

**A Treatise of the most learned man WILLIAM WHITAKER, lately Sacred Theology Doctor & Regius Professor in the University of Cambridge, and Master of St. John the Evangelist's College in the same University, On Original Sin.**

Distributed into three books, against the first three books of Thomas Stapleton on the whole doctrine of Justification, controverted today.

*Published by the work and care of JOHN ALLENSON, Bachelor of Sacred Theology and fellow of the aforesaid College.*

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### To the Reader, Greetings.

You have nothing of mine here, most humane Reader, except some labor employed partly in reading and transcribing the Author's original manuscript, and partly in correcting the errors of the printers. Each of these certainly caused me more labor and trouble than anyone who has never been accustomed to these tasks might perhaps suspect.

For first, as to the Author's original manuscript (αὐτόγραφον), since I came upon the very archetype (ἀρχέτυπον) itself, in which, as is wont to happen, frequent interlineations as well as deletions occurred, it was necessary for me at times to be in doubt about the order of the words, and sometimes indeed about the coherence of the sentences. Nevertheless, I hope that at last, partly by my own effort and diligence, and partly by the help and aid of friends, I have overcome all these difficulties and have arranged everything in such order that no one can deservedly complain that I have anywhere strayed not only from the Author's meaning and scope, but even from his very words.

Now, to constantly watch over the press and to emend the typographical errors from time to time was much more troublesome and laborious for me, a fact which is sufficiently known and ascertained by those who have ever had any business with the press and with printers' works, especially those who have taken care to publish something in Latin. And although in this matter I have applied as much solicitude as I could, nevertheless, even against my will and upon inspecting everything more closely, some things have slipped by, for the pardoning of which I am compelled to implore your humanity and equanimity, my friend Reader. It is not my intention to preface anything about the argument of the book, lest I detain you any longer from the Author himself, who will abundantly satisfy your expectation in all things, as it pertains to this matter which is here treated. To him, therefore, I refer you. Farewell, and look with favor upon these my labors, undertaken for your sake and for the public use of the Church.

*From the College of St. John the Evangelist in the University of Cambridge. March 26, 1600.*

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# On Original Sin

## CHAPTER I

How wrongly most of the Scholastic authors have thought concerning Original sin can be obscure to no one who is moderately versed in their books. Nor have they recently imbibed this error of opinion, but they have retained it as drawn from ancient times and masters. For Lombard, who has held the first place in the school for now five hundred years, testifies that certain Theologians before him taught that original sin is nothing but the guilt of punishment for the sin of the first man, by which his posterity are liable and subject to temporal and eternal punishment for the actual sin of Adam, so that it is neither a fault nor a punishment (Lombard dist. 30. c. 5.). And although he not obscurely signifies that so insane an opinion is displeasing to him, he was nevertheless unable to persuade his disciples from being devolved into the same or a greater absurdity of opinion. For Scotus did not fear to affirm that after any sin whatsoever has been committed, nothing remains in us except the guilt of punishment (Scotus in 2. d. 34. q. 1. art. 2.). And Biel, a blind man, follows this blind man (Biel in 2. d. 30. q. 1.). But if nothing inhered in Adam after the fall except the guilt of punishment, certainly not a fault, but a bare guilt, passed to his posterity by propagation. Durandus also makes original sin nothing other than mere guilt, when he disputes that Adam's will is considered ours in no other way than because Adam, by sinning voluntarily, brought destruction and the privation of original justice upon us all; wherefore he denies that this sin ought to be called a fault (Durandus in 2. d. 30. q. 2.). William, Bishop of Paris, also taught this, when he proceeded so far as to defend that this natural vice is worthy of no punishment (Wilhelmus Paris. de vitiis & peccat.). Ockham professes that he would have gone into that opinion which posits that Original sin is nothing but divine non-acceptance on account of some preceding demerit in another, if he were not prohibited by the authorities of certain fathers, which seemed to him to say that original fault is the lack of justice that ought to be present (Occamus in 2. q. 14.). Thus for this man, original sin would be only the non-acceptance of God on account of Adam's offense, if he did not wish to seem to depart from the diverse opinion of the saints. Are these men ever to be thought to have even dreamed of the contagion and magnitude of Original sin?

But let us dismiss the more ancient ones and see what the recent ones have stated on this matter. Pighius, against Luther and Calvin, most sharply contends that this sin of origin does not have the true and perpetual nature of sin, and that infants do not labor under any inherent and their own vice, but merely sustain the guilt of another's crime. Whether this is also the opinion of the Council of Trent and of the whole Papist Church may not undeservedly be asked, since the Tridentine Council neither censured the opinion of Pighius among the errors, nor delivered any definition of original sin, nor decided this controversy of the Scholastics; and Catharinus of Compso, who was present at the Council and

followed the authority of the Council, so treated this article that he did not hesitate to think openly with Pighius (Cathar. in 5. ad Rom. & lib. de pecc. orig.). For he hands down that by the very fact that we are the sons of a prevaricator who promised that he would retain the gifts received for himself and for his sons, and did not retain them, we are constituted sinners and worthy of hatred. For thus in civil law, on account of the crime of the parents, the children also, who have sinned in nothing, are thought to be wicked and are stripped of their paternal goods. When you know, Stapleton, that such opinions are cherished by your theologians, do they seem to you only to extenuate this sin, do they not truly extenuate it? Do we also, while we wish to dissent from them, exaggerate it too much and, as you say from the poet, "run foolishly to the contrary"? Truly, I fear that you yourself think no more rightly of original sin than these, whose opinions you seem to wish to disapprove in word. But now let us hear briefly what and how great are the errors you charge against us on this head.

First, therefore, you say that the Lutherans assert that this sin is the greatest and most grievous of all, and that in their zeal for contradicting, they have progressed so far as to have removed the distinction of all habitual and actual sins. But what greater or more grievous sin will you find, in the end, than the Original, if one pleases to judge of it from its causes, circumstances, and effects? If you except the sin against the Holy Spirit, which alone is cut off from pardon, I do not see what could have been committed or thought of that was more atrocious and fatal. That man, newly created, should dare so to contemn the majesty of God, to offend His will, to transgress His interdict, as to withdraw faith from God, as to listen to the lies, calumnies, and blasphemies of Satan, and finally, as to snatch at divinity against God's will. And this, when he had been heaped with the greatest benefits from God, and also endowed with such ornaments of nature that he was urged by no internal enticements and evil desires to sinning, which daily solicit us to sin. For as Augustine warns, one ought to consider how great was the iniquity in sinning where there was so great a facility of not sinning (Aug. de civ. l. 14. c. 15.). But what followed? Cast out of paradise, he himself fell into the hard necessity of death and the greatest miseries, and dragged us all with him. He who considers these things with his mind will easily find and acknowledge the gravity of this sin. But if you think this was only Adam's sin, and not also ours, first you contradict the Apostle, who writes that we sinned in Adam; then you slide into the opinion of those who make original sin nothing other than a punishment or guilt. But if you grant that that sin is ours, for what reason do you deny it to be the greatest in us, which it is certain was by far the greatest in Adam? What? Is ignorance of God, depravity of mind, rebellion against God, the corruption and perversity of all faculties, the fount and tinder of wickedness, a light evil, in which all things are present as in a root, which if it alone exists, merits eternal death? Let your Theologians dispute as much as they will that it is the least of all sins, and less than any venial one: what else do they reveal to all but their singular ignorance? If it is so minimal that it ought to be considered less than even any venial sin, then it cannot even

be a sin, because what is less than venial is not to be placed among sins, since no sin is less than venial. Do you think Thomas felt this, when he writes that original sin is greater extensively than actual sin, but intensively less, because the actual has more of the nature of the voluntary (Thom. in 1. 2. q. 82. art. 2.)? If that reason does not deceive, they did rightly who placed it below any venial sin whatsoever, since in the slightest sin there is more of the voluntary than in the original, unless we are understood to have willed in Adam. And then, indeed, it ought to be judged the greatest not only in extension, because it pervades the whole human race, but also in the intension of the will. But of the magnitude of this sin, later. As for what pertains to the distinction of habitual and actual sins, we willingly acknowledge it. But because this is a habitual sin, will it therefore be lighter than any actual one?

Secondly, you reprehend the Lutherans because they state that concupiscence, in which Augustine placed original sin, pertains to the soul and the superior reason, and embraces a conversion to carnal things in the superior powers, as Melanchthon says, and disobedience of the mind, as Calvin writes (Melanch. in loc. com.; Concil. Trid. sess. 5.; Calv. in 2. Instit. c. 1.). And you call these opinions of Melanchthon and Calvin false. What then of you? Do you not think that this sin is to be placed in Concupiscence, as it seemed to Augustine and to most of the Scholastics? Or do you constitute its seat in the flesh, judging that it pertains in no way to the soul? You will make us certain of your opinion in its proper place, and then you will receive our response concerning Melanchthon and Calvin and the whole cause.

Thirdly, you accuse the Lutherans because they affirm that original sin is not only a fault of a true name, but a fault utterly incurable, which has so corrupted the whole man that whatever has proceeded from man is nothing but sin. Do you, however, think that this is not a fault of a true name? Which it is sufficiently established that the Scholastics—not, as you say, a few, but very many, and those not ignoble—have taught. But no one would say it is incurable, since Christ has healed our wounds and has abundantly restored to us what we lost in Adam. But certainly no other could apply medicine to so mortal a disease. Now, whether a man can not sin, who has not yet been endowed with celestial grace, will be manifest hereafter in the discussion of the arguments.

Lastly, you summon the Lutherans to court because they have willed that original sin consists not only as a vicious habit, but also as an act and affection of sinning in infants and in all the unregenerate. Certainly, Luther contends against the bull of the pontiff that the sin of origin is a living and moving thing, and inimical to God, and therefore is always a sin of a true name. He does not deny it is a vicious habit, but he says this habit is not a dead thing but a living one, which erupts and boils up, and incites us to sin. How true this is, Scripture together with all experience confirms, nor would you deny it, unless it were certain to you

to contradict the open truth. If there are no other errors of ours concerning Original sin than these, the matter is safe.

Lastly, you commemorate errors which someone, I know not who, has falsely ascribed to you; for you name no one. But let us speak of the matter. You deny that any Catholic has taught that no one is damned by eternal punishment on account of original sin, but you add, "simply." You confess therefore that they have taught this in some manner, although not simply. But this manner is such that from it, it follows that eternal punishment is undeservedly inflicted for original sin. For you say that your Catholics affirm that eternal punishment is not due to this sin by reason of its own stain or gravity. Which is the same as if you had said simply, original sin does not merit eternal punishment. For if it is neither so grave, nor does it so infect the soul with a shameful stain, as to make him in whom it is worthy of eternal punishment, then surely no one can be justly damned for eternity on account of that sin. For it is unjust for anyone to be punished more gravely than the nature of the sin committed requires; but original sin does not merit eternal punishment by its own gravity, which they say, whom you call Catholics; therefore, it is afflicted with a graver punishment than it ought to be. For if the punishment is graver, it exceeds the measure which justice ought to have observed. Thus, either it is not punished with eternal torment, or it is unjustly punished with so great a torment, if you teach the truth. But for what reason, then, is eternal punishment due to it? You respond, by the condition of man, who is found without grace; and that this is the doctrine of St. Thomas (Stapl. de orig. pecc. l. 1. c. 1. disp. 1. q. 5.). Whosever this may be, it is surely most absurd: that man is punished not because he is stained by original sin, but because he lacks the grace which ought to have been present. Is it thus graver and more repugnant to original justice to lack grace than to be stained with a fault? But this very lack of justice, if it could be separated from stains, would be much lighter than to be stained with sins; for it could happen that someone is held to be unjust, as Pighius thought, on account of a plainly alien offense, of which he himself was never an associate. Then, a stain brings a deformity worthy of hatred and punishment; to lack justice indeed removes a habit, but does not posit the contrary. But Scripture, on the contrary, teaches that nothing but uncleanness and abomination delays entry into heaven (Apoc. 21:27). But from these things it is now sufficiently clear how this error about the punishment of original sin is not undeservedly or falsely imposed upon you. For first you teach that no punishment of sense, neither exterior nor interior, is due to this sin (Thom. in 2. dist. 33. q. 2. art. 2.). For there is a certain eternal punishment, if we believe you, without the sense of pain, and with this original sin, if it is alone, is punished. A mild punishment, I believe, which inflicts no pain either without or within. What is this other than to take away all punishment? For he who feels no pain either in body or in soul, neither understands that he is being punished, nor does he suffer punishment at all, except improperly. Then, if original sin is lighter than any venial sin, which Thomas taught, and no venial sin merits eternal punishment, by what right, in

the end, should original sin be judged worthy of eternal punishment? Therefore, either venial sins should not seem unworthy of eternal punishments, or eternal punishments are not due to the original, or the original is graver than venial sins, or God should be said not to have distributed punishments equally to sins. We certainly, as you say, believe that those who are damned suffer a punishment not only of loss, but also of sense. For if they understand that they are in punishment, they cannot not grieve; if they do not know they are being punished, it is not to be thought a punishment. But who, that knows he is deprived of celestial and eternal joys, would not grieve supremely? If that matter seems to you worthy of no grief, what, in the end, is there for you to grieve? The loss of a little money will bring grief, and will they not grieve who have lost the kingdom of heaven in perpetuity? Certainly, nothing graver or more bitter can be imagined than to know that you, on account of your sin, are excluded from the glory and felicity of the saints, and are held captive there where you will never see God. Augustine writes that infants themselves, who have passed from this world without the sacrament of Baptism, that is, who die in original sin, are not only punished with the loss of celestial joy, but with the torment of eternal and everlasting fire (Aug. de pecc. merit. & remiss. l. 1. c. 16.; Hypognost. l. 5.; Enchir. ad Laur. c. 93.). Because although they have had no sin of their own action, yet they have drawn the damnation of original sin by carnal conception and nativity. And elsewhere he affirms that such boys experience gehenna. Surely to be punished with the torment of fire and to experience gehenna is to be touched with true pain. But it is ridiculous what Thomas responds, that the name of fire, of torment, of gehenna is to be taken broadly, for punishment in general; when it is certain that Augustine never dreamed of such a punishment which has nothing of pain, and he himself used those words by which a punishment of sense is most lucidly declared; and he adjoins the cause of this damnation: carnal conception and nativity. Damnation argues both loss and pain, of which the natural improbity instilled in men by Adam is most worthy. Since you do not concede that a punishment of pain is due to this, you take away the nature and weight of sin (epist. 106.). Augustine says, with eternal life denied, what but eternal death will remain? Fulgentius speaks so openly that you would believe he wished to block the subterfuges for the sophists (Fulg. de incar. & grac. c. 14.). "Whoever does not enter into the kingdom of God," he says, "will be tormented by the interminable punishments of eternal fire."

But what we affirm you say, that this is not our proper sin, but is entirely alien, in this you say we lie. Then you subjoin that all Catholics confess that this is proper on the part of the subject. What, do all Catholics confess this? Even Pighius? and Catharinus? and the Scholastics whom I named above? How can they, when they make Original sin nothing but guilt? and constitute this sin in no subject except the first man? They who think there is no vice, or stain, or fault in newly born infants, what else do they mean than that this sin is not proper, but entirely alien? If you truly think otherwise, we shall immediately understand. From these things it is abundantly established that we have neither taught any error

concerning original sin, nor have we ascribed an error to you, except that which is to be acknowledged as yours.

## **CHAPTER II: The distribution of the future disputation in this book.**

In this chapter, you do nothing else but narrate to us how you have resolved to proceed in that disputation concerning original sin, which you say, not without cause, is the most difficult of all. Wherefore you propose this order for yourself: first, that the terms of the question be explained, that is, that you teach in what thing the true nature of sin consists, and what "original" signifies in this place. Then you will show what must necessarily be believed concerning original sin. Thirdly, you promise that you will treat more laboriously in what the proper and whole nature of original sin consists. Fourthly, you say that the opinions of certain Catholics are to be noted and repelled by you, which they have handed down as probably true concerning the explanation of its nature. Lastly, you will confute, if you can, the foul (as you call them) errors of the Protestants in this matter. We therefore will proceed with you in this order, as we have begun, and let us examine, as we can, whether you explain and defend your opinion rightly, or whether you refute ours truly and solidly.

## **CHAPTER III: In what thing the true and proper nature of sin consists.**

Discussing the proper nature of sin, you bring forth nothing common and plebeian. A not-bad disciple, you follow your masters, whom I do not envy you, provided you do not compel us to swear with you to their opinion when they err, which indeed they do more often than they think rightly. You owe it to Thomas that he has shed light for you on investigating the true nature of sin. For he taught acutely and truly that sin is, as it were, a certain aberration from a rule or a scope (Thom. in 1. 2. q. 71. art. 6.); for our actions ought to be conformed to the rule of the divine will; from which if we deflect, we incur sin. Thus the nature of sin properly consists in this, that there is a departure from this rule or measure, to which whatever we do or will ought to agree in all things. And this is what Augustine meant when he defined sin to be a word, or deed, or desire, against the eternal law (August. lib. 22. cont. Faust. c. 27.). But the will of God, promulgated in His word, is that eternal law, to which if we do not obey, we cannot be excused from sin. And this is what the Apostle John pronounced sin to be: lawlessness (*ἀνομίαν*), that is, the transgression of the divine law (1. Ioh. 3. 4.). But you, a little after, shamefully dissent from your Master and from yourself, and what was rightly posited here, you try to take away. For when you contend that concupiscence in the regenerate does not have the proper nature of sin, you yet confess that it is prohibited in the law and the Decalogue; and although lawlessness (*ἀνομία*) is the formal nature of sin, and concupiscence is indeed a transgression of some law, and therefore is called and is a certain iniquity, yet it is not on that account a sin in the regenerate. Could anything more inert or more contradictory be said? For if the proper and therefore formal nature of sin is this, as you rightly state, to deviate from the rule of the eternal law, surely in

every such deviation it is necessary that sin be found; but if concupiscence is prohibited and condemned by the divine law, will it not abhor from the rule of the eternal law? Reconcile these things now with some distinction, if you can: that the nature and form of sin consists in asymmetry (ἀσυμμετρία) and lawlessness (ἀνομία), and yet it is not a sin which does not agree with the divine law and is alien from it. If that which properly makes a sin is in concupiscence, will there not be sin in concupiscence? Deny therefore that he is a man who is endowed with the true form and nature of man. But if that is insane, then you are not sane enough, who, when you acknowledge the form of sin, do not see the sin. With the same error, the Rheims Theologians indeed confess that all sin is a declination from the rule of the law, but not, on the contrary, that whatever has deflected from the law is a sin, lest perhaps they should be compelled to concede that concupiscence is a sin in the regenerate, which they can in no way bear (Rhem. in annot. in 2. c. Rom.). But it is necessary that they bear it, if this principle which you have taken from Thomas, and Augustine, and the Apostle John shall have stood. For you also say, and that excellently, since the divine will ought to be the rule of all our words, deeds, and thoughts, that whatever has proceeded from the human will is a sin of man, whenever something does not correspond to this will. But the concupiscences of the regenerate are contrary to the divine law and flow from the will, however much consent may not have been added, nor have they proceeded into act; therefore, they are sins in a true sense, on account of that opposition to the law which is in them. But this, which you call "dissimilarity," we can call "deformity," you write is posited in this: that we ourselves either turn away from God, or turn to some other things inordinately, and therefore all sin is concerned with one of these. Nay, in both. For whether we are turned away from God, or we are turned to creatures otherwise than is fitting, we certainly sin. Nor can one of these be without the other. For although those who turn themselves unduly to creatures do not propose this to themselves, that they should turn away from God, yet this follows from that. Augustine says (Aug. de lib. arb. l. 2. q. 19.): the sin of man is an inordination and perversity, that is, an aversion from the more excellent creator, and a conversion to lower created things. But in which of the two sin is more to be thought to consist, you deny is for this place to inquire. But are you not inquiring in this place in what thing the true nature of sin consists? It should have been said, therefore, whether aversion from God, who is the highest and incommutable good, has more of the nature of sin, or a preposterous conversion to a commutable good. Each is an inordination, and the former is called privative by the Scholastics, the latter positive. Now Scotus thinks that aversion, that is, privative inordination, is more conjoined with sin (Scotus in 2. dist. 35.). Cajetan, on the contrary, thinks that the true nature of sin consists rather in conversion, but at last he concludes that both aversion is the formal element in sin, and conversion forms the sin (Cajet. in 1. 2. q. 71. art. 6.). You, if you please, will teach what is the difference between these: to form the sin, and to be the formal element in the sin. But let us now dismiss these things, since you so wish. Let us

hold this: that sin is a certain inordination, prohibited by the divine law, and therefore always both evil and worthy of punishment.

Then you expound what sin effects: namely, the guilt of fault and of punishment, and the stain contracted from sin, and the deordination and debilitation of the powers. And all these you say are evils, but not properly sin itself. Nay, you immediately deny that guilt is an evil at all, much less a sin, since it is from God. But yet guilt is the fruit of sin. To be punished indeed, for him who has committed a misdeed, is just; but to be guilty of a fault and worthy of punishment is the worst of things. And the guilt of punishment is nothing absolute, but a relation and an ordination to punishment, since it has flowed from the inordination of sin, although not directly. Wherefore Scotus is not to be heard, who taught that this guilt is truly a sin, and confused it with a stain (Scot. in 2. d. 34.); for a stain is an evil and a sin; an ordination to punishment cannot but be good, since its cause is the most just will of God. How then are you consistent with yourself, when you contend that the guilt of punishment, which you make an effect of sin, is truly an evil, and yet you do not affirm that the ordination to punishment is an evil? For what else is the guilt of punishment than an ordination to punishment? I see that these things which you write are not sufficiently explored by you.

And this has also happened to you in the rest of your speech, when you wish to teach what that is which remains in us that makes us sinners after the act of sin has passed. In almost a moment is committed that which binds us perpetually, unless, the sin having been deleted by penitence, we return into grace with God. Rightly therefore has it been asked what this is which so adheres and leaves so great and so foul a scar in us. For the opinion of Scotus has already been rejected, who said that only guilt remains, since no one is to be held a sinner because he is held by the guilt of punishment, but on the contrary, because he is wicked or a sinner, he is judged worthy of punishment. You say, however, that it is the habit of sin itself. But if sin has effected this habit, why did you not reckon it above among the effects of sin? Does some habit arise from any act whatsoever? Or how does that habit differ from a stain? You want it to be born from a stain, but not from that stain alone of which you made mention a little before; therefore another effect of sin has also been passed over by you. What, in the end, therefore, is the stain on account of which this habit of sin remains in us? "Not that alone," you say, "which is a privation of the splendor and dignity which ought to be in us, but that which is a privation of conjunction with God, made by sin." What need was there for these ambages and subtleties? We are sinners and are reputed so after the commission of sin on account of the stains deeply branded in us by sin. But these consist in the privation of that splendor with which our minds ought to have been illuminated and adorned. Just as Adam was just on account of his inherent virtue, so afterwards he became a sinner on account of the habit contrary to this virtue. And Cajetan, whom you follow here, after he has proposed this distinction of a stain, immediately

subjoins that if anyone should attend diligently, he will notice that in both places there is nothing but one single privation signified in different ways (Caiet. in Thom. 1. 2. q. 86. art. 4.). But why did you prefer to call this sin a habit, unless it pleases you to dissent by design from your masters, who placed sin much more in privation than in habit? Nay, you yourself state that that privation, by which we are separated from God, is properly sin; and from that, this habitual aversion from God remains. But you may, for all I care, call it either a habit or a habitual privation; for it is not a simple privation, like blindness, but it retains something of that which is deprived, like sickness, as Thomas has taught (Thom. in quæst. disp. de malo q. 2. art. 2. ad 8. & in 1. 2. q. 82. art. 1. ad 1.). In this I do not assent to you, that you think this stain was called by Augustine an "interclusion from God" (August. de pecc. merit. & remiss. L. 1. c. 39.). For by this name he signifies not sin but the demerit of sin, on account of which it has come to pass that we are intercluded and separated from God. But there is no point in contending with you about these minutiae. Provided you grant us that after sin a stain remains, and by it we are both deformed and formally constituted sinners, we will not unwillingly leave to you your stains of aversion and conversion.

#### **CHAPTER IV: How sin is called "original."**

You rightly advise that this word is not had in the scriptures, nor in the most ancient fathers. But the thing itself nevertheless occurs everywhere in the scriptures, as when Adam is said to have begotten a son in his own likeness (Gen. 5:3); and God pronounces that every imagination of the human heart is only evil, and that at all times (Gen. 6:5); and Christ affirms that from flesh only flesh is born (Ioh. 3:6). But there is no point in pursuing these scriptures now. And the Fathers have used words of the same signification. Irenaeus calls this sin "the ancient plague of the serpent" (Iren. 1. 3. c. 33.); Cyprian, "the poison of the ancient serpent," and "the contagion of ancient death, contracted from the first antiquity" (Cyprian. de opera & eleemos. & ep. 64.); Chrysostom, the "first sin" (πρώτην ἁμαρτίαν), which corrupted the body and the soul (Chrysost. in 6. Ep. ad Rom. & Hom. 40. in 1. Cor.). In that place which you cite, he does not call it "radical sin," but says that God alone can extirpate sin by the root (πρόρριζον ἀνασπᾶν); your interpreter has imposed upon you. Hilary calls it "malice through the condition of our common origin," and "the law of sin's origin" (Hilar. in Psal. 118.); and Jerome, "sin originally contracted from the ancient serpent" (Hier. in 7. Matth. & in quæst. hebr. super lib. Reg.). Reticus, a catholic and famous Bishop, "the weight of the ancient crime, the old deeds, the inborn wickednesses," as we read in Augustine (August. contra Iulian. Pelag. l. 1. c. 2.). Where others call it a "vice of nature." Ambrose says, "before we are born, we are stained by contagion; before the use of light, we receive the injury of origin itself, we are conceived in iniquity" (Ambr. apolog. David. c. 11.). Where he also calls it "the defilement of origin" and "natural contagion." Paulinus, in Augustine, "the paternal venom, with which the prevaricating father infected the universality of his own kind" (Aug. epist. 106.). Augustine, so that he might have something certain with which

to resist the Pelagians, commonly named it "Original," from which this name was thereafter frequented in the church. Wherefore he did not feign it, but the catholic faith from antiquity believed in original sin, as he himself responded to the Pelagians (Aug. de nupt. & concup. l. 2. c. 12.).

But that this term is not restrictive, as when we say a "painted man," but that by it a true and proper sin is designated, no one doubts, except those who are in the heresy of Pelagius, and of Pighius, and of very many of the Scholastics. The appellation of Original sin therefore signifies a certain specific difference, by which it is distinguished from the actual and personal. Nor is it called Original because it is the font and origin of sins (although all sins in us flow from this font, or rather from this sewer), but because by a perpetual and hereditary propagation it has stained our nativity, and has settled in us as soon as we are first men, and has been derived into us by the instinct and law of nature and origin, so that we are born nothing but sinners and sons of wrath. This sin was personal in Adam, in us it is natural and original. Adam was by nature incorrupt, he corrupted and destroyed himself by listening to Satan, and he transfused and transmitted the same stain of sin with which he himself was infected into all his posterity. The principal cause of sin in our kind is therefore Adam, circumvented by the devil; since we are the sons of Adam and are procreated from an impure seed, we bring with us into this world a native iniquity, which no one ever lacked, except Christ our Lord, in whom alone, as Ambrose says, both the virginal conception and the birth were without any defilement of mortal origin (Ambros. in apolog. David. c. 11.). It is now sufficiently established what is to be understood by this word "Original"; nor (as I hope) will that matter cause us any delay, that we may proceed without offense in the business undertaken.

#### **CHAPTER V: What must necessarily be believed concerning original sin.**

You could have taught what is to be believed concerning Original sin much better from Augustine and the council of Milevis than from the council of Trent, which so artfully and skillfully tempered its opinion that it could not displease even Pighius, if it found a convenient interpreter. For first, that Synod did not wish to define what Original sin is, either because it could not, or because it feared lest it bring prejudice to the opinions of others. If it could not, where then was the Holy Spirit, the president of the church and master of truth? If it left it free to think one way and another perpetually, and wished the nature and definition of this sin to be unknown, surely it consulted little for the common peace, when it knew that from this ignorance many errors and turbulent contentions hang. But let us hear what was defined there on this matter.

First, they state that Adam received holiness and justice from God. Rightly: but what sort that holiness and justice was, they do not expound; I believe lest they should irritate certain Scholastics, who hand down that man was created in a state of pure nature, and that he could have merited this holiness by rightly

using his natural gifts. You say this was posited against them, but this agrees excellently with their opinion; except that he who has merited should not be said to have received.

Then, they teach that Adam lost this holiness by sin, not for himself alone, but for all his own. And this, you say, is against Pighius, who thought that this, unless it were granted freely, could not be demonstrated. But is anyone so dull as to accept a bare pronouncement of this Council for a Demonstration? Nor does this make against Pighius, who concedes that Adam lost that holiness and justice for himself and for us, but not in the same way (Pighius contro. 1.). For by his sin, he says, it came to pass that we are reputed vicious and unjust, not born so.

Thirdly, they define that from this sin of Adam, not only death and the pains of the body, but also sin, which is the death of the soul, is derived into the whole human race. Nor would Pighius greatly deny this, if by "sin" the "death of the soul" is understood, and by "death," the privation of celestial joy. For Pighius always acknowledges a sin of this kind, which brings with it that death of the soul which separates from the eternal felicity of the saints. But it is a clever saying, what you say: that it is now not only an error, but a heresy, to defend the opinion of those Scholastics who taught that this Original sin is not properly a sin. Now, you say? And will not Pighius be a heretic, who thought so before the council of Trent? Was it not sufficiently concluded of old against the Pelagians that what is called original is truly a sin (Concil. Milev. c. 2.)? This, I say, was always heretical, and will be, since it is contrary to the most open doctrines of the Scriptures. But that which in the book your Catholic collocutors published at Worms is called "the guilt of the fault," would it be heretical if it were said now (Lib. colloq. Wormat. D. 44.)? See what a biennium does in religion. For so much space, and no more, intervened between that colloquy and this Tridentine decree. But surely, since the guilt of the fault posits the fault itself primarily in the guilty one, there was nothing wicked or heretical in that formula, if it is rightly understood.

It also offends you that Zwingli called this sin a disease and a languor of nature (Zuingl. de vera & falsa relig. c. de pecc. Christ. & in lib. ad Urban. Rhegium.). Why so? "For none of these," you say, "is a sin, which is the death of the soul, but an effect of sin." You are mistaken. For that disease and languor with which we all labor, contracted by the original contagion, necessarily brings eternal death, unless it has been healed. Nor is sin the death of the soul itself, but the cause of death. But does not death follow from an incurable languor and disease? But is it not a sin if it comes from sin? Therefore, that which makes us to be and be held as sinners, is it not a sin? and it is an effect of sin, since it remains and adheres in us from sin. This therefore does not prevent it from being a sin and killing the soul, because it arises from sin. Nor did Zwingli err more in saying that original sin is a disease and languor of nature, than Augustine, who called it a vice of nature. Nay, Augustine in one chapter called original sin a languor, and a disease,

and a bad state of health, not once, but very often elsewhere (Aug. de pecc. merit. & remiss. l. 2. c. 28.). And Thomas, on the contrary, says that original sin is a languor of nature (Thom. in 1. 2. q. 82. art. 1.). But you, indeed, seem made for seeking knots in a bulrush.

Fourthly, they conclude that original sin is inherent in each one as his own. "Expressly," you say, "against Catharinus and Pighius." You do not make me believe it. Catharinus wrote after the Council; I do not think he would have dared to think openly against the Council and profess heresy, or to have been ignorant of the decree and mind of the Council. Nor do they deny that this is in its own way the proper sin of each one, since it is imputed to each by reason of propagation and nature. If the Council had had the mind to condemn these opinions seriously, ought it not to have used more express language? But who does not know the arts and impostures of that little Conventicle? Such caution and modification was applied that it simulated a famous defense of the catholic faith, and yet seemed to have condemned what they were unwilling to condemn. For if nothing else concerning original sin must necessarily be believed by us than what is comprehended in these 4 chapters, there is nothing for which Pighius or Catharinus, and almost Pelagius himself, should be ashamed of their opinion.

But how wrongly the whole Synod thought concerning Original sin is abundantly clear even from this: that it affirms that God hates nothing in the regenerate, because they are innocent, immaculate, pure, and harmless (sess. 5. c. 5.). But this is Pelagian, as we shall prove in its place hereafter. And they pronounce that Concupiscence, which they confess is called sin by Paul, is not truly a sin in the regenerate. Which is certainly the same in effect as if they should say that original sin is not a sin at all. I pass over that they except the blessed Virgin, the mother of our Savior, from the common lot of men, which is openly against the Apostle, who writes that this sin has been propagated into all (Rom. 5. 18.). But of these things elsewhere. Now you say that these things have been posited by you without confirmation, both because they are already of the faith, and because they are conceded by the heretics. If, therefore, we concede as much as is necessary to be believed concerning original sin, there is nothing for which you should reprehend our opinion. Or you have not yet posited all that is necessary for us to believe on this matter. But that you say these things are "now" of the faith, what do you mean? Should we think that nothing was of the faith before the Council of Trent? Is faith born of the Tridentine fathers? But was not this the perpetual faith of the whole church? Who doubts it? Why then do you write that these things are "now" of the faith, as if they had now for the first time begun to be of the faith, after it so seemed to the Council of Trent? But since it is not yet sufficiently defined in what thing original sin consists, and what sort of vice this is, you now undertake to treat and explain this matter more laboriously. But if this is necessary, what cause can be feigned why it was passed over by the Council? I opine it feared Pighius, who gravely accused the temerity and

audacity of those who would dare to define Original sin, which the Church never dared to do (Pighius in *controv.* 1.). And surely you would have been more careful for yourself if, imitating the prudence of your fathers, you had superseded definitions. But we nevertheless will take your will in good part; and you, if you have by chance erred in anything, which you do rather often on account of human imbecility, will not take it ill to be admonished.

#### **CHAPTER VI: On Original Justice.**

But before you undertake to speak of Original sin, you briefly touch upon three points, as you call them, concerning Original justice.

The first is that this Original justice, in which Adam was created, comprehended the integrity and perfection of the whole man; not only that by which the body obeys the soul, and the appetite obeys reason, for the perfect attainment of natural ends, but also that by which the mind itself, illustrated with the ornaments of sanctity and grace, obeys God for the attainment of the supernatural end (which is to enjoy God in eternity). This point is pleasing; nor does anyone of sound mind doubt it. For man was made in the image and likeness of God (*Gen.* 1. 26.). That is, as the most wise Solomon teaches, God made man upright (*Eccles.* 7. 30.). Nothing therefore in man, whom God had created, was perverse, or wicked, or distorted, or not in all things consonant with the divine mind and will. But far be it that we should place this rectitude in natural things only, which certain Scholastics unskillfully do; and among them, first and foremost, the prince of the Scholastics, Lombard, who denies that Adam was created in grace (*Lombard* in 2. d. 25. lit. C.). Whom also Alexander of Hales follows, and affirms that that opinion is both more consonant with reason and proved by authorities (*Alex. Halens.* in 2. q. 96.). Bonaventure also, whom it would have befitted to be more sober, says that Adam was without doubt endowed with grace that makes pleasing before the fall, but he does not think he was created in that grace; for he had natural things first, and received grace after (*Bonavent.* in 2. d. 29. art. 1. q. 1.). And he defends that this opinion is not only more probable, but also more common. I pass over the rest who wallow in the same most shameful error. For that is no light dissension among the Scholastics, which the Tridentine Fathers, so that they might leave it undefined, did not say that Adam was created, or made, or fashioned in holiness and justice, but was constituted. For thus they wished to leave it under the opinion of the Theologians, whether he was created in grace or not, as Bannes has observed, provided it is established that he had that holiness and justice before the sin. Oh, the excellent Tridentine Theologians, who make it free for us to think either that Adam was created in grace, that is, justice and holiness, or the contrary! You, surely, are wiser than these, who affirm that Original Justice in the first man was without doubt such a rectitude as not only perfected man in his natural attributes and preserved his nature whole, but also elevated him to God, by which, relying on it, he could both know God, and love Him above all things, and persevere in that love, and not sin or die. This has always been the opinion

of all the Catholic Fathers of the Church. To be silent about the rest, Augustine says that Adam from the beginning had a great grace of God, and a good will, and the divine assistance by which he could persevere, if he wished (August. de correptione & gratia. cap. 11.). To these, it is all the same whether he was such or otherwise, it is enough if we believe that he was so created as to have a sound nature, while in the meantime lacking the holiness and justice by which he might please God. Was this council governed by the Spirit of Christ? Were these Theologians taught by God?

Now, to know whether this Justice was grace itself, or a habit distinct from it, about which matter there are various opinions (as you say), even of those who follow Thomas, you think does not much pertain to the present matter, provided we state that those were inseparable in the first man. But certainly, if you distinguish this Justice from grace, of what sort, in the end, will you make it? Imputative? Not so, I opine; so odious to you is the name of Imputation. If it was a habitual Justice, it is established that it was in Adam the grace that makes pleasing. For he was endowed with that Justice which made him lovable to God, in which if he had persevered, he would have remained most pleasing to God and most happy forever. Nor did he need any new gift for loving God, but by the power of that justice which he had in himself, he could love God as he ought. But what some Scholastics quibble, that if the state of innocence had lasted, it would have come to pass that children would be procreated with original justice, but not with grace that makes pleasing, is a figment of idle men; for original justice could not be separated from grace that makes pleasing. For since they were inseparable in the first man, which you think is most firmly to be held, why should we believe they would have been torn asunder in the children of Adam, if he had begotten any in Original justice? But let them dispute this, who have more than enough leisure, and let them proceed to reveal their futility and ignorance.

The second is, that that rectitude and justice was in the first man by way of a habit perpetually inhering in his soul and its essence, by the law and condition of that state in which he was created. For this reason it is called Original, since it was not in Adam by a motion of free will, nor did it always need new grace, as is the case in us, but because it was innate and fixed in the nature of man itself, so that it existed in him in a certain way by the mode of nature. And this you not badly teach from Augustine, who writes that the first man was created in health and in a good will (August. de correptione & gratia. cap. 11.); and furthermore from Thomas, who says that Justice pertained primordially to the essence of the soul (Thom. in 1. 2. q. 82. ad 2.); from which it follows that it was of human nature, not divinely given to his person. And therefore, grace and justice were natural to Adam. But this could have been confirmed much better and more lucidly from the Apostle, teaching with most explicit words that we must put on the new man, which God has created in justice and true holiness (Eph. 4. 24.); again, that the image to which man was created is the highest purity, to which we daily aspire

(Col. 3. 10.). Therefore, what is to us an adventitious and, as it were, a foreign holiness and justice, was to Adam native and domestic, that is, divinely impressed in his soul, which he would also have transmitted to his children, if he had perpetually retained it, which was in his free will. Since this is so, I wonder for what purpose Bellarmine so sharply attacks Luther and Calvin, for no other cause than because they affirm that original justice was not some separate gift from the nature of man, or that it was added from without, but that it was so truly natural that it was implanted in Adam's nature to love God, to believe God, to acknowledge God (Bellarm. de grat. prim. hom. cap. 5.; Luth. in Gen. 2.; Calv. in 1. Instit. c. 15. parag. 8.). Thus, that Adam, by the benefit of God, as soon as he was created, excelled in those spiritual gifts which are supernatural to us. And this he calls Pelagian, thinking or caring little, indeed, what he objects to most learned men. For Pelagius said that Adam was so created by God as other men are now born (Aug. epist. 89.); we believe that Adam was adorned with every kind of goodness and virtue as soon as he was born, so much so that nothing was lacking to him for living well and blessedly. Therefore, justice was natural to him, but according to the nature of that state in which he was created, not of this in which we are born. Who now does not see the Bellarminian calumny? And this is customary for that man. What then does he state concerning the nature of the first man (Bellarm. de grat. primi homin. c. 5.)? First, that nothing is now lacking to us which was natural to Adam. Then, that that rectitude of all the parts was a supernatural gift per se, and neither flowed nor could flow from the principles of nature. Lastly, that the state of man after the fall does not differ from the prior state, except that man after the fall was despoiled of supernatural goods; wherefore the rebellion against the spirit, which is in our members, is from the condition of our nature, and not from some evil quality transfused into us from our parents. And these things Bellarmine thinks he learned in the school of Thomas, which perhaps is true; for I would not dare to affirm it, since I see there are disputes and quarrels among them on this matter. Thus Peter Soto says that it is neither had openly in the Scriptures, nor can be gathered by necessary reasoning, nor has ever been defined by the Church, that Adam was adorned with the Holy Spirit and created happy by God (Soto de natur. & grat. lib. 1. c. 15. in confess. cath. tit. de pecc. orig. in assert. 5.). But his mind would doubtless have been different on this, if he had more diligently frequented the school of Christ. For what? Did not God make man upright? But in that which is in every way upright, nothing perverse can be present; but unseemly, inordinate, impious motions deviate from the right; therefore, such motions cannot proceed from nature as it was created by God, unless perhaps God is to be thought to have created an evil nature. What of the Angels? Is not their integrity native to them? That is, suitable to their nature? But certainly man was made no less perfect in his kind by God than the Angel in his. But that is called natural which is according to nature; why then should not Original justice be said to be natural, since it was suited to the nature of the first man? But unless that perfection was natural in Adam, why are we, because we are naturally

propagated from him, deprived of it? It was therefore not personal in him, but natural, which because he lost, he could not propagate to his own. But what is so natural as that which is implanted in nature when it first exists? But this justice existed and appeared in the first nature of man, unless one is to rave with those who deny that Adam was created in grace; which Bellarmine, if the Tridentine fathers had ordered, would dare to say. Nor indeed do they prohibit it. We therefore, as we have been taught in the Scriptures, and as the Catholic Church has always believed, let us remain in this opinion, that justice and holiness were as natural to Adam, created in the image and likeness of God, as this injustice and impiety of our origin is natural to us. For it is all the same whether you deny that justice in Adam, or this injustice in us, to be natural. But tell me, Stapleton, what just now very opportunely and first came to my mind, in one word, do you think a good and holy will is a natural gift, or a supernatural one, as they understand supernatural when they say that natural things are diminished, supernatural things are lost? You prove from Augustine that man was created in a good will, and from that you conclude that he was created in grace, and rightly (Thom. 1. p. q. 85. art. 3.). Now, supernatural things were extinguished by the lapse of Adam, which they acknowledge; therefore, all good will, from which the love of God and the desire for justice entirely flows, has perished. But this is beside the matter which we have in hand. Thus far you are right, and we support you. But see that you do not waver in your opinion. For what is it that you afterwards say that Original justice is not properly and simply natural, and that it was superadded? If you understand natural as nature now is, you say the truth, but this is beside the point. For we are speaking of original justice and nature. Therefore, justice before the fall was natural, and the injustice which followed was contrary to nature, wherefore the law of nature was so called because it agreed in all things with original and likewise natural justice. But when you say "superadded," you seem to wish that it was not implanted in nature, but was added afterwards, which you specifically disapproved a little before. But you prove that grace was supernatural because it pertained to the attainment of a supernatural end. Surely, if you deal so restrictively with us, to enjoy the divine vision is natural to no creature, not even the Angelic, much less the human. Nay, not even nature itself in this rigid sense will be natural. But if you take nature as God willed it to be, and as He made it, it was certainly consonant with it, as not to commit anything against the justice or will of God, so to enjoy the favor of God and the highest felicity perpetually, and to be disturbed by no fear of death or misery. Wherefore Augustine says that eternal life is now a gift of grace, which would have been the reward of merit, if the first man had not fallen from the state of innocence (August. de corrept. & grat. cap. 11.). And elsewhere he says that whatever are the vices of souls are privations of natural goods. But what Bellarmine responds, that Augustine is speaking not of forms but of subjects, is a miserable subterfuge. For he does not say that our souls are natural goods, but that we are deprived of natural goods; but we are not deprived of our souls, but of those internal ornaments and gifts with which the soul of Adam was informed

by God. Those goods therefore were natural to Adam, if Augustine is to be believed rather than Bellarmine. Damascene, from the perpetual doctrine of the Church, writes that Adam was created not only harmless (ἄκακον), but upright (ὀρθότατον), and adorned with all virtue (πάση ἀρετῇ κατηγλαῖσμένον), and abounding in all goods (πᾶσιν ἀγαθοῖς κομῶντα) (Damasc. de orthod. fid. l. 2. c. 11.). And Bernard: "Man was made in the image and likeness of God: having freedom of will in the image, virtues in the likeness" (Bern. Serm. 1. de Annunt.). And Prosper: "Adam was just, remaining in the image of his creator" (Prosper. contra Collat. c. 20.). The image therefore and likeness to which Adam was created contained all virtues; and his justice was not sewn onto his nature, but innate and impressed. What of the fact that Bellarmine himself, overcome by the truth, writes that innocence was to be propagated by way of nature, if Adam had stood in it, just as now the sin of Origin can be called natural? Why then does he fight with such effort with phantoms, or with his own shadow? We make that justice no otherwise natural than we make the sin of origin natural.

The third is that the prior part of Justice, by which the will was subjected to God, was the form of original justice, the rest, as it were, the matter. But just as justice, so the form of justice extended through all the parts of the soul. Yet I would not unwillingly concede that from the fact that the mind of man was conformed in all things to the will of God, all the parts and faculties of the soul did their duty. But what has this to do with your formal or material, that is, your ineptitudes? What you add, that for this cause it is said that Original justice is restored to us in Baptism as to its formal part, but not as to its material part—if by "formal" you understood the grace of God, on account of which we are wholly pleasing to God, I would acknowledge it. For that is not in us, but in God, who loves us, though worthy of hatred, on account of the merit of Christ. But by grace you wish to be understood some natural virtue and dignity, which may conciliate God to us and retain His favor. Why therefore do you say that this grace has been restored to us as to the form rather than as to the matter? For if we please God on account of our virtues, it is necessary that we please God as much as there are virtues in us; and thus the form will be equal to the matter. Then, if after this grace which we recover in Baptism, we indeed love God and serve His law with the mind, but yet not with that perfection, as you say, which original justice had, therefore this justice of ours, however great it may be, does not attain to the rule of divine justice. In what part therefore it is deficient, it cannot but be in fault, since to deviate from the perfect and highest good is not free from guilt. But that which so commends us to God as to make us worthy of His love ought to be free from all fault and vice. Therefore, our justice does not make us to be considered worthy of the love of God and of eternal life.

You also say that the rectitude of the lower powers is not restored to us, since the law of the flesh and of the members remains, which wars against the law of the mind. You see, therefore, how many vicious things remain in us after grace; and yet you would compel us to cast aside all justice except our own, and to come

into the sight of the judge fortified with no other? Oh, our hardest lot, Stapleton, if judgment should be accommodated to our justice, and the reward be repaid to us from our merits! But what do you think of the rectitude of the superior powers? Does our mind believe, hope, love as much as it ought? Do not say so, since in no one are these virtues found perfect. Why then do you commemorate the rectitude of the lower powers, when the mind itself first and foremost limps in its duty? About which matter there will be discussion later.

**CHAPTER VII: In what original sin consists, what its viciousness is, and in what way it makes us guilty.**

You promise us here an accurate explanation of Original sin. You have given a loquacious one. You abound too much in words and leisure, and you repeat the same things time and again, and you do not connect your points, which is a sign of a disjointed mind. I will follow the heads of the matters, lest I seem to contend with you in verbosity. First, therefore, you undertake to teach what kind of viciousness and injustice that is which constitutes Original sin, about which you say nothing has been hitherto defined by the Church. Will you therefore dare to define what the Church has never wished to define? But whatever shall have been defined by you, since the same has not been corroborated by the authority of the Church, must necessarily waver and hang in suspense. But has Augustine left nothing of old disputed and defined on this matter? Did the Church have nothing certain against Pelagius to hold? Has it been unknown until now what kind of evil that is which is called Original sin? You err, indeed, if you think so. But what new or unheard-of thing do you bring forth, which Augustine has not explained much more eloquently than you? Come then, let us weigh your explanation, or definition, a little more attentively.

You now say that before all else it must be seen that Original sin is to be distinguished from the act of the sinner himself, Adam. For it is not the actual sin of Adam, but some iniquity contracted in that actual sin of Adam, which remained in Adam after the act of sin. So it is, indeed. For that act could not have been ours, since it passed away immediately. But in the meantime, however much that act was of Adam alone, and could adhere neither in the offspring of Adam nor in Adam himself, yet by imputation it is common to all of us. Does this name of Imputation offend you in this cause also? Then hear Lyranus (Lyr. in 5. ad Rom.). "The sin of Adam is imputed to all descending from him according to the power of generation, because they are thus his members; on account of which it is called original sin." If he seems a little too obsolete to you, I will refer you to two of the firmest columns of the Pontifical Church, Cajetan and Bellarmine. Cajetan thus: "The punishment of death inflicted on him for the whole posterity, testifies that the sin of which it is the punishment is imputed to him and to the whole posterity" (Cajet. in 5. c. Rom.). Bellarmine similarly: "Adam alone committed it with an actual will; but to us it is communicated through generation, in the way that which has passed can be communicated, namely, by imputation" (Bell. tom. 3. l. 5. de amissi. grat. c. 17.). Original sin is an

inherent and native iniquity; but yet that actual and free transgression of Adam is imputed to us. For we would be held neither by any guilt nor by any iniquity contracted from it, unless that act by which Adam violated the precept of God were ascribed to us by imputation. But because certain Theologians of no Scholastic school have accordingly posited original sin in this imputation alone, they have erred shamefully and nefariously.

But what the sin of Adam was, you say does not pertain to the present matter, although in that matter some Scholastics have tormented themselves much and in vain; and indeed so ineptly and ridiculously that it is not obscure from what school they have come. Lombard himself, whom all salute as master, thinks that Adam sinned in this: that he indulged his wife too much, not from lust, but from love, because he believed that she, unless her wish were granted, would perish from grief (Lomb. 1. 2. d. 32. C. 5.). Thus Scotus, and Bonaventure, and Durandus, and even before them, Anselm (Scotus & Bonav. in 2. d. 32. Durand. in 2. d. 32. q. 2.). Others almost excuse Adam and transfer all the blame to Eve. Thus Biel, not insipidly for the capacity of this School, "And thus it is clear that the sin of the woman was begun in pride, had its progress in avarice, but its consummation in gluttony" (In 2. dist. 32. q. 1.). What could be said more lazily? Do you think these men ever thought seriously on this matter? Do you not see their so signal infidelity, from which ambition and ingratitude emerged? For if they had believed that they would die if they did contrary to what they were commanded, they would never have dared so great a crime. But giving more faith to the devil than to God, they immediately progressed to such audacity as to contemn the precept of God, to cast out all memory of the divine benefits from their minds, and to snatch at the kingdom and divinity. The root therefore and fount of all evils was infidelity; as on the contrary, the beginning and mother of all good things is faith. Thus Prosper: "if he had not lost the first faith, he would not have lacked all other good things" (Prosper ad excerpt. Genuens.). But this is not now being discussed, that we should inquire in what thing the first parents sinned most. But that you say no one is born proud or gluttonous, surely the seeds of these vices are in us from nature; nor is there any sin to which we are not too much inclined, unless we are prohibited by discipline or grace. But if we are born sinners, with the stain of what sin, in the end, are we infected, if not of pride, and of gluttony, and of infidelity, and finally of all wickedness?

But let us now proceed to the rest. Therefore, original sin is that iniquity which Adam contracted from the act of transgression and transmitted to his posterity. But this you say is the death of the soul, about which God had foretold to him, "In the day that you eat, you shall die the death" (Gen. 2. 17.). Surely that is the cause of this death; but death itself is more than Original sin: namely, a most grave punishment not only of loss but also of sense. Nor did Adam die immediately, but he was immediately made guilty of death and most worthy of death. But that the privation of original justice was contracted by him in himself and in the whole nature to be propagated from him, and that this was of both

sanctity and sanity, is beyond controversy. For now neither does the soul duly obey God, nor the sense obey right reason. Wherefore there is no need to linger on these things.

But having feared lest you hasten too much, and as it were leave enemies behind your back, while you believe that to be defeated which you have said was contracted from the actual sin—the privation of original justice—you admonish that it is not to be understood so, as if this were distinguished from that as an effect from a cause. For what reason, I ask? But is not original iniquity an effect of that actual sin which Adam committed? No one is ignorant of it. What need was there then for this caution? Or what do you mean? "Lest," you say, "this privation should seem not so much a sin as an effect of sin." Do not fear. For it can be both an effect of sin and truly a sin. When you approach a fire to be warmed, the cause of the heat in you is the fire, and it generates a true heat in you. Is it therefore not heat which the fire has made in you, because it is an effect of heat? What therefore prohibits it from being a sin, if we confess it to be an effect of sin? Do not disturb us with these vain terrors. Augustine says: "The voluntary sin of the first man is the cause of original sin." You do not deny that they are to be distinguished. Rightly; but how? "In no other way," you say, "than is done in all actual and mortal sins." What then after that? "There are three things," you say, "in every mortal sin," and here you commemorate many things from Cajetan which, to what end they tend, I do not understand. For if you are doing nothing other than proving that besides the act of sin and the species of the deed, whatever that may have been, there remained a deformity or aberration from the rectitude in which he was and in which he ought to have persisted, you do nothing great, nor do you say anything other than what you have said often before, and about which it is sufficiently clear.

Then you say that this privation of the justice received was not inflicted on Adam by God by way of punishment, but was contracted by sinning. Why do you not approve of the mode of punishment? Is it because Adam incurred that injustice, God did not inflict it as a punishment? But you have said it is the death of the soul; but the death of the soul is a punishment. And the fruits of sin are punishments; if punishments, therefore imposed by God. For God, although not the author of sins, is yet the author of punishments. Wherefore Augustine calls concupiscence, in which he constitutes original sin, both a sin and a punishment of sin (August. contra Iulian. l. 5. c. 3.). But was not this the gravest punishment which followed that sin, to be deprived of original justice and of a certain celestial light and dignity? This, I opine, you yourself, when you have considered the matter better with yourself, will not greatly deny. I concede this, that this privation was born from the actual sin spontaneously and necessarily; but the same was nevertheless also a punishment, and a vengeance for so great a crime. Your error is no less when you add that the Privation of that rectitude by which the lower powers obeyed reason was not a sin, but was inflicted for a punishment. But in this, most of the Scholastics place the very seat of original

sin. Thus it will be only a punishment, which we call original sin. What? Does so great a perversity of the affections and desires in man, always resisting reason and the divine law, have no nature of a fault? But it fights with the rule of justice, and therefore has in it that in which the true nature of sin consists. But of these things later. Now tell, if you please, why the privation of that rectitude which was in the mind is less to be held for a punishment than that which was in the affections. For I would like you to persuade yourself of this, that your placita are not here oracles. Hitherto, therefore, you have effected nothing other than that the privation of justice, not the species of the deed itself or the actual motion of his will, is derived to us. This could have been dispatched in one word, or at least in many fewer than you have used.

But now let your Definition of original sin come forth. "That deformity," you say, "and loss of original justice, contracted by the sin of Adam, remained in Adam as the act of sin was passing, in his person indeed until by penitence he returned into grace." But is this to define? Indeed, I would not want you as a definer if you always define thus. I will bind these your words more tightly, and if I can, I will hammer out some definition. You wish, therefore, that Original sin is the deformity and loss of original justice which Adam contracted by sinning, and which remained in him after the act of sin by way of a habit, and therefore is propagated to the whole nature propagated from him, and together with that nature. This definition, if it has been rightly expounded and understood, contains the true opinion. For Original sin is certainly a certain deformity which was born from the loss of original justice, and which Adam both contracted for himself and transfused into us with nature itself. If there are any cracks in it, it will appear better later. True also is what follows: that a newly born infant, just as it has received nature from Adam, so also has it received the vice of nature in Adam. And because this vice is the lack of justice that ought to be present (in which manner Anselm most briefly defined the sin of Origin), the infant becomes a true sinner, and deformed, and displeasing to God, and a son of wrath (Anselm de concept. Virg. c. 23.). Most rightly.

You soon add another consideration. For you say that that privation which Adam contracted by sinning, we, by being born, although it is a sin, is yet not our sin nor proper to us, unless because what Adam did when he sinned, we also did, the Apostle saying, "In him all have sinned." And this also I acknowledge. For his will was ours; and therefore his transgression is ours, because he is not considered as one man, but as the root of the human race, in whom we were all included by virtue, as Augustine says, "we were all that one man" (August. de pecc. merit. & remiss. l. 1. c. 10.). But now Original sin does not consist only in the deformity which the fault of Adam brought forth, but it also comprehends the act of that sin itself, if we did the same as Adam did, if we truly sinned with Adam, and what he willed, we willed. Original sin will therefore not be so involuntary as you think, so that it is therefore the least of all sins because it has the least of the voluntary. For if Adam's will was ours, as much as Adam willed, so much are we

also to be thought to have willed. But Adam sinned knowingly and willingly; we therefore in him, and by that his will, both have sinned and willed to sin. But unless you admit Imputation here (a word from which you abhor and carefully guard yourself), you will fall into the greatest absurdity, and you will fight with yourself, you who a little before said that the sin which entered into the world, and by which we are all made sinners, is not the actual sin of Adam, but a certain iniquity contracted from it and transmitted into us. Now you attribute to us the same will of sinning which was in Adam; otherwise, you affirm, this privation left in nature by sin could not make us sinners. Therefore, we are not only bound by a habitual iniquity, but we have sinned with an actual will in Adam; and this will is primarily to be considered in Original sin, without which we could neither be nor be held as sinners.

What you interpose concerning a pact or precept pertains nothing to the matter; for whether Adam received this justice on this law and condition, that he should either preserve or lose it for himself and his own, or whether no such convention intervened between God and Adam, since he was the parent and origin of the nature and of the human race, it was necessary that in him we either stand or fall. Although, that God threatened him with death if he should move his hand to the forbidden tree, from this it sufficiently appears that he had been forewarned of the danger into which he would cast himself headlong if he should sin, of which nothing was to be feared if he should remain in his duty. And hither is wont to be brought what we read in the prophet: "But they like Adam have transgressed the covenant" (Hosea 6:7). Nor is it to be thought that Adam was ignorant either of the reward, if he should not sin, or of the punishment, if he should dare to sin. Unless this had been foretold to him, he would have had some excuse, although not a sufficient one; now, having been taught before of the event, since he did not have faith nor take care for himself, he is to be thought to have deservedly fallen into this calamity. Although, however, there had been no word on this matter, yet what unhappiness he willingly brings upon himself, God has justly inflicted upon all his posterity. But in what way? Because His will is the norm of right and of justice. You will never otherwise understand it to have been just that we are all born miserable on account of the temerity, or infidelity, or ambition, or whatever fault of the first man. For that you say his will was ours, and we willed in him, I confess to be true, but the reason for this truth is none other than the will of the creator. For what cause will you bring why all children do not in the same way atone for the faults of their parents? You will say that Adam is to be considered as the seed and principle of nature, and his sin was the sin of nature itself; the sins of others are personal; therefore his is transfused with nature, not those of others. I hear, and I do not object. But why Adam by sinning destroyed not only his person but nature, when other men harm their own persons but do not make nature worse, assign a cause, if you can, other than the most just will of God.

That Augustine writes that original sin is not absurdly called also voluntary, because, having been contracted from the first evil will of man, it has become in a certain way hereditary, does not affirm so perspicuously what you wish to prove: that our will is conjoined with the will of Adam (Retract. L. 1. c. 13.). But that original sin was contracted from the first evil will of man, and therefore has become in a certain way hereditary. Which is true on account of that evil will which we have when born, not which we had when not yet born. But Augustine nevertheless taught this very thing most openly, which you say, a little after. For he says: "As if indeed the sin which we say they originally draw from Adam, that is, being implicated in his guilt and on account of this held liable to punishment, could have been anywhere, except in the will, by which will it was committed when the transgression of the divine precept was made" (August. Retract. l. 1. c. 15.). Again: "Thus it is shown that without the will there is no sin, whether in deed or in origin." And immediately: "Infants are held not by the property of their will, but by the origin of the thing. For what is every earthly man in origin, but Adam?" Rightly.

Rightly, therefore, did Thomas say that original sin is a sin of nature, which was committed through the will of the principle of human nature. And he illustrates the matter with a quite suitable example: just as the different members of the body are parts of the person of one man, so all men are, as it were, members and parts of the one human nature. But when some member sins, like a hand, or a foot, or an eye, the reason for the fault depends not on the act of the member, but on the will of the man. Thus, we must think that we all sinned in Adam. It is, however, the same sin of ours as the sin of Adam, not in number, but in species, because it is contracted with the nature which we have drawn from our first parent. Wherefore, Anselm, in his work *On the Concept of the Virgin*, prudently warned that the infant who is damned for original sin is not damned for Adam's sin, but for his own. For if he himself did not have his own sin, he would not be damned. But it is difficult to measure these things by reason, that while we sinned and had the will to sin in Adam, our sin is nevertheless numerically different from that which was proper to Adam.

But what have you gained from this, from which it would be established that they err who are unwilling for original sin to be defined by the lack of original justice? For my part, that definition does not fully satisfy me, because we are born not only empty of justice, but full of iniquity and injustice; nor do we only not do what we ought, but as soon as we are able by age, we bring forth the manifold fruits of our innate wickedness. That word "lack," too, does not seem to sufficiently explain the force of that malice. But this is not the issue now; you wish for something else. For some are unwilling for it to be defined thus because this lack remains even in the baptized, among whom is Martinus Navarrus in his *Manual of Prelates*, chapter 8, number 3. And you concede that it remains, but not under the aspect of sin—ineptly. For can a lack of due justice be present and not be a sin? But it ought to have been present, and yet it is not. Will you say this happens without sin? You do indeed say so, and you offer a fine reason: because the baptized are no longer children of Adam, and whatever they sinned in him has been abolished. So, as soon as they are baptized, they have suddenly ceased to be children of Adam? How then does it happen that this lack remains? Or from whom, I ask, did they receive it, if not from Adam? Do they have it from the spirit of regeneration, that they lack justice, and that a justice which they ought not to have lacked? Did not the Apostle teach, in 2 Corinthians 4, that the inner man must be renewed day by day? Will you say that he is at once so renewed that nothing worthy of renewal is left? That nothing of Adam remains in baptized infants? But as soon as they come to some sparks of reason, they betray a perversity, about which Augustine speaks excellently, where he also says, in *Confessions*, book 1, chapter 7: "The weakness of infant limbs is innocent, not the infant's mind." Whence do they have this depravity, if they retain nothing of Adam, if they are not children of Adam, if whatever was evil in them has been abolished?

But you add a distinction: the lack of Original justice does not remain in them (you say) as to its formal element, but only as to its material. Why do you thrust upon us matters without forms, such as do not exist in the nature of things? The matter of sin cannot be separated from its form; for it will be neither sin nor the matter of sin if the form is absent. But what do you make the form of sin, if not the privation of the rectitude in which man was created? And is that not the Lack of original justice? Why, then, in the Lack of original justice do you not recognize the formal element of sin? But you say that this is the clear doctrine of the Council of Trent, that in the reborn nothing remains that has the proper nature of sin. But this is a dark and black error, to be hissed at by all Christians, and surely, it is sheer Pelagianism.

Now, because you said that the privation of original justice is in us by way of a habit, you warn that it should not be understood as if it were truly a habit or a positive thing. For you say it is a mere privation, or a lack of a positive thing that ought to be present. So you now confess that the lack of original justice is truly a sin, or it will be some positive thing. If it is a positive thing, it will no longer be a lack, which signifies a privation. But there is truly in infants, no less after than before baptism, a lack of justice: Therefore, it is formally a sin. But let us reserve that controversy for its own place and time. However, not all the Scholastics, I well know, will confirm this opinion of yours about a mere, pure, naked privation. The matter is debated among them with various opinions. Augustine, in *On Nuptials and Concupiscence* and *Against Julian*, who placed sin in privation, nevertheless gave it the name of an evil quality and compared it to a sickness. Now a sickness and a disease is not only the absence of health, but a certain evil disposition of an affected body, which begets pain and tends to the destruction of nature. Elsewhere, in *Against Julian*, he also says that from the vitiated flesh an evil quality flows into the soul. Thomas Aquinas, in part 1 of the second part, question 82, article 1, calls it a corrupt habit and a corrupt disposition, and denies that it is a pure privation. Cajetan, in his commentary on question 71, seems to me to have explained the matter not badly, when he says: “The inordinate proneness of the first part of the soul, not absolutely, but as that first part coheres with other inordinate parts, has the nature of a quality which is a habit.” And later: “Corruption is distinguished from pure privation in the text. For privation denotes a negation in a subject naturally apt for it; but corruption adds a positive contrary, founding that negation.” Cusanus, in his *Excitationes*, says that sin is like rottenness in an apple. Do you think that vices are opposed to virtues only privatively? Are they not contrary qualities? Therefore, I acknowledge a privation in original sin; but besides the pure privation, there is something else, namely, a corruption and a habitual disposition to evil.

But as for your fear that if original sin is placed in concupiscence—as it was placed by the Master (Peter Lombard in book 2, distinction 31, chapter 2), and Gregory of Rimini (in book 2, distinction 31), and John Driedon (in his book *On Grace and Free Will*), and many others, and by Augustine himself before all others

(in *Against Julian* book 5 and *Retractations* book 1, chapter 15)—we should consequently say that God is the author of sin: that fear is a vain one. For the concupiscence which the divine law, in Galatians 5, condemns is not something positive, but a privation, like sin. There is also a good concupiscence, by which the spirit lusts against the flesh; but no one would have placed original sin in that. But in the evil and prohibited concupiscence, which is an aberration from the law, and therefore a privation, why may we not place original sin without error or danger?

Here you raise the question, by what means could sin remain in the nature of Adam, when it had been remitted for the person of Adam. If it was remitted, and not deleted, the door (you say) would be opened to the imputative remission and justice invented by the heretics today. I fear you will not be able to close this door; it stands so obstinately open, nor does it suffer itself to be closed. Teach, therefore, how sin, which in Adam was utterly deleted and abolished, could be propagated to his posterity, and then I shall indeed confess that imputation is a new invention, and that nothing but what is holy remains in man after remission. But you answer that this fault was left in the nature of Adam, not insofar as he was *this* man, but insofar as he was *man*, that is, insofar as he was the natural principle of generation. A distinction, indeed, that is cold and tasteless. The fault could not have clung to the nature of Adam without clinging to his person. For nature in Adam is not distinguished from his person in reality, but in reason. But you will make a real distinction if what was deleted in reality in the person remained in reality in the nature. Then if man had perished on account of the fault, what would have become of this man? Do you not see the insanity of your response? Why do you now tell me about the principle of generation? Let us speak of any reborn man. If whatever has the nature of sin is deleted, that is, if nothing that is not right and holy remains in the reborn man, it would be as easy for a child with sin to be born from him as for darkness to arise from the sun. For just as the clean cannot be born from the unclean, so neither can the unclean from the clean. Either God is the author of evil and sin, or there is in the nature and person of the parent an evil sprung from the evil will of the first man, which infects the offspring.

What you bring forward from Augustine concerning the purest wheat, I acknowledge, and it is relevant to the matter. We are like wheat, which can never be so purged that the seed of chaff is not left in it. And in us the seed of sin perpetually clings. But chaff is not an evil thing, whereas sin is the worst of things; therefore, the seed from which it is born can only be evil. Augustine, in his work *On the Merits and Remission of Sins*, book 3, chapter 9, says excellently, “A non-Christian is born from Christians, because it is not generation, but regeneration, that makes a Christian.” And elsewhere, in *On Nuptials and Concupiscence*, chapter 25, and *Against Julian*: “This law of sin is both remitted in spiritual regeneration and remains in the mortal flesh; therefore, sin remains, and yet it is remitted.” Remission, therefore, does not signify deletion and

abolition. Wherefore, since sin clings in the mortal flesh, and flesh is propagated by generation, it is hardly surprising that from one who is reborn is born one who is not reborn; from a Christian, a non-Christian; from a faithful man, an unfaithful one. But there will be another place for discussing the remnants of sin in the reborn, to which this question pertained. Now, therefore, you who said you were going to define what has not hitherto been defined, show what new thing you have brought in all this definition or explanation of yours.

#### **CHAPTER VIII. How original sin is derived to us and contracted by us.**

That Original sin is derived to us, and inheres deeply fixed within us, is more than clear enough; but how it was propagated from Adam to his posterity ought to be believed rather than investigated, and can be investigated more easily than it can be understood, and is better understood than it is explained. It is not so much our concern now to care how we fell into this evil, as to be freed from it; just as Augustine relates of the one who had fallen into a well: to someone admiring how he could have fallen into the well, he said, "You think about how to free me from here, not ask how I fell in here." And there is indeed great obscurity and difficulty in the matter, as Augustine acutely said in his *Sermons for the People*, "Nothing is better known for preaching than original sin, nothing more secret for understanding." What others have thought can be more easily criticized than it can be taught what ought to be thought. Augustine discussed this question at length, yet could not satisfy himself. The Pelagians contended that sin could not be propagated with nature; others raised questions about the transmission of the soul; others defended both that souls are created and that sin is transmitted by generation, an opinion which Augustine, although he did not dare to pronounce it the truest of all, nevertheless leaves free to each. In the first place, the heresy of the Pelagians, who remove sin from nature, must be exploded. But the transmission of souls seems to me both incredible and most absurd, when I consider that divine nature of the soul, whose powers are such that no carnal substance could pour them forth or procreate them from itself. But that is not a question for us to treat now. Surely, if souls could be transmitted and generated, we would labor less over the propagation of sin.

Let us now hear your opinion, Stapleton. You say it is enough to know that this sin is contracted along with nature. However, the wickedness of the heretics, the subtlety of the Theologians, and the curiosity of almost everyone has brought it about that this is not enough. Wherefore, we wish to know more from you. You say, therefore, that the seed is the instrument of transmitting this sin, as it was for propagating nature. But sin is in the soul as in a subject; unless, therefore, the soul lies hidden in the seed, how will sin be transmitted in the seed? "Dispositively," you say, following Thomas, not effectively. But does the seed itself become infected with sin, or does it infect the soul? Thomas, in book 2, distinction 31, question 1. Thus, indeed, Augustine thought, when he says in *Against Julian*, book 5, chapter 3, and *On the Merits and Remission of Sins*, book 1, chapter 9, "Either both (that is, the soul and the body) are drawn vitiated from

man, or one (namely, the soul) is corrupted in the other as in a vitiated vessel.” He teaches, however, that this corruption of the flesh is born from concupiscence and lust, which opinion of Augustine the Master of the Sentences (Peter Lombard, book 2, chapter 29) followed. But Gregory of Rimini, so that he might show himself to be subtle, wished to be the author of an admirable opinion. For he says that the serpent which deceived our parents in paradise infected Adam’s flesh with a pestilential and venomous breath, and sprinkled it with a morbid quality, which, although it is not sin, yet because it is propagated with us, contaminates the soul by contagious contact. Here you must help us. Come then, is sin transmitted in the seed? To be transmitted Materially (you say) is not absurd. But we do not want matter without form. And unless the form of sin is transmitted, there will not be sin formally in a newborn child; but no one doubts that there is. Make us, therefore, a little more certain about the manner.

So does the seed corrupt the soul? For you do not affirm that sin is transmitted through the soul, which you say is newly created and infused; nor that it is derived from the flesh into the soul, as some have taught from the opinion of the Master. But why do you deny that the soul is infected by the flesh, and depart from the opinion of Augustine and the Master? You subjoin the reason: “because the flesh cannot impress a quality of the body upon the soul, since it is a spiritual thing.” So Bellarmine, in his work *On the Grace of the First Man*, book 4, chapter 3, denies that it can be understood how the flesh might infect the soul, the body the spirit. Is it so, indeed, that no contagion can overflow from the flesh into the soul? How then does it happen that the soul follows the temperament of the body? That children resemble their parents' genius and morals, not just their face? That foolishness, irascibility, and madness occupy the mind? Will you now remove this commerce between these parts, so that nothing can flow from the body into the soul, or from the soul into the body? I fear that will not be allowed. And how will the seed be an instrument for transmitting sin, if the soul suffers nothing from the flesh, nor is vitiated by the flesh, nor does any stain inhere in the flesh? You say that sin is transmitted in the seed because the soul is infused into flesh sown from Adam, and that infusion is the terminus of generation. It is the same as what Bellarmine responds, that nothing else is required for the transmission of original sin than that a person descend from Adam by true generation. For by that very fact, that he was in the loins of Adam when he violated the precept in paradise, he communicated in his sin.

But then there was no need to speak of the corruption of the seed. For to this end, it is enough that we were born from Adam, whether corruption was transmitted through the seed, or the seed remained incorrupt. For if the seed does not infect the soul, nor does the soul bring any stain with it when it is joined with the flesh, to what end will this corruption of the seed pertain? Either it is transmitted through the seed, or we are not therefore born sinners because we draw our origin and nature from Adam; or the soul is newly created with sin, which it is impious to think. You have led us by your subtlety into such

difficulties, from which you cannot extricate us, unless you confess what you deny, that the soul receives contagion from the flesh. For if it neither brings it with it nor contracts it, whence does it have it? It did not bring it with it, for it is newly created and infused into the flesh, as you say; thus you wish it to seem that it was created outside the flesh. But it ought to be pure, if it is created. It did not contract it; for it could not except from the flesh. But not from the flesh, because the flesh cannot impress a quality of the body upon the soul, as you say, and Bellarmine says it is not to be tolerated that the spirit is infected by the flesh. Now, therefore, it is necessary that our nature was corrupted by God. God forbid. Therefore, the corruption propagated in the seed infected the soul, and as Gerson, in his *Compendium of Theology on Vices*, says, "from its conjunction with the body it contracts that vice; just as when someone falls into mud, he is soiled and stained." And this, I think, is what Scripture meant in Job 14, when it denies that a clean thing can be made, which is conceived from unclean seed: why, unless because from unclean seed impurity and vice are contracted? Thus David, in Psalm 51: "Behold, I was shaped in iniquity, and in sin did my mother conceive me." The Holy Spirit, therefore, made the Virgin's womb fruitful, so that Christ would take no contagion from the mass of our nature. Wherefore Ambrose, in his *Apology for David*, chapter 11, says: "It was fitting that he who was not to have the sin of the fall in his body should feel no natural contagion of generation." And Augustine, in Psalm 30: "Christ was born without the bond of carnal concupiscence, being conceived of a virgin by the Holy Spirit." And a little later: "How is that born without the bond of sin, which is conceived and sown from a body dead on account of sin?" And in the preceding words, "Men are not therefore conceived in iniquity, and nourished in sins in their mothers' wombs, because it is a sin for spouses to have intercourse, but because that which is done, is assuredly done from penal flesh." This is that which is commonly said, that at first the person infected the nature, but afterwards the nature infected the person. If the person is infected by the nature, this must happen through the seed. Thomas, in his *Disputed Questions on Evil*, question 4, article 2, treated this cause not unhappily in my opinion. Thus he says: "Original sin is in the rational soul as in its proper subject; but the carnal seed is, as it were, the instrumental cause of the transmission of human nature in the offspring; thus it is the instrumental cause of the transmission of original sin, and so original sin is in the flesh, that is, in the virtue of the carnal seed, as in an instrumental cause." And this sin, he says, is prior in the seed than in the soul in the order of generation and time, but is prior in the soul in the order of nature. Elsewhere, in the *Summa Theologiae*, part 1 of the second part, question 81, article 1, he says thus: "In this way, from the will of the first parent, Original sin is transmitted to posterity through a certain generative motion, just as from the will of some man, actual sin is derived to other parts of him." I could add more from him, but let these suffice.

Let us now see that reason of yours: The soul, since it is the act of the body, by desiring, follows the sense of itself, unless it is restrained by reason. What then

follows? From this you conclude that the soul, despoiled of the aid of Original Justice and deprived of the friendship and grace of God, follows sensuality and is borne prone to every evil. This opinion is utterly tasteless and even heretical. For if the soul is not itself contaminated with sin, but because it is not aided by the help and grace of God, it follows the sense of the flesh, and so falls into sin, firstly, to lack original rectitude will not be a sin, but an occasion of falling into sin; secondly, infants will not have Original sin before they arrive at the use of reason, except perhaps in potentiality. For the soul does not follow the sense and is not drawn to depraved desires, except after age and reason have been added. And to follow the sense when it draws to what is evil, is to commit an actual sin. Thus, by this opinion, you have absolved infants of original sin. Finally, those sins which are committed by the intellect alone, such as not believing, will not be sins. That you say Augustine always places Concupiscence in the flesh is remarkably false, as we will later show. For that concupiscence which the law prohibits, how could he not place it in the soul, which is the seat of sin? Acknowledge your error from Bellarmine, in his work *On the Loss of Grace*, book 5, chapter 15: “The vice of concupiscence, although chiefly in sensuality, nevertheless also has its seat in the mind. Saint Augustine therefore speaks almost everywhere of the vice of sensuality because this vice reveals itself more in sensuality, not because he was unaware that it also has a place in the mind.” But indeed, the principal seat of that native concupiscence, in which Augustine placed Original sin, is in the mind.

**CHAPTER IX. Against those who have taught that Original Sin is called sin improperly and is only a certain guilt or effect of a past sin.**

Now we must refute certain Catholics who have thought differently than you about Original sin. And you pursue three opinions in order, in the first two of which, you say you will be briefer, because they are now against the faith. The faith you commemorate is indeed a recent one, which was born after Durandus. But we acknowledge no accessions or new increments or moments to the faith; the faith can be illustrated and explained, it cannot be augmented or piled up with new articles: the true is what is first, the adulterated is what is later, as Tertullian says in his work *Against Marcion*. Wherefore, what Durandus falsely taught about original sin was always contrary to the Catholic faith. In the third, because it has not yet been repudiated by the Church, it has most serious authors, and seems to favor the heretics not a little, your intention is to linger longer. And we shall easily allow you to proceed in your manner, and we shall proceed together with you with equal steps.

The first opinion is that of Durandus, who would have it that original sin is sin in us only improperly; for it is only a certain guilt, or an unworthiness of having original justice, and a worthiness of lacking it. His principle was this: that sin must necessarily be voluntary, so much so that if it were not voluntary, it could not even be a sin. Durandus, in his commentary on the Sentences, book 2, distinction 30, question 2. But infants did not sin by their own will, therefore by

another's. Now, something can be voluntary by another's will in two ways: either when someone transfers his will and authority to another, so that whatever the other has done is understood to be done in his name; or when one is in a certain way contained in another, as when a soldier has accepted a castle from the King for himself and his sons, if he has kept faith, the will of the father in keeping or breaking faith is interpretatively the will of the sons. In the first way, the sin of infants cannot be voluntary, because infants were not Adam's authors for sinning; therefore, only in the second way. And because Adam did not have it in his mind to lose original justice, but the loss of this justice followed alongside his will, concomitantly, he therefore concludes that original sin is not in infants voluntary by a personal and proper will, and therefore is not properly a sin. You now say that some were led by this argument of Durandus to think that the reason for guilt in original sin does not flow from the will of the first parent, but from a certain habitual will in infants. But it is quite clear that Augustine himself, and the Master of the Sentences, who had never dreamed of Durandus, placed original guilt in habitual concupiscence; nor is it doubtful to anyone that there is in infants a native propensity and inclination to sinning, which cannot exist without a certain habitual will. Whence, then, comes our will to do evil, if not from a habit of evil will? For no evil habit is infused; therefore, it is implanted in us by nature. This I confess indeed, that it must not be said that the wills of infants are evil without respect to the will of Adam, since just as we sinned in Adam, so in Adam we had the will to sin. That will, therefore, in the first place, and that act of Adam is imputed to us; then from that imputation, the habitual will and the stain of original guilt has adhered to us. You (I believe) fear the imputation of sin, lest you be forced to concede the imputation of justice. But without it, you will never explain clearly or understand soundly what original guilt is, and how the will of Adam was ours, and how we sinned voluntarily in Adam.

Now you undertake to refute this opinion of Durandus; and first, you respond appositely that what Durandus supposed is false, that the sinning will of Adam was ours only concomitantly and interpretatively; but how it was ours, you neither can nor dare to explain. You say that Adam had the intention of losing grace not actually, but virtually; for in every actual sin there is a certain aversion from God besides the intention of the sinner, which is voluntary only consequently. But what is this to infants, who did not sin actually? You must say, therefore, that that actual and voluntary transgression of Adam is ours by imputation; so that what he willed, we truly willed, what he did, we also did; and hence arose that corruption of our whole nature. But that Durandus argues Adam's sin is not voluntary in us, because the loss of justice and grace followed besides his intention and thought, in the same way he will be able to conclude that it was not even voluntary in himself. But it is sufficient for sin that the transgression of the precept be voluntary, whatever he who violates the precept may have desired or avoided. Scarcely anyone sins with the intention of gaining nothing else but divine offense; but this offense nevertheless follows from a sin

undertaken for whatever cause. Therefore, it is not to be thought that sin in infants is not voluntary because Adam did not propose to himself to lose for himself or his own the grace and justice he had received from God; yet he lost it, on which no other condition he had received it than that he should obey God, if he wished to retain it.

Secondly, you say, and that most correctly, that Original justice was implanted in nature itself solely by the will of God, and therefore its loss happened solely from the antecedent will of God, by which He so gave Justice to Adam that he might either preserve it for himself and all his posterity by persevering, or lose it by sinning. For Adam's own intention could never merit that he should either retain or lose it in this way; but this condition depended solely on the will of God. Wherefore, that our will was included in Adam's will, and that our sin is consequently his, and the same is properly voluntary in us, which he committed, this was placed in God's will, not Adam's. But it makes a great deal of difference, indeed, as you say, to know and to hold that Original sin is in each one of us properly a sin. For if it is nothing other than guilt, however much it may be said to be a fault, lest Pelagianism be newly introduced, nevertheless the guilt alone will remove the fault. And Durandus sensed this not obscurely. For he proves that the Original defect does not have the proper nature of a fault, because no one is blamed except for those things which are in his power; and he concludes that we are born children of wrath only on account of the guilt of punishment, which we incur from Adam's sin, just as God is said to be angry not according to affection, but effect; so sin is not formally in infants; wherefore Adam, because he sinned, transfused to his posterity a nature guilty of the lack of Original justice, but he did not transfuse the fault according to the proper nature of a fault. And this is indeed the very heresy of Pelagius, which Lombard, in his Sentences, book 2, distinction 30, testifies had taken hold in many Scholastic Doctors before his own time, however much Durandus may wish it to seem different.

The Scriptures, on the contrary, most openly teach that what is contracted by Origin is truly and properly a sin. David, in Psalm 51:7, confesses that he was conceived in iniquity and born in sin. Paul, in Romans 5:12, says that we sinned in Adam; and therefore he teaches that this is truly a sin even in the reborn, in Romans 7:15, a thing which the illustrious Areopagites of Trent deny. Furthermore, in Ephesians 2:3, he affirms that we are by nature children of wrath, which could not happen except on account of sin implanted in us; for what else merits divine wrath and damnation? For as you aptly cite from Romans 6, verse 23, the wages of sin is death, eternal death, I say, since the Apostle immediately adds, "The grace of God is eternal life." But see now what you determine concerning venial sins. For if Original sin is less serious than any venial sin, which is a common saying in your School, either it does not merit eternal death, or venial sins also will merit the same. Then if death signifies a punishment of loss, not of sense, with which you are accustomed to punish

those who die in original sin alone, then deny that there is any sense of felicity in eternal life. Finally, as in sin is the whole cause of death, so confess that in grace is the whole cause of eternal life, and that it is therefore entirely gratuitous. But back to the matter. From the Baptism of infants, Original sin is most clearly confirmed. For to what end are they baptized, if not for the remission of Original sin? But how would it be remitted, if it were not present? For that a certain feigned remission is conferred in Baptism was condemned, not without cause, in the Council of Milevis. But let us leave Durandus in his Pelagianism.

Regarding Zwingli, I will not believe you, who have not read Zwingli, but have seen such a thing objected to him by Dominicus Soto, or some Lutheran. Surely, he calls it guilt, and misery, and disease, and servitude: and rightly so. But where does he write that we are not born stained with sin? He has written much about Original sin, as occasion arose; but those things which are drawn by many for calumny can be conveniently explained, if the zeal for contention is absent. Hear his candid confession in his Letter to Urbanus Rhegius, by whom he was freely and amicably admonished on this very matter, in book 2 of his letters: "This is our opinion on Original sin, that it is a vice and a disease which was inflicted as a punishment on our first parents; whose propagation was so vitiated by the transgression, that whatever is born from it is prone to sin, and if divine clemency had not provided in time for an efficacious remedy, all who were born from this source would have perished." He acknowledges that the whole of nature was vitiated and corrupted and lost by the transgression. Durandus rightly says, "Wordy, contentious, calumnious, malicious men dispute about names."

#### **CHAPTER X. Against those who have taught that Original Sin is nothing other than the actual sin of Adam.**

This opinion of Pighius, which you call the second, how little, I ask, does it differ from that which was refuted in the preceding chapter? For both Durandus and Pighius place original sin in guilt alone; nor is there anything different in the substance of the matter. Pighius, on original sin in contention with Calvin. But you treat the opinion of Pighius so verbosely and accurately, that you could not have done more if it were your own. First, you relate what it was, but in such a way as those who wish to make a thing better in the telling are accustomed to do: that original sin is nothing other than the actual sin of Adam, and since Adam was the origin of the human race, his sin is the sin of the origin of the human race; and so in him we sinned, that is, we incurred condemnation, because his sin bound us, and it became ours by participation, not by proprietorship. But he openly denies that Original sin is truly a sin, and affirms that it is nothing other than the sin of Adam, on account of which we, his progeny, were made subject to eternal death and damnation, and have been cast out from the celestial inheritance. But this death of bodies, and the miseries of this life, the desires of the flesh, and other such affections, flow from the principles of nature, and therefore ought to be counted among the works of God, not sins; but in infants

there is nothing that has the nature of a fault; and those who die bound by this sin alone will feel no punishment, but he thinks they will rather live in some quite pleasant place, and will be happy with a certain natural felicity, although they are exiled from the kingdom of heaven, about which loss, however, they neither complain nor grieve at all. What is more insane than this comment, in which he so boasts, that you would think Pelagius himself is speaking. Now you illustrate it as much as you can, and with certain painted colors you adorn the opinion of Pighius. For you say that all the Scriptures seem to speak openly in this way; and that the opinion of Augustine and your own can be seen to be borne out in this sense; indeed, that by this reasoning all those difficulties about the proprietorship of Original sin in us, and its transmission and essence, would utterly cease; nor would this sense seem to derogate anything from Baptism; finally, Augustine seems to embrace this opinion, not only before he had to deal with the Pelagians, but also after. You pursue these things in such a way, as if mourning that it is not permitted to think with Pighius, with whom the matter itself indicates you dissent only unwillingly. "Confident in these arguments," you say, "Pighius sustains his opinion as the most probable of all; yet, having opted for the Catholic way, to acquiesce in the better one." Thus indeed can the most foul heresies be defended catholically. No one ever held any opinion so obstinately that he did not say he was prepared to lay it down if he were convinced by a certain reason. But Pighius expired in this heresy, and suffered the same fate as Pelagius. Nor was it enough for you to have spoken thus in favor of Pighius, but you also add further that his opinion was received and believed by some of the ancient Fathers, especially before the time of Pelagius. And here you bring forth Clement of Alexandria, Chrysostom, Theodoret, Jerome, Ambrose, Arnobius, Euthymius, just as Pelagius once did, and his disciple Julian. But I answer you thus, as Augustine did to them: the Catholic Doctors spoke less cautiously about original sin before the heresy of Pelagius arose, as is accustomed to happen, that we are less wary of things which we have not foreseen. But why so many things, Stapleton, on the worse side? Surely, if you could not absolve Pighius, you have abundantly achieved the next best thing, which is to show that he was not a heretic without reason!

Having finally set these things aside, you acknowledge three great absurdities in the opinion of Pighius. First, that he posits in infants not a sin, but only an obligation of sin. The second, that he says they are free from all sin, and yet makes them sinners. The third, that he posits no inherent original sin in individuals, but wills it to be one in number. And does it not seem most absurd to you that he taught that those are damned who have no sin? But what limit will there be to absurdities, if we admit the opinion of Pighius? Therefore, so that you may separate your opinion from that of Pighius, you say that we draw original sin with our nature, and that individuals have individual stains; and then you expound the foundation and causes of the Pighian error, in which you do nothing other than repeat what you have often said before, about sin being fixed in nature, about the propagation of sin, about the stain contracted through

Adam, about Adam's will and ours, in the narration of which there was no need to linger. You propose three arguments of Pighius, with which he argues that the privation of original justice, hereditary in us from Adam's sin, cannot be a sin in us. The first is, because no law can be produced which obligated posterity to the preservation of that justice. The second, if there were any such law, infants could not be obligated by it, as they are not capable of law. The third, because even if all were obligated to such a preservation, yet since it was lost by no fault of ours, its loss cannot be imputed to us as a sin. These are indeed his arguments, but not all of them. For he also has this argument, that no author of this sin can be produced: not God, since He is not the cause of sin; not the devil, since he cannot act immediately upon the soul of man; not the parents, since they furnish nothing other than the seed; and that of which there is no cause is established to be in us without reason. You will also find this argument in him, that no seat of this sin can be found in man: not in the soul, because it is created; nor in the body, because it is not capable of sin; and God made both the soul and the body at the same time. These are his principal arguments, but he is full of such subtleties. You prepare a response in general, but surely it would have been better to respond to each point individually, unless you either could not, or perhaps would not, infringe too much upon the arguments of a friend. But you say that this whole disputation of Pighius is ill-founded, because he always considers original sin as a transgression of some particular law. But how do you think it should be considered? You deny that original injustice is the transgression of any precept, against Scripture, which teaches that we sinned in Adam. If we have sinned, we have transgressed some precept. For without a precept there is no sin, since the nature of sin consists in this, that one deviates from the sentence of the precept and law. Wherefore, in Romans 5:19, Adam's sin is called disobedience, and by it we are said to have been made sinners. No one would have said they did not obey, who had committed nothing against the law and the will of him whom they ought to have obeyed. And so, with this response, you do not refute Pighius, but defend him. For his argument will be most true, that there is no sin unless it is committed against some law; wherefore, if Original injustice is the transgression of no precept, it will be no sin at all, just as Pighius wished to teach. But you say, just as Original justice was not some special virtue, or the observance of a certain precept, but the rectitude of the whole nature given in creation in the manner of nature, and afterwards to be infused naturally into posterity in generation, so that men would not become just, but be born just: similarly, Original injustice is not the transgression of any precept, but the lost rectitude of nature, so that we are born sinners and unjust, on account of no transgression of the law, not even of Adam, as if by way of demerit. Do you acknowledge your words? They ought to have been Pighius's, not yours. For first, you are not ignorant that what you commemorate about the natural justice of Adam, in which he himself was created, and which he would have transmitted to his children by generation, if he had not sinned, is not agreed upon among your fellow-lodgers, the Scholastics. Secondly, it does not

follow that original injustice is not the transgression of any precept, because original justice was neither one virtue nor the observance of a certain precept. For perfect virtue demands the observance of all precepts; injustice is committed if one precept or duty is violated; and yet those who offend in one are guilty of all. Lastly, that we are born sinners by no work of our own, and on account of no transgression of the law, not even of Adam, is against the Apostle and the perpetual doctrine of the Church. For we both are in Adam, and we sinned with Adam, and the transgression of Adam merited that both he himself should be stained with sin, and that we who are his children should be born in sin. Listen to Augustine, in *The City of God*, book 14, chapter 1: "This death would not have been in each individual who was to die, if the first two parents had not merited it by disobedience." And in another book, *Against Julian*, chapter 3: "By the merit of original sin, the human race has deservedly collapsed into great miseries." Most absurdly and most inertly you conclude that we are born unjust and sinners because we are born without the rectitude of nature once received. And yet Pighius desires the rectitude of nature once received in nature. Then also you say nothing other than that we are born sinners because we are sinners, when a cause ought to be brought forward why we are born without the rectitude of nature and therefore unjust. And this cause you remove, when you deny that original injustice is the transgression of a precept. Thus this injustice will not be a sin except equivocally or improperly, because it has no transgression of a precept. For you will never prove a sin unless you produce a law. Therefore, it is not enough, as you say, to show the originally inherent injustice of nature, to show that nature is vitiated from its origin, but a law must be produced, the transgression of which is the cause and reason of that corruption, in Adam and his posterity alike, which must be univocal.

And here you accuse Ruard Tapper, that distinguished Dean of Cologne, of a certain new and unheard-of opinion, because he wrote that original sin is the past disobedience after Adam's act, not simply, but as it remained in the effects of habitual aversion from God, of inordinate conversion, also of stain and of guilt, which were left behind. That he attributes the sin of Adam and ours to disobedience, in this he is no more to be reprehended than Paul; indeed, he rightly derives the beginning and head of sin from disobedience. If he had thought wrongly, you would perhaps not have named him; but now because he does not favor you, and says something that is repugnant to your reason, he is called the author of a singular opinion. And you thought he too should be refuted. But you bring forward two reasons: the first is, that that habitual aversion left in Adam after the sin of disobedience was personal; the second, that it could have been deleted by subsequent penitence. But they are of no moment. For first, although that was a personal aversion, yet it has now also become natural, and therefore it passed to his posterity with nature. Secondly, sin in every pious person is remitted through penitence, and yet the children who are procreated by him are born with Original sin, no less those who were born after penitence than those who were born before.

Yet you do not cease to plead the cause of Pighius, as if you were his advocate. For you bring forward an argument of this kind in favor (as you say) of the Pighian opinion: The mere Lack of grace after an actual sin is not in reality a sin: therefore neither will the lack of Original justice be original sin itself, but some effect of it. You yourself respond in this manner: the privation of grace through an actual sin is not in the act of sin itself, that is, it is not intrinsic to the act itself, but is in the sinning person after the act, and therefore does not pertain to the actual sin itself, but is its effect: but the lack of Original justice so remained in the nature of the sinning Adam, that it was intrinsic to that first aversion which Adam made, and for that reason it deservedly pertains to original sin, which is of nature. And thus you think you have excellently removed this scruple. But there is nothing solid or sound underlying your response, so that it is to be feared that while you present yourself as an adversary, you are playing the part of a prevaricator. You say that the lack of grace after an actual sin is in the sinning person after the act; you deny that it is intrinsic to the act, and therefore you conclude that it does not pertain to the actual sin. Do you yourself understand this? What? Was not Adam's sin most actual? And was the Lack of grace intrinsic to this act? You concede this. What then is the reason why in the actual sins which we commit, the lack of grace is not intrinsic to the aversion itself? The lack of original justice (you say) remained in the nature. Does not the lack of grace also remain in the nature of the sinning person after an actual sin? If it was a sin in Adam to lose grace and justice by sinning, why would it not also be a sin in us to be deprived of the gifts of grace by our own fault? And is it not intrinsic to the act of sin to lose grace? But what is so repugnant to grace as sin? It is its effect, you say. And so the matter stood in Adam's sin. After he sinned, he lacked grace and justice. But sin remains from sin. Wherefore, to lose the grace which you had received, and now to lack that with which you had been endowed by God, cannot but be a sin, and merit a grave punishment. "Hold fast what you have," the Spirit commands the church of Thyatira in Revelation 2; and he most gravely reprehends the church of Ephesus in chapter 4, because it had lost its first love. Therefore, if you dispute seriously and not feignedly against Pighius, do not introduce into the disputation scruples which you are then unable to remove, or you mock us. I confess with Thomas, in his *Disputed Questions on Evil*, question 4, article 2, that the Lack of grace is not the actual sin itself, since that is constituted in the inordination of the act: but that it is in no way a sin, which you say, is utterly false. The act has passed, grace is lost: Is it no evil and sin at all to have made a loss of the grace which it was one's duty to preserve?

From these you subjoin a twofold distinction between actual and original sin, of which the first is, that after an actual sin the lack of grace inheres only in the person after the act, and that not by way of guilt, but of punishment. In this way, you, a good theologian, posit no sin in the loss of grace. If this is true, then in Adam after his sin this was not a fault but a punishment. For if to lack grace is not a sin in us, neither was it in him; for the nature of the thing is one in him and in us. But that you say this lack inheres only in the person after an actual sin,

what person will you find for us outside of nature? The man who has committed a sin has harmed his own nature; and there clings fixed in his nature a stain, until it shall be deleted. And although these personal stains are not always propagated with nature, yet they both infect nature and are no less sins for that reason. The other is, that in actual sin the lack of grace is not intrinsic to the act, but inheres in the subject. And this, which was to be demonstrated by argument, you ask us to concede to you. I do not concede it. To me, indeed, nothing seems so inherent to sin as to expel grace. Therefore the Apostle warns us not to extinguish the Spirit by sinning. And David prays for the Spirit, with which he had formerly been full, to be restored and renewed. Nor does it follow from this, that this lack is not a sin because it is a punishment. For sins are also punishments, and God, when he is most angry with men, is accustomed to punish sins with sins from time to time. The things you then repeat about the twofold stain of lost nature and of aversion, I pass over. And these are the excellent distinctions between Original and actual sin you have offered us: are there no others, or do you not know others? But actual sins differ from original sin chiefly in this, that the former flow from the latter as from a most impure sewer, and these are admitted by our own will and choice, while that was instilled into us when we were thinking of no such thing. For the sin of Adam itself was at first actual, and it is called Original not for his sake but for ours. But now let us return to Pighius, against whom you have said nothing, though you may seem to have said much. If he had not been better refuted by our Theologians than he has been by you, he would not greatly repent of his opinion.

But to whom who is sane is not the insanity of that man manifest? If infants are born without sin, why are they punished with eternal punishments, why do they die, why are they baptized? For first, it is against divine justice that a son should pay for his parent's fault. Therefore, infants pay the penalty for their own sin, not another's. Secondly, since death was inflicted on account of sin, those who come into the world pure and without sin ought not to die. As Fulgentius says in his work *On the Forgiveness of Sins and Grace*, "By what justice is the infant subjected to the wage of sin, if there is in it no pollution of sin; or how do we see it punished by death, if it has not felt the sting?" Lastly, why are they brought to the font of regeneration, if they have in themselves nothing to be purged and washed away? I omit the innumerable other arguments and testimonies of Scripture from our writers, by which Pighius lies transfixed, and will lie for evermore. It remains that we now refute the arguments of Pighius which were proposed earlier.

Wherefore, to the first we respond that we are held by the same law for the preservation of original Justice by which Adam was held. For as we fell with Adam, so we stood with Adam. We ought, therefore, to have preserved and guarded that state; because we did not do so, we have incurred the offense of the law. Ambrose says, "Adam existed, and in him we all existed; Adam perished, and

in him all perished.” Thus Prosper in his most beautiful verses, from his poem *On the Ungrateful*, says:

“Once the inviolate and sublime image of God,

We all were in our first father, while in the nurturing grove

He dwelt, and our parent was wary of the one forbidden tree:

But after he fell..., we all fell at once in our falling sire.”

Therefore, the same law was prescribed for us as for Adam, as Augustine also, in *The City of God*, book 16, chapter 27, declares most eloquently in these words: “Even infants, not according to the propriety of their own life, but according to the common origin of the human race, all in that one man transgressed the commandment of God, in whom all sinned.” And after: “Every one who is held bound by some sin was a transgressor of some law.” Again: “Infants, in the same way that they are sinners, are also acknowledged as transgressors of that law which was given in paradise.” You call the pact and testament a fable; not so Augustine, as you see. And in this way Pighius's argument, which acknowledges no law given to infants, is dissolved. To the second, we were all capable of the law in the first parent of our race; therefore we are obligated by it, however much, for the state of this nature, when we are born, we are ignorant of the force of laws. To the third, although the original justice of Adam was lost by the proper fault of Adam, not ours, yet we are not therefore excused, because we were all in him as in a root. Wherefore, as the Apostle says, Levi paid tithes in the loins of Abraham, so we lost justice in Adam. That loss, therefore, can by right be imputed to us as a sin. To the fourth, the proximate cause of the sin was the free will of our parents, who, turning themselves from the true good to a fictitious appearance of good, fell into the snares of Satan beyond their expectation. To the fifth, the seat of the sin is the essence of the soul, but the sin is derived and contracted by carnal generation, not by imitation or a new infection of nature. Augustine, in his work *On Original Sin and Grace*, chapter 40, and in the *Hypognosticon*, says: “The stain of the filial root was so diffused through the shoots of the generations, that not even an infant of one day is free from the guilt of the first transgression.” Again: “We all contract the sin of the protoplast, not by imitation of morals, but by the conception of the seed.” And Prosper, whether a better poet or theologian is uncertain, in his work *On Grace*:

“For a virulent drunkenness runs through all

and persists in the bowels of the corrupted heart, and a crude indigestion ferments with the seed of crime.

Hence the blunted vigor of the mind,”

And the most beautiful things that follow in that work. Let us pass over the other trifles of Pighius.

#### **CHAPTER XI. What is understood by the name Concupiscence by the Theologians.**

The opinion which places Original Sin in Concupiscence, since it has the gravest authors, Augustine in the first place and the Master of the Sentences, and has not yet (you say) been reprobated by the Church. But whether it will be that it is hereafter counted among the heretical and condemned opinions by you, let him who can, divine. And that alone (you say) almost held sway in the schools until certain Scholastics, having weighed the mind of Augustine from other perspectives, reconciled this with the first view, which was posited by you, and followed a middle way, so that they placed original sin neither in concupiscence alone, nor in the privation of Justice alone. But these Scholastics deserve no great praise or thanks for this, that while they seemed to themselves to have so thoroughly understood the mind of Augustine that not even Augustine himself would have understood what he wanted better, they have fastened upon him a foreign and varied opinion. For they thought that he was speaking of the concupiscence which dominates in the brute part of the soul, and does not occupy the mind and the citadel of reason; when it is certain that Augustine, with the Apostle, understood that Concupiscence which pervades the whole soul, and especially solicits the mind, turned away from God, to sinning; as will be manifest from our discourse hereafter. This ignorance of the Scholastics has begotten multiple ambages and errors and disputes.

“That axiom,” you say, “has always prevailed in the School: Original sin presupposes the vice of concupiscence for its matter, but connotes the Lack of original Justice,” so that the better parts of sin have been attributed to Concupiscence, of the kind that they have fashioned; by which, that which is most vicious in us is something we have in common with beasts. Since, therefore, it is to be discussed whether concupiscence is original sin, it is necessary first to explain what the name of concupiscence declares, and what force it has, not from the unlearned and crass opinion of the Scholastics, but from the doctrine of the Scriptures and the Holy Fathers, and the common experience of all mortals. You distribute man into soul and body; you make three parts of the soul, differing not in species but in power: the rational, the sensitive, and the vegetative, which is the common division. You claim the rational faculty and its parts for man, inasmuch as he is man; the others you say he has in common with brutes and plants. You divide the rational part with the Theologians into intellect and will; as for the sensitive part, the Theologians (you say) consider only the sensitive appetite, which they call sensuality, and place it in concupiscence, and for that reason call it by the name of concupiscence, because that is the foundation of this, although it also contains the irascible power. Thus you conclude that concupiscence among your Theologians signifies sensuality, or the sensitive and animal appetite, by whose force and impulse we

are carried away from the rule of reason to sensible things, which we judge should be sought after on account of some pleasure in them. And I confess that this Concupiscence is indeed in us; but there is also another, more hidden and subtle concupiscence of our mind itself, by which we think, meditate, contrive, and will things which are contrary to the highest military discipline and law. And we are much more wicked and hateful to God on account of this latter one, than on account of the former, although this one is indeed engaged in a turpitude so great that the turpitude of beasts can scarcely be greater.

This is indeed implanted in nature, to desire; and this faculty had a place in the uncorrupted soul. For God implanted in our nature, when it was first created, the power to desire the good, to flee the evil, to be delighted by pleasure, to be offended by harmful things, to protect and preserve itself. But the concupiscence of which we speak is an insane inclination and propensity to all injustice, born from that most funest sin of Adam, which has so besieged and entangled all the parts of our soul, that before Christ has freed us from this lamentable servitude, we sin perpetually and necessarily. Scripture signifies such a concupiscence, Augustine understands such a one, not the one which the Scholastics have placed in sensuality, and in the unbridled incitement and rebellion of the lower powers only; and this while those inconsiderate men believed they had extracted the very marrow of the Augustinian opinion. But this matter will come to be judged later, so that it may be clearly established whether they think more correctly about Concupiscence, or we. That you say in the nature of man, taken by itself, as it is neither vested with the gift of justice, nor corrupted by sin, concupiscence was indeed born to obey the command of the will and reason, but in such a way, however, that it could resist; what do you mean? Or to what end does this caution look? For nature never at the same time lacked both the gift of justice and the evil of injustice; so there is less need to labor over what kind of concupiscence it would have been then. While nature persisted in its first state, in which it was made (and how long it persisted is only a matter of conjecture), it is certain that there were no evil desires of concupiscence in man; but after man was cast down from his rank, the whole of concupiscence, turned away from virtue, rushed headlong, prone to vice. That is why its striving and resisting against the command of reason is owed to sin, without which there could be no dissension of the parts in nature. Wherefore, that you say the appetite has something of its own, from which it can oppose reason, because it can be moved not only by particular reason, which is distinguished from intellective reason, but also by imagination and sense, so that for that reason the intellect dominates the appetite “politically,” not “despotically,” as the Philosopher taught in his *Politics*, I concede to be true in this nature in which we now live. For in that first nature, although it could be moved by sense and imagination, it would never have moved itself against the reason and will of God, unless Satan had pushed man into this fraud. And so I do not acknowledge pure naturals, since nature was always either adorned with all the perfection of virtues, or had fallen into the servitude of sin. For when we

now fight against sin, we strive not with the defenses of nature, but of grace. To what end, therefore, do you commemorate these things, since you believe and maintain that the gift of justice was given to man in creation itself, which polished both the superior and the inferior part of the soul, and the whole man? In which state there was not, nor could have been, any contention between Concupiscence and reason. But why do you call this latter part, by which the lower powers obeyed the higher, the health of original justice, or the integrity of nature? Was not both the nature of the superior parts, and the justice? Why then do you relegate this health and integrity to the lower parts, when it enriched the superior parts with more noble ornaments? Wherefore, it is necessary that we place the original justice and its health primarily in the conformation of the mind itself to the divine image, from which the health of the lower parts followed. For thus you yourself write, that from the sin of the first man, original justice having been removed as to the perfection of the superior reason, this sensuality of the lower parts was made unbridled. If, therefore, sensuality is prone to evil because reason has cast off original justice, and as long as reason regarded nothing but God, sensuality obeyed reason in all things, who does not see that the health of original justice, and the integrity of nature itself, is much more to be measured by reason than by sensuality? Who would bear such ineptitudes and absurdities? But by this path you had to arrive at that most false conclusion of yours, by which you affirm that the inordination of the inferior powers of the soul is that concupiscence which we are seeking, as if no concupiscence could be found except in these parts, in which original sin may be placed. Theologians may have thought so, whom you follow as masters; but we wish neither to rave with you, nor with them, so as to think openly against the Apostle. But now, both what you comprehend under the name of concupiscence in this case, and what we maintain should be understood by this name, has been sufficiently explained.

## **CHAPTER XII. Whether Concupiscence is the material element of Original Sin.**

“We,” you say, “maintain, according to the doctrine of St. Thomas, that concupiscence is not original sin itself, but only its material element.” For who would be so insane as to place original sin, which has pervaded and devastated all the powers of the soul, in sensuality alone? You confuse Concupiscence with sensuality, and then you dispute that the whole of original sin is not in concupiscence, and here you abound in a certain useless and inane verbosity. First, you err about concupiscence in a puerile manner. For it was necessary to begin the discourse about that concupiscence of which Paul said, in Romans 7, “I would not have known what it is to covet, if the law had not said, ‘You shall not covet’”; and Christ himself, in John 8:44, “you want to do the desires (epithymias, Greek for desires) of your father the devil”; and Peter, in 2 Peter 1:4, “fleeing the corruption of concupiscence that is in the world.” But we are not only prohibited by divine law from desiring carnal pleasures, which we also understand should

be avoided, being taught by experience and the light of reason alone; nor were the Jews subservient only to crass lusts or gluttony; nor is this the only corruption of concupiscence in the world to be feared, which pertains to sensuality. But concupiscence is also found in the superior part, and in the very inmost recess of the mind, and it comprehends every motion or disposition against the eternal justice and law. Wherefore the Apostle Paul, among the carnal concupiscences, enumerates not only adultery, drunkenness, and similar vices, but also idolatry, and heresies, and enmity, which are evils of the mind. And this concupiscence is not a certain natural faculty, which Adam had before sin, or which we will have after the resurrection, but it secretly crept into nature and vitiated the whole of it, and the whole of it is most wicked, and therefore not natural, because nothing evil was made. This is that parent and nurse of all sins. Wherefore, as Thomas, in his commentary on Romans 7, lecture 5, not unwisely admonished, the Apostle makes mention of concupiscence because evil concupiscence is common to all sins. Whence the gloss says, and Augustine, "Here the Apostle chose that which is the general term for sin, namely concupiscence." And how Augustine called concupiscence the general sin, he teaches, because it is the root and cause of all sin, and from it all evils proceed. Thus Christ, in Matthew 15:19, admonished his Apostles that from the heart proceed evil thoughts and every kind of evil. Thus Augustine, in his *Sermons on the Words of the Apostle*, sermon 6: "He calls by this name of sin that from which all sins arise." Now if from concupiscence all sins arise as from a root, what prevents us from calling concupiscence Original Sin? It will be most absurd, indeed, to relegate it all to sensuality, from which only the coarser and more bestial vices are born.

Now concupiscence signifies either an act or a power: the act is in motion, the power lies as if asleep within. To desire in act is to sin in act; this concupiscence, therefore, is not original sin. But that habitual and latent concupiscence, which infants contain enclosed in their soul, just as they contain reason itself, which they do not know how to use, is the fount, and the tinder, and the beginning of evils, and therefore not undeservedly is it called Original sin by Augustine, and the Master, and almost the whole College of Theologians. Augustine, in *Against Julian*, says: "this vice, from which evil desires arise, remains in a man even when his flesh is tempted by no commotion." Do you not now see how ridiculous your disputation will be in the first place, in which you contend that sensuality is not Original sin itself, but only its material element? And here it cannot be said how inept you are with your Masters. For what materials, what forms will you posit in a privation? There is no point in disputing about the matter of sins; the form must necessarily be placed in a certain aberration and in a way in a privation, if indeed there is any form of sins, which consist entirely in deformity. If it pleases you to call the action of sin the matter of sin, I will not oppose it; but what action of Original sin will you find in an infant? Since Original sin has permeated the whole soul, on what reason do you rely to maintain that its material element should be placed in the inferior part rather than the superior? Did Original sin

pour all its venom into the subject parts, but not touch the mind itself? That, I well know, you will never dare to say. Will it be there, however, without matter? Will it not therefore desire matter in sensuality? It is in the soul as in a subject, and more in the rational part than in the appetite; and yet will all its matter be in the appetite? You will never say anything why reason is not equally the material element of Original sin as sensuality. For concupiscence is either natural or vicious. Natural concupiscence is related to sin as natural reason is; but vicious concupiscence is formally sin, it does not only furnish matter for sin. And what is to be judged of those sins which, abstracted from sense, are concerned with the mind alone, such as heresy, unbelief? What matter taken from sensuality will you assign to these? Indeed, you will either make virtues out of sins, or you will find no matter in many sins, if you place whatever is the material of sin in sensuality. But it was necessary for you to thrust upon us the worn-out song of the School, which you learned as a boy. Let us examine it in a few words.

It has been shown above (you say) that the ordering or rectitude of the inferior powers pertained only materially to original justice. The reason, however, was that the prior part, by which reason was subject to God, was the cause of this; and you prove this thus, because as long as reason did not resist God, neither did concupiscence oppose reason. The argument does not please me. For first, it does not follow that because these were conjoined, one was the cause of the other. Thus God initially created nature, so that nothing in the whole man, neither in reason nor in the senses, would dissent from His mind and true justice. Secondly, if that is the cause of this, will this be the matter of that? As if there were no cause besides form. Or will that which effects always be the form of that which is effected? Or will that which is effected be the matter of that by which it was effected and produced? For from the fact that reason agreed excellently with the will of God, the supreme harmony of concupiscence with reason followed. Finally, if the formal reason of a moral act is to be estimated from the end of the action, but the material things in morals are, as it were, means to some end, as you say, since reason does many things in either direction without the ministry of the lower parts, it is all too manifest that this is a frigid disputation about formal and material elements. Did Adam do nothing before he fell, except through the senses? And when he sinned, did he look to nothing other than what he could comprehend with some sense? So it has seemed to you, who derive his sin from an excessive love for his wife. But he was conceiving in his mind a certain new state of felicity, which he did not see with his eyes; and he truly sinned when he believed Satan, and sought divine honors, which it was insane and impious to desire, before he put his hand to the fruit of the forbidden tree. But if this reason is as good as it has seemed to you, then faith will be the form of all virtues, because what is not of faith is called a sin by the Apostle. Faith therefore moves the other virtues, even charity itself, yet you would not say that faith is the form of the other virtues, lest you despoil charity of its dignity. But if it is necessary to seek the forms of the virtues, we should certainly attribute those parts to faith rather than to charity.

Now you teach for what reasons Concupiscence is said to be the material element of Original sin; and you commemorate three, worthy of such an opinion. The first is, because it has no more of a formal role in original sin than in actual sin. I believe it. But because it does not have a formal role, must it therefore have a material one? Is this how you dispute? But in actual sin (you say) the inferior powers of the soul do not produce sin, unless moved by the will. What are you saying? But the will very often sins when those inferior powers are at rest. And what if concupiscence does not sin without the will? Nor does anyone please God without faith. But (I ask) what concupiscence do you know of in man that does not depend on and proceed from the will? Even those concupiscences which displease us were not entirely involuntary or unwilling. What are you saying, moreover, when you speak thus, the will moves the inferior powers of the soul to their own acts, not only as objects move powers, but only indirectly? Do those who either understand what they are saying, or wish themselves to be understood, speak thus? Not only, but only. Secondly, you say that concupiscence is the first effect of original sin, therefore it is called its material. Ineptly. You posit the effect for the matter; but the effect rather consists of matter and form. The concupiscence which you understand is not the first effect of original sin. For you place this in the appetite, but original sin occupies the will in the first place, and inclines it to sinning; therefore, the material of this sin must be established much more in the will than in sensual concupiscence. Furthermore, you say that in the first sin of Adam, its formal reason was aversion from God, but the material was conversion to a mutable good. Now you are too sharp and minute. For to be averted from God and to be converted to the world do not differ in reality, since by the very fact that one embraces a mutable and fallacious good, one alienates oneself from God. But what are you trying to achieve with this reasoning? For I do not agree that you establish the aversion from God in the superior part of the soul only. For it is manifest that it is poured through the whole soul. And the conversion to a mutable good has its seat not only in the inferior part of the soul, but chiefly in the mind. For as the act of virtue is not perfected by that which is only of sensuality, as Thomas says in the *Summa Theologiae*, part 1 of the second part, question 74, article 4, but more by that which is of reason and will, so sin is effected much more by that which is of reason and will than by that which is of sensuality. And so the argument limps on both sides, and you achieve nothing at all, except to torment yourself and us with a useless question. You conclude boldly, however, that the concupiscence innate in us, or the proclivity to the love of sensible things, is the material element of Original sin; namely, because the Scholastics, from whom you do not dare to dissent, have handed this down. And yet the Scholastics themselves do not seem, when they inquire about the matter of Original sin, to understand concupiscence as you always do, as the love of sensible things only, but as that which in any way leads man away from the love of God. But we are averted from God not only by desiring those things which delight our senses beyond order and measure, but by not giving faith to the divine words, by fostering false

opinions about God, by not loving God, and similar things, which perhaps to you, because they are not concerned with sensuality, do not seem to be evil at all, or if they are sins formally, they will not be so materially, since your disputation has placed all the matter of sin in the appetite. How it is to be understood, what Thomas recites from Augustine, that Original sin passes away in guilt, but remains in act, will be explained in its own place. Certainly if a sin, which has passed away in guilt, remains in act, it must have the form of sin, since the form is accustomed to give to each thing that it exists.

Now you make a new beginning of speaking, so that what you have said hitherto may be better understood. But that you have hitherto said nothing, that, indeed, we all understand. You say, therefore, that original sin is composed of many parts, because it is a sin of nature. As if it were necessary that a sin of nature be similar to it. How I fear that you are now about to make Original sin, contrary to what you have so often professed, something positive, if indeed it is composed of such diverse parts! I confess that to be true, that you say the defect of the whole nature pertains to original sin. For all pertain either as faults, or certainly as punishments. Those parts which receive fault, their defects are sins; in those in which fault is not properly present, like the body, they are nevertheless subject to miseries and punishments. Hence weakness, diseases, death. That is indeed true, that sins are properly in the superior part of the soul, as in a subject. For the truest sins are here: not to know, not to love, not to worship God. Then whatever sins are committed through the ministry of the members are here thought, begun, and formed. What besides? The defects (you say) of the entire lower reason are culpable materially only, and you show this because sensuality is not simply culpable of itself, since it is indifferent. But from this it is sufficiently apparent how miserably you err from the mark in this whole disputation. For that concupiscence which God implanted in our nature is neither the form nor the matter of any sin, nor does it have anything vicious in itself, such as desiring food by which our bodies are nourished. But that evil concupiscence, which is either Original sin, or is born from sin, neither resides in sensuality alone, nor does it in any part agree with nature as it was created by God. Wherefore the law has condemned this, with this the Holy Spirit wages perpetual war, this must be conquered by us, so that we may serve God, since it does nothing else in us but undermine the inner man, kindle the desires of sin, and separate us as far as possible from God. Wherefore Augustine, in his work *Against Two Letters of the Pelagians*, book 4, excellently says: “nothing good therefore comes from it, nothing good does it do, nothing good is desired from it, but whatever is desired according to it is evil.” “Therefore it is without doubt evil, because not to consent to it is good.” It is of this kind of concupiscence that we must speak, which we must not govern by reason, but utterly extirpate; which we cannot use rightly, but which we must always resist; which is not only a punishment inflicted on us for sin, but always has the proper nature of true guilt. Thus it is sufficiently established that whatever you have discussed so prolixly about the matter of original sin is beside the point; and that your claim that

Augustine, whenever he calls concupiscence original sin, said it in no other sense than according to the material signification of the sin itself, how false this is, no one can fail to know. For if original sin, as Augustine wished, is that concupiscence against which the good Spirit lusts, which must be entirely put off and overcome by us, he did not understand the concupiscence of the lower part only, unless you think that there is nothing vicious in us except that the senses are carried away to pleasant things against reason, and that the Holy Spirit is occupied only in conquering or ruling sensuality. Does Lombard himself seem to you to have thought this, when he said that original sin is concupiscence, not indeed the act, but the vice? Do you not see what a false and absurd opinion you have undertaken to defend, while you adhere so obstinately to the dictates and tenets of your masters, especially Biel? Unless indeed, which I rather believe, you yourself do not understand these things which you write. But hereafter (I think) you will begin to dispute against us; so now it is more important for us to consider what you say, so that we may either yield to you if you speak the truth, or resist you with all our might if you err and try to deceive others.

### **CHAPTER XIII. In what the Protestants place original sin.**

In exaggerating this sin, the Protestants seem to you to have observed no moderation; but you surely do not observe moderation in diminishing it. It is, however, so great and pestiferous a sin that it can scarcely be sufficiently explained or exaggerated for its magnitude; there is less reason to fear that by speaking of it we may make it more serious than it is. It grieves you and yours that it has been so eloquently explained by our side how great a destruction Adam brought upon our nature by sinning, and how wickedly your Theologians extenuate it, lest either our misery or Christ's mercy might be acknowledged and understood. But the Scriptures (you say), and the Fathers, and the more approved Scholastics, teach that the nature of man is born truly sinful, and that the whole man is contaminated by this sin, and therefore they have placed original sin in the blindness of the mind and the corruption of the flesh alike. Rightly so; nor would Pighius have denied it, nor Pelagius himself, that all who are born from Adam labor under a certain blindness of mind and a manifold viciousness of the flesh. But how great this blindness of mind is, and how great this corruption of the flesh, that is finally the question between us, and one that is especially necessary and most worthy of our discussion. It seems to you, therefore, that we exceed the proper limit in this, that we teach that this blindness is not only the privation and Lack of that knowledge and love of God which were inherent in man through original justice, but that it is also contempt of God, hatred of God's judgment, fleeing from God, being angry with God, and despairing of grace. We, indeed, do not acknowledge privations such as are for the most part understood by you, in which there is little or no fault. For blindness signifies calamity or misfortune rather than fault. Wherefore, what fault lies hidden in this sin had to be laid open. And since the knowledge and love of God were snatched from us by this sin, as you yourself concede, was it

not necessary that contempt and hatred of God should succeed? He who does not love God, what else does he do but despise God, hate God, flee from God? Whence, then, has this great contempt of God, such as reigns everywhere among men, emanated, if not from Original sin? No wild beast cares for, or worships, or fears God less than man, if he lacks the word and discipline of God. Almost no one is ignorant that there is some God, but yet all securely despise him, unless they are instructed in religion by the ministry of the word, or are terrified by some fear and danger. But as fear is not usually a good guardian of duty, so as soon as the causes of fear have been removed, they return to their natural disposition and boldly despise God. And that these vices are present in original sin is not only most lucidly proven by the testimonies of the Scriptures and the Fathers, which will be brought forward later, but the very example of Adam excellently confirms it. For when he dared so confidently to break the command of God, of which he was not ignorant or unmindful, did he not openly despise God? Now, after he not only fell from his hope, but fell into the greatest misery, and was conscious of his own fault, and remembered that God was offended and angry, do you doubt that he hated God's judgment, fled from God, was enraged with God, and despaired of pardon? But if those who do evil flee and hate the light, and if guilty defendants dread the tribunal and the sight of the judge, it was necessary for Adam, agitated by the goads and furies of his conscience, to dread the judgment, and never to remember God without horror. And this is manifest enough from the fact that as soon as he sensed God approaching, he flung himself into hiding places and concealed himself among the trees, in Genesis 3:8; and when questioned and ordered to state his case, he neither acknowledges nor prays for pardon for his fault, but transfers it to his wife, and she to the serpent. For they were immediately expecting the punishment they had merited. Do you not see from this the character of Original sin? Now what do you reprehend in the other part? Calvin (you say) teaches that concupiscence necessarily produces sin, never ceases in us, and bears new fruits daily, just as a heated furnace blows out flame and sparks, or a spring pours forth water without end. Wherefore, those who call original sin a lack of Justice, which ought to have been in us, did not sufficiently express its force: because our nature is not only destitute of good, but also so fertile and fruitful of all evils, that it cannot be idle. And those who have spoken of concupiscence have not used a word too foreign, provided that it be added that whatever is in man from the intellect to the will, from the soul to the flesh, is polluted and filled by this concupiscence, and that the whole man is nothing else from himself than concupiscence. For thus, as if by a flood from head to foot he has been overwhelmed, so that no part is free from sin, and therefore whatever proceeds from him, is imputed as sin. These things Calvin [stated] most sweetly and learnedly. You affirm that this opinion is most full of impiety, and you call this Calvin's diabolical decree: I think that nothing more sober or Christian can be said by anyone. For what else did he say or decree, than that the whole man, such as nature produced him, is carried to evil: that nothing good from him can proceed, while he is such: and that inborn

concupiscence always boils forth with vices? If this is diabolical, or impious, let the Scriptures be done away with, and let them yield to the maxims of Stapleton. For certainly Christ taught as much, when he said that a rotten tree cannot ever bring forth good fruit: nor are figs born from thorns, or grapes from a bramble: and Paul when he wrote that we from ourselves cannot even think anything good, much less perform it: and that of the flesh, that is, of the carnal man, such as we all are by nature, the understanding is enmity against God.

In enmity there is contempt, hatred, anger, the eagerness to do those things which are displeasing. Wherefore when we place all these things in original sin, we do not depart a nail's breadth from the Scriptures: and you we rightly condemn, nor will we ever cease to condemn, who impiously defend nature against grace, and elevate original sin with words as much as you can, and diminish the benefit of Christ, who came to take away sin, and you impudently favor the Pelagian heresy.

#### **CHAPTER XIV. Against this opinion, some calumnies of Stapleton.**

In this opinion, which is most true, you have detected four errors, according to your wisdom. The first is, that sin itself is confused with its effect, because we have said that not only the privation and loss of the justice with which God adorned our nature is Original Sin, but that those defects, which have been named, are contained in original sin. For it is one thing, you say, for such defects to arise from this sin, another for these defects to be this very sin. We therefore err, because we place the more serious vices of human nature in the definition and nature of Original Sin. Therefore, your reason makes original sin such that no more serious vice of nature is to be placed in its definition. But yet if you believe that these vices, which have been mentioned, are in Original Sin as fruit is in the tree, branches in the root, effects in the cause, why did you so bitterly reprehend Calvin, and call him the author of an impious opinion and a diabolical decree, because he wrote that these evils so flow from Original Sin, as waters from a perennial spring, or flames from a burning furnace? Then, by what argument do you teach that these vices ought to be called the effects of original sin, rather than original sin itself? And if it is not troublesome to you, tell us also, what you think Adam's sin was? Was it that he ate the fruit? But he had conceived the sin in his mind beforehand, by which he was enticed and in a way drawn to eat: and when he was of that mind, even if he had not touched the fruit at all, yet he would have sinned gravely, as some of the Scholastics also concede. But the final act, as it were, of this sin was to eat what was forbidden. Thus in Original Sin itself, if you consider the matter attentively, you will find those vices which you do not think pertain to the nature of original sin. And does the very privation of original justice, which remains in our nature, have no vice in itself? That is what Pelagius wanted. Tell us, therefore, of what sort this vice is, and whether it is one or multiple? You will never say anything whereby in the privation, or as most say, the lack of Original Justice, those vices are not present which are contrary to justice. For that privation is not alone, or separate

from vices, but it contains in itself whatever vices are in human nature. Wherefore, these evils can be called the effects of Original Sin, as they are in act: but as they inhere in nature, they contain Original Sin itself. And whatever actual sins there are, since they flow from Original Sin, it is necessary that they should be in it as in a root. For whatever good or bad fruits are in the tree, arise from the root itself. From whence, moreover, does homicide or adultery erupt, if not from hidden and innate envy and lust? so the open and profane contempt of God and his commandments is born from our native hatred of God. Therefore, there was no error here, and you, while seeking an error in our opinion, have betrayed a notable error in your own opinion.

The second error is that we affirm Original Sin to be the entire depravation and corruption of the whole man. But this is nothing other than what you yourself have very often at least conceded in words. For since man consists of soul and flesh, you do not ignore, you do not deny, that in the soul are found blindness and concupiscence, and in the flesh the manifold matter of diseases and death. Thus it is established that the whole man has been miserably changed, and deformed, and depraved by sin. But this is also your calumny, contrived for the defense of nature, so that because you do not dare to openly support Pelagius, you may nevertheless profit him in some way.

The third error is that we say this corruption was not only of accidents, but also of the very substance of human nature, both according to matter and according to form, as Musæus (you say) defends against Illyricus. But what Musæus may have defended against Illyricus, does not much concern me: nor is it necessary for us to answer for the private opinions of everyone. It is sufficiently and more than sufficiently established that not only have the qualities been corrupted, but the very substance of our nature is lost, unless it be repaired and restored by the gift and benefit of Christ.

The last error is that Original Sin is of the nature and essence of man, that it is the heart itself, and reason itself with all its powers, which is the opinion of Illyricus. But what does that opinion, which you were proposing in the previous chapter, and which is that of all Protestants, have in common with this error? You know that this invention of Illyricus pleased very few, and has been most lucidly refuted by our writers. Therefore, in refuting it, there was no need to dwell. But yet you prepare the confutation as if it were the opinion of all of us, when I hardly believe there is a single Protestant today remaining who thinks with Illyricus that original sin is the essence of man. For certainly God is the creator of all substances and natures: but sin was neither created by God, nor is it at all a creature, or a substance, or an essence. Then Adam after sin retained the same essence of his nature which he had before, and was the same man; and our essence is not changed into another by either sin or grace. But in a matter of the least necessity, what need is there for arguments? But what you say here, that many sins of men are more serious than Adam's was: and that he did not sin

from contempt or malice, nor against the law of nature, or the eternal law, while you refute Illyricus, you rashly fall into an error much worse than his was. Indeed, if you estimate Adam's sin from the apple, he sins more gravely who kills a man, or even a cock. And this was the delirium of that Pope who felt it was just, since God was so angry with Adam because of an apple, that he who was the vicar of God should be much more moved on account of a peacock. But he who has weighed the nature of that sin in the balance of the divine word and true judgment, will find that no sin so foul, monstrous, and horrible has ever been committed by anyone. Among sins there is none that surpasses rebellion and apostasy in magnitude (I do not speak now of the sin against the Holy Spirit, which for another reason can be called the greatest): but what apostasy was ever so great as that of Adam? who, having been lately formed from the earth, and made lord of the world, and enriched to the highest degree with all ornaments, not only became unmindful of so great a benefit, and not only defected from God, but even vindicated for himself the very honors of the highest majesty? Did he not do this from contempt? But unless he had wickedly despised God, more than can be said, he would never have dared to do what he did, with such great threats proposed. And does not the law of nature and the eternal law demand that we believe God, and obey him? that we preserve the justice and grace given by God? that we acknowledge ourselves, and be content with our state? that we understand that all our happiness depends on God? Since Adam fell so gravely in these things, is he to be judged to have done nothing against the law of nature? But if men now feel that the law of nature impressed on their minds is violated by them when they sin, and are accused by it, as the Apostle affirms, how much more is it to be thought that this law was sharper in Adam's mind, and that he could be less excused, because he knowingly and willingly suppressed so great a light. Hugo de Sancto Victore says that two precepts were given to man, of nature and of discipline. The precept of nature was a natural discretion inspired from within, by which he was instructed about those things that were to be sought or avoided by him: and in his sin there were two disobediences, one in the precept of nature, the other in the precept of discipline. But you everywhere openly declare how slight an opinion you have of original sin.

Then you also dispute something against Musæus, (for you refute the errors which you had proposed in reverse order) and you say that almost the same absurdities follow from this opinion as from the former. Indeed, if he understood such a corruption as you dream of. For a nature utterly corrupted can have neither virtue nor vice. But nature is corrupted in this, that it has utterly lost the justice which was innate in it from God, and which pertains to the perfection of our nature. And you concede that some Catholics also think that virtues were natural to man, whose opinion is indeed much sounder than yours. But as to what you say, that those find it difficult to extricate themselves, who with the Protestants concede that original sin was a corruption of human nature itself as to its essential parts, I see here neither danger nor difficulty. For, I

ask, did not immortality pertain to the nature of man? Pelagius denied this, but he was condemned in the Council of Milevis. Prosper says, they had received in their nature the ability not to die. And now is it not natural for us to die? but yet Adam after sin became mortal, with the substance of his nature preserved: and we will one day be immortal in these bodies. In the same way, even if the virtues were natural, they could nevertheless be lost without the destruction of the substance. For although they pertain to our nature, yet not in such a way that they could not be separated from it. For sight is natural to us, and yet it can be lost while the man remains: unless perhaps you think that a blind man is not even a man. Wherefore you dispute most ineptly, as you always do, that the virtues were not natural to Adam, because a man can be without them. For many things are natural, which nevertheless, if they are absent, it is not immediately necessary for the nature to perish. What your Doctors commonly think, you yourself may see. Since nothing was so natural to man as the image of God, to which as to a model he was made and polished by God; and this image comprehends the most beautiful choir of all virtues, it behooves us, because we wish to think rightly, to say that the virtues were natural to Adam.

Now you return to the second opinion of your adversaries, which places original sin in a certain common depravation of the whole man. But in this place you are going to treat only of the superior part of the soul. Concerning this, therefore, what you may say, I await. But you say that the Protestants think that Original Sin on the part of the mind is not only a privation of Original Justice, but also an inherent and in-existing band of contrary vices: and that this is the point of controversy between you and us today. So be it: and we constantly affirm that you err childishly and perniciously, because you place Original Sin on the part of the mind in I know not what sole emptiness of justice, as if either justice could be absent without a crowd of vices immediately breaking in: or as if the mind of man were not too obviously filled with those vices. But you also do not approve that the Apology of the Augsburg Confession so vehemently amplifies the virtues of Adam before sin, and says that he had every kind of virtue, which both tables of the Decalogue comprise, and that Melanchthon against Eckius in the colloquy of Worms urges these gifts of all virtues. Do you then not also think that Original Justice was placed in every virtue? nor that Adam had those virtues which the Decalogue requires? What did he lack, then? Does not Scripture proclaim that he was created upright by God? If he was upright, he did not deviate in any thing from the law of the Decalogue, which is the rule of right. What that Paul interprets the image to which man was made to be true justice and holiness? But in true Justice and holiness it is necessary that there be a heaping up of all virtues. But unless God had made man as just and perfect as the law demands, he would have given him a law more perfect than his own nature, in which matter you are accustomed to say there is the highest injustice. When you think you are able to excel in those virtues, which the Decalogue prescribes as by far the greatest, and by their merit to attain eternal happiness, will you say that Adam lacked any virtue? But unless you were mad, you would

not doubt that such as the law of God is, such also was Adam, and such we will be in the resurrection. For as our nature formerly in Adam most fully corresponded to the law of nature, so also hereafter in all the elect it will correspond. Perhaps this offends you, that the most learned Melanchthon attributed knowledge of God, love of God, and trust in God to Adam before sin. Therefore, you do not think that Adam believed in God, nay, that he did not love, nor know God? What sort of Adam, then, do you fashion, Stapleton, who did not know God, did not love God, did not believe in God? Indeed, when he listened to Satan, he began not to believe in God, not to believe God, not to love God. But before sin, every virtue in him, especially faith and love of God, shone forth: as I will confirm more fully in the following chapter against your most foul error.

**CHAPTER XV. In what original justice properly consists: what its privation is.**

You seize a new occasion for discoursing on Original Justice: about which how shamefully most of the Scholastics have erred, as all understand, so you yourself acknowledge. For some (as we have shown above) have said that it is a certain health of nature, devoid of grace and holiness, which, however, man could merit through the good use of his natural powers. Thus they have both feigned that man was created without grace, and have most madly attributed health to man without grace. You call this opinion more than semi-Pelagian, which, however, lest it should be a fraud to anyone, Dominicus Bannes is the author for the fact that the Tridentine Fathers most wisely provided that it should be held. Others have taught that this justice was indeed grace, but freely given, not making one pleasing, by which kind of justice Adam could not be truly considered just. The opinion of these differs from the former, both because they hold that Original integrity was not the constitution of nature itself, but a certain grace: and also because they thought that by grace of loving God out of charity, and of knowing God as the author of beatitude, would be not a merit, but a gratuitous gift: for the principle of merit is not the gift of original justice. Thus Scotus, no less subtly than truly. But if the grace of loving and acknowledging God could not have the nature of merit in Adam, neither certainly will it be able to have it in us, and the less so because that grace was in a man made for virtue, in whom nothing was repugnant to grace; this grace is in corrupted men, whom infinite allurements snatch away and call away from God.

Another is the opinion of Thomas, and of those who follow Thomas, that man was created by God not only whole in nature, but also just and filled with grace, so that we also, who are propagated from him, would have been born just, if he had not sinned. But this opinion, although it is most true, nevertheless seems to you to be able to be defended with more difficulty against the Protestants, since it refers those virtues, which the Protestants attribute to the first man, to Original Justice. If this is granted, and it ought to be granted in every way, then it will follow that the privation of original justice is the loss of all these virtues. But if it be granted that all virtues were lost by sin, it is necessary that the contrary vices

be posited. For grace is overcome by nothing but sin. And thus the opinion of the Protestants concerning original sin will be the stronger, and lest it become commonly widespread, it must be provided for by every art, effort, and reason.

And indeed Johannes Eckius, a man (if ever there was one) confident, in the Colloquy held at Worms between him and Melanchthon, which you do not dissemble, because it is most well-known, being constrained on all sides and miserably hindered, finally burst forth to the point of affirming that those virtues do not pertain to Original Justice, and that the Holy Spirit was not given to Adam. See to what a point of impudence and insanity that champion of your party, while he resists the truth and defends a bad cause, has fallen. Eckius could not answer a word to Melanchthon, except that it was necessary for him to say what now even the Papists are ashamed of, that grace was not given to Adam, that virtues were not in Original Justice. Concerning which man Dominicus Soto [writes] thus, "Eckius so rejected that concerning grace, as if it were against the common opinion, and against Augustine. For that man, otherwise not unlearned, could have remitted much of that rigor of his most base and unlearned judgment." And in the meantime you confess that some Catholic writers even today are of the same opinion. Doubtless you are such Catholics, for whom it is permitted to be Catholics in manifest heresy. For if Pelagius himself had either escaped or been sent from the underworld to spread heresy, what could he have devised more false or desperate, than that the first man, whom God formed most beautifully to his own image, lacked all grace and virtue? But such monstrosities of opinion are not unusual among you.

But you, in order that the opinion of the Protestants may be refuted, think it is not necessary to depart from Thomas. How I would wish that Stapleton had disputed with Melanchthon instead of Eckius! It fell out altogether badly that the Pontifical cause did not have better patrons than this Eckius, in whom there was so little either of talent, or of good letters, whom nevertheless the distinguished author Surius in his history, or rather, his bundle of lies, writes was unequal to Luther himself. But let us dismiss Eckius, and let us see what Stapleton thinks should be answered. You say, however, that such justice was attributed to the first man, as had grace that makes one pleasing: for this the very name of justice indicates, since there is no true justice, except that which makes a man just and pleasing to God. But now how will you resist the Protestants, who state this very thing, and from it infer that Original Sin is that great corruption of our nature, which must necessarily follow from the most miserable loss of so many and noble virtues? Indeed, you have devised a subtle response, that original Justice, although it embraced all virtues, was not, however, the virtues themselves. To whom could this have come to mind, except Stapleton? What does man excel man, what does Stapleton excel Eckius? But say a little more plainly what you answer, so that we may judge more certainly of your response. Justice (you say) precisely taken, was nothing other than a grace rectifying the mind in its superior part in relation to God, and restraining the appetite in its

inferior part in relation to the mind: but the individual virtues were certain effects of this grace. And you conclude, after some useless digressions, that the first grace and justice was not the very possession or actual attainment of all virtues, but only the possibility, the root of all virtues.

Than which invention, I believe, nothing more ridiculous has ever come into anyone's mind. For what are you saying? Was original Justice only a certain possibility of all virtues? not the possession of the virtues themselves? But you say that Original Justice embraced all virtues. Therefore, however much you may distinguish Justice from virtues, yet this will nevertheless perpetually remain, that Adam had all virtues before sin, and lost them when he sinned. And from this what we wish will follow, that in the vice of Original sin are contained the sins contrary to those virtues which the first justice had: so that if Adam had knowledge of God, love of God, trust in God in the state of Original Justice, he lost those virtues by sinning, and therefore we, who are born in Original Sin, bring nothing with us into this world but ignorance, hatred of God, and infidelity, and other evils. For whether original Justice was the root of virtues, or the virtues themselves, certainly those virtues were in Adam, unless with the same spirit you will deny what you have given. Now with the root of all virtues removed, what remaining virtue was in him? But with virtue expelled, the malice that is hostile to virtue crept in. Thus our nature is not only empty of virtues, but full of vices is established by necessary reason.

Then if the first justice was a grace rectifying the mind in relation to God, and the appetite in relation to the mind, that is, it so perfected the whole man, that nothing in him was found that was not right and incorrupt, it is necessary that we confess that all virtues were included in that justice. For it is virtue, not the possibility of virtue, that subjects the mind to God, and the appetite to the mind: therefore Original Justice was the heaping up and choir of all virtues: and thus original sin is nothing else than an Iliad of evils, and a crowd of all sins, which are condemned in the Decalogue, the norm of Justice. Let us hear the theologians. Augustine, speaking of the devil, writes thus: "This one, when he saw man made from the slime of the earth to the image of God, adorned with chastity, composed with temperance, surrounded by charity, clothed with immortality, this insatiable murderer immediately envied, and despoiled our first parents of those gifts and such great goods, and moreover destroyed them." What Adam had and what he lost, we understand. But what follows? "Adam received foul rags, when, despoiled by the Devil of chastity, he was girt with unchastity: having lost temperance, he became intemperate: having lost charity, he was found evil, despoiled of immortality, he was delivered over to death." Therefore he was not only naked and empty of virtues, but immediately filled with contrary vices. Thus Prosper, "Iniquity drove out Justice, pride destroyed humility, concupiscence crushed continence, infidelity snatched away faith, captivity took away liberty: nor could any portion of virtues remain in them,

where such a throng of vices had rushed in." and in the words just before: "He lost the knowledge of good, because he lost a good conscience."

Again Augustine, "Man was made carnal in mind, and dead in spirit." If we are carnal in mind, and dead in spirit, with what miseries not only but also vices do you think we are obsessed? Bernard says, "We all bear the stigma and cautery of the conspiracy against God." Adam therefore conspired against God (whom you deny sinned from malice or contempt) and the seed and stain of this conspiracy remains in us. What of the fact that the more prudent scholastics not only concede that Adam was created in grace, but also affirm that he had all virtues, even faith itself, and penitence, and mercy, and charity so perfect that he loved God above all things? And indeed Chrysostom says that Adam, as long as he held trust in God, obtained dominion over all creatures; but after he lost that trust, he fell from honor, and was made subject to creatures. Augustine teaches not obscurely that Adam's sin was infidelity and disobedience: and Prosper says, "Infidelity snatched away faith," and before, "He first lost faith, he lost continence, he lost charity, he was despoiled of wisdom and intellect, he lacked counsel and fortitude." Fulgentius writes that Adam was stripped of the garment of faith. Truly, therefore, Adam had all virtues, and truly lost them by sinning; and then an unhappy throng of vices invaded his mind and occupied it. You place Original Justice in a certain possibility, all others in the full possession of virtues. For he is just, not who can have virtues, but who already has them: and Adam not only could acquire virtues and preserve them; but all virtues were given to him with nature, and the power of retaining them, if he had wished.

That you say the virtues were personal, and more in Adam than in Eve, what does that do against us? For they would also have been natural, and with the propagation of nature they would have passed from parents to children, unless perhaps you think that the souls of men would have been like a scraped tablet, in which there would be neither vices nor virtues, but only a certain possibility or sparks. But just as Adam was adorned with every virtue, so he would have begotten children like himself, heirs of his virtues. Therefore, the first justice was not a possibility, but the beauty and dignity of all virtues, which agree with the divine law and mind, and the Decalogue, so that because of them he was just and pleasing to God. But to deceive us, you misuse two testimonies of Augustine. In the first he says, "Adam was left in the possibility of free will." For in the hand possibility is understood. Then it follows, "This is the first grace, by which man could have stood." Where Augustine does not say, as you unskillfully conclude, that the first justice or grace was nothing else than the possibility of free will for good, but that Adam was endowed with that grace at the beginning, so that he could have stood, if he had wished to keep God's commandments. For besides other most excellent gifts, he also received the liberty and the possibility of standing. Will you ever persuade us that the first grace was only this possibility? or that original justice was not the very observance of the commandments, but

the possibility of observing them? But without virtues, Adam could not indeed observe the precepts of God.

But tell me, Stapleton, what is our justice? The possibility of observing the commandments of God? But the law declares no one just, except those who have done whatever is commanded in the law, that is, who have observed the whole law. The other testimony of Augustine is, "The first liberty of the will was to be able not to sin." What then? Therefore the first justice was to be able not to sin? Augustine never dreamed this. He speaks of the liberty of the will, "He had received the ability if he willed, but he did not have the will to what he was able. In us, however, it is (says Augustine) by the grace of God in receiving and perseveringly holding to the good, not only to be able what we will, but also to will what we are able." A beautiful argument of Stapleton, that because Adam had the liberty by which he could not sin: therefore Adam's justice was no other than the possibility of not sinning: as if someone should argue that a man is therefore rich because he has the liberty of retaining what he possesses. I believe Eckius himself would have been ashamed of this most absurd reasoning, who was ashamed of almost nothing. Indeed, it was all the same, whether you were delirious alone, or with Eckius.

Lastly, you commemorate the properties of this fictitious possibility, which are five in number.

1. The first is, that Adam could not sin, not only mortally, but not even venially! Such a one was he indeed, that it was in his power either to sin, or to abstain from all sins forever. But to think that his justice was no other than that he was able not to sin, is most mad.
2. The second is, that he could avoid each and all venial sins. For if he could not sin even venially, is it doubtful whether he could not avoid all venial sins? I marvel at this custom of yours, not of dividing but of breaking.
3. The third is, that this possibility of the first man was joined with facility. For it was not difficult or troublesome for him to do what he was commanded, and what the law prescribed. We can do something with grace, but with great difficulty.
4. The fourth is, that he could not only not sin, but also keep all the commandments, and that, not only according to the substance of the act, but also the manner of acting, which is the last.
5. And these things have been thus minutely cut up by you.

It was enough to have said in one word, that Adam had the power and liberty of not sinning, about which no one either asks or doubts. But this is not that justice which Adam possessed in his incorrupt nature. For he not only could either not sin, or even perform with facility and pleasure, whatever pertained to his duty, but he also had justice in himself, that is, the perfection and heaping up of all virtues.

**CHAPTER XVI. The brief Stapletonian refutation of the opinion proposed in Ch. 13 & 14 is briefly discussed.**

After these things have been expounded by you in that manner, it is easy (you say) to show how vain that opinion of the Protestants is. Although you think in a Roman way, you do not speak Romanly enough. Which if you did once or by chance, I would pardon: for so great a master to stammer so grossly so often was certainly not fitting. But let us come to the point. Therefore, you refute our opinion thus. That original injustice is not, as we think, the despoiling of all virtues, much less the possession of contrary vices, since original justice was not the possession of virtues itself, but the possibility of having them. But this response is so incredibly false and absurd that no one besides you uses it. For the possibility of a thing is not the thing itself. Nor, therefore, is the possibility of having virtues justice, but the habit and possession of virtues itself. Was that image and likeness of God, which shone in Adam's mind with the highest dignity, nothing else than a propensity to virtues? The Apostle teaches that it was justice and true holiness. And concerning this image, Augustine [writes] thus. "This image, impressed on the spirit of the mind, Adam lost through sin, which we receive through the grace of justice." That image, therefore, was not a certain ability, or inclination to acquire virtues, but the very grace of justice. Thus Bernard, "Man was made to the image and likeness of God: having the liberty of the will in the image, and virtues in the likeness."

Therefore, the justice of Adam was the possession of all virtues. Thomas wants Original Justice to be a certain Rectitude of the whole man, by which reason was subject to God, and the lower powers to reason, and this you also affirmed before. But he, not as you, places this rectitude not in a certain possibility, but in the perfection of virtues. For he says, "Virtues are nothing other than certain perfections, by which reason is ordered to God, and the lower powers are directed according to the rule of reason. Whence the rectitude of the first state required that man should in some way have all virtues." He says "in some way," however, because although all virtues were in the first state, yet not all in the same way. For he distinguishes virtues thus, that he says some imply no imperfection, such as charity, justice, and the like: but some imply imperfection, and that this is twofold, either that which is repugnant to that state, or not. Those virtues, therefore, which signify no imperfection, he says were in Adam according to habit and act: also those which indicate an imperfection not fighting with the state of innocence, were in him according to habit and act at the same time, such as faith and hope. But those which argue an imperfection repugnant to the perfection of that state, were in him not according to act, but habit, such as penitence, mercy: finally, all moral virtues which are concerned with passions, such as temperance and fortitude, were in him in act and habit. That Rectitude, therefore, which he calls Original Justice, he wants to be the comprehension of all virtues.

And what else did the Synod of Trent want, when it said that Adam, when he had transgressed the commandment of God, immediately lost holiness and justice, unless Adam's justice was a holiness and virtue absolute in all its parts? Wherefore Dominicus Soto affirms that Original Justice was nothing other than a grace, which not only made man pleasing to God, but also restrained sensuality, and strengthened the body in obedience to reason. Does not the very name of Justice and Rectitude signify anything other than grace and friendship with God? You see therefore, if you see anything, the ruin of your opinion. But what will Original Sin now be in your opinion? Not malice (you say) or actual ignorance, but the lack of the aforesaid possibility. Indeed, if what ought to have been present is not present, what ought not to be present will necessarily be present. And what is the lack of knowledge, if not ignorance? But those who do not love God, Scripture affirms hate God. And that we are born with malice and ignorance, if Scripture did not say it, experience itself would sufficiently convince. This, therefore, is not our sin, that we lack the possibility of having all virtues, (for as the possibility of virtue is not virtue, so neither is it a vice in itself to have lacked that possibility,) but that we are polluted by the greatest and most numerous sins. And so the Apostle says that he sees a law in his members, rebelling against the law of his mind. But that which rebels against the Spirit of God is innate malice, not the bare loss of some possibility. And this is what Augustine placed Original Sin in Concupiscence.

But to concupisce is more than to lack the possibility of not concupiscing. And he says that man is born not only in ignorance, but in horrible ignorance and infirmity, not of the flesh but of the mind. Thus Hugo says that God, to avenge his injury, condemned the spirit indeed to ignorance, but the flesh to concupiscence. Finally, in your opinion, Original Sin is not a corrupt habit, as Thomas wished, but a certain privation, and that not of virtue, but of the possibility for virtue. But you add, "In Original Justice little ones would have been just, not because they would have had all justice in act, and all virtues, but judgment, reason, and justice itself would have grown in them along with the members of their bodies." These things you pour forth from the chair with enough authority. But you must be asked to prove to us also by reason or testimony of Scripture what you say. Adam after sin procreated children in his own image, if therefore he had begotten any before sin, they would have been in all things like their parent. What Thomas and the rest of the same stamp may have thought on this matter I do not ignore: who have as much credit with me as they have achieved by reason. These do not think that infants would have had the perfect use of reason nor the perfect powers of their members. I do not dispute this now, although it seemed otherwise to Augustine, and as I think, with better judgment and argument. But they all concede that the justice in them would have been as great as could fall upon human nature. Thomas asserts from Anselm, that as soon as they had a rational soul, they would be just, whom man would generate, if he did not sin: and he proves this, because Original Justice would be a virtue of the species.

Bannes says, "children would be born with grace, which cannot be without all other virtues:" and he confirms this from this, that thus virtues flow from grace, as passions from the essence. Dominicus Soto not much differently: "They would all have had a faith and knowledge of God more lively and excellent than ours." Wherefore, what you conclude, that the vices mentioned by us cannot be Original Sin, because neither were the contrary virtues justice itself: I on the contrary and much more truly will conclude, since Original Justice was itself the comprehension of all moral and theological virtues, as all who are not most unlearned and at the same time most perverse concede, that Original Sin is the very leprosy or rather the ruin of the vices contrary to those virtues. So that you may be forced to concede this unwillingly, or if you do not wish to concede, because you wish to persist in error, you may nevertheless not be able to be ignorant of and deny, I will subjoin a most lucid testimony of Augustine, "That which pertains to the first origin," he says, "that the whole mortal progeny was damned, this very life, if it is to be called life, full of so many and so great evils, testifies."

"For what else does a certain horrendous depth of ignorance indicate, from which all error arises, which receives all the sons of Adam into a certain dark bosom, so that a man cannot be freed from it without labor, sorrow, fear? What of the love itself of so many vain and noxious things, and from this, biting cares, perturbations, sorrows, fears, insane joys, discords, quarrels, wars, treacheries, angers, enmities, deceit, adulation, fraud, theft, rapine, perfidy, pride, ambition, envy, homicides, parricides, cruelty, savagery, wickedness, luxury, petulance, impudence, unchastity, fornications, adulteries, incests, and against nature so many debaucheries of both sexes, and impurities, which it is shameful even to mention, sacrileges, heresies, blasphemies, perjuries, oppressions of the innocent, calumnies, circumventions, prevarications, false testimonies, iniquitous judgments, violence, robberies, and whatever such evils do not come to mind, and yet do not depart from this life of men? But these are the evils of men, coming from that root of error and perverse love, with which every son of Adam is born. For who does not know with how much ignorance of the truth, which is manifest even in infants, and with how much abundance of vain cupidity, which begins to appear in boys, a man comes into this life, so that if he is allowed to live as he wishes, and to do whatever he wishes, he will arrive at these crimes and outrages which I have mentioned, and which I could not mention, either all or many of them. You see how immense and monstrous a nursery of evils and crimes this nature is, propagated from that vicious, and hateful, and damned race of Adam. If the fruits are so bitter, if the streams are so pestilential, of what sort, I ask, should we think the root itself and the spring to be?"

End of the first book.

## SECOND BOOK.

### CHAPTER I. Arguments for that sad depravation of our nature mentioned above.

Now you boast that you will fight with us hand to hand, and you hurl warlike threats and terrors. First, you will bring forth the entire cohort and, as it were, the phalanx of our arguments into the middle: then you will attack the hostile lines, and you will tear apart the proposed arguments, and you will blow away all our forces with your breath alone. Bold before the battle, timid in the fight: we, supported by the aid of divine grace (as I hope), will easily blunt your attack. You attribute three kinds of arguments to us. One is taken from the topic of contraries; the second from the testimonies of the Scriptures; the last from the opinions of the Fathers. I do not wish here to raise a dispute with you concerning the disposition of our arguments. For the argument which is proposed in the first place is concluded from those Scriptures which you then commemorate. But we will keep your order, lest we seem to have used any evasion.

First, therefore, since the knowledge of contraries is the same, in order that Original Sin may be understood, it is necessary to consider what Original Justice was like. Thus therefore the Apology of the Augsburg Confession argues, "Since from Original Justice followed the observance of the commandments of both tables, therefore Original Sin brings with it the transgression of all the commandments, so that they not only have concupiscence, that is, an inordinate love for carnal things, from which all injuries against one's neighbor are born, but also blindness of mind, ignorance of God, hatred of divine judgment, and despair of grace." The same also appears from the image of God, in which man was made. For it signifies perfect justice; man therefore was created holy and upright by God. Afterwards, Adam, having lost this Image through sin, begot sons in his own image and likeness. But the image of God was again delineated in the Decalogue and represented to man, the sum of which is this, that we love God with our whole heart, and do not concupisce. Since our nature cannot perform this, therefore Paul not undeservedly says, "All have sinned, and are in need of the glory of God." From this we gather by true and necessary reason that we are all born sinners, and transgressors of the law, so much so indeed that not only is there no power and faculty in us for observing the law, but also a miserable and manifest necessity of sinning.

Now we bring forth almost infinite testimonies of the Scriptures, by which we confirm this depravation of our nature. You say that you will commemorate the principal passages, and those which are especially pressing, and you distribute them into certain orders and as it were classes. The first order contains those Scriptures which ascribe sin to nature itself: as when the Apostle says that the Gentiles walked in trespasses and sins according to the course of this world, according to the prince of the power of the air, and of the Spirit who now works

in the sons of disobedience. Among whom we all also once lived in the desires of our flesh, fulfilling the desires of the flesh and of the thoughts. And that we may understand that all these things emanated from nature itself, and were not acquired by custom or imitation, the Apostle immediately adds, "and we were by nature children of wrath, even as the rest." Those sins, therefore, whose sources Paul commemorates, arise from nature, and are the sins of nature because of that corruption of nature in which we are born. But also those words were not to be omitted which precede, that "we were dead in our trespasses and sins." For from this it is manifest that our nature is subject to death on account of sin. And to this pertains what the Apostle calls Original Sin, "the sin dwelling in us," and "surrounding us," because it so deeply inheres that it has besieged all the parts and powers of the soul.

To the second order are referred those Scriptures which place Original Sin in the mind itself, the heart, and the will. Thus Paul: "Having their understanding darkened, being alienated from the life of God through the ignorance that is in them, because of the blindness of their heart." And in the next chapter, "You were once darkness: but now you are light in the Lord." And in another epistle, "Not that we are sufficient of ourselves to think anything as of ourselves." Thus God in Genesis, "Every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually." And afterwards, "The imagination of man's heart is evil from his youth." These passages are so corrupted in the Vulgate version, "Every thought of the heart is intent on evil at all times:" And again, more so, "The sense and thought of the human heart are prone to evil from its adolescence." Scripture pronounces that whatever man imagines and thinks in his mind from his youth is evil: the interpreter says that our thoughts are prone to evil: and these men abuse the error of the interpreter for the defense of their opinion. To this also contributes what the Apostle says, that we ought to be transformed by the renewing of our mind. Thus it is established that this sin is most deeply fixed in the mind and intelligence itself.

To the third class belong those Scriptures, which describe the depravation of nature not only privatively, but also positively: as what the Apostle says, "The natural man does not receive the things that are of the Spirit of God: for they are foolishness to him: nor can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned." And that, "The mind of the flesh is enmity against God. For it is not subject to the law of God, nor indeed can it be." And elsewhere he calls them "the desires of evil thoughts." And God affirms that "the imagination of the heart is evil." From these and similar opinions of Scripture, it is established that Original corruption consists not only in the absence and lack of virtues, but in the very mixed filth of vices.

The fourth order comprises those Scriptures which place Original depravity in the whole man, such as he is born, and in all his members and parts. Thus Paul teaches that the Old man, our flesh with its affections and concupiscences, must

be crucified: and that "the mind of the flesh is enmity against God." And, "in our flesh dwells nothing good": and, "the law of sin which is in our members rebels against the law of the mind": and, "the body of sin must be destroyed." The prophet David confesses that he was conceived in sins and iniquities: and Paul pronounces that the mouth, lips, tongues, throat, feet, eyes, and all members are infected with sin. And hence it is that man, such as he is of himself, is called soulish, not perceiving the things that are of the Spirit. But that you say that by this depravation of the whole man, we understand chiefly the concupiscence of the lower powers and of the flesh, you knowingly and prudently deceive. For in the corruption of man, we are accustomed to attribute the first place, not without cause, to that wickedness which has filled our mind, by which we despise, ignore, hate, and turn away from God, which is indeed the source of all offenses in common life. This concupiscence also we call with Scripture, lest you think that there is no concupiscence except in the lower part of the soul. And this is that particularly shameful error of your school, that you refer Concupiscence, of which Scripture so often speaks, to these carnal appetites and gross desires. Wherefore you say, when a response is given to this order, that the discussion is chiefly about the depravation of the lower powers. But "the old man," and "the Flesh," and "the mind of the flesh," and "the law of sin in the members," and "the soulish man," and other things of this kind declare and explain the very depravation of the higher powers, as I will make plain in its own place.

The last order recites those Scriptures, which in the description of Original Sin, commemorate the tyranny of the Devil himself. Thus the Apostle mentions "the prince of the power in the air," and "the Spirit who works in the sons of disobedience": and John says, "Sin is from the Devil": and, "greater is he that is in us, than he that is in the world." And Paul says, "The god of this world has blinded the minds of the unbelievers": and, that men are "ensnared in the snares of the Devil," and "held captive by him, at his will." And for this reason the Demons are called by Paul "principalities," and "powers," "lords of the world," and "rulers of these darknesses." Rightly, therefore, you will have called the depraved nature of man a slave of the Devil, which even the Papists themselves sufficiently acknowledge, who, those whom they baptize, they vindicate from the power of the Devils by certain exorcisms beforehand. But Satan could have no right or power over any man, unless he had him entangled on all sides in the chains of sins. Therefore, the superstitious rite of exorcisms itself sufficiently declares, either that it is believed among you that man is both born and lives in the kingdom of sin and Satan, until he is purged by baptism and received into the Church and family of Christ, or that at least a certain shadow and semblance of this faith remains. We bring forth innumerable other Scriptures from both Testaments in this cause: but it is quite likely that they can be reduced not inconveniently to these heads. Now indeed, since the Scriptures everywhere speak so openly of Original Sin, and teach that it is a certain contagion and deadly plague diffused throughout all nature, who would not marvel at the

notable malice or stupor of the Papists, who say that they understand from the Scriptures that there is indeed some evil of this kind; but what or how great it is, is not found in the Scriptures.

## **CHAPTER II. To what extent we may dispute from the Fathers in this controversy.**

Now you leave us the third argument: I suppose, lest you should labor too much in responding. But you ought at this point to have recited the testimonies of the Fathers, which are wont to be urged by our Theologians in this dispute; nor are you such a stranger in the books of our men, that you do not know that many are brought forward and urged. Yet you so narrate the matter, and in narrating corrupt it, that you desire to fix in the minds of all the opinion that the Protestants have no opinion of any Father which they may adduce for themselves. For you say that the Apology of the Augsburg Confession accused the Scholastics of having buried the opinions of the Fathers with sophistical wranglings, not noticing what the Fathers meant, when they spoke of the defect of nature: yet in the meantime to have brought forth no opinions of the Fathers for their opinion. Nor did John Calvin in his Institution, or Martin Kemnitz in his Examination, bring forward any testimony at all from the Fathers for his opinion, although they had written most accurately on this matter from the Scriptures. But this is too much license for prattling. For Calvin in the first chapter cited some, and in the second very many testimonies adapted to this cause: and whoever has digested his most accurate and eloquent response against Pighius, will find as great a supply and light of those testimonies as he could desire. Yet you subjoin, "Except that they sometimes bring forward passages from Augustine alone": and immediately with Augustine you except Prosper. But Augustine alone is worth many, since especially the Catholic cause against Pelagius rested on him for many years. He, as Jerome says, "persisted with the ardor of faith against the blowing winds." Wherefore Jerome so congratulates his industry placed in extinguishing the Pelagian heresy, "By your prowess, you are celebrated in the city; the Catholics venerate and look up to you as the founder again of the ancient faith: and what is a sign of greater glory, all heretics detest you." From no Father, therefore, are testimonies of greater weight brought forward concerning Original Sin and free will, than from Augustine, who both lived in that century, and thoroughly knew all the opinions of Pelagius, and wrote so many things against Pelagius, and was as it were given by God to the Church, that he might counter the most pernicious of all heresies. Prosper, however, was like another Augustine, and was long and much exercised in the same warfare with him against the Pelagians, and in it he was second after Augustine, a subtle and sweet man, so that you might recognize him as a disciple of Augustine. Do you seek any testimonies either more weighty, or more apt to the matter, than those which are brought forward from these two lights of the Church? Nor do we either set Augustine and Prosper against the other Fathers, as you say, or have all the other Fathers as adversaries to us in this cause, or lack the

testimonies of other Fathers besides, as all can understand from what has been said, and what will be said later. We are accustomed to value Augustine and Prosper so much more than others, by how much these, more than others whose vigils have come down to us, labored in this cause, and treated it better and more accurately. But those Fathers who flourished in the Church before Pelagius, spoke so doubtfully at times and inconveniently, that they gave the greatest opportunity to Pelagius, even those whose highest virtue and glory was among all. Who does not know how many things Pelagius cited for his heresy from the Fathers who lived in earlier centuries? And some things Augustine softens with interpretation, some he excuses, some he does not fear to disapprove, because it was necessary. But he frequently applies that most just defense, "Disputing in the Catholic Church, they did not think they were understood otherwise: no one was assailed by such a question: with the Pelagians not yet litigating, they spoke more securely." And who does not see, while Augustine strives to interpret conveniently the testimonies which were adduced by the Pelagians, how foreign and violent interpretations he sometimes followed? Julian adduced a testimony from Chrysostom, in which the holy Father says that infants are baptized, although they have no sins: and from this he disputed that it seemed to Chrysostom that there was no Original Sin in newly born children. And the words not obscurely favor this opinion. Augustine responded that this was Chrysostom's meaning, that infants do not have their own sins. But Chrysostom proves that the grace of Baptism does not consist only in the remission of sins, because infants, who have no sin, are accustomed to be baptized: and he therefore says that they are baptized, so that holiness may be either given or added to them, by which words he signifies that they are not baptized for the remission of sins. For what sense will there be in the words, that infants are baptized, even if they do not have actual sins? as if those who are vitiated by Original Sin alone should not be baptized, or infants are not baptized for the remission of sins. But such opinions sometimes escaped the Fathers when they were intent on something else. I am not ignorant that many things can be brought forward from Chrysostom to the contrary; nor is that now the question. But that some things were often uttered by him and others rather incautiously and inconveniently, no one can be ignorant. The same Julian adduced a certain opinion of Basil, that sin can be most easily separated from the substance, which Augustine explains thus, "That he says evil can easily be separated from the will or from the substance, is not easy for the human will, but for the mercy of God." Rightly: for what is difficult for God? But whether Basil meant that, can deservedly be doubted. Also in Pelagius, Augustine condemned many things, which are found not only in Origen and Tertullian, but in Clement, Justin, Irenaeus, and that confuter of all heretics, Epiphanius. Clement contends that infants have committed nothing, and therefore have not at all fallen into the curse of Adam: and that David was not born in sins. What else did Pelagius say? Justin says, that man has an equal power of turning himself to either side: Irenaeus, that a good opinion is always present to man. Pelagius

likewise posited these things, but in Pelagius Augustine could not bear it, and who at all would bear it, unless he who wishes to betray the doctrine of the Scriptures to heretics? But what Epiphanius said, that the ancients were saved by the law of nature, who followed from the law of Moses, we by grace, is of such a kind that nothing more hostile to grace could have been said by Pelagius himself, however much Andradius labored in the defense of this saying. What that Augustine was forced to retract what he himself had formerly written on this matter? He had written against Adimantus that it was placed in our power to do good: which he explains thus, that it is indeed in the power of man to change his will for the better, but that that power is none, unless it has been given by God. But God does not give that power to all. In the books on Free Will there are many things which seem to favor Pelagius. For he says, "In these and similar words the Pelagians think, or can think, that we held their opinion." And that specifically, that he writes that man can live rightly when he wills, is hard enough. Thus, however, he softened it with an added interpretation, that there is indeed a will, by which one both sins and lives rightly: but unless the will is freed by the grace of God, it is not possible for mortals to live rightly and piously. In the book on the two souls he wrote, "We are ordered to love spiritual things and justice, and by nature we can." Because this favored the Pelagians, he labors to show how it should be understood, lest it should favor them. Thus he says, against the Manichaeans the question was about nature: that grace does this, that nature being healed, can do what, being vitiated, it cannot, through him who came to seek and to save what was lost. Again in the book on the sermon of the Lord on the mount, what he says that in the peaceful there is no rebellious motion against reason, he himself wonders how he said it, and says that it cannot happen in this life that the law repugnant to the law of the mind should not be at all in the members: wherefore he wishes the saying to be taken thus, that the peaceful now act by subduing the concupiscences of the flesh, so that they may at some time come to that most full peace. And in the same book, because, repeating the same opinion in another place, he wrote that these things can be fulfilled in this life, just as they are believed to have been fulfilled in the Apostles, he does not wish it to be understood thus, that we should think that in the Apostles living here there was no motion of the flesh repugnant to the Spirit, but that these things can be fulfilled here to the extent that we believe they were fulfilled in the Apostles, that is, by that measure of human perfection which can be the perfection in this life. Why should I commemorate other things of this kind, which are indeed many? From these it is abundantly clear that the Fathers before the rise of Pelagius, both wrote and thought about Original Sin and free will, in which two articles his heresy was chiefly concerned, more often less accurately than was fitting for such great Doctors of the Church. And God permitted Pelagius to rage for a time, so that the Catholic Fathers might learn to judge and speak more soundly about such great matters. Wherefore what the Magdeburgenses wrote, that the Fathers sometimes attributed too much to human powers, and had somewhat obscured Original corruption, and had

explained it too slightly and coldly, nothing could be said more truly, if you will acquiesce in the judgment of Augustine either concerning his greater predecessors, or concerning himself, or will compare the writings of the ancients with the opinions of Pelagius. That we have more testimonies in this cause than you would wish, not only from Augustine and Prosper, but also from other masters of the Church, especially those who existed after the heresy of Pelagius was published and condemned, if you do not yet understand, I will take care that you feel it abundantly in its own place.

### **CHAPTER III. In what and how great evils we place this depravation of nature.**

As if it were not yet sufficiently understood what and how great a depravation of nature the Protestants understand, you again invent I know not what occasions for speaking on that matter, so that after you have made such long delays in matters not necessary, when it comes to the controversy, and the very contestation of the suit, as it were, you may be briefer. But yet, lest we should omit anything of yours, let us run through all these things as they have been proposed by you, as briefly as may be allowed. First, therefore, in order, as you say, you propose all the things in which we place this depravation of nature, and accuse the Papists because they deny it: then, you will explain what properly pertains to the present dispute. But you will do both according to your custom and faith.

1. First therefore is, that man outside of grace cannot know God, love God, do the commandments of God, or turn himself to God: and this we prove by many testimonies not only of Augustine and Prosper, but of the Scriptures. Do you, on the contrary, defend that man, supported by the aids of nature alone, can do these things? What else will you do at all, unless you declare that the heresy of Pelagius pleases you? Indeed, if we love, or fear, or know God spontaneously and by our own disposition, as we ought; and if, relying on nature, we can keep the commandments of God, and turn ourselves to God, from whom we have turned away, there is nothing for which we should blame nature, or complain of the depravation of nature. For since you have placed Original Justice in a certain possibility for virtues, if nature can do these things by itself, it will not lack Original Justice: but if it has Original Justice, no Original Sin will reside in it. Scripture teaches plainly enough, that none of these things can be done by man outside of grace, since it cries out that the natural man cannot perceive the things that are of the Spirit, which cannot be judged and known without the Spirit. If we do not perceive by our own intellect what are the things of the Spirit, we certainly do not know God, as he ought to be known, much less do we love him, or keep his commandments, or turn ourselves to him, from whom we have departed so far, never to return of our own accord.
2. Then we say that this depravation is so great, that in our very conversion to God, which is by grace, our free will has no power in itself to aid this

conversion, but we are altogether passive in this matter. For it is the entire gift of divine grace that we are converted: no part of this conversion is to be attributed to us, but the whole to grace, lest we should mix nature with grace. For God alone is he who takes away from us the heart of stone, and inspires that mind, that we may be converted to God; since we are by nature unfit even to think anything good, much more therefore are we unfit to obtain divine grace or to procure our conversion and salvation. Therefore we receive the first grace, we do not either merit or acquire it.

3. Thirdly, we teach that man before and outside of grace can do no morally good work, and that he always sins, and that all his actions tend only to evil. But if by moral work you understand the philosophical virtues, we do not deny that a man without special grace can do many things bravely, and temperately, and prudently, and justly, as we read that Aristides, and Socrates, and Scipio, and Cato, and others did, who since they were ignorant of God, were kindled by a certain instinct of nature to seek praiseworthy and laudable things. But these were rather phantoms of virtues, than solid virtues, and therefore they are called splendid sins by Augustine. For for the most part they did these things for the sake of vain glory, and always without faith. But true virtues must flow from faith, and be referred to the glory of God as their end and proper scope. Since some Papists also concede this, tell me then why you called them ill-curious Catholics? Are you so unashamed to profess Pelagianism, that you dare to defend that man outside of grace can either do anything from faith, or have any true virtue? But the Apostle calls sin, whatever is not of faith: but faith is not had outside of grace, unless you think that faith lies hidden in nature. Then if no one pleases God without faith, do you think that these men pleased God or had true virtues, who were so devoid of faith, that they believed nothing to be true, except what they could comprehend by their own reason, but they neither knew Christ, nor had any desire of knowing him? Those whom you call ill-curious Catholics, indeed understand much better than you, and are the best of this kind of Catholics.
4. Fourthly, Luther adds, that even in the very act of sinning we are not free. But that free will has been lost both for evil and for good: and therefore because of the corruption of nature we not only sin in fact, but also always necessarily. For Luther taught this expressly in the articles condemned by Leo. But you interpret Luther in bad faith. Luther does not deny that man sins freely, because he is by nature necessarily evil, and therefore always sins: for even the Demons, who necessarily sin, and cannot do otherwise, yet sin most freely, and burn with a certain infinite desire of sinning. But evil men, and even the Demons themselves, are not so free in sinning, that they may do whatever they wish. For as Luther most truly says, "God rules the evil works in the impious." Otherwise, it would certainly be all over for the good. Therefore, although man is evil by nature, and wills evil, and

does evil, yet it is not simply in his power to think anything either good or even evil, because all things are under God, against whom man can do nothing, except as much as he permits: and Luther proves this by the words of Christ, "A leaf of a tree does not fall to the ground without the will of your Father who is in heaven." But that we always and necessarily sin without grace, Scripture teaches not obscurely, when it pronounces that all the thoughts of the human heart are only and always evil: and that without Christ we can do nothing that pleases God. If we can do nothing without Christ, and yet we are always attempting something, whatever we do without the grace of Christ, is always and necessarily evil, and we cannot not sin, before we are made partakers of divine grace.

5. Fifthly, the Protestants initially said that this depravation is so great, that we even burn with hatred and contempt of God. We say the same thing now also, and constantly defend it, relying on the authority of the Apostle Paul, who wrote that the mind of the flesh is enmity against God. But we without grace are nothing else entirely than flesh: because what is born of the flesh, is only flesh. Either therefore we are not Flesh before grace, and Christ erred, which you, I believe, will not hesitate to say, or we are of that nature and disposition, that we despise God, and persecute him with hatred. For it cannot be, that darkness should not flee the light, that all wickedness and impiety should not shudder at and hate the most just judge.
6. Sixthly, we add further, that the depravation is so great, that it even inheres in the regenerate, so that they cannot be without sins. But if you think that the regenerate can be without sins, you think against Scripture and the orthodox faith. You confess indeed that venial sins cannot be altogether shaken off in this life. But if you think that any sin is venial by its own nature, you understand neither the nature of sin, nor the measure and rigor of divine justice. For any sin whatever is a deviation from the rule of justice, which threatens death and a curse to all who offend in any matter, even the slightest. But this is not the question of this place. Nay, the inherent concupiscence causes us to sin in every action of ours, even a good one.
7. Seventhly, therefore, we teach that it is always sinned mortally by the just, from the nature of the thing and of the actions themselves, although they are not reputed as such. For we acknowledge no sin to be venial in itself, since Scripture adjudges the soul that sins to death, and an offense of so great a majesty ought not to be vindicated by less than an eternal punishment. But we sin in any action, because we both do less than we ought, and we mix in much of our affections, that is, of filth. Wherefore the Prophet pronounced our justices to be like a menstruous cloth. But God, for his immense mercy, accepts our efforts, although very slight and full of errors and offenses, in good part, and rewards them: whatever evil has been either committed or mixed in, he forgives.

8. Lastly, we conclude that this depravation of our nature cannot be healed in this life, so that we may be altogether without sin, or satisfy the law in all things: and we affirm that to think the contrary is the very essence of Pelagianism. For if it could be healed in this life, then Original Justice would be recovered in this life: but perfect Justice, such as that Original justice was, and such as we expect in the kingdom of Heaven, admits the society of no sin, not even a venial one. But here one does not live without venial sins, you confessing it: therefore our nature, while we live in this world and Valley of miseries, cannot be completely healed and repaired: but the inner man is now renewed day by day, as the Apostle says, the perfection of health is reserved for that day.

In these articles there is no jot that is not Catholic; if only that is Catholic which pleased not the Roman Pontiff, or Pelagius, but the Prophets and holy Apostles. But of all these, you say that the first, third, and fifth pertain to the present dispute; the second and fourth to the question of free will, which is indeed most closely connected to this one: the rest to the controversy concerning concupiscence in the regenerate. We, because we follow you, must treat these matters as they have been proposed and distributed by you.

#### **CHAPTER IV. The false doctrine of the Scholastics concerning the present matter.**

The first point (you say) is not denied by Catholics. But it is not conceded ingenuously, and only malignantly and maliciously. For you confess that man outside of grace cannot either know or love God, or do the precepts of God; but you add, "as he ought." But who can so love God, or who can so keep and do the precepts of God, as he ought? Dare to say that you can do what no one ever, either most holy or most proud, has dared. We so love God as we ought, when we love him with our whole heart, and above all things: and we so do the precepts of God, as we ought, when we do both whatever he has commanded, and in the way he has commanded it to be done; which no man ever, after Adam lost Original Justice, could perform, except Christ. You will doubtless bear away a distinguished palm of the Catholic Confession, who concede to us that man without grace cannot effect what they never could, who, by the gifts of grace, for the condition of this life, have excelled the most. You wish, therefore, and this is Catholic among you, that man without grace, supported by the powers of nature alone, can know and love God, and do the commandments of God, although not perfectly: we defend that he cannot in any part. Therefore, we do not openly agree on the first point. And this is what you bring from the Apology of the Augsburg Confession, that the Scholastics attribute to human nature whole powers for loving God above all things, and for doing the precepts of God according to the substance of the acts. But other Scholastics teach that there is a preparation in man before grace, and that to the man doing what is in him, grace is not lacking: which they would never say, if they understood the Original depravation of nature. But you call us slanderers, I believe because we do not

understand what the Scholastics meant, or because perhaps we perversely twist their opinion. Therefore you will explain the meaning of these propositions to us, so that it may clearly shine forth what is to be held against the Protestants.

As to the first article, therefore, you say that the same Scholastics who said that Original Sin was concupiscence in the flesh and ignorance in the mind, such as Hugo Victorinus, Thomas, Bonaventure, whom we think feel the same as we do, openly taught that man from the powers of nature can love God above all things, and do the precepts of God. What about you? Does this proposition not fight (you say) with the true definition of Original Sin? But what if neither their definition comprehends as much as the nature and reason of Original Sin demand? And man cannot, supported by no other aid than nature, either love God as he ought, or do the precepts of God? Certainly nature, if it is alone, can in no way pursue God with true charity, unless we include grace in nature, such as it was created. For the charity by which we love God above all things is not a gift of nature, but of grace. And that saying of the Scholastics is trite, that the natural things remain in man after sin: therefore by this reasoning a man not yet reborn will be able to love God more than himself, and above all things, and so as he ought: which when Pelagius said, he incurred the most severe anathema of the Church.

Then you say that the Scholastics attribute this, which you said, to human nature not corrupted, but whole, in its pure naturals. But we speak of the corrupted nature of man, such as it is now. You are inept, therefore, who tell us what nature could do before sin, when we are disputing about the powers of human nature after sin. Although Thomas inquires this thus, not because he thinks that nature before sin ever lacked grace: but to refute the opinion of certain ones, who did not think that man by the sole powers of nature before sin could love God above all things: which is indeed most true, whatever seemed otherwise to Thomas. For if the Spirit instills even the smallest amount of the love of God in our souls, surely the Spirit alone effects so great a love as this, by which God is loved above all things.

Thirdly, you bid to be observed, that to the whole man is attributed a love of God not perfect, but natural. But that love of God is perfect, by which God is loved above all things, and all the precepts of God are kept; which was indeed natural to the first man. Therefore you absurdly distinguish both natural love from infused, and require a more perfect love, than that we should love God above all things, and with all our strength. We know God now by the natural light, which remains in this darkness of nature, in some way; that is, we are convinced that God exists and, however unwillingly, we confess it, nor is any excuse left for us, that we may not be guilty of a most just condemnation, because we have not worshipped God, whom the creatures have not permitted us to be ignorant of. But this knowledge does not generate true love of God in

our souls besieged on all sides by sin. Wherefore there is need of heavenly grace, to pour a new light upon us.

Fourthly, you add, that this faculty is not attributed to the whole of nature without general divine help, as a moving principle. Nor is it indeed surprising, since without this help not even the Demons themselves, or the most wicked men, can do anything. For he it is who gives life and motion to all.

Fifthly, you note that the same Scholastics expressly teach that man, now in a depraved nature, cannot fulfill all the precepts of the virtues, nor love God above all things, even with a natural love, without grace: and therefore you say that they detract nothing either from the grace of Christ, or from the depravation of nature. You indeed plead the cause of the Scholastics beautifully. But what if the Scholastics now say nothing other than that grace is necessary for man to love God above all things, and to observe all the precepts of God? No one will deny that, unless he who has thought it a crime to depart even a nail's breadth from Pelagius. But how much the Scholastics both diminish the corruption of nature and the grace of Christ, can be understood from this, that from this doctrine of theirs it follows that God can be loved by us, and his commandments be done without grace, although not perfectly. Which indeed is the same as if one should say, that as much can be performed without grace, as with grace. For those who have obtained the most grace in this life, are yet far from perfection. Whether this is not to detract from the grace of Christ, and to adorn nature with false praises, you may see.

Sixthly, you bid to be noted diligently, that when the Scholastics teach that man without grace can do the commandments of both tables, even concerning supernatural virtues, and avoid sins, although not all; they understand this as to the substance of the works, not as to the manner of acting; because we ourselves acknowledge this, we therefore reprehend the Scholastics either most ineptly or maliciously. But what act of the precepts, what substance of the work do they understand? Only the external function of the duty. But in that they are at once inept and malicious, because they recall the substance of the divine precepts to external actions. For God not only commands and requires external obedience, but especially internal: as when he forbade homicide and adultery, he commanded the observance and honor of parents, he did not only wish that one should abstain from violent slaughter, and from base lust, to be performed, nor some external obedience to be shown to parents; but He has commended to us benevolence, and chastity, and piety.

Therefore, who is so foolish or insane, unless he is entirely imbued with the follies of the Scholastics (Durandus, in Book 1, dist. 38, quaest. 1), as to believe that those who do not inflict death on another, but yet hate him and wish him removed from their midst, or who have not touched another's wife, because the opportunity they desired was lacking, or who treat their parents honorably

indeed, but not from the heart, have done what God proposed in these precepts, and have sinned only in the manner? You are not unaware that the manner is to be judged from the principle and the end. Faith ought to be the principle of acting, and God the end. But these causes of good actions pertain to the very act of the precept. For unless we honor our parents, and protect the life of others, and flee adultery and debauchery, and observe the other precepts of God in the way that God has commanded, that is, from faith and for the sake of God, we violate the law in act. Wherefore Christ taught that those are murderers who are angry with their brothers without cause, even if they have not killed them, and that those are adulterers who lie in wait for the marriages of others, even if they have never had relations with the wives of others.

It is therefore most false what the Scholastics teach, that a man without grace can keep the commandments of both tablets with respect to the substance of the works, unless by the substance of the work is understood the external work, which is not the whole substance of the work, but its smallest and easiest part. As for what the Apostle says, that the Gentiles show the work of the law written on their hearts (Romans 2:15), it does not mean that the Gentiles keep the law as to the substance of the work, as the Scholastics have taught, but that they declare a certain knowledge of the divine law inscribed in their minds, in that they recognize and approve of something commanded in the law, and are held by some desire for honorable things, and are moved by a certain silent testimony of conscience. An answer will be given to you later concerning the virtues of the heathens (In Chapter 5). Meanwhile, you have said nothing to prevent us from rightly condemning the barbarous and Pelagian opinion of the Scholastics: since you have either spoken of a nature not such as ours is, or you have attributed to this corrupt nature before grace those powers which it scarcely has when instructed and polished by the gifts of grace.

We, on the contrary, as you say, judge this nature to be so corrupt that without grace it can neither avoid sin nor perform any precept as to the substance of the work; because by the substance of the work we understand all that which is comprehended in the precept. For we do not deny that someone without grace can both abstain from external crime and undertake a noble deed: but this is not to fulfill the act of the precept, as I have already taught. Indeed, we say further what displeases you much more, that even with grace we cannot accomplish anything that deserves the praise of justice before God, but that all our justice consists in the mere mercy and favor of God, since nature is so wholly defiled by sin that whatever we do or attempt is sprinkled with some stains of its native impurity. You affirm that the whole of nature is not so corrupt, and this is the state of the controversy between us.

You proceed also to excuse the Scholastics in that they taught that there is in man a preparation for grace before grace. In the same way you can excuse and defend Pelagius, if you please, whom the Catholic Fathers, however, thought

should be condemned rather than tolerated when he said the same thing. "If anyone," say the Fathers in the Council of Arausio (Canon 4, 6), "contends that our will awaits God for us to be purged from sin, but does not confess that it is also through the infusion and operation of the Holy Spirit in us that we even want to be purged, he resists the Holy Spirit who says through Solomon, 'The will is prepared by the Lord,' and the Apostle who preaches, 'It is God who works in you both to will and to accomplish for his good will.' And later, 'If anyone says that God confers mercy upon us who believe, will, desire, strive, labor, watch, ask, seek, and knock, without grace, but does not confess that it is divinely brought about that we believe, will, and do all these things, he resists the Apostle who says, 'What do you have that you have not received?' and 'By the grace of God I am what I am.'" Therefore, if divine grace prepares the will, as we read here was defined against the Pelagians, what else did the Scholastics do but most impudently contradict this Catholic definition, when they taught that man can prepare himself for grace without grace? But you say this detracts nothing from grace according to the opinion of the more approved Scholastics. Meanwhile, the publicly received meaning of this opinion is most openly Pelagian: what the more approved thought, it was for the few to judge. For it cannot be easily judged even who are the most approved, since some please some more than others according to each one's judgment. You will certainly never persuade any sane person that nothing else is understood by that proposition than that man freely accepts grace when offered: although man cannot do even this, unless the ability has been divinely given to him. For God offers grace to many, which they neither accept nor can accept without grace, since Christ said, "No one can come to me unless it has been given to him by my Father" (John 6:65); and elsewhere, "Without me you can do nothing" (John 15:5). But when you say that man can prepare himself for grace without grace, first it is manifest that no grace is required for this preparation; then, it is attributed to man that he adapts himself to grace by a certain faculty of nature, and makes himself fit and suitable for receiving grace. What other preparation, therefore, can be understood than a certain institution and formation of life to virtue, and as it were a certain habit of doing good, so that when we are thus disposed and prepared by our own industry and disposition, divine grace may more easily insinuate itself?

And this Durandus taught not obscurely (in 2, dist. 28, q. 3); I do not know if he is one of those whom you call approved, but he is certainly numbered among the chief Scholastics, and in the opinion of some, if not preferred to Thomas himself, at least equaled. Thus he says that it is conceded by all that man can prepare himself for grace without a new habitual gift divinely infused: and he confirms this thus, because if man needed a gift of grace to prepare himself for grace, he would similarly need another gift of grace to prepare himself for that grace: since no supernatural gift is given to those who have the use of free will unless they are prepared. But in this way one would proceed to infinity. Therefore he concludes that man can prepare himself for grace without an immediate motion of the will by God: because a moral good, for the

performance of which an immediate motion of the will is not necessary, prepares for grace.

You say that Durandus taught this badly. But he affirms that all concede this. And what if Thomas taught the same before? His words are (in 1-2, q. 109, art. 6): "If by grace is understood some habitual gift freely bestowed on us, we can without grace prepare ourselves to have grace": and he concludes that no other grace is necessary for us for this thing, except a certain divine providence by which man is mercifully directed to the good. And Cajetan says that Thomas thinks the same on this matter as Durandus, since Thomas expressly wrote that man, by doing what is in him, prepares himself for grace. Scotus says (in 2, dist. 28, q. 3), "it is possible for one existing in mortal sin to prepare and dispose himself for grace." But he who remains in mortal sin must necessarily lack grace. Therefore men can prepare and apply themselves to grace whenever they wish, if such a distinguished Scholastic is to be believed. Richard of Middleton says (in 2, dist. 28, q. 3), "He who uses his free will rightly, as much as he can, disposes himself for grace which makes one pleasing." Thus he requires nothing else for attaining grace than that each one use his will rightly. Gabriel Biel similarly (in 2, dist. 28), "Man without infused grace can prepare himself to receive grace." And later, "Man from his natural abilities can act well morally, and dispose himself for grace, avoid sins, and fulfill the precepts." Why should I mention the others, whose song is the same, if you except almost Gregory of Rimini alone? Bellarmine himself (On Justification, book 5, ch. 4) states that a man not yet reconciled can by works of penance obtain justification. How much more easily can he prepare himself for grace and reconciliation? And to this pertains that Pelagian pronouncement of the Scholastics, that God does not deny grace to the man who does what is in him. You fashion an exposition in no way probable, that a man is considered to do what is in him when he freely consents to God who moves him. But the Scholastics, as is apparent from their own words, do not think that a special motion of God is required for someone to be prepared for grace: and what they mean can be obscure to no one. For they say that to him who does what is in him, as much as he can by the powers of nature, God does not deny grace: whence it follows that the first cause of grace is the good use of free will, as Pelagius wished.

Now you say that merit of congruity was long ago rejected. How I wish it were as you say! But I fear you deceive us with empty hope and false rumors. The merit of congruity was rejected long ago? When, by whom, where? Surely not in the Council of Trent? That is false. Surely not by the Roman Pontiff? I do not think so. It matters little, however, what Stapleton, or any private disputant, thinks, since that matter has been established by no public judgment. Bellarmine confidently affirms what all understand to be most false, that the Scholastics do not attribute such merit to those works which are done from faith and the help of God that a reward corresponds to it out of justice; but only a merit of impetration, which the Scholastics are accustomed to call merit of congruity, not

of condignity. And in this matter there is no dissension among Catholics. Stapleton affirms that the merit of congruity has been rejected. Bellarmine retains this merit, but places it in works done with faith: thus he seems to leave no place for merits of condignity. For he wishes the reward not to be owed to merits out of justice, but only to be obtained; and he calls the merit of impetration what the older Scholastics always called merit of condignity. In this he pleases me greatly, that he concedes the reward is only obtained, not attributed to our merits. Thus the merits of works are removed: and would that the very name of merit, which is so hostile to grace, were removed from all the schools of Christians. But the opinion of the Scholastics is far different, which Bellarmine could not have been ignorant of. Biel (in 3, dist. unique) briefly explains the whole matter in these words, "Merit among the Doctors is twofold, namely of condignity and of congruity. Merit of condignity is an act elicited by the will for a reward to be rendered to someone according to the debt of justice." This justice, however, consists in a certain proportion of the merit to the reward and an equality. He does say later that this proportion is based not on the goodness of the act, but on the divine promise, yet he acknowledges the merit of condignity. Now concerning the Merit of Congruity, he says a little later, "The soul by a good motion towards God elicited from the freedom of the will can merit the first grace of congruity." This he proves thus, because God accepts the act of one doing what is in him, to bestow the first grace. Richard similarly (in 2, dist. 27), "out of divine liberality grace is given to the man who does what is in him." Again more plainly, "The same act is done by grace and free will: in the first way it is not meritorious of eternal life of condignity, but of congruity. For it seems congruous that to a man working for God according to his own virtue, God should render a reward that befits his most excellent virtue and goodness." Thus all these confirm the merit of Congruity. Nor can you name any more approved Scholastics that I know of. Perhaps you desire Bonaventure, whom all number among the most approved. He indeed requires grace for this preparation: but what kind? "Some of those which are given freely, not those which make one pleasing, which scarcely anyone lacks after he has attained the use of reason." Thus he writes (in 2, dist. 28), "It is therefore to be held that free will, if it is excited by some gift of grace freely given, can dispose itself for grace that makes one pleasing, of congruity": and he says this grace is in almost all after the use of free will, such as servile fear, or a certain natural piety which many have from boyhood. To this all their opinions come down, that a man doing what is in the power of his will, aided by no supernatural grace, can both prepare himself for grace and merit the first grace.

This opinion is so outstandingly false and heretical that you are now ashamed of it. Therefore you try to persuade us, but in vain, that it belongs only to certain Scholastics; since there is almost no Scholastic who does not profess the same thing quite distinctly and openly. It were better to acknowledge the common error ingenuously than to excuse it so deceitfully and miserably.

## **CHAPTER V. The testimonies of Augustine and Prosper are brought forth.**

To you we seem to exaggerate the depravity of nature and Original Sin too much, because we say that man is both born with those vices and sins which were mentioned above, and outside of grace does nothing good, but always sins: and you say that this is asserted by us from the Scriptures alone without any testimony of the Fathers: to prove this, both the Scriptures and the Fathers are employed. But we have given both confirmed by many testimonies of the Fathers in the preceding book: and because it is necessary, we will now bring forth more, so that your more than childish vanity, and the truth of the cause itself which we defend against the Scholastics and Papists, may be illustrated. Nor will we use the testimonies of Augustine and Prosper only (although chiefly theirs): but we will also seek the consensus of others.

Augustine, therefore, so often commemorates and laments this fatal corruption of human nature in such lucid words, that they are abundantly sufficient for us to explain our opinion. Let us now hear him speaking (*Hypognosticon*, book 3): "Adam, while he willingly gives his consent to the tempting serpent, transgresses the Lord's precept, and having lost the good of possibility, he obtained only a wounded will to will." He teaches that the faculty of doing anything that is good was lost by the sin of the first man. He adds, "by this wound we all limp in our free will, nor is it naturally sufficient for us to be able to fulfill the good, because now, as we discussed above, from a nature vitiated by sin, man cannot arise with a sound will, that is, with the perfect freedom of will by which he might be sufficient for himself." And soon after, "Desolated by this disobedience, man became captive to the devil." Again, "through a bad will, man rightly lost the ability to will the good: whom, now justly captive for his crime, he left to a depraved will." Again, "therefore through sin the free will of man lost the good of possibility." Again, "through the disobedience of the first man, the devil despoiled and wounded the human race, that is, of the ornaments of morals, and of the lost good of the possibility of free will." Furthermore, "by the sin of the first man the human race was made mortal, and subject to other sins with a depraved free will." Finally, "the whole man was vitiated by the vitiated free will." Words of this kind occur everywhere in these books. In another book he writes thus against a certain Pelagian who objected that if the sinner is weakened to this extent, that he sins more, the punishment is the material of sin (*On Nature and Grace*, ch. 33); "Nor does he consider how worthily the light of truth deserts the transgressor of the law: deserted by which, he is surely blind, and it is necessary that he stumble more, and be afflicted by falling, and being afflicted, not rise." In another book also (*On the Spirit and the Letter*), "Free will is capable of nothing but sinning, if the way of truth is hidden: and when what is to be done and where one must strive begins not to be hidden, unless it also delights and is loved, it is not done, it is not undertaken, one does not live well." The same author in another book (*On the Perfection of Justice*, ch. 4), "The will, conquered by the vice into which it fell, lacks the freedom of nature. Because the will

sinned, a hard necessity of having sin followed the sinner." And a little before, "through the freedom of the will it happened that man was with sin, but now a penal viciousness followed from freedom and made it a necessity."

These things and many more we produce from Augustine. You say that certain badly curious Catholics also bring forward other things, by which they attempt to demonstrate what you had said we nowhere prove by the testimonies of the Fathers, that man is born with those vices and sins of which mention was made before, and that he is always inflamed by them before grace. Why you call these men badly curious I do not know, unless because they seem to aim a little more closely at the truth. But let us add these things also. "When I say to you," says Augustine (Against Two Letters of the Pelagians, book 1), "without the help of God you do nothing, I mean nothing good." And elsewhere (Ibid, book 3), "Free will, having been captured, is capable of nothing but sinning." Again, "The will not yet freed, is to be called rather total concupiscence than will." Finally, in the name of the Catholics (Proposition 3), "We," he says, "say that without grace the will's choice has no power not to sin."

But now let us come to Prosper. His testimony, previously cited by us, is this (Against Cassian, ch. 13): "Unbelief seized faith, captivity took away freedom: nor could any portion of virtues reside there, where so great a troop of vices had burst in." Thus, with all virtues overthrown by sin, the very wicked band of all vices, as if by an assault, rushed into the nature of man. Elsewhere thus (Responses to the Objections of Vincent, resp. 1): "Nature, when it had the power not to sin, sinned voluntarily, and subjected itself to its deceiver by its own will. Nor does it move in vice by a natural but by a captive motion, until it dies to sin and lives to God, which it cannot do without the grace of God." And immediately (Response 6): "the malice of many men is like that of the Demons. But this is the difference between evil men and Demons, that for men, even very evil ones, there remains reconciliation, if God has mercy: but for Demons no conversion is reserved for eternity." And in another place (On the Calling of the Gentiles, book 1, ch. 3), he teaches that the human will without grace is either sensual or animal, and therefore can only sin. He also says (Ibid, book 1, ch. 7), "without the worship of the true God, even what seems to be virtue is sin: nor can anyone please God without God." But something more from Prosper was brought up above.

Now let us select some things from other Fathers, so that all may understand that we do not rely on Augustine or Prosper alone in this cause. Jerome (Commentary on Ezekiel, ch. 18), a little older than Augustine, says, "God punishes the sons to the third and fourth generation, because they were emulators of their Fathers, and hated God with a hereditary evil and impiety also from the growing root." Thus hatred of God arises from the native root of original sin. But Augustine, in his books against Julian (book 2, ch. 10), cited many testimonies of the ancient Fathers, by which he confirmed his opinion against the Pelagians, so that it is less necessary for me to linger in

commemorating them. Let us therefore come to those who lived after Augustine. Fulgentius taught this truth excellently in many places, but especially in that where he proves that man through sin lost all faculty of both good thought and will (On the Incarnation, ch. 17). "Sinning Adam," he says, "who was created without the necessity of sinning, in that by sinning he lost the health of his soul, also immediately lost that faculty of thinking those things which pertain to God. For he forgot to eat his bread, and stripped of the garment of faith, and wounded by the wounds of carnal concupiscence, he lay so oppressed by the dominion of sin, that he could in no way have the beginning of any good will, unless he had received this by the free gift of God. For being made a servant of sin, he was made free from justice, and therefore was made a stranger to justice, who voluntarily was addicted to the dominion of iniquity." Who, having no propensity for good will in himself, when will he accomplish any good here? Thus the same author in the preceding chapter says that gratuitous goodness was conferred on the human race, through which the lost faculty of holy thought in the first man might be received through the second man, and thus the captivity which had been accustomed to dominate in our body might be captured. We were therefore nothing but slaves of sin, in whom there was not only no power by which we might turn from vices to virtue, or exercise ourselves in pious actions, or be able to effect anything that would please God, but it was not even in our power to think anything good.

Peter the Deacon, who lived at this same time, says (in the book On the Incarnation and Grace, ch. 6): "Adam, depraved by the cunning of the serpent, voluntarily became a transgressor of the divine law, and therefore is condemned to the punishment of death, the whole of him, that is, according to the body and according to the soul, is changed for the worse, and having lost his own freedom, is held in the service of sin. From this there is no man who is not born bound by the chain of this sin." What good do you hope for from those who are entirely servants to sin, and are so bound by the chains of sin that they can neither free themselves nor move? Gregory says (Epistles, book 9, epistle 45), "because the human race has decayed in its first parent as in a root, and has drawn aridity into its branches." From a decayed root nothing incorrupt can be born in the branches. Anselm says (Commentary on Romans, ch. 5), "Adam by sinning vitiated his entire stock in himself as in a root: with the hidden disease of his carnal concupiscence he weakened in himself all who were to come from his stock." A disease in the root allows nothing in the tree to be sound, but corrupts the whole with its vicious sap. I hasten to Bernard, who calls original sin that greatest offense (Sermon on the Day of the Lord's Circumcision). Then he says, "from the first man even to the last it is extended: and in each one also from the sole of the foot to the crown of the head this poison is diffused." Thus, therefore, the original contagion has flowed and spread itself through the whole nature of man, so that nothing not corrupt and vicious is left in us. Wherefore, since we are such by nature, what else can we do but sin? I come to Gerson, who in his age was considered among the most learned and upright Theologos: thus he says

(Theological Considerations on Original Sin), "It is clear therefore that through the sin and after the sin of the first man there is in the soul a twofold necessity: one of not being able to restrain sensuality, and another, the necessity of concupiscence. And the first is a certain necessity of not being able to do what one ought, and the second is a certain necessity of doing what one ought not. And thus there is in it a lack of both parts of justice, which are to turn from evil and to do good." Therefore, we can neither do what we ought, nor not do what we ought not; it is not in us either to do good or to flee evil: thus to sin is all that we can do. You see, therefore, of what sort we are born, in what great mire and, as it were, abyss of sins we are involved, with what vices this nature teems, finally how nothing remains in us of either power or will by which we might consult our salvation, or turn ourselves to Christ, or attempt any good, or hasten to grace by our own will and instinct, or prepare ourselves.

Wherefore, that we thus exaggerate this corruption of nature with words, we are not to be blamed, since it can neither be exaggerated nor explained by any words sufficiently for its magnitude, if any faith is to be given either to the sacred Scriptures, or to the most excellent Fathers of the Catholic Church, or to experience itself, which is the teacher of fools.

**CHAPTER VI. The opinion of certain Scholastics is asserted, that the corruption of nature which followed Original Sin was the natural constitution of man.**

Before you respond to the proposed arguments, you make a new digression on purpose, so that you may disturb the entire discussion with unnecessary little questions, and defer your response to the very end, when the arguments are less fresh in memory, and the mind, preoccupied with other thoughts, cannot so accurately judge what you are responding. However, that these may be answered, you pretend it is necessary, before all things, to show what and how great the depravity of nature is according to the Orthodox opinion, which I had believed to have been done by you a long time ago. And here, so that you may teach how Catholic your opinion is on this question, you first refute the false opinions of those whom you call orthodox and of certain scholastics: and you frankly confess that there is such a diversity of opinions among you on this matter, that it is difficult for you to deliver what you have promised. But is it true, what you say, that your orthodox are distracted into so many and various opinions, you who are accustomed to boast so insolently and proudly of your consensus? I am angry with the Council of Trent, because it did not settle those contentions: and I think the Pope has limped too long in his office, because he has allowed so many errors for so long to rage in his Church, especially such grave and capital ones, which he could have easily removed with a word or a nod. Do not therefore exclaim so inhumanly against the poor Protestants on account of some variety of opinions on lighter matters, nor so deceitfully preach your consensus and conspiracy. I can affirm this freely, because what I affirm, I can demonstrate with most lucid arguments, that except for this external and

civil association of yours, which is contained by the authority and tyranny of the Pontiff, there is a much greater conflict of minds and opinions among you than there ever was among the Protestants. But this is another matter: let us hear what your Orthodox say, since it is certain that I will examine all these things of yours.

Some, you say, have taught that this concupiscence, with which man began to struggle after the fall, and about which the Apostle complains in such a mournful speech (Romans 7:23-24) that he calls himself miserable on account of it, is nothing but the natural constitution of man, which man would have felt before sin, if he had not received original justice, which would restrain this concupiscence. And they think this is what is commonly said, that Original justice perfected man in his natural attributes. Therefore, they wish that fallen man differs no more from man constituted in a purely natural state, than a man stripped and despoiled of his clothes differs from a naked man who never had clothes, except in that the former was stripped by his own fault, while he who was never clothed does not sin in being naked. Do you call the authors of such a heretical and delirious opinion orthodox? That concupiscence is natural to man, which man would never have felt if he had never sinned? which Paul so grievously bore to dwell in him that he wished to die? which perpetually lusts against the Spirit (Galatians 5:17)? which we are commanded to crucify? which the law of the Decalogue expressly condemns (Romans 7:7)? in which all the orthodox place Original sin? Therefore, God is the author of sin. For what is natural, from what author besides God can it proceed? Thus it will follow that a disease and a certain vicious disposition is implanted in our nature by God, and that its less apparent emergence and eruption in Adam is to be attributed to supernatural grace. This heresy was born from that error by which nature in the first man is distinguished from grace, and certain pure natural states are dreamed of, when the image of God, to which man was made, and with which concupiscence always wages war, was natural to the first man by the benefit and gift of the creator.

Now name the man who committed such a great crime against himself as to invent a heresy more sordid than the Pelagian. It is Dominicus Soto, an intimate counselor to the Council of Trent, who undoubtedly sucked this venom from the breasts of that mother. Thus he writes in so many words (On Nature and Grace, ch. 13): "From these things it is clear that the struggle which the Apostle mentions in Galatians, that the flesh lusts against the Spirit, and the Spirit against the flesh, is innate to man by nature." O monster! Either evil concupiscence was in man before the fall, or after the fall the Spirit, against which the flesh lusts, is innate to man by nature. The same, speaking later of the effects of Original Sin, says: "Original Sin generates no habit: God, who had clothed our nature with a supernatural gift, did not afflict it with a greater punishment for sinning than to leave it naked." Hence it happens that man with only Original sin, setting aside the habits of actual sins (which can be none in infants), is not carried more intensely to sensible things than if he were in a purely natural state: and

therefore they differ only as a mass falling from a height, first impeded and afterward the impediment removed: which indeed falls with equal vehemence before it is restrained and after the obstacle is removed. The sum of this is that evil concupiscence was in man before sin, but it did not agitate and impel man to shameful or wicked actions, because it was impeded and restrained by Original justice: which being lost, it immediately broke forth with its own impetus to wickedness. As a mass, although it is restrained from falling, yet has in itself a nature prone to fall, and rushes when the obstacle is removed: and a ship tied to an anchor, if you cut the rope, is carried away by the waves and winds. And thus he says that holy Council of Trent thought, in the first Canon of the fifth Session. You, Stapleton, were not present at this Synod: for you were then a little boy: he was present, and for the most part presided over the framing of the decrees. Who would not have much more faith in him concerning the mind of the Synod, than in you? And indeed, it is not incredible that the Synod, gathered against God and his Christ, had such a bad mind.

For Ruardus Tapperus also not only proves from the authority of the Council of Trent that concupiscence is not a sin in the baptized, where it was defined that God hates nothing in the reborn, but he also adds that it is difficult to understand and save the proposition that in the not yet baptized, concupiscence is truly and properly sin, and not merely by analogy or figure of speech, whereby the punishment or guilt of sin is called sin. Why did he not say, Impossible? For if concupiscence is natural, God can never hate it, either before or after Baptism: since nothing is worthy of hatred which God has made. And this is the common opinion of all Papists, as the Jesuits in their defense of the Confession, that evil concupiscence without consent is not sin, because it is natural to man, like breathing, like thinking, like the pulse beating: and the Rheims commentators in their Annotations expressly write that concupiscence of itself and without our consent is not sin (on James 1:15). Therefore it is not sin in infants before Baptism, because there is no consent in infants before Baptism, which does not remain after Baptism: indeed, it is never sin, because of itself it is not sin, and what God has made, and instilled in our nature, cannot be sin. Similarly, the same authors in another annotation say that not habitual concupiscence and the inclination to evil is prohibited by that precept, "You shall not covet" (on Romans 7:7), but the consent of our reason and mind, by which we obey its desires. Whence it is manifest that they think there is no sin at all in infants. For infants do not have actual concupiscence, nor do they assent to evil desires, and habitual concupiscence is not (they say) sin, because it is prohibited by no precept. Wherefore concupiscence in infants is not sin, neither in the baptized nor in the not yet baptized, and consequently infants are born without sin: and thus the path leads straight, without detours, into the camp of Pelagius.

The same thing that this Dominicus taught, you say was also concluded by Durandus, although by another method. For he states and concludes by disputation (in 2, dist. 28, q. 3 & dist. 29, q. 1) that the integrity of nature, which is

natural to man, remains the same after Original sin; so that just as grace in the state of innocence was given only for merit, so corrupt nature now does not need healing grace, but only uplifting grace: and therefore man in corrupt nature can without grace both avoid all sins and perform all the works of natural law: indeed, he even says that a man who is in mortal sin as to guilt alone can avoid (whatever the consequent case) every sin that is against a precept of divine law. And that man, although he was created in grace in the state of innocence, did not nevertheless necessarily need it to preserve that state. Therefore Adam could have preserved his state without grace, if Durandus judged rightly. Now Pighius goes further, and contends that the ignorance and infirmity which follows nature are in us by nature, not born from Original sin (Controversy on Original Sin), as his master Pelagius once taught: which if it were so, you say, there would be an expeditious way of ending this controversy against the Adversaries. So the matter stands. For unless you finally resort to Pighius and Pelagius, you will never conveniently dispatch this controversy undertaken against the Protestants. And to this you are clearly inclined in your mind, however much you may dissemble. For what else does it mean, what you say in this place, that death would have been natural to man even without sin? Is not death an infirmity that we suffer in this nature? If it would have been natural to us, even if Adam had not sinned, did Pighius think wrongly, when he attributed these infirmities not to Original sin but to nature? Among the infirmities, I think, a place is owed not to the least of them, death. Then if death were natural, why not also disease, old age, and even ignorance itself? But the Council of Milevis (Canon 1) declared those to be heretics who said that Adam was made mortal, so that if he had not sinned, he could have died. For death entered the world not by some constitution of nature, but by the malice of Satan, and was born from sin. It is false therefore, what you write, that the constitution of the body, such as it was in Adam, was apt for undergoing death. For it is against nature, and against the order established by God in the human race at the beginning, that a rational nature, in which no sin inheres, should be dissolved and perish.

## CHAPTER VII. The same opinions are confuted.

It will be worthwhile to consider briefly with what arguments you attack the preceding opinions. You dispute against Dominicus Soto first from the Council of Trent, all of whose private and public affairs were much better known to him than to you: and it seems quite incredible to me that this Dominicus, who was one side of the Council, should have strayed from the mind of the Council either knowingly or unknowingly. But let us hear what you bring forward. These are the words of the Council that you present (Session 5, Canon 1): "on account of that sin we have incurred the power of the devil, and the whole man according to body and soul has been changed for the worse." What in these words makes against Dominicus? "Man," you say, "in a state of pure nature without grace would by no means have been in the power of the Devil." What then? For Dominicus does not affirm that: but that man, having lost grace, voluntarily rushed into ruin. Therefore, the opinion of Dominicus, however impious and insane, can be reconciled with the decrees of the Council. For if man had concupiscence inherent in the principles of his nature, which supernatural grace constrained and restrained, this bridle and, as it were, chain of grace being shaken off, he could be overcome by this imbecility of nature, and thus fall into the power of the Devil. As for what you say, that man in a state of pure nature would not have been in the power of the Devil, you must first understand that nature before sin was never devoid of grace: wherefore it is inept to divine about the power of man, which he would have had in a state of pure nature. Then I do not see what could have saved man from the power of Satan, except grace. For if Adam, filled with grace, yet did not stand, what do we think so strong and cunning an enemy could have done to him, if he had found him naked of grace?

Next, you argue from Augustine, by which you would teach that the pure natural attributes of Adam, apart from grace, were much healthier and purer than ours are with grace removed. For he says that Adam was in the goods of his nature, we are in the evils of nature: he did not need the death of Christ, we need it: he did not need help against the strife of the flesh, we need it: finally, he received grace by which he could, if he would, and we have received grace (On Correction and Grace, ch. 11 & 12) that we may will, and will so much, and love with such ardor, that we may conquer the will lusting for the contrary with the will of the Spirit. But these words of Augustine do nothing against Dominicus. For Augustine did not speak of the nature of man separated from the gift and help of grace; but he explained what the nature of man was like, whom God had created in grace. He experienced no rebellion or strife of the flesh against the Spirit: he enjoyed a joyful peace: God had made him upright in a good will: he could have remained if he would, because the help by which he could, and without which he could not, persevere in holding the good that he willed, was not lacking. Thus you see that Augustine judges the nature of the first man from grace, without which he could neither hold the good he had received, nor long resist evil. But

this Dominicus does not deny: wherefore you either do not refute him seriously, or you do this ineptly.

Of such a kind also is the argument that follows, that man in a purely natural state would not have been born into the light as infants now are, in whom as soon as they grow up, a very great force of vain desire appears. You dispute about that state of man which never existed: and therefore you bring forward conjectures, not arguments. But I ask, whence did this great mass of vain desires arise in infants, so that as soon as age permitted, they are carried headlong into vices with a certain monstrous impetus, as you yourself say? Baptism removed original sin, and left nothing that does not befit an innocent nature, if we are to believe you. What, therefore, is the cause, what the origin, what the principle of these desires? Did they creep in from elsewhere, or did they proceed from the very bowels of nature? Surely it can be understood that they are born within and at home and, as it were, in the very marrow, from the fact that children, even if they are educated alone and separately, show similar impulses of desires and inclination of nature. There remains therefore in children after Baptism a native font of evil desires, which they pour forth abundantly as soon as they have attained some maturity. Wherefore Baptism confers indeed the remission of sin, but it does not uproot the sin itself. The things you commemorate from Thomas and the rest of this ilk have little moment. Dominicus thought it was permissible for him at times to dissent from Thomas, if he relied on better reasons. Although here he departed from his master without reason. For Thomas rightly taught that the wound of nature is a certain disorder and sickness of all the powers of nature, and that the natural health of man was to desire according to the order of reason: but that the concupiscence which transcends the order of reason is in man against nature. Whatever, however, is in man against nature, has crept into nature by the fraud of the enemy, it was not implanted in nature by God.

And by this true reason Dominicus is refuted. As for what you say, that it is natural for man to desire, this is in no way to be conceded concerning the carnal concupiscence which Scripture condemns. An appetite indeed was in man from nature, but man before sin desired nothing illicitly: but this concupiscence of which we speak is the effect of sin, the wound of nature, the tinder of all evils: and therefore it is in us against nature, as Thomas expressly wrote, nor should it be confused with the natural appetite: and this health original justice created, not merely perfected; it brought it, not merely preserved it. For as soon as Adam lost original justice, he did not retain the health of nature even for a point of time. Wherefore, when you say that original justice, apart from grace, was not the health of nature itself, as Durandus wished, but the preservation and perfection of its health, you proceed to say absolutely nothing: since original justice cannot be separated from grace. For what else was original justice but grace, as was explained before? Now that which Thomas says, that concupiscence which transcends the limits of reason is against man's nature, Dominicus,

because he saw that it fought with his opinion, tries to draw it to himself. He says therefore that this is true simply, by reason of the form, but yet by reason of the material, he wishes it to be natural to man. One will be allowed to say and defend whatever one wishes, if such distinctions are valid. You rightly respond, however, that there was nothing in the first man, either simply or in a certain respect, against nature. Therefore, that appetite, which God implanted in the first man, could in no way be against nature, since it was in all respects suitable to an integral nature.

This indeed is the best argument, that if we admit the opinion of Dominicus, it will be very difficult to excuse God from being considered the author of sin, who implanted so impotent and insane an impulse in the very nature of man through no fault of his own. But consider for a moment whether this does not work against you. You deny that this concupiscence, which incites to sin and is against nature, lay hidden in the first man; and you demonstrate this from the fact that otherwise it can scarcely be understood how God is not the author and architect of sin. Entirely so: for whatever was in the nature of the first man, must all be referred to God as its source. Now if this concupiscence could not have been in Adam for this reason, because it is a certain motion and impulse that is rebellious, as you yourself say, and iniquitous and evil, and therefore sin; lest, if we say that such concupiscence was in Adam, we should seem to make God the author of sin; then concupiscence will always be sin, as long as it has inhabited or adhered to our nature. What excuse, therefore, will you offer, that it is not openly false what you defend, that concupiscence in the Reborn is not sin? For is it not against nature? does it not instigate and impel to sinning? does it not plot a perpetual rebellion against the Spirit? finally, do you not yourself expressly name it sin? Therefore, you have been able to refute the error of Dominicus with no solid argument, except one by which it is established that your opinion and the definition of the Council of Trent are much more validly refuted. For if God hates nothing in the reborn, but they are wholly innocent, immaculate, pure, harmless, and beloved by God, as the Tridentine Fathers state, surely Dominicus erred less, who attributed concupiscence to the incorrupt nature of the first man, than you and your Fathers, who do not concede that the same thing in the Reborn is sin, which you say was not in the first man because it is sin. Unless God hates this concupiscence, why could it not have been in the nature which he created? But God cannot not hate whatever is repugnant to his image impressed on human nature: but concupiscence is always hostile to this image: therefore it cannot not be always hateful to God. But this question of Concupiscence remaining in the Reborn will come to be treated in the next book.

Finally, you return to Thomas, and contend that his mind was far different. But you confirm nothing else with these testimonies, except that the wounding of nature does not consist in the destitution alone or the loss of original justice, but in the distortion and depravation and, as it were, a sickness of all our faculties, which we learned a little before from the same Thomas. This sickness, however,

cannot be healed in this life: wherefore neither is Original sin ever uprooted from our nature while we live in this world. But let us leave Dominicus Soto with his delirium.

When you come to Durandus, you say his opinion rests on two most false foundations. One is, that the first man received grace not for the preservation of health, but only for merit: the other, that man, now corrupt, needs not healing grace, but only uplifting grace, which is the same as the former. On such foundations all that profane and barbarous theology of the Scholastics rests. We have been sufficiently taught from the Scriptures that grace availed for the preservation of his nature for the first man: and that grace is now necessary for us, not only by which we may be lifted up to God, but by which we may recover our pristine health, which indeed we cannot in this life, but hope for in the next. You say, however, that Pighius has been sufficiently confuted by Augustine, in the fourth and fifth books against Julian.

#### **CHAPTER VIII. Various difficulties against this opinion, that it is natural for man for the flesh to obey reason, are discussed.**

As the ark of the Lord among the Philistines, so true theology has been treated and tossed about among the Scholastics. There is scarcely any slightly more distinguished and true opinion which is not either greatly weakened by their foolish subtleties, or, vexed by the importunate injuries of contentions, is forced to depart and be exiled from all the confines of the Schools. But that saying has become very common in the Schools, that it is natural for man that the flesh should serve reason. "Natural," however, was understood as that which pertained to the first nature of man. For of this nature, such as it now is, the disposition is so vicious that the appetite opposes reason when it persuades better things; and reason sometimes leads the appetite to the worst things. But it was divinely given to the nature of man that not only should the appetite obey reason, but reason should govern the appetite with a salutary and just rule.

Now this opinion, which is most true, was either not understood by the Scholastics, or was implicated in unnecessary difficulties, lest it should shine too brightly. Stapleton is now about to say something about it, but as usual, with a rather dull mind, and with the aim of obscuring rather than illuminating the truth. He asks therefore, if it is natural for man that the flesh obey reason, whether man lost anything natural through Original Sin. This, however, he denies can happen, since not even in the Demons have the natural things perished, as Thomas confirms from Dionysius (*Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 63, art. 5). How then was the health of all the powers natural to man, which is now agreed to have been lost, especially since Original justice is not distinguished from grace, as Dominicus Soto proves from Thomas against those who think otherwise? And those who distinguish justice from grace must nevertheless concede this, that if reason obeyed God through a supernatural gift, it was similarly by a certain supernatural power and grace that the flesh obeyed reason.

He responds, however, that it was natural to man that he could, by the power of his superior reason, tend to the good, and that the lower powers could obey reason thus tending; but that he did what he naturally could, this is to be attributed to the gift of Original justice. A mere dream. For by the same faculty by which man could do what was right, he is also to be thought to have done it. Wherefore if by the power and goodness of his nature he could love God, do the commandment of God, flee sin, he did these things by no other than natural virtue, as long as he retained his incorrupt nature. For what reason forces one to posit one power by which he did what was right, and another by which he could have done this very thing, if he had willed? He who has received the power by which he can accomplish something, does not demand another by which to accomplish it, but is content with that which he has. As he who has received an army, by which he could put the enemy to flight and report a victory, when it comes to a battle, does not conscript new troops, but joins battle with the army he has. Stapleton attributes to nature that Adam could please God, but that he did please, he attributes to grace, so that in some way at least he may separate grace in the first man from nature. But he himself has lapsed in his memory or reason. For here he says that it was by the gift of Original justice that Adam actually did what he naturally could: but in the penultimate chapter of the preceding book, he placed Original justice in a certain possibility. But it is not to be wondered at that contradictory things are dreamed. Nor indeed is it to be denied that certain natural things were lost by sin. For those who imagine pure natural things, that is, who separate grace and nature in Adam, either in reality or in thought, they nevertheless concede that it was natural to Adam that the flesh should never attempt anything against reason: and this is necessary, since in the nature which God created, all parts ought to agree and harmonize among themselves. But now the flesh has so defected from reason that it scarcely ever obeys it except unwillingly, nor can it be so restrained or led by reason as not to resist very often. Who therefore would doubt whether anything natural has perished, except one who will deny that a certain right constitution of all parts and powers was natural to man? Wherefore what Dionysius says, that natural things have not perished in the demons, and the Scholastics affirm that natural things remain in man after sin, must be understood either of the natural substance, or of the reason of grace after sin, or it is altogether most false. Thomas interprets Dionysius thus (*Summa Theologiae*, I-II, q. 85, art. 1): "Dionysius speaks of the good of the prime nature, which is to be, to live, to understand." And these natural things indeed remain in demons and in men.

As for what you say, that both Angel and man received grace, not by which they could work well, but by which they could persevere in good work, do you not see that you are speaking absurdly and contradictorily? Cannot the good Angels work well? Not even when you attribute grace to them? But of what sort is that grace, which conferred no power of acting well? And why are they called good, unless because they always act well? For what else do they do, but what God willed? And is not what God willed, and to have done it as he willed, good? To

what end, therefore, do we pray that God's will be done on earth as it is in heaven, if the Angels do nothing well? For they certainly do not do it, unless they are able. What of men? Are not many of their works also good? If they are not, how will they attain justice and salvation by their works? Beware lest you unwittingly undermine the justification of works more than you wish, while you defend that man did not receive grace by which he could work well. Will you concede that we receive it, but say that Adam received none? But what else do we desire and strive for, than to be like Adam before he was cast out and overthrown from his goods, and to keep them better than he willed? Then that, is it not a good work to persevere in a good work? Unless perhaps you think the continuation of an action pertains not at all to the action. You fight therefore with yourself, when you say that man received the ability to persevere in a good work, but not to be able to work well. For it is much better and more difficult to persevere in a work, than to undertake the work, if it is good. Wherefore if Adam could persevere in a good work, you deny in vain that he could have worked well. What is it, however, that you say that both the Angel and man are naturally capable of sinning? Indeed, no one is ignorant that the rebellious Angels and man have sinned: but who in his right mind would say they sinned naturally? For they were created upright; and in grace: wherefore in that they sinned, they acted against nature: and sin is not natural, but against nature, because it destroys it. It was therefore natural for them not to sin: and if they had obeyed the laws of their nature, they would have always preserved their innocence. Thus indeed they were created, that it was free for them to sin: and this one thing was lacking to them for perfect felicity, that they had not yet received a stable and firm will in the good. Now the good Angels are confirmed in the good: and we will one day be confirmed, when this mortal shall have put on immortality. But it was natural to both Angels and man to obey God. To the Angels who stood, this was added by grace, that they willed to adhere to God immutably, and we also expect the same grace in the future age. This I confess is supernatural: but righteousness and justice were no more Original than they were natural; since the damned angels and men have lost this, it is manifest that something natural has been taken away. For immortality itself was natural to man, which death, brought in by sin, overthrew. When we were punished with mortality, did we lose nothing natural? Who would say so? Indeed, we retain nothing natural except the very substances of the soul and body, and certain of their powers, much more enervated and wounded than his who, setting out from Jerusalem to Jericho, fell among thieves, by whom he was so beaten and wounded that he lay on the road giving up the ghost.

You add another absurdity while you wish to refute Durandus, or rather to collude with him. For you say that the cause of the corruption of nature is not the removal of original justice, but a certain punishment inflicted on the flesh. As if the loss of justice has no punishment in itself, than which there was never any heavier punishment. Then, is the punishment of the flesh alone the cause of corruption? or did the principle of corruption begin from the flesh? But

corruption began from the mind, and resides primarily in the mind. This, therefore, is the very cause of corruption, destruction, and all evils, that original justice has departed into heaven from men who were forsaken because of sin. And this is what the Lord said to Adam, "On whatever day you eat, you will die": that is, unless you obey my precept, you will incur corruption and death. It is therefore the same thing that you make a certain punishment, not the loss of justice itself, the cause of corruption, as if you were to say the cause of blindness is not the loss of sight, but a certain damage contracted by that loss. The corruption of nature flowed from sin, as the Apostle says, "The wages of sin is death": and the cause of corruption ought to be established as guilt, not punishment, insofar as it is punishment, since that is from God. Wherefore, as to the Scholastic axiom about which you began to speak, Thomas seems to me to explain the whole matter not badly in these words (*Summa Theologiae*, I-II, q. 85, art. 3): "original justice having been withdrawn by the sin of the first parent, all the powers of the soul remain in a certain way destitute of their proper order, by which they are naturally ordered to virtue: and this destitution itself is called a wounding of nature." From these things I gather, if by the loss of the justice in which man was created, all the powers of the soul were dislocated and dissolved, and this dissolution, since it is a corruption of the natural order, has wounded nature, then that right and beautiful order, by which all the human parts and powers were contained before sin, and naturally tended to the good, was natural to the first man, and this sad dissipation of this order which followed is contrary to nature: and consequently something natural is now lacking in the nature of man.

This is also made clearer from the fact that you yourself respond quite aptly to Pighius, who argued that the fault must be imputed to God if there is a natural depravity in us, that this depravity is said to be natural, not because it belongs to nature itself, which is wholly good, since as Augustine says (*Confessions*, Book 7, ch. 12), "unless it were good, it could not be corrupted," but because, having arisen from sin, it has been derived to us by natural propagation. And thus Augustine (*Hypognosticon*, Book 3): "We call it a natural evil, not because it is congenital to nature from God the creator, but because it has passed from a sinning nature to a sinning nature, that is, it is a vice of a sinning nature, not nature itself." If, therefore, sin is against nature, it follows that justice is natural; since this was lost in Adam, it is established that what was principal in nature has perished. The other things you dispute here against Pighius, because they are irrelevant, I omit.

Finally, you confess that other Orthodox, on account of those vehement (you would say, if you dared, unjust and immoderate) complaints of Augustine and Prosper about the depravation of human nature, and their disputations against the Pelagians, acknowledge such a viciousness of our nature, that they have said it was made inept for all good, and is born filled with all vices, and have differed very little from the opinion of the Protestants, except that we make nature

incurable in this life, while they think that health can be recovered in this life. But neither did they dream that such great health was restored to any mortal as was in Adam before sin; and we preach a renewal and healing of nature in Christ, which makes greater progress daily, until that perfect age of Christ is reached, which we hope for, after sin and death have been triumphed over. For no one but a Pelagian would say that nature is so healed by grace in this life that no wound, or scar, or sickness remains, for which medicine must be applied, since the flesh never ceases to rebel against the spirit, and sin dwells in our members, and the most holy and healthy of men, conscious of his own infirmity and diseases, requires the healing hand of Christ. David says (Psalm 6:3), "Heal me, O Lord, for my bones are troubled." He did not desire the health of the body, but of the soul. Do you believe yourself to be healthier than David? I am silent about the other holy servants of God, who when they began to be healed, and gave themselves to Christ to be healed, and hoped for certain salvation and health, yet always and truly judged that many things remained to be healed. This therefore is the opinion not of some, but of all the Orthodox and saints, and those who think otherwise, they neither understand the Scriptures, nor know their own nature and themselves, nor, to say it in one word, do they depart a nail's breadth from the Pelagian heresy, however much they may pretend to be Catholics. You now say that we must walk in a certain middle way, so that we place the effect of Original Sin neither in the mere denudation of Original Justice, nor in such an enormous and total, as you say, depravation: how this is to be done, you will teach in the following chapter. But we will easily, I hope, both notice and show that this walk of yours is nothing but a certain deviation from the orthodox faith.

#### **CHAPTER IX. In what the Depravation of Human Nature consists.**

This matter, you say, you will accomplish in five points.

1. The first is that the depravation of human nature is multiple, besides that which we are now discussing. One is contracted from the habits of actual sins, and by a certain custom has been turned into nature, which Augustine called the necessity of sinning in these words (Confessions, Book 8, ch. 5): "When custom is not resisted, it becomes a necessity": and this is what is commonly said, that custom by long continuance becomes nature. And you say that many Scriptures, which were brought forward by us before, speak of this kind of depravation. Although this is so, yet it does not therefore follow that they were not aptly brought forward and alleged. For the habit of vices, and the very custom and necessity of sinning, arose from original sin, and reveals the magnitude and mass of the native depravation. You say there is another from the punishment of preceding sins, when men are handed over to a reprobate sense, of which the Apostle to the Romans makes mention. But that you say this pertains nothing to the Original depravation, you speak with little consideration. For whatever and however great the evils Paul commemorates, they are

nothing but certain fruits and increments of this, which is called Original. And then men are truly handed over to a reprobate sense, when, left and permitted to their own native disposition, they proceed from one sin to another, and whatever pleases them, they do freely and joyfully, and, as it were, diligently exercise a certain art of sinning, for which they are instructed by nature. The Apostle, therefore, could not have explained the Original calamity better than if he had placed its horrendous and prodigious offspring before our eyes, which indeed he did excellently. For Original sin itself is hidden in the recesses of nature: but it reveals itself by its contagion, like a plague. Now you say there are other miseries and corruptions and hardships in man, of which you confess Original sin to be the cause, but a remote one. And why remote? For what other cause will you find for the diseases, and difficulties, and all the miseries, which infants suffer as soon as they are born, except the Original plague? But, you say, this is as if the Devil were said to be the cause of all sins: than which nothing could be said more thoughtlessly. For the Devil, although he solicits us to sin, is nevertheless outside us, and draws or entices to sin by a kind of external impulse. But Original sin is within, and has occupied the very citadel of nature: and it is not only the mode, but the matter and tinder of all sins, whatever erupt in life at any time. Wherefore it is no more inept for us to state that all punishments and faults, to which men are subject in this life, are effected by Original sin, than if a fountain were said not to be the cause of a river, which by a long course and many meanderings flows into the sea. In this, however, I agree with you, that we are inquiring into that depravation of nature which is found in all the sons of Adam without any new will or cause intervening, and which is common to all. For this is also in those who have no actual will to sin.

2. The second is that the question here is not about that corruption of nature which concerns the powers of the body, but that which concerns the powers of the soul: and in this also I agree with you. For sin is not in the body, but in the soul. Wherefore, in order that the nature of this sin may be understood, how great a calamity and devastation it has brought upon the soul must first be investigated.
3. The third is to see how manifold the good of our nature was on the part of the soul, so that in this way this depravation, also how manifold and how great it is, may be better illustrated. You say from Thomas (*Summa Theologiae*, I-II, q. 85, art. 1) that it was threefold in Adam. First, the very principles of nature, by which nature was constituted, and the properties proceeding from them, like the powers of the soul, and all other things of this kind. The second is the inclination to virtue, which you say was recognized by the Philosophers, who indeed judged as well of nature as a blind man of color. To them nature seemed apt and prone to virtue: but you yourself confess that it is prone and inclined to sins, and if this is so, where is that propensity to virtue? To many, I confess, a certain external

and civil honesty was pleasing: but in no man from nature was there ever either true virtue or an inclination to virtue. For there can be no natural propensity in darkness to light, or in death to life. You concede that the philosophers erred in this, that they thought these little sparks were stronger than they are, and placed their perfection in our power. But their principal error here was that they pursued certain empty shadows of virtues instead of true virtues. For surely you will not attribute true virtue to Cato? What divine good then did he merit? The third is the gift of Original justice, which was conferred on the whole nature in the first man. Where you see that Original justice is clearly said by Thomas to be natural.

4. The fourth is to consider what and of what kind the good of nature was that was corrupted by Original sin, or could be corrupted. You say therefore that the first good of nature cannot be corrupted, as long as man exists. Indeed, the principles of nature are not entirely removed: for we have a mind and intelligence, and we are capable with our internal and external senses. But even these faculties are less sharp and sound after sin than they were before, since the whole nature of man has been made mortal and weak by sin, as Augustine rightly wrote (On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, Book 6), that the first parents began to die after sin, because they received the law of death, by which they would grow old into senility, although they lived for many years after. Old age, however, weakens the powers of the soul and body. You concede that the last has been taken away by Original sin, that is, that no remnants of justice remain in man. But with justice expelled, what do you think is in man but all injustice? The middle one, although it has been greatly diminished, yet you deny that it has been totally taken away. You wish therefore that there be in man a certain natural propensity to virtues, which I do not acknowledge. For he has both lost justice and all will to recover justice. This, therefore, is a great point of controversy between us. You say there is an inclination in every man to virtue, I defend that all his inclination, effort, impulse, appetite, preparation tends to evil, before he has been both prepared and changed by divine grace. You bring forward certain arguments for your opinion in this place, which must now be briefly refuted, lest they delay us in the future.

The first is proposed by you in these words: "The nature of the species, as long as the individual is safe, cannot be taken away: but the inclination to virtue belongs to man according to the nature of the species." It is responded first, that many things can be taken away which pertain to the nature of the species, provided they are not of the essence of the thing itself. It is natural for man to have five senses: and yet four senses can be absent from a man. And all assume that man is by nature capable of disciplines, yet we have seen many men no less inept for Dialectic, and Arithmetic, and Geometry, than donkeys. Then the very essential principles of human nature are not taken away, like the natural faculties of the

soul. Wherefore the power of reasoning is not completely taken away even in fools, although its use is so bound by some inconvenient event, as by a chain, that it is as if it were not present. But the inclination to the good was a certain quality of the first man, natural but mutable and frail, just as original justice and health. Finally, whence will you prove that man is safe after sin? If you think he is safe who merely lives, I will confess it: but if you understand him to be safe who has whatever befits human nature and ought to be in it, you will never prove by any arguments that man is now safe: indeed, it is too manifest that he is as far as possible from salvation and health.

The second you institute thus, "This inclination is founded in the rational soul as in a root: therefore, as long as that remains, it cannot be taken away." Beautifully, no doubt. For by this very argument you will be able to prove that there is an inclination to virtue not only in damned men, as you affirm, but even in the Demons themselves, since they are sufficiently rational, and surpass us in all the skill of reasoning. But the inclination to virtue rests not on reason but on grace as its root. But it is concluded in the schools that the damned and the Demons are obstinate in evil, and on the other hand that the good Angels and the Saints are confirmed in the good (Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 64, art. 2 & I-II, q. 114, art. 4). The remorse of conscience, which you mention, concerning past evils, is born not from a natural inclination to the good, but from a certain natural knowledge of the good, which all have. Thus Medea indeed saw the good, but was carried away by a total inclination to evil. Although the judgment and love of civil good remains in the mind. But we are disputing about the good simply and theologically.

The third follows, "That inclination can never be taken away by Original sin alone." Why? "Because its corruption," you say, "does not happen through the continuation of sinning, but through the punishment and operation of one sin." Ridiculously: as if Original sin could not have taken away all inclination to the good in us, because it was contracted not by the continuation of sinning, but by the propagation of sin. Deny therefore that Original justice was overthrown by the corruption of one sin, which would be permissible by the same argument. But the sin of Adam stripped us of all justice, and thus also of all inclination to the good.

The fourth is taken from Thomas, but is concluded against the mind of Thomas. He says (*Summa Theologiae*, I-II, q. 85, art. 2) that "the good which is the fitness of the subject for an act is not totally taken away." What then? For this fitness is not an inclination or motion to the good; but a disposition of the soul to receive grace. The air deprived of light has no inclination to light, but it retains a certain fitness for receiving it. And the moon, although it is an opaque body and does not desire light, yet can be illuminated and grow splendid. Thus the soul, although it has in itself no more grace or inclination to grace by nature than the air has of light in the dark night, yet if God shines upon it, it can both be

inclined to grace and be filled with grace. And Thomas in the same place says that evil totally takes away the opposite good. But to sin is opposed not only grace, but the inclination to grace: therefore, as long as sin reigns in us, all propensity to grace is taken away: this only remains, that we are fit to receive grace. But how little this is, when in the meantime not even a spark of grace is found in us.

Lastly, you adduce certain testimonies of the Fathers, which are irrelevant to the cause. For who does not understand that in that universal ruin of prevarication, human nature was not deprived of its substance, nor of will, but of the light and splendor of virtues, as Ambrose wrote (*On the Calling of the Gentiles*, Book 1, ch. 7)? And that man, when he was despoiled of God, was deprived not of will, but of the health of will, which are the words of Prosper? And what Augustine said, that the will was corrupted, not taken away? Certainly, if we were to say that the will was taken from man, we would make a beast or a block out of a man. He always has a will, but before grace, only a bad and perverse one, and prone to vices. For even the damned spirits, who burn with total malice and the desire to do evil, are endowed with will. Wherefore it does not follow that a man devoid of grace is inclined or carried to the good, because a will is left to him, which he possesses not only before grace, but even in the highest and certain desperation of grace. This was the opinion of the Fathers concerning the will of man, which Augustine most accurately explained and defended against Pelagius. Thus he says (*Sermons on the Words of the Apostle*): "Through a bad will, he lost a good will." Again (*On the Merits and Remission of Sins*, Book 2, ch. 18), "Men labor to find in our will what is good and our own, and how it can be found, I do not know." Similarly (*Epistle 107*), "If we wish to defend free will, we do not oppose the source from which it is free." Those who attribute a natural propensity to the good to the will are injurious to grace. In another place (*On Correction and Grace*, ch. 13), "Through the freedom of the will it happened that man was with sin, but now a penal viciousness followed from freedom and made it a necessity." This freedom, therefore, is implicated in a certain necessity. And immediately, "The will, conquered by the vice into which it fell, lacked the freedom of nature." And everywhere Augustine taught that whatever of will remains in man, it looks and avails only for evil. Therefore, the will was not lost or taken away, but the goodness, health, and freedom of the will. Thus Ambrose, or rather Prosper, writes (*On the Calling of the Gentiles*, Book 1, ch. 3): "Man was deprived not of will, but of the health of will." This health of the will, however, contains that inclination of which we speak, which therefore can be none to the good, since the will has lost all its health. Thus Prosper (*To the Objections of the Gauls*, obj. 9): "We have lost all our strength (that is, the faculty of willing and acting well) in Adam." We do not, therefore, take away all the powers of nature, but only those that are of value for the good. Thus, your little arguments have been met. Now let us proceed to what follows.

5. The fifth head, therefore, is that after you have taught that the inclination to virtue is not entirely taken away, you should explain how great its diminution has been. And first you repeat what is false, that this inclination is founded in reason as in a root. For not reason, but celestial grace is the foundation of that inclination, as has been declared. Then you deny that the habit of infused grace gives us a new power, but that it disposes, renews, heals, strengthens, elevates the power. Do you thus dare to profess yourself an open enemy of grace? Does not grace bring us a new power? The Apostle therefore erred, who pronounced that we are not sufficient of ourselves to think anything good. And Christ much more, when he taught that no one can come to him, unless the Father has drawn him (Against Two Letters of the Pelagians, Book 1, ch. 2). Augustine says: "He did not say, 'unless the Father has led him,' so that we might in some way understand that the will precedes. Who is drawn, if he already willed? And yet no one comes unless he wills. He is therefore drawn in wondrous ways, so that he may will, by him who knows how to work within in the very hearts of men, not that men, which cannot happen, should believe unwillingly, but that they should be made willing from being unwilling." If we are unwilling to come before the Father begins to draw us to the Son, whatever of good will is in us is to be attributed to grace. What need would there be to be drawn, if we came by a certain natural inclination and spontaneously, and nothing else were necessary for us but to be called, or admonished, or awakened? Indeed, a certain secret force of the spirit must be applied, which makes us willing from being unwilling and reluctant, which, unless it comes from elsewhere, we will certainly never come.

In the same sense Jerome (Against the Pelagians, Book 3): "He who is drawn does not run spontaneously, but is brought either resisting, or slow, or unwilling." Thus again Augustine (On Correction and Grace, ch. 2): "Men without grace do no good at all, whether in thinking, or in willing and loving, or in acting." We are inclined to the good, and yet we neither love, nor will, nor think anything good? An admirable inclination, in which there is nothing of good will, nor of desire, nor of thought. But why do I refute you with the testimonies of Augustine, when you can be refuted by your own words? For you say that the rectitude by which the superior reason, being subject to God, was able to tend to him with its will, has been entirely taken away. Reason cannot tend to God, and yet it is inclined to God? Are you not pleading a very bad cause, who thus fight with yourself in your reasoning? But yet you bring forward Scriptures, or rather drag them by the twisted neck, by which you would teach that a new faculty is not given by infused grace. For the words of Ezekiel (36:26), "I will give you a new heart, and I will put a new spirit in your midst: and I will take away the heart of stone from your flesh, and I will give you a heart of flesh," so openly contradict your opinion, that I wonder you dare to make mention of them. For it signifies both that a new heart, that is, a certain new nature or disposition of the heart, is given

to us divinely, which you deny; and it demonstrates that our heart is by nature of stone, which must be changed before it can be fit to receive grace. What must be given, we certainly do not have: a new heart must be given to us, that we may walk in the precepts of God; therefore we do not have that power or will in us by nature. Indeed, this whole nature inclines and tends to the contrary, since we have no heart but a stony one by nature. Do you think there is any inclination in a stone by which it may be softened? Is there not need for a new nature for the stone, if you want to make flesh from stone? Thus we must, in order to delight in the divine voices and laws, be renewed by celestial grace, the old hardness of heart removed, and a new certain softness formed.

You apply another place of Scripture, which is irrelevant. The Lord said to Cain, "Its desire will be under you, and you will rule over it." You interpret these words thus, "the desire of sin will be under you, that is, your superior reason can command the appetite." But what if the reason, which ought to command, is equally at fault, as the appetite, which it should command? But if this place is rightly explained by you here, we can always conquer or restrain our appetites and desires by reason. For if they are under us, and we rule them, it will not be difficult to keep them in their duty. But neither Cain, nor any man, could compress and coerce his affections, without very often succumbing to them either willingly or unwillingly. But you knowingly and prudently corrupt the Scripture in this place. For it is to be understood not of rule over sin, but over his younger brother. And thus Chrysostom (Homily 18 on Genesis) rightly explained the words of Scripture, when he introduces God speaking thus with Cain: "Even after this sin I permit this, that you may enjoy the privileges of the firstborn, and I command him to be under your power and dominion." I am not ignorant of what Augustine wrote otherwise (City of God, Book 15, ch. 7): but no one will doubt that Chrysostom's exposition is better, who will consult the very words of Moses. And how did Augustine think we could rule over sin? When we subject it to ourselves by repenting: or when we restrain concupiscence from illicit works. And although we are not masters of our appetites, yet we can abstain from external unjust works: as Cain could have not killed his brother, although he could not extinguish the hatred of his brother, with which his mind burned at the instigation of the devil, without grace.

Then you labor in vain to teach that the natural powers of man have not been utterly destroyed: not reason, not knowledge, not all will. For what mortal says this? Or against whom are you now disputing? But we affirm that no powers for good have been left in us: and you not obscurely acknowledge this, when you say that we are completely dead as to salvation and to God. This is the very thing we say: although while life lasts, we do and attempt many things in the world, we fight for our country, we compose and enact salutary laws, we cultivate civil virtue, we give many teachings of wisdom, yet without grace we are dead to God. But a dead man has no health or inclination to life. But, you say, the savior came as a physician to heal the sick sinners, not to give life to the dead (Luke 5:31-32).

Why then did you say that we are dead to God through sin? For we are speaking of spiritual, not bodily death. And why does Paul say to the Ephesians that God has given us life through Christ, who were dead in our sins, if Christ came not to give life to the dead, but to heal the sick? Christ does both: He heals the languishing and restores the dead to life. The sick are those who, conscious of their diseases and wounds, desire a physician. The others are considered healthy because they believe themselves to be so, and therefore, it is all over for them. But those who aspire to health, and feel that they are sick, and flee to the physician, Christ has already begun to heal them. But before they could think of health, the grace of Christ had delivered them from death. Thus, the beginning of health is to be raised from the death. This is why sin is called the death of the soul, and that health which we obtain by the benefit of grace is called a resurrection.

You add that the man who fell among thieves was left wounded and half-dead, not killed. But he was so despoiled and burdened with wounds that he could neither come to a physician, nor enter into any plans for preserving his life, nor raise or move himself. He was found by the physician; he did not find the physician. He experienced grace, he did not merit it. But that he is said to have been half-dead, not dead, shows that he had not lost all the gifts of nature. For we have not been changed into beasts, and despoiled of all the supports of nature to a one. The power of understanding was left, which cannot be separated from the human mind; some judgment of honesty remains, by which we declare the law of God to be inscribed in our minds; we are not lacking all knowledge and sense of the divine. But all these things, if grace is absent, look only to death and destruction. Thus there is nothing in us safe or sound before grace, which contributes anything to procuring salvation.

*Rom. 1. 21.* Here, however, you say that the Gentiles, who had known God, are reproved by the Apostle because they were unwilling to give thanks to God, not because they were unable: do you therefore think they were able? But who can give thanks to God from the heart, who is not imbued and moved by divine grace? Many among the Gentiles preached honorably of God, the architect of this world, and the parent of nature, as is clear from their records: but yet they did not give thanks, nor did they follow God with His honor, because they lacked true faith. For the function and fruit of faith is the giving of thanks, which is pleasing to God. But whence do you prove that, if from original sin alone they could not, they were not for that reason to be so gravely reproved? It is certain that they accumulated original sin with many wicked deeds in their whole life. But he who is held by original sin alone can neither know nor worship God, before he has been illuminated by heavenly grace.

Again, you say, “to sin always and necessarily is proper to the Devil.” Add also to those in whom the prince of this world reigns, whom he has bound in his snares; who serve him as slaves. For if what is not of faith is sin, and no one pleases God

without faith, as Scripture has pronounced, what else can we do without grace but sin, both always and necessarily? But this is the difference between demons and sinners, that our nature is curable; they are utterly removed from all hope of remedy and liberation. Then, all the actions of demons are properly sins, because the end which they propose to themselves is evil in itself. For they seek the ruin of the human race and the offense of God, and they meditate on nothing else. But many of the pursuits of men are honorable, if the nature of things be considered; yet a flaw from a defect so adheres in every action, that nothing which is done is free from sin. And here you see that necessity does not conflict with freedom. For you say that it is proper for demons to sin necessarily, and you immediately add that they sin always, yet freely. They sin therefore both necessarily and freely, and thus there is a certain freedom in necessity. But as to what pertains to the proper and proximate effects of original sin, I would not deny that they are equally present in all. What will you now conclude from this? For even if malice, or concupiscence, or anger is stronger in these than in those, after age and years have advanced, it does not therefore follow that there is not in little children an equal disposition to these vices. Some indulge more than others in certain sins; which happens either because of discipline and education, or a certain opportunity and license for sinning. But little children have brought with them into the world the seeds and natural habits of all sins, so that for being such, they should be angry with none but themselves. All, therefore, suffer from hatred, contempt, and ignorance of God; in all there is a corrupt, lost, and damnable nature; all are drawn by the same inclination to sin.

But some adhere more to these sins, others to those; they delight more in these, and with these they sate themselves, using others less. Yet no one is without all, nor does he not suffer from many, who has been instructed and cultivated with no other goods than those of nature.

Now from what you have said, you conclude excellently that the depravity of nature is nothing else than a certain great diminution, remission, and retardation of the inclination to virtue, which man naturally had before sin. But in what way is man to be said to have had this inclination naturally? By grace, which was natural to him, or by the principles of nature distinct from grace? If by grace, which is most true, it is certain that it was all lost by sin. But because you place the root of this inclination in reason, you obscurely signify its cause to be nature without grace. Therefore, by this reasoning you establish that the depravity of human nature is only a weakness, and a certain decline of the powers which man had before sin, but with no gift of grace. But the depravity of nature primarily consists in the lost ornaments of grace, which all concede. But how great, then, is this diminution? "Great," you say. I believe so. But how great? "So great and so powerful," you say, "that he can neither see, nor will, nor do what is to be done, without the greatest difficulty." Therefore, man can by himself both see, and will, and do what is to be done, although with the greatest difficulty. Truly, those who abound in the privileges and protections of grace

always find not the least difficulty in all these things. How little do you now differ from Pelagius? For he too confessed that grace is necessary, that we may do what is to be done more easily and more pleasantly; and you acknowledge no other depravity of nature than that which has brought about the greatest difficulty in doing things. Therefore, as Augustine once said to Pelagius, "When 'more easily' is added, the accomplishment of a good work even without the grace of God is suggested by a silent indication" (*On Grace and Free Will*, ch. 14; *Against Pelagius and Caelestinus*, bk. 2, ch. 29), so I answer you, when you add, "without the greatest difficulty," you signify that we can achieve these things by our own powers (*To Boniface*, bk. 2, Epist. 95; Augustine, bk. 2, ch. 8), because what is done with difficulty, is nevertheless done. But Augustine adds a refutation of this sense, saying, "without me you can do nothing." And in another book, "The Lord, as if to answer the future Pelagius, did not say, 'without me you can do something with difficulty,' but he said, 'without me you can do nothing.'" Let the Papists understand that this same thing is also answered to them.

You open your mind more clearly at once when you say that man can avoid all mortal sins, although not for long nor always; but that he can avoid each venial sin, although not all of them; finally, that he can perform good works in some way, namely, those for which the good of nature suffices, that is, absolutely none, if we judge rightly. For if nature were sufficient for any good work, then there would be some good work undertaken without faith and grace. Then a reward would be due to a work done without grace; thus grace would be turned into a debt. It is not therefore as you said above, that the merit of congruity has been exploded from the schools of the Theologians. For either the works which are done without grace are not good, or if they are good, some reward is due to them from condignity, or at least from congruity.

But you subjoin a demonstration of your assertion. And it is this: that man, through sin, did not incur an impossibility of attaining the end proper to his present life. I confess it; but we are inquiring about the end proper to the other life. Indeed, men are so perspicacious and skillful in the affairs of this life that you would desire nothing more. But in the matters which pertain to the kingdom of heaven, they can understand or accomplish nothing; as the Apostle teaches, "The natural man does not perceive the things that are of the Spirit, nor can he know them" (1 Cor. 2:14). You also add that man acts for the sake of an end. This too I grant; but what end? Not the glory of God, or his own salvation. Some look for and seek honors, others their own advantages, others pleasures, others vain glory in their actions; none come to perform their deeds to serve, please, and obey God without grace. For only those come to Christ who have heard from the Father, and whom the Father has deigned to teach (John 6:45). You conclude, therefore, that man can, according to the state of human life, act according to reason. You accomplish nothing; for this he can do, as you are forced to confess, outside of grace. For thus Augustine, cited by you (*Hypognosticon*, bk. 3), among those things which arise from the good of nature,

and can be done by the judgment of reason outside of grace, places this: to will whatever is good pertaining to the present life. Then you say, "This is something good, and indeed truly good." But this is not that good for which we contend, unless you think that our good is to be circumscribed by the limits of this life. The good which we seek is placed in this, that the divine law be obeyed, with faith preceding. We are not now dealing with those economic or political goods, which commend no one to God, and can be found in reprobate men. And thus you do but mock the reader with an empty noise of words.

Now, however, you will also demonstrate that sin can sometimes be avoided. This can be done, you say, either by diverting the thought to other honest things, or by withholding consent from inordinate motions, at least for a time. What do you say, Stapleton? Will sin be avoided if consent is withheld, at least for a time? But first, what if he cannot withhold consent? Then is not that consent a sin? Who doubts it, since you yourselves are wont to concede it? But he who has consented, if he withholds consent, has he thereby satisfied God for the prior consent? But the sin remains, unless it has been blotted out by penitence. But that is not just penitence, merely to withhold consent. But to what purpose are these things? For who denies that a man can both turn his mind away from thoughts of certain things, and abstain from an external act? But it does not therefore follow that sin has been avoided, because either the will to perpetrate this sin has been laid aside, or the act of sin itself has not been committed. Men can so command their hands that they inflict no slaughter, or wound, or violence on anyone; they can restrain their tongue from slander; they can, although with the greatest difficulty, suppress the impulses of their members. But yet they cannot sin in no respect; nay, they can neither do nor think anything well, because the fount of well-doing is grace. Whatever, therefore, flows from a nature that is not founded by grace, must needs be corrupt and vicious.

"It is not necessary, however," you say, "that man should always sin in act. For man sometimes sleeps." But when he acts, he sins in act; yet he sins not by constraint, but willingly, because his will is intent on nothing but evil. But what you bring from Augustine (*Hypognosticon*, bk. 3), that free will has lost the possibility of good, but not its name and nature, makes against you. Man has free will, but of such a kind that it can of itself attempt or perform no good. For it has lost the possibility for good, or the good of possibility. Wherefore it follows thus in the next words in Augustine: "We confess that all men have free will, having indeed the judgment of reason, not by which it is fit for those things which pertain to God, either to begin or certainly to complete without God, but only in the works of the present life, both good and evil." Augustine establishes the freedom of the will only in the affairs of this life, which pertain not at all to the salvation of souls or the kingdom of heaven. What you lastly advise, that we should here beware of Durandus (*d.* 28, *q.* 3), who taught that man can without grace avoid all sins, both mortal and venial, if only you yourselves would be

willing to condemn so freely such blasphemies of your Scholastics and profane heresies, and to exterminate them from your schools and churches, as we both abhor them and diligently warn all Christians to beware of them. But that we persuade not all, you are the cause, who never cease to preach so magnificently and impudently of the powers of nature and the freedom of the will, and to clamor and rail against us. And surely, you have no reason to be angry with Durandus, or to warn us to beware of him, since you yourself establish that nothing but a difficulty in acting has been innate in us from sin. But if we can perform what is to be done, even if perhaps not without the greatest struggle and difficulty, by any effort at all, why should not Durandus have written rightly that all sins can be avoided, if one applied the diligence which he is able to? You can be angry with Durandus because he betrayed your heresy too openly; there is nothing else.

Thus, therefore, you conclude this whole section, that you agree neither with Durandus nor with the heretics, but wish to follow the most moderate doctrine of Thomas, which you proclaim to be conformable to the Scriptures and the Fathers. What, then, is that? That in man constituted outside of grace there is some possibility of some good. "Some," you say? Why do you not say what kind? I will say it myself, because it pleased you less. Thus, then, Thomas (*1-2, q. 109, art. 2*): "Man in the state of corrupt nature can by the virtue of his nature do some particular good, such as building houses, planting vineyards." These are indeed good things, but not in order, as the Scholastics say, to the heavenly fatherland, and we do not deny that man can accomplish these with the highest praise. But in the same place Thomas has orthodoxly felt and established that man without grace can neither will nor do good simply, which he confirms by the authority of the Apostle and Augustine. I would wish that this moderation pleased you all. But you, in truth, have no taste for anything moderate, and at last, because you cannot do otherwise, you have lapsed into open Pelagianism.

#### **CHAPTER X. What is the slavery of sin, what the captivity to the Devil, what the necessity of sinning attributed to man outside of grace by the Scriptures and the Fathers.**

*Servitude of sin.* You affirm that the servitude of sin is opposed to the liberation by the grace of Christ, by which we freely serve justice and holiness; wherefore it is nothing else than a servile and miserable condition, in which one serves sin. It is indeed miserable to serve sin, but more miserable not to understand the magnitude of this servitude and misery. Nor is this servitude to be compared with that freedom, as you think, which the grace of Christ brings to us in this life, which is not perfect; but with that which man had before sin, of not sinning at all. For then man was truly free, when he was drawn by no allurements to sin, and he performed with full freedom of will, which if he had used well, we would never have come into this misery. But when sin was admitted, he lost that freedom and fell into a lamentable servitude. Now the grace of Christ has relaxed this servitude; but it has not restored to us in this life a perfect freedom,

of which, however, it has laid the most firm foundations. For in the kingdom of heaven there will be a happier and more secure freedom than that which our first parents enjoyed in paradise before sin. While we are engaged here, on account of the manifold remnants of sin, and the frequent temptations of Satan, and the infinite troubles of this life, and death itself, which will at last overwhelm us, we do not attain a perfect and solid freedom. Wherefore the Apostle confesses that he cannot either not do at times what he hates, or always do what he wills (*Rom. 7:18, etc.*); and that sin dwells in him; and that he is led captive by sin, so that he deplures his misery, and desires to be sent forth from this body as from a prison. Our freedom, therefore, which we now enjoy, is joined with some servitude, as all the saints acknowledge; and so we must aspire to that freedom, by which we may serve God alone without any rebellion of sin or fear of death or misery, which was also granted to Adam, if he had willed to preserve so great a good. If, therefore, Adam was able to sin in no respect, and this was his most excellent freedom, as all understand, what kind of servitude followed after sin is not difficult to estimate. It is necessary, therefore, that this servitude, which sin introduced into the human race, be opposed to that freedom, not which is of this mortality, but which Adam obtained in that felicity of his nature. He, as he was surrounded by a full supply of all good things and pleasures, so was he endowed with a singular freedom of both shunning evil and doing good, which he would have had perpetually, if only he had been wary of the snares of the most cruel enemy. Having fallen into sin, he plainly lost this freedom, which both Scripture testifies and Augustine affirms more than a thousand times against the Pelagians. Since this is so, what servitude do we think is contrary to this freedom, but to sin necessarily and always, before Christ has freed us by His grace? Wherefore, before grace, one not only serves sin, but sin alone; so that whatever man does or attempts, turns into sin; nor does he only sin, but he serves sin entirely.

But you deny that all freedom was taken away by sin; and you produce Augustine into the midst, against your will and conscience. But what does he say? He denies that free will perished from the human race by the sin of the first man (*Against two letters of the Pelagians*, bk. 1, ch. 2). And who says this? Man retained will, and that free, but for sinning. For as Augustine says in the same place, "to serve sin, a certain freedom was needed." "Nay," you say, "he teaches that not all freedom, but the freedom of full justice, is taken away by sin." He says indeed that that freedom has perished, which was in paradise, of having full justice with immortality. From this you will conclude that we are pressed by no other servitude, than that we lack full justice and immortality? But no one, while he lived in this world, could ever attain full justice. Therefore, in your opinion, even those whom grace has freed serve sin, because they have not yet obtained full justice. But Paul teaches excellently that men before grace so serve sin that they are free from justice (*Rom. 6:20*); not only are they not commended by any justice, either full or any, but they are utterly devoid of all justice. For they are free from justice, in whom injustice dominates; but those who in some part

serve justice, are by no means to be thought of as servants of sin. Wherefore Augustine says thus a little after: "Since men do not live well, unless they are made sons of God, what is it that Julian attributes to free will the power of living well, when this power is not given, except by the grace of God?" Therefore, before this grace of God, we can do nothing well; and consequently, we are slaves of sin. And below: "This will which is free in evils, because it delights in evils, is therefore not free in goods, because it is not freed; nor can man will anything good, unless he is aided by him who cannot will evil. For everything that is not from faith is sin." And he concludes: "Therefore, no one can have a just will, unless he has received a true, that is, a gratuitous one." The will, therefore, before grace is free only for evil; and because it is destitute of faith, it can do nothing else but sin. What freedom for good now remains? Wherefore, will indeed without grace is always free, as Augustine says (*Hypognosticon*, bk. 3), but only in the works of the present life. But if, as you write, man serves sin because his will has not yet been healed and freed by grace, then he finally ceases to be a servant of sin when his will begins to be healed. But grace alone heals the will. Wherefore, before we are imbued with grace, we are so oppressed by the yoke and servitude of sin that we can neither do nor will anything rightly; and we have a will, as Augustine says (*On Correction and Grace*, ch. 13), free but not freed: free for justice, but a servant of sin. Wherefore in another place he distinctly calls this will a servant (*On John, tractate 53*). And elsewhere he writes that the will is free to the extent that it has been freed (*Retractations*, bk. 1, ch. 15). Otherwise, it is not properly a will, but may more safely be called cupidity. What else, therefore, does Augustine do but playfully elude the use of this word, as Calvin wrote? It is not contradictory for you to say free will, provided it is understood to be free for justice. But this indicates that there is nothing of freedom in our will for good; wherefore he calls it a servant of sin; and he thinks that this will of our mind is more truly and safely to be called cupidity than freedom, before it is freed. Why then do you so greatly urge and preach this freedom, which contributes only to sin? Defend the freedom of the will as long as you wish, and delight yourself in the use of this name, and proceed to glory in your excellent freedom; you will at last be forced to acknowledge in that freedom the greatest servitude and misery that can be imagined, so that you would believe it would have been more fortunate for you if you lacked it. For is this what it is to be free, to sin freely? To have no powers for doing good, unless conferred from elsewhere, nay, not even for thinking? For that is the first (πρῶτον) and easiest thing in man, to think good. But we have been despoiled even of the freedom of good thoughts, as the Apostle teaches when he says, "Not that we are sufficient of ourselves to think anything as of ourselves" (2 Cor. 3:5). Augustine prudently and gravely weighs this passage (*to Hilary, Epistle 144*), when he admonishes that to think is prior to believing, and concludes that, as regards piety and religion, if we are not sufficient even to think anything of ourselves, much less are we sufficient to believe anything. What good would you expect from that mind which is inept even for good thoughts? Let us therefore

understand our servitude, that we may learn to value more the grace of Christ, by which we have been freed.

And this is what Augustine so often contends, that the will of man was not weakened or shaken, but lost. Thus in the *Enchiridion* (ch. 30): "Man, by misusing his free will, destroyed both himself and his will." And again elsewhere (*On the City of God, bk. 14, ch. 11*): "Such a thing was given by God that, having been lost by its own fault, it cannot be restored except by him from whom it could be given." And elsewhere he writes that the will of man without the spirit is not free, because it is subject to desires that bind and conquer it (*Against two letters of the Pelagians, bk. 3, ch. 8*). In another place, however, he says that free will, having been captivated, is valid only for sinning, but for justice, unless divinely freed and aided, it is not valid. Still in another, that man, when he was created, received great powers of will, but lost them by sinning (*On the Words of the Apostle, serm. 2*). Prosper also (*Against the Ungrateful, ch. 40*):

"Nor can he now of his own accord lift his captive eyes on high, since, with the tyrant despoiling him, he lost even this, that he might know under what wound he lies."

In vain, therefore, do you try to find in man what he has entirely lost. Wherefore in the whole will of man there remains neither any seed of virtue, nor any inclination to virtue. And this is that servitude of sin, this is the servile condition of our nature, this is the depravity of the mind and of all faculties, that we lie wholly in sins, and our life is nothing else than a perpetual course of sins, before God has shone upon us with His grace.

*Captivity of the Devil.* And hence it is also manifest what and how dire is the captivity into which the Devil has dragged us. For he has reduced our entire selves, as great as we are, into his power. This you deny: but Scripture says that those who are not the sons of God, John calls sons of the devil (*John 8:44*); but the sons of the devil are those whom he can claim entirely as his own: and we do not become sons of God before we are given the Spirit of adoption. By what right you would divide us between God and the devil, I do not understand. Paul says that the impious are so held captive in the snares of Satan that they do what he pleases (*2 Tim. 2:26*). But what did he ever will but evil? Wherefore the Devil is called the prince of this world (*John 12:31*), because he holds full right over the men of the world, such as all are outside of Christ. Thus John says that the whole world lies in wickedness (*1 John 5:19*), because it is under the dominion of Satan. And Paul says that all men who live according to the disposition and custom of the world (*Eph. 2:2*), which all do whom grace has not changed, wholly serve and are enslaved to Satan. Sin reigns over these (*Rom. 6:12*); these are addicted and enslaved to sin, and therefore they are wholly placed under the power of Satan. For Peter says, "by whom anyone is overcome, to him he is also addicted in servitude" (*2 Pet. 2:19*). Why should I mention other Scriptures, in which I could

abound here? You will never so twist them by any interpretation that it is not necessary to concede that those who have not attained liberty in Christ remain wholly under the dominion of Satan. Augustine therefore says (*On John, tractate 49*): "Let no one flatter himself; of himself he is of Satan, of God he is blessed. Take away the sin which is your own." If man has nothing of his own but sin, and if by his own disposition he is so wicked that he can not unworthily be called Satan, what then will you find in him worthy of your patronage and such great commendation?

You say, however, that this captivity is none other than that, being placed outside of grace, we easily follow the temptations of Satan. Even those who have no small amount of grace do not easily repel the temptations of Satan; but to you, perhaps, it seems a matter of no great difficulty to overcome Satan in battle. But Christ affirms that however prompt the Spirit may be, the flesh is nevertheless weak (*Matt. 26:41*); and this infirmity of our flesh is the cause that, unless we watch diligently and apply the utmost attention and solicitude, we are circumvented by the temptations of Satan. But you speak as if you feel that the impious fight against Satan, but depart from the battle defeated. But they are overcome by a light temptation, who of their own accord run to evil and greedily embrace all opportunities for sinning. Although by the habit of sinning we make this captivity tighter and voluntarily impose a heavier yoke on our necks, yet even original sin alone is sufficient to subjugate man entirely to Satan. For we are born children of wrath (*Eph. 2:3*); and Adam cast himself and all his descendants through sin into the power of Satan, from which no one but Christ can deliver us. Wherefore, the more you extenuate this captivity, the more you detract from the grace and benefit of Christ. But with a ridiculous argument, you prove that the will of man is not captive to the devil, because he cannot violently impel it. But man gave himself over to the Devil, impelled by no force, but induced by his own will; so that if the devil never attacked man with any temptation or incited him to sin, but left him to his own disposition, he would nevertheless hold him enclosed in safe custody, from which he would never escape. For man himself has, by his own will, cast upon himself those snares which he can never shake off. What Augustine said of himself (*Confessions*, bk. 8, ch. 5), is true of every man outside of Christ: "My will was held by the enemy, and thence he had made a chain for me." Similarly Prosper (*To the Objections of Vincent*): "He who had the power not to sin, sinned willingly; he willingly submitted himself to his deceiver. Nor does he move in vice by a natural but by a captive motion, until he dies to sin and lives to God." Wherefore Christ came to preach deliverance to the captives (*Luke 4:18*); and ascending on high, he led captivity captive (*Eph. 4:8*).

*Necessity of sinning.* The necessity of sinning also followed from original sin. For the flesh is not subject to the law of God, nor indeed can it be; and those who are in the flesh cannot please God (*Rom. 8:7-8*). Therefore they sin necessarily and always, and this one thing they can do. Wherefore Augustine, urging this

necessity which he learned from the Scriptures against the Pelagians who defended the freedom of not sinning (*On the Perfection of Justice*), says: "Through the freedom of the will it came to pass that man was with sin, but now the sinfulness that has ensued as a penalty has made a necessity out of freedom, whence faith cries to God, 'deliver me from my necessities.'" And soon after: "Because the will sinned, the hard necessity of having sin followed the sinner." And a little below: "Therefore it is the fault of man that he is not without sin, because it was done by the will of man alone that he came to this necessity." Thus he says in another book (*Against Fortunatus*): "After the first man sinned by his free will, we, who descend from his stock, were plunged into necessity." And in another (*Hypognosticon*, bk. 3): "The first man lost the good of the possibility of free will." And finally in another (*On Nature and Grace*, ch. 52): "Deserted by the light of truth, he becomes blind, and it is more necessary that he should stumble."

Because these testimonies of Augustine are especially apposite and clear, you try to deprave them with a contrived and manifold exposition. You therefore bring forward various senses by which the necessity of sinning, which Augustine taught, may agree with your defense. Let us say a few things about them, so that all may openly see how confidently you contradict so great a Father.

The first sense, therefore, is that the necessity of sinning, according to Augustine, does not mean that man without grace always and in every work sins, but that he necessarily sins sometimes and cannot always be without sin by the mere powers of nature, as the Pelagians affirmed. But Augustine calls the works of all the unregenerate, even those which are most praised and are commonly held for great virtues, sins. But sometimes even the saints necessarily sin, because of the law of sin dwelling in their members, which never ceases to rebel against the law of the mind (*Rom. 7:23*). Nor is this rebellion always ineffectual, but it often makes the saints captive to sin. But even the most holy cannot always be without sin; for whom it is always necessary to implore humbly the remission of sins. Does Augustine attribute no other necessity of sinning to the impious than that with which every most holy person struggles? How excellently you know the mind of Augustine! But he understood such a necessity by which man, without grace, can neither will nor do good, but can both will and do evil. The fault of the first man cast us down into this, from which we cannot emerge except through Christ. These are the words of Augustine (*On Nature and Grace*, ch. 53): "Why is so much presumed of the possibility of nature? It is wounded, hurt, vexed, lost; it needs true confession, not false defense." If no possibility of doing well is left to us, a perpetual necessity of sinning has succeeded. "By willing evil," says Augustine (*On the Words of the Apostle*, serm. 1), "man lost the willing of good." But after all good will has perished, evil will has necessarily occupied the whole mind. Wherefore Augustine says that free will, having been captivated, is valid only for sinning (*Against 2 Epistles of the Pelagians*, bk. 3, ch. 8). What else is this

but to sin always and necessarily? This sense, therefore, is so openly absurd and contrary to the mind of Augustine that it betrays itself by its own falsity.

The second sense is that such a necessity is established by Augustine which signifies an impossibility for meritorious good, not for any good and moral action. But Augustine acknowledges no action to be truly good, unless it arises from faith. For he says (*Against Julian*, bk. 3, ch. 3): "Man cannot will anything good, unless he is helped by him who cannot will evil, that is, by the grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord. For whatever is not of faith, is sin." But the splendid and renowned actions of unbelievers or the impious, although they are indeed honorable and useful to the human race, yet he denies that they are true virtues, as we shall show in the last chapter of this book. There is, therefore, no question whether man without grace can exercise these moral and philosophical virtues, by which many Gentiles acquired great praise and fame for themselves (for we have always confessed this); but we are inquiring about true virtue and truly good actions. For he is praised, not whom men admire and praise, but whom God commends: "who will bring to light the hidden things of darkness, and will make manifest the counsels of the hearts: and then shall every man have praise of God" (1 Cor. 4:5). But what you yourself here adduce from Augustine most strongly opposes your defense. For if sin can be avoided only by nature being healed through Christ, and if man cannot abstain from sin except after the medicine which Christ has brought, it is certain that before this healing and medicine, that is, without grace, man necessarily sins in every action, because he cannot be idle.

The third sense is that the necessity of sinning from the doctrine of Augustine is not that which excludes the voluntary, but implies infallibility. Nor do we dream of such a necessity as conflicts with the will. For although man before grace is necessarily evil, and therefore can neither do, nor speak, nor think good, yet he sins of his own accord and willingly. Thus sin can be both necessary and voluntary at the same time.

The fourth sense is that this necessity of sinning outside of grace is opposed to that possibility which the first man had in his integral nature. I concede it. But what was that possibility? Of committing no sin at all, of sinning in no matter, not even the smallest. For it was both possible and easy for him not to sin, and to keep all the precepts of God. But we have incurred a certain necessity contrary to this possibility: therefore we can do nothing but sin. For that necessity is repugnant to that possibility. But you say that they are not opposed either contradictorily, or contrarily, but only subalternately. But subalterns are not really opposed. For this truth, "Every man is mortal," is in no way repugnant to the fact that individual men are mortal, but rather confirms it. But you mean this: the first man could overcome every sin; we cannot overcome all, but many. Nor do we say that all sins are committed by man before grace, but that all his actions are sins. Yet man before grace is of himself prone and apt to commit any

sin whatsoever, if God should relax the reins for him and offer all opportunities for sinning. Therefore, that the principle of right opposition may hold, just as Adam could be without all sin, so we, having lost that integrity and original justice, cannot not be with sin, and that mortal, because it is contrary to divine justice. Whence it is necessary that the whole life of man be, as it were, a rich workshop of sins, on account of this native contagion of sin, diffused through all the internal and external parts and powers. Thus all your devised calumnies against that necessity of sinning which Augustine established have vanished; and we openly obtain that for which we contend, that without grace one sins always and necessarily.

Because, however, it has pleased you here to carp at Calvin, I will dispatch in one word how undeservedly and unskillfully you do it. Calvin says (*Institutes*, bk. 2, ch. 2, sec. 10) that the Master of the Sentences pronounces that we are not of free will because we are equally able to do or to think good and evil, but only because we are loosed from coercion. But this liberty is not impeded, even if we are wicked and can do nothing but sin. You deny that Lombard taught that man outside of grace can do nothing but sin. I think he taught this not obscurely. He distinguishes the liberty of the will into different times (*Lombard, Sentences*, bk. 2, d. 25, ch. G, H, K). "The first was, in which he could sin and not sin. The last will be, in which he will be able not to sin, and will not be able to sin. The middle, however, is that in which he can sin, and cannot not sin." For man after sin, and before the reparation of grace, is "oppressed and conquered by concupiscence, and has an infirmity in evil, but does not have grace in good, and therefore can sin, but cannot not sin, even mortally and damnably." These are the very words of the Master which I produce. If man before grace cannot not sin, and that mortally and damnably, I do not understand what good he can possibly do. For I do not think that anything can be done rightly without grace, or by him who abides in mortal sin. And when he makes a threefold liberty—from necessity, from sin, from misery—by necessity he understands coercion. And after, he cites a testimony from Augustine about liberty for evil and evil servitude: "Servants addicted to sin, of course, what liberty can there be, except when it delights to sin? For he serves liberally who willingly does the will of his Master, and by this he is free to sin who is a servant of sin." Therefore, the liberty of man outside of grace is nothing but the liberty of sinning; whatever, therefore, he does, is sin. Thus Calvin did not deviate from the mind of Lombard.

**CHAPTER XI. The responses to the arguments proposed in the first chapter are removed.**

At last, after the digressions of your six points, you deliberate on refuting the arguments that were proposed in the beginning of the book. But you have responded so lightly and precipitately, as if you were afraid of planting your foot too deeply in any place and sticking too tenaciously. I will both recite your responses with the utmost fidelity and refute them with the authority of clear truth, and I will do both with as much brevity as I can.

*To the first.* You respond therefore to the first, that since original injustice, being contracted, is not opposed to Original justice contrarily or contradictorily, but only subalternately, it therefore does not follow that it is a complete impossibility with respect to both tables of the Decalogue. Do you recognize your words? But who ever heard that injustice is opposed to justice subalternately? What is so contrary to injustice as justice? The first parents flourished with the grace and praise of perfect justice; by sinning they lost it all and entirely; and hence they became not just less just than they had been before, but unjust. And we are born not merely less holy than they were, but sinners, and dead in sins, and children of wrath. If our injustice were opposed to their divine justice only subalternately, they would not have lost all justice, and we would be born with some justice. But in them every light of justice was extinguished by sin; and we, conceived and born in sin (*Psalm 51*), are naked of all the ornaments of justice no less than of clothing. Thus, therefore, I repeat the argument. Original justice was the observance of the whole Decalogue; therefore, the injustice which expelled it is the transgression of the whole Decalogue. What dare you deny here? Was not Original justice the observance of the Decalogue? This, I hope, you will never deny. And the injustice which drove it out, is it doubtful whether it is contrary to it? But if it were not contrary, it would not have exterminated it from the bounds of nature. Therefore, Original injustice is a certain transgression of the whole Decalogue, since no pure and holy love of either God or neighbor remains in the nature of man; and not only did that love which ought to have been present not remain, but even hatred of God and man and a whole host of vices succeeded it. Defeated, therefore, you succumb to the argument; and since you could respond with nothing either true or probable, you did well to respond so little.

*To the second.* To the second you respond, which however pertains to the first, that the Image of God was indeed weakened, but in no way extinguished or taken away; and you cite Augustine, who says that Adam lost the image of God in such a way, not as if none remained in him, but that it was so deformed that it needed reformation (*On the Trinity*, bk. 14, ch. 16). But this response must be brought out from its hiding places. No one is unaware that something of the divine image has remained in man. For we have not been despoiled of reason, and will, and choice, and judgment, and knowledge, and all reasoning. And these, I confess, are some remnants of that image, and as it were, lineaments. But

we say that that image by which we are most conformed to God was not only deformed by sin, but utterly deleted, which shone forth in the splendor of justice, and holiness, and all virtues. This is that which makes us partakers of the divine nature, by which, as becomes well-born sons, we imitate and represent God our parent. Wherefore Paul says that we ought to be conformed to the image of the Son of God (*Rom. 8:29*), and to be transformed into the image of God through the Gospel (*2 Cor. 3:18*), and that it is then restored in us when the old man is put off and the new man is put on (*Col. 3:10, Eph. 4:24*), and that it consists in justice and holiness. By which names he has embraced the entire crown of virtues. And this has been handed down not badly by the Scholastics. For they establish a threefold image (*Thomas, pt. 1, q. 93, art. 4*), of creation, of recreation, and of likeness; Cajetan (*ibid.*) calls them of nature, of grace, and of glory. The image of creation and of nature remains in large part, since man has not lost his intellectual nature. But the image of recreation and of grace, by which God is known and loved in act or in habit, resides only in the just, and that inchoately. Finally, the image of likeness or of glory pertains only to the blessed. Therefore, sin has left no image of God in us, except that which consists in intelligence and is capable of receiving grace, by which God can be known and loved. But that image of grace, for which Adam was primarily created, has been effaced and utterly extinguished. And this is that image of God which Augustine so often wrote was lost (*Questions, 67; On Genesis, literally, bk. 6, ch. 27 & 28*), whose testimonies I therefore omit. Ambrose teaches that this image is to be understood in a good course of life (*On Colossians 3*). Prosper says (*On the Calling of the Gentiles, ch. 33*): "This is proper to the new creature through grace, that those who are the workmanship of God, who are created in Christ by a heavenly birth, do not grow dull in their origin, nor are they dissolved by sloth, but they advance from virtue to virtue by walking in the way of good works. For this is to be formed, this is to be made new from the old creature, this is to be reformed from the image of the earthly man to the image of the heavenly man." Again, ch. 21: "Adam was just, remaining in the image of his creator." Bernard distinguishes the image from the likeness (*On Grace and Free Will*), which many others have also done, and says that man had freedom of will in the image, but virtues in the likeness; then he adds, "and the likeness indeed perished, but man passed over in the image." Thus you see that that image in which justice, holiness, mercy, truth, and every virtue shone forth, not only did not remain unharmed after sin, but perished entirely. Now let everyone judge what cause you had to triumph so at the end of your response: "And thus those two principal arguments have been briefly and solidly satisfied." Lightly, indeed, not to say foolishly.

*To the Scriptures of the first order.* Then you come to the Scriptures, which you cunningly distribute into certain orders, lest it be necessary for you to respond to each of them. Therefore, you say that it must be responded to the Scriptures of the first Order, that the remote cause and root of all sins is the corruption of nature; but that these sins are the proper and proximate effects of the will in each person. "The remote cause," you say? And what is the proximate cause of so

many sins? "Our will," you say. But original sin made the will evil; and the Apostle teaches that the proper cause of all those sins is Original corruption, when he writes that we were born children of wrath (*Eph. 2:3*). Therefore we have brought sin into the world with us, from which all sins are procreated. Do you think the root is the remote cause of the fruits? You confess that Original corruption is the root of all sins; therefore all sins are properly born from the Original, unless perhaps you think that not all the fruits of a tree are born from the root. But you say that concupiscence is called the sin dwelling in us and surrounding us, because it occupies the lower powers in man. But concupiscence has much more besieged the higher powers, namely the mind and the will. For this alone is the seat of sin. For blindness and ignorance and infidelity dominate in the mind; and the Apostle urges the transformation and renewal of the mind (*Eph. 4:23*); and he teaches that it is now necessary for the Spirit of the mind to be renewed. But Augustine (*On the City of God*, bk. 14, ch. 4) confirms with an excellent and long discourse that the name of concupiscence and of the flesh ought not to be understood only of the powers which you call lower. You prove, however, that the participation in the Original stain alone does not stain all works, because one work cannot infect another, unless that work is perpetrated with the intention of that sin. But you have now confessed that Original sin is the root of all others; therefore Original sin mixes itself with all sins and instigates them. But what are the works that are done before grace, if not sins, since Paul pronounces that what does not proceed from faith is sin (*Rom. 14:23*)? Thus all the works which we do, being established in Original sin, must necessarily be stained by the Original contagion. But you beautifully interpret the words of Christ, "That which is born of the flesh is flesh" (*John 3:6*), in this way: when some work is done from the love of the flesh; as if you were a sworn advocate of the Pelagians. For what do you think of infants? Are they not both born of the flesh and are flesh? What have they done from the love of their flesh? "Flesh," therefore, signifies the natural corruption which has spread through all the sons of Adam. Now if the flesh can generate nothing but what is carnal and vicious, whatever men do before the grace of regeneration is contaminated with sin. Similarly, you affirm that the evil tree, which cannot produce good fruits, is the intention and the actual will, not nature itself, as the Manichaeans thought. Did you have to prevaricate so shamefully in such great matters? The Manichaeans accused nature as it was created. But God had undoubtedly created nature most excellent; but it destroyed itself and made itself evil, and in this way an evil tree came from a good one. How in turn could it become good from evil except through divine grace? Therefore, before grace, every man is an evil tree, and can produce no fruits but evil ones. Pelagius once taught that there is in every man a certain possibility of either part, instilled by God, like a fruitful and fecund root, which can, at each one's choice, either shine with the flower of virtues or bristle with the thorns of vices (*Augustine, On the Grace of Christ against Pelagius*, bk. 1, ch. 19). Your opinion is the same. For if man can perform good works before grace, he has in himself a root that can generate and bring forth different things, as

Pelagius said. What did Augustine respond to this? He says that he, not considering what he is saying, establishes one and the same root for good and evil things, against the Evangelical truth and the Apostolic doctrine. For both the Lord says that a good tree cannot produce evil fruits, nor an evil tree good ones; and the Apostle Paul, when he says that the root of all evils is cupidity, admonishes us to understand that the root of all good things is charity. Therefore, an evil man does no good, and whatever he does is evil, because he himself is evil. For all men are evil by nature, because they become good by grace. For thus Augustine says: "Man makes a good tree when he receives the grace of God. For he does not make himself good from evil by himself, but from him and through him and in him who is always good." Nay, not only for a tree to be good, but also for it to produce good fruits, he says it is necessary to be aided by grace, without which no good can be done. Wherefore, either confine grace with Pelagius to nature, or concede with Augustine that man of himself, since he is an evil tree, produces only evil fruits, and that no work which can be called truly good can proceed from any man before faith and the grace of regeneration.

*To the Scriptures of the second order.* To the Scriptures of the second order you respond that there is indeed ignorance in the mind and malice in the will, yet not so great and of such a kind as to be a perpetual furnace of sins, but such as only signifies a great proclivity to sin and difficulty in abstaining from sins. But Scripture pronounces that all who are not illuminated by heavenly grace have their mind darkened, and are alienated from the life of God, because of the ignorance that is in them, from the hardening of their heart (*Eph. 4:18*). But a mind ignorant of heavenly things, and darkened with shadows, and utterly alienated from God, and a heart hardened by sin, what can it be but a perennial fount of sins? Not that men without grace do not understand what is agreeable to nature (*Eph. 4 & 2 Cor. 3*), but that they are plainly ignorant of what pleases God and what contributes to salvation. And you yourself concede this, when you say that the blindness, of which the Apostle speaks, is a complete ignorance regarding the good acceptable to God for righteousness. By which words you not obscurely signify that nothing is done by an unregenerate man which has the true character of good, and which God deigns with his approval or remuneration. But those things which pertain only to the good of nature cannot but be contaminated, that is, similar to nature. Wherefore if mere darkness obtains in the mind, and a certain blindness has extinguished all the light of the soul; and if a certain stony hardness has occupied the heart itself, how great must we judge the ignorance and malice of man to be? Christ said, "if your eye is evil, your whole body will be dark; and if the light that is in you is darkness, how great is that darkness?" (*Matt. 6:23*). But the very fount of light and goodness in man has been blocked up with darkness and wickedness; from which it is necessary that all things be full of darkness and malice.

Concerning the passage in Genesis (*Gen. 6:5*), you respond too ineptly and loosely, that the proclivity to evil is openly taught there, relying on no reason other than the authority of the interpreter. But we weigh the very words of Moses, we do not cling with you to a corrupt version. God therefore affirms that every imagination of the thoughts of the human heart is only evil continually. What could be said more forcefully, what more clearly, what more eloquently? "Every imagination," and "only," and "continually"? These are thunderbolts, believe me, not words. But perhaps you will say that these things were pronounced about the men of the old world, and are not to be referred to us. Hear, therefore, what God affirmed about the whole human race immediately after the flood (*Gen. 8:21*): "The imagination of man's heart is evil from his youth." He calls it not merely prone or inclined to malice, but confirms that it is evil from his very youth, so that as soon as we begin to conceive and form something in our mind with age, we fashion no thoughts but evil ones in our mind. Thus the mind is, as it were, a certain workshop of evil thoughts. This is God's judgment of the human heart: beware here of believing Aristotle or Pelagius more than God. Hear Cajetan in a few words (*on Genesis 6*): "A great and immense corruption is signified inwardly, by saying that it is only evil, having nothing of good mixed in except relatively to evil. And what is more, at no hour will it be granted to them to be wise; but the whole day long their every thought was formed only for evil." The Apostle supports Moses when he writes that man cannot of himself think anything good (*2 Cor. 3:5*). And yet man assiduously exercises his mind by thinking, nor does he cease to meditate on many things and to turn them over in his mind daily. Scripture condemns all these thoughts for malice, however beautiful and praiseworthy they may seem to man. For the mind must be purged by grace before good thoughts, pleasing to God, may proceed from it.

*To the Scriptures of the third order.* To the Scriptures of the third order you respond briefly, that the positive infection of nature which we urge consists not in the habits of all vices themselves, but in an evil inclination, and sickness, and languor. But that original injustice is habitual, no one is ignorant; and from it, as from a certain fount, all evils flow. This infection of nature, therefore, is not only a certain inclination to evil, but an evil disposition, and an evil character, and an evil mind, by which we are always incited to act evilly. Wherefore the Apostle did not hesitate to call the mind of the flesh enmity against God (*Rom. 8:7*). Enmity, however, is not merely a certain inclination, but a vice of evil disposition, by which we oppose God in all things. Similarly, the Apostle writes that we are born children of wrath, not apt to provoke the wrath of God. And this is what God testifies, that every imagination of the heart not only inclines to evil, but is evil, and that only and always. But that which is only and always evil, who would say it is only an evil inclination? Even men who are not evil are, by a flaw of nature, too facile and prone to evil. But these are nevertheless not evil, although prone to evil; they are evil, not because they are only easily inclined to evil, but because all their thoughts and desires are in fact evil. But enough has

been said above about the inclination which you defend. You respond not a word about the Scriptures which we object.

*To the Scriptures of the fourth order.* To the Scriptures of the fourth order you say it should be responded, that every part of man has indeed been made worse by original sin, but that the corruption of every single part is not the subject and seat of sin. But what do you say to the point now? For who places sin in the flesh as in a subject? The seat of sin is the soul, who does not know? But it languishes so completely with the original disease that sin erupts into all the powers and parts of the soul and body. Which sufficiently indicates that there is nothing sincere or uncorrupted in man. Wherefore the Apostle commands the old man, and the whole of him, to be put off and crucified (*Rom. 6:6, Eph. 4:22*). And so Scripture openly names the mind, the soul, the understanding, the spirit, the thoughts, the will, the heart, so that all may see that what is highest and principal in man has been designated. Therefore, sin occupies all the powers, whatever man may have, but especially the higher ones, on which the actions of man principally depend.

*To the Scriptures of the last order.* To the Scriptures of the last order you respond as above, where the captivity of the Devil was disputed. And we showed there that man is so captive to Satan that he serves him entirely. But as for what you add, that the Devil is more effective in the impious on account of actual sins than of original sin alone, if we grant this, what will you conclude from it? Therefore, original sin alone is not sufficient for a just and complete captivity? Those who have added many actual sins to the original one have declared by most clear arguments that they are in the power of Satan, and have bound themselves even more tightly by this captivity; but yet those who are held by original sin alone are so oppressed by the calamity of this captivity that they cannot free themselves from the hands of Satan. And this can be understood sufficiently from the fact that those who are bound by original sin alone are brought to Baptism, that the grace of Christ may loose them from the deadly bond. But that you say the whole substance of man has not been changed into the nature of sin, I concede. For it is necessary that sin not be a nature, or a substance, but an evil disposition of nature. It is inept to dream of changes of substances, which if perhaps one out of the number of Protestants has defended, all the rest have always exploded with the greatest ridicule. We have now received your responses, to say it most lightly, unlearned and irrelevant; and our arguments, by which we confirm that the whole of nature has been oppressed by original sin as by a kind of flood, remain unconquered and almost untouched.

**CHAPTER XII. The responses of Stapleton to the preceding passages of Augustine and Prosper, proven in chapter 5, are refuted.**

You now come to Augustine and Prosper, whom you have as most steadfast adversaries in this cause. But the more you try either to draw them to your opinion or to twist them by interpretation, lest they seem to fight with you, the more the disagreements and dissent between them and you become clear. To what Augustine wrote, that man through sin lost the *posse bonum* (power for good) and the *bonum possibilitatis* (good of possibility), you respond that this is to be understood of that good and that possibility which man had before sin. Was this doubtful or unknown to anyone? But when you say that both possibilities have been lost, both of not sinning at all, and of doing good that is meritorious of eternal life, you are playing with verbal tricks. No one, not even the most holy (*Hypognosticon*, bk. 3), can perform any work that merits eternal life *ex condigno* (out of condignity), as has been shown above from Bellarmine himself. We are disputing about good works; and works that are truly good, you are accustomed to call meritorious. But you deny that works meritorious of eternal life can be done by him who is aided only by the powers of the will. Can any works be produced that are meritorious of grace? That too has been exploded by you before. What sort of goodness of works is this, then, which merits neither glory nor grace? It is certain that, however good they may be called, they are nothing but sins, because they merit nothing. There is indeed some good of nature; and the philosophers judged nothing to be better than their virtues. Yet nothing truly and properly good is found in nature; and the virtues of the philosophers and ethnics were sins, as you will hear in the last chapter. For Prosper rightly says (*On the Contemplative Life*, bk. 3, ch. 23), "The likeness of virtues which seems to be virtue, when it is not virtue, is nothing else than a lie; and therefore it is not to be called a virtue but a vice." I grant, therefore, that man can, without the new birth, supported by the powers of his own will, if he uses them well, both cultivate nature and bestow not fruitless labor on those virtues. Meanwhile, he will do nothing good or well, before he is changed by regeneration into a new man. And this is what Augustine says (*On Correction and Grace*, ch. 2), that without grace no good at all is done with love or delight in justice. But what is done without this love and delight in justice, however much it may please and profit very many, cannot be good.

But Augustine furthermore said that all men, from the wound of the first parent, limp with their free will, nor can a man of sound will arise from a nature vitiated by sin (*Hypognosticon*, bk. 3). We have, therefore, a will, but lame; a will, but insane. But you urge what Augustine says, that unless we are aided by God, we cannot fulfill the precept of justice in every part (*On the Merits and Remission of Sins*, bk. 2, ch. 5); hence you conclude that it can be fulfilled in some part. Will he also fulfill some part of the precept, who does nothing with love? But the beginning of obedience is love. Thus, therefore, they fulfill the precept, who are not aided by God, as the eye sees colors when it is not aided by light. For

Augustine used that example. Something can be done without grace which is materially, as the Scholastics say, good; but for it to be good in every respect, that is, for it to be done from faith and to please God, grace is needed, without which it will not be good at all.

You say that what he says is to be understood in the same way, when he denies that the possibility of not sinning is found in a now vitiated nature (*On Nature and Grace*, ch. 48, ch. 22). For man does not now have the possibility of fulfilling every good and of shunning every sin, such as Pelagius posited. But Augustine taught that the transgressor of the law was deservedly deserted by the light of truth; and so he was made blind, so that it is necessary for him to offend more, and to be vexed, and not to be able to rise. The whole, therefore, that man can do is perpetually to offend, and to fall, and to rush into sins. There is no power in him to raise himself. Wherefore Augustine writes that man is entirely vitiated by sin (*Hypognosticon*, bk. 3). But he who is entirely evil is capable of nothing but evil, and as it were practices a certain art of sinning. And this is what Augustine pronounces, that free will, having been captivated, is valid only for sinning (*Against two letters of the Pelagians*, bk. 3, ch. 8). Therefore, no faculty of doing good or of shunning evil remained in man after sin. Pelagius indeed, as you say, taught that every good can be done and every evil can be avoided by man. The Catholic Fathers, sharply attacking him, affirm indeed that man can perform some good and avoid some evil (*Hypognosticon*, bk. 3). Jerome writes that the perpetuity of impeccability is to be reserved for God alone (*Against the Pelagians*, bk. 1); then he adds, "Nor because I can not sin for a short time, will you compel me that I can do so always." But he spoke of man whom grace has reformed. Thus in the same book he writes later: "Although the conversion of man be perfect, and after vices and sins there be a full possession of virtues, can they ever be so without vice as those who proceed immediately from the font of Christ?" Not even these, who have made such progress in virtue as the condition of the present life allows, have ever dared to arrogate to themselves that *anamartesia* (sinlessness) which Pelagius contended was easy for man even with no grace to aid him. But those whom the grace of Christ has not purged from their sins and raised and conformed to the love of God and the pursuit of true obedience, they can neither perfect nor begin anything good and holy. For the beginning of piety is faith; but faith is the fruit of grace.

But let us proceed to the remaining passages of Augustine. Where, therefore, Augustine says that free will is valid only for sinning, you deny that he asserts this simply; but that he added, "if the way of truth is hidden, or if that manifest way does not delight." What is this eagerness for deceiving and calumniating? Read again the passage of Augustine in the third book to Boniface, ch. 8; there you will find this affirmed by him simply. I will transcribe the words, that all may understand your faithfulness, and from your faithfulness may estimate the cause which you defend. "Free will," says Augustine, "having been captivated, is valid only for sinning; but for justice, unless it has been divinely freed and aided, it is

not valid." Here he teaches that the will is captive in its liberty; but as long as that lasted, this our will is valid only for sinning, and is not at all valid for justice, before it will be divinely freed and aided. Augustine added no exception; but this was his simple statement and sentence. In another book (*On the Spirit and the Letter*, ch. 3), I confess, after he said that free will is valid for nothing but sinning, he subjoined, "if the way of truth is hidden; and when that which is to be done and to what one must strive has begun not to be hidden, unless it also delights and is loved." But what do you gather from this? You say that this way is twofold, one natural, the other supernatural. So be it; what next? You deny that the whole way to a natural work is hidden. We also deny that very thing. But Augustine spoke of supernatural good; and you confess that the way to this good is not only obscure but utterly unknown. You grant, therefore, what we ask, and it was necessary for you. For Augustine requires for doing good, first that the way not be hidden; then, that after it has been established what is to be done, it should pervade our minds with a certain delight. "But this delight is kindled in our hearts, not by the free will which arises from us, but by the Holy Spirit who is given to us." Thus, therefore, Augustine has concluded most openly against you. The will is valid for nothing but sin, as long as it is captive; but it is captive before it is divinely freed; therefore, without grace it can do nothing but sin. Furthermore, good is not done, Augustine says, unless it delights and is loved; nor does it delight or is it loved, unless God effects this love and delight in our hearts; therefore, man does no good without grace.

Concerning Prosper, you say that the same should be established as for Augustine, because whatever he wrote in this matter, he followed Augustine; and content with this very brief caution about Prosper, you return to Augustine. Indeed, Prosper, as you say, follows Augustine in this matter, and for that reason is all the more opposed to your opinion and to you entirely. His testimonies are described above, so suited to the cause which we defend, that not even Calvin could have explained the magnitude of original corruption in more ample words. But since you pass them over, I will not repeat them.

Let us see what remains of Augustine. But what he says, that "without the help of God we do nothing good," you say is to be understood of meritorious good. But he makes good contrary to sin, because for this good the help of God is needed. Men do many things without this help of God, but nothing good; therefore, evil. And surely it is not strange if what is evil merits no reward. You say that it should be understood in no other way when he says that the will not yet freed is rather to be called cupidity than will. "In no other way," you say? How then? For you say he does not simply deny that there is any will in man outside of grace. Ridiculous fellow! And who denies that there is a will in man? But Augustine denies that the will in man outside of grace is either good or free; therefore he thinks it is rather to be called cupidity than will (*Epistle 144*). But you prove that the will is free in some sense, because it not only acts spontaneously, but is also immune and free from coercion and necessity on the part of the principle. Who

would not laugh at such a trifler? Man indeed acts spontaneously, whatever he does by his will. And will cannot be taken from man; nor can man be compelled by any force to will what he does not will, or to not will what he wills. Whatever, therefore, he wills, he wills freely; but he can will nothing good, until Christ has changed his will by his grace, and has freed it from the servitude of Satan and sin. But necessity can exist without coercion. For both the saints will good things, and the damned evil things, necessarily. Nor for that reason is their will to be thought of as coerced. And so Augustine says (*On the Perfection of Justice*), "the will having been conquered by vice, nature lacked liberty." By which words he confirms that man lost liberty when his will fell into sin, by which it was conquered. The will, conquered by vice, lost its liberty and fell into servitude; therefore, before grace and the Spirit of Christ, it wills nothing good or can will it (*Against Julian*, bk. 2, art. 9). What if Augustine, in the words immediately preceding, is speaking of the true liberty of grace, by which Christ makes us free? Is Calvin impious for concealing this whole thing? But Calvin does not conceal this. For to what purpose? Augustine says, "Liberty itself is promised to believers by the liberator. 'If,' he says, 'the son shall make you free, then you will be truly free.'" That Christ promised and bestowed liberty on us most clearly proves that we are slaves by nature. For Christ promised and gave what we did not have before. Either be silent, or answer something to the point. We are indeed made free by grace, but by nature we are slaves. But this servitude did not remove all freedom of choice or a good will and one inclined and fit for good things. But the good which faith prescribes, nature does not seek or institute.

It is just the same that when Augustine says (*Enchiridion*, ch. 30), "man misusing free will, destroyed both himself and it," you understand this to mean the liberty of grace, such as man had before sin. Surely man lost that liberty which he had before sin. What then? Does he still retain the liberty of grace, but not as great as he once had? Say, therefore, that man now has the liberty of grace, but a little smaller and weaker than Adam received. But Augustine teaches that all liberty for good has utterly perished. For he says, "What good can the lost man do, except insofar as he has been freed from perdition?" From this he concludes, "Sin having conquered, free will was lost," and therefore there is no liberty of the will, as being an addicted slave, except when it delights to sin. Sin conquered, the will perished; the liberty that remains tends entirely to evil. In such a will, what possibility will you find, except for evil?

Finally, you say that in the unregenerate man, the will is as entirely cupidity as in the just man the will is entirely charity. Whence do you have this? Or where did Augustine write thus? Are you not ashamed of open Pelagianism? Is the will of the unregenerate so entirely cupidity as the will of the just is entirely charity? But the will of a just man very often and truly and greatly sins, which you yourself will not deny. Therefore, the will of the unregenerate can sometimes not only abstain from evil, but also perform a truly good work, and therefore a

meritorious one, of which kind all of yours are. For that is truly good which is simply contrary to sin. But if the will of the unregenerate could of its own accord do good, and did not need the help of God for this matter, no one was ever more unjustly condemned and proscribed as a most hostile enemy of the faith than Pelagius. Now the will of the just is never, while one lives here, entirely charity, because we ourselves always love both God and neighbor less than we should. But the will of the unregenerate can not unworthily be called entirely cupidity, because it draws the whole man, not resisting, and drives him headlong. I confess that there are two roots of our actions, charity and cupidity. But the charity of a just man always has something of cupidity added to it, because the flesh never ceases to desire against the spirit; but the cupidity of an impious man does not have anything of charity mixed with it, because charity is the fruit of the spirit.

**CHAPTER XIII. Concerning other passages of Augustine; and whether the opinion can be defended from Pelagianism, which teaches that man outside of grace can to some extent avoid sin.**

There are still some passages of Augustine left, which seem more difficult to you; and you confess that they are urged by certain Catholics, whom you therefore call badly curious. Such are when he says (*epistle 106*) that man without grace, through the powers of nature, is worth nothing for not sinning; and among the heretical opinions of Pelagius he enumerates this, that he says that our victory (by which we conquer sins) is not from the help of God, but from free will; and thus he writes of Pelagius: "Sometimes he so weighs the power of the will with equal balance that he defines it to be of some value even for not sinning. But if this is so, no place is reserved for the help of grace, without which we say that the will's choice has no value for not sinning," and he affirms that those who teach that it has some value agree with Pelagius. And he urges Pelagius to confess, "That when we struggle against temptations and illicit desires, although we also have a will there, yet the victory comes not from it, but from the help of our God." Augustine proves this very thing also from the Lord's Prayer (*Epistle 89*): "For in vain," he says, "do we, praying to God, say, 'lead us not into temptation,' if this were placed in our power, so that we could accomplish it with no help from him." To this also pertains what Caelestinus, Bishop of Rome, whose words are found in the Council of Carthage and Milevis, says: he condemns those who deny that grace is of value as a help, so that sins are not committed. And to this opinion, that we are unequal to conquering temptations without grace, Gregory of Rimini brings forth many things from Cyprian, Caelestinus, and Innocent. For it is necessary, as they say, that by him with whose help we conquer, without his help we are conquered. But when we are conquered, then we sin. Therefore, if God withdraws his help, we cannot not sin; but he conquers temptations who does not sin. For thus Augustine (*Epistle 105*): "He who prays, 'lead us not into temptation,' prays that he may not sin, that is, that he may do no evil." And then he adds, "whence it is sufficiently apparent that

for not sinning, that is, for not doing evil, although the choice of the will is not doubted to be present, yet its power is not sufficient, unless its infirmity is aided." But in the epistle to Vitalis (*Epistle 107*), he says that grace is given for each single good act. Thus elsewhere again (*On the Words of the Apostle, serm. 15*): "Absolutely, if the help of God be wanting, you will be able to do no good. You act indeed without his help, with a free will; but your will, which is called free, is still badly suited, and by acting badly it becomes a damnable handmaid." What more from Augustine? I could be infinite. But you yourself commemorate the words of a certain Catholic author, writing in this manner: "It is the voice of the Pelagians that the power of the will is of some little value for not sinning, which without doubt they say who attribute sterile virtues to it." I might adduce many things to the same effect from Gregory of Rimini (*in 2, d. 26, q. 1, art. 2 & dist. 29, q. 1, art. 3*), a man sufficiently acute, and especially commended among the Scholastics. And here he contends most keenly that man without grace can neither conquer the slightest temptation, nor fulfill the slightest commandment or counsel, nor do any work that is even morally good. All of which he confirms by the authorities of the Scriptures, and the testimonies of the ancient Fathers of the Church, and by good reasons.

What now to these things, Stapleton? You say that you will respond briefly and solidly, which if you do, we will admire your art and skill. But you have never performed anything less than what you promised here. Let us hear, however, this brief and solid response of yours. You say, then, that the Pelagian heresy was twofold: since it taught that man can without grace partly merit, and with the praise of justice conquer temptations, and partly avoid all sin. Do you call this a twofold heresy? But in that way one could find a hundred heresies in the opinion of Pelagius. Proceed, however, where you have begun. To embrace your response more briefly than it was proposed by you, who promised brevity, this is the sum of all that you respond: that Augustine understood such a victory as is Christian, acceptable to God, and conjoined with justice. Is this, then, to respond solidly? Especially since you undertook to do it with an interposed promise? You wish, therefore, that man can without grace conquer temptations, but not with the true praise of justice. Can he also merit, and avoid all sins? For Pelagius similarly affirmed that this could be done. What, therefore, prevents man from being able, without grace, to conquer all temptations, although not with the praise of justice, and thus also to merit and to abstain from all sins? But just as it is monstrous and incredibly absurd to say that he who could merit and avoid all sins did nothing worthy of praise, nor pleased God, so it is no less absurd and insane that all temptations are conquered without praise. But what is more praiseworthy and Christian than to conquer temptations? And how do they conquer temptations, who are entirely slaves to Satan and obey his lust in all things? Is not the necessary help of God required for conquering temptations? But we who without divine grace can think nothing good, shall we conquer temptations without grace? You are entirely ignorant of what it is to conquer temptations. For he does not conquer temptations who does not immediately

break forth where his evil will or the malice of Satan has instigated him, but he who restrains the allurements and titillations of temptations, and resists them with a true effort as soon as they have arisen in the soul. This no one can do, unless supported and aided by grace. But Augustine will most easily dissipate these mists of inventions, with the light of his authority and opinion. For he says (*Against 2 Letters of the Pelagians*, bk. 2, ch. 5): "We do not say that free will has perished from human nature by the sin of Adam, but that it is valid for sinning in men subject to the Devil; but for living well and piously it is not valid, unless the will of man itself has been freed by the grace of God, and aided for every good action, word, and thought." He confesses that free will remains, but that it is valid only for sinning; he says that they are subject to the Devil who rely only on the defenses of nature; he denies that the will is valid for living well, unless grace has freed it; he adds that grace is needed for every good action, and word, and thought; finally, he teaches not obscurely that man sins in everything without grace. You dream of a victory over temptations, but one devoid of true praise. But those who lack grace not only do not conquer temptations, but they fall in every effort and motion of the mind. Do they then conquer when they are openly conquered? The Apostle ascribes all victory to faith (*1 John 5:4*); you make conquerors of temptations those who have no spark of faith. And Augustine prudently observes what Christ said: "without me you can do nothing," not "perfect nothing," but "do," and with one word he comprehended the beginning and the end. Where he also proves that there is no remaining desire for good in us (*On the Grace of Christ*, Chap. 8). "For," he says, "if we are not sufficient to think, how shall we be sufficient to desire?" It is necessary to be conquered by any temptation whatsoever, for one who has no strength in himself to resist, and who cannot even desire anything good. Wherefore Augustine so often said that our will is valid only for sinning. But those who sin in no way conquer temptations. For to conquer is this: not to sin. But Stapleton has found a reason by which those who are conquered and captive may be said to have reported a glorious victory. Thus, no doubt, he himself is accustomed to conquer temptations. Nay, Augustine condemned in Pelagius that he contended that our will is of some little value even for not sinning. Are we not of some little value even for not sinning? What then, if not that we sin? Do you now persuade us that temptations are conquered by sinning? But those who struggle against temptations and illicit desires, if they have obtained victory, will they not bear away glorious praise? Or can they at all without the help of God obtain victory from an ass? You defend that it is possible, but yet you deny that this victory is Christian.

But no one conquers sin unless he is a Christian. This cause was diligently treated in the Council of Milevis and of Carthage against the Pelagians. But Stapleton rescinds the damnations of the Pelagians and derides the most weighty definitions of the Councils. I will try whether he esteems the authority of the Roman Pontiffs more highly. Pope Innocent wrote a letter against the Pelagians to the Fathers of the Council of Milevis, in which he says thus:

“Denying the help of God, they say that man can be sufficient for himself, and that he does not need this divine grace, deprived of which he must necessarily, ensnared in the Devil’s traps, fall, while he strives to fulfill all the commands of life by the liberty of the will alone.” He writes openly that those who are deprived of grace are held ensnared and bound by the Devil’s traps. But can those whom the devil has cast into custody, captured and bound, conquer temptations and resist the devil? It follows in the same epistle: “Since these things are so, and since in all the divine pages we read that the help of God must be joined to the free will, and that it can do nothing when destitute of heavenly aids, in what way do Pelagius and Caelestius persuade themselves, and indeed very many, of this possibility, defending it so pertinaciously for the will alone?” I do not mind the rather unpolished and disordered speech: I consider the sentence worthy of a Catholic and such a Pontiff. For he says that the will, separated from grace, can do nothing, and that this is confirmed by all the Scriptures. But to conquer temptations is neither nothing, nor a small thing. He also subjoins that “we must necessarily seek divine grace, because otherwise we cannot avoid the machinations of the devil, unless by its help.” But what are the machinations of the devil, if not temptations?

Let us also repeat something from the epistle of Pope Celestine to the Bishops of Gaul, in which, while many things are written to this effect, there is this excellent passage: “Thus God works in the hearts of men, and in free will itself, so that a holy thought, a pious counsel, and every motion of a good will is from God, because through him we can do some good, without whom we can do nothing.” If we cannot even move our will to good, unless it is given from on high, how shall we conquer temptations and resist Satan without grace? There he also recalls the testimony of Pope Zosimus from a certain epistle of his to the bishops of the whole world: “What time intervenes in which we do not need his help? In all actions, therefore, causes, thoughts, and movements, he must be prayed to as our helper and protector.” So you see that grace is necessary in every good endeavor. Wherefore, the temptations of the devil are in no way conquered without grace: and you, in this disputation, do nothing other than subscribe to Pelagius against the Church and the Catholic faith. The distinction, moreover, which you employ, is too gross and foolish: that temptations are conquered, but not for the sake of God, nor from a love of piety. For he who abstains from wrongdoing for the sake of empty glory, or for ends that are not good, as the impious often do, does not conquer those temptations, but is conquered by them. For that is good which is referred to God as the highest good, and is undertaken and done for God's sake and out of love for piety. Wherefore, what you relate about Scipio Africanus and Alexander the Great has no bearing on our question. Scipio restored a virgin captured in war to her betrothed; and Alexander, after conquering Darius, left the royal maidens unharmed and untouched. The deed of each was outstanding; who denies it? But yet neither conquered temptation. For although they were unwilling to stain themselves with foul lust and with such public and signal disgrace, yet since they

sought the favor of the people and fame by this continence, or looked to something else besides virtue itself and the glory of God, they were certainly far from that victory which we seek. Wherefore, when Julian, the disciple of Pelagius, used the same examples which you now use, Augustine did not hesitate to call those virtues of Fabricius, Fabius, and this Scipio true vices: which he proves with many words and diligently. What of the fact that you yourself deny that it was a true victory over sin? But we are disputing about a victory which you can call true. Nor, indeed, can it be understood what a victory that is not true might be. For he who conquers, truly conquers; and he who does not truly conquer, no sane person will ascribe victory to him.

Yet you think that Augustine wrote of such a victory when he says: "This is not done veraciously and sincerely except by a true delight in justice," and later, "Then vices are to be considered conquered when they are conquered by the love of God." But Augustine recognizes this one victory over sin, which is joined with the delight of justice and the love of God. And he says that this is in the faith of Christ. Therefore, those who are empty of faith and grace will never be victors over temptations, but will always depart defeated from the battle that is undertaken with the devil and sin. For by what reason would he conquer, who brings with him to the fight nothing that is necessary for obtaining victory?

And from this also it is clear how empty another of your subterfuges is. You say that it is Pelagian to claim that *all* temptations can be conquered without the help of God, but not that *some* can, *sometimes*. As if Augustine, and Innocent, and Celestine only condemned this in the Pelagians, that they said all temptations could be conquered without grace. On the contrary, they defend against the Pelagians that *no* temptations can be conquered without it, as is manifest from their testimonies brought into the open. For that reason, they require divine grace in every action and thought; if it is not present, they maintain that the will has power only for sinning. And this is also confirmed by Jerome. For thus he says: "This has been concluded after a long disputation, that the Lord helps and sustains with his grace, by which he has granted us free will, in every single work." And elsewhere thus, which you will think was also said to you by him: "Whence do you dare with a rash tongue to profess that each one is ruled by his own will? If he is ruled by his own will, where is the help of God? If he does not need Christ as a ruler, how does Jeremiah write, 'the way of man is not in himself'?" And he subjoins: "Free will itself depends on the help of God, and needs his aid for every single thing." If we need the help and aid of God for every single thing, we can overcome not only not all temptations without grace, but plainly none. Vincent of Lérins says: "Who before the profane Pelagius presumed such power of free will as to think that the grace of God was not necessary to aid it in good things through every single act?" And Bernard taught this same thing excellently in these words: "We are easy to be seduced, weak to work, fragile to resist. If we wish to discern between good and evil, we are deceived; if we attempt to do good, we fail; if we try to resist evil, we are cast

down and overcome.” Is this to conquer, to be cast down and overcome? And this happens to us, so that we resist no temptations if grace is lacking. Thus our enemy everywhere threatens us and presses upon us, so that he does not even let us breathe. Then we are so besieged by the impediments and snares of the world, and by the allurements of the flesh, and are inclined by a native inclination to sinning, and averse from good, that we are not allowed to emerge even a little from this mire of vices in which we are stuck.

But yet you fabricate other distinctions in this place, of which you are a very unskilled architect. For first you say that it is one thing to resist sin, another to conquer sin; then you subjoin that some temptations are vehement, others slight. These things, however, are referred to this, that you may defend that sin can indeed be resisted without grace, but not conquered, and that lighter temptations, but not grave ones, can be overcome. But this is nothing other than to secretly betray the citadel of the Catholic cause to Pelagius. For what temptations can be light to a man who has no strength at all to resist? For it is necessary to be fortified with the aids of grace for those who declare war on temptations and sins. If there is anything in nature by which we may resist Satan and evil, Pelagius has won, or has been defeated by foul play. The Council of Orange says: “It is a divine gift when we keep our feet from injustice and falsehood.” And soon after: “No one has of his own but lying and sin.” Then what shall we call light, and what grave temptations? Therefore, the grace of Christ will be necessary for us, not that we may flee all sins, but only grave ones. Surely Pelagius would not litigate much with you about this matter. But Christ taught that not only greater things cannot be done without him, but not even the smallest, when he says: “Without me you can do nothing.” Does Christ not terrify you with this word? He affirms that nothing is done without grace; you, that many things, although not the greatest, nor all things. But Christ does not say, “without me you cannot do all things,” or “what is most difficult”; but, “nothing.” Thus Augustine: “He does not say, ‘without me you can do little,’ but ‘nothing.’” But to wage war with Satan, however lightly he may attack, is a thing full of difficulty and peril, so that Christ taught us to pray that we not be led into temptation. The pious have scarcely been able to repel the temptations which you call light, even though they resisted with the greatest zeal and with all their strength; and can the impious, whom Christ has deserted or not helped, break and overcome the attacks of Satan?

Christ says, “as long as that strong man armed keeps his court, all things which he possesses are in peace.” By which words he declares that Satan reigns so potently in his own that he has them obedient to himself in all things. Therefore, the impious follow Satan wherever he leads or drags them, even if they sometimes refrain from external evils either from fear, or shame, or the difficulty of accomplishing them, or the desire for commendation, or for a similar evil cause; yet in their mind they obey, and proceed as far as they dare. These are the words of Augustine: “When men do these things without faith, sins

are not coerced, but other sins are overcome by other sins.” Therefore, the impious never beat back any of the devil’s temptations, not even those which he has hurled most lightly. Although those who think his temptations are light are greatly mistaken. What of the fact that the impious do not even resist sin? For to resist belongs to those who hate sin, and love justice, and are moved by an internal sense of piety, and are delighted by good and holy actions: when, as the flesh lusts against the spirit, so the spirit lusts against the flesh. Surely, victory is always to be hoped for by one who resists, since the Apostle said, “Resist the devil, and he will flee from you.” But another Apostle taught that faith is needed for resisting; since the impious lack this, they cannot even think of resisting. To what purpose now do your distinctions profit you? Wherefore, you do not ineptly say that what you brought forth before is more solid. Why then do you foist these less solid things on us? although indeed these are just as solid as those.

You return again to Augustine, who condemns in Pelagius that he defended that the will, without grace, has some power even for not sinning. Because this greatly obstructs your lights, you thought it should be removed. You say, therefore, that this opinion was rejected by Augustine, either because he understands the victory of sin in the way you have already said; or because Pelagius weighed the power of the will with equal moments on a balanced scale, that is, he attributed as much to nature alone without grace as to grace assisting nature. But you are stuck here in the middle, and you cannot escape. For Augustine says that the will by itself has not the least power for not sinning, and that those who maintain it has some power reserve no place for the help of grace. What about you? With Pelagius, you teach that the will without grace is victorious over temptations and the effector of many good things. Either, therefore, you call good what is not in reality good, and you deceive us with an equivocation, and you respond with no word appositely, or you can bring forth nothing why you should not be proscribed from the Church with Pelagius as a heretic. For since you teach the same thing, you must be placed in the same cause and class with him. Pelagius taught that the will has some power for not sinning: Augustine contends that for not sinning, the will's choice has no power without grace. Do you not now reveal yourself as a Pelagian, when you defend that temptations can be overcome and sins avoided without grace? Nor does Thomas support you, if he holds anything certain and is consistent with himself. For he only teaches that unbelievers can in some way perform good works, for which the goodness of nature is sufficient. No one denies this: but since they lack faith, they can effect nothing that pleases God. Thomas concedes, when he says: “Concerning Cornelius, it should be known that he was not an unbeliever, otherwise his work would not have been accepted by God, whom no one can please without faith.” Why, therefore, did he say a little before, that concerning Cornelius the unbeliever it was said, “Your alms have been accepted by God”? If Cornelius was not an unbeliever, how could Thomas prove by his example that not every action of unbelievers is a sin? But how ineptly he eludes the Gloss that affirms, “the entire life of unbelievers is sin”! For he explains it thus: that the life

of unbelievers cannot be without sin. But whose life, I ask, has been without sin? Or thus: whatever they do out of unbelief is sin. As if there could be any doubt to anyone that what flows from unbelief is always sin. But the Gloss defines the entire life of unbelievers to be nothing but sin: and this is necessary, since unbelievers are void of faith and grace, which alone take away sins. But how will he who is devoid of them avoid sin, or overcome evil temptations and desires, whose whole life is nothing else but sin? To sin throughout one's whole life is not to flee sin, or to conquer temptations.

But you urge what Augustine wrote in his last age against the Pelagians: "The choice of the will is of little avail for not sinning, unless it is aided by the grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord." By which you signify that Augustine, now an old man, had somewhat relented from his opinion. That he who before contended that the will availed nothing, now had come to this, that he confessed it availed something. Thus Augustine will be contrary to himself: and not only that, but what he before so vehemently condemned in Pelagius, he himself will approve at the end. Thus you interpret Augustine, so that you may commend your heresy to us by the counterfeit patronage of so great a man. But he himself in the same book afterwards affirms that the will of man was conquered by vice, and therefore now nature lacks liberty, and is pressed by necessity. This "little," therefore, which the will can do without grace, is absolutely nothing.

Next you come to Pope Celestine, whose words are these: "It is necessary that, without God's help, we be conquered." You say you grant this freely, but with such a necessity as you have before explained from the opinion of Augustine. But you said that by Augustine that necessity is understood by which it is necessary for a man without grace to sin at some time. But Celestine says, "whenever God does not help, it is necessary to be conquered." Therefore, not only at some time, but always we are conquered, when God does not bring aid. Then, however, God helps, when he sustains us with his grace. Therefore, without grace no temptations are conquered. Thus Innocent: "Not free will, but only the help of God can make us equal to resisting." And again: "All the saints testify that they can do nothing without the help of God."

Finally, you respond to Prosper, who wrote that the malice of men outside of grace is the same as that of the demons, that he said this of many, not of all. I confess: for he himself says that this is the malice of many. Many men, therefore, can do nothing else but sin. But if you will have conceded this of many, you will not easily argue against it being conceded of all who are alien from Christ. But the same also says that the will of man without grace is always either animal or sensual. But what good will that which is such ever effect? You confess that the will is always animal or sensual without grace, yet not so that it always sins by a necessary act. As if it were not necessary that whatever proceeds from such a disposition be a sin. But let us hear Prosper: "The sensual will," he says, "which we can also call carnal, is not raised above that motion which is

born from the senses of the body.” What great or outstanding thing will it therefore undertake? And what of the animal will? “It,” he says, “before it is acted upon by the Spirit of God, even if it can raise itself above sensual motion, yet without participation in the love of God, is occupied with earthly and perishable things.” But what is it to be occupied with earthly and perishable things, if not to sin? Therefore, the will of man always and necessarily sins, as long as it is animal, that is, devoid of divine, and heavenly, and saving grace. And this is what Christ pronounces, that from the flesh nothing but flesh is born. Thus it is manifest to anyone that nothing at all has been answered by you to our arguments. Nor is there any reason for anyone to be angry with you: for the matter itself did not permit a better response.

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### **Whether unbelievers, or others placed outside of grace, have good works.**

You try in vain to draw Augustine to your side, that is, into the camp of Pelagius. For since good works follow grace, and faith, and justification, and do not precede them, it cannot be that the impious and unbelievers should accomplish anything good. And this Augustine has demonstrated most clearly from the Scriptures against your predecessors, the true adversaries of grace, and the mendacious boasters of good works, the Pelagians. But first you labor to show that the Scriptures which are against your opinion were so understood and explained by Augustine that they do not oppose your defense. Christ says, “without me you can do nothing.” And Paul, “We are not sufficient to think anything as of ourselves.” And again, “God works in us both to will and to accomplish.” Therefore, grace alone is the fount and principle of good works. But you say that these Scriptures speak of true justice, such as is of the reborn, and so they were understood by Augustine, and ought to be understood. For who ever understood them otherwise? And do we not either dispute, or ought we to have disputed, about truly good works? Indeed, no one doubts that men, unsupported by any aids of grace, can cultivate philosophical and moral virtues, and undertake and accomplish many outstanding deeds useful to the human race. Nor indeed should those virtues, as long as they are separated from faith, be considered true, but are rather images, or certain apes of virtues, as we shall presently show from Augustine. If, therefore, no one outside of grace does anything that contributes to justice, that pleases God, that can be called truly good, this is the very thing that we defend, nor do we ask for anything else. It will be permitted to you to call their works good, and to extol them with praises with Julian, the disciple of Pelagius, as much as you wish. If they are not works of justice, nor pertain to piety, they do not have the commendation of true good works. Thus it will remain, what we say, that nothing good is done by anyone outside of grace. For this pertains to illustrating the magnitude of the original stain, that we may understand that no powers for acting well remain in us,

before heavenly grace has amended this nature. Now if the works which are done before this grace are not good, what else can they be but evil, and therefore sins? For either what we do is good, and pleasing to God; or if it is not good, it is evil, and consequently displeasing to God. But nothing displeasing to God but sin: and what pleases God is truly good, because it proceeds and emanates from faith. The head of your response, therefore, is this, that the works of unbelievers are truly sins, because they are done without Christ, and do not proceed from faith, without which we cannot even think anything good. For God works in us not only to accomplish, but also to try and to will. But what lacks the cause and reason of good, must necessarily be evil. By evil, however, I understand sin; because it is contrary to good. For it must be sin, which is adverse to good.

Then you run into that passage of the Apostle, "The Gentiles who do by nature the things of the law, having the law written in their hearts." To what purpose is this? You subjoin Augustine's interpretation, which does not help your opinion at all. "Although," you say, "he prefers those words to be understood of the reborn Gentiles, yet he does not disapprove of the opinion of others who understand them of unbelievers." And it is sufficiently established that this interpretation squares better with the Apostle's meaning. What will you now elicit from it? You bring forth these words of Augustine: "We read, or know, or hear of certain deeds of certain impious men, which according to the rule of justice we can not only not vituperate, but even deservedly and rightly praise; although if they are examined as to the end for which they are done, they are scarcely found to be such as deserve the due praise and defense of justice." Nothing truer could be said. They did many things which we ought deservedly to praise and admire: as what you commemorated a little while ago about that most brave and most upright man, Scipio. And there are many examples of such great virtues in profane histories. But because we ought to praise them, and cannot vituperate them, will you therefore conclude that they were good? As if the goodness of things is to be measured by our judgment, who have nothing explored except what appears outwardly. The things indeed are good, and worthy of great commendation: but what kind of actions they were, God can judge, who beholds the wills and thoughts of men. We, because we cannot penetrate into the minds and counsels of men, ought to praise those deeds which are truly good, if only the mind of the one doing them is good. It is not for us to examine for what end anything is done; this judgment must be reserved for God. This is certain at least, that a truly good work is that which, having sprung from a good principle, tends to a good end. But what Augustine said, that "they are scarcely found which deserve the praise of justice, if they are examined for what end they are done," you drag inopportunistically to this, as if the works of unbelievers sometimes deserve the praise of justice; because he does not say "never," but "scarcely." You press this too much, but in vain. For you fight with yourself, since a little before you affirmed from Augustine, that Christ when he said, "without me you can do nothing," spoke of works of justice; by which you insinuated that those who are devoid of grace can effect no work of justice. How then will their works deserve

the praise of justice? Thus you do not attend to what you say, so that you contradict and oppose yourself in almost the same place; for works of justice must necessarily deserve the praise of justice. But you deny that the works of unbelievers are works of justice, and truly so; and yet immediately you affirm that they sometimes deserve the praise of justice. You are not at all ashamed of this most vain contradiction. But let us proceed. Therefore, we confess with Augustine that the image of God in the human soul has not been so effaced that no extreme lineaments, as it were, have remained in it. For reason remains, and judgment, and some distinction of the honorable and the dishonorable: whence it can deservedly be said, as Augustine says, that “even in their very impiety of life they do or know some things of the law.” They both know and do certain things of the law, but not well: therefore, the things they do and know are not good, if they are examined by the standard of divine justice. But the material of the works is that which God has commanded and commended in his law. But surely impiety does not do a good work. But as for what Augustine says, that “the life of any the most wicked man is with greatest difficulty found without some good works,” you write that nothing could have been said more openly for your opinion. Why? For who was ever of a life so prodigiously nefarious and wicked that he did nothing just and right in his whole life? Thus the law of God is deeply impressed on human minds, that no wickedness could ever completely erase it. But they never do anything well, who lead their life in impiety. But good works are truly so, when they are both good, and done well. Wherefore you accomplish nothing, while you scrape together these things from Augustine so meagerly. Is anything left? Surely, and what most validly (you say) makes for you. Bring forth therefore at last this most valid bulwark of your defense. It is this, that Augustine denied the works of unbelievers to be good for no other reason than that they are not meritorious of eternal life. Do not now mix new questions into this disputation. Augustine thought that good works were meritorious of eternal life, not because by their own dignity they merit eternal life, as you teach, I know not whether more foolishly or more wickedly: but because God bestows the reward of eternal life on good works with gratuitous liberality. And Augustine felt that only those works are truly good which are of such a kind. When, therefore, he says that the works of unbelievers are of no avail for eternal life, he signifies that they are not good: nay, he even distinctly calls them sins. You now inquire, and teach us, how sins can be good works. Such is the goodness of your works, of which you are accustomed to boast so much. To you they seem good, but in reality they are sins, and yet on account of them you expect outstanding praise and reward. What that will be, is not difficult to estimate.

And here you wish to show why Augustine called those works sins: first, because they are generally done for a bad end; then, because they are not truly and perfectly good, and because they do not please God. And what work is called truly good, which is not truly good, and does not truly please God, or which is done with a bad mind and end? Surely Julian, although he defends the works of

unbelievers to be good, yet did not teach that they merit eternal life; nay, he called their virtues sterile, and when Augustine says he concedes that the works of unbelievers, which seem good to them, do not, however, lead them to eternal salvation and the kingdom. Therefore, Augustine wishes no work to be called good, “except that by which a man is led to the eternal gift and kingdom of God.” For it is necessary for those who walk in good works to arrive at the supernal kingdom. Therefore, Augustine is not only concerned, when he disputes against Julian, with detracting true justice and merit before God from the works of unbelievers, as you say (since Julian himself acknowledged the sterility of these works, nor did he attribute to them, I say, the grace of meriting), but he is wholly engaged in confirming against the Pelagians that all their works, however laudable in human judgment, are truly sins.

Next, you slip into saying that Augustine perhaps exceeded the measure in that disputation. For I have long expected this, that you would cast some reproach upon Augustine for having so excellently confuted the Pelagians. Did Augustine exceed the measure, because he dared to name the virtues of the heathens and unbelievers sins? He affirmed this, relying on those reasons, which no one but either a Pelagian or a Papist will resist. You will be able, by the same right, to accuse both Christ himself and the Apostles of Christ, that they exceeded the measure. For Augustine confirmed his opinion by their authority. But what you say, that he never said or wrote this, when he wrote not agonistically against an adversary but dogmatically, this has the purpose of persuading us that Augustine, in the disputation undertaken with Julian, progressed further by the ardor and heat of contention than the reason of truth permitted. But that this has been falsely and calumniously contrived by you, you will understand immediately. Now let us come to your remaining points. You say, therefore, that the conversion and continence of Polemon was said by Augustine to be a gift of God. Who would deny it? For it is to be attributed to a divine rather than a human work, that, moved by the oration of Xenocrates, from a drunken and intoxicated man he suddenly became modest and temperate. But you add: “Who would dare to say that a gift of God is a sin?” No one sane, I think, Stapleton. Not the gifts of God, but the works of men are sins. Thus Augustine: “The soul and the body and whatever good things are naturally inherent in the soul and the body, even in sinners, are gifts of God, since they themselves did not make these things. But of those things which they have done, it is said, ‘all that is not of faith is sin.’” They are sins, therefore, not as they are given by God, but as they are done by wicked men, who do not rightly use the good gifts of God.

Finally, you seize that reed-like dart, that the works of unbelievers are rewarded with an ample reward by God. Augustine indeed affirms this of the Romans, and it is true of all men: for God not only deigns to reward true virtues with eternal prizes, but also rewards the images of virtues abundantly and amply in this life. Wherefore, as Augustine says, “there is no reason for him to complain of the

justice of the highest and true God: they have received their reward." But that reward is contained within the limits of this life, and the prizes of present goods. For since God desires the safety and security of human society, he wished those things by which it is procured and conserved to be held in esteem. It does not follow, however, that the Romans were not sinners, because they obtained so great an empire by the gift of God on account of their good discipline and civil virtues, in which they excelled; nor does such a reward always argue true virtue, because it is only of true but perishable things. Let Augustine now come forth into the midst, and let he himself be heard proclaiming his opinion: especially in that accurate disputation against Julian, in which he treated this cause by design. Thus he says: "He is not veraciously called chaste, who does not for the sake of God preserve the faith of the marriage bond to his wife." And he immediately confirms this with this argument: "How is a chaste body asserted with true reason, when the soul itself fornicates away from the true God?" But that the soul of an unbeliever fornicates away from God, he (he says) can deny, who openly professes himself an adversary of the holy Scriptures. In such a soul, what true virtue do you think resides? A little later he subjoins: "Far be it that there be in anyone true virtue, unless he be just: but far be it that he be truly just, unless he live by faith." And again: "These virtues with such an end are foul and deformed, and therefore are in no way genuine and true virtues." Then soon: "but you, a learned man, are evidently deceived by the verisimilitude of those vices, which seem close to virtues, when they are as far from them as vices are from virtues." And he wisely advises: "Virtues are discerned from vices not by their duties but by their ends." Wherefore, "when a man does something where he does not seem to sin, if he does not do it for the reason he ought to do it, he is convicted of sinning." Then he uses such an argumentation: "If a gentile who does not live by faith has clothed the naked, freed one in peril, tended the wounds of the sick, spent his riches in honest friendship, and could not be compelled to false testimony even by tortures, I ask you whether he does these good works well or badly. For if, although they are good, he nevertheless does them badly, you cannot deny that he sins, who does anything badly. But because you do not wish him to sin when he does these things, you will surely say he does both good things and well. Therefore a bad tree produces good fruit, which the Truth teaches cannot happen." He then shows by many arguments that an unbelieving man is a bad tree, and concludes: "Their sins are those by which they do even good things badly, because they do them not with a faithful, but with an unfaithful, that is, a foolish and noxious will. What kind of will, no Christian doubting, is a bad tree, which can produce nothing but bad fruits, that is, only sins. For everything, whether you will it or not, which is not from faith, is sin." And he continues: "Therefore, understand what the Lord says, 'If your eye is evil, your whole body will be full of darkness: but if your eye is single, your whole body will be full of light'; and recognize this eye as the intention with which each person does what he does: and by this learn that he who does not do good works with the intention of good faith, his whole body, as it were, which

consists of those works as members, is full of darkness, that is, full of the blackness of sins." This seems to you to have been said too harshly, but the authority of Christ convinces that nothing truer could have been said.

These things indeed Augustine said in contention, but in a contention where he was defending truth against heresy. Nor do I think that Augustine ever spoke more sanely and more fittingly and accurately to the truth than in the disputations undertaken against heretics. For the audacity of his adversaries in contradicting aroused the sharp attention of his intellect. But because you say that he perhaps exceeded the measure in this contention, let us hear what he wrote in another book, and indeed with a mind most calm and free from partisan studies. He says: "This is established among the truly pious, that no one without true piety, that is, the true worship of the true God, can have true virtue: nor is that virtue true which serves human glory." And later more fully: "And therefore the virtues, which he seems to himself to have, by which he commands the body and vices to obtain or hold anything whatsoever, if he does not refer them to God, they are themselves vices rather than virtues. For although by some they are thought to be truly and honestly virtues, when they are referred to themselves, and are not sought for the sake of anything else, even then they are inflated and proud, and therefore are to be judged not virtues, but vices." You see that Augustine is consistent with himself in this matter, whether he was dealing with an adversary, or was writing with a free and untroubled mind. He even revokes what he had written in a certain book, that philosophers shone with the light of virtue, who were not endowed with virtue. Among the unbelievers, none were more excellent than the philosophers: and yet because they lacked faith and piety, Augustine defends that they were despoiled of virtues. The same man compares good works outside of faith to a very swift course off the path: and he says that what sinners work are evil merits and sins.

But lest you think that this was Augustine's private opinion, let us hear what others thought. Jerome says: "Let us do something similar to what is said, 'The just lives by faith,' and let us say, 'The chaste lives by faith, the wise lives by faith, the brave lives by faith'; and from the other parts of virtue let us bring forth a similar sentence against those who, not believing in Christ, think themselves to be brave, wise, and temperate, or just; so that they may know that no one lives without Christ, without whom all virtue is in vice." Behold the virtues of your unbelievers, in defending which you have put so much effort and labor. Prosper follows in their footsteps: "Without the worship of the true God, even that which seems to be virtue is sin: nor can anyone please God without God." But he who does not please God, whom does he please, if not himself and the Devil? And later: "I think that you are deceived by the verisimilitude of justice, and err in the appearance of false virtues, while you think that those goods which cannot be had except by the gift of God, are also found in the souls of the impious: for this reason, namely, because many of them are celebrators of justice, temperance, continence, and benevolence; all of which they have, not indeed in

vain, nor uselessly, and they obtain much honor and glory from them in this life. But because in these studies they serve not God but the Devil, although they may have a temporal reward from vain praise, they do not, however, pertain to that blessed and eternal truth. And so it is most manifestly clear that in the souls of the impious no virtue dwells: but all their works are unclean and polluted, having a wisdom not spiritual, but animal, not heavenly but earthly, not Christian, but diabolical, not from the Father of lights, but from the prince of darkness." Bernard also: "In vain have the wise men of this world disputed so much about the four virtues, which however they could not apprehend at all, since they did not know him who was made for us by God wisdom, justice, sanctification, and redemption." Among the Scholastics, Gregory of Rimini, a rich theologian, adheres tenaciously to Augustine. For he teaches that the philosophers and the ancient Romans and unbelievers, although they performed acts good in their kind, nevertheless did nothing for God's sake; and therefore their actions were not only not good, but even evil and vicious: which Gerson also taught quite openly. What of the fact that among the Tridentine Fathers there was not lacking a public and learned patron of the truth. For Gaspar Casalius, Bishop of Leiria, when he noted many errors of the Scholastics with ingenuity and freedom, also refuted this one concerning the virtues and good works of unbelievers most copiously. This, I think, is that curious Catholic, of whom you complained once and again above.

But now I think it has been sufficiently explained and confirmed by the testimonies of the greatest Doctors of the Church, that whatever unbelievers do, however outstanding and splendid it may seem, is evil and sin: because their actions in no way arise from faith, which is the fount of good works, nor are they referred to God, to whom all that we do ought to be referred. It was most truly written by Prosper: "No good work proceeds from the dead, no justice from the impious." Wherefore, Stapleton, while you contend that the works of unbelieving men are good, you not only diminish and obscure the original depravity of nature, but you also wickedly oppose the grace of Christ, which is the parent of virtues and of good things.

End of the second book.

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## BOOK THREE

### CHAPTER I. What is understood by the name of concupiscence in this controversy.

In the first place, it is necessary to inquire what and of what kind that concupiscence is about which there is controversy between us, and in what part of the soul it has its seat, and how widely it extends. Rightly, however, you say that by this name is not understood concupiscibility itself, which is a natural power. For it would be inept and impious to number concupiscence, which is wholly from the Devil, which God prohibits, which perpetually wages war with the spirit, among the faculties of the soul, all of which God created. That also is true, that this concupiscence is not merely carnal lust, as many have most absurdly thought. For it is engaged in many illicit desires, besides that delight and titillation of the flesh which we are accustomed to call lust. Tell now, therefore, in a word, what you think is finally understood by this name. The whole of sensuality, you say. But what does this sensuality contain and signify? You answer: the whole of that rebellion and depravity of the lower powers. You do not, therefore, think that concupiscence is only carnal lust, but you nevertheless circumscribe it by the compass of this flesh. For sensuality is named from sense: but sense pertains to the flesh and the body. And here you fight outstandingly and with the truth of the matter, both with us, and with your own, and with yourself. For this concupiscence, which we commonly call Original Sin, dominates much more in the mind than in sensuality: and has oppressed the higher powers of the soul more gravely than the lower. Chrysostom teaches copiously and beautifully that the soul is not drawn to sins by the body, but on the contrary, the body by the soul: so that whatever evils are in man are derived principally from the soul, and its chief part. The Apostle says that he would not have known concupiscence, unless the law had said, "You shall not covet." Therefore, he did not understand gross desires, which all by the light of reason know to be vicious; but the higher and subtle motions of the soul fighting with the Spirit. Christ says that from the heart within proceed evil thoughts, envy, blasphemy, pride: these, however, do not consist in the sense or the sensual part, but in the intellect. When Paul attributes a φρόνημα (a mindset) to the flesh, who does not see that what is highest and principal in man is designated by that name? For not the flesh, but the mind φρονεῖ (thinks), knows, considers, understands. For the mind of a man not reborn and restored is itself flesh. Thus Christ pronounces that what is born of the flesh is flesh, so that it is necessary for us either to be born again in the mind, or to be exiled forever from the kingdom of heaven. Wherefore Paul calls the carnal man by a quasi-synonymous word ψυχικὸν (natural/soulish): and bids us to be renewed in the spirit of our mind. Do you think that both νοῦν (mind) and πνεῦμα (spirit) are in this flesh? What will you decide about those words of Paul: "He is puffed up, knowing nothing, but doting about questions and strifes of words, from which arise envy, strife, railings, evil surmisings, perverse disputings of men of corrupt mind"? Do not these diseases adhere in the mind? and Paul calls these men corrupted not in the flesh or body,

but in the mind. Thus elsewhere he writes that certain men are rashly puffed up ὑπὸ τοῦ νοῦς τῆς σαρκός (by the mind of his flesh). The old interpreter translated it, “by the sense of the flesh,” not badly, if you take sense for intelligence. For the Apostle, by placing a νοῦν (mind) in the flesh, not obscurely included the primary and innermost part of man under the name of flesh. And that he may always be consistent with himself, so he calls those who are given to contention, and envy, and dissensions σαρκικούς (carnal), although these vices lie hidden within in the ultimate recess of the soul, and erupt from thence. Thus when he depicts the works of the flesh, he commemorates not only adultery, fornication, uncleanness, and lust, but also idolatry, enmities, strife, emulation, anger, contention, heresies. Badly, therefore, did our Sophists understand Paul, who place concupiscence, which they call the tinder of sin, in the sensible part, as in its own and proper seat. Andradius writes that this concupiscence dwells in the flesh as in a military tent, and from thence makes an attack on the mind. But Scripture teaches that its highest tabernacle is established in the mind.

Augustine, although he calls it carnal concupiscence, and evil desire, and illicit delight, yet shows openly enough that he does not think it consists in the sensual part alone, when he affirms that from it arises whatever is of sin in words, in deeds, in thoughts. For certainly we think with the mind, not with the flesh, and with the mind alone we sometimes sin, and most gravely. But let us hear an outstanding passage of Augustine. “These vices, which hold the chief place in the Devil, the Apostle attributes to the flesh, which it is certain the Devil does not have. For he says that enmities, contentions, emulations, animosities, envies, are works of the flesh: of all which evils the head and origin is pride, which reigns without flesh in the Devil.” Bellarmine, because he could not defend the contrary except with the most open and impudent error, concedes first that a similar vice is found in the higher part: soon, having become more polished, he writes that the vice of concupiscence, although principally in sensuality, nevertheless also has its seat in the mind; and that this seemed to be the view of Augustine, and Lombard, and the Scholastics: but surely not all of them. Finally, you yourself at last depart from your previous opinion. For you confess that the vices of the soul are called carnal by Paul. But since it is certain that the vices themselves of the soul flow from concupiscence, it is necessary that concupiscence also be found in the soul, and consequently not reside in sensuality alone. And you then adduce reasons from Augustine why those which are the proper sins of the soul are referred to the flesh and are counted among the works of the flesh: first, because they belong to the whole man, in whom there is flesh and soul; second, because the soul desires and does them according to the flesh, not the spirit. Both reasons prove that the kingdom of concupiscence is in the mind. But it is a solemn practice of Scripture to brand the whole unregenerate man, and whatever is outstanding and excellent in him, with the title of flesh, so that how inept he is for apprehending heavenly things and those which are of the spirit may be more clearly evident from the very notation of the word. Christ said to Peter, “Flesh and blood has not revealed this to you”: by flesh and blood

understanding reason itself, which, however acute it may be, can nevertheless never by itself penetrate into these mysteries. Indeed, what you say, that the flesh concupisces nothing without the soul, neither the learned nor the unlearned doubts, to speak with Augustine. For what does an inanimate flesh differ from a tree trunk? But Augustine wrote excellently that the flesh is said to concupisce, as the ear is said to hear, and the eye to see. "For who does not know," he says, "that the soul rather both hears through the ear and sees through the eye?" Wherefore he affirms that the flesh concupiscing against the spirit is said by the Apostle to be a carnal delight, which the spirit has from the flesh and with the flesh, against the delight which it has alone. Thus it is the spirit that concupisces, even when the flesh concupisces against the spirit: and the source of this concupiscence is to be sought in the mind, not in sensuality, as you, with the blind-as-a-bat sophists, ineptly and ridiculously opine.

But now let us come more closely to the matter which we have in hand. You say, therefore, that the question is not about the fruits of concupiscence themselves, which you confess to be sins, and that no one doubts this: but about concupiscence itself, and about its first act or motion, whether it is truly a sin in a baptized man. You distribute the matter thus:

1. First, there is in man concupiscence itself.
2. Then its act or motion, that is, some evil desire, with the mind, however, not consenting.
3. In the third place, consent is added, but a light one, which you say is a true sin indeed, but nevertheless venial.
4. Lastly, full consent follows, of which James says, "Sin, when it is finished, bringeth forth death."

The question, however, is not about consent, either full or inchoate, but about concupiscence which no consent of the will at all follows: that is, whether concupiscence in itself, or its first motion suddenly arising in the soul and immediately repressed, is to be held as a true sin.

Thus this whole controversy between us turns on habitual concupiscence, and its sudden act, which often erupts in us, not even with our consent, and even with us finding it troublesome and grievous. If even the slightest consent is added, you do not doubt that a sin has been committed. But surely in every act of concupiscence there is some consent, and as you say, complacency, and a motion of the will, is quite established. For no one desires what does not please: and as long as something pleases, it delights: but what floods the mind with delight, this it does with some consent. Nor was there no consent, because it vanished at once. Wherefore, if you consider the matter more accurately, you will find some consent in every motion of concupiscence. And this Ambrose, or rather Prosper, seems to me not obscurely to insinuate in these words: "That motion of the soul, which can never be without some love, that is, without some

will, has not lost its appetite, but has changed its affection, receiving by desire what it ought to have refuted by judgment.” But let us proceed to what follows.

## **CHAPTER II. The state of the controversy between the Protestants and the Papists.**

What the question is, has been understood. Now you will briefly expound your and your party's cause and opinion concerning this kind of concupiscence. You say, however, that this is the opinion of the Catholics, that that concupiscence which is left in the baptized, and its first motions, to which consent was lacking, are not indeed a good thing, as some Protestants lie about you. But why do you not name them, so that we might be able to understand whether they have lied? Certainly a certain Franciscan of Cologne, whom Melanchthon mentions, not obscurely testified that he believed concupiscence to be a good thing, since he wrote that it is the same if you should command that the flesh not concupisce as if you should prohibit the sun from shining and the fire from burning. For it is good that the sun should shine, and the fire should be hot; because this is agreeable to the nature of these things. And many others have affirmed this same thing similarly. But it is very gratifying, however, that you deny concupiscence to be a good thing: for I was somewhat afraid that you were not going to say that. You add that it is not an indifferent thing, as money is, but is in reality a thing in itself and by its nature neutral. We must be careful here not to be deceived. You deny that concupiscence is an indifferent thing, but you affirm that it is a neutral thing. But we are accustomed to call indifferent things neutral. But if it is a neutral thing, it is not bad in itself: but Augustine everywhere contends that it is bad and very bad, and calls it iniquity, and says that it is contrary to the divine law. But about the malice of this concupiscence, and the magnitude of this evil, we shall speak later. In the meantime, what do you mean, when you make concupiscence a neutral thing, but not an indifferent one? or what snares do you intend for us in the word? But do you not immediately deny that it is a neutral thing, when you write that it is a vice of nature, that it is a certain iniquity, and an obliquity against the dominion of the mind and the law of God, and that it is therefore displeasing to God? and do you think that those things are to be called neutral which are repugnant to the divine law, and displease God? But this is proper to sin, as we have shown before. Yet you constantly deny that in the reborn it is sin truly and properly: as if you were to say that it is sin, but yet neither truly nor properly. But speak more openly and confidently; and I would wish you to say either that it is truly sin, or that it is not sin at all. And indeed you say that it is not a thing of such a kind as to render the reborn person hateful to God in any way, or to be able to render him so: of which I do not deny the former (for although God hates sins in all, even the reborn; yet the reborn are not hateful to God, because all their sins are remitted and covered in Christ:) but the latter I can in no way concede: and about this is the whole controversy. For this concupiscence, if we look at its nature, since it is a true sin, as we are about to demonstrate in its proper place, would make all in

whom it is, hateful to God, unless it were remitted for Christ's sake. And you concede that it is called sin by the Apostle and the Fathers, not because it is truly what it is called, but figuratively, either because it is made from sin, and is its penalty, or because it is the cause of new sin, and not otherwise. This is the sum of your opinion: that concupiscence is not sin in the reborn, however often it is called sin by Paul, and Augustine, and the rest of the Catholic Fathers. We, on the contrary, defend that it is both called and is sin properly, and such indeed that it could bind the whole human race with the chains of eternal death, unless God were to forgive it, and absolve us of its guilt: then by the fault of this deeply inherent contagion it happens that the reborn can never in this life be pure from sins, but are compelled to acknowledge themselves sinners. Nay, this concupiscence casts a stain on all the works of the reborn, and so stains and pollutes them, that no one can hope that he will attain justice and salvation by his deeds. For it makes a man inept for the perfect observance of the law, which the justice of works necessarily requires. Now let us hear the proofs of your defense.

### **CHAPTER III. The proofs of the Papist opinion are refuted.**

1. You bring forward this first reason, which you commend to us as firm and solid, that concupiscence by itself and by its nature, separated from the consent of the will, would not be sin even in the non-reborn, were it not for the original injustice, which causes it to be voluntary in the non-reborn, namely, by the will of the first parent. Thus, therefore, you distinguish between concupiscence in the reborn and the non-reborn, that in the non-reborn it is joined with the consent of the will, whereas in the reborn the consent of the will is absent. To be sure, you thrust and confine concupiscence into sensuality, and grant it no place in the mind and will. But it primarily occupies the mind itself and the will, as has been sufficiently demonstrated above: and in the reborn as well as the non-reborn it is voluntary, except that in the reborn a new kind of will, contrary to this native and corrupt will, has begun to prevail. In infants, concupiscence does not appear, but yet it remains fixed in the deepest marrow, that is, in the very recesses of the soul. You confess that in the non-baptized it is a sin, because it is voluntary by Adam's will: but in the baptized, is it not voluntary in the same way? Was it therefore voluntary in Adam before Baptism, and after Baptism did it achieve this, that it is not voluntary even in Adam? But if it remains after Baptism and regeneration, it is necessary either that it has changed its seat, and has completely migrated from the will into another part disjoined from the will, or that it so lies hidden in the will that it cannot be exhausted, so that it infects it with its contagion. But does concupiscence in the reborn have no vice in itself, except that it was voluntary in Adam? Unless, indeed, Adam had voluntarily fallen, and we had sinned in Adam, no vicious concupiscence would be found in us. Does it follow, therefore, that concupiscence has

nothing vicious in itself, except that it was voluntarily contracted? But who does not know that there is in it an ἀταξίαν (disorder), and a manifold deformity, and an iniquity, which it retains even in the reborn. Therefore, there is a twofold flaw in the argument; the first, that since concupiscence has its own proper and inherent perversity, perpetually fighting with justice and the law of God, you measure its entire vice by the will of Adam, which was his own. The second, that you think the concupiscence of the reborn is entirely involuntary, which, however, it is certain not only remains in the will, but also allures, and moves, and bends the will. For if the will of the reborn were in every respect hostile to concupiscence, it would exterminate it entirely from its kingdom. Therefore, concupiscence, which remains in the reborn, although on account of remission it does not condemn, nor is it imputed as sin, yet if we wish to examine the causes and nature of sin, we shall understand that nothing is lacking to it which is required for the true nature of sin. And this is what Augustine writes in that place which you have cited in a mutilated way. “Such a great evil, merely because it is inherent, how would it not hold one in death and drag one to the ultimate death, unless its bond were loosed in that remission of all sins which occurs in Baptism?” Where Augustine calls this concupiscence in the reborn a great evil, and teaches that it could not but drag those in whom it is to eternal destruction, unless its bond were loosed. But its bond is its guilt: and it is loosed by remission. Surely, nothing could have been said more suited to our defense. For why would Augustine wonder that concupiscence does not condemn those in whom it inheres, if it were not a sin at all? For what can condemn us but sin? But he says that this damnation is prevented not by a full purgation or a total removal of the sin, but by remission. Remission grants indulgence and pardons the penalty, it does not remove or take away the fault in every act. Faith, which is joined with remission, and has illuminated our mind with the light of divine grace, has broken the strength of this sin, and in a way has cut its sinews, so that it does not fly about as freely and widely as it used to; but it did not bring it about that what is sin should be less so. Grace remits and enervates sin: but it does not make what was sin to be no longer sin.

And at this point you offer a distinguished specimen of your theology. You say that sensuality in the impious and non-regenerate is imputed as sin, rather than being truly and properly sin: wherefore I am now less surprised that concupiscence in the regenerate is so greatly excused by you. How shall I try to convict you with other arguments than by your own testimony? For thus you write afterwards: “Concupiscence had the stain of sin before Baptism, both because of the offense of Adam, and because of its dominant impulse in us.” We are therefore stained, and by the impulse of our own desire we are carried astray. But what do you say? Is not concupiscence in the non-regenerate a sin properly and in reality? And is not the original vice a sin in the reality of the

thing? Do you now so extenuate Original Sin as to think that it consists chiefly in imputation? Did Christ come, not to bring remission of a true sin, but to take away the imputation of another's sin? Does Baptism not wash away Original Sin, but remove the imputation of the first transgression? Do so many perish not so much on account of their own sins, as on account of the imputation of that sin which was committed by another? What could be said more absurd or more at odds with divine justice? How little difference is there now between your impious opinion and that of Durandus and Pighius, who constitute Original Sin in guilt, that is, in imputation? But the proper nature of sin consists in ἀνομία (lawlessness), as you yourself, thinking of something else, previously conceded. But concupiscence has, it cannot be said, how much ἀνομίας, which shows itself whenever opportunity is offered. How solid your argument is, which rests on this foundation, who cannot know?

Again you adduce Augustine, but against yourself. Augustine says that concupiscence is “forgiven in Baptism, not so that it ceases to be, but so that it is not imputed as sin.” Rightly indeed. Is concupiscence therefore in the baptized person, but not imputed as sin? And what is usually imputed as sin, if not sin? It remains, therefore, Augustine says, with the guilt loosed; that is, it does not make us guilty, even though it remains. For Augustine asks why a baptized parent begets carnal offspring: and he teaches that this happens because, although concupiscence in the baptized and regenerated parent is remitted, and its guilt is loosed, yet it itself remains. So in another place he says that this law of sin, which he also calls the law of concupiscence, remains after its guilt is loosed; and he teaches by whom it is loosed, namely by those who have begun to be renewed. For this sin is remitted to none but those who begin to be renewed in the spirit of their mind. But in that he says that they have begun to be renewed, he teaches that these are but the beginnings of renewal, and that much remains which needs renewal: but only sin is contrary to this renewal. And so he says in the same place that this sin remains in the members of those who are born again of water and the spirit, not as completely overcome and destroyed, but as though overcome and destroyed: which sufficiently shows that this sin lives in the reborn, and is too powerful; because it can neither be entirely destroyed nor overcome. As for what Augustine says, that “concupiscence, even when dead, rebels, until it is healed by the perfection of the sepulcher,” do you not see how much it makes against you? For he says it is dead, because it does not itself inflict death; meanwhile, unless it lived and thrived, and had more than enough strength in itself, it could not rebel. All rebellion is sin: and this concupiscence will never cease to rebel, until it has been buried. Now as for your saying that the Protestants deny that anything voluntary contributes to the nature of sin, it is a huge calumny. For certainly we concede that will is required for sin, and no one has ever sinned unwillingly, and we say with Augustine, “It is most true that sin cannot exist without the will”: but Original Sin was propagated from the will of Adam, in whom we sinned, not contracted by our own new will. And you yourself affirmed this a little earlier. For you were saying that concupiscence in

the non-reborn is sin, even without any will of their own. Which you should not have said; or we, because we say nothing else, should not have been censured.

2. You subjoin another proof, which you say is no less firm. And I believe it: for nothing weaker, or even more inept, could have been brought forward than that. This one now depends entirely on the grace of Baptism. For you say that all the guilt of sensuality is completely removed by Baptism. But, I ask, are you now so plainly insane or seriously foolish as to maintain that the power of Baptism is to be circumscribed by sensuality? Does Baptism not penetrate beyond the appetite? Or do the mind and will not need Baptism? All things, I suppose, are pure and whole enough in that part. But the Apostle wishes us to be renewed in the spirit of our mind; and Baptism is the stipulation of a good conscience: and unless we are wholly reborn of water and the spirit, we shall never enter into the kingdom of God. Have you not, therefore, deserved excellently of the benefit of Christ and this divine Sacrament by that argumentation? For if Baptism removes the guilt of sensuality alone, either there was nothing else vicious in man besides, or whatever vice there is, remains, or is healed by another kind of remedy than the blood and Spirit of Christ. All of which, how outstandingly absurd they are, there is no one who does not see.

But let us come to your argument from Baptism. You say, however, that you have two things to demonstrate diligently. The one, that in Baptism all sins are taken away; the other, that they are so taken away that the man remains truly just and dear to God. As if we doubted either of these, or as if anything were more certain to us than both of them. You should have spared, therefore, this labor and diligence, and rather have diligently applied yourself to this, to demonstrate that because in Baptism all sins are taken away, that is, are remitted, therefore no vice remains in the baptized. But let us hear the Scriptures which you adduce. The Apostle says, "Through Baptism we put on Christ": also that "Christ dwells in our hearts by faith." What will you effect from this? That those who have put on Christ are so pure and void of all sin that not even a stain adheres? Why then does John so openly say that they lie who have said that they have no sin? Wherefore, either they can put on Christ who have not plainly cast off all viciousness: or no man in this life is to be thought to have put on Christ, because no one can be without sin. But they are said to have put on Christ who believe in Christ, and are clothed with the righteousness of Christ, and are governed by the spirit of Christ: which no one is ignorant is true of many, who have not yet washed away all the stains of sins.

You adduce another place of the Apostle in which he writes, "We are buried together with Christ into death": and "we have also been planted in the likeness of his death." We are indeed buried together with Christ through Baptism, but in part. For if we lay wholly in this sepulcher, no depravity would remain. Now who ever, while living, was so buried with Christ that he felt no life and force of

concupiscence in himself? As for what Augustine says, “Just as a true death occurred in him, so in us a true remission of sins: and just as in him a true resurrection, so in us a true justification,” who does not acknowledge it? For we do not posit a remission of sins and a justification that is not true or is feigned. Remission of sins and justification are indeed always most true, even if we languish with the remnants of the old sin, and are afflicted by new sins. For justification consists not in the perfection of our virtues, but in the remission of sins. Again you bring forward the Apostle, who says, “The Church was cleansed by the washing of water”; from which Baptism is also called the washing of regeneration. What is this to the matter? The Church was cleansed by the washing of water. For the remission of sins first makes it so that no sin is imputed; then that holiness is begun in us, which has perpetual progress, until Christ shall have wiped away every spot and wrinkle, and made us a glorious Church, which we await in our fatherland. Hear Augustine: “Wherever I have mentioned the Church not having spot or wrinkle, it is not to be so understood as if it already is, but as that which is being prepared to be, when it shall appear also glorious.” Thus again the same man previously: “What I said, that God chose for himself a glorious Church not having spot or wrinkle, I did not say it because it is now in every part already such, although it is not doubted that it was elected for this purpose, that it should be such, when Christ shall appear, who is its life.” and then she herself also will appear with him in glory. And Jerome writes that “true and spotless perfection is preserved in the heavens.” And yet the Church in Baptism has received a true remission of sins and a true justification.

And this same thing must be decided concerning the words of the Prophets brought forward by you. Micah says, “God will cast all our sins into the depth of the sea.” And Ezekiel, “I will pour clean water upon you, and you shall be cleansed from all your filthiness.” For then God casts our sins into the depth of the sea, when he forgives them: and then we are sprinkled with pure water, and are freed from all filthiness, when the righteousness of Christ is imputed to us, and we are formed to a true obedience and newness of life. For certainly the sins of men are not so cast into the sea, nor are all filthinesses so utterly taken away, that anyone can say his heart is pure, that nothing is found in him by which God can be offended, that he, whole as he is, is just and holy. In the same way is to be understood what the Apostle writes, that those who had been fornicators and idolaters are now washed, sanctified, justified. For both their former sins had been pardoned, and a new seed of sanctity was growing in them: but yet how far they were from perfect sanctity, the Apostle declares in the whole Epistle: and he even calls them carnal, and convicts them of being implicated in many errors and vices. Meanwhile, who doubts that all crimes are pardoned in Baptism? which you, as if you were treating that question, confirm with the authority of Jerome. An outstanding debater, indeed, who cannot see how much difference there is between the pardon of sins and the full cleansing of all sins.

But as for what the Apostle says, "There is now nothing of damnation to them that are in Christ Jesus," you interpret it thus: that there is in them nothing worthy of damnation. But who would not think you worthy of great reprehension, for daring thus to pervert the mind of the Apostle? For how many things in us are worthy of damnation, that mournful utterance of the Apostle which preceded, "O wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" plainly declares. What cause of death, what cause of misery do you think there is, if not sin? But that we perish not, who have in us so many causes of damnation, is due to the mercy of God, who has most clemently pardoned all our sins in Christ, and has communicated to us the righteousness of Christ. This alone can deliver us from damnation, because it alone satisfies the law, which pronounces no one just, unless he has performed all things. But your righteousness, which you defend, what kind of righteousness is it, I pray? You define a man as just even before God, who has more virtues than vices. A fine righteousness of the Papists, which they may kiss, in which they may rest, which they may proclaim with such full cheeks. A Stapletonian just man is a man composed of vices and virtues, who has no more virtues, or little more than vices. A sentiment worthy of such a theologian. For indeed, the righteousness which is to defend us from the curse of the law ought to be absolute in all its parts, mixed with no vices, such as the condition of the law requires. But let us return to Paul. He does not say that in the reborn there is nothing worthy of damnation, nor that in the reborn there is no sin remaining, but that there is "nothing of damnation," because they are in Christ Jesus, who has deigned them his righteousness and spirit: but they are to be judged to be in Christ who walk according to the spirit, not the flesh. For those to whom sins are remitted, and the righteousness of Christ is imparted, are instructed by the Spirit to lead a life in virtue.

Finally, you urge that we are called the holy temple of God, and our bodies members of Christ: and we are named and are the sons of God. You bring nothing new. For it does not follow, because we are holy, and the temple of God, and members of Christ, and sons of God, that therefore no sin dwells in us, which of itself deserves divine offense. Christ taught us and commanded us always to pray for the remission of sins: which formula of prayer he would never have handed down to us, if after we had begun to be sons of God, we were immediately quit of all sin. And John, who says that we are named and are the sons of God, yet forewarned us to beware lest we should think that there is no sin in us. But we are made sons of God when, our sins being remitted by the gift of Christ, we are received into the grace of God, and are imbued with the spirit of Christ: which spirit, to be sure, wages a perpetual war with the sin inherent in us; so that you may understand that sin remains and is in the sons of God.

Next you object the consensus of the Fathers, all of whom you say teach the same thing with one voice. For if they taught otherwise, they would not be Catholic Fathers: but they teach nothing against us. For we do not envy Baptism

those encomiums which have been bestowed on it by the holy Fathers. Nazianzen says that "the purgation of every single sin, and the complete rejection of the foulness which has entered from depravity, is contained in Baptism." For who doubts that all our sins, whatsoever we have committed throughout our whole life, are pardoned in Baptism, and that we are made as pleasing and dear to God as if we were completely innocent? And this is what Chrysostom writes, that one recently baptized is "purer than the sun's rays." This must necessarily be understood of the remission of sins. For you yourselves concede that concupiscence remains, which is like the seed and spark of vices: yet in the sun there is nothing dark or dusky. We are pure, therefore, and purer than the sun, on account of remission, and the imputation of the righteousness of Christ, but not on account of the inherent purity in ourselves, which indeed, on account of the manifold admixture of filth, can scarcely be deservedly compared to the spotted light of the moon. Of this kind is what Dionysius calls Baptism "the mother of adoption": Clement of Alexandria, a "healing medicine": Basil, "the grace of adoption": Ambrose, "the pascha of Christians": Chrysostom, "the purgatory of this life." For who does not know by what great titles Baptism is everywhere distinguished? Nazianzen could hardly satisfy himself in collecting epithets. "Baptism," he says, "is the splendor of souls, a change of life for the better, an inquiry of conscience toward God, a help for our infirmity, the casting off of the flesh, the aspiration of the spirit, the participation of the word, the restoration of the creature, the deluge of sin, the communication of light, the repulsion of darkness, a vehicle to God, a pilgrimage with Christ, the support of faith, the perfection of the mind, the key of the heavenly kingdom, the abrogation of servitude, the loosing of chains, the conversion of the composition and coagulation to a better state." For no one will be able to explain sufficiently in any words the dignity and virtue of this Sacrament.

But you say that Augustine wrote most clearly of all on this matter, and always impugned our opinion, even when he could have sustained it quite conveniently against the Pelagians. But although it may be possible that sometimes Augustine did not defend himself conveniently enough, since it is most difficult to hold a middle way between the Manichaeans and the Pelagians, so as not to deflect too much to one side; yet I would not refuse to appeal to the perpetual opinion and judgment of Augustine. For how false it is what you say, that he always taught most distinctly that concupiscence in the baptized is in no way truly and properly called sin, I shall hereafter make it so that all may most clearly perceive. Now as to that calumny of the Pelagians, that by Baptism crimes are not removed but scraped, with what face can you say that this is the doctrine of the Protestants? We with Augustine freely respond, "Who but an unbeliever would affirm this?" but what was the cause, or what the pretense of this Pelagian calumny? To be sure, Augustine had often and distinctly written that concupiscence remains after Baptism; and he had named it a bad thing, an iniquity, and a sin; and he had demonstrated that even a baptized man is very far from the perfect holiness and justice such as was in Adam. This the heretics

tried to turn to popular envy, as if he had taught that by Baptism sins were only scraped, not completely removed. But if Augustine had said perspicuously, as our Adversaries contend that he said, and as they themselves most pertinaciously defend, that concupiscence after Baptism is in no way a sin, that manner of teaching would have offered them no handle for calumny. Therefore, the very maliciousness of the Pelagian calumny declares that Augustine felt the same as we do about this concupiscence.

But how does he refute this calumny of the Adversaries? Thus he says: "We say that Baptism gives indulgence for all sins and takes away crimes, not scrapes them." He denies that concupiscence is sin in the reborn, since its guilt has passed away, although it remains in act. For thus he defines sin in the same place: "Sins are those things which, according to the concupiscence of the flesh or ignorance, are illicitly done, said, thought, which, even when past, hold the guilty, if they are not remitted." But concupiscence, although it is a sin, yet because it has been remitted in Baptism, does not hold guilty those in whom it is. And elsewhere he hands down this same thing more openly. "Baptism," he says, "indeed washes away all sins, absolutely all: but it does not take away the infirmity, which the regenerated person resists." Baptism therefore leaves something, which must be perpetually resisted. But nothing can be imagined which a regenerated and holy man ought to resist out of the duty of piety, and insofar as he is regenerated, except sin. Augustine subjoins: "Have we not been regenerated, adopted, and redeemed through the holy font? and yet there remains a regeneration, adoption, redemption, which we must now patiently await to come at the end, so that then we may be in no part children of this world." Thus something will always adhere, which, as long as we live in this world, makes us in part children of this world: so that it is necessary for us to aspire to a more perfect and fuller regeneration. Concerning Baptism he also writes thus: "Whoever now attributes to it that which indeed we are to receive through it, but yet afterwards, cuts off hope." What is that, I ask, which we receive through Baptism indeed, but yet afterwards? The completion of our regeneration. But the mind, as long as it does not arrive at the summit of holiness, which we lost in Adam and expect more fully, always labors with sin. At length Augustine says: "The salvation of man was made in Baptism, because what sin he drew from his parents was forgiven, or whatever also he properly sinned before Baptism." Where you see the grace of Baptism is contained in the remission of sins. In another place the same Augustine says: "Baptism heals the one vitiated from guilt immediately, from infirmity gradually." Again he says: "the guilt of concupiscence is immediately abolished in Baptism, but the infirmity is not immediately healed." But you shall hear things still plainer: "Only a full and perfect remission of all sins is made by Baptism, but the quality of the man himself is not wholly changed at once." Then, however, the quality of the whole man will be changed, when sin shall have completely departed. Thus Augustine perpetually attributes nothing else to Baptism but a full, true, perfect remission of all sins. And this is what he affirms in that same place which you

commemorate: “Grace makes a man perfectly new, inasmuch as it itself leads to the immortality of the body and full felicity. It also now perfectly renews man, as far as pertains to the liberation from all sins whatsoever, not as far as pertains to the liberation from all evils.” Thus indeed he often calls concupiscence after Baptism not a sin, because by remission its stimulus has been taken away, by which it inflicted a mortal wound. Now recall what you have at last found in Augustine that does not agree with our opinion, and cease to hurl a putrid calumny from the barbershop against us.

3. Your final argument is from Augustine, whom you try to draw to our side, and that with the utmost impudence. But surely if you cannot without impudence deny that Augustine is ours in this cause, as is now sufficiently perceived, and I shall shortly make more manifest. But how do you now argue from Augustine? First you say that he never denies that the just are without sin. Then, that he never teaches that we should pray against concupiscence and its motions, to which one does not in the least consent. Concerning the former, I can convince you with such open and many testimonies, that I marvel at your signal ignorance, or audacity. Everywhere Augustine affirms, disputes, and proclaims with the greatest contention, that no man, not even the most just, is at any moment of his life pure from sin. Has not at least that passage of Augustine stuck in your memory, which is so well-known and celebrated in the disputation of all? “Paul does not say, ‘Let it not be,’ but ‘Let it not reign.’ As long as you live, it is necessary for sin to be in your members: at least let its kingdom be taken away.” Does he not here openly deny that any mortal is without sin? does he not say that sin is so in us and adheres to us, as long as we live, that it cannot be completely extirpated? For he says, “it is necessary for sin to be in us, as long as we live”: which because the Apostle understood sufficiently, he did not command that we be without all sin, but that we not allow sin to reign in us. And are not these the words of Augustine? “Examine any very just man in this life: although he is now worthy of that name, he is not, however, without sin.” What do you seek? Augustine does not deny that the just are without sin, you say. Who would say this, unless one who could say anything for the sake of profit? But Augustine denies it, and so distinctly denies it, that there is no place for calumny. “No just man,” he says, “is without sin in this life, not even a very just one, and he who is worthy of that name, if he were to be examined.” What? Does the just man always consent to concupiscence? You would not say so: but he is never without sin, however great progress he may have in virtue. Therefore, concupiscence after Baptism, even without consent, is sin. But this will be explained more fully from Augustine hereafter. For now, it was enough to have refuted your lie with the testimony of a single passage.

The same confession is made by Orosius, who was either a colleague or a disciple of Augustine, *C. de arb.*: “Because I am not in Paradise, and I remain in the land of Adam’s pilgrimage, I do not believe myself to be without sin.”

Concerning the other matter, I will not contend much. Augustine does indeed affirm that we do not pray daily for our sins to be forgiven on account of the concupiscence that was remitted in Baptism, but on account of other sins which flow from that concupiscence as from a perennial spring. *ad Bonif. l. 1. c. 13. & alibi*. But did he therefore think that this concupiscence is not a sin, or could he have so remarkably disagreed with himself? He therefore denies that we say, “forgive us our debts,” on account of this concupiscence, because its guilt has already been consumed by the washing of regeneration, as he distinctly says.

Although the Apostle teaches that we must pray perpetually for the remission of original sin even after Baptism, when he says, “Wretched man that I am! Who will deliver me from this body of death?” It is fitting for us to pray against that which we desire to be delivered from; but we desire to be delivered and freed from this concupiscence, as from a troublesome guest who never ceases to wage internal hostilities with us; therefore, it is necessary to pray against this concupiscence. But Augustine thought this to be less necessary, because it has already been completely remitted in Baptism. So David, when he confesses that he was born and conceived in sin, what else does he do but pray against original sin? And yet it had been remitted before, and this was established for him by faith and the sacrament of circumcision.

Wherefore, when the Lord taught his followers to pray for the remission of sins, it is not to be thought that Original sin is excepted and excluded from that prayer, not even after Baptism, since it never ceases to stir up depraved desires in us and to provoke us to sin with its allurements. *Aug. epist. 29*. But how much more correctly Augustine says elsewhere: “Because of that original vice, however much we may have progressed, it is necessary for us to say, ‘Forgive us our debts,’ since all things said, done, and thought have already been forgiven in Baptism.”

#### **CHAPTER IV. The Arguments of the Protestants from the Scriptures are set forth.**

You recall those testimonies of the Scriptures which were adduced by Chemnitz; and there is no need to seek for anything clearer than these. In the sixth chapter to the Romans, the Apostle calls concupiscence sin at least five times; in the seventh, six times; in the eighth, three times. *Rom. 6 & 7 & 8*. In the epistle to the Hebrews, it is called “the sin that so easily entangles us.” *Hebr. 12.1*. You say that Augustine perpetually and constantly responds that it is called sin either because it was made by Original sin, just as speech is called tongue, and writing is called hand; or because it produces sin if its desires are obeyed. And what must that be like, which not only has arisen from sin, but also always inclines, impels, and

draws towards sin? But what if Augustine, in a single turn of phrase, affirms that this concupiscence is both the punishment of sin, the cause of sin, and sin itself? *l. 2. cont. Iul. c. 3.* Do you recognize these words of Augustine: “The concupiscence of the flesh, against which the good spirit lusts, is both sin, and the punishment of sin, and the cause of sin”? I omit the rest, until the return to Augustine. This passage has always troubled the sophists; and no wonder, since it so clearly contradicts their fictitious reasonings. But what if Augustine had thought what you, with a great lie, affirm that he perpetually and constantly thought? Ought we not to grant so much faith to the Apostle that what he so many times called sin, and depicted with the proper marks and colors of sin, we should say is truly sin? Does not Paul far surpass Augustine? And Paul has expressed himself neither ambiguously nor obscurely, so that all might be able to understand that he was speaking of true sin. For as Chemnitz rightly observed, that manifold description by Paul proves a true sin. *in tract. de reliquiis pecc. Orig.* As, first, that it is not good. *Rom. 7. 18. & 19.* Secondly, that it is an evil that surrounds us. *v. 21.* Thirdly, that it is a privative evil, because on account of it, the good is not accomplished in us. Fourthly, that it is a positive evil, because it rebels against the law of the mind and forces one to do what he hates. *Rom. 7. 15 & 23.* Fifthly, that it conflicts with the commandment, “You shall not covet.” Sixthly, that because of this evil the Apostle exclaims, “Wretched man that I am! Who will deliver me from this body of death?” *Rom. 7. 24.* Seventhly, that it is an evil to be crucified, mortified, and put off. *Gal. 5. 24. Col. 3. 5. 9.* Lastly, because iniquity fights against the law, and therefore it is necessarily sin, according to that saying of John, “Everyone who commits sin also commits lawlessness; and sin is lawlessness.” *1 John 3:4.* These things were indeed gravely and truly disputed by him, and they can persuade anyone who is not contentious to believe that this concupiscence is a much more atrocious thing than you teach. But since you cannot acquiesce, come, bring forth whatever you have to say against it, and we will either satisfy you or, what will not be a great task, we will dispel your slanders.

#### **CHAPTER V. The Response of the Papists to the foregoing arguments is refuted.**

To the first, second, and third points, you respond that those words declare not malice or depravity, but infirmity and defect. For the good that does not dwell in our flesh is the good of perfection; and the evil that is present is the evil of infirmity; and the good that is not accomplished is to not covet at all, which we do not attain in this life. For that is true perfection, not only to be free from all sins, but also from the allurements and desires of sins, and not only not to sin, but also to love God most perfectly. And you say this is that good which Paul complained was lacking in him. But Paul did not merely complain that he had not yet attained the highest happiness and perfection, so as to be free from all concupiscence and to love God so much that he could not love Him more. It is something far different that the Apostle bore so bitterly and gravely. For to have

not yet reached the highest degree of perfection would not have been so troublesome to him, if no other inconvenience and trouble had been added in the meantime. But in the meantime, to be enticed and infested by sin, and to be inflamed with depraved desires, and not to be able to shake off the innate and internal evil, so that it would not remain fixed in his nature, and dwell within, and refuse to be quiet, this is what he so vehemently grieved and deplored. What else did he mean by those words, "I know that in me (that is, in my flesh) nothing good dwells," except that sin clings to his very nature? Everyone knows that by the flesh is understood the carnal state of man; but the good of which he speaks is the good of grace. He says, therefore, that he knows both that much of the flesh still remains, and that in this flesh no good dwells; nay, that evil is present with him, so that he not only does not do the good that he wants, but he even does the evil that he does not want, and that he hates. *Rom. 7. 15. 20.* Now what is worthy of hatred but sin? But what a pious mind hates, cannot but be hateful to God; but a pious mind hates the evil that dwells in the flesh: therefore, in a reborn man God hates something, contrary to what was defined in the Council of Trent. *Concil. Trid. Sess. 5. de pecc. Orig.* Unless perhaps we shall say that Paul hated something in himself which God judged worthy of no hatred, which cannot be, since he says that he delights in the divine Law according to the inner man. Therefore, God hates and condemns something in the reborn. He who does what he hates, his mind abhors what he does; therefore, he does not consent: yet he hates it. There is therefore an evil in us, which deserves hatred even when consent is not added.

To the fourth argument, you respond that the depravity that opposes the mind is not of the mind itself, but only of the flesh, and it holds only the flesh captive in the reborn, not the mind. Nothing more obtuse could have been answered. For firstly, sin does not dwell in the substance of the flesh, but in the soul; secondly, what rebels against the mind and holds it captive must necessarily be active in the mind itself. And when God commanded not to covet, did He prescribe the law to the flesh or to the mind? Are you not aware that there are many depraved concupiscences of the mind, and that they are much keener than those of the flesh? Therefore, the Apostle speaks primarily of that law of sin which had its seat in his mind itself, and held it, though not consenting, and besieged it. For the Apostle, who diligently restrained such concupiscences as much as anyone else, and did not obey them in the least, nevertheless confessed that he was held as if captive by the Law of sin, which was in his members. Thus Paul says, "For the mind of the flesh is enmity against God." *Rom. 8. 7.* But is not understanding a function of the mind? Thus, there is in man's mind and intelligence a carnal mindset (φρόνημα σαρκικόν). *Bellarmin. de amiss. grat. l. 5. c. 10.* But Bellarmine understands by the prudence of the flesh an excessive care and solicitude for providing those things which are useful and pleasant to the flesh, as if the Apostle in this place were disapproving of an anxious thought about the flesh and for the flesh. I am amazed that a man not ignorant of the Greek language should have hallucinated so childishly. For φρόνημα σαρκός (the mind of

the flesh) necessarily signifies the sense which the flesh supplies, not that which is referred to the flesh. And the Apostle opposes τὴν σάρκα (the flesh) to τῷ πνεύματι (the spirit), and says that those who are according to the flesh mind the things of the flesh, and those who are according to the spirit, the things of the spirit. From which it is manifest that the whole of that sense is to be understood which is born from the concupiscence of either the flesh or the mind. Now, to care for the skin is but one vice of the carnal man. There are many other things besides, which he thinks of, to which he is impelled, on which he focuses, and in which he indulges.

To the fifth, you respond, and, as you say, with Augustine, that concupiscence itself is forbidden in the Decalogue, and yet it is not a sin in the reborn. By this response you could excuse all the concupiscences of the reborn: indeed, you could free the reborn from every bond of the Law. For if it is not a sin in them to covet what is forbidden by the last commandment, why can they not without sin perpetrate what is also forbidden and condemned by other commandments? And in this way, nothing, however greatly contrary to the Law, will have the nature of sin in the reborn. How unworthy a response for a theologian this is, therefore, that what is forbidden by the Law is not a sin in the reborn? As if sin were to be judged not by the interdict of the Law, but by persons. Or is it that, just as it is not a sin in the reborn, so it is not forbidden in the reborn? But you concede that this too is forbidden, which you deny to be a sin in the reborn. I pass over how impious it is not to be willing to acknowledge guilt in that which is forbidden by the Law. Jerome says something far different: "Where there is a command, there is also sin; where there is sin, there is offense; where there is offense, there is death." You think that a command can be violated without sin, without offense, without punishment. But you say there are two reasons why the Law has forbidden concupiscence, even if it is not a sin in the reborn. The first is that since the Decalogue was given to restore the Law of nature, which was almost extinct, this had to be expressed in the Decalogue. And it ought, you say, not to obligate, but by way of doctrine. Therefore, that Law does not obligate the reborn, and the reborn can covet with impunity, while the Law forbids it? What? Does this Law never obligate? For you say that this is expressed in the Law, but not so as to obligate. Therefore, I suppose, no one is obligated by this Law; and it was passed only to teach, not to obligate. Do you not see the miserable absurdity of this response? But what does it teach? "Whither we must run, and to what we must strive," as Augustine often says. So it is, indeed. But because it teaches that we must aspire to the point of not coveting at all, does it therefore excuse those who in the meantime covet assiduously? But God created us such that we could desire nothing against His will; and because we ought always to look and strive to this, that we be tempted by no concupiscence, this sufficiently proves that concupiscence in any man is allied to guilt. And the precepts of the Law not only admonish us what sort of people we ought to be, but they condemn whatever in us is not consonant with this state; for they pertain to this life, not the future one. Wherefore, what the Law says, "You shall not covet," not only shows that we

shall at some point not covet, but that we sin if we do covet, which indeed we necessarily do.

The second reason is that concupiscence is forbidden in the Decalogue, but to the mind itself and the whole man, you say, not to the flesh. But is it not forbidden to the flesh to covet? Therefore the flesh will covet with impunity against the spirit. But how is it not forbidden to the flesh, what you affirm to be forbidden to the whole man? But you rightly say that concupiscence is forbidden to the mind in the Decalogue. Therefore, there are also concupiscences of the mind, and they are to be counted as sins, because they are forbidden in the Decalogue. But the flesh, you say, opposes the written Law, because the flesh covets; and yet you deny that it is forbidden to the flesh to covet. What written Law, then, forbids concupiscence to the flesh, besides the Decalogue? And if the Law does not forbid concupiscence to the flesh, how does the coveting flesh oppose the Law? These are strange things; and no one speaks thus, except those who either do not understand themselves, or do not wish to be understood by others. But what of the mind of the reborn? It, you say, consents to the Law, because it wills not to covet. The reborn person indeed wills not to covet, and approves the Law that forbids coveting. But he covets nevertheless, because what he does not will, he does. You add, "Therefore the reborn person, in every concupiscence to which he does not consent, keeps that law which says, 'You shall not covet.'" But he who wishes to keep this Law, it behooves him not only not to consent to his concupiscences, but not to covet at all. For the law does not say, "You shall not consent to concupiscences," but "You shall not covet." Therefore, the reborn, because they resist and struggle against their concupiscences, do not thereby keep the Law; but because they covet what the law forbids, they violate the Law, and incur sin, and can bring forth nothing to prevent them from confessing themselves to be sinners. But after you said, "The reborn person, in every concupiscence to which he does not consent, keeps the Law," you immediately add that clause, "He keeps it, I say, as far as is sufficient to be immune from transgression." You always speak perplexedly and ambiguously, as those who defend bad cases are wont to do. First you say that he keeps the Law which says, "You shall not covet." Then you add a correction, "as far as is sufficient," which proves that the law has not in fact been kept. Lastly, you wish that persuasion to reside in the minds of your followers, that they have not transgressed the Law who do not perfectly keep the Law. But the Law requires sincere, perfect, supreme obedience. For God is to be loved with the whole heart, with all one's strength, with the whole mind. If this were done, not only would concupiscence not be consented to, but no concupiscence at all would be left in our mind or flesh. Therefore, they can never be immune from transgression who covet against the Law and the spirit, however much what was coveted may displease them. For the Law simply forbids all concupiscence, whether you assent or not. It is indeed worse to covet with delight; but to covet itself is evil in itself, however little consent or delight may be in it. For unless sin remained in our nature, there would be no motion in the whole man not in

harmony with the Law. But whatever is contrary to the Law must necessarily be condemned by the Law. This was your twofold response, but it is not consistent with itself. For in the first, you say that concupiscence is forbidden in the Decalogue, but is not a sin in the reborn; in the second, that concupiscence is forbidden in the Decalogue to the mind itself, and to the whole man. But if it is forbidden to the mind and to the whole man, it will certainly be a sin in the reborn. For nothing but sin is forbidden by the Law. *Bellarminus de amissione gratiae et statu peccati l. 5. c. 10.* Bellarmine responds a little differently. Let us therefore now deal with him briefly.

But first let us set forth the passage of the Apostle. Thus, therefore, the Apostle says, "I did not know sin, except through the Law. For I would not have known concupiscence, unless the Law had said, 'You shall not covet.'" In which words he distinctly names concupiscence as sin. For first he says that he knew sin through the Law, then he says that the sin which he knew through the Law is concupiscence; and the Law, through which he knew this, he says is that precept of the Law, "You shall not covet." And it is sufficiently clear that the discourse is established concerning sin properly so called: for he shows that concupiscence is sin, because it is repugnant to the Law which forbids to covet. Bellarmine says that sin in this place is indeed taken properly for a true prevarication of the Law, but that concupiscence is taken for the voluntary act of coveting, not for the tinder of sin. What then? Did no one understand that to covet another's wife, or servant, or field, or things of the same kind, was an evil thing, except one to whom the precepts of the Law were known? It is possible that some were blind in this matter, as one may conjecture from the perverse opinions of the Pharisees. But nevertheless, common reason has always disapproved of these concupiscences. Philemon, a poet of no mean standing, says that a good man, whom God loves, ought to look at or covet nothing that is another's, not an excellent woman, not a house, not a possession, not a boy, or a maidservant, not horses, or oxen, or any of the beasts of burden, not a thread of a needle, etc. Philemon in his verses, cited by Justin Martyr in his work *On the Monarchy of God*. Clement of Alexandria in *Stromata*, book 5, attributes these verses to Menander. This is the first and greatest law of nature, "covet nothing that is another's"; no age has been able to erase this law, inscribed on the minds of men. And the Apostle himself signifies this not obscurely. *Rom. 1. 32.* For he says that the Gentiles, who had not received the Law, when they knew the righteous judgment of God (τὸ δίκαιωμα τοῦ θεοῦ), namely that those who do such things are worthy of death, not only did the same things, but also approved of those who did them. He who knows that what is done is wicked and punishable by death, cannot be unaware that even to assent to this thing is evil, even if he himself has not done it. They understood from the natural law that those things were evil; therefore, they were not ignorant that to assent to those who perpetrated them was evil. Paul, however, speaks of that concupiscence which no one, unless he were a learned disciple of the Law, could have even suspected to be evil. Therefore, he felt that by this Law the very tinder of concupiscence is forbidden. And, I ask, by

what other precept, then, should we think this tinder to be condemned? Or perhaps it should not be considered condemned at all? What? Not even before Baptism? Therefore, it is not a sin even in an unregenerate man? You would never say this, Bellarmine, I know. If therefore it is a sin, it is certain that it is forbidden by some precept of the Law. By what other, can you say? But in little children before Baptism is there any desire for the wives or property of others with assent? Plainly none. Yet in them there is a harmful and damnable tinder, and contrary to the Law, and forbidden by that precept, "You shall not covet." Therefore, the Apostle taught that concupiscence is a sin even in him who does not consent; and the Sophists understand neither the Law nor Paul. Augustine says that the Law said, "You shall not covet," so that from this precept we might know both where we ought to contend, and where we shall arrive in that most blessed immortality. *De nupt. & concup. l. 1. c. 29.* But not to obey or consent to evil desires, even in this life the reborn can do through the grace of God; not to covet at all, which the law commands, that is, to be free from every evil desire, is reserved for the happiness of the future state. But what settles the matter is that the Apostle says that this law was imposed on him, that to him, willing to do good, evil is present, abides, adheres (*παράκειται*). *Rom. 7. 21.* An evil of infirmity, says Stapleton. And we can not inappropriately call sin an infirmity. For it hinders the mind from being able to perform its duty. But this evil, of whatever kind it may be, since it is contrary to the good, can only be sin. And this evil the Apostle calls the sin that easily entangles (*εὐπερίστατον ἁμαρτίαν*), because it surrounds us on all sides, and holds us ensnared by its allurements, and retards our progress. From which one can easily estimate how pernicious a thing it is.

To the sixth, you reply that the Apostle calls concupiscence the body of this death, not because it is properly sin in the reborn, but only a languor and a sickness. Thus it pleases you to play with words. Concupiscence is not a sin, but a disease, and a languor, and a vice, and an iniquity, and an infirmity, and whatever you wish, provided you do not call it a sin. The Stoics of old, a curious sort of men, delighted in similar snares and hiding-places of words. But as Piso says in Cicero, they pursued the same things under other names. *Cic. de finibus bonorum et malorum l. 5.* What is iniquity if not sin? And does not infirmity of the soul, and a sort of languor and disease, signify viciousness? For a vice in the soul cannot be understood as anything other than sin. I know that Augustine preferred to use these names in this case, because sin is almost always coupled with guilt, and guilt is taken away by Baptism. But Augustine teaches plainly enough that a true habit of sin remains, as I shall make manifest hereafter. But now let us see about the passage of Paul. He calls himself wretched and wishes with a groan to be freed from that body of death. Whatever you may understand by the body of death, it is sufficiently clear that sin cannot be exterminated from our bodies as long as we live. For what else but sin was it, for the cause of which the Apostle calls himself unhappy? *Rom. 7. 24.* Bellarmine says that unhappiness is attributed to punishment rather than to fault. But what great punishment was there that could have been so troublesome to Paul that he would call himself

unhappy by this name and desire death with such longing? He suffered many troubles, I confess, and perhaps his body labored under some infirmity. But he was not so soft that he could not tolerate a slight pain; and he was so far from wishing to die, lest he be afflicted any longer by such harsh tribulations, that it was pleasant to him to suffer the harshest things for Christ. There must have been another reason, therefore. Nor indeed would he have grieved that he was sometimes tempted by passions and concupiscences, if there were no sin except in consent, and if not to consent had been in his power. For this would rather be a matter for rejoicing, since to have overcome temptations and not to have obeyed concupiscences, as they themselves say, contributes greatly to merit. Would Paul grieve that the power of meriting had not been snatched away from him? Therefore, Paul sensed in himself a sin which was so hateful and hostile to him that he would have preferred many deaths to life: that sin, I say, which dwelt in his members, and rebelled against the law of his mind, and held him captive. Because he could not be freed from this while alive, he burned with such a vehement desire for death. But Stapleton says that the Apostle's exclamation pertains to misery and sickness, not to the nature of remaining sin, and that this is manifest from the conclusion of the apostolic disputation. By what reasoning, I ask? Because the Apostle says, "There is therefore now no condemnation for those who are in Christ Jesus"; and he cites Augustine, who writes that no one is condemned except he who consents to concupiscence for evil. And who does not know this? But because none are condemned except those who consent to concupiscence for evil, therefore no others have sin in them? Or did Paul not have sin, because he walked according to the spirit and did not fear condemnation? The cause of the Papists is propped up by arguments of this sort. As if it were necessary for sin to condemn all those in whom it is; or as if to be freed from condemnation were the same as to be freed from sin. Paul was sufficiently certain and secure of his salvation; meanwhile, because he saw that sin remained in him, and there was no hope that he could be completely freed from it while he lived, and he thought it a most miserable thing not to be able to be without sin; for this reason he mourned so greatly and desired to exchange life for death. Let the Papists invent whatever they can: convicted on this point, they will be forced to fall silent. In Jerome, a heretic asks for a testimony from the New Testament where error and ignorance are held to be a crime. After the Catholic has brought forth this passage, he says, "What is this law reigning in the members of man and warring against the law of his mind?" *Hieron. adv. Pelag. l. 1.* He replies simply: "Are you silent? Hear the same Apostle most clearly proclaiming: 'For I do not understand what I do. For what I want to do, I do not do, but what I hate, I do,' etc." Where he openly writes that concupiscence in Paul had the true nature of sin. For he says a little later, "I understand one man, though an Apostle, to be subject to sin." And he understands a sin on account of which someone can truly be called a sinner. And of such a kind is what Paul says in the following chapter: "If Christ is in you, the body is indeed dead because of sin." *Rom. 8. 10.* Therefore, sin remains in those in whom Christ is. You, if you

please, may understand a tropical sin. Thus you will be able to change all sins into tropes of sins. Paul confirms that he is speaking of true sin when he immediately subjoins, "but the Spirit is life because of righteousness." Therefore, sin remains in the reborn, which wars against righteousness, that is, it has the true nature and character of sin.

To the seventh, you respond that concupiscence is a certain evil to be crucified, and mortified, and put off, but not a sin. On the contrary, Paul says, "Mortify therefore your earthly members: fornication, impurity, lust, evil desire, and covetousness, which is idolatry." *Col. 3. 5*. Whom does Paul address? The Colossians, who had been baptized, who had died to sin, for whom life was hidden with Christ in God. To say nothing of the other vices, he testifies that evil concupiscence, with which God is angry, remains in the reborn. He therefore commands to put off the old man, and to put on the new, and to be renewed in the spirit of our mind. *Eph. 4. 22. 23. 24*. But to be renewed is to be changed from oldness into newness. What else is this oldness but the sin of the old man? If we are in need of renewal, sin clings to us; if no sin clings, we are sufficiently renewed. Stapleton, with the Bishop of Rochester, denies that oldness is sin. *Roffens. contra Lutherum art. 32*. Let him therefore deny that newness is grace or virtue. For the Apostle opposes oldness to newness. But newness is true virtue; wherefore oldness is true sin. The new man pleases God, therefore the old displeases Him. Thus it is manifest that something remains in the reborn which displeases God, and therefore must be put off. If the oldness of our nature did not displease God, neither would the newness please Him. Now, however, there will be nothing in the reborn that God hates; and yet there will be something in the reborn that displeases God? Who would not hate these mockeries of distinctions? But Stapleton wishes to prove from Augustine that this remaining oldness of the flesh is not the remnant of remaining sin; and he brings forth those words from Augustine by which the contrary is proven. *Aug. de merit. & remiss. l. 2. c. 28*. For the holy Father says that in this oldness there is the Law of sin, or a remitted sin. There is therefore sin in the oldness, but it is remitted. Remission does not make it so that the sin does not exist, but so that it is not imputed as sin. For he said a little before, that oldness remains in our members, but not in such a way as if a remission of it had not been made. Augustine nowhere wrote that this oldness of the flesh is not the remnant of remaining sin; on the contrary, he says distinctly that in this our oldness there is sin, but not in the way it was before, because for those who have been reborn of spirit and water, a full remission of all sins has been made.

To the last, you respond that St. John, when he says in chapter 5, "All unrighteousness is sin," is speaking of actual iniquity, which a man does, or rather, perfects. But why did you omit that passage which is in the 3rd chapter, "Sin is the transgression of the Law," where it is manifest that the holy Apostle is speaking of any sin whatsoever? For it immediately follows that Christ appeared to take away our sins. And in these, Original sin is the principal one, as the

Baptist testifies, “Behold, the Lamb of God, who takes away the sin of the world.” Therefore, he teaches that sin is nothing other than lawlessness (*ἀνομία*). And in that word the nature and definition of sin is contained. Augustine did not think that sin could be better defined than if it were called a transgression of the Law. *l. 2 de cons. Evang. c. 4*. But the transgression of the Law is this very thing of which the Apostle speaks, *ἀνομία* (lawlessness). That definition of Augustine is fuller, by which he says sin is a “word, deed, or desire against the eternal Law.” *Contra Faustum l. 22. c. 27*. The former embraces only the form of sin, the latter embraces the matter and form together. For the nature and cause of sin consists in this, that one deviates and strays from the divine Law. Wherefore, Bellarmine himself concedes that sin cannot be more correctly and briefly defined than as it was defined by St. John in these words, “Sin is iniquity,” or as it is more clearly in the Greek, *ἡ ἁμαρτία ἐστὶν ἡ ἀνομία* (sin is lawlessness). *L. 1. de amissione grat. & statu pecc. c. 2*. But all concupiscence is *ἀνομία* (lawlessness); for it does not agree with the divine Law, because then it would not be forbidden by the Law. Therefore, Stapleton could answer nothing. Wherefore, let us dismiss him for a little while; let us see if others have answered better. *Rhemenses in annot. in 1. Ioh. 3. 4*. The Rheims commentators confess that all sin is *ἀνομία* (lawlessness), but on the contrary, they do not grant that every aberration from the Law is sin. Subtly indeed, but fallaciously. For *ἀνομία* (lawlessness) is not posited as the genus, but as the form or definition of sin; and this both Augustine taught, and Bellarmine conceded, and no sane theologian has ever denied. But a definition must always be convertible with the thing defined, as the Logicians prescribe. And so, just as every sin is *ἀνομία* (lawlessness), so, on the contrary, it is necessary that every *ἀνομία* (lawlessness) be sin. Stapleton himself, when he inquired about the true nature of sin, established it all in *ἀνομία* (lawlessness). *Stapl. l. 1. c. 3*. Whatever, therefore, has in it *ἀνομία* (lawlessness), which is the true and proper nature of sin, is by that most certain reason convicted of being sin. But concupiscence, even in the reborn themselves, fights against the Law of God, and that a threefold law: of the first institution, of nature, and of the Decalogue; it is therefore properly and by true reason a sin.

Bellarmino took upon himself the solution of this argument; now therefore let us briefly compare reasons with him. *Bellarm. de amiss. grat. et pecc. l. 4. c. 14*. He therefore denies that the concupiscence of the reborn is properly *ἀνομία* (lawlessness), in the way that St. John takes this word. What *ἀνομία* (lawlessness), Bellarmine, do you call proper, and what improper? The Apostle by *ἀνομία* (lawlessness) understands an aberration and, as it were, a digression from the Law. Of whatever kind it may be, it proves sin, since this is the property of sin, not to agree with the Law. But the Law prohibits concupiscence; therefore concupiscence is opposed to the Law. But Bellarmine says that not whatever dissents from the Law is *ἀνομία* (lawlessness), but the discord itself with the Law; which we concede: and this is what makes concupiscence a sin. For to covet itself in every way is not a sin, since the spirit lusts against the flesh; but vicious concupiscence is a sin, because of something in it that is distorted and deflected

from the Law, when the legitimate mode of coveting is not observed. And all the carnal concupiscences of the reborn have this vice; therefore, they are sins.

Here Bellarmine says that concupiscence does indeed oppose the law of the mind, but that this is not a formal opposition. What? Not even in those who are not reborn? But even in the reborn, concupiscence has this formal opposition that you seek. For unless there were something in it formally contrary to the Law, it would not oppose the law of the mind, it would not bring trouble to a pious soul, it would not so impel to sin that it never lets us rest. Finally, Bellarmine, in the heat of contradiction, bursts forth to say that God did not command that man should be born with Original justice; and that by the Law, "You shall not covet," voluntary desires, which are actual, are properly forbidden, not Original ones. Thus, the outcome of the whole dispute is that concupiscence without consent is not a sin, nor contrary to the Law, even in the unregenerate. But if God did not command that we be born with justice and be free from all evil concupiscence, by what law are they bound who labor under Original sin alone? God did not command them to have Original justice, and yet He punishes them with eternal death because they lack Original justice. But if Original injustice is a sin, it is against the Law. For all sin is *ἀνομία* (lawlessness). Thus Bellarmine's reasoning persuades us to assent rather to Pelagius and to declare that there is no Original sin.

Secondly, if that Law, "You shall not covet," is to be understood of voluntary and actual desires, it does not condemn concupiscences, not even of unregenerate men, unless the assent to those concupiscences has been joined to them. Pighius, when he saw that it was absurd for us to say that concupiscence before Baptism is properly a sin because it dissents from the Law, but to think that after Baptism no reason of sin is in it, although Baptism does not cause concupiscence to cease to dissent from the Law; lest he be forced to think and follow such contradictory things, he preferred with the Pelagians to affirm that not even before Baptism is there any *ἀνομία* (lawlessness) in concupiscence. *Pighius in controuv. de pecc. orig. c. 4.* To such great absurdity and dissension of opinions he preferred manifest heresy. And to this all the reasoning of the Papists tends, that concupiscence is never a sin, provided that assent is withheld, neither in the unregenerate nor in the reborn, neither before Baptism nor after. And our Rheims commentators not obscurely indicate that this seems to be their view. *Rhemens. in annot. in Ep. ad Rom. 7. 7.* They say that this Law does not prohibit habitual concupiscence, but actual concupiscence with consent; but this has no place in infants. Wherefore, if concupiscence is a sin before Baptism because there is in it something repugnant to the Law, or rather it is itself *ἀνομία* (lawlessness); it is necessary that it retain the true nature of sin, as long as this struggle between it and the Law remains.

But how shamefully Bellarmine lies prostrate in another passage of this Apostle, I beg you to observe. St. John says, "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive

ourselves, and the truth is not in us." *1 Joh. 1. 8*. From this passage, Luther proves that concupiscence is always a sin, since no other sin remains in us perpetually; and he admonishes that the Apostle said, not "we have not had," but "we have," so that we may understand that sin is present even in those who surpass others in virtue. What does Bellarmine say against this? He says first that John is speaking of actual sins, but small and daily ones, which are very frequent. And do you dare, Bellarmine, to call any sin small? Basil wisely says, "Who would dare to call any sin small?" *reg. brev. q. 15*. You call certain sins small; he says that no sin is small. *epist. 14*. Thus Jerome, "I do not know if we can call any sin light, which is committed in contempt of God." And every sin is joined with some contempt of God. Do you think it a light or small thing to have despised God? But John speaks of those sins which are expiated only by the blood of Christ. Go on, call them small, for which Christ shed his most precious blood, and esteem the sacrifice of Christ so little. But do you think Paul labored over a very small matter, when he said that life was bitter to him, because of the contagion and stain of sin? If the sins that remain in the reborn are so small, Paul certainly had no cause for such grave lamentation. Is this a small thing, that the flesh makes no end of lusting against the spirit, so that not only are we not permitted to do what we would wish, but it is even necessary to do what we would not wish, and ought not? Chemnitz teaches that this passage cannot be understood of only actual sins without great blasphemy, because then that sentence would have no relevance to infants and sleeping persons; which reason required serious consideration. But Bellarmine eludes the grave argument with a futile joke. "As if," he says, "infants and sleeping persons have ever said that they have no sin." Certainly, no one has ever heard an infant speak, nor I a sleeping person; although there are some who chatter much in their sleep. But now see the putrid subterfuge. If this passage is to be understood only of those who can talk, it does not pertain to the mute. Wherefore, if Bellarmine had a case with a mute person who thought himself to be innocent, and he were to object this passage to him, "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves," it could be retorted no less cleverly and aptly that the mute had never said this of himself. Would he therefore not be held by the force of the argument and the sentence? The sense therefore is that this can be truly affirmed of no one.

Then Bellarmine responds more audaciously, "It can happen that for at least a brief time someone may be free from all sin, even venial." It can therefore happen at some time that someone may truly say that he is free from all sin. But John excepts no moment at all, not even the briefest. For he pronounces that whoever says this of himself at any point of time is deceived and lies; unless we are to believe, perhaps, that that time is so brief that so few words cannot be uttered in it. What, then, prevents it, that when someone could be free from all sin, it is nevertheless not permitted for him even then to say that he has no sin? "Doubtless he is ignorant of this," says Bellarmine. But that ignorance will not prevent that, if he says he is a sinner when he is not, he lies. Thus, the contrary

can happen to what St. John taught, that he who says he has sin deceives himself and lies about himself. May Jehovah rebuke Satan.

But what then shall we decide about the Lord's Prayer? It has imposed upon us this perpetual law of praying, "Forgive us our debts." But he who is without sin, why does he ask for the remission of sins? Therefore, it is necessary either to say this feignedly, when he has in himself nothing that truly requires pardon; or to add that condition, as a legitimate exception in every prayer, "if there is anything in me that can be remitted." Thus Bellarmine heaps up many blasphemies while he defends one.

But at least from the punishments, and troubles, and infinite miseries of this life, we ought to recognize what sinners we are. Death, diseases, adversities, flow from sin. The reborn are not freed from these; even a newly baptized infant dies. How so, since the cause of dying has been taken away? As Adam would not have died unless on account of sin, so those who are without sin do not know how to die. Christ indeed went to his death voluntarily, because he came into this world that, being innocent, he might die for the guilty, that he might take our sins upon himself, that by dying he might take away the sin of the world. Death rages against the sinner; against him who is without any sin, it cannot sink its tooth; for the matter of death is sin. Therefore, by our arguments drawn from Scripture, no answer has been given either by Stapleton or by Bellarmine, nor can any be given by anyone.

#### **CHAPTER VI. The Opinion of the Fathers concerning concupiscence in the reborn.**

Those testimonies which were cited by Chemnitz from the Fathers, Stapleton spent much labor on them, or rather played, in diluting them. We find his judgment and faithfulness lacking in every place. Come then, let us consult the ancient Fathers of the Catholic Church concerning this controversy. Ambrose, as quoted by Augustine, says that they are our vices which resist the law of the mind by the law of sin; and this law of sin he calls iniquity, because it is iniquitous for the flesh to lust against the spirit. *Ambrosius apud Augustinum l. 2. contra Jul. c. 3.* Finally, he says that there is in it a certain delight adverse to the divine law. What does our author say to these things? He denies that they are vices in such a way that they should be called sins. You are too delicate, Stapleton; that is a contention of the word, not of the thing. For what is sin but a vice by which the divine law is resisted? But if the law requires of us that we obey and consent to it in all things, whatever in us is vicious and different and discordant from the law, you could rightly call sin. But because you labor over the word, and seek hiding places in the sound, and hunt for syllables; come, let us block your throat with that very word about which you slander so much. Thus, therefore, Ambrose immediately says, "Sin works many things in us: even when we are reluctant, pleasures often rise up again, brought back to life." Now you have that word about which you contend so childishly. Ambrose says that

sin works many things in us even when we are reluctant; and so that we may understand this to be truly sin, he affirms that various pleasures, which must be resisted, are born from it; and he attributes to it a delight that is repugnant to the divine law. He does not indeed say that the reborn person is hateful to God, nor does he make any mention here of imputative remission, as you say. For who does not know that the reborn are most dear to God? But because God loves them in Christ, is it for that reason that either they are without all sin, or their sins are worthy of no hatred from God? But as often as you speak of imputative remission, what do you produce but your own foolishness? Because sins are not imputed to the reborn, and the righteousness of Christ is imputed, will you also make remission imputative? If the name of imputation offends you, I do not wonder, since it is so frequent in the Scriptures and the Fathers. Laugh at this as much as you will; you will pay for this laughter one day. *As was refuted above.* But let us proceed. Hilary calls the bodies of the reborn the material of all vices, because of which we, being polluted and sordid, obtain nothing clean, nothing innocent in ourselves. *Hilarius apud Aug. ubi supra.* You respond that nothing in us is clean according to the flesh, that is, when we obey the flesh. But Hilary speaks openly of the reborn, who do not obey the desires of the flesh; because, however, they have the material of sin perpetually clinging to their nature, he calls them polluted and sordid; and he also says that we cannot be clean in this dwelling of an earthly and mortal body until after the resurrection. But what is opposed to that cleanness and purity, of which the holy Father speaks, if not sin? Finally, he says that not even the Apostles themselves, though now amended and sanctified by faith in the word, were without malice, through the condition of our common origin, as the Lord said, "If you then, being evil, know how to give good gifts to your children." You deny that this malice, which was in the Apostles, is of concupiscence itself; but Hilary affirms it. For he says that this malice was born from the condition of our origin. Wherefore he understands original concupiscence, which perpetually fights against the spirit, and although it has been remitted in Baptism, yet it has left a manifold malice in us. Who would ascribe malice to them who have no faults but venial ones, and few and very light ones at that? But Hilary confirms with the words of Christ that not even the Apostles, amended and cleansed by the word of faith, were free from the malice of the flesh. Now malice cannot be conceived without sin. But hear Hilary writing thus in another place: *Hilar. in psalm. 58.* "Who will boast that he has a pure heart before God? Not even if an infant be of one day, since both the origin and the law of sin remain in us, according to the Apostle." This origin and law of sin, that is, this original sin, which remains in our nature, pollutes our heart, and does not suffer it to be pure from sin; but we would have a pure heart if it were without sin.

Cyprian similarly says, "Let no one flatter himself about a pure and immaculate breast." And since no one can be without sin, whoever says he is blameless is either proud or foolish. *Cyprian. de orat. Domini.* You say that this is to be understood not of concupiscence, but of venial sins, which the just do not lack.

And we confess that concupiscence in the reborn is not only venial, but also forgiven. But sin by its nature leads to death, and deserves death, as the Apostle testifies, "The wages of sin is death." *Rom. 6. 23*. What sin do infants bring with them when they come into this world, except the sin of concupiscence? What venial sins are there in them? Or what have they ever transgressed by the consent of their own will? Therefore, concupiscence itself vitiates our whole selves, and sprinkles us with such a stain of sin that we shall never wash it away while we live; so that if we say we are without sin, we are both proud and foolish.

Jerome distinguishes between πάθος (passion) and προπάθεια (first movement) thus: that πάθος is reckoned as a vice; but προπάθεια, which signifies the first movements, although it has the fault of vice, is nevertheless not held as a crime. *Hieron. in c. 4. ad Ephes.* You miss in Jerome that precision which Augustine used in distinguishing words. Jerome certainly acknowledges vice and fault in the προπάθεια (first movements), and Augustine judges no differently, as we shall hear in the next chapter; and Jerome thinks there is a little more evil in vice than in sin. *Hieron. adv. Pelag. l. 2*. For he says that a man can be found without vice, but not without sin. To Augustine, the name of vice sounds better than that of sin. But let us hear Jerome again. "The first sin," he says, "is to have thought of evil things; the second, to have acquiesced in perverse thoughts; the third, to have completed in deed what you have decreed in your mind; the fourth, not to do penance after the sin." Therefore, it is a sin even to have thought evil things, even if you do not acquiesce in evil thoughts; and what you decree, that sin is to be judged by assent alone, he attributes to the Pelagians and overturns it by the testimony of the Scriptures. For thus says Critobulus the Pelagian, "Not only the sight and incentives of vices are reputed as sin, but those things to which we attribute assent." *Advers. Pelag. l. 1*. Thus the heretic argues for the Pelagian cause. To whom Atticus, that is, the Catholic, responds thus, "You argue cleverly indeed, but you do not understand that your argumentation works against the sacred Scriptures." If he argued against the Scriptures who did not think that the allurements of vices, and sudden desires, and naked concupiscence without consent were sin, is it not certain that you think and dispute against the Scriptures, whose argument in this cause is so characteristic that it is almost the only one? You are indeed worthy to lead the first cohort among the Pelagians. But now let us come to Augustine, the chief of our defense.

## CHAPTER VII. The perpetual opinion of Augustine is explained.

Our adversaries are very pleased with themselves in Augustine, but their opinion pleases Augustine little. Indeed, it is urged by them very unskillfully and foolishly that Augustine everywhere is accustomed to call this concupiscence, about which we are debating, an evil rather than a sin. For what he means, and how he totally abhors their opinion, he explains in innumerable places and with the most open words, if they were willing to pay attention with their ears, or eyes, or mind. He says, therefore, that it is not sin, because it is no longer sin in the way it was before; and because it does not make men guilty after Baptism, and because it is not counted as sin on account of remission; not because it does not have in itself what truly proves it to be sin. Let Augustine himself speak, for no one understood his mind better than he. Thus he says: "In those who are regenerated in Christ, when they receive the remission of absolutely all sins, it is by all means necessary that the guilt also of this concupiscence, although it still remains, be remitted, so that, as I have said, it may not be imputed as sin." *August. de nupt. & conc. l. 1. c. 26.* Thus concupiscence remains in the reborn, the same as it was before, but it has lost its former guilt; whence it happens that it neither holds them in death nor draws them to death. *Contra Jul. l. 2. c. 5. & l. 6. c. 5.* Augustine immediately adds, "For this is what it means not to have sin, to not be guilty of sin." Could anyone have explained his mind more openly? Augustine affirms that it is not sin, not because it has nothing in itself that is of sin, but because remission has effaced all the guilt of this sin. Thus against Julian he teaches that the concupiscence which is left in the reborn after Baptism is no longer called sin in the same way, because it does not make those in whom it is, guilty of death. Then he says, "You who think that if concupiscence were an evil, he who is baptized would be without it, you err greatly; for he is without all sin, not without all evil; which is said more plainly thus: he is without all guilt of all evils, not without all evils." Just as if he were to say, concupiscence is indeed by its nature an evil and a sin in the reborn, but nevertheless it is not imputed as sin. For that is to be without sin, to have obtained the remission of all sins, so that we do not have to suffer the punishment for our sins.

But now let us approach that passage which seems to you, as it is, invincible. We shall quote it verbatim in its entirety. "Just as blindness of heart, which only the illuminator God removes, is both a sin, by which one does not believe in God, and a punishment of sin, by which a proud heart is punished with a worthy chastisement, and a cause of sin, when some evil is committed by the error of a blind heart: so the concupiscence of the flesh, against which the good spirit lusts, is also a sin, because in it there is disobedience against the dominion of the mind, and it is the punishment of sin, because it was rendered to the merits of the disobedient, and it is the cause of sin, by the defection of one who consents, or by the contagion of one who is born." *Contra duas epistolas Pelag. l. 1. c. 13.* Augustine attributes three things to concupiscence in the reborn: that it is sin, that it is the punishment of sin, and that it is the cause of sin. Doubtless, by this

well-rounded sentence he has inflicted a huge wound and slaughter upon your affairs. The Apostle called concupiscence sin so often that a distinction was needed, lest it be thought to be truly sin. The Sophists have responded that it is called sin, not because it is properly sin, but because it is the punishment and the cause of sin. Augustine, in this passage, by naming concupiscence not only the punishment and cause of sin, but also sin itself, has utterly disturbed that well-composed and established defense, as if he had foreseen the sophists' trap and judged that it should be met in a timely manner.

Stapleton, in this whole chapter, does nothing else but to obscure the light of this testimony by casting some shadow of darkness over it. He says, however, that he wishes to omit many other ways of responding, which he confesses seemed to him less firm, and to apply a new response, of which he himself was the author. But it is so inept and foreign that Stapleton can claim it for himself as if by his own right. For he says that concupiscence in that passage is called sin by Augustine because it is sin by nature, with respect to its first integrity, not with respect to the person. What is the point of refuting a manifest delirium with many words? For is the spirit lusting against the flesh in nature? Then it will be a spirit not of grace but of nature. But Augustine speaks of the concupiscence of those men in whom the flesh lusts against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh; therefore, he understands the concupiscence of the person. If Augustine wanted to teach nothing other than that concupiscence is against the integrity of nature, he had no need to call it sin. For is not the tinder itself against the perfection of nature? Yet you do not think it should be called by the name of sin. It was enough to have named it the punishment or cause of sin. But you say that Augustine would not have used the reasoning he did if he had wanted to say in that place that it is truly and properly sin. Why so? Because, you say, that is not the formal reason of sin, nor the cause, nor the subject, nor the principle. You have not sufficiently ascertained either what you are saying or what you want to say. Augustine gives this reason why he called concupiscence in the reborn a sin: because in it there is disobedience against the dominion of the mind. By the dominion of the mind, however, he understands the Holy Spirit, who reigns in the reborn. For this spirit assents to the Law, and strives for it, and always desires to obey it. Wherefore, to fight against this dominion of the mind is to be unwilling to obey the divine Law. Now what, pray, is the nature of sin but disobedience, as the Apostle testifies, "For as by the one man's disobedience the many were made sinners." *Rom. 5:19* For not to obey is to stray from the rule, and as it were to cross the lines, in which the formal nature of sin is constituted. From which it appears that concupiscence in the reborn is truly a sin, since a certain perpetual disobedience is in it against the eternal Law, in which the mind and spirit of the reborn delight.

And that Augustine is speaking of true sin is also manifest from this, that he compares this concupiscence with blindness of heart, by which one does not believe in God. If, therefore, blindness of heart, by which one does not believe in

God, is a true and great sin, then surely the concupiscence of the heart, by which the divine law is not obeyed, but is perpetually resisted, must also be counted among true sins.

Then Stapleton says that if this answer does not please anyone, that which is most probable of all is that Augustine is speaking of concupiscence in general, not of that which remains in the reborn. But that this is false and absurd is as clear as the sun shining at noon. For first, a little before, Stapleton said that Augustine speaks of concupiscence *as it is in the reborn*. Secondly, he concedes that this other solution is *certainly more forced*. Lastly, Augustine leaves no room for controversy or doubt, when he testifies that he is speaking of that concupiscence against which the good spirit lusts. For the good spirit lusting against the flesh is found only in the reborn. Your own reasoning, Augustine's, also pertains to this concupiscence. For in it there is disobedience against the mind. *Bellarmin. de amiss. grat. & statu peccat. l. 5. c. 15*. But Bellarmine's insane response on this point is that the disobedience of the flesh cannot properly be a sin, because the flesh is not capable of sin properly so called; as if Augustine were speaking of the substance of the flesh, or as if concupiscence were to be located in the very mass of the flesh, which we have been taught from the Scriptures to be in the will, and intelligence, and mind, and the whole soul.

But let us now bring forth other passages of Augustine, from which this very thing can be demonstrated. Thus he says elsewhere: *de Gen. ad lit. l. 10. c. 20*. "Therefore, did the Apostle say, 'let there not be sin in your mortal body'? He knew, of course, that there was in it the delight of sin, which he calls sin, from a nature depraved by the first transgression. But he said, 'Let not sin reign in your mortal body.' It is necessary for sin to be in us, in which we even delight, as long as we carry about the old man: it has been excellently dealt with us, if it is not allowed to reign in us." Thus again Augustine: *De perf. iust. hom. c. 6*. "When he does not allow sin to reign in his mortal body to obey its desires, nor offers his members as weapons of iniquity to sin, sin is indeed in his members, but it does not reign, because its desires are not obeyed." And a little after: "In this, because he wills what the Law also wills, he undoubtedly consents to the Law; yet he covets, because he is not without sin." Again, against Julian: *Cont. Jul. l. 6. c. 5*. "Do you not attend, do you not perceive, that he who persecutes his body so vehemently, if he persecutes nothing there that displeases God, by fruitlessly persecuting His temple, does a great injury to God?" But what displeases God if not sin? Of the same kind is what he writes in another place: *De natura & grat. c. 58*. "He who does not allow sin to reign in him also abstains from every evil thing, to whom an improper thought creeps in, which he does not permit to reach the end of the work. But it is one thing not to have sin, another not to obey its desires. We cannot be without sin in this life; let us only take care not to obey the desires of sin." And those are the words of Augustine: *Tract. 41 in Ioh.* "As a physician hates the sickness of the sick person, and in curing it acts so that the sickness may be driven away and the sick person relieved: so God by his grace

does this in us, that sin may be consumed and man be liberated." Sin therefore remains in us, and God hates this sin even in us. And after: "From the fact that some infirmity has remained, I dare to say, in the part that we serve God, we are free; in the part that we serve the law of sin, we are still slaves." This servitude is born from sin, which holds us captive. Wherefore he says, "From this part he feels captivity, where justice has not been fulfilled." He adds, moreover, "The Apostle does not say, 'let it not be,' but 'let it not reign.' As long as you live, it is necessary for sin to be in your members; at least let its reign be taken away." Finally, he says, "There is nevertheless something to be restrained, something to be coerced, something to be held back. What, if not sin, lest it break out?"

Now I leave it to all to judge which of us can truly call Augustine his own in this cause.

#### **CHAPTER VIII. On the foundations of the Papist opinion posited in the third chapter.**

Those foundations have been sufficiently demolished by us above; wherefore we can now be briefer. As to the first point, if we speak of proper, actual, and personal sins, as they are called, no one denies that the will is at fault, and that sins depend on the will, and that the proper cause of sin is the will, and that one never sins without some inclination of the will. But the sin of origin has crept into our nature by propagation, it did not arise from choice, or from the consent of our will, since as soon as any will existed in us, it was immediately vitiated by the contagion of Original sin. But after we ourselves begin to do something, and are the principles of our actions and thoughts, only that is counted as sin which our will has contrived. And this is what Augustine wrote, namely, "Nowhere but in the will is there sin." *de duabus animabus c. 10*. But since this seemed to favor the Pelagians, who for this reason argued that infants do not have sin because they do not yet use the choice of the will, Augustine resisted them thus, by tracing the Original sin of infants from the first will of man, in whom we all sinned. For thus he says: "As if indeed the sin, which we say they draw originally from Adam, could have been anywhere but in the will, by which will it was committed when the transgression of the divine precept was made." *De libero arbitrio l. 3. c. 17. Retract. l. 1. c. 16*. And immediately after: "Which was done for this reason, that the willing might be distinguished from the unwilling, and thus the intention might be referred to them who, being first in paradise, were the origin of evil for the human race, sinning with no one compelling them." Wherefore, if we seek the source or seat of this sin, the will must be approached. Original sin is voluntary, says Bonaventure, not by the will of him in whom it is, but by the will of him from whom it is. *Bonav. in 2. sent. dist. 30. q. 2*. To what purpose, therefore, do you so inanelly stir up a quarrel against us concerning the will and the cause of sin? Or what does that contention help your cause? Concupiscence is just as voluntary in infants after Baptism as it was before Baptism, which becomes sufficiently apparent as soon as they have grown up a little.

In the second point, you are excessively odious in your verbosity and futility. We acknowledge and preach the grace of Baptism; we concede that a perfect and full remission of sins is made in Baptism; we believe that the concupiscence remaining in the reborn hinders nothing, so that those who are baptized and believe may please God and remain heirs of the heavenly kingdom, and be truly counted among the adopted sons of God. But in this our Adversaries make a tumult, first because we affirm that this concupiscence in the reborn not only wars against the law of the mind, but also merits the hatred of God and damnation; then, however, that it brings no perdition or harm is to be attributed to divine benignity and remission. Since this entire doctrine is taken from the Apostle, it also squares excellently with the perpetual opinion of Augustine, and has in itself nothing absurd, or impious, or unworthy of our religion. Here Stapleton exclaims that not a true remission of sins, but an imputative one is established by us; than which no one could have invented anything more insipid. For from the fact that we say concupiscence is not imputed to the reborn on account of Christ, it follows that remission is not imputed, but granted. Remission is opposed to imputation. In the remission of sins, there is no imputation; in imputation, there is no remission. For what has been remitted is not imputed; what is imputed has not yet been remitted. But this fellow, from the imputation of righteousness, which we establish, also feigns a certain imputation of remission with an error that is too childish, and then he undertakes to teach that there is no imputative remission of sins. Let him spare his labor, and return to whence he has strayed. We hold that concupiscence is remitted in Baptism; but this remission neither plucks out concupiscence from man by the roots, nor changes its nature, and from a sin makes it a good or indifferent thing. Concupiscence will always be like itself, as long as it has remained in our nature; it can be remitted, it cannot not be sin.

As for your objection of the example of Magdalene, you are mistaken in two ways. First, actual sins do not adhere in a person in the same way as Original sin. The former have passed in act, but remain in guilt; the latter remains also in act, after its guilt has passed. Secondly, it is not the case that nothing of sin remained in Magdalene because Christ granted her remission of all. For all confess that after remission a propensity to sin remains, left over from the habit of sinning. But Scripture affirms that this proclivity to evil is hateful to God, although in the reborn it is diminished and does not effervesce as it does in others. *Gen. 6 & 8*. We ought to judge things as they are in themselves; and we should not doubt that what fights against the Law and the spirit, and displeases God, and draws us away from God, is sin.

But, you say, these two things are incompatible. I see you are a jurist, since you have learned to speak thus. But what are you saying? First, you say, to remit sin is to take away its nature. If by the nature of sin you understand its guilt, I grant it; if you mean the perversity inherent in the thing itself and remaining in us, I do not grant it. But God, you say, after remission has been made, is no longer

offended. This I know to be true. You add, however, that when the cause of the offense is taken away, the effect is taken away. Even while the cause of offense remains in us, that effect is nevertheless taken away. What do you conclude from this? Therefore, you say, the cause must be truly taken away, so that a true effect may follow. I confess. For sins are truly taken away when they are forgiven; and forgiveness removes the offense; but the cause of this forgiveness is the merit of Christ. What can you find here that is inconsistent (ἀσύστατον) or inelegant? Princes are accustomed to pardon malefactors, whom they nevertheless know to be wicked, on account of the intercession of others; will you not grant to God that He may remit all our offenses on account of Christ? Will you also conclude from that remission that nothing worthy of punishment remains in us? He is unworthy of pardon who so decides with himself. I do grant this, that with remission, renewal is always joined, which consists in the emendation of life and new obedience. But we are renewed in part, and we labor with many remnants of our oldness, and God would find in us infinite matter for just condemnation, if He were to deal with us rigidly, and examine us, and judge us according to His Law. Therefore, I respond briefly to this argument with the Master of the Sentences. *l. 2. dist. 32. c. 1.* Original sin is said to be remitted in Baptism in a twofold manner: because by the grace of Baptism, the vice of concupiscence is weakened and diminished; and because its guilt itself is absolved. Baptism and the grace of Christ take away all guilt; but it does not take away concupiscence, but weakens and diminishes it. It is the same concupiscence as it was; evil, iniquitous, damnable, but now much weaker and more tenuous. *Cassander in consult. art. 2.* Cassander, although excessively inclined toward the Papists, nevertheless could not but censure their ridiculous importunity in this matter. First, he says that this seems to be a contention more of words than of the thing itself; then he decides thus: "if you establish the nature of sin in that vice, and iniquity, languor, infirmity, and disease, which must be resisted by the spirit, lest it generate illicit acts, concupiscence in the reborn is not ineptly called sin; certainly a certain distinguished theologian openly asserts that sin remains even in the regenerate, although it is not imputed. But if the nature of sin is understood to be situated in the offense of God itself and in guilt, to which punishment and damnation correspond on the other side, it is certain that in the regenerate there is no sin, since in them a remission of sins has been made, and all guilt has been absolved." Thus sin remains in the reborn, and will always remain, as long as they remain; but its former power, and impetus, and reign, as Scripture says, is taken away. The Israelites, having possessed the promised land, slaughtered all the kings, but many remnants of that people remained among them, until David, established in the kingdom, captured the citadel of Jerusalem and utterly exterminated the Jebusites. Thus concupiscence, like a stock of a hated race, will never be entirely cut down, until Christ has put all enemies under His yoke. Concupiscence has lost its reign and guilt, but it has not cast off its nature and malice. A boundary stone does not cease to be a stone, even if it no longer distinguishes boundaries. Foundations can be left when relations are

extinct. The boundary has been removed, the true stone remains; thus the guilt and damnation have passed, the thing and the sin endure. A magnet smeared with garlic does not draw iron; poison does not always kill; the fire in the Babylonian furnace did not harm those Israelites; a bee, having lost its stinger, does not sting; and yet a bee is always a bee, and a magnet is always a magnet, and poison is always poison, and fire, although it did not harm those men, yet retained the nature of fire.

The other is that sin, you say, by its nature, in whomever it is, separates man from God. Add, I beseech you, what must necessarily always be added, unless it has been remitted on account of the Mediator. For is there not sin in those who seek the remission of sins, which all mortals, even the most holy, are commanded to seek and implore? If sin separates all men in whom it is from God, who then adheres to God, or can be saved at all? You speak even more insanelly, "It cannot, therefore," you say, "be sin in the reborn, who is reconciled to God through regeneration." Thus he spouts mere Pelagianisms, with which he is so stuffed. Let us hear Augustine: "The Pelagians also dare to say this good thing, that a just man in this life has no sin at all; and that in such men there is already in the present time a Church not having spot or wrinkle." *de bono persever. c. 5*. But was not the Apostle John regenerated and reconciled to God? I do not know if you would dare to deny it, with such confidence as you have. His mind and reasoning were certainly different: "If we say that we have no sin in us, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us." *1 Ioh. 1. 8*. Go then where you deserve, with your deceit, and lie, and monstrous blasphemy. There is always sin in any man, so that he always has need of an Advocate, to whose death and merits we must attribute it that, although we are great sinners, we nevertheless remain in the favor of God. Cyprian piously says: "Lest anyone please himself as if he were innocent and, by exalting himself, perish the more, he is instructed and taught that he sins daily, while he is taught to pray daily for his sins." *Cyprian. de orat. Domin.* So finally John in his epistle said, "If we say," etc. But see how you do not agree with yourself, and, as you yourself say, you establish incompatible things. For you defend a just man as one who has more virtues in him than vices; but a just man is reconciled to God; therefore, sins can be in a man who is reconciled to God through regeneration, and in a just man virtues are mixed with sins, unless perhaps you think that to have more virtues than vices is nothing other than to have no vices. Did you not know that this was a heresy of the Pelagians, and long ago exploded by so many judgments of the Church? *Hieron. contra Pelag. l. 1. & 2*. But let us propose one more argument concerning concupiscence, taken from Thomas. He refutes the opinion of certain people who assert that the first movements in unbelievers are mortal sins, with such an argument: "In the same species of sin, a believer sins more gravely than an unbeliever; if therefore the first movements in unbelievers were mortal sins, much more so in believers." *Tho. in Rom. c. 8. lect. 2*. It is permissible for me to conclude by the same reasoning that concupiscence is a sin in believers even after Baptism, because it is a sin before Baptism and in unbelievers; for the

species remains. Indeed, the first movements are not for that reason not sins, because they are in believers, but on the contrary, for this reason they are more so sins, if Thomas argues correctly. Your argumentation, indeed, is filled not only with innumerable absurdities, but with intolerable blasphemies.

### About Augustine again

Augustine, in many places, denies that this concupiscence is a sin; the Sophists seize upon this, and yet, though so often admonished of Augustine's true opinion, they do not acquiesce. He denies, therefore, that it is a sin because it does not exclude justice, because it does not draw us to death, and finally, because it has been remitted. You say this is mere nonsense, but you bring forth nothing but mere trifles, to be refuted by a hiss rather than by a response; nevertheless, let us briefly see what you say. Augustine, you say, distinguishes the offspring from the parent, that is, consent from concupiscence; and he cites the words of James: "Concupiscence, when it has conceived, gives birth to sin." *James 1:15*. And what is this other than to trifle ridiculously? Consent is to be distinguished from concupiscence: therefore, concupiscence is not a sin? For what prevents the parent from being joined with the offspring? Indeed, if the offspring is vicious, she who gave birth is more at fault. But if concupiscence is never a sin without consent, then it will not be a sin either in infants before Baptism, or in unregenerate adults. From which it can also be clearly understood how inconsiderately that passage of James is customarily used in this cause by those adversaries of sound doctrine. For if concupiscence is therefore not a sin, because after it has conceived, it gives birth to sin, then it will be a sin in no one, since it never gives birth or is in labor with sin, except after it has conceived; but no one has ever dared to say that the concupiscences of the unregenerate are not sins. Whether they are mortal sins in the impious has been disputed somewhat.

Secondly, if concupiscence without giving birth, that is, without consent, is not a sin, then consent, unless the deed is performed, is either no sin or a venial one; it certainly will not be lethal. For James says that sin, when it is finished, brings forth death, and yet all theologians count full consent as a mortal sin, even when frustrated in its outcome and desire. But see, you say, the clearest doctrine in Augustine. I am paying attention, and in those words which you bring forth from Augustine, I see our opinion most splendidly confirmed. For he says that sins are those things which are illicitly done, said, or thought according to the concupiscence of the flesh or ignorance; *Aug. contra duas epist. Pelag. l. 1. c. 13. & 14.* but that the concupiscence of the flesh itself is so remitted in Baptism that it does no harm to those who are reborn. In this way, I grant that concupiscence is not a sin; and thus Augustine has sufficiently taught in what sense he so often pronounced this. But if whatever is done, or said, or desired against the eternal law is a sin, as sin is defined by him elsewhere, *Contra Faustum, l. 22. c. 27.* then any concupiscence emanating from the flesh must necessarily be called a sin. We also believe that concupiscence is so remitted in Baptism that it does no harm to the reborn. But unless it were a sin, it could not do harm. It has, therefore, in

itself that by which it may do harm, but yet it does not do harm, for it is prevented by grace and remission.

Now there is no controversy about this, that the reborn are not only loved by God, but are also in the highest grace with God; meanwhile, we affirm that something remains in the reborn which merits God's offense and hatred, but yet is not punished, because our sins are remitted to us, and we are reconciled to God in Christ. For the cause of the love with which God embraces us is not in us but outside of us; so that with the Apostle we may say, "Nothing shall separate us from the love of God, which is in Christ." *Rom. 8. 39.* Here you respond that the efficient cause is outside of us, but the formal cause is within us; and you place it in charity. But if you ask what God chiefly loves in us, it is certain that the first place in this love must be given to faith, without which we cannot please God, *Hebr. 11. 6.* nay, we can only sin; *Rom. 14. 23.* but from faith, charity blossoms, and through charity, faith works; *Galat. 5. 6.* but neither is faith in us perfect, nor charity, nor any other virtue; from which it follows with most certain truth and necessity, that our virtues are not the perfect cause of that love with which God pursues us, which is most perfect. Therefore, the entire cause, both efficient and formal, must be placed outside of us, that is, in Christ. God indeed loves and crowns His own gifts in us, but after He has loved us wholly in Christ. But what is later in nature cannot be the formal reason of that which preceded. Therefore, charity, through which faith works, is indeed that by which we love God; but that charity, which is very small and tenuous, cannot be the cause of that infinite love with which God loves us. For the infinite cannot be effected or produced by the finite. The Apostle has revealed the true cause of this love, *Rom. 8. 1.* when he says that those who are in Christ Jesus have been freed from the hatred of God and from eternal destruction. But what follows, "who walk not according to the flesh, but according to the spirit," does not explain the cause why we are either in Christ, or have escaped damnation, but it distinguishes those who are in Christ from those who are outside of Christ, to whom damnation pertains and comes.

As for what the Apostle says, that the justification of the Law is fulfilled in us, this cannot be truly affirmed of our virtues, which so far from fulfilling the Law, or satisfying the Law, that we have daily need of pardon, lest we be compelled to incur and pay the penalties proposed in the Law. But the justification of the Law is nevertheless fulfilled in us, although not by us; because the righteousness of Christ is imputed to us, in which the Law itself can desire nothing. For the Law requires such perfection as does not fall within this nature, so that not only are there no vices in us, but not even any sparks or seeds of vices, and we may be such as Adam was before he fell into sin, and such as the elect will be after the resurrection. For although man has changed, the Law of God had to remain immutable. If you find a man similar to that Adam, say that he has indeed fulfilled the law; our life, however laudably lived, is as far from the fulfillment of the Law as mediocre virtue differs from the highest degree and perfection of all virtues. But hear Augustine openly writing that we are so freed from sin that this

liberty is to be without crimes, or to be without complaint, but not to be without sin. *Tract. 41. in Ioh.* You say that he says this of venial sin, not of concupiscence. But do you really consider that to be venial which is not a crime or worthy of complaint? For he says that men can live without crime and complaint, but cannot be without sin; where he most clearly teaches that there are many hidden sins in even the most holy, which although they do not incur the reprehension of men, can nevertheless displease God. And Augustine immediately signifies this more openly when he says, "As long as you live, it is necessary for sin to be in your members." And here you confess that concupiscence is called sin by him, but in another sense. Also in the sense in which the Law understands sin. For what is it that reigns in the impious, if not sin? This very thing indeed remains in the faithful, but it is not permitted to reign. Augustine adds in the same place, "Therefore God does not condemn some sins and justify others; He praises none, but hates all." Therefore, God hates concupiscence itself even in the reborn. Here you are now caught in the middle, so that you can nowhere escape. Augustine says that there is sin in the best of men as long as he lives; and that God hates all sins. There is therefore something in the reborn that God truly hates. The Council of Trent has defined the contrary, and you defend the Council of Trent. Where will you now betake yourself? Hear, I pray, the excellent response of an acute man, prepared for every defense. For thus you say, "He speaks of that hatred which is improperly so called." What could be said more stupidly? Augustine says that God hates all sins: you say that he speaks of a certain improper hatred, the nature of which cannot even be imagined. What then? Does God hate no sin except improperly? For that is necessary, if we are to agree with you, because Augustine says that God hates all sins, and you say that he speaks of hatred improperly so called: therefore, God hates all sins, but with a feigned hatred. Augustine simply says that whatever of sins is in us is hateful to God, and there can be no difference in the kind of hatred, although there may be in the degree: He hates the more serious more, the less serious less; but He hates all truly and properly. O miserable cause of the Sophists, which must be sustained by such futile props.

But let Augustine speak yet again, and, if he can, more openly, so as to shut the mouths of the slandering Sophists. Thus, therefore, in another place: "For it is not no vice, when, as the Apostle says, the flesh lusts against the spirit; to which vice the contrary virtue is, when, as the same Apostle says, the spirit lusts against the flesh." *Aug. de perf. iust. hom. c. 11.* To true virtue is opposed TRUE sin: if therefore it is truly pleasing to God that the spirit should lust against the flesh, it is necessary that all the lusts of the flesh against the spirit be truly hateful to God.

And thus Augustine will perpetually confirm our opinion, however much the Sophists may protest.

