

INQUIRY Concerning Thomas's 1.2, questions 68, 69, 70 ON THE GIFTS, BEATITUDES, AND FRUITS OF THE SPIRIT.

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The Scholastics have formed not a few opinions in their theology:

1. From poorly understood passages of Scripture.
2. From writings of ancient or intermediate Doctors: whether genuine or spurious (e.g., from books attributed to Dionysius the Areopagite): whether asserting true or false things.
3. From glosses or interpretations of the sense of Scripture occurring in the fathers; sense, I say, not only literal, but also mystical, namely allegorical, or anagogical, or tropological.
4. From some definition or axiom of a Gentile philosopher, especially Aristotle, well or poorly understood according to his mind: whether it is true or false. If correctly understood and true, nevertheless from this through "crossing over into another genus," or through some other fallacious consequence, that theological opinion or conception is sometimes poorly deduced.
5. From fabulous histories of apparitions, revelations, examples, facts, observations, about which in Desperate Cause of the Papacy & part 2 of selected disputations, title on testing spirits. We will not present examples of each at this time: but only this one about the seven gifts of the spirit, eight beatitudes, twelve fruits of the spirit: which they think they have drawn from the fathers.

§. 1. ON THE SEVEN GIFTS OF THE SPIRIT

Lombard deals with them in book 3, distinction 34. But Thomas in 1.2 deals differently and at greater length. "Who in article 1 derives the distinction of gifts from virtues, and their sevenfold number from Gregory the Great in his first *Moralia* on Job, where he says the seven gifts are signified by the seven sons of Job, distinct from three theological virtues, which he says are signified by the three daughters of Job: and in *Moralia* 5 he distinguishes the same seven gifts from the four cardinal virtues, which he says are signified by the four corners of the house."

The first question in article 1 is determined by Thomas, that gifts are distinguished from virtues, that is, theological and moral. Which correctly before Thomas others, as he himself admits there, and not a few after him denied: such as Lombard in the cited place with his *Sentences*, with Scotus (whom the Minorites and Scotists scarcely ever abandon): with Gabriel and Themesvari, whom I have now inspected and compared. William of Auxerre in *Summa* part 4, question 8, question 1, who after disputing for both sides, concludes the same: "For this reason it seems to us that all

gifts are seven virtues." But he flourished before Thomas around the year 1240. From more recent writers, Cornelius à Lapide in his commentary on Isaiah 11 affirms the negative opinion.

Albertus Magnus put forward and defended the affirmative opinion before Thomas, but not so distinctly and evidently, in his Compendium of Theological Truth, book 5, chapter 38: "Although," he says, "all habits divinely given can be called gifts, nevertheless generally and with approval there are seven gifts of the Spirit, etc."

Besides his commentators, Thomas's opinion is held by Bonaventure and Durandus on 3, distinction 34, Antoninus part 4, summary title 10, chapter 1, Viguerius in Theological Institutions, chapter 13, §1, page 126, where he distinctly determines the distinction of a gift from theological virtues by this definition of his: "That disposition," he says, "by which one is specially moved in a certain superhuman way in sudden events, is called a gift." And today's writers of commonplaces, and commentators on Isaiah 11, Matthew 5, Galatians 5, and even certain catechisms (such as those of Canisius, Bellarmine, and an anonymous one published by the order and authority of Ferdinand I in 1557) seem to presuppose this distinction: when after explaining the theological and cardinal virtues, they add the seven gifts of the spirit, the eight beatitudes of the evangelical law, and the eleven or twelve fruits of the Spirit.

In what consists the distinction of gifts from virtues, and the reasons for the distinction, are not explained in one way. Thomas, after relating and rejecting the explanations of others, advances his own, but no more certain or evident. Thomists and Jesuits such as Suarez, Valencia, Tanner, Vasquez, labor in explaining and saving Thomas's opinion in commentaries on the cited question 68. Among whom Vasquez has doubts. The most recent, Arriaga, in disputation 38, after a laborious investigation of Thomas's mind, finally abandons him, section 3, page 429, saying that he is "more inclined to the far more probable opinion, which holds that it is in no way necessary to posit those acts as specifically diverse, which pertain to gifts; but all are reduced to virtues sometimes operating more excellently." We, having briefly refuted the opinion affirming the distinction, will examine one of all Thomas's interpreters and defenders, Gregory of Valencia, who had read and weighed the defenses of his colleagues just named, and proposes his own methodically, distinctly, and clearly.

§. 2. The specific distinction of the said gifts is refuted.

1. Because all virtues, all good works of those being saved are and are called gifts 2 Peter 1:2, as "his divine power has given to us all things that pertain to life and godliness." But intelligence, knowledge, wisdom, fear of God, etc. (which are listed

in Isaiah 11:2) not only pertain to life and godliness, and are not only given by the grace of God from the holy spirit to those being saved; but also faith, which Thomas with his followers numbers among the theological virtues. Ephesians 2:8: "For by grace you have been saved through faith; and this is not from yourselves: it is the gift of God." Philippians 1:19: "For it has been granted to you on behalf of Christ, not only to believe in him, but also to suffer for him." Therefore faith in the same respect is and is called a gift, as also hope and charity: as knowledge, wisdom, fear of God, etc. Finally, add that well-known saying of Augustine, "God crowns his own gifts in us." Which is to be understood about all our virtues and good works.

2. Because knowledge, intelligence, wisdom, which are numbered among the gifts, are included in the virtue of faith: therefore they are not supernatural habits ingrained by the holy spirit, specifically or generically distinct from the infused habit or virtue of faith. The antecedent is proved from the definition of saving faith, which is knowledge and certain assent or application, etc. Which is proved elsewhere against the ignorant and implicit faith of the Pontificals.

3. Because, as those said gifts by metonymy of the efficient cause are called "spirit," Isaiah 11, so also faith called a gift is called "spirit of faith" by the same metonymy, 2 Corinthians 4:13: "and since we have the same spirit of faith." And 1 Corinthians 12:4: "There are different kinds of gifts, but the same Spirit." verse 8: "To one is given through the Spirit the message of wisdom, to another the message of knowledge, etc., to another faith by the same Spirit, etc." Therefore they are not and are not called specifically or generically distinct habits or dispositions, distinct from infused virtues, faith, hope, charity, prudence, fortitude, etc.

§. 3. Let us now see the explanation of Gregory of Valencia:

who 1. Begins with a distinction of the word. 2. Refutes Scotus's opinion 3. Explains Thomas's. 4. Confirms the same with reasons and testimonies. 5. Responds to the objections of the opposite opinion.

1. As to the first, he says that in scripture the word gift is accepted in different ways: first commonly for any gift granted to men, James 1:17. Second for certain divine gifts, which are called grace freely given, 1 Corinthians 12:17,8. Third in a peculiar way for certain spiritual ornaments, with which the just are believed to be affected, just as also Christ the Lord was adorned with them, Isaiah 11. But in the passage of Isaiah, those spiritual ornaments are not called gifts, but spirit. Not correctly, therefore, was the passage of Isaiah 11:2 adduced to prove that the word gift in the sacred letters is accepted in this third and peculiar way for those spiritual ornaments, which the Pontificals call the seven gifts of the spirit, essentially distinct from the infused theological and cardinal virtues.

2. He refutes the opinion of Scotus and those who agree with him, from an absurd consequence. Because it would follow that Christ the Lord either lacked some gift, or had the virtue of faith. The former conflicts with Isaiah 11; the latter with the common opinion of theologians, who in 3, distinction 27, teach that Christ the Lord, since he was always blessed, never had faith. Response: It is not absurd that Christ had faith, as we proved from scripture in part 2 of selected disputations, title Whether and what faith Christ had, etc.

3. He says Thomas wants gifts to be habits differing from virtues in this, that they perfect the powers of the soul for certain heroic actions, not insofar as such actions are actively elicited from the powers themselves either through the natural power of them, or through some supernatural power added to them, but in the respect that they proceed peculiarly from a certain divine instinct of the Holy Spirit, by which our mind is usually wonderfully moved and impelled to certain outstanding and rare works, etc. But the virtues concur to these and also to other ordinary works, in that particular respect in which they proceed actively from the powers themselves, etc. And therefore in the use of gifts one is rather acted upon. But in the use of virtues, one rather acts as an agent.

Refutation 1: To form this idle commentary, what great absurdities there are! For first, heroic virtue, and actions of the same heroic virtue, which Thomas with his followers in article 1 brings in here, are not distinguished in species and form from others, but only in degree. For more and less do not vary the species.

Refutation 2: Thomas in his discourse in the cited article seems to Pelagianize, when he says human virtues (which he so calls), that is, the infused theological virtues of faith, hope, charity, perfect man, according to what man is, to be moved by reason in those things which he does inwardly or outwardly: that it is necessary for man to have higher perfections, according to which he is disposed to be divinely moved: and these perfections are called gifts not only because they are infused by God, but because according to them man is disposed to be made promptly movable by divine inspiration. But how do these things agree with that common saying of Augustine, "He makes us do what we do": and with that: "That grace is given for individual good acts or virtues." And with the doctrine of Thomas and the Thomists about the grace of God, and about predeterminations explained by Matthias de Ripolis; and about the motion of the first mover, explained by Fr. Sylvius? How with scripture, Philippians 2:13, Song of Songs 1:4, Hebrews 13:21? Will the gift therefore be a habit superadded to infused virtues? And if so, is it distinct from second grace which pre-moves, excites, predetermines to the singularity and specification of each good act? Or is it the same as second grace? If the same: is second moving grace, and exciting, predetermining or premotion, excitation, and predetermination a new and peculiar habit, or infused disposition?

Refutation 3: That statement of Gregory of Valencia is new-sounding and dangerous, that man is rather acted upon in the use of gifts, and in the use of virtues rather acts as an agent. This is said either Semi-Pelagianly or Enthusiastically. If man is not acted upon by God or by special grace of the Holy Spirit when he elicits an act of virtue, for example of faith or charity, or prudence, or fortitude, now the texts just cited are contradicted: Philippians 2, Song of Songs 1, Hebrews 13; to which add Psalm 119:33-36, Jeremiah 31:18. But if a man eliciting an act of the said gift, for example of counsel, wisdom, fear of God, fortitude, does not so much act or is an agent, as he suffers, then let them distinguish this opinion from the fanaticism of Enthusiasts, and certain transcendental doctors of mystical theology, who said mystical union is a pure passion with respect to man. Whom I have indicated as refuted by the Carthusian and Suarez in chapter 3 of Exercises of piety, §3, question 7, page 69. Thomas with his followers would not tolerate it being said of brutes and other inanimate secondary causes that they are acted upon and do not act. See question 105, articles 5 and 3, and against the Gentiles, chapter 69.

Refutation 4: What Thomas's interpreter and defender Valencia seems to do is to make and call a peculiar and extraordinary divine instinct and motion a gift, about which we are inquiring here: e.g., of Samson in Judges 16, Eleazar in Maccabees 6, Solomon in Kings 3, for he brings these examples. But there were more special divine instincts, e.g., of Abraham in Genesis 22, Phineas in Numbers 25, Elijah in 2 Kings 1, Elisha in 2 Kings 2, Peter in Acts 5. How these are to be specially called gifts of the spirit distinct from virtues, I would like to have explained, since such things are not to be imitated. Luke 9:1. And gifts according to Thomas with his followers are habits, necessary for all who are to be saved for the perfection of the Christian life, by which man is perfected to properly obey the Holy Spirit. See Thomas's question 68, articles 2 and 3.

§. 4. Gregory's reasons are these:

1. Objection: Because examples are given in scripture, in which this very power of gifts properly shone forth: as in Samson and Eleazar the gift of fortitude, in Solomon the gift of counsel.

Response: What need is there to multiply entities without necessity, without scripture? Why is Samson's action not attributed to the virtue of fortitude divinely infused, which would have enabled and inclined his will, and with divine premotion and excitation intervening, would have elicited that act? "But," he says, "by human reason, or another ordinary rule, could not Samson have been induced to that deed?" Response: He speaks of Samson as if without the indwelling Spirit of God, and without divine aspiration, inspiration, and excitation, he had been like a Curtius, or a Leonidas the Spartan with his four hundred: who were almost induced to similar

deeds. Samson had the spirit of faith, and others under the Old Testament had it. To that faith, not to a habit specifically distinct from faith and other virtues (which would specially be called a gift), such arduous and outstanding deeds are ascribed, Hebrews 11:32: "And what more shall I say? Time would fail me to tell of Gideon, Barak, Samson, Jephthah, David, Samuel, and the prophets, who through faith conquered kingdoms, worked righteousness, etc." up to verse 39. To say nothing of the fact that Isaiah 11 does not teach that the gift of fortitude is distinct from the cardinal virtue of fortitude. So that he has placed this argument, and in this argument Samson's fortitude, rather unsuccessfully in the front line. As for Solomon's judgment in 1 Kings 3, why could it not be referred to the cardinal virtue of prudence as well as to the gift of counsel?

2. Objection: Because the distinction of gifts from virtues is then also indicated in scripture, when in it gifts of this kind are peculiarly called spirit: as is evident from that passage in Isaiah 11:2, etc. From which first we correctly infer that gifts of this kind are peculiarly referred to the Holy Spirit and therefore perfect the mind, insofar as it can be by the Holy Spirit. Second, from the word "will rest," it is correctly concluded that those are permanent habits, whose function this is.

Response 1: But from the cited text he does not conclude those gifts, which are really distinguished from both theological and cardinal infused virtues. The commentator of the Society, Cornelius à Lapide, saw this, although otherwise accustomed everywhere to forge or vindicate such interpretations of texts as serve received errors. At first indeed he had said for the common error: "Note first. Hence the fathers and theologians correctly, whatever Oecolampadius may mutter against it, infer the seven gifts of the holy spirit, sc., the primary ones. Second, under these seven, as under a number of plenitude, the Prophet understands all his other gifts, etc. Thomas and some others distinguish gifts from virtues, etc. But more probably others think that ordinarily these gifts are not distinguished except by reason, from virtues of the same name, as the gift of piety, fortitude, wisdom, from the virtue of piety, fortitude, wisdom. For they are called virtues because they perfect the soul: they are called gifts of the Holy Spirit because they are given and aspirated to the soul by him, either as habits, or as acts, etc." Later on the words "spirit of wisdom and understanding," he says: "The spirit of wisdom, or wisdom is a gift or Christian virtue, by which we contemplate divine and eternal things, and judge all things according to them."

Response 2: We deny that the gifts enumerated in Isaiah 11 are peculiarly called spirit, and therefore peculiarly and alone referred to the spirit. Since any other infused virtues, whether intellectual or moral, are called spirit. All charismata, which they call graces freely given, 1 Corinthians 14:1,12, are called spirits. And the spirit of gentleness Galatians 6:1, the spirit of wisdom, the spirit of the mind Ephesians 1:13,17 and 4:23, the spirit of grace Hebrews 10:29, the spirit of truth John 4:6. Briefly, whatever gifts of soul, not only saving, but also common, are conferred by the spirit,

are therefore peculiarly referred to the spirit; e.g., the spirit of knowledge, intelligence, wisdom, with which God filled Bezalel, Exodus 31:3.

Response 3: Given but not conceded that in Isaiah 11 those charismata are peculiarly called spirits and referred to the spirit: how will they carve out their gifts from this? When in the text, which would be the seat of this distinction of gift from virtue, not even once is it called a gift: but virtue, namely faith, elsewhere in the scriptures is called a gift, Ephesians 2, Philippians 1.

Response 4: In the cited text, the discussion is about the gifts and virtues of Christ the head: not of the members of Christ.

3. Objection: From the testimonies of the fathers, Cyril of Alexandria book 2 on Isaiah 2, Chrysostom on the holy and adorable spirit, Gregory the Great book 1 moral, chapter 28, and book 2, chapter 36, Augustine book 2 on the sermon of the Lord on the mount, chapter 18.

Response: None of the cited passages seems in any way to hint at that controversial distinction. Indeed Cyril and Chrysostom in the quoted words manifestly identify virtue and gift of the spirit. Gregory in book 2, chapter 36, says that by the four virtues (namely the Cardinal ones) the mind is raised to the highest peak of rectitude; and other virtues (thus he constantly calls the said gifts, but does not distinctly call them gifts) like a certain common offspring feed each other.

4. Objection: drawn from the reasoning of the philosopher in Ethics to Nicomachus book 7, chapter 1, and Eudemian Ethics, book 7, chapter 18, on heroic virtue.

Response 1: Today's Ethical writers commonly hold that the heroic does not differ in species from any virtue, as fortitude, justice, etc., but only in degree. Hence nothing here for the specific distinction of gift from virtue.

Response 2: What Aristotle philosophizes about heroic virtue, which is divine and ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς (above us), through which through "excess of virtue" men are made gods; those things, as effects, are to be referred to certain peculiar divine aids, usually conferred on natural men alienated from the life of God. But the so-called gifts, and virtues, proceed from the same regenerating spirit, from the same grace of regeneration: so that an effect, which would proceed from the gift of fortitude, could not be called θεῖος (divine), ὑπὲρ ἄνθρωπον (superhuman), as opposed to a human act and effect, which would proceed from the virtue of fortitude.

Response 3: Valencia adds from Thomas, to confirm his argument from Aristotle's heroic virtue, that the function of gifts is properly to render men well movable by the holy spirit; when nevertheless virtues properly perfect man, not as he is movable,

but as he himself is moving. But these things, uttered so easily without scriptures, without theological demonstration, we just as easily reject.

Then, we oppose the said gifts, which are said to be infused and permanent habits, that is, active principles quo in any regenerate man: and consequently through them the regenerate man would be active, and with premoving and exciting grace would elicit appropriate acts, e.g., of wisdom, fortitude, fear of the Lord, etc. And how then would they not perfect man, as he is moving, just as much as virtues? For the habit of infused virtue, e.g., of faith, or fear of the Lord, or prudence, is an active principle or principle quo, from which, with premoving and exciting grace, which they call second grace, appropriate acts are elicited.

Finally, as they say from and with Aristotle about sensation, sense is action and passion; why similarly about any spiritual sensation (if I may so speak) do they not say it is action and passion? Since the regenerate and spiritual man, gifted with special grace and the impressed new creature as a certain principle of spiritual actions, is here and now touched, moved, acted upon, determined by the first mover of all grace (which with respect to himself is to suffer, to terminate), and the same being touched, moved, acted upon, determined, moves, acts, determines himself under the divine predetermination. Song of Songs 1:4, Philippians 2:12-13, Psalm 119:36, where about the regenerate and pious man, both passion (with respect to divine action, or God acting), and action, is indicated.

5. Valencia continues and attacks the foundation of the contrary opinion, which Cajetan, in article 1, (as he says) easily refutes from Thomas, thus: "Although," he says, "virtues suffice for attaining in their own way any objects whatsoever, nevertheless they do not suffice for attaining them in every way and reason: namely, so that pious actions can proceed peculiarly from the instinct of the holy spirit, and therefore so that they can attain objects in a certain excellent way, and as Durandus says, in a superhuman way, or in an inhuman way, as Henry of Ghent says": namely, who is Henry Goethals of Ghent, archdeacon of Tournai, who flourished around the year 1290, among the scholastics distinguished by the title of Solemn Doctor.

Response 1: We say that actions, e.g., of the infused virtue of faith, with second grace premoving, exciting, drawing, determining (which is absolutely necessary for every spiritually good act) cannot not be elicited and peculiarly proceed from the instinct of the holy spirit. Moreover, that the infused virtue of faith is sufficient for attaining objects in every way and reason by which the holy spirit or intervening second grace, by efficacious motion and predetermination, wants them to be attained, and makes the one operating attain them. No differently than in Acts 2:4: "And they were all filled with the Holy Spirit and began to speak in other tongues, as the Spirit gave them utterance," 1 Corinthians 12: "who (namely the Spirit) works all things in all," Hebrews 13:20-21: "Now may the God of peace, etc., equip you for every good work

to do his will, working in you that which is pleasing." Compare James 1:17, John 3:27, Philippians 1:9-11. And the above cited Philippians 2, Jeremiah 31. Fulgentius to Monimus, book 9, chapter 14: "he makes us do, by whose operation in us is every good that we do." Augustine in the book on correction and grace chapter 4: "God with the wills of men themselves makes what he wants, when he wants."

Fourth, how suitably with scripture, with Augustinian theology, and Thomistic theology on grace, besides the impression of new life, or new creature through first grace, and premotion, excitation, and physical predetermination of the renewed heart, through second grace, must other habits (which they call gifts) be necessarily posited, through which a spiritual effect is produced by regenerate man, with second grace preceding and concurring?

"But Valencia says, Finally, as St. Thomas correctly reasons here in article 2, the virtues which deal with divine and supernatural things are not so perfectly participated in by the soul, that they do not need besides these other gifts of this kind as supports, by which it may be fully subjected to the motion and power of the holy spirit."

Response: It is a mere begging of what is in question: or a defense of the controverted cause from one's own affirmation. When in natural things the soul, either infused by creation (as in man) or educed from the potency of matter (as in brutes), informs matter, it renders man or brute apt, that is, well movable (to use Valencia's term) by the first mover, and completely subjects that brute to the motion and power of the first mover for eliciting vital and animal actions here and now, given the premotion and predetermination of the first mover. For eliciting which actions fire, water, stone, metal are not apt or well movable.

Response 2: What is that "infused virtues are not perfectly participated by the soul"? Do they not inform and perfect it as accidental forms? Does the regenerate soul, and transformed through the holy spirit, and renewed, not have, hold, possess them? If so, how can there be doubt about the participation of the soul, by which it participates in the virtues of faith, hope, charity, prudence, fortitude, justice, temperance, which the holy spirit has infused by communicating, and communicated by infusing, impressing, inserting, implanting, creating within? This statement would by no means be consistent with Thomistic philosophy: natural virtues, that is, natural powers or faculties are not so perfectly participated in by the souls of brutes concerning natural things, that brutes do not need besides these other natural gifts as supports, by which they may be apt, and fully subjected to the motion and power of the first mover. Let him who can unravel this enigma.

And what if it is asked about the said gifts, whether they are perfectly participated in by the soul of regenerate man? If they affirm it, it must be proved that such

perfection comes to all the regenerate and faithful from the first moment of infusion or divine communication, to the end of life. If they deny it, now the same difficulty returns, and other aids will have to be superinfused and impressed, by whatever name they are called: and thus a process to infinity.

Response 3: Aptitude or potency both passive John 14:17, and active John 15:5, 2 Corinthians 3:4, is absent from unregenerate man, as being dead in sins, Ephesians 2, Colossians 2. But through the infusion of grace or spiritual virtues, both potencies are conferred. For by those infused habits (according to Thomas 1.2, question 51, article 4), man is well disposed to an end exceeding the faculty of human nature, which is the ultimate and perfect blessedness of man. And those habits must be proportionate to that, for which man is disposed. And in question 49, article 3, on habits in general, he determines that a habit is ordained to act and operation as a principle. In question 111, article 3, he cites from Augustine's book on Nature and Grace: "he prevents that we may be healed, he follows that being healed we may be invigorated: he prevents that we may be called, he follows that we may be glorified." When Thomas in question 109 and following introduces grace as a habitual quality and principle of human actions, and indeed really distinct from infused virtues (about which we do not inquire at present), and in addition also the habits of infused virtues, having an order to actions as their principle: for what purpose, without scripture and without reason, is another principle, namely of gift really distinct from grace and from infused virtue, subordinated to it, or coordinated, or preordained, invented?