

Contents

Chapter 1.	
What the corruption of human nature is, and how far it progresses.	2
Chapter 2.	
What the Election and Reprobation of men instituted by God are, and on what causes they depend.	2
Chapter 3.	
What the efficacy of God's Grace is in the calling of the Elect.	3
Chapter 4.	
What the perseverance of Faith is, after the efficacy of Grace has once been bestowed.	4
Chapter 5.	
Finally, what the nature and extent of the redemption of which Christ is the author are, and thus of the grace flowing from that redemption and offered to men through preaching.	4
The Opinion of the Same Amyraut, Concerning the Nature and Efficacy of Mercy Made Known by the Intervention of Divine Providence.	8
The Opinion of the Same Amyraut, on the Equality and Inequality of Grace.	12
On the Phrase, "Men can believe, if they will."	16
On Physical and Moral Inability: and on those things which are said to be ἐφ' ἡμῖν (in our power).	21

A DECLARATION OF THE FAITH OF MOÏSE AMYRAUT CONCERNING THE ERRORS OF THE ARMINIANS

Since some things have been rumored about Moïse Amyraut concerning the errors of the Arminians, from which he has always vehemently shrunk, and since he has been placed by God in such a position that it is in the interest of common edification that no good person should be unaware of whether he thinks rightly or wrongly about His Grace, he has decided to declare his faith briefly here.

The matters of controversy between the Orthodox and the Arminians are all referred to these five main points.

I. What the corruption of human nature is, and how far it progresses.

II. What the Election and Reprobation of men instituted by God are, and on what causes they depend.

III. What the efficacy of God's Grace is in the calling of the Elect.

IV. What the perseverance of Faith is, after the efficacy of Grace has once been bestowed.

V. Finally, what the nature and extent of the redemption of which Christ is the author are, and thus of the grace flowing from that redemption and offered to men through preaching.

Chapter 1.

What the corruption of human nature is, and how far it progresses.¹

Regarding the first point, the **Arminians** indeed confess that man is born a sinner, but they deny that his free will is entirely extinguished. They argue that if only it is anticipated and moved by Grace, it can exert its natural powers to embrace Christ, offered through the preaching of the Gospel or in any other way, through faith.

The **Orthodox**, on the other hand, hold that as far as spiritual and supernatural things are concerned, such as the Gospel of Christ, the free will of man has been utterly destroyed by the corruption of original sin. So much so that no remnants of its powers are left for us to exercise concerning such matters. And they contend that the matter stands in precisely the same way concerning the knowledge of the true God and the true worship which we owe him according to the prescription of the first four commandments of the first Table.

However, regarding what are usually called civil and moral matters, which are contained in the six commandments of the second Table, they do not deny that some light of knowledge naturally remains in the human intellect, and accordingly some inclination towards the good in the will, however slight and in many ways imperfect it may be.

Amyraut is of the opinion that not only in supernatural matters and those which pertain to divine worship, but also in civil and moral affairs, the corruption of human nature is so great and so desperate that if God were to leave men to themselves, there is no one who would not reach such a point of wickedness that he could be compared with the most abandoned and profligate. From this it follows that whatever in man has even a shadow of good is derived from some operation of divine Providence. Thus, in this argument, he has pushed the boundaries of orthodox doctrine somewhat further than others, and has demonstrated his own view with arguments in his writing against de la Milletière, which is

¹ The Chapter headings aren't included in the Original Latin, but I have included them here for memory's sake.

entitled *Replication*, in the chapter on the equality of human corruption, and in his *Defense of Calvin*, chapter 13.

Chapter 2.

What the Election and Reprobation of men instituted by God are, and on what causes they depend.

In the second article, the **Arminians** defend that God, after having decreed from all eternity to offer one and the same grace to all men, so that in either receiving or rejecting it they might exercise the powers of their free will, and after having foreseen who would accept it and who would reject it, from that foreknowledge chose those whom He foresaw would use that grace well, and reprobated the others. So that, according to their opinion, Election is founded on the foreknowledge of Faith.

The **Orthodox**, however, maintain that although God decreed to invite all men to faith without distinction, He nevertheless set apart in His eternal counsel a certain number of men from the rest, to whom He would grant a certain singular grace, by which they would obey that invitation and thus be led to salvation. They maintain that all the others were passed over by Him in the dispensation of that grace. They add, moreover, that God was led to act thus by His own most free good pleasure alone, and that there was no reason or cause in those whom He chose why they should be chosen, whatever that might be thought to be; and that there was no cause in those whom He reprobated why they should be reprobated, which did not exist equally in the others. So that both Election and Reprobation are absolute, and do not depend on the foreknowledge of anything whatsoever.

Amyraut embraces the same doctrine as the other orthodox, and has both explained and confirmed it with unassailable reasons, especially from chapter 9 of the Epistle to the Romans, and chapter 13 of the *Defense of Calvin*.

Chapter 3.

What the efficacy of God's Grace is in the calling of the Elect.

Concerning the third point, the opinion of the **Arminians** is that the calling of men consists only in a certain illumination of the intellect, which leaves the will hanging in equilibrium, so that it can equally embrace Christ and not embrace him, according to its choice. Thus, God calls no one to faith in Jesus Christ who cannot so resist that calling as to render it useless and vain.

The **Orthodox**, however, teach that the force and efficacy which God exerts in the calling of His elect is so great, and the illumination by which He enlightens their minds and moves their will is so powerful, that there is no obstinacy in resisting so great that it does not overcome it, to lead them captive in obedience to Christ.

Amyraut thinks the same in this with the other orthodox, and has demonstrated that efficacy of God's Grace, and refuted the opposing errors in many places of his *Defense of Calvin*, in the last of his sermons on the nature of the Gospel, and in his *Theses on the Causes of Faith*.

Chapter 4.

What the perseverance of Faith is, after the efficacy of Grace has once been bestowed.

The **Arminians** explain the fourth point by saying that the Faith which the Grace of God generates in men is never so great and so firm that it cannot fail and perish. So that some of the elect, who do not persevere in faith, become reprobate, and some of the reprobate, who do not remain in unbelief, become elect. Thus they contend that no one is truly certain or persuaded of his own salvation.

The **Orthodox**, on the contrary, firmly believe that faith, once it has been given to the elect, remains firm and unshaken in them, and perseveres even to death. This is because God, who Himself gave it according to His good pleasure, preserves it, and does not permit it, whatever lapses it may suffer, to fail completely or be extinguished. So that every true believer can and should be certain of his salvation.

Amyraut has embraced the same doctrine, and has bound it with necessary arguments, both in various places of his *Defense of Calvin*, chapters 10 and 11, and in a twofold disputation on the Perseverance of Faith, explained in his *Theses*.

Chapter 5.

Finally, what the nature and extent of the redemption of which Christ is the author are, and thus of the grace flowing from that redemption and offered to men through preaching.

There remains the fifth point, in which three things can be considered.

1. What should be held concerning the necessity of Christ's death.
2. What its nature is.

3. Finally, what its efficacy is, and the extent of the grace flowing from it and offered to men.

Regarding the first, the **Arminians** think that the death of Christ was not necessary for procuring salvation for men, and they believe that God could have pardoned sins without any satisfaction.

The **Orthodox**, indeed, believe that that way of saving the human race was the most fitting of all, since God was pleased to use it; yet most of them readily concede to the Arminians that it was not absolutely necessary, and they do not contend that God's justice was to that extent inexorable.

Amyraut believes that God's justice is so inflexible, and the majesty of His laws so holy and inviolable, that it could not suffer sins to be pardoned without satisfaction. In this matter, he has surrounded the orthodox doctrine with a defense by which it is stripped by many others. He has, moreover, proved his opinion on this matter with arguments in his *Theses on the Necessity of Satisfaction for Grace*.

Regarding the second, the **Arminians** teach that Christ died absolutely for all, so that all men have been actually redeemed by it, and have in reality obtained the remission of sins. From which it follows that even among the unbelievers, the little children who die before they have attained any use of mind and reason are all partakers of salvation. But adults do not fall from the benefit of redemption except because of unbelief, through which they voluntarily let slip from their hands the salvation actually obtained for them. For these two things are taught by them. To which they add that God could have, if He had wished, established the covenant of Grace which is sanctified by the blood of Christ on the condition of works, or of any other thing that it seemed good to Him to choose.

The **Orthodox** defend that no one is an actual participant in the fruit of that redemption unless he believes. And because the promise of salvation made to little children pertains only to the children of believers, they commit those begotten of unbelievers, as being by nature guilty of a curse, to the just and wise judgment of God. They add, moreover, that the condition of works could not have been annexed to the covenant of grace, and that only the condition of faith could be suitable for it.

Amyraut embraces the same doctrine, and has often both publicly explained and demonstrated it, as being consistent with the Word of God and the analogy of faith.

Regarding the third, the **Arminians** teach that the death of Christ obtained for all men that God would communicate to them a certain interior grace, which operates in them, without

exception, to such an extent that it places their will in equilibrium, so that it may believe or not believe, be converted or be hardened, according to the liberty implanted by nature.

The **Orthodox**, on the contrary, maintain that the efficacy of Christ's death, which consists in the communication of the grace of the Spirit, is not exerted except in the elect alone. As for the others, although they are called by the external call, yet because they are not illuminated within, it is altogether impossible for them to remain anything but unbelieving and impenitent.

Amyraut has both always believed that this opinion of the Orthodox is true and has demonstrated it with invincible arguments in his book, *Defense of Calvin*, chapter 14.

The **Arminians** think that the fact that God has not yet caused His Gospel to be announced among so many nations has not proceeded from any other cause than that their ancestors once rejected it; or if there is any other reason for that dispensation, it is to be sought from their own actions, not from the good pleasure of God.

The **Orthodox**, on the contrary, say that although no nation is deprived of the preaching of the Gospel without being worthy to be deprived of it on account of its sins, yet because the peoples to whom the Gospel has been granted are no more worthy of so great a benefit than others, the cause of so memorable a distinction is to be sought from the good pleasure of God alone.

Amyraut has always followed the same doctrine, and has clearly demonstrated it in chapter 12 of his *Defense of Calvin* and in Sermon V on the Nature of the Gospel.

The **Arminians** believe that although the Gospel is not preached among the unbelieving nations, their condition is nevertheless not much worse than that of the rest, because God offers them salvation either equally or at least almost equally as to those to whom the Gospel is preached, so that it can happen that some in that way attain salvation.

The **Orthodox**, on the contrary, maintain that besides the obscurity of the revelation, which is in almost infinite parts more imperfect than that which is made through the word, there is a certain singular excellence of the Word in this, that it alone is the ministry of the Spirit, by which alone men are led to salvation.

Amyraut has both deeply imbibed the same doctrine with the Orthodox in his mind, and has defended it against the Arminians in Sermon 3 on the Nature of the Gospel, and in chapter 13 of his *Defense of Calvin*. There remains, therefore, the external call which is through the word, together with the foundation upon which it is, as it were, built.

The external call, therefore, which is in the preaching of the word, is made indifferently and promiscuously with respect to all those to whom the Gospel is announced. And because it offers grace to all and everyone, it can to that extent be called a common and universal Grace. Because the Promise is universal, *Whoever believes will be saved*. The foundation on which it rests is the will of God, who not only commands his servants to promise salvation indifferently to all, and to each one individually as much as can be done, but also wishes the promise to be held in the same place as if it were sent from his own mouth; according to that, *as though God were pleading through us* 2 Cor. 5. The source of that will is that *φιλανθρωπία* (philanthropia), or love with which he has pursued the entire human race to the extent that he wished to give it a redeemer, who would open access to salvation for all, provided they embraced him. Likewise according to that of Christ, *God so loved the world, that he gave his only Son, that whoever believes in him should not perish but have eternal life*. And also that from our liturgy: *God wills to be acknowledged as the savior of the human race in the redemption made by Jesus Christ*.

Of this his opinion, **Amyraut** has both produced arguments everywhere in his writings, and has confirmed its truth by the testimonies of Calvin, Bullinger, Musculus, Pellicanus, and other most excellent men, and he does not doubt that it is supported by clear passages of Scripture, and contained in the public Declarations of faith of our Churches. This is evident from the words of our Liturgy cited above: "Furthermore, we offer our prayers to you, most clement God and most merciful Father, for all men in general, that just as you wish to be acknowledged as the Savior of the whole human race, through the redemption accomplished by Jesus Christ our Son, etc." From the Catechism for children beginning their letters: Q. "Will the whole world be saved?" A. "By no means." Q. "Why so?" A. "Because the greater part of the world rejects ITS salvation." From the Synod of Dort, which, after having prefixed to its Canons, "The whole world is liable to the curse of God," Rom. 3:19, "All have sinned and fall short of the glory of God," Rom. 3:23, "the wages of sin is death," Rom. 6:23, immediately adds, as if it wished to lay the foundation of the doctrine of Predestination: "But in this is the love of God manifested, that he sent his only-begotten Son into the world, that everyone who believes in him should not perish, but have eternal life," 1 John 4:9, John 3:16. Then in the following chapter it states: "The Promise of the Gospel is that whoever believes in Christ crucified shall not perish but have eternal life. Which Promise ought to be announced and proposed promiscuously and indiscriminately to all peoples and men to whom God in his good pleasure sends the Gospel, with the command to repent and believe." Likewise in the following chapter it declares: "As many as are thus called through the Gospel, are seriously called. For seriously and most truly God shows in his word what is pleasing to him: namely, that those who are called should come to him. Seriously also he promises rest for their souls and eternal life to all who come to him and believe." Finally, this is clear from the Preface which has Calvin as its author, and which has been printed so often by the command and authority of our Churches prefixed

to the French Bibles: "At length, when that fullness of time and the day preordained by the Lord had come, that Messiah, so longed for through so many ages, appeared; and He Himself abundantly performed all those things that were necessary for the redemption of all. Nor indeed did that benefit remain within Israel alone, since it was rather to be extended to the entire human race: because through the one Christ the entire human race was to be reconciled to God, as is contained and most amply demonstrated in these tablets of the New Covenant." Likewise: "To this inheritance we are all called, without respect of persons, male, female, highest, lowest, masters, servants, teachers, unlearned, Jews, Greeks, French, Romans; no one is excluded from here, who only admits Christ, as he is offered by the Father for the salvation of all, and having admitted him, embraces him."

THE END.

The Opinion of the Same Amyraut, Concerning the Nature and Efficacy of Mercy Made Known by the Intervention of Divine Providence.

Since there is no salvation without faith, and no faith without an object that invites belief, and a faculty that embraces the object, something must also be said very briefly about both of these things with respect to those who lack the ministry of the divine word.

The faculty which is destined for receiving the object, and which is called the mind, ought to be considered either in itself, or as it is affected by the Spirit of God. And that in itself it is utterly corrupt, and so hindered by both natural and acquired vices that it cannot embrace any divine object offered from without, **Amyraut** has most constantly taught, and has demonstrated with arguments in his *Defense of Calvin*, chapter six, Sermon VI on the Nature of the Gospel, and in his *Theses on the Causes of Faith*.

As for the Spirit of God, that it is not supplied by the intervention of Providence, and that its power is exerted in the ministry of the Word alone, as **Amyraut** has always believed, so he has most evidently proved in his *Defense of Calvin*, chapter XIII, Sermon III on the Nature of the Gospel, and in his *Replication to de la Milletière*, chapter on the Ministry of the Spirit. Thus, as far as the faculty is concerned, it follows from **Amyraut's** opinion that it can by no means happen that anyone of those to whom the Gospel is not announced, either believes or comes to salvation.

The object itself can likewise be viewed in two ways; namely, either as it is mixed in the human intellect and corrupted by those things which have proceeded from the cunning of Satan and the ignorance and malice of the human mind; or as it ought to be pure and sincere and uncontaminated by that mixture of errors and idolatry: in a word, such as it is objected by God Himself to men.

If the matter is viewed in the former way, **Amyraut** has constantly taught that wherever the light of the word has not shone, there has always been such a fog of pernicious errors, and such a weed of idolatry, that not even a mind much less darkened than is naturally in all of us, could separate from those things what God has revealed by His Providence. Whence it happens that for those who lack the ministry of the word, there is also, with respect to the object offering itself externally to their minds, an ineluctable necessity of perishing. Which happens not by God's neglect, but by the vice and fault of men, who not only look carelessly at the object offered by God, but also involve and overwhelm it with every kind of empty figment of their own mind, or do not even try in the slightest to explain and unfold it when it has been depraved from elsewhere by the frauds of the Devil. And this he has demonstrated in his *Defense of Calvin*, chapters 12 and 13, and in Sermon III on the Nature of the Gospel.

In the latter way, whatever God may have revealed by that reason, yet the historical things in the Gospel, such as that Christ was incarnate, crucified, and raised from the dead, ascended into heaven, and the like, cannot become known from God's Providence alone. Whence it follows that not even that object so considered, even if it obtained a faculty properly constituted for it, could generate a distinct faith in Christ. And this **Amyraut** taught in Sermon III on the Nature of the Gospel. There remains therefore that which is not historical, namely, that God is merciful, and by His nature inclined to pardon sins, if anyone truly repents and turns to Him.

And in that matter, it may be asked:

1. Whether God has in fact revealed Himself as merciful in all the works of Providence.
2. Whether that mercy pertains to the remission of sins to be offered, and, if anyone should turn himself to it, to be actually conferred.
3. Whether it is of the same nature as that mercy which is revealed in the Gospel and offered under the condition of repentance and faith.
4. Whether it is adapted to produce faith or any saving knowledge.

And as to the first, that God has shown Himself merciful in the works of Providence, **Amyraut** thought it to be consistent with the Confession of the Gallican Churches, Articles 1 and 2: "We believe and confess that there is one God, who is one and a simple spiritual essence, eternal, invisible, immutable, infinite, incomprehensible, ineffable, all-powerful, supremely wise, best, supremely just, supremely merciful. This God manifests Himself as such to men, first in His works, both in their creation and in their preservation and administration. Then more clearly in his word, etc." Likewise with that doctrine which he professes in the Preface to the French Bible. For there, after they have explained the creation of the world and the fall of man, they speak thus: "For indeed the perversity of men did not even stop where it first began, but rather worse children bore a more wicked

offspring, soon to give birth to a more vicious progeny. What then? Namely, when that fruitful fault of ages had provoked the hands of God against itself for the utmost extremities, God Himself, not so much inclined to mercy and paternal indulgence, as mercy and indulgence itself, since he would not not pursue with love what was in itself so unworthy of being loved, nevertheless did not suffer the human race to perish utterly and be absorbed in a most deserved destruction: he prolonged the time and reason for repenting, if by some means they might return to him; and although he openly concealed his indignation, as if with winking eyes, and so permitted them to themselves that no voice of his, no express law and direction existed, by which he might convict of sin, yet he never concealed himself as Lord from them, but that he exhibited those things which might remind them of their duty, and lead them by the hand, as it were, to seek and almost grope for him: so that even for such knowledge, it was fitting for him to be acknowledged by them, and being acknowledged, to be worshiped with legitimate honor." Finally, with the opinion of Calvin in his Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, chapter 1:19, "They did not glorify Him as God." "God cannot be conceived without his eternity, power, wisdom, goodness, truth, justice, mercy. Eternity is clear from this, that he is the author of all things. Power, because he holds all things in his hand, and causes them to consist in him. Wisdom from the most ordered disposition. Goodness, because there was no cause why he should create all things, nor can he be moved by any other reason to preserve them than on account of that very goodness. Justice in administration; because he punishes the guilty, he vindicates the innocent. Mercy, because with such patience he tolerates the perversity of men."

The second seems to be self-evident. For there can certainly be no declaration of God's mercy towards a corrupt and sinful creature which does not offer pardon for sins to the repentant. Therefore, **Amyraut** affirmed this, and thought it to be consistent with the doctrine of Calvin, in his Commentary on Ezekiel, chapter 18, verse 23: "Do I desire the death of the wicked, etc." He confirms the same opinion in other words: "That God desires nothing more than that whoever were perishing and rushing into death should return to the way of salvation. And for this reason also not only is the Gospel promulgated in the world today, but in all ages God willed it to be testified how inclined he is to mercy. For the Profane, although they lacked the law and the prophets, yet were always endowed with some taste of this doctrine. It is true indeed that it was suffocated by many errors; but we shall find that they were always led by a secret impulse to seek pardon, because this sense was in a way innate in them, that God is placable to all who seek him. But God testified this more clearly in the law and the Prophets. In the Gospel, however, we know how familiarly he addresses us, where he promises us pardon." Nor indeed did the Gentiles think otherwise of the nature of God.

The third is likewise manifest of itself. For there are not in God two kinds of mercy pertaining to the remission of sins, one of which depends on the decree of the sacrifice of Christ, either future or already performed; and the other has nothing in common with it, and can be shown and revealed without any respect to satisfaction. Wherefore **Amyraut** did not hesitate to affirm this after Calvin, in the Commentary cited above, where he said that the same mercy which is revealed in the Gospel and the Law and the Prophets was known by a secret sense to the profane who lacked the Law and the Prophets. The same was taught by Bucer in the Preface to his *Explanations on the Epistle to the Romans*, by Bullinger in his *Commentary on the same Epistle*, chapter 1, verse 19, by Camero in his *Lectures on the Church* and elsewhere. And indeed, the most distinguished Daille testified that this is confessed among all Evangelicals, in his writing against de la Milletière, which was seen and praised in the Synod of Alençon. For thus he speaks in Part II, page 108: "Nor does anyone among us doubt about this, which is confessed among all Christians, that the Satisfaction performed by Christ on the cross is of such value and price that it is abundantly sufficient for expiating the sins of all men. Nor indeed is it denied by any of us that by the promise of Christ, and by the contemplation of the future sacrifice, it came about that God allowed the world and the human race in it, which otherwise would have been immediately destroyed, to be preserved after the commission of sin, and to persevere in the state in which it now is. From which this (which all also equally confess) most evidently follows, that that admirable nature of the heavens and elements and other parts of the world, which is exposed to the eyes of all nations everywhere, that providence by which this Universe is governed and cherished, testifies to the supreme power and wisdom of the best and greatest God, but also his kindness, and, so to speak, his placability; and that it invites men to the fear, love, and worship of so great a deity, with a silent speech indeed, but nevertheless of such a kind that it deservedly renders inexcusable whoever despise it, and hold back the truth revealed in that way in unrighteousness."

In the fourth, the name and the thing are to be considered. As to the name, it seems that it should be adapted to the thing itself. Faith, therefore, although it is placed in knowledge, nevertheless rests chiefly on testimony. But whatever it is that the mercy of God revealed in Providence is suited to produce, if it obtained a properly constituted faculty, is not properly called testimony. Therefore, it cannot generate faith properly so called. Although, therefore, Calvin, agreeing with David and Paul, in his Commentary on Psalm 19 and his Commentary on Romans 10:18 and elsewhere, calls the documents of Nature and Providence proclamation, and testimony, and witnesses metaphorically, and the knowledge which ought to arise from those documents, faith metaphorically, in the Preface to the Bible, in the Latin edition, and in the *Institutes*, chapter 2, yet the name of knowledge which the Apostle uses in that argument is both proper and more suitable. And this **Amyraut** both acknowledged and professed in his *Defense of Calvin*, chapter 13.

If the thing itself had been performed by anyone (which has never happened), whether it could have been salutary can be asked in two ways. Proximately, that is, and immediately, or remotely and consequently. And that it could be proximately salutary, so that no clearer knowledge, no faith properly so called, was added to it, **Amyraut** has neither affirmed anywhere, nor does he think it should be affirmed, especially in these times, in which Christ has been exhibited to the world. That it could be salutary remotely and consequently he has not denied, because it would lead to a fuller and more abundant revelation, if there were anyone (which there never is) who used that more sparing revelation well. For God, who offers knowledge of Himself to those who do not think of it, and impresses it upon those who reject it, would not deny a clearer revelation to those who embrace the more obscure one. And in this **Amyraut** has followed the most excellent men. As Calvin, in his Commentary on 1 Corinthians 1:21 and his Commentary on Romans 1:19. Also Bucer and Bullinger in the places cited above.

Nor indeed is this to be thought to approach the heresy of the Pelagians. For it is certainly Pelagian to maintain that it can happen that a man by the powers of nature may use that revelation well. For this pertains to elevating the corruption of man, which is supreme. But on the hypothesis that if anyone used it well, it would follow that a good God would not abandon that use, pertains to preaching His one mercy, the praise of which is infinite.

But because that economy of Nature and Providence neither supplies the spirit, which prepares the faculty aright, nor, if it did supply it with its usual and ordinary abundance, could it perform so great a thing as to drive away the darkness of errors and idolatry from the minds of men, nor, if it did drive it away, would it nevertheless supply that light which is fitting for the times in which Christ has been exhibited; **Amyraut** has constantly indicated that both in every age the word of God was necessary, and now the word of the Gospel is absolutely necessary. The reasons for this his judgment he has explained and confirmed in Sermon III on the Nature of the Gospel, and in his *Defense of Calvin*, chapters 12 and 13.

THE END.

The Opinion of the Same Amyraut, on the Equality and Inequality of Grace.

Because **Amyraut** has somewhere said that Christ died equally for all, and since many have interpreted that phrase, "equally," otherwise than he himself understood it, he thought it would not be out of place if he explained it a little more fully and clearly.

The Grace of God can be viewed either in those things which pertain to generating faith in the minds of men; or in the causes from which those things have flowed; or finally in the effects which follow those things, if anyone has believed by their means.

And indeed, pertaining to the generation of faith are the external object, in which the mercy of God is declared; and the internal power, which affects the mind to admit the object. As to the external object, although according to the opinion of **Amyraut** it is established that it is proposed to all, yet it is proposed very unequally. For first, there is a great inequality in this respect between those to whose eyes God objects only the works of Providence, and of μακροθυμία (makrothumia - long-suffering), and of χρηστότης (chrestotes - kindness), and of ἀνοχή (anochē - forbearance); and those to whom He has revealed Himself through His word. For in the former, the declaration of divine mercy is far more imperfect and obscure; but in the latter, it is much fuller and more lucid. So much so that if they are compared with each other, that which is made through Providence, compared to that which is made through the word, seems to be considered very small. This has been explained at length by **Amyraut** in his book *On Predestination*, chapter VII, Sermons II and III on the Nature of the Gospel, and *Defense of Calvin*, chapter XII.

Then, even those to whom the word has been revealed have received that grace unequally. For the mercy of God was manifested more clearly under the New Testament, and more obscurely under the Old. And under the Old Testament, that manifestation received various increases, as the Prophets drew nearer to the times of the Messiah. Under the New, it is done more distinctly in the churches which are purer, less distinctly in those which are more impure. This has been explained by **Amyraut** in Sermons 3 and 4 on the Gospel.

As to that power which affects the mind from within, there is such an inequality among men in this respect, according to **Amyraut's** opinion, that he has taught that that Grace indeed accompanies the word of God, for which reason the word is called the ministry of the spirit, but has expressly denied that it is bestowed through the declaration of mercy which is made without the word. And this he has not only explained in his Sermon on the Gospel III and in his Dissertation on Universal Grace throughout, but has also demonstrated with necessary facts and reasons in his book, *Defense of Calvin*, chapter XIII.

And yet it is not so distributed through the preaching of the word, but that there is a great inequality in this respect among the men to whom the word is announced. For as many are called, but few are chosen, so many hear the word, but few experience the power of the Spirit. **Amyraut** has demonstrated this with Arguments in his *Replication to de la Milletière*, chapter IV, and *Defense of Calvin*, chapter XIV, and in his *Dissertation on Particular Grace*.

Furthermore, even among the elect themselves there is some difference in this respect, for to some a greater, and to others a lesser power of the Spirit is granted, although to all is supplied so much that it necessarily generates faith.

The causes from which these things emanate are either procuring or antecedent to the procuring causes. And the procuring cause is posited in the one death and resurrection of

Christ. In what way it happened that the death of Christ procured these things for men is not relevant to our present subject, and has been explained at length by **Amyraut** in his *Dissertation on Universal Grace*. What is relevant to our subject is that the inequality of the effect undoubtedly argues for some inequality of efficacy in the cause.

Therefore, since that power of the Spirit which can be called internal and subjective grace has not been procured for many men by the death of Christ, it is a consequent and consistent conclusion that Christ did not die for them in that respect. This establishes an immense difference in that respect between them and the elect, and thus an infinite inequality of Grace. In this respect, Christ died for the elect alone.

As to the object, since that common grace of external vocation does not flow from any other source than from some efficacy of Christ's death, it is necessary that in that respect Christ died for all. But because that common vocation is made through a revelation of mercy that is greatly unequal, it remains that in that respect Christ died for all very unequally.

The causes antecedent to the procuring cause are partly posited in the love of Christ, partly established in the affection of the Father. And as to the affection of the Father, it is considered in two moments. One is *φιλανθρωπία* (philanthropia), which respects men as men, and which is conceived in the manner of a certain inclination by which God is disposed to the salvation of all men, provided they believe. The other is a far more intense and vehement affection, which looks to some men only, no longer as they are men, but as God wills them to be well off above other men according to His most free good pleasure: not that He is disposed to their salvation provided they believe; but that He may generate faith in them, through which they may most certainly be led to salvation. These things, indeed, introduce the greatest inequality into that affection of the heavenly Father.

And this distinction was so important to **Amyraut** that he first wrote in express words that that *φιλανθρωπία* (philanthropia) is indeed greatly memorable, if it is viewed precisely in itself; according to that, "God so loved the world, etc." John 3:16. But if it is compared with that other affection, it is almost nothing when compared to its magnitude, as he taught in his book *On Predestination*, chapters 9 and 14, and elsewhere.

Secondly, he also taught that it would have hardly been consistent with the wisdom of God to send his Son into the world, if, beyond the effect of *φιλανθρωπία* (philanthropia), He had not been impelled by His mercy to choose some. Because, of course, the satisfaction of Christ would have been entirely in vain, on account of the unwilling and incurable obstinacy of all men in their corruption. But this neither befitted the wisdom of God, nor would it have been sufficiently glorious for Christ Himself. And this is explained in the book *On Predestination*, chapter 9, and in the *Specimen of the Doctrine of Calvin*.

As to the love of the Son, because He is one with the Father, and in the business of our salvation followed the Father's counsel, it must certainly have been conformed to the nature and measure of the Father's affection. And so He exhibited both a certain common *φιλανθρωπία* (philanthropia) towards all men when He died, and a certain singular and exceptional mercy towards those whom He knew to have been elected by the Father, and given to Him in predestination by the same. The former He commemorated when He said that He would give His flesh for the life of the world, John 6. The latter, when He so often testified that He would lay down His life for His sheep which He has in His hands, and which hear and follow Him when He speaks: and thus He Himself explained how unequally He loved men in that respect.

There remain the effects of those things, which follow faith, if anyone has exhibited it. These, however, pertain either to the Spirit of wisdom and illumination, which increases the faith already exhibited; or to the consolation which arises from the sense of remission; or to the sanctification, which arises and is promoted from the more abundant supply of the Spirit of both wisdom and consolation; or finally to the hope of glory, which perpetually accompanies that spirit. We say nothing of glory itself. For we are concerned here not with the glory which is to be in heaven, but with the Grace which is bestowed on earth.

However, whatever these things may be, they do not pertain to the question of the equality of grace. For first, anyone who did not acknowledge the immense difference in this respect between the faithful and the unbelievers would be insane. For the former are possessors of all these things; the latter, however, are utterly devoid of them, because they did not believe. Secondly, anyone who, if there is any inequality among the faithful with respect to these things (and experience makes it clear that there is a great one), were to infer from this either that Christ died for them unequally, or that God willed their salvation unequally, would be unskilled in theological matters. For that inequality and variety which God follows in the dispensation of the illuminating, consoling, sanctifying, and finally hope-giving Spirit, arises from a wisdom that takes into account the state of the Church as long as it sojourns on earth, as its edification demands. Therefore, when **Amyraut** said that Christ died equally for all, he was considering the procurement of men's salvation, first in the counsel of God, then in the death of Christ, and finally in the very remission of sins and eternal life which the death of Christ merited for us.

And he indeed made two parts of God's counsel or will concerning the salvation of men. For although in God the thing is one and the same, yet two parts of it, as it were, are conceived distinctly by us. One was from *φιλανθρωπία* (philanthropia), the other from that other mercy, as these were considered separately above. He judged the former part, however, because it is established only in God's *φιλανθρωπία* (philanthropia), to be first of such a kind that its effect depended on the condition of faith, namely that God willed the salvation of all,

provided they believed. Second, that it is common because it pertains to all. Third and finally, that it is equal, because *φιλανθρωπία* (philanthropia) regards the nature of men insofar as it is human. But all are equal insofar as they are men, and no inequality seems to exist between them with respect to nature. From this it came about that he did indeed say that God wills the salvation of all men equally, but never except where that former part of the divine counsel which pertains to *φιλανθρωπία* (philanthropia) was considered separately; never without that addition, "provided they believe"; and almost never without that interpretation, "if they do not believe, God does not will their salvation." But where the other part of the counsel, which pertains to the elect, was to be discussed, then **Amyraut** most openly signified that inequality.

Let us come to the death of Christ. We have said that Christ's love in this matter was exactly conformed to the affection of the Father. And so He willed the same as the Father, and in the same way. Now, as He willed to die, so undoubtedly He died. And therefore, that death of His is to be considered in a twofold manner according to **Amyraut's** opinion. First, insofar as it corresponds to the *φιλανθρωπία* (philanthropia) of God and to that part of Christ's love which conforms itself to the Father's philanthropy. Secondly, insofar as it corresponds to the singular mercy with which God embraced the elect, and to that part of Christ's love which is like that singular mercy. If it is considered in the former way, since the will of God is conditional, common, and equal—that is, it equally regards human nature as its object—it is necessary that the death of Christ also be affected by a condition, be common, and equally regard its object. If it is viewed in the latter way, just as that affection of God towards the elect is both absolute and separate from all condition, and particular and limited to a few, and finally such that it regards them equally, but other men in no way, so also must the death of Christ be in the same way.

There remains salvation itself to be considered. It ought to be viewed in two ways. Namely, either as it is offered under the condition of faith, or as it is conferred after the condition has been met. Now, no one says that it is actually conferred on all equally, not even those who are insane. But that it is offered to all equally under a condition, I do not know if any who are wise can deny; provided, of course, that "equally" is understood not of the quality of the revelation through which it is offered, but of salvation itself. For a greater salvation is not proposed to some and a lesser one to others for them to embrace. As there is one Lord and redeemer, one baptism, one God, one hope of our calling, if one faith were performed by each, there would be altogether one salvation for all. And these were the reasons why the Apostle said that righteousness came upon all and to all who believe, without distinction. These things impelled Calvin to say that Christ died for all without distinction, and is proposed to all equally. These things, finally, led Cameron to maintain that the death of Christ under the condition of faith pertains equally to absolutely all men. Although it is

certain that because not all fulfill this condition, Christ suffered death for a certain class of men, namely the Church.

Amyraut understood that equality in no other way than has been explained above. However, although he has suitable authors for that expression, because it seemed liable either to calumny or to sinister interpretation, he has resolved to abstain from it constantly.

THE END.

On the Phrase, "Men can believe, if they will."

Because this phrase, "Men can believe, if they will," which sometimes occurs in the writings of **Amyraut**, being understood otherwise, seems to some to be either absurd—as if to will to believe were to believe itself—or dangerous—as if it attributed something to the free will of men in matters pertaining to salvation—it must also be explained here in a few words.

Since faith consists of two things—the object which is proposed for belief, and the operation and application of the mind to embrace the object—men are said to be able to believe if they will, either with respect to the object, or with respect to the mind and the faculty which applies itself to the object.

And the object is indeed proposed in a twofold manner: namely, distinctly and confusedly. Now, those to whom τὸ πιστὸν (the object of faith) is offered confusedly, certainly cannot believe distinctly, even if they should wish it most vehemently. For as the object is prior to the operation of the faculty—so that no one sees unless an object is offered to him, no one feels unless τὸ αἰσθητὸν (the object of sense) is first presented to him—so the object is the measure of the operation of the faculty, so that no one can either see or feel anything more fully or more distinctly than the nature or clarity of the visible or sensible thing allows. To whom the object is offered distinctly, they can to that extent believe distinctly if they will. This is to say, if they do not believe, they cannot use the defect of the object as an excuse, since it was offered to them. The cause for their not believing is located in their own faculties.

Now when this is said of men with respect to the faculty itself, three things especially come to be considered.

And the first is this: that the actions of men are of two kinds. For some are of such a sort that for their production, besides the operation of the mind and will, the use of some other faculty is required, such as seeing, hearing, moving from a place, and similar things in men.

Others so consist in the mind and will that they require absolutely nothing for their production beyond a certain disposition and constitution of the faculty.

In actions of the former kind, we are not accustomed to use such expressions, unless it is established that those faculties, through whose intervention the mind and will operate, are well and properly disposed. For if the eyes are healthy, and light is presented from without, nothing indeed prevents us from saying that he who is so constituted can see if he wills. For if he wills to open his eyes and look at the light, because they are rightly disposed by nature, they will obey the mind and will and will perform their function. But if those faculties suffer from some defect, the cure of which is not in the power of the mind and will, as if one were blind, then no one would say that a blind man, for example, can see if he wills. But this is not relevant to our matter. For we maintain that the object is offered to those of whom we say that they can believe if they will. But it is certainly not offered unless the eyes and ears and any other organs, by whose means objects insinuate themselves into the mind, are well and naturally disposed in those to whom the object of belief is offered. Wherefore, we must come to the other kind of actions.

These, therefore, are of such a kind that they depend on the mind and will alone, because, that is, they consist in the very act of understanding and willing. Therefore, it is not doubtful that those to whom τὸ πιστὸν (the object of faith) has been offered, can to that extent believe if they will, since nothing prevents them from believing except that they do not apply their faculties properly to the object.

The second point is this: that the faculties of man, as man, capable by nature of admitting truth, are the mind, to which the object is offered under the aspect of truth, and the appetite, to which the same object is offered under the aspect of good. And to the mind properly pertains πιστεύειν (to believe). For to believe is to be persuaded, and those are said to be πεπεισμένοι (persuaded) who are σωζόμενα (being saved). Now, to be persuaded is to perceive the force of the arguments by which something is demonstrated to be true, and to assent to them. Which is the work of the intelligence. The appetite in man, however, is twofold. One is rational, which is called will; the other is sensitive and indeed by nature devoid of reason in itself, but yet naturally apt to obey reason. Although these two appetites are distinct by nature, they are nevertheless accustomed in moral matters to so conjoin their operations that they are hardly discerned. For he, for example, who rushes headlong to vengeance is said to will to avenge himself. Although the appetite for vengeance properly pertains to the spirited part (θυμικόν), while "to will" is properly used of the rational appetite. And the reason for this must be sought from the fact that each appetite, from whatever source it is excited and moved, concurs in seeking vengeance: the one as a πάθος (passion), which is excited by the opinion of an injury received, and which snatches a man towards the ἀναλύπησιν (relief from pain) by which the desire is satisfied;

the other as that to which the remaining faculties, from which the action depends, are by nature subject, such as the power of moving oneself from place to place, or of brandishing one's arms, or if there is anything suited for this purpose by nature or habit.

The objects, therefore, which are offered to the mind for belief, are of two kinds. For some are of such a kind that they are either merely theoretical or at least are considered as such, so that the appetites are in no way moved by their contemplation. And in this kind, we are not accustomed to speak in such a way as to say that someone can admit those objects if he wills. For if, for example, a geometer instructing a student affirms that in a right-angled triangle the side which subtends the right angle makes a square equal to the squares constructed from each of the other two sides, no one would say that the student can understand and believe that proposition if he willed, if that proposition is viewed as it is in itself, that is, merely theoretically. For if the student is of a sharp mind, he will easily comprehend it. But if he is of a somewhat slower and duller mind, even if he desires very much to perceive the force and truth of that proposition, he will still not succeed, because he lacks the sharpness necessary for this matter.

Other objects are either practical by their nature, or are at least considered as practical, the contemplation of which is naturally apt to stir the appetites. And in this kind, we are accustomed to use that phrase. For if, for example, a philosopher is engaged in explaining the nature of the virtue of temperance, and exhorts his students first to understand and admit its excellence, and then to love and embrace it, and to apply all their effort to calming their desires and to moderating the course of their life, there is no one who has greeted philosophy from its threshold who would not say that his students can obey that exhortation if they willed. To be sure, the matter is of such a kind that if they do not comprehend it, they cannot plead the slowness of their intellect or the difficulty of the object as an excuse. Desire alone stands in the way, which casts darkness over the mind and prevents it from perceiving the excellence of temperance, and which snatches young men away to pleasures, so that they are unwilling to apply their faculties to loving virtue.

The object proposed in the Gospel, however, is not only true, and πιστός (believable), that is, by its nature to be believed; but also good and ἀγαπητόν (desirable), that is, to be sought after and loved, and therefore naturally apt for exciting the impulses of the appetites. But that men do not embrace it, they can blame neither the slowness of their intellect nor the difficulty of the object. For they understand well enough what τὸ λεγόμενον (that which is said) is; and τὸ λεγόμενον (that which is said) is marked with such clear and evident characters of both truth and excellence, that unless something else stood in the way, nothing could be more consonant with the nature of the human mind. The perverse appetites of men, therefore, prevent it, and perverse habits, both innate by nature and inveterate by the custom of sinning. For this reason also men are said in this way to be able

to believe if they will: that is, nothing prevents them from believing except that perverse disposition of the faculties, which resides in the mind and will and appetites.

Finally, the third point is this: that "to be able to believe if you will" is said in two ways: namely, in a positive sense, and a negative one. And in the negative sense, it is the very thing which has already been explained above. Namely, those are said to be able to believe if they will, who are hindered by no other thing from believing, except that of which they themselves are the cause. But if it is taken in a positive sense, it can signify two things. For it is said either with respect to the natural faculty, insofar as it is equipped by nature for producing such and such actions; or it is said with respect to the future event, if one may so speak, no longer considered as it depends on the faculty equipped for this purpose by nature, but as something intervenes, which either helps or intercepts the event, and prevents it from proceeding from the faculty into act, and being brought to light. This latter reason is called by some the proximate power of believing; the former, the remote.

And in the latter way indeed, it cannot be said of men corrupted by nature that they can believe. For it certainly cannot happen that they believe. Not because they have no faculty at all destined for this purpose—for they are endowed with a mind, which if viewed in itself, is equipped by nature for this purpose, to understand that which is intelligible (τὸ νοητὸν), and to believe that which is believable (τὸ πιστὸν), and to comprehend that which is comprehensible (τὸ καταληπτὸν). But something has been added to that faculty, namely corruption, situated in perverse habits, the force of which is so great that it always prevents the faculty from exerting itself in apprehending the object, so that an event consistent with its nature may follow. Thus it neither happens, nor can it ever happen, that corrupt men believe of themselves.

In the former way, nothing prevents men from being said to be able to believe. For since they have a faculty, and a faculty is a δύναμις (power), it seems absurd that they should have a δύναμις (power) and yet be able to do nothing. Certainly, a δύναμις (power) is not so called for any other reason than that either it itself δύναται (can do) something, or through it the subject in which it is, is considered to be able to do (δύνασθαι) something. What, therefore, can it do by nature? To be sure, the act of the mind is twofold. One consists in the simple apprehension of an intelligible object, without assent. The other, besides the apprehension of the object, includes assent or συγκατάθεσις (assent). And as for the former, no one doubts that it can be performed by men. For even those who reject the Gospel understand what is contained in the Gospel, if someone explains it to them. The latter, unless it were in the power either of the mind as mind, or of man as having a mind, a man would not sin who does not assent to the Gospel, when he is commanded to believe and assent. For just as he would not sin if he did not fly, even if he were commanded to fly, since he does not have

wings, so he would not sin at all in not embracing the Gospel with his assent, if he did not have the faculty of assenting by nature.

Therefore, "men corrupted by sin can believe if they will" is said in two ways. For either that "if they will" is said of men whose mind is darkened and blinded by darkness, whose will and all appetites are hindered by perverse habits, in the composite sense, as they say. And then that expression would be absurd. For to have a darkened mind and all appetites addicted and enslaved to evil, and to will to assent to the Gospel, are contradictory. Or it is said in a divided sense; and then the expression contains no absurdity. For no one can deny that if the mind and appetites were free from that vice, a man could embrace the Gospel. Furthermore, because a man is bound to expel that vice from his faculties—for everyone is bound by duty not to be evil, and he who does not do it is justly punished, and is thought to be able in some way to do it, since he is justly punished for that reason. For what is either omitted or committed by a human agent is not considered to be justly punished otherwise than because he is thought to have been able either not to omit it or not to commit it.

THE END.²

On Physical and Moral Inability: and on those things which are said to be ἐφ' ἡμῖν (in our power).

Although from the preceding it can be understood what is the nature of the inability that prevents men from believing unless they are most effectively called by God, yet for the sake of a fuller explanation, something more must be said about it.

That it cannot happen that men believe of themselves is manifest partly from experience, partly from Holy Scripture. Why it never happens or can happen, there must be some determinate cause. Now that cause is either in the fact that men have absolutely no faculty for this purpose, or in the fact that although they have some faculty for this purpose, it is nevertheless so affected that an event consistent with its nature never arises from it.

That there is absolutely no faculty for this purpose in man cannot be said without some stain being cast upon the wisdom and justice of God, and a just and legitimate excuse being offered for man's unbelief. For as far as God is concerned, if He were to command men to fly, when nature has denied them wings, the command would not seem to have been wisely instituted; nor would the punishment be just if He were to punish them in some way for not obeying. And if we say that the faculty of believing was granted to the first man, which he lost for himself and his posterity, not even so will reason seem to have been satisfied, if in

² This is my own

Adam's posterity there is thought to be no faculty of believing at all. For if God had committed the eyes of all future men to Adam as a deposit, and he by his own fault had extinguished both his own light and that of the rest, we would neither be wisely commanded to see now, nor would we be thought to be justly punished, if, being ordered to see, we in no way obeyed.

As for man, however, there is neither any philosopher nor any jurist who denies that a legitimate excuse for not obeying is ready for him who absolutely cannot obey because he is deprived of all faculty for obeying.

Man therefore has some faculty, namely a mind and a will, but to which something has been added which hinders and intercepts its operation. That impediment cannot be situated in any other thing than in a certain constitution of the faculty. Now there is no such constitution unless it either removes the power of understanding and reasoning from the intellect, or, while leaving the power of reasoning and understanding in man, yet makes it so that he does not judge well about the goal to which he ought to refer his actions, and is unable, as Aristotle says, to ὀρθοδοξεῖν περὶ τοῦ τέλους (have a right opinion about the end).

An impediment of the former kind is equivalent to a complete privation of the faculty. For an infant in whom the rational faculty (τὸ λογικόν) is not merely simple (ἀπλῶς), but is hindered by the imperfection of the organs, or an adult who by some accident has been made bereft of his mind, or an old man who raves on account of senility, is no less excused if they do not use their mind, than if they had no mind at all. A drunkard, indeed, is certainly not excused. But he himself placed that impediment on his mind, preventing it from performing its duty. Wherefore the vice of the mind is judged by that fault through which he brought it upon himself. For he is thought to have had the faculty by which he could have avoided drunkenness. Others are not considered to be the cause of their own vice. But no one would certainly say that the constitution of man's faculties which prevents him from believing is of such a kind. For most unbelievers are of sound mind, and some even seem to possess a certain singular sharpness.

That constitution, therefore, must be referred to what the Philosopher calls μοχθηρία (wickedness), and what he says διαστρέφειν τὸν νοῦν (corrupts the mind) so that it does not establish the good and legitimate end to which all its actions and reasonings are destined. For that affection of the faculty certainly does not prevent God from wisely commanding men to believe; for even legislators are thought to give laws wisely to the bad as well as to the good. Nor does it prevent unbelief from being justly punished; for even the worst of all men are considered to be justly punished by magistrates, even if they are entirely enslaved to vice. Nor does it offer any excuse to the unbelievers; for the greater the μοχθηρία (wickedness) is, the less excuse it has in itself.

Furthermore, that constitution in man is first from nature, from original sin; then it grows and is strengthened by the custom of sinning; finally, it so occupies all parts of nature that neither the mind, nor the will, nor any appetite remains which is not completely infected with that vice. Whence it happens that from birth to the end of life that inability to believe is invincible in man, unless the power and efficacy of the Spirit of God intervenes. That inability is therefore natural (*naturalis*), because it is in us from birth and imbues and hinders our entire nature; it is moral (*moralis*) however, because it is situated in those things which affect the moral faculties insofar as they are moral. It is, I say, moral (*ἠθική*), insofar as it is wickedness (*μοχθηρία*); but it is natural/physical (*φυσική*) insofar as it is from birth itself, and has infected the entire nature (*φύσιν*) of man. Nevertheless, because when physical good and moral good are opposed, physical good is understood to be that which is neither choiceworthy (*αἰρετόν*) nor praiseworthy (*ἐπαινετόν*), since it is situated in those things which are not from the things in our power (*ἐκ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν*); but moral good is that which is praiseworthy (*ἐπαινετόν*), because it consists in the things in our power (*ἐν τοῖς ἐφ' ἡμῖν*), it seems more consistent if the inability is called moral, than if it is called physical: because it pertains to the praise of the wisdom and justice of God, and it is necessary, so that every excuse for man may be taken away, to establish that it is wickedness (*μοχθηρία*) and that it is constituted in the things in our power (*ἐν τοῖς ἐφ' ἡμῖν*).

Now, those things are said by true philosophers to be in our power (*ἐφ' ἡμῖν*) which are in our control. Furthermore, the things that are in our power are of two kinds. For some consist in those acts of our faculties which are called commanded by the will; others are situated in the acts which are called elicited from the faculties in the Schools.

And as for the commanded acts, they are said to be in our power (*ἐφ' ἡμῖν*) or in our control, when the faculties which are subject and subordinate to the will are well-disposed, as is, for example, the locomotive faculty. For then the movement and exercise of the body is thought to be in our power (*ἐφ' ἡμῖν*). So much so that Aristotle includes among reprehensible things *τὰ αἰσχροῦτα τοῦ σώματος* (the ugliness of the body), which exists not by nature (*φύσιν*), but through lack of exercise (*δι' ἀγυμνασίαν*) and through neglect (*δι' ἀμέλειαν*). To be sure, the conformation of our mouth and the rest of our body in the womb did not depend on our will. But after we have grown up, to exercise ourselves, and to take care of the health of our body in this way, if we have been hindered by disease, was from the things in our power (*ἐκ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν*). On the contrary, those acts are denied to be in our power (*ἐφ' ἡμῖν*) which either do not depend at all on the faculties subordinate to the will, or depend on them in such a way that the faculties themselves are hindered by some impediment, of which we ourselves are not the cause. Thus, to lay aside the blackness of his skin is not, in an Ethiopian, of the kind of things which are said to be in our power (*ἐφ' ἡμῖν*), because there is no faculty in the Ethiopian subject to the will from which any act could proceed by whose power this effect could be given. Likewise, to walk is not from the things

in our power (ἐκ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν) in him whose legs have been broken by some accident; because although he has the faculty of walking by nature subject to the will, it is nevertheless so injured that until it is restored, it cannot obey the commanding will.

As to the elicited acts, they consist in the very motions of the mind and will, namely, in understanding and volition, as they say in the Schools. They are said to be in our power (ἐφ' ἡμῖν) and in our control in two ways. Namely, either insofar as they are natural, or insofar as they are moral. And insofar as they are natural, they are indeed in our power (ἐφ' ἡμῖν), when there is nothing either in the natural constitution of the organs, or in the temperament of the body, or in other such things that would subvert the operations of those faculties. For he who falls into a frenzy either from a fever or from a melancholic humor is certainly said to have gone out of his own control. But he who is by nature mentally deficient on account of an unfortunate constitution of the organs, he was never in his own control. Wherefore those elicited acts are not in the power of such persons, nor are they in their control (ἐφ' αὐτοῖς). On the contrary, these operations of our faculties are said to be in our power (ἐφ' ἡμῖν) when we are well and naturally constituted by all those parts on which the functions of the mind and will naturally depend.

Insofar as they are moral, that is, morally good or bad, they can be said to be in our power (ἐφ' ἡμῖν) in two ways. Namely, either insofar as it can happen that they are elicited from our faculties and performed by us; or insofar as, if this can less happen, the impediment is posited in the faculties themselves only insofar as they are moral, not in any other thing which is or is not subject to the command of the faculties.

And in the former way, it cannot be said that believing is in our power (ἐφ' ἡμῖν), after we have once been corrupted by sin. For it certainly cannot happen that through ourselves, and with no attending power of the illuminating Spirit, we should believe the Gospel. But in the latter way, believing is from the things in our power (ἐκ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν). For the fact that it does not happen, nor can it happen, that we believe, can be imputed to no cause or impediment which is not located and constituted in the faculties themselves. For if the object of faith (τὸ πιστὸν) is offered, since believing (τὸ πιστεύειν) is not an act of a faculty which is subject to the will, but of the mind and will itself, and we have posited that those things on which the operations of the mind and will depend, insofar as they are natural, are well and congruently disposed, it is due to those faculties alone, insofar as they are moral, that they do not embrace the object of faith (τὸ πιστὸν).

And although those moral faculties, insofar as they are moral, are so affected that it cannot happen that they believe, it does not follow that it cannot be said that believing is from the things in our power (ἐκ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν). For those things are said to be in our power (ἐφ' ἡμῖν) which, if they ought to be done, and yet are not done, our mind and will alone can be blamed. But those things are not in our power (ἐφ' ἡμῖν) which, if they are not done by us

when they are commanded to be done, we can truly and deservedly cast the cause upon some other thing different from our mind and will. But believing is of such a kind that if it is not performed by us, we can allege nothing whatever as the cause except our own mind and our own will.

And this can be made manifest by an example. For let us imagine that by God's command two things are enjoined at the same time upon an Ethiopian: that he lay aside the blackness of his skin, and that he believe in the Gospel, which at the same time is clearly and distinctly proposed to him. He will certainly perform neither, nor will he be able to perform it. With respect to both commands, disobedience will be equally necessary and inevitable. But for why he does not lay aside his blackness, he has an excuse both legitimate and ready. For even if he should wish most vehemently to obey, he still cannot: because it depends on something different from his will itself, and which is not in his power, nor in his control (ἐπ' αὐτῷ). But for why he does not believe, not even in his own judgment will he have any excuse. Because if he had willed to obey, he certainly could have. For that did not depend on anything else than on his own mind and will, faculties which are most especially in his control (ἐπ' αὐτῷ), as long as the organs remain well-disposed.

Nor will he seek an excuse from the fact that in both cases the event was equally and from an equal necessity infallible. For the fact that it was infallible that he would not lay aside his blackness, arose from the fact that it was in no way in his power (ἐπ' αὐτῷ) to change his skin. But the fact that it was infallible that he would not believe, proceeded from another cause. For it was in his power (ἐπ' αὐτῷ) to believe if he had not been evil; and that he should not be evil was in his power (ἐπ' αὐτῷ) to this extent, that whether he was wicked or not, was situated in his will alone. And although he was so wicked that it could not happen that he not be so, yet that malice is in the mind and will alone, through which, as long as we use reason and will, we are considered to be most especially in control of ourselves (ἐφ' ἡμῖν).

In one word, that is said to be in our power (ἐφ' ἡμῖν) for the doing of which we have liberty. But liberty is the power of doing what you will; for we are said to be free with respect to those things which we can do if we will. But there is not in the Ethiopian such liberty or power for changing the color of his skin. For even if he wills it, he cannot. But there is in the same Ethiopian such liberty or power for embracing the Gospel. For if he willed it, he certainly could do it. His will alone prevents him from doing it. To be sure, in the business of faith and piety, we can do as much as we will, since faith and piety consist in the will alone.

THE END.