whether and how beatitude is perpetual.

Two things are proposed in the present doubt: one, whether beatitude is perpetual and will always endure—and on this all Scholastics are in agreement and unanimously embrace the affirmative. The other, by what reason beatitude is perpetual—and on this theologians disagree. For Giles (*in the present dist., cited by the Marginists of Scotus*) thinks that the perpetuity of happiness is to be derived from the very beatitude itself, which by its own nature is necessary and is such a form that it cannot fail to inhere in that in which it inheres—just as the most perfect corporeal form constitutes an incorruptible and intransmutable composite, such as the heavens. Others, such as Thomas (*1–2, quaest. 10, art. 1, 62*), hold that the perpetuity of beatitude is to be derived from a habit necessarily and always determining the beatific potency to the beatific act—namely, the intellect to seeing by the light of glory, and the will to enjoying by consummated charity. Scotus, however (*4. dist. 49, quaest. 6, §. Hic duo*), refuting both of the aforementioned opinions, holds (*ibid., §. Dico ergo, F*) that the perpetuity of beatitude comes from the divine will, which just as it willed to beatify the intellectual creature, so also wills to conserve it in that happiness always and perpetually.

Note, first, from the Doctor (*cit., §. Hic duo, B*): besides God, nothing is absolutely necessary, because God alone is through himself and from himself, dependent on nothing. All other things are simply contingent, because they are created and dependent on the divine will in being and conservation. Hence I said (*1. De causis, quaest. 3, art. 1*): if God were to withdraw his sustaining and conserving hand from creatures, they would immediately fall into nothingness. Certain created things, however, are called necessary in a qualified sense—not because they cannot be otherwise, but either because they do not have in themselves a principle of corruption (which is matter with privation annexed to it (*from 1. Phys., T. 80*))—as an angel, which is free from matter—or because they do not have a contrary that could destroy them—as the heavens, for which there is no agent in the nature of things stronger than it that could overcome its power and destroy it; it can be destroyed and annihilated only by God not conserving it. For in this sense, beatitude can be called incorruptible and perpetual: because it has no contrary that could destroy it, and so it always remains and will always continue to remain.

Note, second: "eternal" is taken in many senses, as Vorillong reports from Alexander (*in the matter of sacrifices, 1. dist. 31, art. 1*), which the Doctor seems to reduce to three (*loc. cit., §. De secundo dubio, before L*). First, "eternal" is taken properly for what lacks both beginning and end, being incapable of inception and cessation—in which sense eternity is defined by Boethius (*3. De consol.*): "The complete and perfect possession of interminable life all at once." Second, for a

long temporal duration that will nevertheless at some point come to an end, as Daniel 3: "O king, live forever." Horace also uses "eternal" in this sense, in the epistle cited by Augustine (*lib. 1. qq. in Gen. q. 31*): "He will serve eternally who does not know how to use a little." Third, for a perpetual permanent duration that will never have an end, as Matthew 25: "Depart, you cursed, into eternal fire"; and 2 Corinthians 4: "An eternal weight of glory works in us." Beatitude, however, does not endure in eternity properly so called, as Thomas holds (*4. d. 49, quaest. 2, solut. 3, quaestiuncula*). For as Scotus argues: if substance does not endure in eternity, neither does its act—because an accident is not more immutable than its subject in which it inheres. If, therefore, the act according to substance is measured by aeviternity, as Thomas concedes, consequently the act itself as beatific is not measured by eternity. I add that eternity properly so called belongs to God alone; therefore it is not to be applied to the beatific act. Rather, since it is permanent, it is measured by aeviternity; and if it were successive, it would be measured by perpetual time. Nor is Thomas's reasoning of any weight when he says that because beatitude cannot be attained by the powers of nature, on account of its outstanding and eminent perfection, it must have a peculiar measure, which is eternity, since beatitude is eternal life. For although it is not acquired by natural power, it is nevertheless less noble than substance, since it is an accident, and every accident is of a lower order than any substance. Moreover, the rational soul cannot be produced by natural power—indeed, no intellectual creature can—and yet no other measure is assigned to it than aeviternity, as I said (*in Phys., 1. De tempore, quaest. 1, art. 5*). And so if the aforesaid Doctor, on the basis of his reasoning, admits that the beatific act is measured by eternity, he would necessarily have to concede that the intellectual nature itself is measured by eternity, which he denies elsewhere.

Note, third, from the same (*ibid., §. De tertio, M*): beatitude can be taken in two ways. In one way, as a permanent intensive perfection, insofar as it is permanent—and in this sense perpetuity is not of its essence, because any permanent perfection of any degree of intensity is equally perfect whether it lasts a short time or even a single instant as if it lasted all time, as the Philosopher attests (*1. Eth. 6*): "Nothing is more perfect because it is more lasting; whiteness of one day is equally perfect as whiteness of one year." I am not unaware that the same Philosopher (*3. Top., locus 1*) asserts: "What is more lasting and more stable is better." And (*2. De generatione animalium*): "It is better to be than not to be, to live than not to live." There is no one who would not prefer to live a thousand years rather than, like the ephemeral fish (*from 5. Hist. animalium, cap. 19*), or like certain birds near the Hypanis, to live one day. But these statements, as Scotus writes (*1. dist. 8, quaest. 1; and 4. dist. 12, quaest. 2, §. Hic sunt*), are to be understood as holding other things being equal, as I have noted more than once above. In the other way, beatitude is taken as a permanent intensive and extensive perfection lasting perpetually—and in this sense perpetuity pertains to beatitude just as duration pertains to the thing whose duration it is.

In this sense, beatitude is not a per se unity, just as an operation and its entire aeviternity do not make a per se unity; for they are related as subject and its property, or as measure and measured, as I said (*in Phys., lib. De tempore et motu*).

First assertion: beatitude is perpetual. The Doctor teaches this (*cit., §. Hic duo sunt, A*). This is directed against Origen (*cited and refuted by Alphonsus, lib. 3, adversus haer., verb. beatitudo, haer. 3*), who imagined that the blessed would at some point suffer misery and the damned would have happiness in alternating cycles. This error was derived from Plato, who held that after a great year all things would return to their original state. This is proved, first: Wisdom 5, "The just shall live forever"; Psalm 83, "They shall praise you forever and ever"; and Matthew 5, "The just shall go into eternal life." Second, Athanasius in the Creed: "Those who have done good shall go into eternal life." Augustine (*serm. 17, De verbis Domini*): "The blessed life cannot exist unless it is eternal." And (*serm. 158, De tempore*): "For just as the just person will never leave glory, so the sinner will never be able to be freed from punishment." And the Church sings: "Perpetual light will shine upon your saints, O Lord, and an eternity of ages."

Third, Augustine argues (*13. Trin., cap. 8*): if the blessed person could lose beatitude, he would lose it either willingly, or unwillingly, or neither willingly nor unwillingly. If the first, he would not be blessed, because he would not love it. But the blessed person loves beatitude, which is his ultimate perfection and final end, and all wish to be blessed. If the second, he would be wretched, because he would not will the supreme good; and from what was said above, happiness does not consist in the act of not-willing. If the third, then he is not blessed, because he regards his happiness lightly, when it should be esteemed most highly, since it is the best of all things. Fourth, the same Doctor argues (*12. Civit., cap. 20*): the blessed person either knows that his beatitude will end, or does not know. If he knows, then he is not blessed, because fear is a passion by which the one fearing suffers and does not rest, on account of a future evil that he believes he will endure. Likewise, fear diminishes the love of that which must at some point be abandoned. Hence Christ (*Matt. 6*), to dissuade us from the love of the riches of this world, warns that they will end and be corrupted; and conversely, heavenly treasures will last forever and remain for eternity. If he does not know, then wayfarers are more knowledgeable and learned than the blessed, because the former know that happiness will perish, while the latter are ignorant of this—which is false, since the blessed are adorned with knowledge and crowned with glory. Furthermore, from (*2. De generatione, at the end*): nature desires what is better; but it is better for happiness to be perpetual than to cease, since in it every appetite and desire is to be fulfilled. Finally, no reason can be given why the highest happiness should be only temporary; and to say with Plato that all things will return to their original state is a mere fiction and idle imagination, as I showed with Scotus (*lib. De generatione, at the end*). Moreover, because the soul is immortal, and the body after the day of judgment will be marked with immortality, as Paul testifies (*1 Cor. 15*); and John (*Apoc. 7*): "God will

wipe away every tear from the eyes of his saints, and there shall be no more sorrow, nor mourning, nor crying," and so on.

Second assertion: the perpetuity of beatitude is not derived from the form of beatitude itself, which would necessarily and perpetually affect the subject in which it resides. So holds Scotus (*cit.*, §. *Dico ergo, F*). This is proved, first: a form is no more necessary in a subject than the subject itself in which the form inheres, because if there is any necessity, it is derived from the necessity of the subject sustaining it. But the subject of beatitude, and indeed any other subject, depends on the conservation of God, who freely and contingently conserves it, as I noted above (*Not. 1*). Therefore beatitude too is freely and contingently conserved by God, and consequently is not of itself and by its own nature perpetual. Second, every form really differs from the matter or subject in which it exists, because it is an absolute being and posterior to the subject, and at least by divine power separable from it, as I showed (*lib. 2. Phys., quaest. De forma*). But beatitude is an absolute accidental form, and an action in the category of quality, from what was said above; and every accident is posterior to substance in time, nature, and definition, as the Philosopher teaches (*7. Met., cap. 1*). Third, no form completely satisfies the appetite of matter, which has the appetite for receiving all forms as its perfections, as I said (*loc. cit., quaest. De materia*)—unless the form is infinite. But no created or creatable form can be infinite, since an actual infinite is repugnant. Therefore, since happiness is an accidental form, it is not necessarily and perpetually conjoined with the subject in which it inheres. Fourth, beatitude is no more connected with the blessed person than the blessed person is with God; or rather, beatitude does not depend more on the blessed person and his beatific potency than the blessed person depends on God. But the blessed person depends freely and contingently on God, because God's sustaining and conservation is free. Therefore beatitude is not perpetuated by the necessary union and connection that Giles imagines it has with the blessed person and his beatific potency. Moreover, beatitude is an operation of an intellectual nature; but God can absolutely prevent a cause from producing its effect, as is clear from the fire of Babylon (*Daniel 3*), and from the sky, which for three years by the prayers of Elijah did not provide its influences (*3 Kings 17*).

Third assertion: beatitude is not perennial because in the beatific subject there is no reason of evil or defect. Scotus maintains this (*loc. cit.*). This is proved, first: the blessed person, on account of the beatitude he enjoys, does not lose his will and freedom, since all his natural endowments remain intact—indeed, they are made more perfect. Therefore, when the object is shown to him, he does not relate to it necessarily, but freely and voluntarily possesses it. Consequently, the perennity of the blessed person's happiness is not derived from the goodness of the beatific object. Second, the object of the will, from what was said above, is not the good but being; therefore, with its full freedom and absolute dominion, the will can will, not-will, and suspend its act; it can command the intellect and other potencies, which are subject to its command and authority; it can not-will

the good, will evil, and suspend its act, as I sufficiently showed and proved above, and I composed an entire question (*Tract. De cognoscibilitate Dei, disp. 3*) on the point that the blessed person does not necessarily enjoy the beatific object shown to him.

Fourth assertion: neither is beatitude perennial because of a habit necessarily affecting the beatific potency—namely, through the light of glory necessarily determining the intellect to see God, and through consummated charity necessarily determining the will to enjoy him. The Doctor teaches this (*in the very same place mentioned above*). This is proved, first: a habit that comes to a potency is given to it for operating easily, promptly, readily, and pleurably, as is clear from the definition of habit—not for necessitating and impeding the potency from operating in its own mode. But before receiving the habit, the beatific potency did not operate necessarily, and the will was free and mistress of its own acts. Therefore, with the accession of the habit, its mode of operating is not removed but perfected and ennobled; and so happiness is not perpetuated by a habit superadded to the potency.

Second, when two partial causes concur in simultaneously producing the same effect, and one of them is the principal cause, that principal cause is not necessitated by the less principal cause to produce its operation—rather the opposite, as is clear of intellection, which is produced by the intellect and the known object: yet the intellect is the principal cause of intellection, from which it receives the denomination "understanding," and it is called a vital action. Likewise, an instrument does not necessitate the principal agent to act; rather, the principal agent forewarns the instrument to act and uses it at its discretion. Therefore, and so on.

Third, a prior cause is not compelled by a posterior cause, just as God, who is the first cause, is not determined by a secondary cause. But the beatific potency is prior to the light of glory and to consummated charity, just as a subject is prior to what is in the subject. Furthermore, the beatific potency is greater and stronger than the habit, since it is that by which we simply can act, and the habit is created by God for the sake of the potency. But what is greater and stronger is not necessitated by what is lesser and inferior; rather the reverse. Again, Christ in the way had as great grace and charity as the blessed—indeed greater, since his grace was supreme in the negative sense, as I said (*Tract. De Incarnatione*). Yet his will was free: "He was offered because he himself willed it" (*Isaiah 53*); and he merited by his will and freedom our redemption and salvation. The same must be asserted of the Blessed Virgin, who, more than all others, full of grace, operated spontaneously and freely. Therefore the cause of the perennity of beatitude is not to be placed in habits determining the beatific potencies.

Fifth assertion: beatitude is perpetual through the will of God willing it to endure perpetually. The Doctor holds this (*loc. cit.*), whom Raconius follows (*disp. un. De beatitudine, sect. 4, quaest. 2*). This is proved, first: beatitude is perpetuated

in the same way as an angel or the human nature; for as I was saying above with Scotus, an accident is no more perpetual than its subject in which it inheres. But the nature of an angel or a human being is perpetual by the will of God, as was decreed in the Sixth General Council of Constantinople (*act. 1*): that the angels are immortal and incorruptible by the will of God. Therefore by God's good pleasure, happiness is perpetual. Second, just as by the will of God beatitude is intensified, so also it is extended; but by God's good pleasure beatitude is intensified and the blessed person is perfected. For voluntarily and freely "the Lord will give grace and glory" (*Ps. 83*); and (*Matt. 20*): "Is it not lawful for me to do what I wish?" Moreover, all things that exist and occur *ad extra* are freely and contingently, as I observed above; but formal beatitude is a work *ad extra*, and the beatific object is voluntary. Hence Augustine (*lib. De videndo Deo*) says: "God is a voluntary mirror: if he wills, he is seen; if he does not will, he is not seen."

Sixth assertion: perpetuity is not of the essence of intensive beatitude, but only of extensive beatitude. Scotus defends this (*loc. cit.*). This is proved, first, from Aristotle (*1. Eth. 6*): "Whiteness of one day is equally perfect as whiteness of one year." The reason is that the extension of a thing does not pertain to the essence of its intensity; for the latter is of the category of quality, while the former is of the category of quantity; and the categories are unmixed, from what was said elsewhere. Therefore, and so on. Second, formal beatitude is essentially an operation of the intellect or the will, from the assertions made above; but perpetuity is not an operation, because, being of the category of quantity (which is not active), it cannot be an operation. Moreover, eternity is not of the essence of God's beatitude. For as I proved (*Tract. De Deo uno*), it is a mode of God, and his happiness is situated in operation; otherwise God would be as if sleeping, which Aristotle infers as unfitting (*12. Met.*). Therefore neither is perpetuity of the essence of created beatitude. I add that aeviternity and time are properties of enduring things, as I noted above; but properties are not of the essence of the things of which they are properties, as I showed particularly concerning time with respect to motion, of which it is a property (*in Phys., q. De natura temporis*). Therefore perpetuity does not pertain to the essence of intensive beatitude, but only of extensive beatitude.

You object, first: the same reasoning seems to apply to the certainty of beatitude as to its perpetuity; but certainty is of the essence of beatitude; therefore so is perpetuity. The major seems known and conceded by all. The minor is supported by the testimony of Augustine (*13. Trin., cap. 7*): "What is entirely most blessed will perhaps also be most certain." I grant the major and deny the minor. To Augustine I say, in addition to the fact that Augustine himself adds the particle of doubt "perhaps," his statement is to be expounded of extensive, not intensive, beatitude, as the Doctor says (*cit., §. Ad argumenta, T*). Or say with the same Doctor (*here in Rep.*): beatitude is most certain, not from the nature of beatitude, but from divine revelation, as is clear from the passages of Scripture cited above.

You object, second: it belongs to the intrinsic character of beatitude that it be the best and ultimate perfection, since it is the ultimate intrinsic end of the intellectual creature. Therefore it excludes every privation by which the subject could desire another perfection, and such a perfection could be corrupted and cease to exist; and so perpetuity is of the essence of beatitude. First confirmation: the reason the heavens are incorruptible is that their form fully satisfies the appetite of their matter—and not only that substantial form, but also the accidental form, such as transparency in the heavens and luminosity in the stars. Second confirmation: if a corporeal form can render a body eternal, as the form of the heavens, then surely a spiritual form renders the blessed person perpetual and incorruptible. Hence Saint Paul (*1 Cor. 15*) cries: "It is sown in corruption; it shall rise in incorruption." I reply that the antecedent holds with respect to intensity but not with respect to extension. Hence I said above with the Stagirite that whiteness of one day is equally perfect as whiteness of one year. To the consequent I say that it indeed excludes proximate privation, but not remote privation, and that it fulfills actual appetite but not potential appetite—just as prime matter, with any form received in it, retains the appetite for having other forms.

You press the point: beatitude is the ultimate intrinsic end, ultimately conjoining the intellectual nature with the extrinsic end that fulfills every desire and appetite. Therefore there is no longer any privation by which it could desire another form. I say that it is indeed the ultimate intrinsic end, yet a finite one. Hence it does not exclude remote privation, especially because the blessed do not formally possess every perfection possible for them, but only according to their merits.

You will urge: therefore they are not perfectly blessed, because they do not have whatever they will. For according to Augustine, cited elsewhere: "He is blessed who has whatever he wills." I say that the blessed have whatever they will—namely, justly and rightly, according to the divine law and ordinance. Hence their heart is fulfilled and at rest, especially since they have God, who unitively contains every good. Looking to this, Augustine (*1. Conf., near the beginning*) adds, addressing God: "Our heart is restless until it rests in you." To the first confirmation, I deny the assigned reason for rendering the heavens incorruptible, since absolutely and remotely they are corruptible, though proximately they are incorruptible, because there is no created agent stronger that could destroy them, as I said (*lib. De caelo*). To the second confirmation, the same answer applies: neither a substantial nor an accidental form, since each is finite, satisfies the entire appetite of matter, since matter also desires the other forms by which it is not actually informed.

You object, third: the blessed nature has not been divested of every privation; therefore it can be wretched, since of itself it is capable of both beatitude and misery. But it is impossible for the blessed to be capable of wretchedness;

otherwise they would not be fully blessed—indeed, they would fear lest misery befall them, and fear carries sadness with it, which is far removed from the blessed. Therefore perpetuity is of the essence of happiness. I reply that as far as concerns its own nature, the intellectual nature is capable of both contraries; for the same thing is the subject of contraries (*2. Top., cap. 2; and in the Postpredicamenta*). Nevertheless, it will never be wretched, because it knows from God's revelation that it will always remain in beatitude. Hence neither fear nor sadness falls upon it. Similarly, the damned know that they will be subject to perpetual punishments, and therefore they are afflicted and saddened to the highest degree.

You object, fourth: (*1. Eth. 8*): "Happiness is the best operation according to a perfect life," which for Aristotle includes perpetuity. Hence he considers it unfitting that the happy person could become wretched. Therefore, in the Peripatetic school, happiness is essentially perpetual. I reply that Aristotle speaks ambiguously and hesitantly on these and similar points, just as on the immortality of the soul. For (*12. Met.*) he writes that our beatitude is not perpetual; and (*3. Eth., cap. 9*) that after death nothing good or evil can happen. Nor is this surprising, since he did not know true happiness, which cannot be known by the powers of nature, being supernatural and therefore revealed to us by God. Speaking of this, Augustine (*12. Civit., cap. 20*) says: "That true happiness is truly promised to us, of which there will be a sure security, always to be maintained, and never to be broken by any unhappiness." And (*13. Trin., cap. 9*): "For those who attempted to discover these things by human arguments—however great their genius, however abundant their leisure, however subtle their learning—were scarcely able to arrive at the investigation of the immortality of the soul alone. Yet they did not find for that soul a stable blessed life—that is, a true one."

DOUBT VII. Whether beatitude renders the blessed person impeccable.

That the blessed person is impeccable, infallible, and unable to deviate is held by all orthodox Doctors; but by what reason and what cause he is impeccable, the Scholastics investigate and debate. For many, such as Raconius (*recently cited, quaest. 1, art. 2*), think that the impeccability of the blessed person necessarily comes from the force and nature of beatitude, so that in him there is absolutely no power of sinning—neither proximate nor remote. Scotus, however (*4. dist. 49, quaest. 6, §. Dico ergo, G*), Vorillong, and others in the same place teach that the blessed person is impeccable in the divided sense. For the explanation and resolution of this:

Note, first, and recall from what was said (*in the Epitome, 1.3. q. 4, a. 3, n. 9*): what the composite sense and the divided sense are. When it is said that the blessed person in the composite sense cannot sin, this means the same as saying that he cannot simultaneously be blessed and sin, because sin and happiness are opposed. For beatitude excludes every defect, and sin is a defect from the divine

law and the first rule. Hence the blessed person, as blessed, is impeccable—just as a white wall, as white, in the composite sense cannot be black, as was sufficiently explained in the passage just mentioned. In the divided sense, however, it is not repugnant that the blessed person could sin, or have the potency and possibility of sinning. To perceive this better:

Note, second, from the same Doctor: the potency of sinning is distinguished into remote and proximate. Remote potency is the created will, which by its very nature is defectible and liable to sin. For it is finite, free to do good or evil, and mistress of its own acts; and insofar as it is forewarned and determined from without—that is, by the divine will—to will the good, to continue and perpetuate the optimal act of enjoying the beatific object, it is called a remote potency, just as matter that is not prepared and disposed for receiving some form is said to have a remote potency for that form. Proximate potency for sinning, on the other hand, is the same will remaining in itself, free to either alternative, forewarned and determined by no extrinsic principle, with no obstacle interposed; it can choose the good or the evil presented and set before it—just as matter, when prepared and well disposed, can proximately and immediately receive the form produced or introduced or educed by the agent. Thus the blessed person does not have a proximate potency for sinning, because his will is forewarned by God to continually perpetuate his beatific act; while that act stands and endures, his remote potency for sinning can never be recalled to the act of sinning. For a secondary cause, forewarned by the first cause to act toward one opposite, cannot go out into the other opposite. Nevertheless, the blessed person has nothing intrinsic by which he is intrinsically rendered incapable, impotent, and repugnant to sinning; since his nature is defectible and liable to sin, because it is dependent, finite, and acknowledges a superior rule.

Note, third, (*ibid.*, *from that, extra, I*): an operative potency is not called a potency unless all the things necessary for acting are present and all impediments that could impede its operation are removed. For just as (*from 9. Met. 6*) nothing is in proximate passive potency unless the impediments preventing some form from being received in it are removed, so there is no proximate active potency unless all the requisites are present and the obstacles capable of impeding it from going forth into act or operation are removed. Similarly, in the blessed person there is the same volitional potency as there was before, while he was not yet blessed, and this is called the remote potency of sinning—simply defectible and liable to sin, lacking nothing necessary to it, since it is intrinsic to him, as are the remaining potencies. Yet in him there is no proximate potency of sinning, since he is forewarned by the first cause, which continuously produces the act opposite to sin—namely, the beatific act.

Note, fourth, from the same (*ibid.*): it is not contrary to the nature and freedom of the will to be forewarned and determined by the first cause, because the

secondary cause is inferior, is essentially subordinated to the first cause, and depends on it in being and operating—which the philosophers, notably Aristotle (*7. Phys. 1; and 8 of the same work*), recognized, professing that maxim: "Whatever is moved is moved by another," by reason of which they arrived at the knowledge of the first mover and first cause. It would, however, be contrary to its nature and freedom if it were determined by a habit, because since a habit is inferior and is given so that the potency may use it, consequently the potency cannot be forewarned and predetermined by it, since it is prior to and nobler than the habit, and is the principal cause. For the potency is that by which we simply can act; the habit inclines it, facilitates it, and partially—yet less principally—concurr in the operation. How created freedom, forewarned by the divine will, remains unimpaired, see Scotus (*loc. cit.*).

First assertion: the blessed are actually impeccable. Scotus holds this (*loc. cit.; and 3. dist. 22, quaest. un.*). This is proved, first, from Augustine (*lib. 3, contra Maximinum, cap. 13*); Nazianzen (*orat. 44, in principio*); and others passim. And it can be corroborated from that passage of Scripture (*Apoc. 2*): "Nothing defiled shall enter the kingdom of heaven." If, then, in order to enjoy glory, one must be immune from every stain of sin and blemish of fault, consequently in that kingdom no sin is committed, and the blessed are impeccable. Second, two opposites cannot be simultaneously in the same subject, according to Aristotle (*in the Postpredicamenta*); but beatitude is opposed to sin, and that state is opposed to this one. For in the former there is supreme rest and perfect peace; in the latter, continuous labor and perpetual warfare. Third, the blessed are in their terminus, just as the damned can no longer merit or demerit. For each remains perpetually in his city, by the decree of God, who immutably determined from all eternity that the children of peace and salvation should forever dwell in the heavenly city of Jerusalem, while the children of perdition and reprobation should be tormented with eternal punishments and torments in the city of Babylon and Tartarus.

Second assertion: the reason why the blessed are impeccable is the will of God forewarning and determining their wills to the perennial and perpetual enjoyment. Scotus teaches this (*loc. cit., sub G*). This is proved, first: the cause of the perpetuity of the beatitude of the saints is not the nature of beatitude itself, which is an accident really distinct from the subject in which it exists, separable by divine power, and contingent, as was proved in the preceding doubt. Therefore the cause of their impeccability is likewise not beatitude, which of itself is a separable accident, nor anything else extrinsic to them, but the divine will forewarning and continuing the beatific act. Second, when the first cause acts and forewarns the secondary cause, the secondary cause cannot resist; and when the first cause does not act, the secondary cause cannot act, as is clear from the fire of Babylon, which, when God suspended his concurrence, did not burn the three Hebrew youths cast into it. Moreover, by God's ordained power it has been decreed that the blessed will always remain in the good, as the

theologians commonly assert, and will not decline to evil—since in that state there will be no more pain or grief. Therefore the will of God, always concurring in the beatific act and not in its opposite, is the cause of their impeccability.

Third assertion: in terms of possibility and remote potency, the blessed are capable of sinning. The Doctor teaches this (*cited above, H*). And he asserts the same of Christ as man (*3. dist. 12, quaest. un.*). This is proved, first: created nature and free will are not destroyed in the beatific state but perfected; they are not removed but persist to the highest degree, and only accidents are bestowed on them, such as the light of glory and consummated charity, which together cause the beatific operation. But the said accidents do not take away the volitional power, which of itself can act well or badly and is capable of turning to either alternative, since it is essentially free, finite, and created. And the aforementioned accidents really differ from it, and so by the absolute power of God can be separated from it; they adorn it, perfect it, and conjoin it with the most perfect good and ultimate end. Second, the will of the blessed person, precisely and absolutely, is dependent, acknowledging a superior rule; but God alone is impeccable, because he is independent and the first rule of all things. Therefore the blessed person is absolutely and remotely capable of sinning. Third, God according to his pleasure and good will gives grace and glory to whom he wishes, as is clear from (*Matt. 20*): "Is it not lawful for me to do what I wish?" Therefore, absolutely, just as God freely bestows glory on the blessed, he could also take it away. And supposing that he were to take it away from the blessed person, the latter, left to himself as he was before beatitude, would undoubtedly then be capable of sinning. And so by remote potency and in the divided sense, the blessed person is capable of sinning.

You object, first, against the first assertion, from (*4. Top. 5*): God and the virtuous person can do wicked things; therefore the blessed person too is capable of sinning, just as God. Thomas responds, as cited by Vorillong (*3. dist. 12*): "If God wills"—but God cannot will to do wicked things, therefore neither can he sin. Against this: the power of God is his will; if therefore God can, then he wills. Moreover, Aristotle does not speak conditionally but absolutely, as is clear to one reading that book. The Seraphic Doctor responds that the cited statement was given by way of example, and examples do not require truth, as Ferchi notes in a similar matter (*vest. 3, leg. 2, cap. 6, before num. 58*). Or I say it is to be understood permissively, not effectively—as Exodus 4: "I will harden Pharaoh's heart," as Alphonsus explains (*1.10, adversus haereses, haer. 1, verb. malum*). Or it is understood of an angel or demon, for it is common for Aristotle to take "God" for "angel," as I noted (*in Log., lib. 3, q. 4, art. 3*).

You object, second: if God were to forewarn and determine the will of the blessed to the beatific act, then it would be coerced and would not be free in eliciting its acts. But to remove freedom and contingency from a secondary cause is absurd and incongruous, since it is against its nature. This is confirmed:

there would be nothing praiseworthy or commendable in the beatific operations, and the blessed person would be like a log or an inanimate and irrational thing, which cannot operate otherwise—although in heaven full freedom is promised to him; indeed, the will will be freer there, as Augustine attests (*in Ench.*, cap. 14). I deny the consequent, because as I noted above, since the secondary cause is subordinated to the first cause, if it is forewarned by it, nothing happens against its nature, which is so ordered and subordinated to the first cause—especially since it concurs in its optimal perfection, toward which it naturally inclines. Hence there is no coercion or violation of freedom. To the confirmation, I say this is praiseworthy, since the secondary cause determines itself to the good and cooperates in the good with the first cause. Therefore, since the secondary cause concurs with the first cause in bringing forth the beatific act, it does not follow that it is like a log or any other of the alleged inconveniences.

You object, third: Augustine (*in Ench.*, cap. 86) writes: "Just as our soul has the disposition of not willing unhappiness, so it will always have the disposition of not willing iniquity." And in the same place he adds: "Not only do we not wish to be wretched, but we can in no way wish it." Therefore in the blessed there is no potency of sinning, not even a remote one. This is confirmed: (*2. Perih.*): "When the possible is posited as actual, nothing impossible follows." If, then, the blessed person can sin, and supposing that he does sin—which does not involve a contradiction—it follows that he is not blessed but rather deserving of punishment and damnation, which is completely absurd. Therefore, and so on. I reply that Augustine is to be interpreted of proximate potency, not remote; or of fact, not of possibility; or of natural inclination, not of absolute possibility. To the confirmation, the same must be said: namely, in the divided sense and by remote potency the blessed person can sin, but not in the composite sense, by proximate potency, and by the ordained law of God, by which he has decreed that the blessed person will perpetually persevere in goodness and happiness, and will never fall into evil or sin. What is adduced from (*2. Perih.*) is explained by Scotus (*in dist.* 39, §. *Ad 1. arg.*, q.); see there.

DOUBT VIII. Whether beatitude renders the blessed person secure.

This difficulty has affinity with Doubt VI above, in which we investigated whether perpetuity belongs to the essence of beatitude. Hence from the resolution of that doubt, the resolution of this one is easy. For just as perpetuity presupposes beatitude, as measure presupposes the measured, so security presupposes happiness, just as an object is presupposed by what accompanies it. Security, however, does not regard the beatific object but beatitude itself, concerning which the blessed person is rendered certain and secure. To make what we have proposed clearer:

Note, first: certainty and uncertainty pertain to the intellect. For it is the intellect that is made certain or uncertain, or doubtful, about some object, as I touched

upon (*in Log., lib. 5, quaest. 4*), and will be examined in detail in its proper place. Fear and security, however, pertain to the appetite—whether sensitive or intellectual—and presuppose the apprehension of sense or intellect. Fear presupposes the apprehension of sense or intellect about an evil to be inflicted or about a continuing inflicted evil, as the Doctor notes (*cit., §. De secundo principali, P*); and concerning this the intellect is usually certain, though sometimes doubtful—although properly speaking, fear is not about what comes into doubt, as Scotus writes (*in Rep. here, §. De secundo principali*). Since fear and security are opposed, and opposites are placed in the same subject, and the same reasoning and discipline applies to opposites, consequently from the explanation of fear, the understanding of security is clear. Therefore the fear of an intellectual nature resides in the rational appetite, that is, in the will; and the same must be asserted of security, which also has its seat in the will, following upon the certainty about a good to be conferred or about a conferred good to be continued.

Note, second: "retention" is an equivocal name, of which the Doctor adduces four senses (*cit., §. De secundo principali, R*). First, retention is taken for the holding of an object in memory, when one retains the object itself through an impressed species, or through a habit, or through some other mode; in this sense, retention pertains to the intellect, which is not distinguished from the intellectual memory, from what was said (*lib. 3. De anima*). Second, for the actual intellection of an object, which occurs when the intellect actually contemplates the object, and in that contemplation the will holds the intellect itself, commanding the intellect not to turn to meditating on something else; and in this respect retention pertains to the will, and in the other respect to the intellect. Third, for the love of concupiscence, by which someone desires for himself a good that he hopes to possess. And retention so taken succeeds the virtue of hope, when we hold, possess, and enjoy what we desired through hope. Fourth, for the act of attainment, or the passion following upon the passion of hope, which is in the irascible. In none of these senses is retention of the essence of beatitude. In the first sense, retention precedes beatitude and pertains to first act of the intellect, while beatitude pertains to second act, as is clear from what was said. In the second sense, it is an act of the intellect, which also precedes beatitude, which is an act of the will subsequent to the act of the intellect, just as the will is naturally posterior to the intellect. In the third sense, it is the love of advantageous good, in which beatitude does not reside, since beatitude is the love of the honorable good, existing not for the sake of others but for its own sake. In the fourth sense, retention is a passion subsequent to beatitude, just as perpetuity accompanies intensive happiness.

First assertion: the blessed person is secure concerning his beatitude. So holds Scotus (*cit., §. De secundo principali, P*). This is proved, first: Psalm 111, "He will not fear evil tidings"; Psalm 22, "I will not fear evils, for you are with me"; and John 7, "No one will snatch them from my hand." Second, Augustine (*serm. 143, De*

tempore; and 12. *Civit.*, cap. 20; and in Ps. 99): "But there, when we shall have arrived, there will be perfect security." Third, fear is opposed to security, as I noted above; but fear cannot fall upon the blessed—otherwise they would not be blessed, for they would be afraid of losing their beatitude and would suffer in some way, because fear is a passion. Therefore, if the blessed were not secure about the perpetuation of their happiness, they would not intensely love God, because no one greatly loves what he fears he will at some point lose. But the blessed love God as much as they can love him, as well as their own formal happiness, in which they ultimately rest and take delight. Moreover, beatitude is eternal; therefore also secure, because the object of security is beatitude, which the blessed are certain and secure they will always possess.

Second assertion: the security of beatitude is not derived from the nature of beatitude itself, nor from any created object, but from the revealing divine will. The assertion is tripartite, and Scotus holds it (*ibid.*). The first part is clear from what was said about the perpetuity of happiness, which of itself is contingent, like any other created thing, and is perpetuated through the divine will. Similarly, security does not come from happiness itself, which is an accident and a property really distinct from the subject in which it inheres, and removable from it. Therefore, just as by God's good pleasure it is perpetual, so also it is secure.

The second part is also obvious: for the powers of nature do not attain it, since it is supernatural. Hence Augustine (*recently cited*) reports that men who were otherwise most learned and most subtle did not attain it, but fell into perpetual circles and empty windings, detours, and returns to impossible miseries—about which perhaps the Prophet says (*Ps. 11*): "The wicked walk in circles." Again, what depends on the divine will cannot be demonstrated, and beatitude, its perpetuity, and its security depend on the divine will, as will shortly be shown.

The third part is supported: John 10, "No one will snatch them from my hand." Hence the Church sings: "In eternity is their rest"; and "There shall be no more mourning, nor crying, nor any pain." Furthermore, the blessed know that God is truthful and unchangeable; since, therefore, God has declared that the blessed will forever remain in happiness, it plainly follows that through the divine will they are secure about it. Again, just as the damned are vehemently afflicted about the punishments to be continued for eternity (*Matt. 25*): "Depart into eternal fire"—so by contrast the blessed rejoice about the glory to be perpetually enjoyed and possessed, the divine will so revealing. The Church sings: "In the heavenly kingdoms is the dwelling of the saints, and in eternity is their rest."

Third assertion: security is not of the essence of beatitude. The Doctor teaches this (*cited above, Q*). This is proved by analogy with perpetuity, which from what was said is likewise not of the essence of beatitude but is a property of it, following and accompanying it. But security presupposes beatitude; and what presupposes and depends on something else does not enter into its essence—

this is well known. For the posterior is not of the essence of the prior. Moreover, intensive beatitude can exist without security—as if there were an hourly or momentary happiness. But what can exist without another is not essential to it—no one doubts this. Therefore I conclude that security is not of the essence of intensive beatitude.

You object, first: beatitude is the end of all desires; for through it the intellectual nature is satiated, and its appetite can progress no further, since outside of God, who is infinite and the ultimate end, there is nothing. Therefore, just as it is natural for each thing to remain in the good and persevere in its attainment, so permanence and perpetuity are essential to that state, and security as well. Moreover, Scotus, responding to this objection, says it is true of the extrinsic end that unitively contains every good, but not of the intrinsic end, which is finite and can lack some perfection. But if this response holds, it follows that the blessed person is not perfectly blessed, because his appetite is not fully and perfectly satisfied. I reply that the argument concludes about extensive beatitude and about the extrinsic or objective end, which is God—but not about the intrinsic end and intensive beatitude. To the added point, I say the blessed person is perfectly blessed, even though he does not have every degree of happiness, because he conforms to the will of God and his merits. Hence Augustine says (*13. Trin., cap. 5*): "He is blessed who has whatever he rightly wills"—where he aptly places the adverb "rightly," because if he wished for more, he would not rightly will, nor would he be blessed, because he would not conform to the will of God.

You object, second: the punishment of the damned is eternal; therefore the glory of the blessed is certainly eternal. The antecedent is clear: guilt is infinite, namely against God, who is infinite. But guilt cannot be infinite intensively—otherwise there would be a formally infinite evil, which is impossible. Therefore it will be infinite extensively, that is, in duration. If, then, perpetuity belongs to the intrinsic nature of duration, security likewise belongs to its nature. I distinguish the antecedent and the consequent: of itself, I deny; by the will of God, I concede. To the proof, I say that guilt is intrinsically and formally finite, because it is from a finite will; but extrinsically and objectively infinite, because it is against God, the infinite object. But God willed by his will and liberality to give an eternal reward to the just—which is not rigorously from justice but from his goodness and liberality. For even if the just person enjoyed the divine essence for an instant, it would exceedingly surpass his merit; yet God so willed and decreed that the blessed should perpetually enjoy the supreme good. Similarly, he was pleased to decree that the damned should be eternally tormented in punishment for their sins.

DOUBT IX. Whether joy is of the essence of beatitude.

The two princes of the Scholastics, who disagree in the preceding questions, also dispute in the present one. For the Angelic Doctor (*4. dist. 48, quaest. 3, art. 1*)

thinks that joy enters into the essence of beatitude. The Subtle Doctor, however (4. d. 49, *quaest.* 7), teaches that joy is not of the essence of beatitude.

Note, first: joy, delight, exultation, pleasure, and the like are commonly confused, although they differ from each other in some way. They are attributed both to material potencies, such as the sensitive appetite, and to spiritual ones, such as the rational appetite. For man is said to rejoice in the vision and enjoyment of spiritual things, as well as in good and delicate food. Properly speaking, however, joy is a passion of the soul following upon an intense act of love concerning the beloved object. Gladness designates a movement and expansion of the interior powers. Hence it is called "laetitia," as if "latitia" (breadth), because it makes the soul broad, as it were, spreading its forces outward. Exultation denotes an exterior movement proceeding from the heart and appearing externally; hence it is named "exultation," as if "leaping out." These reside in the concupiscible, presuppose the operation of the lover concerning the beloved object, and subsequently follow and accompany it. Hence the Doctor (*cit.*; and 1. *distinct.* 1, *quaest.* 3, *Rep.*) plainly distinguishes delight from love, because the latter is an action and the former a passion.

Note, second, from Scotus (*in 4, loc. cit.*, §. *Dico ergo, A*): the will can be considered in two ways—as operative and as receptive. If considered in the first way, as operative, it is ultimately perfected through the operation by which it is perfectly and intimately conjoined with the absolute best, which is its beatific object; and in this operation beatitude is essentially located. If the will is considered in the second way, as receptive, it is perfected through supernatural passions, of which it is ultimately receptive—namely, joy, delight, and the like. Hence Scotus gathers (*ibid.*) that joy more closely approaches beatitude than security does. For formal beatitude and joy reside in the same potency, namely in the concupiscible. The will rests through delight insofar as it receives it, just as the same will is perfected through operation insofar as it is operative. But security is in the irascible, which follows hope—not the virtue but the passion—as I touched upon in the preceding doubt.

Assertion: joy is not of the essence of beatitude strictly taken, but is a passion following upon it. So holds Scotus (*cited above*). This is proved, first, from Aristotle, who (10. *Eth.* 4) says that delight (which from what was said above coincides with joy) supervenes upon operation. For after the operation, delight comes and is something supervening; it perfects the operation as beauty perfects a young person. But beatitude consists in operation, from what was shown and proved above. Therefore joy does not enter the essence of beatitude in the school of Aristotle. Second, love and delight differ in that love is an action of the will, about which as an object there can be delight—for someone can take delight in love—as Scotus writes (*in Rep.*, 1. *dist.* 1, *quaest.* 3). But delight and joy coincide; therefore, and so on. Third, beatitude consists in the intimate union of the blessed person with the beatific object; but this union is effected through

operation, which joy accompanies. Again, beatitude regards the beatific object not only as efficient cause but also as object; delight or joy, however, is directed toward the beatific object only as efficient cause, by which it is caused. But beatitude, since it is a vital operation, is effected partially by the blessed person, who relates to it not only passively but also actively. Finally, we desire many things (*from 10. Eth., cap. 3*) even though we have no delight—such as knowing, remembering, and things of that sort. Hence operation does not exist for the sake of delight, but rather the reverse, as the Philosopher says (*loc. cit.*): we do not work in order to rest, but rest in order to work.

You object, first: Saint Augustine (*10. Conf.*) writes: "Joy is the blessed life." Therefore joy is of the essence of beatitude. The antecedent is clear from a definition to what is defined. For if it is valid to say "man is a rational animal," it rightly follows "therefore a rational animal is man." Similarly, "the blessed life is beatitude," and conversely; and "joy," according to Augustine, "is the blessed life"—so it is plainly deduced that joy is essentially beatitude. This is confirmed from (*10. Eth., cap. 1 and 2*): "Delight is the ultimate good"; and in the same place: all things desire delight. Therefore joy is essential to happiness. I explain Augustine with Scotus: causally, insofar as the blessed life causes joy, just as a nature causes a property. And this is clear from Augustine's words: "Whose joy you yourself are, and this itself is the blessed life: to rejoice about you, on account of you, for your sake." Or say that it is not an essential definition but a descriptive one—just as when we say "man is a risible animal." Hence joy is not in the will as operative, but as receptive of its passions, among which joy is numbered. To the confirmation, the answer is clear by the same reasoning. Delight and joy are a good that follows upon beatitude as a passion perfecting the will not as operative but as receptive, as was explained above. This is how the Philosopher is to be interpreted in the places cited.

You object, second: beatitude is perfect rest and the satiety of all desires, as is clear (*Apoc. 14*): "Let them rest from their labors"; and (*Ps. 16*): "I shall be satisfied when your glory appears." Hence Augustine adds. First confirmation: "No good satisfies except God." But joy is perfect rest; therefore it is essentially beatitude. I reply that indeed in the blessed person there simultaneously exist beatitude, joy, and things of that sort, but not in the same way. For beatitude is that by which *per se primo* man is blessed; but joy follows upon happiness, as a property follows its subject from which it emanates.

You object, third: by his absolute power, God can remove whatever is not of the essence of something, especially if it is really distinct from it, posterior to it, and essentially independent of it, as I asserted and showed elsewhere from Scotus. If, then, joy were not of the essence and quiddity of beatitude, by divine power there could be beatitude without joy and delight; but it is repugnant that beatitude should exist without joy, as the Savior indicates (*John 16*): "Your joy no one will take from you." Therefore joy is of the quiddity of beatitude. I concede

the antecedent and deny the consequent, and its assumption. For there is no contradiction; and although it is repugnant, it will never happen. For God has so disposed that delight, joy, and things of this sort are annexed to beatitude. For I said above that intensive beatitude could last for an instant, although this will never happen, but will endure perpetually. Furthermore, *ad hominem*, there can be vision without enjoyment, and yet this will never occur—although Thomas does not wish enjoyment to enter the nature of beatitude.

You object, fourth: what is better and more perfect is to be attributed to beatitude, since it is the greatest of all perfections. But it is better and more perfect for beatitude to have joy as essential to it than not to have it. Therefore, and so on. I reply that the major holds provided it is not repugnant to it; but it is repugnant that joy, since it is a property of beatitude, should be of its essence—just as it is repugnant that the posterior should be of the essence of the prior, and that a property should be of the essence of the subject of which it is a property, as if risibility were of the essence of man, and wisdom, which is an accident, were of the quiddity of the same. So I responded (*lib. De mundo*) to those who assert that it is better for the world to be a composite than something one by unity of order, since the former contradicts the world, while the latter is congruent with it.

DOUBT X. Whether man is the lowest beatifiable being.

In this difficulty, three things can be inquired. First, whether man is beatifiable. Second, whether human nature among beatifiable creatures is the lowest and last. And third, whether the philosophers recognized that man is to be beatified with the true beatitude that we hope for and expect to possess after this life.

Note, first: creatures are of three kinds. Some are inanimate, such as stones, and these are unfit for happiness; for although they seek their proper center in which they rest, nevertheless, because they do not operate there, they are without and incapable of beatitude, since happiness consists in operation. Some are animated and operative in their proper places, yet they are entirely material and use corporeal potencies for operating, and they deal with corporeal and material objects; and since the properly beatific object is spiritual, consequently they cannot properly be beatified, as Aristotle notes (*1. Eth. 9*). Others are entirely spiritual creatures, such as angels, and that they are beatifiable no one doubts. There remains man, who consists of body and spirit; and indeed his soul is capable of happiness, for it possesses intellect and will, which are operative potencies capable of attaining the beatific object through their operations. As for his material potencies, which are called powers of the whole composite, although the same reasoning seems to apply to those in man as to those by which brutes are equipped, yet because the human body is informed by the rational soul, and the beatitude of the soul overflows into the body (as will be shown below), the inferior potencies of man are therefore called beatifiable—not absolutely, since the beatific object is beyond the scope of their objects, but

in a qualified sense, insofar as they operate in their own way as they can, and rest in their operations. Just as our sight cannot as clearly behold the sun as the eye of an eagle, nevertheless it rests in the vision of the sun, because it sees as much as it can see. For it suffices to fulfill the appetite of a nature if it has as much as by its own nature it can have, and is suited to having it.

Note, second: although man naturally desires beatitude, nevertheless he does not know by natural powers the sufficient and opportune means for attaining it; rather, these must be revealed to him by God, and he must be instructed in what is necessary for its attainment, as I asserted (*in the Prologue, quaest. 1, art. 2*).

Hence the Philosopher, led by nature, could not arrive at knowledge of true happiness, because he was not illuminated by the light of faith, and perhaps did not recognize any state of man other than this one. Although, however, as Scotus argues (*4. dist. 49, quaest. 8*), man can know and speculate about being and what is contained under it, and arrive at the knowledge of God the supremely good, in whom alone as the best and most perfect he can be satisfied, nevertheless by his own power he cannot know whether he can attain that best by operation—and therefore clearly see, enjoy, possess, and rejoice in it—as I pursued at length (*Tract. De cognoscibilitate Dei*).

First assertion: man is beatifiable. The Doctor maintains this (*cit., §. Respondeo, shortly before A*). This is proved, first, from Scripture: 1 Corinthians 13, "Then face to face, and I shall know as I am known"; and Matthew 22, "They will be as the angels of God in heaven." Second, from Augustine (*12. Civit., cap. 20; and Oratio contra Iudaeos, Paganos et Arrianos*); and passim elsewhere. Third, each thing inclines toward its own good and is perfected with its ultimate perfection in the best and most perfect good. But human nature is of this kind. For it tends toward its ultimate perfection, and through it is ultimately perfected. But its ultimate perfection is beatitude and the end of actions (*1. Eth. 7; and 10. Eth., cap. 8*). Therefore, and so on. Fourth, God is blessed through the vision and enjoyment of himself. For he is not as one sleeping (*from 12. Met. 51*), but lives an intellectual life, which is situated in the operations of the intellect and will. But human nature possesses intellect and will; therefore it is beatifiable. Furthermore, Christ promises eternal life to the good, which is beatitude: (*Matt. 25*) "The just shall go into eternal life"; and (*John 4*) "It will become a fountain of water springing up into eternal life."

Second assertion: human nature is the last among natures that are beatifiable absolutely. The Doctor holds this (*loc. cit., §. Secundo videndum, before E*). This is proved, first: Augustine (*lib. De natura boni contra Manich., cap. 7*): "The other things that are made from nothing, which are certainly inferior to the rational spirit, can neither be blessed nor wretched." And (*14. Trin., cap. 8*), speaking of human nature: "It is capable of that of which it is an image." But the image is not in any creature lower than humanity, as is clear from what was said (*Tract. cited*). Therefore humanity is the lowest beatifiable nature. Second, natures inferior to

humanity operate only with organic and material operations, by which the beatific object, which is immaterial and spiritual, cannot be attained.

Furthermore, in the above-mentioned treatise I asserted and proved that God cannot be seen with corporeal eyes, and therefore cannot fall under the object of any corporeal and material potency. Aristotle agrees (*1. Eudem. 4*): "For neither a horse nor a fish nor any other kind of animal is called happy." And (*10. Eth., cap. 8*) he asserts the same.

Third assertion: a certain nature inferior to humanity is beatifiable in a qualified sense. The Doctor teaches this (*loc. cit.*). This is proved, first: (*Luke 10*) "Blessed are the eyes that see what you see"; and (*ibid. 11*) "Blessed is the womb that bore you, and the breasts that nursed you." Where the Seraphic Doctor adds: "Mary was blessed not only because she bore Christ in the flesh, but even more blessed because she most perfectly bore him in her mind." Second, every nature that can be conjoined with its own best and ultimate end through its own operation is beatifiable in a qualified sense, because beatitude occurs through the union of the beatifiable nature with its own best—I say with its own best, not with the absolute best, because it is not beatifiable absolutely. But a certain nature inferior to humanity, such as the sensitive nature, can be united to its own best through sensitive potencies, as is clear (*Job 19*): "In my flesh I shall see God my Savior." Therefore human nature is not the lowest beatifiable. Third, the whole man is beatifiable, because the whole man merited, as will be shown in the following article. In man, however, besides the rational nature, there is a corporeal sensitive nature, which through its powers subject and obedient to the will, just as it merits, so also is beatified. Hence after the day of judgment, man's beatitude will be greater and more ample, because his body is to be blessed, as will be shown below—and this only through the sensitive faculties and potencies operating and attaining in their own way the beatific object. Hence the bodies of the saints and the relics of the just are honored on earth—both because they were instruments and causes of good works, and because after the end of the world they are to be blessed and glorified in heaven, as Christ indicates (*Matt. 17*): "His face shone like the sun." And it is a probable opinion of some that the inferior and natural potencies are blessed with respect to the most beautiful body of Christ.

You object, first: a part is inferior and less noble than the whole, as I said (*1–2. Phys., q. De composito, art. 2*). But the soul, which is a part of man, is beatifiable—indeed, now the soul alone is blessed, and the whole man will be blessed after the day of judgment. Therefore a certain nature inferior to humanity is capable of beatitude. I reply by granting the major; to the minor I say that the soul is the immediate receptive subject of beatitude, and functions as the subject-by-which; but man is its mediate subject, and functions as the subject-which. For man understands and wills through the intellect and the will; intellections and volitions are immediately located in these potencies, and mediately in man. But when the question is raised whether a nature inferior to human nature is

beatifiable, the doubt is raised not about the rational soul, but about corporeal and material natures.

You object, second: those things that are ordered to one end, which are nearer and more immediate to it, attain it more nearly and immediately; while the rest, which are more remote and distant from the end, reach it through the prior ones—as if someone were to ascend to heaven, he would pass through the air and fire before reaching it. But the angels are nearer and more immediate to the ultimate end than human beings, because they are more excellent and outstanding. Therefore man is not beatifiable immediately, but mediately—that is, through the mediation of angels. I reply by distinguishing the major: concerning means necessary for the attainment of the end, and concerning essentially subordinated agents—as is explained in the minor, and can also be illustrated by the example of subalternate sciences and arts—I concede; concerning means not necessary for the attainment of the end, and concerning agents not essentially subordinated, I deny. Of the latter, one does not depend on another in acting, and each in its own way immediately concerns one and the same object—even though one deals with it more perfectly and another less perfectly—just as the human eye and the eagle's eye both behold the sun immediately, although the latter sees the sun more perfectly than the former. Similarly, angel and man are both immediately beatified in God as the beatific object, even though the angel, being more perfect than man, attains him more perfectly.

You object, third: God is the supreme and most universal cause, the maker of all things, and also the ultimate end of all (*from what was said, quaest. De causa finali*). Therefore any nature, even one lower than humanity, is capable of happiness. I distinguish the antecedent: God is the efficient and final cause of both material and spiritual things, I concede; God is the cause and end of all those things attainable through operation, I deny. For this belongs only to the intellectual nature; hence human nature occupies the last place among beatifiable natures.

ARTICLE IV. On the beatitude of the body.

That the human body is to be blessed, reason persuades; for since it is an instrument and essential part of man, and the whole man is to be blessed because the whole man has merited, consequently his body must be marked with beatitude. And since the same man cannot be blessed in a mortal body, he will be blessed in an immortal body, as Scotus teaches (*4. dist. 49, quaest. 13, §. Respondeo, A*). The body, moreover, is beatified through four beatific endowments, about which in general and in particular we must speak in the following doubts and paragraphs.

DOUBT I. On the beatific endowments in general.

Sole Section. What are the beatific endowments, and how many kinds are there?

Maior (4. *dist.* 49, *quaest.* 7) and Richard (*ibid.*, *art.* 3) report that some think retention is a beatific endowment distinct from the others. But the common body of theologians—notably Argentinensis (*quaest.* 1, *art.* 1) and Nicholas of Neise (*tract. De beatitudine corporis, quaest.* 1)—as the Seraphic Doctor notes (*ibid.*, *art.* 2, *quaest.* 1), maintains that there are only four beatific endowments of the body: impassibility, clarity, agility, and subtlety.

Note, first: the endowment is commonly divided into the endowment of the soul and of the body. The natural endowments of the soul are the moral virtues—prudence, fortitude, temperance, and justice. The supernatural ones are the theological virtues—faith, hope, and charity. The beatific endowments are vision, enjoyment, and the perfection of perpetual security of both. The natural endowments of the body are beauty, strength, soundness, and similar things. The supernatural ones are comprised in four, and are named as stated near the beginning of this section.

Note, second, from Vorillong (*art.* 1 of *this dist.*): these three—endowment, gift, and paraphernalia—differ from each other. An endowment is what the bridegroom gives to the bride when she marries; hence, when Christ marries us, he bestows upon us grace and charity. A gift—that is, as it were, a "giving by gift"—as Angelo notes (*verb. donatio*), is taken by the jurists, especially Ulpian, properly for an irrevocable giving; but here it means what the husband gives to the wife after the marriage is consummated. Thus glory is called the endowment of the blessed soul. Hence the Church sings: "Come, bride of Christ, receive the crown"; and Paul (2 *Tim.* 4): "There is laid up for me the crown of justice." Other senses and types of gift are to be sought from Angelo (*at the passage cited*). Paraphernalia are what is given to the wife by friends after the wedding. Hence all paraphernal goods are said to be all the goods of the wife, as the Blessed Angelo observes (*verb. paraferna*). For it is derived from "para" (beside) and "pherna" (endowment), as if "beside the endowment."

Note, third, from the same Vorillong (*mentioned above*): endowment is taken in three senses. First, for what is bestowed on the bride by the father of the bride himself, and is her own property and patrimony, and the husband has the use of it for bearing the burden of matrimony, as the jurists observe (*Angelo, verb. Dos*). In this sense, God the Father endows the soul so that it may be the bride of Christ. Second, for what the bridegroom gives to the bride, as is clear (*Gen.* 34), where Jacob says to Shechem and his sons: "Increase the endowment, and ask for gifts"; and (*Exod.* 22): "If anyone seduces a virgin and sleeps with her, he shall endow her." The Doctor makes mention of both these senses of endowment (4. *d.* 49, *quaest.* 13, §. *Dico ergo*). Third, for the perpetual adornment of the soul and body given by reason of the nuptials to be consummated in the resurrection. In this sense, the Doctor (*just cited*) says, impassibility is an endowment—or rather a divine assistance preserving the body of the blessed person from all

corruption—even though such an endowment does not formally inhere in the blessed person himself.

Assertion: there are four endowments of the blessed body, as listed above. The Doctor presupposes this, disputing about each of them in particular (*from quaest. 13 to quaest. 16 of dist. 49*). This is proved, first: Wisdom 3, "The just will shine, and will run about like sparks among reeds." The Seraphic Doctor adds (*loc. cit.*): "In the shining is clarity, in the spark impassibility, in the reed subtlety, and in the running about agility." And the Savior indicates (*Matt. 13*): "The just will shine like the sun." For the sun is clear, subtle, impassible, and agile. The Apostle agrees (*1 Cor. 15*): "It is sown in corruption, it shall rise in incorruption"—here impassibility is noted. "It is sown in dishonor, it shall rise in glory"—here clarity is expressed. "It is sown in weakness, it shall rise in power"—here agility is indicated. "It is sown a natural body, it shall rise a spiritual body"—here subtlety is designated. Augustine agrees (*22. Civit.*): "All deformity will be absent from our bodies through clarity, all slowness through agility, all weakness through subtlety, and all corruption through impassibility." Reason also confirms this: the human body and every mixture is said to be constituted from four elements, from which it contracts four imperfections or defects. From water, which is moist, it contracts passibility or corruption—hence whatever is aqueously moist easily corrupts. From earth, obscurity, since it is an opaque or dense body, and therefore dark. From air, weakness, for it is thin and easily yields to what pushes it. From fire, animality, for fire is the most active and continually consumes, continually needing fuel. Therefore, since the body of the blessed person is perfect and adorned, and the aforesaid imperfections and defects are removed, it must be perfected and adorned with four adornments, which are the four aforementioned beatific endowments.

You object, first: the body does not enjoy more endowments than the soul, nor the servant more than the mistress; for what is less noble is not to be adorned with more ornaments than what is more noble. But the soul is endowed and adorned with only three endowments—namely, vision, enjoyment, and perpetual security. Therefore likewise only three endowments are to be assigned to the glorified body. I deny the major. For the sensitive soul has more potencies than the intellectual, yet it does not follow that it is more excellent. Likewise, God, though the most perfect and noblest of all, lacks accidental perfections and ornaments; especially because nobility consists not in a greater number but in the principal perfections. Or say that there is a disparity, since the endowments of the soul are derived from its potencies, while the endowments of the body are derived from the quaternary number of elements.

You object, second: the endowments are numbered according to the number of comparisons of the body to the soul. But the body is compared to the soul in two ways: the soul relates to the body either as mover or as perfection. Therefore there are only two endowments of the body. I reply that according to

those two comparisons, four dispositions and perfections are required in the body, corresponding to the four defects and imperfections contracted from the four elements; and therefore four endowments of the beatific body are established.

You object, third: just as clarity pertains to beauty, so does the congruence of parts. For Augustine says (22. *Civit.*, cap. 19): "Beauty is the congruence of parts together with a certain pleasantness of color." Therefore, just as clarity is counted among the endowments of the body, so should the congruence of parts be. This is confirmed from Anselm (*lib. De similitudinibus*, cap. 50): "The parts of beatitude are beauty, agility, strength, liberty, health, pleasure, and longevity." I reply that clarity is an endowment because it is given to the glorified body; but the congruence of parts is what was already present before the body was beatified. Hence it does not constitute a new endowment distinct from the rest. To the confirmation, Richard responds (*quaest.* 2, ad 2): beauty is reduced to clarity, liberty to agility, strength to subtlety, and health, pleasure, and longevity to impassibility.

DOUBT II. On impassibility.

Section I. Whether the glorified body is impassible.

For the explanation and resolution of this section, as presented in the said question (*quaest.* 6, art. 1) by Bassolis and other Scholastics there, two senses of "impassible" and two corresponding senses of "passion" are adduced, which I shall express in the first note.

Note, first: "impassible" and "immortal" are taken in two senses. First, "impassible" means "able not to suffer," and "immortal" means "able not to die." Thus Adam in the state of innocence was immortal, namely able not to die. For if he had obeyed God and had not fallen into sin, he could have not died and would not have died; but after a long life in the earthly paradise, he would finally have been transferred to the heavenly paradise, seeing God clearly and enjoying him perfectly, as the Doctor asserts (2. *dist.* 19). Second, "impassible" means "not able to suffer," and "immortal" means "not able to die." In this sense Adam in the said state was not immortal. For he could die, and in fact, through the sin committed by him, he did die. Moreover, observe that passion is properly corrupting or degrading, which is touched upon (*Wisdom* 9): "The body that is corrupted weighs down the soul." Improperly, however, it is preserving and perfecting, about which Aristotle speaks (2. *De anima*, T. 139; and 3 of the same work, T. 18) and Scotus (1. *distinct.* 3, *quaest.* 7, §. *Ad auctoritatem*).

Note, second, from the same Doctor (4. *dist.* 49, *quaest.* 13, §. *Responsio*): in the beatific state, those things are placed which are necessary for it and which contribute to its perfection. Hence nutrition, growth, generation, and things of this kind are not found there, because no nourishment is necessary, nor augmentation, since all things there are perfect—which Paul signifies (*Eph.* 4):

"Until we all attain to the perfect man." For in this state there is the accumulation of all goods and perfections; and actions and passions that carry imperfection with them are far removed from it, with God preserving the glorified body from all evil and affliction, on account of the merits that it performed together with the soul joined to it, according to (*Apoc. 21*): "God will wipe away every tear," and so on.

Assertion: after the resurrection, the body of the blessed person will be impassible and immortal. So holds Scotus (*just cited*). This is proved, first, from Scripture (*1 Cor. 15*): "This corruptible must put on incorruption, and this mortal must put on immortality"—and consequently impassibility. For passibility does not remain with immortality. Second, from Augustine (*13. Trin.*): "The blessed life is immortal." Someone adds: "The supreme good is immortality alone. And virtue advances one to immortality." Third, the body must be proportioned and conformed to the soul in the most perfect state, which is the beatific state, just as in the imperfect state, or in the way, the soul conforms to the body. For it sympathizes and grieves with the injured body; therefore in the homeland the body is immune from all passion and corruption, just as the soul likewise is then impassible and immortal. Fourth, in the same state the soul desires and wills the body to last as long as it itself will last, since both are essential parts of man; but the soul and man will endure perpetually; therefore so will the body, without which man cannot exist. And so the body is then impassible and immortal. Moreover, the body cooperates and concurs with the soul in meritorious acts, as an organ and instrument of it, and is conjoined with the soul, which is then rendered impassible. Therefore the body, by reason of merit and union with the soul, exists in the said state as impassible and immortal.

You object, first: what is palpable is corruptible, as Gregory says (*in cap. 20, John*): "What is palpated must necessarily be corrupted." But the body of the blessed person is palpable, as is clear (*Luke 24*): "Handle and see." And the body of Christ, which is spoken of there, was glorified. Therefore the body of the blessed person is not impassible. I distinguish the major: of what is palpable left to itself and not preserved by any cause capable of freeing it from corruption, I concede, and in this sense the testimony of Gregory cited above is taken; of what is palpable but preserved by the divine will, I deny—and of this kind is the glorified body, as I touched upon above at the end of the second note.

You object, second: the body of the blessed person is endowed with sensation; for sensation is a perfect animal operation (*2. De anima, T. 123*). In that state, moreover, the glorified body is perfect in every respect. But sensation does not occur without the passion and corruption of the sensible body, for every sensitive being suffers from an excessive sensible object—as the sight from the light of the sun, and touch from intense heat. Therefore in the homeland the body of the blessed person does not remain impassible. I distinguish the major: of sensation that does not carry with it imperfection and real passion, such as

intentional sensation—namely vision and hearing—I concede; of real sensation carrying imperfection with it, such as nutrition, I deny.

You object, third, from (*1. Caeli*, T. 15; and *2 of the same work*, T. 18): "Nothing violent lasts." But the glorified body is a mixture that contains in itself four elements, which—apart from fire—remain above by violence, since they are outside their proper places. Therefore the body of the blessed person is not free from passion. The major is glossed as applying to what is violent left to itself, but not to what is violent yet preserved by God and to be perpetually preserved—of which kind is the glorified body.

You object, fourth, from the same (*1. Caeli* 7, 124), where Aristotle, arguing against Plato, says: the heavens cannot be corruptible and be perpetuated by another, because something cannot be of itself possible and be perpetuated by another. But the body of the blessed person is of itself perishable and corruptible; therefore it cannot be preserved by God as incorrupt and perpetual. This is confirmed from Averroes (*12. Met.*): apart from the motion of the heavens, nothing is of itself possible and necessary through another. But the aforesaid body is of itself possible; therefore it cannot be necessary through God, and consequently it is not impassible. I reply with Scotus that Aristotle's reasoning holds, provided it is understood as follows: if the heavens are of themselves corruptible, as Plato admits, then of themselves they can be corrupted. But if God necessarily conserves the heavens, then they cannot be corrupted. That the same body can be corrupted and cannot be corrupted involves a contradiction. But we, holding that God acts freely *ad extra*, say that a celestial body, like any glorified body, is of itself corruptible, but by the divine will is perpetually conserved and perpetually preserved from all corruption and corrupting passion. To the confirmation, I say Averroes speaks from the principles of Aristotle, who held that God necessarily acts *ad extra*. Hence, apart from the motion of the heavens, other things that are by their own nature subject to corruption do not always last, but are corrupted. But we, illuminated by the light of faith, hold that the motion of the heavens will have an end after the day of judgment; yet the elements, the heavens, and the bodies of the blessed, with God preserving them, will be free from all passion and corruption and will endure forever.

Section II. By what cause the body of the blessed person is impassible and immortal.

Many opinions of the theologians are recited and refuted on this difficulty by Scotus (*loc. cit.*) and Vorillong (*ibid.*). Some think the body is made impassible and immortal from the material and subjective cause—that is, because in the glorified body the qualities that follow upon mixture and the contrary qualities disposing it to corruption do not remain; or if the said qualities do persist, as others suspect, they are in equilibrium, and one cannot act upon or be acted upon by another. Many introduce impassibility into such a body from the side

of the efficient cause, by removing everything that could induce corruption in that body, or by giving everything that contributes to preserving it from corruption, whether from within or from without. Some derive the said endowment from the formal cause, affirming that from the glorified and immortal and incorruptible soul there flows perpetual health and perennial vigor into the body that it informs. Nor are there lacking those who derive it from the absolute dominion by which the blessed soul perfectly dominates the body, which perfectly obeys it; hence, since there is no resistance, incorruptibility and impassibility are had. Others hold that the body is rendered impassible because of the absence of privation, which (*1. Phys., T. 81*) is said to be the cause of corruption. Since there is in it no contrary quality, no motion, nor anything else aiding corruption, it is inferred to be incorruptible and impassible. But Scotus (*cit., §. Dico ergo, D*) and his followers, having rejected all the aforementioned opinions, hold that the cause of the impassibility of the glorified body is not intrinsic but extrinsic, not created but uncreated—namely the divine will not co-acting with the secondary cause for its corruption.

Note: the cause through which the body is made impassible can be assigned as multiple. For it is either positive or privative. If privative, two can be posited: the cessation of heavenly motion and the non-cooperation of the first cause with the secondary cause. Positive cause is divided into intrinsic (which is material or formal) and extrinsic (which is efficient or final). The efficient cause is subdivided into uncreated (which is the divine will) and created (which is celestial or sublunar, substantial or accidental, or one that removes an impediment). Specifically, it can be said to be the blessed soul, or an endowment in the body.

First assertion: the body of the blessed person is not made impassible through the absence of natural qualities that follow upon mixture. So holds the Doctor (*cit., sub A*). This is proved, first: nothing is lacking to that body that pertains to its natural being and its adornment, since it is in a perfect state. But those qualities pertain to the natural being of the body—not constitutively, but consequentially, since they flow from it. Therefore, because of their absence, that body is not made impassible. Second, such a body would not be a mixture, since the qualities of the mixture would not emanate from it; nor would it be a suitable and proportioned subject informable and receivable by the rational soul. Third, those qualities are only dispositive toward corruption; therefore, even with them removed, the cause and root of corruption would still remain. Hence (*1. Phys., text cited*) the natural qualities are not said to be the cause of corruption, but matter together with privation. Finally, the heavens are free of those qualities, yet they are not absolutely impassible and incorruptible, as I said (*lib. De Caelo*).

Second assertion: neither is such a body rendered impassible because contrary qualities have been reduced to equality. Scotus holds this (*ibid., sub B*). This is

proved, first: the elements, even though they are equal in acting and resisting taken as wholes, are nevertheless passible and corruptible according to their parts. Hence there is perpetual conflict among them, and continuous generation and corruption of sublunar things. Therefore impassibility of the said body is not derived from the equality and tempering of qualities. Second, in a mixture some quality always predominates, as I taught (*lib. De elementis*). Even if there were a perfect balance in it, the body would still be passible. For the temperament of Christ the Lord was perfectly balanced, yet he was passible and mortal. Furthermore, even if it were impassible from within, it would not be so from without; hence something else must be assigned that renders it impassible both from within and from without.

Third assertion: the cause of impassibility of the body of the blessed person is not derived from the dominion of the soul over the body that it informs. This is against Thomas, and is for Scotus (*cit., before C*). This is proved, first: the corrupting qualities of the body do not oppose the soul; indeed, the soul presupposes them, since it informs a duly organized and properly tempered body, as is clear (*lib. 2. De anima*). Since the soul does not expel them, consequently it is not the cause of the body's impassibility. Second, if the soul impeded the natural corrupting causes of the body, this would be especially by the command of the will. But natural causes do not obey the will of a soul or an angel. For God has not subjected the terrestrial sphere to the will of an angel or soul, as is clear (*Hebrews 2*); hence (*in Phys., quaest. De vacuo*) I asserted that neither an angel nor any creature can produce a vacuum, because natural causes are not subject to it, but only to God their creator. Third, if the state of innocence had persisted, the lower powers would have perfectly obeyed right reason; but man would not for that reason have been impassible, since he would have nourished himself, grown, and done other things of this kind, which do not occur without corrupting passion, as I asserted elsewhere. Therefore, and so on.

Fourth assertion: the body of the blessed person is not impassible because of an endowment or quality prohibiting corrupting passion, which overflows from the soul into the body. This is defended by the Doctor (*loc. cit.*) against Henry (*Quol. 9, quaest. 16*). This is proved, first: that quality is either celestial, or elemental, or mixed; but it can be none of the enumerated. Therefore the body is not made impassible through the said quality. The major is clear from a sufficient enumeration of qualities. The minor is proved: it is not a celestial quality, because it is neither diaphaneity, nor light, nor luminosity, nor an occult quality, as is evident—especially because the human body, being a mixture, is not capable of a celestial quality. Nor is it an elemental quality, because this is corrupted according to parts or degrees. Nor is it a quality of the mixture, since this does not perpetually conserve the mixture, nor can it prevent or impede the body from other corrupting qualities. Hence, although hardness prevents iron

from being easily cut into parts, it does not free it from heating, cooling, and burning.

Second, qualities receivable in a proximate receptive subject are of the same physical genus (*from 5. Met., T. 33; 10 of the same work, T. 22*). But all the qualities of a mixture are either contrary or intermediate; therefore such qualities do not ward off corruption and corrupting passion from the body.

Third, either one quality fights another, or it does not. If the first, then such qualities do not remove all action, because one contrary acts upon another with corrupting action. For as is clear (*lib. De elementis*), one contrary strives to destroy another, and there is mutual struggle and continual conflict among them, from which the corruptions and generations of sublunar things follow. If the second, then one does not impede another from its action and passion.

Fifth assertion: the impassibility of the glorified body does not come from the cessation of heavenly motion. The Doctor teaches this (*loc. cit., sub C*). This is proved, first: the actions and passions of man do not depend on the motion of the heavens or on its absence; hence Augustine says (*11. Conf. 22*): "Even with the heavens standing still, the potter's wheel moves." Therefore neither is the impassibility of the body of the blessed person produced by the cessation of heavenly motion. Second, it is decreed by the Parisian article: "If anyone says that with the heavens standing still, and fire placed near straw, the fire would not burn the straw, this is an error." And (*Joshua 10*) it is narrated that with the sun not setting, a battle was fought against Gibeon. Third, from (*2. De generatione, cap. 11, T. 55*): motion is said to be the cause of generation not actively but adductively—that is, because it brings the generating agent to the place where it generates, where it has proximate matter and the other requisites for generating. If the generating agent were present and approximated to properly disposed matter, motion would not be needed—as if the sun were in the middle of the hemisphere and stood there, it would not need to move to illuminate and warm its parts. I add from what was said (*in Phys., lib. De motu*): formally, motion is a relation of the mover to the moved, and relation is of the category of sterile things. Therefore the positing of motion does not cause its passibility, nor does its cessation cause impassibility in the same body.

Sixth assertion: the cause through which the body of the blessed person is made impassible is extrinsic—namely, the divine will not cooperating with the corrupting secondary cause. This is defended by the Doctor (*passage cited, §. Dico ergo, D*). This is proved, first, by analogy: just as the will of the blessed person is impeccable because God does not concur with it in any sin or evil act, as I showed elsewhere, so the body of the blessed person is impassible because God does not co-act with the corrupting secondary cause. Second, (*Daniel 3*), in the furnace of Babylon, the three Hebrew youths were not burned by the fire, because God did not concur with that fire for their burning. Similarly, the body of the blessed person is not subject to any corruption and passion, because God

suspends his concurrence, without which the corrupting cause of his body cannot harm it; and so it remains immune from all passion and corruption. Furthermore, the heavens are incorruptible—not absolutely, since they consist of matter and form—but in a qualified sense: because in this universe of things no created agent is found that is stronger and more powerful than them. Therefore the body of the blessed person is incorruptible because no agent can act upon it and corrupt it, since God does not co-act and suspends his concurrence.

You object, first: the soul mediates between God and a corporeal creature. Therefore after the resurrection, just as it will be perfectly subject to God, so it will fully dominate its body, and consequently the body will be rendered impassible through this subjection. I deny the final inference: for such subjection would not constitute the body as impassible, as is clear in the state of innocence, in which the lower portion obeyed the higher, yet the body was not impassible. For it performed those things that cannot be done without passion, as I noted above. Moreover, the aforesaid subjection is produced not by the soul but by the divine will, as the Doctor observes (*cit.*, before *G*).

You object, second: Augustine writes to Dioscurus: "God made the soul so powerful that from its full happiness perpetual health and incorruptible vigor overflow into the body." Hence it was a miracle in Christ that, although in his soul he was blessed, that beatitude of the soul did not overflow into his body. First confirmation: hardness is a certain impassibility preventing a hard body from suffering—that is, from easily being cut into parts. Therefore a quality can be given in a body through which the body is preserved from corruption. Second confirmation: through grace man is made pleasing to God, through glory blessed, through whiteness white, and through learning learned. Therefore through the endowment of impassibility, which is a quality, his body is made impassible. Third confirmation: certain natural substances, such as balsam and things of that kind, make a body incorruptible, as experience shows. Therefore it is not unfitting to concede some quality by which the body of the blessed person is made impassible. I reply that this does not come from any quality that renders the body incorruptible, but from the divine will ordaining and decreeing that the soul and the body informed by it should be rewarded with beatitude on account of the merits performed during the person's life—the soul with vision and enjoyment of God, and the body with impassibility and the other endowments, which are from God himself. To the first confirmation, I say that although what is hard resists cutting, it does not resist heating and burning; therefore it is not completely impassible, as the body is. To the second confirmation, I concede the antecedent and deny the consequent, as is clear from the enumeration of qualities in the fourth assertion, which cannot constitute the body as impassible—just as no quality can render a person impeccable. To the third confirmation, those things can indeed preserve a body from corruption for a time, but not forever. For eventually the body anointed

and treated with them is corrupted and consumed, like any other sublunar thing—such as stones and things of that sort, which are called eternal because they last a long time.

You object, third: when the prior is removed, the posterior is removed, for when the cause is taken away, the effect is taken away. But the motion of the heavens is prior to the motion of sublunar things (8. *Phys.*, T. 73). Therefore, since after the day of judgment the motion of the heavens will have ceased (as faith teaches), all the motions of sublunar things will cease, among which is the corruption of the body, and so the body will be incorruptible through the cessation of motion. I grant the major and distinguish the minor with Scotus: the motion of the heavens is prior by the priority of uniformity and velocity, I concede; by the priority of causality, I deny. Or the major must be distinguished: if the posterior essentially depends on the prior, I concede; if it does not essentially depend, I deny—just as brutes are prior to man, as is clear from the book of Genesis, yet man can exist without brutes, as will happen after the day of judgment. But the motion of sublunar things, especially of man, does not depend essentially on the motion of the heavens. For man can move while the heavens are immobile, as was observed above.

You object, fourth: the glorified body is endowed with the endowment of impassibility, as no theologian denies. But an endowment is formally in the one endowed, just as whiteness is in the white thing and light in the luminous thing. If it is held with Scotus that the impassibility of the body of the blessed person arises from the preserving action of the divine will preventing the natural corrupting cause, no endowment of impassibility would be formally in such a body. Therefore the endowment of impassibility is not derived from the assistance and guardianship of the divine will. First confirmation: an element would also enjoy the endowment of impassibility, because after the judgment is concluded, it will be prevented by the divine will from all corruption; for there will no longer be conflict among the elements. Second confirmation: the damned would enjoy the aforementioned endowment, because his body will never be corrupted. Third confirmation: there would be a perpetual miracle—a body being preserved from all corruption—just as it was a miracle that the three Hebrew youths were not burned or harmed by the fire of Babylon. I grant the major and deny the minor. For an endowment given to a bridegroom by the bride's father is not really in the bridegroom or in the bride—as when it is money or a field. Likewise, if someone were to endow his daughter by providing her with soldiers to guard her from all harm, as Scotus teaches (*in Rep. here*). Nor in the definition of an endowment is there any expression denoting that the endowment is formally in the one endowed, as can be seen in Angelo (*verb. dos*) and other casuists and summists. Similarly, in the spiritual marriage, God endows the body of the blessed person with the endowment of impassibility, so that it is immune from all corruption. Likewise, the endowment consists in this: that the blessed person has a right, from his merits, for God to preserve and

conserve his body from every corrupting cause. By this, the answer to the first confirmation is clear: for the elements become incorruptible solely by God's good pleasure, but the body of the blessed person becomes so from preceding merits, by reason of which he has a right to receive such an endowment. To the second confirmation, there is a disparity: the blessed person has that endowment from his merits for his joy and exultation; the damned, however, has it for his punishment and affliction, on account of his demerits. To the third confirmation, I deny the consequence: for if this occurred now, it would indeed be a miracle, as was shown in the case of those three youths remaining unharmed in the fire. But then it will not be so, because a natural course will be established whereby things rest, remain unmoved, and are free from all passion and corruption—just as it will be natural and customary for the heavens to stand still and remain perpetually unmoved.

DOUBT III. On the agility of the body of the blessed person.

Section I. Whether the bodies of the blessed will be agile.

It is the consistent doctrine of the Scholastics, especially Scotus (*4. dist. 49, q. 14*), Vorillong, and others in the same place, affirming that the bodies of the blessed are adorned with the endowment of agility. For easier understanding and more convenient comprehension:

Note, first, from the Doctor (*just cited, §. Respondeo, B*): agility means nothing other than the capability of something to move itself promptly and swiftly by that motion whose principle is the soul—that is, progressive motion, not natural motion, whose principle in a mixture is the predominating element. Since, however, agility cannot be in any whole for moving itself easily unless there simultaneously concurs the motive power and the mobile, agility specifically requires a perfect motive power residing in the soul and a suitable disposition, not resistant to this motion, on the part of the movable body.

Note, second, from the same (*ibid., A*): in an animated sensitive composite, there is a twofold motion. One is natural, derived from the predominating element in it. Thus man naturally descends downward, because in him earth predominates, which, being heavy, tends downward. The other is progressive, which comes from the animal insofar as it is endowed with a soul, which is the principle by which the animal moves itself progressively. These two motions differ from each other in three ways. First, the principle of progressive motion is the soul, while the principle of natural motion is the predominating element. Hence, because in man earth predominates, after death his body is heavier than when he was alive, because then earth maximally predominates, with the spirit or soul separated from it. Second, natural motion occurs without any prior apprehension or cognition, but by the guidance of nature is determined to one direction—as a stone by its weight is carried downward to the center. But progressive motion occurs with prior apprehension and cognition of that

toward which it tends; hence it is not determined to one direction, but according to apprehension and appetite it is now determined to this one, now to that one. Third, in natural motion the mover from within cannot stop itself—as a stone falling downward cannot stop itself in such motion. But in progressive motion, the animal that is moved from within can plant its foot—as a horse, apprehending an offensive object, such as a wolf or a deep ditch, takes no further step, even when struck. And this is read of Balaam's donkey, which, struck by him, would not go further because it saw the angel (*Numbers 22*).

Note, third, from the same (*loc. cit.*, §. *Ad 1. rationem, M*): in the series and coordination of beings, some beings are so perfect that they cannot receive any further perfection, such as God. Some add Christ the Lord, the Blessed Virgin, and the most holy Eucharist. Some are so imperfect that they cannot be perfected by any further perfection—such as relative accidents. Others are indeed perfect in their genus, but can still be perfected—not with essential perfection but with accidental perfection—as a man perfect in his essence is perfected by science, grace, and glory, which are his accidental perfections.

Note, fourth, from the same (*ibid.*, *sub B*): the motive power is one, which can be called organic and inorganic under different respects. Insofar as man first moves one part of his body and then another, as happens in progressive motion, that potency is called organic—about which Aristotle speaks (*lib. De motu animalium*). Insofar as his soul is separated from the body and moves itself from one place to another—like an angel—such a potency is called inorganic. Scotus adds (*cit.*, *below C*): if all parts of the body that the soul informs were equally disposed to receive its motion, such a potency would be called inorganic, as will happen after the universal resurrection. Therefore the motive potency of man is not organic in itself, but per accidens, insofar as one part is more disposed than another. Hence man first moves the nearer part rather than the more remote one, and first the more disposed rather than the less disposed.

Assertion: the bodies of the blessed after the day of judgment will be agile. So holds Scotus (*loc. cit.*). This is proved, first: Wisdom 3, "Like sparks in a reed-bed, they will run about"; and Isaiah 40, "Those who hope in the Lord will renew their strength, they will take wings like eagles, they will fly and not grow weary, they will run and not tire"; and 1 Corinthians 15, "It is sown in weakness, it shall rise in power"—where the gloss says "living and mobile." Second, Augustine (22. *Civit.*, *cap. 30*): "Where the spirit wills, there the body will be immediately." Third, every fitting perfection is to be attributed to the blessed, since they enjoy a perfect state, as is the beatific state; and it is a perfection for glorified bodies to be agile, to be moved without labor and fatigue, and to move about at their pleasure. Moreover, the bodies of the blessed will be impassible, from what was asserted in the first doubt of this article, Section I. Therefore they will also be agile, since the reasoning is the same for this endowment as for that one.

You object, first: if agility is to be conceded to the glorified body, this would be especially on account of its local motion, as is clear from the description of agility in the first note. But in the beatific state there is no local motion, which is the act of an imperfect being (*3. Phys. 2*), since in it there is every possible perfection. Therefore the bodies of the blessed will not be agile. This is confirmed: when the prior is removed, the posterior is removed, because the latter depends on the former. But after the resurrection there will be no first motion—neither time, as the angel cries (*Apoc. 10*). Therefore neither will there be secondary motion, which is the motion of other things contained within the circuit of the heavens. I grant the major and deny the minor. For although the blessed person has every essential perfection simply possible for him, he does not have every accidental and qualified perfection, which is acquired through local motion. Similarly, the blessed person does not know all things actually, but what God wills to show him in the divine essence, which, from what was said elsewhere, is a voluntary mirror: "If he wills, he is seen; if he does not will, he is not seen." To the confirmation, I say the major is true of a prior on which the posterior essentially depends, as I responded above (*Doubt I, Section II, answering the third objection*).

You object, second: the glorified body does not need agility to be moved locally, but carriers and helpers, namely angels, as is clear (*Luke 16*): "It happened that the beggar died and was carried by angels to the bosom of Abraham"; and (*1 Thess. 4*): "We shall be caught up together with them to meet Christ in the air." Therefore the bodies of the blessed will not be agile. I deny the antecedent. For angels are given to the bodies of the blessed not because of need but out of reverence and honor—just as a lady is carried by her servants, not because she lacks motive power, but out of honor and dignity. They rather accompany her than carry her, just as courtiers with respect to a king, whom they follow and serve.

You object, third: the blessed reside in a certain place and a determinate seat, so that some are nearer to Christ and others more distant, according to their merits—as is said of the angels, of whom the first are the Seraphim, the second the Cherubim, and so on for the rest, whose orders and series I reported (*in the Tract. De Angelis*). But if they were agile, they would move locally, and indeed would leave a nearer place and acquire a more distant one. I reply that neither Christ nor the blessed are immobile, but can at will and pleasure move locally and change place, losing no perfection or beatitude—just as those who serve a king sometimes approach him and sometimes withdraw from him, while retaining his benevolence and favor. And this is clear of the angels in sacred Scripture, especially (*Gen. 28*), concerning Jacob's ladder, by which angels descended and ascended. The same must be asserted of blessed humans. Moreover, God is everywhere, and from any place, wherever one may be, he can be seen and possessed.

You object, fourth: the more perfect things are, the fewer operations they need to attain their perfection. But the blessed are perfect in both soul and body; therefore they do not move locally to acquire any perfection, and consequently they lack agility. This is confirmed: beatitude is called rest, as is clear (*Exod. 33*): "I will give you rest"; and "The blessed rest from their labors" (*Apoc. 14*). But if they moved locally, they would not rest, because rest and motion are privatively opposed. Therefore, and so on. I grant the major and distinguish the minor: with respect to essential perfection, I concede; with respect to accidental perfection, I deny—as with cognition, which is a perfection of the intellect and can be acquired anew by the blessed person, as was to be established above. To the confirmation, I say it is rest from labors and miseries; hence the Church sings for the deceased: "May they rest in peace." And also from meritorious works, as the Savior attests (*John 7*): "The night comes when no one can work." But not from local motion, for the angels too move in their blessed state, even though they enjoy eternal and perpetual rest.

Section II. What agility is.

Richard (4. *dist. 49, quaest. 7*) thinks agility is a certain supernatural quality by which the body is rendered capable, so that by the motive power of the soul it is moved quickly and promptly in local motion; by which impediments—especially gravity, which prevents the body from being easily and promptly moved locally—are removed. The opposite, however, is taught by Scotus (*ibid., quaest. 14, §. Respondeo, H*), Vorillong, and the rest of the Scotists, who deny the aforesaid quality and assert that no supernatural quality is added to the body of the blessed person for it to be moved easily and freely; the only thing that happens is that the motive potency of the soul becomes more intense and more perfect, and the accidental resistance (to be explained shortly) is removed from the body.

Note, first, from Scotus (*loc. cit.*): there is a twofold impediment in the body that prevents it from being moved agilely and swiftly. The first is derived from the organs of the motive power, which is in the joints and sinews; when this obstacle is removed, the body becomes agile and easy for motion, especially progressive motion. The second is taken from the whole body, which is replete with thick and material humors, and whose head is full of smoky vapors and exhalations and other things that make a person heavy and slow for motion, as is clear from a dead body full of thick humors, which is heavier than when alive—especially when deprived of vital spirits, which make the body lighter. But to the glorified body, with the aforementioned impediments removed, good and subtle spirits are bestowed, which make the body easy and agile for motion.

Note, second, from the same (*ibid., quaest. 13, §. Ad rationes, sub H*): that is simply violent which opposes the natural, and more violent which more opposes the natural, and less violent which less opposes the natural—as for water to be carried upward, lest there be a vacuum in the universe, is not simply violent; but

if water fell downward, given a vacuum, it would be simply violent and only qualifiedly natural. The reason is that the nature of the whole universe is more a principle of naturalness than particular nature, and what befits the whole is more natural than what befits the part. The Doctor adds (*quaest. 14, cit., §. Ad illud, sub K*): when there are certain ordered potencies, the naturalness of the superior potency is greater than that of the inferior potency, as is clear of touch, which naturally, according to its own inclination, would take delight in the tangible, and likewise taste in the tastable. Yet the blessed exercise neither touch nor taste in their acts, because the said senses follow the inclination of the superior appetite, namely the will. One must philosophize in the same way about what is heavy when it ascends, lest there be a vacuum. And as things are in the greater world, so too in the lesser world, which is man. Therefore it is more natural for the body to be informed and perfected by the soul and to be moved by it than to be moved by its own proper motion toward the center. Hence, according to the inclination of the superior nature, it would rest naturally absolutely, though in a qualified sense violently.

First assertion: the body of the blessed person does not become agile through a supernatural quality flowing from the soul into the body. So holds Scotus (*cit., §. Respondeo, H, G, I; and in Rep., ibid.*). This is proved, first: it is impossible for a mixed animated body not to be heavy, just as it is unfitting for a stone to exist and not be hard, especially if it is marble. For in the body, earth predominates, to which the highest degree of gravity belongs; indeed, the body is neither animated nor perfected by the soul unless it has gravity and the other natural qualities. For if the body were as dense and solid as gold, it would not be a suitable and proportioned subject informable and perfectible by the soul. Therefore the body does not become agile through the removal of gravity and the addition of a celestial quality.

Second, the body of the blessed person is not capable of lightness; otherwise it would not tend downward, because what is determined to one position through one quality is not determined to the opposite position—as is clear of fire, which is carried upward because it is light, and of earth, which tends downward because it is heavy. Since, therefore, the body of the blessed person naturally inclines downward through gravity, it is inferred that it is not agile through a quality joined to it.

Third, that quality is either celestial, or elemental, or mixed. Not celestial, because through it the body would be carried in a circle, just as the heavens are moved circularly. Not elemental, because it would be either a quality of fire seeking only the uppermost place, or of air seeking the middle place, or of water or earth tending to the lowest place; but the body of the blessed person is carried and moved to every place and every positional difference. Therefore, and so on. Fourth, every quality determines an agent to a certain and determinate operation, as is clear of charity, which inclines the will to good

operation, and of science, which inclines the intellect to knowledge of things. Therefore, if there were given a quality to make the body of the blessed person agile, it would only determine it to one motion and one position—upward or downward—whereas in fact it is indifferent and without any labor or fatigue for every motion and every place. And so no quality is given that renders the body agile for moving it. Finally, impassibility is not a quality added to the body; therefore neither is agility, since the reasoning is the same in both cases.

Second assertion: the body of the blessed person becomes agile through a more intense and more perfect motive power of the soul, through the removal of the twofold impediment previously described from the body, and through the conferral of good and subtle spirits on the same body. Scotus teaches this (*loc. cit.*). The assertion has two parts. The first part is proved, first: just as the visual power of the blessed person is intensified and perfected when the glorified body is resumed—for the blessed person can then, without any difficulty or labor, see any visible thing, because the visual power and the rest of his potencies are perfect and proportioned to their objects—so the motive power of the soul in the beatific state will be so intensified and perfected that it can move the body joined to it at its pleasure, without labor or fatigue. Second, the blessed will be like angels in heaven, as Christ testifies (*Matt. 22*). But the angels move themselves and the celestial bodies and anything else without fatigue; therefore the soul in the beatific state will move the body that it informs wherever it wills.

The second part is supported, first: the body is impeded from moving agilely and easily because of the impediment found in the joints and sinews, and because of the superfluous humors distributed throughout the whole body, especially the abdomen and head. When these are removed and subtle spirits are conferred in their place, the body becomes agile and ready for motion. Second, a corpse thrown into water sinks to the bottom because of the thickness and putrefaction in it; but once the putrefaction and thick humors are consumed, it rises and floats upon the water. Therefore, with impediments removed and subtler spirits added, the body will become ready and prompt for motion. William of Paris illustrates this (*1. part. of his Summa de universo*) with fools, who, remaining in their folly, move in marvelous ways, pass through dangers unharmed, and do other difficult and arduous things that they could in no way perform when free from their folly. The reason he gives is that during that time they eat little, their superfluous humors are evacuated, and their motive power is not so bound to the body as in the sane and wise. The same can be said of the body of the blessed person: with impediments removed and the motive power of the soul augmented, it becomes fit and agile for moving wherever the blessed person wills.

You object, first: Augustine (*11. Civit., cap. 10*) writes: "Then the heavy weight will be removed from the soul." Therefore in the beatific state, gravity will be removed from the glorified body, which impedes it from being moved

promptly and readily. Scotus responds (*cit.*, §. *Ad illud*, K), expounding Augustine of the weight that aggravates—namely, thick, noxious, and superfluous humors. Perhaps with this in view, Solomon (*Wisdom* 9) says: "The body that is corrupted weighs down the soul." But not of the weight that coincides with gravity, which is a property of the mixed and animated body, without which the soul cannot inform and perfect the body itself. Hence, as Aristotle says (2. *Caeli*, T. 71): if one star were added or removed, the heavens would not be moved by the angel applied to move them; so too, if the body were light, it would not be informable by the soul or movable by it. For we see that some things are impeded from motion on account of their lightness.

You object, second: if the glorified body were heavy, it would fall downward and tend toward the center to rest there, and it would remain violently above and in heaven. Therefore, for it to remain there, its gravity must be removed. I deny the antecedent. The reason was given in the second note: according to the inclination of the superior nature, it would rest naturally above in the absolute sense, though violently in a qualified sense, as was sufficiently explained in that passage.

You object, third: if the body of the blessed person were heavy, the soul by continuously moving it would grow weary and faint, and so would not be blessed, since beatitude removes all fatigue and labor. Therefore the body of the blessed person is devoid of gravity. I deny the antecedent. The reason is that the soul is not overcome by the gravity of the body, nor does any contrary action come from the body that would cause fatigue. Especially since fatigue comes from the consumption of spirits, which are repaired through rest. But such spirits do not exist in the soul but in the body—just as an angel moving the heavens is not fatigued, as I asserted (*lib. De Caelo*).

You object, fourth: the motive potency of the soul is substantial to the soul itself, really identified with it. Therefore it is not intensified in the beatific state, just as in the same state the soul is not intensified, since every substance, from the chapter on substance, does not admit of more and less. Consequently, the body is not rendered agile through the intensification of the soul's motive power. I reply by granting the antecedent and distinguishing the consequent: essentially, I concede; accidentally and extrinsically, I deny—for through the addition of pure spirits and the removal of impediments it is said to be intensified and perfected, as was abundantly explained above.

One may ask: after the day of judgment, will the saints in heaven be standing or sitting? It can be said that standing is to be attributed to them, rather than sitting or other positions. For in this way the body is more apt for operating and for moving more agilely, since the bending of its parts seems to conflict with agility. Hence (*Acts* 2) Stephen saw Jesus standing, not sitting or lying down. Augustine agrees (*lib. De symbolo*), explaining that article of faith, "He sits at the right hand of the Father," saying it is not to be understood of corporeal sitting but of

spiritual. In this way other passages can also be explained, especially Psalm 109, "Sit at my right hand"; and Matthew 19, "You too will sit judging the twelve tribes of Israel."

DOUBT IV. On the clarity of the glorified body.

Sole Section. Whether the bodies of the blessed will be clear.

That the endowment of clarity will be in the bodies of the blessed is the common doctrine of the Scholastics, especially Scotus (*4. d. 49, q. 15*), Saint Bonaventure, Richard, Bassolis, Vorillong, and Maior (*ibid.*). For easier understanding and more convenient comprehension:

Note, first, from the Doctor (*just cited, §. Respondeo, A*): clarity is a manifest splendor. For besides light and color, it conveys a manifestation of itself. Hence we call a light "clear," a truth "clear," and a color "clear" when it manifests itself or is ready to manifest itself. In this same sense, a Doctor is called "clear" whose doctrine is manifest to all, or can be manifested to all. The bodies of the saints will participate in manifest color, according to their complexions; hence according to diverse complexions they will have diverse colors, more and less beautiful, and also according to various regions, hot or cold, and as they were in the way. For it is probable that Ethiopians will retain their dark color and Tartars their whiteness, as Maior says (*cit., q. 10, at the end*). Also according to the merits of each, as Paul notes (*1 Cor. 15*): "One is the clarity of the sun, another the clarity of the moon." In seeing these, they will take more delight than in seeing the sun or any other luminous body—for a person takes more pleasure in looking at a well-colored face than at the blazing sun. Moreover, those bodies will not only be adorned with color but will also shine with light. Hence those bodies will be both colored and radiant. Therefore the Church sings to their praise and glory: "The just will shine like the sun."

Note, second, from the same (*loc. cit., sub B*), citing Avicenna (*6. Naturalium*), who affirms that luminosity, light, and color have different subjects in which they are received. For the subject of light is what is opaque and dense, while the subject of luminosity is what is translucent and terminately diaphanous. Hence Aristotle adds (*2. Caeli, T. 42*): the denser part of the heavens is luminous, like a star; and what is behind it cannot be seen, and so it eclipses it or another star, as is seen in an eclipse of the sun, when the moon prevents the sun from diffusing its rays to the earth. The remaining parts of the heavens, however, are diaphanous and luminous. From this it is inferred that if glorified bodies are luminous, they would not be translucent and transparent, so that other bodies could be seen through them. The subject of color is what is dense, since color is received in the terminated transparent medium, while luminosity is received in the unterminated transparent medium, as in air or water. Therefore it is probable that the bodies of the blessed will be luminous and colored, rather than luminous and bright with luminosity; for color and light are compatible in a

subject, although by a created agent they cannot be simultaneously induced into the same subject. But the parts of a diaphanous body do not receive light but luminosity; hence colored things are not transparent, and if they are diaphanous or luminous, they behave like a glow-worm. Although these things are commonly and regularly so, and according to the mind of Scotus, nevertheless there is no formal or virtual repugnance against diaphanous things being colored, as Bassolis and Maior (*cited above*) show more than others.

First assertion: the bodies of the blessed after the resurrection will be clear. The Doctor defends this (*cit.*, §. *Respondeo*, *A*). This is proved, first: (*Matt. 13*) "Then the just will shine like the sun in the kingdom of their Father"; (*Phil. 3*) "Conformed to the body of his glory"; and (*Apoc. 21*) "Having the glory of God." Second, Augustine (*22. Civit., cap. 19*): "After the resurrection, the Apostles saw the color of Christ's face, but they did not see his clarity." Third, every perfection is to be attributed to the body in the beatific state, since it is a perfect state; and its perfection is to have a fitting, luminous, and manifest color, which is the endowment of clarity, as is clear from the first note. Fourth, the glorified body is agile and impassible; therefore it is also clear, since clarity is a beatific endowment of the body, just like impassibility and agility. So that the body of the blessed person may be adorned and perfect in every way, it is not lacking in clarity.

Second assertion: the clarity of the glorified body is the manifest splendor of the color fitting to that body. So holds the Doctor (*loc. cit.*, *B*); and this is clear from the first note. For clarity adds nothing to color beyond the manifestation of itself; therefore the clarity of the said body means nothing other than the aforesaid splendor of the color fitting to its complexion, as is clear in the transfigured body of Christ (*Matt. 17*): "His face shone like the sun." That resplendence, that refulgence, is therefore the endowment of clarity.

You object, first: Gregory (*18. Mor., in cap. 18 of Job*) writes that the bodies of the blessed will be translucent and transparent, because the greater delight seems to be in seeing what is within rather than what is without. For in this, art seems to differ from nature: art produces harmony externally, but nature internally. Therefore the bodies of the blessed are not colored, and consequently not clear—since light is received in a dense body, not in a diaphanous one, as is clear from the second note. I reply that glorified bodies will be porous, and hence one blessed person can see what is within the body of another through its pores, as if it were diaphanous—just as a lynx can see what is within and beyond a wall. Thus the body of the blessed person will be more like crystal than air; for air is transparent, and therefore is receptive not of color or light, but of luminosity.

You object, second, from Augustine (*just mentioned*): the bodies of the blessed will be colored and beautiful. Therefore they will not be luminous or clear, because light and color do not seem to be compatible, as is clear from the sun, in which there is indeed light but not color. I grant the antecedent and deny the

consequent; for absolutely, light and color are not repugnant to each other, except on the part of the created agent, which cannot simultaneously introduce light and color into the same subject.

You object, third: clarity, or a clear color, presented to a viewer is necessarily seen by that viewer. But the body of Christ after the resurrection (*Luke 23*) was not recognized by the disciples going to Emmaus. Therefore the glorified body is not clear. Some respond from Augustine (*12. Civit., cap. 19*) that this happened because their eyes were weak, and therefore they could not discern the clarity of Christ's body—just as the Hebrews could not look upon the face of Moses (*Exod. 34*), and a bright cloud overshadowed the disciples at the Lord's transfiguration (*Matt. 17*). This is true of permanent vision, though not of transient; yet it is not absolutely true, as is clear from the sun, which is seen by us, but not as distinctly as by the eagle. Others, such as Thomas, respond that Christ concealed the clarity of his body by the command of his will, so that it would not be seen by those disciples, just as any blessed person can do. Against this: the will of anyone, whether blessed or not, cannot impede the action of a secondary cause—just as my will cannot prevent fire from burning or water from being heated, unless a contrary is present, such as fire against water and water against fire. Similarly, the will of the blessed person cannot prevent and impede natural causes from their acts and effects.

Scotus responds that this was done divinely—that is, by God not cooperating with the said disciples to see and recognize the Lord, as the sacred text indicates: "Their eyes were held, so that they did not recognize him." For without God's concurrence, no creature can do anything, since the action of the secondary cause depends essentially on the first cause. Hence it can happen that for seeing the clarity of a blessed person, God does not co-act in seeing it when the blessed person does not wish the clarity of his body to be seen by any non-blessed person; and so it can be said that the blessed person conceals the clarity of his body—not by his own will, but by God willing it, or rather not co-acting in beholding his clarity. Hence the objection of Argentinensis falls (*4. dist. 49, quaest. 1, art. 1*), who argues against Scotus: the blessed soul is not of lesser power, with respect to its own body, than an angel with respect to an alien body. But an angel, whether good or bad, can make it so that a body illuminated and at the proper distance in a medium is not seen by bystanders. Therefore the soul can do the same. The major is clear. The minor is supported: (*Gen. 19*) the angels struck them with blindness, from the least to the greatest, so that the enemies could not see. Likewise, magicians by the art of the demon make themselves invisible. This does not hold, I say; for this was done by good angels, with God not cooperating. By the demon, however, through the deception of the senses, as I showed abundantly (*Tract. De Angelis*).

One may ask: (*Luke 24*), Christ was seen by the aforementioned disciples in the guise of a pilgrim. Did he then change the color he had before? Did he show

them a sophisticated and phantasmal body? The Doctor responds (*at the end of the cited passage*) in the negative. For God could cause the action of a different quality in their eyes (or not concur with their visual potencies) so that they did not see the clarity of Christ's body, even though that body did not actually have such a color and quality—as is clear from vision through red glass, to which all things appear red, even though in them there is truly no red color. Nor was this an illusion or deception, because they were certain that he was such a person as he truly was, so that they would believe him to be Christ. And this was better than if they had seen him in his clarity, since Christ intended nothing other than to manifest his person to them.

DOUBT V. On the subtlety of the body of the blessed person.

Section I. Whether glorified bodies are subtle.

That the bodies of the blessed will be subtle is the common opinion of the theologians—Scotus (*4. dist. 49, q. 16, §. Dicunt quidam*), Richard (*ibid., q. 4*), Bassolis, Maior, and the rest—for whose understanding and explanation:

Note, from (*2. De generatione, T. 10*): the word "subtlety" is said from the power of penetrating and entering beneath. It is equivocal and hence must be distinguished. For it is taken in four senses. First, for what has an acute figure suitable for penetrating, like a needle. Second, for what has little matter, such as rare bodies—like air, because being rare, it is subtle and penetrative. Third, for the power by which something penetrates another: thus wine, oil, and things of that kind are called subtle, because they are penetrative. Fourth, for the possibility given to a glorified body to coexist with another body at the pleasure of the will of the soul informing it—and of this we speak in the present context, as is clear from Scotus (*cit., §. Ad argumenta*). The word is also transferred to cognitive potencies: for one is said to have a subtle sight who can penetrate to see small and distant things that others do not see, and a subtle intellect who scrutinizes and attains intimate and hidden things. Similarly, vital and animal spirits, as well as immaterial substances, are called subtle.

Assertion: the bodies of the blessed will be subtle. The Doctor holds this (*loc. cit.*). This is proved, first, from Scripture (*1 Cor. 15*): "It is sown a natural body, it shall rise a spiritual body." But what is spiritual is subtle, as is clear from the preceding note. Augustine (*just cited*) and Gregory, cited by Bonaventure, concur. Second, a body that penetrates another body is subtle, because the subtle is penetrative, as is clear from what was said above. But one glorified body penetrates another body, as the body of Christ penetrated the heavens (*Heb. 4*). Therefore, and so on. Third, one of the four beatific endowments is subtlety, as I asserted (*Doubt I of this article*). And the subtler a body is, the nobler it is, as is clear from the elements, among which the more excellent are the subtler and occupy a nobler place, such as fire and air. Again, the glorified body cannot be retarded or impeded from motion; otherwise it could be disturbed, afflicted, and put in

chains, in which case it would not be blessed but wretched. It must therefore be asserted that the glorified body is marked with subtlety.

You object, first: the glorified body possesses as much matter as it had when it was not glorified, because such a body is rightly proportioned and aptly organized. But a non-glorified body is not subtle, because it is opaque and material, which is opposed to the diaphanous and subtle. Therefore the body of the blessed person is not subtle. I reply that the argument concludes about grossness or subtlety in terms of quantity or quality, but not about subtlety in the fourth sense, about which we are now speaking.

You object, second: the subtle does not penetrate but is penetrated by the hard; for what is hard penetrates water, air, and similar things. If, therefore, the body of the blessed person were subtle, it would be passible—the opposite of which was established above. This is confirmed: the penetration of dimensions is considered impossible. But if the body of the blessed person were subtle, there would undoubtedly be a penetration of dimensions. Therefore, and so on. I distinguish the major: of subtlety joined with rarity in relation to a patient, I concede; of subtlety joined with the power of an agent and taken in the fourth sense, I deny. To the confirmation, I say the major holds of a body lacking the endowment of subtlety, but not of a body possessing it, as is the body of the blessed person.

You object, third: the glorified body is not of greater subtlety than a ray of light or air. But a ray of light or air does not by its subtlety penetrate opaque bodies, but only porous ones. Therefore, and so on. I reply that there is an equivocation in the name "subtlety," which from what was said in the note is equivocal. For a ray of light or air is subtle in the subtlety taken in the second sense; but the glorified body possesses subtlety in the fourth sense. Hence there is no valid argument.

Section II. What the subtlety of the glorified body is.

Many opinions are adduced and refuted by Bassolis (*quaest. 4, art. 1*), which can be reduced to two principal headings. One belongs to those asserting that the subtlety of the glorified body is something positive, who among themselves do not agree. For some assert that it is a kind of thinness by which the soul, by its command, can make the body of the blessed person pervade and permeate the cracks and pores of any body—in much the same way as a needle passes through porous bodies. Others affirm it is a quality caused by the overflow of the blessed soul into its body. The rest maintain it is a quality created by God, through which the body is penetrative of any other body. The other heading belongs to others who hold that subtlety represents nothing positive and absolute, and they are divided into two groups. Some say it is a subtraction of matter, so that the body that was material is converted into spirit and becomes entirely spiritual. The rest teach that subtlety is the due order of the glorified

body insofar as it is animated by a soul that has merited this; or more explicitly, the endowment of subtlety is a certain right by way of merit in the blessed person, according to divine ordination—with God himself doing this, either suspending his influence from bodies so that they do not resist each other, or so that they do not mutually expel each other.

First assertion: the subtlety of the glorified body is not the complete subjection by which the body is subjected to the soul so as to be able to reduce itself to any quantity and figure. So holds the Doctor (*cited above*, §. *Dicunt quidam*), and this seems to be against Durandus (*num. 9, dist. cited*). This is proved, first: the body of the blessed person is impassible, from what was said above. But if it were reduced to a small quantity, like a needle, it would be passible, because it would be condensed or rarefied; and condensation or rarefaction is a passion inconsistent with an impassible body. Therefore, and so on. Second, the glorified body is properly organic and aptly proportioned, as the soul requires in order to inform it, as is clear (*lib. 2. De anima*). But a body reduced to a small and tiny figure to pass through the thinnest pores and cracks of another body is not duly organized, as is clear from the cited passage and from (*lib. De quantitate, qq. De certa et determinata quantitate viventium animatorum*). Hence Scotus (*cited above*) rightly calls the opposite opinion a fiction. Third, the function of the soul is to inform and vivify an organic body suitable for exercising vital operations, as is clear from the twofold definition of the soul set forth and explained in the cited passage. Therefore the body is not reduced by the soul to the aforementioned subjection and obedience. Fourth, the divine mysteries of the Incarnation would easily be evaded if it were said that Christ's body passed through the cracks of the virgin's sealed womb; of the Resurrection, if it were asserted that the same body pervaded the pores of the stone of the sepulcher, or passed through the cracks of the door entering the cenacle to the disciples; of the Ascension, if it were held to have permeated the pores of the heavens. For those who assert these things would fall into the heresy of Calvin and others who deny that two bodies can simultaneously exist in the same place.

Second assertion: the subtlety of the body of the blessed person is not a quality caused by the glory of the blessed soul informing that body. This is deduced from Scotus (*cit., before §. Ad argumenta*). This is proved, first: the glory of the soul does not cause such a quality in the body informed by it, as is clear from the transfiguration of the Lord, in which the glory of Christ's soul did not overflow into his body, leaving it in the state it was in before. Therefore, and so on. Second, the happiness of the soul is situated in the vision and enjoyment of the divine essence, which, since they are qualities and termini of the potencies of the intellectual nature, cannot produce another quality by which the body of the blessed person would become subtle. Moreover, in the next assertion it will be shown that no quality can render the body of the blessed person subtle.

Third assertion: the subtlety of such a body is not a quality created by God and inhering in the glorified body itself. So holds the Doctor (*just cited*); Durandus (*num. 10*); and Argentinensis. This is proved, first: that quality would not be of greater power than the power of an angel, "upon the earth there is no power that can be compared to him" (*Job 41*). But the power of an angel cannot render a body subtle so that it permeates and penetrates any body, just as it cannot create a vacuum, from what was asserted elsewhere. Therefore neither can that quality make the body subtle. Second, that quality would be either active or passive. Not the second, because the glorified body would then undergo passion, which is false, since it is impassible. Not the first, because its action would not be the simultaneity of bodies; for its opposite more designates action—namely, the expulsion of another body. Nor is it a terminus, because the simultaneity of certain things is the non-mutual expulsion—and so it is rather a lack than a positing of action. If, therefore, that quality did not act, it would be more of an impediment to the body than an aid. Third, that quality would be either material or spiritual. If the first, it is not apparent why something material would render a body spiritual, since nothing can formally confer on another what it does not formally possess, according to the common dictum: "No one gives what he does not have." If the second, just as the spiritual soul does not make the body spiritual but only gives it life in first act and second act, so that quality, although spiritual, would not make the body subtle and spiritual. Fourth, such a quality would be necessary and natural, acting necessarily and naturally, always inclining to the same thing. But the obedience of the lower powers to the higher does not seem always to tend to the same thing, because sometimes they conform to right reason and sometimes they oppose it. Therefore the body would not be moved at the will of the soul, but according to the causality of the aforesaid quality; and so it would be more of a burden than an adornment for the blessed person.

Fourth assertion: the subtlety of the aforesaid body is not the conversion of matter into spirit. This is deduced from the Doctor (*loc. cit.*), who decrees that the same body in number remains—the opposite of which is censured as heretical by Bassolis and Durandus (*in the cited passages*). This is proved, first: if the body through subtlety were turned into a spirit, it would no longer be a body but a spirit; and so the resurrection of the dead would be removed, and our faith would be in vain—yet it is written: (*Mark 16*) "He is risen, he is not here"; (*John 11*) "Immediately he who had been dead came forth"; (*Luke 7*) "He gave him to his mother"; and (*1 Cor. 15*) "If Christ has risen, then we also shall rise." Augustine concurs (*De fide ad Petrum, cap. 17*): "The same man was in his mother's womb, hung on the cross, lay in the sepulcher, and rose again." Second, the body is now called "animal," and the sinful man is called an "animal man." But it is not called animal because it has been turned into a soul, as is clear. Therefore neither will his body then be called spiritual because it has been changed into a spirit. For it will be restored at that time, but will not be essentially changed—otherwise it

would not be a human being, who is essentially corporeal. Third, the human being would not be beatified or receive the rewards of his merits, because he would no longer be a human being but the spirit into which his body was changed. And innumerable other absurdities would follow from the aforesaid absurd, erroneous, and heretical opinion.

Fifth assertion: the endowment of subtlety means nothing other than the possibility of one body coexisting with another body, at the pleasure of the will of the soul informing it. So holds Scotus (*passage cited; and dist. 50, quaest. 6, §. Iuxta*). This is proved, first, from the refutation of the other opinions, in comparison with which this one is judged more probable and more subtle by Bassolis (*loc. cit.*). For since the endowment of subtlety was conceded above, and it is none of the things previously described, from a sufficient enumeration it is inferred to be exactly what was stated above. Second, one must philosophize in the same way about the endowment of subtlety as about the endowment of impassibility, as Scotus rightly deduces—from whom Durandus and Argentinensis (*cited above*) do not seem to be far distant. But impassibility denotes nothing positive and absolute, from what was previously shown. Therefore the same must be asserted of subtlety.

You object, first, against the first assertion: a body commonly called subtle is one that has fewer parts of matter under the same or greater quantity. Therefore, since from the preceding article the glorified body is subtle, it follows that it is subtle through a paucity of matter, like air or another thin body. The Doctor responds (*cit., §. Ad argumenta*): the glorified body is not subtle through the absence of some part of matter, but through the possibility of existing with another body, at the pleasure of the will of the soul—not effectually from itself, but from the divine will.

You object, second, against the second assertion: Augustine (*lib. ad Dioscorum*): "God made the soul of such powerful nature that from its full happiness perpetual health and incorruptible vigor overflow into the body"—as (*Matt. 17*): "His face shone like the sun." Where Scotus says this was then not a miracle, but the cessation of a miracle. Therefore, through the overflow of the glory of the soul, the subtlety of the body is caused. I reply that Augustine only means there that the body, from its union with the blessed soul, is concomitantly and regularly beatified—which we do not deny. However, he does not affirm that subtlety and the other beatific endowments are effected by the glory of the soul; for since the glory of the soul consists in the vision and enjoyment of the divinity, which are the ultimate termini of rational potencies (*from 9. Met. 16*), they cannot cause anything else.

You object, third, against the third assertion: clarity and agility are positive, real qualities; therefore the same must be asserted of subtlety and impassibility. For there does not seem to be a stronger reason for those than for these. This is confirmed: just as man is pleasing to God through grace, which is a positive, real

quality, and blessed through glory, so the body is subtle through a quality immediately caused by God and inhering in the glorified body. I concede the antecedent and deny the consequent—just as it is invalid to say: matter and form are positive, real principles; therefore privation, which is the third principle of natural generation, is also a positive, real thing. By this the confirmation is also answered: the antecedent is conceded and the consequent denied.

You object, fourth, against the fourth assertion: (*1 Cor. 15*): "It is sown a natural body, it shall rise a spiritual body." Therefore the body through subtlety is turned into a spirit. I reply by way of explanation: the body will rise spiritual not through the conversion of body into spirit, but through the endowment of subtlety. For just as it is called clear through clarity, and impassible through impassibility, so also it is called subtle through subtlety. Hence Bassolis and Nicholas of Neise, explaining that testimony, say: "It shall rise spiritual"—that is, subtle. And this can be corroborated from many passages of Scripture demonstrating that after the resurrection the same body remains: (*Job 19*) "In my flesh I shall see God my Savior"; (*Luke 24*) "Handle and see, for a spirit does not have flesh and bones." Gregory concurs: "The flesh of Christ rose again, but of a different glory, of the same nature—that is, corporeal."

§ III. Whether a glorified body can exist simultaneously, through its subtlety, with a non-glorified body.

That by the power of nature two bodies cannot simultaneously occupy the same place was shown in Physics, book VI, question 2, article 2. But now we must investigate whether this can be brought about by the power of God. On this matter, Durandus (*4, distinction 44, question 6*) holds that it is impossible and involves a contradiction, and Calvin and other sectarians follow him. The common opinion, however, is that of Scotus (*4, distinction 49, question 6, § Respondeo*), Richard (*question 5*), Argentré, and St. Bonaventure (*ibid., question 1, on the endowment of subtlety*), who affirm that no contradiction is enclosed herein, and that God can bring it about that two bodies simultaneously exist in the same place—whether one is glorified and the other not, or both are glorified, or neither is.

Note, from Scotus (*cited § Respondeo, OS*): Some say that between one quantity and another quantity, and likewise between one "where" and another "where," there is no formal repugnance, but only a virtual one. Formal repugnance exists between things that are opposed according to themselves and their effects, as white and black. Virtual repugnance, however, obtains between a natural cause and the opposite of its effect—for example, if the heavens were generating a worm from a given matter and a stronger agent supervened and induced in that same matter a form opposed to the form of the worm, this form is virtually opposed to the heavens. Now, quantity is not formally repugnant to quantity, since nothing is contrary to quantity or to substance, and formal repugnance

does not exist except in the same subject. But there are, by hypothesis, multiple subjects—namely, multiple bodies. The repugnance, therefore, is only with respect to place, because place is a space capable of containing a body, and one body fills one place to the extent that the place is apt to be filled. Accordingly, another body is opposed to it, because it cannot fill the same place already occupied by another body. The opposition is therefore virtual, insofar as the effect of one cause—namely, the filling of a place—is opposed to another natural cause, insofar as another body cannot occupy a place already occupied by another body. God, however, can prevent a natural cause from producing its effect, as when he prevents fire from igniting and heating. For this reason, if either body is abstracted from local repletion, there is undoubtedly no contradiction in two bodies existing simultaneously in the same place, one of which fills the place while the other abstracts from local circumscription. It can also be defended that two bodies can exist simultaneously in the same place even commensuratively and circumscriptively, because quantity, according to Physics IV, the chapter on the void, belongs to the genus of "sterile" things, and since nothing is contrary to it, consequently no contradiction is found to prevent two bodies from being simultaneously circumscribed by the same place, as Bassolis and other notable Scotists hold.

First assertion: two bodies, whether glorified or not, can exist simultaneously in the same place. So holds Scotus (*cited above*), following Damascene (4, *On the Faith, last chapter*) and Gregory (*cited by Bonaventure, question 1, on the endowment of subtlety*).

This is proved, first, because what has been done was at some time actual and was possible, since there is no potency toward the impossible. But it has in fact happened that two bodies existed simultaneously in the same place—namely, the body of the Blessed Virgin and of Christ the Lord at the Nativity; the body of Christ and the stone of the Sepulchre at the Resurrection; at the entry through closed doors to the Disciples in the Upper Room; at the Ascension into heaven; and in his coexistence with the empyrean heaven. Therefore two bodies can exist simultaneously in the same place.

Durandus (*recently cited*) objects that Christ's body exited from the Virgin's womb not by breaking but by dilation of the virginal enclosure, just as would have happened if the state of innocence had endured. To the point that Christ rose with the tomb sealed, he responds that this is not found in Sacred Scripture, and if some Saint asserts it, it is to be taken as an opinion.

Against this: this evasion is precluded by what was proved in § II of this doubt. For dilation and constriction, like condensation and rarefaction, are passions that are incompatible with a glorified body, since it is impassible. Furthermore, even if in the state of innocence there had been dilation, virginity would not have been preserved. But the Blessed Mary, according to the faith, remained a Virgin after giving birth; therefore the comparison fails. Moreover, the sacred

text is twisted: Hebrews 4 says that Christ penetrated the heavens, not that he dilated them—for as is evident from the terms themselves, penetrating is one thing and dilating is another. Furthermore, Matthew 28 records that after Christ's resurrection, an angel rolled back the stone from the entrance of the tomb; therefore before that it was closed, and accordingly Christ rose with the tomb sealed. And the Church sings: "He who, enclosed by the stone, is guarded under the soldier, triumphant in noble pomp, rises victorious from the tomb."

Second, if there were any repugnance, it would be on account of two quantities mutually repugnant, one expelling the other from the same place. But nothing is contrary to quantity, as is evident from the *Predicaments*, chapter on quantity (*1, Predicaments, chapter on quantity*). Therefore, etc.

Third, a cause can exist without its effect, as in Daniel 3, where fire did not burn the three Hebrew boys thrown into it. If, then, the effect of quantity is to fill a place, God can bring it about that one body fills a place while another does not fill the same place. It therefore does not imply a contradiction for two bodies to exist simultaneously in the same place.

Fourth, in the same foundation and subject there can be multiple accidents and relations, not only intrinsically but also extrinsically adventitious—for example, multiple paternities in the same father, and multiple locations of bodies in the same "where." Likewise, a prior thing can be multiplied without the posterior being multiplied, since multiple causes can exist without a multiplication of effects, because a prior, as prior, does not depend on a posterior. Now, bodies are prior to place, just as a subject and foundation are prior to the accident and relation founded and received in them. And a body can exist without a place, as is clear from the outermost sphere and from a body that God, if he willed, could place beyond the heavens.

Second assertion: it is also probable that two bodies can occupy the same place simultaneously even circumscriptively. This is proved, first, because the bodies of the blessed exist simultaneously with the empyrean heaven commensuratively, and it is not plausible that the body of Christ or of the heavens abstracts from local repletion and commensurative circumscription. This assertion is therefore likely. Second, it is easier for two bodies to exist simultaneously with their natural mode than with some other non-natural mode, as the Doctor argues (*4, distinction 10*) against St. Thomas, who holds that one body can exist in multiple places sacramentally but not circumscriptively. But if both bodies exist simultaneously in the same place circumscriptively, each is in its natural mode; whereas if either abstracts from local repletion, one of them is without its natural mode, because it is not commensurated by the place. Therefore this is possible. Third, nothing is contrary to quantity, as stated above; therefore two quantities of two bodies are simultaneously compossible in the same place. Moreover, there is no contradiction in two foundations or subjects equal to a third having two intrinsic respects of equality founded in

them toward that third; therefore neither is there any contradiction in two bodies equal to a given place having two extrinsic respects of passive circumscription founded in them, simultaneously terminated at one place. The former is possible; therefore so is the latter.

You object, first, against the first assertion: Boethius (*1, On the Trinity, chapter 1*) says that a variety of accidents produces numerical difference, yet place is always diverse, since we can in no way conceive one place as two. If, then, diversity of place constitutes numerical or individual difference, it plainly follows that two bodies cannot exist simultaneously in one place.

I respond that Boethius is to be interpreted not with respect to constitution, because place does not individuate or singularize a body, since a body can exist without a place, as is clear from the outermost sphere—but with respect to manifestation, because it is naturally known to us that one body is contained in one place, and if one body enters a place, another body withdraws from that place.

You object, second, from Physics I, 17: things that are the same as a third thing are the same as each other. But if two bodies are simultaneously in the same place, they are the same as each other; therefore they will not be two bodies but one, which contradicts the hypothesis. The major is well known. The minor is supported thus: the dimensions of a body cannot be different from the dimensions of a place, from Physics IV, chapter on the void—if there were a void, a cube (that is, a cubic body) could not be placed there. And where the cause remains, the effect remains.

I respond with Scotus (*cited, in the solution to the third*): place does not participate dimensions, as is established in Physics IV (*just cited*), where the ancient philosophers who supposed place to be an interval or space between the sides of the containing body are refuted. Aristotle infers that as an absurdity—that is, if place were that space, then the dimensions of the place and of the located body would be the same. The Doctor adds that the dimensions are the same not positively but negatively. Others say they are the same with respect to equality, but not with respect to identity of quantity.

You object, third, that things which agree more seem more capable of coexisting simultaneously—as water with water, and fire with fire coexist more readily than with things of a different genus and species. But two glorified bodies agree more than a glorified and a non-glorified body, and yet a glorified body is not simultaneously with another glorified body through the endowment of subtlety; therefore, etc.

I respond that the major is not true unless other things are equal, since not every similarity is a ground for simultaneity. For if that were true, two quantities, being of the same genus and species, would naturally be simultaneously in the same place, and two forms would be simultaneously in the same matter—which

I showed to be false in the Physics. To the minor I say that God has ordained that a glorified body can coexist with a non-glorified body at the will of the blessed, for the sake of acquiring some perfection; but God has not so ordained that one glorified body be in another glorified body, since no perfection is acquired from the simultaneity of both.

You object, fourth, that the entire reason why two bodies cannot coexist simultaneously is the twofold quantity of each, for one quantity does not tolerate another alongside it, because the entities of both are mutually repugnant; therefore, etc. Confirmation 1: just as two parts of quantity cannot simultaneously occupy the same position, so neither can a whole quantity, because it belongs to the intrinsic nature of quantity to have parts outside parts. Confirmation 2: if parts of quantity could exist simultaneously in the same place and position, they could be simultaneously replicated so that one would not be outside the other, and consequently it could happen that a great mountain would pass through the eye of a needle, and the entire heaven could be enclosed in a tiny purse—which seems not merely impossible but even incredible.

I respond in two ways. First, according to Scotus, there is repugnance in quantities with respect to simultaneous existence, but not formal repugnance—only virtual, as explained above. Second, following Bassolis: quantities are not repugnant to each other except from the order of things so established by God, such that the quantity of one does not simultaneously exist with the quantity of another body. To the first confirmation: two parts that are connected and conjoined cannot simultaneously occupy the same place, because they are so disposed that one excludes the other from the same place. But disjointed parts are not mutually repugnant to being united so as to coexist in the same place. Now, when it is argued that it belongs to the nature of quantity to have parts outside parts—with respect to internal extension, this is granted; but with respect to external position, it is denied, as I explained at length in Physics, book V, question 1. To the second confirmation, I say that this is possible through the removal of external extension, but not of internal extension, as is evident from the body of Christ in the Eucharist, which is whole in the smallest particle of the host, because its quantity abstracts from external position and local circumscription.

You object, fifth, that two indivisibles cannot be immediate; otherwise they would not be two, as is evident from Physics VI, chapter 1 and following. Therefore, by parity, if two bodies were simultaneously in the same place, they would not be two but only one—which contradicts the hypothesis.

I concede the antecedent but deny the consequent. The reason for the disparity is that indivisibles have no magnitude or smallness whatsoever, whereas bodies enjoy their own proper magnitude and divisibility. Therefore, even when placed simultaneously in the same place, they are distinguished and divided from each other. I add that two indivisibles or points would be distinguished from each

other even though nothing mediated between them; there would, however, be no continuum there.

You object, sixth, that from one point to another point only one straight line can be drawn. But if two bodies were simultaneously in the same place, two straight lines could be drawn from one point of the containing body to another point of the same contained body; therefore, etc.

I distinguish the major: with respect to the same body, I concede; with respect to different bodies, I deny. For in that case there would be two lines simultaneously and in the same place, just as there are two bodies existing simultaneously in the same place. Moreover, between two opposite points of a place, two straight lines can indeed be extended, but not if the places are not opposite.

§ IV. Through what a glorified body can exist simultaneously with a non-glorified body.

Since it was established in the preceding section that, absolutely speaking, two bodies can enjoy the simultaneous existence of one and the same place, it is fitting now to inquire through what a glorified body can penetrate a non-glorified body. On this matter, several modes of explanation are presented and rejected by Scotus (*4, distinction 49, question 16*), Vorrilong, Bassolis, and others at the same place.

The first is that of St. Bonaventure (*cited distinction, question 1, on the endowment of subtlety*), who affirms that the two aforementioned bodies can coexist in the same place not as mathematical quanta—for then they would become one—but as natural quanta, because although they would not differ in position, they would differ in subject.

The second is that of Richard (*question 5, opinion 2*), who holds that through a created power, which is the endowment of subtlety, a glorified body can coexist in the same place with a non-glorified body.

The third is that of Peter of Tarantasia (*this distinction, problem 4, § 3*), who defends that through the removal of grossness the aforementioned bodies are compatible with each other in the same place.

The fourth is that of St. Thomas (*distinction 44 of the same book 4, question 2, article 2, in the solution to the second sub-question*), who holds that this is accomplished through the removal of matter from the body. For he thinks that the diversity of matter requires diverse places, and since a composite depends not only on proximate causes but also and chiefly on the first cause, consequently God, abstracting matter from a body, can by his power place and conserve the said bodies simultaneously in the same place—in the manner in which, in the Eucharist, he places and conserves the sacramental accidents without a subject.

The fifth is that of Godfrey (*Quodlibet* 6, *question* 5), who teaches that a glorified body exists simultaneously with a non-glorified one through the removal of the quantitative mode by reason of which a body is in a place, which mode can be removed by God.

The sixth is that of Scotus (*cited, before § Respondeo*) and Henry (*Quodlibet* 9, *last question, ad 1*), who affirm that the two aforementioned bodies can exist simultaneously in the same place because God can conserve a prior thing without a posterior, and place is posterior to the body, naturally consequent upon quantity. God, then, can remove place from a body, and in this way it is possible for those bodies to coexist simultaneously in the same place.

First assertion: a glorified body is not able to exist simultaneously in the same place with a non-glorified body on the ground that they are natural quanta rather than mathematical quanta. So holds the Doctor (*cited above, § Dicunt quidam*).

This is proved, first: a natural body and a mathematical body differ only by abstraction—namely, a natural quantum is conjoined with sensible matter, while a mathematical quantum abstracts from sensible matter, as was explained elsewhere. Therefore, if natural bodies can simultaneously possess the same place, the same must be affirmed of mathematical bodies, because consideration and abstraction posit nothing in things. Since they are really identical, it is plainly deduced that the aforementioned distinction carries no weight.

Second, only the quantity of one body prevents the quantity of another body from existing simultaneously in the same place—no one denies this. But both mathematical and natural quantity are essentially quantity, differing only by the aforesaid distinction. Therefore the cited distinction is irrelevant to the matter.

Nor does it avail to say, with Bassolis (*cited, article 2, distinction 7*), that natural quantity differs by subject and mathematical quantity by position. For both require both a subject and a position: since quantity is an accident, it requires a subject; and since it is the ground of existing in a place, it demands a position. This distinction, therefore, does not resolve the proposed difficulty.

Second assertion: it is not possible, through a created power obtained through subtlety, for those bodies to possess the simultaneous existence of the same place. This is defended by the aforementioned Doctor (*§ Ad argumenta, in the solution to the second*).

This is proved, first, by the arguments adduced in doubt 2, § 2, assertion 3. Second, the power of any form, whether substantial or accidental, is limited and finite; therefore through no created power can two bodies possess simultaneous existence in the same place. For since a body is determined to one place, and the placement of one is the expulsion of another—as is confirmed by experience, since when water enters the place of air, the air recedes from that place, and so

on, just as the generation of one thing is the corruption of another. Third, a positive change cannot naturally occur unless there is a transition from the privation of a form to its possession in those things in which they are apt to concur. Therefore, absolutely speaking, no created power can bring it about that one body occupies one place and is not deprived of another place, as is clear in local motion.

Third assertion: through the removal of grossness, corpulence, or heaviness, a glorified body does not exist simultaneously in the same place with a non-glorified body. The aforementioned Doctor holds this.

This is proved, first: even if grossness or corpulence is removed from a body, there still remains the reason why one body cannot simultaneously exist in the same place—namely, the quantity of one filling the place and expelling another body from the same place, as I noted above. Two bodies cannot simultaneously occupy the same place on account of their quantities, which are naturally incompatible in the same place, and with corpulence removed, the quantities of the said bodies still remain. Therefore the alleged reason is irrelevant. Second, a glorified body is sensible and quantified, because glory does not remove sensibility and quantity from it. And with heaviness removed, it still remains quantified and sensible, as is evident from the heavens, which, according to *On the Heavens* II, 1, are neither heavy nor light, yet are natural and quantified. Third, corpulence is a quality that is posterior to quantity, for the first accident consequent upon corporeal substance is quantity. Therefore, with corpulence removed, quantity is not removed—for when a posterior is removed, it is not necessary that the prior be removed, since a cause can exist without its effect, and a principle without what is principiated. And so it is not correctly inferred that, through the removal of heaviness, those bodies hold the same place simultaneously.

Fourth assertion: the matter of one body is not an impediment to another body preventing both from simultaneously having the same place. Scotus defends this (*at the passage reviewed*).

This is proved, first: matter considered precisely does not require a place, for matter can exist without a place—as if it were placed beyond the heavens, since place is posterior to it, just as it is posterior to a body. Therefore, through the removal of matter, two bodies are not established simultaneously in the same place.

Second, if the matters of bodies were distinguished by places, then matters would not be distinguished unless places were distinguished. And since matter is an intrinsic and essential part of a body, it could not even by divine power come about that a body exist without a place, just as a body cannot exist without matter. But it is absurd that a body cannot exist without a place; therefore it is absurd that bodies could exist in the same place without matter.

Third, according to Thomas, form is individuated through matter. If, then, matter does not remain distinct, neither does the form, nor the body composed of them. But it is contradictory for a body to exist without its intrinsic and essential causes. Therefore the reason assigned is of no avail for placing those bodies simultaneously in the same place.

Fifth assertion: one body is not simultaneously with another in the same place through the removal of the quantitative mode. The Doctor teaches this (*before § Respondeo*).

This is proved, first: what is in a place equal to itself is in a place with its quantitative mode, because from quantity flows equality or inequality as its proper attribute. But a body existing simultaneously with another body is in a place equal to itself, for it retains its quantity, which is the ground of filling the place. Therefore this reason carries no weight.

Second, although God can bring about a body without quantity, the question is how, with quantity persisting in two bodies, one can exist simultaneously with the other. For Christ's body, when it ascended and penetrated the heavens, possessed the quantity appropriate to it and the other accidents that pertain to its integrity and adornment. It is not necessary, therefore, to remove quantity in order for two bodies to obtain simultaneous existence in a place.

Sixth assertion: by the power of God alone can two bodies share the same place simultaneously. Scotus teaches this (*cited, § Ad argumenta, in the solution to the second*), and Bassolis shows it at length (*cited, article 3, § Sed quantum ad*).

This is proved, first: the law of created power is that one body is contained and circumscribed by one place and does not bear or tolerate another body alongside it in the same place. Therefore only the divine power, which is bound by no law, can establish two bodies simultaneously in the same place. The antecedent is clear from what has been said and from experience; the consequent is immediate, since God, being infinite, possesses infinite power.

Second, to that power alone belongs it to bring about that two bodies enjoy simultaneous existence in one place, to which it belongs to bring about that one body simultaneously exists in multiple places, whether circumscriptively or sacramentally. But this can be accomplished only by the divine power, as I showed at length elsewhere. Therefore the former as well.

Third, he whom nothing resists can accomplish whatever is possible. For an angel, whom all of conjoined nature resists, cannot produce a void. But nothing resists the power of God, as is evident from Romans 9. Therefore by divine power this is possible. Moreover, that power alone can establish two bodies simultaneously in the same place which can bring it about that a body moves as swiftly as a spirit. Only the power of God can accomplish the latter; therefore also the former.

Seventh assertion: through the endowment of subtlety, a glorified body can exist simultaneously in the same place with a non-glorified body. Scotus holds this (*cited above, § Respondeo*).

This is proved, first, from the refutation of the other positions in the preceding assertions. Second, through the endowment of impassibility, the body of the blessed is rendered impassible; therefore, through the endowment of subtlety, a glorified body can penetrate a non-glorified body, and be intimately present to it at the will of one's own volition—not indeed from its own effective power, but from the divine will so decreeing, as the Doctor clearly explains (*cited, § Ad argumenta*).

You object, first: to every necessary cause there corresponds a necessary effect, for both are correlatives. But the endowment of subtlety is a necessary cause, namely a quality; therefore it has a proper effect, which can be none other than the penetration of a glorified body with a non-glorified one.

I concede the major but deny the minor. For impassibility is an endowment that, according to us who deny that impassibility and subtlety are qualities (following Scotus at the aforementioned passage before § Respondeo), has no effect. Subtlety is a certain extrinsic respect toward another body, and this respect is simultaneity.

You say: impassibility prevents a contrary agent from being able to cause action. I say that this is not an action but a resistance, as is evident from the heavens, which prevent the elements from acting upon them without any action elicited by the heavens themselves.

You object, second: unless subtlety is the cause of a body's coexisting with another body, the body after the resurrection would be a burden to the soul. For the soul could of itself coexist with any body, while its body could not coexist with any other body, and so the body would be a burden to it, since without it the soul could do what with it it could not—which conflicts with Augustine (22, *City of God, chapter 11*).

The inference is to be denied. The reason is that the body could, by divine power, exist simultaneously with another body just as quickly as if the soul, being without a body, could coexist with another body by its own power. For God assists it at its very nod, as though it had this in its own power—just as a wayfarer has grace, although grace is not produced by him but created by God.

You object, third: Scotus asserts that one body cannot exist simultaneously in another unless one of them is absolved from local repletion. Therefore from one of the bodies the quantitative mode is removed, and so he unfairly refutes Godfrey, into whose opinion he unwillingly falls.

I concede the antecedent and distinguish the consequent: with respect to external extension, I concede; with respect to internal extension and the internal position of parts, I deny, as was abundantly explained elsewhere.

§ V. Whether the beatitude of the body is accidental.

Since the Scholastic Doctors—notably Richard (4, *distinction 49, article 5, question 1*)—establish a twofold reward or beatitude, one essential and the other accidental, the essential beatitude concerns the primary or uncreated object and consists in the clear vision and perfect enjoyment of that same object. The accidental beatitude concerns the secondary or created object, without which the soul can be blessed. For this reason Augustine adds (5, *Confessions, chapter 4*): "Blessed is he who knows you, even if he knows not those things; but he who knows both you and them is not more blessed on account of them, but blessed on account of you alone." In the present inquiry, however, we are examining whether the glory of the body is essential or accidental.

Note that the beatitude of the body can be called essential in two ways. In one way, principally—and in this sense only the beatitude of the soul is essential, because the soul is the principal part of the human being. In another way, less principally—and in this sense, since the body is the less principal part of the human being, its beatitude can consequently be called essential, though less principally.

Assertion: the beatitude of the body is essential to it. This is taught by Richard (*cited*) and indicated by the Doctor (4, *distinction 49, question 8, § Ad argumenta; and distinction 50, question 5, § Ad 1. quest.*).

This is proved, first: both the soul and the body are essential parts of the human being, though one is formal and the other material. Therefore, just as the beatitude of the soul is essential, so the beatitude of the body is essential.

Second, that perfection is essential without which the subject would not be perfect, as was indicated above. But without beatitude, the human body would not be perfect, for it naturally tends toward it. Therefore the happiness of the body is essential.

Third, that perfection is accidental which is superadded to the essential and primary perfection—and the beatitude of the body is not of this kind, since the body tends toward it just as the soul inclines toward its own happiness.

Fourth, through the beatitude of the soul and of the body, the whole human being is totally beatified, and without it one is neither perfectly blessed nor indeed a perfect human being, and therefore not blessed. The beatitude of the body therefore contributes to the integrity and complete happiness of the human being, and is consequently essential to it.

You object, first: no beatitude is called essential that accrues to the essential beatitude, for that is accidental which comes to a thing already complete and perfect in its beatific being. But the happiness of the body accrues to the beatitude of the soul, as is evident from the Gloss on Exodus 25. Therefore the beatitude of the body is accidental.

I concede the major but deny the minor. For the beatitude of the body belongs not to the soul but to the body itself. Since it is proper to the body, it does not pertain to the soul.

You object, second: what is essential to one thing is not accidental to another, since, as Physics III, 27 teaches, substance is accidental to nothing. But the beatitude of the body is accidental to the substantial beatitude of the soul, for the happiness of the body follows upon the happiness of the soul. Therefore the beatitude of the body is accidental.

I deny the major. For although substance is accidental to nothing, nevertheless what is essential to one thing can be accidental to another—as heat is essential to whiteness, yet accidental to a wall, because a wall is only accidentally white.

Article V. On the beatitude of the whole human being.

That the elect will be blessed in soul and body is taught with the orthodox faith by the Doctor (*distinction 50, question 5, § Ad 1. quest.*), and the same Doctor writes that the entire human nature is the subject of happiness (*ibid., distinction 49, question 8, § Ad argumenta*). Therefore, after the investigation of the beatitude of the soul and of the body conducted above, it is now fitting to undertake a discussion of the happiness of the whole composite, that is, of the human being.

Doubt I. Whether all the senses of the blessed will have their acts.

St. Thomas (*4, distinction 44, article 2, question 1, in the solution to the third, sub-question 4*) and Richard (*ibid., distinction 49, article 4, question 3*) hold that all the senses of the elect in the fatherland will have their acts. St. Bonaventure, however (*at the same place, article 3, question 1*), Scotus (*question 13, § Ad rationes principales, in the solution to the second*), Major (*first conclusion*), Vorrilong (*article 2, first conclusion*), and many others assert that some senses will issue into their acts while others will not. For the resolution of this matter:

Note, from the Doctor just cited: some senses are necessary and pertain to perfection, such as sight and hearing; others exist on account of need rather than necessity, and their acts involve a concomitant imperfection, such as taste and those that serve nutrition. Furthermore, note from the same author that a certain kind of passion is corruptive and destructive of its contrary, while another kind is perfective, as is evident from what was said elsewhere. Finally, observe that change is twofold—intentional and real—and that there can be intentional change without real change, as was made clear in its proper place.

First assertion: not all the exterior senses of the blessed in the fatherland will issue into their acts. The Doctor holds this (*cited above*).

This is proved, first: where the objects of certain external senses are not present, neither are the acts of those senses, since external senses require their objects to be actually existing in order to act, as I said in the book on the sensitive soul, in the question on the external senses. But in heaven there are no odors or flavors, since these are corruptible qualities, as I showed there. Therefore not all external senses will issue into their acts in heaven.

Second, taste and smell serve nutrition and the restoration of what has been lost, but in heaven there is neither nutrition nor other acts accompanied by imperfection. Therefore not all external senses of the elect will produce their acts.

Second assertion: sight, hearing, and touch will elicit their acts in the fatherland.

Concerning sight, this is proved from Job 19: "In my flesh I shall see God my Savior," and Revelation 1: "Every eye shall see him." Augustine adds (*in the book On the Spirit and the Soul*): "Sight will be refreshed in the contemplation of Christ's humanity," and there is the object of sight—light and warmth—for glorified bodies will be luminous, duly proportioned, and translucent.

Concerning hearing, this is clear from Psalm 149: "The high praises of God shall be in their throats." Both the interlinear and the marginal gloss affirm this. And Revelation (*just cited*): "They sang a new song."

Concerning touch, this is shown from Luke 24: "Handle and see, for it is I." Moreover, the medium of touch—namely, conjoined flesh—is present there. And it is plausible that the blessed will mutually embrace one another. I add that the said senses exhibit no concomitant imperfection in their acts. They are therefore to be granted in the fatherland with their acts.

You object, first: a power conjoined with its act is nobler than one separated from it, because it is perfected by its act—as the intellect is perfected by understanding and the sense by sensation. For understanding and sensing include perfection. But the beatific state is perfect; therefore, since the blessed possess all the senses, it follows that all of them exercise their acts.

Confirmation: just as the soul desires union with the body, so it desires union with its object. Therefore, since the soul is glorified through the union of the acts of its powers, it follows that the sensitive body too is glorified through the exercise of its sentient powers with their acts.

I distinguish the antecedent: concerning a power whose act is not accompanied by imperfection and does not exist on account of need, I concede; concerning a power whose act is followed by imperfection and exists on account of want, I deny—as is clear from taste and smell, explained above. To the confirmation,

the parity is to be denied, and the reason for the disparity is given through the distinction just presented.

You object, second: the body is glorified because it served the soul; therefore the sense too should be joined to its object through its act, since it serves the soul. For there is nothing in the intellect that was not first in the sense (*from the book On Sense and the Sensible, chapter 6*).

I concede the antecedent but deny the consequent concerning taste and smell, for the reason already given. For they are beatified, if not through the presence of their objects and their own acts, at least through the redundancy of the soul's glory into the body and into all its senses.

You object, third: sound does not occur except by means of air, as is evident from its definition given in *On the Soul II*, T. 96. But in heaven there is no air; therefore there is no sound, and so hearing does not enjoy its act there.

I respond that the major holds in this present state, in which air is also required for living and breathing. But in another state air is not necessary, especially since God can supply its function there, just as he can bring it about that a human being live and speak in a void.

Doubt II. Whether the beatitude of all the blessed is equal.

It is certain that, with respect to duration from the part after, beatitude is equally participated by all the blessed, and also that objective beatitude is equally common to all, because God—who is their objective happiness, as the Psalmist says, "My glory" (*Psalms 3*)—is seen and possessed by all. The doubt, however, concerns formal beatitude: whether all the elect are formally equally blessed—that is, whether they equally in intensity and extension see and enjoy God. And the dispute concerns adults, for children departing this life endowed with baptism alone, without any personal merit but solely by the merit of Christ, are saved and equally glorified, as Bassolis writes above others (*4, distinction 50, question 2, article 1*).

Note, first, from Scotus (*at the place just cited, question 6, § Respondeo*): it is not necessary for the natural appetite to have every perfection of which it is capable. For as it suffices for a heavy object to rest on the earth, without it needing to rest in its deepest center, so the natural appetite of a human being rests in happiness according to merits and the will of God, just as each part of the universe rests in its proper place according to the appetite of universal nature. This occurs when heavier things rest in a lower place and lighter things in a higher place, so that by the law of nature each thing obtains its proper and determined place in the universe according to universal nature. And so, although the natural appetite naturally tends toward the highest perfection and happiness, God in his distributive justice ordains that beatitude be given to the blessed in proportion

to their merits, and since merits among human beings are unequal, beatitude is consequently communicated unequally.

Note, second, that equality is twofold: one of quantity and another of proportion. The first obtains between two quantities of bulk or power, of which neither exceeds the other nor is exceeded by it—as two boards each three cubits long. The second obtains between two quantities of bulk or power, of which one may surpass the other or be surpassed by it, yet they have a proportion to each other—as two is to four, so three is to six—and accordingly between two and three there is said to be an equality of proportion.

Note, third, from the same author (*ibid.*, § *Iuxta hoc*): the inequality of happiness can arise either from the active power, or from the passive power, or from the object, if the power is neutral. It cannot arise from the object, because the object of beatitude is infinite in perfection, and what is infinite as infinite in perfection cannot be unequal. The power, moreover, rests perfectly in the best thing in which the nature of its object is preserved, and the entire object is presented to the power of the blessed according to the whole of its reality and nature. Nor does inequality arise from the passive power, because this has equal capacity in every human being, as in an angel. But on the part of the active power, which is twofold—intrinsic and extrinsic—inequality can be investigated. The extrinsic power, if natural, acts equally on a subject aptly and equally disposed, but not on one that is impeded. A free power, however, either acts as it wills—as is evident from Matthew 20: "Is it not lawful for me to do what I will?"—or acts according to distributive justice, rendering to each according to their works, as God does. On the part of the intrinsic power, which is also twofold—natural (such as the intellect) or free (such as the will)—supernatural habits are added: the light of glory and grace, or charity. Now, the intellect or will in one person can be more perfect than in another and can thereby elicit a more perfect act. Likewise the light of glory and grace can be greater in one than in another; and consequently beatitude can be unequal, as I asserted in the treatise *On the Knowability of God*, disputation 3, question 6.

First assertion: the beatitude of all the predestined is not equal. This is defended by all the Scholastics, especially Scotus (*cited*) and Durandus (3, *distinction 14, question 1*).

This is proved, first, from John 14: "In my Father's house there are many mansions"—that is, of greater or lesser glory and perfection, as Bassolis interprets (*cited, at the end of article 2*). Augustine (*cited by Scotus, cited above, question 5*) testifies that this passage is to be understood of the blessed. Psalm 61: "Rendering to each according to his works." And 1 Corinthians 15: "As star differs from star in brightness." The Creeds, Councils, and Fathers adduced at the reviewed passage concur.

Second, just as in the nature of things there are degrees more perfect and less perfect, so also in glory there are greater and lesser degrees. In this universe of the world, it is evident that there are things more noble and less noble, greater and lesser—as is clear from whiteness and blackness and other things that admit of more and less. The same, therefore, is to be affirmed of the glory of the blessed.

Third, just as in the members of the body a greater or lesser excellence is evident—as is seen with the naked eye in the head and the remaining parts—so in the Church, which is the mystical body, the glory of the head is greater than the glory of the members, as Paul clearly teaches (*Ephesians 1*): "God the Father established Christ in the heavens, above every Principality, Power, Virtue, and Domination."

Fourth, greater charity argues for greater glory, for charity or grace is given as a co-principle of merit and glory. Again, God is just; therefore according to his distributive justice, a greater degree of glory is given to one who has labored more than to one who has labored less. Hence the Apostle (*2 Timothy 2*): "Labor like a good soldier." And Philippians 4: "Help those women who labored with me."

Second assertion: the glory of bodies is not equal for all the elect. The Doctors cited in the first assertion hold this.

This is proved, first, by the testimony of Scripture, 1 Corinthians 15: "Star differs from star in brightness." Therefore, just as some heavenly bodies are brighter and more radiant than others, so the bodies of the saints will enjoy unequal happiness.

Second, the body is a part of the human being, and the soul uses it for laboring. Therefore, as one soul is more blessed than another, so one body is happier and more sublime than another. And it is fitting that Christ's body be more resplendent than the rest, because Christ himself is the head over the whole Church (*Ephesians 1*). Then the body of the Blessed Virgin, and so on for the rest, according to their merits. The happiness of the bodies of the saints is therefore unequal.

You object, first: every blessed person has an equal capacity and natural appetite for receiving glory. Therefore, since in the fatherland the entire appetite is fulfilled and the entire capacity is completed through glory, it follows that glory is equal for all the elect. Hence Augustine adds (*12, On Genesis, Literally, chapter 35*): "In the soul there is a certain natural appetite for the body, by which it is somewhat held back from tending with full intensity toward the highest good, until that appetite comes to rest."

I concede the antecedent and distinguish the consequent: concerning the rational and deliberative appetite, I concede—for this is subject to the rule of the

divine will, and therefore it is content with as much glory as God wills to bestow upon it according the requirements of one's merits. But the natural appetite, since it is not an elicited act but only an inclination, does not need to have the highest glory and every glory, just as matter does not actually have every form. Augustine (*mentioned above*) is to be expounded in this sense.

You object, second: Matthew 20 says that all received individual denarii and were made equal, even though some came to labor in the vineyard around the sixth hour and others around the ninth. But the denarius there signifies the beatific reward, as the sacred interpreters explain; therefore happiness is equal for all.

Confirmation: from Augustine (*Tractate 66 on John*): "The joy of all will be equal." And (*83 Questions, question 32*): "One person cannot understand the same thing more than another; therefore one will not be more blessed than another."

I respond that the cited text is to be interpreted concerning beatitude not formal but objective—or concerning eternal life, which all the blessed possess, but not concerning the happiness by which one is happier than another. To the confirmation: Augustine is to be expounded extensively, not intensively. For although the joy is concerning the same objects—because each will rejoice concerning every individual thing and concerning all the things about which another rejoices—the joy is not equal in affection, equal in vision, and equal in enjoyment, but one will see more clearly and limpidly and will enjoy the beatific object more perfectly than another.

You object, third: privation does not admit of more and less. But certain beatific endowments are privations, namely impassibility and subtlety, as is clear from what was said above. Therefore the happiness of the body is not unequal.

I concede the major. To the minor I say that this is true of impassibility and subtlety, but false of agility and clarity, which are real qualities, as Scotus indicates (*cited above, § Ad 3. quaestionem*) and St. Bonaventure (*ibid., question 2, on the distinction of the endowments*). Nor should this surprise anyone. For physical principles are not all positive, and divine attributes include some that are positive and others that are negative, on which I wrote at length in the treatise *On the One God*, disputation 3.

Doubt III. Whether the punishment of the damned is equal.

Scotus (*4, distinction 50, § Ad it, quest.*) observes that just as the blessed person is blessed with the beatitude of soul and body, so the damned person is punished with a twofold punishment of soul and body. The reprobate is punished with a twofold penalty—the penalty of loss and the penalty of sense—as Chrysostom particularly notes (*Homily 23 on Matthew*).

The penalty of loss is the lack of a good suited to one's being—not a remote good, but a proximate one—that is involuntary and unwilled. More briefly, the

penalty of loss is the privation of the beatific vision and enjoyment. This can be called unequal in two ways. First, because it is a privation of unequal degrees—that is, of beatitude to which individuals were unequally ordained, whether to greater or lesser degrees. Second, because it is unwilling, since each person would wish for his own good more than for another's.

The penalty of sense is the positive sorrow or pain, whether bodily or spiritual, by which the damned are afflicted. The penalty of sense is divided into the mental, which is the sorrow caused by the apprehension of harm and is called the penalty of the worm, or the continual remorse of conscience; and the corporeal, which is the pain caused by the fire of hell through the alteration of the senses—for when the sense is altered, the appetite is altered, and through the appetite, the will.

First assertion: the penalty of loss is unequal for the damned. The Doctor (*cited*) holds this.

This is proved, first: privation is called greater or lesser in proportion to the greater or lesser habit of which it deprives. But some of the damned were ordained to a greater good and others to a lesser good. Therefore the penalty of loss is unequal. The antecedent is evident: not all are ordained to an equal good, as is clear from the preceding article. The consequent holds because those who could have attained a greater good and did not attain it grieve more than those who would have obtained a lesser good—just as someone who could have possessed a treasure and does not possess it is more anguished than someone who could have acquired ten gold coins and did not obtain them. Hence Bernard says (*Sermon 8 on Psalm 90*): "So that they may be more sharply pained when they see what they have lost."

Second, the penalty of loss is greater than the penalty of sense—as theologians confess with Chrysostom (*just cited*). But if the penalty of loss were equal, it would not be greater but rather lesser, because children bear this penalty alone, yet they are not equally tormented as adults who are damned.

Third, that which causes greater pain and sorrow is what is more involuntary and more unwilling. But some among the damned are more unwilling than others—as Lucifer suffers more than others drawn by him. Therefore the penalty of loss of the damned is unequal.

First assertion: the penalty of the worm is also unequal for the reprobate. The same Scotus defends this (*cited above*).

This is proved, first: the penalty of the worm, as explained above, is the sorrow caused by the apprehension of harm, and some of the damned grieve more than others. For he who has sinned more grieves more. Since, then, some have sinned more gravely than others, they are punished more than others, and accordingly the penalty of the worm is unequal for the reprobate.

Second, glory is unequal for the blessed on account of unequal merits, as was shown in the preceding doubt. Therefore equally, the penalty of the worm is unequal for the reprobate on account of unequal demerits.

Third assertion: the penalty of fire will certainly be unequal for the damned. The Doctor teaches this (*ibid.*).

This is proved, first, from Job 24: "They shall pass from the waters of snow to excessive heat." And Revelation 18: "As much as she has glorified herself and lived in luxury, so much give her torment and grief."

Second, Augustine (*On the City of God*): "Although the fire burns equally, it does not torment all with equal distress."

Third, the distributive justice of God requires that he who has fallen into greater fault be more tormented by the fire that God has placed in hell to punish the wicked. The penalty of fire is therefore unequal for the damned. Furthermore, he who has merited more by chastising his body and bringing it into servitude receives more reward and glory; similarly, he who has indulged in greater bodily pleasure has demerited more and is worthy of a greater penalty and punishment. The penalty of fire is therefore not equal for the wicked.

You object, first: privation does not admit of more and less, because it is the lack of a form in a subject apt to receive it, as I said in Physics, book 2, question on privation. But the penalty of loss is the privation of the vision and enjoyment of the divine essence. Therefore the penalty of loss is equal for the damned.

I distinguish the major: by reason of the lack of the habit of which it deprives, I concede; by reason of the greater wickedness or greater good of which it deprives, I deny, as was declared above.

You object, second: a natural agent acts equally on a subject that is aptly disposed, inasmuch as it acts according to the utmost of its power. But the fire of hell is a natural agent, acting according to the utmost of its power on the damned. Therefore the damned are tormented with an equal penalty of fire.

Bassolis responds that the inequality of the penalty of sense is not to be derived from the side of the fire, but from the inequality of demerits, and chiefly from the side of God the afflictor, who cooperates with the fire for a greater affliction in proportion to the demands of a greater fault. I add from the same author that if the fire cannot produce as intense an alteration as the sin deserves, the fire cooperates with God to the degree it can, and God immediately superadds the further degree.

You object, third: if penalty admitted of more and less, a greater penalty would be worse. But this is false, since penalty is a positive being and is just, and everything just is good; therefore, etc.

I respond that although a greater penalty is, absolutely speaking, a greater good, it is nonetheless, absolutely speaking, an evil for the one bearing such a penalty, since it is contrary to his inclination toward comfort. Therefore a greater discomfort, a greater affliction, and a greater pain follow. This can be illustrated by the wind, which is good absolutely speaking because it purges the air of clouds or brings rain that benefits the fruits of the earth, but is bad for another because it sinks his ship or soaks him with rain.

You object, fourth: every penalty of a sinner is infinite, because it is against God, an infinite object, and nothing is greater than the infinite. Therefore every penalty is equal for the damned.

I distinguish the major: objectively and extrinsically, I concede; formally and intrinsically, I deny. For the malice is formally as great as the goodness that would have been present in the act had it been elicited according to the due circumstances, as Scotus teaches with the author of the book *On Faith to Peter* (*at the end of the cited question*).

Doubt IV. Whether the elect will be more blessed after the day of judgment.

In this difficulty, one thing is presupposed and another is investigated. It is presupposed, as a matter of faith established by the Church—as can be seen in Alphonsus—that the souls of the saints, abstracted from the bodies that they informed, see God clearly and enjoy him fully before they reassume those bodies at the universal resurrection. What is investigated, however, is whether the glory of those same blessed will be increased after the judgment, or not. On this matter there are two positions among the Scholastics. One is that of Durandus (*44, distinction 49, question 7*) and Major (*ibid., question 12*), who hold that the beatitude of the just after the resurrection of the dead will be greater indeed extensively but not intensively. The other is that of the Master (*at the same place*), St. Bonaventure (*question 1, on the beatitude of the body*), Richard (*article 2, question 7*), and Argentré (*question 3, article 4*), who teach that the glory of the saints after the day of judgment will be greater both intensively and extensively.

Note, from the Seraphic Doctor (*cited*): beatitude can be called greater in four ways. First, because it concerns an infinite object—in this sense it is called greater because no greater beatitude concerning a greater object can be found. And since all the just participate in the same infinite object, beatitude is not properly called greater or lesser by reason of the object.

Second, with respect to habit: Peter possesses a greater habit of glory than Linus. Third, extensively, because Francis rejoices over more things than Anthony. Fourth, intensively, because one person enjoys a more intense vision and enjoyment and a greater effort than another.

Furthermore, observe from Scotus (*4, distinction 49, question 8, § Ad argumenta*): the rational soul is the part of the human being that is capable of beatification

and is the immediate subject of happiness. But the entire human nature is its mediate subject. For vision and enjoyment are immediately received in the soul—that is, in its powers, the intellect and the will—and this is called essential beatitude. The other, which pertains to the body and the humanity, is called accidental, as the Seraphic Doctor affirms (*cited above, before the response to the objections on the opposite side*).

First assertion: extensively, after the resurrection of the dead, the happiness of the elect will be increased. This is deduced from the Doctor (*at the cited passage*).

This is proved, first: not only the soul but also the blessed body will be beatified after the day of judgment, and the higher powers as well as the lower will be beatified. Therefore, extensively, after the universal resurrection, the beatitude of the saints will become greater.

Second, the just will then rejoice not only in their own glory but also in the glory of all others, for all the elect will then simultaneously participate in the same beatitude. A greater extensive happiness is therefore then conceded.

Second assertion: after the day of judgment, the glory of the saints will be more intense. This is in conformity with Scotus's teachings (*cited above*). For the Doctor holds that human nature is the total and adequate subject of beatitude, and that the humanity is a third thing really distinct from its parts taken conjointly. From this the following argument is drawn: the greater power of the whole is more intense than that of a part. Therefore, since after the day of judgment the entire nature is to be beatified, the glory of the blessed will be intensively greater.

Furthermore, this is supported by the Gloss on Revelation 6: "I saw under the altar the souls of those who had been slain." Now the souls of the saints are in lesser dignity than they will be, because they have received only one stole, but then they will be adorned with a double stole. Hence the Church sings in the proper office of St. Augustine: "What he tastes for himself for eternity, adorned eternally with one stole, secure concerning the other."

Jerome confirms this (*On Hosea*): "After the judgment is completed, God will show a more ample glory of his brightness to the elect." Nor does Bernard disagree (*in the book On Loving God*): "The soul, though stripped of the body, is still joined to it, if not by life or sensation, at least by affection, so that without it the soul neither can nor wishes to be consummated."

Moreover, the whole is nobler, more perfect, and stronger than its parts, as is evident from the author of the Book of Causes, proposition 17, received by all: "A united power is stronger than when dispersed." After the universal resurrection, the soul and body will be united together, and the whole human being will be constituted as blessed. Since operating presupposes being, a more perfect being will produce a more perfect operation. The human being will therefore then be more blessed.

Again, natural desire is directed toward the perfection of the one desiring, and the separated soul desires the body as its companion and instrument by which it exercised meritorious works, and the whole human being merited. Therefore James 1: "Blessed is the man who endures trial, for when he has been proved, he will receive the crown of life." But the soul alone is not a man but part of a man. Therefore, since the whole human being is then to be beatified, the happiness of the saints will be more intense.

Finally, the misery of the damned will be greater in the future, since now only the soul but then both the body and the whole human being will be tormented. Therefore, by the opposite reasoning, after the day of judgment the glory of the saints will be intensively increased.

You object, first: the more a power is conjoined to God, the more it is beatified and rejoices. But the soul separated from the body is more united to God than when conjoined to the body, for when conjoined, its power is diffused and dispersed in vivifying and governing the body. Therefore beatitude will be lesser when it reassumes the body than when separated from it.

Confirmation 1: the intellect and will do not use an organ in their operations (*On the Soul III, 16*). Therefore, through the union of the soul with the body, glory will not increase.

Confirmation 2: the soul of Christ in the triduum was less blessed than before, because it was separated from the body, which lay in the tomb. But this is false; therefore so is the premise.

I concede the major but deny the minor. For the human being will rise composed of soul and body, both more perfect and more robust, and all its lower and higher powers will be united and will become stronger, as experience confirms from the axiom adduced shortly before. To the first confirmation: I concede the antecedent but deny the consequent. The reason is that through the reassumption of the body, the nature is made perfect and whole, having a more perfect operation than if the soul alone existed. To the second: the parity is to be denied, since the soul of Christ was endowed from the instant of its conception with grace and negatively supreme glory, as I pursued at length in the treatise *On the Incarnation of the Word*.

You press the point: at that time Christ's soul lacked the body as its companion, and Christ as man was truly dead. Therefore perhaps it will not be unfitting to say that Christ did not then have all the glory he had while living.

The consequent can be conceded. For his body before death was not glorified—it was not endowed with the four beatific endowments. And even more so, because in the triduum he was not a man, and consequently, not having human nature, he did not have its glory. And he who does not have being does not have what follows upon being.

You object, second: the principles that are immediately beatifiable are independent of the body and its union—for they are the intellect and the will, which are immaterial powers. Therefore, through the union of the soul with the body, the glory of the human being does not increase.

I distinguish the antecedent: if those principles are taken as they are in a total and adequate subject having no inclination toward a body, such as the intellect and will of an angelic nature, I concede. But if they are in a partial subject, such as the rational soul, which naturally tends toward the body, I deny. For in that case those faculties become more perfect and more powerful, as is evident from what was said.

You object, third: if the glory of the just after the judgment is to be more intense than before, this will arise either from greater grace, or from the light of glory, or from a strengthening of power, or from the presence of the object, or from an obstacle found in the soul before the resurrection and removed after its union with the reassumed body. But it arises from none of these sources; therefore the glory of the blessed will not increase through the assumption of bodies.

The major is shown: not from grace or the light of glory, because these remain the same; nor from the beatifiable powers, because since they are really substance, they are not intensified or diminished; nor from the object, because the beatific object relates in the same way; nor is there any obstacle when the soul is separated, as is evident.

I respond that it proceeds from the strengthening of power that comes from an integral and perfect nature constituted and composed of soul and body, as was explained and proved above.

You say: this added degree, which was not there before, either is without merits, or is given on account of merits, or comes about without grace or with grace bestowed by God—but none of these appears to be the case; therefore no greater happiness will exist then.

I say that it is given by reason of the whole nature. For it is the human being who properly merited and performed good work; therefore a greater degree is owed to the whole than existed in the soul alone, which is only a part, though the principal one.

Doubt V. Whether the blessed see the punishments of the damned.

This difficulty can be understood either as a matter of fact or as a matter of possibility; likewise, whether by the eye of the mind or of the body; intuitively or abstractively; whether in their proper genus, or in the Word, or in some other similar way. And conversely, whether the damned see the glory of the blessed, and in what manner.

Note, first, from Scotus (4, *distinction 50, question 3, § Respondeo*), following Augustine (9, *On the Trinity, chapter 10*): beyond knowledge of a thing present and in its proper existence, something can be known in two ways. First, in a species—and thus a thing is known in itself and through itself, not through another or through the nature of another. Second, through privation—and thus a thing is known through another, not through its own nature, in the way that a privation is known through the habit opposed to it (4, *Metaphysics 4; 9 Metaphysics 3; 5, Ethics 1*). Again, something is known in its proper genus—that is, in its proper being, its essence, and its existence, as a stone is said to be known in a quarry—or in the Word, that is, in the divine essence, which is the most lucid exemplar representing and containing all things formally or eminently. That privations and other things of which there is no idea are known through the positive things opposed to them, I showed at length in the treatise *On the Knowledge of God*, disputation 2, question 6.

Note, second, from the same author (*ibid.*): the punishment of the damned is manifold. First, the reprobate are sorrowful because they have lost the substantial reward, which consists in the vision and enjoyment of the divine essence. Second, they are sorrowful about their guilt—not insofar as it is offensive to God, but insofar as it is the cause of their torments. Third, they are sorrowful about the perpetual fire detaining them, as in a most foul prison. Fourth, they are sorrowful about the fire altering their senses and holding their intellect in a continual and perpetual consideration of it. Fifth, they are sorrowful about their guilt insofar as it is the worm, or the continual remorse of conscience.

First assertion: the blessed do not in fact see the punishments of the damned with the bodily eye. So holds Scotus (*cited, § Respondeo*), against certain authors cited by Aureolus (4, *distinction 50, article 4*).

This is proved, first: between the visual power and its visible object a due distance is required, as is clear from what was said in *On the Soul*, book 3, question on sight. But between the empyrean heaven, where the blessed dwell, and hell, where the damned reside and are detained, there is an undue distance, as cosmographers and astronomers calculate. Therefore the blessed do not now behold with bodily sight the punishments of the wicked in hell.

Second, sight does not penetrate an opaque body. For it does not intuit what is beneath the earth. But hell is in the center of the earth, as theologians commonly assert. Therefore with the bodily eye, the blessed do not now observe the punishments of the damned.

Second assertion: nor with the eye of the mind by intuitive vision do the blessed see the torments of the lost. The Doctor holds this (*ibid.*).

This is established, first: between the intellect and its object a proportionate distance is required, as I said at the cited place, in the question on the intellect.

But the intellect of the blessed is in the empyrean heaven, while the sufferings of the reprobate are in hell. Therefore the blessed do not intuitively behold the punishments of the wicked.

Second, what is intuitively perceived by the intellect is present to it in its proper genus and in its proper existence—this is clear from the very terms. But the punishments of the damned are not present but far distant from the intellect of the blessed. Therefore the punishments of the reprobate are not viewed intuitively by the blessed.

Third assertion: by divine power, the blessed person can see the torments of the wicked in hell in both the aforementioned ways. Bassolis expressly defends this (*4, distinction 50, question 3, article 2*), and it accords with Scotus (*mentioned above*).

This is proved, first: God can supply every causality of a secondary cause in the genus of efficient cause, since this involves perfection and in God there is the fullness of every perfection. But vision, whether of the eye or of the intellect, concerning the torments of the wicked pertains to efficient causation. Therefore, if the eye or intellect can produce such vision when the object is present and concurring, God, who is of infinite power, can by himself alone cause it in the bodily or mental eye of the blessed.

Second, God by his power can produce every absolute being not essentially dependent on another, because his power is unlimited. But vision, whether corporeal or spiritual, is an absolute being not essentially dependent on another, since it is a quality belonging to the genus of absolute things. Therefore both types of vision can be brought about by divine power.

Fourth assertion: by abstractive mental vision, the blessed see the sufferings of the wretched in the underworld. This accords with Scotus and other Doctors.

This is proved, first, from Isaiah (last chapter): "They shall go out and see the corpses of the men who have transgressed."

Second, Jerome (*ibid.*): "Say—it is not a miracle if the saints, now immortal, see the reprobate by mental intelligence, since the prophets, still mortal, merited to see all these things. The elect shall therefore go out, not by place but by intelligence or manifest vision, to see the sufferings of the impious."

Third, the knowledge and science of opposites is the same, by the common dictum of the philosophers. But glory and misery are opposites. Since it is evident that the blessed contemplate their own glory and beatitude, knowledge of the misery and punishment of the reprobate should not be denied to them.

Fourth, the beatific state, insofar as it is possible, ought to be ennobled, since it is the supreme of all states. It is dignified and fitting that the blessed should know the punishments of the wicked, so that, having been snatched from them, they may return more abundant thanks to God and rejoice more in the happiness

attained, sustained by divine grace, liberated from the snares of the flesh, the world, and the devil, and from the punishments the impious suffer—as Durandus and Richard (*previously cited*) not obscurely indicate.

Fifth, wayfarers obtain some knowledge of the miseries of the reprobate from Sacred Scripture, as is evident from Luke 16: "The rich man also died and was buried in hell"; Matthew 22: "Cast him into the outer darkness"; and Job 24: "They shall pass from the waters of snow to excessive heat." All the more, therefore, do the comprehensors, from whom nothing is hidden that pertains to their knowledge, praise, and beatitude.

Finally, the reprobate know the state of the blessed, as is evident from the cited passage: "Father Abraham, send Lazarus," etc. Therefore the blessed know the misery of the damned.

Fifth assertion: by reason of the divine essence, the blessed see in the Word the positive punishments of the wicked. Scotus and St. Bonaventure (*cited*) support this.

This is proved, first: the divine essence is the most lucid mirror representing all things, as I have emphasized more than once. Therefore the blessed, beholding the divine essence, see the positive punishments of the impious.

Second, the divine essence represents all things whose ideas reside in it—no one denies this. But the aforementioned punishments have ideas in the divine mind, because they are positive beings for which proper ideas exist. Therefore, etc.

Sixth assertion: the blessed do not see the penalty of loss of the reprobate in the Word, but in the positive opposite of that penalty. The Doctor defends this (*cited above*).

This is proved, first, from what was said in the preceding assertion: only those things are seen in the Word whose ideas exist there. But the penalty of loss has no idea in God, since an idea is of something that can be made, whereas the penalty of loss is the lack of beatific glory.

Second, a privative opposite is known through its positive opposite—as darkness through light, night through day, and blindness through sight. But the penalty of loss is a privative opposite, as its description given above indicates. Therefore, since the penalty of loss is a privative opposite, it follows that it is known through its positive opposite, which is the glory of the elect, or the vision and enjoyment of the divine essence.

Seventh assertion: the blessed are affected by no passion from the vision or knowledge of the torments of the wicked. The Doctor teaches this (*cited*, § *De tertio princip.*, and at the end of the cited question, *Ad 3*).

This is proved, first: the blessed are impassible, as was shown above. Therefore they succumb to no passion from the vision of the sufferings of the impious.

Second, every passion is either of the sensitive appetite or of the rational appetite. In the blessed there is no passion of the sensitive appetite, since it is fully conformed to the will and the right dictate of reason. Nor is there passion of the rational appetite, since it is united and conformed to the divine will. Moreover, the blessed are in their final state, immune from all pain and sorrow, and free from passion. For they are absorbed into infinite glory and joy. Hence Gregory (*Homily 41 on Luke*) says: "The faithful in their rest attend to what is above them, the joys of which they cannot afterward contemplate." And concerning the reprobate the Seraphic Doctor adds (*cited*): "Then they will be absorbed by a greater pain, so that it will no longer be permitted them to think upon the dignity of glory; yet they will always hold in mind its loss and absence, so as to grieve."

Eighth assertion: the blessed rejoice over the punishments of the reprobate—not simply, but in a qualified sense, insofar as God has so ordained. This is received from the Doctor (*cited*) and is divided into three parts.

The first part is proved, first, from Psalm 57: "The just man will rejoice when he sees vengeance." And Psalm 51: "Behold the man who did not make God his helper."

Second, the blessed ought to conform to the divine will, which is just and holy. God has thus determined to afflict the unjust and punish the wicked; and Proverbs 1 says: "He will laugh at their destruction," and there too: "She will laugh on the last day." Furthermore, he who has what he sought is glad, and the blessed have what they asked for—namely, the punishment of the wicked. Revelation 16: "All the saints beneath the throne of God cry out: Avenge our blood, our God." Therefore the just exult that the wicked are tormented.

The second part is proved, first: God does not absolutely rejoice in the torments of the wicked, as is evident from Isaiah 1: "Alas, I will be comforted concerning my enemies." Therefore neither do the blessed simply rejoice in their miseries and punishments.

Second, the object of joy is not evil but good, absolutely speaking. But punishment is evil for the reprobate, especially the penalty of loss, which is the privation of beatitude. Add that the object of the penalty, around which it is ordered, is bare nature, which God does not direct toward punishment except on account of wickedness.

The third part is established thus: the blessed are pleased with whatever God wills, because they are joined to him in mind and will. But God justly wills to punish the impious. Therefore the blessed are delighted by the punishments of the wicked only insofar as God has justly decreed to punish them. Again, the just person ought to rejoice in justice, because it is good, and in punishing the wicked God maintains distributive justice. And so the blessed will what God

wills, and if it did not displease God for the wicked to be freed, they would will their liberation—as Scotus and Bassolis (*previously cited*) rightly pursue.

You object, first: the damned will not see the glory of the saints, as the Master asserts in the present distinction with Gregory. Therefore neither will the blessed see the sufferings of the wicked. The consequent holds by parity, for no stronger reason appears for the one case than for the other.

I concede the antecedent but deny the consequent. For the blessed, sustained by the divine light, can do many more things than the wicked, enveloped in the darkness of the underworld. Especially since the blessed are princes of the kingdom of heaven, and it is evident that princes can do more than servants and those consigned to prison, such as the reprobate—of whom it is read in Matthew 22: "With hands and feet bound, cast him into the outer darkness."

You object, second: the divine essence, although it represents the simple terms of things and necessary complexes, does not represent contingent propositions—such as "Judas will be damned" or "Peter will be saved"—otherwise every blessed person would know all contingent, future, and possible propositions, which is not granted.

I respond that the divine essence is representative of contingent propositions, not precisely in itself, but after the determination of the divine will, through which all future things are understood and fully known, as I showed at length in the treatise *On the Knowledge of God*, disputation 3.

You object, third: if the blessed were to see the evils of the impious, either they would have compassion for them, or they would rejoice over their punishments. If the first, they would be miserable, because compassion includes suffering, from which they are far removed. If the second, they would be cruel, for to rejoice over the evils of others conflicts with charity.

I respond that the blessed rejoice upon seeing the punishments of the wicked not simply but in a qualified sense, insofar as God has so decreed, and they delight in them insofar as divine justice shines forth therein, as I showed above.

Doubt IV. Whether the damned would prefer not to exist rather than to be tormented.

Certain authors—whose names the Doctor suppresses (*4, distinction 50, question 1, § Respondeo*) (cited by the marginalists as Scotus; Richard at the same distinction, article 4, question 2, who rather seems to hold the opposite there and in question 3; Durandus, however, expressly holds this view at the same place, question 2)—hold that the reprobate cannot desire non-existence. The common opinion, however, is that of Scotus (*cited*), Bonaventure (*ibid.*, *question 2*), Aureolus, Major, Bassolis, and others, who hold that the wicked can desire non-existence in order to flee from misery.

Note, first: something can be desired by the natural appetite, by which a person is carried toward a good suited to oneself and flees what is harmful and unsuitable—which occurs without prior cognition and an elicited act, as a stone by its weight naturally tends toward its center. Or something can be desired by the rational and deliberative appetite, by which a person desires at will whatever one wishes. It is concerning this latter appetite that the present difficulty arises. Aureolus observes (*cited, question un., article 1*), following Anselm and Aristotle (9, *Ethics, at the end*), that there is a twofold affection in the will—the affection for advantage and the affection for justice. The reason is that the will either tends toward what is advantageous and delightful to itself, and in this respect it is said to have the affection for advantage; or it tends toward what is just and honorable, which is sought for its own sake, and in this respect it is said to have the affection for justice.

Note, second, from Scotus (*mentioned above, § Ad 2. q.*): good and evil, if both are positive, are contrarily opposed to each other; if one is privative, like the evil of fault, they are privatively opposed; but if one is positive and the other negative, they are contradictorily opposed—as being and non-being, existence and non-existence. Misery is contrarily opposed to beatitude, since both are positive. Non-existence, or nothing, is not formally evil, and therefore is not formally hateful; otherwise, since before the creation of the world there was non-existence, or nothing, evil would have existed before the world was made—which is false. Evil, properly speaking, is divided into the evil of fault and the evil of punishment. Therefore arguments proving that, in order to avoid misery, no one can desire non-existence—because non-existence is greater than any other evil, since it takes away every good—are of no weight and are dissolved by the Doctor (*ibid., § Respondeo*).

Note, third, from the same (*cited above*): the evil of fault is not opposed to God as though through fault some detriment accrues to him, but is said to be against God because it is done against his law and precept. Nor does God, on account of fault, will the sinner simply not to exist, nor does the sinner himself desire non-existence on account of sin, nor is non-existence contrary to any precept. When it is said that sin dishonors God—as in John 8: "You have dishonored me"—it does not take anything from God. For honor is in the one honoring, not in the one honored. It therefore takes away some accidental good from the one honoring, which is a lesser good absolutely speaking than his substantial existence, which is excluded by non-existence, as Bassolis rightly argues (*article 2, ad 3*).

Furthermore, note from the same (*ibid., § Respondeo ergo*): fault and non-existence can be compared to the will either uniformly or non-uniformly. Uniformly, if it is understood that the will is the cause of non-existence either simply or as far as lies in itself, just as it is understood to be the cause of fault—so that the will itself would be the cause of non-existence. But this is impossible,

because the will cannot annihilate itself, just as it cannot create itself, for equal power is required for annihilation as for creation. Nor should one will non-existence in order to avoid misery, for otherwise one would sin mortally—since, just as hatred of God is a sin (because everyone is bound to love God above all things), so hatred of oneself is a sin, because after God, one is bound to love oneself. For this reason perhaps Aristotle says (9, *Ethics*, chapter 8): "A good man ought to be a lover of himself." And (chapter 7): "Existence is desirable and lovable for all."

Non-uniformly, however, if the will is the cause of fault but not of non-existence—so that the will does not cause non-existence itself but wills it to be effected by another, as if it wills to be annihilated by God or killed by a tyrant rather than fall into fault. And in this sense the present difficulty is raised: whether one should rather desire non-existence than fall into the evil of fault.

First assertion: by the natural appetite, no one can desire non-existence. The Doctor defends this (*cited*, § *Ad 2. q.*, § *Ad q. ergo*), with whom Bassolis (*article 2*) and Richard (*4, question 3*) agree.

This is proved, first, from On Generation II, T. 59, and On the Soul II, T. 35: nature desires existence, and the intention of all nature is to conserve existence. For this reason, lest any part of the universe perish, nature with its full effort avoids a void.

Second, the natural appetite means nothing other than an inclination and tendency toward one's own advantage and perfection, as is evident from the first note. Therefore so many remedies are sought for preserving one's own existence, and death, which deprives one of existence, everyone abhors and dreads. Therefore by the natural appetite no one desires non-existence.

Third, by the natural appetite every person wants to be happy, and nature knowingly desires (1, *Metaphysics 1*), because everyone wishes to be perfect. Therefore, since non-existence takes away every perfection and goodness, it is plainly deduced that no one naturally desires non-existence.

Second assertion: in order to avoid the evil of punishment, one ought not to desire non-existence. The Doctor holds this (*ibid.*, § *Respondeo ergo*).

This is proved, first: no one by right reason should wish for what conflicts with the good and the just. But to desire non-existence in order to flee punishments contradicts the good and the just, for punishment is from God and is aptly instituted for punishing the wicked. Second, no evil should go unpunished and no good unrewarded. If, then, it is just to reward the good, it is also equitable to punish the wicked with penalties. Therefore by right reason, no one should wish for non-existence in order to escape punishment.

Third assertion: one should rather choose non-existence than fall into fault. Scotus is the patron of this position (*cited above*).

This is proved, first: everyone is bound to keep the divine precept—Matthew 19: "If you wish to enter into life, keep the commandments." To sin is to transgress God's commandment—Matthew 15: "Why do you transgress the commandments of God?" Therefore one should rather choose non-existence than fall into the evil of fault.

Second, a person ought to conform to the divine will as to the first rule, for the inferior must obey the superior, and God is the first rule and the supreme of all. Furthermore, the love of God must be set above love of creatures and the affection for advantage, because God is to be loved above all things. For this reason Christ says: "You are my friends, if you do what I command you." And elsewhere: "He who loves father more than me is not worthy of me." Augustine confirms this (*On John, Tractate 7*): "He who hates his soul will lose it."

This is corroborated from Ethics IV, 3, where Aristotle, speaking of the courageous man, says: "According to right reason, a brave man ought to expose himself to the danger of death"—that is, of non-existence—"for the common good, lest he fall into the vice of cowardice."

You say: the brave man exposes himself to death for the hope of a better life that he expects, but he does not desire non-existence. Against this: Aristotle was uncertain about another life and the immortality of the soul, as I showed elsewhere. Yet he absolutely asserts that the brave man ought to fall for his country.

Fourth assertion: in order to flee fault, the wicked do not desire non-existence. The Doctor defends this (§ *Ad 2. q.*), with the support of Major (*at the end of the fourth book of the Sentences, doubt 1*).

This is proved, first, from Psalm 73: "The pride of those who hate you ascends always." Second, the damned are obstinate in evil, for they are in their final state, unable to do penance for their committed faults. Their fault displeases them not as offensive to God but as afflictive of punishment, and the worm of conscience is in them, which is a very grave penalty, as Bassolis particularly notes (*cited, article 3*). Therefore the wicked do not desire non-existence in order to avoid the evil of fault.

Fifth assertion: it is probable that the impious, in order to flee punishment, desire non-existence. This is the position of Scotus, Bonaventure, and others (*cited above*).

This is proved, first, from Matthew 26: "It would have been better for that man if he had not been born." Revelation 9: "They will desire death, and death will flee from them"—and death tends toward non-existence, for through death a person loses existence and ceases to be a human being. And Ecclesiastes 41: "O death, how good is your judgment for one who is in need, who is diminished in strength and advanced in age."

Second, Augustine (*On the Misery of This World*) writes: "O death, how sweet you would be to those for whom you were so bitter; you alone are desired by those who vehemently hated you." Jerome concurs, as remembered by the Seraphic Doctor: "It is better not to live than to live badly." The same Doctor (*On Mark 10*): "It is better not to exist than to exist for torments." And the Gloss on Jeremiah 20: "It is better not to exist than to exist badly."

Third, Aristotle (9, *Ethics* 9), after asserting that existence and living are desirable in themselves, adds that he does not mean this of those who lead a calamitous and wretched life. For some, out of weariness with life, kill themselves in order to flee misery, and it is commonly said of the wretched: "Death is better for him than life." Hence the same Philosopher (1, *Rhetoric* 2) writes: "The absence of evil is delightful."

Fourth, a momentary punishment is to be preferred to an eternal one, just as the infinite is set above the finite. But if the damned fell into non-existence, their punishment would be temporary, whereas it is in fact eternal. Moreover, non-existence is not evil nor hateful in itself, because it is nothing, as is clear from what was said; but the punishment and misery of the wicked is evil and hateful in itself, by which the reprobate are afflicted. Add that those condemned to death, lest they fall into despair from torments, are swiftly killed by the executioners on the judge's order. Therefore the Seraphic Doctor concludes: "I concede, then, that the damned would prefer not to exist, and every person ought to desire this, considering the gravity of both punishments."

You object, first: Augustine (3, *On Free Will, toward the middle*): "Consider how good it is to exist, which both the blessed and the miserable desire. For it is more to exist and to be miserable than not to exist at all, since you would be unwilling to be miserable." Confirmation 1, from the same (*ibid.*): non-existence is not eligible, because everything eligible seems to be good; therefore it is not desirable. Confirmation 2, from the same (*On the City of God*), cited by Durandus: "Those who appear and are most miserable to themselves: if someone were to offer them immortality in which that very misery would not end, they would exult with joy, and so they would rather choose to exist than not to exist." Add what is on everyone's lips: "It is better to exist than not to exist."

I respond by explaining Augustine: non-existence is not eligible simply, I concede; in a qualified sense—that is, for fleeing evil—I deny. This is what Aristotle indicates (9, *Ethics* 9): "Existence and living are desirable in themselves"; and (*chapter 4*): "Everyone wishes goods for themselves"—but not one who leads a miserable and shameful life. Or this is to be understood of an elicited appetite, not of the natural appetite and the affection for advantage. The same applies to both confirmations from Augustine.

You object, second: what is not contained under the object of appetite is neither desirable nor willable. But non-existence does not fall under the object of

appetite, which is true or apparent good. Therefore, since non-existence encloses in itself no true or apparent goodness but rather removes all entity and goodness, it is consequently not desirable.

I concede the major and distinguish the minor: per se and simply, I concede; per accidens and in a qualified sense, I deny. For metaphysics contemplates being and non-being, and logic considers affirmation and negation.

You object, third: he who necessarily desires beatitude necessarily desires existence, not non-existence. But every person, even the wicked, necessarily desires beatitude as his own perfection. Therefore non-existence is desired by no one. Confirmation, from Metaphysics IX, 16: privation is not desired except by reason of the opposed habit. Therefore non-existence is not desired unless existence is desired, but existence and non-existence cannot be simultaneously desired; therefore, etc.

I concede the major and distinguish the minor: by the natural and conditioned appetite, I concede; by the rational, absolute, and efficacious appetite, I deny. To the confirmation: I say that the habit is desired per se, and its privation per accidens. Privation is also called a principle not per se but per accidens (*Physics I*, 6).

You object, fourth: as a person is related to the supreme good, so to the supreme evil. But one cannot not will the supreme good; therefore one cannot will the supreme evil, which is non-existence, since it removes every good.

I concede the major but deny the minor. For the damned hate God, and so non-existence can be desired by them, especially because, as was said, non-existence is not evil. Moreover, just as the will can be directed toward the impossible, as was said elsewhere, so it can will non-existence by an inefficacious volition.

Doubt VII. What the aureole is, and how many kinds there are.

It is established that the reward is twofold: one essential, the other accidental. That the aureole is to be numbered among the accidental rewards seems clear to the Doctors, since some blessed persons have an accidental reward but not an aureole—which, as will be said below, is granted only to martyrs, doctors, and virgins. Others have the accidental reward that is the aureole, appropriate to those three groups just mentioned. This division is akin to the one we presented in the Epitome, book 1, question 3, article 5, distributing difference into the most proper and the not most proper, the latter being further subdivided into proper and common.

Note, first: the essential reward of the blessed, which consists chiefly in the vision and enjoyment of the divine essence, is metaphorically called a crown—Psalm 20: "You have placed on his head a crown of precious stone." And Revelation 3: "And on their heads golden crowns." For through beatific glory a person becomes a participant in royal power. Therefore it is added there (*chapter*

5): "You have made us a kingdom for our God." For a crown is the proper sign of royal power. The essential reward is called a golden crown, both because it is given to victors and because it is like a crown fashioned in a circular line, which is so perfect that nothing can be added to it except accidentally. Similarly, that reward is so perfect that whatever is superadded to it is accidental. Moreover, just as a circular crown terminates at the same point from which it begins, so through the essential reward the human being is joined to the first principle from which, by creation, he or she came into existence.

The aureole, which is the diminutive of the word for golden crown—just as Tulliola is the diminutive of Tullia—is the accidental reward, or the joy corresponding to works performed by a person that have the character of an excellent victory, through which there will appear outwardly in the body a certain beauty manifesting the aforesaid interior joy externally.

Note, second, from St. Bonaventure (*4, distinction 33, question 2, article 3*): three things are considered in the beatific reward—habit, state, and beauty. To habit corresponds the golden crown; to state, the fruit; and to the beauty of integrity, the aureole.

That the golden crown corresponds to habit is clear, because the golden crown is the essential habit of glory and is contained in the category of habit. That fruit corresponds to state is clear from Matthew 13, where greater or lesser fruit is required according to the superiority and goodness of the soil, more or less—like greater or lesser fruit according to one's state. The aureole corresponds to beauty, since the aureole is given for merits that look to something extrinsically more excellent. Hence there will be a certain beauty for doctors on account of those converted through them; beauty also for martyrs in the body, who exposed themselves to suffering and death for Christ; and beauty for virgins in the body, who kept themselves uncorrupt for Christ.

The same Saint adds that in these there is beauty with joy and joy with beauty. The aureole is owed both to the interior, by comparison to the exterior beauty, and to the exterior as related to the interior. Therefore, if a virgin wills to be corrupted and is not corrupted, and afterward repents—because her flesh remains uncorrupt, if she persists to the end, she will have the aureole. Likewise, if she does not will to be corrupted and is violently corrupted, she too will be adorned with the aureole, as is evident from the case of St. Lucy, who, addressing the tyrant, said: "If you order me violated against my will, my crown will be doubled." Furthermore, unless one actually exercises oneself in the acts of teaching, suffering, and conquering, one will not earn the aureole. Therefore, if someone wills to teach and does not actually teach, the aureole will not be given to him. Similarly, if someone wills to undergo martyrdom and does not undergo it, he will not be marked with the aureole of martyrdom.

First assertion: there exists an aureole, which is an accidental glory for victory over something excellent. The Doctor presupposes this (*at the cited passages*).

This is proved, first, from Exodus 25: mention is made of a golden crown and an aureole, and the Gloss interprets that passage as referring to essential and accidental glory.

Second, to one who fights outstandingly and conquers brilliantly, a special reward and crown should be given, as was done in antiquity. For there were different crowns—civic, military, and others, which Calepinus and other authors discuss at length. Now some in the spiritual battle achieve an outstanding and notable victory; therefore a special crown, which is called the aureole, should be given to them.

Second assertion: a threefold aureole is bestowed on three groups—martyrs, doctors, and virgins. This is the common view, presupposed by the same Doctor (*ibid.*).

This is proved, first: a special crown and singular reward should be given for a singular combat and excellent struggle, as I was saying above. But martyrs, virgins, and doctors fight in a singular way and combat excellently. Concerning virgins, this is evident from Revelation 14: "They are virgins." Concerning martyrs, the Church sings: "With the palm they came to the kingdoms, the saints merited crowns of beauty from the hand of God." And concerning doctors, the Savior says (*Matthew 5*): "He who does and teaches shall be called great in the kingdom of heaven." Therefore a triple aureole is to be assigned to those three groups.

Second, from a triple victory over the three chief enemies, a threefold glory and reward is earned by the victor. For distributive justice requires this. The three chief enemies to be overcome are the flesh, the world, and the devil. Over the flesh—that is, over carnal pleasure—the virgin above all wins a notable victory, and for this reason the aureole of virginity is bestowed upon her, to the reception of which the Church invites her: "Come, bride of Christ, receive the crown." Over the world, chiefly by enduring pain and bearing death, the martyr wins the palm and is adorned with the aureole of martyrdom, of which the same Church sings: "You have placed on his head a crown of precious stone." Over the devil, not only by conquering but also by snatching sinners from his jaws through patience and teaching, the doctor triumphs brilliantly and merits the crown called the aureole of doctors. Therefore Ecclesiasticus 39: "The nations will recount his wisdom, and the Church will proclaim his praise."

Third, three outstanding acts of three powers of the soul correspond to three principal crowns. One notable act of the rational power is defending the doctrine of faith against its assailants, and to this is given the aureole of the doctorate. Hence in the hymn of the Office of St. Francis, it is sung: "Crushing malignant enemies, the golden victor merited; he earned the aureole while he

taught." Another more excellent act of the concupiscible power is to restrain carnal pleasures, and to this is given the aureole of virginity, which David perhaps had in view when he said (*Psalms 44*): "Advance, prosper, and reign." The third distinctive act of the irascible power is to endure pains and labors and to undergo death for Christ, and to this is assigned the aureole of martyrdom.

The struggle of martyrs is stronger and more robust; that of virgins, more difficult and more perilous; that of doctors, greater and more laborious. The glory of martyrs stands highest; the crown of virgins follows; then comes the company of doctors.

You object, first: the freer one is and the more one is able to transgress God's precept yet does not, the more one merits, and a greater reward is owed to that person, as Gregory indicates: "Services are more pleasing the more freely they are rendered." But martyrs in bearing pain and enduring death are not freer, because punishment is inflicted on them by tyrants, and they necessarily undergo it. Therefore the aureole, which is the reward of an outstanding and singular victory, should not be given to them.

I concede the major but deny the minor. For they voluntarily endure harsher and more bitter punishments than others; therefore the aureole is rightly given to them.

You object, second: widows who abstain from the enticements of the flesh are more anguished than virgins, because the former have the habit of intercourse while the latter do not. Hence Augustine (8, *Confessions*, chapter 5): "From a perverse will, lust was made, and while lust is served, habit was made." Therefore the aureole should be given to them rather than to virgins.

Granting the antecedent, I deny the consequent. The reason is that the crown is not awarded for the difficulty of fighting but for the singular and excellent victory in the contest—and especially to one who has never yielded to the enemy but has triumphed singularly over it, as the virgin has.

You press the point: if a special reward is owed to the virgin, it is especially on account of difficulty or perfection. But it is not on the first ground, because it is more difficult to deny one's own will than to preserve virginity. Nor on the second, because it is more perfect to love one's enemies than to guard virginity.

The Seraphic Doctor (*cited above*) responds: the aureole belongs to the virgin not by reason of difficulty or perfection, but by reason of beauty and outstanding victory.

You object, third: he who exalts himself in the present will be humbled, and he who humbles himself will be exalted, as is evident from Luke 18. But the doctor in this life raises himself above others, so that some, puffed up with pride, fall into the depths of evil. Hence the Gloss on Matthew 4: "The devil deceives many

inflated by the honor of the magisterium." Therefore the aureole is not fitting for doctors.

I concede the major and distinguish the minor: one seeking his own glory, I concede; one seeking the glory of God, I deny. And if some doctors fall, this is to be attributed not to the doctorate but to their own wickedness. Therefore Christ says: "You are the salt of the earth; but if the salt loses its savor, with what shall it be salted?"

Query 1: Is the aureole in the soul or in the body? The Seraphic Doctor and Richard (*previously cited, question 4*) respond that it is in the soul, insofar as the joy and reward correspond to merit—for the soul properly merits by the will, and for this reason the aureole is in the soul. It is also in the body, insofar as it is a certain beauty that is a sensible sign of the same internal joy. For this reason Augustine writes (22, *City of God, chapter 20*): "The scars of martyrs will not be a deformity but a dignity." Perhaps for the same reason Christ willed to retain the wounds of his passion.

Query 2: Does Christ have an aureole? Richard responds (*cited, question 5*), and more fully in Quodlibet 1, question 6, in the affirmative. For Christ enjoys a threefold aureole—of martyrdom, of virginity, and of the doctorate—since he was a martyr, a virgin, and a doctor. Indeed, he is the King of Martyrs, the Crown of Virgins, and the one Master and Doctor of all.

Query 3: Are angels adorned with an aureole? The answer is negative. They are not laureated with the aureole of martyrdom, since they are immortal; nor marked with the beauty of virginal modesty, since they are incorporeal; nor endowed with the glory of the doctorate, because they were not taken up for the office of teaching and preaching.

BOOK III. On the Principle and Acts of Human Beings.

Having recognized and set forth the ultimate end, or beatitude, in the preceding book, there now follow in the present book the effective principle and its acts, in the knowledge and selection of which one must labor diligently and attentively. Aristotle follows this order in treating ethics, as can be seen in Ethics I, chapter 2, and Ethics III, chapter 1 and following; as well as in the Great Ethics I, chapter 10 and 11. Cicero (*On Ends V*) and Seneca (*Epistle 71*) do not depart from this order. The reason is that the final cause is the first and noblest of all causes; next comes the efficient cause, from which human acts proceed as from their productive principle. For this reason two questions are raised in this book: the first concerning the principle of human acts, and the second concerning human acts themselves.

Question I. On the Principle of Human Acts.

Article I. What is the principle of human acts.

The resolution of this article seems to be entirely located in the understanding and explanation of the term "human." Therefore, in order to remove all equivocation and to have the matter well understood:

Note, first: the intellect and the will are the principles, or powers, of intellectual and rational nature, of which Aristotle scarcely speaks as distinct things, as Raconius observes (*disputation 1, section 1, on the principles of human actions*), following Scotus (*2, distinction 25, question un., § Dico ergo, T.*). These powers are formally distinguished from each other and from the soul. For the intellect is a natural power, and the will is a free power, as I abundantly showed in *On the Soul*, book 3, question 2.

Note, second: acts can be called "human" in three ways. First, extrinsically and denominatively, because a work is done by a human being—as a bench is called "human," as I observed in the book *On the World*, question 2, on creation. Second, because it arises from some power of the human being—and so an intellection and any other operation proceeding from a human being is called "human" really and entitatively. Third, properly, because it proceeds from the will alone. An act of the will, which is free, is called human because it is proper to the human being as distinguished from beasts, for beasts act naturally and necessarily, or rather are acted upon, while the human being operates spontaneously and freely—as the Doctor discusses (*distinction 41, question un., § Aliter*), and Faber pursues (*disputation 4, on penance, chapter 1*). Aristotle also indicates this (*1, Ethics 9; 6, Ethics 2; 8, Ethics, chapter 1*).

Note, third, from Damascene (*2, On the Faith, chapter 27*): the will presupposes the intellect both in being and in operating. For it is prior in origin. Hence the well-known saying is celebrated: "The will is not carried toward the unknown." For these powers are mutually ordered to each other so that one in being and operating requires and presupposes the other, just as the internal senses presuppose the being and operation of the external senses. Therefore, although the will requires the intellect for being and operating, it does not depend on it in eliciting and producing its acts, nor does the intellect effectively concur in those acts. It only presents the objects toward which the will is carried at its own pleasure, so that the will itself is the mistress of its own acts and commands the intellect and the other powers that are subject to it, as will be shown more clearly below.

Assertion: human acts properly so called proceed from the will alone. The Doctor teaches this (*cited in the second note*), and it is deduced from *Ethics VI, 2*.

This is proved, first, from the common consent of all philosophers and theologians who, when treating of human acts, treat the acts of the will—especially those who in our time professionally compose a treatise on human acts.

Second, terms are to be used according to the common usage of authors, as Scotus notes (*1, distinction 14 and 15, question un., sub E, § Licet autem hac via*). But the general body of Scholastics takes "human acts" as acts of the will only. Furthermore, those acts are properly human that are considered worthy of praise or blame, as I touched on above. But only elicited or commanded acts of the will are capable of merit or demerit, glory or punishment. Therefore human acts are properly those that proceed from the will.

You object, first: the clear vision of God and its beatific enjoyment are human acts; yet they are not free but necessary, because the blessed person necessarily sees and enjoys the beatific object so that one cannot do otherwise—otherwise one could fail to be blessed, or even be damned, which seems contradictory. Therefore human acts are not only the free acts of the will.

The Coimbra commentators respond (*disputation 4, Moral, question 1, article 2, ad 1 and 2*), conceding that those are indeed acts of the human being but not human acts, because they are necessary, as the argument proves. But this response does not appeal to me. For if those acts in *via* are human, why not in the fatherland? They do not seem to lose their being in the fatherland but are more perfect and nobler there, just as charity in *via* and in the fatherland differs only as the perfect from the imperfect, the more from the less—which do not change the species or alter the essence of the thing.

Therefore I respond, following Scotus (*cited above*): these are free human acts proceeding from the will, even though in fact the will does not tend toward opposite acts, because God has decreed always to concur in those acts and not in the opposite ones. Nevertheless, absolutely and remotely, the will can tend toward opposite acts, yet it will never elicit an opposite act, because it is forestalled by the divine will continually sustaining those beatific acts, as was explained at the place just cited.

You object, second: acts of the intellect are human acts, yet they are not free, since they are natural and necessary, as proceeding from a natural and necessary power, namely the intellect. Again, the acts of those who are dreaming or insane are human acts, yet they are not free, since they lack merit or demerit. Furthermore, first movements are not in our power—that is, they are not subject to our will and freedom—and therefore they merit neither reward nor punishment; yet they are human. Therefore, etc.

I respond that the aforementioned acts are improperly called human, insofar as they are done by a human being, as I observed in the first note.

You object, third: acts of the will are immanent, just like acts of the intellect, which do not go outside the power itself. But there are other acts depending on the sensitive appetite, the bodily powers, and external members, which are esteemed good or bad, praiseworthy or shameful. Not all praiseworthy or imputable acts, therefore, are to be attributed to the will.

I respond that certain acts of the will are elicited and others are commanded. Therefore the listed acts of other powers are called good or bad from the will—not from themselves, but insofar as they are subject to the command of the will, whose task it is to rule and command the other powers so that their acts are made right and conformed to the law of God.

Article II. Whether there is free will.

The heretics cited by Alphonsus (*book 8, against heresies, under the word "freedom," heresy 1*) have fallen into such great madness and malice that they have taken free will from the human being. Against these, it seems one should proceed not with authorities and arguments but with sticks and ropes, until they confess that the one striking them could refrain from striking and beating them—just as Scotus says (*1, distinction 19, § Quantum ad 1*) with Avicenna (*1, Metaphysics, last chapter*) concerning those who deny that fire burns: they should be exposed and cast into the fire until they confess that fire burns.

Note, first, from Orbellis (*2, distinction 25, question 1*), following Scotus (*ibid., distinction 38, question un., § Respondeo, sub A*): free will displays two powers of the rational soul—namely, the intellect and the will—as its very name indicates. For it is called "free" and "judgment." It is called "free" because it designates the will, which alone is free among the powers of the soul. "Judgment" is added because it refers to the intellect, whose task is to judge, or arbitrate, what is to be chosen and pursued and what is to be avoided and rejected. The will, however, by the natural order requires and presupposes the intellect and its operation, because the intellect is the ostensive, consultative, and judicative cause, showing the will what is true or false, good or evil—and it then lies in the will's power to choose and pursue either option, or to reject and discard it.

Free will therefore denotes the ostensive cause, which others call the *sine qua non* cause—though Scotus (*2, distinction 25, question un.*) does not favor this terminology—for the role of the intellect is to display objects to the will. And the will is established as the effective, elective, and imperative cause, in whose power it is to choose what is shown to it by the intellect and to command the intellect and other powers, since it is the mistress and queen in the kingdom of the soul.

For this reason, one should not think that free will is a third power distinct from the intellect and will, or some habit of both powers, as some suspect. Rather, it is formally the will, which requires the intellect as a precondition. And this is on account of the natural order of powers, which are so disposed and ordered that a later power does not operate without the prior one—just as the internal senses do not operate without the prior operations of the external senses. Similarly, the will does not act unless the intellect acts first, according to the well-known saying: "Nothing is willed unless first known."

Note, second: although these three—the spontaneous, the voluntary, and the free—are sometimes used interchangeably by authors, as can be seen in Leviticus 22 and 1 Paralipomenon 19; Psalm 53: "I will voluntarily sacrifice to you"; Psalm 117: "May the voluntary offerings of my mouth please you, Lord"; Augustine (16, *Against Faustus*, at the end of chapter 29): "Not born of Jews, but of his own accord made a Jew"; and chapter 22, against the same (*chapter 73*): "If Moses had done this of his own accord, or if the Hebrews had done this of their own accord, they surely would have sinned"; and Ethics V, chapter 5 and 2—nonetheless a certain distinction is observed among them by Faber (*disputation 9, on penance, chapter 13, number 379*).

For the spontaneous is broader than the voluntary and the free; the voluntary is wider than the free. That the spontaneous extends more broadly than the voluntary is evident from Ethics III, chapter 2: for beasts are said to move spontaneously—that is, from an intrinsic principle—toward eating food, as an ox eats hay and a horse oats, yet they do not act voluntarily and freely, since they lack reason and will. Similarly, the voluntary is more universal than the free, since children and the insane, who lack the use of reason, are said to act in a certain way voluntarily, but not freely; for their operations are not capable of merit or demerit, as are properly free operations. The free, however, coincides with the voluntary taken strictly, and the will is a free power, since it is compelled by no extrinsic principle but determines itself to acting or not acting, or suspending its act, at its own good pleasure.

For this reason Damascene rightly writes (2, *On the Faith*, chapter 21): "Things are led by the natural appetite, but the will leads; it is not led." And (*chapters 25 and 26*): "A human being is the proper principle of his own works, and is free in power and judgment." And (*chapter 27*): "Rational beings lead, and irrational beings are led." The same (*book 3, chapter 18*).

Note, third, from Alphonsus (4, *against heresies, under the word "freedom," heresy 1*): the word "freedom" in Sacred Scripture is equivocal. For it is taken chiefly in three ways. First, for grace, through which a person is freed from sin—2 Corinthians 3: "Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom." And more clearly, Romans 6: "When you were servants of sin, you were made free from justice." Augustine concurs (12, *Against Faustus*, chapter 9): "And if the Son shall make you free, then you shall be truly free."

Second, for glory—Romans 8: "The creature itself shall be delivered from the servitude of corruption into the freedom of the glory of the children of God."

Third, as opposed to necessity and coercion—in which sense that is not free which is done necessarily and by compulsion, and conversely, that is free which can be done or not done, and whose principle is the will freely determining itself to action. Hence Augustine (*Against Fortunatus*) says: "God gave to the

rational soul, which is in the human being, free will for doing something or not doing it."

Note, fourth: the free and the contingent, although sometimes used interchangeably—especially by Scotus, who asserts that God acts ad extra freely and contingently—do not coincide precisely. For some things happen contingently and by chance that do not happen freely, and some things happen freely that do happen contingently, as I said in the Physics, in the question on per accidens causes. Again, some things are done necessarily and freely, as God necessarily and freely loves himself. The reason is that the will is essentially free and determines itself to action. But because the divine will is most upright and inflexible, and its object is infinite and infinitely good, it therefore determines itself to loving that object. The created will, however, which wills freely, for the most part wills contingently, because it is capable of deviation and defect.

Assertion: there is free will, or a free will in acting. The Doctor holds this (*cited below*), following Aristotle (*1, Great Ethics, chapter 10*).

This is proved, first, from Genesis 4: "Its appetite shall be under you, and you shall have dominion over it." Ecclesiasticus 15: "He has set before you fire and water; stretch out your hand to whichever you will." John 5: "Do you wish to be made well?" And Mark (actually Matthew) 12: "Either make the tree good and its fruit good, or make the tree bad and its fruit bad."

Second, Augustine, in his work On Free Will; against Felix the Manichean, book 2, chapters 3 and 4; and in the Acts with the same Felix, chapters 3 and 8; Ambrose (*1, On the Calling of the Gentiles, chapter 11*); Tertullian (*1, Against Marcion*); and others cited by Alphonsus.

Third, Aristotle (*9, Metaphysics 10*): irrational powers are determined to one thing, but rational powers are directed toward opposites—that is, they are indifferent to desiring and willing this or that, so that it lies within their power to choose and pursue this or that. If they were not undetermined and open to either alternative, it would not be necessary to deliberate or take counsel, which Aristotle infers as absurd and false (*1, On Interpretation, last chapter; 2, Eudemian Ethics, chapter 8*).

Fourth, if the human being did not possess free will, he would be worse than all other things, both living and non-living. For all these act by the guidance of nature and necessarily, and do not sin. Therefore, if a person were not free in his operations, he would not sin, as Augustine says (*against Fortunatus*): "He who is compelled by necessity to do something does not sin." He would be unjustly consigned to eternal punishments and thrust into the perpetual prisons of hell. And David would cry out in vain to God (*Psalms 118*): "You are just, O Lord, and your judgment is right." And God would prescribe precepts and laws to be observed to no purpose. For, as I may speak with Augustine (*On Faith Against the Manicheans, 4, 10*): "Who would not cry out that it is foolish to give precepts to

one for whom it is not free to do what is commanded, and unjust to condemn one for whom it was not in his power to fulfill the commands."

Furthermore, we experience that we operate spontaneously and freely in what we do, willing what we will and not willing what we do not will. For this reason laws are enacted, judges are appointed to punish their transgressors, and orators and preachers are deputized to admonish the people and exhort them to embrace the good and flee evil. For this reason Zeno, beating a slave caught stealing, wittily and sharply replied when the slave said "It was fated for me to steal": "And to be beaten," as Lactantius (*book 7*) well reports. Augustine (*2, On Free Will*) rightly adds: "He who says or holds that the will is not to be moved is to be expelled from the number of human beings." And Scotus (*1, distinction 30, question un., C*): "Those who deny freedom are to be beaten and tormented until they confess that those from whom they suffer could desist."

You object, first: John 15: "Without me you can do nothing." Therefore the human being has no free will. The consequent holds from what was said: free will is a free power of doing whatever one wills to do; but one can do nothing without Christ, as Christ himself plainly stated, and the Apostle openly proclaims (*2 Corinthians 3*): "Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God."

I concede the antecedent but deny the consequent. For this only infers that the concurrence of God is required for a person to act—just as the intellect cannot understand without an object or intelligible species, yet it cannot rightly be denied that the intellect has the power of understanding. From that passage of Scripture it is deduced that a person acts dependently upon God and cannot operate without God's cooperation, as I showed at length in the book *On Causes*, question 6, on the first and second cause. This is especially so because there the Savior was speaking about meritorious works, which cannot be accomplished without the prevenient grace of God, as the Council of Trent determines at the place there adduced.

You object, second: the same Redeemer says (*John 6*): "No one comes to me unless the Father who sent me draws him." But one who is drawn does not act freely but by compulsion. Since, then, a person is drawn by God, consequently he does not enjoy free will.

Confirmation: Augustine (*Sermon 2, on the words of the Apostle*): "It is true that the human being received great powers of free will when he was created, but lost them by sinning." And (*Epistle 107*): "We lost free will for loving God through the magnitude of the first sin."

I respond by explaining that passage as referring not to physical, necessary, and violent drawing—as Luther wrongly deduces—but to moral drawing, which occurs when a person is called by God, whom he can resist and sometimes does resist and acts contrarily, as is indicated (*1, Great Ethics, chapter 11*) and is evident

from Proverbs 1: "I called, and you refused; I stretched out my hand, and no one heeded; you despised all my counsel." And Matthew 23: "How often I wished to gather your children, as a hen gathers her chicks under her wings, and you were unwilling."

To the confirmation: Augustine there satisfies this by saying: "By death the human being fell; he was made weak, he was left half-dead on the road by robbers"—as is signified in Luke 10. Since grace is required for a meritorious work, without which a person cannot act well, by sin the human being is said to have lost free will—not absolutely, but for acting well, as the same Saint teaches (*Enchiridion, chapter 30*): "How can anyone glory in a good work of free will when he is not yet free for acting well, unless he puffs himself up with vain pride, which the Apostle restrains saying: 'By grace you have been saved through faith.'"

You object, third: God, by his eternal decree, decreed and established all future works to proceed from the human being, certainly and infallibly so and not otherwise, as Scotus and his disciples teach. Therefore there is no free will, since everything is determined from eternity, and a person cannot act otherwise than God decreed from eternity.

Confirmation: Romans 9: "It is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy; he has mercy on whom he wills, and he hardens whom he wills." Therefore no free will exists in the human being.

I respond that God's decree involves the free tendencies of the human will. For God has determined to act freely with free creatures and not to impede their freedom. Although things happen as God foreknew and decreed, free will is not thereby removed, since it lies in the human being's power to do the opposite and to determine himself to either alternative, as I said in Logic, book 4, last article. Hence Arriaga wrongly argues (*disputation 8, on the soul, section 1, number 3*) against the Scotists for admitting and defending such a decree of God, which is indicated in 3 Kings 8 and Colossians 2. For this reason the Church sings in the Office of St. Anthony of Lisbon: "Concerning whom the King of kings decreed otherwise." Add also John 14 (actually 44): "As the Father gave me commandment, so I do."

To the confirmation: I say that text is to be interpreted concerning predestination in intention, which depends on God alone. For God predestines and chooses for glory whomever he wills, since he is the Lord of glory; he bestows it on whom he wills and does no one an injustice, according to Matthew 20: "Is it not lawful for me to do what I will?"

Article III. In what freedom is situated.

Three opinions are recounted and celebrated on this matter. The first is that of Alexander (1, *On the Soul, chapter on phantasia*) and Averroes (2, *Physics, comment*

48), who hold that freedom is situated in the intellect alone. The second is that of St. Thomas (1-2, *question 17, article 1, ad 2*), Medina (*ibid.*), and Javelli (9, *Metaphysics, question 4*), who hold that freedom is radically in the intellect and formally in the will. The third is defended by Scotus (2, *distinction 25, question un., and distinction 38*), Faber (*disputation 9, on penance, chapter 10, number 226*), and others, who teach that freedom is in the will alone.

Note, first, and recall from what was said: the will presupposes the intellect in order to operate—not as an effective cause of the will's acts, whether total or partial (as will be shown below), but as an ostensive, illuminative, and consultative cause, in much the same way as the internal senses require the operation of the external senses. Likewise, in this present state, the intellect presupposes the operation of the senses, both internal and external, and for this reason the well-known saying is predicated by the philosophers: "Nothing is in the intellect that was not first in the senses." And the Doctor (1, *distinction 43, question un.*) adds that God's knowledge is the ostensive cause of things, while his will is the productive and effective cause of those same things, as I showed at length in the treatise *On the Knowledge of God*, *disputation 2, question 4*.

From these considerations it is clear that Faber (*cited*) does not speak to the mind of the Doctor when he writes that freedom can be said to reside radically in the intellect, on the ground that the will cannot issue into an act without a prior act of the intellect. For this does not mean that the root of freedom is located in the intellect, since the intellect is in no way free—neither formally nor causally—since its operations are natural and necessary, as Faber himself acknowledges. Although his explanation is not contrary to Scotus, his manner of speaking is unusual and unheard of among the Doctor and his followers.

Note, second: freedom is commonly divided into freedom of specification and freedom of exercise. Freedom of specification, as the term indicates, concerns objects distinct in species or in any other way, toward the willing or not willing of which the will is indifferently disposed, since it lies in its power to will or not will this or that. Freedom of exercise, as the name denotes, concerns the acts of the will by which the will wills or does not will, and exercises its spontaneous and free operations.

Freedom is further distributed into freedom of contrariety and freedom of contradiction. The former is had with respect to contrary acts, which are willing and not willing (nolition) good or evil. The latter is had with respect to contradictory acts, which are willing and not willing (non-volition) good or non-good.

I know that Raconius (*question 3, proposition 1, section 3, disputation 1, on the principles of human actions*) denies freedom of contrariety, on the ground that the will cannot will evil as evil but always tends toward the good, whether true or apparent. But he errs. For, as I said elsewhere, although the will naturally

inclines toward the good, it can absolutely will evil as evil, with Paul agreeing (*Romans 7*): "I do not do the good that I will, but the evil that I hate, I do." Nor does it help him to respond that the will wills evil under the appearance of good, for this response is precluded by the Apostle's words: "But the evil that I hate, I do." For hatred, which is of evil, cannot be under the appearance of good, as is clearly evident to anyone reading the text.

First assertion: freedom is not formally in the intellect. The Doctor holds this (*cited above*).

This is proved, first: where there is no first act, there is no second act, because the second act arises from the first. But the intellect is not the first act of freedom, because it is a natural and necessary power. Therefore to the divine intellect is attributed the generation of the divine Word, which is natural and necessary; to the divine will, however, belongs the procession of the Holy Spirit, which is spontaneous and free. Freedom is therefore not formally found in the intellect.

Second, the principles or powers of intellectual nature are divided equally into natural and free (*2, On Interpretation, last chapter; 9, Metaphysics 10*). The intellect is a natural power; the will is free. For this reason God is said to act ad extra by will, because he acts freely, and not by intellect, since the intellect is a natural and necessary principle.

Third, the intellect is determined to one thing. When an object is presented to it and duly approximated, it cannot not understand it—just as if a color is presented to the eye, provided it is not impeded and is duly approximated, the eye cannot fail to see that color. For this reason the intellect is compelled by evidently known, necessary truths, so that it cannot dissent from them or recoil, as Scotus asserts (*1, distinction 1, question 4*). And if any defect occurs, it is to be imputed not to the intellect but to the will, as Augustine rightly pursues (*2 and 3, On Free Will*).

Second assertion: freedom does not reside radically in the intellect. This opposes the Thomists; the Scotists (*cited*) defend it.

This is proved, first: either by "root of freedom" the Thomists mean the principle, origin, and source of freedom, or they mean the sine qua non cause, or the principle required as a prerequisite for freedom so that the will may exercise its freedom. Not the first, because from a natural, necessary power determined to one thing, freedom—which is voluntary, indifferent, and indeterminate to either alternative—cannot arise. For it is an implication in terms for freedom, indifference, and indetermination to proceed from what is natural, necessary, and determined to one thing, since these are plainly opposed to each other.

Not the second, either; for then there would be no root of freedom in the intellect, which the Thomists strive with all their might to introduce into the schools. For a sine qua non cause is not a root of operating but rather a necessary condition for operating, as is clear from the approximation of fire to combustible material, which is by no means the root or principle of burning. Similarly, although the intellect and its operation are required as a prerequisite for the will to operate—just as light is required for seeing—the intellect itself causes nothing in the will. Rather, the will is of itself free and the mistress of its own acts. Therefore freedom is not found in the intellect as in its source and root.

Second, every freedom is either of contrariety, or of contradiction, or of specification, or of exercise, as I observed in the second note. But none of these freedoms is rooted in the intellect. For freedom of contrariety consists in willing or not willing (nolition). Freedom of contradiction consists in willing or not willing (non-volition). But it is not in the power of the intellect to will or not will, to will or not will—for these acts do not belong to the intellect, whose acts are intellection, vision, etc., but to the will, as their very names plainly show.

Furthermore, given two premises that are evidently, necessarily known, disposed in due form and figure, the intellect necessarily assents to their conclusion, as I asserted in *Logic*. But if the root of freedom were in the intellect, it could plainly dissent from and recoil from the conclusion, which Aristotle and all other philosophers consider impossible.

Third assertion: freedom formally belongs to the will alone. So holds Scotus (*cited*).

This is proved, first, from Matthew 26: "Your will be done." John 5: "I seek not my own will, but the will of him who sent me." And 1 Corinthians 7: "Not having necessity, but having power over his own will."

Second, the Council of Trent (*session 6, canon 5*) decrees that the human being is free to cooperate with or resist grace by his own will.

Third, Augustine (*3, On Free Will, chapter 3*): "Will does not exist unless it is free." And (*1, Retractations, chapter 9*): "Nothing is so much in the power of the will as the will itself." The same is found in *Against Faustus*, chapter 36.

Moreover, the will commands the intellect and turns it toward or away from the consideration of any object whatsoever. Therefore freedom formally consists in the will alone. Furthermore, honor, dishonor, merit, and demerit are attributed to the will alone, as can be seen in Augustine and other Fathers passim, as well as in the Doctors and philosophers. Moreover, every good division, as was said in the *Epitome*, chapter 2, question 7, article 1, is made into opposed members—as animal into rational and irrational. Now, power taken universally is aptly and

adequately divided into natural and free; since the will alone is free, it is evidently concluded that freedom formally consists in the will alone.

You object, first: a formally free power must be cognitive. But the will is not cognitive; therefore it is not formally free, but the intellect is. The major is proved from Physics VIII, T. 8, and Metaphysics IX, T. 10: a free power is directed toward opposites, but it cannot be directed toward opposites unless it is cognitive, because it determines itself to one or the other, which cannot happen unless it knows the opposites. The minor is well known, for the will is commonly called a blind power, the reason being that it is an appetitive power, which is contradistinguished from the cognitive faculty, as I said in *On the Soul*, book 4.

I deny the major. To its proof, based on Aristotle's testimony, I say that the will is directed toward opposites not because it is cognitive but because it is formally free and of itself undetermined to either alternative. It requires cognition as a prerequisite, and cognition pertains formally to the intellect. Just as the eye requires light in order to see, so the will requires cognition in order to will, as is clear from the second note.

You object, second: freedom formally belongs to the faculty that has the power to command other powers. But commanding is attributed to the intellect and not to the will; therefore freedom too belongs to the intellect. The major is evident. The minor is supported: the role of the appetitive power, such as the will, is to execute what is commanded by reason as it judges and deliberates. For this reason Aristotle (3, *On the Soul*, T. 48) adds that the intellect and appetite are principles of motion, because the intellect commands and the appetite executes.

I concede the major but deny the minor. To the proof I say that this is valid concerning the sensitive appetite, but not concerning the rational appetite, which is the will. For the intellect only shows the will what should or should not be done, and it lies in the power of the will to choose either option and put it into execution, as will be clear in the next question, where it will be shown that command belongs to the will alone.

You object, third: that power is formally free which is indifferent and undetermined. But the will is not of this kind; therefore it is not formally free. The major is clear, for freedom consists in indifference to either alternative. The minor is shown: an indifferent power cannot determine itself; otherwise it would not be indifferent and undetermined but determined, and the same thing would move itself, which Aristotle rejects (8, *Physics*, T. 40).

I concede the major but deny the minor. To its proof I say that this is true of a universal natural agent, which is determined by the disposition of the subject matter—as the sun hardens mud and melts wax—but not of a free cause, which spontaneously determines itself to acting. As for what is added from the Philosopher, I say that this holds in necessary and subordinated motion, but not

in voluntary and free motion, as I abundantly explained in the *Physics*, in the book on motion.

You object, fourth: the will tends toward what is shown by the intellect, and follows the right dictate of reason, so that when a necessary and perfect syllogism exists, the will necessarily gives assent to its conclusion, from which it cannot deviate. Therefore the root of freedom is in the intellect.

Confirmation: the right judgment of the intellect regulates the will, which conforms to it as the regulated to its rule, as Scotus asserts with Aristotle (*question 4, Prologue*), where, describing praxis, he says that it is an action of the will conformed to right reason, and that practical science consists in the twofold respect of priority and conformity. Therefore radical freedom is situated in the intellect.

I deny the antecedent. For the will can, in its freedom, dissent even from a perfect discourse, as is evident from stubborn people who deny true and evident arguments—since the will is not necessitated by the object and is not compelled by any extrinsic factor. To the confirmation: I distinguish the antecedent—by way of counseling and serving, I concede, just as a servant carries a lamp before a master, and a counselor gives advice to a king and shows him what ought to be done in the kingdom, while it lies in the king's power and freedom to do these things or not, or even to choose and carry out the opposite at his own pleasure, as not rarely happens. By way of commanding and directing, I deny, as is evident from the response to this objection.

Article IV. Whether the will is only passive, or also active.

Some hold that the will is only a passive power, but they proceed by different paths. Godfrey (*Quodlibet 6, question 7, cited by Scotus, 2, distinction 25, question un., § Dicitur*) and Bacconi (*ibid.*) think that volition is produced by the phantasm irradiated by the agent intellect as an extrinsic effective principle, and is merely received in the will as its subject. Henry, however (*Quodlibet 12, question 5, cited by the Doctor, cited above, § Alia est opinio*), asserts that volition is produced by the cognized and understood object. Cajetan (*1 p., question 80, article 2*) and Durandus (*2, distinction 24, question 2*) hold that volition is caused by the object and the will as two partial causes constituting one total cause—just as one integral and total cause productive of intellection is had from the intelligible species and the intellect. Others assert that the first volition is produced solely by an intrinsic principle, while for subsequent volitions they posit two partial causes integrating one total cause, as the Nominalists hold, cited by Faber, and as Thomas and his followers appear to hold, according to the same Faber (*disputation 9, on penance, chapter 11, number 272*). Scotus (*mentioned above*) and many others teach that the act of willing proceeds effectively from the will alone, while the intellect serves as an ostensive cause, proposing and showing

the object to the will, in whose power it is to will or not will or refrain from willing it.

Note, first: in the common opinion, the will is receptive of volition, just as the intellect is receptive of intellection. For both operations belong to the genus of quality and are the end and perfection of the said faculties. For this reason Aristotle (3, *On the Soul*, 2) says: "Understanding is a kind of being acted upon." The controversy in the present discussion, however, is whether volition is produced by an intrinsic principle—the will—or by an extrinsic principle, which is the object or something else mentioned at the beginning of this article.

Note, second: the will can be viewed in two ways. First, as an appetitive power naturally inclined to receive its own perfection—and in this way it is a passive power, productive of no act, for to be inclined to receive something is not to act but to be acted upon, and accordingly inclination is not an action but rather a relation, which does not belong to the genus of active things, as I noted in *Logic*, book 1, question 1, article 1. In this we disagree with the Thomists, who hold that the will taken in this way produces a natural and necessary act, and that all subsequent acts are free. Second, as elicitive of its own acts—in which way it is active and free, with freedom of specification and exercise.

Note, third: a natural cause is not per se the cause of contraries but per accidens, by reason of the subject matter—as the sun hardens mud and melts wax, as Scotus notes (2, *distinction 25, question un.*, § *Contra, A*). Similarly, the science of contraries may be spoken of insofar as it regards both contraries, although it does not determine itself but is determined by the object of which it treats (9, *Metaphysics*, T. 3). But the will, being a free power directed toward opposites, is by its very nature undetermined and freely and spontaneously determines itself to one or the other, since it is fully and perfectly free, as the Doctor pursues (*cited, at the end of the question*).

First assertion: the will is not only a passive power. The Doctor defends this (*cited*).

This is proved, first, from Luke 22: "Yet not my will." And Matthew 26: "Not as I will, but as you will." But the will of God the Father, of which Christ was there speaking, is productive and active, for it produces the Holy Spirit and creatures. Therefore the will of Christ as man is likewise active. Again, John 10: "I have power to lay it down, and I have power to take it up again." The will of God and of the human being agree univocally in the common nature of will. If, then, the former is active, so is the latter.

Second, Augustine (*Retractions 9 and 22*): "Nothing is so much in the power of the will as the will itself"—that is, as Scotus explains (1, *distinction 1, question 4, § Ad argumenta*), as its elicited or commanded act. The same is indicated (22, *Against Faustus, chapter 37*).

Third, if two young men equally disposed have the same beautiful and delightful but forbidden object present to them, and one sins while the other does not, this cannot arise from anything other than the will of one concupiscently desiring the forbidden object and the will of the other not desiring it. For if it arose from the phantasm or the object, since the object relates in the same way to both, either both would sin or neither would.

Fourth, a lower power, such as the sense, both internal and external, is an agent—for the eye produces vision, and the imagination produces the act of imagining, as I said in *On the Soul*, book 3. Therefore a higher power, such as the will, is also active. For it would be absurd for the noblest power, which is the will, to be passive while the other less noble powers are active, since acting is nobler than being acted upon.

Moreover, according to *On Interpretation* II, last chapter, and *Metaphysics* IX, 10, the rational and volitive power is directed toward opposites—that is, it can choose or reject either opposite at will. And Aristotle (*1, Great Ethics, 6 and 7*) confirms this, saying that choice is an act of the will.

Finally, being acted upon is not in the power and freedom of the patient but of the free agent. If, therefore, the will merely receives and is not free with respect to what it receives, it would certainly neither merit nor demerit—which is an inconvenience and an absurdity. It is therefore better to deny that the will is merely passive.

Second assertion: neither the phantasm nor the cognized object can be the total productive principle of the act of the will. This assertion contains two parts.

The first part is proved, first: a vital act proceeds only from a vital principle, as its notion indicates. But the act of the will is vital—for it is an operation of the living will. Therefore the phantasm, which is non-living, is not the producer of volition.

Second, the phantasm is corporeal and material, just as the phantastic power is corporeal and material. But the act of the will is immaterial and spiritual. No corporeal and material thing totally produces a spiritual thing, for, as was said elsewhere, a body does not act physically on a spirit.

Third, every active principle is either equivocal or univocal, for as I said in *Logic*, book 3, no middle term intervenes between them. The phantasm cannot be a univocal principle, since it must be nobler than or equally noble to its effect. But it is evident that the phantasm is less noble than the act of willing, which is spiritual. Nor can it be an equivocal principle, which is more excellent than its effect, for an equivocal cause virtually contains its effect and therefore surpasses it in nobility. Moreover, an angel and a soul abstracted from the body could not will, since they lack phantasms. But it is false and absurd that an angel and a soul in that state lack the act of willing, since they enjoy God, and

enjoyment is an act of the will. The phantasm is therefore not the adequate cause of volition.

The second part is proved, first: a natural and necessary cause produces a natural and necessary effect, just as a free and contingent cause causes a free and contingent effect. But the object is a natural and necessary cause. Therefore its effect is natural and necessary—which perhaps is what Augustine had in mind (3, *On Free Will*): "It is not in our power not to be affected by what we see." Volition, however, is a free and contingent act. Therefore the object is not the total cause of volition.

Second, the acts of willing, not willing, and indifference cannot proceed from the object. For the object always excites the power to act in the same way, and since it is a natural cause, it cannot move the will toward volition, nolition, or neutrality, as is clear from the objects of the external senses: the eye, when a properly disposed and approximated object is presented to it, cannot fail to see it. Therefore the same would have to be affirmed of the will. The arguments adduced above to prove the preceding assertion also apply here—especially this: a finite natural agent is not the cause of contraries, because it is per se determined to one thing; the object, however, is a natural and necessary agent, while the acts of willing and not willing are contraries. It is therefore concluded that the object is not the total cause of the acts of the will.

Third assertion: the precognized object displayed by the intellect to the will cannot be a partial cause of volition. The Doctor inclines toward this view (*cited, and in the Reportata, at the same distinction, and 9, Metaphysics, question 15, § Per dicta*).

This is proved, first: if the object partially concurred in causing volition, the will would not be fully free, because it would be determined by the causality of the object, and so it could will only what is caused by the object—since a partial cause cannot act unless the other partial cause acts with it, as is clear from the father and mother concurring as two partial causes to generate offspring. Since the will is absolutely and perfectly free, it follows that the object does not partially co-act in producing volition.

Second, the will could not will evil, since evil is not an object—for the object is supposed to be something positive, whereas evil is the privation of good, as I taught in book 1-2, question on evil, article 1. Again, the will can will a non-existing and impossible object, and since such an object does not have and cannot have being, it cannot cause an act of the will, which is a real positive entity. Therefore the object does not partially co-act in causing acts of the will.

Fourth assertion: the will is free not only with respect to subsequent acts but also with respect to the first act. The Doctor holds this (*cited above*).

This is proved, first: all acts of the will, whether earlier or later, are of the same nature, proceeding from the same free principle. Therefore, if the later ones are free, the first act is also free. For if it were natural, it would proceed from a natural principle, just as a free act proceeds from a free principle. But the first act flows from the same will, which is a free principle; therefore the first act of the will is free.

Second, if the first act of the will is not free, this is chiefly because the will is its natural productive origin, since it is a natural appetite with respect to it. But the will, insofar as it naturally inclines toward something, is not productive of acts, as I observed in the second note.

Moreover, the Doctor argues (*Quodlibet* 21): if the will in its first act were moved naturally by the object, it would not move freely but naturally, and so the human being would be like a brute, which is moved by its apprehended object through natural motion. Furthermore, the will would be determined by an extrinsic principle—which would be either God or something physically predetermining it—which, as something false opposed to truth and freedom, has been rejected by us elsewhere.

Fifth assertion: the will is the total productive cause of its own acts. Scotus supports this (*at the aforementioned passage*), and Raconius follows (*cited above, section 4, question 1*).

This is deduced from the preceding considerations. For since it was proved above that the will is not merely a passive power, and that no total or partial extrinsic principle is the efficient cause of its acts, it plainly follows that the will is the total cause of those same acts. This is evidently shown by the following argument: the will, when any object whatsoever is presented to it, can will or not will or refrain from willing it. Therefore it totally causes its own acts. The antecedent is clear from the description of the will, which is a free, indifferent, and undetermined power, and the mistress of its own acts, as Aristotle rightly observed (3, *Ethics* 5).

You object, first: Aristotle (3, *On the Soul*, T. 54) establishes an order of movers and moved, of which some move but are not moved—as the desirable object moves the appetite toward its attainment but is not itself moved, since it is the object and terminus of the desiring subject. Some move and are moved—as the appetite moves the animal toward the pursuit of the desirable object and is moved by the desirable object on account of its goodness. And some are moved and do not move—as the animal's body is moved by the act of appetite.

But the will is a rational appetite; therefore it is moved by the desirable object and is consequently a passive power. Nor does it help to say that Aristotle is speaking of metaphorical motion, such as the motion of a final cause, since, having previously discussed the motion of an efficient cause, he would labor under equivocation if he then spoke of the motion of a final cause.

Confirmation 1: the same philosophical reasoning applies to the rational appetite, which is the will, as to the sensitive appetite. But the sensitive appetite is passive; therefore so is the rational appetite.

Confirmation 2: between active and passive power there is no middle term. But the will is a power, not indeed active—which (5, *Metaphysics* 17) is "the power of changing another, insofar as it is other." Therefore it is a passive power.

I respond: first, the object moves the will ostensibly, not effectively. Second, metaphorically, not really. Nor is it inconsistent that something be moved in one sense really and effectively, and in another metaphorically and intentionally, since the efficient cause is ordered to the end.

That this can be understood in both ways is evident from Scripture: Ecclesiasticus 31: "He who was able to transgress" is explained of any saint and member of Christ; "And did not transgress" is understood of the head, that is, Christ.

Against this, Scotus (*in the Reportata, ibid., § Ad 1. principale*) expressly says: "The object effectively moves the will, though it is not the total cause." This must be addressed by saying that Scotus is there speaking in the alternative opinion affirming that the object partially co-acts with the will in producing volition—an opinion that does not displease him, although he inclines more toward the opposite view, asserting that the will alone is the total efficient cause of volition.

To the first confirmation: the parity is to be denied, because the sensitive appetite is a natural power, while the rational appetite is free. Hence Damascene adds (*book 4, chapter 23, 42*): "The sensitive appetite is led, not leading."

To the second confirmation: I concede the major but deny the minor. For the will is indeed an active power, not a productive power as described at the cited place.

You object, second: the mover and the moved must be distinguished by subject, since the same thing cannot move itself; otherwise the same thing would be simultaneously in act and in potency with respect to the same thing, which conflicts with On Generation I, T. 17. Therefore the will is not an active power.

I distinguish the major: concerning things that are moved by organic motion, I concede; concerning things that are moved by inorganic motion, I deny—as an angel moves itself, and the intellect understands itself. Nor does it imply a contradiction for one and the same thing to be in subjective and active potency, and to be in formal potency and in virtual act, as I abundantly showed in the *Physics*, in the book on motion.

You object, third: matter and the efficient cause do not coincide (2, *Physics* 70). But the will is related as matter with respect to motion, and the mover is the

efficient cause. Therefore the will cannot be both active and passive with respect to its own acts.

Confirmation: the mover and the moved are really distinct, but there is no real distinction or relation between a thing and itself. For real relatives are opposed, as is evident from the Post-predicaments.

I respond by distinguishing the antecedent: concerning transmutative matter, I concede; concerning receptive matter, or the subject of operations, I deny. To the confirmation: I say this is true of the relations of producer and product, but false of other relations, such as the relations of mover and moved, on which I wrote at length elsewhere.

You object, fourth: if the will were active, since it is duly disposed and aptly approximated to willable objects, it would always will, because a natural agent approximated to a patient acts necessarily (2, *On the Soul*, 52). If the sense were active, it would always act; and if fire had a combustible near it, it would always burn. Therefore, if the will is an active power, it would always will.

I deny the inference of the antecedent. For this holds of a natural agent, not of a free one, which is what the will is.

You object, fifth, from Averroes (12, *Metaphysics*, comment 36): a bath in external reality moves sensitive things—that is, those it moves effectively. But a bath in the mind moves the will; therefore a cognized object effectively moves the will.

I concede the major and distinguish the minor: per se, I deny; per accidens, I concede. For this is true only ostensibly, not effectively.

You object, sixth: from a contingent cause, no determinate effect occurs unless it is determined by something extrinsic, since of itself it is indifferent and undetermined. But the will is a contingent and indifferent cause for willing or not willing. Therefore it is determined by an extrinsic principle, and so it is merely passive.

Confirmation 1: first movements are not in our power, and therefore they are neither praiseworthy nor blameworthy, as the body of theologians teaches.

Confirmation 2: at the end of Ethics VI, sometimes while we are thinking of nothing, an efficacious thought comes to mind that draws the will with it. But this volition is not from us; therefore it is from something extrinsic, and consequently the first act of the will is natural.

I distinguish the major: concerning a natural contingent cause, I concede; concerning a free contingent cause, such as the will, which freely determines itself, I deny. To the first confirmation: I say with Scotus (*Quodlibet* 21, M): "first movements" refers to intellections that are partially caused by phantasms, just as Augustine says (3, *On Free Will*): "It is necessary that we be affected by what we see." To the second confirmation: I say that, given the hypothesis, the will relates

passively, not actively. Therefore it does not then elicit an act, as also occurs in subreption, especially of the flesh.

Article V. Whether the intellect moves the will.

Those who assert, like Cajetan (*cited by Faber in the aforementioned article*), that intellection is the principle by which volition is produced, undoubtedly think that the intellect moves the will to exercise its acts. Those, however, who hold that the will is the total principle of its own acts, as the Scotists cited in the said article plainly affirm, maintain that the intellect does not move the will to produce its acts. That the will moves the intellect to speculate on and contemplate these or those objects, and turns it toward or away from meditating on those objects, is a well-known and clear position among the Scholastics.

Note: to move a power to act means nothing other than to reduce a power from first act to second act—that is, to excite and induce the power itself to act, which happens when the power actually acts and operates. A power can be moved to act in two ways: either with respect to the exercise of acts, when a power is excited to produce this or that act; or with respect to specification, when it is moved to operate with respect to this or that specifically distinct object. Furthermore, observe that in sudden, unexpected, or surreptitious acts, the will is not stimulated by the intellect but by the object—as in vehement pain or great delight, as Augustine confirms (*recently cited*).

First assertion: the will can be said to be moved by the intellect ostensibly and consultatively. This is consonant with Scotus (*cited*).

This is proved, first, from the well-known dictum of Augustine (8, *On the Trinity, chapter 4*): "Nothing is willed unless first known." Since the will is called a blind power, it is necessary that the intellect show it willable objects. It is therefore not unfitting to assert that the intellect moves the will ostensibly.

Second, the intellect is like a counselor and legal advisor showing the will what things are good or evil, just or unjust, and it then lies in the will's power to choose this or that, and to determine and apply itself to this or that course of action. The proposed assertion is therefore legitimate.

Second assertion: the will moves the intellect to understand, and commands it to turn toward or away from the speculation of this or that subject. This accords with the Doctor's writings (*cited*).

This is proved, first: the will is like a king in the kingdom of the soul and the noblest of its powers, as I showed in *On the Soul*, book 5. But the intellect is like its counselor. A king, however, moves and commands his counselor and all who live under his rule. Therefore the will dominates over the intellect.

Second, experience teaches us that the will at pleasure induces or withdraws the intellect from the consideration and speculation of this or that object, as is

evident from those who freely and voluntarily apply themselves to one science or art rather than another. The intellect therefore obeys the command of the will and is subject to its yoke.

You object, first: the intellect, in being and in operating, is prior to the will (*10, Ethics 7*). Therefore the will does not move the intellect. The consequent holds because to move is to act and to be moved is to be acted upon, and it is prior and nobler to act than to be acted upon, as Augustine says (*12, On Genesis, Literally*). Therefore the will does not move the intellect.

I distinguish the antecedent: by priority of origin and generation, I concede; by priority of perfection and nobility, I deny.

You object, second: a prior, as prior, does not depend on a posterior, as I have often emphasized. Since, then, the intellect is prior in being and operating, it is aptly inferred that the will does not move the intellect to meditate and contemplate. The antecedent is evident, because a prior, as prior, can exist without the posterior—as a cause without its effect, and God without a creature.

I respond that the major is true provided that the prior is not subject to the command of another. But if it is subject to another's command, the major does not hold. For a subject and servant, even if they precede the king in age and origin, still obey a king born later in time. Again, although means in being precede the end, they are nevertheless ordered to the end. Similarly, the intellect indeed precedes the will in origin, yet it is ordered to the will and carries out and obeys its command. Hence there is Anselm's saying, cited by us elsewhere: "We understand in order that we may will, but we do not will in order that we may understand." And (*9, Metaphysics 15*): "Things posterior in generation are prior in perfection." Accordingly, the will, though last in origin, is first in perfection.

Article VI. Whether the will moves the other powers to act.

Since there is a triple genus of souls and degrees—vegetative, sensitive, and intellective—the powers and faculties are also tripled. For some pertain to the vegetative soul, such as the generative, nutritive, and augmentative. Others are suited to the sensitive, such as the internal and external sensitive powers, as well as the appetitive and locomotive. Others are adapted to the intellective soul alone, such as the intellect and the will—on all of which I wrote at length in the book *On the Soul*.

Note, from Aristotle (*1, Ethics, last chapter, and 1, Politics, chapter 3*), and Scotus (*3, distinction 33, question un., § Ad arg. principalia, sub N*): command is twofold—despotic and political. Despotic command, also called servile, is that in which the one commanded offers no resistance, or at least resists only with great difficulty—as a master commands his servants. Political command, also called free, is that in which the one commanded can resist and oppose the

commander—as citizens obey magistrates, though sometimes they resist and oppose them.

First assertion: the vegetative powers are not subject to any dominion of the will, whether despotic or political. This conforms to Scotus (*just cited*).

This is proved, first: these powers administer their operations by the guidance of nature, which is necessary, whether one is awake or asleep or doing something else. For one is nourished, grows, and performs other operations of this kind. These powers therefore are subject to no command of the will.

Second, if they obeyed the will, they would operate at its pleasure and motion. But the contrary is evident, since it is not in a person's hand to be nourished and to grow; indeed, one often wants to be nourished and is prevented not only from nutrition but also from the other acts of the aforementioned faculties. Therefore such powers are not comprehended under the dominion of the will.

Second assertion: the motive power, by which the external members are moved—provided they are rightly disposed and not impeded—obeys the command of the will despotically. This is not inconsistent with Scotus.

This is proved, first, from Politics I, 3: "The mind commands, and the hand is moved." Second, from Augustine (8, *Confessions*, 9): "And the ease is so great that service can scarcely be distinguished from command." And (12, *City of God*, chapter 6); Damascene (2, *On the Faith*, chapter 16) and Anselm (*On the Virginal Conception*, chapter 4) concur.

Third, experience shows that we move our hands, feet, and other members at our pleasure without any intervening resistance or opposition. We walk when we wish, or cease from walking, or do anything else through our external members without any interposed obstacle. Therefore the will commands them with despotic and servile command.

Third assertion: the will does not always move the external members with the appetite going before. This conflicts with certain authors cited by the Coimbra commentators (*disputation 4, question 3, article 4*), whom the Coimbra commentators themselves favor. It is not inconsistent with the Doctor.

This is nonetheless established: we move external members against the sensitive appetite, as is evident from the martyrs, who, against the natural appetite, exposed and presented their members to tyrants and executioners for the most grievous torments and scourgings. Again, with no end proposed or offered to itself, the will can at its pleasure and nod excite and move such members. It is therefore not necessary for an act of the sensitive appetite to precede the moving of those members.

Whether the sensitive appetite can move the external members without the command and motion of the will is debated among the Scholastics. Cajetan and

Thomas (*1 p., question 81, article 3*) adhere to the affirmative, while others favor the negative. I assent to the former view, because the sensitive appetite of the human being is not of a worse condition than the sensitive appetite of a brute, and the latter moves the external members without the motion of the will, since the brute lacks a will. Therefore so does the former. Indeed, frequently, against our will, the external members are excited by the sensitive appetite and rebel against reason and the higher portion—as is evident from Christ, who (*Luke 12*) "was in agony," and according to the natural and sensitive appetite, or the lower portion, did not wish to die, and so addressing the Father said (*Matthew 26*): "Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me." And (*2 Corinthians 5*): "We do not wish to be unclothed but to be further clothed." And (*Ephesians 5*): "For no one ever hated his own flesh, but nourishes and cherishes it." Therefore the sensitive appetite can move the external members without the consent of the will.

Fourth assertion: the internal and external senses, as well as the sensitive appetite, are governed by the will—not with despotic but with political rule. This does not contradict Scotus. Thomas (*1 p., question 82, article 3, ad 2*) exempts the cogitative power, but the assertion is proved of all.

First, from Romans 7: "I see another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind." And James 1: "Each one is tempted, being drawn and enticed by his own concupiscence."

Second, Augustine (*Tractate 26 on John*): "The mind is drawn by love"—where he adduces that line of Virgil from the Second Eclogue: "Each is drawn by his own pleasure"—"not by obligation but by delight, not by necessity but by pleasure; how much more strongly should we say that one is drawn to Christ who delights in truth, justice, and beatitude." And after a few words: "You show a green branch to a sheep, and you draw it; nuts are shown to a boy, and he is drawn; and what he runs toward, he is drawn to; he is drawn by loving, he is drawn without bodily injury, he is drawn by the chain of the heart."

Third, those are governed by political command that sometimes do not obey, or at least obey with difficulty—and such are all the senses, because of the firm and fixed apprehension of objects in them. For we cannot fail to see visible objects that are present and duly illuminated, or fail to hear audible things, or fail to touch tangible things, and so on. Those powers therefore obey the will not despotically but politically. The major is evident from the description of political command given in the preceding note. The minor is confirmed by daily experience. I add that sometimes we will what the senses nevertheless perceive, as is clear in dreams, of acts of imagining, and of the sensitive appetite—which the previously cited passages of Scripture express.

You object, first: the sensitive appetite draws the will to itself, as Paul indicates (*Romans 7*): "I do not do the good that I will, but the evil that I do not will, I do."

But it seems the same should be said of the sensitive appetite of the human being as of the brute, and the latter draws the brute necessarily. Therefore the former necessarily draws the human being.

I distinguish the antecedent: indirectly and remotely, I concede; directly and proximately, I deny—as the sacred text indicates (*Genesis 4*): "Its appetite shall be under you, and you shall have dominion over it." This is also evident from what was said in *On the Heavens*, question 3, article 3, and indicated by Aristotle (*1, Great Ethics, chapter 11*).

You object, second: Scripture commands us to guard our senses from objects that can lead us into sin, as in the Song of Songs 6: "Turn away your eyes." Hence Gregory, discussing nocturnal illusions, says: "That malignant spirits do this, divine dispensation benignly permits, in the hearts of the elect, so that not even sleep itself may be without reward." If, then, one merits in sleep, the imagination is subject to the despotic dominion of the will.

Confirmation: in sleep the internal powers are more collected, since the external senses are at rest. For this reason divine revelations occur in dreams, as is evident from Matthew 2: "The angel of the Lord appeared in a dream to Joseph." Therefore the aforementioned powers obey the despotic command of the will.

I respond that this only shows that the senses are governed by the will with political dominion. For sometimes the will, enticed by a delightful object, falls into evil, as is evident from the subsequent words of the cited text: "Because they made me fly away." To Gregory's point: I say that the saints merit in sleep not per se but occasionally, because after sleep, while awake, they are displeased by obscene things and rejoice in the good things offered by the imagination—just as a sinner is gladdened by good things and saddened by evil things. To the confirmation: I say that the natural powers are collected, not the animal powers. For sleep is the rest of the animal powers accompanied by the intensification of the natural ones, as Orbellis attests (*2, distinction 25, question 2*). As for the further point about divine revelations, I say that then a person is acted upon rather than acting, and has more of a passive than an active role.

Question II. On Human Acts.

Article I. Whether the first act of the will is free.

The Thomists, with their master (*1-2, question 9*), as reported by Faber (*disputation 9, on Penance, chapter 12, 1, 310*), hold that the first act of the will is natural and necessary, and therefore in no way free. Scotus, however, and his disciples (*2, distinction 25, question un.*) hold that both the first and the subsequent acts are free. For the elucidation and resolution of this difficulty, what I extensively observed and established in the treatise *On the Angels*, disputation 2, question 6, and what I presented in article 4 of the preceding question, assertion 4, are relevant. With these premises noted and presupposed:

Assertion: the first act of the will is free. The Doctor defends this (*cited above*).

This is proved, first: from a free principle proceed all free actions, just as from a natural principle proceed natural and necessary acts. For principle is adequately divided into natural and free, as animal into rational and irrational. Now, the first act, like the subsequent ones, arises from the will. Therefore the first act is free, just as the others are free.

Second, every voluntary act is free, since it remains in the power of the will, which is by its very nature free. Hence Augustine (2, *On Free Will*) says: "Unless those things that are voluntary were in our power, the will would be neither to be praised nor blamed, and indeed not even to be admonished. But he who asserts that the will is not to be admonished is to be expelled from the number of human beings." The first act of the will is voluntary: if someone rises from sleep and an object is presented to him and he wills it, this act is free and first. For if the same object is offered to another in the same way and he does not will it, this act too is free, as Augustine rightly pursues (12, *City of God*, chapter 6): "If two are equally affected in mind and body, if the same forbidden object is desired by each, and one falls: this does not arise from anywhere other than from the will, which is free regarding whatever is proposed to it for desiring, because one sins and the other does not." Therefore the first act of the will possesses freedom, just as the others that follow it. More can be found in the treatise *On the Angels* (*previously cited*).

You object, first: that act is not free which is natural and necessary and determined by another. For in this a natural act differs from a free one. But the first act of the will is of this kind, for it proceeds from the will as nature and is determined by the object, or by an extrinsic principle. Therefore the first act of the will is not free.

I concede the major but deny the minor. For the will is of itself free and is determined by nothing. Therefore both its earlier and later acts are free.

You object, second: in every order there is a first mover that moves all others of the same order, as Aristotle says (7, *Physics* 1): "Whatever is moved, is moved by another." Therefore the will, producing the first act, is naturally moved by another, and accordingly its first act is not free.

I distinguish the antecedent: concerning necessary, natural, and subordinated motion, I concede; concerning voluntary, free, and non-subordinated motion, I deny. Aristotle (*cited*) is thus to be explained, since he is speaking there of the necessary and subordinated motion of the heavens, as I explained at length (1, *On Motion*, question 3, article 3). The remaining points desired here can be found at the previously named place.

Article II. Whether the act of the will is formally free.

Many recent authors, among them Vazquez (*disputation 34, 1-2, number 15*), Suárez, and others cited by Arriaga (*disputation 8, on the soul, section 4, subsection 4*), affirm that the act of the will is free extrinsically and denominatively, so that freedom is an extrinsic denomination of the act of the will. Other Scholastics, however—especially Thomas (*1-2, question 19, article 1*) and those adduced by Hurtado (*disputation 15, on the soul, section 6, subsection 2*)—assert that the act of the will is essentially and formally free. To these, Scotus and his disciples undoubtedly subscribe, for they everywhere teach that an act is divided into natural and free, just as power taken universally is divided into natural and free—especially because the same authors assert that every act of the will is free, both in God and in creatures, both in the blessed comprehensor and in the wayfarer.

Note and recall from what was said in the Epitome, book 1, question 4, article 9, number 30, and in the book On Generation and Corruption: action is taken in two ways—in one way as action belonging to the genus of action, and in another way as action belonging to the genus of quality, which is the thing produced, or the terminus of the action. In the present matter, the question is not whether the act of the will belonging to the genus of quality is intrinsically free—for since it is a quality and a terminus of the will, it is said to be free only extrinsically and denominatively. Rather, the question concerns the act or action belonging to the genus of action, which is called elicitation, and which is in the power of the will to elicit or not elicit—through which a person merits or demerits—namely, whether freedom is intrinsic and essential to it.

Assertion: the act of the will is formally and essentially free. This is deduced from Scotus (*cited above in the preceding passages*).

This is proved, first: an act is adequately divided into natural and free. A natural act is intrinsically and formally natural because it is determined to one thing. Therefore equally, a free act is formally and essentially free because it is undetermined to either alternative.

Second, things whose intrinsic principles differ formally and intrinsically are shown to have intrinsically distinct acts—as is evident from nutrition and augmentation. But the act of the will proceeds from a free principle, which formally differs from the intellect, which is a natural principle. Therefore the act of the will is intrinsically and formally free.

Moreover, an act is formally true or false, as I said in Logic, book 4, treating of truth and falsity. Therefore the act of the will is formally free—both because it is meritorious or demeritorious, and because the Holy Spirit is produced through an act of the will of the Father and the Son, which is intrinsically free, as I said in the treatise On the Triune God, in the question whether the Holy Spirit proceeds freely from the Father and the Son. Therefore, if an act of the will exists, it is formally free, just as if the will exists, it is formally to be called free.

You object, first: the act of the will is called free because it arises from the will, which is a free power—just as a bench is called human because it is fabricated by a human being. Therefore the act of the will is free extrinsically and denominatively.

I distinguish the antecedent: the act is principiatively free because it is elicited by the will, which is free, I concede; but the act is formally free because it originates from the will, I deny. For in itself and intrinsically it is free—just as I said in the previously cited treatise *On the Triune God*, disputation 1: the divine processions are principiatively distinguished through the intellect and will, but formally through themselves. Nor does the example of the bench apply, since the bench is called human only terminatively—that is, because it is the terminus of a human power. But the act of the will is a vital act, intrinsically and formally free.

You object, second: the same philosophical reasoning applies to a free act as to a true or false act. But an act is called true extrinsically—namely, from the object of which it treats, for truth, as was said in *Logic*, is the conformity of a thing with its principles. Therefore the act of the will is extrinsically free.

I concede the major and distinguish the minor: in itself and formally, I deny; objectively and terminatively, I concede. For truth is twofold: one is formal, which belongs to a true act; the other is objective, about which the formally true act is concerned.

You object, third: a free act can be converted into a necessary one. Therefore it is not essentially free. The antecedent is evident from the act of the wayfarer, which is free, and which then in the comprehensor is necessary. For the blessed person necessarily sees and enjoys God. Therefore the act of the will is not formally free.

I deny the antecedent. To its proof I say that such an act is not changed but remains the same free act, although the will of the blessed person is forestalled from issuing into the opposite act. Therefore it always persists as essentially free.

Article III. Whether there are indifferent acts.

This difficulty can be raised in multiple ways—namely, concerning natural, moral, and meritorious human acts, and about all of these in general, or in species, or in the individual, or in the singular. For some, such as St. Bonaventure (*2, distinction 41*), grant indifferent acts in common and in general, but not in the singular, holding that no singular act is indifferent and neutral. Others, such as Scotus—both here and in the *Reportata (2, distinction 41)*—admit indifferent acts in both ways: both in species and in the singular, in the order of morals and merit, but not in the order of nature.

Note, first: we are not here discussing non-human acts that seem to proceed from imagination alone—like picking up a straw from the ground, moving one's

arm, or touching one's beard—but human acts that proceed spontaneously and freely from the will, as the Doctor notes (*cited, before § Ad argumenta*). These can be viewed in the order of nature, or in the order of morals, or in the order of merit, as will become clear below.

Note, second, from Vorrilong (*at the present place*): these three differ from each other—subreption, deliberation, and intellection. For subreption negates every foresight of the intellect; hence it is called subreption, as if "stealing."

Deliberation designates an act of counsel in matters of action; hence deliberation is an act of the intellect, for it pertains to the intellect to deliberate and to the will to pronounce judgment. Deliberation differs from intellection because intellection receives every intelligible and knowable thing, speculative or practical, while deliberation is occupied only with practical and actionable matters.

Note, third: something can be indifferent in three ways. First, as unitable, determinable, potential, and contractible—and so a genus is said to be indifferent to its differences, by which it is contracted and determined; and similarly matter is indifferent to the forms it receives. Second, as equally participating in certain things—as if there were a shield equally participating in as much whiteness as blackness, it would be neither white nor black but indifferent. Third, as mediating between extremes—as liberality mediates between prodigality and avarice. It is in this third way that "indifferent" is taken in the present discussion: namely, whether between the good and evil of nature, morals, or merit there is an indifferent and neutral act that is neither good nor evil. Furthermore, the threefold goodness and malice—natural, moral, and meritorious—presented and explained above (*1-2, question 1, article 2*) should be recalled.

Note, fourth, from the Doctor (*2, distinction 41, Reportata, question un., § De 3. bonitate*): a person can refer an act to the due end in three ways. First, actually—when one actually thinks of the end, loves it, and operates for the sake of that end. Second, virtually—when one proposes to do something for the sake of God and, while operating, does not always actually refer that work to God. Third, habitually—when one who has the habit of charity can refer every act to God.

Conversely, an act can fail to be referred and ordered to God in three ways. First, negatively—when it is not referred to the end actually, virtually, or habitually. Second, privatively—when the act is not suitable for being referred, as a venial sin, which although compatible with charity, is not apt to tend toward God together with charity. Third, contrarily—when it is opposed to charity, as a mortal sin.

The question is which of these acts can be indifferent and neutral.

First assertion: between natural good and evil, there is no intermediate and indifferent act. So holds Scotus (*in the Reportata cited, § Ad q. dico*).

This is proved, first, from Dionysius (4, *On the Divine Names*): "Good arises from an integral cause, and evil from any defect whatsoever." Either a natural act has everything required for its being, and is good, or it lacks something, and is evil. Therefore no middle term intervenes between them.

Second, between a positive thing and a privation there is no middle term—as between a form and its privation (1, *Physics*, T. 67 and 68). But a good act is a positive being, and a bad act is a privative being, from what was established (1-2, *question 2, article 3*). Therefore between natural good and evil there is no middle, just as nothing mediates between being and non-being.

Second assertion: in the order of morals, there can be a neutral act—that is, one neither morally good nor morally evil. So holds the Doctor (*cited*).

This is proved, first, from Aristotle (10, *Ethics 5 and 9*): "A person is neither good nor evil, but can become good or evil"; and (2, *Ethics, chapter 1*): "The habit of justice is generated from just works, not however from works done justly"—that is, from works proceeding from the virtue of justice. Such an act is neither morally good nor morally evil, since it does not arise from virtue. Therefore it is neutral.

Second, between the just and the unjust there mediates the non-just. Likewise, acts preceding the virtues are neither good nor evil, and acts following the virtues introduce no moral goodness or malice. Indifferent moral acts are therefore conceded.

Third assertion: in the genus of merit, there are indifferent acts—namely, neither meritorious nor demeritorious. The same Doctor holds this (*cited above*), followed by Aureolus (*ibid.*, *question un.*) and Major (*question 2*).

This is proved, first, from Augustine (*Epistle 2*) and Jerome (*cited by Augustine there*): "Continence is good; luxury is evil. Between the two, walking, digesting the waste of the stomach, clearing the nose, and spitting are indifferent: this is neither good nor evil; whether you do it or do not, you will have neither justice nor injustice."

Second, one who has a virtue is not bound to use that virtue in all acts and to produce all acts from virtue. This would be harsh and exceedingly difficult, and would be like the ancient yoke that neither we nor our fathers could bear—namely, that one affected by mortal sin would in all acts sin mortally or venially, or that one in grace would always merit. This obligation exists only when the occasion arises and presents itself. For this reason there are affirmative precepts that bind always but not for always.

The Seraphic Doctor illustrates this with an example: if someone eats to satisfy the natural appetite, this act is not meritorious, because it is not referred to God; nor is it demeritorious, since it is conformed to nature—for sin is dissonant, not

consonant, with nature. Therefore it is neutral, and accordingly an act is admitted that is neither meritorious nor demeritorious.

Fourth assertion: there are indifferent acts not only in common—that is, in genus and species—but also in the singular. This assertion has two parts.

The first part is found in Scotus (*cited*, § *Aliter posset dici*), and is proved, first, from Ethics II, 1, as adduced by us in the second assertion, and, second, from the other points presented there.

The second part is held by the same Doctor (*in the Reportata cited*), who proves it by the authority of Boethius (*in the chapter on quality*), who affirms that the contrary of injustice is justice, as illiberality is contrary to liberality, but there can be a middle in one who previously did not have justice—such a person is not properly called just nor unjust, but non-just.

Furthermore, it is possible for a person to act without all the circumstances necessary for a morally good act, yet without acting against good morals—as if someone gives alms to a poor person neither for the sake of God nor for any other end proposed and intended by oneself. Since such an act is neither morally good nor evil, it is inferred to be a neutral act in the singular.

This is especially so because there can be an indifferent end with respect to goodness and malice. For, as Aureolus (*mentioned*) argues, to will to do what pleases and to experience one's freedom seems to be indifferent in those things that are not forbidden. For it pleases God that a person use the free will received from him and in which one has been left, especially in those things that are neither commanded nor forbidden. Therefore neutral acts are to be admitted both in the singular and in species.

You object, first: between a habit and a privation there is no middle term, because (10, *Metaphysics* 15) privative opposites are contradictory opposites, between which nothing mediates (4, *Metaphysics* 27). But good and evil are opposed privatively, for evil is formally nothing other than the privation of good, from what was established (1, *book 3, question 2, article 3*). Since every act is good or evil, no act is indifferent.

I distinguish the major: absolutely, I deny; with respect to the apt place and suitable time at which something is capable of receiving a certain perfection, I concede—as a puppy before its ninth day is neither seeing nor blind, but non-seeing. Therefore that act is good or evil which ought to have goodness or malice—but not every act, as Scotus rightly deduces (2, *cited*, D).

You object, second: from repeated acts a habit is generated. If, then, there were dissimilar acts, an indifferent habit would be generated from them, which does not seem probable. For since all acts are either conformed to the practical judgment or disconformed from it—if the first, just as the act is good, so is the

habit; if the second is granted, just as the act is evil, so is the habit. Therefore indifferent acts should not be admitted.

I concede the inference. For just as neutral acts are elicited, so from them a neutral habit is acquired, and it suffices for this habit to be consonant with an indifferent practical judgment.

You object, third: moral goodness is derived not only from the object but also from the due circumstances, especially of the end. But every intellectual agent ought to act for a good end. Therefore, if every act is intended for an end, consequently every singular act is good or evil. The major is conceded by all as true. The minor is supported: a rational agent ought to direct its operation toward a right end; otherwise it would act irrationally, and consequently its act would be evil.

I concede the major but deny the minor, because a person is not always bound to elicit a good act but can sometimes produce a neutral act—such as touching one's nose, scratching one's beard, and similar things that do not fall under merit or demerit.

You object, fourth: if a person were not always bound to act well, there would be no idle word, which conflicts with Matthew 12: "For every idle word you shall render an account." And the holy Fathers—especially Basil (*in the shorter rules, question 23*) and Bernard (*in the sermon on the threefold causality*)—affirm this. An idle word, however, is one that lacks an honest end, even if otherwise it is indifferent. Therefore there is no neutral act.

I deny the inference of the major. To the minor I say that, according to Chrysostom, by "idle word" is meant a mocking and calumnious word. For Christ was rebuking the Pharisees who were assailing him with insults and slanders. Moreover, an idle word is especially one that could bring some utility and do some good but does not—such as a frivolous, jocular, or vain word spoken in conversations and gatherings. But neither Scripture nor the Fathers intend that if someone picks up a straw from the ground and dips it in a liquid to taste it, or warns someone to brush a fly from his face, these are idle words for which one must render an account on the day of judgment.

You object, fifth: if the privation of a due end in a human act does not make the act contrarily evil, then equally the privation of any other circumstance would not make the act contrarily evil, and so a conjugal act in church and similar acts would not be evil—which contradicts truth and orthodox teaching. The Fathers concur: Chrysostom (*Homily 16 on Ephesians*): "You have not done the good; this is to have done evil." Jerome (*1, Against the Pelagians, at the beginning*): "Everything that is said either is or is not, and must be numbered among goods or evils." And (*Epistle 89*): "There is no indifference between good and evil, as the philosophers dispute." And Augustine (*1, On the Usefulness of Believing, chapter 12*): "Every deed, if it is not done rightly, is a sin. Nor can any deed be rightly done that does not

proceed from right reason." And (2, *On the Merits and Remission of Sins, chapter 18*): "The will is either good or evil." Therefore no indifferent act is to be established.

I respond by means of a distinction: if there is a privative circumstance, I deny that the act is contrarily evil. But if there is a repugnant circumstance, I concede that such an act is contrarily evil. If sometimes an act lacking a certain circumstance is called contrarily evil, this happens not because of the absence of that circumstance but because a repugnant circumstance is present. For often habits or acts that are contrarily evil are designated by privative names, such as imprudence and illiberality, as Simplicius notes (*in the Predicaments*), cited by the Doctor (*Quodlibet 18, article 1*). The Fathers are to be interpreted not absolutely—as if no act of the will can be indifferent—but relatively, that is, with respect to acts of justice and precept. For in this way, one either embraces justice, and the act is just and good, or injustice, and the act is unjust and evil—namely, when the place and time present themselves at which one is bound to observe the divine precept and to perform a good work, as clearly follows from what has been said above.

Article IV. Whether command is an act of the will.

Cajetan (1-2, *question 17, article 1*), Medina, and Vazquez maintain that command is an act of the intellect. Scotus, however (9, *Metaphysics, question 15, § Sed quomodo; question 4, Prologue; 4, distinction 49, question 4, vers. Tertium medium; and distinction 14, question 2, conclusion 4; also 2, distinction 6, question 1, § Ad 1*), Faber (*disputation 9, on Penance, chapter 9*), Castro (*book 1, on penal law, chapter 1, 2*), and others maintain that command is an act of the will. For its understanding and comprehension:

Note: command can be viewed in two ways. First, formally and precisely—and in this way command is an act of the will, which in question 4 of the Prologue is divided into an elicited act and a commanded act. Second, concomitantly—and in this way it is an act of the intellect. For unless the law, decree, or volition called command is explained and intimated, it cannot oblige anyone to its observance. No one is bound to anything unless he knows what is commanded to him. Hence the promulgation and intimation of the law is necessary; and although this is necessary for command, it is nevertheless intrinsic to it and concomitant by reason of the subject in which it is to be exercised.

Assertion: command is formally an act of the will. The Doctor defends this (*at the above-cited passages*).

This is proved, first, from Anselm (1, *On the Virginal Conception, chapter 4*): "The will moves itself against the judgment of other powers, and moves all other powers according to its own command." And Augustine (17, *City of God, chapter 4*): "The will uses all other powers."

Second, an act belongs to that power whose exercise it is, as is clear from vision, which is an act of the visual power, produced and exercised by it, and not of hearing or of another power, whose task it is neither to produce nor exercise vision. But command is exercised by the will. For the will commands the intellect and all other powers, just as a king in his kingdom and an emperor in his empire. Therefore command is an act of the will.

Medina and others respond by conceding the major and denying the minor. They say that the will is indeed the queen in the kingdom of the soul, but the intellect is the king and emperor. Against this: command formally obliges the subordinate to observe it, and if it does not oblige, it is not properly command but speech, advice, and consultation—which are acts of the intellect. But to oblige someone to observe something is an act of the will, as is signified in Matthew 8: "I say to this one, 'Do this,' and he does it." And (*ibid.* 6): "Your will be done."

Furthermore, command is not a natural and necessary act, as is the act of the intellect, but a free one. For he who commands can refrain from commanding. Hence it is not what the prince knows and understands but what pleases him that has the force of law, as is found (*1, law 1, § on the constitution of the Prince*). Again, the power of commanding belongs to one who is nobler. Hence Aristotle (*1, Metaphysics 2*): the wise and ingenious ought to preside over and command others. But the will is more excellent than the other powers, as I proved elsewhere. Therefore command is an act of the will.

You object, first: Ethics VI, chapter 5 and following: command is an act of prudence, which pertains to the intellect. Therefore command is an act of the intellect. This is also deduced from Proverbs 8, where wisdom speaking of itself says: "Through me kings rule, and the powerful decree justice."

Confirmation 1: Politics I, 3: "Reason commands the body with a servile command, as a master commands a servant, and the sensitive appetite with a political command, as a magistrate commands citizens." And Eudemian Ethics II, 2: "Reason commands the affections."

Confirmation 2: Ethics X, 7 and 8: happiness is placed in the act of the intellect. Therefore command pertains to the intellect.

I expound these passages by means of a distinction. Directively and dictatively, I concede—for the intellect dictates and prescribes what should be done and commanded by the will, and it is to be put into execution. But formally, I deny—for what the intellect proposes and what right reason dictates, the will then chooses and commands to be carried out, as Aristotle indicates (*1, Ethics 3, near the end*).

The passage from Proverbs is likewise understood: for the task of wisdom is to direct, order, and advise what is to be done and what is not to be done—as a

counselor advises the king and shows him what must be attended to in the kingdom, after which the king at his own pleasure commands and operates through his ministers. Augustine is similarly understood (*Homily 16*): "It cannot be that one who has good thoughts has bad deeds. For deeds proceed from thought. Nor can anyone do anything unless the command of thought first goes forth."

To the first confirmation: by "reason" the Philosopher means the entire rational power—namely, the intellect and the will. For we say that the intellect shows and proposes to the will what must be done, and the will itself chooses and orders what is to be carried out by the other faculties. Hence perhaps (*1, Great Ethics, at the end*) he says: "She manages all things, foreknowing; she is the Mistress."

To the second confirmation: I say that the intellect indeed excels the other cognitive powers, but the will surpasses both the cognitive and the appetitive. Aristotle placed happiness in the act of the intellect because he could not attain the truth that we shall enjoy God—and since this is known to us only through divine revelation.

You object, second: if command were an act of the will, it would be either a volition or a nolition. Not the second, because not willing is not commanding. Nor the first, because even if I know that my superior wills something, I am not bound to carry it out unless he commands me and prescribes it to be done. The role of the will, therefore, is not to command.

Confirmation 1: a judge can command something yet not will it to be carried out. Confirmation 2: when the will of a superior is shown to a subordinate, the subordinate is not bound to obey unless the superior commands what he wills.

I respond that it is an efficacious volition of the superior, which I am bound to obey if I know of it. To the first and second confirmations the same answer applies, for these are conceded with respect to an inefficacious will, but denied with respect to an efficacious will.

You object, third: to command means nothing other than to convey and intimate the law of a superior that is to be observed by a subordinate. For if it is not intimated and promulgated, the subordinate is not bound to observe it. But to convey and intimate belongs to the intellect; therefore so does commanding.

I distinguish the major: formally, I deny; concomitantly, I concede, as was explained in the note above.

You object, fourth: the same philosophical reasoning seems to apply to command as to prayer, with this difference: prayer belongs to the subordinate who is in need, directed toward a superior who is abundant and able to grant what the petitioner asks. But prayer is an act of the intellect, for it is described as "the raising of the mind to God." Therefore command too pertains to the intellect.

I concede the major and distinguish the minor by means of the distinction given in the response to the preceding objection. This is especially so because sometimes we pray by the mere affection of the will, as is clear from ejaculatory prayer. Hence Bagnacaval adds (*Treatise on Prayer*): "Prayer consists not so much in an act of the intellect as in an affection of the will."

Book IV. On the Passions.

Question I. On the Passions in General.

Article I. What a Passion Is.

Passion is an equivocal term, and must therefore be distinguished — as other equivocal terms must be distinguished — and its various senses must be adduced and explained, as (*Vorrlong, 3.d.19.art.1. and d.20.art.1. Raconius, disp.3. de passionibus animi sect.1.q.1. and the Conimbricenses, disp.6.q.3.art.1.*) make clear.

Passion is used, first, for a concept of the mind, as Aristotle attests (*1.Perih.c.1*): spoken words are signs of those passions which are in the soul, that is, of concepts. For this reason the intellect, in receiving a concept or an act of understanding, is said to undergo passion, as noted (*3.de anima T.2.*). And the word passion, in its very etymology, derives from the verb patior — to suffer — as (*Alexander of Hales, 3.p.q.17.m.2.art.2.*) observes.

Second, passion is used for the property of any given thing, as the Doctor mentions (*In Rep.1.d.26.q.2. and d.5.q.5. and 3.d.29.q.vn.*).

Third, for a quality of brief duration affecting the external sense, of which Aristotle treats (*in the Predicamenta, c. de qualitate*).

Fourth, for the relation coming to the patient from without through which it stands in relation to the agent, by which relation the predicament of passion is constituted; of this Scotus makes mention (*4.d.13.q.5.*), below, after Gilbert (*1.de sex principiis*).

Fifth, for the corruption and injury of the subject in which it is received: thus fire undergoes passion when water is thrown upon it, and a man undergoes passion when he is wounded, as Aristotle (*6.Top.c.2.*) and the Scholastics (*3.d.19.*) note.

Sixth, for the agitation, disturbance, or affection of the soul or of the appetitive power, of which Augustine (*Tract.46.in Ioan.*) and Aristotle (*1.Magn.mor.c.8.*) and others speak frequently. It is in this sixth sense that the present discussion proceeds.

It is to be noted, first, that appetite, taken generally, is divided into rational and irrational appetite. The former is the will; the latter is called the sensitive

appetite. Each has two powers: the concupiscible and the irascible. The former is concerned with the honest and pleasurable good; the latter is occupied with the arduous and the difficult to obtain, as will be treated at greater length in the following book.

It is to be noted, second, that as long as an animal lives, the heart is moved — in accordance with its natural temperament and proportion — by a perpetual motion of expansion and contraction, in keeping with the demands of animal life and its accustomed course. For such is the nature to which this aforementioned motion is owed, so that the animal may carry out the operations of life and its members may live. From the heart, as from the origin and source of life, the remaining parts of the animal are governed, as the Doctor touches upon (*in Rep.3.d.15.q.vn.ad 4.*). If this motion is exceeded — that is, if the heart is contracted more than usual — pain and sorrow result; but if it is expanded more than usual, joy and delight arise, as Augustine (*just cited*) treats splendidly.

Passion, taken universally, is rightly defined as a movement or agitation of the appetitive power arising from the apprehension of a good or evil. This is presupposed by the Doctor (*as cited above*). The definition of Remigius, cited and approved by (*Vorrlong, 3.d.20.art.1.*), amounts to the same thing: a movement of the soul through the apprehension of a good or evil. We substitute the phrase "of the appetitive power" for the word "soul," so as to establish a generic and universal definition that encompasses all passions — both those of the rational appetite and those of the sensitive appetite. This is explained before it is proved.

It is called a movement — an overflowing or a deficient one — because, as I noted in the second observation, passion arises through an unusual and extraordinary movement of the heart. The phrase "of the appetitive power" is added to designate the origin and subject of passion, which is each of the two appetites mentioned above. For this reason both man and the Angel are capable of passions, according to Scotus (*3.d.33.q.vn. and in the Reportatio ibid.*), following Augustine (*14.Trin.cap.5. and 6.*). The remaining terms are added to distinguish passion from judgments and opinions, against Chrysippus — reported by Cicero (*4.Tusculanarum qq.*) — who held that passions are judgments and opinions; and likewise against Raconius, who (*loc.cit.*) holds that passions belong to the sensitive appetite alone, though he elsewhere maintained that the irascible and concupiscible powers — which are their immediate subject — are congruent with the will.

The definition of passion, as thus explained, is easy to prove. For an apt and genuine definition of a thing consists of genus and differentia, as has often been said; and that definition is composed of both: its genus is movement, and the remaining terms constitute the differentia. The definition given is therefore fitting, and it contains nothing deficient or superfluous, as right definition

requires — as anyone who runs through its individual terms will readily see. It is therefore well framed.

Against this, one may object, first, that John of Damascus (*2.fidei cap.22.*), in defining passion, says: "Passion is a movement of the sensible appetitive power arising from the imagination of a good or evil." Passion, therefore, is properly the act of the sensitive, material appetite, and not of the rational, spiritual appetite. I reply that Damascus speaks only of passion in the specific sense, pertaining to the sensitive appetite. We, however, are speaking of passion in the generic sense, which encompasses the passions of both appetites. Should the text of Damascus not admit this interpretation, he is to be set aside in this regard and Remigius embraced instead, whose authority is not inferior. I am aware that some cite Augustine (*9.Civit.5.*) for the contrary position, but there Augustine treats only of passion belonging to the sensitive appetite, whereas elsewhere — especially in the passages adduced above — he expressly teaches that passions belong also to the rational appetite.

Against this, one may object, second, that passions derive their origin from the heart, as I noted above; but the heart is material and sensible; therefore passions belong only to the sensitive appetite. I grant the major and distinguish the minor: the bodily and carnal heart, I grant; the spiritual and immaterial heart, I deny — of which the Savior speaks (*Matt.15.*): "From the heart proceed evil thoughts," and (*Ps.59.*): "Create a clean heart in me, O God."

Article II. How Many Kinds of Passion There Are.

Many divisions of the passions are current among philosophers and theologians. I select and explain the principal ones, those that in some way pertain to our subject.

The first is the division into culpable and penal passions, touched upon by the Doctor (*3.d.20.q.1.E.*). The former arise from defect and sin, as David intimates (*Ps.118.*): "My soul has grown faint in longing for your salvation." The latter are suffered for enduring punishment on account of one's own or another's faults: on account of one's own, as the brothers of Joseph (*Gen.42.*): "We deserve to suffer this, because we sinned against our brother"; on account of another's, as Christ, of whom Isaiah (*53.*) says: "Surely he bore our infirmities, and carried our sorrows."

The second division is into natural and animal passion, adduced and explained by Alexander (*3.p.q.17.m.2.art.2.*) and Durandus (*3.d.15.q.2.n.5.*). Natural passion, taken broadly, can belong to any subject receiving or casting off a form, whether that form is congruent or incongruent with it: thus the moon undergoes passion when it receives light, and fire when cold — which is contrary to its heat — is induced in it. Strictly speaking, however, natural passion is said to occur when the form received in a subject is discordant and contrary to it: thus water receiving heat into itself is properly said to undergo passion, and one who is ill

properly undergoes passion, not one who is being healed. Animal passion is a movement of the sensitive appetite arising from the apprehension of an object that is either uncongenial or congenial — broadly speaking; but strictly speaking it regards an uncongenial object, in which sense one who grieves and is saddened is said more properly to undergo passion than one who rejoices and is delighted. It is in this sense that the passions of Christ and the Martyrs are spoken of and celebrated. Although what has been said has the force of truth, usage has prevailed such that any form or quality received in a subject is called a passion, whether congruent or incongruent with it; and it is in this way that philosophers speak of the passions when they treat and pursue the subject.

The third division, from Augustine (*14.Civit.cap.3.*) and Jerome (*in comm.ad c.1.Ezech.*), is into joy, sorrow, hope, and fear. These four are considered the chief passions — as it were the ends and terminals of all the others — as Aristotle (*2.Eth.T.1.*) notes and Virgil (*6.Aen.*) sings: "Hence they fear and desire, grieve and rejoice." For just as the sea is stirred and agitated by four principal winds, so the heart of man — which is likened to the sea in Isaiah (*57.*): "The heart of the wicked is like a raging sea" — is troubled and tossed by these four passions, to calm and restrain which the four cardinal virtues were devised and given, of which the following book treats. This should be regarded rather as a subdivision of the passions than a primary division, as will be shown in the next partition.

The fourth division is into the concupiscible and irascible — that is, into passions corresponding to the concupiscible and irascible appetite. For just as virtue, as will be said, is divided into intellectual and moral, so nothing prevents the passions from being divided into those that belong to the concupiscible appetite and those accommodated to the irascible. These are then further subdivided into different members and various species. Some hold that there are twelve in total — six pertaining to the concupiscible and an equal number to the irascible. Others enumerate only eleven — assigning six to the concupiscible and five to the irascible, as (*the Conimbricenses, disp.6.q.5.art.2.*) and (*Raconius, disp.3.sect.1.q.2.*) hold, following (*Aureolus, 3.d.5.art.2.q.vn.*).

The sufficiency of these numbers can be established as follows. The concupiscible power or appetite tends, first and simply, toward good. If therefore a good is offered to it and is pleasing, there arises love; if displeasing, there arises hatred, which is contrary to love. If this good is not present to it in act but is absent, yet pleasing, desire arises; if displeasing, aversion arises, contrary to desire. If such a good is welcome to the concupiscible, joy or complacency arises; if unwelcome, pain or sorrow arises, opposed to joy. Further, the irascible tends toward what is punishable and offensive, as the authority of Scotus (*3.d.34.q.vn.¶.Notandum.F.*) teaches — its good is called arduous and difficult to obtain — so that the one who is angered may avenge the injury inflicted upon him by one who impedes or removes the good offered to him. If he hopes to obtain that good, hope arises; if he despairs of obtaining it,

despair arises. If he approaches and assails it in pursuit, boldness arises; if he withdraws and desists from what he had begun, fear arises. If he endures an evil inflicted upon him, that is tolerance; if he bears it with difficulty and resentment, that is intolerance.

If one prefers another way of compiling the said number of the division of the passions, one may proceed as follows. Since a passion, as stated, is a kind of unusual movement, the good proposed for acquisition through such movement is either, as it were, at the starting point — in which case it is love — and is diligently pursued along the way — in which case it is desire — or it is as it were at the terminal point, and there arises joy, or delight and complacency. Or the good is something to be refused, as it were at the starting point, in which case it is hatred; or it is avoided along the way, and aversion is born; or it is at the terminal point, and pain arises. These six passions belong to the concupiscible. The following belong to the irascible. An arduous good to be acquired: if it is at the starting point, it is hope; or if not, it is despair. If one moves toward assailing it, boldness flows forth; if one avoids the assault, fear emerges. If the injury is avenged by the angered person, intolerance emerges; if it is not avenged, tolerance proceeds. From this the number twelve of the mutually opposed passions is clearly established: to love, hatred is opposed; to desire, aversion; to joy, sorrow; to hope, despair; to boldness, fear; and to intolerance, tolerance are passions in mutual conflict.

Those who assign no passion as the contrary of anger number only eleven passions, with whom neither Aristotle (*2.Eth.7. and 4. of the same work, 5. and 1.Magn.Mor.c.21.*) nor Aegidius (*1.de regimine princ.p.3.c.1.*) nor Aureolus (*cited art.4. ad finem*) agree. For to anger, meekness is opposed: just as rest — understood as remaining in place — is opposed to movement, so meekness is opposed to anger, which we call tolerance, and anger, intolerance. For one who is angry seeks and desires vengeance, as the Stagirite (*2.Rhet.*) attests. This is intimated by the Savior (*Matt.5.*): "Blessed are the meek." For the meek, as the Doctor (*cited*) explains, are those who neither give offense, nor resist in evil. Therefore what others call meekness and we call tolerance appears to be named gentleness by Christ. Nor does it avail to argue from Aristotle (*as cited*) that the contrary of anger is emptiness or its cessation and defect, and that cessation, defect, and emptiness constitute a privation of anger, and therefore no real passion is opposed to anger. For by the word "emptiness" is understood a real, positive passion — just as "incorporeal" and "irrational" signify real, positive differentiae through those very negative expressions which designate and stand in for them. Moreover, in the same work (*1.Magn.Mor.c.21.*) the same author calls it meekness.

Against this, one may object, first, that ignorance is numbered among the passions, as is plain in Alexander (*passim cited*); but ignorance is not found in the series of the passions listed above — nor are illness, fever, hunger, thirst, and things of that kind. The number of passions given is therefore insufficient. I

distinguish the major: ignorance is numbered among the passions in the proper sense — this I deny; among passions in the broad sense of the term — this I grant, just as concepts and acts of understanding are called passions, as I observed in Article I near the beginning. To the minor I say that those passions are comprehended under the catalogue of the passions of the concupiscible. Hunger, indeed, is an appetite for what is warm and dry, and thirst is a desire for what is moist and cold, as I showed in (*Book 3. de anima*).

Against this, one may object, second, that pride is a passion of the irascible — which is why irascible animals are proud, as the lion — yet pride is not captured within the number of the passions listed. The partition of the passions is therefore defective and incomplete. I reply that pride is comprehended under boldness, which is a passion of the irascible, just as indignation and jealousy are comprehended under anger, as the Angelic Doctor (*ver. Indignatio*) suggests.

Against this, one may object, third, that a sound division is binary, as is plain (*in the Epitome 1.2.q.7.art.1.*); but the distribution of passions given above is fourfold and twelvefold, and is therefore faulty. I reply, granting the major, that passion taken generally is binary — being divided into that which belongs to the concupiscible and that which belongs to the irascible — and is then further subdivided into the members already enumerated. Or one may say that this is not a rigorous division but rather a kind of enumeration of the passions, just as four principal winds and eight collateral ones are enumerated, or twenty-eight according to those who hold there are thirty-two — of which elsewhere.

Against this, one may object, fourth, that the distinction of passions and acts is drawn from the distinction of their formal objects, as I treated at length in (*1.2. de anima*); but not from the ease or difficulty of obtaining a thing — especially since Plato (*9.de Rep.*) and Galen (*l. quod animi mores sequuntur corporis temperamentum*) assert that the object of the concupiscible is the good pleasant to sense and congruent with the body, and that the object of the irascible need not be arduous, as is clear when the Lord is angered at a servant whom he can punish at his pleasure. The division and distinction of the passions given above is therefore not rightly framed.

I grant the entire argument, together with Scotus and (*Ballus, 3.d.26.q.vn.*), against the Thomists with their leader (*1.2.q.23.art.1. and 4. and q.26.de veritate art.4.*). For although the object of certain passions — especially of the irascible — is called arduous, this is not because arduousness constitutes the formal ratio of that object, but only indicates and makes manifest that the object to be attained is arduous and surrounded by difficulties. (*Gabriel, 3.d.26.q.vn.art.3.dub.1.*) likewise holds that the object of the irascible is called an arduous good because its attainment and execution is arduous and difficult — for example, the will to avenge an injury.

Article III. Whether the Passions Are Acts.

Aureolus (3.d.15.q.vn.), Gregory, and others cited by Capreolus (1.d.1.q.1.) maintain that the passions coincide with acts. Scotus, however, (1.d.19.), together with Antonius Andreas, Lychetus, and the other Scotists (*ibid.*), denies that delight is identified with the act of the will which is fruition, as they also teach of the remaining passions (3.d.26.q.vn. and d.34. and also 4.d.49.q.7.). With them partially agree Ockham (*in 1. loc.cit. and Quol.2.q.17.*), Gabriel (*ibid.*), and Gervase (*Tract.de notitiis, c.de appetitu rationali q.ult.*), who affirm that joy and sorrow are distinguished from acts as something that follows upon them, while holding that the remaining passions — especially those of the sensitive appetite — do not differ from acts.

It is to be noted that act and action are commonly used interchangeably, but the Scotists, together with their prince (1.d.17.q.2.§. *Qui vellet ante N. and 9.Met.in cap.4.T.42.*), distinguish action of the genus of quality from action of the genus of action. The former is identified with the thing done and is the term of a power and its perfection, of which Aristotle (9.Met.T.16.) and Scotus (*ibid. and at length Quol.13.*) treat. The latter is the same as the elicited act, or production, through which the aforementioned perfection is produced, of which Aristotle (*cap.9.Predicam.*) and Scotus (4.d.13.q.1. and elsewhere not rarely) make mention. The present inquiry is whether the passions are elicited acts — that is, actions and productions of things produced — or whether they are the things or qualities produced and done through those acts, and something that follows upon the elicited and productive act: for example, whether delight is an act of the will elicited by the will itself, or whether it supervenes upon an act and follows it, being caused either by the same principle or by the object upon which the will itself vitally tends and in which it takes delight. For a fuller clarification and more exact resolution of this doubt, what I adduced and expressed (*in dub.9.art.2.q.4. 1.2. and in the Tract.de cognoscibilitate Dei, disp.3.q.19.*) and what I recently published (*in 1.1.Epitom.q.4.art.9.*) are relevant.

The first assertion is that the passions are not acts but rather things that follow upon acts. This is the position of the Doctor (*ubi supra*). It is proved, first, from (10.Eth.4.): delight supervenes upon the elicited act not as a habit that inheres in it, but as a culmination arising above it, just as beauty comes to those who are in the flower of their age. And shortly after: "for it follows upon the operation." Chrysostom agrees (*hom.15.*): "One who is angry or envious does not act, but undergoes passion." Second, it seems a contradiction in terms for a passion to be formally an action, since they are correlative terms: one correlative cannot, with respect to the same thing and at the same time, be the other correlative; and things belonging to different predicaments do not coincide. As I said in the Logic, action and passion constitute distinct predicaments; therefore the passions are not formally actions and causally passions. Third, one must philosophize about moral passions in the same way as about intellectual and natural passions — that is, whether both the former and the latter are acts or not. But intellectual passions are not formally acts, as is plain (*from 3.de anima*

T.1.): "To understand is to undergo passion," and understanding is a passion. The same must therefore be affirmed of love and the other moral passions. Fourth, the terminus of a movement is not the movement itself, nor is the way to the terminus the terminus itself; but passions are termini and perfections of the powers, as stated (*in 9.Met.T.16.*). An act, however, is the way to the terminus, as the Doctor astutely considers in his customary manner (*4.d.13.q.1. and Quol.13.*). Furthermore, we are neither praised nor blamed for passions, whereas we are deemed worthy of praise or blame for acts (*2.Eth.5.*). Moreover, the habit of virtue does not cause passion but act; and virtues regard the moderating of passions, not of acts. Therefore passions are not formally acts.

The second assertion is that all passions of both the intellectual and the sensitive appetite are distinguished from acts. The Doctor (*cited*) maintains this against the Nominalists (*cited above*). It is proved, first, by the same reasoning that applies to delight and sorrow as to the remaining passions; but delight and sorrow are passions distinct from acts — this is the Nominalist position; therefore the remaining passions likewise. The major is supported as follows: all passions are qualities and perfections of the appetitive powers, and the delight of the sensitive appetite follows upon its act just as does the delight of the rational appetite; therefore Aristotle (*10.Eth. cited*), speaking absolutely of delight, denies that it is an act or operation, but says it arises from the operation. Second, sensing is undergoing passion, as is plain (*from 2.de anima T.51.*); and likewise understanding is undergoing passion (*from 3.de anima T.10.*). Similarly, desiring, being angry, and the like are undergoing passion, as I inferred from Chrysostom (*cited above*). Since these passions belong to each of the two appetites named, it is evidently established that all passions are distinct from acts. Third, the acts of the sensitive appetite are commanded by the will, whereas the passions are not commanded, since they are natural and not fully subject to its law and authority — for which reason perhaps Paul (*Rom.7.*) says: "I perceive another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind." Fourth, there can be acts without passions — for example, an act of loving without delight: thus the demon loves himself without any delight, for the intense sorrow with which he is afflicted leaves no room for delight. And the blessed man hates sin, yet is so absorbed in glory that there is no place in him for grief over sin itself. Those among the Nominalists who admit this of the rational appetite must concede it of the material appetite as well. For a blessed man, after the day of judgment with his body resumed, can through the sensitive appetite in act avert from evil and harm without pain; and a damned man can through his sensitive appetite desire good without delight. The distinction between acts and passions of each of the two appetites named therefore stands.

Against this, one may object, first, that (*2.Eth.5.*) the Philosopher writes that in the soul there is nothing but power, habit, and passion; yet it is certain, according to the same Philosopher, that there is act and operation in the soul, as

is plain (*from 10.Eth.4.*) where he places happiness in operation, and also (*in 12.Met.T.51.*) and elsewhere frequently. By the name of passions, therefore, he understands acts, and passions and acts are thus the same. I reply that Aristotle is speaking of things that are permanent in the soul, not of those that are transient and quickly pass, such as acts are.

Against this, one may object, second, that the same Aristotle (*ibid.*) appears to call joy, pain, and the other affections and passions enumerated there by the name of acts; indeed they are commonly held to be acts, as is plain from the (*Predicamenta, cap.de qualitate*) and (*3.Eth.12.*): "Pleasure is more voluntary than pain." Passions and acts are therefore not distinguished. The reply is that passions are referred among acts of the genus of quality, not acts of the genus of action. The former are produced, and are the end of production; the latter are elicited and productive, as I made plain in the foregoing observation. To the final text I say that pleasure is voluntary, or free, not formally but prerequisitesly — insofar as the action which pleasure follows is presupposed, as is plain (*from 10.Eth.4.*).

Against this, one may object, third, that the passions are to be moderated and restrained; for this reason virtues are given to compose and repress them, as Aristotle (*just cited*) notes. But what is especially restrained are acts — those in our power — by reason of which we deserve credit or discredit. Therefore acts do not differ from passions. I reply, granting the major, and I distinguish the minor: as that by which — I grant; as that which — I deny. For it is acts by which we restrain passions; but passions are what we hold in check through acts, as their object and the matter with which those same acts are concerned.

Article IV. In What Subject the Passions Reside.

Some hold that the sensitive appetite alone is the subject of all passions, as can be seen in Ockham (*Quol.2.q.18.*) and Piccolomini (*gradu 1.c.9.*) and Gerson (*Tract.in Cant.3.p. principio primo symplafnatis*). But that both appetites — the intellectual and the sensitive — are the capable subject of all passions, the intellectual of spiritual ones and the sensitive of material ones, was maintained by Scotus (*just cited*), Ockham (*ubi supra*), and the disciples of both, who are supported by Augustine (*14.Civit.cap.6.*), Richard, and Aureolus (*named above*).

It is to be noted, first, that the subject of the passions is of one kind as a subject of denomination — which is the animal, for example a human being or a brute — and of another kind as a subject of inherence, which is subdivided into remote and proximate. The remote subject of spiritual passions is the soul; the proximate subject is the concupiscible and irascible of the will. Likewise the remote subject of corporeal passions is some part of the body of the animal — the heart, according to Aristotle, or the liver, according to others. The proximate subject of the same is the concupiscible and irascible of the heart or liver.

It is to be noted, second, and it is to be kept in mind from what was said in (*Book 4. de anima, q.11.art.1.*), that the sensitive appetite is divided into the concupiscible and the irascible. The Doctor (*3.d.34.*) offers a solid basis for this: some things are primarily appetible, toward which the concupiscible appetite tends; others are secondarily appetible, and these pertain to the irascible. As for whether the concupiscible and the irascible are two faculties distinct with respect to their respective appetible objects, or one power that regards those same objects in different modes, see the passage just cited and (*Majoris, 3.d.33.q.2.art.4.*).

The first assertion is that the subject of material passions is the sensitive appetite. The Doctor (*cited*) holds this. It is proved, first, from (*1.Eth.ult.*) and (*1.Magn.Mor.c.9.*), where Aristotle writes that the moral virtues reside in the irrational part, or in the sensitive appetite. But where moral virtues are subjected, there the passions and acts also inhere; and the moral virtues in some manner reside in the sensitive appetite, as Scotus (*3.d.33.q.vn.§.Ad argumenta*) agrees. Further testimonies are found in the writings of Aristotle, notably (*3.Eth.5. and 7. of the same work, T.14.*). Second, intellectual passions reside in the intellect as acts of understanding (*from 3.de anima T.2. and following*); therefore the material passions too reside in the irrational part, as Aristotle (*cited*) says — which part his interpreters attest is the sensitive appetite. Third, a perfection resides in that of which it is the perfection — just as form resides in matter and science in the intellect; but certain passions are perfections of the sensitive appetite, such as delight; therefore those passions named reside in it.

The second assertion is that the rational appetite, or will, is the seat of spiritual passions. The principal patron of this view is Scotus (*ubi supra*), preceded by Augustine (*1.de moribus Ecclesiae, cap.15. and 14.Civit.cap.5.*). It is proved, first, from (*1.Eth.3. and 6. of the same, 2. and 5.cap.1. and 1.Magn.Mor.q.*), where the Stagirite acknowledges there is a rational appetite — namely the will — in which spiritual passions reside. It is remarkable therefore that Gerson (*cited*) and some others should suppose the Philosopher attributed passions to the sensitive appetite alone, since in the passages cited, and elsewhere not rarely, he affirms that the will is a spontaneous and free power, not without its concupiscible and irascible, in which the spiritual passions immediately reside. Second, the will is capable of love, hatred, delight, and sorrow; for it tends toward good and evil — pursuing the one and fleeing the other — as we experience daily. Therefore the will is a fitting subject of those passions. Third, the soul separated from the body, if blessed, rejoices in the eternal reward; if wretched, grieves at the punishment of hell. But joy and sorrow are passions of the soul, not of the sensitive appetite — which, being separated from the body, is absent — therefore they are passions of the intellectual appetite, which is the will. The remaining matters, regarding the subject of the virtues, will be treated in the following book.

Against this, one may object, first, that Gregory of Nyssa (*de hominis opificio*, c.18.) removes passions from man as man, and holds that only those passions belong to him which are common to brutes; but what is participated in by both man and brutes is the exclusive property of the sensitive appetite. Therefore the adequate subject of the passions is the sensitive appetite. I reply that Nyssa is not speaking absolutely of man, but of man given over to reprobate sense and entirely indulging in pleasure — as is plainly clear from his words in that place. Sometimes reason itself becomes so brutalized that, overcome by affection toward the brute part, it overwhelms by the force of the inferior what is most excellent in man.

Against this, one may object, second, that passion, taken generically, is an agitation and disturbance of the animal — as its very name indicates; but disturbance belongs only to the sensitive appetite, as is plain from anger, which is defined as a rising of blood about the heart, from shame, which causes a blush in the face, and from fear, which causes pallor in that same face. I grant the major and deny the minor. For beyond corporeal and sensitive agitation, there is also spiritual and rational agitation. The instances adduced are valid only of material passions, as is clear to anyone who runs through them.

Article V. Whether Passions Fall Upon the Wise Man.

The Stoics steadfastly maintain that the wise man succumbs to no passion — as the common run of historians and philosophers attest; but the Platonists and Peripatetics oppose this with one voice and one accord, teaching that the wise man is not wholly immune and removed from passions.

It is to be noted, first, that passions can be viewed in two ways. One way is precisely as movements of the sensitive appetite — in which mode they acquire no moral goodness or badness, only transcendental and entitative goodness, as is plain from the passions of brutes, which also belong to man, as Gregory of Nyssa (*ubi supra*) agrees. The other way is insofar as they are subject to the command of the will and to the right dictate of reason — in which mode they participate in moral goodness or badness, not intrinsic but extrinsic, depending, that is, upon the will and reason, as Augustine plainly sets forth (*14.Civit.cap.8.*): "The good and the evil desire, fear, rejoice, and grieve — but the former well, the latter ill, just as men's will is right or perverse." The Doctor likewise (*1.d.17.q.2. §. Quantum ad istum art. and Quol.18. §. De primo*).

It is to be noted, second, that some suppose this impassibility — which the Greeks call *apatheia* — to be what is at issue.

The assertion is that the wise man is not wholly free from passions. This is deduced from the Doctor (*3.d.15.q.vn. §. Quantum ad 2.sub H.*): Christ the Lord, most holy and most wise of all, was moved by passions. (*John 2.*): "He made as it were a scourge of cords and drove out those who were buying and selling from the temple." And (*11.*): "He groaned in spirit and troubled himself." And then:

"Jesus wept." And (*Matt.26.*): "My soul is sorrowful even unto death." Add (*Isa.53.*): "Surely he bore our infirmities, and carried our sorrows." Second, Jerome (*Dial.2.adversus Pelag.*) and Augustine (*14.Civit.cap.8. and 9. and Tract.60.in Ioan.*) say: let the arguments of the philosophers perish who deny that disturbances of soul fall upon the wise man. Third, where there is the principle and cause of passions, there the passions reside — as is plain from the intellect, which is the principle and subject of intellectual acts. But in the wise man the principle and cause of passions is found — namely the will, the sensitive appetite, and the irascible and concupiscible of each — to which there are frequently and almost always offered and set before them objects both congenial and uncongenial, which cause passions. Hence Stobaeus (*serm.1.*): "So too it is necessary that a man be imbued with joy and grief and all the remaining affections." The wise man is therefore not free from passions. Fourth, where the moral virtues shine, there the passions are found; but in the wise man the moral virtues shine, since they are his bright mirror — therefore passions are also in him. The major is plain: for the virtues tend to curb and restrain the passions. Hence St. Basil (*homil.10.*) says particularly of anger: "If by chance anger come to mind or fall upon it, let us hold it in check as a horse in harness, obedient to us through reason as through a bridle, not exceeding its proper order and entering upon the path directed by the right counsel of the mind." And Chrysostom (*hom.30.ad populum*): "Anger is a shameless dog, but let it learn to hear the law." All the more so since these affections take their origin from God, as Lactantius (*lib.6.cap.15.*) attests: "He instilled in man these emotions so that he might be capable of virtue — just as the earth is capable of cultivation — and he set the material of the vices within the affections of virtue." And Damascus (*orat.de duabus Christi voluntatibus*): "Desire was given to man by the gift of God, that we might obey God and his commandments; and anger, that we might resist the Devil and sin and confirm desire." Add the passions of Christ and the Martyrs, which are praiseworthy and meritorious — for which reason St. Peter (*1 Ep.cap.4.*) says: "Arm yourselves with the same thought as Christ, who suffered." The controversy between the Stoics and the other philosophers named is one more of name than of substance, as Epictetus (*apud Arrianum, lib.2.c.26.*), Seneca (*in consol.ad Helviam, cap.16. and Epist.9. and ad Polyb.cap.37.*) intimate, as Augustine (*9.Civit.cap.4.*) touches upon and as Cicero (*libro de finibus*) indicates. They resolve and settle it by this distinction: if one is speaking of vehement and inflamed passions that cast a man down from right reason and drive him toward vice, the Stoics maintain that the wise man is immune from such passions. But if one speaks of the remaining passions proceeding from the sensitive appetite that are regulated by right judgment and held in check by a sound will, the same philosophers hold that the wise man is not alien to these.

Whatever may be the case with this peace and concord — to which perhaps the said authors would not wish to come, since real philosophers usually contend not merely over words and intend more by their arguments and foundations,

seeking to impose the view that a man stripped of all such affections would be like a trunk or a Phidian statue, as someone excellently argues against the Stoics — and as Jerome (*epist.ad Ctesiphontem*) says: "A man who is unperturbed is either a stone or a God." And Augustine (*14.Civit.cap.8.*): "If any have so far advanced in that vainer and rarer vanity as to find in themselves no movement of mind, being stirred and excited by nothing, bent and inclined by nothing, they have lost all humanity rather than attained true tranquility."

Against this, one may object, first, that the wise man is healthy, while one imbued with passion is sick, as Chrysostom (*in Psalm.4.*) touches upon; therefore the wise man is abstracted and withdrawn from passions. I distinguish the first part of the antecedent: the wise man is healthy and free from turbulent passions contrary to right reason — this I grant; free from passions that are held in check and compressed and regulated according to right reason and the will — this I deny.

Against this, one may object, second, that what leads to sin is evil, from which the wise man recoils; but passions incite and impel to sin, as is plain (*from Rom.7.*) where the passions of sins are spoken of; therefore the wise man is alien from passions. I grant the major and distinguish the minor as I was saying a moment ago: of vehement passions that do not moderate the impulse of the soul — I grant; of passions directed by right reason and the will — I deny.

Against this, one may object, third, that what is not in our power brings us neither praise nor blame, since in matters of nature we neither merit nor demerit. For this reason the Doctor (*4.Rep.d.49.q.2.§.Dico.*) writes: "By passions alone we do not merit." But passions are not in our hand, as Augustine (*14.Civit.cap.9.*) implies; therefore passions do not prevail in the wise man. I grant the major. I distinguish the minor: of preceding passions that impede the use of reason — called surreptitious passions — I grant; of passions regulated by right reason and the will — I deny. Augustine is to be explained in this way where he says (*ibid.cap.16.*): "A certain vehement sensible delight impedes the use of reason, than which there is no greater in bodily pleasures, so that in the very moment when its extreme is reached, almost the entire keenness and, as it were, the wakefulness of thought is overwhelmed." And Aristotle (*7.Eth.9.*): "This delight robs the intellect of the wisest man." For this reason Scotus (*loc.cit.*) adds: "If the intellect of the Martyrs exposed to the greatest torments retained the use of reason, this happened by the special grace of the Creator."

Article VI. What Are the Causes of the Proneness to Passions.

It is well known to us and confirmed by experience that the young and the old are more prone and inclined to passions and to discrepant manners — as Aristotle (*2.Rhet.c.12. and following*) writes. And among those of the same age some are more prompt to anger, others slower; some more eager for joy, others for sorrow; and there are those who live in perpetual fear and those whom no

dread or panic seizes — as Aristotle rightly sets forth (*1.de anima T.4. and 2.de partibus c.4.*). And the wise man touches upon this (*Prov.27.*) according to the Greek translation: "As faces are not alike to faces, so neither are the hearts of men." It is therefore plainly evident that in human beings there is a proneness and diversity of passions. In investigating their causes, however, there appears to be no small obscurity and difficulty — in which Gerson (*Tract.de passionibus*) and others cited by the more recent writers are extensive. I will select the more important ones and briefly treat them, first noting that passions properly belong not to the soul nor to the body but to the whole composite — as Scotus (*4.d.49.q.7. ante §.Respondeo*) teaches, following (*Aristotle, 1.de anima T.64.*): "To say the soul is angry is like saying the soul weaves or builds. It is perhaps better not to say that the soul pities or learns or thinks, but that the man does so with his soul." Man therefore, according to the Philosopher and the Subtle Doctor, is the cause of the passions that are received in him; but he is not the only cause, and so other causes must also be examined. To do this aptly and conveniently, I divide the cause into intrinsic and extrinsic, and into natural and moral.

The extrinsic cause is manifold — for example, the heavens, the stars and their influences, the air, the region, and things of that kind. The intrinsic cause can be multiplied according to the multiplicity of temperament: one of choleric temperament is quickly moved, grows angry, and boils up; one possessed of a sanguine complexion is prone to joy and kindness; one constituted of phlegmatic temperament is timid and pusillanimous; and one endowed with melancholic temperament inclines toward sadness and ill will. Add to these the quantity, shape, and position of the heart. Those who are possessed of a large heart are timid — like hares — because a force spread out is weaker than one concentrated; while those who have a small heart are spirited and bold, because the vital spirits in a small heart are united and concentrated, and so strengthen the heart more. Milk, food and drink are not to be passed over, nor the habituation of acting: one who is often angry becomes prone to anger, and one who frequently grieves becomes inclined to sorrow. These are approximately the principal natural causes of the passions. The moral causes are exhortation, conversation, education, example, and things of that kind, which are found in abundance among the philosophers and historians.

Article VII. What Is the Order Among the Passions.

A twofold order may be investigated among the passions: the order of nature or generation, and the order of dignity. Likewise there may be a dispute about each of these orders — both among the passions of the concupiscible and the irascible, and also among the individual passions of each of these two powers.

The first assertion is that in the order of nature or generation the passions of the concupiscible precede those of the irascible. Scotus indicates this (*3.d.26.q.1.§.Alio modo. and d.34.q.1.§.Ad istam quest.*), and Richard expressly holds it (*d.26.q.3.*). It is proved, first, by the fact that those passions precede others in

nature whose objects are prior in nature — since the natural priority of passions, like the priority and distinction of powers, is derived from their objects, as is plain (*from 2.anima T.33.*). But the objects of the passions of the concupiscible precede those of the irascible: the former are goods simply and primarily congruent or incongruent, the latter are goods secondarily and in a restricted sense — as is plain from what has been said above and will be more fully clear when the subject of the moral virtues is treated. Natural priority therefore belongs to the passions of the concupiscible.

Second, what is born or generated before another is prior in nature, as is clear from the description of natural priority in the Postpredicaments; but the concupiscible precedes the irascible in emanating from man, because the irascible is for the sake of the concupiscible and its passions are for the sake of the passions of the concupiscible — as Ballus (*3.d.26.q.vn.*) notes — for if the passions of the concupiscible are impeded, the irascible strives for their attainment: if food is taken from a dog, it grows angry, attacks the one who took it, and, having driven away the thief, enjoys the food. For this reason someone adds that the irascible is the champion and reinforcer of the concupiscible. The concupiscible is therefore prior in nature.

Third, the first passion of the concupiscible precedes in nature the first passion of the irascible, just as the first operation of the intellect precedes the first operation of the will, because — as a thing is with respect to being, so is it with respect to operating — and the being of the intellect is prior to the being of the will, and therefore its operating likewise. The antecedent is plain: for simple love — which is a passion of the concupiscible — is caused before one desires to attain what is loved, as will be made more plain in the next question. The consequence holds by a similar mode of argument as that given (*3.Top.4.*): if the best man is better than the best horse, then man simply is better. If therefore one grants that the first passion of the concupiscible is prior in nature to the first passion of the irascible — which is hope — it must be admitted that the passions of the irascible are in nature inferior to those of the concupiscible.

The second assertion is that the passions of the concupiscible are nobler than those of the irascible. This is deduced from the Doctor (*cited*). It is proved, first: the nobility of a passion, act, and power is derived from the nobility of its object, as stated (*from 2.animae cited*). But the object of the passions of the concupiscible surpasses the object of the passions of the irascible in nobility: the former is the primary good, the latter is secondary; therefore the former are more excellent than the latter. Second, what exists for the sake of another is surpassed in nobility by that for the sake of which it exists (*as is plain from 1.Met.2.*); but the passions of the irascible are ordered toward the passions of the concupiscible, as I was saying in the first assertion. The latter therefore excel the former. Again, the first passion of the concupiscible — which is love — excels the first passion

of the irascible — which is hope — as I will show in the following assertion. Therefore the same must be affirmed of the rest.

The third assertion is that among the passions of the concupiscible love holds the first place. This is deduced from the Doctor (*in loc.cit. and also 4.d.49.q.4.*), who affirms that the will and its act are preferred to all other powers and acts. And in sacred Scripture love is above all commended — hence it is no wonder if the Poet sings: "Love conquers all." Augustine adds (*14.Civit.cap.5.7.8. and 9.*): "Love is the cause of all the other affections of the will." Further, that whose contrary is worse is itself more excellent, as is plain; but opposed to love is hatred, which is worse than sorrow — especially hatred of God, which is in no way to be admitted; therefore love is to be preferred to the remaining passions of the concupiscible. Moreover, the love of friendship perfects man most of all, since it is greatly acceptable to God and all things come about through his grace. Love therefore holds the first place among the passions of the concupiscible.

The fourth assertion is that hope in nature and dignity is placed before the remaining passions of the irascible. The Doctor hints at this (*ubi supra*), and Richard (*cit.art.2.q.1.*) treats and defends it systematically. It is urged, first: that passion excels the remaining passions of the irascible in nature and dignity which is nearest to love — since love is the root and most excellent of all passions, from what was said in the preceding assertion; and hope is of this kind. For it is caused from love through desire or concupiscence of attaining and possessing the good desired; therefore hope holds the citadel among the passions of the irascible. Second, approach toward a good is prior to recession from it — since desire for a good to be obtained is simply prior to recession from it, since the powers absolutely tend toward their object by which they are specified. Since therefore hope regards the good to be acquired and enjoyed, it is soundly inferred that hope holds the first place among the passions of the irascible.

Against this, one may object, first, that what follows another is posterior to it; but delight and sorrow follow upon the passions of the irascible; therefore the passions of the concupiscible — among which delight and sorrow are numbered — are subordinated to the passions of the irascible. The major is known. The minor is supported by the testimony of Aristotle (*2.Eth.3.*), who says that every passion is followed by delight or sorrow — as is plain from anger (*2.Rhet.2.*): "The anger of a man is like honey." I grant the major and distinguish the minor: per se — I deny; per accidens — I grant. For anger does not regard delight or pain but vengeance, because its object is what is punishable or chastisable — as Scotus (§*Ad istam quest.*) attests — and the passage of the Philosopher adduced is thus explained.

Against this, one may object, second, that a cause is prior to its effect (*5.Met.1.*); but hope is the cause of love — hence Augustine writes (*in Ench.cap.3.*): "Love is not without hope." Since therefore hope is a passion of the irascible and love of

the concupiscible, it follows that certain passions of the irascible are placed before certain passions of the concupiscible. I grant the major and deny the minor. To Augustine I say that he is speaking not of love as passion but of perfect elective love, as Richard (*cit.art.1.q.3.ad 2.*) rightly saw.

Against this, one may object, third, that what is prior in generation is posterior in perfection (*9.Met.T.15.*); but love precedes delight in generation; therefore love is subordinated to delight in perfection. The consequence holds: love does not bring rest to one who has it, as delight does — in which one ultimately rests who possesses it; therefore delight excels love. I reply that the major holds of those things that are of the same genus and one of which is essentially ordered to the other — as seed to the generation of man, as the Philosopher exemplifies there — but not of those that are of different genera, as is plain from accident, which is posterior in origin to substance and yet is nobler and more perfect than it, as the Doctor notes (*in 4. passim cited*). To the consequence I distinguish the antecedent: love does not bring rest to one who has it as something desirable for its own sake — I deny; as something consequent and ultimately supervening — I grant, with Aristotle (*10.Eth.c.4.*). And this can be illustrated by the case of the proper and common accident, which, although they follow upon the subject in which they inhere, are nonetheless surpassed by the subject in nobility and perfection.

Article VIII. What Are the Appropriate Remedies for Restraining the Passions.

Since immoderate passions are likened to the heads of the Hydra by Synesius (*orat.de regno*), denoted as Centaurs by Basil (*lib.de vera virginitate*), regarded as beasts by Nyssa (*lib.de hominis opificio cap.18.*), and reckoned as monsters by others — to appease these monsters, to vanquish these beasts, to tame these Centaurs, and to cut off the heads of the Hydra, the meditation upon death and upon the grave is of the greatest assistance. For one who forgets these is easily moved by passions and reduced to their harsh servitude, the misery of which Jeremiah rightly laments (*1.*): "Her filthiness is on her feet; she remembered not her latter end." And beforehand God had warned Adam (*Gen.3.*): "You are dust, and to dust you shall return." And (*Ps.90.*): "How long, Lord, shall the sinners glory? Until a pit is dug for the sinner." Armed with this thought, Leo I repressed the fury of Attila as he advanced on Rome and broke his boldness when he saw death threatening him if he did not obey the said Leo — as the Church records in his life and office. Nor do I omit Xerxes, who, beholding his enormous army and reflecting that within a hundred years not one of them would survive, wept, and restrained his vanity and pride through the meditation on death and the thought of the end of all things.

The remembrance of the presence of God everywhere existing and beholding all things lends force and urgency. For just as — so it is narrated in the life of Alexander — soldiers in his presence feared neither weapons nor enemies, so to

one who thinks upon and keeps in memory the presence of God, the turbulent movements of the passions cease, the great storms of the passions abate, and the raging tempests of the same subside. For then Christ commands the vehement winds of the affections and the troubled sea of the same, and a great tranquility of heart and soul comes to pass. Judith (13.) is a witness, who, adorned and strengthened by the presence of God, bore off the head of Holofernes, and running back victorious to the city said: "Open for me, for God is with us." Hence Augustine adds (*Serm.228.de tempore*): "She went forth secure, with the company of one maidservant, and hurried with sure steps into the enemy camp; she was anxious when she reached what was to be feared, but she was secure, because God was with her." To King Hezekiah ill (*Isa.38.*) perfect health was restored for no other reason than that he had God present in his mind, saying: "Remember how I have walked before you." And the Savior indicates this (*Matt.8.*), who, when asked to heal the servant of the Centurion, wills to be present to him: "I will come and heal him." Therefore one who labors under the poisonous sickness of the affections should think of God as present and assisting, and he will be healed of whatever infirmity of the passions holds him. Remember also that the guardian Angel is present to you, to whom God has given charge over you, to keep you in all your ways. Hence Bernard (*in Ps.90.*) writes: "In whatever lodging, in whatever corner, reverence your Angel; do not dare to do in his presence what you would not dare to do in mine."

I add that the presence of the Angel calmed the wanton movement of Valerian and preserved the virginity of Cecilia, as the chronology of each attests. I do not recount how much the company and example of the good and the bad avails, for (*Ps.17.*): "With the holy you will be holy, and with the innocent you will be innocent." And there is the ancient saying in Pindar: "If you dwell beside one who limps, you too will learn to limp." And Epictetus: "Draw near to Socrates and consider him." I add Christ (*John 13.*): "I have given you an example, that you should do as I have done." And (*Matt.11.*): "Learn from me, for I am meek and humble of heart." Nor do I mention habit, which is called a second nature: if someone has long been given over to his own concupiscences, he recedes from them only with great difficulty — since a habit is hard to move, as Aristotle (*lib.Predicam.cap.de qualitate*) attests. Hence one who is accustomed to play always wants to play, even in his sleep. Therefore the way to the passions must be blocked from the outset, and the commonly known warning must be heeded: resist beginnings.

The external and internal senses must moreover be guarded, for they are, as it were, windows or doors through which the kingdom of the soul is entered, conquered, and destroyed — as Ambrose writes grandly and elegantly (*l.de fuga saeculi cap.1.*): "If you look upon a woman to lust after her, death has entered; if you hear the words of a harlot, death has entered; if lust seizes your senses, death has entered." And the sacred text had previously warned (*Cant.6.*): "Turn away your eyes, for they have made me flee." Therefore if you wish freely and

fully to command your wild affections and to dominate them, and to preserve the kingdom of your soul intact and unharmed, take diligent and vigilant care that your senses — which are your guardians — do not allow evils to enter and goods to be expelled from your said kingdom. For if, with disturbances banished by the senses and the will conformed to the right dictate of reason, you live happily and tranquilly, you may thereafter — with the aid of divine grace — enjoy perpetual peace and eternal rest in the kingdom of God.

Question II. On the Passions in Particular.

Article I. On Love and Hatred.

Augustine sets down in writing (*Epist.52.*) that from good or bad loves, as from two fountains, good or bad morals flow. These moreover are the two loves which, according to the same Augustine (*14.Civit.*), "have built two cities: the city of God, love of God even to contempt of self; and the city of the Devil, love of self even to contempt of God." Of these Scotus treats at length (*2.d.6.q.2. §. In ista quest.*) and Aristotle touches upon them (*2.Magn.mor.c.11.*). We therefore treat first of love and hatred, as the chief affections, investigating their natures, causes, properties, effects, and remedies.

It is to be noted, first, that the words love, dilection, friendship, and charity are sometimes confused and used interchangeably, though there is some distinction among them; they appear to stand in the relation of the more common to the less common. Love is broader and wider than the rest. For every charity is love, but not every love is charity, since charity is generally used for the grace by which man is made acceptable to God. Dilection is the special and singular love of someone — thus John the Evangelist is called the beloved disciple of Christ the Lord above the others. In this sense a certain orator rightly said before Alexander: "One can never say enough of a beloved." Friendship, properly speaking, is the mutual goodwill of certain persons, as Aristotle (*8.Eth.5.*) indicates.

It is to be noted, second, that from Gabriel (*3.d.27.q.vn.*), following Augustine (*14.Civit.cap.7.*), love is divided into natural, animal, and rational. Natural love is a propensity toward something that by its own nature is congruent to it — thus a stone is said to love the place below and fire the place above. Animal love is a passion by which the sensitive appetite, after prior cognition, tends toward a good congruent to it — in which sense a horse is said to love oats and an ox hay. Rational love is a passion by which the will tends toward some good which it pursues, and this is the proper love of the rational and intellectual creature, of which both man and the Angel are capable.

It is to be noted, third, that from the Doctor (*2.d.6.q.2. §. In ista q.A. and 3.d.15.q.vn.*) the famous partition of love into the love of friendship and the love of concupiscence is celebrated. The love of friendship is that by which one loves

something for its own sake — that is, not for the sake of another but for itself; and it is with this love that the saints love God. The love of concupiscence, on the other hand, is that by which one loves something for the sake of another — that is, for the sake of something else; as when someone loves money for the sake of obtaining honors. Furthermore, love is divided into true and venereal: the former is that by which man loves the right and true good, by reason of which he abstains from unjust and illicit pleasures; the latter is that by which man indulges in foul and venereal delights, inflamed and wounded by which he is said to be set ablaze by Cupid — of which Ovid, his teacher, Petrarch, and very many others have written, whose dreams and fictions those who love know better than anyone.

Love can moreover be divided into love as an elicited act — defined (*2.Rhet.4.*) as the will of a good for someone — and love as a virtue, of which the Tyrian (*differt.11.*) and Platina (*Dialogo contra amores*) treat. The definition of the latter is given by Dionysius (*4.de divinis nominibus.*): "Love is a unitive power joining the lover with the thing loved." Augustine seems to hold the same (*8.Trin.cap.10.*): "What is love but a kind of life joining two things together?" Hence Aristotle — according to Diogenes in his life — when asked what a friend is, is said to have replied that he is one soul in two bodies. Sidonius adds (*lib.9.Epist.5.*): "Two souls, one mind." Love is also divided into love as passion — of which we are speaking in the present — whose definition we now adduce.

The assertion is that love is a passion of the appetitive power by which it tends toward a good congruent to it as apprehended by reason or imagination. The Doctor defends this (*2.d.6.q.2.¶.In ista.q.4.*). It is explained before it is proved. Passion is placed as the genus. The appetitive power is added — that is, the sensitive or intellectual appetite. Hence Raconius errs (*sect.2.de passionibus q.3.*) in saying that love is a passion of the sensitive appetite only, since it belongs also to the will — which is a power of intellectual nature. Otherwise neither the rational soul, nor the Angel, nor indeed God would be capable of love, since God is without a sensitive appetite. The remaining terms serve as the differentia. For love tends toward a true or apparent good represented to it by the intellect — if it is the love of the will and spiritual love — or proposed by the imagination — if it is the love of the sensitive and material appetite.

The assertion as thus explained is easy to prove by the common medium: that definition is apt and fitting which participates in genus and differentia, as is plain from what has been said — and the definition of love given above is of this kind. I add that it contains nothing deficient or superfluous, and possesses all the laws of a sound definition; it is therefore the genuine and legitimate definition.

Against this, one may object, first, that it is commonly said that fire is cast into the thing loved by which the lover is inflamed and burns, and that the god of love Cupid is said to have a bow and quiver with which he wounds the lover. But these and similar things are adapted only to the sensitive appetite; therefore

love is a passion of the sensitive appetite alone. The reply is that all these things have no place in spiritual love — such as the love of the will — but only in material and venereal love, as Zeno (*libro de fide, spe, et charitate*) shows admirably and elegantly: "There is another love, truly contrary to our salvation, to which it is right that the form of a man be attributed, because it is recognized as temporal and fragile. Hence it is depicted with the features of a child, because its wanton licentiousness is not tempered even by the years of old age. Hence it is naked, because its will is shamelessness. Hence it is winged, because it rushes swiftly toward whatever it has conceived. Hence it is equipped with darts and torches, because unlawful arms are always joined to unlawful trees. Hence it is blind, because when it is inflamed it considers neither age nor beauty nor sex nor rank nor even that most sacred affection of piety."

Against this, one may object, second, that love is an act of the will, and therefore is not a passion. The antecedent is Aristotle's (*2.Rhet.4.*), who says: "Love is the willing of good for someone"; but willing is an action, not a passion, as is plain — therefore love is wrongly defined as a passion of the appetitive power. I distinguish the antecedent: if love is taken for the elicited act of willing — I grant; if it is taken for the complacency of the will following upon that very elicited act of the will, as it is taken in the present — I deny.

One may ask, first, how many causes of love there are. I reply that there are principally five. The first is the good that shines forth in the beloved object, by reason of which the lover is enticed and invited to pursue it with love. Hence Augustine (*8.Trin.cap.3. and 4.*) adds: "Nothing is loved unless it is good." The second is the beautiful, at whose sight and contemplation the lover is captivated — as someone sings: "As I saw, I perished." In this way Eve in (*Gen.2.*) was captivated beholding the tree of life, beautiful to sight and delightful to look upon. The third is cognition of the lovable object — which is not a cause that flows into love, but a cause *sine qua non*, or presuppositive, since for love to arise the cognition of the lovable object is presupposed, because love does not tend toward what is unknown, according to the adage: "It must first be known before it can be loved" — though the intellect contributes nothing to the will, as the Doctor (*2.d.25.q.1. §.Alia est.*) maintains. The fourth is resemblance among those who love, and also sympathy — Aristotle affirming (*1.Magn.Mor.c.18.*): "Like things rejoice in like things, and man is most delightful to man." But if it happens that like hates like — according to the saying that one potter hates another — this is *per accidens*, insofar as one impedes the other in gaining more. The fifth cause of love is being loved, according to the saying: "If you wish to be loved, love." For we think that one by whom we are loved is good; for that reason we are prompt to love him. Ambrose agrees (*2.off.cap.7.*): "For the increase of common charity it is of great profit if one returns affection to those who love him, and proves himself no less in returning love than he is loved." Again, we love more what we have obtained with greater effort and toil: thus mothers love their offspring more ardently than fathers, because they have expended more

labor in begetting and raising them. Similarly, parsimony is keener in the old than in the young, because the old have sweated far more in acquiring things, which an heir sometimes treats as trivial and squanders and dissipates, reducing himself to poverty.

One may ask, second, how many effects of love there are. I reply that they are as many as its principal causes. The first is the union of the lover with the beloved object. Hence Dionysius (*4.de divinis nominibus*) says: "The soul is more where it loves than where it animates." And the lover is said to be transformed into the thing loved. Hence Augustine adds (*4.conf.cap.4.*): "If you love the earth, you are earth." And Paul had previously warned (*1.Cor.6.*): "One who cleaves to a harlot becomes one body with her." And the celebrated saying (*2.Magn.Mor.c.18.*): "A friend is another self." And (*9.Eth.9.*): "One soul and all things in common among friends." The second effect is that love makes the beloved present everywhere and thinks of it always. Hence Chrysostom preaches (*hom.86.in Ioan.c.10.*): "So great is love that we seem to see every day not only those who are present but even those whom we love when absent; for the great force of love neglects all things in order to win the soul of the beloved." The third is ecstasy. For the lover is carried away into the beloved object. Hence Dionysius (*just cited*) writes that God suffered ecstasy on account of love for man when he became man — as is plain (*John 1.*): "The Word was made flesh." For the impassible became passible, the immortal mortal, and God a creature — as St. Bonaventure learnedly and eloquently sets forth (*in Comm.Luc.4.*). The fourth is zeal — which is the great ardor of love by which one expels from the beloved whatever might impede him from possessing and enjoying it. Thus Christ was zealous for the honor of the Father and of the Church (*Ps.68.*): "Zeal for your house has consumed me." The fifth is infirmity, by which the lover is weakened in the beloved object, having and wishing nothing in mind but it, so that he is deprived of food and drink and the other necessities of life, flees not what is harmful, avoids not dangers, and shuns not evils — for which reason Zeno (*just cited*) writes elegantly and learnedly: "This one set Eve's breast on fire with his torches. This one slew Adam with his darts. This one attempted either to subject Susanna to the monstrous fires of two elders, or to slit her throat with a parricidal sword. He importuned Joseph to be violent to a woman, whom, even when he stripped him, he did not find unchaste. This one overcame the Synagogue when he granted her his arms. Turbulent everywhere, frenzied everywhere: he promises, gives, takes away — now sad, now cheerful, now humble, now proud, now drunk, now fasting, now accuser, now accused. He jests, plays, grows pale, wastes away, sighs, hides, serves, or tempts, or deceives, and flatters more sweetly than he rages."

One may ask, third, how many remedies for love there are. I reply that they can be comprised under five headings. The first: the eyes — which, as the master of love attests, "are in love the leaders" — must be guarded and restrained, lest they see frequently vain and lovable objects that can induce the lover to love them.

Hence David (*Ps.118.*) sings: "Turn away my eyes lest they see vanity." And (*Cant.6.*): "Turn away your eyes, for they have made me flee." And Ambrose confirms this (*lib.de fuga saeculi, cap.1.*): "Death has entered through a window. Your window is your eye. If you look upon a woman to lust after her, death has entered." The second is a long and distant absence from the beloved object. For love is like fire, as is plain (*Job 31.*): "It is a fire that devours even to perdition." If one draws near to fire, he grows warm or is burned; if he stands far from it, he suffers neither warming nor burning. So one who is near to the thing loved is burned — as a certain madman used to say: "I am made of wax and I return to the fire." But one who is far from the fire is immune from burning. Love of this kind is overcome not by persisting but by fleeing. The third is sobriety and frugality in food and drink — especially wine, in excess of which there is licentiousness. Hence the frequently chanted saying: "Without Bacchus and Ceres, Venus grows cold." The fourth is continual occupation and assiduous labor in serious and honorable matters. Hence the celebrated saying: "Remove idleness and Cupid's bow is broken." The fifth is that vain talk and excessive familiarity must be avoided. "For evil communications corrupt good morals" (*1.Cor.15.*). Finally a new love must be found — namely the divine and heavenly love, inflamed by which a man abhors earthly love, destined to enjoy eternal blessedness. It would remain to treat of hatred — the opposite of love — but since from what has been said about love it is plain what must be said of hatred, since the same reasoning and knowledge holds of opposites, I therefore pass over it.

Article II. On Desire and Aversion.

Desire, libido, and cupidity are sometimes confused among authors — Augustine (*cap.15.*), Aristotle (*1.Rhet.cap.11.*), and Plutarch (*8.de Reportat.*) using them interchangeably — though some note a certain distinction among them which, being of little moment, I willingly omit. I observe, however, that desire is taken in three ways.

First, for the natural inclination of each thing — thus a stone is said to desire the center and matter to desire form. Second, for the act of willing and enjoying — in which sense (*1.Pet.1.*) reads of the Angels: "into which the Angels desire to look." Third, for the movement of the appetitive power regarding an absent good — and it is desire understood in this third way that is our present subject, which by the authors cited above is principally divided into common or natural desire — belonging to the sensitive appetite, such as the desire to eat and drink — and rational desire — belonging to the will, such as the desire to see God and to enjoy him. Further, into good desire — of which (*Ps.118.*): "My soul has yearned to desire your justifications at all times" — and bad desire, of which (*Prov.21.*): "The soul of the wicked desires evil."

Desire is described as a passion of the appetitive power regarding an absent good. Passion is placed as the genus. The appetitive power — that is, the will or

the sensitive appetite — is added: for both powers are capable of desire. An absent good is subjoined, so as to differentiate it from delight and joy, which regard a good that is present, attained, and possessed. According to the twofold desire of the sensitive and intellectual appetite there is likewise a twofold capacity: the capacity of the former is finite, because it follows sense — of which it is the appetite — and since sense is finite and bound to a singular object, desire too is limited, though it can in some sense be called infinite, because it reaches to singulars which, being innumerable, are therefore called infinite — for which reason perhaps Ecclesiastes (1.) says: "The eye is not filled with seeing, nor the ear with hearing." The capacity of the latter, however, is infinite, as (1.Pol.6.) says — which Philo (*libro decal.*) compares to the thirst of Tantalus: the reason is that it follows reason, which is not satisfied with finite things. Hence it is that since finite things cannot fill its desire, having attained one thing it does not rest but desires another; and having attained that, it then desires yet another, and so on to infinity. Therefore only the infinite good can be sufficient and more than sufficient for it — as Maximus Tyrius (*differt.19.*) maintains. And the Psalmist announces (Ps.16.): "I shall be satisfied when your glory appears."

From good or bad desire, as from a twofold fountain, all good or evil proceeds, as is plain from the sacred text. The mention of good desire is made (Ps.102.): "He will fill your desire with good things." And (Ps.10.): "You have given him the desire of his soul." Of bad desire (Ps.111.): "The desire of the wicked will perish." And (James 4.): "From where come wars and quarrels among you? Are they not from your concupiscences?" And Christ the Lord indicates both (Matt.7.): "A good tree produces good fruit, and a bad tree produces bad fruit."

Care must therefore be taken that desire does not transgress the limits of the divine commandments; and if it leaps beyond them, it must be restrained and curbed, since it is in our power to do so — as is touched upon (Gen.4.): "Your appetite will be subject to you, and you will have dominion over it." Do not pursue what is vain and harmful. (2.Tim.2.): "Flee youthful desires" — especially the delights and enticements of the flesh. (Gal.5.): "Walk in the spirit and you will not fulfill the desires of the flesh." Finally, let every desire of ours be fulfilled in God, who is wholly desirable and the end of all goods; and let each one of us say with David (Ps.41.): "As the deer desires the fountains of waters, so does my soul desire you, O God."

Against this, one may object, first, that desire is directed not only toward an absent object but also toward a present object; therefore desire is not aptly described as a passion regarding a future good. The antecedent is urged from (1.Pet.1.): "Into which the Angels desire to look." Scotus (1.Met.q.2.§.Ad secundum) and Antonius Andreas (2.Met.) — preceded by St. Bonaventure (3.d.26. in *expositione lit.*) — considering this text, say that desire also regards a present good, lest satiety arise, as the Gloss explains there, and as Gregory clearly shows (18.Mor.c.39.). I deny the antecedent. To its proof I say that the testimony is to be

taken of desire in the broad sense, not of desire in the strict sense of which we are presently speaking. For strictly taken, desire regards only an absent good — as Augustine attests (*in Ps.118.concione 8.*): "Desire is the concupiscence of absent things."

Against this, one may object, second, that there is a limit to desires; therefore desires do not increase to infinity but, one being removed, another fails. The antecedent is supported by (*Ps.111.*): "The desire of the wicked will perish." I deny the antecedent. To its proof I explain that text as being about the desire to inflict evil upon the blessed — which the wicked wish to execute; for since the saints enjoy eternal glory, the torment of malice will not touch them and they will not fear evil tidings. Hence it is added: "The sinner will see and be angry, he will gnash his teeth and waste away; the desire of the wicked will perish."

Of aversion — the opposite of desire — roughly the same must be said. For it is a passion of the appetitive power regarding an absent evil from which it recoils. It is explained in much the same way as the preceding definition of desire, with only this difference — that aversion regards an evil apprehended by reason or imagination. Nor is it necessary to add the other things that could be said about aversion, both because they are easy and because they can be conveniently understood from its opposite, desire.

Article III. On Joy and Sorrow.

Rainaud (*d.3.Mor.q.2.art.4.*) notes above all others that joy, delight, pleasure, and fruition are received indiscriminately. For this reason what I said of joy in (*Book II, q.4.art.2.dub.9. and Book IV, q.1.art.3. and q.2.art.1.*) must be recalled. For joy taken precisely is a passion of the soul following upon an act enkindled by love, as (*Vorrlong, d.11.art.1.*) attests. And it is described as a passion of the appetitive power regarding an attained and possessed good. By the prior terms joy has in common with the remaining passions; by the posterior terms it differs from the same.

Joy and delight are divided into natural — which follows upon the act of the natural and sensitive appetite, and is common to humans and brutes — and rational — which accompanies the act of the rational appetite, which is the will; and this latter belongs to man and all intellectual beings. It is then further divided into good joy and delight — which concerns licit, honest, and divine things (*Ps.36.*): "Delight in the Lord and he will give you the petitions of your heart," and (*Prov.15.*): "Delight in his love always." Hence Augustine adds (*22.Civit.*): "He himself will be the end of our desires — he who will be seen without end, loved without satiety, praised without weariness. This gesture, this affection, this act will be shared by all, as eternal life is common to all." And Christ invites his disciples to this joy (*Matt.5.*): "Rejoice and be glad, for your reward is great in heaven." And (*John 16.*): "Your joy no one will take from you." Or it regards created things — as (*Judith 16.*): "Joy of victory for three months."

And (2.Cor.2.): "My joy is yours." More clearly (Ps.91.): "You have given me delight, Lord, in your handiwork, and in the works of your hands I will exult." Therefore one who makes good use of created things is affected with delight — especially through the virtues, which wonderfully adorn and perfect man, as Nemeseius (*lib.de homine cap.18.*) learnedly sets forth.

Joy and delight are caused by an object that is a congruent and pleasant good to the appetitive power — cognition or knowledge of reason having preceded — as the Doctor (*1.d.1.q.3. and 3.d.15.q.vn. §. Aliter*) maintains, against Ockham (*1.d.1.q.3.*). It is urged, first, from (*10.Eth.cap.4.*) and (*1.Rhet.*): what is delightful is the cause of delight, and from the opposite what is sad is the cause of sadness. Second, when the appetitive power is not operating, if a beautiful and pleasant object is presented to it, delight is produced in it — as is plain from Eve, who in (*Gen.3.*) was captivated and delighted in beholding the tree of life, which was beautiful to sight and delightful to look upon. And this holds also of surreptitious delights, to which the will does not effectively concur; and also of vehement sensible delight, which impedes the use of reason, as Augustine (*14.Civit.cap.16.*) and the Stagirite (*7.Eth.9.*) attest. Third, sorrow is not caused by the will, because it befalls the will against its wish, as Augustine (*just cited, cap.15.*) notes. Therefore the same must be affirmed of delight. Furthermore, delight is either produced by the willing appetite or by the delightful object: if the former, then the appetitive power can always rejoice when it pleases, which is contrary to truth and experience; if the latter, the intended conclusion is had. It is therefore steadfastly to be maintained that joy and delight are produced by the object. Moreover, greater delight and more intense joy are generated by an object that is more pleasant and delightful and more difficult to obtain — as Augustine (*lib.contra mendacium, cap.10.*) and Seneca (*lib.5.de benef.cap.12.*) agree. This surely shows that delight is produced by the object; otherwise it would not be apparent why greater or lesser delight should be caused from this rather than from that object, since the appetitive power is equally disposed and prompt to receive delight from whatever delightful object is offered and presented to it.

The effects of joy and delight are numerous, significant, and great. For joy stirs laughter, expands the heart, preserves health, dispels anxiety, puts sadness to flight, removes anguish, and performs nearly all other excellent works. Hence Philo (*lib.de agricult.*) writes: "The common run of men, traversing various regions all the way to the ends of the earth, crossing the sea too and penetrating its inlets, leaving no part of this universe unsearched, always and everywhere gather those things that conduce to the heaping up of pleasure." And this is no wonder, since both the brute and man by the guidance of nature tend toward delight — as Aristotle (*7.Eth.c.13.*) teaches — without which all things would languish, rot in idleness, and cease to be, as the same Aristotle (*just cited, cap.1.*) suggests and Tyrius (*differt.33.n.190.*) confirms.

In the capture of joys and delights, however, a due measure must be kept and the appetite rightly restrained, lest it transgress its proper bounds and the just laws of God. Above all, the delights and immoderate, unrestrained pleasures of created things are to be avoided. For this reason Chrysostom (*homil.12. ad Timot.1.*) excellently says: "God created bread — its immoderate use is prohibited; and God created wine likewise, and prohibited its immoderate use. He therefore does not bid us shun delights as something unclean, but so that if any measure is abandoned they may dissolve the vigor of the soul." Then they are to be thought upon and weighed as unstable, vain, and quickly passing goods — as the Preacher testifies (*Eccles.cap.1.*): "I saw all the things that are done under the sun, and behold, all is vanity and affliction of spirit." For those who indulge in them too much openly confess afterward — though reluctantly — that they were overwhelmed by the darkness of error and ignorance, as the same Ecclesiastes writes (*Sap.5.*): "We therefore erred from the way of truth; the light of justice did not shine upon us, and the sun of understanding did not rise for us." Hence Nyssa aptly warns (*orat.de pauperibus amandis*): "Let not pleasures so overwhelm you that you fling yourself about in excessive joy and run riot in mad delights." I add that sorrow cleaves to pleasure and mourning is mingled with delight — as the Tyrian (*differt.31. and 32.*) and Basil (*homil.de paradiso*) declare beautifully: "What is pleasant to you, O men, is mingled with sadness." Therefore these sublunary and earthly pleasures are to be cast aside and heavenly and divine ones pursued, so that having attained these we may always rejoice in the Lord and delight in him. The Savior intimates this (*Luke 10.*) to his Apostles who were glorying and saying: "Even the demons are subject to us." He replies: "Rejoice rather because your names are written in heaven." And David had prefaced (*Ps.103.*): "But I will delight in the Lord." And Habakkuk (3.): "I will exult in the God, my Jesus."

Against this, one may object — against what was asserted above, that delight is caused by a pleasant and delightful object — that every positive cause causing a real positive effect must exist, as is plain (*from 2.Phys.T.38.*): "A cause in act has its effect in act"; but sometimes the object does not exist, and sometimes it is impossible — such as the equality with God which the Demon desired and in which he took delight: now what does not exist or is impossible cannot cause a real positive effect, such as delight. Therefore delight is not produced by the object.

This is confirmed, first: if the position of Scotus were true, delight would be produced in any passive subject by the object that causes it in it — which is absurd, since delight inheres in no other subject than the sensitive or intellectual appetite. It is confirmed, second: someone sometimes takes delight in a scientific act, whether speculative or practical; therefore delight is caused by the act, not by the object.

I reply, granting the major and distinguishing the minor: sometimes the object does not exist from the part of reality — I grant; the object does not exist in apprehension or reason — I deny, as is plain from science, which is caused in part by the object, even though the object has no existence outside reason or imagination. For a science of the rose is had in the intellect even when the rose does not exist in the nature of things, as I clearly showed (*in Log. book I, q.2. and book V, q.4.art.5. and in Phys. book de causis, q.5.art.2.*). To the first confirmation I distinguish the antecedent: in a fit and capable subject — I grant; in an unfit and incapable subject — I deny. Beyond the two appetites named, there is no other power properly capable of delight, since delight presupposes cognition and love, of which only each appetite is capable. To the second confirmation I distinguish the antecedent: immediately — I deny; mediately — I grant. For cognition and love are presupposed, and upon them delight follows and supervenes — as I was showing above.

Against this, one may object, second, that delight is meritorious or demeritorious. For if someone loves God and delights in him, he merits; but if he loves a forbidden object and takes pleasure in it, he demerits. But if delight were produced by the object, it would be a natural act, not in our power, and through it no one would merit or demerit. It is therefore better to assert that delight is not produced by the object. I distinguish the major: formally and immediately — I deny the major; materially and mediately — I grant, insofar as delight in some way falls under the command of the will, by reason of which it can be turned away from the continuation of delight and its sweetness — as is plain from a woman violated by force, who is afflicted with sorrow if any delight arose in her, and who merits insofar as she afterward detests this action and passion, and the pleasure, if any followed from them in waking or sleep. Hence the Doctor adds excellently (*1.d.1.q.3. §.De 2.principali.*): "Delight is not corrupt unless the act is corrupt." I add that the passions are absolutely meritorious: for Christ redeemed the human race through his passion, and the holy Martyrs attained glory — for which reason the Church sings: "All the saints, what great torments they suffered, so that they might arrive safely at the palm of martyrdom."

Of sorrow — the opposite of joy — something remains to be said. I am not unaware that pain and sorrow are often used interchangeably, as Orbellis (*3.d.15.*) and Rada (*ibid. controuers.10.art.2.*) carefully observe — though if taken properly and specifically they differ from one another, as Augustine (*14.Civit.T.15.*) teaches, whom the Doctor follows (*3.d.15.q.vn. §.Ad solutionem.*). For pain taken strictly is a passion of the sensitive appetite caused by an incongruent, offensive, and injurious object to the flesh, cognition preceding. Sorrow, on the other hand, is a passion of the intellectual appetite caused by an incongruent object, following upon the act of not willing. From this it is plain that pain taken narrowly pertains to the sensitive part, and sorrow to the intellectual part. For if the object injures the flesh, this injury is called pain —

which can be manifold according to the multiplicity of the injury of the multiple appetite. But if the object displeases the will and the will does not will it, there is born a passion called sorrow — which is about things that happen to us against our will. For this reason the said passions proceed from the incongruence of objects, acts of the said appetites having preceded — just as joy and delight flow from the congruence of objects. And as the latter are multiplied, so too are the former — since from what has been said not once, the same reasoning and learning holds for opposites. Finally, they arise both from within — such as from the intemperance of the animal — and from without — such as from heat, cold, and the other things that injure sense, or from the will on account of unwilled things.

Scotus (*cited*, §. *Praeter illum*, and §. *Praeter duos*, *art.1.*) recounts four principal modes in which sorrow is caused. First, if something happens to the will contrary to its natural inclination. In this way the will, naturally inclining toward happiness, grieves if misery befalls it — hence Augustine says (*in Ench.cap.164.*): "We will so much to be happy that we cannot will to be miserable." For just as the will, naturally receiving happiness, rejoices — since it is its perfection — so when not receiving it, it grieves. Second, if the sensitive appetite is injured by a motivating object, on account of the connection and bond which the will has with the sensitive appetite, the will also grieves — as if someone's body is wounded, the sensitive appetite grieves at the wound, and the will, pitying it, is saddened. Third, if the will does not will some object and it is nevertheless presented and given to it against its not-willing, sorrow follows — as the damned in hell would not have the fire, and contrary to their not-willing God wills the fire to be there to torment them; therefore they grieve. Fourth, if someone absolutely does not will some thing and yet on account of an imminent danger to life wills it conditionally — as a merchant in peril at sea throws overboard his goods, which he would not throw if he could avoid the danger to life and shipwreck. From this sorrow follows, since he would simply not throw them and he throws them under compulsion; hence sorrow comes to him — as the Doctor rightly and fully sets forth (*ubi supra*).

The effects of this dark and poisonous affection are many, and Chrysostom narrates them no less brilliantly than eloquently (*orat.2.de providentia and epist.7.*): "Sorrow is a cruel torment of souls, a certain inexplicable gnawing pain, worse than any judgment and punishment. For it is like a venomous worm that destroys not only the flesh but the soul itself. It is like a moth — reaching not only to the bones but to the heart itself — a perpetual executioner, not rending the soul asunder but consuming the soul's forces, and an endless night and deep darkness, and a storm and tempest, and a fever not apparent but burning more intensely than any fire, and a battle that has no rest, and a sickness that obscures the sight of many." And before him the wise man (*Prov.25.*): "As a moth injures a garment and a worm injures wood, so sorrow injures a man's heart." Counsel must therefore be taken from Ecclesiasticus (30.), who says: "Drive sorrow far

from you, for sorrow has slain many and there is no profit in it." Therefore let each one of us serve God not in sorrow but in joy; and if sorrow occupies the heart and soul, let it be not on account of the evils and losses inflicted on oneself, but on account of sins committed, let one be sorrowful and do penance — which is the end implanted and intended in us by God, as Chrysostom judges (*hom.7.ad populum*): for in this way, when a man does so, sorrow will be turned into joy, as Christ foretells to his Apostles (*John 16.*).

Article V. On Hope and Despair.

After the affections of the concupiscible, next come the passions of the irascible, among which hope holds the first place and despair — which is opposed to it — the second. The Seraphic Doctor warns (*3.d.36.q.1.*) that the name "hope" is equivocal, whose several acceptations (*Vorrlong, Arretinus, and Gabriel ibid.*) adduce and express; I bring forward and explain those more suitable and fitting for illuminating our subject.

First, hope is taken for the expectation of a good or evil future event. In this sense Cicero (*lib.1.ad Atticum*), Augustine (*in Ench.cap.8.*), and Virgil take it: "If I could have hoped for so great a sorrow."

Second, for the thing hoped for, mention of which is made (*Ad Tit.2.*): "Awaiting the blessed hope" — that is, blessedness, which is the object or terminus of hope.

Third, for the theological virtue, which is a habit infused by God into the rational soul concerning the possession of the highest good — of which Scotus (*3.d.26.q.vn.*) and the other Scholastics treat.

Fourth, for the movement of the appetitive power following upon the act of hoping concerning a future good to be attained. It is hope understood in this fourth way that is our present subject. Its object is a future good, as Cicero (*4.Tusc.*) and Augustine (*ubi supra*), following Aristotle (*1.Rhet.cap.11. and 2. of the same work, cap.12.*), observe. The future good to be hoped for being twofold — created and uncreated — hope is directed toward each. Excessive affection for the former is forbidden (*1.Tim.6.*): "Charge the rich of this world not to be haughty, nor to trust in the uncertainty of riches." The latter, however, is to be pursued with all effort and ardor (*Ps.36.*): "Hope in the Lord and do good." Involved in hope are the possibility and credibility of attaining the future good — not as a motivating cause but as a presupposed condition. For in order to hope for something, one presupposes and foreknows that it is possible and future. For what is impossible of attainment is hoped for by no one; and what is believed never to be future and never to be attained does not appear to fall under hope — as Seneca (*Epist.10.*) and the Philosopher (*ad finem libri de execratione*) agree.

I add that hope must not be confused with desire, as some cited in Scotus and Basil suppose — both because they are distinct passions (for desire pertains to

the concupiscible and hope to the irascible), and because it is plain that there can be desire without hope. For the damned desire happiness with their natural appetite, which they do not hope to obtain. And desire sometimes regards the impossible — as was the desire of the demon seeking equality with God, which is impossible. Hope, on the other hand, tends only toward what is possible and future, as I was saying a little above.

Nor is hope divided as into two species — into moderate hope, which does not exceed the powers of the one hoping and the aids for obtaining the hoped-for good, and immoderate hope, which surpasses the faculties of the one hoping and whose external supports are not suitable, opportune, and sufficient for obtaining the good. I say hope is not thus divided into two species, as Rainaud holds (*d.3.q.3.art.1.n.285.*). For such a division is drawn from the measure and excess of hope, and is therefore accidental. Furthermore, more and less do not vary the species, as I said in (*the Logic, q.de qualitate.*); therefore moderate and immoderate hope do not constitute a specific distinction of hope. The distinction of the species of hope is rather to be derived from the distribution of the objects to be hoped for — as is the case with the other movements and affections enumerated above.

As much as hope can accomplish and effect, achieve and produce, is sufficiently well known. For it is, as it were, a savory and pleasant nourishment and seasoning by which the one who acts is fed, supported, and preserved — as Ovid beautifully sings (*lib.2.Eleg.5.*): "Hope nourishes farmers." It increases his forces, strengthens the heart and spirit, rouses to undertaking and completing tasks — to such a degree that nothing illustrious and praiseworthy would be accomplished without the hope of attaining a good. Hence Tertullian rightly establishes (*lib.de pudicitia*) that hope is the doorkeeper of the house of the virtues — so that, having gained and possessed it, everyone may enter broadly and boldly into the dwelling of whatever virtue. Therefore, spurning and dismissing all vain and futile hope of corruptible goods, let us be armed with the hope of incorruptible goods and fortified with the hope of divine aid, so that we may attain and enjoy the happiness we seek and hope for.

Against this, one may object, first, that hope includes faith as its genus, as the Doctor (*cited*) indicates and Majoris (*ibid.art.8.*) attributes to him; since therefore faith pertains to the intellect, the same must be affirmed of hope. I distinguish the antecedent: presuppositively — I grant, that is, the one hoping believes that the good he hopes for exists and believes he will attain it; formally — I deny. For although faith is prior to hope as genus is prior to species, it is not therefore affirmed that faith is the true genus of hope. Especially because faith is a virtue and a habit, whereas hope — of which we are speaking here — is a passion.

Against this, one may object, second, that the Doctor (*in loc.cit.*) seems to want hope to pertain rather to the concupiscible than to the irascible, since it regards an absent good, like desire. Therefore hope is not subjected in the irascible, nor

is its passion. I reply by explaining the Doctor: insofar as hope and desire regard the same object — that is, an absent good — they are in some sense said to pertain to the irascible; but because they tend toward it in different modes, for this reason they are not both considered to inhere in the concupiscible — as Basil and Vorrlong (*named above*) rightly teach. For to desire is an act of love with respect to an absent thing, by which the lover tends toward union with the thing loved; whereas to hope is an act of the will by which the one hoping raises himself and tends toward attaining and possessing, by way of a suitable means, the object hoped for.

Many hold the nature of despair to be difficult to know — especially on account of the variety and multiplicity of the opinions of the philosophers. Setting these aside, I adduce its definition, which is as follows: despair is a passion of the appetitive power following upon the act of not pursuing a good which is apprehended as impossible of attainment. This is intimated by the Doctor (*3.d.16.q.vn.H.*). The prior terms are common to other passions; the posterior terms distinguish despair itself from the remaining affections. For just as hope presupposes the act of pursuing the hoped-for good, so on the contrary despair — which is opposed to it — presupposes the act by which someone no longer wishes to devote effort to pursuing and following up that good which he judges he can in no way obtain and possess. From this it is plain that despair is not an act of the intellect judging the good to be impossible of attainment, as Almain holds (*Tract.2.Mor.cap.7.diff.3.*). For although despair presupposes an act of the imaginative or intellectual power, it is nonetheless not an act of it but a passion of the irascible — which pertains to the will — as the common opinion of the philosophers holds. All the more so because despair is called the last of evils. Hence Chrysostom (*libro de reparatione lapsi*) writes: "Despair closes the doors of that heavenly city which hope opens and piety throws wide." And it gravely harms — as is plain from Cain and Judas. Despair therefore does not suit the intellect. It is also established that despair is not aversion or recession from a good, because aversion is a passion of the concupiscible appetite, whereas despair is established as a passion of the irascible appetite — and also because it is not a not-willing but presupposes a not-willing to pursue any further the good which the despairing person judges he can never attain. The rest, who think despair is a falling of the will from good, a breaking of spirit, and a defection — these expose and assign rather its effects than its nature.

Despair can arise from several sources. First, from weakness of powers — as one feeble in spirit and infirm in body despairs of completing a long journey. Second, from the magnitude and difficulty of the thing to be obtained — as a poor prince despairs of winning victory over a great and powerful king. Third, from sloth, avarice, or lust — as (*Eph.4.*): "Despairing of themselves, they have given themselves over to all uncleanness and covetousness." Fourth, from the insufficiency of means or the gravity of the offense — as (*Gen.4.*): "My iniquity is greater than that I should deserve pardon." Fifth, from an evil will by which one

wishes to persist in evil — as is plain (*Jer.2.*): "Despairing, I will not do otherwise." Sixth, from black bile strongly predominating — and thus some, wearied of life, hang themselves.

Just as there are many causes of despair, so many effects are assigned to it. For despair breaks the spirit, weakens the forces, desists from the pursuit of good, neglects, abandons, and plunges man into the depths of vices — to such a degree that the lost and damned are called desperate. Hence for despair scarcely any remedy is given, unless the intellect is illuminated and the possibility, facility, sufficiency, and abundance of efficacious means of attaining good are shown, and the will is raised and rises eagerly and willingly to attain it — with all impediments removed and overcome. For as long as man lives and breathes, he ought to hope — especially for the forgiveness of sins — since the mercy of God is great and his mercies have no end. Let the good man therefore beware lest he presume upon his virtues and merits, and let the evil man beware lest he despair on account of his crimes — as Augustine piously and learnedly warns (*lib.de Symbolo*).

Article V. On Boldness and Fear.

A certain modern author observes that the diversity of conflicting opinions has obscured and darkened this difficulty concerning the nature of boldness and its properties — as in a similar matter the Song of Songs (*1.*) says: "I am dark" — adding the reason: "The sons of my mother have fought against me." Setting aside those positions therefore that do not conduce to illuminating and explaining the quiddity of boldness, I put forward its definition, which is as follows: boldness is a passion of the appetitive power following upon the act of daring, consisting in an eager and spirited assault upon difficult things and grave dangers. The preceding terms signify its genus, the following ones its differentia, through which it is distinguished from the remaining affections. It is divided into good and bad. The former designates constancy and firmness of spirit in undergoing dangers — hence it is said: "The just man is unafraid." And Aristotle (*2.Rhet.5.*) adds that those are bolder who stand rightly with respect to God and think they have the divine favor on their side, for they hope to be helped by his power and virtue. Hence Joseph of Arimathea (*Mark 15.*) "went in boldly to Pilate and asked for the body of Jesus." And (*Rom.15.*) St. Paul: "I have written to you more boldly." And the celebrated saying is commended: "Fortune favors the bold and repels the timid." The latter — bad boldness — designates arrogance, presumption, and temerity. Hence Ecclesiastes (*8.*) warns: "Do not go on the road with a bold man, lest his evils weigh heavily upon you." And the same adds (*cap.22.*): "An impudent man puts his father and husband to shame." Its subject is the irascible. Its cause is held to be twofold: an abundance of heat in the heart, and a firm hope of eagerly attaining the good and winning victory over dangers. Its effects are seen with the eye and are so manifest that it would be tedious to enumerate them.

Lest anyone act rashly, however, dangers must be weighed and meditated upon lest one perish in them, and one's own forces must be measured, lest overcome, one be exposed to everlasting reproach — as often happens to one who falls wretchedly and is buried with ignominy through inconsiderate and improvident recklessness in dangers.

Against this, one may object that a definition adapts to one thing and not to another, as the laws of a good definition require; but the definition of boldness given above fits fortitude, which differs from it. Therefore the definition stated is not correct. The major is known. The minor is urged: fortitude consists wholly in steadfastly and eagerly assailing arduous and difficult things — just as boldness does. I grant the major and deny the minor: for fortitude is a virtue whereas boldness is a passion — therefore they do not coincide.

Of fear I find four principal usages. First, for any flight and recession from all evil. In this sense Aristotle (*3.Eth.6. and 2.Rhet.5.*) takes fear. Second, for humility and depression of spirit, of which David makes mention (*Ps.110.*): "The beginning of wisdom is the fear of the Lord" — that is, humility, as Scotus (*3.d.34.q.vn. ante §.Ad argumenta*) interprets. Third, for dread by which we fear an imminent evil — in which sense Augustine says (*lib.83.qq.q.35.*): "Fear is of a future and imminent evil." Fourth, for the passion of the appetite following upon the act of fearing, caused by the apprehension of a future evil. The definition of Aristotle (*2.Rhet.c.alleg.*) amounts to the same: "Fear is a disturbance of a future and imminent evil inflicting pain or sorrow." It is called a disturbance — that is, a passion of the appetite — as the genus; and the remaining terms are added as the differentia, by which fear differs from the remaining passions. Whether the evil included in the definition of fear is certainly and necessarily future or uncertainly and contingently future is disputed among the Scholastics: some, like Vasquez (*3.p.d.62.cap.3.*), suppose the evil of which there is fear to be certainly and infallibly going to come about; others, like Richard (*3.d.15.q.3.art.3.ad 4.*), establish that fear properly regards an evil that is uncertainly going to come about.

I hold, however, that both evils are comprehended under the said definition — both because the evil to be feared is placed in it absolutely, and what is universally understood comprehends all evil, whether it comes about infallibly or fallibly, just as when "animal" is said simply, both rational and irrational is understood; and also because an evil necessarily going to come about is feared, as each of us fears death, even though it comes about necessarily. For this reason Christ also feared death itself, as is plain (*Mark 14.*): "He began to grow sorrowful and to be very heavy."

One may say, in objection, that Aristotle (*passim cited*) expressly says that those who hope for no salvation do not fear; therefore fear contains only an uncertain future. I say that Aristotle is to be interpreted of effective and absolute fear, not of ineffective fear — just as effective desire is about what is possible of

attainment, and ineffective desire can be about the impossible, as the Doctor (2.d.6.q.2.§.per hoc.) maintains.

Many divisions of fear are current from (*Vorrlong, 3.d.14.art.1.*), (*Brulifer ibid.d.34.part.2.*), and (*Damascus, 2.fidei cap.15.*). I adduce and explain the principal one, which is into filial, servile, and worldly fear. The first is called reverential fear, by which man fears to offend God whom he loves and dreads to be separated from him — as the Angelic Doctor (*ver. Timor*) notes — mention of which is made (*Ps.18.*): "The fear of the Lord is holy, enduring forever." The second is servile fear, by which man fears God lest he be punished and condemned — of which (*Luke 21.*): "Men withering away from fear." The third is that by which one fears to lose his goods if he does not comply with the prince — as (*John 11.*): "If we let him alone, the Romans will come and take away our place and our nation." And more clearly (*John 7.*): "Yet no one spoke openly of him for fear of the Jews." Aristotle mentions this division of fear (2.com.cap.2.).

The cause of fear is a future or apparent evil, as Aristotle (3.*Anima.T.154.*) and Epictetus (*apud Arrianum lib.2.cap.1.*) maintain. Its effects are plain — especially the pallor of countenance, the agitation of mind, and the like. If a man finds no way to escape the impending evil and imminent danger, he fears and is more greatly terrified. To drive away fear, trust and confidence in God avail greatly — according to (*Ps.124.*): "Those who trust in the Lord will be as Mount Zion." And a right conscience and good work — hence the celebrated saying is commended: "Do good and you will not fear the king." And the Proverb excellently adds (*Prov.28.*): "The just man, like a confident lion, will be without terror."

Article VI. On Anger and Meekness.

Anger can be taken in three ways. First, for the act of avenging an injury — in which case anger can be without sin, as is plain (*Ps.*) "Be angry and sin not." And (*John 2.*): "Christ, moved by anger and led by zeal for the Father, made as it were a scourge of cords and drove out those who were buying and selling from the temple." Second, with respect to its effect — by which, namely, an offense is punished: in this sense anger is attributed to God when he chastises the evil and impious, as one reads (*Ps.77.*): "Their food was still in their mouths, and the anger of God ascended upon them." And (*Ezech.7.*): "I will pour out my anger upon you." And more expressly (*Micah 7.*): "I will bear the anger of the Lord, for I have sinned against him." Third, with respect to its effect — and thus it is defined as a passion of the appetitive power following upon the act of avenging an injury inflicted on oneself or another. Passion is placed as the genus; the remaining terms are subjoined as the differentia. The last two senses of anger are drawn from the Doctor (4.d.46.q.2.§.Respondeo.), who establishes that mercy in God is not with respect to affection but with respect to effect — not the proximate but the remote effect. Similarly anger is adapted to God not as it is a passion and disturbance but in that an evil or offense is punished by God himself. But it belongs to both appetites — sensitive and intellectual — hence perhaps Aristotle

(1.*Anima T.16.*) adds that anger can be defined in two ways: dialectically, as it has just been defined, and physically — in which mode anger is defined as an inflammation of blood about the heart. And this latter definition belongs only to the sensitive appetite, as Scotus (3.d.34.q.vn.§. *Notandum ante H.*) agrees.

Against this, one may object, first, that Aristotle (*just cited*), defining anger, says: "Anger is an appetite for vengeance." He writes (2.*Rhet.2.*), to which Cicero (*cited by Lactantius, lib.de ira Dei, cap.17.*), Augustine (14.*Civit.T.15. and Epist.115.*) agree. Therefore anger does not differ from desire. I reply that the testimonies cited are to be taken not formally but presuppositively — that is, the desire for vengeance is presupposed for someone to be moved by anger on account of an injury inflicted on him. For as I showed above, the passions of the concupiscible precede the passions of the irascible. This is touched upon by the Doctor (*just mentioned*).

Against this, one may object, second, that the same Philosopher (5.*pol.10.*) adds that we should regard anger as a certain particle of hatred; therefore hatred and anger are confused. I reply that Aristotle there only wishes anger and hatred to have some affinity with one another, not identity — just as, according to the same Philosopher, Rhetoric is a certain particle and offshoot of Dialectic (1.*Rhet.1. and following*), though they are distinct habits. Therefore anger and hatred are discrepant passions. For hatred is a passion of the concupiscible regarding an evil that it averts; anger, on the other hand, is a passion of the irascible regarding a good that it pursues — namely vengeance, which is thought to be good. Hence the Stagirite (2.*Rhet.2. cited by Scotus ubi supra*) writes: "The anger of a man is like honey." And this occurs when one actually avenges himself. For thus, the Doctor (*cited*) affirms, that act is perfect, is likened to fruition, and great delight follows.

Anger is then divided into good anger — which is directed by right reason, such as anger at sins committed — and bad anger, which is contrary to right reason, such as anger at God and neighbor. Other members of anger are adduced by Aristotle (4.*Eth.T.5.*), Gregory (30.*Mor.*), and the Angelic Doctor (*ver.ira*). Among them are numbered strife, swelling of mind, contumely, clamor, indignation, blasphemy, war, malediction, and sedition — of which Seneca (*lib.de ira, cap.4.*) and the Angelic Doctor (*just cited*) treat.

The motivating and inciting cause of anger is principally held to be twofold: a slight and the sorrow conceived from it, of which Aristotle (*just cited*) makes mention and (4.*Top.cap.6.*): "The angry man is distressed and thinks himself slighted." And (6. *of the same work, cap.3.*): "Anger is sorrow with the opinion of being slighted." The Doctor (*at the passage just cited*) affirms the same. Add a fiery temperament, those possessed of which — choleric persons — are easily moved to anger. Its effects are many, and these horrible and foul — such as palpitation of the heart, ebullition of blood, trembling of the members, precipitousness of tongue, inflammation of countenance, disturbance of mind, and things of that

kind — which are reported and described by Nyssa (*hom.2.de beatitudine*), Seneca (*lib.de ira, cap.36. and 37.*), and Gregory (*1.Mor.c.30.*). Hence Cyril adds (*serm.de temerario*): "What beast is so savage and fierce as one who is angry and yields as to some tyrant to unrestrained anger? Or what sea, so violently driven and hurled by the winds against the rocks, as an unrestrained and harsh man who cannot be held back from obeying anger and letting all the reins loose to his disturbance." And Basil (*hom.10.contra irascentes*): "When once the disturbance of anger, rushing headlong upon the mind, has seized the command of the soul, it turns the man entirely into a beast and no longer allows him to be a man possessed of reason." Hence a certain philosopher, struck by anger, approaching an enemy — so as not to become brutish — could have but would not kill or harm him, saying: "I would kill you, so as not to be angry at you." The warning of Paul (*Eph.4.*) must therefore be received: "Let not the sun go down upon your anger, and give no place to the Devil." To which Isidore of Pelusium (*lib.1.epist.280.*) subscribes: "Put a bridle on anger as quickly as possible, lest it drive you headlong into ruin." I add Ambrose (*ad Vercellensem*): "Man cannot forestall anger, but he can mitigate it. Therefore even if we are angry, let the emotion of our affections receive its impulse according to nature, and let it not be sin beyond nature." And finally — as Nyssa (*named above*) attests — the subjection of oneself greatly avails: "For if you remove pride from the soul, the vice of anger will have no occasion to grow." And the countless evils that arise from anger — cited by Seneca (*3.de ira, c.5.*): "Lest we be angry, we will achieve this if we continually set before ourselves all the vices of anger and accurately appraise it."

From what has been said of anger, it is plain by opposition what must be said of gentleness, of which the Doctor (*3.d.34.q.vn.§.His suppositis.*) makes mention. Some call it tolerance, and others — such as Aristotle (*1.Magn.mor.c.21.*) — meekness. If taken as a virtue, it is defined by Cicero (*1.de off.*): "A virtue of spirit weighing each condition of the world with equal scale." But if taken as a passion, it is described as an affection of the appetite following upon the act of growing gentle, sparing an offense inflicted on oneself or another. Hence Jerome adds (*in Matt.5.*): "The meek or gentle person is one who neither gives offense nor resists evil, nor thinks of doing harm, and who is affected neither by anger nor fury." Its master is the Savior (*Matt.11.*): "Learn from me, for I am meek and humble of heart." It is enjoined by Paul (*Eph.4.*): "Walk worthily, with all humility and meekness." And before by Ecclesiastes: "Son, perform your works in meekness."

Book V. On Habits.

The treatise on habits is ample and rich — encompassing habits taken generally and specifically, intellectual and moral, spiritual and material — and concerning all and each of these, for a fuller and more exact doctrine, I am pleased to

subjoin the following questions, articles, and disputed points, and to decide them to the best of my ability.

Question I. On Habits Taken Universally.

Article I. Whether Habit Exists.

The name "habit" is equivocal, as I noted (*in Log.1.3.q.7.art.2.*). In the present context it is taken principally for an adventitious quality acquired through art and labor, difficult to remove from its subject, by which the one who possesses it operates easily, promptly, and with delight.

The assertion is that habit is given, by which one is rendered easy and prompt in operating through practice and exercise. This is the common position, which the Doctor presupposes (*1.d.17.q.2. and 2.d.17.q.vn. and 3.d.26.q.vn. and 34.q.vn.*), supported by Augustine (*1.de distinctionib. and in Ench.cap.82.*) and Gregory (*4. and 11.Mor.*) and others frequently — who warn that a good habit is to be retained and a bad one repelled. Aristotle concurs (*2.Eth.5.*), dividing the things that are in the soul into power, passion, and habit; and (*2.Eudem.T.1.*), (*same l.predicam.c.de qualitate*), (*5.Met.c.de qualitat.*), and (*9. of the same work c.5. and 8.*).

Furthermore, it is urged that experience confirms that a man not yet practiced in some art and discipline operates only with difficulty — but afterward, when furnished with practice and custom, acts easily and with delight, and cannot even be pulled away or distracted from it. This ease, aptitude, and delight in operating, acquired through use and custom, is what common usage calls habit; and one who lacks such ease is said not to have the habit — as (*1.Reg.17.*) David says of bearing arms that he has no use and custom of them. Habit must therefore be admitted. Moreover, a power that is indifferent and undetermined to acting with difficulty or easily must be determined by something, so that it may operate promptly and easily — just as the will is determined, through the practice of frugality and abstinence, toward producing acts of sober and chaste living; but such practice and facility of operating is commonly called habit. I add what I compiled together with Scotus (*3.d.24.q.vn.D.*) in (*Epit.1.1.q.4.art.7.*): a catalogue of all habits, both speculative and practical — of which in their own place. The conclusion is therefore beyond doubt: habit is given.

Against this, one may object, first, that a power clothed and imbued with a habit is still indifferent to acting — as is plain from the will, which, however possessed of any habit, still remains indifferent and undetermined to opposite acts and opposite objects; therefore a habit that constitutes a facility determining the power to act is not to be granted. Raconius replies (*disp.ult.de virt.Sect.1.art.1.*) that a power made firm by habit is indifferent contradictorily — that is, to acting or not acting — but not contrarily — that is, to contrary acts; so the will at that point is not indifferent to willing and not-willing. Against this: habit does not remove the power but only assists and facilitates it; but the will before habit was

indifferent both contradictorily and contrarily; therefore also after habit it remains indifferent in both ways. Again, what is posterior does not change what is prior, since the prior, as prior, does not depend on the posterior; but the power is prior to habit, and in that priority is indifferent and undetermined both contrarily and contradictorily; therefore after habit it remains indifferent in the same manner. Hence it must be stated that habit determines the power not absolutely but in a certain respect — that is, to operating easily and with delight. Hence habit is necessary for the power only in a certain respect, for its better being and easier operating; the acts of the power of which it is the habit follow upon it, as will be shown below.

Against this, one may object, second, that if habit is admitted, it is either as a dispositive and passive principle of the subject, or as an active principle assisting the subject in which it resides toward operating. Not the first, because the subject — or the power — by its own nature and immediately is disposed toward receiving any perfection. Nor the second, because — as the Doctor probably holds (*1.d.17.q.2.*) — it is not necessary that a habit be given as an active principle, but as inclining the power toward acting, just as gravity is posited for bearing a weight downward. I reply that habit must be admitted whether it is posited for operating or for inclining the power toward acting. For it can be defended in either way, as is plain from the Doctor (*at the passage just mentioned*). Although the power is simply operative and inclined toward acting, habit is nevertheless given to it so that it may act easily and with delight, or that it may incline toward acting.

Article II. How Many Kinds of Habit There Are.

Many divisions of habits exist; I explain the principal ones.

First, into infused and acquired habit. The former is infused by God into the creature — such as faith, hope, and charity — of which the Theologians treat, notably Scotus (*3.d.34.q.vn. and 1.d.17.q.2.*). The latter is produced by art and labor, by which the agent operates promptly and readily — as I said and explained in (*the Log.q.de qualitate.*). One may inquire what this said division of habit is: whether it is essential and intrinsic, or accidental and extrinsic; and likewise whether it is adequate and sufficient, or whether some other member is wanting to it.

As to the first, we assert it to be extrinsic — derived from the order of the efficient cause — just as the partition of habit into natural and supernatural, which appears to coincide entirely with this one, is extrinsic — as I showed from Scotus (*2.1.prol. and 4.d.6.q.vn. and d.10.q.8. and d.43.q.4.*) (*in Tract.1.summae Theolog.disp.2.q.3.*). There I noted that something can be called supernatural in two ways. One way — properly — is what can be produced by God alone, such as grace. Another way — improperly — is what is indeed produced by God, but can be produced by a creature, such as infused science given by God, which

could have been acquired by a rational creature by its own ability. Therefore just as a habit is called supernatural because it is produced by a supernatural agent, or natural because it arises from a natural agent — as I noted (*in Phys.1.de natura et arte q.1.art.2.*) — so a habit is called infused because it is infused by God the supreme agent, and acquired because it is acquired of its own accord by a created agent. This division therefore is extrinsic, derived from the different respect of the agents — as Suarez (*disp.44.Met.Sect.1.n.5.*) also acknowledges. Though between these habits there is an intrinsic and essential distinction — whether produced by the same or by a different agent — as faith and charity differ essentially from one another, though both proceed immediately from God.

As to the second, we establish that the named distribution of habit is adequate and immediate. For no habit properly so called is innate and connatural. For, as is plain from the definition of habit given in the Logic, every habit taken strictly is begotten by art and acquired by labor. If from the beginning of its creation someone received some habit divinely — as the Angel, who had from God all scientific habit and species of things bestowed upon him — that habit is called infused and natural, because it was created and produced together with the nature, even though it is truly supernatural, because it is from God the supernatural agent, as I was warning above. All the more so because the habit of which we are speaking in the present is generated from frequently repeated acts; and therefore no habit is given that is innate and inborn. And thus habit is sufficiently divided into infused and acquired — as Scotus (*1.d.17.q.2. and 3.d.34.q.vn. §.Not.D.*) agrees.

One may say that the intelligible species innate in the Angel at the beginning of his creation are called habits by Scotus — as I observed (*in Log.1.3.q.7.art.2.*) — and that such species were given and innate together with his nature. A middle habit is therefore admitted between infused and acquired — namely congenital and connatural. The reply is that although intelligible species are not properly habits, and yet are reduced to the series of habit — as I said at the passage mentioned — this kind of habit is contained under the infused habit, insofar as it was infused by the author of nature into the Angel at the same moment as he was created. It is therefore not necessary to constitute a middle habit between infused and acquired.

Second, into cognitive and appetitive habit — derived from the material cause, or subjects, in which habits inhere, which are principally the cognitive and appetitive powers, as (*Vorrlong, 3.d.36.Term.2.art.1.*) notes. Into this comes fairly the distribution commonly adduced as into intellectual and moral habit — touched upon by the Doctor (*9.Met.q.11.q.*) and from what has been said and handed down (*in 1.Eth. at the end*) — which encompasses all habits of both intellect and will; except that the former is wider and broader, insofar as it contains material and spiritual habits, while the latter is narrower and more

confined, in that it takes in only spiritual habits. It is adduced, however, by Scotus (*1.d.17.q.2.§.sed tunc. and 3.d.34.q.vn.§.Notandum.D.*) and by the entire assembly of Scholastics — perhaps because most do not grant habits in material powers, or if they admit them, as Scotus does, they reduce these to those; or because cognitive, broadly understood as intellectual, do not differ. Hence it is not considered a twofold but only a single division — though in truth some distinction is interposed between them. For moral derives from custom, and custom pertains to the will, whose act is formally free alone, and customs are placed in free acts. Hence moral designates the elicited act of the will properly, and improperly the commanded act — by reason of which the acts of other powers can be called moral by participation — as the Doctor writes (*q.4.prol. and expresses in Rep.3.d.33.q.1.§.Oppositum.*). One may also investigate whether this named division is essential and quidditative, and likewise whether it is sufficient and adequate.

As to the first, one may say that it is essential with respect to its formal and intrinsic rationes through which its members are essentially constituted and distinguished — since the same principle is constitutive and distinctive of a thing, as is plain in *Metaphysics*. There is therefore no doubt that the habits just named formally differ among themselves, and hence the said division is essential. Furthermore, one may call it an accidental and extrinsic division — or a division of subjects into their accidents — insofar as intellectual habits are subjected in the intellect and moral habits in the will, from which they receive their denominations.

As to the second, one may likewise say that it is in some sense a sufficient and adequate partition, insofar as nearly all and principally all habits reside in the cognitive or appetitive power. This is to be discussed below.

One may say that a certain habit is both intellectual and moral — as prudence is an intellectual habit (*from 5.Eth.4.*) and also moral, since it is the proximate rule of moral acts. This division is therefore neither essential nor sufficient nor fitting. I distinguish the antecedent: formally — I deny; regulatively and mensuratively — I grant. For prudence is formally a habit of the intellect — namely, the deliberative intellect, as I will show in its own place — but is in some sense the rule of the other virtues, as the Doctor (*3.d.33.§.Ad 1.M.*) notes.

Third, into virtue and non-virtue: this is hinted at by Scotus (*coll.6.*). To understand it, I observe with Vorrlong that virtue is taken in three ways. First, for the power or faculty of operating — in which sense (*7.Phys.T.3.*): "Virtue is the disposition of the perfect toward its best." And (*1.Caeli T.116.*): "Virtue is the ultimate of power." Second, for that perfection by which the subject in which it is is perfected and adorned — in which sense (*2.Eth.cap.5. and 6.*), cited by the Doctor (*1.d.17.q.2.§.Ad ista. ante E. and 3.d.3.q.vn.§.Ad quast.*): virtue is defined as a habit that perfects its possessor and renders his work good. Hence Augustine adds (*lib.83.qq.q.31.*): virtue is a good habit, conformed to the mode, reason, and

nature. Third, for the theological virtue or what is associated with the theological virtue — in which sense Augustine (*l.solilog. and 2.de lib.arb.cap.18.19.*) writes: "Virtue is right reason reaching the highest end, or a good quality of mind by which one lives rightly, which no one uses badly, which God works in us without us." Fourth, and properly, it is thus described by the Doctor (*coll.1. and 3. just cited*): virtue is an elective habit determined by right reason. The same Aristotle intimates (*2.Eth.6. and 6. of the same work, T.3.*). Since election belongs to the will (*6.Eth.3.*), it is inferred that virtue properly taken pertains to the will — and thus the named division encompasses only habits of the will, whose second member is non-virtue: since, as has been said, an indifferent act is given that is neither good nor bad, so also a habit is admitted that is not a virtue. For from indifferent acts frequently repeated, a neutral or indifferent habit is generated that is neither good nor bad. And thus virtue and vice are not immediate opposites — just as just and unjust have between them what is not unjust; and between friend and enemy there intervenes the non-enemy — as the Doctor (*1.d.17.q.2.§.De Secundo.*) notes.

One may say, with Aristotle (*7.Phys.T.17.*), that he divides habits explicitly into virtues and vices; therefore the division given above conflicts with the Stagirite. The reply is that by and large, habits that are not virtues are vices, since man by and large is either just or unjust. Yet speaking universally, between virtue and vice there is non-virtue. Or one may say that the said division of the Philosopher is valid — taking vice privatively — just as between an act that is good and an act that is bad positively and contrarily, there mediates an act that is bad privatively — as Scotus (*Quod.18.art.1.I. and K.*) maintains.

One may also doubt in the present case, as in the preceding, whether it is an essential and adequate division. I know that some — among whom Scotus is cited (*Quol.alleg. and 1.d.17.q.2.*) — consider it to be a distribution of the subject into its accidents, and one member to differ from the other by a certain relation. Yet nothing seems to prevent us from asserting that the said division is essential — as in the preceding one — since habit taken universally is an intermediate genus of quality (*3.d.34.q.vn.§.Notandum D.*), undergoing several intermediate divisions, among which this said division is found. Quality, whether supreme, intermediate, or lowest, essentially includes no relation and proportion to another, since it is essentially an absolute entity contradistinguished from relative entity. Again, a genus is essentially divided into its differentiae and species, as is plain in the Logic. And this partition of habit is a division of genus into its species — as can be seen in the Philosopher (*cap.de Qualitate*) and Scotus (*ubi supra*); therefore the said division is essential.

One may say, with Scotus (*just cited ante I.*), that circumstances are relations; and (*7.Phys.T.17. and 20.*): "Every virtue and vice is relative." This division is therefore had through a relation. I say that it does indeed designate a relation — just as science denotes a respect to the knowable; yet this does not prevent virtue from

being essentially a quality and belonging to the genus of absolutes. For it imports quality per se primarily and connotes a relation — as the Doctor (*1.d.17.q.2. ante S.*) maintains. The same can be said of health and beauty — of which in (*the Log.lib.3.q.7.art.3.*) I would say, however, that the opposite is not without probability — as can be seen in Scotus and Suarez (*there cited*), and its probability is shown and defended there by Gadius (*Quol.18.*) from the Doctor (*ibid. and coll.1.*). Moreover, this distribution is adequate. For every habit is either a virtue or a non-virtue, as has been established above.

Fourth, the division into speculative and practical is handed down by the Doctor (*3. just cited §.Ad istam q.B.*). For the human intellect is either perfected concerning what is speculative — of which the speculative habit is had, which is fourfold: Metaphysics, Physics, Mathematics, and Logic — of which treatment has been given in their own places; or concerning what is operable — of which the practical habit is had, which is bipartite: active and productive — of which I treat at length (*in Log.lib.1.q.2. and Tract.1.summae Theologicae q.6.disp.3.*). Whether this distribution is essential and sufficient is there carefully and exactly examined, (*in libs.q.4.art.6.*).

One may say that Theology is a habit of the intellect which is not, however, enumerated among those adduced above; therefore this partition is defective and insufficient. I say that we have enumerated natural habits acquired through the ministry of the senses — of which kind Theology is not. For it is supernatural and is not placed in the series of proper sciences — as I made plain (*in the Tract.mentioned*).

Article III. What Habit Is.

The definition of habit has already been given by us and explained (*in Log.lib.3.q.7.art.2.*) and touched upon by the Doctor (*1.d.3.part.3.q.1.*) in these words: habit is an adventitious quality difficult of removal from its subject. In this definition the genus is placed along with the differentia — which are required for an apt definition. Its genus is quality, which — from what has been said in the Epitome — is distributed into quality of soul and body, material and spiritual, cognitive and appetitive. That habit is a quality is plain from the very definition of quality adduced at the passage just cited — for by habit we are denominated such and such, and it resides in that category, as is seen with the eye there. Its differentia is adventitious — through which it differs from the remaining qualities, especially from the second species of quality, which is had from within and from nature. Below is subjoined difficult of removal from its subject — on account of disposition, which is easily removed from a subject, as is illustrated there with an example; and also on account of act, which quickly passes and flows, whereas habit remains and persists in the subject in which it is found. Under the definition given, infused habits can be comprehended — which are also adventitious, being infused by the author of nature into the souls of the Faithful. Others add — like Suarez (*cit.num.6.*) — to the said definition: per

se primarily ordered toward operation, and not providing the first faculty of operating but facilitating it. But these terms are not necessary if one defends — as the Doctor probably defends (*1.d.17.q.2.*) — that habit is not an active principle but only an inclining one. The remaining terms, moreover, do not adapt to infused habits, which, as Scholastics commonly hold, grant no promptitude or facility. Therefore that is not a true definition fitting both infused and acquired habits — which Suarez accommodates to them at number 8 — but fitting only acquired habits; and yet the common definition of both kinds of habit would still have to be advanced; otherwise it would be deficient, applying only to one species of it.

One may say that Aristotle (*2.Eth.5. and collected from cap.de qualitate and 7.Phys.cap.2.*), defining habit in the plural, says: "Habits are those by reason of which we are well or badly disposed with respect to the effects themselves." Therefore our definition conflicts with Aristotle, who defines habit differently. I reply that the Philosopher there does not describe every habit but a good or bad habit. For since habits are given that are neither good nor bad but indifferent, and since some habits are intellectual and others moral, we have therefore adduced a common and general definition of all habits. All the more so because that is rather a partition of moral habit into good or bad, into virtue or vice, than a definition — as is plain from the disjunctive particle or. Furthermore, given the definition of the genus of habit, the definitions of its species can conveniently and easily be investigated — and these will be plain from what is said below, especially the definition of the acquired habit, whose nature is better known to us than that of the infused; and the investigation of the latter is specially entrusted to Theologians.

Article IV. Whether the Intellect Is the Subject of Habits.

Most of the Thomistic school — among whom are Soncinas (*5.Met.q.9.*) and Arriaga (*disp.9.sect.2.subsect.1.*), from St. Thomas adduced in many places by Hurtado (*disp.16.de anima sect.2.*) — deny that in the intellect there are habits distinct from the intelligible species. The opposite, however, is defended by Scotus (*3.d.33.q.vn.§.Ad quest.H.*), Vorrlong (*ibid.*), Raconius (*disp.ult.de virtutibus, art.3.prop.3.*), and Suarez (*disp.44.Met.Sect.4.*), with whom agree Cajetan (*1.2.q.54.art.4.*) and Ferrara (*1.contra Gentes, cap.56.*) — affirming that the intellect is capable of habits distinct from the intelligible species.

It is to be noted, first, that the receptive subject of any accident can be twofold: one remote and mediate — commonly called the subject which — such as substance, which is called the subject which of quality, say whiteness; the other proximate and immediate — commonly called the subject by which — such as quantity, which is the proximate subject of whiteness, since whiteness immediately inheres in quantity itself. In the present and in the following articles, what is investigated is not the remote subject — which is the soul, or the animated body, or the whole composite of soul and body — but the proximate

subject, which is the intellective power — now at issue — or the rational appetitive power, or the sensitive one, or the locomotive, or any other — each of which is to be debated separately in the next articles.

It is to be noted, second, that the intelligible species — of which in the book on the soul — holds itself on the side of the intelligible object. For it is its vicarious similitude and natural image, effectively and partially concurring in producing the act of understanding. Hence it precedes the act of the intellect, since it is its cause; whereas habit follows upon the act, being caused by its repetition and frequency. And it is called a habit because it takes on the character of a permanent form, as the Doctor (*1.d.17.q.2.¶.Qui vult.Y.*) notes: "A species, when it has been rooted, can be called a habit." And (*2.d.3.q.10.¶.Ad q.F.*) he holds the same.

The first assertion is that habits of the intellect are not the species residing in it but facilities rooted in the intellect itself, following upon its acts. The Doctor holds this (*at the passages just cited*). It is proved, first: infused faith is subjected in the intellect, just as charity is in the will — as the Scotists and the other Scholastics affirm (*ibid.*) together with Scotus (*3.d.22.q.vn.¶.Ad quast.F.*). But no one maintains that faith is an intelligible species of God; otherwise through that species we could know God — which no one finds in himself, nor does Scotus attempt to show that such a species is given (*ubi supra*). Therefore habits are not the intelligible species received in the intellect. Second, from (*6.Eth.4.*) five habits of the intellect are enumerated — which are certainly not intelligible species, since these are incomplexes whereas those are complexes, or about complexes. And those precede habits as caused by them, while the latter follow as their effect follows its cause. Moreover, species partially cause acts, and acts cause habits — according to the celebrated saying: from frequently repeated acts, habit is formed. Habits therefore do not coincide with intelligible species.

Arriaga (*cit.subsect.2.*) replies, denying that species are not produced by acts. For he thinks the intension of habit is produced by the species. Against this: species — since they are preceding and numerically the same — cannot be caused by acts, which are subsequent; otherwise they would be caused twice — once by the objects and once by the acts — which is repugnant. Hence Scotus adds (*passim cited ¶.Aliter potest ante F.*): "If the object were not present through the species, habit would still stand — just as if the species could be deleted, science would stand." If therefore there can be a species without habit, surely the species is not the habit, and vice versa. Just as: if man can be without the irrational, surely man is not irrational, and vice versa. Furthermore, between species and habit an act mediates, because habit is caused through the act. Hence the Stagirite (*lib.de somno et vigilia, cap.1.*) adds: "Of whom is the act, of the same is the habit."

Therefore the species is not the immediate cause of the act but only the mediate cause — and hence habit does not coincide with species. Third, from (*1.d.17.q.2.¶.Tenendo sub R.*) we experience that one who is habituated differs from

one who is not, because the former acts more easily and promptly than the latter. But such ease and promptitude of acting, acquired through the frequency of acts, is not the species — because one has the species without that promptitude and facility of operating. Hence Aristotle (*at the beginning of the Ethics cited by Vorrlong, 3.d.37.concl.2.*) writes that virtues arise in us from nature and are perfected by habituation. Again, by nearly the same things each thing is generated and preserved. We observe that the moral virtues are preserved in us by habituation and habit — hence they are called moral, from custom, which is the same as habit, as the same Vorrlong notes (*ubi supra*) after (*Aristotle, 2.Eth.cap.1.*). But what is generated by acquisition and habituation is also abandoned and lost. Moreover, Arriaga (*cited*) himself grants that through supernaturally infused habits an acquired habit can be obtained — namely a facility of operating or eliciting supernatural acts; but such a facility is no intelligible species, as is plain. I add that a power lacking habit does not easily and with delight operate, as the Doctor argues (*in Reportat.1.d.17.q.1. §. Ad rationem dicitur.*). And after a few words he adds: a habitual power cannot operate as perfectly without habit as with habit — otherwise habit would be useless. But it is supposed that such a power has an intelligible species but not the habit. Therefore habit differs from intelligible species.

Arriaga replies (*ubi supra*), granting the hypothesis that it has the species but not so intense and perfect ones — hence it cannot operate so promptly and perfectly. Against this: even after acquiring and possessing species, the intellect still has not a little difficulty in understanding and judging about things proposed to it. But the use of the species and their facility is habit, not the species — whether clear or obscure, intensive or remiss. Hence what Arriaga accumulates in defense of his position collapses.

The second assertion is that the intellect is a fitting subject of habits. This is handed down by the Doctor (*at the passages cited above*) and deduced from the preceding, and is supported, first, by the testimony of Aristotle (*7.Eth.4.*) who places five habits in the intellect as in their subject. Second, by reason: just as moral habits are subjected in the will — as will be shown in the next article — so intellectual habits inhere in the intellect as in their subject. Third: every power that is indifferent and undetermined with active indetermination is determined through habits facilitating it toward acting — hence if it previously operates with difficulty, afterward through habit it operates easily. But the intellect is a power indifferent and undetermined with active indetermination toward knowing any knowable and intelligible objects whatsoever, as is plain from the agent intellect, whose function is to make everything (*3.Anima T.18.*). Therefore the intellect is an apt subject for receiving habits. This reason is touched upon by the Doctor (*3.d.33.q.vn. §. Ad rationem D.*).

Against this, one may object, first, that a power necessary and determined to operating does not need a habit: but the intellect is a power necessary and

determined to understanding; therefore beyond the species of objects it does not need a habit by which it understands them. The major is plain: a natural and necessary power, all requisites for acting having been posited, immediately and necessarily acts — as is plain from fire, which, given combustible material suitably approximated and disposed, necessarily burns, no habit being interposed. The minor is admitted: for the intellect is a natural and necessary power, which — having the species of objects and with no difficulty interposed — understands. Therefore no habit is necessary for it, inclining and necessitating it to understand those things. The consequence holds: there is no impediment to producing the acts of understanding of objects — neither on the part of the intellect, which of itself is sufficiently capable and disposed, nor on the part of the objects, which by their own nature are knowable and intelligible. Therefore no habit distinct from the intelligible species is necessary for the intellect.

I grant the major. I distinguish the minor: absolutely — I grant; the intellect is simply and by its own nature determined to understanding any intelligible object whatsoever: in a certain respect — that is, to operating easily and promptly — I deny; for in that sense it needs habit. To its proof I say this holds of a natural power not living — such as fire tends upward and earth downward, as Scotus (*cit. §. Ad 1. sub M.*) indicates — but not of a living power, which uses means for knowing objects, with respect to which, in order to operate more quickly and conveniently, habit is needed — as we experience in the sciences, in the use and exercise of which we are rendered more prompt and swift in producing scientific acts and in passing judgment on the same objects. To the consequence I say with the Doctor (*1. d. 17. q. 2. §. Qui vult. sub X. and coll. 7. §. secundum principale.*): although the intellect is disposed through the negation of the contrary, it is not however disposed through the ratio of a congruent disposition. An example illustrates this: wood of itself privatively is disposed — by the absence of the opposing disposition — to undergo heating; but positively it is disposed through a congruent disposition, which is dryness; hence dry wood is burned more quickly than green and moist and sodden wood.

Against this, one may object, second, that the intellect evidently and without any obstacle interposed understands first principles and assents to necessary propositions without any presupposed habit, and provides assent to dialectical propositions without the command of the will. Therefore no habit is necessary for the intellect. The consequence holds: there is no impediment to producing the acts of understanding of objects — either on the part of the intellect, which of itself is sufficiently capable and disposed, or on the part of the objects, which by their own nature are knowable and intelligible. Therefore no habit distinct from the intelligible species is necessary for the intellect.

I grant the antecedent and distinguish the consequence: absolutely — I grant; in a certain respect — I deny. For those who possess habit and exercise are

rendered quicker and more swift in their works than others who lack habit and exercise. For the principles must be perceived and applied — and the understanding of them is easier and more convenient for those furnished with the habit of principles than for those who lack it — as is especially evident in those who possess the habit of Logic. To the consequence I grant the major and deny the minor — as is plain from astronomers, who have the habit of observing the stars, and others who more quickly and easily behold them than others who lack that habit. Therefore the Doctor (*in 3. passim mentioned*) appears to deny habit only in inanimate things alone that are without cognition.

Article V. Whether Habits Reside in the Will.

Some, cited by Scotus (*3.d.33.q.vn. §. Hic dicitur.*) — among whom the Marginists cite St. Thomas (*3.d.alleg.q.4.art.2.*) and Aegidius (*Quol.4.q.18.*) — think that according to Aristotle and truth, moral habits reside in the sensitive part — except for justice, which from (*5.Eth.c.1. and 3. of the same work c.6.*) they locate in the intellectual part. And there are not lacking in this age certain moderns — whose names Arriaga (*disp.9.de anima.sect.3.subject.1.*) passes over — who consider the will to be without any habit. The common position, however, is that of Scotus (*cited §.Ad quast.H.*), Vorrlong (*ibid.conc.2.*), Orbellis, and the rest of the theologians and philosophers, whom Ockham (*3.q.10.*), Hurtado (*disp.16.de anima sect.3.*), and Suarez (*disp.44.Sect.1.*) follow — teaching that habits are subjected in the will.

It is to be noted from the Doctor (*at the passage mentioned §.Hac opinio.A.*) that Aristotle sometimes takes "persuadible by reason" for the will — and sometimes for the sensitive appetite, which is obedient to reason. For since the will is free, it is indeed persuadible by reason, but not obedient. The sensitive appetite, on the other hand — since it is not free — is therefore not persuadible but obedient to reason, for it is subject to the command of the will, as the sacred text (*Gen.4.*) intimates: "Your appetite will be subject to you, and you will have dominion over it." Similarly, rational is used in two ways: one way strictly — and in this sense it belongs only to the intellect, which alone reasons, understands, and discourses; another way broadly — and thus it belongs to the will, both because the will commands the intellect and can turn it away from the consideration of one object to the contemplation of another, and also because it is really identified with the intellect, which is first and simply rational. One may also call the sensitive appetite broadly and participatively rational, insofar as it obeys reason and the will — and in it virtue is improperly said to reside, as the same Doctor (*ubi supra in fine §.Ad quast.*) observes.

The assertion is that in the school of Aristotle and truth, the will is the capable subject of receiving habits. This assertion is divided into two parts. The first part is proved, first, from (*2.Eth.6.*): "Virtue is an elective habit" — but election is an act of the will (*6.Eth.3.*). And in that (*lib.de somno et vigilia.*): in that in which is the act, in that is the habit. The will therefore, according to Aristotle, is apt for

receiving habits. Second, from (*1.Pol.T.1.*): it is necessary that the ruler have virtue in order to rule rightly, and the one ruled more than the slave, so that the latter may rightly be subject to the former. Therefore in the intellectual part — in which the will presides and is eminent, as the mistress of the kingdom of the soul — reside the habits that are called moral. Third, the same Philosopher (*1.Eth.9.*), in seeking the definition of happiness, separates the sensitive part from the intellectual, and locates it in the rational part — especially in that which is persuasible by reason, which is the will, as I explained in the preceding observation. Augustine (*14.Civit.cap.5. and 6. and lib.de moribus Ecclesiae c.15.*), Avicenna (*9.Met.cap.ult.*), and St. Bonaventure (*3.d.33.art.1.q.3.*) affirm the same.

The second part is urged, first: the will receives infused habits — such as hope and charity; therefore also habits produced by art and acquired by labor, which are the moral virtues. The antecedent is the common position of Scholastics; the consequence holds, for they are of the same genus and predicament, as I observed above. Second, intellectual habits are in the intellect (*6.Eth.4.*); therefore moral habits inhere in the will. For the will is perfectible by habits, just as the intellect is. And it is likewise determinable and inclinable to operating well or badly, promptly and easily. Indeed it is more indifferent and undetermined to performing an act — since it is free — than the intellect, which is a natural power. If therefore the latter is not without habits, neither is the former stripped of them. Third, in that remains virtue and moral habit which is the principle of credit or discredit (*2.Eth.5.*). But the will is the origin and cause of praise or blame, merit or demerit. The will alone is free, in whose power it is to act well or badly; the other powers are natural and necessary: but in natural and necessary things we neither merit nor demerit. Fourth, habit was devised to facilitate the power — as the Doctor (*in Rep.3.d.33.q.1.*) notes — in its acts and works: and it is established that through the repetition of acts the will operates more quickly and easily than without their frequency. Finally, justice is located in the will by the adversaries; therefore the will is not to be exempted from other habits, since the same reasoning applies equally to each kind of habit — as the Doctor (*ubi supra*) wisely and acutely sets forth.

Against this, one may object, first, against the first part of the assertion: (*1.Eth.cit.*) the moral virtues are established in the irrational part, where the commentator says that part is the sensitive appetite — which mediates between the vegetative and the ratiocinating. And (*3.Eth.9.*): fortitude and temperance are located in the sensitive appetite. Therefore in the Peripatetic school, habits have no place in the will. The first consequence holds: the named virtues are in the irascible and concupiscible, which are adapted not to the will but to the sensitive appetite — for the arduous good and the delightful, as the object of the sensitive appetite. The second consequence holds: (*1.pol.3.*) reason dominates the inferior appetite with political dominion, to such a degree that the latter can resist it. Habits must therefore be placed there, so that it may operate easily and with delight according to the right dictate of reason.

I reply with Scotus, interpreting those testimonies: there are indeed habits in the sensitive appetite, but they are not virtues — except improperly and participatively. For (*2.Eth.6.*) virtue is defined as an elective habit, which belongs only to the will, as is indicated (*1.Eth. ad medium.*). To the first consequence it must be denied: for it was shown in the preceding that the irascible and concupiscible are adapted to both the sensitive and the intellectual appetite. To the second consequence this is true in the state of corrupt nature — which Aristotle alone recognized — but not in the state of established nature, in which through original justice the lower forces were subject to the higher, and the sensitive appetite obeyed the will and reason — and all agreed with one another concordantly.

Against this, one may object, second, against the second part of the assertion: if moral habit had its seat in the will, it would be nobler than prudence — since the nobler the perfectible, the nobler the perfection. But this consequence conflicts with Aristotle (*6.Eth.T.6.*). Therefore also the antecedent. The consequence holds: virtue is more perfect than the quality of silver, from which it is said to be more excellent (*as in the Ethics cited*). I grant the sequence of the antecedent. To its proof I say that prudence is nobler than the remaining habits in a certain respect — that is, in the ratio of directing and regulating — but not simply and absolutely, as the Doctor (*cit. §. Ad 1.M.*) maintains. To the consequence I say that this holds with respect to the divine good, not with respect to the remaining goods by which the will is also perfected. For just as the intellect is adorned with both divine and created habits — such as the arts and sciences — so the will is adorned with both infused and acquired habits.

Against this, one may object, third: supernatural acts do not produce supernatural acts facilitating the power toward producing similar acts; therefore neither do natural acts generate natural habits. The antecedent is clear in one who has only an infused habit, from which supernatural acts and habits do not appear to proceed. I reply that this argument — which militates both against us and against the adversaries — has no weight. For the infused habit differs from the acquired, because the latter facilitates the power in which it is, whereas the former does not. And acts of the acquired habit generate habit — which is denied to the infused habit — as will be shown abundantly in the following question.

Article VI. Whether Habits Inhere in the Sensitive Appetite.

Some, who dismiss habits from the will and from the sensitive appetite — which is natural and necessary — also remove habits from it, supported by this foundation: that since the will by its own nature is indifferent and undetermined, it need not be determined by habits; and since the sensitive appetite is a natural power determined to one thing, it does not appear to need habit — unless that appetite is regulated by reason and governed by the will, which is not the case for the appetite of a brute, but only for the appetite of a

man. These seem to be partially favored by Ockham (*Quol.2.q.16.*) and Gabriel (*3.d.23.q.1.art.3.*) — who hold that it cannot be sufficiently and evidently shown that habits reside in the sensitive appetite. The common position, however, is that of Scotus (*3.d.33.q.vii. §.Ad quast.Sub H. and §.Ad argumenta principalia ante N. and collat.6. in fine §.Ad quest.*), Ballus (*ibid.*), and others — who consistently and willingly defend that habits of any kind reside in the sensitive appetite.

It is to be noted that a power possessed of habit is called active and passive under different respects: it is called passive insofar as it receives in itself the habit — which is an accident of the genus of quality — and active because it is the cause and partial principle actively concurring in the production of acts, as will be plain in the next question.

The assertion is that the sensitive appetite is a fitting subject for receiving habits. So Scotus (*at the passages cited above*). It is proved, first, from (*1.Eth.cap.ult.*): the moral virtues are located in the irrational part, by which the commentator and other interpreters understand the sensitive appetite. And (*3.Eth.cap.9.*) it is subjoined that fortitude and temperance — which are habits — are located in the sensitive appetite, though they are not properly virtues except in a certain respect and less principally — as Ballus (*named*) asserts with Scotus. Second, the sensitive appetite indifferently regards appetible objects and is capable of being subjected to reason and amenable to the command of the will; it can therefore be habituated through the repetition of acts with respect to food and drink and any other appetible and pleasant object — as is plain from holy and just men devoted and habituated to fasting, abstinence from flesh, and similar practices. But such habituation and exercise is habit, as is plain from its description given in the present question, art.III. Therefore the sensitive appetite is the subject of habit. Third, habit is established to make apt and facilitate the power in which it resides, from what has been said above; but the sensitive appetite is facilitated and made apt through the frequency of acts concerning appetible, arduous, and difficult things to be borne and overcome — as is established from Religious men in the observance of the vows they have professed and in the acquisition of virtues, whose sensitive appetite at the beginning resists and opposes reason and the will; but afterward promptly and easily conforms itself and is regulated by moderating reason and obeys commanding will — to such a degree that it no longer inclines toward the opposite prohibited things. Habits are therefore subjected in the sensitive appetite.

As for the appetite of the brute, what will be said below will make this plain. The reasoning touched upon at the beginning of this article against this, is of no weight — since it is not because the appetite is determined toward appetible things, as the intellect is toward intelligibles, that it is capable of habit, but for other reasons adduced for proving the assertion given, especially because through the frequency and exercise of acts it is rendered easier and more prompt in operating.

Against this, one may object that all things we experience to be in us through the repetition of acts can in fact be produced without frequency of acts — through bodily qualities and through medical art. Therefore no habit is to be posited in the sensitive appetite. The antecedent is urged: every inclination toward gluttony and coition is induced through the generation or corruption of heat or cold; and through medical art concupiscence is diminished and one is disposed to sobriety and chastity. I deny the antecedent. To its proof I say that habit always assists and facilitates the power in which it is. For if there were two equally disposed and inclined toward appetible things through the said qualities, yet the one who possessed the habit would more quickly and conveniently tend toward them than the other who lacks habit — and therefore habit must be given in the sensitive appetite.

Article VII. Whether Habit Resides in the Body and Its Members.

Several — notably St. Thomas (*1.2.q.50.art.3.ad 3.*) and Almain (*3.d.23.q.2.*) — allege that the animated body and its members are not capable of habits, whom Suarez (*disp.44.Met.sect.2.n.3.*) follows. Scotus, however, (*3.d.33.q.vn.§.Ad 1.sub M.*), the Scotists (*ibid.*), and the Nominalists with their prince (*Quol.2.q.17. and 3.q.10. and 11.*), with whom Raconius (*disp.ult.de virtutibus q.1.art.3.*) subscribes, hold that habit resides in the body and its parts.

The assertion is that in the animated body and its members habit can be acquired. So the Doctor (*ubi supra and coll.6.§.secundum principale.*). This can be urged from Aristotle (*2.Eth.c.1. and 1.Magn.Mor.c.7.*), who denying habit to inanimate things seems — from the opposite — to grant it to animate things, namely those capable of being taught and instructed. Second, certain arts — called mechanical — are exercised by the members of the body: the art of playing the cithara by the hands, and the art of singing by the tongue; and by exercise the said members are more made apt, as experience attests. Since therefore habit is the facility and promptitude of acting, it follows that habit resides in the said members. Third, habit facilitates and makes apt those members that are moved — as is plain from painters and players, who by painting and playing are rendered more capable and prompt to paint and to play; but neglecting such exercise, they become slower and have more difficulty producing those works. I add that if someone has mastered the rules of an art but does not practice them, he does not possess the promptitude and facility of acting that constitutes habit. Habit is therefore aptly located in the members of the body.

Suarez replies (*loc.cit.*) that these things only prove that through the exercise of said acts, habit is acquired — not indeed in the body or its parts but in the faculties of the soul commanding and directing the motion of the body and its members. Against this: such facility remains in the body — say in the foot, or the hand, or other parts of the body — and although the said powers were present, unless the aptitude and facility were in those members, there would be

no habit in them. Moreover, such facility can be produced in the members even if it is not produced in the internal powers, because it is produced through acts that are transient and concern external matter. Furthermore, in brutes there is not the said directing of acts, yet in them habit is found — as I will show in the next article. For habit to exist, therefore, the direction of art need not intervene.

One may say, with Suarez (*cit.sect.2.num.4.*), that in the external instruments of art we sometimes experience that they become through use and exercise more apt to act — either because they are perfected with respect to shape, or because they are rendered more polished or soft: thus the members of the body by use can be made more fit for movement, either because the joints are relaxed or more contracted, or for some other reason. Similarly, the nutritive forces by custom become accustomed only to abstinence, because the qualities are remitted or parts of the body are desiccated and resist more. Against this: artificial instruments — since they are without soul — are not capable of habit, like any other inanimate things, as I said and forewarned from Aristotle. Therefore it is no wonder if, when polished and refined, they have nothing of habit. But if two men by their own nature are equally disposed in their bodily parts, and one of them has been furnished with habit, surely the one who possesses habit acts more easily and promptly than the other stripped of habit. Habit is therefore subjected in the bodily members. And what Suarez subjoins about the nutritive faculties openly conflicts with himself. For if by custom they become accustomed to abstinence, surely they become accustomed through habit — since habit and custom coincide, as will become known in the following article.

Against this, one may object, first, that the fitting subject of habit is that which alone is receptive of an immanent act — for since habit facilitates the power, it is received in it and resides in it; therefore neither the body nor its members are apt subjects of habit. I reply that the antecedent is insufficient. For the subject of habit receives not only immanent acts but also transient acts, and internal and external acts — through whose repetition and exercise the agent operates quickly and with delight.

Against this, one may object, second, that if habit is admitted in the members of the body, either this habit is received immediately in the local motive power — or not. Not the first, because that power would then not be active but passive. Nor the second, since that quality would not be a habit — since habit is in a power facilitating it toward acting. Therefore no habit is to be located in the body and its parts. I grant the major. To the minor I say that the motive power — as it receives the habit — is called passive; but as it produces acts, it is called active. Nothing prevents the same power from being called active and passive under different respects, as is plain from the intellect, which is called agent and patient (*3.de anima T.18.*).

Article VIII. Whether Habit Resides in Brutes.

Several Scholastics — to whom Suarez (*just cited Sect.3.*) and Arriaga (*disp.9.de anima sect.2.subsect.1.*) adhere — hold that brutes lack all habit and that every sense — both internal and external — is wholly unfit to be its subject. Scotus, however, (*3.d.33.q.vn. §.Ad 1.Sub M.*), Raconius (*disp.ult.de virtutibus q.1.art.3.*), and all the Scotists and Nominalists consistently and willingly defend that habit exists in brutes.

It is to be noted from Scotus (*just cited*), following Aristotle (*2.Eth.1.*), that in inanimate things no habit can be generated — because through the repetition of their acts they are not rendered more apt and easy than by the cessation of those acts: just as a stone, if it falls a hundred times downward, is not carried to the center more quickly through the first than through all the other descents. And if fire tends upward a hundred times, it is not elevated there more quickly and easily on the later occasions than on the first. But with animate things — capable of being taught and instructed — things go otherwise, as is plain from experience and the history of the elephant, lion, dog, and others.

The assertion is that brutes are distinguished by habit. The Doctor (*ubi supra*) hands this down, and it is urged, first, from Aristotle (*cited*) who excludes inanimate things from the participation of habit; therefore — from the opposite — since brutes are possessed of a soul, they can acquire habit for themselves. Second, the powers of brutes are determinable by habit, as is plain from the horse, which when first rounded with difficulty, afterward — after repeated circles — is easily driven in a circle; but such facility acquired through the repetition of acts is habit — and (*6.Eth.T.3.*): "In children and beasts, natural habits are implanted." And this can be illustrated by countless examples and experiences — especially of the elephant forming characters, as (*Athenaeus*) attests, and of the raven saluting Caesar, as (*Pliny*) records. Third, certain animals possess memory and are capable of experience (*1.Met.c.1.*) and also of facility of acting after they have been taught — as is plain from the dog, who carries in his mouth a handkerchief thrown by his master to that same master, when he has been instructed in carrying it several times; but such facility and promptitude is habit, as is plain from its notion and description. Augustine agrees (*1.83.qq.q.36.*): saying that the most ferocious wild beasts become tame and gentle through custom; but custom coincides with habit. Habit is therefore rightly established in brutes.

Suarez (*named above*) replies that this custom is not a habit inclining the power of the brute toward operating easily and with delight, but a phantasm — say a species representing in this or that manner more firmly and tenaciously inhering in the memory or phantasy. Against this: custom and habit sound the same — as Suarez himself noted from Augustine (*cited*) and Aristotle (*2.Mor.Eudem.cap.4.*). If therefore brutes have custom — as the same author grants — surely they are possessed of habit. Furthermore, species or phantasm is not custom but rather the cause of custom and habituation — as I said above

of the intelligible species, which is not habit but its partial cause. But a cause cannot be an effect with respect to the same thing. Moreover, Suarez himself (*sect.4.loc.cited*) argues against the Thomists who hold that the intellectual habit does not differ from the habit of the intellect; but the same thing would happen here — according to Suarez himself, who thinks that custom and facility of brutes in performing acts is intelligible species. Furthermore, (*sect.3. of that disputation, num.4.*) he wants to hold with the Thomists that the cogitative faculty of man, as well as the phantasy, is capable of habit; therefore so too is the cogitative of the brute — since they are of the same genus and ratio. Nor does it avail to say that the cogitative of man is directed by the intellect and commanded by the will. For that is extrinsic and does not make it capable of habit. For either the cogitative is precisely capable of habit or not; if not, then the cogitative of man is unfit to receive habit; if so, then so is the cogitative of the brute — which can likewise be directed by something extrinsic, namely by man through sensible signs, insofar as by habituation the brute has learned through the performance of such signs to obtain delight or avoid pain — as (*Richard, 3.d.33.q.1.art.1.ad 2.*) wisely hands down. Moreover, if the reasoning of Suarez who holds that habit is not to be posited in brutes — because every power of theirs is natural and determined to one thing — were valid, it would be retorted against himself: the intellect of man, his phantasy, and the other powers — with the exception of the will — are natural, necessary, and determined to one thing. But this notwithstanding, habit is posited in the intellect and in the cogitative of man; therefore it is also to be located in the cogitative of the brute and in the rest of its faculties — which are rendered more prompt and swift through habituation in operating.

Against this, one may object, first, that Averroes (*3.de anima com.18.*), defining habit, says: "Habit is that which we use when we will"; but brutes — since they lack will — cannot use habit when they will; therefore habit is not found in them. This is confirmed from Damascus (*2.fidei cap.22.*): "Brutes are not led but lead themselves"; therefore they obtain no habit. I reply that Averroes there speaks only of the moral habit pertaining to the will, the use of which remains in our freedom; not of the natural habit, the use of which sometimes does not remain in our power — as Paul (*Rom.7.*) agrees: "For what I would, that I do not." To the confirmation I say that testimony does not harm us. For even if brutes are led, they can nonetheless be made apt and facilitated in their acts. Hence Scotus (*1.d.17.q.2.§.Hanc viam.*) adds: "The sensitive appetite does not lead, because it does not have dominion over its action as does the free appetite, but is led — that is, determined to a certain operation by an agent."

Against this, one may object, second, that the powers of the brute — both external and internal — are necessarily determined to one thing by the objects themselves offered to them; therefore habit is not found in them. The consequence holds because habit inclines and determines the power to one thing. The antecedent is plain of the external senses — no one doubts whether

any habit is given in these, since it is clearer than light that they have no need of habit. Of the internal senses it is shown as follows: the object being present, there is no indifference in these senses but they are wholly directed toward it, in the same manner at the end as at the beginning — unless greater force is applied from without, as when a horse is spurred it runs faster. But if the object is absent and represented only through a species, the internal sense is determined to it — and through custom such a species adheres more firmly to it; therefore habit is not to be sought in it, since none can exist beyond the species residing in it, which — as has been said — do not participate in the proper ratio of habit.

I reply, distinguishing the antecedent: equally difficult or equally easily — I deny; more difficultly or more easily — I grant. For we see that a horse when first being tamed at the beginning only with difficulty moves and allows a taming rider; but afterward — through the frequency and exercise of acts — it easily moves at the direction of the rider and horseman. To what is subjoined about the external senses, one may say that in some perhaps there is habit — as is plain in Perspective and Astronomy. For an astronomer sees and observes the stars more clearly and distinctly because he has been exercised in them, than another who has looked at them once and is inexperienced in their study. And likewise in beholding images and other things — which are seen more conveniently and easily by one who has seen them many times than by another who has seen them only once. Of the internal senses the reply is more convenient: since the phantasy of the brute passes judgment on what is harmful and profitable to it — and we sometimes observe brutes, with no external impulse and spur, halting on a path and then proceeding. And if it should happen that the same beast traverses the same path where it previously halted, and does so afterward without any hesitation — even though before that place was a difficult passage for it — this occurs through habit, not through a species adhering to it more tenaciously.

Question II. On the Efficiency of Habit.

Article I. Whether Habit Is an Effective Principle of Acts.

The first position is that of Aureolus (*1.d.17.art.4.§.Restat. ergo.*), Durandus (*3.d.23.q.2.*), Vasquez (*1.2.disp.83.cap.2.*), and Hurtado (*d.16.de anima, sect.7.*) — who deny that habit effectively concurs in the production of an act. The second position is that of St. Thomas (*1.2.q.49.art.3.*), Cajetan (*ibid.*), Ockham (*Quol.3.q.20.*), and others — who affirm that habit flows effectively into the act. Scotus, however, (*1.d.17.q.2. and Coll.6.*) defends each of the two positions named as probable — but inclines more toward the second, as can be seen (*passim cited §.Ad solutionem huius quest.sub GG. and 4.d.49.q.2. §.Ad argumenta propè finem. and from 3.d.33.q.vn. §.Ad rationem.sub E. and in the Reportatio*). Vorrlong (*2.d.3.*), Viguerius, Lychetus, and others hold the same.

It is to be noted, first, that these three are ordered among themselves as follows: the object — or its species, which takes the place of the object; then the act, which is caused by the cognitive power and its object as by two partial causes constituting one total cause; and then habit, which is generated from repeated acts and flows actively into the subsequent acts. Although the species is sometimes called habit because it is permanent and rooted in the subject — as a habit is — it is nonetheless not properly a habit. For, as the Doctor (*2.d.3.q.10.§.Ad quest. ante G.*) notes, the species differs from habit. For one can have an intense habit and a remiss species — for example, if someone were of slow intellect and devoted to much study, he will have an intense habit and a remiss species; but if another were of sharp intellect and little devoted to study, he will enjoy a remiss habit and an intense species. Hence we experience that those slow of intellect arrive at greater learning than others of outstanding intellect who devote little time to study. The reason is that the former labor much and the latter little in acquiring learning — as Vorrlong (*ubi supra*) observes.

It is to be noted, second, from the Doctor (*1.d.17.q.2.§.Tertio modo. ante H.*) that habit is a partial cause — together with the power, which is the other partial cause — producing perfect and subsequent acts. For the power is indeed the total cause of the acts preceding the generation of habit; but the acquired habit and its power are two partial causes integrating and constituting one total cause producing at once the subsequent acts — just as the cognitive power and the object — or its species — are two partial causes constituting one total cause that produces the cognition of the object. Though between these there is some distinction: since the cognitive power without the object or its species cannot generate cognition; whereas the power absolutely — without any habit — can produce an act: namely the act that precedes habit and is itself the cause of habit.

It is to be noted, third, from the same (*ibid.*) that the power is the principal cause of the subsequent acts — by which the agent is said simply to be able to act — such as the intellect, by which man can understand, and the will, by which he can will; whereas habit is the less principal partial cause of those same acts. For habit is given not for acting absolutely but for acting easily and with delight. Hence it is not necessary simply but only in a certain respect — so that the agent may operate more easily and promptly. Moreover, the power uses the habit, not the reverse; and what uses another is principal — as is plain from the principal cause using an instrument. Furthermore, grant the opposite and it follows that there is no free cause — because since habit is a natural cause, if it were principal it would necessitate the free cause toward acting. Again, habit would be that by which the one who has it could first operate. And in what is ordered, the prior cause is more principal than the posterior — as is plain from God and the creature.

The assertion is that it is probable that habit concurs actively in the production of subsequent acts. Scotus holds this (*at the passages named above*). It is proved, first, from (6.*Eth.*6.): the practical habit is divided into active — such as prudence, described as an active habit with right reason — and productive — such as art, described as a productive habit with right reason. Hence the following argument can be formed: the prudent man is an agent, therefore prudence is active. Similarly, the craftsman is a producer, therefore art is productive. Hence Aristotle (2.*Phys.*T.28. and 5.*Met.*T.2.): art and craftsman belong to the same genus of efficient cause. Moreover, (3.*Eth.*6.): "Virtue is a habit by which a good man is made good."

One may say that prudence is called an active habit not because it is an active principle of its proper operations but because it directs moral actions; and art is called a productive habit not because it is the productive principle of its proper acts but because it directs transient operations concerning external matter. Against this: such direction is practical; therefore its principle is truly effective. The antecedent is plain — since from such direction craftsmen are denominated effective, not for any other reason than because they have a productive principle. Furthermore, the practical habit differs from the speculative in that the latter does not have an effective principle tending toward work — as I explained elsewhere when I treated of praxis — whereas the former possesses an effective principle, whether concerning manual things or otherwise.

Second, habit — from what was said in art.II. of the preceding question — is distributed into infused and acquired; but the infused habit is an active principle — for grace is the productive principle of the meritorious operation, and the light of glory is the active principle of the beatifying operation; therefore the acquired habit is also an active principle. The consequence holds because each is of the same subalternate genus of quality.

One may say that the infused habit does not act by its own force but only inclines the power toward acting — thus for meriting, grace is required so that the one who has grace is accepted by God, not so that grace brings anything about with him. Against this: besides the fact that this conflicts with the torrent of Scholastics who admit that the infused habit is truly active and infused by God into man so that with it he may actively concur, it contradicts Scripture — especially (1.*Cor.*15.): "Not I but the grace of God with me." And (*ibid.*): "The grace of God in me was not empty." (*James* 2.): "Faith without works is dead." And (*Heb.*10.): "The just man lives by faith." Moreover, everything that has an end has a principle of operating toward attaining that end — otherwise it would strive in vain to attain such an end; but the infused and acquired habit regards an end with a view to whose attainment they tend; therefore they possess proper operations concerning it — and hence every habit is productive and effective.

Third, form differs from matter principally in that form is an active principle whereas matter is a passive principle (*1.Phys.T.66.*). But habit is an absolute form — for it is of the genus of quality; therefore it is an active principle.

One may say that the substantial form is indeed an active principle, but not the accidental form — such as quantity, which is not of the genus of actives, as Averroes (*1.Phys.com.41.*) notes. Against this: quality is an active form, as is plain from the first and second species of the predicament of quality; but habit is of the first species of quality, as is plain in the Logic; therefore it is an active principle. Furthermore, that to which the effect is assimilated is its active principle; but the effect produced by the power together with habit is assimilated to the habit itself — as the grateful work is assimilated to charity, and the morally good work to the morally good habit; therefore habit is active.

Fourth, experience confirms that habituated men operate more than the non-habituated — as one who has the habit of Logic produces more and readier arguments than one who lacks it. But this comes from no other source than from habit — for it does not come from the power, which operates in the same manner if it is natural. Since therefore that effect depends on some cause, and this cause is not the power alone, it is plainly inferred that it comes from habit — together with the power concurring and cooperating.

One may say that this proceeds from the fact that habit inclines the power toward acting — just as gravity inclines the heavy toward the place below — not because habit is an active principle but only an inclining one. Similarly, because through habit all impediments are removed that can retard the power from work — and so the power itself operates promptly and readily. Against this: an agent of greater effort now than before — all other things being equal — has greater power, by which it produces a greater and more perfect effect. For that excess must flow from something — not from the inclination of habit, because inclination is not active, since it is of the genus of relation, and natural powers by their own nature are inclined — for example, the intellect is inclined toward understanding. Therefore from some active principle newly coming to it — which plainly is nothing other than habit. Nor is the power impeded from its work — since when the obstacle has been removed, we still experience that the habituated person operates more than the non-habituated. Moreover (*8.Phys.T.32. and 2.anima T.55.*): a man before science is in essential potency, and one who has science is in accidental potency. But what reduces from essential potency to accidental potency is an effective principle — because it is that by which the one who has it operates. Hence at the place last cited it is said: "As the soul is that by which we live, so science is that by which we know." But it is plain that the soul is the effective principle of its acts; therefore similarly habit is the cause of similar acts — from which it was produced. Finally, the moral habit is the active principle of moral acts — as justice, by which a just man operates

justly, and virtue, by which the one who has it is well disposed (*2.Eth.3.*); it is therefore concluded that habit cooperates in causing acts.

Against this, one may object, first, that a relation is not an active principle — since it is of the genus of sterile things; but habit is a relation (*7.Phys.T.17. and 5.Met.T.20.*); therefore habit does not actively concur in the production of acts. I grant the major and distinguish the minor: formally — I deny, because habit is quality, which is an absolute form; really — I grant; for just as science formally is an absolute being and designates a relation to the knowable, and just as a creature is an absolute entity and exhibits a relation to the creator, so habit formally signifies an absolute entity and connotes a relation to the power and also to the object about which the habit is.

Against this, one may object, second, that the power is the adequate principle of its acts; therefore habit is not necessary for the production of acts. The antecedent is plain: one power is a sufficient principle of those acts and does not require another power for producing the same — otherwise it would not be an adequate power. Habit is therefore uselessly admitted as another active principle concurring together with the power in producing those same acts. I distinguish the antecedent: absolutely — I grant; in a certain respect — that is, for easily and promptly eliciting acts — I deny. For habit avails and profits in that respect, and its usefulness and utility is seen therein.

One may press further: the power — without any cooperating with it — acts conveniently and readily: for in one instant it elicits an act. But what happens in a moment does not require facility and promptitude — which is expressed through habit; therefore habit is of no profit for the performance of acts. I deny the major. For although one admits that the power elicits one act in an instant, it does not elicit the remaining acts in the same way. Therefore habit conduces to their easy and delightful production.

Against this, one may object, third, that an accident is not an active principle in its proper subject — as whiteness does not act upon the wall in which it is subjected; but the act which is said to proceed from habit is often received in the power in which the habit resides; therefore it is not its active principle. I deny the major, which is not universally true — as is plain from the intelligible species, which partially causes the act of understanding, received in the same intellect in which the species inheres. Scotus, attending to this (*1.Met.q.6.*), explains that text of Aristotle (*l.de somno et vigilia, c.1.*): "Of whom is the potency, of the same is the act" — understanding "subjectively."

Against this, one may object, fourth, that things that differ in species cannot be equivocal causes of one another, because the equivocal cause is more perfect than its effect — since it contains it virtually and eminently. But the same thing with respect to the same cannot be more perfect and less perfect, more eminent and more depressed. But habit and act differ in species and are equivocal causes.

Therefore habit cannot be the effective principle of act, and vice versa. I distinguish the major: of total equivocal causes — I grant; of partial equivocal causes — such as habit is — I deny. As is plain from the intelligible species, which is a partial equivocal cause of the act of understanding, which is nobler and more excellent than it.

Article II. Whether a Habit Is the Active Principle of the Moral Character of an Act

Those who hold that the moral character of an act is an absolute entity caused by a habit assert that the habit is its efficient principle. The Doctor mentions these thinkers without naming them (*Collationes*, 6, §. *Secundum principale*), saying that some suppose the power to be the cause of the substance of an act and the habit to be the cause of its moral character. Those, however, who maintain that the moral character of an act is a relation of conformity or disconformity — a matter we treated in (*Book II, Question I, Article III*) — deny that a habit exercises an active influence on the moral character of an act by an influx distinct from the influx by which it concurs in the substance of the act. This is the position of the Doctor, to be cited below.

There is found in an act a twofold being: the being of nature and the being of conduct. The former is physical and absolute being — namely, a quality — whose efficient principle, if it precedes the habit, is the power alone; but if it follows upon the habit, we hold its active principle to be the power and the habit concurring together. The being of conduct, however, is that which follows upon the natural being of the act — that is, its physical being as either conformable or disconformable to the right dictate of reason. Hence a distinction may be drawn between the material being and the formal being of one and the same act, as the Doctor indicates (*Book I, dist. 17, q. 2, §. Ad arg. alia adducta ante Z*). The material being is the physical act, and is called the substance of the act; the formal being is conformity to right reason, or disconformity from it. For moral goodness is the integrity of all the due conditions and circumstances. The question now under examination is whether a habit concurs efficiently toward this moral being of the act, or not.

For moral goodness to exist, the right dictate of reason to which the act is conformed must precede it, as the measured precedes its measure and the regulated precedes its rule. Such a dictate, however, need not come from an intellectual habit — namely, from prudence — nor need the act conforming to the right dictate be elicited from a moral appetitive habit. For the right dictate precedes prudence, just as a cause precedes its effect, since through it the first degree of prudence is generated. Similarly, right election antecedes the moral habit, because through it moral virtue is generated in its first degree. Therefore, in the first act, reason dictates rightly without prudence, and the will chooses rightly in a moral sense without moral virtue. Prudence, however, once generated from the first act or from many other right acts of reason, inclines

more strongly toward eliciting similar dictates — that is, toward drawing the right conclusions of practical syllogisms concerning all the circumstances that are said to be present in the act to be elicited. Likewise, moral virtue, once generated after the first act, tends more readily toward producing acts similar to those from which it was generated than toward other acts.

What is generated by moral virtue is a certain quality whose essence, precisely speaking, does not include conformity to prudence, since it can be generated from similar acts of the same species without prudence — indeed, from erroneous reason, if such were present. This quality, however, which is generated from acts in general, is not a virtue by reason of being a quality. For it to be a virtue, conformity to prudence is required — or rather, its coexistence with prudence in the same agent to whom this habit is joined, as to a rule and prior cause. Although an act or that quality is of itself conformable to right reason, nevertheless such an act is not morally good in act unless it is actually conformed to right reason and to prudence coexisting in the same agent.

First Assertion. The moral goodness of an act does not have an efficient cause distinct from the cause that produces the substance of the act. So holds the Doctor (*ibid.*, §. *Quantum ad istum, sub P.*).

It is proved first: the moral character of an act is nothing other than a relation of conformity or disconformity, as is clear from the foregoing foundations. But for a relation, precisely as a relation, there is no proper cause distinct from the cause producing its extremes, since it arises from the positing of those extremes. Therefore, and so on.

Second: an act is not moral except through its habitude and conformity to the right dictate of reason, as I explained in the second note. If, therefore, a proper principle were given for the moral character of an act, it would be that relation of conformity; but a relation is not active, as I noted above. Therefore there is no proper principle of the moral character of an act distinct from the principle that produces its substance.

Second Assertion. Nor does a habit concur efficiently toward a moral act by an efficiency distinct from that by which it concurs toward its substance. So the Doctor teaches (*ibid.*).

It is proved in the same way as the preceding assertion, with the name of the act changed to that of the habit. For the moral character of a habit is a relation, just as the moral character of an act is a relation. Since, therefore, a relation is not properly produced but co-produced and emerges from the positing of its foundation and term — and since a relation is not an active principle — it follows that a habit acquires no efficiency distinct from that by which the substance of the act is caused. I add further: what gives being also gives what follows upon being, just as what produces the soul is also said to produce its powers and faculties. Likewise, what produces a corporeal substance is held to

produce also its quantity and the other accidents that follow upon it. In the same way, a habit that exercises efficient influence on the substance of an act exercises that influence also on its moral character, which follows from and accompanies the substance.

One may object first: virtue is that which perfects its possessor and renders his work good; but it does not render the work good through a passive principle, since it is not a receptive principle; therefore it does so through an active principle, and accordingly a habit is the active principle of the moral character of an act. Confirmation I, from (*Physics VII, 17; Topics V*): virtue is the disposition of a perfect thing toward what is best — not passively, since it is not a receptive principle; therefore it actively co-produces the moral character of the act. Confirmation II: the best stands to the best as the good stands to the good; but the principle of active production is best; therefore, since virtue most perfectly perfects its possessor, it follows that it is an active principle. I respond by expounding that testimony and drawing the distinction at the major: by an efficiency that is distinct, I deny; by the same efficiency that follows upon the substance of the act, I grant — as has been explained and proved above. The same distinction resolves the two foregoing confirmations.

One may object second, from the same (*Ethics II, 3*): virtue moderates the passions, not through a passive principle. For since an object is a natural cause, it produces effects to the ultimate extent of its power unless an obstacle is interposed; therefore, if virtue restrains the passion caused by the object, it follows that it is its sole principle. I distinguish the antecedent: virtue moderates a passion already present, I deny; one that is about to arise, I grant — insofar as it inclines the power, together with coexisting prudence, to shun immoderate pleasures that produce immoderate delight, not by diminishing pleasures already present but by forestalling those that could arise.

One may object third, from the same (*ibid., ch. 4*): one who does not have justice, even if able to perform just acts, cannot act justly; but moral goodness requires acting justly; therefore virtue is the active principle of the moral character of an act. I respond by interpreting the Philosopher and distinguishing the major: one who does not have the habit of justice cannot act justly absolutely speaking, I deny — for whoever elicits a first act of justice acts justly, even though he is not endowed with the habit of justice. In a qualified sense, I grant — that is, one who does not have the habit of justice does not perform just acts easily and with delight, as one who possesses the habit of justice does.

Article III. Whether a Habit Concurs Efficiently toward the Substance of an Act

Some thinkers — among whom Marsilius is numbered (*in Book I, dist. 17, q. 2, §. Ad 2. quaest. ante E*) and Henry (*Quodlibet IV, q. 10*) — hold that an infused habit produces the entire substance of a supernatural act, while an acquired habit

concurr only toward its ease. Others, such as Godfrey (*Quodlibet IX, q. 4, cited by the same authors ibid., §. Alio modo, ante G*), think that a habit concurs toward the mode or intensity of the act, but not toward its substance. The common opinion, however, is that of Scotus (*loc. cit., §. Quantum ad istum art., sub Q; and Book IV, dist. 49, q. 2, §. Ad argumenta FF*), Suárez (*Metaphysics, disp. 44, sect. 6, n. 8*), and others, who teach that a habit is the active principle of the substance of an act.

It is to be noted first, from the Doctor (*in Book I, loc. cit., G*), that the mode or intensity of an act is not an extrinsic accident of the act but an intrinsic degree of the act itself, so that an intrinsic degree is not one thing per accidens but one thing per se, just as an individual of a single species is one thing per se. Mode or degree is described as that which, when added to a thing, does not alter the thing. In this way, whiteness, whether of three or of four degrees, does not change in its essence but is intensified and perfected, because a quality admits of more and less. Hence mode or degree does not alter the nature of a thing — whether in divine things, such as infinity, or in created things, such as finitude. Difference, by contrast, does alter the essence of a thing, because it constitutes the thing in a determinate essential and quidditative being.

Assertion. A habit concurs not only toward ease and intensity but also toward the substance of an act. The assertion is threefold and is defended by the Doctor (*loc. cit.*).

The first part, found at the cited place at the beginning of question II, B, is evident: a habit is given for the purpose of facilitating the power in its operations. Hence stands that saying of Victorinus, cited by Vorrillon (*Book II, dist. 3*): "Nature makes one apt, art makes one easy, and practice makes one capable." And Aristotle (*Ethics II, 1*): habits bring delight in the affective faculty, ease in operation, and readiness and dispatch in the executive faculty, through the removal of obstacles. So to one who possesses a habit four conditions are attributed: (I) acting with delight; (II) acting easily; (III) acting with dispatch; and (IV) acting with readiness. Therefore a habit concurs toward the ease of an act.

The second part, which militates against Suárez (*loc. cit., sect. 6, n. 2*), is shown thus: whenever two partial causes concur simultaneously in producing a common effect, the production and perfection of that effect are attributed to both, as is clear in natural things. But the power and the habit concur partially in producing a perfect act, as I said in Article I of this question. Therefore the habit is the cause of the intensity of the act. Furthermore, when a cause that by itself alone produces an effect with less effort is joined by another assisting cause, the effect is produced with greater effort and rendered more perfect, as experience makes clear. Therefore, since the power alone does not produce an effect as intense and perfect as it does when the habit cooperates with it — as Suárez himself seems to suggest (*loc. cit., n. 6*), for a power with a habit can accomplish more than one without it — it follows that the habit co-produces the intensity of

the act. This is corroborated by that common saying, "United virtue is stronger" — an insight perhaps behind what Ecclesiastes says (4): "If two lie together, they warm each other; how can one alone keep warm?"

The third part is proved first: a cause that concurs toward the intensity of an act certainly concurs toward its substance as well, since, as I noted above, the degree of intensity is intrinsic and of the same character and species as the thing of which it is a degree. But the habit co-produces the intensity of the act, as even the authors of the opposing opinion concede. Therefore it also co-produces its substance. Second: if the habit caused only the intensity and the power caused the substance of the act, the act would be equally intense whether the power operates with lesser effort or with greater — just as a free power, which can operate intensely or weakly according to its own pleasure, produces equally intense acts. But the habit, being a natural cause, always operates necessarily and in the same way. Yet it is false that an act is equally intense whether the power operates with lesser or greater effort, as is evident and plain to everyone. Therefore, and so on. Third: if the habit were to supply intensity to an act, it would do so in some determinate degree — say, in the fifth degree. Suppose then a power more perfect than the habit, namely one of the sixth degree. This power, without a habit, would have a more intense act than a less perfect power with a habit. Therefore the substance and intensity of a perfect act are to be sought not from the habit alone nor from the power alone, but from both together.

One may object first, against the second part of the assertion: a habit is no more intense than the act from which it is generated, since an effect is not more perfect than its cause. Therefore a habit does not concur efficiently toward acts more intense than those from which it was produced, and accordingly the habit does not assist the power in producing more intense acts. I grant the antecedent and distinguish the consequent: by itself alone, I grant; together with the power, I deny. For although the habit alone cannot intensify an act, it can do so when joined with the power — just as one man who cannot drag a boat by himself can do so when joined with another.

One may object second: if the habit actively influences the substance of an act, then the habit is a power. The consequence holds because the principle of producing a thing as to its substance is a power, as the Doctor indicates (*Book III, dist. 34, q. un., ante §. His suppositis, sub H*). I grant the antecedent and deny the consequence, since, as Scotus notes (*Book I, loc. cit., §. Tertio modo, sub H*), a power is that by which its possessor can first operate and is the prior cause; a habit, by contrast, is that by which its possessor operates easily and is the posterior cause. For the power uses the habit, and not the reverse, and the power is more unlimited and universal than the habit.

One may object third: either the power and the habit are total causes or partial causes of an act. Not the former, because then one of them would be

superfluous. Not the latter, because the power is a sufficient cause for producing an act, as is clear in the case of the first act, which proceeds from the power alone. Therefore the habit cooperates in no way toward the substance of an act. I respond that they are partial causes of different orders and characters, concurring toward the same perfect act. Although the power would be simply sufficient for the production of an act, the habit is nonetheless given as another partial cause, so that the power may produce its acts easily and with delight.

Article IV. Toward Which Acts Does a Habit Exercise Influence

The acts of a power either precede or follow upon a habit, and are either similar or dissimilar, belonging to one power or to another. It is certain, however, that a habit does not concur efficiently toward first acts, because the posterior presupposes the prior and can supply no influx to it — just as an effect cannot give being to its cause, from which it itself received being. Since a habit is posterior to the prior acts from which it is generated, those acts share nothing of its being. This is affirmed by the Doctor (*Book I, dist. 17, q. 2, §. Tertio modo, ante H; and Book III, dist. 33, q. un., §. Ad quaest. H*).

It is likewise certain, in the common view, that a habit co-operates with the power toward acts that are posterior to the habit itself, since a cause precedes its effect and for that reason the habit is posterior to them. And a habit cooperates only with the power that it informs, since a habit is granted in order to assist the power in acting easily — just as the soul vivifies not any body whatsoever but only the body it informs. Furthermore, two partial causes concurring in producing a single common effect are united together so that they can produce that effect, as is clear in the case of matter and form, and of intellect and intelligible species. Now the power and the habit are two partial causes concurring simultaneously toward a perfect act, as I showed above. Moreover, habits must influence the production of acts similar to those from which they are generated, because the end of a habit is to confer strength on the power in which it resides. Since it is a necessary and natural cause, it cooperates accordingly toward those acts of the power that it informs. All the more so because a habit must be proportioned to the power it determines, and therefore a habit inclines a power toward acts similar to those from which it was generated. Furthermore, a habit is the less principal cause of an act, and the power uses it to cooperate with itself; therefore a habit operates only in the power in which it inheres.

It is equally certain that a habit does not cooperate toward all posterior acts of a power, but only toward acts similar to those from which it was generated. The first point is clear because there is not just one habit of a power but many habits, multiplied in proportion to the multiplicity of objects — so that the intellect is endowed with speculative and practical habits, and the will with moral habits. Again, someone may possess the habit of logic but not the habit of medicine. The reason is that a habit determines a power toward one thing, being a natural

cause. Therefore a habit does not concur toward all acts of the power in which it resides. The second point is also clear because a habit has no other power of acting beyond what it participates from the acts through which it was engendered. For a natural effect does not exceed the power of its cause; and the acts from which a habit is generated have only the power of producing acts similar to themselves, since they have a determinate and limited power. Therefore a habit is founded solely upon acts similar to itself. Moreover, habits are specified by the objects with which they are concerned — for instance, physics by the natural body, medicine by the curable body — and from those same objects they derive their unity, as was stated in my (*Logic, Book V, final question*). Therefore a habit produces only acts similar to those from which it was generated, as the Doctor confirms (*Book III, dist. 33, q. un., §. Ad argum. N; and dist. 34, q. un., §. Notandum ulterius, following Aristotle, Ethics II, end*).

On the third point, I maintain physically that one power does not cause an act in another power, and that the habit of one power does not cause a habit or act in another power. This follows from what has been said, since a power acquires a habit in order that the habit may assist it in operating easily and readily, and habits are diversified according to the diversity of powers. The habit of the intellectual power is one thing, the habit of the volitional power another, as the Doctor treats (*Book III, dist. 34, q. un., §. Ad istam quaest. B*). Therefore one power does not cause an act or habit in another power. Furthermore, for acts and habits to arise, the power and the habit must be simultaneously united, and the habit must inform that very power in which the habit inheres, as I showed above. Since, then, a habit does not inform any other power than the one in which it resides, it clearly follows that one power causes neither an act nor a habit in another power — except by way of direction, as the intellect shows the will what is to be done and what is to be omitted, and right reason dictates what is to be embraced and what avoided. Likewise, the will can command the intellect to consider this or that object and can divert it from speculation. It can also command the sensitive appetite to conform itself to the right dictate of reason and to abstain from forbidden foods during Lent. But this is not to act physically, only morally — as Suárez notes (*loc. cit., sect. 7, n. 3*) regarding certain moral philosophers who spoke in this way.

One may object first: Scotus (*Book III, dist. 33, q. un., §. Ad argumenta, ante N*) concedes a certain virtue in the sensitive appetite that can be caused only by the will, which is mistress of the powers, both higher and lower, as I said in (*the final question of Book I on the soul, on the will*). Therefore one power can cause an act and a habit in another power. I respond that in that passage Scotus is speaking of moral causality, not physical efficiency, which is what is at issue here. For there he posits a virtue in the sensitive appetite insofar as it conforms itself to the right will.

One may object second: fortitude and temperance are moral habits and are said to reside in the irascible and concupiscible appetites, and they bear upon the arduous good and the pleasurable good respectively; yet the same virtues are held by the Doctor (*loc. cit.*) to reside in the will. Therefore one and the same habit can produce an act in several faculties. I respond that the aforesaid virtues reside differently in the sensitive appetite and differently in the intellectual appetite. For in the sensitive appetite they reside improperly, insofar as the sensitive appetite is regulated according to the right dictate of reason and obeys the right will and acts according to its command. But properly they reside in the will, in which the irascible and concupiscible are also distinguished, as the Doctor writes (*Book III, dist. 34, q. un., §. Notandum, sub G*).

Article V. How Acts Concur toward the Generation of a Habit

Durandus (*Book III, dist. 33, q. 2*) holds that a habit is produced by the power, given the prior disposition of acts — that is, the habit naturally proceeds from the power, which however would not proceed at all unless the power were first disposed through acts. Others, such as Buridan (*Ethics II, q. 3*), hold that the power produces the habit through acts — that is, that acts are the path toward generating a habit. Scotus, however, (*Book I, dist. 3, q. 9, §. Ad I, ante P; and dist. 17, q. 2, §. Contra istam opinionem, ante L*), Vorrillon (*Book II, dist. 3*), Faber (*ibid., disp. 26, n. 32*), and Suárez (*Metaphysics, disp. 44, sect. 8, n. 6*) teach that acts are the efficient principle of a habit.

The cause of something can be twofold: remote or mediate, and proximate or immediate. For example, the proximate cause of an intellection is the intellect, while its remote and radical cause is the rational soul. So also in our matter: the proximate cause of a habit is acts; the remote cause is the power. This is not obscurely indicated by the Doctor (*loc. cit., Book I, dist. 17, q. 2, at the end of §. Tertio modo, H*), who says: "The power is the cause of the habit, at least through acts as intermediaries, and in no way the reverse." And (*Book II, dist. 42, q. un., §. Ad arg. D*): "From similar acts a similar habit is generated." For as he had said (*Book I, dist. 3, q. 8, §. Ad I, sub E*): "The formal effect is more assimilated to the lower proximate cause than to the remote and principal cause." Now it has been said above that the power is the primary cause and the habit the secondary cause of an act; and therefore, conversely, the immediate and proximate cause of the habit is acts.

Assertion. The efficient cause of a habit is not a disposition or a path toward causing a habit, but acts. The assertion is threefold and is defended by the Doctor (*loc. cit.*).

The first part, against Durandus, is shown thus. First: there is often no indisposition in a power toward the production of a habit — as is clear in the case of the intellect, which by its very nature is aptly disposed toward acquiring the habit of principles and of science, just as the heavens are rightly disposed to

receive the light of the sun. Therefore the efficient cause of a habit is not to be attributed to a disposition. Second: a natural cause that is rightly disposed and properly approximated to its object necessarily produces its effect — as is clear in the case of fire properly approximated to a combustible. But when a power is posited with every obstacle and indisposition removed, the habit is not thereby posited; yet when repeated acts are performed, a habit is acquired. Therefore the cause of a habit is not the aforesaid disposition.

The second part, which militates against Buridan, is proved thus. First: the action that is a path toward generating a habit belongs to the category of action, while the action that is the efficient cause of a habit belongs to the category of quality, as Scotus notes (*Book I, dist. 3, q. 9, toward the end*). Therefore the efficient cause of a habit is not the path toward producing a habit. Second: an action in the category of action has a term — for instance, the act of speaking has an intellection as its term, since through the act of speaking an intellection is produced, as I showed in (*the final question of Book I on the soul, on the intellect*). But an action in the category of quality has no term; rather, it is itself the term of the power (*Metaphysics IX, T. 16*). I add further that a habit is an absolute being, since it belongs to the category of quality; therefore it cannot proceed from a relation, which is a path toward an effect.

The third part is proved first from Aristotle (*Ethics II, 1*), who affirms and says that just as builders come to be by building and lute players by playing the lute, so by doing just acts men become just, by doing temperate acts temperate, and by doing courageous acts courageous. Scotus adds (*Book I, dist. 3, q. 9, at the end of Q*) another analogy: just as the light of the sun in a medium is the reason for generating heat there, so an act is the cause of a habit. Now it is clear that light is the efficient cause of heat; therefore an act is likewise the efficient principle of a habit. Second, from the common maxim of the philosophers: from frequently repeated acts a habit is generated — where the preposition "from" denotes efficient causality, as Vorrillon (recently cited) observes. This is confirmed by (*Romans XI*): "From him" — and (*Genesis XXV*): "Two young ones from your womb." Third: that to which an effect is assimilated is its efficient cause. But a habit is assimilated not to the power but to the acts from which it is generated, as Scotus testifies (*Book II, dist. 41, q. un., §. Ad arg. D; and Book III, dist. 33, q. un., §. Haec opinio, D; Ma.*) — and it is at hand that a cause strives to assimilate its effect to itself, as I said in (*Book I on causes*). This is clear also in the case of father and mother, to whom the son is similar.

One may object first, on behalf of Durandus, from (*Physics VII, ch. 3, T. 17*): there is no motion per se toward a habit; therefore a habit is not produced by acts. For if it were produced by acts, it would be an absolute form — like quantity, toward which, according to Aristotle, there is motion per se — and it would come about through an act or action. I respond by exposition and by distinguishing the antecedent: if "habit" is taken in the sense of the relation it designates — as when

science includes a relation to the knowable — I grant it; if it is taken as a quality and absolute form, I deny it, as I sufficiently explained in Article I of this question in the response to the first objection, and as the Doctor suggests (*Book I, dist. 17, q. 2, §. Hanc viam, S*).

One may object second, on behalf of the same, that a vicious habit is actively preserved by the will — for it is not preserved by an act that has already perished, nor by God who hates evil. Therefore it is preserved by the will, and consequently produced by it — which must be said of the other powers and habits as well. I grant the antecedent and deny the consequence. For air preserves light, which it does not produce. Likewise, the intellect preserves a species that it does not produce. Therefore, although a habit is preserved by a power, the power is not on that account its proximate cause.

One may object third, on behalf of Buridan: an active principle does not produce anything except through an action — just as fire does not heat except through the action of heating. But a habit does not produce an act through an action distinct from the act itself, because an act is an action, and there is no action of an action, nor a place of a place. Therefore the proximate cause of a habit is the path toward producing a habit. I respond that the argument works against action in the category of action, which is in no way the efficient cause of a habit — but not against action in the category of quality, which, along with Scotus (*loc. cit.*), we hold to be productive of a habit.

Article VI. Whether One Act Can Cause a Habit

The prior opinion is that of Durandus (*Book I, dist. 17, q. 8, ad 2*) and Hurtado (*De anima, disp. 16, sect. 5, §. 45*), who hold that a habit is produced by a single act. The posterior opinion is that of Scotus (*Book I, dist. 3, q. 6, §. Ad q., sub H; dist. 17, q. 2, §. Qui vult, sub Y; and Book III, dist. 33, q. un., §. Haec opinio, B; §. Ad rationem, E; §. Ad q.; and §. Ad I, I*), Vorrillon (*Book II, dist. 3*), Faber (*Book II, disp. 26, n. 32*), Racon (*final disp. on virtues, sect. 4, q. 2*), and Suárez (*Metaphysics, disp. 44, sect. 9, n. 12*), who teach that a habit is acquired from several acts.

It is to be noted first, recalling what was said in the (*Logic, question on quality*), that the first species of quality is given two names: disposition and habit, which, as was established there, differ accidentally — as the perfect from the imperfect, the inchoate from the consummated, the transient from the permanent, the weak from the firm — as I explained and proved at length in the passage now recalled. A disposition is easily removed from its subject; a habit is difficult to uproot from it. Ease or difficulty, brevity or length of time, do not make an essential difference, as is clear from (*Ethics I, ch. 6*), cited by the Doctor (*Book IV, dist. 49, q. 6, near the beginning, ante A*). Hence, although a disposition can be called a habit in an imperfect and inchoate sense, yet "habit" in its proper and common usage denotes a quality rooted in a subject, difficult to move, fixed and permanent, produced from repeated acts — as the Philosopher indicates in the

(chapter on quality), saying that a disposition becomes a habit through long duration.

It is to be noted second that a habit is intensified and perfected through many degrees, as I said elsewhere regarding the intensity of quality — so that through the first act of an agent operating in a power the first degree is acquired, through the second act the second degree, and so on in turn, in the manner I explained at the passage now cited and which the Doctor shows (*Book I, dist. 3, q. 7, §. Quidquid fit, ante Y*), and which Gabriel expresses distinctly (*Book III, dist. 23, q. 1, dub. 4*). For this reason certain thinkers are to be refuted who suppose that nothing is acquired in a power through the first act, but only through the last act by virtue of the preceding acts. For since the same reasoning applies to the first act as to the subsequent ones, it follows that just as nothing is acquired in the power through the prior act, so likewise nothing is acquired through the posterior acts — which those same authors do not concede. Therefore they ought not to admit the former either. Hence those who are zealous for virtue are said to advance from virtue to virtue, from degree to degree of greater perfection. For this reason theologians enumerate three states of those who strive for virtue: the beginners, who have not yet attained virtue; those making progress, who are advancing in its acquisition; and the perfect, who possess it in a perfect state. The last are said to have a perfect and consummated habit; the former have a disposition and imperfect habit. For this reason Aristotle (*Ethics VII, 7*) distinguishes the continent man from the temperate man — because the former, although he acts virtuously, still feels some difficulty, while the latter acts without difficulty, readily and with dispatch — as Scotus approves (*Book III, dist. 33, q. un., ante §. Ad rationem, B*).

Assertion. A habit absolutely speaking is acquired not through one but through several acts. So the Doctor holds (*loc. cit.*).

It is proved first from Aristotle (*Ethics I, 7, and Ethics II, ch. 1*), where the Philosopher, discussing both intellectual and moral habits, says that these are acquired by use, time, experience, and practice. He makes this clear (*Ethics I, loc. cit., ch. 8*) with this analogy: just as one swallow does not make a spring, nor one day, so neither does one act make a habit. Second, from the celebrated and common maxim of the philosophers, adduced by the Doctor (*Book I, dist. 17, q. 2, §. Qui vult, sub Y; and Book III, dist. 33, q. un., §. Haec opinio, B*): "From frequently repeated acts a habit is generated." And the reason is, as the Doctor argues (*at the last-cited place*), that a habit is placed in a power not merely so that the power may act through it, but also and principally so that it may operate easily and with delight. For someone can act rightly without an acquired habit — as is clear in the case of a man addicted to vices and habituated to them who has recently converted to the good. Such a man, although by the right dictate of reason he can act well, does not do so easily and readily but experiences difficulty. Third: if a habit were acquired through one act, one who possessed the habit would

undergo no difficulty or struggle in acting virtuously — the contrary of which is evident from experience. Third: if the entire habit were generated through one act, since one habit is opposed to another and they cannot coexist — as I said in (*Logic, Book V, final question*) — it would follow that the contrary habit is destroyed through one act, as the habit of lust would be destroyed through one act of chastity and continence. But that this is false, no one fails to see. Fourth: through one act a disposition is produced which, as Aristotle testifies (*at the end of the chapter on quality*), becomes a habit through practice. But if through such an act the entire habit were acquired, this would not be necessary; rather, as soon as there was a disposition, there would also be a habit. Furthermore, the habit would be a simple quality, and all of science would be acquired by us through a single demonstration — which I showed to be false in the (*Logic, at the place just cited*). Hence I am surprised at Suárez, who, while holding with the Thomists (*loc. cit., sect. 4, n. 15*) that the habit of science is acquired through one act, now teaches that a habit is not acquired except through a frequent repetition of acts. For if science, which is a habit, is produced by a single act, then a habit absolutely and simply speaking is also acquired through one act — which the same Suárez denies.

One may object second: if a habit is not generated by one act, then neither is it generated by many acts. For the same reasoning seems to apply to one as to many. If the first act does not cause a habit, neither does the second, and so on through the rest, since they are of the same character and concur successively in producing a habit. I deny the consequence, as is clear from the example of someone cutting wood: he does not cut the wood with one blow, but with many. I add that often-cited saying: "A drop hollows the stone not twice but by falling often."

One may object second: a very intensely exerted act has as much force as many weakly exerted acts have together — as is clear from experience in the case of someone cutting wood with an intense blow, which he could not have achieved with many weak blows. But weak acts cause a habit; therefore the single act that equals them also causes a habit. I respond that a habit is most often caused through a frequency of acts; but it cannot be denied that at times a very intense act produces a habit, as may be seen in the Doctor (*Book III, dist. 33, q. un., §. Ad q., H; dist. 36, q. un., §. Licet, infra K; Book I, dist. 3, q. 9, at the end of Q; and Book IV, dist. 49, q. 9*).

One may ask first, whether there is mutual causality between an act and a habit. I respond affirmatively. For as is clear from what has been said, prior acts cause the habit; then the habit concurs partially in causing posterior acts — just as vapors drawn by the power of the sun into the middle region of the air become drops of rain, and subsequently rain is the cause of vapors: not the same vapors numerically, but specifically.

One may ask second, whether acts and habits are of the same species. I respond negatively, with Scotus (*Book I, dist. 17, q. 2, §. Tertio modo, H; and §. Contra istam, K*). For an act is vital, whereas a habit is not; and there can be an act without a habit, and conversely, as is clear in the case of a sleeping person. Again, an act is the term of a power (*Metaphysics IX, T. 16*), whereas a habit is not.

One might say: both acts and habits are species of the first genus of quality, as can be seen from its enumeration given in the Logic; therefore they are of the same species. I say that they are of the same subalternate species, but not of the same lowest species, which is what the objection concerns.

Article VII. Whether an Act Is More Perfect Than a Habit

Alemán (*part II, q. 96, m. 2*) and others hold that a habit is nobler than an act. Scotus, however, (*Book IV, dist. 49, q. 1 and 2, §. Ad arg. GG*) and many others hold that an act is more excellent and eminent than a habit — which Suárez candidly acknowledges is more probable with respect to acquired habits (*loc. cit., sect. 8, n. 20*).

It is to be noted that a habit and an act can be regarded in two ways. In one way, as causes: in this regard, an act, which is the cause of a habit, surpasses in nobility the habit produced by that act; and conversely, a habit is nobler than the act caused by the habit. Although one might say that a habit is only a partial cause of an act, which is not wont to surpass in nobility the effect produced by it — as is clear in the case of the intelligible species, which although it is a partial cause of an intellection, is nonetheless subordinate to the intellection itself. In the other way, they may be regarded as entities — and in this sense the present question debates whether an act excels a habit in nobility.

Assertion. An act is simply more excellent than a habit, whether acquired or infused. The assertion is twofold and is defended by the Doctor (*loc. cit.*).

The first part, concerning an acquired habit, is proved by the Doctor (*loc. cit., q. 1*), arguing against the opposing view: first, from (*Ethics I, ch. 8 and 9 and following*), where the Philosopher places happiness in the best and ultimate act. The same is read in (*Ethics X, 10*). It is gathered also from (*Metaphysics IX, ch. 7, and book XII, ch. 6*), where the Stagirite, speaking of God, says: "If he does not understand, what will be distinguished and venerable in him? He would be like one asleep." And he holds this expressly in (*Magna Moralia I, ch. 18*). Augustine favors this view (*On Christian Doctrine I, ch. 6*), placing beatitude in the act of enjoyment. Second: a vital act excels what is not vital, just as the animate is ranked above every inanimate thing, as has been said elsewhere. But the act of a vital power is vital, whereas a habit is not at all. Therefore the former excels the latter. Third: an act is the total cause of a habit, but not the reverse; for a habit is only a partial and less principal cause. Now it is clear that a total cause is more eminent than a partial and less principal cause. Therefore, and so on. Fourth: the ultimate formal end of something is nobler than those things directed

toward its attainment, since an end is superior to the means to the end, as I said in the (*question on the final cause*). But the most perfect beatific act is the ultimate formal end of a beatifiable creature, as is clear from the authorities cited above. A habit, however, exists for the sake of the attainment of such an end, since a habit exists for the sake of a perfect act — for a power informed by a habit produces a more intense and excellent act than it would if deprived of a habit, as the Doctor writes (*in Book I, loc. cit., §. Concedo, I*). Finally, an act proceeds from a nobler principle — namely, the power.

The second part, concerning an infused habit, is shown in the same way. For the authorities cited above and the reasons adduced clearly demonstrate the same thing, even though Suárez (*loc. cit.*) on infused habits is unwilling to affirm this openly.

One may object first: a good that is lasting and permanent is better and more perfect than a good that is instantaneous and fleeting. But a habit is permanent and lasting, being difficult to move; whereas an act quickly passes and immediately flows away. Therefore an act is inferior to a habit. The major is supported by (*Aristotle, Topics III, ch. 1*). Confirmation: a habit is the equivocal cause of an act — not univocal — and such a cause is more excellent, since it contains its effect virtually and eminently. Therefore a habit excels an act. I expose and distinguish the major: in terms of simple and absolute nobility, I deny it; in a qualified sense, I grant it. Hence Aristotle (*Ethics I, 6*) goes on to say that a white thing of one day is equally as perfect as a white thing of one year — for duration, whether greater or lesser, is accidental to those things, as Scotus explains (*Book IV, dist. 49, q. 6, §. Hic duo*). To the confirmation I say that this would conclude regarding a total equivocal cause, not a partial and less principal one — which is what a habit is with respect to an act, as Scotus notes (*in Book I, loc. cit., §. Contra, sub H; and in Book IV, loc. cit., q. 2, GG*).

One may object second: infused habits are created by God and infused into the rational soul, while acts proceed from the faithful human being. But it is nobler to come immediately from God than from a creature. Therefore at least infused habits surpass acts in dignity. I respond that the argument concludes only to a qualified nobility, not a simple one — as is clear from the case of a composite substance, which is produced by a creature and yet simply excels any accident produced immediately by God.

Article VIII. How a Habit Is Perfected Through Acts

It is certain among philosophers that a habit is perfected by the acts from which it is produced. For just as it is generated through acts, so through those same acts it is perfected, as the Doctor teaches (*from Ethics II, 2*) in (*Book II, dist. 3, q. 1; and in the Reportatio, Book I, dist. 17, q. 3*). Since it is a quality that can be perfected and intensified, it tends from the imperfect toward perfect and consummated being. This being presupposed as true and demonstrated in (*Book on Intension*

and Remission), the present inquiry is whether a habit is perfected and intensified through all acts, or only through more perfect ones.

Thomas (*Summa I-II*, q. 52, art. 7; *II-II*, q. 24, art. 5 and 6) and his disciples hold that a habit is not intensified through a remiss and equally intense act, but only through a more intense act. Scotus, however, (*Book I*, dist. 17, q. 2; *and more expressly in the Reportatio*, same distinction, q. 6), Durandus (*ibid.*, q. 8), and Gabriel (*Book III*, dist. 23, q. 1, dub. 4) affirm that a habit is intensified and perfected through every act, whether intense or remiss.

It is to be noted, recalling what was said at the cited place, that intensification is achieved through the addition of degree to degree. Degrees, moreover, are of the same species and character, from which a unity arises — the unity of homogeneity, as will be clear in the following article. It is also to be recalled from that same passage that there is a twofold augmentation: intensive and extensive. With these points presupposed and recalled:

First Assertion. A habit is intensified through more intense and more perfect acts. This is the common opinion among scholastics. It is proved first: what is capable of being perfected is perfected by a greater perfection suited to it — as the luminous is perfected by greater light, and the blessed by greater glory. But a habit is capable of being perfected and intensified, as none deny, and a more intense act is its greater perfection. Therefore through a more intense act a habit is perfected. Second: what tends from the imperfect to the perfect is first perfected by a lesser perfection, and afterwards by a greater — as daily experience shows. But a habit progresses from the imperfect to the perfect — namely, from the state of disposition to the state of habit, as is clear from what has been said. Third: a thing receives its perfection from the same source from which it receives its being, because perfection follows upon the thing whose perfection it is — just as a mode follows upon the modified thing and a degree follows upon the graduated thing. But a habit receives its being from acts, as was proved above. Therefore it also draws its perfection from the same source, and principally from more intense acts, which are more perfect. Therefore a habit is perfected through more intense acts.

Second Assertion. A habit is perfected through every act, whether remiss or equally intense. So Scotus (*loc. cit.*) holds. It is proved first from (*Physics VIII*, T. 80): a power that is in a greater magnitude is greater and has greater efficacy. For if two fires are brought near a combustible, they burn it more quickly than one fire alone; and if the power of both were in one, it would be stronger and more efficacious than if distributed between two. In the same way, therefore, several equal or unequal and remiss degrees of the same order and character intensify and perfect the same habit. Second, Augustine (*On the Trinity XII*, ch. 6) seems to argue thus: every form and specific ratio is more perfect in several individuals than in one, because it is in them by participation — so that if the aforesaid ratio of one individual were in another, it would be more perfect. In the divine things,

however, since the divine nature is wholly and entirely in all and each of the Persons without division, being infinite, there is no specific difference among them. Therefore, likewise, several degrees even if remiss intensify a habit. The consequence is proved by two examples: one of two equal or remiss lights, or one more intense than the other — if placed together in the same hall, they illuminate and clarify it more, because they are intensified. The other example is of two gravities: if they are in the same weight, it is clear that the weight weighs and is heavier for no other reason than that they intensify each other in the same subject — just as water added to water, and earth added to earth, whether more or less, always increases that to which something is superadded. Therefore, if any act is performed by the same power with respect to the same habit, whether intense or remiss, it intensifies and perfects the habit. Furthermore, every perfection perfects its perfectible, just as every form perfects matter. And the degree caused by an act is some perfection of the habit. Again, degrees are of the same species; therefore if one act intensifies a habit, another act also in its own way intensifies the same habit. For if heat heats, then every heat, whether great or small, heats in its own way. In the same manner, every degree of whatever kind perfects a habit. Add the evidence of experience: if someone exercises himself in some art with remiss acts, he will become more skilled and ready than another who does not exercise himself in the same art with such acts — and this can arise from nowhere other than the intensification produced in the habit through such acts.

One may say, with Suárez (*loc. cit.*, *sect. 10, n. 11*), that this arises from a disposition that one act has and another does not. Against this: a disposition does not intensify a habit — since even according to Suárez intensification occurs through the addition of degree to degree. But a person becomes more ready and disposed to act through the use and exercise of several similar acts. Therefore it is not through a disposition but through intensification that a person becomes more ready and disposed to operate. Furthermore, God augments grace in those who merit and act well — both through intense acts and through remiss acts. For to every good work grace is due. If, therefore, through a greater or lesser good act the habit of grace always grows, the same must be affirmed of acquired habits, since each is augmented through the addition of degree to degree, as Suárez himself also admits (*loc. cit.*).

One may object first: action proceeds from a proportion of greater inequality — that is, the power of the agent is always greater than that of the patient. But if a habit were intensified through equal or remiss acts, this would not be true. Therefore a habit is not intensified and perfected through just any acts. I distinguish the major: concerning a destructive action of a contrary upon its contrary, I grant it — for fire to act on water, it must be stronger and more powerful than the water, as I said in (*Book on Action*). Concerning a perfective action, I deny it. For light is augmented even when the light added to it is more remiss than the preceding light.

One may object second: an equal does not act upon an equal, nor a remiss upon an intense; for action proceeds from the victory the agent has over the patient, and there is no proportion of a remiss agent upon an intense one. Therefore a habit is not augmented through equal or remiss acts. I distinguish the antecedent: concerning perfective action, I deny it; concerning depletive and destructive action, I grant it — as has been sufficiently illustrated in the case of light and similar things, which if added to equal or more intense things are themselves thereby intensified and perfected.

Article IX. Whether a Habit Coalesced from Several Degrees Is One

This difficulty has no place among the Thomists, who hold a habit to be a simple quality; but it does arise among the Scotists and Nominalists, who teach that a habit is a composite quality coalescing from many similar degrees. All agree, however, that a habit is one, since it is one species of quality, and every species enjoys its own proper unity. The question is how, given that a habit participates in perfective degrees, all those degrees existing in the habit can make one habit.

It is to be noted and recalled from (*Physics, Book II, q. 5, art. 1*) that a thing can be one in many ways: (I) by unity of aggregation, as a heap of stones; (II) by unity of order, as an army; (III) by unity per accidens, as white wood; (IV) by unity of real identity, as a nature and its property; (V) by unity of composition, as a physical body; (VI) by unity of similar parts — in which sense a continuous quantity is one by the unity of parts of the same character. And a habit is one by homogeneous and gradual unity.

Assertion. A habit is one by homogeneous and gradual unity. So Scotus holds (*Reportatio, Book I, dist. 17, q. 6, dub. 2*). It is proved first: just as a continuous quantity having parts of the same character is one by the unity of continuity or homogeneity, and a material substance having entitative parts is one by homogeneous unity — as I taught with Scotus in (*Book on Quantity*) — so a habit having several degrees is one by homogeneous and gradual unity. Second: a whole body of water gathered in one place is said to be one by homogeneous unity, and a homogeneous body is called one by singular and homogeneous unity. Therefore, by the same reasoning, a habit compacted from several degrees is one by homogeneous and gradual unity.

One may object first: from two things a composite one is not constituted unless one stands as potency and the other as act (*Metaphysics VII, T. 2*). But this is physical composition from matter and form, which is said to be one by unity of composition — and such is not the union of degrees in a habit. Therefore a habit composed from degrees is not one. I distinguish the major: concerning unity of composition, I grant it; concerning homogeneous and gradual unity, such as is the unity of a habit, I deny it.

One may object second: the first degree of a habit is less perfect and stands in potency with respect to the second degree, which is more perfect and stands as

act with respect to the first. Therefore in a habit there is the unity of physical composition. I deny the antecedent: all degrees of a habit are of the same character, just like all parts of a continuous quantity. Therefore they possess not a unity of composition — whose parts are of different character — but a homogeneous and homogeneal unity.

Article X. Whether and How a Habit Is Corrupted

Experience teaches that a habit can be diminished, corrupted, and lost — and reason confirms it. Experience does so in the case of some who, through forgetfulness or some other cause to be assigned below, have lost the habit of an art or science with which they were endowed — notably Albert the Great, whom common report says had lost the habits of the arts and sciences before his death. Reason confirms it because what can be augmented can also be diminished, and what is capable of intensification is also capable of remission and loss — as is the case with a habit. For I said above that a habit is intensified through acts; consequently it is remitted and lost through the cessation of acts or through some other cause to be given presently. Scholastics debate and inquire what the corrupting and destructive cause of habits may be.

It is to be noted first that this difficulty is not raised concerning infused habits, which, since they are produced through creation, are not properly corruptible but only annihilable. For what can be created can likewise be annihilated, as the Doctor notes (*in the Reportatio, Book I, dist. 17, q. 7, §. Dico ad q.*). Such habits are said to be corrupted by us in a demeritorious way, as the same Doctor testifies (*Book II, dist. 35, §. Ex ista solutione, ad 2*). But this discussion concerns acquired habits, which are both generated and corrupted within us. Their generation is called a positive and acquisitive movement, while their corruption is called a privative and depletive movement, as is evident in (*Physics, Book on Motion; and Book on Generation and Corruption*). Furthermore, note that the subject of a habit is either corporeal and corruptible — in which case, when it is corrupted, the habit is corrupted along with it, according to that common saying: "When the subject is corrupted, all things in the subject are corrupted"; or it is incorporeal and incorruptible — in which case, from the side of the subject itself, the habit is not corruptible. Nor is it corruptible from the side of its formal cause, which is the habit itself, since a habit is a permanent quality. Nor is it corruptible from the side of its conserving cause, since it does not require a continuous influx from its efficient cause — for it depends on that cause in its becoming, but not in its being, given that it is permanent and rooted in its subject.

It is to be noted second, recalling from (*Book on Causes, q. 1*), that there are two kinds of cause: per se and per accidens, or positive and privative cause. A positive corruptive cause is one that applies force to something and destroys it — as great heat destroys small cold. A privative corruptive cause is one by whose absence or non-operation something perishes — as by the absence of a helmsman a ship is wrecked, and through non-exercise of an art the art is lost.

Tatarets (*Book on Length and Brevity of Life, sub 3*) gives four ways in which something can be corrupted: (I) by its contrary, as heat by cold; (II) through the corruption of its subject — as Aristotle says in the work just cited, ch. 2: "When animals are destroyed, both science and health, which reside in animals, are destroyed"; (III) through the corruption of what conserves it — as light is extinguished when the luminous body is destroyed; (IV) through the corruption of its natural and fitting disposition — as when heat and dryness are removed, fire is destroyed. Or through the approach of what is opposite — as science is corrupted by the advent of error.

First Assertion. The cessation of acts is not a per se cause of the corruption of a habit but a per accidens cause. The assertion contains two parts. The first part is proved first from (*Ethics I, ch. 5*): sleeping persons possess the same habits that they have when awake; yet when they sleep they cease from the acts of those habits. Therefore the cessation of acts is not a per se cause of the corruption of habits.

Nor does it avail to say that brief cessation does not remove the habit, while prolonged cessation does — as iron does not immediately corrode, but only after a long interval of time. For this is said gratuitously, since time is not per se a cause of corruption, as I showed in its proper place, but only per accidens. All the more so because a habit does not depend on acts in its being, but only in its becoming — otherwise, one who possesses a habit would necessarily always be acting and producing acts, which is false. This is like a house, which does not decay or wear away from the builder, even if the builder is absent, especially if the house does not depend on a bodily organ or faculty, nor is it assailed by contraries. Second: a positive effect does not depend on a privative cause in its being, nor is it corrupted by such a cause. For a corrupting cause must positively influence the effect to be corrupted, if it is per se permanent and difficult to remove. But the cessation of acts is a privative cause, as Aristotle indicates (*Ethics II, 3, and ibid. book III, 5*): to cease from acts is not to act and not to exercise influence. Third: for a contrary habit to be introduced into a subject, the habit previously existing must be expelled. But it cannot be expelled except through a positive action — as is clear from the case of heat expelling cold from the same subject.

The second part is proved first from Aristotle (*On the Length and Brevity of Life, ch. 2*), who affirms that science is corrupted through forgetfulness. Augustine writes the same (*On the Immortality of the Soul, ch. 4*). This is to be understood per accidens — that is, because a man forgets the middle term of a demonstration by not exercising himself in the science he possesses, and therefore sometimes lapses into error, which destroys science. Second, experience confirms that a habit is lost through idleness and non-exercise. But this deficiency or cessation from acts is not a per se cause, as I showed in the first part; therefore it is a per accidens cause, since a cause is sufficiently divided into per se and per accidens,

as I noted in (*Book on Causes*). Moreover, the corruption of a habit can sometimes arise from ill health of the body — as Sabellicus relates that Messala Corvinus, the orator, through a severe illness forgot even the names of his slaves and his own name. Or from injury to an organ — as Valerius Maximus reports that a certain philosopher, struck by a stone, lost the memory of letters. See what I said in (*Logic, Book V, final question*).

Second Assertion. The per se efficient corruptive cause of a habit is opposing and contrary acts; the formal corruptive cause is the contrary habit. The assertion is divided into two parts and is defended by the Doctor (*Book III, dist. 36, q. un., §. Per hoc, sub C*).

The first part is proved first: a habit is generated from similar acts; therefore it is corrupted by contrary acts. The antecedent was proved above, for the efficient cause of a habit is acts of the same character, repeated. The consequence holds from opposites — just as heat makes and conserves heat, so if it is stronger it expels from the same subject and corrupts cold, which is contrary to it. Second: contraries mutually expel each other from the same subject, from Aristotle (*in the chapter on opposites*). Therefore opposing and contrary acts expel the opposing habit from the subject into which they strive to introduce the contrary habit. The consequence holds because two contraries in the extreme cannot coexist in the same subject simultaneously.

The second part is proved first: two forms opposed to each other are impossible in the same subject — as the form of fire and the form of water in the same matter. But habits are accidental forms. Therefore they formally expel each other from the same subject. Second: an active principle acts through acts as intermediaries — as fire heats through heat and the act of heating. But a habit is a partial active principle of similar acts, as was established above. Therefore one opposing habit formally excludes another, by itself, and efficiently through dissimilar and contrary acts. Thus virtue expels vice, and science expels error, as the Philosopher just cited affirms.

Third Assertion. Remiss opposing acts cannot corrupt the entire opposing habit. This is deduced from the Doctor (*Book III, dist. 33, q. un., §. Haec opinio, B*). It is proved first: a weaker and feebler cause cannot overcome a stronger and more powerful cause, as is plain to all. But remiss opposing acts are a weaker and more feeble cause than the opposing habit, which is intense and acquired from more intense acts. Therefore, and so on. Second: for something firmly rooted in a subject to be corrupted, the corrupting cause must have greater power and effort than the resistance of that thing — because the corruption of a patient comes from the victory the agent has over the patient, as was proved in the (*question on action*). But a habit adheres tenaciously to its subject, being difficult to move. Therefore a remiss and feeble act cannot destroy the opposing habit — as is clear in the case of one steeped in a habit of vice who, upon

converting, elicits an act of virtue: such an act is remiss and is accompanied by difficulty, as Scotus notes (*Book III, at the passage previously cited, B*).

One may object against the first assertion by experience: those who possess habits, if they do not persevere in their exercise, little by little lose the habits they possess — indeed, if they lack the use and exercise of them for a long time, they are entirely without them, as if they never possessed them. This is admitted in the case of intelligible species, which are in some sense called habits and sometimes fall from the memory — on account of which a person is said to forget what he previously learned. Therefore cessation of acts is the per se corruptive cause of a habit: for given the cessation of acts, the habit is taken away. I grant the antecedent and deny the consequence. For the cessation of acts is a cause not per se but per accidens of the corruption of habits, as was explained above.

One may object second: a contrary habit so occupies the subject in which it inheres that it does not permit a contrary act to be received in the same subject — an act seeking to introduce a new habit opposed to it. Therefore through an opposing act a habit is not per se corrupted. The antecedent is shown thus: for a new habit to be introduced, the prior habit must be corrupted, since two contrary habits cannot coexist in the same subject; or at least, so that the posterior degree introduced through the new act may destroy some degree of the prior habit — yet this cannot happen, since the lesser force that the recent act possesses cannot overcome the greater power with which the pre-existing habit is endowed. I deny the antecedent. To its proof I say that the prior habit is not corrupted but remitted through the contrary act — just as when a little water is thrown onto a great fire, it remits the heat to some extent, and if mixed with wine, it weakens its power. So through a remiss opposing act a new disposition or opposing degree is caused in the subject possessing the contrary habit — a degree opposing the preceding habit. All the more so because through an act a new degree of the contrary habit is introduced by the power, which is the absolutely productive and principal principle of acts and habits. Therefore the contrary habit cannot prevent the introduction, through the power and its act, of a new degree into the subject opposing the contrary habit pre-existing in the same subject. However one may try to respond otherwise (*Arriaga, De anima, disp. 9, sect. 6*). Finally, opposing habits can coexist in the same subject in remiss degrees, as I showed regarding primary qualities in (*Book on the Elements, q. 2, art. 5*).

Article XI. Whether a Supernatural Habit Is Intensified Through Acts

What a supernatural or infused habit is appears from (*q. 2, art. 2 of this book*). It is a quality infused per se by God into an intellectual creature for the production of supernatural and meritorious acts. Although all scholastics concede that acts proceeding from an infused habit intensify the habit meritoriously, certain thinkers — such as Arriaga (*De anima, disp. 9, sect. 1, subsect. 2*) — hold that an

infused habit is physically intensified and perfected through acts. The common view of the remaining doctors, however, is that such acts do not physically augment a supernatural habit.

This is proved first: a habit is intensified through degrees of the same character, as is clear from what was said in (*Book on Intension and Remission*). But acts elicited from a natural power informed by a supernatural habit produce degrees of a different character from the degrees of the infused habit. For the former are acquired, the latter infused — and that there is a difference between them, no one denies. Therefore the infused habit does not grow through acts elicited by the natural power. Second: the degrees of an infused habit — such as charity or grace — are created, as the Doctor maintains (*Book I, dist. 17, q. 3, §. Sexto propter opinionem; and Book II, dist. 34, A*). But from the same source (*Book IV, dist. 1, q. 1*), no creature can create anything, because creation belongs to the independent alone (*Book I, dist. 17, q. 2, §. Ad argumenta, sub PP, in resp. 3*). Therefore neither can it physically influence the intensification of an infused habit. Third: if an act could physically intensify an infused habit, a creature could, through its act as intermediary, produce grace in itself — because those degrees are grace, being homogeneous with it, just as any part of water is water. But grace is created by God alone, according to (*Psalm 83*): "The Lord will give grace and glory." Therefore, and so on. Fourth: an infused habit, according to the adversaries, is a simple quality. But if an act were to physically intensify it, it would not be a simple quality but a composite one, like an acquired habit. Moreover, the degrees of the infused habit could be separated from the degrees produced by acts. Given this hypothesis, I ask: would those degrees render a person acceptable to God, or not? If the former, then without an infused habit a person can be pleasing to God — which those same authors rightly deny along with other theologians. If the latter, then those degrees are not of the same character, since they do not produce the same effect; and therefore they do not intensify the habit — since a habit is intensified and perfected through acts of the same character.

One may object first: intelligible species are intensified through acts that partially proceed from them, and become more perfect. Therefore an infused habit is also physically intensified and perfected through its acts. Confirmation: a natural habit is intensified through supernatural acts. Granting the antecedent, the consequence is denied: for the species and their acts are of the same character and natural order; not so the infused habit and its acts, from (*Book I, dist. 17, q. 2, sub PP*). For the habit is infused, the act is acquired; and between infused and acquired there is a wide difference, as assigned in (*q. 2 of this book, art. 2*). To the confirmation I grant the antecedent and deny the consequence — both because they are of different orders, and because a creature through its acts cannot physically attain to them, since it cannot create.

One may object second: a more perfect cause can produce a more imperfect effect — for what can do the greater can do the lesser. But an act is more perfect than a habit, as was shown above. Therefore it can intensify the habit. I respond that the antecedent is true if the cause is capable of it and the effect falls within its range — as one who can carry ten pounds can certainly carry five. But it is false if the effect is not within its power — as a man who can generate a man cannot therefore generate a dog or a frog, since these animals are not within his generative power. In the same way, although a habit is ranked below an act, it does not therefore follow well that such an act can attain to the intensification of an infused habit.

Article XII. Whether an Infused Habit Can Produce an Acquired Habit

Arriaga (*loc. cit. in the previous article*) and Hurtado (*De anima, disp. 16, sect. 1, subsect. 2*) defend that infused habits produce acquired habits specifically distinct from them. All other scholastics disagree with them, denying that acquired habits — which facilitate the power toward readily and promptly producing acts — are in any way produced by infused habits. This is deduced from the Doctor (*Book I, dist. 17, q. 2, §. Ad arg., sub OO, in resp. 1; and in the Reportatio, ibid., q. 1; and Book IV, dist. 6, q. 10, §. Ad q., sub P*).

It is proved first from the distinction established between an infused and an acquired habit — acknowledged by the Doctor just cited and conceded by Arriaga (*loc. cit., subsect. 1, n. 4*) and Hurtado (*loc. cit.*): namely, that an infused habit does not facilitate the power, as is evident in a baptized adult who certainly possesses infused habits but does not thereby have ease and readiness of operation with respect to the objects of those habits. But an acquired habit renders the power easy and delightful in operation. Therefore, and so on. Second: a habit does not immediately cause a habit, but acts are the immediate generators of a habit, as I have repeatedly insisted. But an infused habit is not generated from acts, as the Doctor notes (*in the Reportatio, loc. cit., q. 1*). Therefore, and so on.

One may say by denying the consequence: just as the acts of a natural habit cause a natural habit, so the acts of a supernatural habit cause an acquired supernatural habit. Against this:

Things of a different nature and order do not produce the same effect — as is clear from fire, which heats, and water, which cools. But an infused and an acquired habit are of a different nature and order. Therefore, and so on. Third: a person cannot be pleasing to God without an infused habit, as is clear from (*Hebrews XI*): "Without faith it is impossible to please God." But if an infused habit were to cause another acquired habit, a person could, with the infused habit removed while the acquired habit remains, be acceptable to God through that acquired habit — so that through acquired grace he would be pleasing to

God — which appears to be false. Fourth: there would be two graces — an infused one and an acquired one — which is at odds with the Council of Trent, which decrees and defines one faith and one grace only.

One may say that this in no way contradicts the said Council. For the aforesaid Council establishes one infused habit of grace, but does not deny the existence of another acquired habit of grace — leaving this to scholastic debate. Against this: an acquired habit of grace is either a proper grace or it is not. If not, then it is not produced by the infused habit, which is supposed to produce true grace. If yes, then it is of the same order and character as the grace of the infused habit, and it intensifies it — which was rejected in the preceding article. Furthermore, it would not be a distinct habit but the same habit intensified and perfected. Moreover, a sinner through that acquired habit would be pleasing to God even though in mortal sin. Furthermore, there would be three causes concurring toward an act — namely, two habits and one power — whereas an infused habit suffices according to orthodox doctrine. Therefore an acquired habit is superfluous. For things are not to be multiplied without necessity (*Physics I, tit. 50*). Moreover, the ability simply speaking is presupposed for acting easily: but according to the supporters of the opposing opinion, an infused habit is given to complete the power in first act for producing supernatural acts. Given then that the infused habit is taken away through demerit, there would still remain the acquired habit — that is, the ease of acting — without the power to act, which is absurd. Finally, someone through that acquired habit and ease of acting could know with certainty that he is in God's grace — which is false, according to (*Ecclesiastes IX*): "No one knows whether he is worthy of love or hatred."

One may object first: natural acts produce a natural habit — for from repeated acts a habit is generated. Therefore supernatural acts also produce a supernatural habit. For there seems to be no stronger reason for the one than for the other, since all are active and operative. Confirmation: someone imbued and practiced in the habit of piety and devotion, if he chances to fall into mortal sin, loses the infused habit and yet still retains the ease of eliciting acts of piety and devotion. Therefore he retains an acquired habit generated from frequently repeated acts — and accordingly through supernatural acts an acquired habit is generated for producing supernatural acts. I grant the antecedent and deny the consequence. The reason for the disparity is drawn from their very nature: for the nature of an infused habit is such that it assists the power in operating but does not facilitate it — as is evident in a baptized adult, who has infused habits but not the ease and readiness of operating with respect to their objects. An acquired habit, by contrast, is for facilitating the power in eliciting acts. No further cause need be sought — just as one does not ask why fire heats and water cools. To the confirmation I say that such a person participates in an acquired habit that derives from the side of the power, which through the repetition of acts produces a habit — not from the side of the infused habit. Thus a heretic can, without infused faith, acquire a habit concerning certain things to be

believed; and a studious unbeliever can acquire for himself the habit of scholastic theology.

One may object second: a habit facilitates a power toward the acts from which it is generated — for acts as it were leave behind their seed, that is, ease. Therefore supernatural acts produce an acquired habit for producing similar supernatural acts. Confirmation: the beatific vision is said to be supernatural from a supernatural habit — namely, the light of glory. But if through supernatural acts a supernatural habit is not generated, the way to showing that acts elicited from an infused habit are supernatural is blocked — for one could say that the act proceeds from a naturally entitative habit. I respond that all of this holds for an acquired habit, but not for an infused one, which is of a different order and character from the former. To the confirmation I say with Scotus (*Book I, dist. 17, q. 2, §. Ad arg., sub PP*): an act is called supernatural from the supernatural habit concurring toward its production. But supernaturality and naturality are not intrinsic and essential differences of acts and habits, but extrinsic ones — with respect to a natural and supernatural agent — from (*Book IV, dist. 10, q. 8, G*). I have shown this at length in (*Treatise I of the Theological Summa, disp. 2, q. 3*). Hence, according to Scotus in the first passage just cited, an act is not properly supernatural — because even if the presupposed habit was produced by a supernatural cause, yet this act, immediately posited in being, is a natural cause with respect to its own act. And therefore the act produced through that habit is not properly supernatural. For a form can stand in as natural a relation to its act as one that is produced supernaturally as a form that is merely natural does to its act. Hence, a difference in the production of forms does not cause a distinction between them in comparison to their effects — just as a vision caused by God in a blind man and a vision caused by a sighted man are of the same character and species.

Question III. On the Habits of the Intellect

Since the most important division of habits is into intellectual and moral habits — the former preceding the latter — it follows that, having now completed the inquiry into habits in general, we must discuss habits in particular: first the intellectual, then the moral. Five intellectual habits are enumerated in (*Ethics VI, 3*): understanding, wisdom, science, prudence, and art. Art and science have been treated in (*Logic, Book I, q. 2; and Book V, final question*). It remains now to discuss the other three, of which the first is the habit of understanding.

Article I. On the Habit of Understanding

Disputation I. Whether the Habit of Understanding Is Distinguished from the Intellective Power

It is certain that there is a habit of the first principles, which is called by the name of understanding. The reason is this: just as a habit is conceded with

respect to a conclusion deduced from principles — which is called science — so a habit must equally be admitted with respect to the principles from which the conclusion is deduced. For there are certain first, immediate, and self-evident principles, open to the intellect once their terms are made explicit — called the "gateways of the sciences" (*Metaphysics II, I*) and "dignities" (*Posterior Analytics I, 2*). The present inquiry is whether this habit coincides with the intellective power or differs from it. Some thinkers — such as the Doctor (*Book III, dist. 33, q. 1*) and Racon (*sect. 2, on virtues, q.*)* — deny that the habit of understanding is distinguished from the intellect itself, holding it to be the same intellect insofar as it is occupied in the cognition of first principles. Others, however — such as Scotus (*Reportatio II, dist. 23, q. un.*), the Complutenses (*Disputationes, Book II of Logic, q. 1*), Ruiz (*ibid., tract. I of principles*), and Suárez (*Metaphysics, disp. 2, sect. 4, n. 15*) — affirm that the habit of first principles differs from the intellect or intellective power.

The habit of principles is called understanding perhaps for this reason: the intellect perceives those principles without any medium. For just as when it perceives things by means of discursive reasoning it is called reason, so what it knows without discourse and is called a moving cause is called understanding, or is given that name by antonomasia on account of its excellence, as the Complutenses note (*loc. cit.*). It is also called intelligence, because just as an intelligence — that is, an angel — immediately knows things presented to it, so the intellective power, once the terms of principles have been perceived and made explicit, immediately and without any ratiocination acquires evident knowledge of them.

Assertion. The habit of principles is distinguished from the intellect. So Scotus (*loc. cit. in both works*) holds. It is proved first from Aristotle (*Ethics VI, 3*), who numbers the habit of principles among the habits of the intellect. But other habits are distinct from the intellect, as is clear; therefore this habit too differs from the intellect. And in (*Posterior Analytics II, final chapter*), the same Philosopher writes that the habit of principles is generated in us through experience and memory. But the intellect, as an understanding power, is not generated from memory and experience but emanates from the soul and intellective nature, as I said in (*Book II on the soul, q. 2*). Therefore, and so on.

Second: things that are entirely the same — whatever is predicated of one is also predicated of the other — as because man and rational animal are entirely the same, whatever is affirmed of man is also affirmed of rational animal, and conversely. If, therefore, the habit of principles and the intellect coincided, whoever had the intellect would also have the habit of principles. But that this is false is clear from experience: all possess an intellect, yet not all enjoy the habit of principles.

Third, it is confirmed by experience that one who exercises himself in the knowledge of principles assents to them more easily and readily than one who

lacks such exercise. But this ease is a habit and a quality distinct from the intellect. Furthermore, I showed above that the intellect is capable of a habit that renders it ready and easy in operating; and in grasping and learning principles, it is adorned with such a habit. Therefore the habit of principles differs from the intellect by a real distinction — since it can be stripped of it, and can be diminished and corrupted in it, for the causes assigned in (*the preceding question, art. 10*).

One may object first: a habit is attributed to a power in order to determine it toward operating, and is generated in powers that are of themselves indeterminate toward an act, through an act frequently elicited — so the Doctor holds (*Book II, dist. 3, q. 10, §. Ad argumenta pro 1. opinione, K*). But the intellect is maximally determined toward the cognition of first principles, since once their terms are made explicit it immediately knows them. Therefore the intellect has no need of a habit by which it may know them more easily and quickly. Confirmation: the intellect is as disposed toward the knowledge of first principles as sight is toward seeing color. But it is clear that sight does not require a habit distinct from itself by which it sees color. Therefore neither does the intellect need a habit in order to survey first principles. I grant the major and distinguish the minor: with respect to specification, I grant it; with respect to exercise, I deny it. For in (*Metaphysics IV, 2*), some deny first principles — against whom the Philosopher advises against disputing (*Physics I, tit. 8*) — especially because the intellect is not maximally determined, like a stone toward downward motion (with respect to which no one denies a habit is unnecessary), but is indeterminate in passing judgment on an object presented to it and can pass correct or incorrect judgment. Therefore a habit is necessary to determine it to judge correctly and to operate easily. Hence I said above that one practiced in principles assents to them more quickly and easily than one unpracticed — because even when the principles are offered to him he perceives them, yet not so well and readily as the other. To the confirmation it may be said that even sight, in seeing objects more readily and easily, needs a habit — as is clear in the case of astronomers who contemplate the stars more easily, and in the case of those skilled in optics who discern visible objects more quickly and readily. Especially because sight judges in its own way about color, and conversely a blind man does not judge about color. Therefore, since sight can judge well or poorly, a habit inclining it toward correct judgment seems necessary for it.

One may object second: the same philosophical treatment applies to the practical intellect as to the speculative — since, from (*Physics II, tit. 8*): "As the principle is in speculative matters, so the end is in practical ones." But the practical intellect does not need a practical habit in order to assent to practical matters, such as "good is to be embraced" and "evil is to be avoided." Therefore neither does the speculative intellect require a habit in order to assent to speculative matters. The major is evident and admitted by the Doctor (*Book I, dist. 1, q. 4*). The minor appears to be the view of Augustine (*On the Lord's Sermon*

on the Mount, Book II) and Jerome (*Epistle 8, to Demetrius*), who assert that there is in us a natural light by which we flee evil and approach the good. For there is in us a certain synderesis, or spark of conscience, by which we turn away from evil and are inclined toward good. Confirmation: in the will no habit is posited for the universal good and the ultimate end willed, because the will by its own nature tends toward it without any addition. Likewise, then, no habit is required for speculative principles that are per se known and indemonstrable. I grant the major and deny the minor. For the will has more need of a habit than the intellect, being a free and altogether indifferent and undetermined power, as is clear from what was said above. To the argument based on the authorities of Jerome and Augustine I say they do not trouble us — for those Fathers concede that there is in us a power by which we can turn away from evil and turn toward good, which we also admit; but they do not deny that such a power is devoid of a habit or incapable of one. They affirm the one thing without denying the other. To the confirmation I deny the antecedent. For the will is not compelled to will the common good and the ultimate end, since it can by its own choice will, not will, or refuse to will — as I showed at length in the proper place.

Disputation II. What the Habit of Understanding Is

Ruiz (*Tract. I, on the habit of principles, art. 2*) defines the habit of principles in these words: "The habit of principles is an intellectual virtue by which the intellective power is determined to a self-evident assent to principles and to the easy production of the same." But this definition of principles does not appear exact: for it places "intellectual virtue," which is equivalent to "intellect" — which the same Ruiz (*loc. cit., art. 3*) acknowledges to be distinguished from the habit of understanding. Therefore it seems better and more aptly described thus: the habit of principles is an acquired quality by which the intellect is rendered easy and ready to assent to first principles. This is explained with respect to all its parts. "Quality" is placed as genus; "acquired," to distinguish it from an innate quality, which belongs to the second species of quality. The remaining words are added to distinguish it from other habits of the intellect. For through the habit of science we assent to a scientific conclusion; through the habit of opinion to a probable conclusion; and so with the rest. Since, then, the said definition consists of genus and difference and correctly explicates the nature of the thing defined, we judge it to be legitimate. One might ask which principles are defined here — the first and universal ones, or also the particular ones? And whether complex or incomplex principles?

For the understanding of this question, I observe that universal principles are common to all sciences and are called "dignities" (*Posterior Analytics I, 2*) and "gateways of the sciences" (*Metaphysics IV, 1*), in which no error can occur. Particular principles, by contrast, belong to one science and not to another, and are called by the same Philosopher "positions." Incomplex principles are simple principles apprehended through the first operation of the mind — such as

"God," "Heaven." Complex principles are axioms or propositions per se known, immediate and evident from their terms — such as "Everything either is or is not" and "Every whole is greater than its part." It is certain that the aforesaid definition does not apply to incomplex principles, which, being simple terms from which a proposition is composed, do not admit of affirmation or negation. The difficulty, then, concerns complex principles — and since some of these are common and others particular, the inquiry is whether the said definition applies to both or only to the one sort. For Vásquez (*Summa I-II, disp. 74, ch. 3*) attributes it only to universal principles; other doctors, among whom is Suárez (*Metaphysics I, disp. 1, sect. 4, n. 23*), include both universal and particular ones under that definition.

It is proved first from Aristotle (*Posterior Analytics I, c. 2, 67; Topics I, c. 2; Physics I, c. 2; Metaphysics I, c. 1 and 2; and Metaphysics IV, T. 7*), where, in assigning the distinction between the habit of principles and the habit of science, he says that the habit of principles is occupied with propositions that are per se known and immediate; and all first principles, whether common or particular, are propositions per se known and immediate. Therefore the aforesaid definition is applicable to all principles. Second: the habit of principles is that which is produced without a medium through the mere explication of terms, as is clear from what has been said. But both universal and particular principles are grasped without any medium and through the mere knowledge of terms, as is clear by induction. Therefore that definition applies to all principles.

One may object: the habit of principles can be demonstrated. For Metaphysics, from (*Posterior Analytics I, c. 7; Physics I, c. 1; and Metaphysics IV, c. 3*), defends and confirms first principles — not only its own, but those of the remaining sciences as well. Therefore first principles are not immediate and known from the mere explication of terms. I respond first: the function of Metaphysics is to defend first principles with respect to transcendental and common reasons. For since it is the first science in the order of distinct cognition — because it distinctly contemplates being and the other transcendentals which are presupposed in the other sciences and are known confusedly — it is for this reason that the office of defending first principles is attributed to Metaphysics, as Fonseca indicates (*Metaphysics III, c. 2*). Second, Metaphysics demonstrates principles not by demonstratio ostensiva but by reductio ad impossibile, through that principle: "It is impossible to simultaneously affirm and deny the same of the same" — which is deployed against the contentious, as may be seen in (*Epitome, Book II, q. 1, art. 11*), and is also presented by Suárez (*Metaphysics, disp. 1, sect. 4, n. 22*).

Disputation III. Whether the Habit of Principles Is Instilled by Nature

There are three opinions, diverging among themselves. The first is that of Báñez (*Summa I, q. 1, art. 6, not. 3*) and Conradi (*Summa I-II, q. 94, art. 1*), who hold that the habit of principles is natural — a view favored by Thomas (*Book II, dist. 24, q. 2, art. 3, ad 3*) and in other places cited by recent authors. The second is that of

Scotus (*Reportatio II, dist. 23, q. un., §. Dico tamen*), the Complutenses (*Posterior Analytics I, q. 1, art. 4*), Ruiz (*Tract. I on the habit of principles, n. 11*), and Suárez (*Metaphysics, disp. 1, sect. 4, n. 14*), who teach that the habit of principles is acquired. The third is that of Cajetan (*Summa I-II, q. 51, art. 1*) and the Complutenses (*Logic, disp. 20, q. 2*), who affirm that the habit of principles is partly from nature — that is, from an intrinsic principle, which is the agent intellect — and partly from an extrinsic principle — that is, from the intelligible species of the principles themselves — so that when the knowledge of terms is acquired through the senses, mediated by intelligible species, the habit of those very principles naturally flows from the intellect; much as nutrition and growth arise from food digested by natural heat in the nutritive and augmentative faculties.

It is to be noted first, for present purposes, that something is called natural in two ways. First, because it is concreated and congenital with something — in this sense the powers of the soul are connate to it, since once the soul exists they naturally emanate from it, and the species of angels are called natural to them because they were instilled by God in their intellects from the moment of their creation. Second, because without any intermediate it is evidently cognized by the natural cognitive power — in this sense the habit of principles is called natural, because given prior sensory knowledge, through intelligible species, with only the terms made explicit, it is grasped by the intellect and acquired through repeated acts. All of this is clearly stated by the Doctor (*loc. cit.*), who says: "For principles are not so innate to the intellect as to be concreated with it; but they are called innate for this reason: because, as (*Metaphysics II, c. 1*) holds, they are like gateways, in that they arise immediately from sense once the terms are known, from the very light of the intellect."

It is to be noted second, from (*Posterior Analytics II, c. 18; and Metaphysics I, c. 1*), that sense is given to us by nature, and from sense comes memory, from memory experience, and from experience the cognition of the universal — which is the principle of science. For science is of universals (*Metaphysics VII, §. 3*). Hence it is clear that the cognition of principles is not instilled in us by nature, nor is it produced from any prior knowledge of the intellect, but takes its origin from sense — which is concreated in us by nature. Therefore Ruiz (*loc. cit., n. 14*) is mistaken in reading "from assent" in the text he cites, when it should read "from sense" or "from the senses" — as the Doctor and the other interpreters there supply, and as the explicit text of the Philosopher shows, as appears to any reader. For although the intellect gives assent to principles, the origin of that assent comes from sense, as the Stagirite shows (*ibid. and Metaphysics I, c. 1*).

First Assertion. The habit of principles is not instilled by nature. So Scotus (*ibid.*) holds. It is proved first from (*Posterior Analytics II, T. 27*), where it is explicitly stated: "It is impossible that a habit should exist in us without our knowing it." As

was said (*Posterior Analytics I, T. 4*): science is not in us through recollection, but is newly acquired by us. Since, therefore, according to Aristotle the habit of science is not innate to us, so likewise the habit of principles is not instilled in us by nature. Second, from (*On the Soul III, 14*): the intellect is like a blank tablet on which nothing is written. Therefore the habit of principles is not concreated with us. The consequence holds because if the habit of principles were congenital, there would be some cognition of things impressed upon and existing in it from the very beginning — and it would therefore be falsely likened to a bare tablet on which the images and likenesses of things are to be formed. Third: all our cognition takes its origin from sense, as the Philosopher testifies (*loc. cit.*) and in (*On Sense and the Sensible, c. 6*): "Nothing is in the intellect that was not first in the senses." But cognition acquired through the ministry of sense is not from nature. And since the habit of principles is had through sense presenting simple terms to the agent intellect — with which, once explicated, assent is given with no intervening cause — it is plainly deduced that the habit of principles is not innate to us.

Second Assertion. The habit of principles is not partly natural and partly acquired in the manner expounded by the authors of the third opinion. This follows from the Doctor (*loc. cit.*). It is proved first: for apart from the apparent implication in saying that the same habit is in part innate and in part acquired — since a habit is sufficiently divided into natural and acquired, and no intermediate habit between them is to be invented — even if their explanation seems to remove that contradiction, it in fact does not remove it. For that cognition which is acquired through sense and is caused by the intellect, over the course of time, is entirely acquired and not congenital, as is plain from the terms. But the habit of principles is produced by sense and the intellect over the course of time, as the Philosopher clearly shows (*Posterior Analytics II, loc. cit.*). Second: what naturally flows from something is found in all things from which it flows — as is clear in the case of risibility, which, since it naturally proceeds from human nature, is found in all its individuals. But the habit of understanding is not in all persons — indeed, some deny it, as is clear from (*Metaphysics IV, 2*) and as Averroes declares (*Metaphysics II, com. 15*). Third: what is acquired through induction is acquired — since induction is a progression from sufficiently enumerated singulars to the universal. But principles depend on sense, and sense is of singulars while the intellect is of universals. For a necessary universal proposition to be gathered, necessary premises must be premised — which are the principles of a scientific conclusion — and it is necessary to know beforehand the singulars of that conclusion; once these are known, the universal is inferred, as the Stagirite excellently pursues (*Posterior Analytics II, loc. cit.*).

Third Assertion. The habit of principles is acquired. This follows from the preceding assertions. For since it was proved in the first assertion that it is not innate, and in the second that it is not composed of the innate and the acquired,

it is sufficiently and necessarily deduced that it is acquired. Furthermore it is shown: for we experience that we first perceive one principle, then another, and so on in succession. Again, at the outset we do not grasp them so easily, but afterwards through exercise we know and use them more easily and delightfully in inferring conclusions — therefore such a habit is acquired. The antecedent can be illustrated by example: if someone proposes this principle — "Every whole is greater than its part" — it is not easily understood unless it is shown specifically that this whole is greater than its part — say, this whole table, or this whole body of water — and once these are known, when later such a pronouncement is made, the intellect is rendered easy and ready to assent to it: namely, "Every whole is greater than its part." Moreover, nature grants being and ability sufficient to attain what is necessary and beneficial for itself. For (*On the Heavens II, 17*): "Being is for the sake of operating." For this reason it gave the soul an intellect by which it could acquire intellection, and a will by which it could elicit volition. But from the beginning the intellect is not adorned with intellection, nor the will with volition. For nature provides only what is necessary for simply acting, not for acting more easily — which is what a habit is for. Therefore the habit of principles is acquired through the intellect, by the frequent repetition and multiplication of its acts. Furthermore, the intellect is indifferent toward any cognition, whether of principles or conclusions, and is moved by species and objects presented through the ministry of the senses. For of itself it is capable of every cognition and understands first what moves it earlier and more efficaciously, retaining it more tenaciously. Therefore it needs a habit in order to understand more conveniently and readily what it encounters — and if these are principles, they cause the habit of principles; if conclusions, they produce the habit of science. Therefore the habit of principles is acquired.

One may object first: God, in creating things, so arranges them that the summit of a lower nature reaches the first level of a higher nature. But among natural habits the habit of principles holds the primacy. Therefore if God granted all habits to the angels at the moment of their creation, he likewise bestowed on human beings the habit of principles — which is supreme among all habits. Confirmation I, from (*Ethics VII, c. 8*): virtue is acquired by nature or by practice. Confirmation II: God did not create a nature entirely stripped of principles of operation; but the habit of principles is concerned with the principles of all the sciences. Therefore it is congenital to us. I respond that the major holds with respect to essential perfection of natures — that is, that natures are so ordered and arranged that one surpasses another in perfection; say, that earth is essentially inferior to water, water to air, and so on ascending to the last. But this does not hold with respect to other perfections. For it is not necessary that if the supreme creature excels in some perfection, an inferior creature possesses the same or a similar perfection. Therefore it does not follow that because the intelligible species of things were concreated with the angels at the outset of their creation, the habit of principles was also instilled in human beings at the

moment of their creation. To Confirmation I: Aristotle there speaks not assertively but doubtfully and problematically, as is clear from the particle "or." To Confirmation II: I say that God created nature with its powers necessary simply speaking for operating, but not with those others that pertain to better and easier operating — such as the habit of principles and of other things.

One may object second: a habit is given to remove difficulty and induce ease of operating, as is clear from its definition. But the intellect has no difficulty in assenting to principles: it assents to them equally easily the first time as if it had assented to them many times. Therefore an acquired habit is not necessary — a natural habit suffices. I grant the major and deny the minor. For we experience that through use and exercise there is generated in us an easier cognition, and the indifference which the intellect previously had in knowing and assenting to things is removed.

One may ask first, whether the habit of principles is one in genus or in species. Those who think the habit of principles is congenital respond that it is one in species — like the habit of faith and other infused habits — on account of one formal specific reason, which consists in the mere explication of terms, without any medium. But those who think such a habit is acquired maintain that it is one in genus. So Ruiz holds (*Tract. I on the habit of principles, n. 19*). For the same philosophical treatment applies to the habit of principles as to the habit of science: both are acquired and depend on acts and objects — with this difference, however, that the former is without a medium, while the latter requires a medium. But the habit of science is one in genus, since it comprehends speculative and practical sciences, which differ in species, as is clear in (*Logic, Book V, q. 4*). Therefore the habit of principles regarding speculative and practical principles is likewise one in genus. Again, there is one assent in genus for common and particular principles alike — as is clear from the assent by which we assent to this common principle, "Everything either is or is not," and by which we give assent to this particular principle, "Every whole is greater than its part." Therefore the habit of principles is one in genus. The motive noted above does not trouble us — for the cognition of principles, consisting in the mere explication of terms, is not a specific but a generic reason, inasmuch as it is common to specifically different principles, such as speculative and practical principles, just as the conclusions deduced and caused from those principles are also specifically different.

One may ask second, whether the first principle exists on the side of reality, or is it a fiction devised by the intellect — regarding every possible affirmation or negation? I distinguish: if taken logically — that is, for second intentions signified by the names "affirmation" and "negation" — I grant that it is fabricated by the intellect. But if taken metaphysically — that is, for the intrinsic and formal reasons by which one thing on the side of reality is connected with another or separated from it — I say it exists on the side of reality,

independently of any intellect thinking about it. For things are so ordered and connected that some are necessarily joined to each other — as man and rational animal — while others are separated from one another — as man and stone.

Article II. On Wisdom

Disputation I. What Wisdom Is

Wisdom has a twofold etymology: either from "savoring" (*sapiendo*), because it illuminates the mind, or from "tasting" (*saporando*), because it inflames the will — in which sense it is called savory knowledge. For this reason Scotus notes (*Book III, dist. 34, q. un., §. His suppositis, sub O*) that in Sacred Scripture wisdom is taken for charity or grace, which "savors" for its possessor. In this sense Solomon says (*Wisdom I*): "Wisdom will not enter a malevolent soul." Brulifer observes (*Book III, dist. 35*) that wisdom is used in four ways. First, for the divine attribute common to the three Divine Persons — as Alphonsus shows against Abailard (*Against Heresies, vol. 6, verb. Deus*). Yet it is appropriated to the Son, as is clear from (*Ecclesiasticus XXIV*): "I came forth from the mouth of the Most High, the firstborn." The Church sings in Advent: "O Wisdom, who came forth from the mouth of the Most High." And (*I Corinthians I*): "We preach Christ, the power of God and the wisdom of God." And since God is true wisdom, the true philosopher is consequently a lover of God — so that since philosophy tends toward the blessed life, one who has loved God is made happy by enjoying God, as Augustine subjoins (*City of God XVIII, ch. 18*). Plato holds the same view, and Scotus does not dissent, as appears in Plato's Dialogue on Philosophy.

Second, for the gift of the Holy Spirit, as is read in (*Isaiah XI*). It is a spiritual sweetness in the minds of pious men, inclined toward loving God — for the attainment of which three things are required: first, humility, which is the fear of God, according to (*Psalms 110*): "The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom"; second, charity, by which a person is dear and pleasing to God, as (*Ecclesiasticus I*) suggests: "The love of God is honorable wisdom"; third, an interior savor of the whole person, who finds pleasure in God alone. Hence (*Psalms 118*): "How sweet are your words to my palate, sweeter than honey to my mouth."

Third, for eminence and excellence in some art or science, as is touched upon in (*Metaphysics I, 1; and I Corinthians III*). Thus an architect is called wise who provides the laws and precepts for building well; likewise, one who gives the norm for rightly administering the commonwealth is called wise. To this Socrates perhaps referred when he said that commonwealths would be happy if either kings philosophize or philosophers administer the commonwealth.

Fourth, for the knowledge of all things insofar as possible — whether of principles or conclusions — and it signifies a certain intellectual rectitude for judging well about all things. In this sense seven wise men flourished in Greece. And through the knowledge of the highest and eternal things, theology is called

wisdom — as Alensis (*part I, q. 1, m. 1*) and Scotus (*prol., q. 5*) acknowledge. So too Metaphysics, which also treats of God, angels, and other things — as the Stagirite acknowledges (*Metaphysics I, 1; and Metaphysics III, c. 2*), to which the same Philosopher attributes six conditions. The first is that it be a knowledge of all things, universally — for knowledge of all things with respect to particular and singular reasons seems impossible. Hence Aristotle adds (*ibid.*) that it belongs to the wise man to know objects not singly but insofar as possible. The second is that it concern difficult things remote from the senses — for what treats of easy things obvious to all does not merit the name of wisdom. The third is that it proceed from the most certain principles — from which judges, astrologers, planetarians, and magicians are excluded. The fourth is that it be sought for its own sake and be desirable in itself, acknowledging no superior or worthier (*Metaphysics IV, c. 3, T. 7*). The fifth is that it direct and command others — with a speculative direction and command, as Fonseca pursues (*Metaphysics II, q. 5*). The sixth is that it be fit for teaching. For wisdom must teach causes and the principles of knowing, resolve and decide everything — including first principles and first causes. Hence Aristotle writes (*Metaphysics I, 1*): "A sign of the wise man is to be able to teach, and it pertains to the wise man to know and assign the causes of things."

One may object first: Aristotle (*Sophistical Refutations I, 2*) says: "It is the function of the wise man to speak well about all things and to refute the ignorant." Hence in ancient times certain philosophers flourished who, according to Fonseca (*loc. cit.*), were ready to dispute about all things. Therefore wisdom is a full knowledge of all things — not only universally but also in particular. I respond that Aristotle there merely means that the wise man can discuss all things insofar as possible and insofar as human wisdom allows, as the same Philosopher declares (*Metaphysics I, 2*): "The wise man in a certain sense knows all things." Otherwise it would not be wisdom but vanity and presumption of spirit. For it belongs to divine wisdom alone to attain all universals and singulars, as is evident from (*Hebrews IV*): "All things are naked and open to his eyes."

One may object second: the mathematical disciplines are more certain and evident than the other sciences — proceeding as they do from the most evident principles and those most remote from the senses (*Metaphysics II, c. 3, T. 16*). Therefore wisdom is not supported by the most well-known principles, since that pertains to mathematics. I respond that this holds for proper and particular principles, not for the first and most universal principles of all — such as the principles of Metaphysics. All the more so because those are confirmed and corroborated by Metaphysics, whose function it is to defend all the principles of the particular sciences against those who deny and resist them. Furthermore, Metaphysics is first in the order of distinct cognition; therefore no science more clearly and distinctly explicates and illustrates principles than Metaphysics. Hence it is called in (*Ethics VI, 8*) the head of all the sciences, and in (*Metaphysics*

I, 2) the goddess of the sciences. Miranda (*On the Overturning of Single Certitudes*, 20) places it before others, following Bonetus (*Metaphysics I*, c. 1).

One may object third: practical science, which labors around the operations of the will — especially political science, which provides rules for living well and governing the commonwealth, and by which a person commands others — seems to be more wisdom than speculative science, as is clear from (*Deuteronomy IV*). For it is directed toward the love of God and beatitude, which Aristotle locates in the contemplation of abstract substances (*Ethics VI*, 10). Confirmation: Scotus (*prol.*, q. 4) makes theology practical, and both the Doctor himself and other theologians (*ibid.*) affirm that it is most eminently wisdom. Therefore wisdom commands and directs not by speculative but by practical direction. Hence Socrates, abandoning natural science, converted himself entirely to moral science. Likewise, pious men devote themselves to divine love, in which is found true wisdom — and the other disciplines, without it, are considered foolishness. I respond that Aristotle and the other philosophers did not acknowledge true wisdom and happiness — which, as I said at the beginning of this article, following Augustine, is located in the love of God. Therefore it is not surprising if they posited only speculative wisdom. We, however, illumined by the light of faith, know that God can be attained by us through vision and enjoyment, and accordingly we assert that that science which concerns God and tends toward his love is more excellent and truer wisdom. Whatever Suárez may say (*Metaphysics*, *disp. 1*, *sect. 5*, *n. 44*). By this the confirmation drawn from Scotus is also answered. I have pursued this at length in (*Physics*, *Book I*, *q. 1*, *art. 4*).

Disputation II. Whether Wisdom Is Nobler and More Certain Than the Habit of Understanding

Báñez candidly acknowledges (*Summa I*, *q. 1*, *art. 6*) that he is ignorant of this difficulty. Suárez (*Metaphysics*, *disp. 1*, *sect. 5*, *n. 30 and following*) touches on it at length and confusedly. Some hold that wisdom is more certain and noble than the proper principles of the particular sciences, but not than the most universal principles and causes from which it is caused. Other authors deny that wisdom is to be preferred to the habit of understanding in certainty and evidence.

It is to be noted first that wisdom is taken in two ways: (I) insofar as it comprehends the knowledge of principles and conclusions — in which sense Aristotle seems to speak (*Ethics VI*, 8): "Wisdom is a kind of head having understanding and science"; and (*Metaphysics I*, 1): "The wise man in a certain sense knows all things"; (II) insofar as wisdom is the knowledge of conclusions grasped through the highest causes — and it is of wisdom so accepted that the present debate moves, namely whether it surpasses the habit of principles in certainty, evidence, and nobility.

It is to be noted second that something can be more certain and evident than another without being nobler. For the accidents of a corporeal substance are to

us, insofar as concerns sense, more known and manifest than the accidents of an incorporeal substance; yet the knowledge had of the latter surpasses the knowledge acquired of the former, as Aristotle teaches (*On the Parts of Animals I, c. 5*) and Scotus (*Book I, dist. 3, q. 2*). Therefore knowledge of God and angels is more excellent and worthy than knowledge of being and the other transcendentals and predicamentals.

Assertion. Absolutely speaking, the habit of principles surpasses wisdom in certainty and evidence — not only with respect to proper principles and conclusions deduced from them, but also with respect to common principles and conclusions collected from them. This is drawn from the Doctor (*loc. cit.*) and (*Reportatio II, dist. 23, q. un., §. Dico tamen*). It is proved first: all the certainty and evidence that wisdom participates proceeds from principles. For demonstration, through which wisdom is generated, proceeds from things prior, better known, and the causes of the conclusion (*Posterior Analytics I, c. 2*). In support of this Aristotle there adduces that axiom: "On account of which each thing is such, that very thing is more such." The conclusion is true, known, and evident through principles; therefore principles are more known and more evident. Second: what is immediately evident and certain surpasses in certainty and evidence what is known and evident through a medium — as is clear from the sun, which is immediately luminous, and from God, who is being by essence. But principles are of themselves known and evident once their terms are made explicit, immediate and indemonstrable; wisdom, by contrast, is generated through a cause and produced through demonstration. Therefore, and so on. Third: first principles are independent and irreducible — for everything else is resolved into them, as is clear from this principle: "Everything either is or is not." Hence the intellect cannot err concerning principles and the conclusions it beholds following demonstratively from principles, as Scotus notes (*Posterior Analytics II, loc. cit.*). And the Philosopher in (*Metaphysics II, 1*) calls principles "gateways," which are more open than what is inside the house. Similarly, principles are more manifest than conclusions deduced from them — and therefore the habit of principles surpasses wisdom in certainty and evidence. I add further: a cause is nobler than its effect, as was proved in (*Book on Causes, q. 1*). But principles are the causes of conclusions, as was said above. Finally, the knowledge of God, which is without medium and discourse, surpasses in nobility created knowledge, which is generated through medium and discourse. Therefore it is concluded that the habit of principles surpasses and excels wisdom in nobility, certainty, and evidence.

One may object first: wisdom is the most noble habit (*Ethics VI, 8; and Ethics X, c. 8; and Metaphysics I, 1*). Therefore wisdom is more excellent than understanding — both in certainty and in evidence. I respond that the antecedent is true among discursive and ratiocinative habits — such as the other habits are, except the habit of understanding. Or say that in those passages and others cited, Aristotle takes wisdom as comprehending the habit of principles and

conclusions, as Fonseca (*Metaphysics III, c. 2, §. 5*), following Vorrillon (*loc. cit., in the note*) and Tatarets (*Logic, q. 1, scibile 3*), observes — as Suárez reports (*loc. cit., n. 31*). All the more so because this is suggested in Scripture: (*Ecclesiasticus XV*): "He filled him with the spirit of wisdom and understanding"; (*Isaiah XI*): "The spirit of wisdom and of understanding"; and (*Colossians I*): "In all wisdom and understanding."

One may object second: wisdom judges not only of principles but also of conclusions. Therefore it is nobler and more certain than principles — just as the container is nobler and more certain than the contained. The antecedent is at hand: for conclusions are inferred from principles, and it is first necessary to know the principles as causes from which conclusions arise. But wisdom accomplishes this; therefore it excels the habit of principles. Confirmation: wisdom does not only regard principles by a simple, direct act, as the habit of understanding does — which by a simple and direct natural light contemplates principles — but also regards them by a reflexive act, taking them as media and causes to deduce its demonstrative conclusions. And this mode of knowing and judging seems more excellent and eminent. Therefore wisdom excels the habit of principles. I respond: if wisdom is taken precisely insofar as it is a caused cognition through a supreme and highest cause, I deny it; if taken for a knowledge of conclusions and principles, I grant it — as I made abundantly clear above. For there are different habits: one concerning principles, which is the habit of understanding; another concerning conclusions, which is wisdom. To the confirmation I grant the major and deny the minor. For a more noble mode of knowing things immediately than mediately is evident from God, who immediately knows all things in his essence with no medium or cause intervening; and perfect knowledge, which is without discourse, excels knowledge that involves discourse — since it immediately perfects the intellect. Therefore, since such a reflexive act of wisdom is discursive, it denotes not perfection but imperfection.

Disputation III. How Wisdom Differs from Science

That some distinction is held between wisdom and science is clear from (*Ethics VI, 3 and 8*), where Aristotle, enumerating the quintet of habits of the intellect, places wisdom among them as a habit distinct from the others. For the understanding of this, two acceptations of wisdom noted in the preceding disputation are helpful — namely, that wisdom is taken for the knowledge of principles and conclusions, and for the knowledge alone of conclusions caused through first and supreme causes. Furthermore, the acceptance of science offered by our colleagues (*q. 3, prol.; and Book III, dist. 24, q. un., §. Ad q., D; and in the Reportatio ibid.*) is not to be despised — namely, for science in the sense of (*Ethics VI, 3*), which is a habit by which someone determinately speaks the truth; and for science in the sense of (*Posterior Analytics I, 2*), which is a certain and evident cognition of a necessary thing through its proper cause. Furthermore, I

observe that every wisdom is indeed a science — as is evident from (*Metaphysics II, c. 1 and 2; and Metaphysics XI, book I and II*). But not every science is wisdom. For physics is a science, but is by no means wisdom, according to the same Philosopher (*ibid.*). Hence wisdom seems to differ from science as the less common from the more common, and as the most excellent species from its genus.

Assertion. Wisdom is distinguished from science. This follows from Scotus (*loc. cit.*). It is proved first from Aristotle (*Ethics VI, 3*), who lists wisdom as a habit distinct from science and the other habits recited there. Second, from Augustine (*On the Trinity XII, 15*), who assigns the distinction between wisdom and science thus: wisdom is the intellectual cognition of eternal things, and science is the rational cognition of temporal things. Vorrillon (*loc. cit.*) also acknowledges this same distinction — which appears to be the same as this: wisdom regards the highest things and things of the superior portion or more excellent order; science regards lowly things and things of the inferior portion or lesser order. Third: the conditions and attributes of wisdom, recalled in the preceding disputation, are not applicable to science. For not every science meditates on things separated from matter, nor is it sought for its own sake, nor does it direct and command others as wisdom does. Therefore wisdom is distinguished from science. Third: young men for the most part can be learned but not wise. Hence Aristotle adds (*Topics III, 2*): "No one chooses young men as guides, because they are not wise." Hence Rehoboam (*III Kings XII*), accepting the counsel of young men and spurning the counsel of the elders, lost the kingdom of Israel.

One may object first: wisdom is used for the habit of understanding and science, acquired through demonstration — as is clear from what has been said. Therefore there are only three habits of the intellect: wisdom, prudence, and art — which is at odds with Aristotle (*Ethics VI, 3*), who enumerates five habits of the intellect. I respond that given that acceptance of wisdom, the quintet of habits of the intellect adduced by the Philosopher (*loc. cit.*) is still preserved. For wisdom so taken is not formally or identically understanding and science, but a habit formally distinct from them — although materially and objectively it is the same — as Tatarets (*recently mentioned*) rightly notes. And this follows from (*Ethics VI, 7*).

One may object second: one species of a genus is not made from another — as man is not composed from brute. For species are opposed through opposing differences that constitute them. Therefore it is wrongly asserted that wisdom coalesces from the habit of principles and science. I distinguish the antecedent: formally, I grant it; materially, I deny it. For as I said in (*Book on Quantity*), from a line a surface is made, and from a line and a surface a body — which are distinct species of continuous quantity. Again, from continuous quantity discrete quantity arises, as I noted (*ibid.*).

One may ask whether wisdom is univocal with created and uncreated wisdom. I say they are univocal with transcendental univocity — just as divine and created substance participate in the common transcendental notion of substance. I add: being is univocal to substance and accident, to God and creature, as Scotus holds (*Book I, dist. 3, q. 2, §. Secundo, ad B; and dist. 8, q. 3, §. Teneo, F*). Likewise, uncreated and created wisdom are univocal in the common notion of wisdom, as Scotus expressly defends at the end of his question.

Article III. On Prudence

Disputation I. What Prudence Is

That prudence exists is evident to all, plainly shown from its effect. For some act prudently and some imprudently — as is clear from (*Matthew XIV*) concerning the five prudent and five imprudent and foolish virgins. Aristotle warns, at the end of (*Topics II, c. 4*), that no one is by nature prudent — as will be made clear from what follows. What prudence is, however, is taught by the same Philosopher (*Ethics VI, 5*) and explained there by his commentators.

It is to be noted first that prudence is taken in two ways. First, broadly — that is, for a natural sagacity and circumspection in preserving and maintaining life. In this sense ants are called prudent, because in summer they gather and store grain on which they afterwards feed in winter (*Proverbs VI*). Likewise among animals, serpents are said to be prudent, as our Savior teaches us (*Matthew X*): "Be therefore wise as serpents." Hence the Stagirite (*Metaphysics I, 1*) notes that certain animals are capable of prudence and discipline. Second, strictly — for an active habit in finding opportune and efficacious means, regarding things that can be done, for the attainment of a proposed end. It is prudence in this sense that is the subject of the present discussion — which the Philosopher (*Ethics VI, 12; and Ethics X, c. 8*) asserts to be the steward of wisdom. And the virtuous one in (*Proverbs VI*) says to wisdom: "You are my sister, and I have called prudence my friend."

It is to be noted second that many things are required for perfect prudence — chiefly memory, without which there can be no prudence. Hence Aristotle, at the passage just cited, selected, among those endowed with memory, certain ones possessing prudence and others that are teachable — though those that are prudent need not be teachable, as bees and serpents. Furthermore, the knowledge of singular things that can be done is necessary, so that with prior knowledge of those things, prudent animals may be able to operate toward the attainment of their end. Moreover, astuteness (*solertia*) is required, by which the prudent person quickly tracks down the means that are sufficient and opportune for attaining the proposed end. Likewise foresight (*providentia*) is required — hence Vorrillon notes (*Book III, dist. 33, term. 2*), following Isidore (*Etymologies*), that prudence is the equivalent of foresight or far-seeing. For the prudent person must foresee what is to be done in the future, provide for what is

necessary in the present, compare the past with the present and the future, and pass judgment on all of them so as to attain the intended end. Add circumspection of all circumstances, and the caution by which a prudent man must remove all obstacles, impediments, and attacks — and with these removed and necessities applied, may hold and possess the desired goal. Hence the Doctor subjoins (*Book III, dist. 34, §. His suppositis*): "Prudence is a deliberative habit, since it is the habit of reasoning correctly in a practical manner." To this the Angel of the Schools refers (*verb. prudentia*), from Aristotle (*Ethics VI, 7*), assigning three acts or functions of prudence: good deliberation, judgment, and commanding of execution. To these three contribute most greatly: recollection of the past, ordering of the present, and meditation on the future — which Seneca enumerates (*On Morals*): "If your mind will be prudent, recall the past, order the present, foresee the future."

Assertion. Prudence is rightly defined as an active habit in conjunction with right reason, concerning what is good or evil for a human being. So Aristotle (*Ethics VI, 5*) holds, and Scotus (*loc. cit.*) concurs, as does Augustine (*On Free Will II, ch. 15; and Book 83, Questions, q. 31*). It is explained with respect to all its parts before being proved. "Habit" is placed as genus — for prudence is a quality of the first species of the genus of quality. "In conjunction with right reason" is added so as to distinguish it from an erroneous habit and other habits that are false or doubtful. "Active" is placed to distinguish it from art, which is a productive habit concerned with manual works, while prudence concerns moral matters that are good or evil — as the last words clearly signify. The foregoing definition being thus explained, it is easy to prove. For that definition is adequate and legitimate which consists of genus and difference, as I said in (*Epitome, Book II, q. 7, art. 2*). But the aforesaid definition of prudence participates in the genus, which is "habit," and the differences, which are the remaining particles already made explicit. Nor does it contain anything superfluous or deficient. Nor does anyone I have read despise or reject it; rather, all readily and constantly receive and defend it. Therefore the said definition is apt.

One may object first: prudence is a right habit, as is clear from its definition. But the objects around which prudence labors are uncertain, changeable, and susceptible to deviation — since they are singulars, which undergo perpetual change. Therefore prudence is not well defined as an active habit in conjunction with right reason. I grant the major; to the minor I say that prudence is a true and right habit, even though its object is changeable and susceptible to deviation — as is clear from art, which concerns contingent things, yet art itself is certain and right according to its rules and measures, which it prescribes concerning the work to be done. Likewise, since prudence provides the norm and rule of acting well, even though things to be done are changeable and defective, prudence itself is nonetheless right, certain, and infallible — as the Doctor rightly notes (*in the Reportatio III, dist. 36, q. un., §. Per hoc, §. Ad I, arg.*), expressly adding that

"virtue is not deviated, but the one possessing virtue, through deficiency of another," and so on.

One may object second: Aristotle (*Ethics VI*, 6) writes that prudence is the most noble among the moral virtues. But if prudence were a certain and right habit, it would not be the most noble of virtues — for charity would excel it among the moral virtues, and wisdom would surpass it among the intellectual virtues. Therefore prudence is not rightly defined as an active habit in conjunction with right reason. The Doctor responds (*Book III*, *dist. 33*, *q. un.*, §. *Ad I, M*): prudence is nobler than the other virtues not absolutely but in a qualified sense, because prudence is in a way the directive rule of the other virtues, insofar as it deliberates, judges, and directive commands what is to be done.

Disputation II. Whether There Is One Prudence for All Things That Can Be Done

The Thomists — cited by Ruiz (*Disputationes on virtues*, *art. 4*, *m. 1*) — hold that there is only one prudence specifically for all things that can be done, just as there is one faith for all things to be believed. Against them the Scotists, with Scotus (*Book III*, *dist. 36*, *q. un.*, §. *Quantum ergo L*; and *Metaphysics VI*, *q. 1*; and *Collationes I*), oppose themselves; and the Nominalists, with Ockham (*Book III*, *q. 13*, *art. 2*), along with Richard (*ibid.*, *q. 3*, *art. 2*) and Aureolus (*art. 5*), affirm that prudence is one in genus, distributed into diverse species according to the diverse specific reasons of things that can be done.

It is to be noted that a habit is generated through repeated acts — from what was said above — and is distinguished from without and posteriori through similar acts. In the same way, acts are distinguished from without through the objects to which they bear, as I showed at length in (*Book II on the soul*, *q. 2*). So that, in accordance with the generic or specific distinction of objects, a generic or specific distinction of habits is inferred. And this is to be maintained not for infused but for acquired habits, as the Doctor urges (*Book III*, *dist. 35*, *q. un.*), giving the reason that infused habits are supported by the sole authority of the revealing God, which is one for all things to be believed; but acquired habits rest on complex objects, of which some are evident from their terms — as the habit of understanding — and some from principles — as the habit of conclusions. The same is to be affirmed of the objects around which prudence labors, of which some differ from one another specifically and some generically.

Assertion. Prudence is one in genus. So the Doctor holds (*loc. cit.*). It is proved first from (*Politics III*, 2; and *Ethics VI*, 9): the virtue and prudence of the good man and of the ruler is one — understood by unity of its subaltern genus, as Basil excellently expounds (*Book III*, *dist. 36*, *q. un.*, *art. 2*, *at the end*). Second: the unity of a habit is derived from the unity of its formal subject, from (*Posterior Analytics I*, *T. 43*; and *On the Soul III*, 33). According to what it is occupied with: but the object of prudence is one by unity of genus — namely, the doable

(agibile), which is divided into three specifically distinct things: monastic, economic, and political. Therefore prudence is one in genus. Third: the same philosophical treatment applies to the unity of prudence as to the unity of science and art — as Ockham (*loc. cit.*) preeminently notes, and Aristotle does not dissent (*Ethics VI, 4*). The reason is that just as art is the right reason of things to be made, so prudence is the right reason of things to be done. But science and art obtain the generic unity of their generic subject, and are divided into many species — as I clearly showed in (*Logic, Book V, final question*). The same is therefore to be held of prudence. Fourth: as a principle is in speculative matters, so is an end in practical matters (*Physics II, T. 89*) — which the Doctor accepts (*Book I, dist. 1, q. 4*). Of speculative matters there are many specifically distinct habits, and also one habit in genus containing many habits specifically different — as Metaphysics, which is about being, comprehends the habit concerning substance and the habit concerning accident. And likewise physics, which concerns natural body, contains the habit concerning celestial body and the habit concerning sublunar body, animate body, and the like. Therefore prudence, which regards things doable, contains under itself the habit of prudence concerned with the doable matters of temperance, fortitude, and things of that sort — which are known to differ specifically from one another. For experience testifies that some are prudent in judging what belongs to each — such as a prudent jurist — yet imprudent in discerning and commanding what pertains to waging war. Again, some are prudent in governing themselves but not in governing a household and family, and one who prudently presides over a family does not do so over a kingdom — and conversely, some conduct themselves prudently in the administration of a kingdom and principate but do not know how to preside over their own household, or are improvident in their own actions. Therefore there is one prudence in genus comprehending under itself many prudences specifically different.

One may object first: what possesses only one formal objective reason concerning doable things has only one prudence specifically — since habits are specified according to distinct formal objective reasons. But prudence participates in only one specific formal objective reason of doable things, namely the human good orderable according to right reason to the due end. Therefore there is only one prudence in species directing all acts of the moral virtues. I grant the major and deny the minor: for there are several formal objective reasons specifically different — such as the formal reason of temperance, the formal reason of fortitude, and similar ones — which are manifestly different from one another in species. And so the argument proves rather the opposite of what was proposed, as what I presented above evidently demonstrates.

One may object second: prudence extends itself to as many things as its first practical principle does — since a habit that is maximally discursive, like prudence, does not seem to extend further than its first principle. But the first

practical principle of doable things does not extend beyond one specific reason of doable things. Therefore there is only one prudence in species. I grant the major and deny the minor. For the first principle regards many things that are plainly specifically different from one another. For whatever prudence directs concerning one moral virtue is specifically different from what it directs concerning another moral virtue — for some are prudent with respect to justice but not with respect to temperance, as I was deducing above.

One may object third: all doable things, even though they differ among themselves, nonetheless regard one ultimate end toward which they ultimately tend. Therefore since all doable things participate in one reason of attribution with respect to one end, according to that specific reason of attribution only one prudence in species is constituted. Granting the antecedent, I deny the consequence. For although all creatures tend toward God, the ultimate end of all things, it does not follow that they are of the same species. Likewise, although one ultimate end of all doable things is posited, it does not follow well that there is one prudence in species — since the doable things that prudence regards are many and specifically different, as is sufficiently clear from what was said.

Disputation III. Whether Prudence Concerns Means and Ends

Thomas (*Summa II-II*, q. 97, art. 6), Cajetan, and others there assert that prudence regards only means, directing the moral virtues concerning means alone — which are ordered toward attaining their ends. Scotus, however, (*Book III*, dist. 36, q. un., §. *Licet I*) and his followers at the same place teach that prudence is occupied not only with means ordered toward obtaining the ultimate end, but also with dictating concerning a particular end at least — such as chastity and other particular ends.

It is to be noted first that prudence is formally an intellectual habit perfecting the intellect, and is called moral from without because it dictates and directs the operations of the moral virtues. Before every moral virtue, a prudence that regulates that same moral virtue is required, because there is no virtue unless it conforms to the right dictate of reason — so that afterwards the will may readily and promptly choose what right reason determines ought to be chosen. But the habit of virtue is generated from repeated right choices — as the habit of chastity from repeated choices of continence — while prudence is caused from repeated right dictates concerning doable things.

It is to be noted second that three commonly enumerated parts of prudence are usually listed: subjective, integral, and potential. The subjective parts — which are also called species of prudence — are: monastic, which directs a person toward his own good; economic, which regulates a person toward rightly governing a family; and political, which orders a person toward the common good of the commonwealth. Under this last are comprehended legislative and military, of which Aretinus, Aureolus, and Richard speak (*loc. cit.*, q. 8). The

integral parts, mentioned in the present article, disputation I, number eight: six from Macrobius (*On the Dream of Scipio I*): reason, understanding, circumspection, providence, docility, caution; a seventh is added by Cicero (*Rhetoric II, 5*) — namely, memory; an eighth by the Stagirite (*Ethics VI, 10*) — namely, astuteness. The reason is that prudence is considered in two ways: as cognitive, and as preceptive. Considered in the first mode it has five of the said parts: memory, understanding, docility, reason, and astuteness. Considered in the second mode it has three of the listed parts: providence, circumspection, and caution.

Memory is the recollection of past things that we have seen, heard, and experienced — for these greatly assist in establishing what is to be done in the present. Understanding, which is also called intelligence, is the cognition of moral principles from which, once rightly perceived and fully known, right conclusions concerning things to be done are deduced. Reason is the good disposition by which a person aptly disposed reasons from known things to the knowledge of others. Providence is the foreknowledge of future things that can arise and follow from what is being done, toward the attainment of the proposed end. Docility is the natural capacity for receiving knowledge of what is to be done. Astuteness is sagacity or the prompt subtlety of finding in a short time the means for acting. Circumspection is the careful attention to, weighing of, and consideration of all the conditions and circumstances required for the work to be done fully and perfectly. Caution is the care by which someone removes obstacles that can impede the attainment of the intended end. The potential parts are contained in a threefold number: eubulia, synesis, and gnome. Eubulia is good deliberation and apt arrangement of what is to be done. Synesis judges rightly about deliberated matters in accordance with common laws. Gnome renders right judgment about things to be done in matters not sanctioned by common law. Hence Aristotle (*Ethics VI, 9, 10*) records three acts of prudence. The first is inquiry and deliberation of means. The second is judgment about the means found to be most apt for attaining the end. The third is command, by which the deliberated and found means are applied to the work to be performed and put into execution. The last act is the principal one, since the first two are ordered to this third, as Richard holds (*loc. cit.*, q. 6).

It is to be noted third that, these things having been explained, the intellect shows the will what is to be done and pursued and what is to be rejected and fled — not by commanding and compelling the will absolutely to execute them, since command is not an act of the intellect but of the will, as I taught in (*Book III, q. 2, art. 4*) — but by dictating and directing, as a counselor does for a king, or a jurist for a prefect and judge. This can be called commanding in a qualified sense, as Richard notes (*loc. cit.*). Therefore the intellect does not properly command the will — since the will is as a king in the realm of the soul, as Anselm testifies (*On the Conception of the Virgin, ch. 4*) — but shows and dictates

what is conformable to the right dictate of reason. It is in the power of the will to choose or not choose these things, to put them into execution or not.

Assertion. Prudence concerns not only means but also the end. So the Doctor (*loc. cit.*) holds. It is proved first: there is no moral virtue without prudence, since virtue conforms to the right dictate of reason, without which it cannot be. But prudence is the habit that reasons rightly about doable things, toward the attainment of an end. For no one abstains from forbidden foods during a time of fasting unless the ultimate end to be obtained has been set before him — which is written even of Christ (*Hebrews XII*): "For the joy set before him he endured the cross." Therefore prudence regards both the end and the means apt for attaining it. Second: a moral virtue is one by unity of its object and end, as is established of the other habits. But prudence, which is occupied around that virtue, is likewise one. For someone is prudent in making war but not in restraining himself from illicit pleasures. Therefore prudence is one, just as the virtue it directs is also one. But it is not one by the unity of means — since means are many. Therefore it is one by the unity of the end, and consequently prudence regards means as well as the end. Third: a relation is not cognized unless its term — by which it is specified, since a relation depends on its extremes, one of which is the term — is cognized. But the means about which prudence is concerned pertain to prudence itself; therefore so does the end to be acquired through those means — since the means carry forward an ordering and reference to it, and to its end. All the more so because the end is prior in the intention of the prudent person to those things that are for the end. Therefore prudence bears upon both the means and the end proposed and intended.

One may object first: prudence is a deliberative habit, being the right reason and rule of doable things. But deliberation concerns means, not the end (*Ethics III*, 6): for the physician does not deliberate whether the patient should be healed, nor the rhetorician whether he should persuade his audience, nor the politician whether he should grant peace to enemies. Therefore prudence regards means only. I grant the major. I distinguish the minor: more principally, I grant it — thus the Philosopher is expounded; less principally, I deny it. For prudence dictates concerning the proper ends of virtues, by discoursing from the practical principle taken from the universal end down to particular ends — and this discourse is the first deliberation, as the Doctor teaches (*loc. cit.*).

One may object second: prudence must be in accord with right appetite; otherwise it will not be prudence, which is the right reason for acting. But this agreement of prudence with right appetite is achieved through means selected for obtaining the end. Therefore prudence regards means only. I deny the antecedent. For since prudence is prior to appetite, it does not depend on it — just as the prior does not depend on the posterior. Therefore prudence can exist even though right appetite is absent. For the regulated conforms to its rule, not the rule to the regulated. Thus there can be prudence even without the

consequent virtue. Indeed, sometimes while prudence stands, vice follows — as is evident from (*Luke XVI*): "The children of this world are more prudent than the children of light in their generation."

Disputation IV. Whether Prudence Can Exist Without Moral Virtue

Godfrey (*Quodlibet*, q. 12) and Henry — cited by the Marginists of Scotus — hold that prudence is so necessarily joined with moral virtue that the one cannot exist without the other. The opposite, however, is taught by Scotus (*Book III, dist. 36, q. un., §. Quantum G; and in the Reportatio ibid.*), Orbelli, Vorrillon, and Basil (*ibid.*), who assert that prudence can exist without moral virtue — but not moral virtue without prudence.

It is to be noted first that an act of the will is not right or good unless it conforms to the right dictate of the intellect. For right reason is the rule and measure of the rectitude of an act of the will, as the Doctor teaches (*q. 4, prol.; and Book III, loc. cit., §. Licet istud K*). Therefore there cannot be moral virtue without prudence — which, as has been said more than once, is the right reason of doable things. But prudence can perfectly well exist without moral virtue, just as the prior can exist without the posterior, and the rule without what is regulated — as I was deducing in the preceding disputation.

It is to be noted second, from the Doctor (*in Book III, loc. cit., §. Quantum ad istum G*), that malice can blind the intellect in two ways: privatively and positively. Privatively, by diverting the intellect from right consideration. For when the will chooses the opposite of what the intellect dictates, it consequently diverts it from remaining in such a dictate, and turns it toward considering the opposite — finding dialectical or sophistical reasons by which it is not displeased to have abandoned that dictate. Positively, by commanding the intellect to find, around the evil end established by the will, the necessary means apt for attaining it — and persisting in this and pursuing that same end with evil means applied to its attainment. Hence an evil will is said to blind the intellect — not that the will leads it into error about complex matters, but by compelling it through a habit formed around the evil end, with evil means employed for its attainment. Thus error occurs not in speculative matters but in doable things.

This is further shown from the same author (*ibid., §. Contra*): terms are the total cause of the knowledge of a first principle, both speculative and practical (*Posterior Analytics I, 6*). We know principles insofar as we know their terms. But the syllogistic form is evident to every intellect, as appears from the definition of the perfect syllogism (*Prior Analytics I, 1*). Therefore, once the terms are apprehended and composed and arranged in the right mode and figure, the intellect necessarily assents to the conclusion deduced from the principles. And the will cannot lead the intellect that is thus evidently and demonstratively reasoning into error, nor blind it — except in the way said above.

Assertion. Prudence can exist without moral virtue. So Scotus (*loc. cit.*) holds. It is proved first from Augustine's exposition of the words of (*Psalms 123*): "Perhaps they would have swallowed us up alive." These are: "Those are swallowed up alive who know the evil and consent with their tongue — they die absorbed." (*Psalms 68*): "What is it, those consenting to vices, except those who know they ought not to consent? Behold, they know the mousetrap, and place their foot in it." And (*Psalms 118*): "Understanding goes first, affection follows slowly, or not at all." Second, from Aristotle (*Ethics II, 4*): reason avails little or nothing toward virtue. But if virtue necessarily followed upon prudence, reason would contribute greatly — indeed, would accomplish everything — because through it virtue would remain in the will. And consequently the learned and the prudent would be morally good and free from fault and vice — yet the opposite sometimes occurs, as some are entangled in sins and crimes. Nor would they need to be exhorted and persuaded to will what is right and just; rather, it would suffice that they look at and consider what is right — since from that right looking and consideration they would participate in the virtue annexed to it. Third: the University of Paris so decrees: "That the will, with knowledge present both in the universal and in the particular, cannot will the opposite — is an error." Therefore, while prudence stands, the will can fail to act well — and accordingly fail to have virtue. Fourth: someone from right dictates about doable things possesses the habit of prudence, which dictates to the will what is to be embraced and what avoided. But the will can choose the opposite of what is rightly dictated, and do evil — as the wise and prudent men of this world do, against whom truth cries out (*I Corinthians I*): "I will destroy the wisdom of the wise, and the understanding of the prudent I will reject." And (*Romans VIII*): "For the wisdom of the flesh is death." Fifth: the will does not necessarily will the good but can absolutely will evil, as was proved above. Therefore even if prudence dictates that good is to be done, the will can recoil, choose evil, and put it into execution. Sixth: one who has the habit of imprudence and error, as long as he remains on the way, can be corrected and saved. For as long as a person is in transit, he can leave the wrong path and travel the right one, because his will always remains free. But if, while prudence stands, virtue necessarily accompanies it — then correspondingly, while imprudence stands, vice would persist necessarily — as is clear from opposites. But while imprudence remains, someone can act rightly and operate well by not following the deviant dictate of reason. Therefore prudence can exist without moral virtue.

One may object first: Aristotle (*Ethics VI, 15*): "If the will chooses badly, the intellect dictates badly." And in (*On the Motion of Animals*) he concludes that the will, unless impeded, follows the right or deviant dictate of the intellect. Therefore while prudence remains in the intellect, virtue persists in the affective power. Confirmation I: Dionysius (*On the Divine Names III, ch. 9*): "No one, looking at evil, performs good." Confirmation II: Augustine (*on Psalm II*): "A

darkening of mind follows those who transgress the law of God." Confirmation III: "Their malice blinded them." Therefore if prudence exists, so does virtue — and conversely. If imprudence exists, so does vice. I respond that the Philosopher is to be interpreted indefinitely, as in (*Physics I*, 48): "Principles are contraries" — supply: indefinitely, not universally. Therefore our assertion is not universal but indefinite: that is, while right reason stands and prudence rightly dictates about doable things, the will can choose and pursue the opposite. Hence having prudence in the intellect, virtue in the will does not necessarily follow — but there can be not only virtue but also its opposite, namely vice. By this the first confirmation is also answered. For as I asserted in (*Book II*, q. 3, art. 3), the will can be borne toward evil as evil. To Confirmation II: I say that this is achieved through the diversion of the intellect around evil concupiscence, according to (*Psalms 57*): "Fire fell upon them, and they did not see the sun." According to Angerius's commentary on the word "blindness." To Confirmation III: I say this happens privatively or positively, as is perspicuous from the second note.

One may object second: the damned in (*Wisdom V*) complain and say: "Therefore we erred, and the light of justice did not shine upon us." If therefore this light — that is, right reason for acting — had shone upon them, they would not have erred. Therefore if prudence is in the intellect, virtue is likewise in the will. I respond that they complain wrongly and conclude ineptly — since they had whatever was needed for their salvation, but they abused it, as is clear from (*Psalms 35*): "He did not wish to understand so as to act well." And they preferred to indulge in illicit pleasures, as they themselves confess (*Wisdom II*): "Let us crown ourselves with roses before they wither; let no meadow go without our debauchery." Hence at the end of that chapter it is subjoined: "These things they thought, and erred. Their malice blinded them."

Question IV. On the Habits of the Will

Since habits are divided into intellectual — of which we treated in the preceding question — and moral — of which we are to treat both in general and in particular in the present question.

Article I. On Habits or Moral Virtues in General

Disputation I. What Moral Virtue Is

That moral virtue exists is established among those who, having relinquished wealth and cast aside their faculties, strive with all effort to acquire it. Indeed, such is the power of moral virtue that Cicero said: "If virtue could be seen with our eyes, it would excite a wondrous love of itself." Samuel writes the same (*to Sixtus VIII*). Hence Horace (*Book I, Epistles*): "The good hate sin out of love of virtue." And Seneca (*Epistle 88*): "Virtue raises a person up and places mortals

above the stars, and neither greatly covets nor greatly fears what are called good or evil things."

Moral virtue, however, is not congenital to us but is acquired through labor, as the Stagirite shows (*Ethics II, 1*). For those things that are instilled by nature can be changed neither by art nor by practice — as a stone, no matter how many times it is thrown upward by one throwing it, cannot by such practice tend upward. But moral virtue by practice changes a person from bad to good, from intemperate to temperate, and from the dissolute to the chaste. I add further: what belongs to us by nature is prior to acts — as the powers precede acts, since the intellect precedes intellection and the will precedes volition. But what is acquired by study and labor — we have an act of these things before we have a habit; and therefore we elicit an act of virtue before acquiring its habit. Therefore moral virtue is not instilled by nature.

It is to be noted and recalled from (*q. I, art. 2 of this book*) that many acceptations of virtue are found in Vorrillon (*Book III, dist. 27*), Aretinus (*ibid., dist. 33*), Gabriel (*dist. 13, q. 1, art. 1*), and Berchorius (*Moral Part III*). I present and explain the principal ones. The first is for power, vigor, and strength — in which sense the intellect and the will are called the virtues of the soul, as are the virtues of herbs, stones, and the like. Hence is derived that axiom: "Virtue is the ultimate of power" — adduced by the Doctor (*in the Reportatio IV, dist. 1, q. 4*) and drawn from Aristotle (*On the Heavens I, T. 131 and following*). The second is for a good disposition ordered toward an end — in which sense (*Physics VII, 17*): "Virtue is a disposition toward what is best"; and so moral and intellectual habits are called virtues (*Ethics II and VI*). The third is for a theological habit — in this sense virtue is defined by Augustine (*Soliloquies; and On Free Will I, ch. 18*): "Virtue is right reason arriving at the supreme end." And in (*On the Spirit and the Soul*) — to which the commentary on Augustine adds (*verb. virtus*): "A good quality of the mind by which one lives rightly, of which no one makes bad use, which God works in us without us." The fourth is for moral virtue alone.

Assertion. Virtue is rightly defined as an elective habit consisting in a mean, determined by right reason, as a wise man will determine. So Aristotle (*Ethics II, 5 and 6*). The Doctor appears to hold the same (*Book III, dist. 33, q. un., B; and dist. 36, q. un., §. Dicitur aliter, sub A*). It is explained with respect to all its parts. "Habit" is placed as genus — for habit is a subalternate genus in which intellectual and moral habits agree. "Elective" is placed to distinguish it from intellectual virtue, since election pertains to the will. "Consisting in a mean" is added because of vicious habits, which concern extremes — not arithmetic but geometric ones. The remaining words are added to distinguish it from prudence, which is dictating and directive, to which, unless the virtue conforms, there is no virtue. The definition being thus explained, it is easy to prove. For that definition is legitimate which consists of genus and difference, as I have often insisted. But the aforesaid definition is of this kind: for the genus is "habit," while the

remaining particles are the differences. Add further that all accept it, and no better or more exact definition has yet been found. Therefore it is to be retained.

One may object first: prudence is counted among the moral virtues, yet is not an elective habit. Therefore moral virtue is wrongly defined as an elective habit. I respond that prudence is formally an intellectual virtue, and is called moral in a directive and extrinsic sense, because it directs the moral virtues — as Orbelli rightly notes (*Book III, dist. 33, q. 2*).

One may object second: certain moral virtues pertain to the sensitive appetite — such as fortitude and temperance (*Ethics III, 9*). Therefore moral virtue is not an elective habit, which belongs to the will alone. I respond with Scotus (*Book III, dist. 33, q. un., §. Ad argumenta principalia, ante N*): those qualities that reside in the sensitive appetite are not properly virtues in the way that those residing in the will are — as is to be decided below according to the plan.

Disputation II. Whether Goodness Is of the Intrinsic Nature of Moral Virtue

Thomas (*Summa I-II, q. 55, art. 1 and 4*) and Gabriel (*Book III, dist. 23*) assert that moral virtue intrinsically and formally includes moral goodness. But the subtle Doctor (*Book I, dist. 17, q. 2, art. 3, §. Quantum ad istum*), Lychetus, and others there deny that moral virtue requires goodness as its intrinsic and quidditative reason.

It is to be noted first, recalling from (*Book II, q. 1, art. 2*), that moral goodness is the conformity of an act to right reason fully dictating concerning the due circumstances of the same act, and is formally a relation — which per se has no active principle, since it follows only from the positing of its extremes. In the same way, moral virtue is the habitual conformity of the will to right reason, as the Doctor rightly notes (*loc. cit., sub Q*). And it adds nothing above the substance of the habit except the relation of the said conformity — as is clear from what was said at the passage cited.

It is to be noted second that in moral virtue two things are distinguished: the quality, which is an absolute being — called its material being with respect to the aforesaid relation — and its conformity to right reason, which is its formal being. Therefore moral virtue materially is a quality, while formally it is the relation of the said conformity. Hence Scotus (*Quodlibet XVIII, §. De I, infra H*), when it was objected from Aristotle (*Ethics X, 3; and the Book of the Predicaments, chapter on quality*) that the good is a quality and that virtue too is a quality, responds from (*Physics VII, 10, cc. 10, 20*) that every virtue and malice designates a relation, but has the mode of denominating or predicating quality — just as "healthy" and "beautiful."

It is to be noted third, from the same Doctor (*loc. cit., §. Hanc viam, ante S*), that even though a relation is not formally an active principle — being of the genus of sterile things — yet that with which the relation is really identified is an active

principle. Thus a moral habit, precisely insofar as it denotes a relation of conformity to right reason, is not active; but it is active insofar as it is a quality — just as a relation that is really identified with a creature is not active, but the substance of the creature is truly an active principle. Therefore since virtue derives its name from "power" (*vis*), it receives this denomination not from the said relation but from its entity, which is a quality.

Assertion. Moral virtue is not intrinsically and formally good. So the Doctor holds (*loc. cit.*, §. *Sed oppositum*, O; and §. *Quantum ad istum*, Q; and *Book II*, *dist.* 36, *q. un.*, §. *Dicitur aliter*, sub A). It is proved first: what is adventitious and accidental to something is not intrinsic and essential to it. But goodness is adventitious and accidental to moral virtue. Therefore it is not intrinsic and quidditative to it. The major is clear from the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic, essential and accidental. The minor is at hand: the same habit of abstaining from wine for the sake of Jupiter — which is not good — if the one who has such a habit converts to the true God and exercises acts of the same habit, which he retains, that habit becomes good and meritorious. Therefore goodness is accidental and extrinsic to moral virtue.

The Complutenses respond (*Ethics*, *disp.* 7, *q.* 1, *art.* 2): one who is imbued with the habit of abstinence and has converted from the idol of Jupiter to the true God performs two functions — namely, abstaining from the drinking of wine, and restraining the disordered appetite. By reason of the latter function, not the former, he feels ease in abstaining religiously, whereas before he abstained superstitiously. Against this: the same habit of abstinence remains, and what was previously superstitious is now religious, previously bad, now good. Therefore intrinsically virtue does not import goodness — otherwise it would always be good, since what belongs to the intrinsic reason of something cannot be changed without its essence being destroyed. Therefore, although by reason of the prior function it is not good, while by reason of the latter it is, it does not well follow that goodness enters the essence of virtue.

Racon responds (*Tract. on virtues*, *m.* 3): they are distinct habits. Against this: that habit is productive of the same acts of abstinence. Therefore it is not a distinct habit whose acts are not distinct. Second: a relation is not of the essence of an absolute being — since absolute being and relation are two members of being, from one another distinct, into which being itself is divided, as is clear from the (*Tract. on Formalities*). But goodness is formally a relation, and a habit is an absolute being — being a quality. Therefore, and so on. Third: a moral habit is of itself indifferent to goodness and malice. For there are neutral and indifferent acts, as I proved in (*Article III*, *Question II*, *Book III*). Furthermore, moral virtue is not good unless it conforms to prudence; therefore since it can be conformed or disconformed to it, it is clearly not essentially good.

One may object first: Augustine (*On Free Will II*, *ch.* 18; and *On the Customs of the Church II*, *ch.* 6) defines virtue in these words: "Virtue is a good quality of the

mind." Therefore goodness is intrinsically contained in the essence of virtue, since it is placed in its definition. I respond that Augustine there speaks of infused and theological virtue — as his subsequent words indicate and Vorrillon (*loc. cit.*) notes. But we are speaking of moral virtue and habit, as is clear from the title of this article.

One may object second: "Virtue is that which perfects its possessor and renders his work good" (*Ethics II*, 5). And "Virtue is the good disposition of a perfect thing toward what is best" (*Physics VII*, 17). And "Virtue and vice are opposed as contraries" (*Book of the Predicaments, chapter on opposites*). But vice is intrinsically evil. Therefore virtue is intrinsically good. I respond that Aristotle is to be expounded as speaking of virtue conjoined with and coexisting with prudence, not of virtue as a quality. For in itself virtue involves no intrinsic moral goodness, as Scotus suggests (*loc. cit.*, §. *Ad illas*, *BB*).

One may object third: what is placed in the definition of something is contained in its intrinsic reason — for a definition grasps and expresses the essence of a thing. But moral goodness is posited in the definition of virtue, which is "an elective habit consisting in a mean, as a wise man will determine." Therefore goodness is not to be removed from the essence of virtue. I distinguish the major: what is placed in a purely quidditative and essential definition, I grant; what is placed in a definition given by way of addition, as in the present case, I deny. This solution is indicated by the last words of the definition adduced — namely, "as a wise man will determine" — where it is signified that virtue depends on prudence, to which it is conformed and without which it would not be virtue. Therefore absolutely speaking, virtue as a quality exhibits no moral goodness; insofar, however, as it regards prudence, to which it is conformed, it includes goodness.

One may say: virtue formally, as virtue, imports a relation of conformity to right reason. But such conformity is a relation through which, according to Scotus, virtue is formally constituted in the being of virtue. Therefore virtue intrinsically contains in itself moral goodness. I respond that the argument proves this of virtue as it is virtue formally — not of virtue taken materially, which is what the present difficulty concerns.

One may object fourth: the habit of playing the cithara tends only toward harmonious sound according to the precepts and rules of the art. Therefore likewise the virtue of, say, temperance inclines only toward abstinence with the due circumstances that render it formally good — and therefore goodness is intrinsic to moral virtue. Granting the antecedent, the controversy still remains whether those circumstances and the relation of conformity enter into the nature of virtue as a quality — which we deny — or are extrinsic and adventitious to it — which we concede. For just as a surface is of itself indifferent to receiving whiteness or blackness, so moral virtue is indifferent to goodness or malice.

Disputation III. Whether Moral Virtue Consists in a Mean

That moral virtue consists in a mean is the common view of the philosophers. I say "moral virtue" — for scholastics teach that theological virtue is without a mean, notably Thomas (*Summa II-II*, q. 17, art. 5) and Báñez (*ibid.*, q. 27, art. 6). The reason they give is that it is measured by an infinite object — although from the side of the one possessing it and with respect to circumstances it can have a mean, as the same authors note.

It is to be noted first, from (*Ethics II*, 6), that there are two kinds of mean: arithmetic and geometric. The former is called the mean of the thing, which always preserves equality between extremes — as the number six mediates between ten and two, since it is equidistant from both by four units. The latter is called the mean of reason and with respect to us, in which equality is not preserved but proportion and fittingness, according to the right dictate of reason. Furthermore, two kinds of mean are commonly assigned, recalled by Scotus (*Book II*, dist. 15, q. un.) and Orbelli (*Metaphysics IV*, q. 4): one is called the mean by participation in the extremes, which participates something from each extreme — as tepid water mediates between hot and cold. The other is called the mean by negation of the extremes — as virtue is said to mediate between two extreme vices (*Ethics II*, 8), because it recedes from both. Say, liberality is the mean between prodigality and avarice, because it turns away and flees from them.

First Assertion. Moral virtue is situated in a mean — not arithmetic but geometric, and not in the mean by participation but by negation of the extremes. The assertion is comprised in three parts and is deduced from Scotus (*Book III*, dist. 33, q. un.; and dist. 36, q. un.).

The first part is expressed explicitly by Aristotle (*Ethics II*, 7). It is proved first by induction: liberality mediates between prodigality and avarice; fortitude between audacity and timidity; and so for the remaining virtues. Therefore virtue is in the mean. Second: virtue is defined as "an elective habit consisting in a mean." And it is on everyone's lips: "Extremes are always vicious." Therefore virtue is rightly said to exist in the mean.

The second part is shown: what mediates between things by arithmetic mean is equidistant from its extremes, as is clear from the note set down above. But moral virtue is closer to one extreme than to the other (*Ethics II*, 8) — as fortitude is closer to audacity than to fear. Therefore it does not obtain an arithmetic mean.

The third part follows from the preceding: since, as was proved, virtue is in a mean — not arithmetic — it plainly follows that it is in a geometric mean, since no other mean is found besides the two named.

Second Assertion. Justice admits of a mean. This is maintained against Racon and certain others who do not acknowledge a mean in justice, and is collected from the Doctor (*loc. cit.*), which Orbelli explicitly defends (*both in Metaphysics IV, q. 4; and Book III, dist. 33*). It is proved first: (*Ecclesiastes VII*): "Do not be overly just." Where a sin through excess is denoted as occurring sometimes in justice. Second: one who gives another more than is due sins against justice, and one who decrees excessive punishment for the guilty also opposes justice. I add: distributive justice consists in an arithmetic mean, distributing rewards according to the merits of each (*Ethics V, 2*). And commutative justice preserves the geometric mean, giving to each what is his according to the proportion and dignity of persons. I conclude therefore that justice is placed in a mean — which Orbelli (*loc. cit.*) explains thus: between the just and the unjust, the not-just mediates — just as between seeing and blind, not-seeing mediates.

One may object first against the first assertion: certain moral virtues hold extremes. Therefore not every virtue has a mean. The antecedent is shown: magnanimity regards great honors, magnificence great expenditures, and virginity great abstinence from venereal pleasures. I deny the antecedent; to its proof I say that these hold a mean — since they perform their functions not rashly but prudently and with caution, as right reason dictates. With respect to that rule the mean of virtue is taken, not with respect to the quantity of the thing — as is clear from (*Ethics I, 6*).

One may object second: virtue and vice are two extremes opposed to each other, as is clear in (*Postpraedicamenta, chapter on opposites*). Therefore virtue occupies not a mean but an extreme position. The antecedent is shown: between good and evil there is no mean. Therefore neither between virtue and vice — since virtue is good and vice is evil. I deny the antecedent; to its proof I say that virtue is not compared to vice as an extreme. For in that case it would not hold a mean — since the mean presupposes extremes between which it mediates. But it is compared to two extreme vices, between which it obtains the mean — as I made plain above in the case of liberality, which mediates between avarice and prodigality.

Disputation IV. Whether the Moral Virtues Are Connected with One Another

Thomas (*Summa I-II, q. 65, art. 1*), Richard (*Book III, dist. 36, q. 1*), and the Complutenses (*Ethics, disp. 6, q. 4, art. 2*) embrace the affirmative part, asserting that the moral virtues are necessarily connected with one another as to their genera and their species. But the negative part is followed by Scotus (*Book III, dist. 36, q. un., §. Quantum ad istum, B*), Bonaventure (*ibid.*), Brulifer, Vorrillon, and the remaining Scotists and Nominalists, who say that the aforesaid virtues are connected with each other.

It is to be noted that the moral virtues can be regarded either as imperfect or as perfect in their genus, or simply and with respect to the end attainable by a

person. According to these distinctions, some say that moral virtues are connected in the perfect state but not in the imperfect state — which the Doctor refutes (*loc. cit.*, §. *Contra hoc*). For if one virtue can exist in the second and third degree, it can certainly exist in the eighth and last degree, if the exercise is performed only in it and not in another. For someone can exercise acts of temperance without exercising acts of justice, and consequently can acquire the habit of temperance in its perfect state, even without acquiring the habit of justice — because he is occupied in the one and not in the other. Again, he may not think about another virtue — either because he so wills, or because no occasion presents itself for eliciting acts with respect to its matter, or because he can only do what his acquired habit inclines him toward and not what he has no habit for nor any inclination toward. Therefore, neither in the perfect state are the moral virtues joined. Nor does it avail to say with others — whom the same Doctor pursues (*ibid.*, §. *Dicitur aliter*) — that one habit, even if perfect, does not enjoy the reason of virtue unless the union and connection of the other virtues accedes. For since virtue is an elective habit determined by right reason, prudence can dictate about things pertaining to temperance and not about things pertaining to justice. Therefore given this hypothesis, the habit of temperance is acquired without the habit of justice — and thus one virtue does not require the union and connection of the other virtues.

Moreover, if the connection of virtues were necessary, there would be no order in their acquisition. For if, once temperance is had, it cannot exist without justice — and neither is a virtue without the other — then one is not prior to the other, since neither requires the other for its being. Or if it is conceded that one precedes the other, one could be without the other, and therefore no necessary connection exists between them. But speaking absolutely, no one can be morally good unless he participates in all the moral virtues — just as no one is simply and perfectly sentient without all the senses, as Scotus concludes (*loc. cit.*, §. *Quantum ad istum, sub B*) and as follows from (*Ethics VI, 13*): "The simply good does not happen to be separated. For when prudence exists in one, all will be present in him."

Assertion. The moral virtues are not connected with one another. So the Doctor holds (*loc. cit.*). It is proved first from Augustine (*On the Sentence of James, to Jerome, ante medium*): "This is not that divine sentence which says that whoever has one virtue has all, and that none exists for one who lacks any one." And (*ibid.*, *post medium*): "One and the same man has greater prudence than patience, and still does not have continence, even if he has greater mercy." Hence Vorrillon (*loc. cit.*) writes that this is the express opinion of Augustine and the Catholics, against the Stoics and Thomists. Second, from Aristotle (*Ethics VI*), cited by Orbelli (*here, art. 2*): "The same person is not best suited to all." Therefore one who exercises himself in things toward which he is inclined will acquire virtue concerning those things; but if he does not exercise himself in others toward which he is not inclined, he will not acquire virtue concerning those — as a

religious person can become accustomed to moderating and restraining his passions, but not to undertaking and engaging in military affairs. Third: parts can exist without the whole, because they are prior to it — and one precedes another, as form precedes matter, and the heart or liver precedes the other parts of an animal. But one virtue does not perfect a person totally and cumulatively, but only partially. Therefore, just as essential and integral parts are not necessarily connected, neither are accidental and perfective parts — such as the moral virtues. This is confirmed and illustrated admirably by the Doctor (*just recalled*) in the case of the sensitive powers: for who can have perfect vision without hearing, or the reverse? Therefore one can enjoy one virtue without another. Fourth: just as prudence is directive of the moral virtues, so is wisdom directive of the intellectual ones — for it is the head (*caput*) and mistress of the sciences (*Ethics VI, 8*). Yet who can excel in Metaphysics who lacks Geometry? And some can be endowed with Physics while lacking Mathematics. Therefore likewise one can be adorned with one moral virtue and deprived of another — especially if the habits are disparate, such as conjugal continence and virginity, or magnanimity and humility. Therefore there is no necessary bond between the moral virtues.

One may object first: Aristotle (*Ethics VI, 13*), Augustine (*On the Trinity VI, 3*), Gregory (*Moralia XIX, c. 3*), and others adduced by Richard and Basil — seconded by Cicero (*Tusculan Disputations II*) and Averroes (*Ethics VI*) — openly assert that the moral virtues are mutually joined and connected. I respond that these authorities are to be expounded of the one who is morally perfect and perfectly good — that is, one who enjoys every perfection. Just as one is said to be perfectly sentient who is endowed with all the senses, so one is simply and perfectly moral who is richly supplied with all the moral virtues on every side — especially for attaining the ultimate end. For although someone may be courageous and mild, yet if he is a fornicator, he will not possess the kingdom of God. For "whoever fails in one point has become accountable for all" (*James II*). To this Paul refers (*I Corinthians XIII*): "If I know all mysteries, and if I have all knowledge, and if I have all faith so that I can move mountains, but do not have charity, I am nothing." Nor does Jerome dissent (*on chapter 16 of Isaiah*): "As a cithara does not emit a harmonious sound if one string is broken, so the spirit, if one virtue is absent, will not resound with melody."

One may object second: there is no perfect temperance unless fortitude is annexed to it, and fortitude is not perfect without prudence, which directs all virtues. Therefore virtues are mutually bound. The antecedent is shown: if a temperate person is presented with death or fornication, and is not courageous, he will succumb to fornication rather than to death. But if he is courageous, he will choose death rather than fornication — as Cicero says: "I prefer to die than to be defiled." And (*Daniel XIII*): "It is better for me to fall without the deed into the hands of men than to sin in the sight of the Lord." I deny the antecedent; to its proof I say that this is per accidens. For temperance in its own genus is

perfect and does not labor around the matter of another virtue — such as fortitude, whose function is to endure terrible things. And it is not the function of one virtue to direct a person toward all things, but toward its own proper and peculiar end — just as sight in itself is perfect that perfectly discerns visible things, nor is it imperfect with respect to this sense if it lacks hearing or another sense.

Disputation V. Whether the Moral Virtues Are Connected with the Theological Virtues

One may ask not only whether the moral virtues are necessarily bound to the theological virtues, but also whether the theological virtues are joined to one another such that one cannot be separated from another. Both difficulties are raised and resolved by Scotus in both works (*3.d.36.q.un.*), Vorreux, Orbellis, and the other authors previously named, in the same place. Note from the Doctor in the passage of the third book now cited that each virtue, whether moral or theological, is perfect in its own species. For it has its proper object and end, as well as whatever is required for its specific being. But with respect to the common and ultimate end, all virtues are said to be unformed and imperfect. For the moral virtues presuppose the theological, and the theological virtues do not suffice to attain the end without charity. For this reason charity is called their perfection — not, indeed, an intrinsic perfection, but an extrinsic one, by reason of the end that can be attained. Note further that the theological virtues excel the moral, both by reason of their object, since the object of the theological virtues is uncreated and infinite being, whereas the object of the moral virtues is created and finite being, and also by reason of their end, since the end of the former is ultimate, while the end of the latter is not ultimate — that is, an end subordinate to an end. Moreover, they are not equal to one another. For among the theological virtues charity is preeminent, and among the moral virtues magnanimity and liberality excel.

First Assertion. The moral virtues have no bond of union with the theological virtues. So holds the Doctor in the place cited above. It is proved from Augustine's sermon on patience (*Serm. de patientia*), which is found in the Decrees (*d.49*) and in the section on penance (*d.3. §. Quamvis de haeretico*): if a heretic or schismatic who dies and denies Christ — shall we commend his patience? Here we have patience, which is a moral virtue, existing without charity, which is a theological virtue. Secondly, when one thing stands to another as a disposition to a form, the disposition can exist without the form — just as alteration can occur without generation, as was explained in the treatise on generation (*l. de generatione, q.1*). But a moral virtue stands as a disposition toward the theological virtues, just as natural happiness stands toward supernatural happiness. Therefore the moral virtues are not necessarily bound to the theological. Thirdly, even if there were no theological virtues, there would still be moral virtues, as is evident from Socrates and the other moral

philosophers, who possessed moral but not theological virtues. Again, what is prior can exist without what is posterior, provided there is no essential dependence or connection between them, as was shown elsewhere. But the moral virtues precede the theological in order and priority of nature. Therefore they are not necessarily connected with them.

Second Assertion. Nor are the theological virtues connected with one another. So holds the Doctor in the cited place (§. *Quantum ad 4. art.R.*). It is proved firstly from the fact that in heaven charity exists without faith and hope: *Charity never fails, though prophecies will be made void and tongues will cease (1 Cor. 13)*, and shortly after: *When that which is perfect has come, that which is in part will be made void*; and a little further: *We now see through a glass darkly, but then face to face*. Secondly, in this life a sinful believer who is in mortal sin has faith and hope but not charity, as the same Apostle indicates in the passage cited: *If I have all faith so as to remove mountains, but have not charity, I am nothing*. Therefore the theological virtues are not necessarily connected with one another by a necessary bond.

First Objection against the First Assertion. The formal being of a thing is necessarily connected with that of which it is the formal being, as is established both logically and in natural philosophy. For a genus cannot exist without its differences, nor matter without form. But the formal being of the moral virtues is charity, without which they are unformed, as Augustine testifies (4. *contra Iulianum*, c.2): whoever possesses them without charity does not perfectly glory in the Lord, as Paul confirms (Col. 3): *Above all these things, have charity, which is the bond of perfection*. Therefore the union between the moral and theological virtues is necessary.

I distinguish the major premise: if it is understood of intrinsic essential formal being, I grant it; if of extrinsic formal being, such as the theological virtues are with respect to the moral virtues, I deny it. For in their own species the moral virtues are perfect, although with respect to the ultimate end and to a further perfection they may rightly be called imperfect, because the ultimate end cannot be attained without charity. In this way the testimony of Augustine is to be explained, as well as any other passage adduced in opposition.

Second Objection. No form can exist without its prerequisite dispositions, since the form presupposes them and could not inform matter without them. But the moral virtues stand as dispositions toward the theological virtues. Therefore the theological virtues cannot exist without the moral virtues. The major is evident from natural philosophy. The minor is from Scotus in the cited place (§. *Contra hoc.N.*). I respond that the major holds in natural things but not in supernatural and gratuitous things, such as the theological virtues, which God bestows upon us by his will and generosity, as the Doctor indicates in the cited passage (§. *Quantum ad 4.R.*).

Third Objection. The theological virtues presuppose the moral, because the moral are ordered to the theological as the imperfect to the perfect and the lower to the higher, on the authority of the Augustine just mentioned. Therefore the moral virtues are necessarily bound to the theological. It follows further that just as faith and hope can exist without charity, yet charity cannot exist without faith and hope — since without faith it is impossible to please God (*Hebr. 11*) — so by parity of reasoning the theological virtues, being more perfect, cannot exist without the moral virtues.

I deny the antecedent. For a baptized infant or an unlettered adult possesses the theological virtues but not the moral, as is evident at least with respect to act, since they do not perform moral acts — and because the moral virtues are not infused per se but acquired, and beyond the theological habits there are no other per se infused habits; otherwise a man would be prudent, temperate, and just in the same way that he is a believer through infused faith. Likewise, in the blessed there is no need for infused knowledge in its own proper genus; the beatific knowledge in the Word suffices. Nor is it improbable that the blessed can acquire some knowledge in their own proper genus, as I said concerning the experimental knowledge of Christ the Lord in the treatise on the Incarnation.

One may say: the end requires and presupposes the means without which the end itself is not attained. But the moral virtues are as a means for achieving the end with respect to the theological virtues, because it is through moral means that charity attains the ultimate end, as the Doctor teaches in the place cited above (*Sub N.*). Therefore the theological virtues are not found without the moral.

I distinguish the major: if it is understood of a means that is necessary for the attainment of the end, I grant it; if of a means that is gratuitous, as the moral virtues are with respect to the theological, I deny it.

Disputation VI. In What Subject the Moral Virtues Are Seated

Although this difficulty is addressed and resolved in Articles V and VI of this book in the treatise on habits taken in general (*q.1. de habitibus generaliter sumptis*), it is nevertheless pleasing to examine and resolve here in particular the question of fortitude and temperance. For Saint Thomas (*1.2.q.56.art.4*) and his disciples assert that fortitude and temperance are seated in the sensitive appetite. But Scotus (*3.d.33.q.un.*), Ockham in the same place (*q.10*), and the followers of both — to whom Bacon also assents (*disp. de virtutibus, sect.3.q.2.art.2*) — firmly and vigorously maintain that fortitude and temperance, as virtues, reside in the will, just like the other moral virtues.

Note from the Doctor in the cited place (§. *Ad arg. principalia, ante N.*) that in the sensitive appetite a quality or habit can be generated by repeated acts in the matter of fortitude and temperance, by reason of which the sensitive appetite is able to obey reason more easily and readily. Yet this is not properly and

essentially a virtue, since it is not an elective habit, which belongs to the will alone; it can rather be called a path and disposition toward acquiring virtue in a man who is capable of virtue — not, however, in brutes, which have a sensitive appetite but lack a will. Thus in certain animals — a dog, for example — a habit of refraining from food set before it until its master judges that the food offered may be taken can be generated in its sensitive appetite through conditioning. Likewise habits of standing, jumping, and other such things that are acquired by habit and custom can be engendered in it, as I said in the previously named place (*art.8*). Note further, from what has been said elsewhere, that there is a twofold appetite — the sensitive, which belongs also to brutes, and the rational, which is proper to man and is called the will. Hence Scotus (*3 Rep. d.33.q.un. in fine*) and (*3 Oxon. d.34.G.&H.*), following Bonaventure in the same place, acknowledges in man a twofold concupiscible and irascible: one irrational, in which no virtue resides; the other rational, in which virtue inheres — namely, fortitude in the concupiscible and temperance in the irascible.

Assertion. Fortitude and temperance are located in the will as their subject. This is defended by Scotus in the passage just cited. It is proved firstly: a habit resides in the same faculty in which its act resides (*l. de somno et vigilia, c.1*). But the acts of fortitude and temperance are located in the will — since choice pertains to the will as the faculty that elects, whether in facing and enduring dreadful things or in renouncing the pleasures and allurements of the flesh and preserving sobriety. Therefore the habits of both reside in the will. Secondly, fortitude and temperance have the same subject as virtue itself and the definition of virtue — but the definition of virtue is accommodated only to a habit residing in the will, since virtue is an elective habit (*2 Eth. 6*), and choice properly belongs to the will alone. Since, therefore, temperance and fortitude are properly virtues, it is plainly concluded that they reside in the will. Thirdly, the said virtues are located in the power that endures difficulty in bearing their matter, since virtue concerns what is difficult (*2 Eth. 3*). But it is the will that endures difficulty in approaching dangers and in abstaining from pleasures — and is sometimes drawn and carried away by them, as indicated by James (*Iac. 1*): *Each person is tempted when he is drawn away and enticed by his own concupiscence*. And the well-known saying goes: *Each man is drawn by his own pleasure*. Furthermore, God and the angels are said to be strong (*Ps. 23*) — not on account of the difficult arousal of a sensitive appetite, which they lack — but therefore on account of the intellective appetite, of which they are capable. Moreover, the intellect is the common subject of all intellectual virtues, as no one denies; therefore the will is likewise the common subject of all moral virtues. For the same reasoning applies in Aristotle concerning justice as concerning the others, as the Doctor argues in the cited place (§. *Haec opinio*). But justice is placed in the will even by the adversaries — therefore the same holds for fortitude and temperance.

One may object with the Coimbrans (*art.2.q.5.disp.7 Eth.*) that there is a disparity here, since justice immediately directs the will toward the good of another,

rendering to each what is his own, whereas temperance and fortitude are ordered toward one's own goods. Therefore the former resides in the will, while the latter reside in the sensitive appetite.

On the contrary: fortitude and temperance can be ordered and directed toward the goods of one's country and other common goods — as when someone goes to war for his homeland against its enemies, or when someone abstains from base concupiscences out of love of God and neighbor. If, therefore, justice inheres in the will for the reason alleged, then surely for very nearly the same reason the said virtues are located in the same will. Moreover, it pertains equally to the will to live justly, to live temperately, and to act courageously. And if merit and the morally good pertain to the will, then without doubt its principle and its disposition also belong to the will itself — as Vorreux, mentioned above, elaborates following the Seraphic Doctor.

First Objection. Aristotle (*2 Eth. 10*) and the last chapter of the first book of the same work places fortitude and temperance in the sensitive appetite. Therefore the opinion of Scotus conflicts with Aristotle. It follows further that the said virtues are said to be in the concupiscible and irascible parts, which are not parts of the will but of the sensitive appetite; for they are occupied with the arduous good and the pleasant good, which belong to the sensitive appetite. Therefore the aforesaid virtues have their seat in the sensitive appetite.

I respond by explaining Aristotle through a distinction: concerning fortitude and temperance as virtues, I deny it — since virtues are properly elective habits — but concerning fortitude and temperance as certain habits and capacities with respect to the goods mentioned above, which can even be had in a dog, horse, and other brutes, I grant it. And Aristotle himself suggests this (*1 Magn. mor. cap.6*), placing fortitude and temperance in the irrational part, and likewise in the same work (*cap.1*).

One may say with the Coimbrans in the cited place: therefore there is a twofold fortitude and temperance, yet Aristotle mentions neither of them. On the contrary, over and above the fact that the argument is from negative authority, it is not obscurely derived from the passages already cited that according to Aristotle there is a twofold fortitude and a twofold temperance — one in the will, and another in the sensitive appetite, which does not merit the name of virtue. To the consequence I say that in the will too there is found a spiritual concupiscible and irascible with respect to the said objects, just as in the sensitive appetite there are a material concupiscible and irascible.

Second Objection. The will is fully perfected by the theological habits; therefore moral virtues ought not to be admitted in it. I distinguish the antecedent: with respect to the divine good, I grant it; with respect to the created good, I deny it. Similarly, the intellect is perfected by the light of glory and by consummated

glory, yet from it natural intellectual habits are not removed — they are its ornaments and natural perfections.

Third Objection. Medicine is applied to the part that is ailing, as we observe daily. But in the matter of fortitude and temperance, the sensitive appetite is the ailing part; therefore the medicine that fortitude and temperance constitute ought to be applied to it. I respond that the major premise is not universally true. For when the head is suffering, medicine is applied to the arm, the veins, and other parts. And this is evident from sympathetic powder and from agents acting at a distance. Or, granted the major, I say that to the sensitive appetite, as its remedy, there is applied the habit and quality already explained above — not, however, the habit that is a virtue.

Fourth Objection. Perfect temperance is had if the sensitive appetite is restrained and fully subjected so as not to resist right reason, as Sacred Scripture indicates (*Gen. 4*): *Your appetite will be subject to you, and you will rule over it*. Therefore temperance is located in the sensitive appetite.

I grant the antecedent and deny the consequence. For all that follows is that the will endowed with temperance restrains the sensitive appetite and holds back its impulse so that it obeys right reason.

Disputation VII. Whether There Are Moral Virtues in Angels

This difficulty has its origin in the resolution of the preceding disputation. For if the will is the subject of the moral virtues, as was established there, and the angel possesses a will, it is not unreasonable to inquire whether the aforesaid virtues reside in the will of an angel. On this question, the Thomists, followed by the Coimbrans (*q.5.disp.7.Eth.art.3*), deny that virtues of this kind exist in angels, since angels lack the sensitive appetite, which they consider to be the adequate subject. For once the subject is removed, all that belongs to the subject is removed. But Scotus (*3.d.33.q.un. §.Ad 1.*) appears to be undecided on the matter. In favor of the affirmative he adduces this argument: every will that does not necessarily lack some perfection befitting it can acquire that perfection for itself, as is evident in the other powers that tend to acquire their fitting perfections. But to will a practical good not only for oneself but for another is a perfection of the will, just as to understand some intelligible object is a perfection of the intellect. Therefore it can belong to the will of an angel to will for itself the good of temperance, and by repeated acts to generate within itself a habit of such practical goods — and such a habit is temperance. Hence there is no repugnance for an angel to possess this habit, whether for itself or for another, as the Doctor teaches concerning practical justice (*q.4.prol. infra N.*). Indeed, this is not denied even of God, insofar as it is considered apart from every imperfection, as Scotus indicates both here and in (*4.d.46.q.3.q. Ad arg. principalia. M.*): for charity, fortitude, justice, and mercy are attributed to God and to the angels. For God is called strong and mighty, merciful and just. And the angel Michael is called the

strength of God. I add further that certain choirs of angels are named principalities, powers, and virtues. Moreover, a more perfect nature participates not only in the perfections of a less perfect nature but in others that are nobler — as is evident in man, who not only enjoys the perfections of things below him but also possesses others that are greater and more excellent. Since, therefore, man, who is inferior to the angel, possesses moral virtues, so too does the angel, and in a nobler manner. See Mayr (*q.2.art.7*) and Aretus (*art.6*).

On the other hand, in favor of the negative the same Doctor in the same place puts forward this argument: virtue is concerned with the arduous and difficult good; but the good of temperance is not difficult of attainment except for one who has a sensitive appetite that tends toward what is opposed to that good, at least in some circumstance. Since the will of an angel is not joined to a sensitive appetite, it follows that the habit of temperance does not exist in it. Or one may say with the same Doctor in the same place that in an angel there is no effective will capable of commanding in the matter of temperance, since it lacks a sensitive appetite; there is only a simple and inefficacious volition, which is not fitted to command — and therefore the habit of temperance does not exist in an angel.

First Objection against the Affirmative Part. Aristotle (*10 Eth. 10*) excludes moral virtues from the gods; therefore the opinion affirming that moral virtues exist in angels contradicts the Peripatetic school.

I respond that the Philosopher excludes from the gods — or angels — accidental and adventitious habits, because he thought these were really identified with their substance and were innate to them. But since the said Philosopher is deficient in his principles, he is equally deficient in his conclusion. For it is false that intellectual and moral habits are identical with their substance, since they are the substance's accidental perfections, separable from it, as I showed at length in the treatise on angels (*tract. de Ang. disp.1*). Or one may say that he denied such habits to them in the sense of habits for taming the passions of the sensitive appetite, which angels lack. So the Doctor deals with the objection in the Reportata (*Rep. 3. d. praesenti, §.Contra in Deo*).

Second Objection. One who lacks the matter and objective grounds of fortitude and temperance likewise lacks the virtues of fortitude and temperance, as is evident. But the will of an angel lacks the matter and objective grounds of these virtues. Therefore it also lacks the virtues themselves. The major is evident. The minor is proved: the matter of fortitude is the arduous good concerning dreadful things, and the matter of temperance is the arduous good concerning pleasures that are agreeable to the sensitive appetite. The angel, however, is exempt from these, since it has no sensitive appetite.

I grant the major and deny the minor. For an angel can, when objects of temperance and fortitude are presented to it, rightly choose what is to be done

regarding these or those practical matters, and by frequent acts generate within itself a habit of such practical matters — and thus it would possess those virtues. The same must be affirmed of the blessed, who are endowed with all the virtues, as is clear from Augustine (*14 Trin. cap.9*) and the Master (*3.d.33*).

Third Objection against the Negative Part. If Scotus's argument were true — namely, that an angel desiring temperance for someone would cause the habit of temperance in that person — then an intemperate father and an immodest mother who desire the habits of temperance and modesty in their children would generate those habits in them. This Medina considered to be manifestly false and plainly absurd (*1.2.q.61.art.5*).

I deny the consequence of the antecedent, since the desire of wicked parents with respect to their children is not effective but simple and inefficacious — and therefore it does not follow that the aforesaid habits are produced in them. Thus Medina ineptly argues against Scotus in the cited place.

Disputation VIII. Whether There Are Virtues Other Than the Theological and the Moral

Henry of Ghent (*Quol.4.q.33*) established a distinction between virtues, gifts, and beatitudes as diverse habits, saying that virtues dispose in a human manner, the gifts of the Holy Spirit in a superhuman manner, and the beatitudes in an inhuman manner. Saint Thomas (*3.d.34.q.1. parte 1*) and Saint Bonaventure in the same place do not appear to diverge from this view — both of whom Scotus reports and refutes in that place (*q.un.*), reducing all other habits to the seven virtues, namely the cardinal and the theological.

Note firstly that the theological virtues are three — faith, hope, and charity — and the cardinal virtues four — prudence, fortitude, temperance, and justice. The gifts of the Holy Spirit, from Isaiah XI, are seven: wisdom, understanding, knowledge, counsel, fortitude, piety, and fear of God. The beatitudes, from Matthew V, are eight: poverty of spirit, mourning, mercy, nakedness, purity of heart, peace, persecution for justice, and patience. The fruits of the Holy Spirit, from Galatians V, are twelve: charity, joy, peace, patience, kindness, goodness, longsuffering, meekness, faith, modesty, continence, and chastity.

Note secondly that the objects of the virtues are either God or creatures. With respect to God there are three virtues, called theological because they regard God as their proper object — believing in him, which is faith; hoping in him, which is hope; and loving him, which is charity. With respect to the created object, virtues are ordered as follows: either a man moderates himself, and this happens in two ways — by restraining the irascible, giving rise to fortitude regarding dreadful things, or the concupiscible, giving rise to temperance regarding pleasurable things — or he moderates another, from which justice emerges; or he dictates what is to be done, from which prudence arises.

Assertion. The other aforementioned habits are to be reduced to the seven virtues enumerated. So holds the Doctor in the place cited above (§. *Ad istam, q.B. & §. His suppositis*). Gregory the Great favors this (*in Iob. l.1.cap.18. in 3. exp.*): *Seven sons were born to him — that is, the seven virtues*. And Isaiah IV: *Seven women shall take hold of one man — that is, the seven virtues*. This is urged firstly: through the virtues the wayfarer is perfected to the extent that perfection is possible in this life. Therefore the said seven virtues suffice, to which all other habits are to be reduced. The antecedent is clear from the second note: for either man is perfected in his ordering toward God, and then he requires the theological virtues; or in his ordering toward creatures, and then he is adorned with the moral virtues. Again, for the perfecting of the created intellect, beyond the speculative habits there is need of prudence, which deliberates about all practical matters; and for its effect — that is, for adorning the will — the remaining three moral virtues are necessary. Secondly, every multitude and plurality must be reduced to certain supreme heads, as is evident in the case of universals, which are reduced to five, and in the case of the predicaments, which are reduced to ten supreme categories. Therefore the plurality of the perfections of the wayfarer, since it can be reduced to the said seven virtues, is to be so reduced — lest a plurality be posited without necessity, contrary to the Philosopher (*1 Phys. T.52*). The consequence is proved: for either they are named with their own names and species, or they are named with other names and more contracted species, as Scotus works out and expresses individually in the cited place (*M. & inde*), and Richards in the same place (*d.35.art.3.quaest.4*).

First Objection. The number of virtues is different from the number of beatitudes, fruits, and gifts, as is clear from the first note. Therefore they are diverse habits — otherwise it is not clear why the latter should not be counted in the same number as the former.

I grant the antecedent and deny the consequence. For sometimes it is not the genus of a virtue that is listed but its species contained under that genus — as is evident with justice, which is expressed under the name of mercy and kindness, which are its species, and are enumerated among the fruits of the Holy Spirit. Sometimes, moreover, in sacred Scripture certain things are enumerated among the numbers listed above, and at other times omitted — as can be seen in I Corinthians XII, where Paul enumerates nine, while Peter in his second letter (*cap.1*) enumerates eight.

Second Objection. More and less in the domain of morals argues for a specific distinction. But the fruits stand to the gifts as the greater to the lesser, as the more perfect to the less perfect. Therefore they are distinct habits. The major is proved: magnificence differs in species from liberality, and magnanimity from euprepeia (*proper ambition*) (*1 Eth. 3*); and yet they differ only according to more and less — since magnificence consists in large expenditures, magnanimity in great honors, liberality in small expenditures, and euprepeia in small honors.

The minor is known: a fruit is called the end of the gifts, just as what is ultimately expected from a tree is called its fruit.

I distinguish the major: if the division is into species, I grant it; if into modes, as in the present case, I deny it. For the fruits are grades or more excellent modes of the gifts, just as intense heat is more excellent than remiss heat.

Third Objection. No fruit is incompatible with charity, since a fruit designates the rest and delight of the one who loves with the one who is loved. But fear contradicts charity, because charity casts out fear (*1Jo. 4*), to which Vorreux subscribes in this place.

I grant the major and distinguish the minor: servile fear, I grant; filial fear, I deny. And it is filial fear, not servile fear, that is numbered among the gifts of the Holy Spirit.

Article II. On Fortitude

Four moral virtues are enumerated — prudence, fortitude, temperance, and justice — which are called cardinal, because just as a door turns on its hinge, so the goodness of human life revolves around these four virtues. They are also called political virtues, because they order man toward living rightly in the commonwealth, just as the theological virtues direct him toward God. Prudence has already been treated above (*art.3.q.3.l.5*), since it is formally an intellectual virtue — yet it is numbered among the moral virtues because it directs and regulates them as their rule and measure.

Disputation I. What Fortitude Is

No one doubts that fortitude exists. There are indeed strong and mighty men, as Genesis VI says: *These are the mighty ones from of old, men of renown*. And II Kings II: *Be sons of fortitude*. And I Peter V: *Be strong in the faith and resist*. Hence the Church in the office for Apostles invites us to fortitude: *Be strong in battle*. From the concrete to the abstract the inference is valid, as Aristotle indicates (*4 Top. ult.*): for it follows well — he is strong, therefore there is fortitude — just as he is a philosopher, therefore there is philosophy. And Scotus adds (*3.d.34.q.un.¶.Notandum, sub F.*): just as temperance is given for moderating the concupiscible, so fortitude is had for regulating the irascible. The same Doctor notes in the same place (*¶.His suppositis*) that power is that by which a powerful being is powerful, and that by which a powerful being is strong. And in spiritual matters, to be powerful and to be strong are the same thing.

Note firstly that fortitude is given three principal senses. First, for bodily strength and robustness — thus a horse is said to be strong. *Issachar is a strong ass* (*Gen. 39*); *The strength of stones is not my strength* (*Iob 9*). Second, for the virtue by which someone acts firmly and robustly in good and honorable undertakings — Aristotle mentions this (*2 Eth. 4*) — and in this sense it is not a virtue but rather a condition of virtue, since the virtuous person, especially if perfect, adheres

firmly to the good. Third, for firmness and constancy in undertaking arduous and dreadful things and in enduring evils — and it is fortitude taken in this third sense that is under discussion here.

Note secondly, from the Doctor in the cited place (*3.d.34.q.un. §.Ad istam.B.*), that the virtues, both intellectual and moral, perfect and adorn man — the intellectual ones perfecting his intellect in speculative matters, as the speculative scientific habits do, and in practical matters, as the practical, active, and productive habits do. The moral virtues, for their part, adorn his appetite — that is, his will — with respect to desirable goods regarding himself, namely fortitude and temperance, and with respect to desirable goods regarding another, namely justice. Whether man is sufficiently and fully perfected and adorned by these virtues alone, without requiring others such as the theological, is a question to be consulted in Scotus in the cited place and in the other Scholastics there, since it is not within the scope of the present undertaking to discuss and decide it.

Note thirdly, from the same cited place (*§.Notandum*), that a habit comprehends under itself many subaltern and lowest species. For habit is first divided into intellectual and appetitive. The intellectual is subdivided into practical and speculative. The speculative into the real, which is threefold — metaphysics, mathematics, and natural philosophy — and the rational, which is subdivided into logic, rhetoric, and grammar. The practical into the active, such as ethics, and the productive, such as medicine. The appetitive is divided into the appetitive directed toward another, which is justice, and the appetitive directed toward oneself, which is an unnamed habit — perhaps best called a certain form of reason as a common name. And this latter is subdivided into the primarily appetitive, which is concerned with what are primarily fitted to agree or disagree, to be embraced or avoided first — and this is temperance — and the secondarily appetitive, which is occupied with what are to be embraced or avoided second — and this is fortitude. The first pertains to the concupiscible, the second to the irascible. For a clearer understanding of this:

Note fourthly, from the same Doctor in the cited place (*F.*), that the object of the concupiscible is the fitting or the disagreeable, from which pleasure or sorrow, embrace or flight, naturally first follows. For what is desired either suits or does not suit the appetitive power: if it suits, it causes delight and pleasure; if it does not suit, it brings sorrow and grief. But the object of the irascible is what provokes anger — what is punishable and offensive. For if what the concupiscible desires is removed or impeded, the animal that desires such an object becomes angry — as when a bone being gnawed by a dog is taken from it, the dog is moved to anger, bites the one who takes it, and drives him away. Therefore fortitude is discerned in repelling what must be repelled and in bearing evils, as will become clearer in the next article.

Assertion. Fortitude is rightly defined as the elective virtue consisting in a mean between fear and audacity. So says Aristotle (*3 Eth. 6*), and the Angelic Doctor

assents (*verb. Fortitudo*), and this is derived from the Doctor in the passage cited. It is explained through each of its individual terms. It is called a virtue as its genus. Elective is added to distinguish it from intellectual virtue, which is natural. The remaining terms are added to distinguish it from the other moral virtues and from vices — namely fear and audacity, which are its extremes. Once explained in this way, the assertion is easily proved. For a definition is fitting and adequate when it is composed of genus and difference, as I have frequently insisted in the foregoing discussion. But this definition of fortitude is composed of genus and difference, as has been shown above. Therefore it is proper and legitimate. Moreover, from (2 *Eth.* 3) and following, virtue is concerned with the difficult good; and it is good and difficult to approach dreadful things and to endure evils — which pertains to fortitude, which preserves the mean and moderation so as neither to fear dangers more than is right, which is the mark of the timid, nor to despise dangers excessively, which is the mark of the audacious and reckless. The definition given explains all these things; therefore it is well stated.

First Objection. Psalm XXIII calls God strong and mighty, and Psalm XII calls him fortitude itself. But God can neither approach dangers nor suffer evils; therefore either fortitude is not rightly defined, or it does not belong to God.

I respond that fortitude is attributed to God stripped of every imperfection, just as knowledge and charity are attributed to him, as I explained in the treatise on the knowledge of God and in other places.

Second Objection. A definition is coextensive with the thing defined, according to the laws of good definition. But the definition given exceeds the thing defined. The major is evident. The minor is shown from (3 *Eth.* 6): fortitude is concerned with dreadful things that arise in war, such as death, which is the greatest of dreadful things, as the same Philosopher notes in the same place.

I grant the major and deny the minor. To the proof, I explain the testimony of Aristotle as follows: fortitude is most properly concerned with the dreadful things that present themselves in war, as Aristotle himself declares near the end of that chapter — yet this does not exclude from the object of fortitude other arduous and dreadful things that the courageous man also approaches outside of war. Hence Aristotle concludes at the end of the cited chapter, and in (1 *Magnorum moral.* 19): the strong moreover conduct themselves manfully in those situations where valor is expected or where death is glorious. This is consonant with the Canticle (*Cant.* 8): *Love is strong as death.*

Disputation II. How Many Kinds of Fortitude There Are

Fortitude is divided into two parts — integral and subjective — which are exhausted by its two acts, namely the assault upon dreadful things and the endurance of them. To the former belong magnanimity and magnificence: magnanimity pertains to undertaking great things, so that someone prepares

himself with a confident and great spirit to overcome difficult obstacles. For magnanimity, as Cicero testifies (*2 de inventione*), is that by which the mind has placed great confidence with certain hope in great and honorable matters. For the assault upon difficulties, magnificence is also necessary, which, from the same Cicero, is described as the carrying out and management of great and lofty things with a certain large and splendid purpose of mind. For it is necessary that one who girds himself for an arduous task and undertakes it be of a lofty spirit, lest he collapse in heart. To the second act — which is the endurance of great labors — belong patience and perseverance. Lest someone succumb and be overwhelmed by sorrow on account of impending and pressing evils, patience is necessary for him, defined by Tully in the cited work as the voluntary and prolonged endurance of arduous and difficult things for the sake of what is honorable or useful. To this is joined longsuffering. Hence of the holy Patriarchs it is said that they were longsuffering — that is, as Orbellis interprets in the cited place (*3.d.34. post Scot. ibid. ante §.Ad arg.P.*), as though longanimously awaiting the coming of the Lord. For the same act, perseverance is also required — lest the strong man desist from what he has begun in the endurance of arduous things — and it is defined as a stable and perpetual permanence in rightly considered reason. Hence the Savior says (*Matt. 10*): *But he who has persevered to the end shall be saved*. And the often-repeated saying goes: not the one who has begun but the one who has persevered shall receive the crown of glory. For many began well and ended badly, not persevering in the good. To this is joined constancy, which appears to differ only slightly from perseverance.

From all this are gathered four integral parts of fortitude, which as it were compose it, namely magnanimity, magnificence, longsuffering, and perseverance. But there are two subjective parts, namely belligerence and patience. For in assaulting dreadful things there is belligerence, and in enduring them there is patience. For just as there are two acts of fortitude — assault upon and endurance of dreadful things — so there are two corresponding species. For the strong man appears and shines forth both in assaulting and in sustaining dreadful things. Which of these two is the nobler and more excellent, Scotus decides in the cited place (*§.His suppositis, ante L.*), saying that the most noble form of fortitude is patience, because it is harder not to repel what offends than to repel it. For this reason Persius sings: *Patience is a noble form of victory, my son*. Therefore, if you wish to conquer, learn to suffer. And of the Martyrs the Church says: *A mind with a good conscience preserves patience*. And finally: *In your patience you shall possess your souls*.

Hence the Coimbrans are refuted (*disp.9.Eth.q.2.art.2 in fine*) in claiming that there are no subjective parts of fortitude, on the grounds that fortitude is concerned with a very contracted and narrow matter. For, as argued above, fortitude consists either in the assault upon serious dangers or in their endurance; and since the evils and impending dangers are of diverse kinds — pertaining to honor, death, and the like — consequently there can be many

species of fortitude. Again, the said Coimbrans themselves admit that magnanimity and magnificence are potential parts of fortitude — if magnanimity is considered with respect to great honors, and magnificence with respect to great expenditures. And the same they admit for longsuffering, perseverance, and constancy. Therefore the many species of fortitude are not to be denied, even though Scotus does not expressly enumerate them, as is evident from the passage cited above (*ante L.*).

First Objection. Distinct acts and diverse functions do not argue for distinct species of things, as is evident from man, who is of one species yet performs diverse functions and produces diverse acts. But to assault great and dreadful dangers and to sustain heavy and serious ones are distinct functions and diverse acts. Therefore they do not constitute distinct species of fortitude.

I respond that diverse functions do not indeed argue for diverse agents, but they do argue for distinct powers and faculties, whose specific distinction is manifested by the specific difference of acts and objects. Similarly in our case, those acts of fortitude do not indicate different strong agents, but distinct species of fortitude — since those acts and objects differ from one another in species.

Second Objection. To bear labors and to suffer evils is not to act. Hence Scotus adds in the passage just cited that to suffer is a kind of permitting, and to permit is not to act positively. For God indeed permits sins but does not commit them, as was said above. Therefore there are not two acts or two species of fortitude.

I respond that although suffering evils is not to act by an external action, it is nevertheless to act by an internal action. For it is to will to endure dreadful things, as the Doctor suggests (*in Rep. 3.d.34.q.un. §. Ulterius*). And the Angelic Doctor explicitly says (*verb. Fortitudo*): to sustain is the more principal act. And willing is a positive act of the will. Now, although God permits sins, he nevertheless does not will them — indeed, he prohibits sins. Therefore there is no parity here. Whether permission is a positive act of the will or not, see the treatise on the will of God (*quaest. de praedestinatione*).

Article III. On Temperance

Disputation I. What Temperance Is

No one who is temperate doubts that temperance exists. For just as a knowledgeable person cannot exist without knowledge, so a temperate person cannot exist without temperance. I am well aware that temperance is signified by the name sobriety, as the Angelic Doctor notes (*verb. sobrietas*). And that sobriety exists is held as certain by all, to which Saint Peter invites us in his first letter (*cap. 5*): *Brothers, be sober and vigilant*. Moreover, just as fortitude avails for moderating and governing the irascible, so temperance in like manner conduces to ruling and perfecting the concupiscible.

Note firstly, from Orbellis (*3.d.33.q.2*), that temperance is taken in two ways. First, strictly, for pleasure or delight of taste and touch, concerning which Aristotle discourses (*3 Eth. 10*) — by reason of which those are most properly called temperate who abstain from venereal pleasures, food, and drink. Second, for the habit of the will as well as of the sensitive appetite, with respect to what is primarily concupiscible — and temperance taken in this sense is numbered among the moral virtues, to which Andronicus asserts that humility belongs, as Orbellis reports in the cited place.

Note secondly, from the same Doctor in the same place (*post Scotum alleg. §.Notandum ante H.*), that there is a twofold concupiscible and a twofold irascible — one in the sensitive part or sensitive appetite, and the other in the intellective part or will. In the sensitive part they have diverse organs, because the same thing cannot be moved simultaneously by different motions. For the sorrow of the concupiscible comes with contraction, while the delight opposed to it comes with dilation of the heart; but the pain of the concupiscible is effected with heating, because as was said, anger is an enkindling of the blood around the heart. In the intellective part, they have an affinity of the distinction of objects that they participate in from the sensitive part. For the will can desire the good that is fitting either to itself or to the sensitive appetite, with which it is joined in the same suppositum. The will can also have an offensive object and regard it as offensive by an act of repulsive willing — although the distinction in the will is not as great as in the sensitive appetite, since the will is not organic as the sensitive appetite is. Nor are the irascible and concupiscible in the will distinct powers and faculties from one another; rather, just as the same power is called the higher portion and the lower portion with respect to different objects, so the same will is called irascible insofar as it regards an offensive object, and concupiscible insofar as it regards a fitting object — in much the same way as the same intellect tends toward principles and toward the conclusions drawn and gathered from them.

Assertion. Temperance is an elective habit consisting in the mean with respect to what is primarily concupiscible. This is derived from Aristotle in the passage recently cited and from Scotus in the cited place (*shortly before G.*). It is called a habit as its genus. Elective is added to distinguish it from the intellectual habit, which is natural. In the mean is placed to exclude vice, which consists in some extreme. What is primarily concupiscible is added to distinguish it from fortitude, which regards not the fitting but the offensive, as is clear from the preceding article. Once explained in this way, the assertion is easily established. For it is a good definition that is composed of genus and difference. But the definition given is of this sort, as is clear from the preceding explanation of its terms. Therefore temperance is aptly defined.

First Objection. Temperance concerns only the pleasures and pains of the body. For no one is called temperate or intemperate with respect to the delights of the

intellect or will, as the Philosopher noted above. Therefore the definition given is faulty, since it exceeds temperance by encompassing spiritual pleasures.

I deny the antecedent. For not only the sensitive appetite but also the intellective appetite needs a habit that moderates and tempers what is concupiscible and delightful to it — since both appetites curb their concupiscible and pleasurable objects, as the Doctor firmly and consistently maintains in the cited place. Though it is most properly concerned with venereal pleasures, food, and drink.

Second Objection. Virginity is a virtue belonging to temperance, yet it does not consist in a mean, because the virgin abstains from all venereal pleasure, which is one of the extremes. Therefore temperance is not well defined as a virtue consisting in moderation, since it is placed not in a mean but at an extreme.

I respond that virginity consists in the mean not according to the quantity of the thing, following (2 *Eth.* 6), but according to the right dictate of reason, with respect to which the mean of virtue is taken — as is clear from magnanimity, which, although it is occupied with great things, is nevertheless placed in the mean with respect to reason (4 *Eth.* 3), because the magnanimous person tends toward great things according to the right dictate of reason. For the magnanimous person tends toward the lofty not for his own glory but for the glory of God and the benefit of neighbor. And so he holds the mean between the timid and the reckless, as I made clear in the preceding article.

Disputation II. How Many Kinds of Temperance There Are

Since temperance resides in the concupiscible and regards the fitting good as its object, the following foundations and notes must be laid for tracing out its species and subjective parts.

Note firstly, from Scotus (3.*dist.* 34.*quest.un.* §. *His suppositis. ante K.*), that there is a threefold fitting good: the honorable, the delightful, and the useful. The first two goods are desired for their own sake and therefore primarily move the appetitive power to desire them. The third does not primarily move the appetite, since it is desired for the sake of something else — for example, riches are useful goods desired for the acquisition of honors and pleasures. Yet riches can also be delightful goods insofar as they are beautiful and gladden the heart of man; in this way they can be primarily desired, just as anything else that is pleasant to sight and delightful to behold — such as the tree of life, of which Genesis III speaks.

Note secondly, from (7 *Eth.* 1), that in every species of virtue or vice there are three degrees: disposition, perfection, and excess. In virtue, the first degree is called continence, which is a disposition and preparation for virtue — as when someone restrains a passion and acts rightly, though with difficulty, owing to a passion that resists him. The second degree is called virtue, as when someone

who has the habit operates easily and with delight, though without exceeding the common mode of human action. The third is called heroic, when someone excels others in action. For those who exceed the common mode of action are called heroes, angelic, and divine. Correspondingly, in vice there are three degrees: the first is called incontinence, as when someone, urged and dominated by passion, falls into sin. The second is called malice, as when someone, from frequent evil acts, has an evil habit. The third is called bestiality, when someone, by vicious acts, surpasses the human mode of action and becomes like the beasts — especially by intermingling and consorting with them.

Note thirdly, from the same passage, that perseverance and continence stand to one another as resisting and overcoming. In the beginning of virtue it is called perseverance, and in progress it is called continence. For perseverance, it suffices to resist what impels. For to persevere means nothing other than to resist what impels and to stand firm against its onslaught. Continence, on the other hand, is said to overcome the opposite: for what is in our hands, we properly contain or hold. Hence one who restrains immoderate passions, conquers and curbs temptations, though with labor and difficulty, is called continent. Since continence and perseverance are only dispositions toward virtue, they pertain to the first degree of virtue, to which softness is opposed — that weakness by which one easily falls, withdrawing from the good and not overcoming evil with good. Note further that perseverance can be taken for a habit whereby someone endowed with it persists in good works and is counted among the virtues — especially if it endures until death. Hence Christ the Lord says (*Matt. 10*): *But he who has persevered to the end shall be saved*. And the Angelic Doctor adds (*1 de perseverantia*): *No one can be said to have perseverance while he lives in this life, unless he perseveres unto death*.

First Assertion. There are two species of temperance. So holds the Doctor in the cited place (*sub K.*). It is proved firstly: there are two objects primarily concupiscible — namely, the honorable good and the delightful good. Therefore there are also two primary species of temperance. The antecedent is clear from the first note; the consequence holds, since the number of the primary species of temperance is drawn from the number of primarily concupiscible objects. Secondly, every genus is first divided into two species, as is evident from animal, which is distributed into brute and man as its two species. But temperance is a genus having species under it, just like fortitude and the other virtues. Therefore there are two species of it: one is called humility, by which the desire for great things is restrained and directed toward the lowest and most humble; the other, which is concerned with pleasures, retains the name of its genus.

Second Assertion. There are as many species of temperance as there are distinct pleasures or specifically distinct delightful objects to be moderated. So holds the Doctor in the cited place. It is proved firstly: specific habits are as many as there

are specific acts and objects, as has been seen elsewhere. But there are many specifically distinct delightful objects — such as tactile, gustatory, and others of the kind — and many acts with respect to them, as experience makes evident; for one person takes delight in one object, and another in a different one. Therefore, in accordance with the number of specifically distinct delightful goods, there is a corresponding number of species of temperance. Secondly, one species of temperance can exist without another; therefore they differ from one another in species. The antecedent is proved: someone can be temperate with respect to tactile things — namely venereal pleasures — and intemperate with respect to gustatory things, namely food and drink. Likewise, someone can be temperate with respect to sensible things and intemperate with respect to speculative things — as when a person abandons what is useful and necessary for his life and well-being on account of his devotion to speculative disciplines.

Concerning the moderation of tactile pleasures, four species are set down: two regarding venereal matters, which are chastity and modesty; and two regarding food and drink, which are abstinence and sobriety. Chastity restrains venereal pleasures and is divided into virginal, conjugal, and widowed chastity. Modesty curbs the pleasures that consist in the outward signs of venereal things, such as immodest glances and kisses. Related to this is modesty of countenance, which is a fear of disgrace and infamy. Abstinence is a virtue that consists in moderation in the consumption of food; sobriety, on the other hand, moderates the pleasure of drink — though the two are sometimes confused. For sobriety, as I noted above following the Angelic Doctor, is taken for the whole genus of temperance. And abstinence is not infrequently used for the moderate consumption of drink, as in Numbers VI: *Let him abstain from whatever can make him drunk, and from wine.*

Objection. Aristotle (*3 Eth. 10*), in defining temperance, says that temperance is a mean with respect to the pleasures and pains of taste and touch. Therefore temperance does not apply to the will, which lacks touch, taste, and pain — and consequently belongs only to those who possess a sensitive appetite.

I respond that this definition is too narrow, as I noted with Orbellis in the first note — just as the definition of science in the first book of the Posterior Analytics is accommodated only to a priori science. For temperance taken universally comprehends every delight, whether sensible or spiritual. For angels and the spiritual soul take delight in delightful goods, as the Psalmist indicates (*Ps. 33*): *Taste and see that the Lord is sweet.* (*Ps. 36*): *Take delight in the Lord.* (*Isa. 66*): *Their soul shall be delighted.* (*Rom. 12*): *Not to be more wise than it behooves to be wise, but to be wise unto sobriety.* Cicero also supports this (*2 artis veteris*), defining temperance in these words: temperance is the firm and moderate dominion of reason over lust and over other disordered impulses of the soul.

Article IV. On Justice

It remains to treat of justice, which by universal consent is placed in the will as its subject, as is evident from Aristotle (*5 Eth. 1*) and Scotus (*3.dist.33.quaest.un.§.Haec optime. ante A.*); and justice excels and shines above the other moral virtues. For through it, things go well both for the one who possesses it and for another, since it preserves the good for itself and for another — as the Philosopher observed admirably in the passage just cited. There he cites the saying of Bias: *Rule shows the man, since it is a matter of dealings with another and of one who is in a position of authority in society.* And he concludes in the same place: *The worst man is he who employs wickedness both toward himself and toward others; the best is not he who practices virtue toward himself, but he who practices it toward others — since that is something very difficult.*

Disputation I. What Justice Is

Justice — which is also called the status of the law, as Vorreux notes (*4.dist.16.art.6.art.1*) — is used in many senses, as can be seen in the Angelic Doctor (*verb. Iustitia*) and in Scotus (*4.dist.46.quaest.1.§.Hic primo. A.*), Ricardus, and others in the same place. First, for any rectitude of the will, in which sense Anselm (*lib. de veritate, cap.12*) defines justice as follows: justice is the rectitude of the will preserved for its own sake. Chrysostom intimates the same (*homil.12 in Matt.*): thus holy men are called just, as in Matthew I: *Joseph, being a just man.* And I Timothy I: *The law is not made for the just man.* In the same way: *The Lord is just and has loved justice; his face has beheld equity (Ps. 10).* Wherefore, since God has a most upright and unerring will, justice taken generically is consequently located in him — and this can be determined and specified by the formal account that Aristotle adds (*5 Eth. 1*), which is that it is directed toward another, as the Doctor notes in the cited place. Second, justice is taken for the fitting demand and agreement of things among themselves — thus there is justice in fire in that it is hot, in water in that it is cold, in the light in that it moves upward and in the heavy in that it moves downward, as the same Doctor elaborates admirably (*cit. f. Non improbando sub G.*). Third, justice is taken for the habit inclining the will to render to each what is his own — and it is in this sense that the discussion of justice is conducted in the present place.

Assertion. Justice is rightly defined as the moral virtue inclining the will to render to each his own. This is drawn from Aristotle (*5 Eth. 1*) and Scotus in the cited place (*and 3.dist.34.quaest.un.§.His suppositis L.*). The definition of Ambrose (*1 de off.*) amounts to the same: *Justice is that which gives to each what is his own, claiming nothing of another's.* And Augustine (*19 Ciuit. cap.21*): *Justice is the virtue that distributes to each his own.* The first definition is explained as follows: virtue is said as the genus; moral is added to distinguish it from intellectual virtue; the remaining terms are added to distinguish it from the other virtues. Once explained in this way, the assertion is established by the common medium: that definition is fitting and adequate which is composed of genus and difference, as

I have repeatedly pointed out; and the definition of justice given is of this kind, as is clear from what has just been explained. Therefore justice is well defined. Moreover, not one of the philosophers I have encountered contradicts this, but it is accepted by universal consent. This is therefore a clear sign that it is the genuine definition of justice.

Objection. Ulpian (*in leg. Iustitia, ff. de iustitia et iure*) and the common body of jurists define justice in these words: *Justice is the constant and perpetual will to render to each his own.* Therefore justice is not well defined as a virtue, since a will is not a virtue but the principle of virtue — for virtue is caused by many acts elicited by the will according to the right dictate of reason.

I respond that this is not an identical predication but a causal one. For there the principle, cause, and subject of justice are taken for the virtue of justice itself — whereby someone with a constant and firm spirit and will renders to each his own right. This is just as in (6 *Eth.* 3) the intellect is taken for the habit of the intellect, concerning which I have discoursed at length above.

Disputation II. How Many Kinds of Justice There Are

Justice, which from (5 *Eth.* 1) is the good of another, either regards the uncreated good and inclines man toward divine honor — and this is religion, or latria (that is, in Latin, religio, as the Angelic Doctor notes following Augustine (*verb. Latria, post Aug. 10 Ciuit. 4.*), which is the honor or worship owed to God alone, as is clear from the Doctor (3.d.9.quest.un.)) — or it regards the created good and inclines man toward the good of his neighbor, and this in two ways. For if that good is common and laws have been established by the Legislator to protect it, legal justice arises; but if there is a particular good, particular justice applies to it. This division of justice is handed down by Aristotle in the cited place (*and 3 Pol. 5*), and is received by the Doctor (4.d.40.quest.1.§. *Hic primo*) and by all jurists and moralists — in particular the Angelic Doctor (*verb. Iustitia*). Legal justice is further subdivided into political and domestic. Again, either a man communicates himself to another as fully as possible — and this is friendship, which is the more perfect justice, because total justice is more perfect than what concerns only oneself, as I noted at the beginning of this article — or he communicates something else to another. And that something else is either an extrinsic or an intrinsic good pertaining to human sustenance. If he communicates something intrinsic and necessary to one who is joined to him, such as governance, there arises authority, by which superiors rightly govern their subjects; or there arises obedience and due submission, from which flows obedience, by which subjects rightly comply with the commands of their superiors. To this belong truthfulness and affability. But if he communicates an extrinsic good, this can be done in two ways: according to due measure and equality, from which equal justice emerges, which Aristotle (5 *Eth.* 3) divides into commutative and distributive. Commutative justice is discerned in commerce and exchanges, in which arithmetic proportion is preserved and equal is

rendered for equal; its acts are many, such as buying, selling, hiring, usufruct, deposit, surety, pledge, transaction, and others of this kind, which are enumerated by the jurists and the Coimbrans (*disp.9.Eth.quest.1.art.3*).

Distributive justice shines forth in the bestowal of rewards or the infliction of punishments, preserving geometric equality and regarding the dignity of persons. This is further subdivided into remunerative and punitive. The former regards the dignity of the persons to be rewarded; the latter considers the punishments by which the guilty and wicked are to be punished. Again, punitive justice is divided into punitive of oneself as a defendant — since to punish oneself is granted to oneself as a minister of the judge, as the Doctor notes (*4.dist.14.quaest.2*) — and punitive of another, by which a judge condemns the accused and inflicts capital punishment. Or according to fittingness and inequality — under which are contained liberality and piety, whether piety is taken for the honor of children toward parents, or for mercy toward the poor and wretched, or for devotion toward God. More on this can be found in Ricardus (*3.dist.33.art.3.quaest.7*) and in Aureolus (*Quol.14.art.4*), who enumerates a sufficiency of twenty-two virtues contained under justice.

First Objection. Common and particular do not constitute a specific difference within any genus, as is clear from logic. Therefore justice is badly divided into general and special as into two species — otherwise general justice will be the species of special and particular justice.

It follows that the particular or singular does not constitute another species, since species is essentially predicated of many things differing in number, which are singulars; and therefore the said division of justice is not a genus into its species.

I distinguish the antecedent: if common and particular are taken precisely and in logical rigor, I grant it; if they are taken relatively, I deny it. For in our case, justice is called general with respect to the object, or the public good and due service that is to be preserved — and in this it differs from special justice, which is occupied with private law, which is called particular by appropriation because it is possessed by a private individual and owed to him, even though in itself and in the character of a good it is not particular, since it regards not one but many private and particular goods. This answers the objection: for it is not called particular because it is communicable to one alone and incommunicable to many, as the argument proves, but because its enjoyment and possession is owed to one and not to another.

Second Objection. Justice tends toward the good of another, on the authority of Aristotle (*5 Eth. 1. 2.*). Therefore the division of justice into punitive of oneself and punitive of another is faulty, since one and the same man is not distinct and divided from himself such that the function of justice can be exercised toward himself.

I respond that the antecedent holds most properly of remunerative justice. Or I say that it is to be understood of the good of another, or of what is quasi-another, because each person can punish himself for sins committed through fasting, bodily mortification, and penance, as the Doctor interprets (*in 4 cit. ante B. §. Hic primo*).

Third Objection. What does not fit the definition of justice is not justice or a species of it. But the definition of justice does not apply to liberality, obedience, gratitude, friendship, affability, religion, truthfulness, and piety. Therefore these are not rightly enumerated among the species of justice. The major is evident. The minor is shown: the liberal man does not render goods to another from a legal duty, but from an honorable motive and the cheerfulness of his spirit. The grateful man similarly does not keep in mind the one who has done him good out of a legal duty, which is required for justice, but out of a moral duty. Again, friendship tends toward a friend not out of duty but out of good will. And affability consists in kind compliance. Regarding religion toward God and piety toward parents, there is no justice between a master and a slave, or between a father and a son, as Aristotle testifies (*5 Eth. 9 & 8 c.14*).

I grant the major. To the minor I say that some of the aforementioned are not true and genuine species of justice but dispositions toward them. For in some cases there is not a legal but only a moral duty — as in liberality, affability, and gratitude; or there is not equality, as in piety toward God and parents, and in the reverence by which virtue is honored — as is clear from (*4 Eth. 3*): perfect virtue does not receive an honor equal to its worth. I pass over truthfulness, which in this context is the virtue by which a man presents himself to his neighbor through words and deeds as he truly is in the moral character of his ways. Finally, in friendship it is clear that there is a legal duty and that it is perfect justice, as Scotus affirms (*3.d.34.quaest.un.L.*).

One may ask firstly: what is law, and how many kinds of it are there? Aristotle responds (*5 Eth. 2*): what is just and right. For this reason, Celsus in defining law says: *Law is the art of the equitable and the good*. And the act of law is, for anyone just, to firmly will to preserve the due rectitude in one's works toward another. A judge, moreover, is called, as it were, one who speaks the law; and judgment amounts to the pronouncing of the law, as is clear from the regulations on the signification of words (*Extra de significationibus verborum*). Judgment is defined as the act of a judge as one pronouncing sentence according to the rules of law — as the Doctor notes (*4.d.47.q.1. §. Respondeo.B.*). Law is divided into natural and positive. Natural law is described (*5 Eth. 7*) as having the same force everywhere, and is distinguished by the Doctor (*3.d.37.quest.un. §. Ad quaest.*) and the Angelic Doctor (*verb. Lex*) into natural law strictly taken — which is known from its terms, such as the first practical principles and the law of nature: *Do to another what you would have done to you*, and *Do not do to another what you would not have done to you* — and the precepts of the first table, such as *Worship one God*; and

natural law broadly taken, such as the precepts of the second table — for example, *You shall not kill*. Positive or legal law is what has been established by some Legislator. Hence it is called legal — that is, receiving its force from some prescribed and sanctioned law. If the law is from God, it is called divine law; if it comes from man, it is called human law, as Scotus indicates (*4.d.14.quaest.2. infra E.*). Human law is further subdivided into canon law and civil law. Canon law is ecclesiastical law and is derived from the word canon, meaning rule. For it contains the rules of the holy Fathers and the supreme Pontiffs, and is again divided into the Decree and the Decretals. Civil law is so called because it was established by the commonwealth, prince, or emperor. Hence, as the former is called pontifical law, the latter is called imperial law, as the Doctor touches upon (*4.d.15.q.3.E.*).

One may ask secondly: what is law, and how many kinds of it are there? Alexander of Hales responds (*3 p. quaest.26.m.4.*) from the teaching of the jurists — law (which, according to Isidore (*2 Eth. 1.*), derives from reading, because it must be read and promulgated in order to bind; or from binding, because it binds and obliges subjects to observe it) — is defined in these words: *Law is a holy sanction commanding what is honorable and forbidding the contrary*. It is explained by Vorreux (*3.d.38.art.1.*): it is called a sanction — that is, a determination and command. For it belongs to a superior to determine and command what is to be done and what is to be avoided by those below him, and this is an act of jurisdiction (*verb. Lex*). Holy is added, that is, just — for this reason the law of the Lord is called immaculate (*Ps. 18*) and: *All your commandments are truth* (*Ps. 118*). Commanding the honorable is placed there, that is, the state of honor. For laws are established so that citizens may live honorably and peaceably. Forbidding the contrary is added, so that every disturbance among citizens may be removed, audacity restrained, and innocence defended. From this are gathered two ends of law: one principal, which is honorable life; the other less principal, which is the restraint of temerity and the protection of the good. Hence Mayr rightly, as cited by the Angelic Doctor, defines law as the art of living honorably, binding man to its observance.

Law is threefold, as is derived from the Decrees (*d.1*) and as is learnedly and skillfully treated by Alexander of Hales in the cited place, omitting the rest that is adduced and expounded by the canonists. The first is natural law, described as the natural light given to us prescribing what is to be done and what is to be avoided, and this is contained in only two precepts: one affirmative, *Do to another what you would have done to you*, and one negative, *Do not do to another what you would not have done to you*. The second is written law, or the law of Moses, which is contained in the Pentateuch and has three types of precepts — moral, judicial, and ceremonial — concerning which see the Doctor (*3.d.40.q.un.*). The third is the law of Christ, called the law of grace, which is contained in the Gospel. The second is called the law of fear; the third the law of love. The former promises

temporal goods to those who observe it; the latter promises eternal goods. The former has been abrogated; the latter will endure until the end of the world.

One may ask thirdly: whether law is immutable? I distinguish: the law of nature and divine law is immutable, as Augustine asserts (*3 cap.7*), and Alexander of Hales shows in the cited place (*m.S.*). The reason is that God is immutable, and what is commanded in natural law is simply good, and what is prohibited is simply evil. Therefore the law of nature and of God always and everywhere stands firm. The other positive laws, whether old or new, can be changed — and indeed the old law has been suppressed and removed, as is evident from the law of circumcision. And one law can be abrogated — for God can confer grace without the reception of the sacraments. Human laws are frequently varied and changed, as is evident from the decrees of parliaments and the constitutions of religious orders, especially the Franciscan.

One may say: even divine law can change. For God, who in the Decalogue forbids homicide, commands Abraham in Genesis XXII to sacrifice his son Isaac. And the same God, who there forbids theft, commands the Israelites in Exodus XI and XII to carry off the golden vessels of the Egyptians. And in Osee I: *Go, beget children of fornication*. Therefore the law of God admits of change.

Alexander of Hales responds in the cited place that the divine law is in itself immutable and immutable as to counsel, but is mutable in effect and as to sentence. To the instances adduced one may say that God dispensed in these cases, being the Lord of all, and transferred the dominion of the Egyptians to the dominion of the Hebrews. Or one may say with Scotus (*in Rep. 3.d.37.q.un. in fine*): the Israelites served the Egyptians; they received so much that the Egyptians were unwilling to render back to them. For this reason it was given to them by the superior, who is God, by whose command the Israelites could justly and licitly take from the Egyptians what was due.

One may ask fourthly: how many functions does law have? I respond that there are five: to command, to prohibit, to permit, to punish, and to reward. Good things are commanded, evil things are prohibited, indifferent things are permitted — and sometimes evil things are permitted to avoid greater evils — transgressors are punished, and those who observe the law are rewarded. May God place us in the number of these, he who bestows upon the just the crown of life and of justice. Amen.

Transnatural Philosophy, or Metaphysics

of Father Bonaventura Columbi of the Order of Conventual Friars Minor, Doctor of Sacred Theology and Professor of the Same

Preface

The doctrine we are undertaking to treat is distinguished by many names, which are applied to it on account of its excellence and eminence. For just as many names are assigned to God to declare his infinity, immensity, omnipotence, and the remaining essential, notional, and personal attributes and predicates, so Metaphysics acquires numerous titles on account of its nobility, loftiness, and eminence. First, so that its nomenclature may be clear, it is called Metaphysics, which is equivalent to Transnatural, inasmuch as it transcends natural science or Physics, because it treats of things abstracted and separated from matter; or it is called Postnaturals, for the reason that it is handed down and taught after Physics and natural science — although Bonetus (*1 Met.*) and Antonius Bernardus of Mirandola (*1.20.vers.sing.cert.*) hold that it should be set before the other disciplines. By our Subtle Doctor in the proem of his Metaphysics it is named the Theoretical Philosophy of Philosophers, because above all others it is occupied with the contemplation of the truth of transcendental things. By Aristotle (*1 Met. c. 2*) it is called Wisdom, because it contemplates the highest causes and the first principles of things. By the same author (*4 Met. T. 4*) it is called First Philosophy — first not only by priority of origin and nature, but also by priority of dignity and perfection. And in the same place (*T. 5*) it is called Philosophy by antonomasia, since in truth only he who is master of this doctrine deserves to be called a philosopher — a doctrine which is rightly proclaimed Queen of the sciences by Antonius Andreas (*at the end of the prol. Met.*). Further, in (*6 Met. c. 1*) and (*11 of the same work, c. 6*) it is proclaimed Natural Theology, because it conveys and imparts what can be known about God by natural means. Moreover, it is called Common and Universal Science, because it treats of common and universal things, meditates upon first principles, and establishes, fortifies, and defends the elements of the remaining sciences. Now five books are proposed and organized on this science, of which the first treats of the Prolegomena to Metaphysics, the second of being and its properties, the third of Angels, the fourth of God, and the fifth of beings of reason.

Book I

On the Prolegomena to Metaphysics

Following the customary practice, certain prefatory matters are set out and resolved in this discipline, as in the other disciplines as well, so that our approach to what we are about to say may be more convenient and more straightforward. For these preliminaries make plain, and clearly indicate and manifest, the nature of Metaphysics and the things that pertain to it.

Question I

On the Nature and Character of Metaphysics

Article I: Whether Metaphysics Is a Science

What the nature and essence of science demands, and what conditions are required for it, I made clear and established in the Prolegomena to Logic (*1.1. q.2*). And there (*q. 1*) I pointed out, not obscurely, the discovery of Metaphysics and of the other disciplines; these matters having been presupposed and foreknown.

The assertion is: Metaphysics is truly and properly a science. So holds Scotus (*q. 3 prol. § Ad 1. secunda q. V.*) and (*collatio 1. § praeterea tertio*), following Aristotle (*1 Met. c. 1*) and (*6 of the same work c. 1*), who divides science into Mathematics, Physics, and Metaphysics. No philosopher I have seen departs from this assertion.

It is proved first: science is acquired either by demonstration from the posterior or from the prior; but in Metaphysics many demonstrations are made from the posterior — for example, a multiplicity of beings, dependency, composition, and the like demonstrate that something exists which is actually simple, independent, and necessary. Whence Aristotle concludes (*12 Met. near the end*): beings do not wish to be badly governed; therefore there is one ruler of the universe, one first cause, and one God. Demonstrations from the prior are likewise had in Metaphysics — for example: every being is good; substance is a being; therefore it is good. For the properties of being are demonstrable and knowable through being, which is their middle term and cause, as will be clear in the next book. Therefore Metaphysics is a science, inasmuch as it is generated by demonstration from both prior and posterior.

Second: from (*1 Post. c. 2*), science is certain and evident cognition of a necessary thing, obtained through its proper cause by means of syllogistic reasoning; but Metaphysics is of this character, as the first proof just offered shows; therefore it is a science.

Third: the remaining disciplines — such as Mathematics and Physics — are sciences, because they concern conclusions caused by true and necessary premises; therefore Metaphysics likewise is a science, as it is the mistress and queen of those disciplines, through which their own principles are established and fortified.

You will object first: Metaphysics is wisdom, from (*1 Met. c. 2*), since it is concerned with the highest and most excellent things, namely God and the Angel; therefore it is not a science. The consequence holds from (*6 Eth. 3*), since science and wisdom are two habits of the intellect distinct from one another. I concede the antecedent and deny the consequence. For science can be taken in one way for certain cognition, whether of a contingent or a necessary thing — and in this sense science is distinguished from wisdom. It can be taken in another way for certain and evident cognition of a necessary object, whether or not it is generated through the highest cause; and if it is generated through the highest cause, it is not distinguished from wisdom but is wisdom itself, which is what Metaphysics is. This is hinted at by the Doctor (*12 Met. near the end of his conclusions for that book*). Nor does Aristotle appear to dissent from this (*6 Eth. c. 8*): wisdom is a composite habit, composed of intellect, which is the habit of principles, and of science, which is the habit of conclusions. Nor does Augustine disagree (*11 Trin. 15*), asserting the difference between wisdom and science to be that intellectual cognition of eternal things belongs to wisdom, and rational cognition of temporal things to science. And in (*13 of the same work*) he adds that each can be called both science and wisdom, with the broader term.

You will object second: science and prudence are distinct habits (*6 Eth. 3*), yet Metaphysics is called prudence by Aristotle (*1 Met. 1*); therefore it is not a science. I concede the major. I distinguish the minor: properly, I concede; by way of likeness, I concede. The resemblance consists in this: just as prudence is eminent among practical habits, so Metaphysics shines above the speculative ones.

You will object third: science is produced through a cause, as its definition makes clear; but Metaphysics is not generated through a cause, since it is about God, of whom no cause is given. I concede the major and deny the minor. For about God there are made demonstrations from the posterior, through which science is also acquired from the posterior. Add to this that Metaphysics has God as its principal partial object, but being as its total and adequate object, as will be shown in the following book; and of being there are demonstrations from the prior, as is clear from the proof of the assertion set out above.

Article II: Whether Metaphysics Is a Speculative Science

The things I said and established in Logic (*1.1. art. 5. q. 2. dub. 1. 2*) must be reviewed and recalled; these having been foreknown and presupposed.

The assertion is: Metaphysics is speculative. The Doctor holds this (*3 d. 34. q. un. § Notandum sub D.*) and (*1 Met. concl. 13*), where he gives this reason: because Metaphysics exists for the avoidance of ignorance and not for any external end — a sign of which he adduces in the fact that it was later sought out, after the other sciences which serve human necessities had already been established. It is proved first from Aristotle (*1 Met. c. 4*) and (*6 of the same work, c. 1. T. 2*), affirming that speculative science is of three kinds — namely, Mathematics, Physics, and Metaphysics — the sufficiency of which division has been proved and settled in Logic (*loc. cit. art. 6*). Second: speculative science exists for its own sake, since it rests in the mere contemplation of its object; practical science, on the other hand, exists for the sake of something else, since it is directed toward action — whether moral or manual. But Metaphysics is placed in the mere contemplation of its subject, namely being, which is neither doable nor makeable; therefore Metaphysics is a speculative science. Furthermore, practical science is either active or productive, by the common judgment of all; but Metaphysics is neither active — since it is not Ethics or Moral Philosophy — nor productive, since it is not manual or mechanical; it is therefore concluded to be speculative.

You will object first: practical science was discovered so that we might become good, and speculative science so that we might know; but Metaphysics was discovered so that we might attain the highest good — namely happiness, which from (*1.10. Eth. 10*) consists in the contemplation of abstract substances; therefore it is practical. Confirmation: to order things belongs to practical science; but Metaphysics orders the other sciences and corroborates their principles (*1 Met. 1*); therefore it is to be counted among the practical sciences. I concede the major. I distinguish the minor: per se, I deny it; per accidens, I concede it. To Aristotle I say that he indeed believed his own happiness to lie in the contemplation of abstract substances; but such contemplation is not praxis, and therefore Metaphysics is not practical on that account. To the confirmation I distinguish the major: to order in the role of director and regulator, I concede; to order in the role of end alone, I deny. For it is the function of the wise person to order in the role of end, not in the role of efficient cause.

You will object second: just as supernatural theology perfects our intellect supernaturally, so Metaphysics perfects our intellect naturally; but theology in the school of Scotus is practical; therefore Metaphysics is likewise practical. I reply that the likeness alleged between theology and Metaphysics is very remote, and nothing is concluded from it. For all sciences perfect the intellect, and yet not all are practical; some are practical and some are speculative. Whether the other sciences are subalternated to Metaphysics or not has been settled in Logic at the passage cited above (*art. 7*).

Question II

On the Object of Metaphysics

Article I: What Is the Adequate Object of Metaphysics

This difficulty is treated at length and with precision by Scotus (*1 Met. q. 1*), Antonius Andreas there, Bonetus (*c. 6*), Tataretus, Ponce (*disp. 68. q. 1*), Suárez (*disp. 1 Met. sect. 1*), Fonseca (*4 Met. cap. 1. q. 1*), Hurtado (*disp. 1. sect. 2*), and others, who cite many divergent and conflicting opinions. From their number I select and present four of the more celebrated ones.

The first is that of those whose names Suárez suppresses (*cit. n. 2*), who hold that being taken in the most common and abstract sense — as it abstracts from real being and being of reason — constitutes the total and adequate object of Metaphysics. Hurtado (*cit. subsect. 1 and 2*) favors this, and Fonseca (*ibid. sect. 3. § Atque est quidem*) finds it not displeasing as a response to the arguments put against this view.

The second is defended by those who hold that God alone is the first and adequate object of this science. Hurtado just named (*sect. 4*) supports this, and Averroes anticipated it (*1 Phys. com. 83*), adding abstract substances or intelligences as the total subject of this science, so that he wishes God and the intelligences together to constitute one adequate subject of Metaphysics.

The third is recounted and refuted by our Doctor in the passage mentioned, and is attributed to Buridan, who determines that the total subject of this discipline is substance precisely and abstractly considered, abstracted from both finite and infinite, and from both spiritual and material — to such a degree that he excludes all accidents from its consideration.

The fourth is the common position, championed by Scotus (*ibid.*) and (*1 d. 3. q. 3. § sed contra B.*) and (*4 dist. 49. q. 8. § Respondeo B.*), by St. Thomas and the disciples of both, and before them by Alexander of Hales, Avicenna (*1 Met. cap. 1*), and Aphrodisias; to which Suárez (*in the passage reviewed, n. 24*) and Fonseca (*sect. 2*) and other recent authors subscribe — determining and defining that being as real being, common to God and creature, is the total and adequate subject of Metaphysics.

Note I, from Scotus (*Quol. 3. art. 1. § De primo. A*): a thing or being is taken in three ways — most broadly, broadly, and strictly. Being taken in the first way comprehends all real beings, both per se and per accidents, and beings of reason, so that to being taken in this most transcendent sense there is opposed nothing — that which is called prohibited being and repugnant being, because it can have being neither in the intellect nor outside the intellect. By contrast, what has being in the intellect or outside the intellect is called being; and what has being only from the intellect is called a being of reason — in which way logical intentions are called beings of reason — while what has or can have being outside the intellect is a real being, such as everything created by God or

creatable. In the second way, being is taken commonly and transcendently for real being, which abstracts from substance and accident, from God and creature — of which Avicenna makes mention (*1 Met. c. 5*), and which is explained by Lychetus and Gadius in their commentary on the Quodlibet just cited. In the third way, it is taken for substance alone, whether material or spiritual, which is described as being subsisting per se — in which sense Aristotle speaks of being (*7 Met. tit. 2*), calling substance the first being, and calling accidents beings of being, because they are caused by it and inhere in it as their subject, and cannot naturally exist without it, and thus depend on it for their being, are ordered to it, and bear relation to it — whether they are absolute, like quality, or are themselves relations and respects, if they are relative accidents, such as similarity and dissimilarity and the rest which are placed in the last seven categories.

Note II: the division of being taken in the most common sense is not a division of a univocal into its univocates, but of an equivocal analogate into its analogated equivocates, as the Formalists write together with their master Syrectus (*Tract. Formalitatum, art. 1 principale*) — because being taken simply and being taken in a qualified sense have nothing in common that is univocal. But real being is being simply, and being of reason is being in a qualified sense; therefore the aforesaid division is not a division of a univocal into its univocates. Furthermore, being taken most precisely is either real or of reason, because no medium exists between them; it is not, however, a real being — otherwise real being would be included in being of reason, and being of reason would be formally real being, which is absurd; nor is it a being of reason — otherwise real being would be a being of reason, which is false. Therefore real being and being of reason are not univocated in the concept of being taken most precisely, whatever Bonetus (*recently cited. § Ens autem*) may protest. The division, however, of real being taken broadly and commonly — into God and creature, into substance and accident — is indeed univocal, as I shall show in the next book. Similarly, the distribution of substance into material and spiritual, into transcendental and predicamental, is univocal, since of these the same name and the same essential and formal account is predicated, in which true and genuine univocation consists, as I have amply explained in the (*Epitome Dialecticae, l. 1. q. 1. art. 5. n. 17*).

Note III: recall from what was said in Logic (*l. 1. q. 3. art. 1*) what an object is, and how many kinds there are, and the conditions required of it in order for it to be the total and adequate object of the science that deals with and is occupied with it — all of which matters, having been carefully examined and discussed there, need not be repeated here but should be reviewed in memory there and applied here.

First Assertion: being taken in the most common sense, as comprehending all real beings and beings of reason, as well as accidental beings, is not the adequate

object of Metaphysics. This assertion is two-part; the first part is derived from the Doctor in the passage recalled above, and expressly from (*6 Met. in exp. Text. near the end*) and there (*q. 3. contra Hurt. cit. § 51*). It is proved first from Aristotle, who at the end of (*6 Met.*) explicitly excludes being of reason from the consideration of Metaphysics. Therefore in the Peripatetic tradition, being of reason is not a proper partial object of Metaphysics, as Hurtado holds.

You will say: the same Aristotle writes (*4 Met. T. 5*) that Dialectic and Metaphysics deal with the same common being — which is not real being, and is therefore being of reason; and so being of reason is included in the most common object of Metaphysics. I reply that he is to be interpreted as speaking of Logic properly so called, which disputes about every being just as Metaphysics does, but in a different way; for Logic treats of diminished and qualified being clothed in a second intention, while Metaphysics contemplates being simply and really. Because being of the second intention extends just as broadly as real being, both are therefore said to meditate upon common being — as the Doctor rightly expounds (*q. 3. cit. § secundam veritatem*). See what I said in Logic (*l. 1. q. 3. a. 5*), where I adduced and explained the same testimony of the Philosopher, with other passages from the same Subtle Doctor cited there.

Second: every science derives its unity and specification from the object about which it is occupied, because sciences are divided as things are divided (*3 Anima T. 51*). But real being and being of reason share no unity except one of name; therefore being of reason cannot be a partial object of Metaphysics. The major is clear; the minor is at hand, since no whole can coalesce or be constituted from real being and being of reason. Hurtado encounters this objection (*cit.*) and says that Metaphysics is not one but multiple; and therefore in its most common object there is no need for a univocal unity that would belong to its partial objects. On the contrary: a science is one by the unity of the genus of its subject; but a genus is one by univocal unity with respect to its species; therefore Metaphysics, which is about being — which is transcendent — is one by a unity befitting itself, which is transcendental. Furthermore, the science which is about a conclusion is caused by premises, which are its immediate or mediate principles and causes, and the middle term is the definition of the subject or of the property; and the subject contains potentially, or virtually, or formally all the truths of the science of which it is the subject, as Scotus proves (*q. 3. prol. § De secundo. B.*) and as I showed at length in Logic (*l. 5. q. 2. art. 5*). But these and similar things cannot be said of being of reason, which is a diminished and qualified being, depending solely on the operation of the intellect; therefore being of reason is wrongly established as the proper partial object of Metaphysics, which is a true and proper science. What is more, all those things I have just enumerated about the object of science are necessarily connected, maintain a mutual relationship and an indissoluble bond with one another, as is clear regarding natural body, its properties, and the species thereof, and likewise regarding substance, its properties, and the like — which have absolutely no

affinity or connection with being of reason; therefore being of reason is not comprehended under the most common object of Metaphysics.

Third: real science is distinguished from rational science, as is clear from the law of a good division, the members of which must be distinguished from one another; but Metaphysics is a real science, as is clear from the threefold division of real speculative science (*6 Met. T. 2. c. 1*). And indeed, for no other reason than because it is about a real object; and rational science is so called because it is about an object of reason. Therefore Metaphysics does not have being of reason as its proper partial object; otherwise it would be called rational just as it is called real, and would simultaneously be both real and rational — which involves a contradiction.

Hurtado forestalls this (*ibid.*) and says there is nothing incongruous about one and the same science treating of opposites, given the adage that opposites fall under the same account and law; and therefore Metaphysics treats of real being and being of reason, just as Logic reasons about the true and false syllogism, the demonstrative and sophistic one; Physics about form and privation; Medicine about health and sickness; and Theology about grace and sin, virtue and vice. On the contrary: real being and being of reason are not properly opposites but only improperly and broadly so. For opposites are of four kinds, as is clear from the Postpredicaments, and among them real being and being of reason are by no means found. They are not contrary opposites, of which one expels the other from the same subject; nor privative, of which one imports the privation of the other; nor contradictory, of which one denies the other; nor relative, which mutually regard each other. The examples that Hurtado adduces and offers are privative opposites; therefore the said author does not satisfy the objection and argument brought forward. Furthermore, it is not necessary that if a science treats of one broadly-taken opposite, it must treat of the other opposite. For Metaphysics does indeed treat of spiritual substance — namely God and the Angel — yet it does not contemplate corporeal and natural substance. And likewise, Physics, which considers corporeal and natural substance, does not meditate on incorporeal and immaterial substance.

You will press: being of reason is knowable, having its own properties in its own way; therefore it belongs to some science — and to none other than Metaphysics, which is the common and universal science of being; therefore being of reason is comprehended under the object of Metaphysics. It is satisfactorily answered by saying that Grammar, Rhetoric, and Logic treat of being of reason; but Metaphysics does so not per se and directly, but per accidens and reductively. But what is treated by a science in this fashion is not thereby established as its proper partial object, as Hurtado holds with respect to being of reason in Metaphysics, making it a partial object thereof. Thus negations, privations, and the like — which are referred back to the things of which they are the negations and privations — do not constitute one

predicament distinct from the decimal number of predicaments, as I affirmed in its place; likewise being of reason, which is referred back to real being as qualified being is referred to being simply, does not constitute a special object distinct from the object of Metaphysics, which is real being — and that is Hurtado's own intention and proposal. You will press further: being taken in the most abstract sense can be the object of the intellect, as Scotus teaches (*Quol. 3. cit. B.*). But nothing can be intelligible that does not include the account of being so taken; therefore such being is considered by Metaphysics. One must reply with Gadius and Lychetus in their commentary on that passage: the discussion there is not about the motivating object of the intellect, but the terminating one — and not the primary, but the secondary, as a consequence and by a kind of corollary. In this way being of reason is contained under being taken in the most common sense, which Metaphysics does not regard directly and per se, but indirectly and reductively, in the manner explained above.

The second part is defended by the Doctor (*6 Met. in exp. T. 4*) and there (*q. 2*), and is the express mind of Aristotle in that place — taken of accidental being that is not fortuitous and chance, but aggregated from many beings, such as "the white musician" and "the musician builder." It is proved first: science is about one object (*1 Post. T. 43*); but accidental being is not one being but many, as the examples given make clear; therefore, since Metaphysics is a science, it is not occupied with accidental being. Second: what a science is occupied with has properties demonstrable and knowable of it, as is clear in all the objects of the sciences; but accidental being participates in no demonstrable and knowable properties, nor does there appear to be any necessary and natural connection between one being and another, as the examples already adduced and the induction of Aristotle in all the sciences — both practical and speculative — indicate. Therefore Metaphysics does not contemplate accidental being.

You will say: Music is a true science, and yet it is about accidental being — namely sonorous number. Likewise, Perspectiva, which is counted among the sciences, deals with the visual line, which is an accidental being; therefore there is no obstacle to Metaphysics contemplating accidental being. I deny the consequence. The reason for the disparity is that Metaphysics is a disparate science, whereas Music and Perspectiva are subalternated sciences, whose objects are contracted by an accidental difference, as I amply showed in Logic (*l. 5. q. 4. art. 7*), and as Vigerius plainly teaches (*q. 5. prol.*).

Second Assertion: neither God alone, nor God together with the intelligences, is the total and adequate object of Metaphysics. This assertion has two members and is defended by the Doctor (*1 Met. q. 1. § Contra istam positionem*) and (*q. 3. prol. § Ad argumentum 2. q. T.*).

The first part is urged first: just as a power is related to its object, so too a habit is related to its object — for each regards its adequate object, about which it is occupied; but a power has an object common to all the things it regards, as

sound — which is the object of hearing — belongs to all the things perceived by that very hearing; taste to all perceived by taste; smell to all reached by smell, and so on; therefore a habit, whether intellectual or moral, has an object that is common to all that is treated in it. But Metaphysics is one of the intellectual habits, since from what was said in (*1 q. of this book art. 1*) it is a science; therefore it has an object that is common and universal to all that is treated in it — which is not God alone, who is not predicated of being, substance, accident, and the rest that are contained in Metaphysics; and therefore God cannot be determined as its first and adequate object.

Second: the adequate object of a science extends just as far as the science itself, and is therefore called adequate because it neither exceeds the science of which it is the object nor is exceeded by it. But Metaphysics extends and spreads more broadly than God; for it contemplates being, which is more common and universal than God; therefore God is not its total object.

Third: Metaphysics is a science from the prior and through the cause, as I showed above. But God has no cause and no middle term from the prior through which God is naturally demonstrated; and if some demonstration is made, it is from the posterior and from the effect, as I showed (*Tract. de Deo uno, disp. 1. q. 2.*). Therefore God is not established as the adequate object of Metaphysics. Whence in Hurtado's stated position there seems to be a contradiction in terms, when (*sect. 4. disp. 1 Met.*) he places God as the adequate object of attribution of Metaphysics, and then (*q. 102*) adds that by "proper and adequate object of attribution" he understands what is called the principal object by others. For the general run of philosophers calls the adequate object of attribution the total object, beyond which the science of which it is the total object does not extend; and by "principal object" they take the inadequate, partial, though nobler and more excellent object. If that is what Hurtado means, he would not differ from the common position of philosophers, who commonly hold God to be the first and most noble thing considered in Metaphysics — especially Scotus (*just cited*), Vigerius, Lychetus, and others there, from whom the Thomists do not differ. If that is so, Hurtado's labor and controversy appear vain and empty — a quarrel over a name, when he says: what they call "principal," I call "attributive." Perhaps, however, they think otherwise, judging that God does not have the true and formal account of even a partial principal subject, since the necessary conditions required for such an object are not adapted to him — especially because properties knowable from the prior are not demonstrated of him, as *propter quid* demonstration requires, in order to generate *propter quid* science, which is what Metaphysics is held to be — but rather that God is the highest and most eminent cause, as St. Thomas indicates (*1.2. q. 66. art. 5.*) cited by the same Hurtado, and as Scotus openly teaches (*1 Met. q. 1. § Ad alias auctoritates*) in these words: *Prima consideratio est de entibus, inquantum attributis ad Deum, non vt subiectum, quia non potest habere conditiones subiecti scientiae propter quid, sed vt ad causam* — the first consideration is of beings

insofar as they are attributed to God, not as subject, because God cannot have the conditions of the subject of proper quid science, but as to a cause. The same he teaches in the Prologue a little before the place cited, to which Antonius Andreas and other Scotists there adhere. And so all things treated in Metaphysics are attributed to God as to the supreme efficient and final cause of all, and as such are directed, ordered, and referred to him. And nothing else is proved by the arguments and testimonies that the same Hurtado adduces and heaps up (*ibid.*). For Metaphysics is called Theology because it treats of God as cause, not as its object — just as Physics is called natural because it treats of nature, even though nature itself is not its object but its principle and cause, as Aristotle intimates (*1 Met. near the end of c. 2*), where, after calling Metaphysics the most divine and most honorable science — both because God possesses it in himself, and because it is about God, who is worthy of all honor and praise — he adds that God himself is the cause and principle of all things.

You will say: the most noble science is about the most noble genus (*6 Met. T. 2 and 1 Anima 1 Met.*); but Metaphysics is the most noble science among the speculative and practical sciences; therefore its object is God, who excels all things in nobility and excellence. I reply with Scotus (*in prol. cit.*) that God is not the first subject of Metaphysics, though he is considered in it in the most noble manner in which he can be considered in any science acquired by natural powers. To this I add: if per impossibile God did not exist, there would still be Metaphysics, which is the common and universal science of being and other common and transcendental things; therefore its proper adequate object is not God.

Hurtado replies by denying the consequence of the antecedent, giving the reason that God is the cause of all, and therefore when their cause is removed, all the things that were made and caused are also removed. On the contrary: science abstracts from existence and is concerned with the thing in objective being — as in the case of a rose that does not exist — and most especially Metaphysics, which is the science that abstracts from all matter. Furthermore, from inferior to superior the consequence does not hold, as in: there is no man; therefore there is no animal — since there could be a lion or something else. Similarly the following does not hold: there is no God; therefore there is no being — because being abstracts from God and creature, substance and accident. This therefore is a sophism of the consequent.

The second part is shown first: one science has one object (*1 Post. T. 43*); but Metaphysics is one science, distinct from the rest (*6 Met. T. 2*); therefore it has one subject. But God and the intelligences are two subjects; therefore they are not the subject of Metaphysics. Nor is it valid to say that they are two partial subjects constituting and integrating one total and adequate subject — since what is under investigation here is not the partial and inadequate subject, but the total and adequate subject, which we deny to be God and the intelligences.

Most especially because, if a total subject were formed from these as partial subjects, it would plainly follow that neither God nor the intelligences is the subject of this science, but rather that thing composed and integrated from them — just as in Physics neither matter nor form is its subject, but the composite of matter and form, which is natural body; and likewise in the book *On the Soul* their total subject is not body nor soul, but the composite of both, which is animated body.

Second: the same mode of philosophical treatment must be applied to intelligences as to God, for they are abstract substances separated from matter, which are known by us only from the posterior. But in the preceding part of this assertion it was decided that God constitutes neither the total nor the partial object of this science; therefore the same must be held of the Angels, who are known by us in the same way as God — namely, from the posterior and from the effect. But Metaphysics is a science from the prior, and indeed the most excellent of the sciences; therefore Angels are not its object.

You will say: Angels are knowable by proper science; for they are immaterial substances, about which there is science. But they do not fall under any other science than Metaphysics; therefore they are not to be expelled from its object. I reply that they are indeed knowable, but not by the ministry of the senses and in the present state — only from the posterior and from the effect, and under the common and transcendental predicates by reason of which they are treated in Metaphysics. But another special science of these is possible in another state, as Scotus and his disciples write (*in the place recalled above*).

You will press: Metaphysics is wisdom, which contemplates the highest causes and the first principles — such as abstract and separated substances — therefore such substances, which we call Angels, are the first object of Metaphysics. I reply with Scotus (*q. 1. prol. § Contra istam rationem*): the aforesaid substances belong to Metaphysics under common and transcendental concepts, but not under proper and peculiar ones, which in the present state are hidden from us; and therefore they are not established as the object of Metaphysics, but rather the common nature they participate in, as will be explained below.

Third Assertion: substance taken universally is not the first and adequate subject of Metaphysics. The Doctor holds this (*1 Met. q. 1. § sed contra praedicta instatur*). It is proved first: the total object of a science is not more contracted and narrow than the science that is occupied with it, but is perfectly commensurate with it, as I have impressed more than once above; but substance taken broadly is limited and narrower than Metaphysics, since this science contemplates not only substance but also accident, being, and its properties — both reciprocal and disjunct — and other common and universal things, as is evident throughout its whole course; therefore substance taken precisely and abstractly is not determined as the object of Metaphysics.

You will say: accident is referred back to substance, and everything else treated in this science, for it is the base and foundation of all those things; therefore it is the first and adequate subject of this science. I reply that substance is indeed the underpinning and support of all accidents and their cause; yet the accidents themselves are beings distinct from substance — since being is sufficiently divided into substance and accident, and there is only one predicament of substance, whereas nine predicaments of accidents are reckoned. Wherefore, although these are referred to substance and cannot naturally subsist and exist without it, they are nonetheless distinct knowable things and partial objects of Metaphysics — though less principal ones — while substance is its more excellent and principal object.

Second: if substance were constituted the total object of Metaphysics, it would contain under itself all substance — both material and immaterial — and would contemplate both; and it would therefore not be distinguished from Physics, since it would share the same object, namely material and natural substance. This conflicts with Aristotle (*6 Met. c. 1*), who divides science into Physics, Metaphysics, and Mathematics; and that which conflicts with Aristotle conflicts also with this view. The consequence of the major is shown thus: whoever treats of a genus likewise treats of its species — as whoever reasons about animal also disputes about man and the remaining species. But Metaphysics would treat of incorporeal substance, which is its species; and it would equally consider corporeal natural substance, which is another species of the same genus — and so the speculative sciences would be confused.

Third: if substance were the object of Metaphysics, its properties would be set forth therein, as the object which a science regards requires; but nowhere in the books of Metaphysics are the properties of that object assigned, except perhaps (*7 Met. c. 1 tit. 4*), where we read that substance is first in account, in cognition, in time, and in nature before all things. But these are not demonstrable or knowable, since they do not have a middle term and cause through which they are demonstrated and known, as demonstration and science require (*1 Post. c. 2 tit. 5*). Therefore the account of the adequate object of Metaphysics is not to be ascribed to substance.

You will say: Aristotle (*4 Met. tit. 2*) writes that substance is the first subject of this discipline, from which the others depend; and that the principles and causes of substance pertain to Metaphysics. Then (*tit. 4*) he adds that there are as many parts of philosophy as there are substances. Furthermore, (*7 of the same work tit. 5*) he inquires about the causes, principles, and properties of substance; therefore he takes substance to be the total object of Metaphysics. It is satisfactorily answered by saying that these and similar testimonies are to be taken of the partial principal subject, not of the total and adequate subject, as Scotus expounds there.

Fourth Assertion: real being taken abstractly as being is established as the total and adequate object of Metaphysics. So holds Scotus (*cit.*) and (6 *Met. q. 1 and last*); and this is the express mind of Aristotle in many places, especially (6 *Met. 1*) in these words: *De ente, ut ens est, ac quid est, et qua ei insunt, prout ens est, speculari huius est, puta Metaphysicae* — to contemplate being as being, what it is, and what belongs to it as being, belongs to this science, namely Metaphysics. The same is had (4 of the same work, in the beginning of c. 1 T. 1): *Est scientia quaedam, quae speculatur ens, prout ens est, et quae ei per se insunt* — there is a certain science which contemplates being insofar as it is being, and what belongs to it per se. This science is Metaphysics, as is plainly clear from its whole course; therefore in the Peripatetic and common school, being as being is the first and adequate object of this science.

It is proved first: the fitting and appropriate conditions of the first and adequate object of any science are that what the thing is and whether it exists be foreknown of the object, that its properties be demonstrated of it, and that all things treated in such a science be reduced to it; but being as being is of this character; therefore it is the total and adequate object of Metaphysics. The major is drawn from (1 *Post.*) and is pressed many times in what precedes. The minor is in common acknowledgment from the two texts of Aristotle just cited. For of being it is presupposed and foreknown whether it is and what it is; in Metaphysics its properties are demonstrated — which are one, true, good, and the like. And all things treated in Metaphysics are referred back to being itself — either as principles, or as parts, or as causes, or per se, or per accidents, or in some other way — as is evident to anyone who contemplates it.

You will say: if there are properties of being, they are either beings or nothing — since no middle exists between being and nothing. But they cannot be nothing, because nothing has no property; nor can they be beings, otherwise the same thing would be the property of itself, which is self-contradictory — for being would be the cause of being and would be predicated in quid of its own properties, which is not accepted in the school of Scotus. I reply that the properties of being are not beings formally and quidditatively, but are aliquities (determinate characters) of being. And therefore they are placed in the definition of being as an addition to it.

You will press further: such properties are either within the essence of being or outside of its essence. If the first, then they are predicated in quid of being and are of its essence and quiddity. If the second, then they are accidents, since they come to being as accidents come to a subject; and so they are really distinguished from it, just as accidents really differ from the subject of which they are accidents. I reply that they are outside the essence of being and differ from it — not really, but formally — which is to be decided in the following book.

Second: being taken commonly is knowable, because it is demonstrable through its own properties, as I was just saying; but it is knowable by no other science than Metaphysics; therefore it is the proper adequate subject of the latter. The major is clear. The minor is at hand, since Metaphysics, according to its own nomenclature, is a transcendent science, because it is occupied with being and the other transcendental things. And if there were another science about being, the threefold division of speculative science handed down by Aristotle (*6 Met. tit. 2*) would be insufficient. Furthermore, Metaphysics would not be first philosophy, but that science which regards being — as the Philosopher subjoins (*ibid. tit. 3*), saying that if there were no science besides Physics that contemplated being as being, Physics would be the first science and first philosophy; but Aristotle treats it as absurd that Physics be the first science; therefore Metaphysics is to be admitted, which is the first and universal science contemplating as its adequate object being as being. Moreover, (*1 Met. c. 2*) Metaphysics is called wisdom, whose task it is to know all things and inquire into everything; and the wise person is said to be omniscient — not in the singular and particular, but in the common and universal, since he excels and presides over all; therefore to it belongs the contemplation and consideration of being and the other transcendental things. Furthermore, to the greatest science there is owed the greatest object, because between it and its object there is a proper commensuration and adequation; but Metaphysics is the greatest science, the most honorable and the most eminent, and the prince of sciences; therefore there befits it the most eminent object, which is being — than which nothing is prior and more eminent, most remote from the senses, simply simple, and irreducible into anything else.

You will object first: the most noble and most excellent science has the most noble and most excellent object; but being is the most ignoble and most imperfect of all, and Metaphysics is the most excellent science, supreme above all; therefore its object is not being. I reply that it is not necessary for the total object of the aforesaid science to be the most excellent and most worthy; it suffices for the partial object to be the most noble, or for what is considered in it to be the most excellent, and for it to be considered by it in the most noble manner — as Vigerius reports from Scotus (§ *Ad 1. arg. secunda q. in com. q. 3. prol.*). Thus God and the Angels are considered in Metaphysics in the most noble manner, by reason of which Metaphysics is called the most noble and the most excellent. This Aristotle also hints at (*1 Anima primo* and *6 Met. summa 1 in calce tit. 2*), saying that the most honorable science is about the most honorable genus.

You will object second: that by which a science is distinguished is its object, as is clear from (*3 Anima T. 38*); but Metaphysics is distinguished from the other sciences by its abstraction and separation from sensible and intelligible matter, as is evident from the passage just cited; therefore its subject is not being. I concede the major. To the minor I say that abstraction from matter is a kind of distinction, but that the essential and total distinction is derived from its total

and adequate object — being — as the Philosopher hints (*cit. at the end of T. 3*), assigning being as being as its total formal object.

You will object third: the adequate object of a science has principles and properties demonstrable and knowable of it (*1 Post. c. 2. T. 5*); but being taken universally and precisely does not have principles, since it is irreducible into anything else, is simply simple, and has nothing above it — otherwise it would not be absolutely first, and there would be a prior prior, which is self-contradictory; therefore being so taken is not the adequate object of Metaphysics. I concede the major. I distinguish the minor: of constitutive principles that constitute and integrate being itself, I concede; of emanative and originative principles of its own properties, I deny. For reciprocal and disjunct properties flow and proceed from it, just as risibility from man and roaring from the lion, as will be more fully established in the following book.

You will object fourth: if being as such were the total object, our beatitude would be placed in the speculation of being — which pertains to the wise person, whose office it is to know all things and preside over all. But this conflicts with Aristotle, who places our happiness in the contemplation of abstract substances (*10 Eth. c. ult.*); therefore being is not to be determined as the object of Metaphysics. I deny the consequence of the major. For it is one thing for being to be the object of Metaphysics, and another for it to be the object of happiness. These two do not entail each other, since they are disparate. Most especially because true happiness consists in the vision and fruition of God.

Article II: Whether Metaphysics Contemplates All the Quiddities of Things

In this article two positions are related and refuted by Scotus (*1 Met. q. 9*) and by Antonius Andreas there. The first is that of those who hold that the contemplation of all natures and quiddities — both in the universal and in the particular, though not under all aspects belonging to other sciences — pertains to Metaphysics. The second is that of those who think that Metaphysics considers not only all quiddities, both common and singular, but also the accidents of those quiddities. Those who hold that there is only one science of all things — divided into different sciences for the use and convenience of learners and students, of whom I made mention in Logic (*l. 5. q. 1. art. 6*) — favor this view. The third position, which is followed and chosen by our aforementioned Doctors (*cit.*) and by the rest outside our school — among whom are Hurtado (*disp. 1. Met. sect. 5*), and in part Suárez (*ibid. sect. 2*) and Fonseca (*1 Met. c. 2. q. 1. sect. 2*) — affirms that Metaphysics contemplates all quiddities only in common and under the account of being.

Note and recall from what was said: the distinction of sciences is sought from their distinct objects, about which they are occupied — according to that well-worn dictum (*3 Anima tit. 38*): sciences are divided as things are divided. And

therefore from the distinction and diversity of things the distinction and diversity of the sciences is derived, as Aristotle does (*6 Met. tit. 2*), abstracting and dividing speculative science into three — namely Mathematics, Physics, and Metaphysics — according to three distinct abstractions and three specifiable objects; and there he concludes that Metaphysics is the common and universal science, contemplating being as being as its first and adequate object. Further, note that by the quiddities of things we understand the natures and essences thereof — whether they are substances or accidents. For each being, whether substantial or accidental, has its own nature and essence, which is expressed and made manifest through definition or description; although quiddity is most properly said of substance, and sometimes substance is taken for the nature and quiddity of any thing whatsoever — both substance and accident — as Augustine uses the term (*in exp. Ps. 68. enarratio 1. partis*), saying: *Natura ipsa, substantia dicuntur* — "nature itself and substance are said." And before him Aristotle, in the definition of univocals: *univoca sunt, quorum nomen est commune, et ratio substantiae secundum illud nomen est eadem* — "univocals are those whose name is common and whose account of substance according to that name is the same."

First Assertion: Metaphysics does not regard all the common and special quiddities of things apart from their accidents that belong to the other sciences; nor does it consider those same quiddities together with their accidents. This assertion contains two parts, handed down by Scotus at the beginning of this article cited. The first part is proved first from Aristotle (*1 Met. sum. 1. c. 2*), saying that the wise person knows all things maximally, as is possible — that is, in the universal and not in the particular, as Scotus interprets there and (*q. 1. prol. § Tertio arguitur sub F.*). But by the same Philosopher there, the wise person is called the metaphysician, and wisdom is called metaphysics; therefore according to Aristotle, Metaphysics does not contemplate quiddities in the particular but in the universal. With this agrees the version of Cardinal Bessarion, saying: "We think the wise person knows all things maximally as is possible, not having singular knowledge of them" — that is, not being versed in their special natures and quiddities. This is further clarified by what is added a little later: "He who knows universals knows in some manner all their subjects." The aforesaid Cardinal translates: "He who has the most universal science must necessarily have it. For he in a manner knows all subjects." Therefore if Metaphysics knows and grasps its subjects in some manner and to some degree, it does not attain their proper and special accounts and quiddities. And from (*4 of the same work, tit. 1*): *Et scientia quaedam, quae speculatur ens, prout ens est, et quae ei per se insunt. Haec autem nulli earum, quae in parte dicuntur, eadem est. Nullae namque caeterarum universaliter de ente, prout ens est, considerant: sed eius aliquam partem abscindentes, quod ei accidit, speculantur, ut Mathematicae scientiae* — "And there is a certain science which contemplates being insofar as it is being, and what belongs to it per se. But this science is not the same as any of those which are said to treat of a part. For none of the others consider being universally as being, but

cutting off some part of it, they contemplate what belongs to that part, as the Mathematical sciences do." From this text it is plainly clear that Metaphysics does not go beyond the limits of its adequate object — which is being as being — nor does it consider the peculiar degrees and proper accounts of the remaining sciences; but each labors about its own object, which it happens to consider. The same is read (*6 Met. near the beginning tit. 1 sum. 1*).

You will say: (*4 Met. at the end of tit. 6*) it is held that Metaphysics contemplates being insofar as it is being, and its species and the species of species; and it belongs to one and the same science to consider the whole and its parts, the genus and its species. Therefore, since Metaphysics contemplates the common and general accounts of being, it likewise contemplates the special degrees and proper quiddities of any given thing and nature. I reply with Scotus there in exp. T.: Metaphysics indeed contemplates being and its own proper and special properties belonging to being as being; but the species of species — that is, the subjective parts of being under special accounts — belong to the particular sciences, such as Physics and Mathematics.

You will press: (*6 Met. c. 1*) Metaphysics contemplates what a thing is — that is, the natures and quiddities of things; and (*4 of the same work. tit. 5*) the contemplation of all degrees, even individual ones, pertains to Metaphysics — for example, whether Socrates and Socrates sitting are the same? Whether there is one contrary to one? Or what a contrary is, or how many ways it is said? I reply that Metaphysics alone treats of the quiddities of things in common and in the universal, not in the special and in the particular. As to the addition, I reply that Metaphysics indeed judges what is the same or different, what is contrary to one thing or not, and similar matters — because these are contained within the limits of Metaphysics, for they are common affections of material and immaterial things, about which Aristotle treats (*5 Met. c. 9 and 10*). Yet it does not scrutinize their special natures and quiddities and individual degrees, since there is no science of singulars (*3 Met. at the end*), nor definition or demonstration of them (*7 of the same work, c. 17 tit. 53*).

Second: the adequate object of a science neither exceeds the science nor is exceeded by the science, as is clear from the notion of the name; but being as being is the adequate object of Metaphysics, as I showed in the preceding article; therefore Metaphysics does not diffuse or extend itself except to being as being, and does not stray through the special accounts of the objects of the others.

You will say: Metaphysics is the common and universal science of the sciences (*6 Met. T. 3*) — common and universal by the commonness and universality of its object, which is being; and being is absorbed and diffused through all the objects of the other disciplines and faculties. Whence Aristotle (*4 Met. T. 5*) writes that the philosopher — that is, the metaphysician — speculates about all things; and shortly after, that Metaphysics and Dialectic dispute about everything; and that being is common to all; therefore Metaphysics pervades and penetrates through

the proper objects of the remaining sciences. I reply that Metaphysics is called common and universal not because it contemplates all the objects of the other sciences, but because it regards being — which is common and transcendent — and investigates first principles and the highest causes in common and in the universal; and it is in this way that it speculates and disputes about these things. This is how Aristotle in the passage cited is to be interpreted. Third: common properties flow from the common subject — which is being — and are demonstrable and knowable about it, and not about a special and any other particular subject, from which particular properties alone demonstrable and knowable about that very subject proceed — such as mobility from natural body, and so on; therefore Metaphysics is contained only within being and its properties, first principles, and whatever other transcendental and common things there are.

You will say: whoever treats of the superior likewise treats of the inferior; and similarly whoever treats of the whole likewise treats of its parts; and whoever treats of the genus likewise treats of its species — as Physics treats of natural body, which is the whole, and of matter and form, which are its parts, and of animated and inanimate body, which are its species. But Metaphysics contemplates being; therefore also its subjective parts, which are the objects of the other sciences — all of which are comprehended under being — and so it attains the special and proper accounts of those sciences. I reply that all of this is true in the manner fitting and appropriate to it. But since Metaphysics is competent to contemplate all these things only under common and transcendental accounts, it consequently does not regard their proper and special accounts, their degrees; but leaves them to be considered by the remaining sciences, as they belong to those sciences and are specified, constituted, and distinguished by them. Hence Metaphysics does not meditate on animated or inanimate body, nor on the healable body, nor on sonorous number, nor on other things belonging to other sciences; but it remains within the limits of its first and adequate object, as the Doctor rightly pursues (*q. 1. prol. § Tertio arguitur. Sub E.*).

Fourth: the object of a science formally or virtually contains all the demonstrable and knowable truths about it, as the Doctor shows (*nunc cit. § Arguitur*); but being neither formally nor virtually comprehends the demonstrable and knowable truths about the proper objects of other sciences. For about God as God — who is the object of Theology in himself — it does not contain such truths as: God is one and triune; the Deity is communicable to three divine Persons; and the like. Likewise, about immaterial and incorporeal substance it possesses only common and general concepts belonging to Metaphysics itself; the proper and special ones are hidden from us, and if they were known to us, they would constitute a proper science distinct from the others. For just as there is a proper science of corporeal natural substance called Physics, so likewise there is another science of incorporeal and immaterial

substance — since it has knowable properties, as the former does. The same is to be said of the objects of the other disciplines, which, since they have their own properties and demonstrable middle terms, are consequently neither investigated nor scrutinized by Metaphysics, except in common.

The second part is urged first: the other principal sciences contemplate primarily substantial objects — as Physics considers corporeal natural substance, Mathematics quantified substance; therefore the other sciences besides Metaphysics do not regard only the accidents of the natures and quiddities in question. Second: a quiddity and its accident compose one accidental unity, about which there is no science (*6 Met. T. 4*). But accidents cannot exist without the subject in which they inhere; and the subject with its accident constitutes one accidental unity, which is excluded from science. Whence Antonius Andreas (*ibid.*) rightly warns that we should avoid those who make mobile being or mobile body the subject of Physics — because mobility is an accident which, together with the subject, makes one accidental being, which cannot be the object of Physics or any other science.

You will say: Perspectiva is a science whose object is the visual line, which is an accidental being. Likewise, Music is counted among the sciences, whose object is sonorous number, which is an accidental being; therefore even if the remaining sciences regard the accidental accounts of quiddities and natures of things, they are not on that account to be removed from the number of true sciences. I reply that these are subalternated sciences, whose objects we do not deny to be accidental beings; but the present discussion concerns disparate sciences — such as Metaphysics and the other speculative sciences, which are not subalternated to one another and whose objects are per se beings, as the Doctor touches on (*q. 3. prol. § contra istas positiones*). Third: of accidental being it is not presupposed whether it is and what it is, nor are there knowable properties demonstrable of it, since it has no proper ones; therefore such being does not fall under a science — especially the first, disparate science of which we are now speaking.

Second Assertion: Metaphysics contemplates all the quiddities of things in common and solely under the account of being. This is the common position of Aristotle, Scotus, and the others cited above, and follows from the preceding assertion. It is urged first from the whole course of the things treated in Metaphysics — namely, first principles and causes, being and its properties both reciprocal and disjunct, universals, predicaments, intelligences, and God, and whatever other common and transcendental things are contained in the twelve books of the Metaphysics of Aristotle, Scotus, Antonius Andreas, Bonetus, Alexander of Hales, and others who wrote on this science; therefore Metaphysics does not overstep the limits of common and transcendental quiddities.

You will say: in Metaphysics there is dispute about matter and form, which are essential parts of the physical composite, as is clear (*7 Met. c. 1*). Likewise about

the four kinds of causes (*5 Met. c. 2*), which are treated in (*2 Phys.*). And about principles (*1 Met. summa 2. c. 1*) and elsewhere, of which there is extensive treatment in (*1 Phys.*). About God (*12 Met.*), of whom under the name of the mover (*8 Phys.*); and then at the end of (*12 Met.*) the number of intelligences is determined in accordance with the number of movable heavens, and the heavens are objects of physical consideration. I pass over the rest concerning the Mathematical disciplines, Dialectic, and other sciences which are not rarely read about in the same work on Metaphysics; therefore Metaphysics strays through the proper objects of each individual discipline. I reply that all these aforesaid things are considered differently by this science and by the others. For this one contemplates them in common and under the account of being; the others, however, under their proper and special account. Therefore the objection carries no weight. Most especially because some things are there mentioned indirectly, in passing, and per accidens.

Second: each science does not transgress the limits of its total and adequate object; otherwise there would be great confusion among the sciences. But Metaphysics has its first and adequate object — which from what has been said is being as being; therefore it contemplates only being as being, and what befits it as such. Hence Aristotle (*6 Met. c. 1*), in enumerating the speculative sciences, assigns them their adequate objects; and indeed at the end of that chapter (*T. 3*) he assigns in explicit terms the adequate object of Metaphysics, saying: *De ente, prout ens est, ac quid est, et qua ei insunt, prout ens est, speculari, huius est* — to contemplate being insofar as it is being, what it is, and what belongs to it insofar as it is being — this belongs to this science. The same he writes elsewhere repeatedly.

You will say with Suárez (*cit. n. 11. assert. 1*): Metaphysics descends to some inferior things to contemplate them under their proper and special accounts. Nor does Fonseca (*concl. 2 and 3*) seem to be far from this, affirming that Metaphysics regards and considers the quiddities and essences that abstract from matter, and many that include matter as well. On the contrary: besides the fact that the said Suárez contradicts himself — assigning along with the common view the total object of Metaphysics to be being as being, and attacking the prior opinion affirming that Metaphysics extends itself to peculiar quiddities and special natures of things, Suárez himself now admits that Metaphysics diffuses itself not only to common but also to inferior and proper accounts of things — once this is posited, being taken precisely is no longer the adequate object of this science, because it extends to inferiors and contemplates the peculiar accounts of things, which is to transgress its own limits. For if Metaphysics regards not only body insofar as it is being, but also its proper account as body, then it contemplates body insofar as it is body — because body is constituted in the being of body through corporeity, which is its essential difference; but body belongs to Physics; therefore if Metaphysics descends to the peculiar accounts of things, it transgresses its own limits.

Nor does it avail to say with the same Suárez that not all but only some special quiddities are regarded by Metaphysics — those that have the same degree of abstraction as the common ones, and that are necessarily connected with one another. For the same or different degree of abstraction neither widens nor narrows the object of a science; rather, it is a broader or narrower quiddity of things. Hence if Physics were to regard something outside of natural body, it would exit beyond the limits of its own object — even if it abstracted with the same degree of abstraction — since a science is specified not by its abstraction but by its object. Therefore if, according to Suárez, Metaphysics regards other inferior objects besides being as such, it goes outside the limits of its adequate object. As to his addition about the necessary connection among those special quiddities, it does not serve the purpose — since all inferiors are necessarily joined with superior predicates, and therefore one argues rightly from inferior to superior, because the superior predicates are of the essence of inferiors. Therefore Metaphysics contemplates no inferior quiddities and no peculiar accounts of things.

What the same author appends together with Fonseca — that Metaphysics contemplates the proper and special accounts of abstract substances — is false, because the proper and peculiar natures and quiddities of those substances are hidden from us, as the same authors candidly admit; and if they were known to us, there would be a special science about them, as Scotus rightly saw (*cit. q. 9. primi Met.*). For if there is a proper science of corporeal and material substance, there would similarly and without doubt be another science of incorporeal and immaterial substance, since the reason is equally valid on both sides, and there would be properties demonstrable and knowable of it. But to say that the latter belong to Metaphysics and not the former concerning corporeal substance is empty and without any foundation or reason.

Nor does the distinction alleged by Fonseca (*ibid.*) — between the Metaphysician as common artisan and as particular artisan — seem less empty and imaginary. For the Metaphysician is one completely undivided, just as Metaphysics is one in every way undivided in itself and distinct from every other science by the unity of its formal and adequate object — which is not divided into common and particular, since it is irreducible into other superiors, because it is simply simple and common to all inferiors by a commonness not of application, as is the object of Logic, nor of consideration — because it does not consider the inferiors under their proper and special degrees — but of predication, because it is predicated of all that is contained under it. Furthermore, it is not the task of the Metaphysician to inquire into the proper objects of the other sciences, to distinguish them, and to pass judgment on them; rather, this belongs to the intellect as the common and general judge of all — since Metaphysics itself exists for its own sake and remains in the mere contemplation of its own object. But if some particular science, needing proof of its principles, proves and confirms them through the first principles of Metaphysics — which are the most

common, most certain, and most evident, such as: "everything either is or is not"; "it is impossible to affirm and deny of the same thing at once" — then Metaphysics remains within the limits of its formal and adequate object. Therefore the aforesaid distinction into common and particular artisan is not to be accepted, as it is fictitious and resting on a sandy foundation, devised not to dissolve the opposing arguments but to evade them — which arguments seem to me to be most firm and most valid.

Furthermore, if the said distinction were admitted, the other sciences would be superfluous. For the Metaphysician as particular artisan would investigate and scrutinize what belongs to his own object; but as common artisan he would pervade and inquire into what pertains to the other sciences. Since therefore Metaphysics does everything, the other sciences are redundant; and these authors fall into the inconveniences and absurdities into which those fall who favor the affirmative part of this article. Moreover, Metaphysics is posterior in discovery to the other disciplines — as these authors do not deny. Those sciences therefore already enjoyed their proper and special objects, which Metaphysics did not take away from them when it was later devised. Since therefore it has taken away nothing, but only holds and possesses what is its own, it must be firmly and consistently held that it does not descend to alien things, nor strips the remaining sciences of their goods or proper objects, but rather clothes them more fully, by proof and confirmation of their principles — in the manner explained above.

You will object first: Metaphysics is called the Goddess of the sciences, in which God is especially powerful; therefore just as God understands and sees all things — not only the common but also the special — so Metaphysics regards all things, both transcendental and non-transcendental, both universal and particular. I concede the antecedent. To the consequence I say that the likeness consists only in this: just as God excels and is eminent over all things in dignity and perfection, so Metaphysics is the most excellent and eminent of all the sciences. In the remaining respects there is dissimilarity and disparity — because God beholds all things, even the deepest abyss, while Metaphysics regards only transcendental things.

You will object second: if Metaphysics contemplated only being and the other common and transcendental things, it would be the most imperfect and most ignoble of the sciences — because being is the most ignoble and most imperfect of all; therefore Metaphysics contemplates not only common things but also the proper and special objects of the other sciences. I reply that Metaphysics is the most noble and most excellent, because it concerns itself with the most noble thing considered in it — which is God — and it deals with first principles and the highest causes, as I was noting a little above from Aristotle and Scotus.

You will object third: the object of Metaphysics is just like the object of the intellect, as Scotus hints (*Quol. 3. art. 1.*); but the intellect regards all beings —

common and particular; therefore the same must be said of Metaphysics. Confirmation: a superior sense, such as the phantasy, perceives its own proper subject and the individual objects of the other inferior senses; therefore Metaphysics — which is first philosophy and first science — also attains its own object and the proper objects of the inferior disciplines and doctrines. I reply that if the major is conceded of the motivating object, it is not however to be conceded of the terminating object, as Gadius expounds the testimony of Scotus; or it can be absolutely denied, because the intellect is a power that is not determined by the object about which it is occupied; but Metaphysics and any other intellectual habit is determined by the object with which it is occupied, and is partially caused by it. Therefore it cannot overstep the bound of its own object. To the confirmation the same must be said — since a superior sense has greater power and extends to more things than an inferior sense; but a habit is caused and specified by the object about which it is occupied; therefore it cannot extend to other things than its own object.

Book II

On Being

Philosophers treat of being principally in (*4 Met. c. 1*) together with Aristotle, and Scotus there both in the exposition of the text and in (*q. 1 of the same book*). And theologians treat of it in (*1 dist. 3*) and there the Doctor, Lychetus, Vigerius, Bargius, and the rest of his interpreters; Syrectus (*Tract. Formal. art. 1*); Trombeta, Brulifer, and others there, preceded by Mayronis in a special treatise on the univocation of being in nine questions, placed before the compiled commentary on the fourth book of sentences of the same Doctor; and in (*q. 2. prol.*) and from there forward. I, however, with my accustomed brevity and clarity, will review, decide, and settle in the following questions and next articles what is said about being itself and its properties.

Question I

On the Concept of Being

Article I: Whether There Is One Common Concept for Real Being and Being of Reason

Although from (*2 q. of the preceding book, art. 1*) this difficulty seems already to have been resolved, nevertheless, so that its decision may be rendered more evident and exact, it is my pleasure to examine it in the present context and to establish its truth as best I can. There are those who defend the affirmative part, among whom is Bonetus (*1 Met. Sua. c. 6. § Ens autem inquantum*), saying that

there is one common concept belonging to real being and being of reason. The negative part, however, is embraced by all the rest — notably Mayronis (*Tract. praecit. q. 6. Canon. 1. Phys. q. 3. § contra 4. concl. arguitur*), Lychetus (*1 dist. 3. q. 3.*), and Gadius (*Quol. 3.*) — who say that real being and being of reason have nothing in common.

Note and recall from what was said in Logic (*l. 1. q. 3. art. 5*): real being is described as that which has being or can have being apart from any operation of the intellect; while being of reason, by contrast, is that which has being only from the intellect. Further, note from the same (*l. 2. q. 1. art. 7*): concept is distributed into formal concept — which is equivalent to the intellection and cognition of the thing cognized and understood, or the representative likeness and image of the thing itself understood and cognized — and objective concept, which is the object presented to the intellect, whether it actually exists or not, so long as it is presented to the intellect. The present dispute is not about the formal but about the objective concept, and what is asked is whether some objective account belongs to both real being and being of reason.

The assertion is: no common concept exists for real being and being of reason. This is derived from Scotus, who, presupposing the truth of this assertion, inquires whether real being is a common univocal for substance and accident, God and creature — as is clear (*4 Met. q.*) where he proceeds problematically, though according to Mauritius and Cavellius there he inclines to the affirmative part. In (*1 dist. 3. q. 3.*) and elsewhere he explicitly and resolutely adheres to and vigorously maintains the affirmative part.

The assertion premised is proved first by Ponce (*disp. 69. q. 1. concl. 1*): if there were one concept common to real being and being of reason, it could be explained; but it cannot be explained, and if it were given it could be explained; therefore no such concept is given. This argument is not conclusive, since many things exist that cannot be explained by us — such as the ultimate differences of things which are hidden from us, the proper differences of intelligences, the will of God, and many other things of which we are entirely ignorant. Furthermore, explanation does not posit a thing, and non-explanation does not remove it if it exists — since explanation is extrinsic to the thing itself, just as affirmation or negation does not cause a thing to be or not to be. Especially since Aureolus, cited by Canonicus (*ibid.*) and others of the opposing view, express and defend that common concept, as is clear from their arguments to be adduced below in the objections. Furthermore, things of minimal being — such as beings of reason — and things most remote from the senses are either not grasped by us or are barely known, even though their existence is clearly admitted and granted by us; therefore it is no wonder if that concept is barely explained even by those who posit and assert it, since explanation neither posits nor removes it. Therefore the argument of Ponce is feeble and empty.

Second, it is proved by Mayronis (*pass. alleg.*): between contradictories there is no common middle; but real being and being of reason are contradictories; therefore there is no common concept of them, predicable of and applicable to each. This does not satisfy me. For, the major being conceded, the minor must be denied — since being and non-being are indeed contradictories, but not real being and being of reason; for the latter is diminished and qualified being, while the former is being simply; therefore they are not contradictories, since one contradictory denies the other — whereas this is not the case with real being and being of reason, since the latter exists only in the mind, while the former exists outside the mind, as will be clearer in the last book, and is already clear in Logic (*l. 1. q. 3. art. 5*).

Third: to being simply and to being in a qualified sense there is no common objective concept, as is clear regarding a real man and a painted man, who have nothing in common except in man; for this reason Aristotle (*l. Praedicamentorum c. 1*) places them among equivocals. But real being is being simply, and being of reason is being in a qualified and diminished sense; therefore no common concept belongs to them.

You will say: substance is being simply, and accident is being in a qualified sense (*4 Met. T. 2*), yet in the school of Scotus they are univocated; therefore the same must be said of real being and being of reason. I reply that there is a disparity, because accident, with respect to substance — which is the principal being and its cause — is called being in a qualified sense and being of being; yet absolutely it is being and possesses the true and proper account of being, just as substance does; and being is rightly divided into substance and accident. This is not the case with being taken in the most common sense, which is distributed into real being and being of reason — since the name "being" is merely common to these, just as the name "man" is common to a real man and a painted man, as Aristotle exemplifies (*in Antepredicamentis c. 1*). Furthermore, nothing appears to be included in real being that is of lesser perfection than being of reason. For just as among beings, being of reason participates in a minimum of entity and therefore in the minimum of perfection, so if such a common concept of being were given, something would be included in real being that would be more imperfect than being of reason — namely, the said concept, since what is included is more imperfect than what includes, and the more common are more imperfect than the less common, as animal is more imperfect than man; and so on. Finally, about that one concept there would be some science, since science is about what is univocal, as asserted elsewhere; but it would not be Metaphysics, which excludes being of reason from its subject (*at the end of 6 Met.*); nor is any other special science yet found that contemplates it per se, as is clear to anyone who surveys them. Therefore one concept — abstracting and prescinding from real being and being of reason — is not conceded.

You will object first: where there is a property, there is a subject, and such a property always accompanies the subject from which it flows — as risibility always accompanies man, from whom it proceeds. But intelligibility is a property of being. Hence that saying (2 *Met.* 4): "as a thing is related to being, so it is to being known"; and this belongs both to first intentions, which are real beings, and to second intentions, which are beings of reason; therefore being — which is common to all of them — is intelligible, and accordingly there is one objective concept of it, from which intelligibility proceeds as its property. I reply that intelligibility belongs to being on account of the name, which is indeed common; but not on account of the thing, because they have nothing in common in the thing. Or you may say with Canonicus (*cit.*) and Vallonius (*in sua lectura, fol. 15*): intelligibility belongs per se to real being, but per accidens to being of reason.

You will object second: one who is certain about one concept and doubtful about diverse ones has one concept distinct from the others, as the Doctor shows in (1 *cit.*); but someone is certain about something that is being, and doubtful whether it is real being or being of reason; therefore being, prescinding from real being and being of reason, imports one concept common to both. I concede the major. I distinguish the minor: about the name, I concede; about the thing, I deny.

You will press: what is divided is participated by the dividing members, as animal is participated by man and brute; but being is divided into real being and being of reason; therefore being is common to them. I reply that this is a division of a name into its acceptations — just as the name "dog" is divided into terrestrial, aquatic, and celestial, and "man" into living and painted. You will press further: when several things are said to be many, they share one common thing, as many animals share the common account of animal; but real being and being of reason are said to be many beings; therefore they share one common concept of being. I must reply that they are absolutely not many beings except in name — just as a painted man and a real one are not two men, and a terrestrial and a celestial dog are not two dogs.

You will object third: every power that regards many things is occupied with a common object under which those many things are contained — as sight regards white and black, which have a common object, namely color, which comprehends both. But the intellect is directed to real being and being of reason; therefore being is indeed common to them. I reply that any power whatsoever possesses its own proper per se object under which some things fall per accidens and by a kind of consequence; thus the intellect considers real being per se and being of reason per accidens. Therefore there need not be something common to both, to which the intellect is directed.

You will press: God and creature are more distant than real being and being of reason; yet the former share in the common account of being; therefore so do

the latter. The major is clear, because God and creature are infinitely distant — since God is infinite and immense, while creature is finite and limited.

Confirmation: being of reason is predicated of creature and is founded in it — for it is valid to say "animal is a genus" and "man is a species," and genus and species are beings of reason, while animal and man are real beings; therefore it seems probable that real being and being of reason enjoy a common concept of being. I distinguish the major: of infinite intensive and perfective distance, I concede; of entitative distance, I deny. For God and creature share in the common account of real being; but real being and being of reason do not. To the confirmation I reply, in accordance with what was asserted in Logic, that it is a privilege of second intentions — which are beings of reason — to be predicated of first intentions — which are real beings — and to be founded in them. Yet they are more distinguished than real beings; indeed, they share nothing in common. This can be illustrated by accident, which is founded in a subject and predicated of it; yet it is more distinguished from the subject itself than one individual from another individual of the same species — for these differ only in number, while the former differ in genus.

Article II: Whether There Is One Concept of Being Prescribed from Its Inferiors

The difficulty exists not only regarding the formal concept but also the objective. Regarding the formal concept, however, there is not one unanimous opinion. For Cajetan (*l. de analogia nominum c. 4. § 6.*), Ferrariensis (*1.1. contra Gentes c. 34*), Gerard (*Quol. 1. q. 1.*), and Aureolus (*1 d. 2 art. 4*) do not admit one formal concept abstracted from its inferiors. The rest, however — such as Scotus (*1 d. 8. q. 2.*) and elsewhere, Lychetus, Bargius, Vigerius, and others there, to whom Suárez (*disp. 2. Met. sect. 1. n. 9*), Hurtado (*sect. 2*), and the rest cited by them subscribe — teach that one formal concept of being exists, prescinded from the particular and special formal concepts. But regarding the objective concept of being, not all are in agreement. For although those who reject one formal concept of being also reject one objective concept of it, there are nevertheless those who concede one formal concept but deny one objective one. Scotus, however, and his whole school (*loc. praecit.*) — to whom the more recent authors cited and many others unanimously adhere — firmly defend that one objective concept of being, abstracted and prescinded from its inferiors, must be admitted; just as they also concede that one formal concept of the same being exists, separated from the rest and terminated at the aforesaid objective concept.

Note: being can be taken in two ways. In one way, as a participle — which is the same as "existing" — so that a proposition that consists only of a subject and the substantive verb "is" is called one of the second adjacent, such as "Peter is" — that is, "Peter is existing," as I explained in (*Epitome Dialecticae l. 2. q. 2. art. 3. n. 15 at the end*). In the other way, as a noun — and so it signifies something to which

essence and existence are not repugnant. Hence a proposition consisting of subject, predicate, and verb as copula of both is called a proposition of the third adjacent — such as "man is animal." In this sense that division of being into act-being and potential-being is admitted. For even though something does not actually exist, yet because it is in potency to existing, or because existence is not repugnant to it, it is called a real being — as Gadius notes, above others, (*in exp. Quol. 3*). Furthermore, Aureolus (*ibid. art. 1*) notes that being can be used grammatically and metaphysically. If it is taken grammatically, the inquiry is whether "being" is a noun devised and imposed to signify one concept of real being or of reason, or of some other such type — or many concepts of the ten predicaments, or other concepts of the transcendentals, copulatively or disjunctively. If it is taken metaphysically, the investigation is whether the concept of being comprehends under itself the proper and special concepts of inferior things, or only being itself abstracted and prescinded from all those contained under it — in which sense this controversy is agitated, which Aureolus (*nunc cit.*) considers very difficult and arduous.

The assertion is: one formal concept of being prescinded from its inferiors is given; and one objective concept of the same being is given. This assertion is two-part, as the Doctor holds (*loc. praememoratus*). The first part is urged by Ponce (*disp. 69. q. 2. concl. 3*): if there were many concepts of being, we would notice and experience many objects; but we do not notice or experience many concepts, but only one concept of being; therefore one concept of being as such exists. But this argument does not satisfy me: for it is subject to the same objections that Ponce himself brings against the argument he adduces for disproving one common concept for real being and being of reason, as is clear from the preceding article. Whether we notice or not, a single or multiple concept of being is not thereby posited — since our consideration posits nothing in the thing, but presupposes the thing in being and is extrinsic and adventitious to it. Furthermore, opponents do not notice or experience such a concept; indeed, they plainly deny it and say they perceive many concepts. Therefore the aforesaid argument of Ponce is of no weight or force.

But it is proved otherwise. First: words are signs of formal concepts that reside in the mind (*1 Perih. c. 1 at the beginning*); one word signifies one concept, and many words signify many concepts, as is clear in Logic explaining terms, and as everyday experience teaches us in our conversations and reasonings. But "being" is one word and one noun, as I explained above in the Note; therefore it signifies one concept, which we form in our mind — and so one formal concept of being must be admitted.

You will say: names are by convention; therefore the name "being" can signify both one concept and many, at the will and pleasure of those who use it. I reply that words and names signify from the original imposition of the one who established and imposed them; and since the first instituter wished to use

"being" for one formal concept, it is not in the hands of others to take it differently and to use that name to signify many formal concepts.

Second: cognition and intellection — which is the formal concept — is directed to the object which is proposed to be known and understood, and by which it is specified and determined, according to the adage received by all: powers and acts are specified by their objects (*2 Anima T. 33*). But being as such is the first and adequate object of Metaphysics, by which Metaphysics itself is called one, as is clear from what was said; therefore the formal concept we have of being is one, just as being itself is one.

Third: on hearing the name "being" we form in ourselves a concept of it — and not of God, or creature, or substance, or accident, or anything else; therefore this formal concept is prescinded from all others. Most especially because we experience that if we see someone from afar, we first cognize them as being, then as animal, then as man, and lastly as Peter. Hence Avicenna rightly says (*1 of his Met. c. 2*): being and thing are impressed with the first impression. Therefore, since being is presented and set before us to be known — apart from its inferior degrees and predicates — it is plainly deduced that we have its formal concept abstracted and prescinded from those same inferiors.

The second part follows from the first: for to one formal concept there corresponds one objective concept, since the former is determined and specified by the latter; therefore the former cannot be one simply unless the latter is one simply — since our cognition must conform to the object cognized. Therefore if the latter is one absolutely, the former is likewise absolutely one. Furthermore, it can be proved first from Aristotle (*4 Met. at the beginning of c. 1*) and (*6 of the same work T. 3 at the end*), assigning being as being as the first and adequate object of Metaphysics — whether universally taken, abstracting from accident and substance, from God and creature; therefore the objective concept of being prescinded from its inferiors is had, as just shown (*in loco*). Second: what things agree in, is not the same as that by which they differ — as man and brute agree in the common concept of animal, but differ by their proper differences, which are rational and irrational. But God and creature agree in the common concept of being, which is essential to both and is essentially predicated of each. For it is true to say: "God is being," "creature is being"; but they differ in that creature is finite and God is infinite. Therefore the objective concept of being prescinded from its inferiors is to be given.

Third: every property has its adequate subject from which it emanates (*1 Post. T. 43*); but there are transcendental properties — namely, one, true, good, contingent, necessary, and the like — of which some are reciprocal, others disjunct. Now these properties belong only to precise being and not to its inferiors, as is clear to one who contemplates the matter; therefore their subject — which is being — simply imports one objective concept abstracted from its inferiors.

You will object first: that name does not exhibit one concept simply and absolutely which is equivocal; but "being" is equivocal; therefore being does not import one concept simply. The major is clear. The minor is supported by the authority of Porphyry (*in Isag. c. de specie*), who says: if someone calls all beings equivocals, he will name them equivocally. And it seems to be Aristotle's position (*1 Phys. T. 16*): "being is said in many ways"; but manifoldness excludes unity of concept. The same is found (*4 Met. T. 2*), from which this argument is extracted: what stands in relation to its signifieds as "healthy" stands in relation to its own does not exhibit one precise and abstract concept of those of which it is predicated — because "healthy" is said of the drink, urine, medicine, and animal equivocally-analogically; but such is being with respect to substance, accident, and the others; therefore being does not import one concept precisely and absolutely. I concede the major and deny the minor. To its proof from the testimony of Porphyry, I say he is to be interpreted as speaking of physical equivocation, not logical or metaphysical, in accordance with that saying (*7 Phys. T. 31*): "in genus equivocations lie hidden" — physical ones — as the Doctor expounds (*4 Met. q. 1*).

You will say: Porphyry (*cit.*) treats of Logic; therefore he is not to be understood as speaking of physical but of logical equivocation. One must reply that in Logic many things are said not logically, just as in Metaphysics some things are said not metaphysically — as (*2 Met. T. 12*): "in every removed thing there is matter," which belongs to Physics. To the first passage of Aristotle it is thus expounded by the Doctor (*cit. in exp. T.*): "in many ways" — that is, in many modes, since being is not divided into differences but into modes, as will be explained below. Hence Antonius Andreas (*ibid. q. 1*) adds: being is said in many modes — namely, finite or infinite. To the second passage I reply with Scotus there in commentary: just as Grammar regards all words, and Medicine all healthy things, so Metaphysics universally contemplates all beings — whether per se or per accidens, whether directly or reductively, or in any other way. Whether the concept of being is univocal or analogous is to be weighed below.

You will object second: if one concept of being were given, one idea of it would likewise be given, and vice versa, as Plato teaches; but Aristotle (*1 Eth. c. 6*) writes that Plato ought not to posit one idea of being; therefore neither is one concept of it to be handed down in the Peripatetic school. I reply that Aristotle denies the idea of being in the way in which Plato affirms it — namely, a subsisting and really existing idea separated from singulars, as I made plain in Logic (*l. 2. q. 1. art. 3*). And therefore he does not deny one concept of being abstracted from its inferiors, which is what we intend.

You will object third: no common thing simply signifies the inferiors contained under it — as animal, which is common to man and brute, does not signify man and brute, but only the precise account of animal abstracted from them. But "being" signifies substance and accident, as is clear (*l. Praedicamentorum c. 5*):

"each of the uncomposed signifies either substance, or quantity, or quality, or the like." The same is read (*5 Met. c. 7. T. 14*). Therefore one concept of being simply is not to be admitted. I reply that those testimonies only indicate that being is divided immediately into those members, and not into other prior ones — just as animal is distributed into rational and irrational — and that they do not reject the concept of being prescinded from those enumerated. This the Philosopher hints at (*4 Met. T. 4*), saying that being is at once something, a quantity, a quality, and the like — because these are the immediate parts of being, so that being is not divided into other parts before these ones. This is interpreted by Scotus (*4 Met. q. 1*).

You will press: the predicaments are primarily diverse, as Averroes (*10 Met. com. 3*) and Porphyry (*in Isag. c. 3*) write — for they are the first and highest genera; but what is primarily diverse agrees in nothing; therefore no common concept of being abstracted from inferiors is to be conceded. I distinguish the major: the predicaments are primarily diverse subjectively — that is, they agree in no potential reality contractible by differences, I concede; they are primarily diverse objectively — that is, they do not agree in the common concept of being prescinded from them by the intellect, I deny. The same must be asserted about God and creature, which are said to be primarily diverse not objectively but subjectively, as will be clearly established in the next article.

Article III: Whether the Concept of Being Prescinded from Its Inferiors Is Real and Distinct from Them

No small controversy exists among the Scholastics about the aforesaid objective concept of being — whether it is real or of reason. About the formal concept of the same, however, there is no dispute, since everyone asserts it to be real, as it is a quality placed in the category of quality. The present controversy therefore obtains only about the objective concept, and the greater dispute arises about its distinction from inferiors. For Suárez (*disp. 2. Met. sect. 3. n. 7*) and the Thomists cited by him deny that such a concept of being is formally and from the nature of the thing distinct from others. Among the Scotists, John Vallone (*in sua lectura, fol. 74*) and most recently Mastrius (*disp. 2 Met. n. 75*) favor this; but the opposite is affirmed commonly by Scotus and his disciples (*1 d. 8. q. 3.*) and (*Tract. Formalitatum art. 3 partiali*), teaching that being taken universally is formally distinguished from its inferiors, to which it is determined and contracted. To settle this controversy and decide the dispute, what I said and noted in Logic (*l. 2. q. 1. art. 16*) on real, formal, and rational distinction is very valuable — indeed necessary.

Note I: for the present, being is used in two ways. In one way, for what is outside of nothing — that is, for what has some being, whether that being is quidditative, or aliquitative, or modal. In this way, the properties of being are called "aliquities" of being, its modes — such as finitude and infinitude — and the ultimate differences are called beings, even though "being" is not predicated

of them in quid, as I shall show below. In the other way, being is taken for the common concept of being abstractable from its inferiors and predicable of them in quid. And it is being taken in this sense that is the topic of the present discussion — which is the first transcendental, having its reciprocal and disjunct properties, and which is the first and adequate object of Metaphysics, of which Avicenna (*1 of his Met. c. 2*) makes mention, saying that being and thing are impressed with the first impression. The first acceptation of being is also mentioned by the same author (*2 of the same work c. 5*), saying that being and thing are common to all ten genera, as Trombeta (*pass. alleg. parte 2 fol. 24*) well explains; and there he adds a third acceptation of being — for what first and per se has being and subsists per se, such as substance — in which sense Aristotle (*7 Met. T. 2*) takes being, writing that accidents are not beings except because they belong to being — namely, to substance, from which they proceed and in which they inhere. And there (*T. 14*) he adds: quality and the other accidents are not beings except in the way logicians say "not-being is being" — not simply, but in a qualified sense; which is to say, substance is primarily being because it subsists per se, and secondarily accident is being because it inheres in another — that is, it is subjected in substance itself.

Note II: the objective concept taken universally is divided into the quidditative and the qualitative. The quidditative — or what is predicated in quid of its inferiors — is subdivided into the transcendental, as the concept of being is simply predicated in quid of God and creature, substance and accident; and the predicamental, which is either generic, as animal, which is said in quid of man and brute; or specific, as man, who is enunciated in quid of Peter and Andrew. The qualitative — or what is predicated in quale — is tripartite. The first is in essential quale, as "rational" of man. The second is in modal quale, as "creature is finite" and "God is infinite," where finitude and infinitude — which are modes — are predicated in modal quale, so called from the said modes. These modes and degrees are some transcendental, as the aforesaid; others categorical, of which some are specific and others individual — the former belonging to specific natures and called portions and perfections of them, such as degrees of whiteness; the latter belonging to individuals and singular natures, such as this particular whiteness having four or five degrees. The third is in accidental quale — and this is bipartite: either in accidental quale taken for something extraneous — that is, what is outside the essence of the subject, as it is taken in the fallacy of accident — so a property is predicated of its subject, as "man is risible"; or in contingent accidental quale, which can be present and absent without injury to the subject — so an accident is predicated of a substance, as "the heaven is quantified." From all this it is clear that some concepts are contractible, as the superior ones; and others are contracting, such as the inferior concepts. Those that are contracted by essential differences are potential and generic; those that are contracted by modes or degrees are neither potential nor generic, as will be made plain in the following Note.

Note III: there is a difference between a difference and an intrinsic mode. For a difference imports a perfecting, constituting, and contracting reality, contracting the reality of the genus — which is in potency to it — so that from the reality of the genus and the reality of the difference there is formed one composite with a metaphysical composition, just as from matter and form there is formed a physical composite. A mode, however, does not in any way perfect the thing of which it is a mode, nor is the thing in potency to that mode — since it is included in the perfect concept of the thing. For a thing is never perfectly and completely conceived unless it is conceived together with its intrinsic mode: if God is perfectly understood, he is understood along with his infinity, which is his intrinsic mode; and if creature is perfectly understood, it is likewise perceived along with its finitude, which is its intrinsic mode. But a genus can be well conceived without its difference — as animal without rational or irrational — because the sensitive, which is animal, is outside rationality and irrationality, which are its divisive and constitutive differences; and therefore it is in potency to them. A mode, however, because it is not outside the thing of which it is a mode, means that the thing itself is not in potency to it — since it includes it within itself, and nothing is in potency to what it already has. Therefore the concept of being along with its mode is perfect and adequate; the concept of being without its mode is imperfect and inadequate. And being as conceived without a mode does not exist, nor is it understood as existing in the thing — but only in the concept — because it is abstracted and conceived as abstracted; and so it is not known by intuitive cognition but by abstractive cognition. Hence God cannot be seen by the Blessed without his infinity, nor can creature be seen without its finitude. This can be illustrated by whiteness intensified to the degree of eight, which no one can fully and perfectly intuit unless they see it with those eight degrees — although by abstractive cognition they can reach whiteness itself. Therefore being is known abstractively without its modes, to which it is determined and contracted; but it cannot be conceived intuitively without them. The reason is that being including its modes is one formal object of intuitive cognition; but prescind from those very modes, it is the object of abstractive cognition.

You will say: if degrees and modes of being are related to being as degrees of whiteness are to whiteness, then just as whiteness is in potency to its degrees, so being is in potency to its modes; but whiteness is directed to its degrees as potency to act — because it is intensified and perfected by them; and so, when it has its ultimate degree, and is most intensified, it no longer tends to another degree. Similarly, being is in potency to its modes, and since it is precisely the most ignoble and most imperfect, it is contracted and perfected through the said modes; and therefore in God there would be something potential, ignoble, and imperfect — which is absurd, false, and impossible. I reply that degrees of whiteness — since they are homogeneous and of the same account — do not stand to each other as act and potency, and therefore do not form one

composite but one homogeneous whole; and so neither is whiteness properly in potency to them, nor is one degree in potency to another. And if perhaps there is some order among them, that order is irrelevant to composition — as is clear in the world and in an army, in which there is indeed order, but not composition. I add further: if perhaps in created things, because they are finite and limited in entity and perfection, some potentiality is found — this is not the case with God, who is infinite and unlimited, and therefore incapable of further perfection. Wherefore neither in being nor in God is there any potentiality, but all things in God himself are most actual and most perfect — even though being taken precisely is said to be the most ignoble and most imperfect, as was amply decided and explained in the preceding book (*q. 2. art. 1*).

First Assertion: the concept of being is real, yet it is not after the manner of a common and universal nature in relation to its inferiors. This is derived from Scotus (*1 d. 8. q. 3.*) and from the other places adduced in Logic (*l. 1. q. 1. art. 5*). The first part is professionally handed down and defended by Antonius Andreas (*1 Met. q. 1. art. 3. concl. 2.*), Canonicus (*1 Phys. q. 3. art. 3. concl. 4.*), Trombeta (*2 part. Tract. Formal. fol. 41*), Vorrillongus (*1 d. 3. ad finem 1. partis*), and the rest in common — with a few exceptions, whom Vigerius follows (*1 d. 8. q. 2. § Ad 1. principale*), who hold the concept of being to be of reason.

It is proved first: what essentially and quidditatively belongs to something and is predicated of it in quid is real, because the essential predicate of a real being is real; but being is an essential and quidditative concept, and is predicated in quid of God, creature, substance, and accident — for it is truly valid to say "God is being," "creature is being," and so on of the rest; therefore the concept of being is real.

You will say: many things are predicated which are nevertheless not real — as "animal is a genus" and "man is a species," yet genus and species are beings of reason; therefore it is false that what is predicated of others in quid is real. I must reply that this holds in logical predicates taken in terms of second intention; but not in metaphysical predicates taken in terms of first intention, of which we are now treating.

Second: what precedes every operation of the intellect is a real being, because a being of reason is made by the intellect or follows its operation; but being precedes every operation of the intellect — since it is its object, and an object precedes the power of which it is the object, as color precedes sight and sound precedes hearing; therefore the concept of being is real, not of reason.

You will say: being of reason, as directive of the operations of the intellect, is the object of Logic; therefore the object does not always precede the operation of the intellect. I reply that in the present context we are speaking of the motivating object, which along with the intellect concurs partially in its

operation — which being of reason is not, since it follows the very operation of the intellect, as I said in Logic (*l. 1. q. 2. art. 5*).

Third: a real science is occupied with a real object, as is clear from induction in all the real sciences; but Metaphysics is a real science, whose object is being (*4 Met. T. 1*); therefore the concept of being is real. Nor does it help to say that Logic is real — since it is a quality — and yet it is occupied with second intentions, which are beings of reason; for Logic is called real formally and entitatively, which is not what we are talking about, and not materially and objectively, which is what is under discussion here.

Fourth: what real beings agree in is real, because agreement is a real relation whose foundation is real; but substance and accident — which are real beings — agree in being and share in its quidditative and essential account; therefore being common to them is real.

You will say: man and brute agree in genus and enjoy its essential account, and yet genus is a being of reason and a second intention. It is satisfactorily answered by saying that the objection holds for a logical genus; not, however, for a metaphysical genus, which is relevant to our purpose.

The second part is urged first: a common nature is contracted by its own differences; but being is contracted by its modes — and I showed above in Note III that a vast difference lies between mode and difference. Therefore being is not related to its inferiors in the way a common nature is.

Second: a common nature, together with its difference, forms a composition — as from humanity and Petrinity Petrus is formed; but from being and its mode no composition arises — as from Deity and infinity God is not composed, as I showed above; therefore being is not related to its modes as a common nature is related to its differences.

Third: a common nature and its difference are two realities; but being and its mode are by no means so — for being merely imports a real concept abstractable from its inferiors, and a mode is a degree inconceivable without the thing of which it is a mode, and a mode added to a thing does not change the thing. A difference, however, in quidditative and essential being constitutes the thing of which it is the difference and distinguishes it from everything else. Therefore the similarity and parity between a common nature and being taken simply and precisely is not complete.

Second Assertion: being differs formally from its modes and from the rest of its inferiors — and indeed from its modes formally negatively, and from others formally positively. The Scotists commonly teach this three-part assertion, and especially the Formalists (*Tract. Formalitatum*) together with Syrectus there — against whom Mastrius (*recently cited*) unjustly inveighs, since they are distinguished by learning and subtlety, brilliant in talent and genius; and as our

venerable and praiseworthy masters, they drew their knowledge from the most abundant source of the Subtle Doctor.

The first part is proved first: formal distinction belongs to those things that have distinct definitions or descriptions and cannot be in any way separated from one another — as I showed at length in *Logic (l. 2. q. 1. art. ult.)*; but being and its inferiors are of this character — for being is described differently from finite and infinite, from substance and accident, as is clear to one who contemplates and describes them; therefore they are formally distinct from one another.

Second: what is communicable and what is incommunicable, inseparable from one another, differ formally — as is clear in the divine nature, communicable to several, and divine paternity, which is incommunicable to many; but being is communicable to all its inferiors, while infinity belongs to God alone. Likewise being is predicated of substance and accident, while substance is predicated only of subsisting things, and accident only of things inhering in subjects; therefore between being and these there falls a formal distinction.

Third: one thing is distinguished from another really, or formally, or by reason; but being is not really different from its inferiors, since it is of the quiddity and essence of them — than which nothing is more intimate, and if that essence is destroyed, what it is the essence of is also destroyed; nor by reason only — since, apart from any operation of the intellect, the inferiors add something to being by which they differ from it, as substance adds subsistence, accident adds inherence, and so on; therefore being differs from these things by more than reason — namely, formally, since no other distinction remains besides the formal one.

The second part is shown first: a mode does not enter into the essence of which it is a mode — as degrees of whiteness are not placed in its essential and quidditative definition, because that definition abstracts from them and precedes them; therefore likewise the modes of being are not of its essence, but are formally distinct from being itself.

Second: what is posterior is not of the formal account of what is prior, because the prior is presupposed as constituted in its essential being before the posterior exists — as is clear of the cause, which precedes its effect; but the modes are posterior to being, since being is more common and universal than they are; and that the more common and more universal precede the less common and less universal, the Stagirite commits to writing (*1 Phys. c. 1. T. 4*). Therefore being is formally negatively distinguished from those modes — I say negatively, because a mode does not import a distinct formality from the thing of which it is a mode, since it is not conceivable or intelligible per se without it, as I noted above in Note III. Therefore between being and its modes there is found a formally negative distinction — which others call a modal distinction, drawing its name from the lesser extreme, which is the mode.

The third part is urged: what has distinct conceivabilities and intelligibilities is formally distinguished — because formality means nothing other than a distinct conceivability and intelligibility, to which the intellect is terminated, as the Formalists commonly teach (*ibid.*); but being and its inferiors exhibit distinct conceivabilities and intelligibilities, to which the intellect is directed in understanding being precisely, substance, accident, and the rest; therefore among these there intervenes a formally positive distinction. Furthermore, distinction conforms to those things between which it distinguishes, and derives its name from them — as real distinction is from real extremes, because it falls between thing and thing; rational distinction is from extremes that are beings of reason, or between two second intentions, such as subject and predicate, genus and species. Therefore likewise between two formalities or realities and conceivabilities, there is found a formally positive distinction, deriving its name from them. But being and what follows it and is subjected to it are of this character — for they are positive formal extremes, per se intelligible and conceivable; therefore they formally differ.

You will object first: Scotus, cited by Vallone (*in sua lett. fol. 74*), writes that the concept of being is of reason; therefore it is not real. The consequence holds because real being and being of reason seem to be opposed to each other, and the common division is between being in the mind, which is being of reason, and being outside the mind, which is real being. I reply that Scotus there takes "reason" for the quidditative and objective account, not for an account caused by the intellect — as he makes clear in (*Quol. 1. art. 2.*) and (*4 d. 49. q. 1. § Ad argumenta. P.*). And before him Aristotle (*l. Praedicamentorum. § 1.*), in defining univocals: *univoca sunt, quorum nomen est commune, et ratio substantiae, secundum idem nomen est eadem* — univocals are those whose name is common and whose account of substance according to that name is the same.

You will press: if being were simply real and contractible by inferior degrees, there would be composition in God — namely, from that contractible being and the contracting Deity, since composition is made from a contractible potency and a contracting act (*8 Met. 15*); but God is immune from all composition, both physical and metaphysical; therefore that being so prescinded from its inferiors is not real, but of reason. I deny the consequence of the major: for if the composition is physical, it is made from thing and thing, or from matter and form; if it is metaphysical, it coalesces from reality and reality — namely, from genus and difference. But the concept of being is not a genus, which is potential, nor is its mode a difference; and therefore from being and its mode no composition arises. Consequently, even though in God there is being and infinity — which is his mode — there is no composition admitted in God himself, since he is most supremely simple and separated from every imperfection.

You will press further: from what is contracting and what is contractible there is composition, as from what is actualizing and what is actualizable; but being is contractible and actualizable, and infinity is contracting and actualizing; therefore, given such a real common being for God, composition is plainly admitted in God himself. I distinguish the major: from a contractible reality and a contracting reality there is composition, I concede; from a real concept and its mode there is composition, in your sense I deny — as remains amply explained and declared in what precedes.

You will object second: being is participated by God and creature — for each is a being. Either, then, all of being is participated by God, or only a part of being. If the first, then creature is not being, since (*3 Phys. § 3*) the whole is described as that outside of which there is nothing. If the second, then in God there would be something imperfect — since a part is an imperfect and incomplete being, which is incompatible with God himself. I reply that all of being is in God — not indeed adequately, but inadequately; which is to say, in God there is whatever is required for the quiddity and nature of being, even though being extends to creature, which is also a being and participates in the quiddity and nature of being itself — just as man is said to have the whole nature of animal, because nothing pertaining to the nature of animal is lacking to him, even though the nature of animal itself also extends to the brute, which equally participates in it.

You will press: the dividing members are parts of the divided, into which the divided is itself divided; therefore, since being is divided into God and creature, it follows that God is its part. I reply that the antecedent holds of a material and physical divided; but not of a transcendental and metaphysical divided, which is what being is with respect to God and creature.

You will press further: the divided is prior to the dividing members, as a whole is prior to its parts; but if being is divided into God and creature, being would be prior to God — which is false, since God is the first being, the first cause, and the first mover (*8 Phys. 1*). I reply that being is first in conceiving and predicating, not however in existing and causing. In that sense it is true that God is the first being, the first efficient, and the first cause, from which all created things derive their origin.

You will object third: God is most actual and most singular — since he is, of himself, this God. But if one concept of real being common to God and creature is admitted, it would be contracted and singularized through the very divinity and infinity of God himself, through which creature is also distinguished; and so God would not be free from composition and imperfection. Therefore the aforesaid concept of real being is not to be conceded. I concede the major and deny the minor — because that concept is not determined to God by a difference, but by a mode — namely, infinity — as I noted above; and therefore neither imperfection nor any composition is placed in God. Most especially because God is of himself and from himself this individual and singular being

— not from something extrinsic, as are created individuals and singulars, which are individuated and singularized through individual differences or thisnesses from the agent that produces those individuals. Wherefore, although God includes being in himself, his supreme actuality and singularity are not thereby injured — just as the divine essence, containing in itself the divine attributes, does not cease to be this thing of itself, since they are really identified with it, even though they are formally distinguished from it.

You will press: the concept of being is either God or not. If the former, then something is in God that is not God. If the latter, then something is in creature that is God; and these and similar things involve great contradiction and absurdity. For all things that are in God are God, and all things that are in creature are created, caused, and participated; therefore such a real concept of being common to God and creature is to be rejected. I reply that being taken precisely is neither God nor creature; but if it is contracted through infinity, it is God; through finitude, however, it is creature — just as animal taken precisely is neither rational nor irrational, but if contracted through rationality, is rational, and if through irrationality, is irrational. Therefore all things that are in God are indeed God — yet not formally, as in the case of intellect and will; for the divine attributes are the same in God really, yet they are formally distinguished. Likewise being and the other common and transcendental predicates are really identified with the Deity, even though they differ from it formally.

You will object fourth: the same thing cannot be dependent and independent, participated and unparticipated, supremely necessary and contingent, caused and uncaused, created and uncreated. But being taken simply would be of this character. For if being is in God, it is independent, unparticipated, supremely necessary, uncaused, and uncreated; but in creature, being is dependent, participated, contingent, caused, and created; therefore there is no common real being for God and creature. I distinguish the major: the same thing with respect to the same cannot undergo the aforesaid predicates, I concede; with respect to different things, I deny. For being taken precisely is neither dependent nor independent, neither created nor uncreated — since it abstracts from both. But if it is contracted through finitude, which is its mode, it is finite being — participated, dependent, caused, and created; whereas if contracted through infinity, it is infinite being — unparticipated, independent, supremely necessary, uncreated, and uncaused.

You will press: what is in God assumes its properties, since nothing exists in God but what is God himself; but the properties of God are infinity, independence, supreme necessity, and the like; therefore being which is in God is infinite, independent, supremely necessary, unparticipated, and uncreated — and by contrast, being which is in creature is finite, communicated, dependent, and caused; and so being does not prescind from all these predicates just enumerated. I reply that all of this is true really, but not formally — and as being

is contracted to God, not as being is in itself considered and prescinded from God and creature. Hence Scotus (*cit.*) adds that being in itself is neither finite nor infinite, but abstracts from both — which is to be maintained about the other modes, attributes, and predicates; but that it is infinite as it is determined to God, and finite as it is contracted to creature. To argue from a prescissive abstraction to a divisive one does not hold as a consequence. Likewise, from superior to inferior affirmatively is a sophism of the consequent. Thus the following does not hold: being simply is not uncreated and independent; therefore being which is in God is not uncreated and independent. Similarly: being taken precisely is not finite nor created; therefore being as it is contracted to creature is not finite, created, communicated, and participated. This can be corroborated regarding the relations of origin, which of themselves are neither finite nor infinite, neither perfect nor imperfect formally; but really, as they are identified with the divine essence, they are infinite and perfect — on the authority of Scotus (*Quol. 5*). It can also be illustrated by substance — which of itself and precisely taken is neither corporeal nor incorporeal; yet as it is contracted to material things, it is corporeal; and as it is contracted to spiritual things, it is incorporeal. But if someone were to argue: natural substance is corporeal; therefore substance precisely is corporeal — the consequence would be poor. And likewise if someone were to argue: substance precisely taken is not corporeal; therefore natural substance is not corporeal — the consequence would be invalid, for the reasons stated and confirmed. Therefore these and similar objections, which Mastrius (*recently cited*) heaps up and presses at length against the torrent of Scotists, collapse — since he abandons the most stable and most firm foundation of our teachers and relies upon a reed, a sandy, alien one, to make himself pleasing and agreeable to the Recentiores.

Article IV: Whether the Concept of Being Is Univocal

St. Thomas (*1 Th. 1. p. q. 13. art. 5.*) and (*contra Gentes cap. 32*) and his disciples there, to whom Fonseca (*4 Met. c. 2. q. 2. sect. 9.*) and not a few others subscribe, hold that being is analogous to God and creature, to substance and accident. Scotus, however, (*4 Met. q. 1.*) and (*1 d. 3. q. 1. 3.*) and (*d. 8. q. 3.*) and his followers there — to whom Arriaga (*disp. 11. Log. sect. 4.*) and many others subscribe — teach that being is univocal to all of the aforesaid. The things I noted and explained in (*Epitome Dialecticae l. 1. q. 1. art. 5.*) and the rest I handed down in Logic (*l. 3. q. 2. art. 1. 2. and 7.*) must be reviewed and brought back to memory; these having been presupposed and foreknown.

The assertion is: being taken precisely is univocal to God and creature, to substance and accident. So the Doctor (*just cit.*), for whom Canonicus (*q. 3. primi Phys.*), Antonius Andreas (*4 Met. q. 1.*), and Bonetus (*1 Met. c. 1.*) fight brilliantly. And it follows from what was said above: since being simply exhibits one objective concept prescinded from those enumerated, it is plainly established that it is univocal and synonymous with them.

It is proved efficaciously and evidently: a univocal is what belongs to many under the same name and the same account of substance — or essence, quiddity, and objective account — as is clear from its definition adduced by the Philosopher (*l. Categoriarum c. 1. near the beginning*). But being belongs to God and creature, to substance and accident, under the same name and the same objective account. For God is called being, and creature is likewise called being, which is also said of substance and accident. Likewise, the account of being — which is to have real being outside of nothing independently of any operation of the intellect — belongs to all of them, since they all participate in real being and real entity, without anyone thinking of it; therefore being is univocal to them.

The Thomists encounter this objection and say that a univocal is equally participated by its univocates; but being is not so: more noble and more excellent being is God than creature, and substance than accident. And therefore it is to be judged not to be univocal but analogous. On the contrary: the same account and nature of being equally belongs to God, creature, and the rest enumerated; therefore being is truly univocal to them. The antecedent is at hand: the essence of being is unsplittable and impartible — since it is simply simple and irreducible into another superior, and nothing is found above being; and therefore being is either totally known or totally unknown; therefore being is equally participated by its inferiors, and hence is truly univocal.

Furthermore: the account of being simply is to have being simply real, outside of nothing; but God, creature, and the rest equally enjoy such being simply and outside of nothing — for they are truly and properly real beings, outside of nothing; therefore being is by no means to be denied of them as univocal. Hence some, perceiving the force of this argument and the weakness of the response, have recourse to another response, saying that a univocal properly belongs to its univocates without any order and dependence of one upon another — as is clear of categorical substance, which is univocal to corporeal and incorporeal substance without any subordination and mutual respect. But the inferiors of being are not so related. For creature essentially depends on God, and accident regards substance as its subject, in which it inheres and without which it cannot naturally exist; therefore being is not univocal. On the contrary: the order and dependence that inferiors import to one another does not remove the univocation of the prior, the superior, and what is common to them — since that dependence is posterior, while univocation is sought with respect to the common account of the superior; therefore such respect and dependence, which creature imports to God, and accident to substance, does not remove from them the univocation of being.

Furthermore: quality states an order to quantity as its subject in quo; relation depends on its extremes; habits of the intellect and will depend on their principles and powers; and yet they are univocated in their common and

general account; therefore the same must be said of God and creature, of substance and accident, with respect to being.

Second: an intellect certain about something and doubtful about two things has one concept about which it is certain, distinct from the others about which it is doubtful. But the intellect is certain that something is being, and doubts whether it is God or creature, substance or accident; therefore it has one concept of being distinct from the others about God and creature, substance and accident — and so the concept of being is univocal to all of them. The major is in common acknowledgment, because the unity of a concept is derived from the unity of the object, and its multiplicity is sought according to the multiplicity of the object. But being is one object, whereas God and creature, as well as substance and accident, are many objects; therefore one univocal and quidditative concept of being is had, common to all those enumerated.

Cajetan meets this objection (*l. de ente et essentia c. 2.*) and says that the concept of being is different from the concepts of God and creature, substance and accident — yet not univocal, but analogous. On the contrary: that concept of being belongs to its inferiors under the same name and the same account and quiddity of being; therefore it is univocal. The antecedent is conspicuous from the definition of univocals. For nothing more is required for univocation than the same name and the same account or essence according to that same name; and being is such, as I evidently showed in the first argument. What is more: between equivocal and univocal there is no middle, as I proved in *Logic (l. 3. q. 2. art. 7.)*. But Cajetan admits that being is not equivocal; therefore he must concede that it is univocal and synonymous.

Third: the object of any science is univocal, about which its knowable properties are demonstrated — as is clear from induction in all the objects of the sciences. But being is the first and adequate object of Metaphysics, as I showed in (*1.1. q. 2. art. 1.*); therefore it is univocal to its inferiors, of which it is essentially predicated. Furthermore: God is naturally known by us, as is clear (*8 Phys.*) and (*12 Met.*). But God is not known under proper predicates, as Scotus rightly pursues (*q. 1. prol.*); therefore under common and transcendental predicates — among which being is found first, which, since it is predicated in quid of God himself and of the rest mentioned, it is plainly deduced that it is univocal to God himself and the others. This very thing Aristotle hints at (*2 Met. T. 4.*), when he urges that eternal principles are most true — because each thing is most such, through which univocation belongs to others; as if fire is the cause by which other things are hot, fire itself is hottest. Therefore, since being is the first thing by which other things are, and since it is participated by all its inferiors, it plainly follows that being itself most supremely has being, and thus is univocal to them, and is predicated of them univocally, essentially, and in quid.

You will object first: Aristotle (*4 Met. c. 2. T. 2.*) writes that just as health is said of the health of an animal, of urine, and of medicine, so being is said of substance

and accident; but health is not univocal to the health of an animal, of urine, and of medicine; therefore neither is being univocal to substance and accident. Confirmation I from the same (*7 Met. T. 14.*): accidents are not beings except because they belong to being, and as logicians say "not-being is being" and "not-knowable is knowable"; therefore if accidents do not participate in the account of being, it follows that being is not univocal to them. Confirmation II from (*1 Eth. c. 6.*): being is analogous, because it is said first of substance and afterward of accident. I reply that Aristotle there adduces a likeness and parity in that — just as the health of urine and medicine is ordered to the health of an animal — so accident is ordered to substance, since substance is being subsisting per se. In another respect there is disparity and dissimilarity: because health is formally only in the animal, in urine as a sign, and in medicine as a cause. But the account of being simply is formally and properly in substance and in accident. If it were otherwise explained, being would be equivocal to substance and accident — just as healthy is equivocal to those enumerated — which Aristotle denies in that place, saying that being is said of substance and accident not equivocally. What is more, since in that place he seems not to be speaking assertively — as he adds: "but however one wishes to say these things, it makes no difference" — if it makes no difference, someone will say that being is univocal, which the Doctor explains and corroborates (*4 d. 12. q. 1. § Ad quaestionem. H.*). To Confirmation I, I reply with the same Doctor in his exposition of that text and in (*collatio 25.*): it is there only signified that accident is caused by substance; and therefore it is called "being of being" — that is, being caused by the substance in which it inheres and without which it cannot exist. To Confirmation II: the Philosopher explicitly makes no mention of any analogy; and if he were to adduce any, it would have to be reduced to univocation — and he refers to another philosophy, which is Metaphysics, which in no place expresses such an analogy, as is clear from what has been said. You will press: Job, the patriarch of the suffering (*c. 14. of his book*), addressing God, says: *Nonne tu, qui solus es?* — "Are you not the one who alone is?" Therefore, if God alone is being, the rest are non-beings; and consequently being is not univocal to God and creature. I reply that God alone is being from himself — independent and unparticipated — while creature is dependent and participated being. In this way the testimony of Job just cited is expounded, which does not remove the univocation of being with respect to God and creature.

You will object second: nothing is simpler than God, since he is supremely simple; but if being were univocal to God and creature, being would be simpler than God — since what is contracting is simpler than what is contracted, and the superior is simpler than the inferior; but being is contracted to God through infinity, and is superior to God himself, since it is his essential and quidditative predicate; therefore, and so on. I reply that being is said to be simple in one way, and God in another. For being is simply simple — because it is irreducible into anything superior; while God is supremely simple — by exclusion of all

composition and composability, as I taught in (*Summa Theologica Tract. 2. disp. 1. q. 6.*).

You will press: a univocal is equally participated by its inferiors, as is clear of a genus, which is communicated equally to its species, and a species to its individuals; but being is unequally participated by its inferiors — and therefore substance is being more nobly, since it subsists per se, while accident is being more ignobly, since it inheres in a subject; therefore being is not univocal to substance and accident, God and creature. I concede the major and deny the minor. Why substance surpasses accident in nobility, and God surpasses creature — this is not sought according to the common account of being, which is equal to all of them, but according to the proper and peculiar accounts by which they are distinguished from one another.

You will object third: if being were univocal to those enumerated, it would be their genus — for it is of the essence of a genus to be predicated in quid of many differing in species; but being is not a genus (*Met. T. 10.*); therefore neither is it univocal to them. I deny the consequence of the major: for a genus imports a potential and contractible entity in the manner of a part; but this does not belong to being — since it is simply simple and contracted through modes, not through differences as a genus is, on the authority of Scotus (*1 d. 8. q. 3.*), to whom Bonetus (*1 Met. c. 1.*) and the other Scotists adhere.

You will press: where there is reality and reality, there is a genus — since a species coalesces from a contractible reality, which is the genus, and a contracting reality, which is the difference; but being imports a contractible reality, because it is being contractible by the proper contracting accounts of substance and accident; therefore without any foundation or reason it is excluded from the account of a genus. The major being conceded, I deny the minor. For being designates a real objective concept — not a potential reality that is composable with the reality of a difference, as I made abundantly clear in the preceding article. And therefore Mastrius (*cit.*) rightly criticizes Ponce for conceding that being exhibits a contractible reality with respect to God and creature — for in that case God would not be free of metaphysical composition, which is made from reality and reality; but this is false and rejected by the general run of Scotists and the other Scholastics.

Article V: Whether Being Is Predicated in Quid of All Things

It is nearly certain among all that being is predicated univocally and in quid of God, creature, substance, and accident, and of all those that are placed directly in the predicaments. A not insignificant quarrel, however, exists between Thomists and Scotists as to whether being is predicated of its own properties and of the ultimate differences. The affirmative part is defended by the Thomists — notably Cajetan (*l. de ente et essentia q. 3.*), Soncinas (*4 Metaphys. q. 19.*), Suárez (*disp. 2. Metaphys. sect. 5. n. 16.*), Hurtado (*ibid. sect. 4. § 57.*), and very

many others. The negative part is embraced by Scotus (*1 d. 3. q. 3. art. 1. § Ad quaestionem igitur. F.*), Vigerius, Lychetus (*ibid.*), Syrectus (*Tract. Formal. artic. 1. principale*), Trombeta, Brulifer, Vallone (*ibid.*), Rada (*Contr. 21. art. 2. primae partis*), and many others.

Note I and recall from what was said in (*Epitome Dialecticae l. 1. q. 2. art. 2.*) what predication is and how many kinds there are; and what I asserted (*l. 2. Logicae q. 5. artic. 3.*) about superior and inferior differences — namely, that the former are not predicated of the latter quidditatively and essentially, but only denominatively and identically. Furthermore, it is to be brought back to memory from (*l. 2. de Anima q. 1. artic. 11.*) that there are intermediate and subordinated forms, and that in one animated being, besides the soul, there is a form of corporeity presupposed and pre-required to it — which persists and endures even when the soul departs, though it does not long endure, because it is ordered to the soul, through which one whole is constituted and ultimately completed, and without which the composite is gradually corrupted and reduced to dust.

Furthermore, very useful for understanding and resolving this controversy is the repetition of the acceptance of being brought forward and explained in this book (*art. 3. of this question*) — namely, for the common quiddity and the first transcendental, to which reciprocal and disjunct properties are accommodated, univocal to all inferiors and predicable of them, which is established as the first and total object of Metaphysics. And for everything that is positive and outside of nothing, which follows upon being taken in the first way — whether it is a property of it, or a mode, or an ultimate difference, or something else outside the quiddity and essence of being taken in the most abstract and most precise sense. One who does not discern or weigh this — such as Suárez (*praecit.*) — assails Scotus vainly and uselessly at great length and heaps up many things there that utterly collapse once the acceptance and distinction of being now noted is grasped. For when it is asked whether the ultimate differences and modes are real beings or not, the reply is easy and fully satisfying: they are beings taken not in the first but in the second way — or, as others say, they are not beings formally but really and identically.

Note II: some differences are intermediate and subaltern — such as living and sensitive — while some are specific and ultimate, such as rational. Besides, some are formal and essential — such as corporeal, which constitutes corporeal substance, and incorporeal, which constitutes spiritual substance; while others are material and individual — such as thisnesses, by which individuals are constituted in the being of an individual.

Some doubt whether the present difficulty is to be taken of only the ultimate differences, or also of the subaltern and intermediate ones. For Vallone and Rada (*recently cit.*) include both; while the rest — such as Vigerius and Lychetus (*just enumerated*) — call only the ultimate ones into question and treat of them.

And indeed rightly, for Scotus (*loc. alleg.*) and in (*Rep. ibid.*) and (*2 d. 3. q. 6.*) and elsewhere makes mention of and discusses only the ultimate differences; and when the mind of an Author is clear about something, it is not to be dragged and twisted to something else. And the adversaries attack and contend against Scotus about the ultimate ones and not about the intermediate differences. What is more, subaltern differences are essential parts of genera — as corporeal is an essential part of body, and animate is an essential part of animated body — of which being is predicated in quid; and also of the said essential parts, Scotus asserts (*1 d. 3. q. 3. § Quantum ad 2. art. I.*). Therefore this contest is moved solely about ultimate differences.

Note III: a difference is derived from the form or from the ultimate reality of the form. The former difference — derived from the form — is not simply simple, because since the form includes many realities and formalities, it shares in the common account of form, as well as in the common objective concept of substance; and consequently in the common concept of being. Wherefore, just as the form participates in its essence distinct from the rest, so it likewise has its own difference by which it differs from others. Likewise, according to the multiplicity of realities which it contains in itself, it likewise acquires a multiplicity of differences by which such realities differ from others — as by the account of form it differs from matter, by the account of substance it differs from accident, and so on. The latter difference, however, is simply simple — primarily diverse and irreducible into another — just as the concept of being is abstracted and prescinded from its inferiors. This doctrine — which is true and very subtle, built on a firm foundation — is attacked by Fonseca (*4 Met. c. 2. q. 3. sect. 2.*) and Suárez (*recently cit.*) and is refuted as false and empty. For they say that no difference drawn from the whole form is given, and no ultimate difference except the individual one; and therefore the division of a difference into ultimate and non-ultimate, just set out, is insufficient and void — and so being is predicated in quid of all, including differences and modes, in which it is essentially included.

On the contrary: each thing, just as it has its essential and quidditative being by which it shares with others, so also has being by which it differs from others. Hence the adage adduced by the Doctor (*1 d. 26. q. un.*): "the constitutive principle of a thing is the same as the distinctive principle." But the form has its being by which it is constituted in the being of form; therefore it also has a distinctive principle — a difference — by which it differs from others that are not form; and thus a difference drawn from the form is had. Furthermore: a whole is distinguished from its parts — from what was said elsewhere — and from everything that is not the whole; therefore also the whole form has a difference by which it differs from everything that is not form.

Furthermore, in the form there are many realities: the reality common to it in which it is univocated with other forms; and the reality of substance, and other

aforesaid common things — both predicamental and transcendental — that are comprehended in the form itself; and the reality proper to it, through which it differs from everything else that is not form. Therefore a difference drawn from the form is to be admitted.

Furthermore: there are supreme, subaltern, and lowest genera; and each genus has its own differences into which it is divided and through which its species are constituted; therefore an intermediate and ultimate difference derived from the ultimate reality, or from the total form, must be conceded — otherwise all things would be confused and gathered into one. Yet the predicaments are unmixed and distinct, and all things placed in them enjoy their proper and distinct positions and are located in them. Or else everything would be fabricated by the intellect, and nothing would be real besides singulars and individuals — which I have shown elsewhere to be false at length.

But when the aforesaid authors add that from Scotus's doctrine it follows that the ultimate differences are only individual ones — this is wrongly inferred, since individual differences are material, while Scotus is speaking of formal and essential differences, which are the specific differences of the lowest species, that among essential differences occupy the last place. Nor does it help them to add that in Scotus's view there would be only ultimate differences, because all differences are sought from the last degree and the final actuality. For, since some things are common and others singular (*1 Perih. § 5.*), it follows that some differences belong to common things — by which they differ from others — while others are adapted to particulars and singulars, contracting and actualizing indifferent and undetermined things.

Furthermore: from the antepredicamental canon, for different genera not subalternately ordered there are different differences, species, and individuals — as is seen in the entire catalogue of each predicament. But such differences of genera are not drawn from the ultimate singular and individual actuality, because this is incommunicable to many, while the former are communicable to many — namely to those that are of the same genus. Most especially because some contractible potential reality and some contracting reality belong to subaltern genera, while others belong to lowest genera and atomic species — as can be seen in the tree of Porphyry and in all the series we have ourselves constructed for each predicament. Therefore the aforesaid Scholastics wrongly infer from Scotus's doctrine that there are no differences except ultimate and individual ones.

Note IV: some things are of a different account and primarily diverse — which happens in two ways: subjectively and objectively. Those are said to be primarily diverse subjectively that agree in no potential and generic reality — such as God and creature, who have no genus in common, since God is most actual and outside every genus, as Augustine affirms (*1 Trin. cap. 15.*). Others are primarily diverse objectively — those that do not participate in the common concept of

being abstracted from its inferiors, such as the Doctor considers the ultimate differences and properties of being to be. But God and creature, although primarily diverse subjectively, are not so objectively — since they agree in the common concept of being univocal to them, from what was asserted in the preceding article. Likewise, matter and form — which are essential parts of the physical composite — differ totally from each other subjectively, not having any genus, since they are parts reducible to the genus of substance; but they do not do so totally objectively, since they are truly and properly beings, of which being is predicated simply and in quid, as the Doctor acknowledges (*1 dist. 3. q. 3.*). Matter and form can also be said to be primarily diverse with respect to the accounts of receptibility and receptivity — that is, insofar as matter precisely is subjective potency and form is pure formal act — as Trombeta indicates (*Tract. Formal. fol. 15. pag. 2.*), and before him Averroes (*1 Phys. com. 1.*). In this way they do not include being formally, but denominatively. For Aristotle (*5 Metaphys. c. 9. T. 16.*) and (*10 of the same work, T. 12.*) says: primarily diverse things include nothing the same, so that nothing of one is something of the other. Therefore matter and form so taken include nothing the same in their essences and quiddities quidditatively — which could be predicated of them quidditatively and essentially — though they can be predicated identically and denominatively.

First Assertion: being is not predicated in quid of the ultimate differences. So Scotus (*ibid.*) and (*2 d. 3. q. 6. § Ad quaestionem ergo. G.*) and in the Report.

It is proved first: between the same and the diverse there is no medium (*10 Met. T. 12.*); but the ultimate differences are not the same as being — because being is contractible, while the ultimate differences are contracting; and between what is contractible and what is contracted there is a distinction, as is clear in Physics regarding matter and form, and in Metaphysics regarding genus and difference, of which one is contractible and potential, the other contracting and actualizing. Furthermore, since being from what was said in the preceding article is univocal — if the ultimate differences are univocated in being, they differ from one another; and what differs, differs by differences; and so either there would be a process to infinity, or one must stop at the ultimate differences — which differ by themselves and do not include being quidditatively in themselves, such that being would be predicated of them in quid. Nor are they diverse things, since diverse things are described (*5 Met. c. 9.*) as having something the same, while things primarily diverse are said to include nothing the same; but the ultimate differences are primarily diverse — since nothing of one is something of the other; therefore they do not include being in themselves, which would be predicated quidditatively and essentially of them.

Soncinas and Suárez (*just cited*) encounter this objection and say that things primarily diverse can agree in some common concept — as is clear of the predicaments, which are supreme genera and primarily diverse, and yet all

agree in being, which is predicated univocally and quidditatively of them; and similarly there seems to be no contradiction in the ultimate differences being primarily diverse. On the contrary: the predicaments are primarily diverse subjectively — that is, they do not share in any common reality of a genus; but they are not primarily diverse objectively, since they agree in the common concept of being. But the ultimate differences are primarily diverse in both ways — that is, objectively and subjectively — having no reality of a genus and participating in no quiddity of being; and therefore there is no parity between the predicaments and the ultimate differences. Nor does it avail to add that the ultimate differences are not things that differ, but things by which other things differ. For even though the ultimate differences are what by which species differ from one another, it still remains to be inquired whether the differences themselves differ from each other by themselves or by other differences — just as whiteness and blackness are what by which a white and a black wall differ, and whiteness and blackness do not differ by themselves but by other differences. Wherefore, if the ultimate differences include something quidditatively, they are not simply simple but resolvable into another concept which they include, and it remains to be inquired by what they differ; and so on successively, proceeding to infinity. Therefore the argument set out is in no way broken by the adversaries' response, but still remains in its full force.

Second: just as in physical composition and resolution there are first and ultimate principles from which physical composites are composed and into which they are resolved — which are matter and form — so the same manner of reasoning holds in metaphysical composition and in its resolution into the first and ultimate principles of the same; but of the physical principles, one does not include something of the other — form does not include something of matter, and conversely — since they are of a different account and primarily diverse, from Scotus (*2 dist. 12. q. 1. § Sequitur secundo. E.*). Therefore neither do the ultimate differences contain within themselves being as something common to them and an essential predicate.

The adversaries encounter this — notably Suárez (*cit.*) — and say that the comparison and likeness between physical and metaphysical principles does not hold, since above composites and metaphysical principles there are being and the other transcendentals — which are referred to and predicated quidditatively of them. But in Physics, above its principles there is nothing found that is included in them and predicable in quid of them; and therefore there is no parity.

On the contrary: the parity and proportion aforesaid consists in this — that just as the ultimate reality of natural principles is simply simple and irreducible into another reality, so the ultimate reality of transnatural principles is simply simple and irreducible into another; but of matter and form — which are the first principles of natural things — there exist the aforesaid ultimate realities —

namely, receptibility and receptivity — which do not contain in themselves other realities distinct from themselves; therefore the same must be said of the ultimate differences pertaining to Metaphysics. And so the parity is found.

Third: in ascending there is a last contractible and determinable quidditative thing, which is being — simply simple; therefore there must be conceded a last contracting and determining quidditative thing in descending, which is the ultimate specific difference — simply simple. The consequence is derived: because contractible and contracting, determinable and determining, mutually regard each other — like active and passive power, act and potency; and no one denies that being is simply simple; therefore nor will anyone deny the same of the ultimate differences. Furthermore: from what was proved in Logic (*l. 2. q. 5. art. 3.*), inferior differences do not formally include superior differences; therefore neither do the ultimate differences formally contain the first transcendental, which is being.

Second Assertion: being is not included quidditatively in its own properties, but only identically and denominatively. The Doctor defends this (*ibid. sub G.*).

The first part is urged first: what is placed in the definition of a property through addition does not enter the essence of it — since a definition by addition is not quidditative but descriptive, from the notes in (*Epitome Dialecticae l. 2. q. 7. art. 2.*); but being is placed in the definition of its property, since being is its subject from which it flows (*4 Met. c. 3. T. 5.*); therefore being does not essentially and quidditatively include its own property.

This is corroborated: a per se proposition of the second mode is not converted into a per se proposition, but into a per accidens one — as "man is risible" and "the risible is man" — whose reason is that in the first proposition the subject is the cause of the predicate, whereas in the second proposition it is not, as I showed at length in Logic (*l. 5. q. 3. art. 7.*). Hence I showed there that in the first mode of saying per se, the predicate is of the essence of the subject — as "man is rational"; while in the second mode of saying per se, the predicate is outside the essence of the subject — as "man is risible." But this proposition "being is one" is of the second mode of saying per se; therefore being in its own essence does not include its own property, and consequently it is not predicated essentially of it.

Second: being is sufficiently and adequately divided into uncreated and created being; but the property of being is not uncreated being — since this is God alone — nor created, since created being is finite, while the property of being abstracts from finite and infinite; therefore being does not essentially include its own property. Nor does it avail to say that just as the property of being abstracts from finite and infinite, so it also abstracts from created and uncreated. For even if this is admitted, nevertheless an essential predicate that is superior is not a property of its subject, since a property is reciprocated with its very subject; and being itself is what the property follows, as originated from originating and

produced from producing. But what is originated and produced is not included in the quiddity and essence of what originates and produces — just as the effect does not enter the essence of its cause; but the property of being emanates from being; therefore it is not of its quiddity and essence.

Third: is the property of being a being, or nothing? Not the latter — because nothing, just as it has no being, so has no property. Nor the former — because being would proceed from being, and it would be its own property, which is false. Nor something else — for it would then be asked whether that something else is being, and so on successively, proceeding to infinity, which Aristotle (2 *Met. c. 2.*) warns we must avoid. It is therefore concluded that being is not predicated quidditatively of its own properties.

Convinced by these arguments, Fonseca (*cit. at the end of sect. 3.*) does not dare to contradict this part; but he refutes the preceding assertion as consequent upon the univocation of being — which he calls new and dangerous, because it conflicts with the older tradition handing down the analogy of being. But new doctrine resting on firm reason and consonant with truth, and not opposed to the Orthodox faith, is not to be despised. For the law and doctrine of Christ the Lord was new in its beginning, as is clear from (*Jn. 13*): *Mandatum novum do vobis* — "A new commandment I give you"; and (*Col. 3*): *Expoliantes vosvetem hominem cum actibus suis, et induentes novum* — "stripping off the old man with his deeds and putting on the new"; and (*1 Cor. 5*): *Expurgate vetus fermentum, ut sitis nova conspersio* — "Purge out the old leaven, that you may be a new batch." Hence Tertullian rightly (*l. contra Gentes*) rebuked those who despised the Orthodox religion as new. But vain novelty is to be rejected, and anything opposed to the rites of the holy Church, as St. Bernard intimated (*Epist. 174. ad Canonicos Lugdunenses*). Add to this that Aristotle (*1 Phys. 1. and 2. Met.*) and elsewhere refutes the views of the ancients and proves and confirms his own by arguments — in whose footsteps Scotus similarly follows, refuting the positions of prior Scholastics with the most firm foundations and the most acute arguments — yet modestly, as is his custom, in these words (*1 dist. 3. q. 2. ante B.*): "Secondly, not asserting it, because it does not agree with the common opinion: it can be said that God and creature agree in the concept of being — not analogous, but univocal." And it is not incongruously used by recent authors, that saying of Anastasius of Sinai (*1.2. epist. 35.*): "Truth is open to all; it has not yet been seized; much of it is left for those who come after."

The second part is at hand for us: for a property is the same really as the subject of which it is a property — just as a power is also really identified with the thing of which it is a power, as the Doctor writes (*2 dist. 16. q. un.*); and as I discussed in (*l. 2. de Anima q. 2. art. 2.*).

You will object first, against First Assertion: that to which the definition of being belongs is formally being; but the definition of being belongs to the ultimate difference; therefore the ultimate difference is formally being, and being is

predicated quidditatively of it. The major is clear by the argument from definition to defined. The minor is also evident — because the definition or account of being is the account of being, and the ultimate difference has being; therefore it also has the account or quiddity of being. I concede the major and deny the minor. To its proof I distinguish: if the account of being is taken for the quiddity of being prescinded from inferiors, I deny that it belongs to the ultimate difference. But if it is taken for everything that is outside of nothing — apart from the operation of the intellect — I concede, as I noted above in Note I.

You will press: to what the properties of being are adapted is formally being; but the properties of being belong to the ultimate differences — for the ultimate difference is one, good, and the like. I concede the major. I distinguish the minor: formally, I deny; identically and denominatively, I concede, as I made plain above.

You will urge: what exists is being — since existence accompanies being insofar as it is outside its causes; the ultimate difference has existence, if it exists on the part of the thing; therefore it is truly being. I concede the major. I distinguish the minor: the ultimate difference exists by the existence of common being simply, I deny; by its own proper existence, I concede. For each thing, according to the being which it has, participates in existence.

You will object second: the ultimate difference of substance — such as rational — is substance; therefore the ultimate difference is formally being, and being is predicated quidditatively of it. It is satisfactorily answered by saying: if the difference is drawn from the form of rationality, the antecedent is conceded; but if it is drawn from its ultimate reality, the antecedent is denied — as remains amply explained and settled above.

You will press: from (*1 Phys. c. 6. T. 52.*) — from what is not substance, substance is not made; but from animality and rationality man is made, who is a substance; therefore rationality — which is his essential and differential part — is substance; but substance is being quidditatively; therefore the ultimate difference of substance is also essentially being. I reply that this objection is dissolved by the distinction just premised. For if the difference is sought from the form which is rationality, it is being and substance incompletely quidditatively; but not so if it is drawn from its ultimate reality. For then it is only identically and denominatively substance and being.

You will urge: whatever is, is either substance or accident; but the ultimate reality of a substantial form is not an accident; therefore it is substance. I reply that it is substance really and not formally — just as a property of being is being really but not formally; and the intellect in the school of Scotus is the soul really but not formally; and in the divine Trinity, paternity is God really but not formally.

You will object third: from (*3 Met. T. 10.*) if being or one were a genus, there would be no difference; but being is not a genus; therefore it essentially includes differences — both ultimate and non-ultimate. I reply that, apart from the fact that Aristotle speaks there not assertively but problematically — as the Doctor rightly notes in his exposition of that text — if being were a genus, it would not have a difference of which it would be predicated in quid, but only in quale. For a difference is outside the formal account of a genus.

You will press: the ultimate difference is either something or nothing; but it is not nothing — since it is an essential part of a species; therefore it is something. But something is being; therefore the ultimate difference is being. I reply that it is being identically, not formally; it is something of the form, or the ultimate reality of it.

You will urge: that ultimate reality of the form is either being or nothing — since no medium exists between being and nothing; it is not nothing; therefore it is being. I reply that the same response recurs — namely, that it is being really, but not formally.

Question II

On the Properties of Being

From the quiddity and essence of things arise properties, which are called their properties, affections, and attributes; likewise from being taken simply there emanate properties, of which some are called conjoined — such as one, true, and good — while others are disjunct — such as one or many, act or potency, necessary or contingent. Wherefore, the foregoing debate about the common concept of being and its quiddity having been completed, the order of nature demands that we now treat principally of the conjoined properties of that same being.

Article I: Whether the Properties of Being Are Real

The things I noted in (*Epitome Dialecticae l. 1. q. 3. art. 6.*) about what a proper attribute is and its modes are to be reviewed; these having been reviewed and noted — since they contribute very greatly to the understanding and decision of this doubt.

The assertion is: properties are real and positive. So Scotus (*4 Met. T. 1. and 5. in comm.*) and (*q. 3. prol. § Ad 1. argumentum 2. q. Sub T.*) and (*d. 3. q. 3. § Ad quaestionem igitur sub G.*); Antonius Andreas (*1 Met. q. 1. concl. 4.*); Bonetus (*1 Met. cap. 1.*) and others of the same rank — against the Thomists, whom Suárez (*disp. 3. Met. sect. 1.*) and Fonseca (*4 Met. Sect. 3. q. 5 cap. 2.*) cite and follow, holding that the properties of being are not real and positive, but negations, or relations of reason, or extrinsic denominations.

It is proved first from Aristotle (*4 Met. at the beginning*), affirming that a certain science — namely Metaphysics — contemplates being insofar as it is being, and what belongs per se to it, which are its properties, as Scotus interprets there — which Suárez and the others just cited do not deny. But what belongs per se to real being is real, since a being of reason does not belong per se to real being nor follows from it by itself; yet the properties of being, according to Aristotle, belong per se to being itself, accompany it, and are reciprocated with it; therefore they are true and real properties. Furthermore, the same Philosopher (*ibid. T. 5. c. 2.*) adds that just as number, solid, and the like enjoy proper properties considered and demonstrated in the special sciences, so being participates in true and proper properties which are demonstrated of it in Metaphysics.

You will say with Fonseca (*cit.*): it is not necessary that these properties formally exhibit something positive superadded to being; it suffices that they formally import some negation or relation of reason — just as (*2 De Anima c. 7.*) visibility is a property of color, even though it adds nothing real and positive to color itself. On the contrary: negation or relation of reason does not arise from the essence and nature of a thing — since a being of reason depends on the intellect, and negation is absolutely nothing; but the properties of being flow from being as rays from the sun and streams from the source; they are subjugated to and reciprocated with being; but a being of reason and a negation do not inhere in being nor are converted with being itself. It is absurd that real being should be converted with being of reason — since the former can exist without the latter — and that real being should be reciprocated with nothing, which is what negation is. Nor does the testimony adduced about the visibility of color favor this view but militates against it — since visibility is the capacity and aptitude by which color is apt by nature to be seen, just as the intelligibility of an object is the capacity by which the object can be understood; and such properties are real on the part of the thing — without anyone thinking of it — and distinct from the natures of which they are properties, as I shall show in the next article. The same must be asserted about the properties of being.

Second: a real science is occupied with a real object and with real knowable properties demonstrable of it (*1 Post. T. 5.*); but Metaphysics is a real science, whose object is real being (*4 Met. 1. 5.*); therefore its properties demonstrable of it are real — since they proceed from real being itself as effects from a cause.

You will say: it is sufficient for a real science that such things be after the manner of real properties and properties — even though they may not truly be so and may include nothing real and positive beyond the nature of being which they express and declare. On the contrary: the foreknowledge of a subject is different from the foreknowledge of a property (*1 Post. 1.*); and to generate science through premises, a property must be demonstrated of a subject — as the Philosopher writes there and Scotus explains (*1 Met. q. 1. § Ad 3. rationem.*).

Therefore a property is something real distinct from being — otherwise nothing would be concluded in the conclusion, and its subject and predicate would be formally the same; therefore the properties of being are true, real, and positive properties.

Furthermore: if real properties belonging to and true of being are not given — as Suárez deduces — then other things would also lack proper and true properties, since the same reason applies in all cases; and thus properties and affections of things would be abolished, and to them would be assigned only negations and relations of reason — which, and similar conclusions, are known to all to be false and absurd.

Third: the disjunct properties are real and positive — such as same or diverse, contingent or necessary; therefore the conjoined properties of being are likewise real and positive. The antecedent is well known. The consequence holds — because the latter are more immediate and proximate to being; therefore if the former are real and positive, and not negations or relations of reason, the same must be asserted about the latter, with stronger reason.

You will object first: if the properties of being are real, they are beings — since what is real on the part of the thing is being; but they cannot be beings, since properties are outside the essence of the subject, as Aristotle hints (*1 Post. c. 18. T. 35.*) and (*7 Met. c. 5. T. 18.*); therefore the aforesaid properties are not real, but of reason. It is satisfactorily answered by saying that such properties are beings really but not formally — as I made plain at length in the preceding question, in the last article.

You will object second: what is quasi-such is not such — since the particle "quasi" is distracting; but according to Avicenna (*1 of his Met.*) the properties of being are quasi-such; therefore they are not such, and therefore not real. I reply that the word "quasi" is sometimes distracting — as (*Eccl. 24.*): *Ego quasi vitis fructificavi* — "I like a vine put forth fruit." Sometimes, however, it is confirmative — as (*Jn. 1.*): *Vidimus gloriam eius, gloriam quasi unigeniti a Patre* — "We saw his glory, the glory as it were of the Only-Begotten from the Father"; where "quasi" is equivalent to "truly the Only-Begotten from the Father." That profane authors have also used it in this way, Calepinus (*verb. quasi*) reports. Wherefore, when Avicenna (*cit.*) says that being has quasi-properties, it is the same as if he said that being has true properties, or truly has properties.

Article II. How the Properties of Being Are Distinguished

There are as many divergent opinions on the present article as were reported in the preceding one. Those who hold that the properties of being are not real and positive consequently place between being and its properties a distinction of reason as reasoned (*distinctio rationis ratiocinatae*), in much the same way that these authors distinguish the divine attributes both from one another and from the divine essence. This is the express position of Suarez (*cit. Hurt. disp. 3. Met.*

sect. 2. & Art. disp. 1. sect. 2.). Those, on the other hand, who affirm that the properties of being are real and positive consistently hold that between being and the said properties there obtains a formal distinction.

What I set out and noted in Logic, Book II, Question I, final article, concerning the real distinction, the formal distinction, the distinction of reasoning reason, and the distinction of reasoned reason must be presupposed and recalled from memory. With these preliminaries in place:

The properties of being differ formally from being itself and from one another. This is the position of the Doctor (*2. d. 16. q. vn. & 4. Met. q. 2.*), where also Anthony Andrew and other Scotists hold it against the Thomists and others named above. It is proved first: in the definition of a property its subject is placed as something added, on the authority of Aristotle (*1. post. T. 35. & 7. Met. T. 18.*). Therefore a property is outside the essence of the subject from which it emanates, and consequently differs from it formally. But if in general a property differs formally from its subject, it is plainly established that the properties of being differ formally both from being itself and from one another.

You will say: this holds for a positive addition, but not for a negative addition, such as is the case when a property is added to being. On the contrary: what is added to real being and follows it per se is not a negation, because negation, properly speaking, is not something real, and so is not properly said to be added to real being — non-sight is not added to a stone, nor nothing to being. But a property is added to being and properly follows it, as something that emanates and is caused by being itself, as the Doctor says (*2. d. 25. q. vn. § Contra, sub C. & 1. d. 8. q. 4. § Ista M.*). Moreover, a property is predicated of its subject in the second mode of saying per se — as "man is risible" — whereas a negation is not predicated in the second mode of saying per se of that of which it is a negation. And the property of being is so predicated of being — for example, "being is one," "being is good" — but it is not said that "being is a negation." Therefore what a property adds above being is something positive and real that formally differs from it.

Second: things that receive distinct descriptions and are inseparable from one another are formally distinguished, as I said in the Logic passage cited. But being and its properties are described in different ways: being is described as the objective concept that is precise from its inferiors and predicable of them; one as what is undivided in itself and divided from everything else; true as what is conformed to its principles; and so on for the rest. Therefore being and its properties are formally distinguished from one another.

You will say: there are not distinct formalities, but only distinct conceptions. For if, as Suarez argues, being is conceived confusedly as a subject having common entity and essence, it is called being; but if it is conceived as having a mode of perfection and property, it is called one, true, and good — and thus between

being and its properties there intervenes only a distinction of reason. On the contrary: between positive terms that exist on the part of the thing, independently of any operation of the intellect, and that are inseparable, there falls a positive distinction on the part of the thing, prior to any act of thinking — which distinction the Scotists call a formal distinction. But being and its properties are positive and real terms, not fabricated or devised by the intellect, as the same Suarez candidly admits (*ibid.* n. 10.). Therefore between them there is a formal distinction.

Again: given positive real terms, a real relation arises by the common sense and agreement of all. But being and its attributes are real terms, as the same author likewise concedes (*ibid.* n. 6.). Therefore the distinction that obtains between them is a positive real one — not the kind that exists between thing and thing, but the kind found between reality and reality, which is called the distinction from the nature of the thing, or the formal distinction. Furthermore, just as certain things in the nature of things are distinguished in a certain way, because the distinction is demanded by objects that are distinct from one another, and the intellect conceives them as they are on the part of the thing — if it were to conceive them otherwise, it would err — so too being and its attributes are real, apart from any operation of the intellect, as the same Suarez equally admits in that place. Therefore they are not distinguished by reason, which is effected by the intellect, but by formal reason, which precedes every operation of the intellect.

Third: the natural inclinations, capacities, and aptitudes of things are not fabricated by the intellect, nor do they coincide entirely with things, since they proceed from and are caused by those things — and the same thing cannot be both producer and produced, both cause and effect. But the properties of being seem to be nothing other than its capacities and aptitudes, as the aforesaid Suarez concedes (n. 5.). Therefore they differ from being not by reason but formally. Moreover, the powers and faculties of things differ formally from one another and from the things themselves, as the Doctor holds (2. d. 16. q. vn.), and as I proved at length (l. 2. *de anima* q. 2. art. 2.). Therefore the same must be asserted of being and its properties.

Against this: one should philosophize about the distinction between being and its properties in much the same way as about the distinction of the divine attributes — but the divine attributes are distinguished by reason, both from one another and from the divine essence. Therefore being and its attributes likewise differ by reason. I grant the major and deny the minor, as I showed at length (*Tract. 2. Summa Theologica, disp. 2. quest. 2.*).

You will press: Scotus, writing in 10. *Met. concl.* 13, says that one and being are the same, though they differ by reason — but one is a property of being, and therefore between being and its properties there falls only a distinction of reason. I say that Scotus must be understood not of reasoning reason or

reasoned reason, but of objective and formal reason that precedes every operation of the intellect — in which sense the Philosopher himself uses "reason" (*cap. 1. lib. praedicam.*) when defining univocals as those whose name is common and whose account of the substance according to that name is the same.

Against this a second objection: a property and its subject belong to the same genus and predicament, as is evident in the property referred to under the third species of quality. Likewise, then, the properties of being are entirely identical with being and thus are not formally distinguished from it. I respond that the term "property" is equivocal. It is taken, first, for a quality of brief duration affecting the senses, as in the passage just cited; and second, for an affection and property of a thing, as here. If the latter is predicamental, it is located in the predicament in which its subject resides. But if it is transcendental — as is the property of being — it resides in no predicament.

Against this a third objection: between a cause and its effect there is a real distinction — but a property is caused by the subject of which it is a property, and therefore between being and its properties there falls a real distinction. I distinguish the major: if the cause acts through motion and change, I grant it; if it acts through simple emanation, or if the effect proceeds through natural resultance — as in the present case — I deny it.

You will press: Scotus, in *1. Met. q. 1.*, as Mauritius notes there, seems to want the properties of being to be distinguished really — and therefore not formally. Mauritius addresses this there, saying that Scotus in that passage is speaking in a loose sense and in the manner of others, or else is not treating of reciprocal properties in the fourth mode. Or one may say that he uses "real distinction" not in the strict sense — which is between thing and thing — but in the sense of what is found between reality and reality, as I have indicated above, and which Scotus himself (*1. Rep. d. 48. q. 2.*) calls a real distinction in a qualified sense.

Article III. How Many Properties of Being There Are

The cleverness of the dialecticians is hinted at by that one word *REUBAU*, which is transmitted as containing the six transcendentals, each letter signifying one transcendental, as I noted in the *Epitome of Dialectics*, *l. 1. quest. 1. art. 9.* — namely, being, one, true, good, something, thing. Since being is the first transcendental, the remaining five, which proceed from being itself, are counted as its properties. Bonetus, however, in *5. Met. cap. 1.*, while not departing from the number five for the properties of being, omits the last two just mentioned and adds two others in the abstract — namely, primateness and contractibility. The rest, whom Fonseca (*4. Met. q. 5. sect. 2.*) and Suarez (*disp. 3. Met. sect. 2.*) follow, posit only three properties of being: namely, one, true, and good.

Note first that the name "thing" is most universal and common, applying both to uncreated and to created realities. For this reason Scotus, at the beginning of

Quodlibetal 1., citing that passage from Ecclesiastes I, "All things are difficult," says it must be interpreted of all things — created or uncreated, necessary or contingent. He adds that in divine matters it is taken both essentially and notionally, citing the testimony of Augustine (1. *de Doctrina Christiana*, cap. 1.): "The things we are to enjoy are the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit" — where "thing" is taken notionally. And: "That same Trinity, one supreme thing common to all who enjoy it" — where "thing" is used essentially. Moreover, "thing" and "being" appear to be confused and to be synonyms — like "sword" and "blade" and the like — as is evident in Scotus (*Quol.* 3.), where Sirect, Trombetta, and many others agree, and Suarez (*ibid.*) assents.

Note second, and recall from what was said in Book I of this work, *Question II, Article I*: according to Scotus in the passage just recalled (§ *De primo. A.*), the name "thing" is equivocal, and therefore is to be distinguished and understood as the approved authors have used it, who seem to hand down three principal acceptations of it — the most common, the common, and the most narrow. The first stands for everything that has being, comprehending all being. Since being is twofold — in the soul and outside the soul — thing accordingly is posited as twofold: in the soul, which contains beings of reason and second intentions, which are usually called logical things; and outside the soul, which extends to all that has being on the part of the thing, whether prescinding from existence or enjoying existence. Thus Avicenna (2. *Met. c.* 5.) speaks: "Being and thing are impressed as first impressions." The second acceptation is for absolute being, in which sense the first three genera — substance, quantity, and quality — are called beings and things, while the remaining genera are called modes of a thing and its circumstances, because they express the relation of one thing to another. Boethius (1. *de Trin. cap.* 10.) refers to this acceptation. The third acceptation is for a being and subsisting thing; in this sense substance is a being, and accident is the being of a being. Aristotle took it this way (7. *Met.* 2. 14. and following).

Note third that the name "reality" is an abstract whose concrete form is "real," derived from "thing." Now "thing" receives a double nomenclature, as Henry holds (in his *Summa*, art. 2. *quest.* 23.), with which Scotus is not displeased (1. *d.* 36. q. vn. & 2. *Report. d.* 1. *quaest.* 2.), along with Sirect and others in the *Tractatus Formalitatum*. One derivation is from the verb *reor*, meaning to think, imagine, or feign — in which sense "thing" is taken in the most common manner and applies to beings of reason, real beings, and fictitious beings, as I showed in the preceding note. The other derivation is from the participle *ratus*, *rata*, *ratum*, meaning firm, stable, true, not feigned. In this sense, "a settled thing" is called a real, firm, stable, true, and non-feigned thing — in which sense both quiddity and essence, whether in objective being or in the being of existence and subsistence, are called things. From this arises the real distinction, which is between thing and thing, and the formal distinction, which is between reality and reality, in the manner explained above.

Note fourth that "something" can be viewed in two ways: either absolutely without any addition, in which case it does not appear to be distinguished from being but is opposed to nothing — hence it is commonly said that a thing either is something or is nothing, so that "something" and "nothing" are contradictorily opposed, and "nothing" and "non-being" are synonyms, as are "being" and "something." Taken this way, "something" is equivalent to having some quiddity. Or, if it is taken with an addition — that is, if something else is joined to it — it clearly differs from being: for example, "something substantial" or "something accidental," and in this case "something" means nothing other than "another what," whose abstract is "somethingness" (*aliquitas*) — a name that can be applied to every property not only of being but of anything else whatever. For "unity" is a somethingness of being, "truth" is a somethingness of being, and "goodness" is a somethingness of being; likewise, "risibility" is a somethingness of man, "ability to roar" is a somethingness of a lion, and so on for the other properties of things which, since they flow from their essential principles, are outside those essences — and therefore are rightly called, not the essences themselves, but the somethingnesses of those essences, by Scotus and his disciples.

The properties of being are three: one, true, and good — and if any others are listed, they do not appear to be separable from these. This assertion is two-part, from which Scotus and his followers do not depart (*at the places cited above*), nor do the Thomists cited by the Recents disagree. The first part is established first: whatever emanates from being is either undivided in itself and divided from everything else, or conformed to its principles, or whole and perfect. If the first, it is one; if the second, it is true; if the third, it is good. Therefore there are three properties of being, and no more and no fewer.

You will say: beyond those three properties of being just recounted, it is possible to add "same," "diverse," and the like — so those three are insufficient. I say that "same" and "diverse" are disjunctive properties of being — but we are speaking of conjunctive and convertible properties, which we hold to be contained in the number three alone. Second: every attribute of being either expresses the relation and respect of indivisibility in itself — and is one — or the relation of conformity with its principles — and is true — or the relation of integrity — and is good. Nothing else remains for a property of being to regard; therefore only those three properties of being are to be admitted, which Scotus explicitly sets out (*4. Met. in expositione tex. 3. cap. 2. & 2. d. 16. q. 1. K.*).

You will say: there still remain other transcendental relations and habits — such as primateness, contractibility, intelligibility, and the like — so if the number of properties of being is reckoned by distinct habits, there are more than the three enumerated. I say that those three are properties in the fourth mode; the others, however, also belong to being in other respects — for primateness is adapted to the ten highest genera, contractibility also to genera both supreme and subalternate and proximate as well as to species that are contracted through

individual differences, and intelligibility applies not only to being in general but to any particular being, according to that saying (2. *Met. cap. 1. T. 4.*): "As a thing stands with respect to being, so it stands with respect to intelligibility."

The second part is conceded from what was said above in the foundational section: for "thing" coincides with being, as I showed in the second note, and "something" either is not separated from being, or is a property in no way distant from the three already given, as I showed in the fourth note. Moreover, if any other properties are devised, they can comfortably and aptly be reduced to the three aforesaid, as is plainly evident from what has gone before. Therefore other properties are not to be introduced into the Peripatetic school and posited there without any foundation or reason.

Against this first objection: being extends more broadly than thing — therefore being and thing do not coincide. The antecedent is proved: action and passion are called two beings, but not two things. Likewise in divine matters there are many beings, because there are many Persons, yet there is one thing common to the three Persons. Again, there are many beings because there are many attributes, yet they are not many things — and therefore being and thing are not synonyms but are two transcendentals, and thing should be posited as a property of being. I respond by denying the antecedent. Regarding its proof, I say that action and passion are indeed two realities, but not two things, nor two beings, unless they are called two relative beings. Likewise in divine matters there is one absolute thing, which is the deity common to the three — though there are not three absolute things, but three things and three relative beings. Likewise the attributes are many attributal beings, but not simply so, since they are many not really but only formally distinct, as I said at greater length elsewhere.

Against this second objection: "something," as a particular sign placed with the subject of a proposition, makes the proposition particular — as "some animal is rational" — and therefore "something" is not the same as being but is something distinct from it, which is its property separate from the rest. It is answered by saying that "something" taken substantively is not separated from being; otherwise, when taken adjectivally, as happens in a particular proposition whose subject is modified by that particular sign, as is explained in the proposition just cited — "some animal is rational."

Article IV. What One Adds Above Being

A serious and difficult controversy persists among the older and more recent metaphysicians on the present article, as Mauritius notes (*in annot. 2. q. Scoti, 4. Met.*). There are three principal divergent opinions. The first is that of Averroes (4. *Met. com. 3.*), Thomas (1. *p. quaest. 11. art. 1.*), Mayron (1. *d. 24. q. 2.*), Aureolus (1. *d. 3. art. 4. § Restat*), Fonseca (4. *Met. cap. 2. q. 5. sect. 5.*), Suarez (*disp. 4. Met. sect. 1.*), and many others, who hold that one adds to being nothing but the negation or

privation of division in itself and of division from everything else. The second is that of Alexander of Hales (*1. p. q. 13. m. 1.*), Bonaventure (*1. d. 24. quest. 1. art. 1.*), Vasquez (*Tom. 2. disp. 128. cap. 2.*), and others, who hold that one formally imports something positive, differing from being by reason alone. The third is handed down by the Doctor (*4. Met. q. 2. & 2. d. 3. q. 2. § Concedo igitur. D. & d. 16. q. vn. § Ideò dico. sub K. & ibid. in Report.*), Anthony Andrew (*4. Met. quaest. 3.*), Tataretus (*ibid. q. vn. art. 2.*), Bonetus (*5. Met. cap. 1.*), Viguer (*1. d. 24. q. vn.*), Poncius (*disp. 70. q. 2.*), and not a few others of the same school, who teach that one is a real positive property of being, formally distinct from being itself — and Avicenna (*7. Sua Met. cap. 1.*) seems to have preceded them, as cited by the Doctor in the places cited above.

Note first that "one" is taken in two ways: as a principle of number, which is located in the predicament of quantity; and as a property of being, which resides in no predicament, since it is transcendental. The number of which "one" as a principle is the source is caused by the division of the continuum and is called quantitative number and number simply, as Lychetus notes in particular (*in expositione 1. d. 24. q. vn.*). The number of which the transcendental "one" is the principle is effected by the distinction of quiddities and essences and is called quidditative number and number in a qualified sense — in which way we say "two souls," "three angels," and the like, about which number I treated at length (*tract. de Deo Trino disp. 4. quaest. 7.*). Further, "one" is taken simply, insofar as it is a conjunctive and reciprocal property of being simply; or in a qualified sense, insofar as it is opposed to multitude and is a disjunctive property of being — in which case it is said that "being is one or many," and one so taken does not convert with being except disjunctively.

Note second that "one," according to Bonetus (*cited by Vallone in his lecture, fol. 109.*), is fivefold: transcendental one, one in genus, in species, in number, and by proportion. The transcendental one, which is the first property of being, is described by Aristotle (*4. Met. T. 3. & 10. eiusdem T. 5. & 5. cap. 6.*) and by all subsequent philosophers as that which is undivided in itself and divided from everything else. This description of one, though commonly received, is explained differently by different authors; setting aside their interpretations and disputes, it is my pleasure to explain it in the following way. In that description two negations are signified: one is the negation of division from itself, the other is the negation of identity with anything else — which denotes that one in the concrete is not distinct from itself but is distinct from everything else. Its abstract is unity, by which one is not distinguished from itself but by which it is distinguished from everything else that is not itself that same one. And through this kind of negation is hinted a real positive property of being proceeding from being itself, by which that same being is rendered undistinct in itself and distinct from everything else — just as risibility is a real positive property of man proceeding from humanity, by which man is risible. Therefore, just as given risibility man is risible, so given unity — which is non-distinction from itself

and distinction from everything else — being is one with transcendental unity. This refutes Poncius (*pract. concl. 1.*) explaining "one" as that which does not include several things separate from one another, since some things are not separate from one another — as a wall and its whiteness — and yet they are not one with entitative and transcendental unity; though united, they are not one according to that unity. Likewise, the parts of a continuum are not separate from one another, and yet they are not one with that unity, but with the unity of integrity and continuity. Again, matter and form in a composite are not segregated from one another — but they do not participate in that unity as united in the composite; rather, each, since it is a being, enjoys its own unity. For "one" is said in as many ways as "being," as Aristotle teaches (*at the places cited above*), and as I noted in Logic, *l. 2. q. 1. art. 6.* For this reason I shall not expound the other unities just recounted here, since they have already been expounded and illustrated there at length.

If you should object against this explanation of the description of transcendental one and say: man is one, and yet he is not undivided in himself, since he is divided into his parts — namely genus and difference, or into animal and rational — from which he is constituted; therefore it is not correctly explained that one is undivided in itself and divided from everything else. I say: first, man is one from the unity of humanity, which is specific unity — and is one with entitative and transcendental unity insofar as he is a being, because the greater unity, such as specific unity, entails the lesser, such as transcendental unity; even though being simply is divided into substance and accident, into uncreated and created. The reason is that unity is not drawn from the dividing members but from the whole that is divided — namely from being, from man, and so on — otherwise there would be no unity but only multitude, since everything divided is split into dividing members, as I made plain (*Epit. Dialect. l. 2. q. 7. art. 1.*).

The first assertion is that the transcendental one is not formally negative or privative. This is defended by the Doctor (*cit. in Met. & 2. d. 3. quaest. 2. § Concedo. D.*). It is proved first: from a real positive subject there emanates only a real and positive property, as is evident by induction — from man flows risibility, from a lion the ability to roar, and so on for the rest, which are their real and positive properties. But being simply is real and positive (*4. Met. T. 1. & 5.*), whose first property is one, which reciprocates with it. Therefore one is not formally negative or privative.

You will say: one indeed formally imports a negation, but fundamentally is being itself as real and positive, since they are entirely the same and of the same nature, as Aristotle openly writes (*ibid. T. 3.*). And this can be illustrated by incorruptibility, immateriality, and immortality, which formally present negations but fundamentally are real and positive entities and properties. On the contrary: although in the description of one a negative name is used —

namely, "undivided" — it formally signifies a reality and a real and positive formality. For, as Aristotle notes in the place just cited, being and one stand to each other as cause and effect — but an effect is a real positive just as a cause is — therefore one formally designates a real positive property and attribute of being. Moreover, the examples adduced concerning incorruptibility, immateriality, and immortality tell against the objection. For they formally present real and positive entities, as is clear in the case of substance, which is divided into corporeal and incorporeal, corporeal into animate and inanimate, animal into rational and irrational. The irrational, the incorporeal, and the inanimate substance are real positives formally, though they are designated by negative names; therefore the same must be asserted of one, which is defined through "undivided in itself," which is a negative term.

Second: what measures something positive is formally positive, because no negation or privation is the measure of anything positive. But one is formally the measure of number, which is a positive being, since it is the subject of arithmetic — whence Aristotle writes (*10. Met. cap. 2.*): "Number is multitude measured by one." Therefore one is formally positive, from which follows the negation of undividedness in itself.

Third: a negation or privation does not formally denote a perfection simply, because privation has the character of evil (*1. phys. 82*): "privation engineers harm." But one imports perfection simply, since in anything it is better to be it than not to be it, as is clear from the description of simple perfection given by Anselm (*in Monol. cap. 3.*). For this reason, supreme unity belongs to God, the first being, who is subject to no imperfection. Therefore one formally designates something positive.

Fourth: in negatives and privatives there is no reduction to a first such thing — to a supreme evil — because there is no supreme evil. But in positives, such as goods, there is reduction to the supreme good; in truths, to the supreme true; and in ones, to the supreme one. Therefore one is formally positive.

Furthermore, privation or negation does not admit of more and less; but one does admit of more and less — for what is simple is more one than what is composite. Moreover, a positive is not composed of negations and privations, as is evident; yet number, which is something positive, is composed of units. Hence the Philosopher adds (*loc. memorato, T. 5.*): "Number is a multitude of units." Therefore one is formally positive.

You will say: these and similar arguments only prove that one is positive fundamentally — that is, by reason of being, in which it is grounded and in which it is based — but not formally, for formally one means nothing other than the twofold negation set out and explained above. On the contrary: one is a proper property of being, either by reason of the foundation or by reason of what is added above being. Not the first: for the foundation of the property — or of one — is being; and if one were a property of being through the foundation,

it would be a property of itself, which involves a contradiction. Nor the second: for that which is added above being would be either positive — and the point is established — or negative — and this is impossible, because since a property is really identified with the subject of which it is a property, being would be composed of positive and negative; and since a negation is formally nothing, and nothing is opposed to being, it would consequently follow that being and nothing are one, and that nothing is a property of being — which is false and absurd. This objection appears so compelling that the Adversaries greatly torment themselves and diverge into various positions, adducing various responses, as can be seen in Fonseca and Suarez (*cit. sect. 2.*); but since these responses do not satisfy the objection or remove the difficulty, it is tiresome to adduce and refute them.

The second assertion is that one does not differ from being by reason of the intellect alone, but formally, from the nature of the thing. This is the position of the Doctor (*cit.*). The first part is established: what arises from and follows something else with no one thinking of it does not differ from it by reason of an operation of the intellect. But one arises from being and accompanies it (*4. Met. cap. 1.*). Therefore one is not separated from being by the intellect alone.

You will say: Aristotle, just cited (*T. 3.*), explicitly writes that being and one are not signified by one account — therefore, just as they are signified by a distinct account, so they are also distinguished by reason from one another. I say that the Philosopher there does not take "account" for the account of the intellect but for objective account, with any operation of the intellect excluded — just as I have more than once noted him using "account" in the definition of univocals (*l. praedicam. cap. 1.*), saying that univocals are those whose name is common and whose account of substance according to that name is the same. And (*1. 5. Met. cap. 6.*).

The second part remains proved by the second article of this question, in which I showed universally that the properties of being differ formally both from being itself and from one another. Moreover, it is shown most powerfully of one from Aristotle just cited, where he says that being and one mutually follow each other as principle and cause: but principle and cause import distinct formal accounts. For "principle" is said by reason of primateness — hence the Philosopher adds (*1. post. T. 5.*): "I say the same thing by 'first' and 'principle.'" But "cause" is said by reason of giving being — hence a cause is described as that upon whose being something else follows. And (*1. phys. sum. 3. cap. 3.*): "Privation is indeed a principle of natural things, but is not a cause, because it does not influence the generation of the natural composite." Likewise, a point is a principle of a line, but is not its cause, since it communicates nothing to it and causes nothing. Therefore one formal account belongs to principle and a different formal account to cause. Likewise, in our matter, one formal account belongs to being and another to one, as is plainly clear from the descriptions of

each. Whence Aristotle adds in the same place (4. *Met.*), as just recalled, that being and one are, in generation as in corruption, inseparable from each other — which is a clear indication of the formal distinction between them. I conclude therefore that one adds to being not something negative but something positive, formally different from being itself.

Against this first objection: Aristotle, in the place just cited, openly says that one signifies the same nature as being. And a little further he adds that one is nothing other than being. And the same is intimated (10. *eiusdem*, T. 5.): "For this reason to be one is to be indivisible — it is truly being itself and inseparable." Therefore one adds to being nothing beyond a negation or rational relation. I respond that these and similar testimonies, which may be adduced, must be interpreted of real identity, not formal identity. Thus being and one are really the same and formally distinguished. Therefore they do not designate two natures but one — just as "man" and "risible," designating only one nature, are really identified and formally differ from one another.

Against this second objection: being, insofar as it is distinguished from one, is either one or not one — not the latter, because there is no being that is not one, since they mutually imply each other. If the former, it is either one through another, and that through another, and so on to infinity; or it is one through itself — and thus being is one without any positive addition to it, which is what the Adversaries intend. I say that being taken precisely abstracts from unity and multitude, just as it abstracts from finitude and infinity, substance and accident. In this sense perhaps Avicenna (5. *Met. cap. 1. & 2.*) said: "horseness is only horseness, neither one nor many." But being is one through the unity added to it — just as man is risible through risibility joined to him.

You will press: that positive thing which one adds above being is either one or not one — not the second, because everything positive is one; nor the first, because if it is one, it is either one through another, or through itself — and the first argument recurs. I say that the sophism of the figure of speech is committed, changing *quo* into *quod*. For one is that by which (*quo*) being is one, not that which (*quod*) is one — just as whiteness is that by which a wall is white, while whiteness itself is not white.

Against this third objection: between two positive real terms there is a real distinction — but being and one are two positive real terms — therefore between being and one there intervenes a real distinction and not a formal one. I distinguish the major: if the said terms are thing and thing, I grant it; but if one is a thing and the other is a somethingness of it, as happens here, I deny it.

Article V. On the True

After one follows the true, and then the good — this is the common opinion of all philosophers, because a thing seems first to be undivided in itself, by reason of which it is one, before it is true and conformed to its being, and afterward

good — namely, whole and perfect in its being. For these last two there is given a different reason: the true regards the intellect and the good regards the will; and no one denies that the intellect is naturally and generatively prior to the will. What the true is, as a property of being, and what it adds above being — this is genuinely difficult and hard to understand, no less than what was said of one in the preceding article. Concerning complex truth, which is called logical truth, I treated at length in *Logic, l. 4. quaest. 4. per totam*. Now, however, I shall briefly treat only of incomplex and entitative truth, also called the truth of the thing, leaving aside the various and diverse opinions reported by Aureolus (*1. d. 19. tertia parte, art. 1.*) and Suarez (*disp. 8. Met. sect. 7.*) and other Recents.

The first assertion is that transcendental truth is not the quiddity of a thing, nor is the true the whatness (*quid*) of a thing. This assertion militates against Aureolus (*mox cit. art. 2. propositione tertia*) and is held for Scotus (*2. Met. in exp. T. 4. & 6. eiusdem, quaest. 3.*), Anthony Andrew (*quaest. 6.*), and others of the same school (*ibid.*), from whom the Thomists and others outside both schools do not diverge. It is proved first: if the quiddity of a being were its truth, being and true would be formally the same, and no distinction would fall between them. But Aristotle asserts that the true differs from being (*4. Met. T. 1.*), saying that metaphysics contemplates being and the properties that follow it, among which is truth. And before that (*2. Met. T. 4.*) he had premised that "as a thing stands with respect to being, so it stands with respect to truth." But if being or essence were to coincide with the true and with truth, there would be no comparison or similarity but complete identity — which is contrary to the cited text showing that truth follows the thing; hence first principles are eternal and supremely true because their being is eternal and sempiternal. And a little before: "an effect is true if its cause is true, and indeed the cause is truer than its effect." Hence if wood is hot on account of fire, fire itself is hotter — indeed hottest. Therefore truth is not the essence of a thing but follows the essence itself.

You will say: if this argument held, then since the earth is hot on account of the sun, the sun would be hotter — which is not granted. I say this holds for univocals, not for equivocals, of which sort are the sun and the earth, which are of a different kind.

Second: the truth of a proposition — which is called the truth of cognition — is not the quiddity or essence of the proposition, as I observed in the *Epitome, l. 2. q. 3. art. 1. n. 4. & q. 2. eiusdem lib. art. 2. n. 9.*, but is its property; hence if someone asks "What is a proposition?", the answer is that it is a statement of something about something. But if someone asks "What kind of thing is a proposition?", it is properly answered that it is true or false. Therefore the same must be affirmed of the truth of a thing and transcendental truth — namely, that it is not the quiddity of being but its property — since the reason is the same in both.

Third: if transcendental truth were entirely the quiddity and essence of being, then the proposition "being is true" would be not of the second but of the first

mode per se — indeed it would be nugatory, just as I said above: if one did not differ from being, then "being is one" would be the same as "being is being," and it would be an identical proposition because the same would be predicated of itself, as "man is man." But this is commonly rejected — therefore so is that.

You will say: Augustine (2. *Soliloq.* c. 5.) expressly says: "The true is that which is." But what is, is a being, and its essence is the quiddity or truth by which that being is — just as whiteness is that by which a white thing is white. Therefore the truth of a thing means nothing other than the quiddity and essence of that thing. I say that this testimony of Augustine and similar ones, if adduced, must be understood of real identity, not formal — that is: truth is really identified with being, though it formally differs from it. Scotus likewise interprets (4. *Met.* T. 3.) the statement that "one, beyond being, is nothing else, and signifies the same essence" — understood, that is, really and not formally.

If you should reply and press: when a craftsman holds a touchstone (*lapis lydius*) to gold to examine whether it is true gold, he inspects it and its luster, touches it with the said stone, and thereby knows whether it has the nature of true gold or not — therefore truth is the quiddity and nature of the thing. I reply that the craftsman scrutinizes true gold from its property, which he knows; and by the said stone he comes to knowledge of its nature along with its essence and that of everything else that may be hidden from us. But from this it is not rightly inferred that truth is the nature of a thing; rather, it is a property of it, since the property becomes known while the nature remains hidden.

The second assertion is that the true does not include a relation of reason to an intellect — whether created or uncreated. This follows from the Doctor (*at the places cited above*) and is opposed to Molina (1. p. q. 16. *disp.* 2.) and some others. It is established first from Aristotle (1. *praedicam. cap. de substantia, propè finem.*): "From the fact that a thing is or is not, a statement is true or false." Therefore the truth of a thing imports no relation to a created or uncreated intellect. Conversely, the truth of a cognition is only in terms of the truth of the thing: for if the intellect knows a thing as it is on the part of the thing, its cognition is true; but if it knows the thing otherwise than it is on the part of the thing, its cognition is false. Therefore the truth of a thing in no way regards the intellect, whatever its kind.

Second: if by an impossible hypothesis there were no intellect — as Scotus also seems to suppose (6. *Met. quaest.* 3.) — transcendental truth would still exist, because there would be being; and being and the true mutually imply each other. But there would be no relation of reason, because this is effected by the intellect and follows upon its operation; with no intellect existing, there would be no operation of it, and consequently no relation of reason. Therefore the truth of a thing and transcendental truth in no way includes a relation of reason.

Third: before the aforesaid relation of reason to the intellect, there was truth and being was true. Hence the Church sings in the Nicene Creed: "God from God, true from true." Moreover, a craftsman proposing to himself some exemplar to be imitated, just as it is outside his intellect — as a painter looks at the image of the Blessed Virgin as Saint Luke the Evangelist painted it — does not regard the idea he has in his mind or the idea God has in his intellect, but regards it as it is truly set before him and represented outside himself, as was long ago commanded to Moses (*Exod. 25.*): "Look, and make it according to the pattern shown to you on the mountain." Hence Aristotle (*1. Eth. in fine, cap. 6.*) says that to perform true things, it is not the Platonic ideas and their concepts that must be contemplated, but the things themselves that must be pursued and executed — just as a physician treating a sick patient need not look at health and the concept of it that he holds in his mind, but at the very health he wishes to bring about in the sick person, and indeed at this health in this sick man, as that same Philosopher concludes there. Furthermore, if truth presented this relation of reason to the human or divine intellect, it would be necessary for the craftsman to know the concepts and ideas of both intellects — with the result that every craftsman would have to be a philosopher and a theologian, since to know a relation one must know its terms. But that this and similar consequences are absurd and preposterous, there is no one who does not see. Therefore truth does not present such a relation of reason to a created or uncreated intellect.

The third assertion is that the true is a property of being, adding above being itself something positive — namely, knowability (*cognoscibile*) — whose abstract is truth or knowability, formally differing from being itself. Both parts are hinted at by the Doctor (*ibid.*), and are evident from what was said in the preceding article on one. The first part is further established from (*1. Met. T. 4.*): "As a thing stands with respect to being, so it stands with respect to being known." That is, according to the entity of a thing, its knowability or truth is had. For these reciprocate and are adequate to one another: true being, knowable being, entity, truth, and knowability. Again, given the knowability of a thing and its adequation, the transcendental truth of the thing is given; and if knowability is removed, that truth is removed as well. For if there is no knowability, there is no truth; and if there is no truth, there is no entity — since truth follows entity. Therefore the true is equivalent to the knowable, and truth is the same as knowability.

The second part is at hand. For every property formally differs from that of which it is a property, as I showed in article II of this question. But truth is a property of being, by the assent and agreement of all. Therefore it formally differs from being.

Against this first objection against the first assertion: without conceiving or considering anything distinct from the nature and quiddity of a thing, truth is conceived and understood — for if the nature of man is conceived and

understood as it is, true humanity is conceived and understood, and so for the rest of the natures and essences of things. Therefore truth is nothing other than the quiddity of a thing. I distinguish the antecedent: really, I grant it; formally, I deny it. For since truth is a property of a thing, it consequently differs formally from the thing of which it is a property, and is really identified with it — as is sufficiently clear from what has been said.

You will press: Hilary (6. *Trin. ante medium*) calls God subsistent truth — but nothing subsists besides substance; therefore if subsistence belongs to truth, it is itself also a substance and a substantial nature, and consequently truth is not distinguished from the substance and nature of the thing. The answer must be given through the same distinction — namely, that truth is really identified with the divine subsistence but formally differs from it, as do the attributes and the relations of origin, which are discussed in the *Tractatus de Deo Uno, Trino*.

Against this second objection against the second assertion: truth presents a relation and respect toward a knower. Therefore truth expresses at least a relation of reason to the intellect, whether created or uncreated. The antecedent rests on the testimony of Augustine (1. 2. *Soliloq. cap. 5.*): "The true is that which is such as it appears to a knower who is willing and able to know it." I respond that truth indeed imports a relation — not of reason, but a real aptitudinal transcendental relation, which can exist without the term actually existing, as I indicated in Logic (l. 3. q. 6. art. 11.). And this is also signified by Augustine (*ibid. a little later.*): "Because even if a thing is not seen, nor has conformity with any cognition, nonetheless it is true."

You will press: Aristotle, at the end of 6. *Met.*, explicitly writes that the true and false are not in the thing but in the mind; while on the other hand, good and evil are not in the mind but in the thing. Therefore truth necessarily includes a relation of reason to the intellect. I say that Aristotle must be interpreted of complex truth, which belongs to logic, not of incomplex and transcendental truth, which metaphysics treats.

Against this third objection: truth, according to Scotus (*cit.*), is a conformity of the thing to the intellect — but conformity is a relation; therefore truth also is a relation. It is answered by saying it is a relation not predicamental but transcendental, as Scotus seems to hint for all the properties of being (4. d. 49. q. 4. § *Iuxta hoc, sub I.*) after Augustine (l. *de vera religione*, c. 36.): "Truth is the supreme likeness" — and Boethius: "Truth is the adequation of thing and intellect."

You will press: relatives are said by way of conversion (*ex l. praedicam. cap. de ad aliquid.*) — as a father is the father of a son, and a son is the son of a father. But the true does not stand this way — for it is not said that "the true is the true of the true" — therefore neither is the true relative nor truth a relation. I say the major holds especially for predicamental relatives, but not for transcendental

ones, which are under discussion here. Especially since it does not seem incongruous for these too to be converted: as "the knowable of something is knowable," and "the visible of something is visible," and "the conformable of something is conformable," and "the true of something is true" — whatever Hurt (*disp. 7. sect. 15. 7.*) and Arrubal (*disp. 1. sect. 5. Subsect. 3.*) may say.

Article VI. On the Good

There are as many competing opinions on the present article as were reported in the two preceding articles — setting these aside, I note that what I observed and asserted in the *Philosophia Moralis*, l. 2. *quaest. 1. art. 1. 2. 3.* must be recalled, where the acceptations, divisions, and descriptions of goods — especially transcendental good and moral good — are had and explained. These need not be adduced and repeated here lest I do what has already been done, but should be sought and read there. Now, however, I shall briefly touch on a few points that contribute to our present discussion.

The first assertion is that good is properly a property of being. This follows from Aristotle (6. *Met. propè finem.*) and is plainly had (1. *Eth. cap. 6.*): "Good is said in as many ways as being." This is against Molina (1. *part. quaest. 5. disp. vn.*), who denies that good is truly a property of being. It is the common position of Scotus (4. *Met. in exp. T. 3. & 2. d. 16. quaest. vn. K. § Ideo dico*) and the rest of the Scholastics (*ibid.*); and it remains proved from the third article of this question. Moreover, it is shown specifically: what follows being and converts with it is properly a property of it, as the Philosopher indicates (4. *Met. T. 1.*) and Molina himself seems to sense (*ibid.*). But good follows being and reciprocates with it. For being comes first, and then following upon it is appetibility and fittingness — which is good. And every being is appetible and fitting, and vice versa. Therefore good is truly a convertible and reciprocal property of being. Furthermore, the other properties convert with good, and syllogisms about them formed in the first mode of the first figure are valid and necessary — as: "every one is good; every being is one; therefore every being is good." Likewise: "every true is good; every being is true; therefore every being is good."

You will say: some things are beings but not good — according to Aristotle (3. *Met. T. 3.*), mathematical objects are beings but not good. Likewise, matter is a being, which, being pure potency, is devoid of all goodness. And the divine relations have a share in entity but do not receive goodness and perfection according to Scotus (*Quol. 5.*). Therefore good is not properly a reciprocal and convertible property of being. I say that mathematical objects, since they abstract from motion and from matter existing in a qualified sense, are not called good in that qualified sense, because they are not then active and useful; but simply and absolutely they are good, with the entitative goodness befitting them, since they are real beings. Hence Lyra, commenting on *cap. 1. Genesis*: "God saw the light that it was good" — that is, useful, as he explains. Conversely, what is not useful is said not to be good — for example, mathematical objects

and Platonic ideas, in the interpretation of Scotus on that text just adduced. To the other objection about matter, I say it is good with transcendental goodness because it is a being and possesses entitative act, as I asserted in *Physics* (*l. 2. quaest. 2. art. 5.*). To the last, I say the relations of origin are good with entitative goodness but not with gradual goodness, as I showed at length (*Tract. de Deo Trino, disp. 5. quaest. 5.*).

The second assertion is that good adds to being more than a relation of reason alone. The Doctor (*cit.*) is patron to this, and opposed to it are Capreolus (*2. d. 34. q. 1.*), Molina (*as cited above*), and Fonseca (*4. Met. q. 7. c. 2. sect. 5.*), with Thomas cited (*q. & 21. de veritate art. 1.*). It is proved first from Aristotle (*6. Met. sum. 2. c. 2. T. 8.*), affirming that the true and false are in the mind, while the good and evil are in things — where the Philosopher evidently suggests that complex truth formally presents nothing other than a relation of reason, while good formally signifies a positive reality, said to be in the thing or on the part of the thing. Augustine's saying is consonant (*1. de Doctrina Christiana, cap. 32.*): "Insofar as we are, we are good." And the sacred text favors it (*Gen. 1.*): "God saw all things that he had made, and they were very good" — where beyond any doubt there is question of transcendental goodness, which inheres in all created things prior to any intellect forming a relation of reason of fittingness toward them, as sacred Scripture openly attests and clearly proclaims.

Second: from a real positive subject there does not proceed a property of reason formed by the intellect, as is evident to one who runs through all the particular subjects from which real positive properties proceed. But being, of which we are speaking here, is real and positive, from which good and the other properties arise, as I showed above. Therefore good is not formally a mere relation of reason of fittingness.

Third: good is sufficiently divided into transcendental or natural good and moral good — and the latter is real and positive, and it is the science of morals that deals with it. Therefore likewise the former is a real positive. Hence perhaps the royal Psalmist, adorned with the goods of nature and grace, addressing God (*Psalms 118.*), says: "Thou hast dealt well with thy servant, O Lord, according to thy word." Moreover, truth is attributed to the intellect and goodness to the will; the end of speculative science is truth and that of practical science is goodness. And of privative opposites, one term is a real positive and the other is privative — as seeing and blind, light and darkness. But good and evil are privative opposites. Evil indeed is privative, since it is a privation of good; and good is positive, as what I have adduced up to this point, and similar considerations that can be brought forward, plainly shows and clearly demonstrates.

The third assertion is that good does not formally add to being something absolute, nor a connotate, but a real relative fitting, formally differing from being. The assertion is fourfold, hinted at by Scotus (*at the places cited*) and Durand (*2. d. 34. quaest. 1.*). The first part is proved first: the absolute is "toward

itself" and the relative is "toward another," as is evident from the explicit terms explained in the *Epitome Dialectics*, l. 1. q. 1. art. 6.. But good is not toward itself but toward another, insofar as it is a property of being and expresses fittingness toward another, or insofar as it is good for another — as Suarez himself explains and candidly admits (*disp. 10. Met. sect. 1. n. 14.*), along with other adversaries whose names Durand suppresses (*ibid.*). Therefore good does not formally import something absolute.

Second: if good formally designated something absolute, the evil opposed to it privatively would present the privation of such an absolute. But this is false. The minor is shown: feverish heat is bad for a man not because it denotes the privation of that heat, but because it is unbecoming (*disconveniens*) to that man. But what is unbecoming or becoming is not absolute but relative. Therefore good does not formally signify an absolute.

Third: good is equally divided into transcendental and moral good — for each participates in the common and general character of goodness. But moral good is not absolute, since it is described as that which belongs to the will in relation to right reason. Therefore transcendental good also is not absolute, since it regards what is proper and fitting to the thing and its quiddity, as Dionysius hints (*4. de divinis nominibus.*): "Good comes from an integral cause, and evil from any defect whatsoever."

You will say: Scotus (*Quol. 18. § De primo. C.*) after Augustine (*8. Trin. cap. 3.*) divides good into primary or essential good, and secondary or accidental good. The former is called good in itself and simply; the latter good in a qualified sense and with respect to another. And Suarez holds the latter to be the property of being, but not the former, because he thinks the primary good entirely coincides with being while the secondary differs from it in some way, by reason of which it is called a property of being. On the contrary: primary good is what is fitting to a being, and primary goodness is the fittingness and perfection of that being. But what follows and accompanies the quiddity of something is not its essence nor of its essence, because it presupposes the essence it follows. But the simple good accompanies being when it befits it in the second mode of saying per se and is its perfection following upon its entity — just as the perfection of a species follows the specific nature, which is why one species is said to be more perfect than another, as Aristotle notes (*8. Met. 10.*): "Species are like numbers, of which one is more perfect than another." Therefore simple good is not entirely the same as being but is its property. It is called essential and good in itself because it belongs and is proper to being, and flows from its essence — not as accidental good, which comes from some external term. Hence Augustine (*cit.*), in explaining this, adds: "Good health without pain and weariness," which is called good because it is good for another — namely, for man, because it befits him. And: "A good face of a man which has all that belongs to a face." In each explained goodness, fittingness is placed, which is a relation

and respect of one thing to another. Therefore Suarez's response seems neither fitting nor legitimate. Hence the said author, not firmly adhering to it, offers another response — namely, that good differs from being by reason — which response plainly conflicts with what he himself offered in section cited (*n. 3.*), expressly refuting the opinion of those who hold that between being and good there is only a distinction of reason; which now, pressed by the argument, he admits (*n. 17. eiusdem sect.*).

The second part argues against the aforesaid Suarez (*ibid. n. 12.*) and other "connotators," whom I reported and rejected (*1. 2. Philosophia Moralis, q. 1. art. 3. aff. 3.*). It is established first: between absolute and relative there is no middle, because everything that exists either is "toward itself" and is absolute, or is "toward another" and is relative. But good is not absolute, as I showed in the first part. Therefore it is relative — and thus a connotate is not distinguished from a relative, as Suarez strives to introduce into the school, establishing a position on connotation of the good that differs from the rest.

Second: good presents an order and some relation by reason of which a thing is called appetible and lovable — hence by such respect Aristotle defines good (*1. Eth. c. 1.*): "that which all desire," as the said Suarez concedes in that place. Therefore good does not include a connotation distinct from the relation of fittingness that good formally imports.

Third: a connotation is either intrinsic to the good or extrinsic. If intrinsic and essential, it must enter into its definition; but in its definition only the relation of appetibility and lovability is placed, as I was just saying. If extrinsic, it is irrelevant to expressing and capturing its formal and essential character. Nor does it help to add that good connotes the capacity and propensity of the nature to which it is good — for such capacity is already required and presupposed in the nature that is capable of good, and does not constitute the formal character of good. And that capacity and propensity belongs among relatives, just as good does. Therefore good is not a connotate distinct from a relative.

The third part follows from the two preceding ones — for since good is a real positive, and is neither absolute nor a connotate, it is plainly established to be relative, as its definition shows. For good is what is fitting to the thing of which it is good, and goodness is the fittingness of that same thing — which is a relation and respect of the thing to which it belongs, or to another. Moreover, moral good is a relative of the act of the will to right reason, as I proved (*loco nuper cit. art. 3.*). Therefore the same must be asserted of transcendental good, which imports the fittingness of the thing of which it is good, or fittingness to another. Furthermore, transcendental truth is indeed a relative, as I showed above (*art. 5. of this question.*), and universally all properties of being are transcendental relations, as Scotus seems to hint (*4. d. 49. quaest. 4. § Iuxta hoc. L.*). Lastly, good perhaps differs little or not at all from the appetible and lovable — and that the

appetible and lovable belong among relatives, there is no one who seems to doubt. Therefore the same must be concluded of good.

The fourth part is plainly clear and remains proved from article II of this question, in which I showed universally that the properties of being differ formally both from being and from one another. But good is a property of being; therefore it formally differs from being itself. Moreover, the description of good specifically shows this, which description is different from that of being and from the descriptions of the other properties of being. And that a distinct description argues a distinct formality, I have insisted upon sufficiently above. Therefore between being and good, and the other transcendentals, there falls a formal distinction from the nature of the thing.

Against this first objection: Scotus (*Quol. 6. § Contra ista arguitur. K.*) cites the testimony of Augustine (6. *Trin. c. 8.*): "To be greater is the same as to be better." For essential goodness, by which one species is better than another, is not a thing added to the essence. Therefore if the goodness of a species is not distinguished from its essence, then likewise the goodness of being is not distinguished from being itself, even formally. I respond: the magnitude of God, which coincides with his infinity, is really the same as the divine essence and is distinguished from it formally and negatively, because infinity is its mode; likewise the goodness of the specific nature is really identified with it and formally differs from it. And the same must be affirmed of transcendental good, which is really the same as being and formally different from it. This is how Scotus explains Augustine, as is apparent to one who inspects his text.

Against this second objection: transcendental goodness belongs both to God and to creatures. But in God goodness is not distinguished from his essence and is common to the three Persons, as is the essence. Therefore the same must be affirmed of the goodness of creatures. All the more so because no relation is found in God that belongs to the three Persons — rather, each Person has its own proper relation, as the Father has Paternity and the Son has Filiation — but goodness is adapted to the three Persons; therefore it is in no way distinguished from the Godhead, and consequently formally imports not a relative but an absolute. I grant the major and deny the minor. For it is really identified with the divine essence from which it formally differs, just as the other relations do. To what is added, I deny that there are no real relations common to the three suppositis, as Scotus teaches (*Quol. 6.*) and as I showed at length (*Tract. de Deo Trino, disp. 5. art. 6.*).

Against this third objection: each being participates in its goodness, even if it regards nothing else — as heat is good even if it is not in fire, since it has whatever belongs to the nature of heat. Therefore goodness does not formally include a relation. I respond: good is twofold, as I noted above — simply and in a qualified sense, or in itself and with respect to another — and each is relative. Hence heat considered in itself apart from fire or any other subject has primary

goodness, which is fittingness according to the demands of its nature, so that it is desiccative and nothing is lacking to it that contributes to the integrity and perfection of that nature.

You will press: a relation presupposes actually existing real terms from which it emerges — but heat separated from fire does not have such terms; therefore neither does it participate in such fittingness. I say the major holds for predicamental and actual relation, not for transcendental and aptitudinal relation, of which sort is the relation of fittingness and entitative goodness that we are discussing.

Question III. On the Divisions of Being

Article I. What Is the Primary Division of Being

John Vallone (*fol. 28. of his lecture on the Tractatus Formalitatum of Master Anthony Sirect*) adduces and refutes several diverse opinions on this article, of which I examine and investigate the three more important and celebrated. One is that of the Thomists reported by the aforesaid author, who hold that the primary division of all being is into one and many. The second is that of those whom Suarez follows (*tom. 2. Sua Met. disput. 28. sect. 1. n. 5.*), who hold that the first and most known division of being is into infinite and finite. The third is handed down by Scotus (*Quol. 5.*), Gadius, Lychetus (*ibid.*), Trombetta (*Tract. Formal. art. 1. principali, fol. 5.*), and the rest of the same school, who teach that being is first divided into quantified being (*ens quantum*) and non-quantified being (*ens non quantum*) — which, so that it may be correctly grasped and clearly understood, and vindicated from the attacks and calumnies of the Adversaries:

Note first that real being is distributed in many ways, of which certain divisions are related. Thus it is divided by the Doctor (*in prooemio Quodlibetorum*) into uncreated and created being; likewise into being from itself (*ens a se*) and being from another (*ens ab alio*); also into necessary and contingent being; then into infinite and finite being; further into unparticipated and participated; and afterward into actual and potential being. Uncreated, from-itself, necessary, infinite, unparticipated, and actual being is God. Created, from-another, contingent, finite, participated, and potential being is creature. Other divisions are dissimilar and diverse: in this way being is divided into quantified and non-quantified, into absolute and relative, into one and many, and into substance and accident. The prior division of being is theological and difficult to grasp, and must therefore be explained by us.

Note second that quantity is twofold: quantity of bulk and quantity of power or perfection. The former belongs to corporeal things, which are extended through quantity; the latter to spiritual things, which are magnified by power, vigor, and perfection. In this sense Augustine writes (6. *Trin. 8.*): "In things that are great not by bulk, to be greater is to be better." In the present context, through "quantified

being" we understand a being perfect with virtual and gradual perfection, and through "non-quantified being" we understand a being lacking this intensive and gradual perfection. But Lychetus (*2. d. 1. quaest. 4. Ante §. Ibi.*) adds for the sake of clarity that he distinguishes quantified being into that which includes perfection and excludes every imperfection — as God — and that which admits perfection with imperfection — as created substance. And he gives some being that neither formally participates in perfection nor in imperfection — as are the relations of origin, namely paternity, filiation, active spiration, and passive spiration. The same author adds some being that formally receives no perfection but includes imperfection — as a created relational genus. The first three members of being the Scotists all uphold and defend; but the fourth they reject: for since a created relation is formally finite and hence quantified, residing in the predicament of relation, it consequently is not lacking in all perfection, but participates in some, though slight. For quantified being formally presents perfection, as is clear from its description given above; and conversely non-quantified being is devoid of all perfection. Therefore, since a created relation is quantified and finite, it should not be excluded from all perfection. In divine matters, however, the relation of origin precisely and formally is neither finite nor infinite, because it is not quantified; hence in the school of Scotus it is rightly inferred that it formally imports neither perfection nor imperfection.

But if you contend that an uncreated and a created relation are of the same kind — and therefore if the latter is quantified, so also is the former; especially since it is not formally infinite but only identically so, that is, because it is really identified with the divine essence, which is formally infinite and perfect — indeed the sea of all perfections: the answer must be given from Scotus (*nuper cit.*), Gadius (*ibid.*), Trombetta (*Tract. formal. fol. 5. pag. secunda.*), showing that these relations are greatly distinguished. For to a created relation it is not repugnant to exceed or be exceeded; hence quantity, finitude, or infinitude is not repugnant to it. But to a divine relation it is repugnant to be exceeded, because it is really identified with the divine essence, which is formally infinite. What is infinite cannot be exceeded. And it is also repugnant to it to exceed, since exceeding belongs to that which participates in the character of measure or is a first and absolute being. But a divine relation cannot be a first and absolute being, nor some whole from whose plenitude of perfection it might measure everything else — more as it approaches, less as it recedes from it. For that uncreated relation presupposes and presupposes the fontal plenitude of all goods and the first foundation and root of all things, which is the divine essence. Therefore, since the said relation can be neither measure nor measured, it cannot be formally quantified — and hence neither finite nor infinite — of which sort being precisely is also neither finite nor infinite, nor God nor creature, nor substance nor accident, though it can descend to these and be determined by them. This is repugnant to the said relation; and in this the parity does not hold.

Note third that the quantity of power and perfection is twofold: one which belongs to the quiddity of the thing and is called quidditative, because it follows the quiddity itself — as Scotus speaks of essential and quidditative goodness (*1. d. 1. quaest. 2.*) with excellent explanation by Viguer (*in com.*) — and another which is adapted to the individual by reason of its individual difference and which follows individual being, in which way one individual is more perfect than another, even though there is no essential order among individuals, according to Aristotle (*3. Met. T. 11.*). Now when a thing has its quiddity, essential perfection, modes, properties, and other such things, if it is divided, it is first divided into quiddities and essential perfections, as Scotus touches upon (*1. d. 1. quaest. 2. § Ad argumenta. I.*); then into modes; then into properties; and so on for the rest that follow it and are subjected to it.

Again, note that we can speak of the primary division of being in two ways — theologically and philosophically. If theologically, the primary distribution of being seems to be into quantified and non-quantified, because theology teaches us that the divine relations of origin are not quantified, as Scotus proves subtly and effectively with three arguments (*Quol. cited above.*), while everything else divine is formally quantified with intensive and gradual quantity. But if we discuss it philosophically, the prior distribution of being is held to be into infinite and finite being, as Anthony Andrew hands down above all others (*1. Met. q. 1. art. 1.*), and the Doctor does not dissent — neither there nor elsewhere, in the *Oxoniense* and *Reportata*; nor do his disciples and followers diverge, among whom are Gadius (*in fine Quol. 5.*), Barolus (*fol. 20.*), Sarnus, and the rest of the same school.

The first assertion is that the division of being is into quantified and non-quantified. This is the position of Scotus (*Quol. nunc memorato, § Ad argumentum principale: BB.*). It is proved first: what is more intimate, more immediate, and more proximate to a thing, if that thing is divided, is first divided into that more intimate, immediate, and proximate before into the rest, which are not so intimate, immediate, and proximate to it. But quantified and non-quantified are two members more intimate, immediate, and proximate than the rest that belong to being, since they immediately belong to the quiddity itself — and nothing is more intimate to them than the quiddity and its quidditative and essential perfection. Therefore the said division of being is the first of all.

Second: the natures and essences of things stand as numbers (*8. Met. T. 10.*) — that is, one essence is more perfect than another, just as one number is greater than another. Therefore essential quantity of perfection and power belongs to being before its modes, attributes, and properties — and accordingly being is first differentiated and divided into quantified and non-quantified being before the other members.

Against this first objection: that is not the primary division in which another prior division is found. But another division of being is had — into real being

and being of reason — which precedes the division of being into quantified and non-quantified, as is apparent in the Doctor (*Quol. 3. § De primo. A.*). Therefore the said division is not the first of all. I grant the major and distinguish the minor: of the division of an equivocal into its equivocates, as is the division of being into real being and being of reason, I grant it; of the division of a univocal into its univocates, as is the distribution of being into quantified and non-quantified, I deny it.

Against this second objection: a transcendental division is prior to a predicamental division, since transcendentals precede predicamentals. But the division of being into one and many, and likewise into infinite and finite, is transcendental; while the division of being into quantified and non-quantified is predicamental — for "quantified" is one of the ten predicaments (*5. Met. T. 18. cap. 13.*). Therefore the said division is not to be preferred to the rest. I grant the major and deny the minor. Regarding its proof, I say it concludes of quantity of bulk, not of quantity of power, as I forewarned in the second note.

Against this third objection: if the said division were to be admitted as prior to the rest, it would be primarily because a divine relation of origin formally does not import goodness and perfection. But this seems false, for Augustine (*3. de lib. arbitrio, cap. 5.*) says: "All things that are in God are good." He repeats this (*1. 83. qq. q. 24.*). And our Doctor (*1. d. 1. quaest. 2. § Ad argumenta. I.*) adds that a divine relation enjoys a certain goodness, though not enjoyable (*non fruibili*), and that good converts with being. Therefore the said division of being is not to be received as primary. I grant the major. To the minor, supported by the authority of Augustine, I say it is to be interpreted identically, not formally; or to be understood of entitative goodness, not of gradual and intensive goodness. So too Viguer and Lychetus (*in com.*) interpret Scotus (*cit.*).

You will press: equality or inequality is a property of quantity — and every being compared to any other is either equal or unequal. But since the divine relations are beings, they can be compared to other beings and hence equated or made unequal to them. Therefore they are quantified, perfect, and infinite. I say the objection holds of quantified being, of which sort the divine relations are not. For where a subject is removed, the property of that subject is likewise removed — as if humanity is taken away from a horse, risibility is taken away in like manner. Thus since quantity is removed from the said relations, equality or inequality — which is a property of quantity itself — is likewise separated from them.

Article II. How Being Is Divided into the Ten Predicaments

From the preceding article it is plainly clear that being is divided into quantified and non-quantified; then quantified being into infinite and finite; and afterward finite being into the ten predicaments. It is now investigated whether this proximate division into the ten categories is into ten distinct modes of being, or

rather into ten modes of predication. In the present discussion it is presupposed from what was said both in Logic (*l. 3. quaest. 3. art. 2.*) and in this book (*quaest. I. art. 3.*) what a mode is, what the difference is between mode and difference, and that being is not a genus with respect to the said members and its other inferiors.

The assertion is that real finite being is divided into the ten predicaments as into ten modes of being, not into ten modes of predication. This is the position of Scotus (*5. Met. quaest. 6. § Ad 2. q.*), Anthony Andrew (*ibid. quaest. 7.*), Vallone (*fol. 148. of his lecture*), and others in the *Tractatus Formalitatum* with Sirect — against certain others whose names the aforesaid authors suppress (*in those same places*), who hold that being is distributed into the said predicaments as into modes of predication. It is proved first: a mode of being is prior to a mode of predication, because being comes before being predicated — since the latter is grounded in the former. Therefore being is divided into the ten predicaments as into ten distinct modes of being. Second: the modes of predication simply are either two — namely, *in quid* and *in quale* — or five, from what was said in Logic (*l. 1. quaest. 1. art. 10.*); while the predicates according to Aristotle (*1. Top. cap. 4.*) are numbered as four. Moreover, logic deals with modes of predication, while metaphysics treats of modes of being. Finally, modes of predication depend on the intellect and are counted among second intentions, while modes of being are on the part of the thing, excluding any operation of the intellect; and metaphysics is a real science, treating as it does of real being and what follows it — among which are found modes of being. Therefore the aforesaid modes of being, and not modes of predication, are devised and examined in this science.

Against this first objection: being is not contracted to the ten categories through differences, as Scotus and others commonly affirm. Therefore it is contracted through modes, which are modes of predication, treated also by logic as well as by the predicaments. I grant the antecedent. To the consequence I say that being is indeed contracted through modes of being, but not through modes of predication — and the predicaments belong per se to metaphysics, to logic only insofar as they serve the construction of the syllogism and as simple and incomplex terms.

Against this second objection: the predicaments are primarily diverse, as Aristotle (*3. phys. T. 4.*) and Porphyry (*in Isag. cap. de specie.*) seem to indicate. But what is primarily diverse does not admit of division into modes of being — therefore into modes of predication. I distinguish the major: objectively, I deny it; subjectively, I grant it, as I explained above. Here the division of being into universal and singular should be adduced and weighed. But since I have already treated this at length in Logic (*l. 2.*), I do not call it into examination again here — only the investigation remains as to what is the principle of individuation, that is, what it is that constitutes an individual in the being of an individual and a singular in the being of a singular, which I explore in the following article.

Article III. What Is the Principle of Individuation

On this very difficult and very arduous controversy there are reported many diverse and opposing opinions of the Scholastics, by Scotus (*2. d. 3. from the first question to the sixth*), Canonicus (*1. phys. quaest. 6.*), Suarez (*disput. 5. Met. sect. 2.*), Poncius (*disput. 6. quaest. 2. and following*), and not a few others. Setting aside the rest, I adduce and discuss four principal opinions. The first is that of Ockham (*1. d. 2. quaest. 6.*), Gabriel, Adam (*1. d. 33. quaest. 8. art. 1.*), Aliacus, Gregory, and the rest of the Nominalists, who hold that there is no principle of individuation for an individual and a singular, but that an individual is an individual and singular through itself, not through anything added to it that might constitute it in the being of the individual and the singular. The second is that of Godfrey (*Quol. 6. q. 16.*), who affirms that quantity is the principle of individuation. The third is that of Thomas (*1. p. q. 3. art. 2. ad 3. and elsewhere*), Cajetan, and the whole Thomistic school, who posit the principle of individuation in designated matter — that is, matter affected by quantity. The fourth is defended by the Subtle Doctor (*cited above*) and (*2. Rep. d. 3. q. 1. & 7. Met. quaest. 3.*), Canonicus (*ibid.*), Anthony Andrew (*5. Met. q. 5.*), Bonetus (*8. Met. dicto quinto Peripatetico.*), Tataretus (*in com. 2. d. 3.*), Gratian of Brescia, Lychetus (*in that place*), Rhadus (*secunda parte, contr. 3.*), and very many others, who commonly teach and hold that the principle of individuation is the individual difference, called by these authors "haecceity" (*haecceitas*). This opinion is embraced by Fonseca (*5. Met. cap. 6. quaest. 1. sect. 1.*), who premises (*quaest. 4. sect. 6. in fine*) that Scotus discovered and handed down the truth of this matter. And Ockham (*cited above*), though an opponent of Scotist doctrine, testifies that in this matter Scotus surpasses everyone else in subtlety. Hence Mauritius adds (*in annot. 7. Met. quaest. 1.*) that Scotus comprehended the great chaos of opinions and disputes, distinguished, explained, and corroborated them with firm foundations, powerful arguments, and efficacious reasons.

Note first, and recall from what was said in Logic (*l. 2. quaest. 1. art. 4.*), that there are given real common natures, which are indifferent to being either universal or singular. For they become formally universal through an operation of the intellect, and singular through individual differences. For what is indifferent and indeterminate is contracted and determined by something added to it. But a real common nature is in itself indifferent and indeterminate, as I showed abundantly and clearly there. Therefore it must be determined and contracted through individual differences, which the Scotists call haecceities. And this is clearly illustrated: just as a specific nature is determined by its specific difference — as human nature by rationality — so an individual nature is determined by its individual difference, and becomes this by haecceity — as Peter by Petriety and Paul by Paulinity, and so on.

Note second that the nature, inspected in quidditative and specific being, is not rarely called "form" by Aristotle, as is evident (*5. Met. T. 2. & 7. eiusdem operis, T.*

41.), which Scotus clearly explains (2. *practit. q. 6. § Ad argumenta. O.*). But the nature in individual and singular being is sometimes called "matter" by the same Philosopher, especially (1. *Caeli, summam 8. cap. 7. T. 92.*), in these words: "When I say 'heaven,' I say the form; and when I say 'this heaven,' I say the matter." A not incongruous reason for this is given: just as matter is subjected to everything (1. *phys. T. 82.*), described as the first subject of every form, so the singular nature is subjected to all that is placed in a straight predicamental line. Hence it is called "matter." Therefore when Aristotle sometimes says that the cause of individuation is matter, he is not to be interpreted of the matter of the part — which enters into the essence and quiddity of a physical composite — but of the matter of the whole, which is the individual difference, so called for the reason just assigned and hinted at by Scotus (5. *Met. in exp. cap. 6. T. 12.*).

Note third that to newly discovered things new names must be found and imposed upon them. Hence the holy Fathers — notably Augustine (7. *Trin. cap. 4. & 3. contra Maximinum, cap. 14. & libro contra sermonem Arrianorum propè finem*) — invented a new name to signify the unity of the divine substance and essence of the three Persons — namely, *homoousios*. And Augustine himself (*Tract. 97. in Ioan.*) observes, from the Acts of the Apostles XI, that the disciples of Christ were first called Christians in Antioch. Then, to signify the transformation of bread into the Body of Christ, the Council of the Lateran under Innocent III and the Scholastic Doctors coined the term "transubstantiation" — confirmed by the Council of Trent (*sess. 13. can. 4.*). So no one should find it remarkable if the individual difference is called "thisness" (*hecheitas*) or "haecceity" — not only by the Scotists but by Scotus himself (1. *Met. Sum. 2. in expositione cap. A. & S. eiusdem cap. 6. T. 12. & 1. post. quaest. 6. q. Ad rationes. & collat. 26. propè initium. & collat. 36. post § Ad rationes.*). The individuating difference can thus be called by that one name aforesaid, and singulars can be named by their proper names — both in the concrete, as Peter and Paul, and in the abstract, as Petriety and Paulinity. Marcus Tullius long ago did this (3. *Epist. 7. ex Appio & Lentulo.*), speaking of Appianity (*Appietatem*) and Lentulanity (*Lentulitatem*). And Augustine does the same (6. *Trin. cited by Scotus, 7. Met. quaest. 13. § Ex ista opinione.*), abstracting Danielity (*Danielitatem*) from Daniel. Finally, it is said that Diogenes said to Plato: "O Plato, I see a table and a cup, but I do not see tableness and cupness." I add: since the matter is established, the novelty of a term ought not to offend a philosopher, as Athanasius testifies (*dep. habita contra Arrianos.*). And accordingly, Scotus and his disciples rightly assigned a new name to the principle of individuation newly brought forth by themselves.

The first assertion is that an individual is not an individual through itself but through something added to it, by which it is constituted in the being of the individual and singular. This is the position of Scotus (2. *d. 2. quaest. 1. § Ad quaest. E.*). It is proved first: if an individual were an individual through itself and without any addition, a common nature could not be understood under the universal character — since the singular and the universal are opposed, for the

singular is incommunicable and the universal is communicable. But a common nature can be understood under the universal character, because it is in itself indifferent and indeterminate to being universal or singular, as I noted in the first note. Therefore it is not individual and singular through itself, but through something added to it — which is the individual difference, called by one name "haecceity."

Second: from (*10. Met. T. 3.*): "In every genus there is given a one that is the measure and standard of others." But that sort of one is not one in number or singular, because it belongs to many. Therefore if something becomes singular, it is constituted in singular being through something adjoined to it, which is haecceity.

Third: a species is not a species through itself but through its specific difference — as man through rationality. Therefore an individual is not an individual through itself but through its individual difference. The antecedent is evident. The consequence holds by analogy, since the same reason manifestly applies in both cases.

You will say: a substance or nature is proper to that of which it is the nature, and not to another (*7. Met. 20.*). Therefore a nature is singular through itself and not through something coming to it from outside. I say that something can be proper to something in two ways: in one way through itself, with nothing accruing to it — which I deny; in another way through something contracting it, by which it is rendered incommunicable to another — which I grant, and thus a nature is made singular and incommunicable, even though it is not repugnant for it to be communicated to others. In this way the human nature in Peter is singular through Petriety, while through itself it is communicable to many others and is in fact communicated to and contracted through many individual differences. This refutes the opinion of Henry (*Quol. 5. quaest. 8. 15.*), who holds that a nature becomes singular through a negation called incommunicability to many. For a positive constituted thing receives a positive constitutive principle and a principle distinctive from others — indeed the constitutive and distinctive principle of something is the same. But one individual is positively distinguished from another individual of the same species. Therefore it is also constituted through something positive — which is the individual difference. The major is evident. The minor is at hand: individuals are numerically distinguished from one another and act differently, as we daily experience — and these and similar facts evidently argue that they are distinguished from one another by positive numerical differences, through which they are constituted in individual and singular being. But if any negation is noted in them, it designates their positive entity, which it perhaps follows and accompanies.

The second assertion is that quantity is not the principle of individuation. This is handed down by the Doctor (*cit. q. 4. § contra istam conclusionem. A.*). It is established first: the predicaments are unmixed, as is clear in the individual

syllables of each predicament elaborated in the *Epitome Dialectics*, l. 1. q. 4. and in the second antepredicamental rule (*ibid.* art. 1.) established: the genera that are not subalternately posited have diverse differences, species, and individuals. But if the individual of substance were individuated through quantity, substance and quantity would coalesce into one — for the former would be contracted to singular being through the latter — which is false.

Second: a thing is first constituted in its substantial being before it is in accidental being. For a thing is first constituted in itself before it regards something distinct from itself, since the prior, as prior, is not constituted through the posterior. But substance precedes quantity as its subject — and as a cause precedes its caused effect. Therefore substance is first individual before quantity accrues to it — which is its accident — and hence is not individuated through quantity.

Third: given Godfrey's opinion, the individual of substance would not be one per se but per accidens — for it would be constituted from substance and accident, which is one per accidens, as is evident (7. *Met. Summa Secunda*, capite 3.). Therefore substance is not individuated through quantity.

You will say: division and distinction belong to quantity, and individuals are mutually distinguished and a species is divided into individuals — therefore the individuals themselves are individuated and singularized through quantity. I distinguish the antecedent: into integral and quantitative parts, I grant it; into substantial and subjective parts, of which sort are individuals, I deny it.

The third assertion is that neither matter nor form is the principle of individuation. The first part is held by the Doctor (*cit. quaest.* 5.) and is shown first from Aristotle (1. 2. *Met.* T. 27.), who affirms that my matter is one thing and your matter is another. But such matter, which is common to you and to me, is not made individual through another matter — otherwise there would be a regress to infinity — nor is it individual through itself, as I proved in the first assertion. Therefore beyond matter, another principle of individuation must be sought. Especially because matter, from what was said in Physics (l. 2. *quaest.* 2. art. 11.), is one in species — therefore matter itself, which is common to many individuals, is not the constitutive cause of the individual in the being of the individual and singular, which is incommunicable to many.

Second: the matter is the same in the generated and the corrupted, as experience shows. But the generated and the corrupted are distinct individuals, not distinguished through matter, which is the same for both — therefore through something else, to be handed down below. All the more so because accidents are individuated not through matter, of which they have no share — therefore through something else they become singular.

Third: what is of the essence of something cannot be the principle of individuation, because essence pertains to specific being. But matter enters into

the essence of a physical composite — for a physical whole is constituted from matter and form as from two essential parts. Therefore individuation is not had through matter. Especially because this or that rational soul is singular not through matter, of which it is devoid since it is spiritual — therefore the principle of individuation is not sought from matter.

You will say: Aristotle (*7. Met. T. 28.*) clearly writes that Callias and Socrates differ from each other in matter. He frequently repeats the same thing elsewhere: Callias and Socrates are individuals. Therefore if they are individuals through matter, it plainly follows that matter itself is the principle of individuation. I say that Aristotle must be interpreted of the matter of the whole, which is the individual difference, as I explained in the second note — not of the matter of the part, which together with form constitutes the natural composite.

The second part of the third assertion is taught by Scotus (*cited above, quaest. 6. § Ad quaestionem ergo respondeo. Sub K.*). It is established by nearly the same arguments as the first part, since form is incommunicable to many and is of their essence — indeed it is their principal part, by reason of which they are mutually assimilated. But the individual difference is incommunicable to many and pertains to material and ultimate subjectable being. Therefore form cannot be the principle of individuation. Moreover, if form were the principle of individuation, it would be either the form of the part or the form of the whole — but neither is able to individuate anything. The major is evident from a sufficient enumeration of parts. The minor is at hand: each can be considered either universally or particularly. If the first — it is communicable, either by information or by inherence, which is opposed to the incommunicable, as is the individual principle. If the second — there still remains the question of through what a singular form is individuated, and thus form itself is not the cause and individual principle. Moreover, just as each thing has its entity, so it also has its unity, since unity is a property of being as has been said. But form participates in its entity distinct from matter, the composite, and everything else — therefore it also participates in its unity distinct from them. And if it is specific, the unity is specific; and if it is numerical, the unity is numerical. Consequently form itself does not constitute itself and other things in numerical and individual being, but is constituted in such being through its numerical unity and individual difference. Therefore from form itself the individual character of anything is by no means derived.

You will say: form separates and distinguishes one thing from another (*7. Met. T. 5. and following.*). Therefore the principle of individuation and distinction of one individual from another is derived from form. I distinguish the antecedent: specifically and formally, I grant it; numerically and materially, I deny it. And form is a principle of being in the way in which it is a principle of distinguishing — and since it is a specific and essential principle of being, it is likewise a specific

and essential principle of distinction, but not an individual and material one, which is now at issue.

I know that some Scotists, whom Faber follows (*Theor. 90. cap. 2. 10.*), think that the ultimate reality of form is the principle and cause of individuation of everything. But this assertion conflicts with Scotus (*just cited*), who says in explicit words: "Such an entity (namely the individual one) is not matter nor form nor the composite, insofar as any of these is a nature — but it is the ultimate reality of the being that is matter, or that is form, or that is a composite." Therefore according to Scotus the individual character is the ultimate reality — it follows that it is not the ultimate reality of form, as Faber supposes. There was thus no need for Faber to labor in handing down and determining as the cause of individuation the ultimate reality of form, as he does (*c. 2. of the place just cited*), since Scotus had already established it to be the ultimate reality of being — which, if it is that of matter, is called the ultimate reality of matter; if of form, the ultimate reality of form; if of the composite, the ultimate reality of the composite — which the Scotists subsequently collectively comprehended under one name, calling it haecceity. And the Doctor hints at this (*ibid.*), affirming that this is the ultimate reality of the being that is matter, or that is form, or that is a composite. If Scotus held that the individual character is the ultimate reality of form, he would plainly have said it is the ultimate reality of the being that is form. Since he enumerates those three disjunctively, it evidently follows that he by no means wanted the ultimate reality of form to be the universal constitutive principle of every individual.

Furthermore, Scotus (*at the passage cited, sub H.*) from Aristotle (*cited by him*) calls the individual difference "matter," insofar as it precisely constitutes the individual in individual being — which is said to be material and ultimately subjectable. Therefore if according to Scotus this reality is matter in that sense, it follows in Faber's position that the ultimate reality of form is matter — but who does not see that this is false? For matter does not arise from form but is presupposed by it, being the common subject of all forms. Therefore the ultimate reality of form cannot be the individual character — especially in the school of Scotus, in which the individual principle is called "matter." Again: matter taken specifically is contractible through its individual differences, but not through the ultimate reality of form, because form and its reality are really distinguished from matter and can by divine power be stripped of all form, as I asserted (*l. 2. Phys. quaest. 2. art. 8.*). Therefore from the ultimate reality of form the common character of individuation of anything whatsoever is not derived. For just as other things do not borrow their entity from form, so neither do they borrow their unity and individual difference from it.

You will say with Faber (*cit.*): this is true of form in itself, but not of form taken as the ultimate reality of form. On the contrary: first, the ultimate reality of form is not called "form" by Aristotle and Scotus but "matter," as I just noted —

and can only be called form really and not formally. Granting Faber's opinion, everything that Scotus constructs to resolve those testimonies of Aristotle indicating that only what receives matter can be multiplied and divided would collapse; and he would have accumulated those many passages and arguments to disprove Thomas's opinion that the cause of multiplication of individuals is matter to no purpose — if by the individual character is not understood matter taken for the individual difference, since the ultimate reality of form can in no way be that matter in that sense, nor does it suit the text of the Philosopher, as is evident to one who reflects on it. Finally, there still remains the question to ask Faber: what is that ultimate reality of form? And since beyond what has been said he has no other answer, he must be set aside, and Scotus with his followers must be embraced — who hold that the individual principle is the ultimate reality of being, that is, haecceity.

The fourth assertion is that the principle of individuation is the ultimate reality of being, or the individual difference, which is called haecceity. The primary author and patron of this is Scotus (*cited above, quaest. 6. § Ad quaestionem ergo. C.*). And it follows from what has been said: since a nature is not individual and singular through itself, but through something added — something real and positive that is not quantity, not matter, not form, nor anything else — it is plainly inferred to be the ultimate reality of the thing, or haecceity.

Second: every inferior in itself includes something that its superior does not include, because a superior is contracted to an inferior through something contracting and determining it — as is evident in any predicamental series. But a specific nature, which is superior to individual nature, is contracted and determined through the individual difference to individual and singular being. Therefore this individual difference, or haecceity, is the principle of individuation.

Third: the ultimate constituted thing is constituted through the ultimate difference — as is evident, because the nature of the constituted is that of its constitutive. But the individual is the ultimate constituted thing, being placed at the base of the predicamental series. Therefore its principle is the ultimate constitutive, which is the ultimate individual difference and haecceity.

Moreover, one should philosophize in much the same way about species and about the individual. But a species is constituted in specific being through its specific difference — as man through rationality. Therefore an individual is likewise individuated through its individual difference — as Peter through Petriety, Bucephalus through Bucephalicity, and so on for other individuals and singulars.

Against this first objection: a singular act presupposes and requires a singular potency, which it contracts and actuates, as Aristotle indicates (*2. Phys. T. 38.*), saying that a particular form presupposes particular matter. But haecceity is a

singular act — therefore it presupposes a singular potency, which it determines and actuates. But that potency is the nature within the individual or of the individual. Therefore the nature of the individual is singular before the advent of haecceity, and thus haecceity is not the principle of individuation. This argument is Aureolus (*cited by Canonius, 1. Phys. quaest. 6. § circa praedicta.*), from whom Cajetan took it (*1. de essentia, cap. 2.*), and what follows below. I respond: granting the major, I distinguish the minor — of a singular act that has the character of a *quod*, I grant it; of a singular act per se and primarily, which properly has the character of a *quo*, I deny it — for this properly is not called singular but rather the character of singularity, indeed singularity itself, by which the singular is constituted in singular being, just as rationality is not the species of man but the constitutive principle of it in specific being. And perhaps Cajetan, not noticing this (*at the passage recalled, q. 5. cap. 2. 1. part. quaest. 85. art. 7.*), concedes intrinsic individuating differences to individuals — which here he strives to overthrow and eliminate.

You will press: what is posterior is not the cause of what is prior — just as an effect is not the cause of its cause, because a cause is presupposed to be before its effect. Hence there is the common axiom: the cause is prior to its effect. But the individual difference is prior to the nature that is contracted through it, since the contractible precedes the contracting — just as matter, which is actuatable through form, is prior to the actuating form that contracts it. I grant the major and distinguish the minor: in the being of nature, I grant it; in individual being, I deny it. For they are simultaneous and exist simultaneously — just as the nature of animal by natural presupposition precedes rationality, which is its difference through which it is constituted in specific being, yet they exist simultaneously. For an animal cannot exist without being either rational or irrational. Therefore between the contractible and the contracting, such a priority of nature — not of time — is established, as is contended in the objection. Or the major can be distinguished: of what is produced and truly caused, not of a constituting and determining principle.

Against this second objection: the principles of individuation are primarily diverse — but the haecceity of Peter and the haecceity of Paul are not primarily diverse, therefore they are not principles of individuation. The major is Scotus's, who from what was said above establishes that ultimate differences, of which sort haecceities are, share no real common concept. The minor is shown: the haecceities of Peter and Paul have more in common with each other than the haecceities of Bucephalus and Francis. But what share something in common are not primarily diverse, as is evident from the terms. Therefore. I grant the major and deny the minor. Regarding its proof, I distinguish: they share a common real and quidditative concept, I deny it; they share in some third thing really identified with them — which is nature — I grant it. But this does not prevent such haecceities from being primarily diverse.

You will press: what belongs to one and is repugnant to another of the same species necessarily presupposes their distinction. But Petriety belongs to Peter and is repugnant to Paul — therefore they are not primarily diverse but differ in something and agree in something. I say the major must be restricted — provided, that is, that the relevant feature is not distinctive of them — as haecceities are, which are the principles distinctive of individuals, as is evident from Scotus (*Quol. 2. art. 1. ad C.*) if read attentively.

Against this third objection: if Scotus's opinion were true, in every material and corporeal individual there would be three haecceities — namely, of matter, of form, and of the composite — but this is impossible, because one individual would be a triple individual. I respond: there are two partial haecceities and one total — just as there are two partial entities and one total coalesced from them. It does not follow, however, that there is a triple complete individual composed of two partial and incomplete ones.

You will press: if matter and form united to the composite enjoy their own haecceities, then likewise drops of water joined to the whole water, or separated from it, participate in their own haecceities, and are therefore many individuals — but this seems false. The major is evident. The minor is shown: the same water, when certain drops are removed from it or added to it and again joined to it, would lose its haecceity or recover it, and would thus be now "this" and now not "this" — which involves a contradiction. I say there is a disparity, because the said drops when joined together make one with homogeneous and integral unity. But matter and form constitute one with essential compositional unity really distinct from each, as I said in Physics, Book II. I have written many things fully and distinctly in the *Tractatus de Angelis, disp. 1. quaest. 6.*, in nine complete paragraphs, in which I treated of all and singular things — both corporeal and incorporeal — that can be individuated.

Question IV. On Essence and Existence

Article I. Whether the Essences of Things Are from Eternity

The first opinion is that of Henry (*in his Summa*) and Francis of Meyronnes (*1. distinct. 42. quaest. 1. and following, & Quol. 8.*), who suspect that the essences and quiddities of things are uncaused, and that they are created and caused in time only in respect of their being of existence. The second opinion is the common one of Scotus (*2. Rep. dist. 1. quest. 2. & dist. 36. quest. vn.*), Lychetus, Viguer, Barge, Vorlong, Bonaventure (*ibid. art. 1. quest. 1.*), Richard (*dist. 19. quaest. 3. art. 3.*), Ockham (*dist. 36. quaest. vn.*), Aureolus (*art. 2.*), Canonicus (*2. Phys. quaest. 1. art. 2.*), Suarez (*disp. 30. Metaphys. sect. 2.*), Hurt (*disp. 8. sect. 1.*), and the rest, who teach that the essences of things are produced and created by God in time in respect of both their being of essence and their being of existence — so that all being, whether of essence or of existence, is produced and caused by God in time, and what was not made by God is absolutely nothing.

Note first, from Durand (*in 1. dist. 36. quaest. 2.*) after Augustine (*12. Ciuit. cap. 2.*): "Just as from that which is *sapere* (to be wise) wisdom is named, so from that which is *esse* (to be) essence is named." But since being admits of a twofold mode — in potency and in act — essence is likewise posited as twofold: in potency and in act. The former is producible, or it is not repugnant for it to be produced — in which it is distinguished from prohibited being, namely that which is repugnant to be produced, such as fictions and other impossibles. The latter is produced and caused and enjoys actual existence, as are all things that now exist in the nature of things. From this arises the division of being into potential being and actual being, or potential being and actual being — the former is called objective being in a qualified sense and diminutive being; the latter is real positive being and being simply.

Note second, from Bonaventure (*cited above.*), that to be in another can happen in three ways: in respect of actual existence, or in respect of a likeness present, or in respect of creative power. In the first way things exist that are actually existing in the universe — whether inanimate, corporeal, or incorporeal. In the second way things exist in the knower and in the artisan who is working, whether they actually exist or not, whether they are future or merely possible. In the third way things exist in their causes — that is, causes have the power and virtue to produce things — as a plant participates in the power of producing flowers, a tree of producing fruits, and so on. This distinction contributes greatly to understanding and explaining the testimonies of Sacred Scripture and the holy Fathers adduced and expounded by Ockham and Gabriel (*as cited above.*), especially (*Ioan. 1.*): "All things in him were life" — understood, that is, cognitively and causally, since God from eternity knew all things and had the power of creating and causing them, and willed to create those same things in time, as is evident (*Gen. 1.*): "In the beginning God created heaven and earth." Or exemplarily and ideally, because God has in his mind the exemplars and ideas of all things that can be made, according to (*Hebr. 11.*): "By faith we understand that the worlds were framed, so that visible things were made from invisible things." And Boethius (*3. consol. metr. 9.*): "Governing the world and forming it from a like image." Augustine adds (*12. Ciuit. cap. 25.*), saying that ideas are the efficient causes of things. Therefore the passages adduced by opponents in opposition are rightly expounded in this twofold way — ideally or causally — as Lyra also forewarned (*in postil. Ioan. 1. and elsewhere.*). Thus (*Exod. 33.*) is to be interpreted: "I will show you all good" — that is, causally. And Augustine (*hom. 3. in Ioan. & serm. 4. de Verbis Domini.*): "What you seek variously here, he himself will be all things to you as one." And the Seraphic Father in prayer, addressing God, says: "My God and my all." Nor should the following from Dionysius (*de divinis nominibus 1.*) be omitted: "God is the life of the living, the substance of substances, the beginning and cause of every life and substance."

Note third, from Scotus (*in the place cited above, § Concedo. sub C.*), that all the motivating arguments adduced by Henry regarding the divine intellect in

support of and to confirm his own opinion seem also to be able to be adapted and to suit the human intellect in defense of our own position. First: our intellect can understand something not only in respect of its being of essence but also in respect of its being of existence, because each is intelligible — even though that thing may not actually exist, and even though our intellection does not produce or cause it in the true being of essence and existence, nor has the power of producing and causing such being. The same must be asserted of the divine intellect, which — even though a thing may have no being of essence or existence — nonetheless understands it most perfectly. Hence Augustine adds (5. *super Gen. cap. 7*): "God does not know things already made differently from things yet to be made." Therefore although God has foreknown from eternity the being of essence and existence of a thing, no Catholic admits any being of existence of a thing from eternity — but holds that the being of existence of a thing was known from eternity; and the same must be conceded of the being of essence of a thing, namely that no being of essence of any created or creatable thing existed from eternity, but the being of essence was only known.

But there is a difference between these intellects, because the divine intellect understands before the human intellect does — which Scotus calls the first production into intelligible being, and production into known and qualified being. But that intelligible being and known being does not require the being of the thing simply either unproduced or to be produced — because just as our intellect, in order to understand, does not presuppose that being simply, so too the divine intellect, in order to understand things *ad extra*, does not presuppose any being of their essence or existence. Therefore, from the eternal knowledge by which God foreknows things from eternity, it is wrongly inferred that their being of essence is eternal; rather, only that their being as known is from eternity is deduced — which is not a middle between real being and being of reason, as Poncius thinks (*disp. 59. quaest. 5. concl. 4.*), since being taken in the most common sense is rightly and adequately divided into real being and being of reason, as after Aristotle (6. *Metaphys. T. 8.*) the Doctor writes (*Quol. 3. art. 1.*). Therefore the said being does not mediate between either member of being as just described.

Moreover, the members of a good division are opposed, as is apparent from the precepts of a good division — and this can be induced from all particular divisions, especially of animal, which is adequately distributed into rational and irrational, so that no animal can be found that is not either rational or irrational. Likewise no being is found that is not either real or of reason. Nor does it help to say with Poncius (*cited.*) that the said being of creatures is a middle not by participation in the extremes but by negation of them. For since that division is of an equivocal into its equivocates, its parts and members do not participate in the nature of the divided term — of which there is none — but only in the common name, as is clear from the description of equivocals (*l. 1. praedicam. cap. 1.*). It therefore remains to investigate what that being is — whether real or of

reason, whether within or outside the intellect? If the first, it is real being; if the second, it is being of reason. Therefore it does not mediate between real being and being of reason.

Moreover, being is sufficiently divided into created and uncreated, into unparticipated and participated, into being from itself and from another, as I asserted above. But none of these can be such a middle being as Poncius devised — otherwise it would be God or creature, which is impossible. Furthermore, such being is diminutive and qualified, as Poncius himself concedes (*ibid.*). Therefore it is in no way simply being, since between simply being and being in a qualified sense nothing is interposed. Finally, the said being — since it is the same as known being — has its being either from the divine intellect or from a created intellect. The first Poncius denies, against Scotus (*1. dist. 39.*); the second he cannot affirm, since it is against the orthodox faith. But to posit such being of creatures as independent, from itself unproduced, necessary, and eternal is a fiction and plainly a dream, which I am reluctant to continue refuting. And if perhaps the mind of the said author does not err, certainly his manner of speaking is not to be received — since not only must error be avoided but also the way and occasion of erring — of which sort it is to posit, besides God, something independent of itself, unproduced, and eternal, as Poncius (*cited.*) endeavors to prove. See the *Tractatus de Creatione, disp. 1. quaest. 6.*, in which I treated and examined this difficulty at length.

The assertion is that the essences of things are not from eternity, but exist in time whenever God willed to produce and create them, together with their existences. This is the common opinion, and the opposing view has already been rendered obsolete and repudiated by the Doctor (*ibid. § Contra conclusionem istarum rationum. C.*). It is established first from Augustine (*12. Cinit. cap. 5.*) defending the said assertion with these words: "Every essence was made by God." And Sacred Scripture suggests this, especially (*Gen. 1.*): "In the beginning (that is, at the beginning of time) God created heaven and earth." But what was created was created according to its total being — which is being of essence and existence — since creation is production from nothing, or from no presupposed subject. Therefore the essences of things are not from eternity unproduced and uncreated.

You will say: Augustine (*lib. de natura boni 6. 8.*) seems to hold that the being of essence coincides with possible being — but possible being is from eternity, since it is not repugnant for creatures to have been from eternity, as I asserted elsewhere, and things are possible through themselves. Therefore the being of essence is also from eternity. I say either Augustine speaks in the opinion of others, or is to be interpreted of objective possible being — which is known being and diminutive being — not of the being of essence and quidditative being, according to the opinion of Henry cited above. Or one may say with Scotus (*cited, ante N.*) that by the "capacity of the form" mentioned by Augustine,

matter is to be understood — which enjoys entitative act, which is not being of essence nor possible being, as is clear from Physics (*l. 2. quaest. 2. artic....*).

Second: given Henry's opinion, there would be no creation and no annihilation — since things would arise from that preexisting and presupposed being of essence, and would return to that same being of essence, not to nothing — which is contrary to truth.

You will say: in the school of Scotus a real common nature is given, which is not produced — since production, generation, and corruption are of singulars. Therefore such a common nature has an uncaused and unproduced being of essence — which the first opinion, that of Henry, admits and hands down. I say indeed that Scotus teaches a real contractible common nature, really identified with individual differences and formally distinguished from them. Hence although singulars are produced and generated *per se* and immediately, the common nature is produced and generated mediately and *per accidens*, as is evident (*l. praedicam. cap. de substantia, & 1. Metaphys. cap. 1.*). Especially because universals and particulars are inseparable from one another, since the former are intimate and essential to the latter — therefore if the latter exist, so do the former; if the latter are caused, so are the former — with the qualification that we now establish from the Philosopher cited.

Third: either God produces the essences of things as understanding them or not? If the first, then such essences are known before they have that being of essence — and thus are posited in vain on account of God's eternal cognition. If the second, then God produces them purely naturally — as fire naturally heats — which seems absurd of everything that God himself produces *ad extra*, and thus that eternal being of essence is devised wrongly.

You will say: this argument involves a contradiction in the sayings of Scotus. For Scotus himself concedes known being from eternity — having posited which, one can likewise argue: either God first understands this in known being, or not? If the first, therefore it is first understood before it is produced. If the second, therefore he produces purely naturally, as fire produces fire. Therefore either Scotus's argument against Henry is invalid, or in his assertions there is open inconsistency. I say there is no contradiction. For it is one thing to produce something in qualified being; another to produce it in simply being. It would be inconvenient if God produced something in simply being and did not pre-understand it, but not so if he produced something in qualified being — as Lychetus shows at length. Therefore, since Henry speaks of the being of essence which is simply being, and Scotus treats of known being which is qualified being, there is a disparity — and thus no inconsistency exists in the writings of the Doctor.

Against this first objection against the proposed assertion: Ecclesiastes I: "There is nothing new under the sun. Nor can anyone say: behold, this is new." But this

cannot be said in respect of being of existence, since daily new individuals of diverse species arise that never existed before. Therefore it must be understood in respect of being of essence, which is eternal and unproduced. I respond: that testimony must be interpreted of known being, because since creatures were known by God from eternity, nothing new can fall into the knowledge of God. Or it must be expounded of specific being — that is, that God no longer founds new species. Hence it is written (*Genesis 2.*): "He rested on the seventh day from all the work he had done" — and, in the interpretation of Lyra (*in postil.*): he ceased from creating new species. Or: what is now said to be discovered by the wise was discovered previously by others — as Aristotle attests (*1. Met. c. 1.*) — though it perished through the flood, or through the carelessness and death of men and was given to oblivion, as the same Postillator notes (*in cap. 1. Ecclesiastes cit.*).

Against this second objection: relatives are simultaneous by nature (*ex Arist. 1. praedicam. c. de ad aliquid.*). But God from eternity is understanding creatures, and creatures are understood by him. Therefore creatures have some being from eternity that is understood. But that being is not being of existence — therefore it is being of essence, and hence the being of essence of creatures is eternal and unproduced. I respond: it suffices for an intellect to understand a thing that it have objective being — for of a thing not existing, as of a rose in winter, we have cognition according to its objective being. But to argue from objective being to real being of essence is the fallacy of arguing from what is so in a qualified sense to what is so simply.

Against this third objection: truth follows the thing of which it is truth. Hence Aristotle (*at the place just cited, c. de substantia*) hands down: "A statement is true if the thing is so, and false if the thing is otherwise than is affirmed or denied." But there are propositions of eternal truth, as I asserted in Logic (*l. 4. q. 4. art. 5.*), not in respect of being of existence. Therefore in respect of being of essence. I respond: truth does not follow being of existence and essence but objective being. Hence concerning things not existing in the intellect there exist propositions that are true and of eternal truth, as I abundantly explained and powerfully confirmed at the passage just cited.

Against this fourth objection: the divided is predicated of its dividing members, as animal of rational and irrational. But being is rightly and adequately divided into potential being and actual being. Therefore potential being participates in true being before it is produced and caused — but this is not being of existence, therefore it is being of essence. And hence being of essence is eternal and uncaused. I respond: this holds of being in the distinctive sense of potency, not of the distractive sense — just as if man is divided into living man and dead man. Add also that potential being does not have true being in itself, but in its cause, which is able to produce and cause it, as I noted above with the Seraphic Doctor.

Article II. Whether Essence and Existence Are Distinguished from Each Other

Scholastic Doctors are divided three ways on this article. Some — namely the Thomists with Thomas (*l. de ente & essentia, c. 5. & 1. p. q. 3. art. 4.*) — acknowledge a real distinction between essence and existence. Others — such as Aureolus (*1. d. 8.*), Alexander of Hales (*7. Met. in text. 22.*), Gabriel (*3. d. 6.*), and Gregory (*2. d. 6. q. 1.*) — posit only a distinction of reason between essence and existence. Still others — namely Scotus (*2. d. 16. q. vn. & 4. d. 13. q. 1.*), Canonius (*1. phys. q. 9. art. 1. propositione 2.*), Trombetta (*Tract. Formalitatum fol. 37.*), Vallone (*ibid. fol. 58.*), and in part Fonseca (*4. Met. c. 2. q. 4. sect. 4. concl. 3.*) — teach that essence and existence are distinguished from the nature of the thing, formally, not positively but negatively.

Note that essence is equivalent to the nature and quiddity of a thing — as the essence of man is rational animal — while existence is the actuality of a thing; hence "to exist" is said to stand outside of itself (*extra se sistere*). For that being which a thing has outside its cause is said to be actually existing being, because the essence of a thing exists through existence — which is its actuality — and is contracted and modified by it. Hence essence is called the "thing" and existence is its "mode," as I made plain at length (*q. 2. art. 3. & q. 1. art. 3. and other places not rarely*).

The assertion is that essence and existence are distinguished from each other — not really, nor by reason alone, but formally and negatively. This assertion has three members, defended by Scotus (*ibid.*) and (*1. d. 36. q. vn.*). The first part is established first: what are really distinguished from each other can, at least through the absolute power of God, be separated from one another, with one existing without the other, as I proved elsewhere when treating of the real distinction. But existence cannot be separated from essence, nor vice versa. For singulars cannot exist without universals, because these are the essences of those things — thus Peter cannot be without rational and the other essential and quidditative predicates. Conversely, such quidditative and essential predicates cannot exist without singulars and individuals, which are their bases and foundations, in which they inhere and subsist. Hence Aristotle rightly adds (*c. de substantia*): "When primary substances are corrupted, secondary substances are corrupted as well" — since the latter are universal substances and the former are singular. And the same Philosopher continually argues against Plato, who thought universals exist per se separated from singulars, because universals are the essences of singulars, which essence is inseparable from existence — and hence really indistinguishable, since it is impossible for things to exist without their essences, as for Peter and Paul without human nature, and for Bucephalus without equine nature and essence, and so on. Therefore between essence and existence a real distinction is not to be interposed.

Second: between a thing and its mode there is no real distinction, because a mode cannot exist without the thing of which it is a mode — as a degree of whiteness cannot exist without whiteness. But existence is a mode of essence, as I observed above. Therefore between existence and essence there falls no real distinction. And Fonseca (*cited, in fine sect. 2.*) writes that the Philosopher touched on this (*1. post. 1.*). Add that the real distinction falls between thing and thing — but if essence and existence differed really, they would be two things and two beings, which does not seem rightly said — for one existing singular, since it is one with the greatest unity, would be a double thing and a double one, and those two things and two beings would be separable from one another, as things that really differ can be — so that Peter could be separated from himself, since his essence could be without his existence because they are really separated.

The second part is shown first from Aristotle (*2. post. 7.*), who distinguishes the existence of man from his essence with these words: "But what man is, is other than that man exists." And again: "But being is not the substance — that is, the essence — of any thing." And this is intimated by the same author at the beginning of the same book, distinguishing the question "whether it is" — which denotes existence — from the question "what it is" — which designates essence. These are had apart from any operation of the intellect. For even if no one were thinking, there would still be the question whether something is — that is, whether it exists or can exist — and what it is, whether the essence is such or such, definable in this or that way. Therefore in the school of the Philosopher, essence does not differ from existence by reason alone.

Second: things that differ by reason alone — what is adapted to one is likewise accommodated to the other on the part of the thing, and they share the same predicates and attributes. But essence is common and definable and resides per se in a predicament, while existence is not so — it is only located reductively in a predicament and lacks those predicates. Therefore essence and existence differ by more than reason.

The third part follows from the two preceding ones. For if essence and existence are distinguished neither really nor by reason, it is plainly inferred that they are distinguished by a middle distinction — which is called formal. Moreover, things that are described differently are formally distinguished, as has often been insisted upon. But essence and existence receive different descriptions, as is evident from the preliminary note — for essence is described as the nature and quiddity of a thing, while existence is described as the intrinsic mode of the thing, or its actuality. Therefore between them there is a formal distinction. Furthermore, what is contractible and determinable is formally at least distinguished from its contracting and determining term — as is evident of a genus and its differences. But essence is contractible and determinable, while existence is contracting and determining of it. For a common nature through existence becomes an existing one — just as through the individual difference it

becomes this and singular. Therefore between them a formal distinction must be established — not indeed a positive one but a negative one, because since existence is a mode of essence, and a mode, as has been said, is not conceivable per se without that of which it is a mode, nor is it a distinct reality, it follows that they do not formally differ positively but negatively — as Trombetta, Lychetus, and other celebrated Scotists affirm, from whom perhaps Fonseca (*cit.*) and Poncius (*disp. 59. quaest. 4. concl. 2.*) do not depart — not daring to call the said distinction formal actual and Scotistic, because existence is a mode, which is not a reality distinct from essence as a positive formal distinction requires, whereas a negative formal distinction does not require this — which distinction the said authors would perhaps not deny. I know that others call it a modal distinction, the denomination taken from existence, which is a mode of essence. But call it as you will — we do not insist on the name, since the matter is clear.

Against this first objection: Aristotle (*4. Met. c. 2. T. 3.*) openly asserts that man and existing man are the same. And afterward he adds that things subject to generation share the same nature. And (*7. of the same work*) he adds that there is no difference between saying "a man who is strong" and "a man is strong." Therefore essence and existence are entirely identified. I respond: these and similar testimonies that can be adduced must be taken of real identity, not formal — as Scotus indicates in his exposition of them. And this interpretation is exhausted from those same passages, in which the Philosopher writes that those things are the same — as being and one. But it is clear from what was asserted (*q. 2. art. 2. 4. of this book*) that being and one are really identified and formally distinguished. The same must be affirmed of essence and existence, between which falls not a real but a formal distinction.

Against this second objection: what is indifferent and undetermined with respect to something is really distinguished from that by which it is determined and limited — as is evident of matter, which is determined by form and really distinguished from it. But essence is indifferent to existing. Therefore between essence and existence there is a real distinction. I respond: the major holds of thing and thing, but not of thing and the mode of a thing, as happens in our case — and it is exemplified of matter and form, which are two things and two beings, though incomplete and imperfect. To the minor I say it is true in the precise sense, not the divisive sense. For although essence can be prescinded from existence, it cannot be divided and separated from it.

Against this third objection: between potency and act there is a real distinction, because potency can exist without act. But essence is potency and existence is act, since through existence essence exists actually. Therefore between these there intervenes a real distinction. I respond: the major can be granted of subjective potency and formal act, but not of objective potency and its act. For the same thing that is in potency is the very same thing that actually exists through its efficient cause. To the minor I deny that essence is objective potency.

For from what has been said, essence is the nature and quiddity of a thing — which, before it exists, is said to be in objective potency, but is not itself objective potency. For there is a wide difference between objective potency and that which is in objective potency.

Question V. On Substance and Subsistence

What substance is and how manifold, its properties and affections, were treated abundantly and carefully in Logic (*l. 3. q. de substantia*), and in the *Epitome*, *l. 1. q. 4. art. 3. 4. & 5.* Here, however, a few things that are lacking there are briefly weighed and decided.

Article I. Whether Substance Is Prior in Time to Accident

Three opinions are reported by Scotus (*7. Met. q. 2.*) and Anthony Andrew (*ibid.*), the first two of which are refuted by those same authors, while the third is received — as can be seen in the aforesaid authors.

Note that "time" is used in two ways. In one way, properly, as it is defined by Aristotle (*4. Phys. T. 101.*): "the number of motion according to before and after" — for in this sense time is the measure of motion and rest. In another way, improperly — as meaning that it does not imply a contradiction for something to be separated from another, to last without it, and to not depend on it; and thus in this acceptation of time three things are designated as belonging to it: first, that it is not repugnant to be separated from another; second, that it can remain without the other; and third, that it does not depend on the other — as the Doctor indicates (*2. d. 1. q. 5. § Contrà istud. L.*), arguing against Henry (*Quol. 9. quaest. 3.*).

The assertion is that substance precedes accident in time. It is proved first from Aristotle (*7. Met. T. 4.*), who advances this proposition: "Substance is prior to accident in time, in definition, and in cognition." The Doctor agrees (*ibid. & at the places just cited.*). Second: what is not repugnant to be separated from another, and does not depend on it, is said to be prior in time in the second sense accepted above, as is apparent from the preliminary note. But substance can be separated and stripped of every accident, and does not depend on any accident — indeed, on the contrary, accident depends on substance, is caused by it, and cannot exist without it. Therefore substance precedes every accident in time. This priority, moreover, does not seem to differ from the priority of nature, just as a cause naturally precedes its effect.

Against this first objection: nothing is prior in time to what is eternal, since the eternal is without before and after and lasts with all its duration at once. But some accidents are eternal — namely motion (*8. Phys. 1.*). Therefore the proposition "substance is prior in time to every accident" is not universally true. I grant the major and deny the minor — for Aristotle wrongly held that the world and motion existed from eternity, as I showed clearly there. Or: even

granted that motion and time had existed from eternity, substance would still be prior in time to every accident, in the last acceptance of time adduced and exhibited and explained in the preliminary note.

Against this second objection: risibility is simultaneous in time with humanity — but risibility is an accident and humanity is a substance, and the former arises from the latter. Therefore substance does not precede accident in time. The major is known to all. The minor is at hand, since risibility is a proper accident, as is evident in the *Isagoge* of Porphyry. I grant the major. To the first part of the minor, I say that risibility is indeed a proper accident — taken for something extraneous really identified with humanity — but not a common accident, which is what the present difficulty is about.

Article II. Whether Substance Precedes Accident in Definition

Aristotle (*7. Met. summa secunda, cap. 1. T. 4.*) openly affirms that substance precedes accident in time, in definition, and in cognition. I examined the first in the first article; the second in the second; and the third will be weighed and decided in the third article.

Note that neither actual inherence of an accident in a subject nor aptitudinal inherence enters into the essence of the accident, as will be examined and established in the final question of this book. But an accident connotes the subject in which it inheres — which subject is the substance from which it arises — hence it is called "the being of a being" (*entis ens*), that is, a being caused by substance. Hence in the definition of every accident the subject is always placed as something added, and its definition is accordingly called a definition by addition (*definitio per additamentum*), as I explained in the *Epitome, l. 2. quaest. 7. art. 2.*

The assertion is that substance precedes accident in definition. So Aristotle (*ibid.*) and Scotus (*ibid.*). It is proved first: substance is prior to accident in entity — therefore also in definition. The antecedent is conspicuous: substance is the subject and cause of accident; but a subject is prior to that which is subjected in it. The consequence holds from (*2. Met. T. 4.*): "As a thing stands with respect to entity, so it stands with respect to knowability." But substance precedes accident in being — therefore also in being known and being defined. Second: the simple is prior to the mixed and composite and aggregate. But an accident includes its subject, in which it inheres. Therefore accident is posterior to substance in definition.

Against this first objection: a definition is constituted only from genus and difference — but the definition of an accident is of this sort — therefore an accident does not include a subject in its definition. The major is evident. The minor is shown from the antepredicamental rule: of different genera there are diverse differences, species, and individuals. But the accident has diverse genera, as is plainly clear from the book of predicaments. Therefore. I distinguish the

major: of a quidditative definition, I grant it; of a descriptive definition, I deny it. To the minor I say with Scotus (4. d. 12. q. 2. § *Ad argumenta principalia K.*) that in the definition of every accident the subject is placed — which is substance — so that a perfect and intellect-satisfying concept of it may be had, which cannot be had of an accident without the subject on which it depends, as the same Doctor writes (*ibid.* q. 1. § *Ad q. Respondeo L.*).

Against this second objection: a proper and legitimate definition only explains distinctly the nature of the defined — but the nature and essence of an accident is not confused and mixed with the nature and essence of substance, since accident is just as simple as substance. Therefore it is not necessary that substance be placed in the definition of accident, and consequently accident is not placed after substance in definition. I grant the major. To the minor I say that although accident does not formally and essentially include substance as its subject, it nevertheless connotes it and is ordered toward it as depending on it. Hence every accident is completely and satisfyingly defined through substance, as Scotus and Mauritius forewarning (*quaest.* 29. *Universalium*, fol. 4. col. 2.).

Article III. Whether Substance Is Prior to Accident in Cognition

I adduced and explained the many modes and acceptations of priority in the *Epitome* — here I only recall and adduce two: one is called the primacy of generation, which occurs when one thing is generated before another — as the heart in an animal is generated before the rest of its members and parts. The subsequent one is called the primacy of perfection, whereby what is more perfect and excellent than another is said to be prior. Hence the Philosopher adds (9. *Met.* 16.): "what is prior in generation is posterior in perfection — and conversely, what is posterior in generation is prior in perfection," as is evident in the order of nature, which proceeds from the imperfect to the perfect.

The assertion is that substance of itself and absolutely is prior in cognition to every accident — but from our perspective, accident is known before substance. This assertion has two members, which the Doctor hands down (7. *Met. quaest.* 3.). The first part is established first from Aristotle (7. *Met.* T. 4.), who absolutely advances this proposition: "Substance is the first of all beings in cognition." And it can be proved from the same Philosopher (2. *of the same work*, T. 4.), who establishes as a maxim: "As a thing stands with respect to being, so it stands with respect to being known." But substance in being precedes accident as its subject. Therefore also in being known.

Second: substance is the first being and cause of the rest of beings, as Aristotle writes (*at the place just cited.*). Hence among the predicaments it holds first place. Therefore absolutely substance is found to be first with respect to cognition.

Third: substance is more perfect than every accident — for it is a being subsisting per se, while accident is a being in another and a being of a being. Therefore in dignity and perfection, substance excels the rest of beings.

The second part is shown first: all our cognition takes its origin from the senses, and the senses only perceive sensible accidents — as the eye color, the ear sound, smell odor, taste flavor, and touch primary qualities. Therefore from our perspective accident is known before substance. Second: through accidents we arrive at knowledge of substance. Hence Aristotle writes (*1. de anima T. 11.*): "Accidents contribute greatly to knowing substance." And (*3. of the same, 39.*): "The one who understands must contemplate phantasms." But species and what through them is represented to sense and intellect are accidents. Therefore accident is first in cognition from our perspective and in the order of generation. Hence its cognition is more imperfect — and what is more imperfect is first in the way of generation, according to what I brought forward at the end of the preliminary note: what is prior in generation is posterior in perfection.

Against this: what is known by us is known through a species representing the object to sense and intellect, as I showed elsewhere. But of substance for this state we have no proper species, as the Doctor writes (*1. dist. 3. quaest. 3. & dist. 22. quaest. 1.*) — though we do have one of accident, through whose knowledge we arrive at knowledge of substance. Therefore accident is prior in cognition to substance. I respond: the argument concludes of cognition according to proportion, not of cognition in itself and absolutely and perfectly taken — as is sufficiently declared and proved above, and can be further illustrated by this example. The vision of an eagle looking at the sun is absolutely more perfect than any vision of ours — yet according to proportion, our vision of this white thing is more perfect than the eagle's vision of the sun. The reason is that we see this white thing more perfectly than the eagle sees the sun.

Article IV. On Subsistence

Whether and what hypostatic and personal subsistence is, is greatly controverted among the Scholastic Doctors. For us it seems to have become known solely through faith in the sacred mysteries of the Trinity and the Incarnation. And the greater and more serious difficulty is whether it is distinguished from the singular and individual substance. First of all, Aristotle and the other Philosophers neither acknowledged nor distinguished it from singular substance, as is evident in the book of the predicaments and in other places where Aristotle himself treats of substance. What is cited from him (*1. Met. 1.*): "Actions are of suppositis" — in that passage "of suppositis" is not found, but "of singulars," as Scotus rightly interprets (*that passage in his commentary.*). Hence Augustine (*7. Trin. cap. 5. & 9.*), whom Aureolus reports and follows (*1. dist. 25. artic. 3. propositione tertia.*), says that formerly "person" was confused with singular and individual substance, and no distinction was established between them — but with the passage of time the holy Fathers and Scholastic Doctors distinguished person from singular and individual substance, and hence in divine matters confessed three persons and one singular substance. And in the

humanity of the divine Word, they confessed one person of the Word himself and two natures and singular substances — divine and human. There are read, moreover, many divergent opinions at Bassolis (*3. distinctione prima, quaestione prima, articulo primo.*), Faber (*ibid. disput. 2.*), and Fonseca (*5. Met. cap. 8. quaestione 6.*) — on what a person formally presents and what it adds above a singular substance, and what distinction obtains between them. From these I select and discuss three more important and celebrated ones. The first is that of Durand (*1. distinctione 34. quaest. 1.*) and Henry (*Quol. 4. quaestione quarta.*), who hold that the singular nature and individual substance differ from the supposit and person only in the mode of conceiving and signifying — as concrete and abstract differ, such as "man" and "humanity." The second is that of Cajetan (*3. part. quaest. 4. articulo 2.*), Medina (*ibid.*), Ferrariensis (*4. contra Gentes, capite 42.*), Fonseca (*cit. sectione quarta.*), Suarez (*disput. 34. Met. sectione secunda, num. 20.*), Hurt (*disput. 11. sectione tertia.*), Arrubal (*disp. 4. sect. 11. subsect. 2.*), and many others, who hold that a supposit adds some real positive thing above the singular substantial nature — which the aforesaid Recents say is a substantial mode, the ultimate term and complement of the same singular substance. This opinion does not seem improbable to Scotus (*3. distinctione prima, quaestione prima, articulo tertio, § Ideò propter sub D. vers. Quid autem sit illud proprium, quo natura est personata, duae videntur viae probabiles. & § Non asserendo potest mediari inter istas vias ante E. & 1. dist. 25. quaest. vn. & dist. 23. quaest. vn.*). In favor of it are Lychetus (*ibi in com.*), Gadius (*Quol. 19.*), and Rhadus (*3. parte contr. 1. art. 1. conclus. 5.*). The third is that of Scotus (*now cited*), and (*Quol. 19. art. 3. V.*) and (*in Report. 3. dist. 1. quaest. 1.*), Bassolis (*ibid.*), Meyronnes (*quaest. 11. Quand.*), Bonetus (*6. naturalis Theolog. cap. 1.*), Aureolus (*1. dist. 25. art. 3.*), Ockham (*3. quaestione.*), Gabriel, Marsilius, and the rest of the Nominalists, Molina (*1. part. quaestione 29. disput. 2. in fine.*), Salmerón (*Tom. 2. Tract. 27.*), and others both older and more recent, who teach that a supposit formally adds nothing to the singular and individual substance beyond a twofold negation — of actual and aptitudinal dependence.

Note first that singular, individual, supposit, and person stand to each other as superior and inferior, as Scotus touches upon (*1. distinct. 2. quest. 7. § Ad 2. quaestionem, CC.*). For every person and every supposit is singular and individual — but not every singular and individual is a supposit and person, because singular and individual belongs both to substance and to accident. For this whiteness is indeed a singular but is neither a supposit nor a person. Moreover, every person is a supposit, but not every supposit is a person — for "supposit" extends more broadly than "person," being adapted to both living and non-living substance, while "person" is adapted to the rational and intellectual alone. Hence person is defined by Richard of St. Victor (*4. Trin. cap. 22.*) as "the incommunicable existence of an intellectual nature." Through this, the description of person given by Boethius (*libro de duabus naturis & una persona Christi*) — "the individual substance of a rational nature" — is corrected and expressed. For in place of "rational nature" is placed "intellectual nature," and

instead of "individual substance" is placed "incommunicable existence," as the Doctor rightly notes (*1. dist. 23. quaest. vn. § Ad quaestionem ante C.*).

You will say: Augustine (*lib. contra Donatistas post collationem lib. 4.*) calls fish and cattle "persons." Therefore the name "person" is not accommodated solely to rationals and intellectuals. I say that there Augustine spoke metaphorically of "person" — just as in the Gospel the predestined are improperly called "sheep" and the foreknown "goats," as is evident (*Matt. 25.*): "He will set the sheep on his right and the goats on his left."

Note second, from Scotus (*just cited & dist. 2. quaest. 7. § Ad q. dico DD.*), that there is a twofold incommunicable and a twofold communicable — as a *quo* and as a *quod*. What is communicable as a *quo* is what is communicated to something as a part or in the manner of a part — as form is communicated to the composite, of which it is a part. What is communicable as a *quod* is what is communicated to something as its quiddity and essence — as the universal is communicated to the singular. What is communicable as both *quo* and *quod* is what is communicated to something according to its entire being — as the common nature is communicated to singulars. Conversely: the incommunicable as a *quo* is what is not communicated to something as a part or in the manner of a part; and the incommunicable as a *quod* is what is not communicated to something as its quiddity and entire essence. A supposit is incommunicable with that twofold incommunicability — as *quo* and as *quod* — namely, the supposit cannot be communicated to anything either as part or as whole, either as form or as entire essence.

Note third, from the same Doctor (*Quol. 19. § De tertio art. V.*), that there is a threefold dependence: actual, aptitudinal, and potential. Actual dependence is that by which one actually depends on another — as whiteness has actual dependence on the white wall in which it inheres. Aptitudinal dependence is that by which one aptitudinally depends on another — as a stone existing above has aptitudinal dependence on its place below, which is its center. Potential dependence is that by which something has no repugnance to depending on another — as it is not repugnant for a stone in its center to be placed above. Now a supposit and a created person is independent with actual and aptitudinal independence — that is, it depends neither actually nor aptitudinally on another. Hence a rational soul is not a person, because although when separated from the body it does not actually depend on the body, it still has aptitudinal dependence toward the body itself. Bassolis (*as cited above*) adds that the rational soul separated from the body is not a person because it is not a total and complete nature as is required for the personal character, but a partial and incomplete one — which is excluded from the character of person. But a divine Person enjoys a threefold independence — actual, aptitudinal, and potential — meaning it neither actually, nor aptitudinally, nor potentially depends on another, because it is repugnant for it to depend on another. Hence God alone is

independent, and to God alone is it repugnant to depend on another — not only by reason of the three personalities but also by reason of the absolute subsistence that belongs to God as he abstracts from the three Persons, as I showed and proved at length (*Tract. de Deo Trino, disp. 4. quaestione 10.*).

The first assertion is that suppositional and personal subsistence does not differ from singular and individual substance only in the mode of conceiving and signifying — in the concrete and abstract. This follows from Scotus (*at the places just listed*) and is shown first. Signifying belongs to a name, because a name is a voice signifying by convention, as I said and expressed in the *Epitome, book second, question second, article first*. But a supposit does not differ from a singular nature by name and word alone — otherwise they would be entirely the same in reality, and thus in divine matters there would be only one person, because there is only one divine nature; and in Christ there would be two persons, because there are two natures, divine and human — which is erroneous and heretical. From this arose the heresy of the Sabellians, because they did not know how to distinguish and establish a difference between nature and supposit, as Alphonsus a Castro reports (*5. Adversus haereses, verb. Deus, haeresi quinta.*) after Eusebius of Caesarea (*l. 10. historiae Ecclesiasticae, cap. 29.*). Second: things that differ by the mode of conceiving alone differ by reason — but apart from any distinction of reason, a supposit and a singular substantial nature still differ from each other. For the singular human nature was assumed by the divine Word, but not its human supposit — as has been established by faith. Therefore they differ by more than reason.

Third: from the seventh general Synod (*Tom. 3. Conciliorum, actione 6.*) it is read that many erred by not distinguishing nature from supposit. And Emperor Justinian in an edict of faith, after the second Council of Toledo, openly declared that nature and supposit do not coincide. Moreover, John of Damascus, reported by Alphonsus (*l. 4. adversus haereses, verbo Christus, haeresi 4.*), writes that the errors and heresies of the Eutychians and Nestorians arose from the fact that they confused nature with person. For Nestorius, acknowledging two natures in Christ, thought there were in him two persons. Conversely, Eutyches, acknowledging only one nature in Christ, confessed one person in him. Therefore, according to truth and orthodox doctrine, a supposit and a singular substantial nature are distinguished from one another. Nor does it help to say with Vasquez (*Tom. 1. tertia partis, disp. 31. cap. 1.*), in defense of Durand, that to save all the aforesaid it suffices to have a distinction of reason between nature and supposit — for the motivating arguments and testimonies cited above intend more. For if nature and supposit do not differ on the part of the thing except through the intellect, it is plainly inferred that in Christ there would have been two persons — human and divine — which smacks of Nestorian heresy. For if according to Durand nature and person are the same thing, and the human nature was truly in Christ, then so also was the human person — since

these two really do not differ except by an operation of the intellect and in the mode of signifying.

Hence briefly the argument runs thus: either in Christ there existed a human person or not? If the first, the Nestorian heresy arises, positing in the same Christ a double person — created and uncreated. If the second, then person is really distinguished from nature — since it does not remain when nature remains. But to remain and not to remain with respect to the same thing involves a contradiction, and clearly indicates a distinction of more than reason and mode of conceiving and signifying. Furthermore, the communicable and the incommunicable differ with no one thinking — but nature is communicable and assumable, while person is incommunicable and inassumable, according to truth and the opinion of all. Therefore a distinction of reason alone is not sufficient between nature and person. But if you say that the authorities cited should be taken of divine nature and person — which differ by reason in the Thomistic school — this helps Durand even less than the preceding response, since the Councils and Fathers were speaking of a created person. For they were disputing against Nestorius, who admitted two persons — created and uncreated — in Christ, and strove to show that in Christ there are two natures, divine and human, and one supposit of the Word alone that supplies the place of the human supposit, which did not exist in him. But if it truly did not exist, it is evidently deduced that it is distinguished from the created nature that was in the same Christ. Between that which is and that which is not, it is plainly established that there is a distinction in reality and not by reason — and hence the said Fathers, notably Vigilius and Epiphanius, were speaking explicitly also of the distinction of nature from a created person. All the more so because a divine person differs formally from nature, with every operation of the intellect excluded and its distinction eliminated — since the former is absolute and communicable, the latter relative and incommunicable, between which a formal distinction is found, which from what I have asserted elsewhere precedes every activity of our intellect.

Moreover, neither Suarez, Hurta, and Arrubal are to be heard or tolerated when they draw the opinion of Scotus to that of Durand. For, as will be plainly evident below, a wide difference lies between the chief of the subtle school and Durand — who is not infrequently judged by theologians to be a leader of rash opinions. For Durand thinks that a singular nature and a supposit differ as concrete and abstract — which are in fact the same and differ only in the mode of signifying — while Scotus holds that a supposit and nature are distinguished on the part of the thing without any mode of conceiving and signifying, and establishes that the supposit itself is incommunicable as *quo* and as *quod*, as I explained in the second note above. Again, Durand concedes that man taken absolutely and precisely is a supposit, while Scotus denies it; and according to the latter, God taken precisely from the Persons is indeed the individual of the Godhead, yet is not a supposit. Moreover, Durand distinguishes nature from supposit only in

the mode of signifying — while Scotus presupposes the distinction and asks whether what by which a supposit differs from nature is positive or negative, as will be made plain below through the following assertions. Scotus is therefore not with Durand but far distant from him, as anyone who interprets both without distortion can see.

The second assertion is that a supposit taken formally does not add any real positive thing to the singular substantial nature. The Doctor (*at the passages cited*) is its patron. It is proved first: that positive thing allegedly added above the individual nature, which is held to be formally the supposit — either it is assumable and capable of being united to something in suppositional unity, or it is inassumable and incapable of being united to another in such suppositional and personal unity. Neither can be said. Therefore no real positive thing superadded to the singular individual substance is to be admitted. The major is evident from a sufficient enumeration of parts. The minor is shown as to the first part: a supposit is formally incommunicable, as is apparent from its definition explained in the first note. As to the second part, it is established: the thing in question is inassumable and was in fact not assumed by the divine Word, as the Councils cited above define and the Fathers mentioned confirm, and all Scholastic Doctors in *3. distinctione prima* teach. But what is inassumable is incurable — on the authority of Damascus (*3. fidei, capite 6. 18.*), who says: "What is destitute of assumption is incurable." But what is incurable is irredeemable and unsaveable — and thus there would be something in us that Christ not only did not and could not redeem and save, but could not have redeemed and saved either, namely that real positive thing which person adds above the singular substantial nature. The Thomists — notably Cajetan, Medina (*3. parte, quaestione quarta, articulo secundo.*), and Suarez (*disput. 34. Met. sectione secunda, numero 20.*) — arise against this and distinguish a twofold positive entity: one natural, following nature; the other personal, following person. The former they make assumable, capable of union, and curable; the latter, inassumable, incapable of union, and incurable. Through this distinction they suppose themselves to satisfy the Councils and Fathers cited for us. Against this, however, I argue thus: either everything that is assumable by the Word pertains to the quiddity and essence of the assumable nature, or necessarily follows and accompanies it. If the first, then the Word did not assume the singularity or haecceity of the humanity assumed by it — since this is not of the essence of that humanity — and likewise the properties, powers, and faculties that proceed from it. If the second, then just as it assumed its individual difference — which we call haecceity — so also it assumed the said personal positive entity through which nature is supposed and personated. For each positive entity is in obediential potency to be assumed by God for whatever he effects if he wills. For it is an absolute entity, creatable and annihilable, and hence capable of union and assumption. For all things are placed in the hand of God — hence David, addressing God (*Psal. 118.*), says: "All things serve you," and (*Psal. 75.*): "Who can

resist you?" Since therefore all things do the word of God, and no one can resist his will, it plainly follows that no power exists in the said entity by which it could resist being assumed and united. For if being assumed means nothing other than being hypostatically united, then it can itself be united to the hypostasis of the Word, just as any other entity can. Especially in the position of Suarez, who thinks that any creature can be an instrument of creation for creating anything to which God wills to assume it. For if every creature in creation can be assumed, it is not apparent why also in hypostatic union — since the latter is not a greater or more difficult work than the former, nor is it harder to unite than to make. It is remarkable in Suarez and others among the Recents that every creature can obey God, and yet that personal positive entity cannot obey God — and that there should be some creature altogether disobedient with respect to which God is powerless to coerce it, while a resistive power would be established in that same entity and a coercive power would be removed from God. All the more so because God is in all things through essence, presence, and power, and through grace in the blessed and in the assumed humanity through hypostatic union — as Paul hints (*Coloss. 2.*): "In him dwells all the fullness of the divinity corporeally" — that is, as Lyra (*in postil.*) explains, through union in the supposit of the Word. But if God exists in all created things by the aforesaid modes, then also in that positive entity — and can inhabit it "corporeally," to speak with Paul, which is equivalent to assuming and uniting to himself, in Lyra's interpretation (*ibid.*). If therefore that positive entity is capable of union with God, it is not apparent why in Christ it was not united — as Nestorius contended. But if it is not capable of union with God, God's power of uniting seems to be lacking — which is absurd and false in both alternatives.

Second: that to which something is lacking for totality, perfection, and integrity is not total, perfect, and integral, as is evident from the description of whole, perfect, and integral. But nothing is lacking to Christ pertaining to the totality, perfection, and integrity of man — for he is a perfect man, subsisting in a rational soul and human flesh, on the authority of Athanasius (*in the Symbol.*). But if personality were a real positive entity, something pertaining to the complement of man would be lacking to him — namely, the created personality, which according to the Adversaries is the ultimate term and complement of humanity. Therefore Christ would not be whole and perfect man, as is proclaimed by all the Orthodox and defended against sectarians by Alphonsus (*l. 4. adversus haereses, verbo Christus.*).

The aforesaid authors arise against this and say — making a distinction — that Christ indeed participated in everything pertaining to human nature, by reason of which he is called a perfect man, but not in what belongs to his person, whose place was taken by the person of the divine Word. Therefore they do not consider it inconvenient that Christ lacked the said positive entity constituting person. On the contrary: that positive entity devised by the aforesaid authors is the ultimate term and ultimate complement of nature, as they themselves

admit. Therefore it pertains to nature — and hence if Christ had been lacking in it, he would not have been perfect, since he would not have had what belongs to the integrity and complement of nature. And something would be in man that was not redeemed and healed by Christ the Lord — which contradicts the words of Christ himself (*Ioan. 7.*): "I have made the whole man well." And Augustine (*in fine serm. 145. de tempore*): "The Word redeemed everything, assumed everything, liberated everything in its totality — he who created all in totality." And Damascus (*3. fidei, capite 6.*): "He assumed the whole in totality, and the whole was united to the whole, that he might bestow salvation on the whole." There follow the definitions of the Council of Chalcedon (*actione quinta.*), where these words are read: "We teach that the same Christ, according to humanity, is in all things like us according to humanity, without the stain of sin." And the sixth Council (*actione prima.*): "Like us in all things, without sin." This was prefigured by the Apostle of Tarsus (*Hebr. 2.*): "He had to be like his brothers in all things" — save guilt, as the glossator Lyra notes — to which accords Dionysius (*lib. de divinis nominibus, cap. 2.*): "From us the Word was fully and truly made man." And even more remarkably, Damascus (*at the passage cited, capite 6. & 22.*) gives testimony: "Nothing of what God the Word planted in our nature when he formed us in the beginning is lacking, but he assumed all — body, rational soul, and their properties." These and other things that Alphonsus (*just cited*) adduces not obscurely show that the opinion of Scotus on the supposit and person taken formally is truer and more conformable to Sacred Scripture, the ecumenical Councils, and the holy Fathers than the rest. But if personality were a positive substantial entity, Christ would truly be lacking in that entity, and would not be "like us in all things" except for guilt. For heretics — and even Catholics — would say that Christ lacks that positive substantial entity which makes for the excellence and dignity of man; and more excellent and noble is the personality of man than any kind of irrationality or inanimate supposit. And I add that according to the Adversaries it is the last positive complement of man — which does not seem to accord with the sanctions of the Councils stating that the Word assumed everything, even the properties of man, except sin. For it would be opposed to them that the Word did not assume the said positive entity posited and asserted by the Adversaries — and thus that except for guilt it did not unite to itself all things conducive to man — namely, that positive substantial entity — which does not seem to agree with the Councils and Fathers aforesaid.

Third: if the Word were to lay aside the assumed humanity — given this hypothesis — either that humanity would remain unpersonated, or the personality of it would be newly produced in that humanity. Neither can be said. Therefore the said positive entity through which nature is constituted in the being of person is not to be admitted. The major is evident and sufficient: just as the Word could assume humanity, so it can also lay it aside. Having this granted, the question is investigated: whether the said humanity would remain without personality, or whether a personality for it would be caused from that humanity

itself, or by God. The minor is established as to the first part: it is inconvenient for such a nature to exist without its personality, which is its ultimate complement and term — just as a line cannot subsist without the points terminating it. As to the second, it is shown: God can refrain from cooperating to its production. Given this, that nature would persist without its personality, and there would be a personalizable nature without personality — as a rational one without rationality.

Medina (*cited.*) responds: given the hypothesis, personality would flow from nature as its property, in the way that risibility proceeds from humanity as its property, ninnability from equinity, and light from the sun. On the contrary: first, Medina himself and the other Thomists deny that substance is immediately and proximately active — therefore since that humanity is a substance, it cannot cause its own personality. Moreover, if personality flows from humanity as its property — since all properties and properties remained in the assumed humanity, as Damascus teaches (*at the place just recalled.*) — so too its personality would have remained, which is erroneous and heretical. Again, something would have been lacking to Christ's humanity — namely, that personal property — and hence it would not have been whole and perfect humanity, as was defined in the Councils cited above. Hence those who took away the will from that humanity — the Monothelites — were condemned at the Council of Constantinople, as Alphonsus testifies (*ibid. haeresi 6.*).

Cajetan (*cit.*) responds otherwise and says that personality flows from humanity not as a property but as an effect from its cause. Hence he does not think it inconvenient for a nature abandoned by the Word to exist without personality and to receive such a mode of subsisting alone until another mode of subsisting *per se* comes — which is the personal one. But this response is of no moment. For it multiplies mode upon mode, which is vain and fruitless. Moreover, if God had from the beginning of the world produced all singular intellectual natures in that way, none would be persons — which appears absurd. Furthermore, a singular intellectual nature existing this way is truly and properly a person — for in that way it is incommunicable as *quo* and as *quod*, as the definition of person requires. Therefore the aforesaid explanation and response does not satisfy and does not diminish the force and efficacy of Scotus's argument.

The third assertion is that suppositional subsistence is not a positive substantial mode added to a singular substantial nature actually existing. This follows from the Doctor (*ibid.*) against Suarez (*cited above, sect. 4. n. 24.*) and other Recents. It is proved first: the mode of a thing is distinguished modally from the thing of which it is a mode, as the same Suarez candidly admits (*ibid. n. 33.*), or formally and negatively, as the Scotists want. But what is modally distinguished consists of inseparables — as does what is formally distinguished. But in Christ there did not exist a created supposit in the humanity united to the Word, but only the divine supposit. Therefore between nature and supposit there is no modal

distinction — and consequently neither is the supposit itself formally the said substantial mode. Moreover, to feign a real and modal distinction simultaneously between them, as Suarez does (*at the place just cited*), involves a contradiction in terms — since real distinction is between thing and thing, and modal distinction is between a thing and its mode. Especially since he himself does not distinguish existence really from essence, though he concedes that existence is a mode of essence — why then does he now interpose a real and modal distinction between nature and supposit, which he makes its substantial mode?

Second: from nature and supposit there is no composition — otherwise in God there would be composition, in whom there is one nature and three hypostases; likewise the person of Christ would be composite. But Suarez (*at the passage cited, n. 39.*) holds that from the said mode and nature there is composition, so that the former is determining and actuating and the latter is determined and actuated. This especially seems most false both in God and in Angels. Again, something of human perfection would be lacking to Christ's humanity — namely, the said substantial mode — which, since it does not enter into the essence of man, would be adventitious to it and accidental, not substantial. Again: to an accident existing without a subject in the Eucharist, no new positive mode is added, as I showed elsewhere. Therefore neither to a singular substance existing is there to be given a real positive mode determining and actuating it. What I adduced in Physics (*l. 2. quaest. 5. art. 2.*) also pertains here — where it is shown that form is united to matter without any substantial mode superadded to them.

The fourth assertion is that suppositional and personal subsistence formally adds to the singular substantial nature something negative — namely, a twofold incommunicability as *quo* and as *quod*, or a twofold negation of actual and aptitudinal dependence. This is the position of Scotus (*cit.*). It is proved first from the refutation of the others: since a supposit and person does not formally coincide with singular substantial nature — as I showed in the first assertion — nor is it something positive, nor a substantial mode, as I proved in the two preceding assertions — therefore it is the negative thing shown and asserted above. Second: from the definition of person, which is the incommunicable existence of an intellectual nature. For a person is not precisely the intellectual nature, because this is in Christ without a created person; nor is it formally existence, because existence belongs to singular nature, and the humanity in Christ participates in its own existence — which existing humanity was assumed by the Word. What remains is the twofold incommunicability and twofold negation of dependence shown and explained above, through which a person is formally constituted in the being of person.

Third: what first, when posited, is posited, and when removed is removed, formally constitutes a supposit. But given that twofold negation of

communicability and dependence, a person and supposit is given, and when it is removed, the supposit is removed. Therefore that twofold negation formally constitutes a supposit. And hence it is concluded that a supposit materially includes the singular substantial nature, and formally includes the twofold negation of dependence — actual and aptitudinal — as just described. Nor should anyone be surprised by this, since primary substance is described by a twofold negation — namely, what is neither in a subject nor said of a subject. Matter (7. *Met. T. 8.*) is designated negatively; indeed God is known through negations, as Dionysius (*lib. de caelesti Hierarchia.*) hints — and Alexander of Hales infers from him (1. *p. quaest. 2. art. 2.*). All the more so because in this way the difficulties raised by the Adversaries are easily dissolved, and all things are well and properly coherent — as Molina (1. *p. quaest. 29. art. 1. in fine disp. 2.*) notes and defends above others. And this will be clearer and plainer from the resolution of the objections to be adduced immediately below.

Against this first objection in favor of the first opinion: concrete and abstract do not differ except in the mode of signifying, as "white" and "whiteness" — with Scotus's assent (1. *dist. 4. q. 1. in calce.*). But "man" is a concrete name and "humanity" is an abstract, and the former is a supposit and the latter is a nature — therefore nature and supposit entirely coincide, and thus a supposit adds nothing above nature. I distinguish the major: of concrete and abstract of accident — which others call the concrete concretized to a subject — I grant it; of concrete and abstract of substance — which others describe as concrete concretized to a supposit — I deny it. So Lychetus (*in com.*) expounds that passage of Scotus. The reason for the difference is that singular accident, since it is in a subject and cannot naturally subsist without it, cannot be a supposit; but a singular substance, since it is a being per se, can subsist per se in solitude and not depend on any extrinsic supposit — hence it can be a supposit through something added to it, by reason of which it is called incommunicable and independent.

You will press: what the supposit adds above the singular nature is the twofold negation set out and explained above — but a negation is nothing; therefore a supposit adds nothing to nature. I grant the major and distinguish the minor: a negation is nothing formally, I grant it; fundamentally, I deny it — just as eternity formally is the absence or negation of beginning and end, while fundamentally it is the divine essence existing entirely at once and independently, as Scotus hints (*Quol. 6.*), whom Suarez follows (*disp. 50. Met. sect. 4. n. 12.*). I add that privation is the absence of a form in a suitable and fitting subject, and yet is a principle of natural generation (1. *Phys. cap. 6.*) and the terminus *a quo* of the same, as I sufficiently explained and proved there. So it should surprise no one if a supposit taken formally adds something negative to the singular substantial nature.

Against this second objection in favor of the second opinion: the divine supposit adds something positive above the divine nature — namely, a subsistent relation of origin, through which it is constituted in the being of a supposit. Therefore the same must be affirmed of a created supposit, since it also adds something positive above nature. The consequence holds, since the reason seems the same in both. For both agree in the same character of supposit — therefore if the former is positive, so also is the latter. I grant the antecedent and deny the consequence. The reason for the difference is that the divine supposit presents the negation of a threefold dependence — actual, aptitudinal, and potential. But the negation of potential dependence designates something positive. For what negates potential dependence and for which it is incompatible to depend on another formally includes something positive, by reason of which it is incompatible for it to be communicated to another. But a created supposit, because it is constituted only through the twofold negation of actual and aptitudinal dependence, therefore formally includes nothing positive. The common character of person, however, abstracts from positive and negative — just as being abstracts from finite and infinite, and animal from rational and irrational. Therefore this argument, held in such great esteem by the Recents, wholly collapses; and their admiration in the school of the subtle ceases, if they correctly consider and equitably judge.

You will press: an uncreated and a created person are univocated in the common character of person, since the definition of person is adapted to each. But between positive and negative there is no common univocal — therefore if an uncreated person formally designates the positive and a created one the negative, they are not univocated. Scotus addresses this (*in 3. praealleg. § per hoc ad argumenta. G.*) and says that an uncreated and a created person are indeed univocated in the common concept of the twofold negation of actual and aptitudinal dependence, but not in the concept of the third or potential negation — by which it is incompatible to be communicated to another — which is accommodated to the divine person alone, and by reason of which it formally imports something positive.

Against this third objection: what is absolute residing in the predicament of substance is something positive, since the predicaments are series of positive beings. But a created supposit is located in the category of substance, as can be seen in Porphyry's tree. Therefore a created supposit is something positive. I grant the major and distinguish the minor: fundamentally, by reason of the individual substantial nature, I grant it; formally, by reason of the twofold negation of dependence just recalled, I deny it.

You will press: real positive actions proceed from a real positive principle — on that saying of Aristotle (*1. Met. c. 2.*): "Actions are of supposits." Therefore a created supposit formally is something positive. I grant the major and deny the minor. Regarding that saying of the Philosopher, I say it is not well rendered as

"of suppositis" but as "of singulars" — in the interpretation of Scotus (*in com.*), from whom Suarez and other Recents (*cited.*) do not depart; and that text is sufficiently open and clear.

Against this fourth objection: a supposit is one per se — but from the positive, such as singular nature, and the negative, such as the supposit taken formally, there is not had one per se. Therefore a supposit does not formally include the twofold negation described above. I distinguish the major: by reason of the foundation — namely the singular nature, which consists of act and potency, from which one per se is made — I grant it; by reason of the twofold negation described above, through which the supposit is formally constituted in the being of supposit, I deny it. Therefore, since one per se is properly composed of act and potency, whether physical or metaphysical — and the person of the Word is not the act of the assumed humanity, nor is humanity its potency, since in the character of humanity it is complete and perfect — the supposit therefore does not seem to be one per se in this sense. Otherwise the person of Christ would be composite not only with the composition of humanity from body and soul, but also from humanity and the personality of the Word — which in the *Tractatus de Verbo Incarnato* we have rejected. Or if the major is conceded, the minor may be distinguished: positively, it is granted; negatively, it is denied. For in this way one subsisting per se is constituted with suppositional and personal subsistence — and thus there is one Christ with the unity of person and of the supposit of the divine Word, which — since it is positive — is one subsisting positively. But if there were a created supposit, since it is formally negative, it would be one negatively — which is what we are speaking of here.

You will press: an individual is incommunicable to many, and yet according to Scotus (*2. dist. 3. q. 2.*) it is constituted through a positive individual difference, and is one per se positively. Therefore the same must be asserted of the created supposit — which, though incommunicable, nevertheless has its formal constitutive as positive. I grant the antecedent and deny the consequence. The reason for the difference is that it is incompatible for an individual to be divided into several subjective parts — but not so for a supposited or supposable nature to be supposited by an alien or proper supposit. For the nature supposited by the Word can be laid aside by it and supposited by a proper supposit, or by another. Hence it is not necessary that its formal constitutive be positive. But an individual is incompatible with being communicated to another — hence its formal constitutive is positive.

You will say: every negation is referred back to an affirmation (*2. Perih. 3. & 4. Met. tit. 6.*). Therefore every negative is reduced to a positive — and consequently if a supposit imports a negation, it still does not depart from a positive being. It is answered: all of this is true fundamentally, but not formally — which is now at issue.

Against this fourth objection: the pronouns "I," "you," "he," and the like signify a person — and commonly they designate not a negation but a substance; indeed they are primary substances, which no one doubts are positive beings.

Therefore person formally presents something positive. I respond: those pronouns signify the whole concrete thing composed of singular substantial nature and personality together — but if they were taken precisely for personality alone, they would signify a negative independence alone.

You will press: if Christ's humanity were to be laid aside by the Word, it would become another person from the person of the Word — since the relative "other" is a relative of diversity of substance. Therefore one cannot deny that person adds to the singular nature something positive. I say: given the hypothesis, it would be another person distinct from the person of the Word. For it would stand per se in solitude, independently from an extrinsic supposit. Hence I deny that the relative "other" always designates substance — since sometimes it designates an accident, as "the whiteness in Peter is different from that in a wall." So it is not surprising if in the given case it were to signify formally the negation of twofold dependence as described above.

You will urge: nature inclines toward its own personality — but a natural inclination is not directed toward a negative but toward a positive. Therefore person formally includes something positive. I say that just as any thing desires its natural mode — as a stone desires to be below and fire to be above — so also the individual substantial nature desires its mode of subsisting in solitude, independently of another. Just as when someone is standing, he desires to sit: this mode of existing and subsisting per se in solitude and independently of an extrinsic supposit is itself the proper supposit and personality of that nature.

Against this fifth objection from Valencia (*Tomo 4. disp. 1. quaest. 4.*): Scotus seems to explain the unknown through the equally unknown or more unknown. For the question is: in what precisely does the character of person consist? And the answer is that it consists in the negation of communicability or dependence on an extrinsic person — which negation, unless one first perceives what a person is and what such dependence on a person is, cannot be understood. Therefore Scotus wrongly thinks the formal character of person lies in the said negation. Valencia responds that he does not perceive the mind of Scotus nor attain his meaning. For Scotus himself excellently explains what a person formally is, as is sufficiently clear from what was said above. For it is not necessary to know beforehand what a person is in order to understand what that negation of twofold actual and aptitudinal dependence is — because this negation is formally person. For if rational animal is man, to know rational animal it is not necessary to first know man, because man and rational animal entirely coincide — unless one speaks of confused and indistinct cognition, which does not pertain to the matter.

You will press: the definition given by Richard cannot suit person unless it is explained ridiculously and ineptly. For if according to Scotus potential communicability is not repugnant to person — and only actual and aptitudinal communicability can be negated of person — it would be necessary that those words "incommunicable existence" be expounded in this way: that the substance of person is not incommunicable per se but only ex hypothesi and in the composite sense, if we posit that it is not actually communicated. I deny this follows from Scotus's opinion. For Scotus does not say that potential communicability belongs to person, but to nature — since person as person cannot be communicated to anything, and hence a personated nature is inassumable. Yet it is not repugnant absolutely and in the divided sense for a created personated nature to be communicated to another supposit. Valencia therefore errs when he thinks we say the same thing of nature and of its personality — since above we showed a wide and open difference between the two.

Against this sixth objection: the orthodox faith teaches us that the Word assumed humanity, but not the personality of that humanity, as Alphonsus narrates (*l. 3. adversus haereses, verb. Christus, haeresi 3.*). But if personality imports a twofold negation as Scotus teaches, it follows that the Word did not assume the said negation, and that in Christ there is no created person — because in him there is no such negation. But a negation is simply nothing. Therefore in this way the Word would not have assumed that nothing which should have been in the humanity if the Word had not hypostatically united it to himself. But this is plainly false, absurd, and unworthy to be handed down by a true theologian — since the sanctions of Councils and the doctrines of holy Fathers against sectarians defending the opposite would be vain, jocular, and ridiculous. An inept meaning indeed would be the saying of the Fathers that the Word "consumed" the created supposit — that is, consumed its negation. Likewise, that it did not assume the created supposit — that is, did not assume its negation, but removed it and prevented it. And that it did not join such a created supposit to itself, because it did not conjoin and unite its negation to itself, and the said negation did not remain in Christ. Add: the Word did not assume the human supposit, because it did not permit the humanity remaining in itself to remain united to itself. Who is so ignorant and foolish as not to see that this meaning is plainly void and entirely false? What purpose all those labors, prayers of Catholics, and definitions of Councils — to establish that the Word did not unite to itself the negation that the human supposit formally presents? For something else was intended by the Nestorians, who thought that in Christ two persons existed — namely, person constituted by an absolute entity that they posited in Christ according to both humanity and divinity, so that, just as there were two natures in him — human and divine — they suspected there were two persons in him as well — human and divine — constituted through real positive constitutive principles. Finally, not a few brand the Scotistic opinion with the

mark of falsity and error, as Arrubal reports (*disp. 4. Met. sect. 9. subsect. 2.*), conspiring and howling against Scotus like cubs against a lion, chattering like birds against an eagle, fighting like pygmies against a giant, seeing like the eyes of an owl in the light of the sun. To whom we easily respond, presupposing that the Councils and Fathers condemned and anathematized the Nestorians who asserted two persons in Christ disjunctly and separately — one human, called the Son of Man, and the other divine, called the Son of God. Hence they call the Blessed Virgin not the Mother of God but the mother of a man, and imagine Christ to be not God but a God-bearer — in whom God specially inhabits by prerogative, grace, and friendship — and hold him to be one with accidental and moral unity, not with physical and suppositional and substantial unity. Against whom Leo I contends (*in epistola ad Flavianum.*), using the testimony (*1. Ioan. 4.*): "Every spirit that dissolves Jesus is not from God, and this is the Antichrist." And the most learned Alphonsus, the keenest refuter of these and other sectarians (*l. 4. adversus haereses, verbo Christus, haeresi 3.*), adds: "Who is it that more truly dissolves Jesus than Nestorius, who separates the divine nature, positing two persons — dissolving that admirable bond of each nature in the unity of the supposit?" Hence the Council of Ephesus established that the holy Virgin "corporeally gave birth to the God-Word united to flesh, according to subsistence." The same is written by Cyril (*lib. de vera fide, ad Theodosium.*), Pope Gelasius, and others reported by the same Alphonsus. From all these it is plainly clear what the heretics wrongly held and what the Fathers and Councils aforesaid intended — namely, that Christ has two natures, human and divine, united in the unity of the person of the Word. But what person formally is, whether it presents something positive or negative, they do not touch upon — but leave it for Scholastics to dispute. Just as the orthodox faith hands down that there are three divine persons, but whether those very persons are constituted through relatives or absolutes it does not decide. Likewise philosophers commonly assert that one is a property of being, but whether it is formally positive or negative remains a matter still under judgment. With these things posited, without labor and sweat, it is plainly and fully answered to the objections cited above — which the aforesaid Recents hold in great esteem, while we consider them of small moment. Therefore I grant the major and distinguish the minor: of a negation universally and precisely taken, I grant it; but of the negation of actual and aptitudinal dependence, as described above — which is the mode of subsisting in solitude per se — I deny it. But this mode, though negative, is not nothing — just as a point is the terminus of a line, though it is the negation of further length in the opinion of many; and just as one is a property of being, though in the opinion of the Adversaries it is the negation of division from itself and from everything else. Likewise this mode is indeed negative, but is grounded in the singular substantial nature, by reason of which it is rendered independent and incommunicable to another. But Christ's humanity, which naturally should have had this mode — namely, to be independent and incommunicable to another, and to stand per se, united to no

one — was anticipated by the supposit of the Word, and united to it hypostatically. By reason of this, Christ is one with the unity of person — God and man at once — whom the Blessed Virgin bore. Hence she was the true Mother of God and of man. But Nestorius wanted her to have been only the bearer of a man, because he divided Jesus — namely standing per se in solitude, and separated from the person of the Word, and not united to it in subsistence — which the Council of Ephesus just cited sanctions the opposite of. It is therefore evident that Scotus's opinion accords with the Catholic truth and the sanctions of the Councils and the doctrine of the Fathers, and opposes the dogma of heretics who separate humanity from divinity according to the subsistence of the Word — to use the words of the Council just cited — and who suspect that that union was by grace and friendship, and not "according to subsistence," as the same Council also notes; and Aureolus adds (*3. dist. 4. art. 3.*). Hence enormous was the labor of the Council in establishing that Christ was not a pure man born of the Virgin, that he never stood per se separated from the divinity, but was always united to it in suppositional unity — "whom the holy Virgin corporeally bore," according to the definition of the Council just cited. Therefore all that the Neotericians heap up against Scotus collapses, and his doctrine remains firm and stable, ever immune from any suspicion of error — as the Sacred Congregation of Cardinals declared in the year of the Lord 1610 — for the person of the Word supplied in the assumed humanity whatever the created personality would have furnished if it had been there. For if created personality had been present, it would have stood per se independently and incommunicably to another — and it subsists in the person of the Word, incommunicable and independent in that same person. Hence the supposit of the Word is said to have "consumed" the created personality — that is, that mode of standing per se in solitude, which it would have had if it had not been assumed by the Word. Hence it is said to have been exalted and elevated to that greatest hypostatic union with the divine Word. Hence she is said to have been the true Mother of God and of man.

You will press: that union according to Scotus is an accident — as a relation grounded in the assumed humanity and terminated toward the Word. Therefore Scotus's opinion favors the aforesaid heretics who held that union to have been accidental, and it is opposed to the orthodox faith that teaches it to be substantial. I say that that union indeed formally is an accident — but is called substantial with respect to the united extremes, which are substances — just as also in physics, the union of matter and form is formally an accident, yet is called substantial because what is united through it are substances. But I treated this ex professo (*tract. de Deo incarnato, disp. 6. q. 2. & l. 2. Phys. q. 5. art. 2.*).

You will say: if the human nature is not a person because it is united to the Word, then by the same token the Word is not a person because it is united to humanity. I say that the assumed human nature is not personated by its own personality because at the very moment when it should have been personated

by its own personality, it was personated by the personality of the Word — but not so the Word when it is united to humanity, since the Word itself is a person and not a personalizable nature, as humanity was in that instant when it was to be personated by its own or another's personality. Or if the antecedent is conceded, the consequence must be denied. The reason for the difference was shown above — because a created person formally presents the negative, while a divine one presents the positive; hence it remains in the humanity united to it.

Question VI. On Accident

In the preceding question I treated substance; in the present question I propose to treat accident, the knowledge of which Aristotle in *On the Soul* I, ch. 11 urges greatly aids the knowledge of substance. I also presuppose what I have handed down on accident itself in the *Epitome*, Bk. I, Q. 3, Art. 7, and Bk. II, *Logic*, Q. 7.

Article I. What the Essence of Accident Is

This difficulty is treated by Scotus (4, d. 12, Q. [text missing]), Bassolis, and other disciples of his; the Conimbricenses (Q. 1 in the *Predicaments*, Art. 3, Cap. 4); the Complutenses (in the same place, Disp. 11, Q. ult., Dub. 3); and most recently Poncius (Disp. 13, Q. 1). For a more ready grasp of the question, the following remarks will be of immediate service.

Note 1, from Scotus cited above: accident is a concrete name, concrete with respect to a subject, and is taken in two ways. In one way, formally, that is, for accidentality, which is nothing other than the relation, adventitious from without, of the inhering thing to the subject in which it inheres — a relation from which it derives its origin, as the Seraphic Doctor observes (1, d. 8, n. 9) — or because it presupposes the thing to which it happens, as the Subtle Doctor touches upon (*Quodl.* 3, Art. 3, §. *Respondeo* 5). In the other way, materially, or for the denominated thing to which accidentality belongs; and accident thus taken is divided into absolute accident, such as quantity, and relative accident, such as paternity, of which I have treated at length elsewhere.

Note 2, from the same author (*ibid.*, and 7 *Metaph.*, Q. 1): there is a twofold inherence of accident — actual and aptitudinal. The former is that by which an accident actually inheres in a subject, as the inherence by which whiteness actually inheres in a wall; the latter is that by which an accident is apt and suited to be able to inhere in a subject — which is to say, aptitudinal inherence is the essential order or disposition of an accident toward a subject.

Note 3: for something to belong to the essence of a thing means nothing other than that it belongs to the quidditative concept of that thing and enters into its nature and essence — as animal belongs to the essence of man, and rational likewise belongs to the essence of the same man, since the whole and complete essence of man is composed, integrated, and essentially completed from both. For one thing to be really identified with another is the same as being undivided

and unseparated from it, and also inseparable by any power whatsoever, whether created or uncreated — even though not infrequently one proceeds from and follows upon another, as unity and truth are really identified with being and emanate from it as its proper attributes, even though they differ formally from it and from each other, as I wrote in Q. 2, Art. 2 of this book.

Assertion: The essence of accident is situated neither in actual inherence nor in aptitudinal inherence in a subject, but in the root and foundation of both. The assertion is threefold and is defended by the Doctor in the places already cited.

The first part is common and easy to prove. First: of accident there is demonstration and scientific knowledge, insofar as it is considered by metaphysics, as stated in Bk. I, Q. 1, Art. 1, and there is true and proper science of it; but the actual inherence of an accident is not knowable scientifically, because the accident can exist without it, and science is of necessary and inseparable things (*1 Post., Cap. 2*). Therefore the essence of accident does not consist in actual inherence in a subject.

Second: an absolute accident can by divine power exist without any subject, as faith teaches us regarding the sacramental accidents, sanctioned by the Lateran Council under Innocent III and by the Council of Trent (*Sess. 13, Can. 2*). But what exists without another and is separated from it neither includes nor is included in it as in an essence or as an essential part of it. Therefore actual inherence does not enter into the essence of accident.

One might object that at least actual inherence belongs to the essential notion of a relative accident, which can in no way exist and be separated from it. I reply that this inference is not rightly drawn, because the reason why a relative accident is inseparable from its subject is not that its essence consists in actual inherence in a subject, but because it depends entirely on the subject, that is, on the foundation and term from which it arises. Add to this that relative accidents mutually posit and mutually destroy each other; for this reason they cannot exist without actual inherence in a subject — and yet this inherence is neither their essence nor part of their essence.

The second part is argued first as follows: the capacity and aptitude of something for a thing is not the essence of that for which it is a capacity and aptitude — for instance, the aptitude and capacity for laughter is not the essence of man but his proper attribute; but aptitudinal inherence is the capacity and aptitude of an accident, by which the accident is suited and fitted to inhere and to exist in a subject. Therefore such inherence is not to be posited as the essence and nature of accident.

Third: the posterior presupposes the prior as already constituted in its essence, as is evident from an effect, which, being posterior to a cause and the cause being prior to it, presupposes and requires its cause to be already constituted in its essential and quidditative being. But aptitudinal inherence is posterior to the

absolute accident, because it emanates from it as an effect from its cause, or as a proper attribute from the nature of which it is the attribute. Therefore it is not to be constituted as that accident's essence. Moreover, a relation does not belong to the essence of what is absolute, since the absolute and the relative are distinct members of being; but aptitudinal inherence is a relation, as is clear from Note 2. Therefore it does not enter into the essence of accident.

The third part follows from the two preceding: since the essence of accident is neither actual nor aptitudinal inherence, it follows that it is the root and foundation of both aforementioned inferences. Furthermore, every relative thing is something over and above the relation, on the authority of Augustine (7 *Trin.*, 5). Therefore accident, over and above the relation of inherence which it imports toward the subject, is something, which is called accident. Again, being is equally and sufficiently divided into substance and accident, and accident abstracts from the absolute and the relative into which it is distributed. Therefore that which is thus abstracted and set apart from these is the nature and essence of accident, which earns this name; and by some it is called affection or inhabitation.

Objection 1: Aristotle (1 *Phys.*, T. 14) holds that accident is inseparable from the subject in which it inheres; therefore actual inherence in a subject must be regarded as the essence of accident. This is confirmed by St. Augustine (5. *contra Iulianum*, Cap. 9): "What is in a subject cannot exist without it." He writes the same in the *Book of the Categories*, Cap. 6, and in *On Nature and Grace against the Pelagians*, Cap. 10.

I reply that these and similar testimonies, which are adduced and can be brought forward, are to be interpreted as speaking of natural power and potency, not of supernatural power, as the Scholastics speak in (4, d. 12).

You will press further: what essentially depends on another cannot exist without it even by divine power, as is clear from a creature essentially depending on God, without whom it can in no way exist; but accident essentially depends on the subject in which it is subjected. Hence the common run of philosophers cries out that the being of accident is to be-in. Therefore neither by created nor by uncreated power can accident be separated from its subject.

I reply that the objection concludes with respect to intrinsic dependence, not extrinsic — and such is the dependence of accident on its subject, which some call the dependence of the sustained on the sustainer.

Objection 2: What is the formal constitutive principle of something belongs to its essence; but the inherence of accident is its formal constitutive principle; therefore it belongs to its essence. The major is evident, because its subject includes its predicate in the first mode of per se predication. The minor is supported by the authority of Aristotle (7 *Metaph.*, Cap. 1, T. 2) and the other philosophers who divide being into being per se, which is substance, and being

in another, which is accident. The essence of substance is its per se subsistence; therefore the essence of accident is inherence.

I concede the major and explain the minor by a distinction: being is divided into being per se and being in another as essential differences — this I deny; as distinct modes — this I concede, as I have made abundantly clear elsewhere.

You will press: just as substance is related to being per se, so accident is related to being in another; but substance is constituted in being by being per se; therefore accident is constituted in being by being in another. I concede the major; I distinguish the minor — essentially, I deny; modally, I concede — as I have just now satisfied the objection.

Objection 3: What is included in the definition of a thing belongs to its essence, because a definition is a discourse distinctly explaining the nature of a thing; but inherence enters into the definition of accident, because accident is defined as being in another, namely as inhering in a subject; therefore inherence belongs to the essence of accident. I reply that the argument holds for a quidditative definition, but not for a descriptive one, which is the kind of definition of accident cited above.

You will press: a definition given through genus and difference is essential and quidditative, as I have repeatedly insisted in the foregoing; but the definition of accident is of this kind, for being is its genus and being in another is its difference; therefore it is quidditative and essential. I concede the major and deny the minor: being is not a genus but a transcendental, and being in another is not a difference but a mode of accident; therefore it is not a quidditative and essential definition.

Article II. Whether Several Accidents Differing Only Numerically Can Exist Simultaneously in the Same Subject

Among the various and diverse senses and opinions on this difficulty recorded by recent authors, notably Fonseca (*5 Metaph., Cap. 10, Sect. 2, Q. 1*) and Suárez (*Disp. 5 Metaph., Sect. 8*), I adduce and discuss the two more important and celebrated ones. The first is that of St. Thomas (*5 Metaph., Lect. 12, and 3a Part., Q. 35, Art. 5*) and his disciples, who deny that many accidents of the same species can simultaneously exist as subjects in the same subject. The second is defended by the Subtle Doctor (*3, d. 8, Q. un.*), Richard (*ibid., Q. 2, Art. 2*), Bassolis, Lychetus, Tartaretus, Antonius Andreas (*5 Metaph., Q. 8*), and other Scotists, who affirm that several accidents differing numerically can simultaneously be subjected in the same subject; with whom the Nominalists agree, notably Gabriel (*3, d. 8, Q. un., Art. 3, Dub. 1*), and not a few recent authors, among whom are Suárez (*Disp. cit., Sect. 3*). For a more easy grasp and convenient understanding of the question:

Note 1: Some accidents are intentional — so called not because they are beings of reason, but because from objects they tend toward the cognitive power — such as sensible species in sense and intelligible species in intellect; others are real, which are subdivided into relative, such as paternity and filiation, and absolute, such as quantity and quality. They are further divided into congenital, such as natural heat and color, and acquired, such as pallor from fear and redness from shame; and into those that are created, such as grace and glory, and those that are educed from the potency of matter, such as primary and secondary qualities; and into those that come to be in an instant, such as light, and those that are produced by motion and temporal succession, such as the arts and human sciences, which are acquired by long labor and toil.

Note 2: The aforementioned authors of the second opinion do not speak universally but indefinitely, as will be evidently clear from the assertions to be submitted below. For this reason, what Suárez (*ibid.*, nn. 11–12 and following) heaps up against them is easily dissolved. First of all, he says that all accidents are educed from the potency of matter, arguing against the distinction of accidents into those that are educed from the potency of matter and those that are not, placing light in the latter member according to their view — but he is mistaken, because the said authors do not remove light from the series of accidents educed from the potency of matter; they only say that light is a real accident and simultaneously intentional, as I said in (*Bk. IV, On the Soul, Q. 5, Art. 2*). Furthermore, that some accidents — for instance, grace — are not educed from the potency of matter, Scotus and his disciples hand down (2, d. 34, §. *Istae quaestiones. A, and 4, d. 1, Q. 1, Q. Ideo dici potest*). And that light is intensified not only by the addition of new light but is also multiplied, I shall show below in a specific assertion. Moreover, what the said Suárez adds in the same place against the distinction of accidents that come to be through motion or through an instant — since that distinction is true and admitted by all, and is not given for the purpose of producing numerical multiplication of accidents, as Suárez seems to presuppose, but for showing which accidents can simultaneously be multiplied numerically in the same subject and which cannot — he does not show the individual cause of those accidents as Suárez himself objects in the same place, because since it is universal and based on extrinsic features, it does not denote their principle of individuation. And what he adds about the distinction of accidents into absolute and relative — that not all relative accidents can simultaneously be multiplied in the same subject, as he exemplifies by the relation of the creation of one creature, which is non-multipliable in the same creature; and that not all absolute accidents generated in succession can be either — this does not harm us, who do not intend or maintain a universal canon and certain rule about all and singular accidents, as I indicated at the beginning of this Note, as Suárez himself also senses (n. 14). Moreover, note that this dispute does not concern proper and reciprocal accidents along with their subjects — such as their proper attributes and

properties — but common accidents, which are separable from the subjects in which they inhere.

First Assertion: Many intentional accidents differing numerically can simultaneously exist in the same subject. The Doctor maintains this in the cited place. It is proved first: in the same medium and the same eye there exist several sensible species of objects differing only numerically; similarly, in the same intellect there reside several intelligible species of objects differing only numerically, as of Peter, Paul, and the other individuals of human nature. But such species are intentional accidents participating in numerical difference; therefore such accidents can simultaneously inhere in the same subject. The minor is evident; the major is at hand, since wherever the eye exists, it can see those numerically distinct objects presented there, with no obstacle intervening either on its own part or on the part of the medium — for a natural cause duly disposed and unimpeded, having all the requisites for acting, necessarily passes into act and produces the effect which it is by nature capable of producing, such as the eye existing in an illuminated medium with no opaque obstruction, possessing the species of many visibles differing only numerically and the other things necessary for acting and seeing. And what I say about the eye must equally be affirmed of the imagination, the intellect, and the other powers acting intentionally, which receive not only such intentional species but also several acts and operations of the several objects presented through them. Hence, when several bells are rung and musical instruments played simultaneously, several sounds are produced at once, which appear undoubtedly to differ numerically and to be numerically different accidents.

One might object that the aforesaid species are subjected in distinct parts of the organ, not simultaneously in the same part or whole organ of sight or imagination, and therefore it does not follow that those species inhere simultaneously in the same organ and subject. Against this: not to mention that this reply has no place with intelligible species, which simultaneously reside in the same intellect devoid of parts, the parts of the visual organ are very small and minute, so that they individually and separately cannot receive the almost infinite visual species of the same species and kind — especially since through the narrowest aperture the eye sees an almost infinite number of visibles of the same species, such as innumerable white things or black things, of which it would not be capable if their species were not simultaneously in the same organ of sight. For how would such tiny parts of the medium and organ be able to contain so many species separately and in isolation? Hence some, perceiving the weakness and vanity of this reply, try to answer differently and to distinguish these species into natural being and sensible being, conceding in the first mode that they are of the same species, but denying this in the second. But this later reply is no less futile and feeble than the first. For apart from the fact that sensible being is also natural being — though the former is more manifest than the latter, because natural is adapted to both the sensible and the insensible —

two white things of equal magnitude and intensity have no other difference between them than numerical difference, both in natural being and in sensible being. Therefore this second reply is equally empty. Hence they have recourse to a third reply concerning the intensification of these species, which will be more conveniently adduced and more easily refuted in the first part of the last assertion.

Second: in whatever essential order, the unity of the prior is compatible with the multiplicity of the posterior, provided the posterior does not belong per se and adequately to the prior; but the subject is prior to any accident; therefore in one subject there can simultaneously inhere several numerically different accidents. The major is evident: one cause can have several effects, as one God has several creatures, one sun several rays, one intellect several acts of understanding, one tree several fruits, and one body several places. The minor is also clear, because a cause is prior to its effect, and the subject is at least the material cause of accidents; therefore it is prior to accidents.

One might object that the major is not universally true, especially when the prior is placed in the definition of the posterior, as happens in our case, because the subject enters into the definition of accident; and when the posterior is equal to and belongs per se to the prior — thus in the divine persons there cannot be several productions of the same kind, such as several filiations and several sons, nor several processions and several Holy Spirits; and one body cannot simultaneously occupy several places, precisely because place is equal to the body existing in it.

Against this: in the aforesaid major, the qualifications per se and adequately are aptly placed — two conditions limiting it — and when these are removed, the said proposition is true, and the objections cease. For one accident is not equal to the subject in which it inheres, since several can be subjected in it; nor does it belong to it per se in the first or second mode of per se predication; and if the subject is placed in its definition, it is placed only by way of addition, as I have abundantly explained elsewhere. All the more so because the foundation of the adversaries is ruinous, since they think accidents are individuated by their subjects — whereas above, in Q. 3, Art. 3 of this book, I showed that each nature, whether substantial or accidental, is individuated by its own individual difference or haecceity.

Second Assertion: Relative accidents differing numerically, whether congenital or acquired, can simultaneously be multiplied without contradiction in the same subject. The assertion is two-membered, and is patronized by Scotus cited above, and in (2, d. 2, Q. 7, §. *Et ideo. Sub cap.*, and 5 *Metaph.*, Q. 7).

The first part is argued first: absolute accidents can simultaneously inhere in the same subject, as I proved in the second assertion and will be shown in the next assertion. Therefore relative accidents as well — the consequence holds because

relatives are of lesser entity than absolutes; therefore if these are simultaneously compatible in the same subject, so likewise are those. Second: simultaneously existing extrinsic relative accidents can enjoy existence in the same subject — as the same piece of wood can be heated by several heatings, and the same body can be located by several locations; but heatings and locations, from what has been said elsewhere, are relations adventitious from without. Therefore if these can simultaneously be multiplied in the same subject, so likewise can those called intrinsically adventitious, since the same principle appears to hold in both. Here belong the arguments I adduced in (*Logic, Bk. III, Q. 6, Art. 7*) — the objections, counter-arguments, and replies of the adversaries, which, lest I do again what has been done, are to be seen and reviewed there.

The second part is proved first: experience is a collection of many certain and evident cognitions of singular things differing numerically, of objects singularly distinct — as cognitions about this and that rhubarb which cures bile, as Aristotle hands down (*1 Metaph., Cap. 1*). But such cognitions are singular accidents differing numerically, acquired by labor, about objects numerically distinct; therefore several numerically different accidents simultaneously in the same subject are not impossible. Second: several numerically different graces can be simultaneously infused into the same rational soul; but such graces are numerically distinct accidents not educed from the potency of matter; therefore it is not incompatible for the aforesaid accidents to share simultaneously the same numerical subject.

One might object that all accidents are educed from the potency of matter, because creation is adapted to a self-subsisting thing, which is substance alone; therefore the division of accidents into those that are educed from the potency of matter and those that are not is irrelevant. The antecedent is denied: many things are produced which are in no way educed from the potency of matter, such as physical composites, which are properly said to be generated, and their accidents which arise from them; likewise the acts of intellect and will, which are produced by them but are not educed from the potency of matter. Therefore the division of accidents into those that are educed and those that are not educed from the potency of matter stands firm.

Third Assertion: Most accidents that are produced in an instant in the same subject can simultaneously exist, but not those produced successively and through motion. Scotus in the place cited above defends both parts.

The first part is argued: homogeneous things are simultaneously united in the same place and are mutually compatible, as is clear from fire, water, and similar things — fire does not repel fire, nor water water; they are simultaneously joined and strengthened together. But most accidents produced in an instant are homogeneous, such as lights; therefore they share a simultaneous place and subject.

Suárez (*cit.*, n. 11) and Fonseca (*ibid.*), following Cajetan and other Thomists cited by recent authors, reply that lights joined together are not multiplied but only intensified, and when one of them is removed or extinguished, that intensified light is diminished. Against this: several lights separated from one another are numerically distinct; therefore also when united and joined together. The antecedent is evident and denied by no one I have seen. The consequence is proved: while they are joined, they do not perish but are intensified, and the intensification, which is posterior to their singularities, does not destroy their numerical differences — indeed, it conserves and strengthens their powers, because they illuminate and clarify the medium in which they exist more greatly; therefore they are numerically distinct. This can be confirmed from water and other homogeneous things, whose union does not remove their individual distinctness. Hence when they are separated from one another they remain distinct as they were before the union — which is an open indication that they retain their individual differences both when disjoined and when conjoined, differences which differ only formally from their essence. Especially since union and intensification are not given to destroy but to perfect; a cause must be assigned for the destruction of their individual differences and for the production of only one difference of the intensified quality newly produced — and since none can be assigned, it follows that all those that previously existed when the aforesaid lights were disjoined and separated from one another remain.

One might object that those many things coalesce into one and are one and not many numerically distinct things. Against this: even though from them one thing is made in the unity of homogeneity, yet one thing is not made in the unity of composition; nor does a change happen to them, but only a union and intensification which presupposes and requires the prior and pre-existing degrees — and thus they do not lose their numerical differences. Furthermore, matter and form, which are simultaneously united to make up a composite, retain in the composite itself their essential and numerical being; therefore likewise lights, which are simultaneously connected to make one more intensified and more perfect homogeneous thing, conserve their essential and individual being.

Second: existence belongs to singulars; but most numerically distinct accidents exist separately in isolation; therefore also when conjoined. Hence if at night two lit candles are placed in a hall, one on each side of the same hall, and someone walks through the middle of that very hall, two shadows of the walker will appear, corresponding to the duality of the light — but shadows are secondary lights and darkness is the privation of both lights, both primary and secondary; therefore those lights simultaneously joined retain their numerical differences, as those two shadows indicate. And if one of the said candles is extinguished, only one shadow will remain; therefore it is plainly established that two lights, when joined, are numerically multiple.

One might object that there is one light in the unity of the subject and medium, but two effectively — in the duality of lights producing one more intensified and more perfect light. Against this: two agents produce two effects, which are the terms of their actions; but two lit candles are two total efficient causes of two lights through their illuminations, as is clear if the light of one passes through an aperture of one wall and the light of the other passes through an aperture of another wall — for then they are distinct lights; and if both pass through the same aperture, there are indeed two lights simultaneously joined in the same aperture and subject. Furthermore, the two shadows seen from an interposed opaque body are two secondary lights proceeding only from two primary lights; therefore just as the shadows are numerically multiplied, so likewise the lights. Moreover, from those lights geometric rays are emitted, as well as perspectival and visual ones — otherwise *Perspectiva* would collapse regarding the intersection of rays, which John Peckham composed excellently and concisely, as Mauro attests (*5 Metaph.*, Q. 7), and which all admit as a true science subalternate to geometry. Furthermore, if two lights simultaneously united were only one numerically intensified light, they would undoubtedly cause only one species of themselves — but if they are diminished and reduced, no species of them would be had, because it is a diminished and unintensified quality; but species represents the thing as it is, since it is its natural likeness; therefore if there will be a species of the intensified quality, there will be no species of the diminished quality, and accordingly the diminished light would not be perceived by us — which is plainly false and absurd.

Third: if two whitenesses were inhering in two walls and God were to destroy the two walls while the two whitenesses remained in their being, those whitenesses would still differ numerically just as before when they were inhering in the said walls; similarly, if God were to destroy the two lit candles while their lights remained, then those would be two numerically distinct lights; therefore also those lights differ numerically when they share the same medium and the same subject.

One might object that, granted the hypothesis, if two whitenesses and lights exist separated from one another, they are indeed numerically distinct; but if they are simultaneously joined, they coalesce into one numerically intensified quality. Against this: God can supply the causality of any cause, especially an efficient cause, and can impede it if He wills, since all things are subject to His will; therefore He can suspend the action and causality of the two lights so that they are not intensified, because intensification pertains to the genus of efficient cause — and thus there would be two numerically distinct lights without intensification; that this is not impossible, among others Ockham (*1, d. 17, Q. 7*) and Gregory (*ibid.*, Q. 5) judge.

One might object that it belongs to the intrinsic notion of a gradual quality to be intensified, and therefore it cannot be brought about that two lights

simultaneously united are not intensified. Against this: intensification is a property of quality — not in the fourth mode, as I said in the question on quality — and it can be suspended so as not to pass into effect, just as fire can be prevented from burning and heating; therefore God can likewise bring it about that the intensification of two lights simultaneously united does not occur.

The second part is shown first: an accident that is induced in a subject through motion must expel the accident preceding it in the same subject, because from (5 *Phys.*, T. 19) motion occurs between contraries, which alternately expel each other from the same subject; therefore two numerically different accidents enjoying simultaneous existence and inhering in the same subject cannot occur. Second: the generation of one is the corruption of the other (1 *On Generation*, Cap. 4, T. 18) — which axiom I said in that place is to be understood not only of substances but also of accidents; therefore if one accident is produced through motion, the pre-existing accident must consequently be corrupted; otherwise the new one cannot be induced in the same subject, and thus accidents of this kind cannot simultaneously coexist and cohabit in the same subject. Third: an agent acts so as to introduce a new form, of which the subject is deprived, into a well-prepared and rightly disposed subject; hence, when the intended form is achieved, it acts no more. Hence comes that saying: *When the term is acquired, motion ceases*. And that other (5 *Phys.*, T. 26): *The terms of motion are impossible*. But if one accident of the same kind and species already precedes and pre-exists in the subject, the capacity of that subject to receive another accident of the same species no longer exists — just as matter informed by one form cannot simultaneously receive another form of the same species; and therefore in the same subject numerically distinct accidents are not simultaneously multiplied if produced through motion.

Objection 1: Aristotle (5 *Metaph.*, Cap. 10, T. 16) — the text said to be without commentary — writes in explicit terms that several numerically different accidents cannot in any way simultaneously inhere in the same subject; therefore the opposite view clashes with the Peripatetic school. I reply that Aristotle's testimony is to be interpreted as speaking of accidents produced through motion, as I was just asserting in the second part of the last assertion — not however of the other accidents, of which I treated in the first part of the same assertion and in the preceding ones.

Objection 2: Contraries in a diminished state are simultaneously compatible in the same subject, as is evident in lukewarm water, in which heat and coldness exist together; but contraries are properly accidents in the genus of quality; therefore it must not be denied that several accidents differing only numerically enjoy simultaneous existence in the same subject. It can be said that contraries are accidents of distinct species even though they participate in the same genus; but the present dispute is about accidents of the same species, yet differing numerically. Or it can be said that this occurs violently, not naturally, for the

reason that one element does not predominate over another; and hence their qualities remain in a refracted and diminished state, as I showed in (*On the Elements*, Q. 3, Art. 5).

You ask whether one numerical accident can be in several subjects. Scotus replies (4, d. 1, Q. 2, §. *De secundo principali*. C. and H., and d. 4, Q. 2, §. *Respondeo*. Sub B. and E.) that there is no contradiction implied — just as there is nothing incompatible about one body being simultaneously in many places, as I showed at length in (*Bk. VI, Phys.*, Q. 2, Art. 4).

Book III. On Angels

Since substance is rightly and adequately divided into corporeal and incorporeal, as is seen in the tree of Porphyry described by me in the *Epitome*, Bk. I, Q. 3, Art. 4, and since I have treated corporeal substance at length in the *Physics*, I shall now briefly add a few things about incorporeal substance as they pertain to the philosopher, leaving the remaining and more numerous matters to be examined by theologians.

Question: On the Nature of Angels (Single Question)

Article I. Whether Angels Exist and What an Angel Is

Those whom the Scholastic Doctors call angels in (2, d. 2–3 and following), the philosophers call intelligences, abstract and separate substances, as can be seen in Aristotle (12 *Metaph.*), Scotus, Antonius Andreas, Alexander of Hales, and others in the same place. The word *angel* is Greek; in Latin it means *messenger*, as St. Augustine observes (2 *Trin.*, 13); hence the same saint in his exposition of Psalm 103 adds: "Angel is the name of his office, not of his nature. Do you ask his nature? He is a spirit. Do you ask his office? He is an angel." St. Gregory writes the same in the *Moralia*, cited by Berchorius in the first part of his *Repertorium*, s.v. *Angel*. And it is indicated in (*Hebr. 1*): *They are all ministering spirits, sent to serve*.

First Assertion: Angels exist. This is presupposed by the Doctor in both works (2, d. 2, and 12 *Metaph.*, in the commentary, toward the end). It is proved first from sacred Scripture: Psalm 90: *He has commanded his angels concerning you, to guard you in all your ways*. Daniel 3: *Bless the Lord, all you angels of the Lord*. And Matthew 18: *Their angels always see the face of my Father*. Second, from the Lateran Council in the profession of faith, where it is decreed that God at the beginning of the world created both natures, the worldly and the spiritual, the angelic and the human. Third, from the Fathers — Dionysius (*On the Divine Names*, Cap. 6), Augustine (*Serm. 19 de tempore*), Damascus (2 *fidei*, Cap. 1), Bernard (*in his commentary on Psalm 90*), and Hilary (*on Matthew 18*) — who openly demonstrate and proclaim the existence of angels. The Theological Doctors subscribe to this with the Master (2, d. 2). The philosophers are favorable: Aristotle (8 *Phys.* and 12

Metaph.), Averroes (*ibid.*), Avicenna (9 *Metaph.*, *Cap.* 4), Plato, and the other Academics. Nor are there lacking reasons and congruences urging and confirming this. For substance, taken generically, is divided into material, under which corporeal and physical substances are contained, and immaterial, under which are comprehended substances devoid of matter, such as angels, as I noted immediately at the beginning of this book. Furthermore, the world is perfect, since it is the work of God whose every work is perfect; but if it lacked angels, it would not be perfect, because it would lack the most excellent and noble of all creatures. Add to this: a monarch has ministers and servants assisting and serving him in all things throughout his realm; but God is the supreme monarch of the universe, since He is the King of kings and Lord of lords; therefore He has ministers and servants ministering and serving Him, such as angels are, according to that of Daniel 7: *A thousand thousands attended him, and ten thousand times ten thousand ministered to him.* Moreover, the Magi perform wonders through demons, and demons are angels, though evil; therefore angels are not to be denied. Hence St. Augustine in (*Psalm 123*) subscribes: "We know from faith that angels exist; we read and hold that many have appeared; and it is not lawful for us to doubt this." They are divided into three hierarchies and nine orders, enumerated by me in the *Epitome*, Bk. I, Q. 4, Art. 5; likewise into good and evil, of which a definite number is not known to us, and their nature and attributes are barely manifest to us, except through common reasoning and general and transcendental predicates.

Second Assertion: An angel is a created, spiritual, and complete substance. This is deduced from the Doctor in the cited place and Quodl. 7, and is expressly handed down by Gadius in that place. The individual parts of the definition are explained. It is called *substance* to distinguish it from accident. *Created* is added on account of God, who is an uncreated substance. *Spiritual* is added to distinguish it from corporeal and material substance. *Complete* is appended to distinguish it from the rational soul, which is incomplete and the form of a body. The assertion, thus explained, is easy to prove, since this definition distinctly explains the nature of an angel, is composed of genus and difference, contains nothing superfluous or deficient, and therefore is to be received and retained — with which Gabriel agrees (2, d. 3, Q. 1).

Objection 1: St. Dionysius, cited just above, in defining an angel says: "An angel is the image of God, the manifestation of hidden light, a pure, splendid, and immaculate and uncontaminated mirror, receiving, if it is right to say so, the whole beauty of the well-formed divine likeness." And Damascus (*ibid.*) adds: "An angel is a certain spiritual, rational, and intellectual substance, ever mobile, of free choice, incorporeal, ministering to God, obtaining immortality by grace, not by nature." Therefore one or both of these definitions of angel should be taught, strengthened by the testimony of these saints, and not the one assigned above, which is supported by the authority of no saint or approved Doctor.

I reply that St. Dionysius has rather offered a similar and metaphorical description of an angel than an essential and quidditative one, as is clear from its parts excellently expounded by Alexander of Hales (*2 Part., Q. 20, Art. 2*) and by St. Bonaventure (*2, d. 9, Expositio lit., n. 3*). Especially since it is not adequate, since it fits only the good angel and not the evil and reprobate one — for a wicked angel is not an immaculate and uncontaminated mirror, which is explicitly placed in the cited description, in which the holy Father strives to describe only the good angel. The definition of Damascus is likewise descriptive, not quidditative, since it is given through the power and proper attributes of an angel, and makes the angel perhaps mortal by nature — whereas that angels are by their own nature immortal will be shown and explained in the good sense below.

Objection 2: A right and genuine definition is composed of genus and difference, as no one denies; but in the definition of the angel received by us, several genera and differences are placed, as is apparent to anyone running through its individual parts; therefore the aforesaid definition of the angel is not sound and legitimate. I concede the major; to the minor I say: when the nature of something is not fully and completely known to us, as in the present case, we employ several genera and differences to define and declare it as best we can, as we did in the proposed and explained definition of the angel. This is clear also in Aristotle (*1 Perihermeneias, Cap. 2*) in the definition of a noun, and (*ibid., Cap. 3*) in the definition of a verb.

Article II. Whether Angels Are Incorporeal

Philosophers and theologians, both ancient and modern, are not in agreement on this article. Some, such as Plato and his followers, to whom St. Augustine seems to adhere (*On the Marvels of Sacred Scripture*) and (*8 City of God, Cap. 15, and 15 of the same work, Cap. 23*), and which Cavellius does not consider improbable in his commentary (*Q. 15 On the Soul*), think that angels are corporeal. Apuleius, as Vives reports in his commentary (*8 City of God, Cap. 15*), explains that their bodies are intermediate between earthy and airy, much less dense than a cloud formed from the purest air; or, as others say, their bodies are very subtle and tenuous. The common view, however, is that of the others — Scotus (*Quodl. 9, and 4, d. 1, Q. 1*), Major (*2, d. 8, Q. un.*), Fabre (*Disp. 9*), Molina (*1 Part., Q. 50, Art. 1*), and Suárez (*Disp. 35 Metaph., Sect. 3, n. 10*) — affirming that angels are incorporeal; preceded by Dionysius (*On the Divine Names, Cap. 4*), Nyssenius (*1 On Prayer*), Chrysostom (*Hom. 22 in Genesis*), Gregory (*4 Dial., Cap. 29*), Bonaventure (*2, d. 8, Q. 1*), and many others cited by more recent authors.

Note: Some holy Doctors and Fathers held the negative part of this difficulty — that is, that angels are not incorporeal and thought them to be corporeal — among whom are cited Tertullian (*1 On the Flesh of Christ*), Lactantius (*2 Institutiones, Cap. 15*), Eusebius (*5 On the Preparation of the Gospel, Cap. 4*), Origen (*1 On First Principles, Cap. 6*), and not a few others, with whom Augustine agrees,

both in the places mentioned above and also in (*3 Trin., Cap. 1, and on Psalms 85 and 145*). This is not surprising, because at that time the Platonic sect holding this view was in its greatest vigor, to which the aforesaid Fathers, and especially Augustine, were favorably disposed; nor was there any sanction and definition of the holy Church that compelled them to affirm the contrary, nor does any evident and demonstrative reason seem yet to have been adduced and found that establishes the opposite, even though some brand with the mark of error and rashness those who hold the opposing opinion. Hence on the proposed question it pleases me to cite Augustine, who in (*Tom. 4, 1, 83 Questions, Q. 3*) says he wishes to hear the Doctors, and adds that he is ready to think otherwise and correct what he had said. "Nor ought we to be unteachable teachers; and certainly it is better for a perverse man to be corrected than for a hard one to be broken; in order that through those things which we have written, our own weakness or that of others may be exercised or educated, yet in a way that no canonical authority, so to speak, be established in them." Then he adds there, and at the end of that book: "I love to learn more than to teach." Wherefore, following in the footsteps of Augustine, I do not wish to censure the views of others, but to embrace what is common and consonant with sacred letters and councils.

Assertion: Angels are incorporeal. This is handed down by the Doctor (*ibid., and 2, d. 2, Q. 8, §. In ista q. ante A., and d. 3, Q. 7, §. Qui dicunt. sub F.*). It is proved first from sacred Scripture: Psalm 103: *Who makes his angels spirits*. But a spirit is devoid of body, according to Luke 24: *A spirit has neither flesh nor bones*. Therefore angels are incorporeal. The same is deduced from Tobit 12, where the angel Raphael says: *I use another invisible food and drink, which cannot be seen by men*. Since an angel lacks a body, as Lyran comments, it is not nourished by visible food and drink, as living bodies are nourished. Hence the angel had prefaced this by saying: *When I was with you, by the will of God I seemed to eat and drink with you* — as if saying: truly I did not eat or drink, because true eating and drinking is the conversion into the substance of the one nourished, which cannot be effected by an angel, but only a passing through and local movement of the food and drink by an angel in an assumed body. Hence in the passage of Luke cited above, Christ the Lord after His resurrection showed that He was a true man, as He had been before, through true eating, when He said to His disciples: *Do you have anything here to eat?*

Second, from the Lateran Council (*Cap. Firmiter de summa Trin. et fide Catholica*): "There is one universal principle, creator of all things invisible and visible, spiritual and corporeal, who by His almighty power simultaneously from the beginning of time created from nothing both creatures, the spiritual and the corporeal — that is, the angelic and the worldly — and then the human, as if constituted in common from spirit and body." From these words it is plainly clear that an angel is incorporeal, because it is contradistinguished from the corporeal. Creature is divided into incorporeal, such as the angel, and corporeal,

such as the heavens and whatever is contained under them, apart from man, who is composed of spirit or soul and body. Since, therefore, every creature is corporeal, or incorporeal, or composed of spirit and body, and an angel is a creature that is not corporeal, nor composed of body and spirit, but incorporeal, spiritual, and immaterial, it is undoubtedly concluded that the aforesaid Council supports the proposed assertion and that it is to be held and embraced by all the Orthodox.

Third, from Aristotle (*12 Metaph., Cap. 5, T. 49 and following*), affirming that the intelligences — which are angels — are substances separated and disjoined from matter; and those that abstract and are segregated from matter are spiritual and incorporeal. And (*8 Phys., T. 78*): intelligences lack magnitude, because they move for infinite time; therefore in the Peripatetic school, angels are incorporeal and spiritual.

Fourth: corporeal things cannot simultaneously exist in the same place, as is clear from (*Bk. VI, Phys., Q. 2, Art. 2*); but several angels can simultaneously occupy the same place, as narrated in (*Luke 8*), where a legion of demons was in one possessed man and demoniac. A legion, according to Vegetius, comprises six thousand six hundred and sixty-six. Therefore angels, among whose number are demons, are incorporeal.

Fifth: what is contained under one species is not comprehended under another, since diverse species are constituted through diverse differences; but angels are placed under the species of incorporeal substance, as is clear in the tree of Porphyry, expounded and delineated by me at length in the *Epitome*, Bk. I, Q. 4, Art. 5, as the Lateran Council whose words I cited above plainly shows, and as their definition cited and declared in the preceding article, Assertion 2, manifests.

Objection 1: Sometimes angels appeared clothed in corporeal garments, as in Tobit 12, Luke 16, and Revelation 22; therefore angels are corporeal, since clothing indicates one who is thus clothed. I reply that the appearances of angels were performed in bodies assumed by them and assisted by them — not however as the angels informing those bodies, since they cannot be acts of bodies and informing forms, as Scotus excellently shows (*Quodl. 9*). Thus angels can assume bodies and appear in them, and can even form and compose bodies, because they know well how to apply active things to passive; and in them they perform wonderful works. Hence Scotus reports (*2 Rep., d. 8, Q. un.*) about a certain king who was borne by a demon for a year and was believed by the people to be alive.

Further objection: Angels walk, speak, and perform other actions that can only be effected by corporeal beings; therefore angels are not immune from body. I say that these actions are performed by angels not because they inform bodies but because they move such bodies, as a charioteer moves a chariot and a sailor

moves a ship. Thus the angels themselves, by moving the tongue of the assumed bodies, appear to speak, and by moving the feet, to walk.

You will press: Demons, who are angels though reprobate, delight in the odors and smells of sacrifices and in venereal things — but these and similar things cannot be performed except by corporeal beings; therefore angels are corporeal. I say that the major is true objectively and not formally — just as fire tortures them objectively and detentively, as the Doctor hands down (4, d. 44, Q. 2).

Objection 2: The Church depicts angels in the likeness of boys and adolescents; therefore they have proper bodies, otherwise the Church would deceive us by representing a thing other than it is. I reply that this is done by the Church for our comprehension, because we do not grasp spiritual things except in the manner of corporeal and material things, since our cognition is bound to the bodily senses. Hence God the Father is depicted in the form of an old man, God the Son in the form of a youth, and the Holy Spirit in the form of a dove. But there is no deception, because according to the truth of the matter we are taught that angels are spiritual and incorporeal.

Further objection: At the Council of Nicaea, in the fifth session, the book of John, Bishop of Thessalonica, was read and received, asserting that angels ought to be depicted because they are corporeal, to which the holy Synod gave its assent; therefore according to the truth and orthodox faith, angels are corporeal. I say that indeed in the aforesaid Council it was decreed that angels should be painted, which was its intent — but it was not defined that they are corporeal, because that reason was offered by the aforementioned Bishop, whose was that book; and since he was a Platonist, he thought angels to be corporeal, which view was not rejected by that Council because it was not treating this *ex professo*. I add that at that time many Fathers and distinguished Doctors affirmed the same thing — namely, that angels are intermingled with bodies — whom the holy Synod did not wish to condemn, as Miranda and Joverius suggest in their summaries of councils, whatever Molina may say in the cited place.

Objection 3: In Genesis 6, where the Vulgate has: *Seeing that the sons of God, that the daughters of men were beautiful, they took wives for themselves*, the Septuagint translators render it: *Seeing that the angels of God saw the daughters of men*. And a little later, in the Vulgate it reads: *After the sons of God went into the daughters of men and they bore children*. But in the version of the Seventy it reads: *After the angels of God went in to the daughters of men*. Therefore, since angels contracted marriage with those women and begot sons by them, it is plainly inferred that angels are corporeal.

One must respond that by "sons of God" in that place the sons of Seth are understood — who, being just, were called angels of God — since it is customary in Scripture to call holy and just men angels, as in Malachi 3 and other places.

So explains Lyran, following Chrysostom (*Hom. 22 in 6 Genesis*), Augustine (*15 City, Cap. 23, and Bk. I, On the Literal Meaning of Genesis, Q. 3*).

You will press: in John 8, Christ says to the Pharisees: *You are of your father the devil, and you want to carry out your father's desires*; therefore if the devil, who is an angel, begot sons, as Christ the Lord testifies, the same must not be denied of the other angels. I say that the wicked are called sons of the devil not by creation or generation but by imitation — so explains Lyran there, and before him Augustine (*Serm. 51 de tempore, and Serm. 86*), and in his tract on the Epistle of John he adds: "The devil created no one and begot no one, but his imitators are born, as it were, from him." But if any generation occurs through an incubus or succubus, the one born through it is not the son of the devil but of that man from whom the seed was drawn.

Objection 4: St. Augustine (*1 Retract., Cap. 11*) recanted in these words: "By the name of holy angels I would now call every holy spiritual creature constituted in the hidden and secret ministry of God." Therefore he is no longer to be cited for the opposing view. It can be said that in the cited words there is no word of explicit retraction of what he had previously handed down. Especially because there are those who understand by "spiritual creature" an invisible, tenuous, and subtle substance, as can be seen in Bernard (*Sermon on the Canticle*), Eugubinus (*on Psalm 103*), and many others. Hence Louis Vives (*15 City, Cap. 23*) adds that it is beyond doubt, in Augustine's view, that angels are corporeal — although perhaps he sometimes hesitated and did not adhere to it as strenuously as others did.

Article III. Whether Angels Are Composite

The Scholastics are divided into three positions: some, like Durandus (*2, d. 3, Q. 1, n. 15*), make angels immune from all composition. Others think that angels are composed of matter and form — some of whom, like Avicembron (*On the Fountain of Life*), think that matter to be of the same kind and species as the matter of sublunary things, while others, such as St. Bonaventure (*2, d. 3, Q. 1, prima pars*), Richard (*ibid., d., Art. 2, Q. 1*), Auriol (*Art. 3*), and Alexander of Hales (*2 Part., Q. 29, m. 2*), think it to be of a diverse kind and species. Still others, such as Scotus (*Quodl. 9, Art. 2*), Lychetus, Tartaretus, Gadius in that place, Fabre (*2, Disp. 10*), St. Thomas (*1 Part., Q. 50, Art. 2*), Molina (*ibid.*), and Suárez (*Disp. 35 Metaph., Sect. 3, n. 33*) commonly teach that angels are composed of genus and difference.

Note: There is a twofold composition — one from thing and thing, that is, from matter and form, which is commonly called physical composition; another from reality and reality, that is, from genus and difference, which is called metaphysical composition — as can be seen in Scotus (*2, d. 3, Q. 6, K., §. Ad quaestionem ergo*).

Assertion: Angels are composite — not indeed by physical composition, but by metaphysical. The assertion is three-membered and is deduced from Scotus

(*ibid.*, and 1, d. 8, Q. 2, §. *Alia est opinio*, and *ibid.* in the *Report.*, Q. 5, §. *contra illam viam*).

The first part is against Durandus cited above, who removes metaphysical composition from angels and all accidents, and is proved: the predicaments are a series of genera, species, and individuals, as is clear from Logic; but angels are in the predicament of substance, under which they are placed as its species; but a species is composed of genus and difference, as is shown there; therefore angels are composite. Furthermore, the reason Durandus removes composition from angels is that they are simple, like accidents; but accidents, though simple, are nonetheless composite by metaphysical composition consisting of genus and difference, since there are nine predicaments of accidents, in which various genera, species, and individuals are assigned; therefore, even though angels are simple, they are not for this reason to be exempted from all composition.

The second part remains proved in the preceding article, where I showed that angels are incorporeal and immaterial; but everything corporeal consists of matter and form, and everything incorporeal is free from matter and form. Therefore, since angels are incorporeal and spiritual, they are devoid of physical composition, which consists of matter and form.

The third part is argued first: what resides under the species of categorical substance is composite by metaphysical composition, because the predicament of substance is a series of substantial genera and species; but angels are placed in the predicament of substance, as I showed in (*Logic, Bk. III, Q. 4, Art. 4*); therefore they are composed by metaphysical composition, which consists of genus and difference. Second: what is created, finite, and non-transcendent is constituted by genus and difference — for in this God is distinguished from created things, because since God is the most actual being, He is not constituted of potency and act, whether physical or metaphysical; but angels are created, finite, and non-transcendent beings, as is clear; therefore they are composed by metaphysical composition, which consists of genus and difference.

Objection 1, against the first part: simple and composite are opposed to each other, as is clear from the terms; but angels are simple and pure acts, as their description cited in the first article of this question indicates; therefore they partake of no composition. I concede the major; I distinguish the minor: angels are simple — with the simplicity opposed to physical composition, I concede; with the simplicity opposed to metaphysical composition, I deny. For in this way only God is simple, alien from all composition whether physical or metaphysical; and every creature is said to be composite — by physical composition, like natural composites, or by metaphysical composition, like an angel.

Objection 2, against the second part: to whatever the definition of physical matter fits, physical matter belongs, because the definition declares the nature of

what is defined; but the definition of physical matter fits an angel, which is the receptive subject of accidents, since an angel receives material accidents because it is capable of local motion and similar accidents, as well as spiritual accidents because it is possessed of love, hatred, grace, and the like; therefore an angel has physical matter and accordingly is composed by physical composition, which consists of matter and form. I concede the major and deny the minor, because the immediate and proximate subject of material accidents is not matter but the substantial composite, as I proved in (*Bk. V, Phys., Q. 1, Art. 4*). Even though an angel is capable of the aforesaid accidents, it does not therefore consist of physical matter and form, because although receptivity is a property of matter, it is not receptivity of accidental forms but of substantial ones; and if this is perhaps attributed to matter, this is done only in a similar and improper sense. And this is all that the authorities and arguments adduced by the authors of the second view prove, as is sufficiently clear to anyone attentively considering and reading them in the Seraphic Doctor, Richard, and Auriol just cited, as Molina protests in the cited place.

Objection 3, against the third part: corruptible and incorruptible differ by more than genus (*10 Metaph.*); but sublunary and corruptible substances are placed in the genus of substance; therefore angels, who are incorruptible substances, do not reside in the same genus and predicament of substance, and accordingly do not consist of genus and difference such as things composed by metaphysical composition. I reply by expounding the philosopher's maxim with Scotus in that place — that it speaks of physical genus, not of metaphysical genus, of which we are now disputing, and in which both material and spiritual substances agree, as I taught in (*Logic, in the passage cited above*).

Article IV. Whether Angels Are Immortal and Incorruptible

Some, among whom is mentioned Cardanus (*On Subtlety*), deny that angels are immortal and incorruptible. The common opinion of the philosophers (*8 Phys. and 12 Metaph.*) and of the theologians (*2, d. 3, and 1 Part., Q. 50, Art. 5*) affirms that angels are immune from all corruption and mortality.

Note and recall from what was said in (*Bk. V, On the Soul, Q. 1, Art. 3*) that immortality is used in three ways. In one way, for complete immutability and perfect necessity — in which way God alone is immortal, as the Seraphic Doctor affirms (*1, d. 8, n. 10, and 2, d. 19, n. 2*). In another way, for that which lacks an intrinsic principle of corruption and mortality, such as matter (*Metaph., T. 12; 1 Phys., T. 81*), which always contrives mischief by reason of the privation annexed to it and the appetite it has for receiving other forms which it does not have. Third, for that which is rendered incorruptible and becomes immortal through some gift and accident inhering in it — thus Adam was, in the state of instituted nature, through the original justice bestowed on him by God, which if he had not lost through sin would have kept him always incorruptible and immortal.

Assertion: Angels by their own nature are immortal and incorruptible. This is deduced from Scotus (*ibid.*, and *Quodl.* 9, *Art.* 2), Bonetus (6 *Metaph.*, *Cap.* 5), Durandus (2, *d.* 3, *Q.* 1), and others there.

It is proved first from Aristotle (2 *On the Heavens*, *T.* 36, and 12 *Metaph.*, *T.* 44), who openly writes that the intelligences are unalterable, perpetual, and immortal. And he had previously suggested this (4 *Topics*, *Cap.* 2), saying that some animals are mortal, others immortal — in whose catalogue most ancient philosophers numbered the angels. Augustine agrees (13 *City*, *Cap.* 16) based on the opinion of Plato, whose words he there cites; and (22 of the same work, *Cap.* 26). Dionysius agrees (*On the Divine Names*, *Cap.* 4): "Intellectual substances have everlasting life, which cannot be diminished, freed and liberated from all destruction, death, matter, and origin."

Second: rational souls are immortal and incorruptible, as has been defined as a matter of faith in the Lateran Council (*Sess.* 8, *under Leo X*); therefore also angels, who are more excellent and superior to them, as is clear from (2 *Peter* 2, *Hebr.* 2, *Psalms* 8).

Third: what lacks an intrinsic principle of corruptibility and mortality is incorruptible and immortal, since when the principle and cause is removed, the principiated thing and effect are also removed; but angels lack the intrinsic principle of corruptibility and mortality, which is matter with the privation conjoined to it, as I noted above — for they are substances disjoined and separated from matter; therefore they are incorruptible and immortal.

Furthermore, the corruptible and mortal is attacked, conquered, and perishes from a contrary; but nothing is opposed to angels, neither from within, since they are simple, nor from without, since there is no power in the nature of things that can compare with them. Moreover, what is created is not corruptible but only annihilable, as is clear from matter, which since it was created is incorruptible and can only be annihilated by God. Furthermore, the dwelling and reward of the good is incorruptible and perpetual — hence the Church in the office of martyrs during Paschal time sings: *Eternal light shall shine upon your saints, O Lord, and the eternity of time*. For the evil, the punishment is eternal, according to Matthew 25: *Depart, you cursed, into the eternal fire, prepared for the devil and his angels*. Angels, therefore, are to be considered alien from all corruption and destruction.

Objection 1: Incorruptibility and immortality are attributed to God alone, as St. Paul shows (1 *Tim.* 2): *Who alone has immortality*. Therefore incorruptibility and immortality are not to be assigned to angels. I reply that this testimony of the Apostle is to be expounded of immortality and incorruptibility taken in the first way, which belongs to God alone — not of incorruptibility and immortality taken in the second way, which I observed in the preceding note to belong to angels and rational souls.

Objection 2: In the sixth general Synod, in the eleventh session, there was read and received the letter of Sophronius holding that angels are incorruptible and immortal not by nature but by grace. Damascus also affirms the same (*2 fidei, Cap. 3*): "An angel is a substance that has obtained immortality by grace, not by nature." And Bernard confirms this (*5 On Consideration, to Eugene, Cap. 4*). Therefore it does not seem consonant with orthodox faith or the teaching of the holy Fathers to think that angels are by their own nature incorruptible and immortal. I reply that that Council and the Fathers had in view immortality taken in the first way, by which God alone is immortal — not the second way, by which angels and those lacking matter are immortal and incorruptible. For every creature, whether spiritual or material, depends on God in being and conservation and needs the continuous influence of God, which is called the grace of God — or rather the gratuitous will and influence of God. For just as God gratuitously by His good pleasure created it from nothing, so by His gratuitous influence He conserves the same perpetually. Looking to this, Plato in the *Timaeus* introduces God addressing the angels thus: "O gods of gods, of whom I am the maker and father; you indeed are my works, of a nature dissolvable, yet by my will indissoluble."

Objection 3: What is composed of non-being and being is corruptible and mortal, because it tends toward non-being; but angels are constituted from non-being and being, since they are finite and limited in entity and perfection; therefore angels are naturally corruptible and mortal. I reply that the major is insufficient: what is required is that such a composite from non-being and being have an intrinsic or extrinsic cause of death and corruption — from which angels are immune; therefore they are immortal and incorruptible. I have treated these matters more at length and more copiously in the treatise on angels, which I have completed in its entirety in sixteen disputations.

Book IV. On God

The name *God* in Latin is *Deus*, in Greek *θεός*, and in Hebrew *He who is* (*Exod. 3*). The reason God is called *He who is* is given because God is being by essence, while creatures are beings by participation. He is also called by one word *Adonai*, according to (*Exod. 6*): *My name Adonai I did not reveal to them* — which is called by the Greeks the Tetragrammaton, as Augustine notes (*2 Questions on Exodus, Q. 120*), and which is called the ineffable name, by reason of whose veneration and holiness it was pronounced only by the high priest. On which I have treated at length in the *Treatise on the One God*, Disp. 2, Q. 13 and following. Presupposing what I said of the predicates of God in (*1 and 8 Phys., Q. 4*), I will add a few remaining things that pertain to metaphysics.

Question: On the Nature of God (Single Question)

Article I. Whether God Can Be Known by Us

Scholastic Doctors dispute the knowability of God along with the Master (*1, d. 1*), among whom it does not seem there is any dissent that God falls under our cognition; but concerning the mode — whether He is known negatively or positively — there is controversy. For St. Thomas (*1 Part., Q. 3, Art. 3*), preceded by Alexander of Hales (*ibid., Q. 2, Art. 2*), hands down that God is known by us negatively. Against these are Scotus (*1, d. 3, Q. 1*), St. Bonaventure, Richard, Major, Auriol, and others who commonly teach that God is positively attained by our intellect.

First Assertion: God by His own nature is known by us. So Scotus (*ibid., Q. 1, §. In 1. quaestione*). It is proved first from sacred letters: Wisdom 13: *From the greatness of beauty and creature, the creator of them can be seen in a way that allows knowledge.* Psalm 18: *There is no speech, nor language, where their voice is not heard* — where St. Chrysostom adds (*Hom. 9 ad populum Antioch.*): "There is no nation of such hidden tongue that it does not hear and perceive the voices of the heavens and other things, which naturally proclaim God." Damascus (*1 fidei, Cap. 1 and 3*): "The knowledge that God exists is naturally implanted in all." And Augustine (*3 On Free Will, Cap. 23*): "If this does not appear as much as was needful, we are admonished that in that highest and ineffable unity of the Creator all these things are constituted; and if you attend piously and diligently, every beauty and motion of creation that falls under the consideration of the human mind proclaims our instruction — by diverse motions and affections, by a certain variety of tongues crying out everywhere and rebuking — that God the Creator is to be known." He writes the same (*1 On the Spirit and the Letter, Cap. 12*). Dionysius (*On the Divine Names, Cap. 7*) and Tertullian (*1 contra Marcionem*). Added to this is the testimony of St. Paul (*Rom. 1*): *The invisible things of God, understood through what has been made, are clearly seen — his eternal power and divinity* — where Lyran says: "The attributes of God are known, indeed even His very essence, through creatures, as a cause through its effect; and thus the philosophers knew God."

Second: Aristotle (*8 Phys. and 12 Metaph.*) and his interpreters there pronounce and predicate many attributes of God, saying that He is the first mover, the first cause, the first being, infinite and blessed, and the governor and prince of all things. Therefore God is naturally knowable by us.

Third: we desire to see God and to enjoy Him as the beatifying object; but the will, as stated elsewhere, is not moved toward the unknown; therefore our knowledge attains God, to which the royal Psalmist invites us (*Psalms 104*): *Seek his face always* — for when God is sought, He is found. And Augustine adds (*on Job 37*): "God will not save the wicked," assigning as the cause of their damnation that they did not wish to know God.

One might say that Augustine seems to affirm the opposite (*Serm. 180 de tempore*): "Do you want to know the nature of God? Know this: that you do not know; and be not saddened that you do not know, because neither do the angels know, nor similarly all creatures." I say that this testimony of Augustine, and whatever others may be brought forward, is to be interpreted as speaking of total and comprehensive unknowing — for in this way God alone knows and comprehends Himself — not of apprehensive and abstractive unknowing. Hence the same saint in his annotations on Job 9 adds: "This is the death of the soul: not to know God." The Seraphic Doctor deals with this similarly (*ibid.*).

Second Assertion: God is known by us not negatively but positively. The Doctor maintains this (*ibid.*). It is argued first: a negation is known only through an affirmation (*2 Perihermeneias, at the end, and 4 Metaph., T. 16*); therefore God is not known negatively unless He is known positively, since a negative concept presupposes an affirmative concept. Second: we know no negations about God except through affirmations, by which we remove things incompatible and repugnant to God Himself. For we say God is not composite because we attribute to Him simplicity opposed to physical and metaphysical composition; likewise we remove from God finitude and limitation because we attribute to Him infinity and illimitability; and so with the rest — therefore God is not known precisely through negations.

Third: we love God supremely, according to Augustine (*8 Trin., Cap. 4, and 10 of the same work, Cap. 1*); hence each person placed in grave danger invokes God and has recourse to Him. But we do not supremely love negations — otherwise we would love nothing, since negations are nothing; therefore God is not known precisely by us negatively. For either a negation is conceived precisely as a negation, or as something said of some positive thing. If the first, then God is conceived no more than nothing or a chimera — since a pure negation, such as not being a stone, is said of nothing and a chimera just as much as of God or any other positive thing, and accordingly God would be understood no more than nothing or a chimera. If the second, then either the concept of which that negation is truly expressed is affirmative or negative: if affirmative, the point is conceded; if negative, the argument recurs — namely, either the negation is conceived precisely as negation, or as said of some positive thing; and thus either God would not be understood more than nothing, or one must rest in some affirmative concept prior to any negative one. Which is our contention.

Objection 1, against the first assertion: Aristotle (*2 Metaph., T. 1*) writes: "As the eye of the bat is to the light of the sun, so is our intellect to the most manifest nature, which is God." But the eye of the owl cannot see the light of the sun; therefore our intellect cannot know God. I reply that the Philosopher's likeness consists in this: just as the owl cannot intuitively and distinctly gaze upon the light of the sun, so our intellect cannot see God by distinct and intuitive cognition, according to (*John 1, Cap. 4*): *No one has ever seen God, nor can see him.*

Objection 2, from (*1 Phys.*, T. 35): the infinite is unknown; but God is infinite; therefore He cannot be known by us. To the major I reply by a distinction: the infinite in potency and in multitude is unknown, I concede; in act and in perfection, such as God is, I deny. Thus Aristotle is explained in the cited place.

Objection 3, from (*3 On the Soul*, T. 30): phantasms are related to the intellect as sensible things are to sense; but sense can perceive nothing unless it is sensible; therefore neither can the intellect perceive anything unless it is imaginable in phantasms; but there is no phantasm of God; therefore neither is there cognition. It is satisfactorily answered if it be said that the comparison holds for the first motion of the intellect from its object. For phantasms in the agent intellect have the role of a first moving object — but not for every subsequent act after the first motion. Since the intellect can abstract the object included in some first mover and consider that object so abstracted without considering that from which it is abstracted, it can thus perceive what is common to sensible and insensible, and accordingly the immaterial and spiritual, such as God. But sense, because it does not abstract or prescind, requires and needs in every act of its, both first and second and subsequent, some first moving object.

Objection 4, against the second assertion: St. Damascus (*1 fidei*, Cap. 12) writes: "It is fitting that each of the things said of God be regarded not as signifying what He is according to substance, but as showing what He is not." And St. Gregory (*1 in Ezechiel*, Hom. 3) adds: "However much our mind progresses in the contemplation of God, it attains not to what He Himself is, but to what is below Him." I reply by explaining the authority — that is, negation is not to be taken precisely as negation, but as designating a positive thing, as has been sufficiently shown in the third argument I used to prove the second assertion. To Gregory, I say that perhaps he intends that God is known by us through creatures, as a cause is recognized through its effect. Or he means that we have a common transcendental concept of God — such as being, substance, and forms of this kind — but not a proper concept drawn from what is properly His, which we cannot attain by our own powers. Since that concept is inferior to this one in entity, likewise in intelligibility; for this reason the aforesaid saint adds that by our labor we arrive at a concept of God that is below Him — that is, inferior and less noble than the proper concept which is had of God Himself.

Article II. Whether It Can Be Demonstrated That God Exists

There are not a few among the ancient philosophers and moderns who think that God's existence can be demonstrated neither a priori nor a posteriori, dissolving the arguments by which Aristotle demonstrates both in *8 Phys.* that there is one first mover and in *12 Metaph.* that there is one first cause and one lord and prince of all things — among whom are Ockham (*in the Centiloquium*, Concl. 1), d'Ailly (*1 d.* 3, Q. 3), Major (*ibid.*, d. 2, Q. 1), Andreas de Castro Novo (*d.* 8, Q. 1), and not a few others. On the other side, some think that God's existence is demonstrated in both ways — both a priori and a posteriori — to whom Suárez

seems to be favorable in some way (*Disp. 29 Metaph., Sect. 3, n. 2*). The common view of the Scholastics, however, is that of Scotus (*1, d. 2, Q. 2*), Major, Auriol, Viger, Richard, and the rest, who teach that God's existence is demonstrated only a posteriori.

Note 1, from Aristotle (*1 Eth., Cap. 3*): there is not the same evidence and certainty in every matter and subject being treated. One kind of evidence belongs to mathematical discipline, another to metaphysics. Hence when the holy Fathers and Scholastic Doctors adduce physical or metaphysical arguments to show that God exists or any other matter, they do not all proceed with equal certainty and evidence — but some are stronger and more evident than others, according as the greater firmness and evidence belongs to the matters from which they are drawn and derived. If it sometimes happens that some do not perceive certain demonstrations, this occurs not because they are not true demonstrations, but because they are not so plain to sense, or it arises from their dull intelligence or from stubbornness and obstinacy — of whom perhaps is said that of Romans 1: *Their foolish hearts were darkened*.

Note 2, from Hermes Trismegistus (*1 On the Definitions of God*), who, describing God, says: "God is an intellectual sphere whose center is everywhere and whose circumference is nowhere." This is explained with respect to all its parts. It says *sphere* because just as in a sphere neither beginning nor end is found, so God has neither beginning nor end, since He Himself is the beginning and end of all things, as He says of Himself (*Apoc. 1*): *I am the Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the end*. *Intellectual* is added because God is the purest spirit, devoid of all matter and body, enjoying intellectual life, which surpasses all others. The clause *whose center is everywhere* is placed on account of His immensity. The clause *whose circumference is nowhere* is appended on account of His incomprehensibility, since He is enclosed by no term and no limit.

Note 3, from St. John Damascus (*1, 1 of his Sentences, Cap. 12*): the name *God* has a threefold etymology, which is cited and expressed by Vorillong (*1, d. 2, Art. 1*) and touched upon by Scotus (*ibid., Q. 2, §. Ex his, sub D.*). I adduce only the one I consider truer and more important — namely, that *Deus* in Latin and *θεός* in Greek is derived from *θεᾶσθαι*, which is the same as to behold, as Vives notes (*in the commentary on 1 City of God, Cap. 31*) — or, which is the same, from *to see*, because God beholds all things, even the depths of hell, and *all things are naked and open to his eyes* (*Hebr. 4*). And universally God is called from His actual operation, as Damascus in the cited place notes and the Doctor agrees in the same place (*ibid.*), because He always operates by cherishing, burning, and seeing: He cherishes with piety, burns with charity, and sees with clarity — so that there is no one who does not behold these operations, since there is no one who can hide from His warmth (*Psalms 18*).

Assertion: That God exists is demonstrated — not indeed a priori, but only a posteriori. This assertion is two-membered and is defended by Scotus (*1, d. 2, Q. 2, §. Ad 1. quaestionem. G.*).

The first part is common and easy to prove. What has no cause cannot be demonstrated a priori, because demonstration a priori is had through the cause (*1 Post., Cap. 2*); but of God there is no cause, since God Himself is uncaused; therefore His existence cannot be demonstrated a priori. Furthermore — and this seems to come to the same thing — the middle term of an a priori demonstration, especially of the most powerful kind, is the definition of the subject according to Scotus, or the definition of the predicate according to others; but there is no definition of God, since definition consists of genus and difference, which are far removed from God; therefore His existence cannot be demonstrated a priori.

One might say: if someone were to argue as follows from the divine attributes, which seem to be as it were the properties and proper attributes of God — "God is immense, therefore immutable; and He is infinite because He is independent and from Himself" — and arguing as it were a posteriori from these, could then a priori demonstrate and demonstrate His existence; therefore demonstration of God's existence a priori can be acquired and obtained by us. I say that this discourse is indeed good, yet not evidently known, since its principles are not clearly manifest to us — and especially the divine essence, which is the source of those attributes and the ocean of all perfections — and therefore no demonstration of God's existence a priori can be had, as St. Dionysius suggests (*1 On the Divine Names*). And this is handed down of any subject of science (*1 Post., T. 2*).

The second part is argued first from the testimonies of sacred Scripture cited in the preceding article and the authorities of the holy Fathers adduced there, to which I add Augustine (*Serm. 143 de tempore, and 1 and 3 On the Creed for Catechumens, Cap. 2*) and Ambrose (*in the Epistle to the Romans, Cap. 1*): "Since God was invisible, in order that He could be known even from visible things, He made a work which by its visibility might demonstrate the maker."

Second, it can be shown by the physical medium adduced by Aristotle (*8 Phys., Cap. 1, and 12 Metaph., T. 36*); and (*Summa 2, Cap. 1, at the end*): everything that is moved is moved by another; and since one cannot go on to infinity (*2 Metaph., Cap. 2, T. 2*), one must arrive at the ultimate mover and the first cause of motion, which we call God. And this is openly shown and lucidly declared by the same Aristotle (*12 Metaph., cited*) and by Scotus in his exposition of the text: for there is given the lowest moved thing, such as the earth; moved and intermediate movers, such as the remaining elementary and celestial orbs and the intelligences revolving them — as is clear from the motions of fiery comets, which are moved in the sphere of fire by the motion of the orb of the moon, and from the motions of the planets, each of which completes its motion and

course in a certain and determined interval of time, as we see daily with our eyes — therefore there is given a first mover, which among the celestial orbs is the outermost heaven, which in the space of twenty-four hours, carrying the rest along by its rapture, completes its course; and among the intelligences moving the said heavens, there is the first intelligence, which is called the first mover — namely, God; therefore through motion the existence of God is rightly demonstrated, and this is a physical demonstration a posteriori, as the Doctor (*Q. 3, Prol., §. Ad 1. argumentum. N.*) indicates.

Yet not all accept this; they strive to dissolve and undermine it. For the proposition "everything that is moved is moved by another" does not seem to be universal but indefinite, as I showed in (*8 Phys., Q. 3, Art. 3*) — since animals move themselves, and likewise heavy and light things; and there are those who think the heavens are moved by their own intrinsic form, being animated and constituting one thing through which the stars wander, as birds through air and fish through the sea. Moreover, Zeno and his followers deny motion, though wrongly and against experience. Furthermore, some admit a circle in movers and things moved. And the same Aristotle does not seem to have adhered firmly to the cited proposition, since according to Fonseca (*in the Preface to Metaph., Cap. 1*) he was accused of being ἄθεος καὶ ἀσεβής — without God and impious. For if he had denied God and despised His worship, surely everything he taught about the first mover, motion, and the other matters he tries to demonstrate in the cited places would have been undermined. But that the Philosopher did not fall into such a crime of impiety is openly shown by his life and writings, so that there is no need to defend him otherwise from such a slander, with which he is attacked by the envious and his enemies after the death of his pupil Alexander.

Third: everything that exists is either produced or unproduced — that is, either it is from another or from itself: if unproduced and from itself, it is God; if produced and from another, it is a creature. For nothing is found that produces itself; indeed, according to Augustine (*1 Trin., T. 1*): "There is nothing more inconvenient than that the same thing should produce itself." And since no infinite process is to be admitted in essentially ordered causes, as stated above, it follows that there is given a first efficient cause, the first maker of all things, which is God. Hence Scotus, cited just above, writes that the multitude of beings, their dependence, contingency, composition, and the like openly argue and clearly demonstrate that there is one independent, necessary, and simple being, which is God. But this is a metaphysical medium more excellent and efficacious than the physical medium premised above. Against it some come and say it is not demonstrative but dialectical — for Anaxagoras, cited by Aristotle (*1 Phys., T. 3*), thinks that anything is made from anything; Democritus posits an actually infinite number of generable and corruptible things (*1 On Generation, Cap. 1*) and infinite worlds, as Valerius Maximus testifies (*1.8*); and Aristotle himself, positing the eternity of the world from the past and unwillingly constrained to admit an actual infinity of souls — though he himself openly denies any actual infinite (*3*

Phys., T. 40, and 1 *On the Heavens*, T. 34) — and many other objections would be raised by a stubborn person yielding to no one and resisting truth, stable foundation, and firm reason, so as more freely to indulge every vice and finally slide into atheism.

Fourth: in any well-constructed and rightly ordered house, and in any republic and empire aptly disposed, there is established a lord, governor, and prince to whom all are subject and obedient, who rewards the good and punishes the wicked; therefore in this immense fabric of the world and assembly of all things there is and exists a supreme Lord, monarch of all, avenger of good and evil — which is God. And thus God's existence is demonstrated physically, metaphysically, and ethically.

Objection 1: What is self-evident cannot be demonstrated either a priori or a posteriori, but becomes known from the mere explanation of its terms; but it is self-evident that God exists, as Scotus writes (1, d. 2, Q. 2); therefore God's existence is in no way demonstrated. I concede the major; I distinguish the minor: it is self-evident that God exists — to one who distinctly conceives the terms, as God Himself and the Blessed do, I concede; to one who apprehends the terms only confusedly, as happens with us, who have only a confused and indistinct knowledge of God and His essence and existence, I deny. So the Doctor deals with this (*ibid.*, §. *Ex his ad q.*).

Objection 2: What is demonstrated cannot be denied by anyone, because demonstration is an evident and necessary syllogism; but some deny that God exists, as Psalm 13: *The fool says in his heart: there is no God*; therefore that God exists is not demonstrated a posteriori. I concede the major; I distinguish the minor: some fools and wicked persons deny that God exists, I concede; some wise and good persons deny this, I deny. Hence rightly in the cited testimony it is said *in his heart*, because if he had said it publicly, he would have spoken foolishly and would have been refuted by all creatures, which naturally proclaim that God exists. Or perhaps the fool said in his heart that there is no God, because if he had said it openly, he would have been burned, as atheists are burned.

Objection 3: It is self-evident that truth exists — for if there were no truth, it would be true that there is no truth, and thus truth would exist; but God is truth, as God Himself testifies in John 14: *I am the way, the truth, and the life*; therefore that God exists is not demonstrated a posteriori. I reply to the major: not every truth is self-evident — since for the most part it escapes us, and the philosophers labor greatly in its investigation, sweating over it and barely attaining it — but only that which is born from the mere distinct knowledge of the terms, which is not the case with God's existence, which we apprehend only confusedly.

Objection 4: What is believed by faith is not demonstrated, because faith is of things obscure and enigmatic, while demonstration is of things clear and evident; but we believe in God, as is clear from the Apostles' Creed, *I believe in God*; therefore it is not demonstrated that God exists. It is satisfied if it be said that of what there is demonstration, there is no faith; hence if someone has a demonstration of God's existence, of that same existence he has not faith but science — in which way pagan philosophers, lacking faith, acknowledged and knew that God exists, as is clear from Romans 1: *For when they knew God, they did not glorify Him as God, nor were thankful*. Wherefore Doctors have scientific knowledge of the common predicates of God, but faith regarding His proper predicates; while the uneducated and simple have faith regarding all, as I showed at length in the *Treatise on the One God*, Disp. 1, Q. 2.

Article III. Whether There Is One God

Alphonsus de Castro (*1.5 against Heresies, s.v. Deus*) reports that some think there are several gods — notably the Gnostics and Manicheans — preceded by Augustine (*On Heresies, Cap. 6*), Irenaeus (*1.3, Cap. 18*), and Epiphanius (*Heresies 33 and 36*), who recall and refute those who fell into polytheism. The common and orthodox doctrine teaches us that God is one. Whether it can be demonstrated that God is one is not agreed upon by all Scholastics. For Ockham (*1, d. 2, Q. 10*), Gabriel (*ibid., Art. 2, Concl. 3*), Major (*in that place, Q. 1, Concl. 3*), and others think that it is not demonstrated but only dialectically argued that God is one. But others, such as Scotus (*1, d. 2, Q. 3*), Mayr (*Q. 4*), Auriol (*d. 3, Art. 3*), and others commonly hand down that it is demonstrated that God is one. This difficulty presupposes that God exists and asks whether God is one — since a thing has being before its unity arises, since unity is a proper attribute of being (*4 Metaph., Cap. 2, T. 3*). Wherefore, since above it has been demonstrated that God exists, it is rightly inquired whether He is one God or several.

First Assertion: There is only one God. It is proved first from sacred letters: Deuteronomy 6: *Hear, O Israel: the Lord your God is one*. And (*ibid., 26*): *See now that I am alone, and there is no other god beside me*. Psalm 8: *Who is God except the Lord? Or who is God besides our God?* Wisdom 12: *For there is no other God but you, who cares for all*. 1 Cor. 8: *We know that there is no God but one*. And Ephesians 4: *One Lord, one faith, one baptism, one God and Father of all*.

Second, from the holy Fathers: Tertullian (*contra Praxeam*), Athanasius (*in the Symbol*), Augustine (*contra sermonem Arrianorum, Cap. 1, and 3 contra Maximinum, Cap. 10, and in the exposition of Psalm 49, and On the Ten Strings, Cap. 5*), and Damascus (*1 fidei orthodoxa, Cap. 5*). And it is decreed in the Nicene Symbol: *I believe in one God*. The philosophers concur, notably Aristotle (*12 Metaph., at the end*): "Beings do not wish to be ill governed; one, therefore, is the prince of all in the universe, who is called God." And it is reported that when the same Aristotle was near death, he uttered these words: "Being of beings, have mercy on me" — whatever Veglia may say in his (*4th Investigation*). And that Socrates, Plato,

Pythagoras, and other ancients held the same is attested by Augustine (*4 City, Cap. 11*) and Eusebius (*11 On Preparation, Cap. 3*), with whom Avicenna (*1 Metaph., Cap. 6, and 9 of the same, Cap. 1*) and Trismegistus (*On Divinity, to Asclepius*) agree, as Richard reports (*1, d. 2, Art. 1, Q. 1*).

Third: every multitude is reduced to one, after St. Dionysius — as Scotus writes (*Q. 3 Prol., before §. Ad 3. quaestionem. V.*) — and dependence reduces to the independent; but there exists an abundant multitude of created things and dependence; therefore it is reduced to one uncreated and independent being, which is the one God.

Fourth: in whatever essential order of things there is established one thing that is the measure and standard of the others (*10 Metaph., T. 2*); therefore in the whole aggregate of all things and their essential order there is had one first being, which is the measure and standard of all of them — namely, the one God.

Fifth: the things of the world are so arranged and ordered among themselves as soldiers of one army toward one general and as subjects toward one king and prince, as Aristotle records in writing at the end of (*12 Metaph.*). Those who think otherwise, positing several first principles and several princes of the world, make the substance of things and the mass of the universe incoherent. Therefore there is only one God.

Second Assertion: It is demonstrated that there is only one God. So Scotus (*ibid., and in the Report., ibid., Q. 4, and Quodl. 7*). It is proved first by a physical argument: there is one first mover because there is one first movable (*8 Phys., T. 54, and 12 Metaph., T. 44*), and the first mover is God; therefore there is one God. This argument seems indeed efficacious, yet it suffers many objections which I brought up in the preceding article. For if there were several worlds — which the Scholastic Doctors do not deny to be possible — there would be several first movers, yet not several gods. Furthermore, God does not immediately move the first movable, as Scotus hands down from Aristotle in his exposition of (*12 Metaph.*). Moreover, the pagans admit a plurality of gods, which they would not concede if it were demonstrated that there is only one God — since demonstration is a necessary and evident syllogism to which no sane person can contradict.

Second, it is shown by the metaphysical argument, which is stronger and more efficacious, as the Doctor rightly saw (*in the Prol., cited just above*): there is one independent, uncaused, and supremely necessary being, as I showed in the preceding article; therefore there is one God. The antecedent is evident because dependence reduces to the independent, caused things to the uncaused, and contingency to the necessary; but God is from Himself and independent, uncaused and supremely necessary; therefore it is demonstrated that there is only one God.

Third, by the moral and political argument: a better principate and a more excellent government must be posited in the world, since it is a better and more excellent work, to which a better direction and governance is fitting. But a monarchy in which one rules is better than a democracy and aristocracy in which several rule and predominate; therefore there is only one God, creating, governing, and ruling all things found in the universe.

Fourth: if there were several gods, they would be distinguished either specifically or numerically. Not specifically, because species are related as numbers, one of which is more perfect than another; but God is that than which nothing more perfect and greater can be conceived, since He is most perfect and contains the sum of every perfection. And what differs specifically is under the same genus, which is potential and finite, as is clear in Logic. Nor numerically — since not only does one individual surpass another in perfection, as the University of Paris decreed regarding the soul of Christ the Lord, but individuals are contracted by their individual differences and are finite and limited, and there is no incompatibility in their being multiplied to infinity — all of which are repugnant to divinity, which is infinite, unlimited, and non-multipliable.

Therefore it is demonstrated that there is only one God. Here belong the seven arguments adduced for the demonstration and confirmation of this by Scotus (*in 1, cited*) and treated at length and solidly by Antonius Andreas (*Q. ult., 12 Metaph.*), which for the sake of brevity I omit, and which can be read in the said authors.

Objection 1: Divinity is attributed to men, as Psalm 81: *God stood in the assembly of gods*. And shortly after: *I said, you are gods*. Therefore a plurality of gods is not incompatible. Lyran replies in his commentary there, saying that by gods in that place are understood judges, and he proves this from Exodus 22: *To the gods — that is, judges — both sides of the case shall come*. Judges are called gods because they execute the works of divine justice. And Augustine in his exposition of Psalm 49 writes that men are called gods not by nature but by grace; he says the same on Psalm 84 and in tract 48 on John. Damascus also adds (*4 fidei, 16*): "I say gods and kings and lords — not by nature but as ruling their passions, dominating them, and preserving the image and likeness of God in an unobliterated way. For a king is said to be the image of the king."

You will press: 1 Cor. 8: *There are many gods and many lords*; therefore a multitude of gods is not to be rejected. I say that this testimony holds for idolaters and pagans, as is clear from Psalm 95: *The gods of the gentiles are demons* — not for adorers of the true God. Hence the Apostle adds (*ibid.*): *But for us there is one God*. And Scotus adds, cited just above, that many are gods by name — that is, in name only — but one is God in reality and essentially, the creator and governor of all.

Objection 2, from St. Anselm (*Prosol., 2*) and Scotus (*1, d. 2, Q. 2, §. Quarta via, sub BB.*): God is that than which a greater cannot be conceived; but several gods are

those than which a greater cannot be conceived; therefore several gods are not to be rejected. The major, which the Nominalists do not accept, is premised and handed down by St. Augustine (*Book of Questions on the Old and New Testament, Q. 1, and 1 On Christian Doctrine, Cap. 7*): "God is that than which nothing better and more sublime is thought." The same is had in (*7 Confessions, Cap. 14*) and more expressly in (*On the Spirit and the Soul, Cap. 63*). I reply that the aforesaid major and authority are to be glossed and limited, provided there is no incompatibility. But it is incompatible for there to be several gods, as has been shown above; therefore a plurality of gods is to be denied, because it is impossible and involves contradiction.

Objection 3: It is better for there to be several goods than one good, as it is better for there to be several men than one man — hence it reads in Genesis 2: *It is not good for man to be alone*. But several gods are several goods; but one God is only one good; therefore a plurality of gods is to be admitted. It is satisfied if the major is glossed in the same way as the major of the preceding objection — that is, unless there be an incompatibility; but it is contradictory to affirm polytheism; therefore it is repudiated. Looking to this perhaps, Augustine, addressing God, says at the end of his exposition of Psalm 58: "No one is better than you, no one more powerful than you, no one more generous than you in mercy — from whom I received that I should be, from whom I received that I should be good."

Article IV. Whether It Is Demonstrated That God Is Infinite

Two things can be investigated in this article — namely, whether God is infinite, and whether it can be demonstrated or only dialectically argued that He is infinite. Concerning the first, there seems to be no difficulty, since no one I have seen removes infinity from God. Concerning the second, however, there are as many opinions as were related in the preceding article. For Ockham (*in the Centiloquium, Concl. 3*) and his followers assert that God's being infinite is to be held as probable and believed by theologians, from the signification of the word. But Scotus (*1, d. 2, Q. 2, and in the Report., Q. 3*), Mayr (*Q. 8*), Lychetus, Bargius, Viger, and others commonly there, with whom Suárez agrees (*Disp. 30 Metaph., Sect. 2, n. 2*), affirm that by natural reason it can be demonstrated that God is infinite. The acceptations and divisions of the infinite adduced and explained by Bonetus (*Bk. 2 of his Natural Theology, Cap. 1*) and by me (*Bk. V, Phys., Q. c.*) are to be recognized and recalled. Here, however, I only observe that this doubt is raised only concerning the infinite in act, in intension, and in power.

First Assertion: God is infinite in vigor and power. The Doctor maintains this (*cit., §. Ostensis igitur 7, and Quodl. 7, §. Sed quia. FF.*). It is proved first from sacred Scripture: Psalm 144: *The Lord is great, and his greatness is without end* — where Lyran adds: "God is great not in greatness of bulk but of power." And Baruch 3: *He is great, and has no end, high and immense*. Second, from the holy Fathers: Dionysius (*On the Divine Names, Cap. 9*): "Great above all greatness, transcending

all infinity." Augustine (*3 contra Maximinum*, Cap. 26) and Athanasius in the Symbol. Added to this is the Lateran Council under Innocent III (*Cap. Firmiter de summa Trin. et fide Catholica*), in which this assertion was defined; and it seems also to have been decreed before that in the Council of Florence in the instruction of the Armenians. Aristotle favors it, both (*8 Phys.*, T. 79) and (*12 Metaph.*, T. 41), Averroes there, and the other Peripatetics, from whom the other philosophical schools do not depart, who affirm that God is of infinite and unlimited power.

Third: being, universally and adequately, is divided into infinite and finite; under the finite every created thing is comprehended; therefore the remaining member, which is the infinite, imports the uncreated — which is God.

Fourth: the finite and the infinite are proper attributes of quantity, as I observed in the *Epitome of Dialectics*, Bk. 1, Q. 4, Art. 6, n. 19. But since quantity, as stated from there (n. 18), is twofold — of bulk and of power — the former belongs to material things and the latter to spiritual things; but finitude is adapted to created being; therefore infinity belongs to uncreated being, which is God.

Fifth: no imperfection is to be attributed to God, who is the most perfect and most eminent being; but finitude carries with it imperfection, as the lack of further perfection in the thing of which it is the finitude; therefore finitude is not to be ascribed to God, but infinity, which imports unlimited perfection and the fullness of every perfection simply.

Sixth: the closer something is to what is more imperfect and worse, the more imperfect and worse it is, as is clear from material forms, which are closer to matter, which is worse and more imperfect than all things; but finitude of bulk belongs to material things, which are inferior and worse than all others; but finitude of power is accommodated to limited spiritual things; therefore infinity of power, which is far removed from material things, belongs to the most excellent and supreme being, which is God.

Second Assertion: It is naturally demonstrated that God is actually infinite. So Scotus (*ibid.*). It is proved first: what is from itself and through itself is plainly and fully infinite, because it is caused and limited by no one; but what is from another is finite, because it is caused by another, which limits and ends it within the bounds of its own genus. But God is from Himself and through Himself, since He is unproduced and independent; therefore God is infinite, and accordingly it is demonstrated that God is infinite. And Aristotle recognized this (*in the cited places in the preceding assertion*), writing that the first mover, which is God, moves for infinite time — and what moves for infinite time is infinite; therefore according to the truth of the matter and Aristotle it is demonstrated that God is infinite.

One might say that this does not follow, since an angel applied to a heaven moves that heaven for infinite time, and yet that very angel is both in entity and

in power finite and limited; therefore by that medium Aristotle does not demonstrate that God is infinite in act in vigor and power, since motion and time are not simultaneously infinite but only successively so. And hence a finite incorruptible and immortal power, such as the power of an angel, can move by motion and for infinite time; and accordingly from the fact that the first mover moves for infinite time, it is not rightly inferred that it is of infinite power in intension, but only in duration, as the Nominalists think (*with Ockham, cit., and Quodl. 2, Q. 2, and Quodl. 7, Q. 11*). But this sense is alien from Aristotle's mind. For he hands down in the cited place of the Physics that an infinite power cannot exist in a magnitude — but it could, if the power were formally finite, just as the power of an intelligence is in the magnitude of the heaven it wished to move. Therefore, not obscurely, Aristotle is shown to teach that the power of the first mover is intensively infinite. But why does an angel perpetually move, and yet its power is formally finite and of infinite duration, while the first mover's power is formally and intensively infinite? Scotus excellently responds and assigns the cause: because the first mover is from Himself and independent, while the other movers, such as the angels, are from another and dependent on the first. Hence the first has infinite power, the others finite power in vigor.

One might say, along with Suárez (*cit., n. 4*), that this reply does not match Aristotle's text, which does not there mention the clause "from itself or independently" — which holds not only of motion but also of any other action. And the same Philosopher argues from the infinite duration of motion for his proposition. Especially since Aristotle uses a physical medium, which is not "to move from itself and without dependence on another." Moreover, that to move from itself and independently requires infinite and unlimited power has not been proven and demonstrated by the same Stagirite. Against this: even if Aristotle did not explicitly mention that clause, he implies it when he says one must arrive at one first mover and that everything moved is moved by another; therefore since the same Aristotle thinks there is given one first mover who is not moved by another but moves all others, plainly according to him that first mover is from Himself and independent. And intimating this (*12 Metaph., in the cited passage*), he adduces that proposition, so that — having prefaced the physical medium of motion — he might buttress and confirm it through metaphysics, as the same Philosopher himself did in that very place. Hence Averroes in his commentary on that place distinguishes a twofold mover: one first, which does not immediately move the first movable — and this is God, independent and supreme of all; another second, which immediately moves the said first movable, caused by and dependent on God. Thus Aristotle posits the first mover as from Himself and independent and of infinite power, which can be limited by no one since it has no superior — and thus the first uncaused and unparticipated being, which Suárez seems to sense in the cited place (*n. 22*). This sometimes happens: one who attacks Scotus unwillingly falls into his doctrine,

as the same Suárez expressly in the cited place (*n.* 8) frankly admits, arguing ingeniously against the Thomists.

Second: what can produce infinite effects of itself is infinite in power, because infinite effects argue an infinite cause; but God, as far as in Him lies, can produce infinite effects — as infinite souls; and especially according to Aristotle, who thinks the world is eternal, from which it follows that there is an actual infinity of souls; and according to the Nominalists, against whom we are disputing, an infinite magnitude, multitude, and intension is possible, as I reported in (*Bk.* 5, *Q.* 5); therefore God is of infinite power.

One might say that if the sun were to last infinitely, it would successively produce infinite effects, though it is of finite and limited power; therefore even though God successively causes infinite effects, He does not therefore possess infinite power in vigor and intension, but only in duration. I say there is a disparity, because the sun is a secondary and dependent cause, while God is the first and independent cause; hence God Himself possesses infinite power intensively, while the sun has finite power that would endure perpetually if God wills.

Third: an intellect actually understanding infinite intelligible objects is actually infinite, since a power that actually respects infinite things is actually and formally infinite; but the intellect of God actually understands infinite intelligible objects — for what it understands, it simultaneously understands, and the intelligible objects are infinite, which do not require existence to be understood but need only to be in objective being, from what has been asserted elsewhere; therefore if the intellect of God is formally infinite, so likewise His will — which are of equal scope and capacity — and likewise His essence and nature, since infinite powers and potencies can only proceed from an infinite essence; and thus it is shown that God is infinite in power and intension. This argument is held in such esteem by Mayr, cited just above, that he thinks it insoluble and that the adversary cannot escape and evade its force.

Furthermore: our appetite tends toward an end and does not rest in a limited object and end; therefore it requires an unlimited and infinite object and end — and such an end is God, according to Psalm 16: *I shall be satisfied when your glory appears*. Finally: the most eminent and most perfect being is formally infinite, for it has every possible and conceivable perfection, which it would certainly not possess if it were finite and limited, because finitude carries with it annexed imperfection; therefore it is concluded that it is demonstrated that God is intensively infinite — that is, in vigor and power.

Objection 1, against the first assertion: if some being were actually infinite, it could not be compatible with anything contrary to it, because one contrary expels another, as heat expels cold. But God is supremely and infinitely good. Therefore if God were actually infinite, there would be no evil in the universe,

which is false. I reply from Scotus (*1, d. 2, Q. 2, §. Ad 1. argumentum principale. DD.*) by distinguishing the major: of the natural and necessary, I concede; of the voluntary and free, I deny — such as God is, who does all things whatsoever He wills and permits evil in order to elicit good. Especially since evil is not a positive real thing but only the privation of good.

Objection 2: If an actually infinite body were given, it would not be compatible simultaneously with another body, since such an infinite body would fill and occupy all places; therefore if God were actually infinite, there would be no other being, and accordingly every created being would be excluded, which is false. I reply: given the hypothesis, such an actually infinite body would not be simultaneously compatible with another dimensional body occupying a place; but it would be compatible with another body abstracted and absolute from quantitative dimensions, as I handed down in (*Bk. VI, Phys., Q. 2, Art. 3*). Likewise, God is the infinite and independent being, who does not carry along with Himself another infinite and independent being; but He is compatible with a finite and dependent being, which is created being.

Objection 3, against the second assertion: a finite cause produces a finite effect; therefore if God is infinite in power, He causes an infinite effect; but every effect produced or producible by God is finite, since every creature is limited and finite; therefore it cannot be demonstrated that God is infinite in vigor and power. I concede the antecedent and deny the consequence; the incompatibility sought is not on the part of God, who is omnipotent, but on the part of the effect, which cannot be infinite since it is determined and limited in some genus. Just as another God is not possible, because it is incompatible for there to be two infinite, unproduced, and independent beings from themselves. Therefore the infinite power of God respects possibles, not impossibles — such as what is intensively infinite.

Objection 4: A finite power moves in time; therefore an infinite power, since it is more active and efficacious, moves in an instant. But motion cannot occur in an instant, because it is continuous and successive; therefore it is not evidently shown that God is formally and actually infinite. I concede the antecedent and deny the consequence; to the subsumption I distinguish: if motion is taken in its species, as continuous motion, I concede; if however it is taken in its genus and as instantaneous change, I deny — as I showed at length in (*Bk. VIII, Phys., Q. 1, Art. 5*).

Book V. On the Being of Reason

Many things about the being of reason are assembled by Mayron (*Quodl. 6 and 7*), Fuentes (*Q. 2 of the Logic*), Poncius (*Disp. 1*), the Complutenses (*Disp. 2*), Ruuio (*Tract. on the Nature of the Being of Reason*), Suárez (*Disp. 54 Metaph.*), Mastrius

(*Disp. 2 Metaph.*), and others, of whom some treat this matter at the beginning of Logic, others at the end of Metaphysics. Following them, I have until now deferred this treatment so that, having already obtained knowledge of real being, we might more easily arrive at knowledge of the being of reason, which is its opposite; and so that the obscurity and thinness of the subject might not delay and overwhelm the minds of beginners with its difficulty. For it does not seem to me a dialectical error if someone treats the being of reason in Logic — as Suárez just cited thinks — since almost all things treated in Logic are beings of reason, and the object of its predication is the being of reason. Especially since Aristotle at the end of (*6 Metaph.*) expressly removes the being of reason from the consideration of metaphysics, indicating that the being of reason does not per se and directly fall under its object, but only incidentally and reductively, as Scotus rightly saw there.

Question I. On the Nature of the Being of Reason

Article I. Whether There Is a Being of Reason

A very few, cited and named by the recent authors just adduced, with whom Mayron (*ibid.*) seems to agree, deny that there is a being of reason. But all the other philosophers and theologians affirm it, to such a degree that the said Mayron confesses that the affirmative part is too widely diffused in theology; and some add that he defends the opposing view only for the sake of disputation, as is clear from many points he places in the cited question. Indeed the said Mayr clearly stated at the end of (*Quodl. 6*). For a more convenient and easy grasp and understanding:

Note 1: reason is used in many ways — first, for the quiddity of a thing, which is called the formal notion of any thing; thus Ecclesiastes 8 seems to speak: *I understood that no man can find out the work of God* — because, namely, the differences of things, especially the ultimate ones, escape us; or, as Lyran explains there, no man can have certain particular knowledge in particular. Second, for the declarative knowledge of such a quiddity, which is sometimes called a definition. Hence Job 38: *Do you not know the order of heaven, and do you set its reason on the earth?* — where the aforesaid Lyran adds that its reasons pre-existing in heaven cannot be fully comprehended by all, nor fully applied to determinate effects. Third, for comparative knowledge of one thing in relation to another — in which sense the said Ecclesiastes 9 writes: *Neither work, nor reason, nor knowledge, nor wisdom will be in the underworld, where you are hastening.* Fourth, for cause — in this sense one who assigns the cause of something is said to give its reason. Perhaps looking to this, Augustine (*1, 83 Questions, Q. 46*) calls the ideas of things their eternal reasons. Fifth, for intellect — in which sense man is called capable of reason and rational.

Note 2: for something to be of reason or from reason happens in many ways. First, because it is produced by reason — that is, by the intellect — in which way

all intellectual habits are called beings of reason. Second, because it is caused by right reason or reason as ruler — thus that is said to be of right reason which right reason dictates. Third, because it is left behind by reason, as being-known follows from the act of knowing; or because it is entirely worked out by reason — and thus the intellect negotiating around intelligible objects is said to make diminished and qualified beings, which, as Richard notably observes (2, d. 1, Q. 2, Art. 1), are beings of reason distinct from real beings.

Note 3, from Scotus (1 *Elenchi*, Q. 1, and 1 *Post.*, Q. 11): being is divided into the being of nature and the being of reason — and commonly into being outside the mind and being in the mind, from (5 *Metaph.*, T. 14). The first is real being; the second is the being of reason, which from Scotus (4, d. 1, Q. 2, §. *Hic primo. B.*) is taken in three ways: subjectively, objectively, and comparatively. The being of reason subjectively is what is subjected in reason — that is, the intellect — such as science, which inheres in the intellect; and this is not distinguished from real being, since it is a quality, which is a real being. The being of reason objectively can be understood in two ways: either because it not only presents itself as object and is presented to the intellect, but beyond that objective being has being outside the intellect — and this likewise is a real being, such as a stone, which besides presenting itself to the intellect has being on the part of the thing; or because it has being only objectively in the intellect and depends in its coming-to-be and in its being on the intellect itself — and this is properly the being of reason. Third, comparatively: which, beyond the description just given, is described by the Doctor (*ibid.*) as the passive comparison of one known object to another known object, as will be clear in the following article. And this is properly the being of reason, which is distinguished from real being.

Assertion: There is a being of reason. This is the common view, and the opposite is against the torrent of philosophers and theologians, notably Scotus (1, d. 8, Q. 4, §. *Contra istam opinionem. F.*, and *Quodl.* 1, §. *De altero termino. H. and L.*) and other places; Thomas (1, d. 26, Q. 2, Art. 1, and 1 *Part.*, Q. 28, Art. 1) and the disciples of both there; preceded by Aristotle (5 *Metaph.*, Cap. 7, T. 14, and 6 of the same, T. 8, toward the end).

It is proved first from the most common and received division of being into real being and the being of reason: but the members of a good division are opposed, and if one is admitted, the other must likewise be conceded; therefore since real being is given — which has being apart from any act of the intellect — the being of reason is likewise to be given, which depends only on the act of the intellect and without which it cannot exist. Second: science is sufficiently and adequately divided into real science, whose object is outside the intellect and on the part of the thing, and rational science, whose object is in the intellect — as is clear from Logic, whose object is the syllogism, which is a being of reason; and likewise its parts, whether proximate or remote, are beings of reason. Grammar and Rhetoric likewise treat of the being of reason; therefore the being of reason is

not to be rejected. Third: if there is a necessary and natural cause duly approximated and unimpeded, its necessary and natural effect follows, as experience establishes; but the intellect, since it is a comparative and reflexive power over its own acts, is the cause of the being of reason — and indeed a natural and necessary one; therefore the being of reason is not to be denied. Fourth: if there is a proper attribute, there is likewise the being of which it is the attribute — just as if there is the capacity for laughter, there is likewise the man from whom the capacity for laughter emanates; but intelligibility is a proper attribute of the being of reason, because it truly is intelligible, as predicate, subject, affirmed, negated, and things of this kind, which we truly understand, are numbered among beings of reason; therefore there is a being of reason.

Objection 1: More entities are not to be posited without necessity; real entities suffice; therefore beings of reason are not to be admitted. The major is a universal canon and maxim received and recorded by all (*1 Phys.*, T. 52). The minor is shown: if there were beings of reason, they would be above all universals; but universals are real entities, as is clear by induction — for animal, which is genus, is a real being; rational, which is difference, is likewise a real being; man, who is a species, is likewise a real being; the capacity for laughter, which is a proper attribute, is likewise a real being; and whiteness, which is an accident, is numbered among real entities. I concede the major and deny the minor. To its proof, the minor being conceded, one must distinguish: metaphysically and in first intension, I concede; logically and in second intension, I deny. This distinction was abundantly expounded and declared in (*Logic*, Bk. II, Q. 1, Art. 7), whose elucidation I do not consider needs to be repeated here, but is to be reviewed and recalled there.

Objection 2: If there were a being of reason, it would be intelligible, because intelligibility follows entity as its proper attribute; but only real being is intelligible; therefore no being of reason exists. I concede the major and deny the minor. For (*2 Metaph.*, T. 4): "As a thing stands with respect to being, so it stands with respect to being known." Since the being of reason has being only objectively, in a qualified and diminished way, likewise it has the character of being knowable and intelligible in a qualified and diminished way, as Scotus indicates (*Quodl.* 3).

You will press: what is known is prior to being known, because the object precedes the act; but the being of reason is not prior to being known, because its essence is to be known; therefore in no way is the being of reason knowable and intelligible. The Complutenses (*Disp.* 2, *Log.*, Q. 1) deny the major, thinking that the essence of the being of reason consists in its actual cognition. But their reply admits an implication and a contradiction in terms, since in the same place they assert that the being of reason is knowable and that it is not knowable, because its essential being is posited in actual cognition — which openly involves contradiction. Furthermore, every being before it exists is producible and

knowable, according to its essential and quidditative being, which abstracts from existence; but the being of reason in its own mode has essential and quidditative being — abstracting from existence — which it receives from the intellect. For it is defined as that which has being objectively in the intellect alone, from what will be said in the next article. Therefore just as in its own mode it has possible being, so likewise it has intelligible being.

Moreover, the nature of the being of reason is not the cognition itself — for this is a second act pertaining to the science of the soul — but it is what is known through such cognition, by which the being of reason is said to be known, just as a wall through vision is said to be seen; therefore its essence is not posited in actual cognition. Wherefore to the objection I concede the major; I deny the minor — for the being of reason, even though formally it is not knowable except through the intellect, from which it receives its formal being, is nonetheless knowable fundamentally, according to its possible and objective being alone — as Mastrius rightly argues against Poncius (*Disp. 2 Metaph., n. 234*).

Objection 3: Apart from God, everything is caused and produced; but what is caused and produced is real; therefore no being of reason is to be thought up and introduced into the Schools. I concede the major; I distinguish the minor: of things caused per se and primarily, I concede; of things caused accidentally and secondarily, such as beings of reason, I deny. This distinction has been expounded at length in (*Logic, in the cited passage, Art. 1*).

You will press: a real cause produces a real effect; but the intellect is a real cause; therefore it produces no being of reason, and accordingly the being of reason is to be rejected. The objection is dissolved by the aforesaid distinction: the major holds for the primary effect, not for a secondary effect that follows and is left behind from the primary, through a comparative cause — such as the intellect is, or another collative power.

Article II. What the Being of Reason Is

Some, whom Suárez follows (*Disp. 54, Sect. 1*), think the being of reason is a non-being apprehended in the manner of a being. Others, with whom Poncius agrees (*Disp. 1 Logic, Q. 1*), describe the being of reason as that which cannot do anything or exist in anything capable of doing something, except through the consideration of a power capable of considering something. Still others, such as Averroes (*6 Metaph., Com. 5*), Orbellus (*4 Metaph., Q. 1*), from whom Siretus (*Tract. of Formalities, Art. 1 principali, folio 5*), Trombeta (*ibid., first part of the same tract*), Vallo, and Brulifer (*in that place*) do not seem to depart — think that the being of reason is that which has being only objectively in the intellect. And this is not obscurely indicated by Scotus (*Quodl. 1, §. De altero, sub H., and 3, d. 8, Q. un., §. Ad argumenta. H., and 4, d. 1, Q. 2, §. Hic primo. B.*), and Canonicus agrees (*1 Phys., Q. 3, fol. 10*), and Mayr does not dissent (*Quodl. 6, Art. 6*).

Note: the being of reason bears many names. It is called a qualified being, a diminished being, a secondly considered being, a being objectively in the mind alone, and a second intention. It is distributed into the being of reason that profits and serves the sciences, and what is wholly useless and chimerical. Hence arises the distinction into the being of reason that has a foundation in the thing — such as logical second intentions — and that which has no foundation in the thing, such as fictions, for example, a chimera, a goat-stag, and the like, which are wholly impossible and contradictory — and are prohibited beings.

Assertion: The being of reason is not aptly described as a non-being apprehended in the manner of a being; nor as that which cannot do anything; but as that which has being only objectively in the intellect — or rather, as the passive comparison of one known object to another known object. So the assertion is threefold and is consonant with Scotus in the places cited above.

The first part is argued first: being and non-being are contradictorily opposed; but the being of reason is a being, because it is comprehended under that most common division by which being is divided into real being and the being of reason, as is clear from the preceding article; therefore the being of reason is not rightly called a non-being apprehended in the manner of a being. Second: what has a cause of its being is a being, because non-being, since it is nothing, is not caused; but the being of reason has a cause of its being — namely, the intellect or another comparative power, even according to the adversaries. Third: if the being of reason were a non-being as described above, the intellect in its cognition of it would be deceived, because it would understand it otherwise than it is — in which there is deception; but the intellect in making and understanding the being of reason is not deceived, as is clear in Logic — indeed it is perfected in seeking truth and discerning it from falsity; therefore the being of reason is not such, but something left behind in the known object through an act of the intellect, such as a second intention.

The second part, over and above the fact that Scotus (*cit.*) combats its opposite — whose doctrine Poncius professes to embrace — is proved first: a definition does not exceed nor is exceeded by the defined, as I have repeatedly insisted in the foregoing; but the aforesaid definition of the being of reason is exceeded by the defined — since quantity, relation, and prime matter belong to the genus of sterile things, and yet they are not beings of reason but real beings; therefore the being of reason is incongruously defined as that which cannot do anything.

Poncius (*cit.*) replies, saying that although matter is not active, as the being of reason is, yet matter itself exists in form, which is active — and the being of reason does not thus exist in another capable of accomplishing something. Against this: the being of reason also in its own mode exists in the intellect, which causes the being of reason. For just as the being of reason in its own mode participates in the essence explicitly expressed through its description, so also

its existence in its own mode is in the intellect, by which it is made and in which it is; therefore the gloss adduced does not satisfy the aforesaid objection.

Second: one opposite is explained and declared through the other — hence that saying is celebrated: *of opposites the principle and science are the same*; but the being of reason is opposed to real being — for each is an opposed member of the most universal division of being taken most commonly; but real being is defined as that which has being apart from any act of the intellect; therefore its opposite, which is the being of reason, ought to be described as that which has being only objectively from the intellect — not as that which cannot accomplish anything, which is very far from the essence of the being of reason.

Third: a definition is a discourse distinctly declaring the nature of the defined, by the common sense of all; but the premised definition clearly does not explain the nature of the being of reason — since its nature does not consist in not being able to do anything, but in intentional objective being only; but not being able to do anything is rather a property common to others, namely matter and relation, as I touched upon above — just as being able to move and run belongs to man and to brute, by which neither man nor brute can be described. Hence the reply of Poncius is rejected, where he says that the being of reason is defined by not being able to do anything as its proper attribute, just as man is defined by the capacity for laughter, because the capacity for laughter is a proper attribute of man in the fourth mode — but this is not so with the inability to do anything, since this is participated by others, as I was showing just now. Hence the argument still stands in its force.

Fourth: what the said Poncius adds — that the being of reason comes to be through a power capable of considering something — is not absolutely true, since a power does not make the being of reason precisely insofar as it considers, otherwise the intellect speculating on a real being, substance, or accident, would make the being of reason, which is false. But if the aforesaid author comes back and says that it comes to be through the sole consideration of the intellect, he falls into the very view he refutes — namely, that the being of reason is a secondly considered being and has being only objectively in the intellect — the opposite of which he strives to introduce into the Scotist school.

The third part is shown first: a genuine and legitimate definition consists of genus and difference, or quasi-genus and quasi-difference in those things that do not properly have genus and difference; but the aforesaid description of the being of reason is of this kind — for its quasi-genus is being abstracting from real being and the being of reason, and its quasi-difference consists of the remaining parts assigned; therefore it is a right and fitting definition of the being of reason.

One might say that this description does not embrace the fictitious and chimerical being of reason, which since it is impossible is not presented to the

intellect; therefore the said definition of the being of reason is inadequate and not reciprocal with the defined, and accordingly illegitimate and poor. I say that the chimerical being of reason is also not excluded from that definition, because this likewise in its own mode has being objectively in the intellect — namely, as fictitious and chimerical — especially because one who defines the true also defines the false, since the straight is the judge of itself and of the oblique. Hence Scotus in (*Q. 4, Prol.*) defines right practice, because from this it is easily understood what wrong practice is; and of opposites the principle and science are the same.

You will press: Scotus (*4, d. 1, Q. 2. A.*) excludes the fictitious being of reason from the description of the being of reason handed down by him there, and says that the true being of reason is that which is secondly considered — which is, as his interpreters explain there, the passive comparison of one known object to another known object; but such comparison is a relation of reason; therefore according to Scotus every being of reason is relative.

I say that Scotus in that place removes nothing and the impossible from the true and proper definition, because it has nothing that is properly defined; and the Doctor there does not mention the chimerical being of reason, as is clear to anyone looking at the cited text — because even though this from the part of the thing is impossible, nonetheless in the intellect it has being in some way, namely as fictitious and chimerical, that is, as what has no foundation in the nature of things; hence in the preceding note I observed that it has no foundation in the thing. Second: the being of reason is that which immediately and proximately is distinguished from real being, just as rational is what immediately and proximately differs from irrational, since they are divisive differences of the same genus — which is the anomalous being; but real being is described as that which has being apart from any act of the intellect; therefore its opposite, which is the being of reason, is that which has being only objectively from the intellect, or which depends in its coming-to-be and in its being on the intellect, and is the artifact of the intellect and secondly considered and compared.

One might say that the likeness of two beings of reason does not have being only objectively in the intellect when they exist, because they are not actually made by the intellect — since to have being objectively in the intellect is the same as being conceived and considered by the intellect; therefore the being of reason is not aptly described as that which has being only objectively in the intellect. I say that a being of reason is real, not formally — just as the proper attributes of being are not formally beings, but only really, from what was said in (*Bk. II, Q. 2, Art. 1 of this work*). Add that even though the being of reason in actual existence consists in actually being conceived and considered by the intellect — in the order of essential being and quidditative being in its own mode, it does not; as I have sufficiently made clear above. Hence it is not an

obstacle that there can be a likeness between two beings of reason, just as between two real beings — though properly in the latter, and improperly in the former.

Third: the universal formally is, by the common view, a being of reason; but such a universal has being only objectively in the intellect, and comes to be through its comparative act, as I wrote in (*Logic, Bk. II, Q. 1, Art. 3*); therefore the premised description of the being of reason is to be retained.

Objection 1: The being of reason can be effected not only by the intellect but also by the will and the imagination, because these are collative powers; therefore the being of reason is wrongly defined as that which has being only objectively in the intellect, since it can likewise have being objectively in the will and in the imagination. I reply that properly the being of reason has being only objectively in the intellect, as its name denotes; but improperly in the aforesaid powers, as will be apparent in the following question.

Objection 2: If the being of reason were thus described, a possible being would be a being of reason — such as another possible world — because it has being only objectively in the intellect; but this is false; therefore so likewise is the former. I deny the consequence of the major, because a possible being, even though it does not actually exist outside the intellect, nonetheless it is not incompatible for it to exist outside the intellect — and in this it is distinguished from the being of reason, which can in no way exist outside the intellect itself.

Objection 3: If the being of reason is such as has been described, then it is not the passive comparison of one known object to another known object, as the common Scotist opinion holds. The consequence is shown: what can only be presented as object and considered by the intellect, even without being compared to another, would thus be a being of reason without the passive comparison of one known thing to another known thing. The consequence is denied: the reason is that the intellect, before it makes the being of reason, considers real objects — such as animal, man, and brute — and once these are known, it secondly considers that animal is superior to man and to brute; and comparing this to those, it makes the being of reason that is called genus. Say the same of man with respect to his singulars — for comparing him to these, it makes the being of reason called species. Or one can say that the first description of the being of reason suits the metaphysical being of reason, and the second suits the logical being of reason — just as the universal is distributed into the logical and the metaphysical universal, and a distinct description is assigned to each, as I showed in the *Epitome of Dialectics*, Bk. I, Q. 3, Art. 1.

Article III. Whether Extrinsic Denominations Are Beings of Reason

From a broader or narrower acceptance of the being of reason and of extrinsic denomination, many and diverse opinions have arisen, related and rejected by more recent philosophers. Some, thinking that the being of reason is all that is

not in the thing and outside the intellect, think that any extrinsic denomination of the intellect with respect to known objects, or of any other power with respect to its objects — indeed even of insensible and inanimate things, in the way that a column is called right or left with respect to the right or left side of an animal — are beings of reason. Others, among whom is Durandus (*cited just now*), think that only those extrinsic denominations that arise from acts of the intellect are beings of reason — such as being known and being understood, and the like. Still others commonly deny that any extrinsic denominations whatsoever are beings of reason.

Note 1, from the common view of all, clearly recorded by Vallonus in his reading (*fol. 179*) and deduced from Scotus (*1, d. 30, Q. 2*), Viger, Lychetus, and others there, and Mayr (*Quodl. 7, point 10*): there is a twofold denomination — one intrinsic, the other extrinsic. The former is sought with respect to a form that really exists in the subject through which it is denominated as such — as milk is denominated white through whiteness inhering in it, and the eye is denominated seeing through vision existing in the eye itself. The latter is taken with respect to a form existing indeed in another subject, yet terminating toward the very subject which it denominates extrinsically — as a wall is denominated seen by the vision existing in the eye, terminating toward the wall itself.

Note 2: these two terms, *denominating* and *denominated*, differ — because *denominating* signifies the form, while *denominated* signifies its subject; and the concrete signifies both, but with this difference: the form primarily and in the first place, the subject secondarily — as was established in (*Logic, Bk. III, Q. 2, Art. 2*). Wherefore the form denominates the subject, and the subject is denominated by the form; and because the form affects the subject either intrinsically or extrinsically, so if it affects the subject intrinsically, its denomination is called intrinsic; but if it affects and respects the subject extrinsically — that is, because it is carried toward it as to its term — its denomination is called extrinsic, as is illustrated by the examples in the first note.

Note 3: denomination is considered in two ways. In one way, for the appellation and signification of the word, which is made by convention of the one instituting and imposing it — in the universal sense spoken of in the *Epitome of Dialectics*, Bk. II, Q. 1, Art. 1 — and thus it is regarded as a being of reason. In another way, for the formal affection by which a form gives its formal being to a subject either intrinsically or extrinsically — and thus it is a real being preceding the operation of the intellect, of which we are disputing in the present context. Moreover, observe that cognition is considered in two ways: as it respects the intellect by which it is produced and by which the intellect knows the object — and this is called active cognition; or as it respects the object through which it is known — and this is called passive cognition, by which the object is

denominated known and understood. But cognition accepted in both ways is not a being of reason, because active cognition, by which the intellect knows the object, and passive cognition, by which the object itself is known, are had without the negotiation and comparison of the intellect.

First Assertion: Extrinsic denominations of whatever kind are not beings of reason. This is deduced from Scotus (*1, d. 30, Q. 2, and 3, d. 8, Q. un., and elsewhere*). Mayron (*Quodl. 7, point 10*), Fuentes (*in Logic, Q. 2, Diff. 2, Art. 4*), Fabre (*4 Metaph., Disp. 2*), Hurtado (*Disp. 19, Sect. 1*), and many others patronize it.

It is proved first: what is on the part of the thing, with no one thinking, is not a being of reason. But extrinsic denominations are on the part of the thing, with no one thinking; therefore they are not beings of reason. The major is evident, because the being of reason is made by the intellect; hence what precedes its operation is not a being of reason but a real being, which is opposed to the being of reason. The minor is shown: the form denominating and the denominated subject are real — such as the right side of the animal from which the column is denominated right; the vision of the eye from which the stone is said and denominated seen; likewise the act of understanding from which the wall is denominated understood and known.

Nor does it avail to say that this holds for intrinsic denomination, by which the real subject in which the form really inheres is denominated — not however for extrinsic denomination, by which the subject is affected by no form through which it is really denominated, but is thus said by the intellect negotiating, whose work is the being of reason, and accordingly such denomination is not real but of reason. This reply, however, does not weaken but rather corroborates our argument. For if intrinsic denomination is conceded to be real, extrinsic denomination is likewise real — since just as the subject is denominated on the part of the thing by a real form inherent to it by intrinsic denomination, so likewise the term which the same form respects is denominated by extrinsic denomination through the same form terminated toward it — as through the very same vision by which the eye is intrinsically denominated seeing, the stone is extrinsically denominated seen; therefore both denominations are real.

If you should come forward and say that for a denomination to be real, a real union of the form with the subject and term is required, which does not obtain with the term in the aforesaid extrinsic denominations — against this: even though this may be true for intrinsic denomination, it is not so for extrinsic denomination, for which not the union of inherence is necessary but of adhesion and termination, which in vital acts Scotus (*Quodl. 13, Art. 2, Q. circa secundum. M.*) calls the union or relation of reaching and tending toward the term. Hence it is not without reason that scholastics distinguish the object of a power into motive and terminative. Furthermore, in the hypostatic union of the divine Word with the assumed humanity, the Word terminates that union even though it receives nothing real in itself — therefore it is not necessary for the

term of the denominating form to receive that form in itself, but it suffices that the form is carried toward it and terminates to it.

Second: God is denominated creator and Lord, as is clear from Genesis 1 and 2, and as was decreed in the Lateran Council under Innocent III. But these denominations belonging to God are extrinsic, and precede the created intellect — and if no intellect existed, God would still be thus denominated; otherwise, if the being of reason fabricated by the created intellect did not exist, God would not be cause and maker of things and their ruler and Lord, which is false and absurd; therefore extrinsic denominations are not to be counted among beings of reason.

One might say that they are real fundamentally, but not formally. Against this: just as the things created are said and formally denominated created through the relation of creation, which is formally in creatures — as a wall is denominated white through whiteness which inheres in it — so God is formally denominated creator through the relation of creatures, which terminates toward Him, and is called Lord through the relation of subjection of those very creatures, terminating toward God Himself. Therefore just as things are formally and intrinsically called created, so God is formally and extrinsically denominated their creator and Lord.

If you press and say: God really and formally is creator and Lord; therefore being creator and Lord posits something real in God; but this is false; therefore so is the former. The prior consequence is shown: for God to be creator and Lord in reality and formally seems to be the same as for being creator and Lord to be something real in God. I deny the prior consequence; to its proof I deny those two things are identified — for God's being creator means nothing other than the relation of the creation of a creature terminating to God Himself, with nothing new and real accruing to Him; just as a work is denominated human because the human power making it terminates toward that very work, even though nothing of humanity exists in it. Likewise God is denominated Lord not by a relation of lordship that is in Him, but by the relation of subjection which is in the creature, subject to Him and terminating toward Him — as the Doctor excellently asserts (*1, d. 30, Q. 2, §. Ad argumenta 2. quest. sub R.*) and more clearly in the (*Report., ibid., at the end of the cited Q.*).

Third: moral extrinsic denominations are real — such as being good, evil, loved, hated, and the like — otherwise the will and other powers, both interior and exterior, of men and animals, would make beings of reason; therefore physical extrinsic denominations are likewise real, such as being agent, patient, and the like.

One might say that denomination is by convention of the denominating party; therefore it is not real but of reason. I distinguish the antecedent: by reason of

the name, I concede; by reason of the thing signified by the name, I deny — as I sufficiently expressed above in the third note.

Second Assertion: From extrinsic denominations no relation of reason results. This is deduced from the Doctor (*4, d. 1, Q. 2, §. Hic primo. B., and 3, d. 26, Q. un., §. Ad quaestionem igitur. E., and 1, d. 35, Q. un., §. contra conclusionem, and following*).

It is proved first: a real being by its own nature does not follow a being of reason; but extrinsic denominations are real; therefore of their own nature they are not accompanied by a being of reason. The major is evident, because the being of reason is not a proper attribute of real being, but its opposed member, as is clear from the foregoing assertions. The minor remains proved from the preceding assertion. Second: if a being of reason were to result from extrinsic denominations, it would undoubtedly be caused by them — as a proper attribute flows from a subject, such as heat from fire and light from the sun; but the cause of the being of reason is not an extrinsic denomination but a collative and comparative power of one thing to another, from what will be said in the following question; therefore the being of reason does not arise from extrinsic denominations.

Furthermore: if the being of reason were to emanate from the said denominations, it would either flow before any act of the intellect or not; if the first, then it is a real being, which from what has been said is distinguished from the being of reason — for this follows the act of the intellect, while that precedes it; if the second, then it is made by the act of the intellect and not by the extrinsic denominations. Moreover, that relation of reason would appear superfluous and needless, since it serves and profits no one; therefore as useless and fruitless it is to be rejected and denied. Yet I do not deny that the intellect can form in the denominated extreme denominated by extrinsic denomination a being of reason as if there were in it an intrinsic denomination — as in God a relation of creation by which He is formally denominated creator, and a relation of lordship by which He is formally denominated Lord. The reason that can be adduced is that correlatives mutually respect each other; therefore from the fact that in one extreme there is a true and real relation by which it is formally denominated as such, the intellect can likewise in the other extreme — in which no real relation corresponds and there is only the termination of the relation of the other extreme — form a relation of reason through which it formally denominates it. Yet such a relation of reason is not necessary, nor is it even profitable — and it seems to attribute to the said extreme what is incompatible with it, as Mayron argues (*in the cited point, toward the end*).

Objection 1, against the first assertion: every form by which a subject is denominated is intrinsic to it, since it provides its formal being to the same; but the object is denominated known and understood not through a real form, as is clear, since no real form is in it; therefore through a form fashioned by the intellect, which is a being of reason; and accordingly extrinsic denomination is a

being of reason. I distinguish the major: if the form formally exists in the subject, I concede; if however it terminates toward it, I deny. The minor is to be distinguished in the same way: the object denominated known through a form or cognition residing in it, I deny; through cognition and understanding terminating toward it, I concede — as I made clear above.

You will press: a concrete signifies the form and its subject — as *white* signifies whiteness and the wall in which whiteness inheres; but *known* and *understood* are concretes; therefore they signify the cognition and understanding not in the real form, since this resides in the knowing and understanding power — therefore in the form of reason; and accordingly the aforesaid denomination is a being of reason. It is satisfied if the major is distinguished by the same distinction: a concrete signifies a form inhering in it or terminating toward it — in which way *known* is a concrete that signifies cognition not existing in it but terminating toward it. For cognition is subjected in the knowing power and terminates toward the known object, as is clear from the second note.

Objection 2: Scotus (*1, d. 30, Q. un., §. concedo. C.*) calls the being-known of creatures a being of reason; but being-known is an extrinsic denomination; therefore extrinsic denomination is a being of reason. I reply that Scotus there does not assert that the being-known of creatures is a being of reason, as is clear to one reading the text — but that it is a qualified and diminished being. For since creatures from eternity were not produced by God, they do not have being simply, which is the being of essence and existence, but have only known being, because they are known by God — which is a qualified and diminished being — as the same Doctor explains (*ibid.*) in response 2. G.

You will press: Scotus himself in the same place (*§. Ad argumenta 1. quest.*) calls the qualified making — such as being-known — a relation of reason; therefore he is not to be drawn to another sense; and hence Mastrius (*Disp. 3 Log., Q. 2, Art. 1*), with Vulpes, explains him as speaking of the being of reason materially, not formally. But Scotus there does not seem to speak in his own view and as an assertion, but dubiously, saying: "And thus some one might concede concerning God, that God is lord, noting the qualified making — namely, a making according to some relation of reason." Hence the same Doctor (*1, d. 35, Q. un., §. poteft dici ad quest. H.*), having the same discussion of the divine intellect, adds in the third moment that the divine intellect can compare itself to the understood stone and can cause a relation of reason. Wherefore, according to Scotus, a being of reason properly is not had unless a new comparison of one thing to another is made, as is explained more explicitly by the same author (*4, d. 1, Q. 2. B., and Q. 5, §. Ad 1. argumentum 28. quest. Sub. K.*).

Objection 3: A transition from one contradictory to the other cannot be effected without some new form being acquired — as a wall from being non-white cannot become white unless it newly receives whiteness; but an object from being non-known becomes known; therefore it receives some new form — not a

real one, as all admit; therefore one of reason; and thus extrinsic denominations are beings of reason. I distinguish the major: without a new inherent form, I concede; without a terminating one, I deny. Thus God from non-creating becomes creating in time, without receiving anything new, but only the relation of the creature newly created by Him terminating to God Himself.

You will press: if God were to create Peter as emperor of the whole world, Peter would thus be denominated emperor of the universe without any new real form newly produced inherent in him or terminating — therefore through a form that is a being of reason, he would obtain such denomination. I say that given the hypothesis, he would thus be denominated by a real extrinsic denomination terminating to the act of the divine will constituting him lord of the universe. Wherefore, in these extrinsic denominations, either in one extreme some new form is produced, or a new termination occurs without the production of a new form.

Objection 4, against the second assertion: Scotus (*1, d. 36, Q. un., §. contra istud obiicitur. G.*) explicitly writes that after the diminished being a relation of reason follows; but being-known is diminished being and denominated by extrinsic denomination; therefore in the Scotist school from extrinsic denominations beings of reason result. I reply that the Doctor is to be explained as not meaning that of its own nature and absolutely, after extrinsic denominations, relations of reason follow — but that once these are posited, the intellect can form such relations of reason, as has been sufficiently declared above.

Article IV. Whether Negations and Privations Are Beings of Reason

Most Thomists, whom the Conimbricenses (*Q. 6 of the Universals, Art. 2*), Suárez (*Disp. 54 Metaph., Sect. 3, n. 4*), and Arriaga (*Disp. 6, Sect. 6*) follow, think that negations and privations are to be numbered among beings of reason. The opposite is defended by the Scotists, notably Mayr (*Quodl. 7, point 5*), Mastrius and Bellutus (*Disp. 3 Log., Q. 7*), Fuentes (*Q. 2, Diff. 2, Art. 1*), and Poncius (*Disp. 1, Q. 3*), to whom Fonseca (*5 Metaph., Cap. 7, Q. 6, Sect. 5*) and others agree, who remove negations and privations from the series and catalogue of beings of reason. Presupposing the acceptations of privation and its differences from negation adduced in (*Bk. II, Phys., Q. 3, Art. 1*), which are to be reviewed there:

Assertion: Privations and negations are not beings of reason. This is deduced from Scotus (*d. 23, Q. un., §. Item arguo. H., and 2, d. 12, Q. 2, §. Ad 1. rationem sub F., and 4, d. 22, Q. 1, §. De primo. A.*).

It is proved first from sacred Scripture: Genesis 1: *Darkness was upon the face of the deep* — that is, as Lyran comments, privations of light. And John 9: *As he passed by, Jesus saw a man blind from birth*. But these privations precede any act of the intellect; therefore they are not beings of reason. The same is indicated by the holy Fathers, especially Augustine (*On the Ten Categories, Cap. 18*), Anselm (*On the Fall of the Devil, Cap. 41*), and Damascus (*in his Philosophy, Cap. 2*).

Second: the being of reason depends in its coming-to-be and in its being on the intellect, as is clear from its description cited in Art. 1 of this question; but negations and privations exist with no one thinking — as, with any act of the intellect excluded, a brute is not a stone, a man is not a plant, Celidonium is blind from birth, Claudius is deaf, and so on; therefore they are not beings of reason.

Third: nothing that is the negation of a creatable being is the terminus a quo of creation and annihilation, and the terminus a quo of physical change and its principle is privation (*1 Phys.*, T. 57, and *12 Metaph.*, T. 22). But privative opposites are on the part of the thing, and form and its privation are privatively opposed; therefore privation and negation are not beings of reason, but are found on the part of the thing without any negotiation of the intellect. For it would be false and absurd to say that the aforesaid changes do not occur unless the intellect thinks, and that blindness is in Paul through the fabrication of the intellect.

The adversaries, among whom is Suárez (*cit.*), come forward and say that one must distinguish: negations and privations can be used in two ways — for the removals of positive entities, and thus they are found on the part of the thing apart from any act of the intellect; or for forms thought up by the intellect and apprehended in the manner of positive forms, which cannot exist outside the intellect, and thus they are beings of reason.

Against this: negations and privations are to be taken in the way in which they are described, since their descriptions denote and declare their natures and essences in their own mode, as happens with other things; but negations are defined as the absence of forms in subjects that are unfit, and privations as the absence of forms in subjects that are fit and suited; therefore they are thus to be understood — and thus they are on the part of the thing; therefore they are not beings of reason. But to think up and feign them in the manner of positive forms is contrary to their natures, which are not possessed of them but devoid and lacking them. Furthermore, if those conceived in the second way are beings of reason, anything else if so apprehended would be a being of reason — as if man were conceived as an angel, and the Holy Spirit as a dove, and things of this kind, which are real, would be beings of reason. Wherefore, even though negations and privations are feigned by the intellect in the manner of positive forms, they are not for this reason simply to be numbered among beings of reason.

Objection 1: What is considered by a science is a being, of which intelligibility is a proper attribute; but negations and privations are treated by metaphysics, as is clear from (*4 Metaph.*, T. 2, and *4 of the same*, T. 14); but they are not real beings; therefore they are beings of reason. The consequence holds, because there is no middle ground between real being and the being of reason. I concede the major; I explain the minor by a distinction: per se, I deny; per accidens, I concede. To what is further inferred — between real being properly taken and the being of reason there is no middle ground, I deny — for there is found an improper

being, such as negation and privation. Between real being taken broadly and the being of reason, no middle ground exists, I concede: for thus being taken broadly is divided into real being and the being of reason; and real being can be called all that is on the part of the thing independently of the intellect — in which way we call a non-being a non-being (*4 Metaph., in the cited passage*).

Objection 2: Affirmation and negation are acts of reason and pertain to Logic, which treats of the being of reason; therefore if affirmation is a being of reason, likewise negation is a being of reason. I distinguish the antecedent: as active and passive acts, I concede; but as objects of affirmation and negation, I deny. For thus they are on the part of the thing, independently of the intellect. Especially because by affirmation and negation is commonly understood composition and division, which do not pertain to our matter, since we are treating of simple and non-complex things as they are on the part of the thing, with the act of the intellect excluded.

Article V. Of How Many Kinds the Being of Reason Is

Many divisions of the being of reason are adduced by recent philosophers. The first is into relation, negation, and privation — which is indeed accepted and defended by the Thomists, but rejected and denied by the Scotists. For in the first place, relation is a real being and is posited as one particular predicament of real relations, as is clear from Logic. Furthermore, negation and privation are not beings of reason, because they are found on the part of the thing without any thinking intellect, as I showed at length in the preceding article. Moreover, a good and genuine division is two-membered, and its dividing members must be opposed, as the law of good division requires; but relation, negation, and privation are not opposed, as is clear from the four types of opposites handed down by Aristotle in the *Postpredicaments*, chapter on opposites; therefore this division is not to be accepted. Furthermore, under that division it does not seem that prohibited beings, fictions, and the like are comprehended, as our two younger authors rightly pursue (*Disp. 3 Log., Q. 7*); therefore the aforesaid division is deficient and incomplete.

The second is into the being of reason that has a foundation in the thing, and the being of reason that has no foundation in the thing. It is commonly known and received by almost all, and touched upon by the Doctor (*1, d. 43, Q. un., §. Aliter dico. E., and Quodl. 1, §. De altero H. and L., and Q. 4, on universals, §. Dicendum in solutione tertij*). But that being of reason is said to be founded in the thing whose motive, cause, occasion, and origin is provided by the thing — hence it is not rashly and gratuitously formed by the intellect; as because a nature is communicated to many, the intellect attributes to it formal universality, which is a being of reason, by which it is formally predicated of many. Likewise because a nature agrees with many differing in species, the intellect produces the being of reason that is genus, which is predicated in the *quid* of many differing in species. Similarly, because a nature is communicated

to many numerically distinct ones, the intellect fashions the being of reason that is species, which is predicated of many numerically differing ones. But the being of reason that is not founded in the thing is called that for which there is no opening, occasion, or property on the part of the thing for feigning it — but it is merely gratuitously and without any motive and foundation feigned by the intellect; hence it is called a fiction, such as a chimera and a goat-stag.

The third is into transcendental and predicamental. For just as real being is either transcendent or enclosed in one of the ten categories, so the being of reason — which is as it were the shadow of real being — is either placed or rather reduced to one of the ten predicaments: thus a chimera is referred to the genus of substance, and the imaginary space that some think up outside the heavens is referred to the genus of quantity, and so with the rest; or it transcends all genera, in which way God the Father is formed in the likeness of an old man, God the Son as a youth, and God the Spirit as a dove. Although this division of the being of reason has not been listed by anyone I have seen, it nonetheless seems congruous and fitting — since, just as every body is followed by its shadow, so every real being is accompanied, or rather can be accompanied and followed, by its being of reason. And this is splendidly expressed by Scotus (*Q. 6, on universals, in the solution of the 4th argument*), saying that just as in real being there are many degrees, so likewise in the being of reason — for this is understood through analogy to the former; hence it is divided in much the same way as real being; and accordingly, just as real being is divided into transcendental and predicamental, so likewise the being of reason is transcendental in one case and predicamental in another; and likewise one is substantial and another accidental, and so on. For created freedom is such that it strives to attain and somehow perceive not only real things but also intentional, true and fictitious, possible and impossible ones.

The fourth, which is a subdivision of the preceding, is into absolute and relative being of reason — which is indicated by the Doctor (*1, d. 36, Q. un., §. contra istud obiicitur. G.*) against certain Scotists who seem to recognize only relative being of reason, relying on Scotus's testimony (*4, d. 1, Q. 4, §. Hic primo. B.*), who defines the being of reason as the passive comparison of one known object to another known object; but such comparison is a relation of reason; therefore according to Scotus every being of reason is relative.

One must reply that a twofold being of reason is posited: one logical — and this is relative, described by the Doctor just cited — another metaphysical — and this is absolute, defined by the same Doctor (*Quodl. 1, §. De altero. H., and 3, d. 8, Q. un., §. Ad argumenta, sub. H.*) as that which has being only objectively in the intellect. Under this description every being of reason can be comprehended, whether absolute or relative. Nor should this surprise anyone. For just as the universal is described in two ways — the logical universal (*1 Perihermeneias, Cap. 3*) as what is fitted to be predicated of many, and the metaphysical universal (*7*

Metaph., T. 15, T. 45) as what is fitted to be in many — so a twofold being of reason is posited: logical and metaphysical, both of which I described above according to Scotus.

Objection 1, against the first division: every being of reason has a foundation in the thing; therefore the division of the being of reason into that which has a foundation in the thing and that which has not is valid. The antecedent is proved: a chimera and a goat-stag, numbered among those beings of reason that are supported by no foundation in the thing, participate in true and proper parts existing on the part of the thing. I reply that even though the parts of a fiction are real and founded in the nature of things when taken separately, yet when united together they are impossible and contradictory for composing and constituting that whole which is called fiction; hence by reason of the union of parts in the whole it is said to have no foundation in the thing, and to be incompatible with respect to any agent, whether created or uncreated — as the Doctor excellently writes (*1, d. 43, Q. un., §. Aliter dico. E.*). Therefore what cannot be made by any agent is rightly said to have no foundation in the thing, since it is impossible and involves incompatibility in coming to be and existing.

Objection 2, against the third division: if beings of reason are distributed in the manner of real beings, it follows that just as real being is divided into ten categories, so likewise the being of reason — but this is not admitted; therefore neither is the former; and accordingly the added partition of the being of reason into transcendental, predicamental, and the like is invalid and inappropriate. The consequence of the major can be denied, from what was asserted in (*Logic, Bk. III, Q. 3, Art. 2*), where this objection has been dissolved. For just as privations and negations are reduced to the habitual states of which they are the privations and negations (*2 On the Soul, T. 96*), so the being of reason — which is as it were the shadow of real being — is reduced to the real predicament in the likeness of which it is fashioned.

Objection 3, against the fourth division: as the cause is, so is its effect, because the effect is assimilated and proportioned to its cause; but the cause of the being of reason, from what will be said in the following question, is the comparative and collative cause, and its effect and action is comparison, which is formally a respect and relation, as the common run of Scotists holds; therefore the being of reason is wrongly divided into absolute and relative.

It can be said that the major holds for the primary effect and the one per se intended by a univocal cause — not however for a secondary and accidental effect from an equivocal cause, such as the being of reason is, which accompanies the operation of the intellect, and is rather left behind from it than properly caused — otherwise, just as the intellect is a power and real cause, so its effect would be a real effect and real being, which is false. To the minor I say that the intellect is thus denominated with respect to the principal being of reason, which is logical and a logical second intention — not however absolutely, with

respect to every being of reason, especially if fictitious and chimerical, which is absolute, such as a goat-stag, for whose being it suffices that it have being only objectively in the intellect, as its definition in the second article of this question cited and explained requires.

Article VI. Whether the Being of Reason Has Proper Attributes

Since in the preceding article the being of reason was chiefly divided into the being of reason that has no foundation in the thing on the part of the thing, and that which has a foundation in the thing itself, it can accordingly be doubted whether each or either of these obtains affections and properties befitting it or not. I resolve and decide this briefly through the following two assertions.

First Assertion: The being of reason that has no foundation on the part of the thing — which is called a fiction — is devoid of every proper attribute and affection. This is deduced from the Doctor (*1, d. 3, Q. 5, §. contra ista infra. G.*), Viger, Lychetus, and others there, who write that this kind of being of reason lacks genus and difference, which together are united to constitute the species from which proper attributes and properties emanate.

It is proved first: what is incompatible in its parts and whole participates in no proper attributes, since these arise from a non-incompatible and non-impossible whole; but a fiction and any other similar being of reason involves contradiction in its parts simultaneously joined and in the whole, as the Doctor clearly discusses (*1, d. 43, Q. un., before F.*); therefore it is devoid of any proper attribute. Second: what has no quiddity — either simply or in a qualified way — is deprived of its proper attribute, because the latter proceeds from the former; but a fiction has neither, since it and its parts are simultaneously impossible and devoid of any quiddity and essence — as all prohibited and impossible beings are; therefore it is stripped of every proper attribute.

One might say that a fiction participates in the definition of the being of reason and is its species, since from what was said in the preceding article the being of reason is sufficiently divided into the being of reason founded in the thing and not founded in the thing; and from a species flow proper attributes and affections; therefore the fictitious being of reason in its own mode is not stripped of its proper attributes. I distinguish the major: the chimerical being is defined by an improper definition, called a nominal definition, I concede; by a proper definition, which is called a quidditative or descriptive definition, I deny. To the minor I say that just as the being of reason is not properly a genus, so a fiction which is contained under it is not properly a species; and accordingly no proper attributes belong to it, since proper attributes are those that emanate from species, among which number the fictitious being is not comprehended.

Second Assertion: The being of reason having a foundation in the nature of things participates in its own mode in affections and properties. The Doctor

maintains this (4, d. 1, Q. 2, §. *de secundo. 1.*, and at the end of Q. 6 of the *Universals*), Mayr (*Quodl. 6, Art. 15*), and the rest of the Scotists.

It is proved first: the real transcendental and predicamental being is possessed of its proper affections and properties, as I showed in (*Bk. II, Q. 2 of this work*) and elsewhere not rarely; therefore the same is to be asserted in its own mode of the being of reason having a foundation in the thing. The consequence holds, because this kind of being of reason is in the manner of a real being and its likeness — it is therefore not deprived of its proper attributes of reason. Second: corresponding proper attributes belong to each and every being, because these proceed from those; but real being — which is being simply — participates in real affections, which are unity, truth, goodness, and the like; therefore likewise the being of reason — which is a qualified and diminished being — is not without its properties of reason. Third: the natures and essences of each and every being are accompanied by their proper attributes and properties, as is clear from all and singular genera, both of substance and accident, both of living and non-living things, both material and spiritual; but the aforesaid being of reason participates in its nature and essence, declared through its definition cited in the second article of the present question; therefore from this its own proper affections arise and follow.

Fourth: demonstration shows the inherence of the proper attribute in its subject — as the capacity for laughter in man through rationality; but Logic demonstrates many things and is concerned with the being of reason as the subject of its predication; therefore proper attributes are to be conceded to the being of reason. Otherwise Logic would not be a science, as Scotus adds (*in Q. 4, cited just above*) — since it would not have definitions consisting of genus and difference and proper attribute, in the mode in which the logician treats the proper attribute, genus, difference, and the like.

Thus from the being of reason founded in the thing proper affections are not to be removed. Added to this: the aforesaid being of reason is intelligible, on the authority of Scotus (2, d. 1, Q. 5, §. *contra istam opinionem. B.*); but intelligibility is a proper attribute of that of which it is the intelligibility. Hence (12 *Metaph.*, T. 4) Aristotle adds: "As being stands with respect to being, so with respect to intelligibility"; but the being of reason has being in a qualified and diminished way; consequently it participates in intelligibility in a qualified way proportioned and congruous to it, and the other affections belonging to it.

The recent undivided Scotists (Q. 6) object against the first assertion and say that intelligibility and the other properties are accommodated not only to the being of reason having a foundation on the part of the thing, but also to the fictitious and chimerical being of reason — for the reason that in its own mode it has an essence from which proper attributes flow; and moreover, propositions in the first and second mode of per se predication can be made about it, in which the proper attribute is predicated of the subject. Furthermore, it falls under science

and is intelligible, just as any other being of reason; therefore this being of reason is not to be stripped of its proper attributes. The parity is to be denied, because that being obtains a determinate and congruous nature and essence with respect to the things of which it is predicated, from which proper attributes suited to it proceed; but the latter by no means — since its parts among themselves and in the whole involve incompatibility and contradiction. Hence no proper attribute and affection can proceed from it; and accordingly it is not intelligible nor knowable, as Scotus not obscurely hands down (*Quodl.* 3, §. *de primo. B.*, and 1, d. 3, Q. 5, sub G., and d. 43, Q. *un.*), and Lychetus, Viger, and Gadius defend (*ibid.*) — because its parts are impossible and mutually contradictory. For what is contradictory cannot be a being outside the mind, nor in the mind, and consequently is neither intelligible nor knowable. Since two contradictories simultaneously, nor a contradictory with its contradictory, ever constitute one intelligible or knowable thing. Furthermore, a proper attribute is necessarily united with the subject of which it is the proper attribute, and is demonstrated of it, and demonstration is from true things. Hence science, which is its effect, is defined as certain and evident knowledge of the necessary thing through its proper cause — which certainly cannot be of a fictitious being of reason, as Mayr excellently shows (*Quodl.* 6, *Art.* 17).

You will press: the intellective power can feign a golden mountain, a chimera, and the like, which are called beings of reason not founded in the thing; but the intellect understands these in the mode in which they are and establishes a distinction between them and others; therefore these beings of reason have intelligibility and the other proper attributes, just as beings of reason founded in the thing. I concede the major; I distinguish the minor: the intellect understands them by knowledge of the name, not by knowledge of the thing — as Lychetus excellently saw (*Quodl. cit.*); or per accidens, not per se, as Gadius writes there.

Objection 2, against the second assertion: everything that exists is either a real being or a being of reason, as is clear from what has been said; but if a proper attribute of the being of reason were on the part of the thing, either it would be a real being — and this is false; or a being of reason — and this is not, because a proper attribute is a lesser being than the subject of which it is the proper attribute; but there is no lesser being than the being of reason, since this is the minimum among beings, having only a qualified and diminished being; therefore no proper attribute of the being of reason is to be handed down, even of that having a foundation in the thing. I concede the major; to the minor I concede the first part and distinguish the second part: identically, I concede; formally in its own mode, I deny. For a proper attribute of the being of reason is its aliqueity — just as a proper attribute of real being is the aliqueity of real being, as I showed in (*Bk. II, Q. 2 of this work*). To the subsumption the answer is clear through the distinction now adduced — how a proper attribute can be called a lesser being than the being of reason, namely formally, but not identically.

Objection 3: Intelligibility is adapted only to real being, as Scotus asserts (*1, d. 3, Q. 3, §. Quantum ad 2. art. 1.*); therefore it is wrongly attributed to the being of reason. I expound the antecedent by a distinction: motive intelligibility, I concede; terminative intelligibility, I deny. For the latter belongs to real being and the being of reason alike, as Bargius observes in his commentary on the cited passage.

You will press: nothing is intelligible unless it can impress a species of itself in the intellect, because from (*3 On the Soul, T. 31*): one who understands must inspect phantasms; but the being of reason can have no species of itself, because it is not sensible per se nor per accidens, nor formally nor virtually contained in real being; therefore it is not intelligible and accordingly intelligibility is not its proper attribute and affection. I reply that the major holds for the motive intelligible object, not for the terminative one — such as the being of reason is — for whose cognition no species of itself is prerequisite, since it cannot have one; but it is known through analogy to real being, in the manner of which it is fashioned.

Question II. On the Cause of the Being of Reason

In the present context the word "cause" is not taken in its proper sense, of which I treated at length in (*Bk. IV, Phys.*), but in the broad sense, insofar as it somehow attains its effect. For just as the being of reason is not properly a being but in the manner of real being and is known through analogy to it, so properly speaking it has no cause of its being — and in the mode in which it has being, its cause is likewise handed down, as will be clearly established in the course of this question.

Article I. Whether the Being of Reason Has a Cause of Its Being

Some, among whom Mayr (*Quodl. 6, Art. 4*), Gabriel (*2, d. 1, Q. 1, Dub. 4, T. 4*), and Soncinas (*6 Metaph., Q. 18*) are cited, acknowledge no cause of the being of reason. Others, such as Suárez (*Disp. 54 Metaph., Sect. 2*), concede an efficient cause to it, but remove the other causes — especially the final — from it. Nor are there lacking those who attribute the remaining causes to it, with the exception of the formal cause. Still others, whom our two recent authors follow (*Disp. 3 Log., Q. 3*) and Poncius (*Disp. 1, Q. 6*), think that the four genera of causes are in some mode accommodated to the being of reason — whom the Doctor seems to have preceded (*Quodl. 1, §. De altero. H., and Quodl. 3, §. De primo. B., and 1, d. 3, Q. 7, Q. Contra istam opinionem. F., and elsewhere*).

It is argued first: whatever has any being apart from God is caused — for every being, from the foregoing assertions, is either from itself and uncaused, as God is, or from another and properly caused, if it is a real being, or improperly caused, if it is a being of reason; but the being of reason has being in a qualified, diminished, and objective way, as is clear from the preceding question, articles 1

and 2; therefore the being of reason has a cause of its being. Second: what was not before and now is, is produced and caused by some cause — because nothing produces and causes itself; but the being of reason previously did not exist — as when someone previously did not syllogize, but now syllogizes, defines, divides, and performs other acts, which are formally beings of reason; therefore the cause of the being of reason is not to be denied. Third: as shadow is related to an opaque body, so the being of reason is related to real being, from the notes above — since the former is in the manner of a shadow of the latter and is fashioned in some way after its likeness; but a shadow has its cause — namely, the opaque body; therefore the same is to be asserted of the being of reason, that it has a cause of itself.

Specifically it is proved for each genus of causes — first indeed for the efficient cause, which Scotus specifically posits as the intellect for second intentions (2, d. 1, Q. 1, §. *Quantum ad hoc, sub H.*), and in general for all beings of reason, in the places just cited above. For this is indicated by its nomenclature — for "being of reason" is the same as a being made by reason, that is, by the intellect. What also manifests this is its definition: that it has being only objectively in the intellect. And Logic, which is concerned with the being of reason, is produced by the comparing and conferring intellect, conferring one known thing with another known thing. Hence the Formalists rightly add (*Tract. of Formalities, Art. 1 principali*) that the being of reason is the passive comparison of one known object to another known object. The intellect, therefore, is the efficient cause of the being of reason.

The final cause is shown. First: efficient and final causes are necessarily conjoined with each other — hence that saying (2 *Phys.*, Cap. 3, T. 30): "Causes are causes of each other" — which is understood chiefly of the efficient and final causes. Therefore if the efficient cause of the being of reason is given, the final cause is not to be denied to it. Furthermore, everything invented and existing is for some end — otherwise it would be fruitless and superfluous; but the being of reason is thought up and exists in the intellect; therefore for some end, as is clear from Logic about second intentions, which are by us for the pursuit of truth and its discernment from falsity; therefore the being of reason participates in the final cause.

Nor does it avail to say, with Suárez (*cit.*), that the end of the being of reason is the act or the very thinking of man. For the being of reason is made through that act and thinking; therefore it is not its end, because the very thinking or fiction is that through which it is made, and not that for the sake of which it is made — which is required for the notion of end. Moreover, cognition is a real being pertaining to the predicament of quality, and it would be absurd and ridiculous for a real being to be the end of a being of reason. Add that the same Suárez (*cit.*, Sect. 1, n. 8) in the second cause adduced by him seems to assign the end of the being of reason — comparing one thing to another, in order to judge

truth from falsity; therefore the end of the being of reason is not precisely cognition and thinking of man, as the said Suárez imagines.

Regarding the material and formal cause: in the logical being of reason and that which is founded in the thing, its genus and difference can be assigned — as Scotus agrees (*4, d. 1, Q. 2, Art., §. Ex his. L.*). For genus stands as matter, and difference as form, since the latter determines and contracts the former. But in the fictitious being of reason not founded on the part of the thing, its matter can be its parts mutually incompatible, and its form its entity and difference by which the whole fiction is constituted and distinguished from everything that is not itself.

Objection 1: If the being of reason had a cause, it would be proportioned to it, because the effect is proportioned to its cause; but every cause is real; therefore no effect of it is a being of reason, and accordingly the being of reason has no cause of its being. I reply that the argument concludes with respect to a proper cause and proper effect — not however with respect to an improper cause and its improper effect, as I noted just now at the beginning of this question.

Objection 2: What is produced is produced by a production, and what is caused is caused by a causation; but the production and causation by which the being of reason is produced and caused is either real or of reason: not real — otherwise the being of reason would be real, which implies a contradiction; nor of reason — because since production precedes the produced, the being of reason would exist before it was produced, which is incompatible. Therefore, lest any incompatibility be conceded, it seems better to say that the being of reason has no cause of its being. I concede the major; to the minor I say that that production is improper, just as the cause is improper — which by that production produces the being of reason — and therefore no absurdity follows, namely that the being of reason exists before it is caused. Whether the being of reason is subjected in the intellect or not, see what I wrote in (*Logic, Bk. II, Q. 1, Art. 13*).

Article II. What Are the Efficient Causes of the Being of Reason

Some hold that the being of reason is produced by the external and internal senses, whom Arriaga most recently follows (*Disp. 6, Sect. 3*). Nor are there lacking those who posit the intellect alone as its efficient cause, among whom are the Complutenses (*Disp. 2 Log., Q. 3, §. 2, T. 2, and 4*) and Poncius (*Disp. 1, Q. 7, Concl. 3*), and commonly the Thomists. Most Scotists, however, add the will; and among these a number, notably Stephen Brulifer (*Tract. of Formalities, fol. 7*), posit three formative powers of the being of reason — namely the intellect, the will, and the imagination.

Note: the being of reason is taken in two ways. In one way, strictly and properly, as it is made by the intellect or reason alone, from which it derives its denomination. For it is called a being of reason — of reason, which coincides

with the intellect — and thus the being of reason is caused only by the intellect, nor can any other power produce it except the intellect; otherwise there would be a contradiction in terms in investigating whether the being of reason is made by another cause than reason. Hence Fuentes (*Q. 2, Logic, Diff. 3, Art. 1*) abstained from the name of the being of reason and investigated whether the imagination or phantasy can feign beings. In another way, broadly and improperly, as it is made by another power, having some likeness and proportion with the true and proper being of reason — insofar as, namely, just as the proper being of reason has being only objectively in the intellect, so some fictitious being is given from another vital power, which in that power has being only objectively; and of this the present discussion is about. But this twofold acceptance of the being of reason is adduced and expounded by Lychetus in his commentary on (*Quodl. 17*) and Gadius in that place; and is indicated by Scotus both there (§. *De secundo. C.*) and in (*1, d. 45, Q. un., §. Ad argumenta. C. and D.*). But why the passive comparison of the will is called a relation of reason — the cause is assigned by our Doctor (*Quodl., cited just above*): because the will, even though essentially it is not rational, like the intellect, is nonetheless rational by participation; by reason of which, its said respect can be called a being of reason and a relation of reason. Perhaps looking to this, Aristotle (*9 Metaph., Cap. 2, T. 3, T. 6, T. 10*) little or not at all distinguishes the intellect from the will, and calls both powers rational. He writes the same in (*3 Ethics, T. 3*).

First Assertion: No sense, whether external or internal — except the imagination — can attain the production of the being of reason taken in the second way. This assertion is two-membered and is consonant with the doctrine of Scotus in the places cited just above.

The first part is certain among the Doctor and his disciples, since none of them whom I have seen defends the opposing view. It is proved first: the efficient cause of the being of reason must be comparative, from what was said in Art. 1 of this question; but no external or internal sense is compositive of one thing with another and collative of parts with the whole, or of superiors with inferiors, or of common things with particulars — since they are bound to sensible and material things, of which they are perceivers only of singulars, according to that not infrequently sung maxim: "Sense is of singulars and intellect of universals"; therefore the aforesaid senses are not makers of the being of reason. Second: the being of reason is fashioned by that whose object it is somehow contained under, as is clear from the intellect, which comprehends the being of reason as its terminative object, as Lychetus, Gadius, and others assert in the commentary on (*Quodl. 3*); but the being of reason is not attained by any of the aforesaid senses, since their object is the real sensible; therefore it is produced by none of them. Third: to whom the definition does not belong, the defined is likewise not accommodated to the same; but the definition of the being of reason — which is to have being only objectively in the knowing and making power — does not suit any production and causation of sense; for what is perceived by sense exists

outside it and is present to it; therefore the making of the being of reason is not adapted to sense.

The second part is indicated by the Doctor (*Q. 9, On the Soul, in the solution of the 4th*) and in the passages cited just above, even though elsewhere he seems uncertain; and the Scotists not a few favor it, to whom Suárez (*Disp. 54 Metaph., Sect. 2, n. 18*) and Arriaga (*Disp. 6, Sect. 3, subsect. 2, n. 27*) agree.

It is proved first: an effect or quasi-effect is conformed and proportioned, as much as possible, to its cause or quasi-cause — chiefly in this: that just as the effect is producible, so the cause is productive and causative of it. But the being of reason taken broadly is in its own mode producible by the phantasy or imagination — for it can present to that phantasy a golden mountain, a goat-stag, or another chimera, which would have no being unless only that objective being in the imagination itself, which would plainly be a being of reason as described above; therefore the imagination can cause this kind of being of reason. Second: a collative power is a maker of the being of reason, as the Doctor openly suggests in the cited place; hence the same Doctor (*4, d. 1, Q. 2. B.*) describes the being of reason as the passive comparison of one known object to another known object; but the imagination is a collative power, since it can simultaneously connect the species of a mountain and of gold and fashion a golden mountain and fully possess it in dreams and delight and enjoy it; therefore the imagination is not to be excluded from the fashioning of the being of reason.

Our two recent authors (*Disp. 3 Log., Q. 4, Art. 1*) reply, from Bargius (*1, d. 3, Q. 1, and Quodl. 17*) and Tartaretus there, saying that the imagination indeed apprehends the golden mountain precisely, yet not the union of mountain and gold — just as the eye sees Peter running without seeing that bond and copula of Peter with running. But for the being of reason to come about, it is necessary that the power making it attain the parts simultaneously united in the whole, and the whole itself composed from them — namely, mountain and gold, the connection of each, and the whole itself, the golden mountain, fashioned by the aforesaid power, which is formally the being of reason. But the imagination cannot perform this; therefore it cannot formally feign the being of reason.

Against this: in dreams, with the external senses at rest and with intellect and will not acting, someone imagines himself having a golden mountain, orders and arranges it for gaining honors and dignities, for contracting marriage with the great and princes of the world, and for acquiring other such things; therefore the imagination attains the parts of the whole, the union and bond of these with those. Hence the example adduced of the eye seeing Peter actually running does not hold, because the eye is an external sense perceiving objects existing and present only; but the imagination is an internal sense knowing both present and absent things, jointly and separately. Furthermore, with the imagination alone acting, a man recounts his dream — though he may not know

how to interpret it — as is clear from the cupbearers of Pharaoh in Genesis 40. On the contrary, in Daniel 2, Nebuchadnezzar did not know his own dream. Therefore the imagination also attains the whole complex and its union and copula. Third: the imagination excels the other internal and external senses; therefore if the other senses perceive a complex without distance — that is, without the copula, as the aforesaid authors hand down — the imagination, which is more excellent and efficacious than they, perceives more than them — namely, the complex and its union. Moreover, the will, which is conjoined with the intellect, is called rational by participation and a maker of the being of reason, as the Doctor writes (*Quodl. cited*). Therefore the imagination, which is proximate to the intellect and offers and presents sensible species to it, can by participation be called an effective cause of the being of reason.

Fourth: we experience that in phantasying and dreaming we form many beings of reason. Hence Scotus (*Q. On the Soul, cited above*) says: "The imagination perceives its own act — for we imagine that we are imagining and that we have imagined, and we dream that we are dreaming, as we clearly experience." Therefore the formation of the being of reason is not to be excepted from the imagination. For someone in dreams imagines himself to be a general of an army, commands the army, orders the foot soldiers, arranges the cavalry, and so on. Likewise another thinks himself lord and king of the universe, whom all obey and carry out his orders — and waking he sees himself a vile and humble servant as he was before the dream. But these and similar things are done by the imagination and phantasy alone, with the other powers not at all concurring; therefore the imagination can feign beings of reason in the mode stated above.

Second Assertion: Not only the intellect but also the will in its own mode is a cause of the being of reason. This assertion is two-membered, like the first, and is handed down by the Doctor (*cit.*). The first part is common and remains proved from the preceding article and Q. 1 of this book, Art. 1 and 2. And it is openly denoted by its nominal definition. For "being of reason" is the same as a being of the intellect, an artifact of the intellect, its work and effect, as I made clear above. Nor can it be more aptly accommodated and adapted to any other power than the intellect — since the intellect is collative, reflexive, discursive, and immaterial, attaining every conceivable and intelligible being, such as the being of reason is, as is clear from what has been said.

The second part is indicated by the Doctor (*1, d. 45, Q. un., §. Ad argumenta. D., and Quodl. 17, §. De secundo. C., and 4, d. 16, Q. 2, §. Respondeo. E.*) and is commonly defended by the Scotists, with few exceptions, whom Poncius follows (*Disp. 1 Logic, Q. 7, Concl. 2*).

It is argued first: every power collative of one object with another is a maker of the being of reason, as Scotus well saw in the cited place; but the will is a collative and comparative power of one willed object with another — such as of means toward the end, as when it loves a creature for the sake of God, and

conversely God for the sake of a creature; therefore the will can form the being of reason. Nor does it avail to say that if the will is moved toward an object and compares it to another that seems good but in truth is not good, it does not feign such good but the intellect that has first apprehended and presented it to it — and thus the intellect and not the will makes that being of reason. For each of these powers in its own mode forms the being of reason — the intellect indeed by understanding and judging, hence it is called proper and rigorous being of reason; the will truly by willing and ordering, which is the being of reason improperly and broadly taken; therefore just as the intellect, conferring one known thing with another, makes the being of reason, so the will, comparing one willed object with another, forms the being of reason. As when a sinner wishes to use God for the sake of a creature which he enjoys, such a relation of God to the creature is of reason — not of the intellect, because use and enjoyment do not pertain to the intellect; therefore it is of the will; and accordingly this formation is not to be removed from the will.

Second: the will can tend toward a pre-established and fixed end (*1, d. 1, Q. 1, Art. 3 and 4*) and will evil under the notion of evil, as I showed in (*Moral Philosophy, Bk. II, Q. 3, Art. 3*). But this pre-fixed end and evil under the notion of evil not pre-shown to it by the intellect can be impossible — such as equality with God sought by the evil angel (*2, d. 6, Q. 1*) — and can only be presented to the will itself, as the notion of the being of reason requires; therefore the will does not lack the power and virtue of making the being of reason.

Third: the object of the will extends as broadly as that of the intellect. For everything intelligible is likewise volible, as the Doctor seems to assert (*4, d. 49, Q. 1, §. Ad 1. quaestionem, before T.*). Indeed, the will is of greater power and dignity than the intellect, since it is mistress of its own acts, commands the intellect itself and the other powers, as I showed in (*Bk. V, On the Soul, Q. 3, Art. 2*). Therefore if the intellect can accomplish this, so likewise the will; and if that which proceeds from the intellect is called a being of reason, this that issues from the will can be called a being of the will, because it proceeds from the will.

Objection 2, against the first part of the first assertion: many and diverse appearances exist — such as colors in the rainbow and on the neck of a dove in the light of the sun, the obliqueness of a straight rod placed in water, and the curvature of an oar in the sea; but these and similar things are not real beings; therefore they are beings of reason fabricated by the external sense — namely the eye — and accordingly the external sense can form beings of reason. I concede the major and deny the minor. For real being is divided into true and apparent — just as good is likewise distributed into true good and apparent good, which is on the part of the thing; since even if no eye or other external or internal sense or intellect existed, there would still be the apparent colors of the rainbow and the like — meteors about which I treated in (*On Meteorology, Art. 3, Q. 3*).

You will press: sense is sometimes deceived when it perceives a thing other than it is, and its act is false; but a false act is a being of reason; therefore the external sense contrives a being of reason. I concede the major from (*Bk. IV, On the Soul, Q. 2, Art. 4*), and the erring sense the intellect can correct, as the Doctor writes (*1, d. 3, Q. 4, §. De tertiis cognoscibilibus. G.*). I deny the minor: for the act of sense and intellect, whether true or false, is placed in the predicament of quality, which is a series of real beings. Furthermore, a false act can be true if the object is perceived as it is — which does not belong to the being of reason, unless the being of reason is taken for a non-existent being that is nonetheless possible, as Arriaga (*cited*) does against common usage and according to his own whim and pleasure — which is not to be tolerated.

You will urge: the eye sees that light is absent but shadow present; but shadow is a being of reason, because it is conceived in the manner of some positive form, which truly is not; therefore the formation of the being of reason belongs to the external sense. If the major is conceded, the minor is to be denied: shadow, even though it is a privation of primary light, is nonetheless a secondary light, and accordingly a positive real being — while darkness is the privation of both lights.

Objection 2, against the second part of the same assertion: no power goes beyond the limits of its total and adequate object, as no one denies; but if the imagination were to feign the being of reason, it would go beyond the limits of its total and adequate object, which is the sensible, whether present or absent; hence, concerning this, it provides and supplies sensible and material species, in which the being of reason is contained neither formally nor virtually; therefore the faculty of imagination cannot fashion the being of reason. I concede the major and deny the minor: since in the imagination reside many species of diverse material and sensible things, it can join and compose them, and compare them mutually, and thus cause the being of reason — such as a goat-stag and other things that are comprehended within the limits of sensible things.

You will press: only immaterial and inorganic powers can produce the being of reason, as Scotus affirms (*Quodl. 17, §. De 2. C.*); but the imagination is a material and organic faculty; therefore it cannot attain the production of the being of reason. I deny the major; to the testimony of Scotus I say with Lychetus there that immateriality of the power is not the entire and precise cause of making the being of reason, but its collativity and comparativity of one thing with another; since, however, from what has been said the faculty of imagination is collative and comparative of one thing with another, and compositive of one with another — as our two recent authors concede (*cit., Art. 1, Disp. 3, Q. 4, before §. Altera etiam pars.*) — for this reason effectiveness of the being of reason is attributed to it.

Objection 3, against the second part of the later assertion: a cause is that which gives being to its effect, as is clear from its definition; but the will does not give

being to the being of reason, which is only objective being — for only the intellect communicates this to it; therefore the will is not a formative agent of the being of reason. I concede the major; I distinguish the minor: the will does not bestow being that is only objectively known, I concede; objectively willed, I deny. For just as the intellect primarily forms the being of reason in its own order, so the will likewise in its own order fashions its own willed beings — which, in the broad sense of the word, are called beings of reason, or rather beings of the will.

You will press: the will can be moved only toward what the intellect proposes and presents to it — hence that celebrated saying: *nothing is willed unless previously known*; therefore the will does not make the being of reason, but presupposes it as made by the intellect. I concede the antecedent and deny the consequence — for even though the intellect previously forms its being of reason and presents to the will all the relations of reason, nonetheless the will itself does not cause them in that known being — since they are already presupposed as caused by the intellect — but in the willed being, which pertains to the will itself. Indeed the will itself can will and choose the opposite of what is presented by the intellect — as when the intellect proposes good to it and it wills evil even under the notion of evil, it turns that intellect away from the right and commands the oblique.

You will urge: the will cannot bestow objective being upon real beings toward which it is moved; therefore neither upon beings of reason — since the reasoning is equal in both cases. It is satisfied by the distinction: for the will bestows upon real beings the being-willed, by accepting and loving and pursuing them through its direct act; upon beings of reason by a reflexive and comparative act — as the Doctor excellently expresses (3, d. 26, Q. un., §. Ad q. igitur. E.) and Mayron discusses (*Quodl.* 7, point 12).

Article III. By What Act of the Intellect the Being of Reason Is Made

From the various and diverse acceptance of the being of reason, modern authors proceed into various and diverse views. For some, such as Vásquez (1 Part., Q. 76, Cap. 2, n. 6) and Hurtado (*Disp.* 19 *Metaph.*, Sect. 5), deny that the being of reason is produced through the first act of the intellect — which is the apprehension of simple terms — and think it is made through the second, which is affirmative or negative. Others, such as Ruuio (*Tract. On the Nature of the Being of Reason*), Fuentes (Q. 2 *Log.*, Diff. 3, Art. 2, T. 4), the Complutenses (*Disp.* 2, Q. 3, Q. 2, T. 2 and 4), and Arriaga (*Disp.* 6 *Metaph.*, Sect. 3, Subsect. 3), think the being of reason can be formed through any operation of the intellect.

What was observed in (*Logic*, Bk. I, Q. 1, Art. 3) about the acts of the intellect — direct, reflexive, and comparative — is to be presupposed and recalled. The three operations of the same intellect described and explained there (Q. 3, Art. 6) are likewise to be recalled. Nor is one to depart from the common and ordinary

definition of the being of reason, which is: to have being only objectively in the intellect. To extend that definition to a prohibited and impossible being and to what does not exist but is nonetheless possible — or to restrict the same to a false composite or divided act pertaining to the second operation of the mind — is vain and voluntary; nor is it permissible according to anyone's whim to broaden or narrow the descriptions of beings received and subscribed by the common run of philosophers, such as the aforesaid definition of the being of reason — premised and pre-explained by me in (*Q. 1, Art. 2 of this book*). One must persist in it as in the others, as almost all do.

First Assertion: The being of reason can be formed through the first operation of the intellect. This is defended by Scotus (*Q. 3, on Universals, and following*), and is indicated in (*2, d. 3, Q. 1, §. Ad quaestionem igitur. E. and F.*).

It is proved first: to the first operation of the intellect belong simple and non-complex terms — such as genus, species, and the other universals, as well as the predicaments; but these are formally beings of reason, as the common sense of the Dialecticians holds; therefore the formation of the being of reason is to be attributed to the first operation of the intellect. Second: what can make something have being only objectively in the intellect can make the being of reason; but the intellect through its first operation can make something have being only objectively in it — as when it makes the abstract, the concrete, and the like, which depend only on it itself in such being and being-known; therefore through its first act the being of reason can be caused. Third: someone can imagine and apprehend a chimera and goat-stag without any affirmative or negative judgment; but the apprehension of these belongs to the first operation of the intellect; therefore through this action the being of reason can be feigned.

Second Assertion: Through the second and third operation, beings of reason are made not only materially but also formally. This assertion is consonant with Scotus (*ibid.*) and is at variance with Mastrius and Bellutus (*Disp. 3 Log., Q. 4, Art. 2*), who affirm that beings of reason pertaining to the form of a proposition and syllogism — such as subject, predicate, major, minor, and conclusion — are produced only through the first operation of the intellect, but as for matter, they are caused through all three.

It is proved first: each operation of the intellect participates in its own and peculiar efficiency, since they are distinct from one another, as is clear from their descriptions; therefore just as through the first operation — with respect to the matter and form of a proposition and discourse — the being of reason comes to be, so through the second and third — since these are not of inferior and worse entity and causality. Hence there are distinct books, of which some pertain to the first — such as the book of universals and predicaments — others to the second — such as the book of the *Perihermeneias* — and still others to the third — such as the books of the *Prior* and *Posterior Analytics*.

Nor does it avail to say, with the aforesaid recent authors, that what comes to be through the second and third operation are extrinsic denominations — such as being affirmed or negated, being antecedent and consequent — and only through the first operation are non-beings apprehended in the manner of a being, and accordingly only these are formally beings of reason pertaining to the first operation alone. For extrinsic denominations are on the part of the thing, with the operation of the intellect excluded, as those same authors admit (*cit.*, *Q. 2, Art. 1*); but being affirmed or negated, being consequent and antecedent, and the like have being only objectively in the intellect; therefore they are formally beings of reason pertaining to the second and third operation of the intellect. The minor is shown: the relation of predicate to subject, and conversely — when something is predicated of another — does not arise from the nature of the extremes, as "man is white"; nor likewise the relation of antecedent to consequent — but from the second and third operation; therefore it is formally a being of reason pertaining to those very operations.

Furthermore, what these authors add — that the being of reason is a non-being apprehended in the manner of a being — is false and was rejected by me in (*Q. 1, Art. 2 of this book*) in the first assertion. For it is required for the formal being of the being of reason that it have being only objectively in the intellect — whether it has apprehended being through the first operation, or affirmed being through the second, or consequent and inferred being through the third. Therefore the first operation does not respect the union of predicate with subject, nor the deduction and inference of consequent from antecedent — as the aforesaid Neoterics think. Second: an enunciation is the assertion of one thing of another — whether affirmation or negation — which is adapted to the second operation of the intellect; but this is not simple but a composite quality, as I showed at length in (*Bk. IV, Logic, Q. 3, Art. 2*); hence it is called composition or division; therefore what is fashioned through the second operation is not referred back to the first, which is the apprehension of simple things. Third: a syllogism is formally a being of reason composed of integral and subjective parts, and belongs to the third operation — as is clear from its description adduced and explained in the *Epitome of Dialectics*, Bk. III, Q. 1, Art. 3; therefore the being of reason, as to form, is not adapted only to the first operation.

The same Doctors come forward and distinguish: the relations of reason which an enunciation and argumentation exhibit — if taken in the concrete and in the exercised act — import something complex, pertaining to the second and third operation of the intellect; but if they are taken in the abstract and in the signified act, they are something simple and non-complex — namely relations and dispositions of predicate to subject, and of antecedent to consequent, suited to the first operation. But this distinction does not please — since, undoubtedly, the first operation is presupposed and is prior to the second; and simple and non-complex terms precede composite and complex ones, and parts precede the whole; but in the second operation, these terms are not taken in the abstract

and in the signified act, but in the concrete and in the exercised act — because the second operation itself is composition and complexio of one thing with another, in which predicates are bound with subjects through a verbal copula. Therefore that consideration and abstraction in the abstract and in the signified act is irrelevant for dissolving the aforesaid objections. Moreover, when the first and second operations concur in making their own being of reason, the first operation has already produced its being of reason; therefore the being of reason that is caused by these is not at all attained by the former, since the latter has already performed its function and what pertains to the former is remanded and delegated to it — since they are not confused but are distinct from one another in their entities, functions, and offices.

Objection 1, against the first assertion: through a false act the being of reason is made, by which a thing is perceived other than it is — as the nature of the being of reason requires; but in the first operation there is no falsity — since this pertains to the second operation; therefore neither is there a being of reason. The major is denied: for it suffices for the being of reason that it have being only objectively in the intellect; but it is accidental that the act is false, as I noted above.

Objection 2: The power formative of the being of reason is collative and comparative, and the being of reason by the common run of Scotists is described as the passive comparison of one known object to another known object; but in the first operation there is no comparison of one thing to another, since it is the apprehension of simple things; therefore through it no being of reason is produced. I concede the first part of the major; to the second it can be said that it is the definition of the logical being of reason and of logical second intentions — not however of the being of reason taken universally, as I observed in (*Art. 2, Q. 1 of this book*). Or say that in the first operation there is some comparison of one thing to another, yet without affirmation and negation — as when something is conceived through another, such as darkness through light, and in the manner of another, such as the being of reason, in the likeness of real being.

You ask whether an angel can produce the being of reason. I reply affirmatively. For the reasoning is equal concerning the angelic and the human intellect: both are collative, comparative, and discursive, as I showed at length in (*Tract. On Angels, Disp. 6, Q. 1, §. 5*).

Article IV. Whether God Can Make the Being of Reason

Vásquez (*1 Part., Disp. 118, Cap. 2, n. ult.*), preceded by Mayron (*1, Quodl. 6*), thinks not only that God cannot produce the being of reason, but that He cannot even know it. Suárez (*Disp. 54 Metaph., Sect. 2, n. 23*), however, admits that God knows the being of reason, but denies that He can cause it. Scotus, on the other hand (*Quodl. 1, §. De altero, before L., and in other places*), Gadius, Lychetus, Viger,

Bargius, and the rest of the Scotists teach that God both knows and makes the being of reason — to whom Gabriel (2, d. 1, Q. 2), Fonseca (7 *Metaph.*, Cap. 8), Arriaga (*Disp.* 6, Sect. 4), and many others agree.

First Assertion: God knows all beings of reason. The Doctor maintains this (*ibid.*, and elsewhere). It is proved first from sacred letters: Hebrews 4: *All things are naked and open to his eyes* — which place Lyran interprets as applying not only to things accomplished but also to things thought, which are sometimes real, sometimes imaginary, impossible, and fictitious — which are beings of reason. If you come forward and say that the cited testimony is to be taken of real beings only — I oppose to you that of (*Wisdom* 8), which can hardly be explained otherwise than of beings of reason: *He knows the subtleties of speeches and the solutions of arguments; signs and wonders he knows before they happen* — where Lyran translates "the fallacies of speeches." But it is clear that fallacies are argumentations apparently true but in truth false; and argumentations are formally beings of reason, as was shown and clearly proved in the preceding article.

Second: the knowledge of God is infinite, by which He comprehends the secrets of the heart, the thoughts of the mind, and all its acts wandering chimerically; but to comprehend is to know a thing in all the modes in which it is knowable; but the being of reason from what was said in (*Q. 1 of this book*, Art. 6) is knowable and is known by us; therefore also by God. Nor does it avail to say with Vásquez (*cit.*) that God knows the real extremes in which the being of reason is founded, but not their union, which is the relation of reason or the being of reason itself. For one who knows the extremes fully and in every mode likewise knows the union of the extremes — since one who attains the parts also attains the whole composed from the parts; if therefore God knows the false propositions and argumentations fabricated and put together by the created intellect, He also knows their union and connection — especially since some beings of reason, such as fictions, are supported by no extreme and no foundation. Hence Arriaga rightly says (*cit.*) that this view of Vásquez is rejected as false by all.

Third: who knows the greater, knows the lesser, from the place from the greater to the lesser; but God knows the greater being — namely real being, which is being simply; therefore He knows the lesser — namely the being of reason, which is a qualified and diminished being. Finally: the finite and created intellect attains the being of reason through its act; therefore it does not escape the infinite and uncreated intellect.

Second Assertion: God can make the being of reason. Scotus (*cit.*) favors this. It is proved first: who has the principle and power of making the being of reason can make the being of reason; but God has the principle and power of making the being of reason; therefore He can make the being of reason. The major is evident — for being and being able is for the sake of operating. The minor is admitted, because God possesses an intellect, which is a collative and comparative power of one object with another, and accordingly productive of

the being of reason, as I showed in (*Articles 1 and 2 of this question*). Nor does it avail to say, with our two recent authors (*Disp. 3 Log., Q. 1, §. 5*), that the effective force of the being of reason carries imperfection — that is, conceiving non-being in the manner of being — which is far removed from God; because, apart from the fact that the being of reason is not thus described, as I showed in (*Art. 2 of the preceding question*), it is the express doctrine of Scotus (*Quodl. 1, cited just above*), affirming that the divine intellect can confer one object with another and produce the being of reason. Especially because this does not lower but exalts the intellect, which extends to every being — real and of reason — and contains both under its object. What they say — that real being is the adequate object of the intellect, from (*1, d. 3, Q. 3*) — does not hold, because the Doctor there speaks of the motive object, not the terminative one — such as the being of reason is — as the same authors themselves sense and accept there (*Q. 6*) with Bargius and other Scotists. Therefore the argument stands in its force.

Second: every efficiency is to be attributed to God, who is the supreme maker and craftsman of all things; but the formation of the being of reason pertains to the efficiency of the efficient cause; therefore it is fitting for God. The major is evident, because only the causalities of the material and formal causes are removed from God, since they carry imperfection with them. The minor is clear from (*Art. 1 of this question*), in which the efficient cause of the being of reason was established. Third: God can do whatever a secondary cause can do — indeed greater and more excellent things, since He is of infinite power; but a secondary intellectual cause can contrive the being of reason, from what has been said; therefore also God, who is the first cause. Moreover, God can cause Logic in the intellect of someone — as He did at the beginning of the world, infusing it into Adam and the Angels; but Logic is concerned with the being of reason, namely the syllogism; therefore the production of the being of reason is not to be denied to God. All the more so: nothing is independent except God; but the being of reason would be independent, because for its being — which is qualified and objective — God Himself would not cooperate or concur; and if the created intellect in forming it were to act independently, without the concurrence of God — if it is conceded that God concurs with the created intellect in its production — then certainly it must be admitted that God Himself, without the cooperation of another, can attain the formation of the same.

Third Assertion: The affirmative part is certain and to be held in the Scotist school. This assertion militates against Mastrius and Bellutus, cited above (*Q. 5*), who defend it only problematically. It is argued first from (*Quodl. 1, §. De altero, before L.*), where it is openly and explicitly stated that both intellects — created and uncreated — form beings of reason through the comparison of their acts to objects. Second, from (*1, d. 30, Q. 2, §. Respondeo. sua. G.*), where it is perspicuously and clearly read that the divine essence can be compared to the creature both through the act of the created intellect and the uncreated, and can

cause a relation of reason in it. Third, from (*ibid.*, d. 36, Q. un., §. *contra istud. G. and H.*, and *Quodl.* 17, §. *de secundo. C.*, and 3, d. 26, Q. vn., §. *Ad quaestionem. E.*, and 4, d. 16, Q. 2), and other places, in which it is plainly established that our Doctor asserts that God produces beings of reason.

Nor does it avail to cite against this the testimony of the same Doctor (1, d. 2, Q. 4, §. *Ista tamen positio, ad N.*), where it is held as absurd that the divine intellect causes a relation of reason in the essence as existing. Because there, as Lychetus interprets it, Scotus is speaking of the direct and absolute act of the intellect through which the being of reason is not made — hence it is absurd for the being of reason to be made through such an act; for the being of reason is produced through the collative and comparative act of the intellect, as those same authors do not deny. The other testimony which they add from (1, d. 35, Q. un., §. *contra 2. positionem. H.*) — where Scotus, discussing the divine intellect as producing the being of reason, places the particle *fortasse* ("perhaps"), which is a dubitative word — does not profit them, because in (*Report.*, 1, d. 36, Q. 2) having the same discussion, he speaks assertively; and likewise in the other places cited above — which all his interpreters and his entire school follow. Wherefore, although in the first place he does not firmly determine himself to the affirmative part, yet in the later ones he adheres to it entirely; and accordingly this — and not the other, which is negative — is to be received and embraced.

Objection 1, against the first assertion: to know the being of reason is to feign something; but God cannot feign anything, since He is most truthful; therefore God cannot know the being of reason. The major is proved: to feign is to hold in mind what is feigned; therefore to know the being of reason is to feign something. I deny the major and its proof, which rests on no foundation; and accordingly, in the mode in which it is proposed, it is also dissolved.

Objection 2: God cannot be deceived, because He cannot know things otherwise than they are; but if He knew the being of reason, He would be deceived — because He would know non-being in the manner of being, as is clear from darkness and other privations, which are apprehended by us in the manner of real and positive forms; therefore God is devoid of knowledge of the being of reason. I concede the major and deny the minor. For the argument presses those who think that the being of reason is a non-being apprehended in the manner of a being — whom I refuted in (Q. 1 of this book, Art. 2).

Objection 3, against the second assertion: no imperfection is to be ascribed to God, since He is most perfect and the ocean of infinite perfections; but to make the being of reason is an imperfection — for to make the being of reason is the same as to make a qualified and diminished being; and to produce such qualified and diminished effects is a sign of weakness and impotence; therefore God is alien from the efficiency of the being of reason. I concede the major and deny the minor; to its proof I distinguish: if the effect is diminished by its own nature and of itself, I deny; but if the effect is not diminished of itself, I concede.

But the nature of the being of reason requires and demands that it be a qualified and diminished being. For if it were otherwise made, its nature and essence would be destroyed. Therefore the imperfection, weakness, and feebleness are attributed not to the making power but to the nature of the being of reason.

This concludes the whole and complete course of Scotist philosophy, which by God's guidance I began — addressing along with Scotus God Himself, who is the end without end — and with Scotus's support I finish and conclude with Him, who is the term and ultimate end of all, in whom may I enjoy for all eternity.

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