

PHILOSOPHIA GENERALIS, BOOK III, CHAPTER III, SECTION II - THEOPHILUS GALE

§1. All acts of the will are free and voluntary; therefore, every coercion is incompatible with the will.

This thesis has been embraced by Plato and the more insightful philosophers, as well as the Scholastics. Hence, *voluntary* and *free* are conjoined in Platonic definitions and are illustrated by the same ideas. Thus, on page 414: Ἐξορή τὸ αὐτὸ προσαγωγόν· τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ αἰρετόν, καὶ διάνοιαν σπορεύον ("Voluntary, which leads itself; what is chosen by itself is completed according to the mind"). From this follows the definition of the free: Ἐλεύθερον, τὸ ἄρχον αὐτο, ("Free is what commands itself"). It is clear enough that these ideas of the *voluntary* and the *free* are not really different, but are mutually explanatory. For what does it mean to lead oneself other than to command oneself? From these definitions, it is not difficult to deduce the nature and identity of the voluntary and the free. Two things are necessarily required to constitute a human act as both voluntary and free: (1) that it be elicited by a rational agent, i.e., τὸ ἀνάλογον, as before; (2) that it be spontaneous, i.e., τὸ αὐτοκίνητον, which Serranus translates as "that which is gentle and enticing." Not only Plato, but also Aristotle seems to attach the same idea to the *free* and the *voluntary*, as we will see later, in part 2, book 1, section 4, §2.

Simplicius, in Epictetus, chapter 1, page 28, writes: Ἐξαιρεῖ τοῖς ἐκουσίοις ἐκτείνειαν τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ τῷ συγκατάθεσιν αὐτῆς καὶ ἀπάρνησιν, οἱ προσλογίζονται οἱ τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἀναιροῦσιν· τίς οὐκ ἔχει συναίθησιν τὸ θέλειν καὶ μὴ θέλειν, καὶ τὸ αἰρεῖσθαι καὶ μὴ αἰρεῖσθαι; ("Then they do not consider the vital power of the soul, nor its assent and refusal, those who deny the freedom of will. For who does not notice in himself the will to want or not want, to choose or not choose?") From this, he teaches: (1) that liberty is the vital power of the soul, or the soul itself as willing; (2) that to choose or not choose freely is the same as to will or not will. Therefore, the liberty of the will can be considered either as a *faculty* or as an *operation*: as a faculty, it plainly coincides with the intellect and the will; as an action, it is said to have the intellect and the will as its subject.

Thus, liberty as a faculty is called by Augustine **Rational Will**. For just as the judgment of the intellect ends in the will, so liberty of the will has its root in the intellect. Hence, liberty was long ago given the name *free will*. However, to avoid confusion, we omit the term *free will*. Thus Calvin, in *Institutes*, book 2, says: "But since I think that the term *free will* cannot be maintained without great damage, it would be of great benefit to the Church if it were abolished, and I would wish neither to use it nor advise others to use it." Aquinas, in part 1, question 83, article 4, asserts that liberty is not really distinct from the will, where he proves that the will and free will are one and the same power. Gibieuf, in *On Liberty*, book 1, chapter 5, §4, says: "Free will is the faculty of reason, not distinct from the intellect and the will, but comprising both."

From this, election, which is the proper act of free will, is called by Aristotle **appetitus intellectivus** or **intellectual appetite**, which, however, pertains more properly and

principally to rational appetite, or will, than to the intellect. And if the root of liberty is carefully considered, it will be easy to show that liberty is nothing other than will: for the root of liberty is knowledge, not constrained and bound to things as they are subject to the senses, or as they are in themselves, but extended to God. Just as the amplitude and universality of the intellect is the origin of liberty in the will, or rather in free will, so free will corresponds to the universality of the intellect, as Contarenus explains.

Gibieuf, in *On Liberty*, book 1, chapter 24, §5, also says: "If free will is taken in its full breadth, and is also referred to the state of liberty, it is as broad as the voluntary." Jansenius, in his *Augustine*, vol. 2, on the Nature of the Fall, book 4, chapter 24, page 270, demonstrates this at length: "Since, according to Augustine, nothing is free except that which is in our power, nothing can be more in our power than what we will; and therefore nothing is more free, whether it happens necessarily or not." In vol. 3, on Grace, book 6, chapter 1, Jansenius speaks even more clearly and distinctly about this matter: "By free will, says Augustine, only the power or act of the will is meant, as it alone is properly and immediately free; and reason only through the mediation of the will." Again, in vol. 3, on Grace, book 6, chapter 5, page 262, Jansenius says: "Thus, the will is free, i.e., volition by reason of itself, because it is essentially free. It implies a contradiction that the will should not be free, just as it implies that by willing we do not will, or that we do not do what we will, i.e., that the will is not the will." Suarez, in *On Metaphysics*, vol. 1, book 2, page 121, also admits the same. He writes: "It is certain that liberty is nothing other than a certain power of acting with dominion, which power is not distinct from the will, but is its natural perfection, although it arises from the perfection of the intellect." This hypothesis of the identity of the will and liberty is greatly defended by John Scotus, in *Quodlibetum*, 16, as I will discuss later in §8.

Camero, in his *Collation with Tilenius*, page 699, affirms that liberty is nothing other than τὸ ἐκούσιον ("the voluntary"). And Le Blanc, in *On Free Will*, Thesis 2, page 402, says: "It is the constant opinion of all the Reformers that free will, simply considered and according to its proper nature and essence, is something that cannot be separated from the rational creature; and therefore the faculty of acting freely was not entirely removed from man by sin." He adds in Thesis 3: "It is also agreed among them that this free will, which is inseparable from man, is not an act or habit, but rather a certain faculty of the soul; nor is it understood by this term to designate a faculty distinct from the mind and will, but that free will belongs to man insofar as he is endowed with intellect and will." Onuphrius, in *On the Soul*, treatise 2, disputation 2, part 3, doubt 7, page 407, sharply demonstrates this identity between liberty and will. He writes: "From this, it is clear that the will is not distinct from free will; and although free will seems to signify a certain act, it is not really an act, but the very power of the will. For when we say that a person has free will, we do not mean that the person is actually judging and choosing, but that they have the power by which they can choose; and since all acts of liberty come from the will, free will is the will itself."

Moreover, free will is formally one single power, namely the will, though it includes something of reason, insofar as the object of the will must be proposed and judged by the intellect. Durandus notes, although free will is properly a power that is the will, this term *free will* does not name the power absolutely, but rather the property of the power. Le Blanc, in *Theological Theses on Free Will*, Theses 19, 20, 21, concedes: "Many learned men among Protestants confuse the free with the voluntary and assert that all acts of the will are free; moreover, they claim that the liberty of the will in general, according to them, is nothing other than τὸ ἐκούσιον νοητόν ('intellectual spontaneity'), i.e., spontaneity guided by the light or judgment of the intellect. Therefore, they state that the general liberty of the will properly consists in this: that the will has dominion over its acts to such an extent that it cannot be coerced, but moves, restrains, acts, or refrains from acting at its own pleasure, according to a certain reason, consideration, or judgment. Aquinas, in *Question 2 on Free Will*, Article 5, John Major, in *Sentences*, Book 2, Distinction 25, Question 1, Giles, in *Sentences*, Book 2, Distinction 25, Article 2, and Durandus, in the same place, Question 1, affirm that free will is formally one single power, namely the will."

§. 2. Every Act of the Will is free and voluntary, hence any Coercion is incompatible with the Will.

Thus Plato, *Symposium*, page 196, speaks of the virtue of Love, stating: This is the greatest thing, that Love neither causes harm itself, nor suffers harm from others; neither to God, nor from God; neither to man, nor from man: ἐπὶ δ' αὐτὸς ἴλε, τάξεν αὐτὸς τάσσει (διὰ τὸν Ἔρωσ) καὶ ἀγαπᾷ τῷ πολλῷ καὶ. τάξει Ἔρωσ τῶν ὑψηλῶν, nor does Love suffer any force (Love), if it suffers anything at all: (for violence does not touch it at all), nor does it do anything by force. Whoever obeys Love does so willingly in all things. What Plato says about Violence, or Coercion, having no place in Love, and therefore that Love neither does anything by force nor imposes force on anyone, symbolically and graphically illustrates the Freedom of Will, which is essential to all human actions. For he desires that τὸ ἐκούσιον, that which is Voluntary or Free, be the principle of human actions; and hence that τὸν βίαν, violence and coercion, are incompatible with the Will, whose actions are spontaneous. Hence the famous saying among the Rabbis: "Will and unwillingness are two Poles, by which all actions are turned." The Will always freely follows the dictates of the Intellect; and even if it acts out of necessity, it still acts as much as it cannot not act, and one who judges that something must absolutely be done, does so willingly: for nothing but the judgment of the Intellect can impose chains upon the Will. This will become clearer by contemplating voluntary and violent action. For what is a Voluntary and Free Action, except that which is performed by an intelligent agent according to their own inclination? Indeed, an action is not called violent and coerced when it arises from an external principle against the inclination of the Agent. Therefore, violence cannot be imposed on voluntary actions and actions elicited from the Will, because it would involve a contradiction — that the same action would be performed by an internal principle according to the inclination of the Agent, and at the

same time not performed, as Derdodon says, *On Free Will*, chapter 1. Moreover, the proper act of the Will is from the Will itself according to its inclination: but an act in which the Will would suffer force would come from an external principle opposed to the Will itself: and thus it would not be Will but Unwillingness. Thus, it should be noted, (1) that the human Will can be coerced regarding commanded acts, but not regarding elicited acts. Thus Aquinas, 1. 2. Question 6. Article 4: It is impossible for violence to be imposed on the Will concerning its proper act, which is willing, although it may happen with regard to commanded acts, which it performs through another power, which can be prevented from exercising its own act. To impose violence on the Will in its own actions and elicited acts involves a contradiction, for then the same act would proceed from an internal principle according to the inclination of the Agent, and yet not proceed. (2) It is one thing to be moved violently or by coercion, and another to be moved necessarily: the Will can necessarily be determined by God to its own act, but never coerced, as will be explained later, §. 9. (3) There is a twofold form of voluntary and free action; one that enters into and affects the Will, and another that arises and emanates from the Will. Acts are called voluntary because they proceed from the Will; habits, however, are called voluntary because they are impressed and rooted in the Will. (4) For an act to be voluntary and free, it is not required that the principle be intrinsically the first. For the human Will is not the first free principle, but rather the divine Will is. Thus Onuphrius, *On the Soul*, Tract. 2. Disput. 2. part. 3. doubt. 4. It should be noted, when it is said that a voluntary act requires the intrinsic principle of the one performing the act, it does not mean that the principle must be intrinsic to the operation; it is sufficient if it is the first intrinsic principle in a certain order, whether it is the first in an absolute sense or not. For this reason, Thomas also admits that God moves the Will: not only objectively, but also effectively; however, because He does not move the Will in such a way as to prevent it from moving itself, but concurs with it so that it operates naturally in this manner, it is not removed that the act is voluntary, since it truly proceeds from an internal and vital principle. Hence, §

§. 3. Physical freedom primarily denotes the power or faculty of acting with dominion.

Thus Plato defines it: "Liberty is essentially life with dominion." Likewise: "having full power in all things"; again: "having the power to do what one wills in life." Hence, the term "free" means "that which commands itself." Aristotle similarly says, *Ethics*, Book 1, Chapter 3, "Of the things whose origins are within us, they are in our power"; the origins of such things lie within us, and are in our power, and they are sustained by our own capacity, or else they are free. Hence, according to the Stoics, freedom (ἐξουσία) is defined as "the power of self-movement." Epictetus explains it in his *Enchiridion*, Chapter 1: "Certain things are within our power, others are not: our opinions, desires, aversions, and in one word, whatever actions are truly ours." In our power are opinions, desires, aversions, and in one word, all our actions. In these two significant things arise that are worth noting: (1) All human actions are free. (2) The freedom of human actions consists in them being within our power. Simplicius, on this passage, page 7, says: "Lawgivers say, 'That which is voluntary is free, because it is in our power.' We declare

that those things are in our power, of which we are the masters, and of which we have dominion." We say that this is so in everything that neither comes from someone else nor can be hindered by anyone else: such are the movements of the soul, which are directed from within itself, and which are ruled by its own judgment and choice, even if the object of the choice is external. But even if what is chosen is external, the act of choosing itself, and the movement towards the choice, are internal, because they are entirely from within. Thus, the movements of the soul, which arise from its own judgment and decision, are internal. The Will, then, cannot be moved from the outside. Even though what it seeks may be external, the movement towards it is internal. From this, it follows that (1) all movements of the soul are free. (2) The liberty of the Will is located in its judgment and choice. (3) The Will cannot be moved from the outside, i.e., violently or by coercion. (4) When the Will is moved externally by an objective or efficient cause, that is, by God, that movement is internal to the Will and natural to it. For properly speaking, that is called acting from an internal principle, which not only has the power to act but also acts for the sake of an end. Thus Aquinas, 1.2, *Quaest.* 6, Art. 1, says: "Whatever acts in this way, acts or is moved by an internal principle, which has some knowledge of the end; it has within itself the principle of its own action, not only to act but also to act for the sake of an end." Simplicius, on page 9, elaborates on this more fully: "When the soul acts according to its own nature, then it acts freely and autonomously from within itself; and in such action, it is undisputedly free." When it acts in accordance with its natural inclination, it acts freely and spontaneously from within itself. And in such a mind, whatever is in its power is clearly evident, without dispute. He teaches that nothing more is required for freedom than for the soul to act from itself, internally, and by itself.

Jansenius very skillfully explains this dominion of Free Will in *Augustinus*, vol. 3, book 6, chapter 35, page 301: "But," he says, "the greatest difficulty arises here because we do not seem to be the masters of that act of the will which is free only by its freedom from coercion, nor do we seem to have it in our power, which is absolutely necessary for a free act. For, as Augustine says in *On Free Will*: 'Nothing is so much in our power as the will itself.' But how can we understand that we have the act in our power and are its masters, when we cannot refrain from willing due to the necessity of willing? We seem to be the masters only of what we do or do not do when we will. Moreover, in such an act, we seem more to be acted upon than to act." Jansenius resolves this difficulty by stating: "Everyone, by nature, has the notion that what is called Free is when we will, and what is not is when we do not will. From this, Cicero also says: 'What, then, is Freedom? The power of living as one wills.' Behold, willing is set as the immovable norm of freedom." From this, he adds: "And there is nothing more powerful in a person than their own will and judgment." Therefore, the most learned have described Free Will as the power of doing what one wills, or of inclining oneself to any actions one wills, or something equivalent. And on page 303, he adds: "Thus, we respond that acting and moving oneself indicates a kind of dominion over one's action, so that one may move or restrain oneself at will. But this absolutely requires that one be able to reflect upon one's

own action, not only by desiring but also by judging. From the Will, one has the ability not only to move oneself by desiring but also to reflect upon one's own movement and to will to move oneself by reflection: and in this, there is properly the power of self-movement." And because in every rational movement there is always an explicit or implicit reflection upon oneself, there is also, in every rational movement or consent, the act of moving oneself and having dominion over oneself. This, therefore, is what beasts lack. And this is what the Greeks commonly call Free Will, 'unconquerable,' and 'uncontrollable,' because whatever passion, however vehement, arises in the will, Free Will always remains superior, because it always judges whether this or that ought to be chosen or rejected, freely and voluntarily deciding that this ought to be willed, and that ought to be rejected: and so it does what seems good to it, what pleases it, and what delights it; these are the true signs of freedom. If, however, something vehemently pleases or displeases, it is no wonder if Free Will most vehemently and steadfastly judges that it should will or not will something. Therefore, if reason, with the fullest, calmest, and most serene judgment, judges that one ought to love God, and judges most perfectly that one should judge in this way, and if the Will, in loving, wishes to follow reason, and wishes to will this, and does not wish to cease, then the perfectly blessed move themselves and have the most perfect dominion over their own act. For the necessity that appears in the act arises from the perfection of the Will's dominion and freedom, because it makes necessity for itself, not by the manner of nature, but by most perfect liberty in moving and determining itself. Finally, according to Augustine, nothing else is meant by saying that the Will is free except that it has its act in its power: and to have power over it is nothing else but to do it if one wills. But more about this in § 7 and 8."

§ 4. The dominion that free will has over its own act is not simple, universal, absolute, and independent; but only in a certain respect—conditional, limited, dependent, and subordinate. Indeed, man is free, master of himself and of others, both physically and morally; but not absolutely and independently of God, the Lord of lords.

For that which has limits of essence must necessarily also have limits of dominion and activity: a limited cause obtains only limited dominion, influence, and effect. Finally, the mode of operating follows the mode of being. Therefore, the created will, which depends on God for its existence, necessarily also depends on Him in acting. Moreover, it implies a contradiction for a creature to obtain absolute dominion and independence from God.

Hence, Suarez vigorously demonstrates in *Metaphysical Disputation* 31, Section 14, that by the absolute power of God, it is impossible for a created being to exist that does not have subordination to the uncreated being. Therefore, it is a sign that this subordination is founded in the very essential nature of a created being. From this, he asserts that the dependence of the creature is a substantial mode, which does not constitute the substance but affects it.

Indeed, nothing enjoys fullness of dominion unless it also obtains fullness of essence. But every creature has some admixture of nothingness in its entity; and the more

non-being and passive potentiality it contains, the less dominion and activity it has, and accordingly, it is more constrained in acting. God, who alone is free from nothingness and potentiality, is also alone the *autocrat* (αὐτοκράτωρ), who is impeded by nothing, whom nothing resists, as in Romans 9:19–20. It is His sole prerogative to proceed to His acts from His own will and goodness alone; to be impelled or hindered by nothing else.

Whence it is clear that the dominion of the created will is subordinate and dependent on the divine will. This, in turn, is demonstrated by Bradwardine in *De Causa Dei*, Book 3, Chapter 8, page 669. "According to the common mode of speaking," he says, "among the common people and the learned, nothing is said to be in anyone's power unless it is subject to his will and follows his will, just as it is his act of being."

Hence, he proves by various arguments that God's will is not within the power of the human will. Because:

1. The volition of God, which is prior, does not depend on the volition of man, which is posterior.
2. Then the divine will would be more in the power of man than the will of any of his lowest servants; for no one has a servant so lowly who always follows his master's will by willing.
3. Then the divine will would be more in man's power than his own will.
4. From this, it would follow that it was and is in the power of men to nullify the entire effect and the entire final efficacy of our Lord's passion.
5. A superior active cause cannot be in the power of an inferior cause; nor the mover in the power of the moved; nor the first cause in the power of the second.
6. Thus, the human will would be more free than the Divine.

Hence he concludes: "All and only that is said to be in our power which is in our free power; that is, what we do when we will, and when we do not will, we do not do. Therefore, nothing is in our power except in a certain respect only; namely, subordinately, subexecutively, and necessarily subservient—with a necessity naturally preceding with respect to the divine will; which is therefore said to be in our power because when we will, we do it voluntarily, not unwillingly. But simply and entirely absolutely, antecedently and sufficiently, nothing at all is truly said to be in our power.

"Let no man, therefore, be indignant if he has nothing absolutely and simply in his own power, but is subject in all things to a higher power. 'To will or not to will is in the power of the willing or unwilling person, so that he may fulfill the divine will and not surpass the power,' says Augustine. For since that is in our power which we do when we will, nothing is so much in our power as the very will itself; but the will is prepared by the Lord; thus He gives power."

And in Chapter 9, page 676, Bradwardine concludes: "From these things it becomes manifest how man is and is not the master of his act; how he is and is not free consequently. For just as the act of man is constituted and not constituted in his power,

so he is and is not the master of it; and thus he is and is not of free will consequently. For I hope no man will presume to claim such proud dominion for himself that he does not acknowledge that superior Lord who has written on His garment and thigh, 'King of kings, Lord of lords.' Nor, I pray, let anyone claim for himself such freedom that he even refuses the servitude of God, as Augustine says.

"Therefore, no man is master of his act simply, supremely, and antecedently; but only in a certain respect, namely, with respect to all secondary causes, necessarily subservient to the first cause, and this with a necessity naturally preceding; and thus he is said to be master of his act because when he wills, he acts, and when he does not will, he does not act; and this voluntarily, not unwillingly nor by compulsion. Nor let him bear this indignantly; for it is sufficient for him to be a middle master, just as the angels are.

"The dominion of the human will excludes involuntary determination to one thing and the violence of an externally moving cause, but not the determinative influx of the first cause," says Aquinas, *Contra Gentiles*, Book 1, Chapter 78. "The dominion that the will has over its acts, whereby it is in its power to will or not to will, excludes determination of power to one thing and violence of an external acting cause; but it does not exclude the influence of a superior cause from which it has being and operation; and thus causality remains in the first cause, which is God, with respect to the movements of the will, so that God, by knowing Himself, can know such things."

More distinctly, Gregory of Rimini, *Sentences*, Book 1, Distinction 17, Question 1, page 79, says: "In order that an action be in the power of the agent, it is not necessary that every principle of it be the form of the agent; otherwise, no act of the will, good or evil, would be in our power, since God is the productive principle of each. I say, therefore, that to make an action be in the power of the agent, it is required and sufficient that the action be done by the agent willing it. Hence Augustine says: 'It is in natural power that when we will, we do.'"

To which Alvarez agrees in *De Auxiliis Gratiae*, Disputation 117: "The first conclusion," he says, "is that the free will of man has dominion over its act as its proximate cause. Conclusion 2: Created free will, in the actual use of dominion and faculty which it has over its acts, depends on God as on an absolutely sovereign Lord who pre-deliberates and pre-determines. Conclusion 3: The dominion over its act is not primarily in the power of created free will but in the power and dominion of God. And indeed, if the human will were free from the efficacious command and providence of God, the hearts of men would not be in the hand of God, nor would it be necessary to ask or expect from Him anything to be accomplished through the wills of men."

Therefore, Alvarez, *De Auxiliis*, Disputation 23: "In order that the will be free, it must indeed have dominion over its act; but it is not necessary that it have the first and absolute dominion of it; for this dominion resides only with God, who is the first free being upon whom every created freedom intrinsically depends." No one, however, seems

to explain that dominion of liberty more felicitously than the most illustrious Gibieuf, *On Created Freedom*, Book 1, Chapter 1, Section 5: "Freedom of exercise in us denotes dominion over our acts, or rather over the objects. And indeed, when discourse is about the freedom of the creature, it implies a dominion proportioned to the creature and suitable to its condition, namely, subordinated to the divine dominion. Since, therefore, subordination implies subjection, our freedom implies subjection to God; which Thomas most diligently observed, who always explains our freedom through the order to God or the ultimate end, as in Part 1, Question 62, Article 8, whence he concludes that those who adhere immovably to the end, like the angels, are freer.

"I cannot sufficiently marvel at certain moderns who are so aggrieved to admit that subjection to God in the description of our freedom and who try by whatever means they can to remove it; as if they wish our freedom, like the freedom of God, to be an absolute indifference to act or not act, not tempered by order to the end—forgetting that we are creatures subject to a beginning and an end. Is it really so important to make us free that they even make us in some way sacrilegious? They would remove our freedom from the divine dominion, nor are they ashamed to say, 'God has nothing to do with moral being; physical and metaphysical beings indeed all depend on Him, but not the moral.' What, I ask, is this strange and new doctrine and freedom that does not know God? Do they wish to be so free that they do not even wish to have God as Lord, as Augustine says? Do they think so poorly of God that what flows from Him by creation is either lost through His governance or becomes satisfied, and that the dominion of God is contrary to creation?

"Let them hear the Angelic Doctor, Part 1, Question 83, Article 1: 'God,' he says, 'is the first cause moving both natural causes and voluntary ones; and just as by moving natural causes He does not take away that their acts are natural, so by moving voluntary causes He does not take away that their actions are voluntary, but rather He makes them so. For He works in each according to its property.' Let them hear St. Dionysius, who repeatedly insists that God so governs secondary causes that He not only allows but makes them perform their proper motions; hence He calls Him the author of every authority and principality. Let them finally hear Christ, John 8:36: 'If the Son makes you free, you will be truly free.' And they will be compelled to admit that the grace of God never destroys freedom but always builds it up."

Further, in Book 2, Chapter 17, Section 4, he explains the dominion of our freedom thus: "And so we are lords of ourselves; but we are so governed by dominion proportionate to our condition—which is subordinated to the divine dominion—that we act. This dominion does not exist above or entirely alongside God, but under God; a dominion by which we are both lords and servants: lords, because we move and act ourselves; servants, because we have this very ability to act from God. Finally, a dominion that implies greater and more illustrious freedom the more we are subject to God. Such dominion, proper to a rational creature, always belongs to it when it operates from knowledge and intention of the end, even if it receives that knowledge and intention

from God. For it is utterly false and irrelevant to desire independence from God for the freedom of the creature, since the creature has nothing pertaining to perfection that does not both originate from and depend on God; I add, and that does not tend toward God."

Finally, Gibieuf, *On Created Freedom*, Book 1, Chapter 31, Section 3, concludes: "Therefore, the freedom that we attribute to the rational creature does not imply a negation of subjection to the uncreated; for if you remove it from subjection to God, while you think to exalt it, you debase it; while you wish to extend it, you diminish it; and when you say it is free because of this, you contradict yourself by that very statement, because whoever refuses to serve God serves himself."

Jansenius excellently explains what and of what kind is the dominion of physical freedom, in *Augustinus*, Volume 3, *On Grace*, Book 6, Chapter 3, page 258: "Therefore, liberty and the condition of being free seem rather to be sought in those things which are opposed to servitude, captivity, impediments, bonds, and being in another's power; these are to be master of oneself, to be one's own, or under one's own authority, and in one's own power. For these plainly resonate something positive." Then he adds, page 259: "Not only Augustine, but also Pelagius frequently takes as the same thing to be of free will and to be in our power. Nor is anything else signified by being master of oneself. But no explanation and account of freedom is more familiar than to Greek writers; so much so that those wishing to express the genuine force of free will call nothing else free than 'what is in our power.' They have also called the free will itself τὸ αὐτεξούσιον, that is, 'of one's own authority,' 'of one's own power,' or 'having its acts in its own power.' This was most acutely expressed by Basil when he opposes αὐτεξούσιον to ἀνεξούσιον. Hence Thomas, imitating the Greeks, calls God 'free and per se potent.' Hence it is clear that we are said to have all the actions of our internal faculties and external ones in our power, and consequently free, insofar as they are subject to our will, or insofar as we do them when we will."

Therefore, Basil, in his Sermon on Free Will: "Free will is that which is in the power of man."

§ 5. The dominion of human freedom is principally founded on the immateriality and physical amplitude of the human mind.

For the more immaterial something is, the more it is capable of knowing and the freer it is, as was more fully proven in Chapter 2, Section 10, Paragraph 4. Furthermore, that human freedom is founded on the physical amplitude of the mind is evident from the formal idea of freedom. For what pertains more to the essence of freedom than the universality, amplitude, and unattachment of the appetite: not being bound to this or that thing, but being able, one being set aside, to pass to another, and determined only by the highest and universal Good?

But this universality and amplitude of freedom arises from the universality and amplitude of cognition; for the will rejoices in breadth and universality in desiring because the intellect is universal in knowing, insofar as it comprehends the universal notion of the good and proposes the universal good itself. Both amplitude and universality, both in knowing and in desiring, have their origin in the immateriality and spirituality of the human mind, which embraces all things and the reasons of things spiritually, and therefore universally. Hence, it is concluded that freedom in desiring and loving follows freedom in judging, and both indeed arise from freedom in being—that is, from immateriality and amplitude.

Thus, Aquinas teaches that God is supremely free because He rejoices in the highest universality and amplitude in desiring, judging, and being. For God understands all things in the most unified, absolute, and separate manner and desires most freely because He is the most simple and supremely immaterial Being. But the human mind is free because it also rejoices in its own amplitude and universality—though dependent and limited—in being, judging, and desiring. Freedom in being is its spirituality and immateriality, from which springs its freedom in knowing as well as in desiring. For the more spiritual the mind is, the more extensive, universal, and free it is, both in knowing and in desiring.

Other living beings, which are earthly and mortal, are carried along by impulse, and are not masters of themselves but are seized by objects; and they refer all things to the body. Those of the same kind act in exactly the same way and with one tenor. For we see these creatures contrive lairs similarly, weave nests, rear offspring, and hatch them because they have received a very narrow and contracted nature and have accepted very few images. Bees, which so aptly fashion hexagonal cells, will never shape them into another figure, as Du Hamel aptly notes in *On the Mind*.

Therefore, a brute animal, although it is not entirely bound to one thing like a plant or a stone but rejoices in a certain animal spontaneity, does not possess freedom because it obtains no universality and amplitude either of judgment or appetite. It lacks this because its soul is not free from the laws of matter. Freedom, therefore, is the privilege of the rational creature alone, which, endowed with an immaterial nature only, is capable of understanding God as the first truth and of loving the highest Good, and by that capacity can pass into divine amplitude.

Moreover, man does all things by the nod of his will, devises almost infinite arts; he corrects himself, examines his actions, and reflects upon himself in various ways; he presides over all living creatures; lands and seas serve him, and he almost rules over all of nature. These indicate his supreme freedom and amplitude of both intellect and will. Suarez encompasses this succinctly in Book 1, Part 2, Treatise 2, page 178: "The freedom of the will arises from the perfection and amplitude of reason, not from the plurality of powers." This is explained more fully by Gibieuf in *On Freedom*, Book 1, Chapter 34, Section 10:

"The first part of freedom in man is universality in being, so to speak, and the passive capacity for the highest Good, which all, I believe, consider indistinct from his nature. Whence follows a similar amplitude, both according to the intellect—which understands all things, both the end and whatever means can be to it—and according to the will, which is directed to the end and to other things on account of it. Hence,"

§ 6. Freedom properly and primarily regards the Subject, but only secondarily the Object. For freedom, according to its formal concept, denotes a certain rational spontaneity and amplitude of the mind. This is most acutely explained by Henry of Ghent in *Quodlibet* 3, Question 17:

"He says, 'Free Will can be considered in two respects: one, namely, insofar as it regards the will effecting a willing act; the other, insofar as it regards the object as its terminus. And according to both respects, the freedom of the will itself is to be judged, but more essentially according to the first; because it is a disposition of the will as subject, albeit in respect to the object, insofar as it tends toward it through its action. If, therefore, free will is considered in the first respect, thus I say that the will is called Free Will because it is free from all coercion impeding and saddening it in its action. For every will, as it freely tends into its action, is delightful; the necessity of coercion is saddening because it is against the will, and everything that compels is necessarily saddening, as the Commentator says on the fifth book of the *Metaphysics*. And in this way, man and every rational and intellectual nature possesses free will or free will, because the rational will cannot be forced—I mean by impelling coercion—according to what Anselm says in *On the Concord of Predestination*, etc.: 'The will's choice to abandon rectitude is compelled by no necessity, although it is assailed by the difficulty of death.'"

The same is stated by Onuphrius in *On the Soul*, Tract 2, Disputation 2, Part 3, Doubt 6, and by Jansenius in *Augustine*, Volume 3, Book 6, Chapter 27. In agreement with them, Alvarez says in *On Divine Assistance*, Book 12, Disputation 116, Conclusion 4:

"The formal freedom of created free will does not formally consist in objective indifference, nor in passive indifference, but in the active indifference of the free faculty itself, which indifferently relates to opposites. This is proven because free will is essentially and per se an active power."

Hence,

§ 7. Physical freedom, according to its formal Idea, is nothing other than the rational Faculty of doing what one pleases.

This thesis can be established by arguments drawn from Holy Scripture, as well as from Plato and other more perceptive philosophers. The first thing to note here is that there is a twofold formal Idea of physical freedom: one with respect to the Principle, the other with respect to the Act.

Freedom regarding the Principle is nothing other than the rational Faculty, which Aristotle calls ὄρεξις μετὰ λόγου (*orexis meta logou*), that is, appetite with reason. Freedom regarding the Act, in Holy Scripture, is expressed as γεωφῶν (*geōphōn*), spontaneous choice of the heart, and αὐτοπροαίρετον (*autoproaireton*), spontaneous; in Plato, it is termed αὐτοπραγία (*autopragia*), αὐτοκίνησις (*autokinesis*), ψυχαγωγίας ἐναρκωσία (*psychagogias enarkosia*), and ἐλευθεροπραξία (*eleutheropraxia*), that is, rational Spontaneity or spontaneous self-agitation.

Firstly, that Holy Scripture has placed the formal concept of physical Freedom with respect to the act in rational Spontaneity or the Willingness of reason is proven from various passages. Thus, Psalm 110:3: "Your people shall be most willing, or spontaneous, in the day of your power." The Hebrew word נְדָבָה (*nedavoth*) means "your people shall be [a people] of willingnesses," or spontaneities, that is, of promptitudes and alacrities, if one may speak so; which is the same as "most willing" or "spontaneous," "most prompt" and "most ready," namely, to render obedience and most faithful worship to God.

The Hebrews are accustomed to indicate the superlative degree, which they otherwise lack, by the genitive plural. Theologians from Tübingen and Schindler translate it as "your people [are] Spontaneous"; Italians and English translate it as "your people will come willingly." **Nedavah** generally signifies every spontaneity and alacrity of the mind with which something is done; metonymically, it means a gift or offering freely and promptly given. Hence, one who is prompt and spontaneous in giving, that is, generous and beneficent, is called נָדִיב (*nadib*).

This virtue especially befits princes and magnates, who are therefore called clement and benign, referred to by the Greeks as εὐεργέται (*euergetai*, benefactors) in Luke 22:25. Therefore, they are called נְדִיבִים (*nadivim*). The Chaldee נְדָבָה signifies Will, Spontaneity, Liberality. In Deuteronomy 16:10, "the distribution of your hand's liberality," that is, "voluntarily, cheerfully." Psalm 54:8: "I will sacrifice to you willingly" (Hebrew נְדָבָה, *nedavah*; LXX: ἑκούσιως, *hekousiōs*). In Hosea 14:4, God says, "I will love them freely" (נְדָבָה, *nedavah*; Targum: "spontaneously"; LXX: αὐτομάτως, *automatōs*). From this, it is clear that God's freedom also rejoices in a certain Spontaneity.

Hence, נְדָבָה (*nedavah*) metonymically signifies a spontaneous offering and a voluntary gift, as in Deuteronomy 23:23 and Leviticus 22:18. From all these, it is abundantly clear that the ancient Hebrews, as well as Holy Scripture, placed the formal act of Freedom in rational spontaneity.

The same is evident from the New Testament. Thus, 2 Corinthians 9:7: "Each one must give as he has decided in his heart, not reluctantly or under compulsion." Here, the Apostle proposes two things:

1. Each one as he freely purposes in his heart. By this proposition, he places the nature of freedom in προαίρεσιν (*proairesis*), that is, in spontaneous choice. This is the same among both Platonic and Aristotelian philosophers. For what is

Freedom among them except ὄρεξις διανοητική (orexis dianoētikē), rational appetite, or διάνοια ὀρεκτική (dianoia orektikē), appetitive mind?

2. Hence follows the antithesis: Not with sadness or with compulsion. He opposes to freedom only sad and compelling necessity. Ἀνάγκη (anankē), compelling necessity, which alone is repugnant to freedom, is best explained by Plato in *Cratylus*, page 420: "The necessary and resistant, the constrained," etc. "Necessary is the rigid and refractory, which is beyond both will and counsel." He proves this from the origin of the word: for ἀνάγκη is derived from ἄγκος (ankos), a rugged valley, as will be shown later in Section 8.

From these, it is clear that only rigid and compelling necessity is opposed to Freedom. The same is evidenced from the *Epistle to Philemon*, verse 14: "So that your goodness might not be by compulsion but of your own accord." Here, ἀνάγκην (anankēn, necessity) and ἐκούσιον (hekousion, willingly) are opposed. In the same way, 1 Peter 5:2: "Not under compulsion (ἀναγκαστῶς, anankastōs), but willingly (ἐκουσίως, hekousiōs)."

From these, it is sufficiently clear that:

1. Physical freedom consists in rational spontaneity.
2. To this rational spontaneity, no necessity is repugnant except involuntary necessity, as will be more fully explained later.

That Plato included the whole of human Freedom, with respect to the act, in rational spontaneity has already been partly demonstrated in Section 3. The same appears more fully from the various notions of Freedom which he has presented.

Thus, in *Laws Book 2*, page 663: "It seems to me fitting to God that no one would willingly be induced to do that in which there is not more joy than pain." That is, all human actions rejoice in rational spontaneity or freedom and do not admit any saddening or compelling necessity.

And in *Timaeus*, page 88: "But which of the motions is there that is moved in itself by itself always, which is especially akin to the motion of the intellect of all, or that which is moved by another?" Of all motions, that is best which arises in itself from itself (for it is most akin to the motion of the entire mind); but that which is moved by another is inferior.

By this, he teaches that the spontaneous motion of the mind in itself from itself is the best, being the most free and most akin to the supreme motion of the mind. Hence, from that spontaneous and free motion of the mind, Plato demonstrates its Immateriality and Immortality in *Phaedrus*, page 245, where he teaches that the soul is τὸ αὐτὸ κινεῖν (to auto kinoun), that which moves itself, indeed καὶ πηγὴν καὶ ἀρχὴν κινήσεως (kai pēgēn kai archēn kinēseōs), is the source and principle of motion. And from this, he concludes: "There is nothing else that moves itself except the soul."

By these, he teaches that the human Mind is an **αὐτοκίνητον** (*autokinēton*) principle, which moves itself, and he wants this **αὐτοκίνητον** to be rational spontaneity, or spontaneous motion from itself towards its ultimate end. "This is well explained by Simplicius in *Epictetus*, chapter 1, page 28. "Now, against all those who say, ὅτι οἱ τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἀναφεροντες (that those who refer what is in our power) to the opposition of the soul, and they are ignorant of τί ἐστὶν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀσθενὲς οὐσίας (what the weakness of the soul's substance is); for the voluntary movement of the soul is τὸ αὐτοκίνητον αὐτῆς ἐκουσίως (self-directed and voluntary), and it moves willingly on its own. Those who remove what is within our power and the freedom of the soul, *naturam animi ignorare & tollere* (are ignorant of and remove the nature of the soul), remove τὸ αὐτοκίνητον (its self-movement), which is the primary aspect of its nature." He proves (1) that freedom is essential to the soul, indeed it is the soul itself. (2) That the freedom of the soul consists in its spontaneous motion. This spontaneous and voluntary motion, in which the idea of formal freedom is conceptualized, is alternatively expressed as voluntary and natural, εὐφυὲς (effortlessly natural), an easy operation of the natural mind. Also, εὐφυὲς, the easy faculty of the mind. Again, *εὐσχήμων αὖμυδελιν ἀφνειοῦς* (well-formed harmonious shades). Lastly, of the natural and spontaneous familiarity. The Stoics also taught, *ἐνεργεῖαν εὐφυὲς ἐωὐτοκίνησις* (the activity of natural self-motion). Freedom is the faculty of acting, hence Aristotle attributed to it, τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἔνεκα (for our sake), which is the cause of itself; what others call τὸ αὐτεξουσίον (self-authority), that which is of one's own right or within one's own power. And Aristotle in *Rhetoric*, book 1, chapter 10, section 24 says, ὅτι ὁ ἀπὸ τῶν ἔξωθεν ἡγεῖσθαι, etc. (that those who are led by external [forces]). Truly, whatever actions men undertake for themselves are voluntary; those not done for themselves are not voluntary; thus, whatever they do willingly are either good or seem good and are either to be judged or seem to be judged. He teaches that nothing requires more for freedom than that whatever men do for themselves, they do willingly. The same Simplicius, who interpreted Aristotle, whom he considers an expositor of Plato and Epictetus, in *Epictetus*, chapter 2, page 34, *Pésiquam said*, what are ours, what are others."

But no one has more felicitously adorned this hypothesis than Thomas Bradwardine, in *On the Cause of God*, Book 2, Chapter 10, page 443. "Therefore," he says, "it is evident that God has free will of volition; 'Will,' I say, because of the judgment of reason or intellect; and 'Free,' because of the spontaneous power of the will. For because of these two operations of these two powers in one mind, 'free will' has taken these two names for one name for itself; just as it should, the very preceding reason of the name manifests the will better than if it were called 'free will.'" Hence Augustine in *Hypognosticon* 231 says: "Arbitrium' (choice), he says, 'from arbitrating, rational consideration, or discerning what to choose and what to refuse, has purely received its name for that reason. Likewise, it is called 'free' because it is placed in its own power, having the possibility of doing what it wills."

From this, Bradwardine adds: "It is clearly evident that free will can be defined in this way: that it itself is the Rational power of judging rationally and executing voluntarily."

With these also agree Hugh [of Saint Victor], *Sentences* Book 3, Chapter 20, and Peter Lombard, *Sentences* Book 2, Distinctions 24 and 25. Finally, Bradwardine, Book 2, Chapter 2, page 448, expressly says: "Nor is it called Free Will because it can freely turn to the opposite of any act and itself; but because from rational choice or judgment it spontaneously performs it."

From which it is clear that Free Will arises from the necessary elements of Intellect and Will; indeed, it is nothing else than the principle of acting with reason; nor does one act who does not act spontaneously with reason, who is determined naturally; brute animals, to which belongs a certain natural spontaneity, not rational, which is proper to humans.

Very accurately, Twisse, in *Vindication of Grace*, page 194, says: "Whenever the learned affirm that men act spontaneously, it should be candidly interpreted as if they had said they act of their own accord, that is, so spontaneously as properly befits a rational nature, whether this occurs in the desire for the end or the choice of means. Agents lacking reason act spontaneously in such a way that they are rather acted upon than act; and they receive determination to act from secondary causes: not so rational agents, who receive determination only from God Himself, the first cause of all, who excites and moves each agent to act most congruently with their own natures."

That liberty consists in that willingness by which the will follows the judgment of the intellect, and not in any indifference of the will, is also maintained by Ursinus in his *Explanation of the Catechism*, Part 1, Question 8, number 1. He says: "Free will is the faculty or power of willing or not willing, or of choosing or rejecting the object shown by the intellect, by one's own motion, without coercion." That this is the common opinion of Protestants is conceded by Le Blanc in his *Theological Theses on Free Will*, as below.

That the whole essence of liberty is included in rational spontaneity is evident from the fact that only the necessity of coercion and natural necessity is repugnant to liberty. Hence, as Derodon defines in *On Liberty*, Chapter 2, Thesis 19: "Liberty is the power of acting from oneself in an intellectual agent." And in Thesis 27 he adds: "Freedom from coercion or spontaneity in general is the faculty by which an intellectual agent acts spontaneously and according to its own inclination, whether necessarily or not." Likewise, Chapter 4, Thesis 33: "All intellectual creatures have freedom from coercion with respect to actions elicited by the will itself, because they exercise acts of love and hate by themselves, according to their own inclination; and there is no external agent that can force them to exercise these against their own inclination."

The same is said by Cameron, page 104: "Liberty is the faculty of doing what you please. Therefore, he is free who can do as much as he wills: for liberty is so called from being free. Furthermore, there is a twofold faculty of doing what you please, one ethical, the other physical." Similarly, Amyraldus, in *On Free Will*, page 256: "Nature has placed the liberty of man in choice," that is, in the willingness of reason, or rational spontaneity.

That this is the opinion of Amyraldus and several of the Reformers, although there is some discrepancy among them regarding the terms, is acknowledged by Le Blanc in *Theological Theses on the Liberty of Human Will*, Thesis 19, page 405: "But to disclose what seems to me, I think that the first opinion [namely, of Wendelinus, Ursinus, etc.], which defines liberty as immunity from coercion in one who acts from the judgment of reason, does not in reality differ from the second opinion [of Placæus, Amyraldus, etc.], which opposes liberty not only to coercion but also to necessity which arises from matter or from sense, which others call physical necessity. For since he holds that immunity from coercion is not worthy of the name of liberty unless in one who uses reason, he clearly supposes that for liberty it is required that the agent follows the judgment of reason, and is not determined by matter or by sense."

Hence,

§ 8. Rational and spontaneous necessity does not take away Freedom.

For no necessity is contrary to Liberty except that which destroys the rational spontaneity of the will. Every action that is exerted by the will according to its own proper inclination is called Spontaneous; to which is opposed a violent action, which is exercised from an extrinsic principle against the agent's own inclination.

Hence, it is evident that spontaneous and voluntary necessity best aligns with both human and Divine freedom. No necessity except violent necessity is opposed to Liberty, as is abundantly clear both from sacred scripture and from the opinions of philosophers.

Our thesis from sacred scripture is now invincible, as in §7. Thus, in 2 Corinthians 9:7, where spontaneous choice is opposed to saddening necessity and violence. And in Philemon 14, "voluntary or spontaneous." Likewise, in 1 Peter 5:2, the term "ἀναγκασμένως," insofar as it is opposed to "ἐκούσιως," signifies saddening and violent necessity, not spontaneous.

In the same way, Necessity, insofar as it is opposed to liberty, is explained by Plato in *Cratylus*, page 420. Moreover, it is helpful to explain the meaning of the terms Necessity and "ἐκούσιον" (voluntary) or spontaneous:

"The voluntary is that which yields and does not resist, but, as I say, yields to what is going; and by such a name, it will be clear that it proceeds from the will."

By this, he teaches:

1. That "ἐκούσιον," the voluntary or spontaneous, is derived from "ἔκω," which means "to yield"; to which is opposed "ἀντιπλεῖν," which resists—that is, what is necessary, violent, and adverse.
2. That "ἐκούσιον," voluntary, is so called because the will yields and suffers no violence.

Then he proceeds to explain the meaning of "ἀνάγκης," of necessity:

"But the necessary and rigid and refractory, which is beyond both will and counsel, will involve error and ignorance."

By this, he teaches that "ἀναγκαῖον," the necessary, insofar as it is opposed to the voluntary, is rigid and refractory, being repugnant to will and reason. He proves this from the very origin of the word:

"It is derived from the journey through the ᾿γκη' (rugged valleys), because proceeding is difficult, rough, and laborious. Therefore, perhaps it was called ᾿ναγκαῖον' (necessary) by comparing the journey through the valley."

Thus, it is an image and a formed name after the likeness of that journey which is through rugged valleys; which, being impassable and rough and covered with bristling thickets, impede the way. From this, perhaps, the appellation "ἀνάγκη" (necessity) is derived, likened to a journey undertaken through valleys.

1. It is noteworthy that the word "ἀνάγκης," according to Plato, is one of those which the Greeks derived from the Barbarians, that is, the Hebrews. For ᾿γκος" (from which "ἀνάγκη"), meaning "a rugged valley," is deduced by learned men from "angor," because it is compressed between mountains; and this from the Hebrew "צָר" (*tsar*), meaning "he suffocated," metaphorically "he afflicted with distress," as Martin notes. Otherwise, ἀναγνύω, ἄγχω (anguish), and ἄγγω (to press tightly, choke) could be derived from the Hebrew אָנַח (*anach*, from which also comes ἄγχο (*gemini*), the oppression of the dying, from אָנַח *gemuit*). But I am more inclined to derive ἀναγνύω from the sense of 'to be sad, to mourn, to weep for the dead,' as in the Arabic *gemere cum dolore* (to groan with pain). Hence, in the Targum, Jonathan, and Hierosol., אָנַח (*anach*) often signifies the same as ἀναγνύω, the soul's Distress, Affliction, Calamity, and anguish, as in Genesis 21:15 and 38:25, Hosea 5:15. Likewise, in Syriac, 2 Corinthians 6:4. Furthermore, in the LXX, the word ἀναγνύω itself denotes affliction, as in Psalm 25:17: ἔξ ἀναγνύων τῶν ψυχῆς μου ἐξέλυσαι με' (LXX: 'Rescue me from the necessities of my soul'). This meaning of the word ἀναγνύω frequently occurs not only in the LXX but also in the New Testament, as in Luke 21:23, 2 Corinthians 6:4, and 1 Thessalonians 3:7. From these quotations, it is abundantly clear that τὸ ἀναγνύω (*necessitas* or necessity), when opposed to voluntary τὸ ἐκούσιον (*voluntary*), indicates not only affliction but also involuntary necessity. Necessity and spontaneity perfectly conspire with the will and freedom. Plato once stated τὰ ἀναγνύω (*necessitas*), or optimal necessity, flows from supreme good. In the following thesis, it will be demonstrated that necessity is not opposed to freedom but that coactions arise from freedom itself, as even Aristotle suggests, which I have demonstrated elsewhere (Part 2, book 1, chapter 5, section 4, paragraph 2).

Simplicius explains this double necessity—namely, violent and spontaneous—most acutely according to the mind of Plato and Epictetus, in *Commentary on Epictetus*, Chapter 1, page 23:

"Against those who say that the appetite of the one desiring and the opinion of the one opining are by their own nature directed toward their own appetible and opinable objects, and that it is not within one's own power to be directed otherwise: we must say to these that there is evidently a necessity which is opposed to free will, and another which coexists with it. The external necessity destroys free will (page 23: for one compelled externally to do or not to do something is said to act without free will); but the internal necessity, which compels all to act according to their nature, preserves free will all the more."

Therefore, against these, it must be said that there is a double necessity: one opposed to the freedom of the will, the other joined with it. The external, therefore, destroys freedom (for no one who is compelled externally to do or not to do something will be said to act freely); but the internal necessity, which compels all to act according to their nature, confirms freedom all the more.

He replies most skillfully to those who deny that any necessity can coexist with Liberty.

1. He divides necessity into violent or coercive, which is contrary to liberty; and voluntary or spontaneous, which aligns most excellently with it.
2. He concedes that violent or coercive necessity, being external, is incompatible with liberty; and he adds an invincible reason: for no one who is compelled externally to do or not to do something will be said to act freely.
3. However, he strongly denies that internal and spontaneous necessity, which intimately and pleasantly penetrates the will itself, destroys Liberty; for this necessity requires the will to act in all things according to its nature; since, being congenial and connatural to the will, it moves it pleasantly yet powerfully.
4. Indeed, he asserts that this spontaneous necessity confirms Liberty all the more. And he immediately adds the reason:

"For that which moves itself, it is necessary that it be moved by itself according to its nature; and therefore it is not moved by another. Nor does this necessity come from outside, but it is conjoined with the nature of that which moves itself, and preserves it, and leads it to its own proper actions."

An excellent philosophical maxim indeed, drawn from Plato's quiver, but worthy of a Christian.

To demonstrate his hypothesis, he adopts Plato's **automovent** (self-mover) as a most invincible argument. For, he says:

1. The **automovent**, that which moves itself, must necessarily be moved by itself according to its nature; that is, since the will is the **automovent**, which moves itself, it is necessary that it be moved by itself according to its nature—that is, spontaneously.
2. Nor is it therefore moved by another; that is, it cannot be compelled or suffer violence from an external cause.
3. Nor does that necessity come from outside; that is, the necessity which enters into the will and moves it pleasantly and powerfully is not external or violent; it does not inflict any force.
4. But it is conjoined with the nature of that which moves itself; that is, it is connatural and spontaneous.
5. And it preserves it and leads it to its own actions; that is, that spontaneous and voluntary necessity not only aligns most excellently with liberty but greatly confirms, promotes, and produces it.

What could be said more clearly to establish the combination of spontaneous Necessity with Liberty?

From there, Simplicius proceeds to demonstrate that passive and objective indifference is not proper to liberty, much less essential to it. About this, more fully in Section 10. And he concludes, page 24:

"And each [i.e., good and evil] they do of their own choice, and necessarily, but without any compulsion."

By which he teaches that no necessity except that of compulsion is contrary to liberty.

The same in *Commentary on Epictetus*, Chapter 2, page 34, where he asserts that our actions are free because they are neither compelled by others to happen nor hindered from happening:

"Our actions are free because they are not compelled by others, nor can they be prevented from happening."

By which he means that nothing more is required for liberty than immunity from the necessity of compulsion or rational spontaneity, as above in §7.

Here, however, it must be noted that Simplicius, by internal Necessity, does not understand that which is said to arise from a material or formal principle, and therefore is natural (for this is repugnant to liberty), but that which arises from the ultimate end, the first cause, through the dictate of practical judgment.

But such internal necessity, which the efficacious influx of the supreme Good and the first cause produces, not only is not repugnant to liberty but also preserves and promotes it. For to be determined by God as the first cause to seek Himself as the

highest Good presents a happy and voluntary necessity, and thus the highest liberty, as in §9 and 10.

This double Necessity, of Coercion and Voluntary, has been recognized in every course of the Christian Church by the greatest Theologians against the Pelagians, who have demonstrated that the former, not the latter, is contrary to liberty.

That this was Augustine's hypothesis is clearly proved by Jansenius in *Augustinus*, Vol. 3, Book 6, Chapter 6, etc.:

"Now we must see how Necessity relates to the freedom of the will in Augustine's opinion, from which, as opposed to liberty, it will be much more clearly understood how he wishes the freedom of the will to be taken.

In his doctrine, a double necessity is found: one which produces its effect even if you are unwilling, or however much you resist; the other by which it is simply necessary that something be done without resistance of the will.

That first necessity by which something is done even if you are unwilling is always opposed to the will in Augustine. For it is impossible that what is done by our will should also be done by us unwillingly; and conversely, that what is done by necessity, or by us unwillingly, should be done by our will.

Testimonies of this acceptance are very many and found everywhere, which Jansenius recounts in the following:"

And in Chapter 7 he adds:

"But all these things (about that double necessity, one of violence, the other simple, with which the liberty of the will remains entirely intact) will be much more evident if we set forth Augustine's view on the Liberty of God Himself, and of blessed men and angels. For as to the liberty of God, he very often teaches—that which is manifest in itself even without his testimonies—that God is free, even if He cannot sin, etc."

The same he demonstrates in Chapter 8 from the liberty of blessed men and angels.

The same in Chapter 9 from the liberty of Christ the Lord.

The same in Chapter 10 is shown from the will enjoying the supreme Good clearly seen, according to Augustine's principles.

The same in Chapter 11 is proved according to the proper principles of the Scholastics.

And in Chapter 12 he proves that the same distinction was indicated before Augustine and during his life by many others, namely by Dionysius, Clement, Irenaeus, Tertullian, Origen, Hilary, Epiphanius, Macarius, Basil of Seleucia, Eusebius, Chrysostom, Cyril.

In Chapter 13 he proves that after Augustine the same doctrine was taught by all up to the Scholastics, especially Prosper and Fulgentius.

He proves the same in Chapter 14 from Bede, Chapter 15 from John of Damascus, Chapter 16 from Anselm, Chapter 17 from Bernard, Chapter 18 from Hugh of Saint Victor, Chapter 19 from Richard of Saint Victor, Chapter 20 from the Master of the Sentences, Chapter 21 from Alexander of Hales, Chapter 22 from William of Paris, Chapter 23 from William of Auxerre, Chapter 24 from Thomas Aquinas, Chapter 25 from John Duns Scotus, Chapter 26 from Bonaventure, Chapter 27 from Henry of Ghent, Chapter 28 from Richard of Middleton, etc.

Then in Chapter 35 he shows how the necessary act of the will is in the power and dominion of the will itself, as in the above §3 and 4.

The same hypothesis and distinction is vigorously defended by the great Bradwardine in various places in his *On the Cause of God*. Thus, Book 3, Chapter 1, page 640, where he draws this corollary: **"That some kind of necessity and liberty are not contradictory."** To explain and demonstrate this, he reviews various distinctions of necessity on page 643:

1. **"There is,"** he says, "a necessity of violence and compulsion; and whatever is done from it is not to be imputed to the agent but to the one inflicting the violence. Indeed, that to which violence is inflicted is not even to be called an agent, but rather the one who inflicts the violence.
2. There is a necessity of stability and immutability, such as we say is the necessity of God, by which He is immutably good; and this necessity does not take away liberty but perfects it. The necessity by which it is necessary for God always to act well, and the impossibility by which it is impossible for Him to act badly, in no way prevent or impede Him from acting both freely and laudably; and this is because they neither impel Him violently to act well, nor violently prevent or avert Him from acting badly; nor does that impossibility in any way resist or contradict His will."

And in Book 3, Chapter 10, page 678, Bradwardine distinguishes concerning Necessity and Liberty:

1. **"Necessity,"** he says, "is first and foremost taken for the intensity of being of that which is necessary in itself, which is God.
2. Necessity is also taken for natural necessity.
3. For the necessity of violent coercion.
4. For the necessity of spontaneous stability, permanence, or firmness; which is also called the necessity of immutability, although not so properly; for necessity is better described affirmatively than negatively.
5. There is also preceding and following necessity. Conversely, liberty is spoken of in the same ways."

Then he adds:

1. "Natural necessity and the necessity of violent coercion are repugnant to the liberty of a rational creature; therefore, these can be brought to one general category, namely, Necessity that is adversarial or contrary to liberty, which therefore takes away liberty and excuses sin.
2. And another can be called spontaneous, agreeable, free, and compatible with liberty. Therefore, all authorities denying Necessity in a rational creature deny only that first kind, which is adversarial and contrary to liberty and takes it away; hence, when they deny Necessity, usually by opposing Necessity with this conjunction 'BUT' or a similar adversative, because it opposes the previous statement, they affirm the will or liberty; saying that someone did this or that not by necessity but by liberty, or will, or free power, indicating that they only refuse the Necessity that is adversarial to liberty or will."

And to confirm this, he cites the words of the Apostle in Philemon 14 and 1 Corinthians 7:37: **"Not out of necessity, but of his own will,"** etc.

Having laid out these distinctions, Bradwardine demonstrates more fully that spontaneous necessity does not at all conflict with liberty. Thus, page 684:

"Therefore," he says, **"Augustine wishes to deny that unwilling necessity which compels the will violently and takes away free power; but not spontaneous necessity,"** etc.

Again, Book 3, Chapter 28, page 722:

"According to Anselm's opinion," he says, "there is a double Necessity, namely, preceding and following:

1. Preceding Necessity, according to him, is an active, indefectible cause in acting, which, once posited, its effect necessarily follows; and this is twofold, for one kind is compatible with liberty, and another takes away liberty; and this latter is twofold: for one is such natural Necessity, and another is such violent Necessity.
2. Also, following Necessity is twofold: one is Dictational, or Consequential and Complex; the other is Real and Incomplex.
 - (1) Following Dictational or Consequential and Complex Necessity is the Necessity of some statement and enunciation composed or conjointly, namely, in the sense of composition, or Conditional Necessity or of the consequence.
 - (2) But following Real and Incomplex Necessity is twofold: for one is Presential, and another is Causal or Effectual.

Following Real and Presential Necessity can be called from the present thing, or from presence. For this necessarily follows every present thing in this way, that everything that is, when it is, necessarily must be.

Hence Anselm in *On the Concord*: 'What the free will wills, it can and cannot not will; and it is necessary that it wills. It can not will before it wills, because it is free; and when it already wills, it cannot not will, but it is necessary that it wills;

because it is impossible for it to will and not will the same thing at the same time,' etc.

I have excerpted these things more fully from the great Bradwardine because they greatly help to explain the idea of Liberty and to refute Pelagian errors. More on this matter in §9.

Moreover, among the ancient Scholastics, John Duns Scotus—who is greatly esteemed by the Jesuits—most invincibly demonstrates that the highest Freedom can most perfectly align with Necessity. His philosophical arguments about Freedom can be reduced to four main points:

1. **He demonstrates that the Freedom of the will can entirely coexist with Necessity.** Thus, in *Quodlibet* 16, he says: "Concerning the second principal article, I say that Freedom remains in the Will together with Necessity to will." He confirms this hypothesis most invincibly and from there shows the manner in which the highest Necessity can conspire with the highest Freedom; because, he says, **"The Will, on account of the firmness of its freedom, imposes Necessity on itself in eliciting an act, and in persevering or fixing itself in an act."**
2. **He asserts that the Will always acts freely.** "The Will," he says, "always has its own proper mode of causing, namely, freely. Likewise, the Will, as Will, is the principle of acts freely."
3. **Moreover, he proves that such freedom has place not only in creatures but also in God Himself:** that He loves Himself most freely, although necessarily. "The Divine Will," he says, "necessarily wills its own goodness, and yet in willing it is free."
4. **Furthermore, he wants the connection of these terms—"The Will always acts freely and not naturally, however necessarily it acts"—to be so immediate and, as dialecticians love to say, primarily true, that its reason cannot be assigned at all.**
"If you ask," he says, **"How does freedom stand with necessity? I answer, according to the Philosopher (*Metaphysics* 4): 'One should not seek the reason of those things of which there is no reason. For the demonstration of a principle is not a demonstration.'** By which he teaches that this proposition—"The Will always acts freely even if it acts necessarily"—is a first principle, whose reason is not to be inquired, since it carries its own light with it.

The Thomists invincibly defend our hypothesis; who, according to the mind of Thomas Aquinas, distinguish about Necessity in the composite and divided sense. Thus, Alvarez, in *On the Aid of Divine Grace*, Disputation 92. For its explanation, it should be supposed:

1. **From Thomas, that there is a double modal proposition:** the first is Composite, which is otherwise called *Modalis de Dicto*; the second is Divided, which is usually called *Modalis de Re*. The Composite Modal is that in which the Dictum is the

subject, and the Mode is the predicate; as, "For the predestined to be damned is impossible." The Divided Modal is that in which the Mode is interposed in the Dictum; as, "It is impossible for Socrates to run." Similarly, it is also a divided modal when the mode is held on the part of the verb; as, "A white man can be black."

2. **It should be noted that the forms imported into the modal proposition by the extremes of the Dictum sometimes signify the first act, or potency;** as when we say, "For the risible to be capable of weeping is possible"; sometimes they import the second act; as if we say, "For one who is laughing to weep is impossible." Therefore, when the extremes of the Dictum signify the second act, for the truth of the composite modal of possibility, it suffices and is required that both acts signified by the extremes of the Dictum be simultaneously compossible in the same subject at the same instant. But when the extremes signify the first act, it suffices and is required for the truth of the composite modal of possibility that the potencies themselves are compossible in the same subject; as in this proposition: "For the risible to be capable of weeping is possible"; for its truth, it suffices that the power of laughing and the power of weeping can be together in the same subject.
3. **Note that a modal proposition, if it is true, is also necessary; and if false, it is impossible.** Hence, he concludes:
 1. **When Theologians and Dialecticians say that something is possible in the composite sense, they signify nothing else than that the composite modal, modified by the mode of 'possible,' is true.** Similarly, when they say that something is impossible in the composite sense, they signify that the composite modal of 'possible' is false. For example, when it is said, "A predestined person cannot be damned," in the composite sense it is signified that being predestined and actual damnation cannot simultaneously belong to the same person. Hence, when it is said, "A man moved by efficacious aid cannot dissent in the composite sense," nothing else is signified except that that efficacious motion and actual dissent are not simultaneously compossible in the same man; but the sense is not that the efficacious motion and the power to dissent are incompatible in the same man.
 2. **If the composition is made of one act with the potency to the opposite, it is most truly affirmed that one moved by God with efficacious aid at the same time retains the power by which he can dissent if he wills.**
 3. **If the composition is made of efficacious aid with actual dissent, it is impossible in the composite sense that one moved by God with efficacious aid to consent should dissent, reject, or abandon that aid of grace.** For something to be impossible in the composite sense is nothing else than that the composite modal of 'possible' is not true.
 4. **Hence, he concludes: Necessity from the supposition of the absolute and efficacious Divine Decree, or Necessity from the supposition of the**

efficacious aid of prevenient grace, neither takes away nor diminishes the freedom of the will as to the exercise of the act; but rather perfects and strengthens it.

Then he goes on to show the use of this distinction:

"In the Sacred Scriptures," he says, "there are many things which cannot be reconciled except by the common distinction of the composite and divided sense. For it is said, 1 John 3:9, '**Whoever is born of God does not sin, and indeed cannot sin.**' Which is understood by all in the composite sense; namely, that these two cannot stand together—that someone has habitual grace and sins mortally."

Thus far Alvarez, who seems to me to have spoken most acutely.

§ 9. The necessity that arises from the efficacious and determining concurrence of God does not destroy freedom but rather supports and perfects it.

For such Necessity is not one of violence or coercion but is exceedingly spontaneous and voluntary. Nor was this unknown to Plato and Socrates.

Thus, Plato, in *Laws* Book 1, page 642:

"Those among the Athenians who are good are, in a certain excellent and outstanding way, truly good, it seems to me most true. For they alone, without any bonds of compelling necessity, of their own accord, by a certain divine inspiration or divinity, truly and not fictitiously are good."

By this, he teaches:

1. That those among the Athenians who were the best became such not by their own power but by divine inspiration.
2. That this divine inspiration did not introduce any necessity of coercion but only a gentle and spontaneous, although efficacious, motion; that is, as Plato elsewhere says, "the will is bound by the bonds of most excellent necessity."

Also, in *Theaetetus*, page 150, he introduces Socrates speaking thus:

"God indeed compels me to act as a midwife, but forbids me to generate anything."

Behold the great example of divine concurrence, sweetly and yet strongly necessitating Socrates to bring forth the offspring of wisdom! But this necessity, which the most efficacious concurrence of God imposes on the human will, is not violent but most gentle, as is evident from the fact that the will follows spontaneously. For the efficacy of the divine concurrence does not prevent the motion of the will from being in itself and from itself, and therefore most free.

Thus Plato, in *Timaeus*, page 89:

"Now of motions, that which is in itself moved by itself is best; for it is most akin to the motion of mind and the whole."

Such is the motion of the will moved efficaciously by God. In the Schools, a twofold divine predetermination is established: one of the Faculty, the other of the Act; and each imports something intrinsic and inherent in the faculty; yet neither takes away freedom; for to depend on God and to adhere to Him as the first cause is most congenial to the will. Indeed, the more efficaciously the will is moved by God, the more freely it moves itself.

For the efficacious concurrence of God predetermines the will not only to act but also to the freest mode of acting; wherefore, the more efficaciously God concurs, the more freely the will cooperates. That the will moved most invincibly by God moves most freely is evident from the fact that such motion exhibits the highest spontaneity.

For, as Plato says, *Laws Book 2*, page 663:

"No one willingly would be induced to do that in which there is not more joy than pain."

The grace of Christ, efficacious and victorious, displays such joy and sweetness most excellently, as the great Jansenius demonstrates in *Augustinus*, Vol. 3, *On Grace*, Book 4, Chapter 1:

"Nothing is more certain to Augustine than that in the Holy Scriptures that efficacious Grace, through which alone we perform whatever good we perform, is signified by the name of Sweetness, Gentleness, Delight—namely, Spiritual and Heavenly."

He subjoins to Delight: Love, Ardor, and Fervor; for they are effects that immediately sprout from that heavenly sweetness. And in Chapter 2, he adds:

"That heavenly Sweetness or Delight infused is that true Grace about which there is such controversy among the Scholastics, as can almost be demonstrated by induction. For there is no kind of good work which Augustine does not refer to that inspiration of Divine Sweetness as to the aid by which God works it in man."

The same in Chapter 3, he proves from the contrary, namely, sin, which Augustine teaches proceeds from a similar earthly delight as from a cause.

From this Heavenly Sweetness, the most efficacious pre-motion or predetermination of the Divine concurrence is most excellently reconciled with human freedom. Firstly, such

reconciliation of the Divine concurrence with human Freedom can be drawn from Plato's *Symposium*, page 196.

"Next, concerning the virtue of Love, we must speak: 'But the greatest thing is that Love neither does injustice nor suffers it, neither towards God nor from God.'"

And he subjoins an invincible reason:

"For neither does he suffer anything by force, nor does he act by force; for everyone willingly obeys Love in all things; and whatever one willingly contracts with a willing person, they declare to be just."

Here occur some most noteworthy points for reconciling the most efficacious concurrence of God with human Freedom.

1. Plato describes the virtue or efficacy of Love in establishing all the actions of life.
2. He says that violence in no way falls upon Love; and thus that Love neither does anything by force nor inflicts force on anyone; that is, nothing is more spontaneous than what is done from Love.
3. He expressly says that Love [i.e., the choosing and loving will] suffers no violence from God. And he adds the reason: For everyone willingly obeys Love in all things.

Then he adds:

"No pleasure is more powerful or vehement than Love."

Indeed, he subjoins:

"Even Ares (Mars) could not resist Love; he who dominates over the strongest others is the strongest of all."

By all these, Plato demonstrates that the acts of Love—that is, of the loving will—are most gentle and most powerful.

Furthermore, the Necessity which arises from the predetermination of the Divine concurrence is most excellently reconciled with human Freedom from the fact that it introduces only voluntary servitude.

Thus Plato, *Symposium*, page 184:

"Just as that law was passed concerning Lovers, that no kind of servitude displayed by the lover to the beloved should be considered as flattery or disgraceful; so also there remains another kind of voluntary servitude according to law, which incurs no disgrace; and this is that which is concerned with virtue."

By which he teaches:

1. Universally, that no kind of obedience shown by the lover is disgraceful or violent.
2. Specifically, that the servitude of Virtue is most voluntary.

Whence he immediately subjoins:

"For it is established by our laws that if anyone wishes to honor someone, thinking that he will become better and more excellent by his favor, this voluntary servitude is not shameful."

From which it is clear that the predetermining concurrence of God does not destroy but supports and perfects human Freedom; for the Necessity arising from it is *ἑθελοδοουλεία* (*ethelodouleia*), voluntary servitude and subjection.

"That heavenly Sweetness," says Jansenius, "of victorious Grace smooths the way, so that the will can emerge from the mire of carnal things and fix itself in the love of justice. For since motion cannot be made except by the immovable, that Sweetness renders the mind in some way immovable, so that it can break forth into the free motion of spiritual will and love; from which it consequently follows that if it is absent, the will is as it were dead. That which delights us more, we must also will and love more; for we desire something more vehemently as we delight in it more ardently; and what we desire and love more, we must necessarily act according to it. Thus, to will strongly and to conquer, so also to will constantly and perseveringly, indeed impeccably, proceeds from the same *ἑθελοδοουλεία*, the voluntary and most sweet servitude of virtue," as Jansenius explains more fully in *Augustinus*, Vol. 3, *On Grace*, Book 4, Chapters 7 and 8.

Moreover, the Necessity that arises from the pre-determining concurrence of God is best reconciled with human Liberty through Plato's concepts of **psychagogy** and **autexousia** (self-determination), about which he philosophizes extensively. For Plato teaches that Virtue is an **automeleia**, a spontaneous action according to nature; likewise, concepts like **eukrasia** (good temperament), **eurhythmia** (good rhythm), **symphonia** (harmony), Elegance, Propriety, good Constitution, and Symmetry of the Soul. All these indicate that the exercises of Virtue, inspired by divine inspiration, display the greatest sweetness and delight.

Indeed, Plato teaches that all precepts of virtue aim toward a certain **euthymia**, or an easy and pleasant guidance of the soul. Thus, in the *Phaedrus*, page 271, he says: "Since the faculty of speaking seems to be nothing other than moving the Soul and leading it where you will; he who is to speak rightly must first know how many kinds of souls there are." By this, he means:

1. That there exists a kind of **psychagogy**, an easy and pleasant leading of the mind, which is the principal goal of the art of speaking and all teachings about virtue.

2. That to achieve this **psychagogy** more successfully, the one who intends to speak rightly must first know the various types of souls. This knowledge is best, indeed only, known by God; therefore, He alone can perform this **psychagogy** pleasantly and powerfully.

Hence, in the same *Phaedrus*, page 246, Plato attributes to the Soul wings, horses, or a winged Chariot and a Charioteer. He designates that celestial Liberty of acting and efficiency by the term "wings." For he says: "The natural power of the wings is to raise that which is heavy to the heights, where the race of the gods inhabits." Thus far concerning the Soul's winged chariot and horses.

But the Charioteer, or the external principle by which the Soul is impelled, he identifies as God. Thus he continues: "Now the great leader in heaven, Zeus, driving his winged chariot, first proceeds, ordering all things and taking care of them." Therefore, great Jupiter in heaven first advances, propelling his winged chariot, adorning all things and governing them by his providence. By this, he teaches that those internal principles of the soul are powerfully and pleasantly impelled and ordered by God.

But no one, as it seems to me, among the pagans has more illustriously reconciled the efficacious Concurrence of God with human liberty than Plutarch, in the life of Coriolanus, page 229 (Paris edition, 1624). In monstrous and reckless matters, where a frantic and frenzied impulse is required, [Homer] introduces God:

"Not abolishing the free will, but moving it; not instilling an impulse, but providing leading images of impulses; by which He does not effect the action against our will, but offers a beginning to free will, and adds confidence and hope. Either we must altogether remove the divine from all cause and origin of our actions, or what other way is there by which they help and cooperate with men? For they do not, I suppose, mold our body, nor themselves set and move our hands or feet, but they arouse the practical and deliberative part of the soul by certain principles and imaginations, or, on the contrary, turn it away and restrain it."

He introduces God, not abolishing but moving the free choice of the will, neither infusing an impulse but leading images of impulses. By this, He does not effect the action against our will but rather offers a beginning to free will and adds confidence or hope. For either we must at once take away from the gods all cause and origin of our affairs, or what other reason remains by which they help mortals and assist their endeavors? For they do not arrange our body, nor move our hands or feet as the matter requires; but they arouse the power of acting, which is in our souls, and the will, by certain principles and signs and imaginations, or on the contrary, turn it away and restrain it.

In these matters, various and significant points arise that are most suitable for reconciling the necessity of divine concurrence with human Liberty:

1. In general, he establishes that Homer introduces God not abolishing but moving the free choice of the will; that is, God moves the will in a manner most agreeable to its liberty.
2. Specifically, he says that God, by concurring, does not effect the action against our will but rather provides a beginning to free will. Here, it must first be noted that no necessity is adverse to Liberty unless it is unwilling and involuntary. Then, that the beginning of free will arises from God.
3. He explains and demonstrates this more fully: "Either," he says, "we must at once take away from the gods all cause and origin of our affairs [i.e., human actions], or what other reason remains by which they help mortals?" That is, either God effectively pre-moves the will, or He does nothing.
4. Yet he acknowledges that God produces in us a good will, not without our concurrence.
5. Finally, he expressly says that God first excites and promotes the practical and deliberative power—the power of acting and freely choosing—that is, He predetermines the will to freely choose.

Thus Philolaus thought that all things happen by Necessity and Harmony; that is, by a divine necessity most suitable to both natural and human things, which moves and determines all things in a manner most fitting to their natures. Seneca, excellently, in *On Benefits*, says: "He does not therefore will less who cannot not will; indeed, it is a great proof of firm will not even to be able to change: the good man cannot but do what he does. Moreover, there is much difference whether you say, 'He cannot not do this because he is compelled,' or 'He cannot not will.'" By this, he expressly teaches that no necessity except that of compulsion takes away liberty.

But indeed, the Necessity of divine Concurrence and human Liberty are nowhere more clearly and happily reconciled than in the sacred texts. Thus in Psalm 110:3: "Your people will be very willing in the day of your power." Or as others render it, "in the day of your strength"; for it first insinuates the notion of strength; hence the Septuagint translates it as "youth," the old Latin as "Virtue," Pagninus as "Fortitude." All of which indicate the turning of the heart and the efficacy of divine grace. Behold the admirable combination of efficacious Grace with human Liberty!

Thus in *Canticles* 1:4: "Draw me," that is, apply your Medicinal, most Efficacious Grace, and Turning of the Heart to my most infirm will. And what follows? "We will run after you," that is, spontaneously and most freely. The drawing indicates the power of Him who draws, as in Job 24:22: "He draws away the mighty by His power." And if it is towards the good, it signifies the efficacy of medicinal grace. John 6:44: "No one can come to Me unless the Father who sent Me draws him." Now, this drawing is best reconciled with the spontaneous and most free course of the will. Indeed, the more strongly Grace turns the heart, the more sweetly and freely the human will runs, as in Psalm 119:32.

The same reconciliation of efficacious Grace with human Liberty is explained in Isaiah 10:21: "The remnant shall return, the remnant of Jacob, unto the mighty God." This is a characteristic of the Messiah, Isaiah 9:6, who is here called "the Mighty God," inasmuch as by His efficacious grace He strongly and yet sweetly draws the will. Hence it is said, "The remnant shall return," that is, spontaneously and most freely, although drawn by the strong hand of the most mighty God.

The same is found in Hosea 2:14: "Therefore, behold, I will allure her." "It signifies," says Sanctius, "to use gentle words to persuade, such as lovers use to a woman whose marriage or company they seek. Therefore, it also means to flatter and to entice someone to one's own desires or pleasure." That word signifies speech that is kind, liberal, full of sweetness and benevolence. Yet behold the highest efficacy and power! For it follows: "And I will speak to her heart."

To speak to the heart means:

1. To speak lovingly, gently, sweetly, and finally such words as are in the desires of the listeners.
2. To speak such things that effectively penetrate the heart, capture it, and allure it to love in return.

The Word of God is a heart-turner: it persuades and at the same time seizes; it gently attracts, and yet powerfully conquers the heart. Thus Hosea 11:4: "I drew them with cords of a man, with bands of love." He says He has drawn the Israelites with bonds. But to draw in this context indicates the most powerful efficacy of medicinal Grace; and this drawing is not merely moral, but in its own way physical, or rather physico-moral.

Hence follows: "with cords of a man, or human." By "cords of a man" or "of men," they understand, in a proverbial manner of speaking, all human and amiable dealings. Whence is added: "bands of love," that is, loving bonds. The will is bound by the bonds of a happy necessity, as Plato says.

Our Lord sums up all this briefly in Luke 14:23: "Compel them to come in." Under this Evangelical compulsion and divine turning of the heart, He indicates the efficacy of medicinal Grace, which nevertheless in no way invades human Liberty. For:

1. That a free agent is moved by God does not prevent it from moving itself most freely. It is said to be moved by God, both morally, insofar as He is the ultimate end, and effectively, insofar as He is the first cause and prime mover. It is said to be moved by itself, insofar as it consents, chooses, etc.
2. It is most natural for the action of the will to depend on God and to be effectively moved by Him.
3. God can in some way necessitate every free agent to its free act.
4. What happens necessarily and immutably by reason of divine concurrence happens freely and contingently by reason of the secondary cause.

5. The supreme efficacy of the divine will is the first cause and root of all contingency and human liberty. For God determines not only the things themselves but also the modes of things.
6. Finally, it is a contradiction and absurdity to say that the human will is moved immediately by God and yet that this motion is violent to it.

That God's predetermining concurrence is friendly to human Will and Liberty, not adverse or violent, is best demonstrated by Thomas Aquinas, Part 1, Question 19, Article 8:

"When any efficacious cause acts, the effect follows the cause not only according to what is done but also according to the manner of doing or being. Therefore, since the divine will is most efficacious, it not only follows that those things happen which God wills to happen, but also that they happen in the manner in which God wills them to happen. Now, God wills certain things to happen necessarily, others contingently, so that there is order in things toward the completion of the Universe. Therefore, the effects willed by God do not happen contingently because their proximate causes are contingent, but because God willed them to happen contingently, He prepared contingent causes for them."

By this, he teaches that God determines not only the things themselves but also the modes of things, namely, contingency and liberty.

Also, in Part 1 of the Second Part, Question 6, Article 4:

"God, who is more powerful than the human will, can move the human will; but if this were through violence, then it would not involve an act of the will; nor would the will itself be moved, but something against the will. The reason is that the act of the will is nothing other than a certain inclination proceeding from an internal knowing principle, just as natural appetite is a certain inclination from an internal principle without cognition. But what is compelled or violent comes from an external principle; hence, it is contrary to the very nature of the act of the will that it should be coerced or violent."

The same Thomas Aquinas, in *Contra Gentiles*, Book 3, Chapter 88:

1. "The actions of all creatures are contained under the order of Divine Providence; hence, they cannot act beyond its laws. But it is the law of Providence that each thing is moved immediately by its proximate cause."
2. "What is violent is defined in *Ethics* 3.2 as that whose principle is external, with the patient contributing nothing to the force, etc."

Then, in Chapter 89, he adds:

"But some, not understanding how God can cause the movement of the will in us without prejudice to the freedom of the will, have tried to misinterpret these authorities; so that they would say that God causes in us the willing when He perfects us, insofar as

He gives us the power of willing, but not in such a way that He makes us will this or that; as Origen says, *Peri Archon* 3. And from this seems to have arisen the opinion of some who said that Providence does not concern those things which are subject to Free Will, etc. But the Sacred Scriptures evidently oppose this; for it is said in Isaiah 26: 'You have worked all our works in us.'

3. "God not only gives things their power but also no thing can act by its own power unless it acts in His power (as in Chapter 70)."
4. "Order is found more perfectly in spiritual things than in corporeal things; but in corporeal things, every motion is caused by the first motion. Therefore, in spiritual things, every movement of the will must be caused by the first will."
5. "Above, in Chapter 70, it was shown that God is the cause of every action and works in every agent; therefore, He is the cause of the movements of the will."

Hence, in Chapter 90, he demonstrates that human wills and choices are subject to Divine Providence:

1. "For all things that God does, He does according to the order of His Providence; since, therefore, He is the cause of our choice and will, etc."
2. "The more noble things are in the Universe, the more they must participate in the order in which the good of the Universe consists; but spiritual substances are more noble. Therefore..."
3. "If human choices and movements of the will do not fall under divine providence, human affairs would be outside God's providence, etc."

This is well explained by Aloysius Catanea in the Council of Trent (English edition, page 210):

"The fear of subverting free will is removed by Thomas, who teaches that things are moved violently by a contrary cause but never by their own. But God is the proper cause of the will, and therefore moves it according to its own proper inclination."

Hence Plato, in *Republic* Book 10, teaches that God, as the parent of all—that is, the natural producer—exerts His power in nature itself, according to the natures of all things. But no one seems to explain Thomas's mind more successfully than the illustrious Gibieuf in *On Liberty*, Book 1, Chapter 17, Section 4:

"Thomas teaches," he says, "that the will can be moved efficiently without violence only by Him who created it. Whence it follows that if I, as myself, move myself, that movement would be somewhat violent; and if I rely even more on myself as the principle, the movement would be even more violent. But then a man is moved by himself without violence when he moves, being moved and determined by God; and as much as he departs from that motion, so much does he fall away from perfection and, so to speak, from the naturalness of the motion suitable to him."

In this context, it is helpful to observe that excellent doctrine of Plato in *Alcibiades I*, that man, if considered in God, is "the same as himself," himself the very self; but when he begins to stand in himself, he becomes "the same other," himself indeed, but now somewhat other than himself. Indeed, appropriately to this doctrine, it can be said that when a man relies on himself, he is now somewhat moved by another; and therefore his motion is not entirely natural and free. But then his motion is most free and removed from all violence when he relies solely on God and not on his own virtue and efficacy.

Moreover, God, in moving the will, does not compel it because He gives it its own proper inclination. "To be moved voluntarily," says Thomas, "is to be moved from oneself—that is, from an intrinsic principle; but that intrinsic principle can be from another extrinsic principle (he understands this to be not only regarding power but also regarding the act and the willing); and thus to be moved from oneself is not incompatible with being moved by another." Indeed, Gibieuf adds: "To be moved by God is not to be moved by another, much less by something external. And although God is neither a part of me nor myself, insofar as I am considered in my limitation, yet my being is praiseworthy, as the Platonists say."

Hence Thomas teaches that God not only works our works but moreover works them as existing within us and intimate to us—the author, namely, of nature, who not only once gave what we are and can do but perpetually bestows it. Whence it follows that whatever He works in us cannot but be natural. For the relationship of the creature to God, as to the first Efficient Cause and ultimate end, is not only one of subjection but also of constitution, and tends and is directed both to being and to well-being; for to depend on God is essential to the creature as such.

Finally, the rational creature does not suffer violence or coercion from God determining and efficaciously applying it, because God so moves and determines it that He makes it act, and indeed act in a manner agreeable to itself—purely freely; so that, therefore, that necessity is no more violent than when I move myself. For my Creator is He who moves me; He is more intimate to me than my inmost being, as Augustine says; and He has my will more in His power than I myself.

Furthermore, the turning of the heart by God's Grace conspires excellently with human Liberty, as the pious and most learned Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln, vigorously demonstrates in *On the Cessation of the Laws*, page 112 (Edition 1658). "Christ," he says, "by His Passion extracting man from the mire of sin, for the increase of the benefit, so that the man himself, being extracted, might also be praiseworthy for his emergence; man ought to have been left to his own free will, so that he might use it well; and by his endeavor and motion, with Grace drawing him by the hand, he himself might go forth; so that the whole act of going forth may be ascribed to the one extracting; and nonetheless, the whole may also be ascribed to free will cooperating with Grace. For the whole of

what we do well, Grace does in us, and we do the whole of it through obedient free will. Hence Bernard, in *On Free Will*, says, "Thus Grace operates with free will, so that it comes first and accompanies the rest; preventing (going before) to this end, that now it may thereafter cooperate with it. Yet in such a way that what was begun by Grace alone is equally perfected by both; so that they operate mixedly, not separately; together, not alternately, through each step of progress; not partly Grace, partly free will, but each performs the whole in an individual work; and this whole, and that whole; but as the whole is in it, so the whole is from it. Therefore, the benefit of this extraction is entirely in this way of the one extracting, and is a pure benefit much more abundant than the very emergence. Nonetheless, the whole is the proper act of the one extracted."

Moreover, the great Bradwardine, in *The Cause of God*, Book 3, Chapter 1, page 637, most acutely explains and invincibly demonstrates our hypothesis, where he vigorously proves this thesis: that God can in a certain way necessitate every created will to its free act and to free cessation and abstention from action. For since what God wills cannot not be, when He wills that the human will be coerced or prohibited by no necessity to will or not to will, and wills the effect to follow the will, then it is necessary that the will be free and be what it wills. Otherwise, man could make God false and perjured. By the testimonies of divine words, it is sufficiently, as I think, manifested that God works in the hearts of men to incline their wills to whatever He wills. Otherwise, God would not be omnipotent: for although God did as much as He could so that you would will something, you could, this notwithstanding entirely, not will the same. What also pertains more worthily to His omnipotence than to preserve His truth inviolable in all things, even in free acts? How also does it not pertain to His omnipotence to be able to dispose freely of all possible natural and free things whatsoever? Therefore, Augustine says that God has more power over the wills of men than they themselves. There will be no doubt to anyone that the free acts of the will are the most noble of all; therefore, they are contained under God's omnipotence.

Furthermore, in Chapter 2, page 646, he proposes to demonstrate this hypothesis: God in a certain way necessitates any created will to any of its free acts and to any free cessation and abstention from action, and this by a necessity naturally preceding. And on page 647, he says: "All necessity in any creature, as also anything else whatsoever, is produced by the divine will as by a prior efficient cause; therefore, all necessity of willing in the created will is effected by the divine will. Therefore, necessity in the divine will is prior naturally to the necessity in the human will and the efficient cause of it. Wherefore, the divine will antecedently necessitates the created will," etc.

Again, Bradwardine, in Book 3, Chapter 27, page 704, strongly demonstrates, according to the opinion of philosophers and theologians, that all future events will happen by a certain necessity with respect to higher causes, not contrary but agreeable to liberty. "But," he says, "to express my own opinion on this matter, or rather not my own but that common to our fathers, with the distinction of antecedent and consequent necessity premised; I say that there is a double antecedent necessity: one entirely absolute, and

another in a certain way relative; and this double, namely, with respect to some or all lower or secondary causes, or only with respect to superior and primary causes, namely, the highest and first cause of all, who is God. According to this distinction, it seems to me to be said that not all things that will happen will happen by entirely absolute necessity; nor even by relative necessity with respect to some or all lower or secondary causes; but all things that will happen will happen by relative necessity with respect to the primary causes, which are the will and power of the highest God. Or more briefly: All things that will happen will happen by necessity of the first cause, namely, necessity of agency or activity or efficacy in acting; that is, all those things will happen by the divine will, which with respect to all things willed is not able to be hindered, because in the power of no other; and therefore necessary and inevitable in causing, and even the antecedent necessity itself: For the will of God is a higher and prior cause naturally; wherefore, whatever future will happen."

"Moreover, if it were within our power that some future event would not happen, this would be by resisting the divine will, or by hindering or changing it, etc., which cannot be said: For a cause superior and prior naturally does not follow in causing the inferior and posterior cause, just as an artisan does not follow the instrument. Also, every inferior thing in its action and passion is in some way antecedently necessitated naturally by the divine will: for it is the antecedent necessity naturally to all."

He proceeds to demonstrate this hypothesis from Augustine, Lombard, etc. And on page 707, he says: "Anselm shows, in *On Concord*, that future events happen in one way from necessity and in another way from liberty; because, namely, with respect to the divine will, they will happen necessarily; but with respect to the created will, by no means: and because with God and in eternity they are immutably established, but with the creature and in time mutably."

Wycliffe follows Bradwardine in this matter. Thus, in the condemned Articles of the Council, number 278: "Just as God necessitates the futuration of instants, so He necessitates all events that in those instants are future." Also, as reported by Walden, Book 1, Chapter 21, page 35, and Chapter 23, page 37, and also by Wideford, pages 240, 248. Wycliffe, in the second *Dialogus*, Chapter 13, boldly asserted that God necessitates every active creature to each of its acts.

Indeed, Cassander, in *Consultation on the Articles of Religion*, Article 18, is a follower of Augustine and Bradwardine in this respect. "Certainly," he says, "the Orthodox have always contended against the Pelagians and Manichaeans that Justice is to be attributed not to the virtue of Free Will, but to the singular grace of God. Nor is the unwilling will coerced, but the weak is healed, the depraved is corrected, and is converted from evil to good, and is drawn by a certain inner motion, so that from unwilling it is made willing, and willingly consents to the divine call, and afterwards, cooperating with the same, obeys the divine will. The sum of this Orthodox doctrine is briefly comprehended in the Second Council of Orange, which is, as it were, a compendium of all those things which

are diffusely read here and there in Augustine and others; and would that we remain in this simple explanation, which is consistent with the divine writings and orthodox doctrine, and suffices for piety. For indeed, this doctrine of the Grace of God and Free Will was also vigorously defended by the sounder Scholastics against the Pelagians, among whom is THOMAS BRADWARDINE, called in his time the Profound Doctor, who wrote an excellent volume against the Pelagianism growing in his age, which sounder opinion of the Scholastics Bucer acknowledged. But if any from the number of Scholastics have spoken less appropriately about this liberty of the Will and human affairs, these are to be placed among private opinions, and the sounder writings of others of the same order of men are to be opposed to them."

"Moreover, how much most of them have attributed to divine grace, even one Bonaventure testifies: 'It is,' he says, 'the mark of pious minds to attribute nothing to themselves, but all to the Grace of God: whence, however much anyone gives to the Grace of God, he will not depart from piety, even if by attributing much to the Grace of God, he subtracts something from the power of nature or free will: but when something is subtracted from the Grace of God, and is attributed to nature what is of Grace, there danger can intervene.' Behold the very great commendation of Bradwardine and other defenders of Divine Grace!"

The predetermining concurrence of God does not remove but perfects contingency and human liberty, established with the highest consensus of the Thomists. Thus Alvarez, who acutely explained the mind of the whole sect. (1) He teaches that God moves the created will with a prior motion inhering in it, in the manner of a physical cause. He explains and demonstrates the hypothesis in *On the Aid of Grace*, Disputation 23. "This," he says, "physical determination is said to be a certain form impressed upon the will, which with it completes the proximate principle of the act of the will. But when the Thomists say that God by His efficacious aid physically predetermines the will to a good act, they do not exclude moral motion but presuppose it. Therefore, the meaning is that God, by a prior actual motion inhering in secondary causes, especially free ones, applies them to acting, and truly efficiently and efficaciously makes the same causes concur and operate such an act in particular; which is to physically determine or predetermine to acting, not indeed by priority of time, but only by priority of reason and causality; in such a way, namely, that God is the one who first truly efficaciously begins to act before we cooperate with Him: and consequently, that causality is true: because God acts, our free will cooperates with Him. This and nothing else is signified by the term of God's motion physically predetermining free will to acting such an act in particular."

From this hypothesis, Alvarez elicits the following conclusions. (1) God by that prior motion efficaciously applies the created will so that it may freely and infallibly act, just as He also applies other secondary causes so that they may operate naturally. This is proved first; because God is the efficient cause of all things of which He is the ultimate end. Second, God is the true Lord of all secondary causes; therefore, He uses them when He wills. Thus Twisse, in *Vindication of Grace*, page 191: "Something can happen

immutably by reason of God's decreeing, which yet happens mutably by reason of the intervening secondary cause. For what prevents that what happens immutably by reason of God, happens mutably and freely by reason of man; as that what with respect to God happens contingently and freely, yet by reason of the creature acting naturally and necessarily, happens necessarily?"

(2) By this motion and application, God really changes the will from one thing to another and makes it from unwilling to willing. This is the conclusion of Thomas, in the Second Part, Disputation 25, Question 1, Article 2, where he says, according to the second: "That God works according to its requirement: whence in the will, even if He changes the will in the free will of man into another, nevertheless He does this by His omnipotence, so that that into which it is changed, it may will voluntarily." And explaining how this change can be made by God without imposing force upon the will or compelling it, he adds: "When God changes the will, He causes that to the preceding inclination another inclination succeeds; and thus the first is taken away and the second remains: whence that to which He induces the will is not contrary to the inclination now existing, but to the inclination which previously inhered: whence there is no violence nor coercion. Just as a stone, by reason of its gravity, has an inclination to the place downwards: but with this inclination remaining, if it is thrown upwards, there will be violence: but if God should remove from the stone the inclination of gravity and give it the inclination of levity, then to be carried upwards will not be violent for it: and thus a change of motion can be without violence. And in this way it is to be understood that God changes the will without compelling the will." And further, "Just as the Will can change its own act into another, so much more can God."

(3) By this motion, application, and change, God determines the will to a determined act, preserving its liberty.

(4) This motion is not only moral but also physical; that is, it does not only hold on the part of the object, nor is it a motion only by way of persuading, counseling, alluring, or in any way even inwardly morally attracting; but it holds on the part of the power received in it and is a motion by way of a cause, truly and properly acting; by which namely God truly efficaciously makes that the will cooperates and consents. This is proved; because a moral cause moves only metaphorically. Furthermore, if God moved the will only by persuading, alluring, etc., He moves no differently than a man, good angel, or devil.

(5) God by an actual efficacious motion in the manner of a physical cause, that is, truly efficiently predetermines the will of man to good free acts, so that the will moved by God through such aid determines itself freely and infallibly to the act to be freely produced. This is proved: For the efficacy of the cause does not depend on its effect; but on the contrary, the effect depends on the efficacy of the cause: but that free will concurs and consents to God calling is the effect of efficacious aid. Moreover, the Jesuits concede that God by efficacious Grace codetermines, that is, simultaneously in the same instant of time determines the free will. Therefore, either the human Will by its

concurrence determines the divine, or on the contrary, the divine Will by its efficacious Grace determines the human. The former cannot be said. Therefore.

(6) These two are incompatible together, namely, that such predetermining aid is in free will, and that free will does not perform that act to which it moves, although it can always not perform the same act if it wills. The first part of the conclusion is evident from the fact that otherwise the absolute Will of God would be inefficacious and would be hindered by the human will, so that what the omnipotent wished to be done through it would not be done.

2. **The second hypothesis**, which Alvarez proposes (*On the Aid of Grace*, Disputation 26), for reconciling divine predetermination with human liberty is as follows: **The efficacious Will of God is the first cause of all human liberty.**

To elucidate and establish this hypothesis, the following conclusions are most worthy of note:

1. **The supreme efficacy and omnipotence of the divine Will is the primary root and first efficient cause of all contingency found in things.** For the supreme efficacy of the divine Will is, regarding execution, the cause of all things, and similarly, it prepares contingent causes so that from them such contingent effects may proceed. Therefore, etc. Moreover, that is the first cause of contingency which first includes, formally or eminently, every mode of causality found in secondary causes and causes such causes to produce effects proportionate to their nature. But such is the supreme efficacy of the divine Will. Therefore, etc.
 2. **The supreme efficacy of the divine Will is not only the primary root and cause of the contingency found in things because it created free will, but also because it absolutely pre-established by its efficacious will that from such contingent causes such contingent effects would follow under such circumstances.**
 3. **The proximate and formal reason for contingency in these lower things is taken from a proximate cause that is defectible or can be impeded by the concurrence of another cause.** For contingency, taken formally, signifies imperfection and defectibility. Hence Thomas teaches that although the supreme cause is necessary, the effect can nevertheless be contingent because of a proximate contingent cause.
3. To reconcile the necessity of **Divine Concurrence** with human liberty, Alvarez also proposes this hypothesis (*On the Aid of Grace*, Disputation 32): **Created free will cannot resist the omnipotent God.**

To explain this hypothesis, we must first note that it is one thing for the will to be necessitated, and another to be compelled to some act. For, in order for it to be necessitated, it suffices that it be determined to one thing by way of nature, so that it is not within its power to do the opposite if it wills, or not to act; and thus it is necessitated in heaven to love God. Moreover, for it to suffer violence or be compelled, it

is necessary that the act to which it is compelled comes from an external principle, with the will itself actually or virtually resisting.

These premises being set forth, it is demonstrated that **the free will neither ever resists nor can resist God or His efficacious will, if we properly and strictly speak of physical resistance**. And this is understood not only in the composite sense but also in the divided sense. Therefore, there is found, nor can be found, in human will any power by which it can resist God or oppose His efficacious will.

1. **This is evident from the fact that the human will cannot move itself or effect anything unless it is moved by God.** But God cannot move the human will to resist His efficacious will; for thus He would be acting against Himself.
2. **Simply speaking, it implies a contradiction that any creature is moved immediately by God and yet that such motion is simply violent to it;** for God cannot move any creature except by ordering such motion toward His goodness. Moreover, all creatures are more inclined (passively at least, if not actively) toward divine goodness than a stone is toward the center. Therefore, it is impossible that any motion of a creature proceeds immediately from God and that such motion is violent to it; and consequently, that any creature can resist God immediately moving it.
3. **In order for someone effectively to resist another, it is necessary that he has greater or at least equal power with him.** But no created will has equal power with God. Therefore, etc.

Finally, Alvarez concludes that **no creature can suffer violence immediately from God**; for it would be an imperfection in God if any creature resisted Him. Moreover, violence cannot be inflicted upon anyone except by a cause operating externally; for that is called violent which is from an external principle, with the patient contributing nothing to the force. But God operates intimately in all things, with full and perfect dominion over them. Hence, there cannot be violent motion when something moves itself; so also, when it is moved immediately by God, it cannot be moved violently. For every motion of anything depends more on God than on any intrinsic principle, both active and passive, of the movable itself.

This non-resistance of the will is cleverly explained by our **Ward**, in Philippians 2:13, page 30:

"This is what we say: when God by efficacious Grace works in the Will itself to will, this Grace efficaciously places in the Will non-resistance, and thus removes at that time actual resistance; which is done by certain knowledge and conquering delight; and it becomes impossible for such resistance to coexist with efficacious Grace received into the will. But this impossibility is only of consequence and conditional, or from supposition."

But no one seems to reconcile the necessity of Divine Grace with human liberty more successfully than the great **Jansenius**, following Augustine, in Volume 3, **On Grace**. He candidly acknowledges the difficulty of reconciling Divine Grace with human liberty:

"The mode of reconciling Divine Grace with free will is so difficult to discern," says Augustine, "that when free will is defended, the Grace of God seems to be denied; but when the Grace of God is asserted, free will seems to be taken away."

To cut this Gordian knot, Jansenius sets himself. His opinion on this matter can be extracted in the following theses:

1. **The medicinal and efficacious Grace of Christ, as to its substance, is celestial Sweetness or Divine Delight.**

Jansenius explains and demonstrates this thesis in Volume 3, Book 4, Chapter 1, page 167:

"There is no small controversy among recent Doctors about what that Grace is by which God converts the heart of man and works good in it. Some think it is a holy thought; others that it is certain indeliberate motions of love, etc.; others that it is the physical predetermination of the will to act; which others explain in such a way that it is a certain actual premotion by way of a quality passing with the operation of the will; others that it is really the operation itself of the secondary cause, as it proceeds from the promoting influx of God; others finally, that it is something having incomplete being, in the way that colors are in the air; which they think can be called a virtuous motion by which the First Agent causes the Will to operate.

But Augustine teaches that this medicinal Grace of Christ is nothing other than a certain celestial and ineffable sweetness, or spiritual delight, by which the will is anticipated and bent to will and to do whatever God has determined it should will and do. And it will plainly be evident that there is no kind of action, no effect of efficacious grace, which is not attributed to that celestial delight as to the true Grace of Christ."

Jansenius demonstrates this thesis:

1. From the Scriptures and other testimonies found in Augustine.
2. From induction or enumeration of every kind of good operations of the will, as in Chapter 2, etc.
3. From the necessity of such delight, in Chapter 7:
"I say," he says, "according to Augustine's mind, that in this struggle with temptations, a great, indeed greater and conquering celestial delight is necessary so that earthly delight may be overcome."

And in Chapter 9:

"The true reason why celestial delight is necessary for good acts must be sought from the nature of medicine or medicinal aid. For the will, through the sin of the

first man, has been cast down into the dominion of lusts; from which it happens that in all actions before grace, it is provoked by a certain lustful delight going before and titillating, to which by consenting it sins. But the delight of charity absorbs the earthly motions of affection. And this is the reason why in heaven, all carnal delight having been absorbed and with the sole sweetness of the spirit dominating, the will loves God most ardently, and loves so immovably that it cannot sin."

Then, in Chapter 11, page 184, he explains this celestial delight according to Augustine's mind:

"This delight," he says, "which Augustine requires for all good works, is nothing other than a certain indeliberate act sent into the will from heaven, by which the proposed good either only sweetly pleases it, or even it is moved to desire the good. We say, therefore, that this delight or sweetness celebrated in Augustine is partly that first and indeliberate affection of the soul, which is actual complacency; partly also and frequently the second, which is called indeliberate desire; by which the soul is so sweetly and delightfully carried away to desire the good that the will consents to that free act and loves the good, the more vehemently, the more strongly it is carried away by those acts."

For philosophers also acknowledge that in these acts there is delight. Thus Thomas says:

"Love is the chief cause of delight."

Namely, because since all love tends toward delight as toward its rest and center through desire, it cannot be that the movement itself does not participate somewhat in that sweetness.

Finally, in Book 5, Chapter 11, Jansenius demonstrates that **the medicinal Grace of Christ is properly the Inspiration of Charity**, along with the remaining affections naturally flowing from it—desire, joy, etc.—and this with respect to any acts whatsoever, from whatever virtue they proceed.

2. That celestial sweetness is medicinal Grace, most efficacious and most powerful for seizing the heart.

Jansenius explains and demonstrates this thesis in Augustine, Volume 3, Book 2, Chapter 22, page 77:

"The genuine nature of medicinal Grace," he says, "is not found in that it is a 'Grace without which not,' that is, habitual, but in that it is the 'Grace by which,' that is, actual, or by which we determinately will and act, as is clearly evident from the daily prayers which the Church pours out to God... Now it

is clear that no one can will or do anything piously unless here and now his will is determined to this, etc."

Also, in Chapter 23, he says:

"Who doubts that the principal part of good will and action is taken away from God if the very determination of the will here and now is so withdrawn from divine Grace that we, with the more recent theologians, say it belongs chiefly to human free choice?"

But more illustriously and distinctly, in Chapter 24:

1. **"Augustine teaches that this most efficacious and most powerful, this ineffable and most omnipotent power is exercised upon the will in that it is so seized and acted upon by the Spirit of God through Grace that the will itself scarcely understands that it is acting.**
2. "The reason is that there is no kind of expression among the Scholastic Doctors so efficacious and pregnant to express that the very determination of the will—and therefore predetermination—is from the Grace of God, but that Augustine uses it to indicate to Christian readers that the medicinal Grace of Christ is not of such a nature that its effect is suspended on the will, but of such a nature that through it He most powerfully brings in and infuses the effect into the will—not by working if the will wills, but by working and determining that it wills.
3. "Hence it is that Augustine is accustomed to attribute all good operations of man, however much they are done by free will, to God Himself—as He who through the will, as through an instrument which He moves according to His own free good pleasure, impels, bends, turns, inclines it wherever He wills, working the motions of the will itself. 'He Himself,' he says, 'sings in us, by whose Grace we sing,' etc. These things are said not to take away free will from man, but to remove boasting about his own will; lest he should think that it is from himself, by himself, that which God gives him to be.
4. "Moreover, from this efficacious mode of working it follows that Augustine not rarely calls the medicinal Grace of Christ 'Victorious,' because it breaks through all opposing obstacles of wills and affections with invincible power.
5. "Wherefore Augustine places the Grace of God as so victorious over the free choice of the will that he not rarely says that man cannot resist God working in him through Grace; but on the contrary, that God works whatever He wills in the will, which He holds more in His own omnipotent power than the will itself holds itself."

Hence, in Book 3, Chapters 1, 2, 3, etc., Jansenius demonstrates:

No sufficient aid is given to fallen men that is not at the same time efficacious according to Augustine's principles. Indeed, he says:

"Purely sufficient aid pertains to the Grace of nature and is utterly useless for the restoration of the fallen, even if it were increased to six hundred degrees of sufficiency. Indeed, what could be more monstrous than to propose a certain kind of aid distinct from other aids, which never from the beginning of human fall until the day of judgment had or will have any effect in the human will?"

Finally, it should be noted in passing that the **physical predetermination of the Thomists did not entirely please Jansenius**, yet he acknowledged that they touched upon the core and essential aspect of medicinal Grace. Thus he speaks in Volume 3, Book 8, Chapter 1, page 343:

"Whence it comes about that what is essential and formal in the medicinal Grace of the Savior, those [i.e., the Thomists] have observed in Augustine. Therefore, they have approached much closer to the truth. For they have touched upon the very marrow of the Grace of Christ with respect to the wounded will—that is, the Aid by which. So that it may deservedly be said that those most learned men have seen and held the true opinion of Augustine concerning the Grace of the Savior."

The same in Chapter 3:

"In this," he says, "the medicinal aid agrees with physical predetermination, that the function of physically predetermining the will truly belongs to it, and with that term not taken abstractly but concretely, it may deservedly be called so."

3. Hence, the necessity of Divine Grace is best reconciled with human Liberty through this celestial sweetness.

Jansenius explains and demonstrates this thesis from Augustine, Volume 3, Book 8, Chapter 3, etc.:

"Since through earthly desires the will is determined not to will, indeed to resist; He removes that depression and determination to the contrary and reflects it to the good—not only if this seems good to free will and it wills, but by making through His ineffable light and sweetness that it so seems to it and it wills. For thus God removes the stony heart and gives a heart of flesh; thus He converts the mind with most efficacious power; thus He removes the hardness of the heart; thus He works to will and to perfect; thus from those unwilling and resisting He makes willing and consenting.

"For He does this not otherwise than by inclining, applying, determining the will; and because He anticipates the very predetermination of the will, even

by predetermining—not only morally but by a true, real, and physical determination. For that predetermination is called moral which only has its place on the part of the object, as does one who advises, persuades, commands, entreats, flatters, whether externally or internally; but this [i.e., physical predetermination] has its place in the very power of the will, which He properly applies to willing by the greatness of His own sweetness, and by applying determines it—as causing in it that very thing that it determines itself, and therefore predetermines."

In these words, **Jansenius expressly asserts physical predetermination**, even if not as it is usually defended by the Scholastics.

Following in Chapter 4, **The Reconciliation of this Predetermining Grace with Human Liberty**:

"Now, if anyone desires to know how this kind of medicinal aid of Christ can consist with human free will, it is not difficult to satisfy him. For since that aid has the same mode of operating which is usually attributed to physical predetermination, as was noted in the preceding chapter, in the same way the liberty of the will already mentioned remains unharmed under that aid of Christ as it is preserved under physical predetermination. Wherefore, whatever the defenders of physical predetermination have advanced in favor of their opinion to persuade that free will is saved under it, consider it said in favor of this opinion. For in the same way, it can be shown and defended that that liberty of free will, about which they are solicitous, remains unharmed under that medicinal aid which Augustine taught.

"For almost whatever can be objected by adversaries can be solved and dissipated by that single distinction of the composite and divided sense which those defenders of physical predetermination use. For it is not necessary, they say, that with all those requisites for acting, among which is also any celestial delight and predetermination, it should stand at the same time that the will does not act; but only that it can not act. For in free will, however much prepared for acting, indeed determined and actually operating, there is found, as they themselves teach, a simultaneous power to act and not to act—not a power of simultaneity, that is, to act and not act at the same time; that is, to say it more clearly, in free will there is a power toward opposites, but not a power to have opposites at the same time in itself. For no one unless a fool would say this.

"Therefore, they teach that in this sense that which the adversaries require for liberty is to be understood—namely, that with all the requisites for acting in place, including any celestial delight and predetermination, it stands at the same time that it can not will, but not that it at the same time does not

will. For the power of not willing does not conflict with all those requisites for willing; but only that it actually does not will. Therefore, in the divided sense, the will can not do what God works in it through efficacious Grace; but in the composite sense, by no means.

"For hence are those expressions of Augustine: 'Help has been brought to the weakness of the human will, that the divine Grace may be acted upon indeclinably and insuperably.' Therefore, just as in the composite sense such phrases are true, by which the will acted upon by divine Grace is said to be unable to resist God; unable to dissent from that which God wills to work through it; unable to be turned aside; unable to be overcome: so, on the contrary, in the divided sense those phrases are true by which it is said to be able to turn aside; to be able to separate; to be able to dissent. For the power of dissenting does not conflict with that excitation, or delight, or predetermination, or even with the actual consent of the will; but only with the actual dissent: just as when a white wall is truly said to be able to be black, this does not signify that with whiteness remaining, blackness can at the same time be found in it; but that together with the whiteness there is in it the potentiality that it may become black."

Thus far concerning the reconciliation of efficacious Grace with human Liberty according to the mind of the Thomists; which, although it is true, yet Jansenius adopts another method, and, as it seems to me, a more successful one of reconciling efficacious Grace with human liberty according to Augustine's mind, in Volume 3, Book 8, Chapter 5, etc.

However, he says, it can rightly be doubted whether Augustine understood that liberty remains intact in that way, and thus thought that the influx of Grace should be reconciled with free will, to the extent that under its efficacy determining the will so that it wills and acts, at the same time the power remains that it may not will and not act. From this he concludes: Nothing can be more evident than that the Pelagians thought that the liberty of the will was violated in no other way except because God alone did the whole thing through Grace, and thus compelled man, unwilling and reluctant, to good; nor did Augustine defend free Will otherwise and hand down the concord of both except because not Grace alone works in man, but also the will from unwilling and resisting becomes willing, and by willing does something together with Grace.

The same at the end of Chapter 6: "Therefore," he says, "in order that Augustine might manifest that the liberty of free will is safe under Grace, and reconcile both to each other, he nowhere at all attempts to show anything against the Pelagians except that God does not work Grace alone, but that the will, divinely helped, wills, and thus not absolutely nothing, but also something the will itself does at the same time."

And more distinctly, in Chapter 18: "Catholics say in six hundred places and ways, again and again they cry out, that through the operating Grace indeed the good work of God is done, but yet we are not compelled unwilling, not believing unwilling, that men are not unwilling and resisting, that the will is not coerced, that the unwilling is not compelled, that Grace is not violent; because the virtue of the unwilling is nothing; because a man is not good if he is unwilling; because men cannot believe unwilling; because if the will is compelled, it does not will; Grace is not so received that men lose their own will.

"They add the reason: because God does not build His temple through Grace as from stones which have no motion of their own, nor does He work as in those who lack reason and will; but we ourselves will, we run, we strive, we act, and we do something. Therefore rightly Grace stands together with free Will, because Grace makes us will, makes us act, gives us to will well and to act well; for it produces the very good of the will."

Also, in Chapter 19, he adds: "From this therefore immediately shines forth the true reason why always Augustine, Prosper, and the other Fathers, explaining the concord of Grace and Liberty, could have pressed or thought to require nothing else than that the free will under Grace should will, serving Grace no less than itself. For nothing more in conformity with his doctrine could be said than that he had consistently handed down in his writings that it cannot be that willing is not free for us. Therefore, if willing cannot not be free for us, surely if Grace makes the will will, it also makes it will freely, and there is no conflict between Grace and free Will.

"From this therefore consequently arises why Augustine, Prosper, Fulgentius, and all these ancient witnesses insist against the Pelagians, who confirmed that the interior of free will follows from Grace, that Grace does not coerce the will; does not draw the unwilling; does not inflict force or violence. Namely, the nature of the will is to be freely formed; but force, coercion, and necessity alone impede it, which they saw, as he says, is not in our power, etc."

Finally, in Chapter 40, he solves an objection. The objection of adversaries is that this concord of Grace and free Will does not differ from the opinion of Calvin, etc. They answered, he says, "Not all things that heretics teach are heretical. But if in the matter Calvin has thought with Augustine and the ancient Fathers, it is not Augustine who is to be offended because of Calvin, but Calvin rather to be congratulated because of Augustine, etc."

Indeed, not only Calvin and Augustine, but also the philosophers Socrates, Plato, the Stoics, Simplicius, even Aristotle himself, have had the same formal idea of liberty, as has been already demonstrated at the beginning of this §9, and §§7 and 8.

Moreover, that the Necessity of Divine Concurrence does not take away human Liberty can be demonstrated from the very things granted above. For Suarez, in Part 1 of the Second Part, Tract 2, Section 3, page 138, says: "It must be said," he says, "that when God

moves a creature to a supernatural form, He inflicts no violence upon it; because He does not act in it against the appetite of nature, but above it; and indeed if such a form does not of itself induce nor require the privation of any natural perfection, as in the infusion of Grace or of knowledge; then it is said, as it is in the divine operation which is immediate to the faculties, because such action is in no way repugnant to or from the faculty." And this, he says, is the natural appetite from Aristotle himself, *Ethics*, Book 3, Chapter 1, page 72: in the very willing, the will is the virtue inborn in us, etc. (If it be allowed thus to explain the meaning of the words, against the sense of the man.) Virtues are not from nature, but from God, "yet not from beyond nature," since the will is most free while it receives virtues infused by God. Also, *Ethics*, Book 3, Chapter 8, page 153: "Voluntary actions are one thing; habits are another: habits are the principle of voluntary action."

Suarez adds on the same matter, page 139: "It must be said (1) although God can by His sole power infuse habits into the will, and consequently inducing their necessity; yet He cannot by this action inflict violence upon it. (2) Concerning the privation both of act and of habit, it must be said that God can necessitate the will so that it lacks any act or habit. If God could necessitate the will, would not the necessitated necessity be able to coexist with liberty? Would not that necessity conflict with the nature of the will and with liberty? To be brief and sum up in few words: that we subject the determination of the human will to the divine determination, they by no means deny that the human will is determined by the determining, but that it is to be determined by liberty itself. There it is where it is acted upon by determining to will; to say nothing else than that it is free to determine to will by will, and that there is cessation of the divine operation flowing into it. Moreover, nothing here from divine immediate things but the ultimate powers, and thus the will by its efficacy will firmly will, is inclined toward Grace the will. If this concurrence is firm, knowledge is determined by Aristotle through Philosophy, and our soul is called through divine wisdom, is established in God, what then through affection virtues inhere in us, etc.

§10. From the things previously said and considered together, it follows most invincibly that **Actual Indifference is not essential or constitutive of liberty**. This thesis properly contends against the Jesuits and all their followers, who acknowledge no liberty except that which enjoys indifference. But I do not doubt that, when the darkness of their reasoning is dispersed by the ray of right reason, the truth of our thesis will be illuminated, from the very degrees of indifference. But before I proceed to a clear declaration of the matter, a few things about the various distinctions of indifference must be premised.

1. **Indifference in the Schools is said to be either Radical or Actual:** Radical indifference regards the flexibility of the will, or the first act itself; Actual indifference pertains to the second act or the exercise of the will.
2. **The will is said to be indifferent either with respect to contraries in species, or with respect to contraries in exercise.** Indifference of contraries is when the will

is indifferently disposed toward contraries, namely good and evil, which is called specificative and not contrariant liberty. It is called specificative liberty thus, because this and that around which the free agent is engaged are different species; and because they are often contrary, opposed, or disparate, it is also called Contrariant or Disparative Liberty. Indifference of contradictories is when the will is indifferently disposed to will and not will; whence arises the liberty of contradiction or of exercise. **Liberty of exercise** is the faculty by which the agent, all prerequisites being in place and impediments removed, can act or not act. For because to be able to act and not act is to be able to exercise an act and to cease from it, therefore it is called Liberty of exercise; and because to act and not act are contradictories, it is also called Liberty of contradiction. Liberty of specification includes liberty of exercise, and liberty of exercise does not include liberty of specification, as Dorodon states in *On Liberty*, Chapter 2.

3. **Indifference is either passive, objective, or active and subjective.** Passive indifference is in a potency capable of different forms; objective indifference is when several objects are proposed; active and subjective indifference is in the agent.
4. Again, **indifference is either absolute or conditional.**

These things premised, we set forth our thesis in the following hypotheses, with as much brevity and clarity as we can.

1. **Adiaphoea or Indifference universally is not essential to the will or connatural to liberty.** Here first it must be distinguished between the Essentials and Accidentals of Will and Liberty. The essential to liberty is nothing else but the power of willing and acting spontaneously, or rational spontaneity; but Indifference is accidental. It must not be denied that in the Jesuit Schools the Idea of Indifference enters into the definition of liberty: for they define the free as that which, all requisites being in place, can act or not act. But that this definition of Liberty is spurious and most incongruous, indeed rejected by the sounder Scholastics, will be sufficiently evident from what has been said and what follows. And Suarez, in 1.2, Tract 2, page 124, frankly confesses that Scotus requires indifference neither for the voluntary nor for the free; but only that it proceeds from perfect knowledge. And in truth, no man or Angel has had or can have Indifference, if it is considered as exercising a singular action, having regard to the object, the disposition, the subject, the first cause, and the circumstances, from which it is evident that all men and Angels exercise all their actions whether natural, civil, moral, or supernatural, necessarily and infallibly, although spontaneously, voluntarily, and most freely.

All men and Angels in the exercise of their freest acts are determined:

1. **By the Immutable volition and infallible knowledge of God**, from which it necessarily follows that all acts, effects, and future events are in themselves

certainly, infallibly, and determinately future. A certain effect presupposes a certain and determined cause for its production: for there cannot be a certain futuration of a thing unless it has certain causes of itself; and if it has them, it follows that it is necessary. Moreover, it is impossible for God to have infallible knowledge of a future thing which is not necessarily future but can be otherwise.

2. **From the congruence between the object and the subject.** For between every properly disposed faculty and the object which is naturally destined to it, such a congruence intervenes that if one is suitably applied to the other, the operation of the faculty agreeable to the nature of the object is inevitable. As much as there is congruence between the faculty and the object, so much is there necessity in operation. Thus:
 - In natural things, from the application of the active to the passive, namely fire to combustible material, the act necessarily follows.
 - In animate things, when the object is properly applied to the sense organ, sensation necessarily follows.
 - In human matters, when an intelligible is rightly presented and accommodated to the Intellect, assent necessarily follows.

The same occurs in the practical Intellect, which judges about the goodness of things: for the practical Intellect necessarily judges that good is to be loved; and that the highest Good is to be loved supremely and necessarily. Should we not then, by parity of reasoning, conclude that the act of the will concerning its own proper object clearly and distinctly apprehended is no less necessary? God indeed has so adjusted the faculty of Understanding and Willing to its own proper object that if it is well disposed and the object suitably accommodated, it cannot but be that from the conjunction of both the act necessarily, although most freely, arises. Therefore add clarity to the object, and remove viciousness from the faculty; as you increase that congruence, you will have introduced greater necessity proportionally into the futuration of the operation. You may see more in Derodon, *On Liberty*, Chapter 4, and following. Hence...

2. **Jesuitical Equilibrium, or Indifference to opposites**, namely, **good and evil**, is utterly spurious and in no way congruent with human **Liberty**. This hypothesis is invincibly demonstrated by **Simplicius** in *Epictetus' Enchiridion*, chapter 1, page 22:

"For to the free man, it is worthy to attend to what is his own and familiar, and to have better things than those that are alien—unlike those who have philosophized in contrary ways."

Nor, however, is our liberty and power in all things to be measured by the fact that it can also do the contrary. For those always attached to the good of the soul, embracing the good, also have free choice (for that choice is not coerced), and they always adhere to their own good; nor are they ever drawn away to the contrary.

Three things occur here that are eminently conducive to understanding the nature of Liberty so uniformly:

1. **Nothing is repugnant to free choice except coercion.**
2. **Certain souls, indeed pious ones, are always attached to the good.**
3. **Hence, our liberty is not to be measured by the fact that it can also do contraries, i.e., good and evil.**

Indeed, this is an unassailable argument to refute the Jesuits' equilibrium; see more about this in §8.

That indifference to good and evil is spurious and in no way connatural to liberty is vigorously demonstrated by **Jansenius**, against the Jesuits, in his *Augustinus*, Volume 2, Book 4, Chapter 24. There, he presents the Jesuits' argument against the necessity of sinning in these words:

"If there is a kind of men who, with the liberty of doing good removed, are oppressed by the necessity of sinning, you command and exhort them to abstain from sins; we unjustly blame and censure them if they have not abstained."

"They responded," he says, "that the necessity of sinning, which Augustine teaches, with the liberty of doing good removed, is not repugnant to the liberty of choice, because Augustine teaches that both are simultaneously in the same men. But the whole delusion lies in this: when we hear of the free choice of the will, we are accustomed to imagine a certain indifference of the will to good and evil, which **Julian** always stubbornly asserted was added to men, at which Augustine aimed, and which the truth itself compels Catholics to insist upon. They argue this weakness in Catholics, and in the opinion born of the infirmity of the **Pelagians** and pagan philosophers."

Then Jansenius proceeds, from Augustine and the Scholastics, demonstrating that this indifference to good and evil does not belong to free choice:

- From (1) the **Liberty of Demons**, who would sin, having no indifference to good;
- (2) From the **Liberty of good Angels**, who have no indifference to evil.

"It is certain," he says, "that Angels cannot sin, and notwithstanding that, they do good," etc. For the desultory mobility of changing the free will, as even the Scholastics admit, is not of the essence of liberty but an imperfection of it, involving imprudence or inconstancy of the will. Indeed, he proves from Augustine, page 271:

"Every deliberate will, by the very fact that it is in our power—that is, that it is not without our willing but with our willing—is free, and cannot not be free, whether the exercise is necessarily made by necessity or not."

Which is most broadly demonstrated to be true from Augustine's mind in the very love and beatific vision.

That liberty does not require the faculty for opposite contraries is demonstrated by **Alvarez**, *On Aid*, Book 12, Disputation 115, Section "Note":

"That for liberty, a faculty for opposite contraries, such as doing good or evil, is not necessarily required. For in God, the most perfect liberty of choice is found, but in God there is not a faculty for doing good and evil, but only for doing good."

Hence, it is sufficiently clear that the ability to sin is not of liberty or a part of liberty, but a disease and sickness of free choice: for the will is the more free the less it can serve sin. Does not Paul say, **2 Corinthians 3:17**, "Where the Spirit of God is, there is liberty"? But if liberty, according to the Jesuits' opinion, consists in equilibrium, then as God increases the Spirit of Grace in us, our liberty is entirely diminished if He fills our mind with grace. Is it not most absurd that when we are made better, we are more determined to good? What! Can that liberty be natural to man, which is thus in the vice of the will?

3. **Indifference of contradiction**, or of suspending action, is not essential to liberty. The will is either always free or never; if always, then it is impossible for the indifference of suspending its action to be essential to liberty. For (1) the will cannot suspend its action regarding the ultimate end clearly and distinctly apprehended. Reason itself declares that the highest good must be supremely loved: where there is suspension of the will, there is room for deliberation; but concerning the ultimate end, as Aristotle testifies, there is no deliberation, but about the means. Therefore, in *Ethics* I.3.c.7, he says, "**The end appears**," meaning the end is natural. The same with the Scholastics: and yet, that the end is freely loved and desired is equally clear. To be determined to the highest Good, and so that it cannot not be determined, pertains to the perfection of the will, therefore also of liberty. The appetite for the end is either more or at least no less appropriate to liberty than the choice of means. For the appetite for the ultimate end is the most natural and most perfect act of the will, therefore also the most free. Let that liberty perish which does not pertain to the perfection of the will. **Pererius**, just like **Corvinus**, concedes that the ultimate end can be desired voluntarily and freely. This is vigorously demonstrated by Jansenius, *Augustinus*, Volume 3, Book 7, Chapter 4.

"Liberty is most concerned with the end, according to Augustine. For since that is free to it which is when we will, and there is first and most the will, it is certainly necessary that there is the greatest liberty concerning the end: for we will the end most, because we will it for its own sake. Again, since that is free which is for its own sake, which does not serve another, it is necessary that in the appetite for the end there is the greatest liberty, to

which the movement towards the means necessarily serves. Then, since that is free which delights, it is necessary that that movement is most free which is most delightful: such is the will's movement towards the end. Finally, the movement towards the end is most free because it is least coerced."

(2) The highest beatitude of the will does not admit such indifference of suspending. **Suarez** acknowledges, in 1.2, Tract 1, Disputation 9, page 78, that given the vision of God by the nature of the thing, the will necessarily follows the movement of that object, loving it above all things as much as it can, and therefore the beatific vision admits no indifference. And thus in Disputation 10, Section 1, page 88, he concedes that the liberty of the blessed is placed in this, that they can exercise various acts. **Aristotle**, *Ethics*, Book 3, Chapter 7, says, "**No one is unwillingly happy**," i.e., beatitude is the most free thing, and yet it is necessarily desired. Whence it necessarily follows that the liberty of the blessed presents no indifference of suspending. Just as God, perfectly and constantly beholding Himself, cannot but love Himself perfectly and constantly, so we, through the light of Glory according to the measure of our vision, cannot but love God. But if in this way our liberty is taken away, let liberty be taken away indeed and farewell, says **Camero**.

Thus, according to Augustine's mind, although beatific love is necessary and admits no indifference of exercise, it nevertheless does not cease to be free. For that necessity is not repugnant to the will but arises from the vehemence of the lover. For just as the will has reasons for willing something without danger to liberty, so sometimes it has reasons for willing firmly and never changing, without danger to liberty. For the continuation and stability of volition is no less free than the initial volition itself. Why then do we complain about the liberty of an immutable will, if the wisest and most perfect will itself does not wish to change? As if, indeed, that desultory inconstancy of willing, which we experience in ourselves, contributes anything to the perfection of free will; when it is the most certain sign not of liberty but of the soul's sickness. For it arises partly from ignorance of all the reasons and circumstances on account of which something is prudently to be embraced; partly from inconstancy in not persevering in what we have prudently embraced, as Jansenius very wisely notes, *Augustinus*, Volume 3, Book 6, Chapter 35.

(3) The will does not have indifference of exercise, or of suspending its action after the practical dictate of the practical intellect, as they love to say in the schools. For indeed, just as the speculative intellect, once the truth of a proposition is known, does not suspend the act of assent but necessarily and infallibly gives assent to it; so also the practical intellect, having recognized the goodness of something, does not leave the will suspended, nor judges that the act of love should be suspended, but necessarily and infallibly judges that that goodness should be loved.

(4) Moreover, the will is not indifferent regarding the exercise (of action) in respect to the means, when they are judged necessary to achieve the end. For the means, when we

find them useful and necessary to the end, we embrace with no less necessary inclination than the end itself.

(5) Finally, there is no indifference of contradiction, or of suspending action, from the divine concurrence effectively determined. For if the will were indifferent with respect to divine concurrence, the hearts of men would not be in the hand of God, nor would anything to be accomplished through the wills of men need to be asked or expected from Him. But this is what Augustine complains happened to **Cicero**, who, in order to make man free, made him sacrilegious. Let man's liberty rather perish than that he be established as free by such a law that he is not subject to God's will and providence. Therefore, when God removes indifference with respect to exercise by His efficacious grace, He perfects liberty: for the will acts freely because God inspires in it the most free willing, so that it acts thus.

Most excellently says **Bannes**, in 1, Question 23, Article 5:

"The free choice of the creature receives liberty participated from the divine free will, moving it strongly and sweetly according to the mode of its nature."

The profound **Bradwardine**, Book 2, Chapter 2, page 448, most validly demonstrates that indifference of contradiction is not of the essence of liberty. Perhaps it might still be asked:

"Is it of the essence of free will that there is naturally liberty, or the possibility of contradiction—that is, of repelling any of its acts? For this seems to be implied from the meaning of the name. Yet the opposite is certain concerning the free will of God by which He loves Himself."

He later shows the same:

"Further, it can be asked: Does free will, which is naturally of contradiction, always freely, according to contradiction, be able to turn into the opposite of any of its acts? One must distinguish times and qualities of free will: for in the time and quality of confirmed beatitude, it cannot, as the reason of confirmed beatitude demonstrates, and all Catholic doctors unanimously agree. But in the time and quality of the way (i.e., during the journey, in this life), it can in the opposite privatively not act—that is, not do such an act; yet it cannot always positively go into the opposite—that is, into a contrary positive act with respect to any object."

From here.

Objective and Passive Indifference Is Not of the Intrinsic Nature of Liberty

For the free will does not have objective indifference by reason of the ultimate end clearly apprehended; nor passive indifference by reason of the efficacious concurrence of God. Thus **Alvarez**, in *De Auxiliis*, Disputation 116, states:

"The formal liberty of created free will does not formally consist in objective indifference, nor in passive indifference, but in the active indifference of the free faculty itself. This is proved because free will is essentially and per se an active power."

1. **Objective Indifference Is Not Intrinsic to the Nature of Liberty**

This is vigorously demonstrated by the great **Bradwardine** in *De Causa Dei*, Book 2, Chapter 2, page 447. He says:

"Here it could be further asked: 'Can the will knowingly not will and hate pure good in itself, which appears, and because it appears in every way good?' And some argue that it can, because otherwise the will would not be free at all. But this cannot stand; for just as the primary reason for something to be willable and lovable is the good, whether apparent or real, so the non-willable and hateful is the evil, whether apparent or real. Therefore, one cannot not will in itself what does not appear in some way evil."

After this, it is reasonably to be inquired:

"Can the will not will pure good offered to it?"

Bradwardine concludes on page 448:

"From these things, I consider it manifest that free will is not so called because it can freely will and not will anything whatsoever; but because it can freely will any of its willable objects and not will any of its non-willable objects. Nor is it called free because it can freely will or not will any of its objects in any manner whatsoever, as the preceding taught; but in the manner suitable to its own power. Nor is it called free will because it can freely turn into the opposite of any of its acts; but because from rational choice or spontaneous decision it acts."

Therefore, it seems that the first proper act of the will is to will its first and proper object, which is good; and because it wills good, it does not will otherwise, and thus hates evil.

2. **Passive Indifference Is Not of the Essence of Liberty**

This is likewise demonstrated by **Alvarez** in *De Auxiliis*, Disputation 22. He says:

"A twofold indifference is found in the created will: one passive in order to God, insofar as it receives prior motion by which God Himself causes free

will to determine itself to willing this or that; the other is active indifference in order to this free act or that. The first indifference is efficiently removed by God alone; the second is efficiently removed by the created will, moved by God, and formally by the free act, which is not produced in us effectively by God alone, but by God and free will. For God works in us to will and to accomplish, but not without us simultaneously consenting."

Hence, the determination of the will in the first act, or in the final completion of the first act, is not formally the operation of the will, but something prior, and therefore from God alone; but the determination of the will in the second act is formally the operation of the same will, and therefore from God and free will, moved by God Himself.

Although the will is merely passive insofar as it receives assistance and prior motion, yet in order to reach the end of the motion, which is free operation, it behaves actively and freely. This passive indifference is sometimes called privative, about which **Alvarez** philosophizes cleverly in *De Auxiliis*, Disputation 22:

"The other is indifference which is opposed to free determination and implies a certain potentiality or suspension of the free act; and this indifference the will has during the whole time when it does nothing and is not efficiently promoted by God to do anything, because then it is determined neither by a free act nor by an efficacious motion, to which the free middle power follows such an act. And this indifference is not of the nature of liberty but rather an imperfection appropriate to it when it is deprived of the second act to which it is in potentiality; for the will and its liberty are more perfect when it is free in the second act than when it is only free in the first act."

Moreover, if such indifference were of the essence of liberty, the will would not be free when it actually produces a free act, because it is now determined by such an act.

The same is further demonstrated by an invincible reason. For God is most perfectly free in what He wills or works externally; and yet He has no indifference at all that includes potentiality, otherwise He would not be supremely perfect or pure act; therefore, such indifference is not of the essence of liberty but an imperfection appropriate to it.

The same is briefly touched upon by **Alvarez**, Disputation 116, Conclusion 1:

"Passive or privative indifference is not of the intrinsic nature of free will if it is considered according to the common reason by which it analogically agrees with God and intellectual creatures."

Finally, no indifference pertains to liberty except the radical, habitual, and conditional kind, insofar as it serves the order of the ultimate end and the First Cause. This indifference holds one and the same concept with rational spontaneity, or the

inclination of reason, which includes the entire formal concept of liberty. It is called radical and habitual indifference insofar as it is opposed to indifference concerning exercise and the actual. Hence, it is also called by some "indifference in the first act," insofar as it denotes the flexibility of the will, which the predetermining concurrence of God does not at all destroy.

For when God efficaciously determines the will, He does not so circumscribe it to one part that it cannot bend itself to the other (in the divided sense), but only so that it does not actually bend itself to the other. Indeed, it suffices for the liberty of the will if it is in itself or by its nature flexible to the opposite of what it chooses, although the same liberty is governed and determined to one part by God. The reason is that it is not determined by God except in a manner suitable to its nature, i.e., to act conveniently and freely, with the power of bending or determining itself to the opposite—from itself, I say, although not from itself alone.

Thus **Twiss**, in *Vindiciae Gratiae*, page 206:

"To establish the liberty of the will, it suffices that it is considered flexible, i.e., not only passively in respect of some extrinsic agent (in which case it can be bent and moved immediately only by God, not by any second cause), but also actively in respect of itself, so that it can bend itself to the opposite, although not by itself alone, without the concurrence of God."

We frankly profess, with the Thomists, that the will of man at the very moment it is moved by God can be moved otherwise in the divided sense, by reason of its radical flexibility; but to assert that the same obtains also in the composite sense is considered nothing less than unjust.

This is more fully explained by **Alvarez** in *De Auxiliis*, Disputation 15:

"It must be supposed that, as Aristotle and Thomas teach (Metaphysics IX, Lesson 10), in a contingent and free cause there is at the same time a power to either of the opposite extremes, yet there is not a power to have opposites at the same time; and the reason is that the power to one act is not repugnant to the power to the contrary act, nor even to the contrary act; but contrary acts are repugnant to each other in the same subject. Hence, created free will, not only before it is determined to one act, but even in the very instant in which it is determined by God and determines itself to the same act, simultaneously has the power by which it can freely produce the contrary act; yet it does not have the power to have the contrary act at the same time, for two contrary acts cannot be in the same power at the same time, but only successively."

Hence that distinction between the simultaneity of power and the power of simultaneity. Thus **Capreolus** says:

"In free will, there is the simultaneity of power to opposites, but not the power of simultaneity, i.e., the power to have opposites at the same time. For in free will, there is at the same time the power to assent and dissent, which are contrary opposites; and to act or not to act, which are opposed contradictorily; yet there is not in it the power to assent and dissent at the same time, or to act and not act at the same time. The reason is that the power to one act is not opposed to the power to the contrary act; but two contrary acts are impossible in the same subject, nor can they be verified of the same at the same time, just as two contradictories are not verified of the same."

To explain this more fully, the distinction between the composite and divided sense, discussed in §8, is useful. From these points, it is clear that determination to act does not take away the power of not acting.

Indeed, **Alvarez** notes well in Disputation 115, number 4, that "to be able to act and not act" can be understood in two ways:

1. So that the sense is that the power not to act stands at the same time in the same subject with the grace and assistance required to act; and this sense is true.
2. That grace and efficacious assistance given for such a particular operation, and the absence of such an act or the contrary act, can be or sometimes are at the same time in the same subject; which sense is most false.

To sum up briefly: All men, considered absolutely, without any regard to the object, the disposition of the subject, and divine concurrence, have some indetermination and radical indifference to various acts, or to act and the suspension of the act, since they have the rational faculty of moving themselves now to one good, now to another.

And that such indifference in the first act, or habitual indifference, suffices for liberty is admitted by **Suarez** himself in 1.2, Tract 2, Section 3, page 128:

"Liberty, actual or exercised, also requires determination to one side in the second act itself, but indifference in the first act or faculty to which it relates."

2. The Indifference Pertaining to Liberty Is Only Conditional, Preserving the Order of the End

Thus **Gibieuf** in *De Libertate*, Book 1, Chapter 1, proves:

"The indifference required for liberty is not absolute nor restricted by no condition, but tempered by that condition which the second cause and the nature of the dependent being desire, preserving the Order of the End: so that to be indifferent to acting and not acting, disregarding the order of the

end, which is the rule of our appetites, is not true liberty but spurious, and a true defect of liberty."

This conditional indifference, insofar as it regards the order of the end, comprises in itself various conditions:

1. **It Is Founded on the Amplitude and Dominion of the Human Will**

For brute animals, being bound to matter, enjoy no universality or rational indifference. But the free cause, thus obtaining indifference from lower objects, can leap over the limits of all created things with which it is engaged, and even soar straight to the highest good. And from this eminence and dominion arises conditional indifference with respect to lower things.

2. **This Conditional Indifference Regards Not Acts but Objects**

Thus **Gibieuf** in *De Libertate*, Book 1, Chapter 24, Section 4:

"We do not place liberty in absolute indifference to acts, but in indifference to objects; and in this, that he who acts freely engages with them without adhesion and attachment, being bound only to the highest good. Absolute indifference to acting is removed by the act; for he who acts is no longer indifferent but determined to act. Indeed, I am about to demonstrate that no human act is morally indifferent in the individual."

3. **This Conditional Indifference to Various Objects Does Not Regard the Ultimate End but the Means**

For there is no indifference of contradiction, much less of contrariety, concerning the ultimate end clearly apprehended, as has already been demonstrated; therefore, all indifference is concerning the means that tend to the end. This is hence called the **Liberty of Choice**, by which we engage with those things which are under the end and towards the end, according as the order of the end requires, being in no way attached to them but adhering only to the supreme end.

"The Liberty of Choice," says **Gibieuf**, "implies withdrawal from lower things and approach to the infinite. And that is the best choice which intends God most. For liberty consists not so much in the mind being open to many things as in reducing many things to one."

Hence, that conditional indifference, or Liberty of Choice, is the legitimate and well-ordered pursuit of creatures, or the movement of the mind tending towards God through creatures, as through means and steps; namely, that one so behaves towards lower objects that he contemplates and loves them only in God.

4. **This Conditional Indifference Is Not Merely Negative or Privative but Positive and Active**

It is the power of containing under itself lower things so that through them we may tend to the ultimate end.

"The wise man," says **Gibieuf**, "according to God, is indifferent because, adhering to God alone, he regards as indifferent whatever is outside of God, who is his highest and universal good; and with the Spirit of God dwelling and active within, he frees himself from all things that are below God. This is active, not passive indifference; and not changeableness or servile abasement but a generous and plainly divine sublimity surpassing the narrowness of things inferior to God."

3. **The Indifference of Liberty Is Conditional**

Insofar as it serves the order of the First Cause and dependence on its efficacious concurrence. For there is no absolute indifference with respect to divine concurrence; rather, the more the will is subjected to it, the freer it becomes. Thus, **Augustine** says:

"The will is the freer, the more it is subject to divine Grace."

But to briefly summarize the main point, it must be said that indifference pertains to liberty as something consequent and accidental, not as something essential. For liberty, according to its formal and essential idea, implies nothing but **Rational Spontaneity**, or the **Volition of Reason**, founded in the **Immateriality**, **Universality**, and **Amplitude** of the human mind. And indeed, that actual indifference is not essential to liberty, I will prove with a single argument, which seems to me most invincible:

1. **All human acts are free.**
2. **Many human acts are not indifferent.**
3. **Therefore, indifference is not essential to liberty.**

That the major premise is most evident is clear from the fact that liberty is essential to man and to all human acts. Thus **Suarez**, in 1.2, Tract 2, page 132, says:

"It follows that the faculty of acting freely is intrinsic and connatural to man. If the faculty of acting freely is intrinsic and connatural to man, then consequently to all human acts."

Similarly, **Suarez**, in 1.2, Tract 3, page 203, states:

"Secondly, it must be said that, for an act to be moral, it is necessary that it be actually free. But every act of the will is moral. Therefore, it is clearer than clear that liberty cannot be separated from the will: where there is will, there is liberty; and where there is voluntariness, there is freedom: either man always has free will, or never."

For if this belongs to him as he is a man, free will must be in him as long as human nature itself remains in him, as **Amyraldus** states in *De Libero Arbitrio*, page 6. Likewise, **Camero**, in his *Collations* with **Tilenus**, page 699, says:

"Liberty cannot be separated from the will, since it is nothing else than *prohairesis* (choice)."

And the Jesuits concede that all moral goodness and malice are founded on physical liberty; but every human act is good or evil; therefore, it is free. As will be discussed below.

The minor premise, namely, that many human acts are not indifferent, is clearer than midday light. For:

1. The Jesuits concede, just like other Scholastics, that the act of the will concerning the ultimate end is not indifferent.
2. Moreover, to add abundantly and conclusively, I assert that no human act in the individual is either physically or morally indifferent.

That no individual human act is physically indifferent is evident from the fact that every individual human act is determined by:

1. The congruence between object and subject.
2. Practical judgment.
3. The cognition and concurrence of God, as previously discussed.

Furthermore, that no individual human act is morally indifferent is clear because every human act in the individual is either good or evil. For every human act must tend toward the ultimate end; and if a man acts otherwise, he will deprive himself and his act of due perfection, and thus will sin. The human will has the most universal subordination to the ultimate end; nor is it permissible for a rational creature, which confesses that it receives itself from God, not to refer this back to God. Everything ought to act according to its nature; and he who acts otherwise fails.

Therefore, if a man exercises a certain human act, he must by it be converted to God, because this is his nature as a human. Hence, it follows that there are no human acts in the individual morally indifferent, but all are good or evil. Where then is the indifference about which the **Pelagians**, the **Jesuits**, and their followers boast so much?

