

Translated by Nosferatu

My substack: <https://sedulitas.substack.com/>

My X/twitter: <https://x.com/nosfetigue>

Book translated: [Diss. theol. de libero hominis arbitrio](#)

THEOLOGICAL DISSERTATION, ON THE FREE WILL OF MAN,
Which, BY DIVINE GRACE ASPIRING,
IN THE NOURISHING VIADRINA [University of Frankfurt (Oder)]
WITH THE MOST MAGNIFICENT RECTOR,
THE AUGUST AND MOST SERENE ROYAL PRINCE AND LORD
FRIEDRICH WILHELM,
HEIR TO THE KINGDOM OF PRUSSIA and the ELECTORATE OF
BRANDENBURG, etc. etc.

UNDER THE PRESIDENCY OF **BARTHOLD HOLTZFUS,**
DOCTOR OF SACRED THEOLOGY AND PUBLIC PROFESSOR
ORDINARIUS,
his promoter and preceptor, to be pursued with all observance and
reverence,

On the 13th Day of July, in the Year of our Redeemer 1707,

To the Placid Examination of the Erudite
submits
DANIEL KROSNIEWIECKI,
Lithuanian.

FRANKFURT on the ODER,

From the Press of **CHRISTOPH ZEITLER.**
IN THE NAME OF JESUS

CHAPTER I.

§. I.

Free Will (*Liberum Arbitrium*) is called by the Jews רשות (reshuth), whose celebrated saying is in Pirke Avot: והרשות נתונה (vehareshuth nethunah), i.e., all things are foreseen by God, but freedom is nevertheless given. By the Greeks, and indeed by the Aristotelians, it is called ἐλευθέρᾳ προαίρεσις (eleuthera proairesis, free choice), ἐξουσία προαιρέσεως (exousia proaireseos, power of choice); by the Stoics, τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν (to eph' hēmin, what is up to us). Thus Epictetus in his Enchiridion, ch. I, says: "Of things that exist, some are up to us, and others are not up to us." The Platonists called it τὸ ἀντεξέσιον (to autexousion, self-power) or ἀντεξέσιον (autexousian), whom most of the Greek Fathers follow. The Latins call it *Liberam voluntatem* (Free will) and *Potestatem voluntatis* (Power of the will). Most usually, however, *Liberum Arbitrium* (Free Will/Judgment), or simply, *Arbitrium* (Will/Judgment).

§. II.

Some have wished that the words *autexousion*, *autexousia*, and *Liberum Arbitrium* had never been received, (1.) because they are too proud and insolent, and seem to signify that men are ἀδεσπότες (adespotēs), i.e., of their own jurisdiction, and independent from God. (2.) because Pelagius abused these words for the defense of his error. (3.) because the term *Liberum Arbitrium* implies a tautology.

But we judge that these words should not be rashly eliminated, (1.) because they have always been applied not only by gentile Philosophers, but also by Christian Doctors. (2.) because the thing itself expressed by these words, namely the Liberty of the Will, is taught and handed down in the Sacred Scriptures. Whence also equivalent words are read in Holy Scripture; although the term *Liberi Arbitrii* does not exist there in so many letters. For in **1 Cor. 7:37** it is called ἐξουσία περὶ τῷ ἰδίου θελήματος (exousia peri tou idiou thelēmatos), power of one's own will. In **2 Cor. 9:7**, προαίρεσις (proairesis), free will, Election, a destined Purpose, study. In **Philem. v. 14**, ἐκούσιον (hekousion), voluntary, spontaneous, and in **Hebr. 10:26**, men are said ἐκουσίως ἁμαρτάνειν (hekousiōs hamartanein), to sin voluntarily; and in **1 Pet. 5:2**, the Presbyters are ordered to pasture the flock of GOD μὴ ἀναγκαστῶς, ἀλλ' ἐκουσίως (mē anankastōs, all' hekousiōs), not by constraint, but spontaneously and voluntarily. (3.) because the Doctors and Ecclesiastical Writers have sufficiently liberated and purged these words from the abuse of the Gentile Philosophers and Heretics, by whose example we can and should attend to and imitate the legitimate use of these words, but avoid the abuse.

§. III.

The word **Arbitrium** is taken in two ways: (1.) for an act of the Intellect, and it signifies the same as judgment or opinion, which sense the verb *arbitrari* also obtains: for it signifies to judge, to opine, to think. (2.) for an act of the will, in which sense it signifies

the active power of the will, or the faculty of choosing, and thence free election; also the right and power of acting according to one's pleasure: as, when we say: it is in my will (*arbitrio*) to do this or that, or to omit it; i.e., it is in my power and of my election. And in this sense it is taken in this place, for which reason the Adjective, *Liberum* (Free), is added to the word *Arbitrium*, to express the matter that much more fully and significantly, and to indicate that knowledge of the intellect is prerequisite for a free action.

§. IV.

The word **Liberty** is also taken variously, for it is taken (1.) for immunity from coercion and external force; for it is everywhere conceded that the will, as to its elicited acts, i.e., those which the will immediately produces from itself, such as willing and not-willing, desiring and being averse, cannot be coerced; although as to its commanded acts, i.e., those which the will produces by means of another power, such as speaking, writing, sitting, walking, it can be coerced, i.e., be moved and carried away by an external and violent principle. This liberty from coercion coincides with spontaneity, and to whatever subject it belongs, that subject is uncoerced, spontaneous and not violent, and by a spontaneous motion, of its own accord, and not unwillingly, it does what it does; which kind of liberty belongs not only to men, but also to brutes, which according to a natural inclination from an intrinsic principle, are carried to food and drink and other things pleasing to them. (2.) it is taken for immunity from necessity, not only physical and internal, which is an exemption from determination to acting and to acting one thing; to which is opposed physical necessity, by which certain secondary causes are so determined to one thing that they cannot not act, nor act otherwise, such as the necessity of burning is in fire, when combustible material is given and applied; but also for immunity from the necessity of production, which is motive or impulsive, which is an exemption from an external, impelling, and necessitating cause. By this, man acts not only spontaneously, but also freely, so that with all things requisite for acting being posited, he remains indifferent, both as to the exercise and as to the species of the act.

§. V.

Hence, Liberty from internal and external necessity is subdivided into the **Liberty of Contrariety** or **Specification**. The former is that by which the will can will or not will an apprehended and known object; in practical matters, to love or not to love, to act or not to act. It is called the **Liberty of Contradiction**, because to will or not to will, to love or not to love, to act or not to act, are opposed contradictorily. The same is called the **Liberty of exercise**, because it can exercise or not exercise the act of willing or not willing, the act of loving or not loving, of acting or not acting.

The **Liberty of Contrariety** or **Specification** is that by which the will, from two or more species, can choose one and reject another. It is called the **Liberty of Contrariety**, because to will or to be unwilling (*nolle*), to do this or to do the opposite, to love good or

evil or to hate are contraries. The same is called the **Liberty of Specification**, because to choose this or another, good or evil, to do this or to do the opposite, to love this or another, to hate this or another, infers different species. Hence the Scholastics, and from them other Theologians and Philosophers, observe that to will (velle) and not to will (non velle) are contradictory acts of the will, but to will (velle) and to be unwilling (nolle) are contrary acts: for "not to will" states a bare negation of volition; but "to be unwilling" (nolle), besides the negation of volition, also infers a positive act contrary to volition.

Nor is the faculty of acting evilly precisely required for the Nature of Free Will, as is plain in GOD and in the good angels who are confirmed; but the faculty of choosing evil is rather a defect of Free Will than its Nature: and pertains only to the accidental state in men as wayfarers.

(3.) **Liberty** is taken for immunity from the Dominion of sin, as in **Rom. 6:18; Col. 3:17**, which is called by Bernard, Lombard, and others the **Liberty of grace**. (4.) It is taken for immunity from the sense of sin, and from all the troubles of this life, of the soul and of the body, **Rom. 8:21**, which by the same Bernard, Lombard, and other Scholastics, is called the **Liberty of glory**. In this place, Liberty is taken for immunity from necessity, both internal or physical, and external or of production, motive or compulsion, which is called the **Liberty of Nature** by Bernard, Lombard, and the Scholastics.

§. VI.

Before all else, it must be seen whether Free Will exists. The negative is commonly attributed to Simon Magus, Valentinus, Marcion, Hermogenes, Bardesanes, the Manichaeans, also Peter Abelard, Valla, Spinoza, into whose opinion we will not now inquire. Today, the Doctors of the Roman Church accuse the Protestants of denying Free Will; where, however, it should be noted that the question is not about the state of Integrity: For the Pontificists confess that Protestants have always acknowledged that the first-formed were endowed with Free Will. But when they deal with the state of sin, they attribute to Luther, Calvin, and other Reformers that they teach that Free Will was utterly extinguished and lost through the Lapse of Adam, and therefore that man after the lapse does not have Free Will. But it never came into the mind of the Protestants to simply deny Free Will, even after the lapse, neither with respect to Natural works, nor Civil, nor moral works of the Natural Order; but they only denied the Rectitude and Sanity of Free Will, and its Natural powers for spiritual good, in which matter they followed Augustine, *Enchiridion*, c. 30: "Man, by making bad use of Free Will, destroyed both himself and it."

§. VII.

We therefore affirm the question, and state that there is absolutely a Liberty of the Will.

1. because this is a Property of all Intellectual Beings, of God, and of the Angels: it is therefore also of men, since they too are of an intellectual Nature, to whose

Nature Free Will pertains. Hence Rivetus in *Catholicus Orthodoxus*, Tractat. 4, Quæst. 4, p. 277, rightly writes: "We acknowledge that Free Will, well understood, so pertains to the Nature of man, and is so proper to it, that if it were plainly taken away, the essence of man could no more be retained than if reason, to which it pertains, were taken away."

2. because Scripture attributes Liberty of the Will to men, not only in the state of Innocence, but also in the state of a lapsed Nature, as in **Deut. 11:26-28; Deut. 30:15, 19; Josh. 24:15; Jerem. 21:8; Num. 30:14; 2 Sam. 24:12; 1 Reg. 3:5; Eccles. 15:17; Matt. 19:17; 1 Cor. 7:37; 2 Cor. 9:7; Philem. v. 14.**
3. because our Conscience itself convicts us that we are endowed with Free Will; whence we rejoice when we have done well, and we grieve when we have done evil.
4. because otherwise Religion would be prescribed to men in vain, precepts and prohibitions would be given, promises and threats would be added to precepts, rewards and punishments would be proposed, Consultations and deliberations would be instituted, reprehensions would be sharpened.
5. because even through the lapse, man was not changed into another species, but remained man, and therefore a rational creature, endowed with intellect and will.
6. because the whole World, and in it the faithful and the unfaithful, the learned and the unlearned, consent to this truth; so that, with Augustine as author in *Book on True Religion*, c. 14, "no small number of the Learned, no crowd of the Unlearned dissents here." For, with the same Augustine as witness in *Book on Two Souls, against the Manichaeans*, c. II, "Shepherds sing this even in the mountains, and Poets in the Theaters, and the unlearned in the circles and the learned in the Libraries, and Masters in the Schools, and Bishops in the Sacred places, and in the whole world, the human race."
7. The same in *Epistle 46 to Valentinus* asks: "If there is no Free Will, how will Christ judge the world?" And Jerome so approves the Liberty of the Will that he does not fear to say, in book 1 against the Pelagians: "In vain you blaspheme, and pour into the ears of the ignorant that we condemn free Will; nay rather let him be damned who damns it." Hence Scotus said that those who deny Free Will should be refuted not with reasons, but with beatings. Whose liberty of tongue Anton. le Grand imitated in *Institutiones Philosophicae*, Part 10, Art. 19, n. 1.

§. VIII.

Because, however, Free Will can be considered either in the genus of Being, and absolutely, as it belongs to every Intellectual or rational being—God, Angels, and man, and to this last indeed in any state; or in the genus of morals, and in relation to various states, whether Instituted, or Destitute, or Restituted, or Prestituted; Order demands that we first deal with Free Will in the former respect, and then afterwards in the latter.

§. IX.

As for what regards the Definition of Free Will; the Scholastics, at least the later ones, both the Thomists and the Scotists; also the Greeks, Lutherans, and Remonstrants, and not a few of the Reformed, define Free Will as the power or faculty by which, with all things requisite for acting being posited, the Will can act or not act, this or that, and act otherwise. Some of the Reformed, however, define Free Will by Rational Preference, by which man does what he pleases, with a preceding judgment of reason. But many other of the Reformed—Franc. Junius, Gerh. Joh. Vossius, Davenantius, Joh. & Ludov. Crocius, Ludov. le Blanc, Wilh. Amesius, Rob. Baronius, Joh. Strangius, Rich. Baxter, D. Elias Grebenitz, D. Phil. Buchius, Dn. D. Sam. Strimesius, Pet. Jurieu—out of love for Truth, Antiquity, and Ecclesiastical Peace, have preferred to retain that old and accustomed definition of Free Will; because it, in itself, and viewed without the abuse of the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians, contains nothing evil or inconvenient. Following their moderation, we (with the principle always being saved, from whence Free Will receives or has its powers, and the mode of operation of Divine grace) define Free Will thus: **Free Will is the active faculty of the Will, by which the will, with all things requisite for acting being posited, can act or not act, this or that, and act otherwise.**

§. X.

Therefore, Free Will is not some act, as Hervæus willed, which is now present, now absent, but is something inborn from Nature itself, which can in no way be taken away; nor is it a certain natural habit, arising from the Intellect and Will, as Bonaventure willed; because (1.) a habit inclines determinately only to one thing in species; whereas Free Will is for opposites, or at least in certain states is indifferent and indeterminate to this or that. (2.) Of the nature of a habit is the facility of acting; but of the nature of Free Will is not the facility of acting, but the indifference of acting or not acting, of doing this or that or otherwise. Nor is it a Universal power containing under itself as other species, the Intellect and will, and other powers. Because the acts of the other faculties, although they may be capable of free acts, are nevertheless not free insofar as they proceed from themselves, but only insofar as they are commanded by the Will; which alone is truly and properly free, because it alone is the mistress of its own act, since by its own will it can produce it or not produce it. (3.) Because if Free will were such a universal power containing under itself so many species, Free Will would be as manifold as that power was, or as many as there were powers; which by the consent of all is absurd. Nor is Free Will a certain third power or faculty, distinct in species from the Intellect and will, as Alexand. Halensis willed; for since the Intellect suffices for the apprehension and cognition of things, and the Will suffices for moving and applying the other powers to willing freely, that third power would be superfluous. It remains, therefore, that Free Will is a faculty or power not passive, which is a mere logical non-repugnance, but an Active [power] of the Will, which under and with the Concurrence and aid of GOD, is and remains the Mistress of its own acts, and freely produces them: in which matter Thomas and Scotus, and their followers, even the Protestants, consent. See Bellarm. *de Gratia &*

Libero Arb. Lib. 3, c. 7 & 8, and from the Reformed, Rob. Baronius, Metaph. Generalis, Sect. 12, Disp. 1, n. 20, 21, 22, p. 324 to 327.

§. XI.

The **Author of Free Will** is GOD, who, in creating man in the image of GOD and in inspiring a soul into him, at the same time conferred Free Will, as a gift of an Intelligent Nature, so that he might be able to know, worship, praise, and obey GOD.

§. XII.

Hence, not indeed a physically Predetermining Decree, but yet the Decree of Creation, and the Will, in the actual Creation, Ordaining and Constituting, and the very Will of man, being Free and indeterminate, is the Root, reason, foundation, and cause of Contingency and Liberty. For from where does man have the power of operating contingently and freely, unless because GOD willed that he be able to act so, and because he gave him a free Will, by which he could determine himself and act indeterminately? Which Melancthon excellently expressed in his *Loci Communes* on the cause of Sin and Contingency, saying: "The cause of the Contingency of our actions is the Liberty of the Will," likewise in his *Response to the 22nd Bavarian Article*: "Therefore Contingency is, and the fount of the Contingency of Our Actions is the Liberty of the Will."

§. XIII.

The **Subject of Free Will** is otherwise either General or special. The General is Intelligent Nature, Infinite and finite—God, Angels, Men. Hence Damascenus, Bk. 2 of *On the Orthodox Faith*, ch. 27, & Bk. 3, ch. 14: *πᾶν λογικὸν καὶ ἀντεξέσιον*, i.e., "every rational thing is of free power." But that brutes do not have Free Will, the same man teaches, *ibid.*: *τὰ ἄλογα ἐκ εἰσιν ἀντεξέσια*, i.e., "Irrational things lack Free Will." See also Bellarm. *de Grat. & Lib. Arbitrio*, bk. 3, ch. 15-16. The special Subject, as to Man, is either of denomination or the *Subject Which*, and this is the whole Man; or of Inhesion or the *Subject By Which*, and this, the remote and mediate, is the Soul of man; the Proximate and immediate is formally the **Will**; but the **Intellect**, according to Thomas, is so radically; according to Scotus, better, antecedently: because with Scotus and Henricus Gandavensis as authorities, the name of Root signifies a true cause, but the intellect is not the true Cause of the Liberty of the Will; but only the Antecedent and the condition without which there would not be Liberty in the will.

§. XIV.

But that the Will is formally free is plain, because Free Will is an affection of the Will; whence also Scripture vindicates Liberty for the Will, **Deut. 30:19**; **Josh. 24:15**; **2 Sam. 24:12**; **1 Cor. 7:37**, and the Council of Arausica [Orange], Canon 13, expressly calls it the Free Will of the Will (*Liberum Voluntatis Arbitrium*). The Fathers also often call it Free

Will (*Liberam Voluntatem*), as Augustine, bk. 3 of *On Free Will*, ch. 1 ff.; Damascenus, bk. 2 of *On the Orthodox Faith*, ch. 25; but sometimes they call it the Free Will of the Will (*Liberum Voluntatis Arbitrium*), as Ambrose, bk. 2 of *On Faith*, ch. 3; Augustine, *City of God*, bk. 5, ch. 9.

§. XV.

On the other hand, the **Intellect** is neither Free from the necessity of Contradiction, or as to the exercise of the act, nor from the necessity of Contrariety, or as to the species of the act. Not from the necessity of Contradiction, because with all things requisite for acting being posited, it necessarily acts and cannot not act: neither in simple apprehension, nor in the Judgment of composition, nor in the Judgment of illation is it free. Not in apprehension, because with an object being proposed, and with all things requisite for apprehending the object being posited, it cannot not apprehend it, just as the eye of the body necessarily sees, with all things necessary for seeing being posited; nor in the judgment of composition is it free, because to a proposed proposition, either affirmative or negative, with convincing arguments being proposed and perceived, it cannot not assent, but necessarily assents; nor in the judgment of illation; for with a legitimately formed Syllogism being proposed and understood, it cannot not assent, but necessarily judges that the illation was rightly made. Nor is the Intellect free from the necessity of Contrariety or as to specification, (1.) because this Liberty presupposes the Liberty of Contradiction or of exercise, which being denied, this also must be denied. (2.) Because if necessary arguments are proposed to the Intellect, it cannot dissent, but necessarily assents; if probable ones, it opines; if contrary ones that are equally probable, it necessarily doubts, unless the command or inclination of the will is added. From all of which it appears that not the intellect is Free, but the Will.

§. XVI.

From a confused or not accurate apprehension of the object, or from an equilibrium of reasons adduced on both sides, there sometimes arises in the Intellect a certain passive Indifference or fluctuation of judgment, by which the Intellect remains suspended as to which object or to which proposition it ought to assent. But since this Indifference is merely passive, and in cognition states only a defect or negation, which is to be taken away by a sufficient cognition of the object; hence it is apparent to anyone that this passive indifference of Judgment ought not to be confused with the Active Indifference of the Will, by which the Will can still choose or not choose, choose or repudiate, an Object that is sufficiently known and approved by assent.

§. XVII.

The ultimate Judgment of the Practical Intellect is indeed a Condition without which the Will does not ordinarily operate; In the meantime, however, the Will is not determined by the Practical Judgment of the Intellect. Which, against the Thomists and certain of

the Reformed, to whom Bellarmine accedes here in bk. 3 of *de Grat. & Lib. Arb.*, ch. 8, the Scotists and others rightly deny, who teach that the ultimate judgment of the practical Intellect does not necessarily determine the Will: for (1.) Scripture teaches that men often act, or choose something against the light of the Intellect, or the dictate of right reason and Grace, as in **Job 21:14**: *They said to GOD, depart from us, we do not want the knowledge of thy ways.* **Ch. 24:13**: *They were rebellious to the light.* **Luke 12:47**: *The Servant who knew the will of his Lord, and did not prepare himself, nor did according to his will, will be beaten with many stripes.* **James 4:17**: *To him who knows to do good and does it not, to him it is sin.* Whence (2.) they are damned who have acted against the dictate of the Intellect or of right reason. **John 3:19**: *This is the judgment, because men loved darkness more than the light: for their works were evil.* **Rom. 2:1-2**: *Thou art inexcusable, O man, whosoever thou art that judgest. For wherein thou judgest another, thou condemnest thyself: for thou dost the same things which thou judgest.* **v. 17-18 ff.**: *If thou art called a Jew, and retest in the law, and makest thy boast of God, And knowest his will, and approvest the more profitable things, being instructed by the law, Art confident that thou thyself art a guide of the blind, a light of them that are in darkness, An instructor of the foolish, a teacher of infants, having the form of knowledge and of truth in the law. Thou therefore that teachest another, teachest not thyself? thou that preachest that men should not steal, stealest? Thou that sayest, men should not commit adultery, dost thou commit adultery? thou that abhorrest idols, dost thou commit sacrilege? Thou that makest thy boast of the law, by transgression of the law dishonourest God.* **Ezek. 12:2**: *They have eyes to see, and see not: and ears to hear, and hear not: for they are a provoking house.* Cf. **Ez. 33:31-32**; **Zach. 7:11-12**; **Jer. 6:16-17**; **John 5:40**; **ch. 8:46**; **Ch. 15:22**; **Acts 7:51**; **Ch. 13:46**; **Matt. 11:21**.

(3.) If the will were necessarily determined by the ultimate Judgment of the practical Intellect, it would follow that the Will acts not freely but naturally. (4.) this opinion being admitted, the will would not be an active faculty that moves and determines, but a passive one, moved and determined; which should rather be said of the intellect. (5.) It would follow that the will could never prefer a lesser good to a greater good; and (6.) from two equal goods it could choose neither. But experience teaches the contrary. (7.) There would be no voluntary, deliberate sins against Conscience; against the passages cited in n. 2; for to sin voluntarily and against Conscience is to cry out against the ultimate judgment of the practical Intellect. (8.) There would be no Blasphemy against the Holy Spirit, against **Matt. 12:31-32**; **Mark 3:28-29**; **Hebr. 6:4, 5, 6**; **Hebr. 10:29**.

The Intellect therefore moves the Will indeed, but not physically, but morally, as a Guide, not as a Master; and the Will depends on the Intellect, but not as from an effective principle of Volition, but as from a Condition without which it would not be. In agreement are Pet. Molinæus, *Enodatio Gravissimarum Quaestionum*, Tractat. 6, qu. 2, p. 192; Amesius, *de Conscientia et eius iure vel casibus*, bk. 1, ch. 7, §. 6-7; Rob. Baronius, *Metaphysica Generalis*, Sect. 12, Disp. 1, n. 20, 29 ff., p. 325, 335 ff.; G. J. Vossius, *de Idololatria*, §. 3, ch. 43; Dn. D. Samuel Strimesius, *Praxiologia Apodictica*, Ch. 3, Subsect.

3, Art. 1, §. 10 ff.; Baxter, *Methodus Theologiae*, Part 1, Ch. 5, n. 35, 36, 37, p. 160; Ch. 8, n. 106, p. 208; Ch. 14, n. 68, 69, 70, p. 276-277; and from the Cartesian hypothesis, Burmann, *Synopsis*, bk. 2, Ch. 11, §. 5; Wittich, *Theologia Pacifica*, Ch. 11, §. 126-127. Compare also Hornejus, *Philosophia Moralis*, bk. 2, Ch. 5, 6, 10 ff.; and from the Scholastics, Suarez, *Disputationes Metaphysicae*, 19, sect. 6, n. 2; Becanus, *Theologia Scholastica*, Part 2, Tract 1, Ch. 2, qu. 5; Arriaga, *Disputationes Physicae*, 8, sect. 2; Fonseca, etc.; also Boyvin, *Philosophia Scoti*, Part 4, Part 1, Disp. 2, qu. 1 & *Theologia Scoti*, Part 2, Tract. *de Gratia Christi*, Ch. 2, qu. 4.

§. XVIII.

The **Object of Free Will** is τὰ πρακτὰ, **Agibilia** (doable things), proposed and shown to the Will by the Intellect. For the Will is not borne toward the unknown: nor is anything willed, unless it is first known. Whence that trite saying: of the unknown there is no desire. Therefore the Intellect is not indeed properly the root of Liberty, since root signifies a true cause, but causality cannot be attributed to the Intellect with respect to Liberty; but it is the Antecedent and the Condition without which the Will would not choose freely; whence the Will is called the rational Appetite, since on the contrary the appetite in brutes is not free, because it is not rational. Nor yet is it always necessary for desiring an Object that the Intellect should practically judge that the proposed Object is to be chosen, but sometimes a simple apprehension of the Object as good suffices; which has its place before all others in the movements of the Will which they call the very first, and which happen without deliberation.

§. XIX.

The **Form of Free Will** is not the sole immunity from internal physical necessity, by which a Natural agent is determined to one thing; nor the sole immunity from coercion, or spontaneity, since that also belongs to brutes; but it is the **Indetermination and Indifference of the Will**, both that which is as to exercise, and that which is as to the species of the act; with the principle always being saved, from which the Will receives or has the powers for acting, and the mode of operation of Divine Grace. This is plain (1.) from the sayings of Scripture, **Deut. 30:15, 19; ch. 11:26 ff.; Josh. 24:15; 2 Sam. 24:12; 1 Reg. 3:5; Jer. 21:8; Sir. 15:15; 1 Cor. 7:37; 2 Cor. 9:7; Philem. v. 14**; in which the Liberty of the Will is placed not in Immunity from Coaction, nor in Rational Preference, but in immunity from necessity both intrinsic and extrinsic or of production, and in the election of either one. (2.) From the testimony of our Conscience itself, which convicts anyone that he, in the sphere competent to any state, can act, or not act, this or that and otherwise, here and now, act, and therefore is constrained by no necessity: likewise, that he can omit more evil than he does omit, and do more good than he does. (3.) From the Consultations and deliberations among men, for escaping evil and obtaining good, and for that purpose applying legitimate means, which are customary and praised in Scripture. (4.) from the imputability of our actions to praise or blame, to reward or punishment, in the sacred Letters also asserted. (5.) From the penitence of men, when

knowingly, willingly, and therefore from malice, or even carried away by affections, they have committed some evil; by which they testify that they could have not done what they did, and could have done something else. (6.) from the Liberty of other Intellectual agents, namely GOD and the Angels. For God freely willed and wills all things outside of himself, so that he could also have not willed them, and in the sphere of goods he can will this or that: For He is not a Deity enclosed in the prison of the Fates, such as the Stoic God was thought to be, according to Melanchthon. The Angels likewise can, with one Object being proposed, will or not will, act or not act; and no less, in the genus of goods, as to the species of the act, will this good rather than that. For with Wendelinus as Author, *Systema Theologiae*, bk. 1, ch. 5, Thesis 18, Expl. 3-4, p. 182-183:

"Those who think that this Indifference, which includes the Liberty of Contrariety and of Contradiction, is to be found neither in GOD, nor in the Angels, nor in men, they take Indifference too strictly, when they refer it only to good and evil in general, as if an indifferent Will could not be said of that which is determined only to good in general, or only to evil in general. But there is also an Indifference only to good, and only to evil, not indeed in general, but in species as to certain acts: For neither is a will confirmed in good, nor hardened in evil, so determined to all and every one of its free acts that it cannot not exercise each one; which is manifest in the state of Integrity and Innocence of the first men, in the state of sin, in the state of Grace, and in the state of Glory. The same is to be judged of the Will of the Angels, and many things GOD does willingly which he could have not done, and the contraries of which he could have done."

Which the same Author in the same place also affirms of the Blessed in the other life; following Augustine, who in bk. 22 of the *City of God*, last ch., speaks thus:

"nor will they for that reason not have Free Will, because sins will not be able to delight them: for it will be much more Free from the delight of sinning, even unto an indeclinable liberty for the delight of not sinning."

For Indifference to good and evil does not pertain to the Essence and formal reason of Free Will of any Intellectual agent, but pertains only to the accidental state in Us Wayfarers.

§. XX.

It is plain (7.) from the Consensus of the Jews, and of the Latin and Greek Fathers, not only of those who lived before Pelagius, but also of those who lived after Pelagius, such as Jerome, Augustine, Fulgentius, Prosper, who all require for Free Will an immunity not only from coercion, but also from necessity. See Bellarmine, bk. 3 of *de Grat. & Lib. Arb.*, ch. 5; also from the Consensus of the Scholastics, both the Thomists and the Scotists.

Thomas Aquinas pronounces severely in this cause, Vol. 8 of his Works, Tractate *de Malo*, Qu. 6, sole Article on Election or Free Will, p. 289, col. 2, where he writes thus:

"Some have posited that the will of man is moved by necessity to choose something, yet they did not posit that the will is coerced: for not everything necessary is violent, but only that whose principle is external, whence also some natural motions are found to be necessary, yet not violent. But this opinion is heretical: for it takes away the reason of merit and demerit in human acts: for it does not seem to be meritorious or demeritorious that someone acts thus from necessity, which he cannot avoid. It is also to be numbered among extraneous philosophical opinions: because it not only contradicts the Faith, but it subverts all the principles of moral philosophy: for if there is not something free in us, but we are moved by necessity to willing, deliberation is taken away, exhortation, precept and punishment, and praise and blame, around which moral philosophy consists."

See the same, *Summa*, Part 1, qu. 83, artic. 1-4. Hence the Thomists everywhere defend Indifference: as Alvarez, *de Auxiliis Gratiae*, Lib. 4, c. 14, n. 56; Cumel, *Variarum Disputationum*, Tom. 2, p. 21, says: "This Liberty and Indifference is not passive, but is an active Liberty and Indifference of acting and not acting, or of doing this or that: and to say the opposite can never please a Theologian, nor is it to be borne." Gonet, *Clypeus Theologiae Thomisticae*, Tom. 3, Tract. 2, which is on Human Acts; Disp. 2, Art. 1, 2, 3, where in Art. 3, §. 1, p. 119, he writes: "That no one can be called a true Thomist, or a disciple of St. Thomas, who denies that Indifference pertains to the essence of liberty." Anton. Goudin, Vol. 4 of *Philosophia*, Part 3, Philof. Quæft. 11, Art. 2, §. 3, p. 67-68, also §. 4, p. 75, 80. Concerning the Scotists, the matter is without controversy; from abundance, however, see Boyvin, *Theologia Scoti*, Part 2, Tract. *de Gratia Christi*, Cap. 2, qu. 1, p. 321 & Cap. 8, qu. 6, p. 566-567 to 597. The excessive opinion of the Greeks on Indifference can be gathered from the two Synods held against Cyril Lucaris, in the Anathemas against Ch. 14 of his Confession, p. 75, 127; also from the Collation of Patriarch Jeremiah with the Tübingen theologians. That the Lutherans constitute the form of Free Will in Indifference is more known than needs to be proven by the allegation of Authors. See, however, D. Quenstedt, *Systema Theologicum*, Part 2, C. 3, Sect. 1, Th. 21.

§. XXI.

And not a few of the Reformed constitute Free Will in a certain Indetermination and Indifference concerning its acts. After Melancthon, in their number is Franc. Junius, in his book *On the first Sin of Adam*, where in ch. 3 (Edition in octavo), p. 71, he says: "The Will of man is constrained by no necessity except from its own internal principle. But if it should experience a compelling necessity, this certainly, insofar as it compels the man, does not compel the will, which is always free; but it strips him only of the external act and the compliance of his internal principle." *ibid.* § C. 4, p. 80: "GOD, the most free agent and universal principle of all things, bestowed upon Adam that common principle of

nature, which is determined by a natural necessity; and also the internal and particular Principle of actions, i.e., an integral intellectual Will, not determined by any necessity, but through itself by its own power determining its own movements, freely inclining any indeterminate actions freely." C. 3, p. 70-71: "He who consults another has the liberty of his own will, and he who is consulted can freely accept the given counsel or repudiate it by his own internal principle. For which reason the Will of man is constrained by no necessity, except from its own internal principle: and if it should experience a compelling necessity, this certainly, insofar as it compels the man, does not compel the Will, which is always free."

The renowned Lud. Crocius, *Syntagma Theologiae*, lib. 3, C. 37, §. 3: "The liberty of the human will is its natural property, by which it can choose from what is proposed to it by the intellect or sense under the reason of good, and, with all things requisite for acting being posited, can will to undertake or to suspend the action." Gerh. Joh. Vossius, *de Origine et progressu Idololatriae*, bk. 3, C. 43, p. 956: "Liberty is an active power, from itself and its own nature, having the force either of exercising or of suspending its own act: so that, with all things requisite being posited, it can act and not act." Joh. Crocius, *Consideratio Triadis Syllogismorum Asselmanni*, C. 5, p. 57: "If all things were to happen by an absolute necessity, Contingency would be taken away from human affairs, and that liberty which is for either of two opposites."

Rob. Baronius, *Metaphysica generalis*, Sect. 12, Disp. 1, n. 12, p. 316, approves the Definition of Bellarmine: and concerning it he says that it contains nothing repugnant to the dogmas of our faith, nor is any particle placed in it for establishing the heresy concerning Free Will. The same, *ibid.* p. 320, n. 15, complains that Fonseca, Suarez, and others so dispute against the Evangelicals in this Controversy, as if all Evangelicals embraced the doctrine of those who say that GOD by the Decrees of his Providence has imposed on men a necessity for acting, when however it is evident that many of our Theologians assert the contrary, among whom he names Franc. Junius especially, for the sake of honor, who in his little book *On the First Sin of Adam* evidently defends the Contrary. *ibid.* p. 322, n. 17, he asserts: "That the Will even of Lapsed man is held by no motive or impulsive necessity with respect to GOD; for he gave Free Will to men, and consequently does not totally take away that faculty by imposing necessity on it, either by his eternal Decree, or by a temporal motion and Inflexion."

Ludovicus le Blanc, *Theses Theologicae de Libero Hominis Arbitrio*, in general, Part 1, Th. 28, p. 413: "The liberty of man in acting is not badly constituted in a certain indetermination and indifference concerning his acts. But it must be observed that by that indifference is not understood, as some seem to suspect, an uncertain state of a fluctuating man, not yet certain which way he turns and inclines, but a true power of acting, or not acting, and of instituting his action thus or thus; which remains even in him who by his own judgment and election has determined himself to these or those actions, and with whom it is certain and established to do this and not another." Ther. 29: "Therefore that common definition, according to which human liberty is established

in this, that with all things requisite for acting being posited, man can act, or not act, do this or another, although some abuse it, can yet have a good and suitable sense. For in all deliberate actions, which alone are properly and strictly free, man not only before he acts, but also while he acts, has a true and real power of not acting, or of acting otherwise." The same le Blanc appeals to the consensus of Wilh. Amesius, who in *Bellarminus enervatus*, Tom. 4, bk. 4, Th. 1, p. 77, writes: "We concede that free will, in that which acts, is free from all necessity, so that it properly cannot act necessarily as to the exercise of its act, although with respect to the divine ordination it acts certainly and infallibly."

Besides the Episcopal English, among whom are Joh. Overallus, Joh. Davenantius, Lancelotus Andrews, also Richardus Baxter, a Presbyterian, places Free Will in Indetermination and a certain Indifference, in his *Methodus Theologiae Christianae*, Part 1, C. 8, p. 198, where he says: "That the Liberty of the Will is under GOD the Principle of its own determination and the Mistress of its own acts, powerful to determine itself without Predetermination, divine or human, or of any creature." *ibid.*: "The liberty of the will is 1. either of contradiction: to will, or not to will; to be unwilling, or not to be unwilling. 2. Of contrariety: to will or to be unwilling. 3. Of comparison and competition: to will either this or that." *ibid.* C. 8, in the *Elucidations*, n. 97, p. 207: "This natural Liberty consists in those three things mentioned in the Table. 1. namely, and principally, that the Will, as a part of the natural divine image, is a certain first cause (although dependent and subordinated to GOD) of its own acts; or is a Power of determining itself, or of exercising an act without any cause physically and efficaciously predetermining it; etc. 2. That it has the power of commanding the other faculties. But diversely according to the diversity of the commanded faculties. 3. That absolutely, directly and properly it is not so subject to any created power that it can be determined by it with a physical motion; or receive an effective necessity of determining itself." n. 98, p. 208: "Those who from an ignorant Zeal for divine glory vociferate against this liberty of the will, as if it were Sacrilegious and proper to GOD, must by the same reasoning also either obliterate or deny the entire Image of GOD from the nature of things, especially from the human soul: and say that because we have a likeness of GOD, we sacrilegiously attribute to ourselves things proper to GOD. And thus they will Spoil GOD of his most just glory, lest they spoil him, while they not only dishonor and vituperate His Image, but also blaspheme Divine Omnipotence, while they deny that he can make a free faculty that determines itself, etc."

Joh. Strangius, *de Voluntate Dei circa Peccatum*, bk. 2, ch. 8, p. 167: "That such liberty in a stricter sense belongs to the will, so that as to some Objects it has an active Indifference, and therefore can by its own innate power determine itself to either part, without any antecedent necessity which would restrict it to the other part, is not to be denied." From the French, Petrus Jurieu defends the active and indeterminate power of Free Will; also Dn. Jaquelot, in his French book: *Conformité de la Foy avec la Raïson*, Part 2, C. 3, p. 143. Pertaining here also are the things which the Theologians of Bremen have in the Acts of

the Synod of Dort, *Judgment of the Foreigners* on Articles 3 & 4, p. 724, n. 8: "In the state of misery our Will has remained free from necessity in animal, civil, and external Ecclesiastical matters; also free from the necessity of this or that crime." To which the British hand down twin statements in the *Acts of Dort* on Articles 3 & 4, in the Rejection of the heterodox Theses, where in Th. 4, p. 684, they reject this Thesis as false and absurd: "That Man cannot do more good than he does, nor omit more evil than he omits"; to which thesis they confirm the contrary doctrine from Scripture.

Most solidly also, the Blessed D. Elias Grebenitz in his Tractate *de Regeneratione*, Disputation 2, which is on Conversion, Sect. 2, §. 19, lit. b, An. 1671, responding to Sam. Strimesius, published; teaches that Liberty, from which the Will is denominated free, is not (1.) a Natural inclination, nor (2.) spontaneity; but (3.) Indifference to either of two opposites, by which an agent both can act and can not act: can do this and can do that; which, on account of the twofold species of Opposites, is twofold, one of Contrariety and Specification, the other of Contradiction and Exercise. The same opinion was professed by the Blessed D. Joh. Simonis in his Theological Disputation *de Decretis divinis in genere*, held in the year 1666, in which, in Subsection 2, real, Point 20, teaching the essence of the Decrees, n. 20, lit. D, he speaks thus: "GOD permits sins in time and decreed before the ages to permit them, with them having obtained their futurity not from the permissive divine Decree, but from human nature constituted in Indifference to sin and from a Liberty that was going to abuse it, with the fraud of the Devil being added." The same was asserted also by the Blessed D. Philippus Buchius in his Manuscript Lecture on Maresius's *Systema Theologicum*, Loc. 8, at §. 46; also Dn. D. Sam. Strimesius, *Praxiologia Apodictica*, ch. 3, Subsect. 3, Art. 2, §. 14 ff., & *Origines Morales*, Diss. 4, 5, 10, 11 ff., p. 141 ff.

§. XXII.

The **End of the Free Will of Men** is the glory of the Wisdom, Goodness, Mercy, Justice, and Power of God. Wisdom, which shines forth from this, that GOD, by creating Intellectual Creatures and among them man, has paved for himself a way to Legislation and has made a place for Legislation and for free worship and obedience towards himself. Goodness, which consists in this, that GOD, being Blessed in himself, has deigned to make man a partaker of the divine image and also of his glory, and to elevate him to this through faith and free compliance. Mercy and Justice, since he can and does affect with a gratuitous reward those who believe out of his grace and obey him with filial love; but the unfaithful who are disobedient and contumacious with a just punishment. Power, since GOD, in a wondrous and ineffable way, whatever men may even attempt, contrive, or work, preserves the Order of divine providence most wisely established in the first Creation of all things, and directs all the attempts, machinations, and operations of men to his own glory and the good of the Universe.

§. XXIII.

The **opposite of Liberty is Necessity**; yet not just any.

Not (1.) the Necessity of Servitude, which is the State of man after the lapse, in which man is subject to the yoke of sin and the misery flowing from it; whence the Will of men has become a Servant of sin, from **John 8:34**; **2 Pet. 2:19**; **Rom. 7:14**, without the destruction of natural liberty, which a servant exercises just as freely in things pertaining to his own sphere as a master does in those that pertain to his sphere; since, notwithstanding the Servitude of sin, free Will has remained immune from the necessity of this or that crime, and is free in animal, economic, civil, and moral matters of the natural order.

Nor (2.) the Necessity of Obligation, which is the directive determination of the human Will to doing good and avoiding evil, imposed on men by GOD if they wish to be blessed; for this presupposes Liberty in man, nor could it be imposed on man unless man were endowed with Free Will.

Nor (3.) the Necessity of Dependence on God in becoming and being, and in operating; as that which is common to all Creatures, not only the irrational, but also the rational; since, this dependence being saved, the mode of dependence is and remains various or diverse for the variety of Creatures and Agents: for Intellectual Creatures and free Agents do not depend on God in the manner of stupid brutes, much less in the manner of statues or of turning metal plates, but as intellectual and free Agents, which, being endowed with an internal active principle, exercise and determine their own acts under divine providence and grace, and are thence capable of a gratuitous reward or a just punishment.

Nor (4.) the Necessity of Consequence, or *a posteriori*, by which the Consequent, or event, foreseen by God and, from foreknowledge with an accompanying Decree, decreed, so infallibly follows from the antecedent, that yet, viewed absolutely, it could also have not followed and the opposite could have happened: because here the Decree is not the Cause of the Consequent or of the Event; but with the event being foreseen, it is the Cause, or Condition without which not, or the Occasion of the Decree, and because God, from the foreknowledge of the voluntary inclination of men to acting, decrees to concur with the man who is going to act this or that way. This is dealt with in **Matt. 18:7**; **1 Cor. 11:19**; also **Matt. 26:54**; **Luke 22:22**; **Acts 2:23**; **Ch. 4:28**.

But [the opposite is] the **Necessity of Coaction**, which is the violent compulsion of a man to one thing against his Will; also the **Necessity of the Consequent**, *a priori* and of Production, which is the true efficacious and productive Cause of such a precise effect, both in evils and in goods, so that neither another, nor otherwise, here and now, ought to have happened, whether that Necessity be derived from the stars or from the Decree

of God. against which the arguments brought forth in the Chapter on the Decrees of God, §. 26, fight.

§. XXIV.

The Stoics are thought to have asserted such a Necessity. Concerning whom, however, it is rightly doubted whether they fostered so foolish an opinion of Fate. There certainly occur in the books of the Stoics passages in which they not only assert the free and indeterminate Will of man, but also deny that the same is subject to God himself, and therefore they are so far from asserting a Necessity of the Consequent and of Production with respect to human acts, that they rather exceed the measure in their defense of human liberty and make the Will of man Independent from God. Epictetus, *Enchiridion*, c. 1: "In our power are Opinion, Endeavor, appetite, desire, aversion, and in a word, whichever are our own actions." C. 2: "And those things indeed which are in our power are free by their nature, nor can they be prohibited by anyone, nor can they be impeded." Arrianus, *Commentary on Epictetus*, bk. 1, C. 1: **τὴν προαίρεσιν ἐδ' ὁ Ζεὺς νικῆσαι δύνανται**, "Not even Jupiter can conquer the free Will." c. 6: "God has granted to us a free Will, loosed, constrained by no necessity (*ἀνανάγκαστον*), and impeded in no part, and he willed that it be entirely in our power: nay indeed, he has left to himself no power over it, to coerce or impede it." C. 12: "As to what pertains to the soul, you are neither inferior nor lesser than the Gods." C. 17: "Know, O man, that you have a Will that is by nature free, which no one can inhibit and it is constrained by no necessity (*ἀνανάγκαστον*)." also: "You see in what way in this place you have a Will and Judgment that is Free, bound by no necessity and utterly loosed." and after a few words: "This is properly our part, which God has given to us; which if he were to snatch from us, or had made subject to his own or another's coercion or coercion, he would not be God, nor would he care for us as he ought." also bk. 2, C. 15. Seneca uses the same grandiloquence, Epistle 31: "This is the Highest Good; which if you obtain, you begin to be a Companion of the Gods, not a suppliant." *ibid.*: "One must seek that which cannot be resisted. what is this? The Soul; but this a right, good, great one. What else would you call this, than God lodging in a human body? This soul can fall to a Roman Knight as well as to a Freedman, as to a slave." He extols his wise man in Epistle 59: "That wise man is full of joy, cheerful and placid, unshaken, he lives on equal terms with the Gods." Epistle 92: "You ask what makes a wise man? What makes God." Epistle 57: "Sextius was wont to say that Jupiter can do no more than a good Man. Jupiter has more things which he can offer to men; but between two good men, he is not better who is richer, no more than between two who have equal skill in steering a rudder, you would say he is better who has a larger and more splendid ship. In what does Jupiter precede a good Man? he is good for longer. The wise man esteems himself no less, because his virtues are enclosed in a shorter space, etc." Epistle 53: "You ask what will be the difference between you and the Gods? they will exist for longer. But by Hercules, it is of a great artist to have enclosed the whole in a small space. As much time lies open to the Wise man, as all ages to God, etc." also *de Providentia*, c. 1. Cf. Lipsius, *Manuductio ad Stoicam Philosophiam*, bk. 3, Diss. 14, §. 12.

§. XXV.

The Manichaeans asserted a Necessity from the influx of the Stars, for which reason they were accused of denying free Will. whose error the Priscillianists in Spain renewed, whom Jerome for that reason calls a Part of the Manichaeans in his *Epistle to Ctesiphon against Pelagius*. See also Augustine, *de Haeresibus*, c. 70. An asserter of Necessity was also Laurentius Valla; also Bened. Spinoza in his *Cogitationes Metaphysicae*, part 2, ch. 4; also part 1 of his *Ethics*, p. 26, Prop. 29; *Ibid.* prop. 36; *Ibid.* also in the Preface to part 4, p. 161. Not pertaining here is the Necessity of Nature, by reason of the System of the World, by which things from the divine Ordination and Constitution through Creation, and the connection of inferior Causes flowing therefrom, ordinarily cannot be otherwise. Concerning which Augustine, *de Genesi ad litteram*, bk. 6, ch. 15 says: "The Will of God is the Necessity of things."

CHAPTER II.

§. I.

According to the diverse State of men and the diversity of Objects, the faculty of free Will, related to those States and Objects, comes to be considered in diverse ways: that is, otherwise in the State of Innocence, otherwise in the State of Sin, otherwise in the State of Grace, otherwise in the State of Glory.

§. II.

In the **State of Innocence**, man was disposed to the good and to its practice, yet was indeterminate and indifferent to both, with Calvin as author, *Institutes*, bk. 1, C. 15, §. 8, also Bk. 2, C. 3, §. 10; Spanheim, *Syntagma Disputationum*, Part 1, p. 738, th. 7; Maresius, *Systema Theologicum*, loc. 8, th. 50; Lud. Crocius, *Syntagma Theologiae*, bk. 3, ch. 37, §. 6. and therefore he was immune from the Necessity and servitude of Sin and misery; not however from the Necessity of Dependence; nor from the Necessity of Obligation to commit good and omit evil.

§. III.

After the lapse, the free Will of man ought to be viewed either in the **State of Sin** or the destitute, or in the **State of Grace** or the Restituted. And here, if anywhere, extremes are to be avoided, i.e., Manichaeism and Pelagianism, as two Rocks, are to be shunned, and with the Catholic Church Grace is so to be preached that free Will is not taken away; and the liberty of the Will is so to be urged that Grace is not denied or injured. Mindful of which warning, we so propose the doctrine of Free Will in the destitute and restituted State, that we do not fall upon either Rock.

§. IV.

In the **State of Sin** or of reigning Corruption, before Conversion, free Will, inasmuch as it is a natural faculty of man, remains in man, because man through the lapse did not cease to be man, endowed with Intellect and Will, nor did sin take away the nature of men, but depraved it; and so through sin was not lost Free Will itself, but the sanity and rectitude of free Will. Which will be apparent if we consider what kind of liberty, and concerning what Objects, man has in this State.

§. V.

As to liberty itself; there remained in the will of lapsed man:

1. immunity from the Necessity of coercion, or external violence, by reason of elicited acts.
2. immunity from internal physical Necessity.

3. the Liberty of exercise or of Contradiction, which is between willing or not willing; loving or not loving; acting or not acting.
4. the Liberty of Specification, by which the Will, from two or more things or species which can be recalled to the Sphere of doable things in the State of Corruption, can choose one and neglect another.

Whence GOD in Gen. 4:5-7 addresses the fratricide Cain thus: "Why art thou wroth? and why is thy countenance fallen? If thou dost well, shalt thou not be accepted? (it is an acceptance or a pardon) but if ill, sin will be immediately at the door? but its desire shall be under thee, and thou shalt have dominion over it." Which last words Chrysostom, Cyril of Alexandria, and certain more recent men refer to Abel; but they are more conveniently referred to sin: as Joh. Coccejus shows in his Commentary on Gen., ch. 4, v. 5-7, §. 33, p. 64, with Melanchthon preceding him in *Loci Theologici*, on Good Works, qu. 5. But to this sphere do not pertain Spiritual actions or Spiritual goods: because in this State natural and rational man obtains only a natural life, but lacks Spiritual life, and therefore from a principle of a natural, animal, and rational life, and that a weakened one, can elicit or produce no Spiritual actions, which flow from the Life of the Spirit.

5. He has immunity from the Necessity of Production, motive or impulsive, whether it be derived from the stars, or from the very Decree of God physically predetermining, or from a temporal physical premotion, which liberty we have asserted in the chapter on the Distinction of Divine Knowledge, §. 13, p. 90 ff., also on the Decrees of God, §. 26, p. 201-202.

§. VI.

The Objects which pertain to the Sphere of Doable things in the State of reigning Corruption, before Conversion, are all those things which are subject to the senses and to natural reason, and do not surpass human grasp. And they are:

1. actions merely natural and animal, e.g., to eat, to drink, to be awake, to sleep, to be moved from a place, to rest.
2. the inventions or apprehensions of Sciences and arts, concerning which see Calvin, *Institutes*, bk. 2, Ch. 2, §. 14.
3. civil and economic actions, such as to care for a family and the Commonwealth, and in them to do or omit one's duty.
4. moral actions of the natural order, and those which pertain to common Ethics, **Rom. 2:14-15**. Whence also in **Dan. 4:24** Nebuchadnezzar is commanded to redeem his sins with alms. and praised in **Exod. 1:17 ff.** are the Egyptian women, and in **Josh. 2:4 ff.** and ch. **6:22-23**, Rahab, on account of the kindness shown to the Israelite women and to the spies, and they are affected with a reward by God. Cf. **Ez. 29:19**. hence the Virtues of the Gentiles, produced by the general aid of GOD, as to their substance, are true moral Virtues of the natural order, consisting

of the same internal form, Object, Means, and acts; although by reason of their mode, Adjuncts, circumstances, and also their end, they often had notable defects, in respect of which Augustine calls them, by a broad signification, sins, although elsewhere he commends the Virtues of the Gentiles, as in *de Spiritu et littera*, ch. 27; *Epistle 99 to Evodius*; also *Epistle 130*; and bk. *de Gratia Christi*, ch. 24. See Dn. D. Sam. Strimesius, *Praxiologia Apodictica*, ch. 7, §. 5; D. Joh. Fabricius, *Systema Theologicum*, Loc. 3, Aphor. 2, p. 277. Nor does the passage **Rom. 14:23** stand in the way, for there Paul by Faith does not understand saving Faith, but the dictate of Conscience, by which something is judged to be licit or illicit.

§. VII.

But to this Sphere in no way pertain Spiritual actions, which cannot be elicited and performed except by the Spirit of God vivifying, illuminating, acting, operating, regenerating, and sanctifying, in certain degrees. In respect of these, we rightly teach that the natural powers of Free Will are not only bound, attenuated, impeded, wounded, and broken, but plainly lost, destroyed, extinguished, and null, against the Pelagians, Semipelagians, Socinians, Remonstrants, Mennonites; and in part also the Greeks, Synergists, and Pontificists, of whom see Bellarmine, bk. 6 of *de Amissione Gratiae et Statu Peccati*, ch. 16; Coster, *Enchiridion*, ch. 5, p. 190.

§. VIII.

Against whom we assert that unregenerate man in the state of dominant Corruption, or before his Conversion, has from himself no natural powers, whether in the Intellect or in the Will, for either beginning and effecting, or continuing, advancing, and completing spiritual and saving actions; nor can he, without the prevenient and preparing grace of God, dispose or prepare himself for grace, or accept it when offered through the Word; much less convert himself, or begin, promote, and consummate his own Conversion; or keep the precepts of God, and do good works, pleasing to God and saving for himself. For Scripture teaches:

1. that men in that State are blinded by reason of the Intellect: **Eph. 5:8**, *You were heretofore darkness. Ch. 4:18, having their understanding obscured with darkness. hence in Luke 14:21, they are called blind: Go out quickly... and bring in hither the poor, and the feeble, and the blind, and the lame. Matt. 4:16, that sat in darkness and in the shadow of death. add 1 Cor. 2:14 and 2 Cor. 3:5. an example of which thing exists in the Philosophers of the Gentiles, who in Rom. 1:21-22, became vain in their thoughts, and their foolish heart was darkened: For professing themselves to be wise, they became fools. and in Acts 17:18-32, some said: what is it that this babblers would say? But others: He seemeth to be a setter forth of new gods; because he preached to them Jesus and the resurrection. also: And when they had heard of the resurrection of the dead, some mocked; but others said: We will hear thee again concerning this matter. to which pertains what Aristotle in Metaphysics, bk. 2,*

Chap. 1, acknowledged, that the mind of men is no less blind to divine things than the eyes of an owl to the light of the sun. and that Democritus complained that Truth was as it were submerged in a well.

2. that they are depraved as to the Will is plain, **Gen. 6:5** & **ch. 8:21**; **Rom. 8:6**; **Rom. 6:17, 20**; **Ch. 7:14**. Whence in **Ez. 11:19** & **ch. 36:26**, a heart of stone must be taken from the flesh of men, and a heart of flesh be given.
3. The blindness of the Mind and the depravation of the Will is followed by the perversity of the Affections, by which corrupt men hate and are averse to that which is truly good and acceptable to God, but love and pursue evil, **Rom. 8:7**; **Jer. 17:9**; **Gen. 6:5**; **Ez. 36:26**; **Matt. 15:19**.
4. that sinful men themselves are dead in sins, **Eph. 2:1**; **Col. 2:13**, and unfit for doing spiritual good, is taught in **Matt. 7:18**: "A bad tree cannot bring forth good fruit." **John 15:5**: "Without me you can do nothing." **John 6:44**: "No man can come to me, except the Father... draw him."
5. Whence it is necessary that spiritual life be kindled in sinful man, and that man be regenerated by the Divine Spirit, if he is to perform spiritual works and those that are profitable for celestial life. **John 3:3, 5**: "Unless a man be born again of water and the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God." **Eph. 5:14**: "Arise thou that sleepest, and arise from the dead, and Christ shall enlighten thee." **Gal. 5:22**: "The fruit of the Spirit is: Charity, joy, peace, patience, etc." **v. 25**: "If we live in the Spirit, let us also walk in the Spirit."
6. hence David in **Ps. 51:12** asks God to create a new heart for him. and in **Ps. 119:18** prays: "Open thou my eyes: and I will consider the wondrous things of thy law." **v. 125**: "give me understanding, that I may know thy testimonies." **v. 36**: "Incline my heart unto thy testimonies." also **Ps. 143:10-11**.
7. and there is need for divine benefits for the restitution of men and the emendation of corruption: by Calling, Vivification, Regeneration, Sanctification or Renovation.
8. and this defect of free Will in Spiritual matters was acknowledged by the Council of Arausica [Orange] II, chapters 5, 6, 7, and 9; nor does the Council of Trent deny it, sess. 6, Can. 3.

§. IX.

And this Sanity and Rectitude of Free Will man lost through the Lapse, but not Free Will itself: which Augustine taught before the Protestants, *Enchiridion to Laurentius*, c. 30: "Man, by making bad use of Free Will, destroyed both himself and it. For just as he who kills himself, does not live by killing himself, nor can he resuscitate himself when he has killed himself: so, when sin was committed by a free will, with sin being the victor, free will also was lost. For by whom a man is overcome, to this one also is he addicted as a Servant: whence he will not be free for doing justly, unless, being freed from sin, he has begun to be a servant of justice. But from where will this liberty be for a man who is addicted and sold, unless He redeem him, whose is that voice: *If the Son shall make you*

free, you shall be free indeed." Sermon 2 on the Words of the Apostle: "It is true, man received great powers of free Will when he was created, but he lost them by sinning." And the 2nd Council of Arausica [Orange], Chap. 13: "The Will's freedom, which was weakened in the first man, cannot be repaired, except by the Grace of Baptism. What was lost could not be rendered back, except by him who could give it."

§. X.

Impotence is wont to be distinguished into Physical or natural, and Moral. The former arises from a defect of the natural faculty required for doing something; e.g., in the deaf for hearing; in the blind for seeing; in a wall for speaking. The latter has its origin from a voluntary evil disposition of the soul and a perverse custom, such as is in a drunken man, a gambler, and a thief; of whom the first cannot abstain from drink, the second from gaming, the third from theft. If these things are applied to the present Theological matter; the Impotence which is congenital to man after the lapse, and is in him from his very birth, can be called natural, not because it is a destruction of the Will and of the natural liberty of the Will, but because, having arisen from the first sin of Adam, it has degenerated as it were into nature and is transmitted to posterity: as if leprosy, a stone, Epilepsy, or another kind of disease is propagated from parents to children by the contagion of nature through natural generation.

§. XI.

But because, by the erection of the Covenant of Grace, by its sincere oblation and the invitation to it, and by the collation of Prevenient and Preparing Grace, that impotence has been so far taken away that no one who is called is necessarily and inevitably constrained by it or held subject to it or ought to remain so; but by federal powers he can cast off and shake off this Impotence: hence under the Covenant of Grace, Moral Impotence, arising from a voluntary and evil disposition of the soul and a perverse custom, is that much more culpable, and is that much more gravely censured and damned, especially if it is Affected and Malicious. because men, being endowed by the Prevenient and also Preparing Grace of God through the Gospel, could and ought to have more and more overcome, laid aside, and shaken off this impotence. concerning which Voluntary and Affected Impotence the passages in **Jer. 13:23** deal: "If the Ethiopian can change his skin, or the leopard his spots: you also may do well, when you have learned evil." **John 12:39-40**: "Therefore they could not believe, because Isaiah said, etc." **Jer. 6:10**: "Behold, their ears are uncircumcised, and they cannot hear." **John 5:44**: "How can you believe, who receive glory one from another: and the glory which is from God alone, you do not seek?" **Matt. 12:34**: "O generation of vipers, how can you speak good things, whereas you are evil?"

§. XII.

For in the **State of Grace**, Restituted or of inchoate Reparation, the man who is called is excited and vivified from the lethargy and death of sin by Prevenient and Preparing Grace, so that he may be able to read, hear, understand, and meditate on the word of GOD; by which means the intellect is illuminated and the will is impelled, and is gradually prepared and disposed, so that he can obey GOD calling through the Word, believe, and convert himself. **Eph. 2:5**: "God, even when we were dead in sins, hath quickened us together in Christ... And hath raised us up together, and made us sit together in the heavenly places, in Christ Jesus." **ch. 5:8**: "For you were heretofore darkness; but now, light in the Lord. Walk then as children of the light." **v. 14**: "Wherefore he saith: Arise, thou that sleepest, and arise from the dead: and Christ shall enlighten thee." **Tit. 2:11-12**: "For the grace of God our Saviour hath appeared to all men; Instructing us, that, denying ungodliness and worldly desires, we should live soberly, and justly, and godly in this world." **Rev. 3:20**: "Behold, I stand at the gate, and knock. If any man shall hear my voice, and open to me the door, I will come in to him, and will sup with him, and he with me." To which pertain the passages in which Christ is called the Light of the World, as in **John 1:9**; **ch. 8:12**; **Ch. 12:46**. Whence Paul was sent to the gentiles, **Acts 26:18**, "to open their eyes, that they may be converted from darkness to light, and from the power of Satan to God, that they may receive forgiveness of sins, and a lot among the saints, by faith in Jesus Christ."

§. XIII.

In this State of Reparation, therefore, or of sufficient Grace, man is Free not only from internal physical necessity, but also from the external necessity of Production, motive or impulsive, and of immutability; and he has Liberty not only of Contradiction or Exercise, but also of Contrariety or Specification, since the Will of man, aided by the Grace of GOD, can do or not do not only evil, but also good, not only civil and moral, but also spiritual; and not only this good, but also that, by the powers of Grace: likewise choose this or that evil, by the remnants of the Flesh. Because, in the State of inchoate Reparation, two diverse Principles remain in man, of Nature and of Grace, of the Flesh and of the Spirit, hence also diverse acts can be produced by man; and man can operate according to the motion of corrupt Nature, or according to the motion of restituted nature or Grace, and sometimes he actually operates so. Hence the Struggle of the Old and New man, **Gal. 5:17**; **Matt. 26:41**; **Rom. 7:14**. But so that we may choose good and flee evil, Rewards and punishments are proposed, Precepts and Prohibitions are given, promises and threats are added, praises and increpations.

§. XIV.

In the same State of Reparation, but advanced, with Operating Grace, there is present indeed in man the faculty itself of willing and being unwilling, which has the nature of a receiving subject, as that without which he would be neither a man nor convertible; yet

in the first moment of Conversion, while the Intellect is being illuminated, the Will is being prepared, disposed, and changed, it behaves merely passively, with Scripture as witness. **Ps. 119:18:** God "reveals the eyes to consider the wondrous things of the Divine Law." **Luke 24:45:** he "opens the minds of men, that they may understand the Scriptures." **Acts 16:14:** he "opens the heart, that they may attend to those things which are said by the ministers." **Eph. 1:17-18:** he "gives the Spirit of Wisdom and of revelation, in the knowledge of Christ, the eyes of our heart being enlightened, that we may know what the hope is of our calling, and what are the riches of the glory of his inheritance in the saints." **Ps. 51:12 & Eph. 2:10:** He "creates a clean heart" in them, and "renews a right spirit" in their bowels. **Ezech. 36:26-27:** he "gives a new heart and puts a new spirit in the midst of the converted: and takes away the stony heart out of their flesh, and gives them a heart of flesh, and puts his spirit in the midst of them, and causes them to walk in his commandments, and to keep his judgments, and do them." **John 3:5 & 1 Pet. 1:3:** he regenerates from heaven. **John 6:44:** he draws. **Eph. 1:19-20:** he "works on them according to the operation of the might of his power, which he wrought in Christ, raising him up from the dead." **Phil. 2:13:** he works "both to will and to accomplish." **2 Thess. 1:11:** He "fulfills all the good pleasure of his goodness, and the work of faith in power" in them. **Hebr. 13:21:** He "works in them that which is well pleasing in his sight through J.C." **Jer. 31:33:** He "gives his law in their bowels, and will write it in their heart." Whence Israel there sighs in v. 18-19: "Convert thou me, and I shall be converted: for thou art the Lord my God. For after thou didst convert me, I did penance: and after thou didst shew unto me, I struck my thigh." Man, however, being illuminated, aided, and renewed by this Grace of God through the word, and from being unwilling made willing, under Grace, with a free but attendant Will, without injury to his free Will, freely and actively complies with operating Grace, and with resistance having been taken away, willingly cooperates and concurs, according to the vow of the Church, **Cant. 1:3:** "Draw me, we will run after thee." to which can be referred that passage in **Jer. 20:7:** "Thou hast seduced me, O Lord, and I am seduced: thou art stronger than I, and thou hast prevailed." for Grace does not kill Free Will, but remakes it; does not abolish it, but cherishes it; does not take it away, but transfers it, according to Prosper and Bernard.

§. XV.

Although, however, being thus reborn and converted, they are free from the guilt and obligation to punishment, since in **Rom. 8:1**, "there is now therefore no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus, who walk not according to the flesh." also free from the Dominion of sin, since they have now been made servants of justice, **Rom. 6:18:** "Being then freed from sin, you have been made servants of justice." and since in **Gal. 5:17**, "the flesh indeed lusteth against the Spirit: but the Spirit also lusteth against the flesh, so that you do not the things that you would," they are not, however, free from the misery and sense of sin.

§. XVI.

In the prestituted State or the **State of Glory**, the Blessed will be free even from misery itself and from the sense or root of sin. Concerning which State Augustine in his *Enchiridion*, c. 105, says: "free will will be much more free, because it will be altogether unable to serve sin." For although the Blessed will be determined to the good alone, they will yet enjoy the liberty of exercise or of Contradiction, by which they will be able to act or not to act; and the liberty of Specification, by which they will be able to choose this good before that. in which matter they will be not only "equal to the angels" (ισάγγελοι), but also like God himself, **1 John 3:2**. For God, on account of the absolute Perfection of his essence and his essential Sanctity, cannot will evil, but necessarily wills good; yet to the outside, from the number of goods, he can choose either this or that, and this he can either will or not will. and this true, most excellent and eminent Liberty of the sons of God, that will last forever, we ought here ardently to seek and to pant for! since this is the **END** of our Creation.

ERRATUM:

Chap. 1, §. 5, line 2, read: is subdivided into the Liberty of Contradiction and of Contrariety.