

Gisbertus Voetius, *Politica Ecclesiasticae* [Amsterdam, Joannes à Waesberge, 1663–1676], 1:114-148.

114

Chapter I - The Term Ecclesiastical Power is Distinguished. The Power itself is Properly Defined. The Parts Entering and Constituting that Power are Explained, along with its Qualities and Opposites.

For the sake of better understanding, we will distinctly and separately consider Power (to which we refer as Liberty), Ecclesiastical Polity or Governance, and the Laws or Canons of governance. The former as a principle and foundation, the latter as a principle of order, namely, constituted by that Power or assumed by the Churches, duly imposed and adapted:.....

115

...as a rule and formula generally guiding and leading the Churches in their corresponding and closer confederation. The power of the Church is distinguished into extrinsic and intrinsic, or properly called. The former in its kind and formally is secular, which can be common to Churches as well as other societies and colleges. The latter is sacred in itself and formally ecclesiastical, proper to it. The former directly depends on secular power and polity, as its proper and proximate efficient cause; the latter does not. To the former pertains:

The dominion of property or useful goods and revenues; which is no less appropriate to any Church in its deacons and dispensers, than to any other colleges, whether scholastic, mechanical, mercantile, etc., or even to private individuals: on which, more elsewhere.

Privileges and liberties granted to ecclesiastical persons, such as e.g. that the faithful may not serve Jews or Pagans, L. We Decree C. concerning the Hearing of Bishops. L. If anyone C. from the Expected; and that Bishops could not be appointed as guardians by testament.

The liberties and immunities of temples: on which, more below in Book 4, where concerning Temples.

The immunities of ecclesiastical goods: on which, more below in Book 4, title concerning Temporal Matters of the Church.

Opposed to this external power and liberty are excessive extension and abuse. Such as 1. The Anabaptists, who, led by Thomas Müntzer, John of Leiden, and other fanatic men of that kind, proclaimed the liberty of the Church and the faithful under the New Testament from all political power and defended it with the sword. For which, the younger ones should consult the History of Sleidanus, and the particular Histories of Heresbachius, Lambert Hortensius, etc., concerning the Anabaptist Tumults, as well as the Catalog of Heretics by Conrad Schlüsserburgius. Today's Anabaptists, although they disapprove of the use of the sword by their predecessors and brothers, and the power taken from the magistrates and its usurpation; nevertheless, they still believe that the immunity or liberty from all civil governance belongs to Christians in the forum of conscience before God; since no conscience of a Christian can use it towards their brothers. But this should be treated under the Fifth Commandment, title concerning the Magistrate.

2. The Papists, who exceed in many ways here. Firstly, they claim for the clergy immunity and exemption from all jurisdiction and judgments of the magistrate both civil and criminal. Secondly, they attribute to their Church, Councils, and Popes either direct power (as the Canonists say) or indirect (as most theologians now commonly say) over all secular matters and persons, even Emperors, Kings, etc. Thirdly, especially over heretical Kings. On which, the Decrees, Bulls, and many writings cited elsewhere should be seen: among which those excel that were issued for the temporal power of the Pope, as well as the Apologetic writings during the time of the French League against Henry IV, such as those by Gul. Rossaeus concerning the just authority of the Christian Republic against impious and heretical kings; and the Apologetic writings against the Oath of Allegiance in England, and the writings against the Venetians under Paul V.....

.....Select Part. Disput. title concerning the Pope's Temporal Power, incompatible with the Roman See, etc. Fourthly, they grant coercive power to bishops in general, with prisons and corporal punishment. About which the writers on Episcopal Power and Practice, and the manner of proceeding in the Roman Curia and Episcopal Courts, should be consulted. Fifthly, they assert the same power and right of war to them: a particular apology of the Bishop of Poitiers, Henry Louis Castaneus, in French, in octavo, should be consulted. Sixthly, they grant to the same and inquisitors the power of inquiring into consciences and compelling them under the title and pretext of questions of faith. Indeed, they indirectly extend coercive power to Jews and Saracens. As can be seen in Canon Law and the Director of Inquisitors, where it concerns Jews. Seventhly, they subject matrimonial and adultery cases, as well as those of magic, to Episcopal courts, removing them from secular courts. Eighthly, they eagerly seek and tenaciously retain the dominion of royal goods, not only useful but also direct and supreme with the entire pragmatic jurisdiction of civil law with empire. Concerning this, the history of Chapters, Monasteries, Bishoprics (especially in Germany), and the treatises of John of Chokier, Vicar of the Bishopric of Liège, on Ecclesiastical Liberty, and the Jesuit Gretser's treatise on the Liberality of Kings and Princes towards the Roman Church, should be consulted. To the height of confusion, they make such power formally sacred and ecclesiastical, even paramount.

We thus exclude from this discussion:

The external power of the Church (which is inherent to the Church, but not as the Church), with its opposites and abuses.

The ecclesiastical power of the magistrate, objectively and by external denomination so called, not formally; which is present in the Church, or which deals with it, but does not directly subordinate it to itself.

The intrinsic spiritual and ecclesiastical power, but superior and regal, or monarchical, both internal and external; which belongs solely to Christ the head and king, dependently and economically. Ephesians 1:22, Revelation 3:7.

The ecclesiastical power of God, one and triune, our redeemer in Christ the mediator: which is absolutely and independently supreme and monarchical. The ecclesiastical power, which might be said by external denomination to be in the Angels, as ministers and instruments of Christ the mediator in aiding and defending the Church.

The ecclesiastical power, if it existed and would have existed before the fall, if indeed man had persisted.

The extraordinary power of Prophets and Apostles, as such, and formally and specifically taken; especially the power of Moses, concerning which Deuteronomy 34:10-11, Hebrews 3:5-6, and according to some interpreters Galatians 3:19.

The spiritual power and liberty of individual believers considered separately and in their union with Christ: concerning which, more elsewhere and otherwise. The same spiritual power considered in the union and mutual invisible and mystical communion of the members.

117

We propose to consider here only the inferior, ministerial, ordinary, and formally sacred and ecclesiastical power of the instituted Church as such, in its union and communion, visibly and concerning its external state. These ambiguities, because they were not accurately distinguished and clarified by everyone, have cast considerable shadows on this doctrine.

Let us, therefore, proceed to the definition, the principle of all right disputation, which is as follows: **Ecclesiastical Power is the sacred ministerial right granted by Christ, the head of the Church, and ordinarily applied, externally and governing itself and its members for mutual edification and salvation. The remote genus in this definition is right; the proximate genus is sacred right; the nearest genus is ministerial sacred right; which, by metonymy and synecdoche, is called the key of the kingdom of heaven in Matthew 16.** The adequate subject is the external, visible, and instituted Church as such, considered

in its collection. The object (which is the same as the term) is the care and governance of its persons and things, or ecclesiastical and sacred things, persons, and actions. The efficient cause of the institution is Christ the mediator, as such, as the spiritual king and head of the Church: the application to this or that collection of believers or those professing the faith, and each particular ecclesiastical body, is the particular consent and confederation of the believers themselves. For just as this primarily founds the visible particular Church and produces its form, so also it grants power according to the common saying of philosophers: "He who gives the form gives the consequent powers." See what has been said before in the Treatise on the foundation and efficient cause of the instituted Church. The end is mutual edification and salvation, Acts 2:47, Hebrews 10:24-25, compared with 2 Corinthians 10:4-5, 8.

The parts of this power (which, as a whole and aggregate, have hitherto been considered by us) are distributed either by the object it occupies or the term, or by the subject in which it resides. In the former way, it is divided into Dogmatic, Legislative, Executive or Governing, and Judicial. Others refer it to two members, namely, the power of governance and jurisdiction, or the key of order and jurisdiction. Others distinguish the key of knowledge and the key of judgment or the power of sentencing. Thus almost do the Pontiffs. See Gabriel and other Scholastics in Book 4, Distinction 18. Primarily, see Gerson Part 1 on Ecclesiastical Power, where they make this power granted to the ministers of the Church (according to themselves) sixfold: the power of consecrating sacraments, administering the same, preaching, judicial correction, disposition of the ministers of the Church, and receiving necessities of life from those to whom they minister spiritual things. About which also Gabriel in the Exposition of the Canon of the Mass, Lecture 1. They also specifically make the power of the confessor twofold, of order and jurisdiction, about which Casuists, among them Toletus in Book 1, Chapter 3, and Book 3, Chapter 13. Again, they distinguish the power of jurisdiction into internal, in the internal forum of conscience, and external, in the external ecclesiastical forum.

They claim it for the bishops and the ecclesiastics, whom they call governors; they leave the latter to all priests and confessors, except in reserved cases, namely episcopal and papal. These are extensively discussed by casuists and canonists, and in particular treatises by John Chapeaville and Francis Coriolani; the latter has elaborately covered this topic. However, how far the judicial power of the confessor extends is taught by Claudius Soleri in a particular treatise. But omitting these elaborate trifles and useless details, we refer all ecclesiastical power with our catechism to dogmatic and judicial or disciplinary. To the former belong the preaching of the word, the administration of the sacraments, along with other ecclesiastical duties, and those things that serve as means to them; the gathering and constitution of churches, the election of ministers, the determination of times and places, the holding and convocation of assemblies, etc., and the writing and authorization of statutes and constitutions concerning all these matters.

It is also most conveniently divided into 1. Dogmatic, 2. Governing or Ordering, and 3. Judging or Disciplinary. The first is subdivided into common or ordinary and incidental or occasional. The former is the power of handing down doctrines from the Scriptures and applying them to the consciences of all and each individual: its appendix is the power of administering the sacraments. The latter is the power of determining in cases of doubts or controversies from the word of God. This is particularly called the key of knowledge by some. The antagonists of the Pontiffs discuss it under the title of Judge of Controversies and of Councils. The second is subdivided into legislative and governing according to those laws. The former is the power of making ecclesiastical laws and constitutions by which the Church is governed. The latter is the power of arranging and executing all that is required for ecclesiastical duties and governance. To both, and as a prerequisite, belongs the power of gathering and constituting the Church that does not yet exist. The third is subdivided into the power of marking with censure and excommunicating, and into the power of reconciling the excommunicated. Here is also included the power of renouncing unity to churches or doctors or members of the Church who are outside our confederation and proximate and explicit communion. And this indeed is the partition of ecclesiastical power according to the object. The partition according to the subject is instituted thus: one is the

common power, of the whole Church considered distributively according to all and each individual member; the other is proper, considered distinctly and oppositely according to this or that part. The former contains immunities, privileges, and rights of the Church in sacred and ecclesiastical matters: which some call the key of liberty and power, simply so called; e.g., in knowledge and doctrine, in which all and each ought to abound and mutually exhort, reprove, etc., Romans 15:14, 1 Thessalonians 5:11, Hebrews 3:13. Likewise in the election of ministers, etc., or only of predecessors, which is called the power or key of authority and direction, and this in doctrine where they judge antecedently and directly.

119

In the election of ministers, in the reception and excommunication of members, where they likewise act, judge, and determine antecedently, directly, and authoritatively. Or in both members and predecessors, insofar as they too are members. And this is what we now indicate. There are those who attribute the authoritative key and power to the whole body composed of predecessors and members concerning inexistence or adhesion; but only to the predecessors concerning principal execution. This can be expressed differently: **that the ministerial key of authority and direction is virtually in the whole body of the Church as such; but formally only in the predecessors. Or thus, that it is in the body of the Church as the principle what, and in the predecessors as the principle whereby.** Just as in the human body the proximal seat of animal functions is the upper abdomen, and the common seat is the whole body, and the instrumental principle whereby is the brain, and the principle what is the whole composite: about which we will speak later in the Problems. It suffices here to have indicated the partition of power subjectively or according to the subject.

Further, the common power of the whole Church and the ecclesiastical people considered distinctly is established as 1. Dogmatic in these; that all, as spiritual prophets and priests, may pray, prophesy, teach, exhort, etc., according to the measure and proportion of the spirit, 1 Cor. 11:4-5, Rom. 15:14, 1 Thess. 5:11, 14. And that when occasion arises, they may judge and determine controversies by the judgment of discretion, not of direction; by liberty, not by authority; by consequent consent and approval, not by antecedent prescription. 2. The power of order and

governance is established in these; in the origin of the Church or when the Church is in the process of formation, that they come together into an ecclesiastical body by free consent, suffrage, and counsel, and enter into a spiritual confederation: in the act of the Church, or when it is already constituted. That the election of pastors, elders, deacons is carried out in and with the Synod, by suffrage either expressly and vocally, or by scrutiny, or by silence. The sense and practice of our Churches relies on the texts of Acts 1:15 with 26, Acts 14:23, and 6:3, 5, 6, and the consent and practice of the most ancient Church. This is sufficiently proved below in Part 2, where we deal with the Call of Ministers and the Right of Patronage. 2. That the people are not excluded from the reception of members, their dismissal, and the giving of testimonials, as we noted in the preceding discussion. Something like this seems to be derived from Acts 10:47, and 9:26-27. 3. That it is communicated to the people either by word of mouth or by letter, what has been done or is to be done in other Churches, Acts 14:27, and 15:3, Col. 4:27. 4. That they may bring their doubts to the Synod or have them brought, Acts 15:2. 5. That controversies may be handled and determined in Synods before them, indeed, that synodal decrees may be issued in their name and with their consent, whether express or implied, Acts 15:22-23.

120

That delegates, whether presbyters or others, may be elected and sent by him or with his conscience and consent to other churches, either to provide assistance, seek counsel, make collections, determine controversies, plant churches, or convert unbelievers, as in Philippians 2:25, 2 Corinthians 8:18-19, Acts 15:2, and 13:1-3, 7. That he may, together with the presbytery, and sometimes separately and in certain cases, have the power to communicate with other churches in various ways, namely through participation, commendation, consultation, contribution, admonition, etc., which will be discussed elsewhere.

III. Jurisdictional power (if we may speak thus) in these matters:

That they may not only privately, in the case of private offense and scandal (Matthew 18:15-16), but also collectively with their presbytery in the case of

public scandal, indeed, and judge (Matthew 18:17, collated with 1 Corinthians 5:1, 4-5, 22, and 6:3-5, and 2 Thessalonians 3:14).

That they may withdraw from evil practices (ibid., v. 6).

That this power may also extend to ministers (Acts 11:2-18, which also relates to Colossians 4:17).

That they have the power to admit the lapsed and penitent to reconciliation (2 Corinthians 2:7-8).

That, when the authority of direct jurisdiction is lacking, where another church is concerned, or guidance and direction, where the presbytery is corrupt and does not fulfill its duty, they may exercise vicariate power or freedom by withdrawing privately from that church, presbytery, and said faithful, or furthermore, positively by sending a formal renunciation of peace and renouncing their communion and fraternity (2 Thessalonians 3:6, Romans 16:17-18).

That finally, in cases of necessity, when the synod is wholly corrupt, and the synodical or classical correspondence either will not or cannot assist, they may constitute others and apply authority to them, so that together with the people, or at least the better part of it, they may help the struggling church. Such a thing happened a few years ago in some churches of Belgium by the Remonstrants in times of trouble.

The people who elect elders and deacons have not so entrusted the power to them that they cannot in case of necessity themselves apply it, not to say reclaim and usurp it (as Suarez and Bellarmine, elsewhere cited on the power of the king entrusted by the people, concede), but only to apply it by designating other persons who might use it better. The safety of the church is the supreme law. And these indeed are the parts of the power of the people distinct from the presbytery, and thus of the whole ecclesiastical body.

The parts of the power or authority of the ministry and presbytery distinct from the people we establish as follows:

I. In dogmatic power:

That ministers ordinarily and with special authority as dispensers and ministers of Christ (1 Corinthians 4) lead in the word (Titus 2:15) and thus bind and loose (Matthew 16 with John 20), feed the flock (1 Peter 5), and nurture and nourish it (1 Corinthians 3:2).

That they alone administer the sacraments (Matthew 28:19).

That they judge and determine controversies with antecedent, directive, and prescriptive judgment (Acts 15:23, 28, Hebrews 13:17).

121

II. In governing power:

I. That they are properly called overseers or governors, teachers, bishops, leaders, rulers, elders (Hebrews 13:7, 17; 1 Timothy 5:17; Acts 20; 1 Peter 5; 1 Thessalonians 5), who attend to the flock (Acts 20), watch over souls (Hebrews 13), and take care of the church (1 Timothy 3:5).

That they can, when the occasion demands, convene the church and call assemblies (Acts 6:2), and thus, as in the Old Testament, priests in Joel 1:13-14; and with a blessing, dismiss the same when a majority appears (Numbers 6:23 with Hebrews 7:7).

That they inquire into and examine the ministers and members to be admitted and prove them (Revelation 2:2).

That they establish and solemnly introduce the legitimately elected presbyters (1 Timothy 4:14 with Acts 6:6).

That they begin the sermon, impose silence, and preside over the ecclesiastical assembly in all things. This order was derived from the synagogue (Acts 13), as Tertullian in his Apology mentions: "approved elders preside," etc.

That they examine synodal grievances and matters, prepare everything on their part, are ordinarily sent to synods, and cast decisive votes in synods (Acts 15), and authoritatively prescribe these to the church or churches. As in Acts 19:4, authoritative decision and directive prescription are particularly attributed to the apostles and elders, although the decision and conclusion were made in the presence of the church or brothers, indeed with their consent, and the synodal letter was written in their name, and they contributed exploratory and deliberative votes by vocally examining the controversial matter (Acts 15:7 with 12, 13, 22, 23, 28).

III. In the power of jurisdiction:

That they can privately and publicly, if the matter requires it, with authority rebuke (2 Timothy 4:2, 5).

That in the matter of scandal they prepare the matter and do everything to prevent or remove it so that everything may be done in order and expediently before the multitude (Acts 21:18) and natural necessity and reason teach this manner of proceeding according to Matthew 18:16-17.

That in the case of contumacy, they pronounce the judgment of the church, form the sentence before it, and pronounce and declare the same with it (1 Corinthians 5). This can refer to the prediction in Ezekiel 44:23-24.

That in the case of incurable corruption and wildness, or when the offenders are not subject to their discipline, they can lead disciples away and precede them in forming another church or separate assembly, and send a renunciation of peace and fraternity to the malignants (Acts 19:9 and 13:46 with Romans 16:17-18).

Thus far, the divisions of ecclesiastical power according to parts. Divisions according to species can be made as many as there are churches instituted, as explained in the preceding treatise, which the younger ones should supplement as I spare the paper. One division into analogous species or a distinction of the above-indicated ambiguity is to be reiterated here: that some are extraordinary, others ordinary. The former was conferred in prophets and apostles immediately or

at least in an extraordinary manner by God, and applied to their persons and mediately through the apostles to evangelists, e.g., Timothy, Titus, etc.

122

Which differed from the ordinary in that the Prophets and Apostles possessed universal direction and ecclesiastical authority solidly, and they exercised it in matters, causes, places, and persons as needed, either by themselves or through others delegated by them (who in the New Testament were Evangelists). Moreover, they were infallible in the common prescriptions of polity and governance and in apostolic direction. These distinctions must necessarily be observed lest this matter becomes more obscure than it is illuminated. We see this happening among the Pontificians and other hierarchicals, particularly the builders of the supreme Pontificate, who continually invoke Moses, Solomon, etc. As for the Apostles, as such and specifically considered as extraordinary ministers, they admit no successors to their authority. Any arguments drawn from their power and practice to today's churches and ministers can only conclude analogically and generically, and all such arguments are fallacies.

4. The characteristics of ecclesiastical power are as follows:

I. That it is sacred, not secular or of this world. For the kingdom of Christ is not of this world (John 18).

II. That consequently it is not homogeneous with political or economic power.

III. That it is inferior, not superior or supreme. Only the supreme power is reserved for Christ.

IV. Therefore, it is not monarchical, nor properly aristocratic or democratic, but similar to the latter two, that is, quasi-democratic-aristocratic. This will be explained below.

V. That it is ministerial, not dominating; and this not only in relation to Christ but also in relation to the Church itself and its members (1 Corinthians 1:12-13; 2 Corinthians 1:24; 5:18-20; 1 Peter 5:2-3; Luke 22:25-29).

VI. That nonetheless, it is effective concerning consciences, where it manifests itself by convincing, testifying, binding, and, through ministerial judgment and denunciation, excluding from the kingdom of heaven; but it is not externally coercive, for it does not have jurisdiction with command but is purely ministerial (Matthew 16:18; John 20:20 compared with 2 Corinthians 10:4-5).

VII. That it is not rash; but it is held to give an account in dogmas, in making laws, in governance, and in the jurisdiction of all consciences whenever the matter so requires, duly informing them of its acts and actions.

VIII. That it cannot establish or change special forms of governance as political power can through God's permissive power (1 Peter 2:13-14), but it must keep that unique form as the most special species prescribed by Christ.

IX. That it does not immediately and directly bind consciences, nor is anyone absolutely compelled to obey it; but only hypothetically, inasmuch and as long as its exercise of power formally and explicitly, or reductively and implicitly, agrees with the prescription of the divine word. This will be discussed further in the Problems.

X. Hence it is evident the difference between any secular power of this world and...

123

... and ecclesiastical power. The latter is either political or public, scholastic (to the extent that it is directly subordinated to the political); or economic, which is threefold: marital, paternal, and masterly. We now indicate the distinction from the political, which can be reduced to four points.

The subject in ecclesiastical matters is the Church, or the community of the faithful; in political matters, it is the magistrate and the community of citizens or the people. How this authority is held by each, whether virtually or formally, is not the subject of this inquiry; nor should it or can it be determined in general or in theory, but rather in hypothesis and in application to the polity, pacts, laws, and privileges of each people. For this, consult legal and political writers.

The formal object in ecclesiastical matters is sacred things, persons, and actions, as such, and under that formal aspect, namely, as ordered and ordainable to the state of heavenly beatitude and union with God, and insofar as they must conform to divine law and consciences must be informed by divine law concerning them; in political matters, the formal object is things, actions, and persons as they pertain to the external and temporal world, as indicated in 1 Corinthians 6 and John 18. Briefly, whatever pertains to natural or animal life and political coexistence.

The internal and proper end in ecclesiastical matters is eternal salvation and consolation in life and death; in political matters, it is the tranquility and happiness of civil coexistence and the highest political good.

The superior efficient cause in ecclesiastical matters is Christ the mediator, as such, the only King and Head of the Church; in political matters, it is Christ as God and the supreme Lord, along with the Father and the Holy Spirit, the Creator of the human race, and the Preserver and Governor of the universe. The subordinate efficient cause in ecclesiastical matters, regarding the conferring and applying of power, is the Church and those delegated by the Church; in political matters, it is the political community and those delegated by it.

The proper attributes, as we have indicated, are that the former pertains to ecclesiastical power and the latter to political power. Anyone who applies this distinction will clearly perceive the significant difference between the two.

Contradictions of ecclesiastical power [Differences between church power and civil power of the magistrate]:

I. On one hand, there is the sacred right of majesty improperly explained and applied to the political magistrate, which, unless God averts it, would lead to a new pontificate, supremacy, primacy, ecclesiastical monarchy, and consequently Antichristianism far worse than pseudo-ecclesiastical Antichristianism. For if, based on its absolute and supreme authority, the Church tyrannically agitates, destroys, and carries off souls to hell without any accountability, who will restrain such a power? Who will protect the miserable Church? Who will say to such a pontiff, "Lord, why do you act thus?"

II. On the other hand, it opposes the ecclesiastical monarchy of the Pope.

III. It also opposes the absolute, supreme, and infallible power of an ecumenical council, as they call it.

IV. It opposes any power and pretended ecclesiastical liberty, whose types we noted above.

124

V. Anarchy and Ochlocracy: which we briefly touch upon in the Problematics. VI. Every Oligarchy, along with its occasions, images, shadows, in the institution and exercise of episcopal power, and others similarly related to it. This also refers to the excessive and insufficient extension of the power of synodal or classical visitors, and others appointed for specific matters or causes. Refer to Book 1, Treatise 1, last chapter, and below in Part 3, where we discuss the Episcopate and ecclesiastical colleges or assemblies.

CHAPTER II - Discussion on the Power and Jurisdiction of the Magistrate concerning Sacred Matters.

The occasion for this discussion was first given in Germany by the contentions between the Pontiffs and Emperors over their rights, about which Historians and Imperial Collections (as I may call them) edited by Goldast, as well as his Reply in defense of the Empire against Gretser, with the appended Apologies for Henry IV, should be consulted. Especially noteworthy are Marcellus de Menandrino Patavini's Defense of Peace or Apology for Louis of Bavaria. After the Reformation began with Luther's preaching, perpetual dispute arose between Papists and Protestants concerning the authority of the Magistrate over the reform of the Church. Consult Sleidan's History, the Council of Trent, Melanchthon's Counsel, the Protestant Princes' Writings against the Council of Trent, etc. After the reformation began there, Thomas Erastus, a physician from Heidelberg, stirred up controversy regarding discipline and ecclesiastical authority, which was transferred to the Christian magistrate, as evident from his Theses and his

posthumous work against Beza. In England under Henry VIII and thereafter, this controversy arose due to the royal title: Supreme Head and Governor of the Church of England under Christ, in all temporal and ecclesiastical matters. How this title was explained by English theologians and defended against attacks by the Papists, we shall indicate below. Controversies over certain ceremonies and hierarchical governance there drew this question of the Magistrate's Power concerning Sacred Matters afterward. See Didoclavius' "Altar of Damascus," chapter X, and 5. Also, an anonymous vernacular book published in 1637, titled "Disputation against Anglo-Papist Ceremonies Imposed on the Scottish Church," part 3, chapter 8. Some years ago, amidst ongoing debates over episcopal and presbyterian governance in England, the opinion of Erastus was refuted by several learned men (among whom were the most celebrated William Prynne and John Selden), ...

125

...and recently defended with great effort by Ludovicus Molinaeus, a physician and political professor at the University of Oxford, in a book titled "Paranesis to the Builders of the Empire," to which he subsequently added a pamphlet in 1657 titled "Corollaries to the Paranesis." In our Belgium, the occasion for this controversy was partly given by certain magistrates who imprudently and factionally attributed ecclesiastical power to themselves (especially in places like Leiden, Gouda, and Utrecht): some of whom were completely alien to the reformed religion, others semi-Papists, some true neutrals, others Libertines wise only to civil honesty and aspiring beyond it, and some infected by the rough scabs of that Pelagian and turbulent Diederich Coornhert (if not also some interlopers like David Joris, Zwickfeldians, Arians), all professing to be enemies of ecclesiastical power and discipline as much as of the Spanish Inquisition. Concerning the disturbances in Leiden, apart from Belgian histories, consult the Remonstrance delivered to the Senate of Leiden in 1582 and its Justification. Also, the Examination of the Remonstrance by the Synod of Haarlem in 1582, and the Anonymous Apology against the said Justification. Regarding what happened in Gouda, and how the magistrate there illegitimately seized power in defense of a heterodox minister, the account will be taught by the Relation of the Synod of South Holland published in The Hague in 1592. The events at Utrecht and the profane and reckless usurpation of ecclesiastical power, resulting in the dissolution of the Church, are learned both

from the extradition of parents and primarily from the history of Pieter Bor from Utrecht and from Ada Curia and the Consistory. Those who are not familiar with these Belgian matters should read the Dedication prefixed to Francis Junius' Analytical Exposition of Exodus in 1597, where, in faithful warning, their sin is silently hinted at. Compare this with the Dedication to the King of Scotland in the Analysis of Numbers. And here indeed is the first sickness of contentions, but a particular paroxysm. The second, but greater and more universal, began with the faction of the Remonstrants. They, when they could not prevail with the courtesy of their cause, or obtain applause in the scattered pamphlets of the ecclesiastical populace, or consensus of more in synods, classes, and assemblies, resorted to this presumed power of the magistrate as a sacred anchor. But to bring their cause from ecclesiastical to political tribunal, they particularly used the arts and authority of one and another leading minister in our province and neighboring Holland, namely Johan van Oldenbarnevelt and Egidiu....

126

...was published in 1610 by Johannes Wtenbogaert, then minister at The Hague (whom our distinguished teacher Gomarus, in his first work against the Remonstrant cause titled "Warning," referred to as Courtly Eusebius). Although that treatise by Waldo was refuted at that time in such a manner that the author could never respond, yet he did not yield to the truth (I remember he promised to do either one of these things in another public book in the following year). However, his associates did not cease from that time onward to sing the same tune, especially until the Synod of Dordrecht convened in the year 1618, whose changes by the mercy of God began in the troubled churches of Belgium. Therefore, before that Synod, the following were published, besides Wtenbogaert's tract: Grotius' Piety of the States; Episcopius' Disputation on the Right of the Magistrate in Ecclesiastical Matters; Barlaeus' Declamation or Philippic against the Ministers who defended orthodox and accepted religion; the reply by Bogerman to Johannes Corvinus; and vernacular writings such as "Incendiary Bell," an old comedy, the Church Peace Decree of the Estates of Holland (which also exists in Latin), their justification in 1617; Ecclesiastical Constitutions of the Estates of the Province of Utrecht in 1612; both Remonstrant petitions of Holland, the former in 1610 (whence the term Remonstrants originated), the latter in 1617; Response to the

Letter of the Ministers of Walachia in 1617; the Great Britain Orator Carleton's Balance of Speech. Besides these, various common and vernacular pamphlets, the number of which is innumerable, and Remonstrant sermons continually resounded the authority and power of the magistrates, and by some envy, they burdened orthodox pastors, their legitimate assemblies, and ecclesiastical actions. And these things especially occurred in those two provinces of Holland and Utrecht; for in Gelderland, they either dealt differently or were silent, which the Supreme Court did not favor in the least. The same happened in Friesland, Amsterdam, and elsewhere, where the magistrates then either allowed everything at the nod and in favor of the Remonstrants or did not establish anything. I remember one among the Remonstrants from Gelderland in 1619 who was cited before the Synod of Dordrecht for professing a different opinion from the Remonstrants, namely, that judgment on ecclesiastical matters does not belong to the magistrate. This was the first age of Remonstrantism, during which the vernacular writings opposed them, including Ruardus Acronius' treatise in quarto, who also published a sermon by Johannes Wtenbogaert delivered a few years ago in The Hague on this issue; Anonymous (Feast Hommius), who made a dialogical statement from the book and sermon of Wtenbogaert under the title "Thus and Not So" by Johannes Wtenbogaert; Antonius Walaeus against Wtenbogaert; Franciscus Gomarus; Elhardus Menius; Anonymous writers against the decree of the Estates of Holland in 1616.

127

Anonymous, titled "Second Against the Remonstrants" in 1617, which two of the last mentioned were converted into Latin. The Latin writings are opposed to Grotius by Bogerman, Lubberti, Sopingius, and are highly worthy of reading. With these writings, others regarding synods, ministerial vocations, ecclesiastical discipline, the magistrate, etc., can be compared elsewhere. The second age of the Remonstrants spans from 1619 to 1628, yielding us not a few altered opinions and writings. As they observed significant changes in the magistrates' sentiments, they limited their own power accordingly, as seen in their Apology, chapter 25, and more so in the Acts of the Synod of Dordrecht, sessions 26–34. Furthermore, in the vernacular books opposed to the Synod, titled "Nullities of the Synod," "Ahab's Fast," "Free Exercise of Religion," "Free Examination of Decrees," "Crystal

Mirror," "Alarm Clock to the Batavians," "Heavenly Synod," etc., they not only deny any pretended ecclesiastical power to non-Remonstrant magistrates, but they barely leave political matters to them, as is not obscurely gathered from "Ahab's Fast," chapters 3 and 4, and pages 48, 50, 61, 62, 65, 72, 77, 97, 98, 112, and pages 5, 8, 12, 13, 15, etc. If these were not written by Wtenbogaert himself (which is thought to be established from many indications), they are at least highly praised in his description of his life, chapter 13, page 249.

With these, compare the words of the "Heavenly Synod," page 12. If any of these pamphlets are not read, especially the vernacular ones, one might seek another example of excerpts in Vedelius, part 2, "Arcana Arminianism," book 2, chapter 10. The third age of the Remonstrants runs from 1627 onward: after the death of Prince Maurice, they seemed to perceive, in certain newly adopted and restored magistrates of Holland (especially in the most powerful city), a greater favor towards the Remonstrants. Thus, pamphlets from that time onwards appeared, which seemed to hardly alter the discussion regarding the power of the magistrates. But all their views on this matter were beforehand influenced by the essence of Arminianism, as well as those things in their own time and even in the most recent disputes regarding the power of the magistrate, they deemed it best to maintain a distinction between public or temple churches and private or privately-public ones, which hold their unique and proper assemblies separate from temple gatherings: so that in the former, all pretended power belongs to the magistrate by divine right; while in the latter, none does. The secrecy of this distinction seems to have been hinted at by Episcopius in his Disputation on the Right of the Magistrate concerning sacred matters in 1618, March 3, when the affairs of the Remonstrants appeared to be leaning in no small way. They openly and formally professed the same after the sentence against them was passed in Dordrecht in 1619, and executed by the magistrate; as can be seen in the Confession of 1621, chapter 25, and in the Apology, chapters 24 and 25.

128

In the Remonstrance of the Exiled Ministers to His Serene Highness Prince Maurice, Illustrious States, page 20. But this very distinction cannot be applied to

their prior statements (whatever they affirm in the cited place, they never attributed power to the magistrate without it), or it is evident that they interpreted rebellion against the Remonstrant magistrate, if any of ours who separated from public ministers took care of themselves at their own expense, gathering separate assemblies in private houses or attending sermons outside public territory! Refer now to the decrees of Utrecht and Schieland (about which Trigland's Church History talks), and private Episcopius' Disputation 17. §. 9. 12. 16. 18. compared with the public one on the right of the magistrate concerning sacred matters §. 17. 18. James Taurinensis's speech Carletoni page 26. The same tract on mutual tolerance part 1. cap. 12. Barlai Bogermannus the same declamation, in orthodox ministers, the Decree of the Estates of Holland for the peace of the churches in 1614. pages 6. & 122. and the defense of the same decree by John Wittenbogard part 1. cap. 14. let me skip the rest of the quibbling pamphlets, whence it appears that they gave the power in favor of the Remonstrants to segregate the orthodox churches outside the temple or collect Ecclesiastes from 1619.

The magistrates and subalterns in the Remonstrants, and the other separatist sects, after Remonstrantibus, absolute Remonstrantibus, against efforts to resist all disputes, disobedience, rebellion, they condemned the men, our own from the privates in the homes of the cult year 1612, where and the pen abundantly with a desire. Behold the shoes, behold the faith, behold the theology of the times, not of the Gospel. His adds the power and his goes, who first in the line began in the book of the year 1610, to make a distinction between them. See page 89, where he made up the ground of the controversy, and the object of the power of the sacred or ecclesiastical power of the magistrate, who all belonged to the external worship of God, namely, the things, the persons, the reasons. Ibid. explicitly distinguishing between the supreme magistrate and the subordinate, and to him only, to Ordines Hollandiæ, he vindicates this power, but to the subordinate ones he condemns; so then, when the time was, the Magistrates of Amsterdam, and several other cities, in the months of the Remonstrance, did not favor it; for he omitted it, but the Orders of the Netherlands, and the Decree of the year 1619, against the classes of the Remonstrants, by the votes of the men of the eleventh year, declared and seriously implemented, for the magistrates of the lower classes, in one way, that in the city of

the Netherlands, they seemed to favor them, for they were about to be turned aside, in a new, eastern sun, and about to be released from the lower magistrates, the power of the power, the authority, the obedience, in order that, to the decrees, and the opposition of the supreme magistrate of the obedience. They see, to whom, it is this thing, the book of the Remonstrance, about the troubles of Amsterdam, year 1628, and 1629, and after that, I am going through, in the first part, 1, 1.

129

Among those pamphlets exists one which opposes the response of the theologians of Leiden to the Questions about civic oath, authored, as is supposed, by John Wittenbogard; whom the said theologians resisted in the same year. And indeed, this is the history of the Remonstrant controversy about the authority of the magistrate in sacred matters. When in the year 1639, the opportunity was presented to the Deputies of the Synod and the Classes of Holland to explain and act on this cause with common effort, and my modest opinion and judgment were requested by the Reverend and most friendly Mr. Paul Colonius, Pastor of Leerdam, now is, I drew up a methodical summary several years ago of the dispute between the Remonstrants and the Orthodox, divided into three parts, and subjected it to public examination at the Academy on April 6, May 4, and May 11, under this title: "On the Question, To whom belongs Ecclesiastical Authority: which later, translated into vernacular by an anonymous person, without my knowledge, was printed in The Hague.

I deemed it appropriate to include that summary, as well as the Dissertations on the Power and Policy of Churches, proposed in the year 1644, here: because I learned that the arguments, exceptions, and distinctions used therein are widely approved as accurate and clear by the orthodox and erudite, and I have learned that they are useful for diligent work. After this battle fought with the Remonstrants, the causes of the Churches caused new annoyance, with two writings by two of our distinguished friends, among other theologians, and most stout against hyper-Arminianism, published under the title "Brief Response to Given Solutions," etc., at Franeker in the year 1642. And, about the Bishopric of Constantine the Great. The former was opposed in the year 1642 by an Apologetic Response, etc., by Mr. Peter Cabeljau; but the latter, an Examination of the Dissertation, etc., by

Jacobus Revius, and a Theological Dissertation on Civil and Ecclesiastical Authority by Jacobus Triglandius, and the Right of Majesty in Sacred Matters, etc., by William Apollonius, now aged. This war, in the year 1642, was so conducted that I thought no one would venture anything unless they were prodigal of leisure and their reputation. Nevertheless, in the year 1645, an anonymous manuscript against Apollonius appeared under the title "Grallarum"; which soon received others under the titles "Bom. Bomachia Ulyssingana," and "Grallatoris furentis." Jodocus Larenus and William Apollonius responded to those virulent pamphlets. After that time, this controversy rested in Belgium. For after that last treatise of Grotius on the power of supreme authorities, etc., and recently Ludovicus Molinaeus' "Paranesis to the builders of the empire within an empire," with a submitted corollary to the paranesis, nothing but rehashes and repeated scenes are produced again and again. Therefore, nothing remains but for the reader to apply solidly what has been said before to the repeated pseudographs and sophistry of today.

130

...but concerning divine law, defending the Holy Spirit in the sacred scriptures, not about forming dignity or preeminence from the word of God and subjecting it through obedience of faith:

not about worldly and carnal considerations and preferences; but about the order established by the Master of the Church, Christ Himself:

not about what may seem most suitable to some things and persons, whether ecclesiastical or political, now or in the past or in the future, according to the judgment of the wise;

but about the invisible point of truth, so that we may know what is equally due to each person, whether friend or foe, willing or unwilling, in domestic and foreign matters. I profess and declare that I will attribute nothing here to anyone's favor or authority, no particular causes, no prejudices or prejudgments:

For we decide the doctrinal question dogmatically, in the thesis, and universally; we do not give theological advice on how much and in what manner Christian charity and prudence, in this complex and manifold human weakness, where all scriptural persuasions have been in vain, should tolerate, overlook, indulge,

dissimulate, and digest for the peace and salvation of the Churches. We held the same opinion and said the same when the truth of the cause and the Churches seemed less fair to the magistrates, especially in Holland, where my studies and ministry apprenticeships were placed in the midst of those tumults. We hold the same and profess it diligently after God restored the magistrates to the Churches from the year 1618, most devotedly. We will profess the same whether they change (which God forbid) or are changed, or stand, or go. For we will not allow our theology, by God's grace, to listen to pseudo-politics, that is, a fluctuating and versatile stance, according to the condition and status of those who... For that would be faith (as Hilary once said in another question), not of the gospel, but of the times.

The terms for understanding this question beforehand are: 1. Polity or Magistracy. 2. Church or Ecclesiastics. 3. Ecclesiastical Authority. I. Politia, and Magistracy, what they signify, is well known and explained elsewhere among politicians and theologians; there is no need to repeat it here. Only I warn in general that any magistrate here should understand whether supreme or subordinate, always preserving the proportion of rights and powers, according to the status and place of each, in accordance with the fundamental laws and laws of the republics. For whatever pertains in political cases and matters to the superior concerning the inferior or not concerning it, and vice versa, concerning ecclesiastical cases and matters, this appeal is lawful or unlawful from the inferior to the superior, and again recourse from the superior to the inferior or inferiors:

For if the Church is in the State, it certainly can enjoy and use political rights; as how Paul appealed to Caesar in Acts 24. And thus Melancthon, in the Common Place on the Magistracy,

131

...teaches that inferior magistrates can defend religion against superiors, which undoubtedly pertains to the Electors and Princes of the Empire. A similar reasoning applies to the Illustrious States of Holland, Zeeland, etc., who admitted and defended the reformed religion even before the year 1581, although at that time their Prince, Philip II, King of Spain, opposed it. I make an exception here for

specific cases when affairs and ecclesiastical causes are exempted by pact, alliance, or fundamental law. Except for this, political authority equally extends (while preserving proportion and distinction between internal and external authority) over secular affairs and ecclesiastical matters.

II. Church here denotes, firstly, particular topics within cities or villages. Then, it signifies those combined or gathered by pact, correspondence, or a stricter union and bond, termed as National, Provincial, or Districtual corporations.

III. Ecclesiastical Law, or Power, is commonly divided into three kinds: teaching, ruling, and discipline. Otherwise, it is reduced to a dichotomy, expressing all ecclesiastical authority in terms of governance or jurisdiction, which is also represented by the dual keys of the Church. The first is ordained for the dispensation of the Word and sacraments. The second is for establishing laws, ecclesiastical assemblies, visitations, electing and appointing ministers and inspectors. Jurisdictional power is for discipline or censure. But concerning these divisions, we have already discussed them above.

Here are the three kinds granted by us: 1. Granted by us. 2. Assumed on both sides. 3. Demanded afterward. Granted and given by us: 1. Regarding the Church: 1. That it exists in politics, not against it. 2. That it and its individual members are subject to the State concerning external matters—namely, property and assets. 3. Specifically, ecclesiastics and clergy, even those administering and performing sacred duties. II. Regarding Politics: 1. That it has, with respect to people, not a ministry but dominion; not ministerial but supreme and overarching power over all subjects. 2. That it specifically has coercive, supreme, and formal power over persons, things, actions, and ecclesiastical matters—not in themselves or as such, but to the extent that they pertain to this world, external persons, and external natural or civil goods, or concern them: based on and with respect to external, accompanying circumstances, to the extent that they may or may not be less or more tolerated, established, defended, impediments removed or not removed, fortified by public authority or not, should or can. 3. Thus, indirectly, mediately, incidentally, regarding external, accompanying or accessory requirements for publicly admitting or not admitting spiritual exercises with appendices. 4. That the

magistrate, as such, has public judicial power—not just the power of cognition and discretion, but also definitive judgment in ecclesiastical affairs and cases.

132

That consequential judgment is not antecedent (for there are no such in the Church); thus, it is presuppositively theological, but formally political; because the ultimate inquiry therein is not whether this doctrine is true or whether it is ecclesiastical, but whether they wish to defend and enforce it by public authority. Finally, in the case of the demand for approval, public defense, and execution thereof, such judgment is necessary and belongs solely to them. 5. Equal cognition belongs to the Magistrate in the case of public tolerance and demanded freedom of exercise; thus, definitive political judgment on whether they wish to tolerate it. 6. Indeed, to both the infidel and the faithful magistrate, if he chooses to undertake cognition, as he can and should. This is often intended in the Apology of Paul, Acts 26, Justin Martyr, Athenagoras, Hilary to Constantius, etc. 7. Equally to the infidel and the faithful, authority belongs over persons, things, causes, churches, insofar as they touch external human and natural or civil good. We reject these new dictations of the Remonstrants, Chapter 25 of the Apology: First, that the Magistrate cannot bind and compel observance of Synodal decrees conforming to the word of God by his authority. Ref. Truths of faith derived from scriptures and synodically demonstrated, confirmed by imperial authority: Gratian, Valentinian, Theodosius, Martian C. with supreme Trinity. They were imitated by Charlemagne, Louis, Charles the Bald in their Capitularies, and other pious princes; and from the outset of the Reformation, all kings, princes, magistrates have defended this reformation. No reformed person has so far reproached them for defending well-established churches and synods and removing all impediments by their authority, exercising tyranny over consciences, or forcing anyone to believe what they do not want to believe. The Remonstrants themselves spoke differently when the States of Holland, by a majority vote, without any legitimate and public ecclesiastical judgment preceding it, decreed in 1617 that the reception of their decree of 1614 for church peace should be imposed on all ministers by public authority (as they asserted). The United States of Belgium in their decree of 1619 provided more than enough protection against Remonstrant assemblies for the liberty of conscience, which we have always shown to be distinct from the freedom of exercise in our

Belgium. 11. It is further stated that no ecclesiastical power belongs to the magistrate, accepted either in our or their sense, in separate gatherings and churches outside public temples. Ref. Unheard of, absurd, and contradictory is the notion that ecclesiastical authority of the magistrate, whether formally (according to the Remonstrants) or objectively and by external denomination (according to us), is based in the public edifice of the temple or even in the provision of ministers' stipends by the magistrate, which latter seems to be suggested by Grotius in *Pietate*.

133

Therefore, the authority of the Magistrate will be like that of a chameleon, and according to circumstances, it will assume various colors. Where, therefore, salaries are not paid by the Magistrate (as in a good part of Belgium and in almost all Protestant and Reformed churches), there the Magistrate will have no authority, whether ecclesiastical or political, concerning ecclesiastical matters. And I do not say that in Belgium, salaries are supplied not from the treasury of the Republic, much less from the funds of the Magistrates, but from ecclesiastical revenues previously liberally established for pious uses, indeed with the consent of the Governor; which pious Magistrates have not yet entered into the treasury of the Republic, much less converted them to their private uses. Men seem to dream the same thing that I remember being objected to by an Anabaptist: that Belgian Ministers, receiving salaries from the hands of Magistrates, are under the same condition as servants and other hired servants of Magistrates, who are hired to do nothing other than the will, prescription, and work of their masters. As for public temples, that accident which can be present or absent sets or removes the authority of the Magistrate: whether by divine or natural law, that is, by the very law of the Magistrate, it does not compete with him. How does this accord with the opinion of the Remonstrants, which they incessantly impressed upon us through the year 1618 in the aforementioned pamphlets; and with the practice of Magistrates favoring them, who pursued our separate and clandestine assemblies as schismatics, applauded by many, at least nowhere disapproved by the Remonstrants?

And indeed, how easy it would have been for us to free ourselves then once and for all from all Magistrate authority by migrating to Rotterdam, Horn, Alkmaar,

Utrecht, Gouda, etc., from public temples to any other building, whether rented or freely given, following the example of Paul, Acts 19, verse 9. Yet the Remonstrants condemned this at the time, and they so unjustly attributed and promoted Magistrate authority excessively to themselves and depressed it in ours, clamoring against us. What will they say about most of the Reformed churches in the Duchies of Cleves, Julich, etc., which hold assemblies outside public temples? To overturn those absurd arguments with which they then pressed our truth, it would follow from here that ecclesiastical authority of the Remonstrant Church be given in some city or province (e.g., Rotterdam, Utrecht) which is not subordinate to Magistrate authority, which is independent from it, which is parallel to it, which builds a republic within a republic, an empire within an empire. Let them reconcile this, if they can. To speak plainly, it would follow to give the Church authority that is not within the Republic; which is most absurd, unless it is said to be outside the world, in Utopia, or in the Kingdom of the Moon.

134

The application of authority to this or that person does not depend on the Church or ecclesiastical entities as such, nor on ecclesiastical law, but on divine permission and positive human law, whether by succession, election, or any other agreement, or by the law of war, as Politicians and Jurists say.

The Magistrate should not exercise approving or confirming political authority over ecclesiastical governance and jurisdiction unless he first understands it and decides on its goodness in conscience.

The same Magistrate cannot exercise political power regarding false worship, approving and defending what is approved. However, in some cases, he can immediately apply approval regarding tolerance of evil (but not of the evil being tolerated) and thus defend immediately the decree of tolerance issued by himself or the law concerning political tolerance, which is properly the defense of public authority and power and order established by and according to that authority, not concerning the tolerated evil itself. Whether in the case of false worship, heretical, idolatrous, Jewish, Muslim, or pagan, he can tolerate or not, must be discussed elsewhere.

The Magistrate, whether faithful or unfaithful, by voluntary concession of the Church, or by prudent and necessary connivance, or by any other agreement and consent, can have dominion not only supreme in direction and jurisdiction (which he equally has over all goods of private individuals), but also of property for public uses and other necessities. However, this dominion of his is clearly distinct from ecclesiastical authority over sacred and spiritual matters. Whether it is separated from it or joined with it will be seen in due course. But regarding the consent of the Church, whether explicit or virtual, in this transfer of dominion, and finally the confusion of ecclesiastical treasury with political matters, or its infusion, when and how it has been obtained somewhere, and in which cases it may or may not be expedient for the Churches; finally, the handing over of the funds of the poor, or the temple, or the pastoral care into the hands of a Prince, whether faithful or unfaithful, so that the poor or Church pastors are deprived of them, is discussed elsewhere. Here, above all, the question of the deed of Laurence must be aired. Pontiffs are expressly and too much languid about these questions, as they touch this age and the belly more closely than the care and salvation of souls.

Finally, to conclude, I say that the Magistrate, who publicly approves and protects religion, firstly has the power, following the judgment of discretion on its causes in conscience, to judge from the word of God, which is common to him with other members. Secondly, he has the power, similarly following public judgment (not ecclesiastical but political), to definitively establish by public permission and tolerance, or admission, or even by authoritative confirmation, defense, and due execution of this truth or these causes.

135

Thirdly, the authority, both before the exercise of ecclesiastical rule or jurisdiction, and after it, to remove all obstacles, and by care, counsel, admonition, intercession, to prepare the way for the production of these acts, and the application and execution of ecclesiastical acts.

Fourthly, the authority to compel the Church and ecclesiastics to observe their own laws established by and within the Church, as well as ecclesiastical judgments, and

other actions legitimately and ecclesiastically approved, now also politically approved. Here, note that I am speaking of canons and decrees emanating from the Church and ecclesiastical judgment, not those imposed elsewhere against the will of the Churches, which are sometimes tolerated or should be tolerated due to fear. Such as, for example, the patriarchal tribute, which the new Patriarch of Constantinople is forced to pay to the Ottoman Emperor upon assuming his office.

Similarly, the statements or assumptions from our Ecclesiastical Constitution regarding the Right of Patronage, and the Presence of certain individuals from the Magistracy in Consistories (Article 37), provided it is understood about perpetual and ordinary, or discretionary presence, as some, with I know not what kind of devices, attempt to wrest it from the text of the assumption. All churches sufficiently declare by not observing perpetual law (if there were a law) and not admitting their decrees, and by actual negative resistance, that this is not their doing; consequently, well-constituted and peaceful churches in their possession since 1586 (when that assumption first appeared) should not be disturbed by the Magistracy out of love for building up and maintaining the peace of the Church. Especially since the Magistrates, burdensomely and contentiously, seem to have sufficiently repealed this assumption throughout all of Belgium since 1586, and again from 1619 onward to this day, following their non-observance. More on this below. So much so that not without shameful quibbling in more recent years, the forced embrace of this session by the Magistracy was sought: when in Part 3 of the same dispute I expressly and vigorously opposed it.

Here, we reject:

The Pontiffs who indiscriminately remove all judgment about religion from the Magistracy, Bellarmine in *De Membris Ecclesiae*, Chapter 17, and Becanus in *De Primatu Regis*, Part 1, Chapter 8.

The Remonstrants, and specifically Grotius in *De Pietate*, who argue that all authority belongs to the Magistracy in elections, affairs, and ecclesiastical matters, because they procure public salaries or at least their dispensation.

The Remonstrants in *Apologia*, cited chapter, who make the foundation of this authority in the Magistracy the concession of public temples.

The same, cited in the same place, where they take away all authority to coerce and defend against disturbances and disturbances in the Church, ecclesiastically established rights.

136

There are demands elsewhere which are otherwise expressly approved:

That ecclesiastical authority is distinct from political authority in material object, at least in some cases; because the former concerns the affairs of Jehovah, the latter concerns the affairs of the King. Moreover, in formal aspect, this is true in all cases and always; because the former directly concerns the person or cause in terms of internal human state and spiritual state, as in the form of spiritual grace and heavenly glory to be assumed. The latter, however, directly concerns the same in terms of external human state and in relation to the highest political good.

From the efficient cause, foundation, and thus subordination and dependence. The former is from the Redeemer as such, or Christ as Mediator. The latter is both dependent on God and the same Christ as Mediator, in preserving and governing all things commonly (Hebrews 1:3), but not specifically as Mediator and Lord.

Therefore, the former pertains to the special or grace kingdom; the latter to the general kingdom or power, or nature.

The former is inferior and purely ministerial with respect to humans and God; the latter with respect to humans is supreme and commanding.

The former, with regard to purpose, execution, and manner of acting, is spiritual, supplicatory, and exhortative in consciences and around consciences (2 Corinthians 4:2; 5:20). The latter, however, is external, corporeal, coercive.

The former, in terms of distinct forms, acts, modes, degrees, is from divine positive law (Ephesians 4:11). The latter, however, is purely from human law (assuming divine permissive law), hence it is said to be human creation (1 Peter 2:13), as for

example, monarchy, aristocracy, etc., election, succession, etc., leader, count, king, consul, etc.

Therefore, one authority does not contain the other either formally or eminently; nor can one authority as such give or produce another, according to the common axiom: "Nothing gives what it does not have itself, either formally or eminently." Just as consular or pastoral authority does not include marital authority, nor vice versa; nor can one give the other; although one can operate around the other in directing or dominating (as in the consular republic around marital authority), or ministering, as in the Church pastoral around the same marital authority.

No head of the Church is given except Christ, no monarch, whether external or internal.

IV. The Church is the Church, and within it resides all ecclesiastical authority absolutely necessary for the building of Christ's kingdom and the salvation of mankind, even when the magistrate is outside the Church; indeed, sometimes it is best situated in terms of spiritual state, as for example, in the time of the Apostles, and thereafter, of apostolic men.

Equally, politics is truly and legitimately such, even when it has no connection with the Church.

V. Only Christ architecturally governs the Church, and no authority under Christ in heaven or on earth governs the Church except ministerially.

137

For it should not be said with the Papists that there is a dual head of the Church, a dual monarch, one principal and one ministerial: however this is explained, it implies a contradiction.

The Remonstrants vehemently slandered us, in their Apology chapter 25, page 299, when they clashed with our assertion that the reformed ministers claim an

architectural power concerning external church governance, and an architectural judgment on matters pertaining to that governance.

With these premises established, we state our thesis: **The magistrate does not have ecclesiastical power formally and properly called εἰδίας & intrinsically antecedent or directive, and therefore supreme under Christ, above the church and its predecessors.** We prove this with both direct and indirect arguments or absurd consequences. Direct arguments are: 1. Because he neither has it entirely, nor in part; neither totally nor adequately. Therefore, not entirely, for otherwise ecclesiastics would have nothing, which is contrary to 2 Corinthians 10:4, 6, 8, 13; Romans 12:8; 1 Corinthians 12:28. Not entirely or adequately in part, so that ministers would have the same in part, because this would imply a coequality of the magistrate and ministers in the same kind of power, whether supreme and ruling or inferior and ministerial, which is usually designated by the term "keys of the kingdom of heaven." This is absurd in itself and is also rejected by adversaries. Therefore, there is no need to deduce this further. 11. Argument: Because if he had it, either as a magistrate, or as a Christian, or as a Christian magistrate—a third entity composed of Christianity and authority. Not as a magistrate, because then it would belong to every magistrate, even the unfaithful, which adversaries themselves do not admit. Not as a Christian, because then it would belong to every Christian. Not as a Christian magistrate, because two distinct and formal principles that are not one or united in themselves cannot establish a formal effect or reality. For example, if a person is both a consul and a father, he cannot be said to have consul authority over citizens as a consul-father, nor paternal authority over his son as a father-consul. Although fatherhood is added to the same subject as consulship, or consulship to fatherhood, they are not joined in relation to their own formal effect, namely consul authority or paternal authority. For paternal authority in consulship, or consulship in paternal authority, is in no way the foundation or cause of the other, but purely incidental. One form, one formal reason, is derived from two complete and united beings where the assumed entity is extraordinary; thus we say Christ satisfied for our sins not as a man but as God, where distinct natures and distinct principles are united, yet they are one in themselves because the assumption is of natures inconfused.

That which cannot be attributed to any natures or created things. Therefore, those relations, namely the right of Christians and the right of the Prince, and their foundations should converge into some third perfect right or power. But such a third would be neither of them; and thus, by confounding Christianity with princely authority, both would be taken away. 111. Argument: He who is not the Church does not have ecclesiastical power intrinsically and formally so called. But the magistrate is not the Church, etc. Therefore, the minor premise is evident, because a magistrate can be one (for example, an Emperor, King, Prince, etc.), but the Church is not one, as is debated elsewhere against the common view of the Papists concerning the Church virtually, as expounded elsewhere by an Episcopus or Pontiff. The major consequence is proven because Scripture assigns power to the Church (Matthew 18:15 and the places cited above). The same is proven by the reason which can be derived from the argument immediately following.

IV. Argument: He who is not of the essence of the Church, that is, who is not the essence or form of the Church, nor an essential part, nor a constitutive or consequential essential, nor any necessary adjunct, does not have ecclesiastical power. But the former is true. Therefore, the minor premise is certain, because a magistrate can exist and not exist without corruption of the subject; for in this case, the Church is neither posited nor taken away, which is evident especially in the Apostolic Church. The major premise is proven because a relation or proper adjunct cannot be said to exist in or with any thing that is not its subject or proper adjunct, nor can it be an essential or necessary part of the subject or adjunct. **Now, internal ecclesiastical power, which is properly and formally called ecclesiastical, is the proper property of the Church; therefore, it cannot be communicated to the magistrate who is distinct from the Church in reality. It cannot be said either that the magistrate is like an ecclesiastical prefect, and the Church or ecclesiastics are subject to him; and the relation between subjects constitutes ecclesiastical prefecture or power.** Wherever there is a relation, there is a correlate; and where they are conceived, they must be conceived together in nature and time; because relations are born of their correlatives, and with one posited or removed, the other is posited or removed. But here the correlate (as it is said), the Church, can exist without its relation, the magistrate. So

where is the relation? There is no color here. The only thing left is for them to say that the magistrate and the Church are related and correlated, and the relation between those two constitutes ecclesiastical power, since the magistrate grants and the Church usurps public temples by its own concession. This recent and newest argument of the Remonstrants, especially in Apology chapter 25, struggles not with one absurdity. Firstly, nowhere does it appear in Scripture; secondly, the foundation of this power is weak, as it is based on the ownership or useful dominion of a building, whether brick or wood, which, when it burns down or collapses due to age, that people with their formulas, rites, and other ecclesiastical union and confederation bonds, are replaced by some private place,.....

139

..., whether he has built it with his own funds or has leased it, or has lent it for free, that very sum of power so loudly trumpeted must necessarily collapse and cease, according to the rule of Logicians: when the foundation is removed, the relation is removed. The same judgment applies to the stipends of ministers paid from the public purse (which Grotius mentioned above as the principal foundation supporting this power). How absurdly and fallaciously these analogies can be applied against the foundation of the profession of Christianity made by the Magistrate, we shall discuss below. Thirdly, it is founded purely on temporal things; consequently, it is not intrinsic ecclesiastical power which concerns itself with spiritual matters. For what foundation and reason of this power, such is the power concerning ecclesiastical matters; but the foundation is temporal, or the ecclesiastical and spiritual necessity not immediately in itself or per se, but mediately, incidentally, because and insofar as ecclesiastical matters (which solely pertain supremely to the power of the Magistrate directly and architectonically) are connected and associated with temporal matters, or as far as they touch them. Fourthly, no power remains from this perspective which is formally political and also competes with the unbelieving Magistrate. Fifthly, while by their circular and temporary theology they seem to vindicate for the Magistrate the right in public temples and our churches (which they frequent), which we by no means deny to them, they shamefully deny them perpetual and natural power, which nevertheless we attribute to ourselves. For if they have no right and power in the temples and buildings of the Remonstrants, Anabaptists, Jews, etc., among us; nor in the

exercises of religions, ministries, ministers, elders, deacons, members, laws, discipline, ecclesiastical assemblies, with all the profession of these appendages, then it follows that they have no supreme dominion or direction and jurisdiction over any places, buildings, goods of their jurisdiction, nor even concerning people acting or speaking anything about God, religion, virtue (provided it is in temples or buildings and under the auspices of the society and profession of the Remonstrants or another separate group), no inspection or direction belongs to them, whether it is called political or ecclesiastical, whether absolutely or subordinately. Again, this absurdity follows: if ownership, or their own care and prefecture, or both, which they attribute to the magistrate in public temples, in bells, towers, candelabras, and the area on which the temple is built, were to establish their supreme and architectonic power, or the Majesty's right in sacred matters or around sacred things. And if ownership establishes such a right and such supreme power, then it would follow that anyone who, in his area, builds a temple for the community (as they used to aspire to acquire patronage) would acquire for himself the Majesty's right in ecclesiastical matters. But if they except that the Magistrate also has supreme ownership in our temples and thus has the Majesty's right which the private owners or patrons of temples do not have:

140

.....I ask of them whether they do not equally have supreme ownership and jurisdiction in the temples of the Remonstrants (which previously served private purposes of merchants, etc.), now as before; and consequently in the ministers of the Remonstrants as such (according to that: the offspring follows the belly), both in their ministries and in whatever matters, well or poorly performed, in those temples? But they consult their own interests over this issue of the metamorphosis of places and buildings: whether whenever it pleases the Remonstrants to convert their temples into their own, the Magistrate's rights and authority there would cease immediately; and conversely, when they acquire another building or a larger temple for their assemblies, and convert their old temple into a private house, the Magistrate would then regain his supreme dominion over that newly transformed house.

Fifth argument: Every Magistrate (at least the supreme one) is a ruling, external, carnal, coercive power, immediately dependent on God as the Lord of the world; furthermore, divinely ordained, undetermined as to certain species, forms, or modes, and now determined by human law (whence "submit yourselves" 1 Peter 2); but no ecclesiastical power on these lands intrinsically, formally so-called, is such, but rather ministerial, spiritual, etc., as stated above!

It is major in confessedly true. Our side has proven the minor as universally true in the controversy over the Pope. But if they except any part of the Church, namely the Magistrate, let them prove their exception from sacred scriptures, and indeed concerning ecclesiastical power, or power in the Church, which the cited authors have refuted; otherwise, we will reject their exception as easily as that Papistic one, by which they perpetually exempt their Pope.

Sixth argument: What are not the affairs of the King, in them the King (or Magistrate) does not have royal and architectonic power, formal, direct, and intrinsic; such as he has in goods, affairs, and subjects under him. But the affairs of Jehovah (that is ecclesiastical) are not the affairs of the King. Minor is proven from 2 Chronicles 19, where they are explicitly distinguished from each other. The major is self-evident; and there is no apparent exception, unless they say that in all affairs of Jehovah they have power, not as they exist and are considered spiritually, but as they touch temporal matters or as they are annexed and combined, either by natural necessity or voluntarily, with places, buildings, supports, means, and causes without which they cannot operate, and with the removals of impediments? But already they fall into this, where we wish to establish this supreme, extrinsic, indirect power over sacred things, not in sacred things, not immediately or directly concerning sacred things in such a way, but concerning the adjuncts and requisites of sacred things, whether antecedent or consequent. This matter can be explained similarly: the father of a minister whom he educated, taught, and even now supports; ...

141

...or a military commander who, with his troops and exercises under his care, has and exercises the necessary office concerning his pastoral oversight: yet neither formally has the office or care of a pastor, either in whole or in part; although each

diligently attends to his function. Thus the authority of the Magistrate and the political or subordinate or architectonic care (depending on the nature of the place and his duty) revolves around ecclesiastical authority, yet is not transformed into ecclesiastical authority by abolishing it, converting it into itself, or blending with it into a unity of essence. For royal power or the Magistrate is essentially one and uniform: according to that, the form of a thing placed in an indivisible entity is not divided in itself or varied like a chameleon according to the variety of objects. Thus the King has the same royal power over his father, son, brother, father-in-law, son-in-law, etc., as equally over any citizen or countryman. For what adds another bond there, such as the power of the homeland, fraternity, etc., this does not diminish or augment royal power, nor does it transform it into another form; for all of this is incidental to royal power.

Seventh argument: Whoever does not have ecclesiastical power immediately from Christ as Mediator, and immediately applied to the person through legitimate calling, mission, election, ecclesiastical ordination, does not have ecclesiastical power. But the Magistrate as such does not have it, etc. The minor is manifest, because the Magistrate as such, and all his power as such, is simply independent of those ecclesiastical matters. The major is proven, since no other means of applying ecclesiastical power to this or that person appears throughout the entire Scripture, except ordinary or extraordinary calling. Particularly unknown are those methods of acquiring this power through hereditary succession, through the right of war, etc.

Eighth argument: What in no way applies to women and children does not apply to the Magistrate as such. But ordinary ecclesiastical power, which is guiding and public, in no way applies to women or children. Therefore, the first part of the minor is confirmed by 1 Timothy 2:11-12 and 1 Corinthians 14:34. We have spoken elsewhere on the latter. The major is proven, because whatever is attributed to the Magistrate as such must equally be attributed to women and children, if it happens (as often occurs) that supreme authority resides in them. Here, nothing can be excepted, except to attribute to women the supreme right to judge, not in the Church (where they must remain silent), but outside the Church in politics. Correctly, this is what we want: to have authority over ecclesiastical matters, but not formally ecclesiastical. If this were appropriate for the Magistrate as such, it would equally be appropriate for women and others constituted by law. But what

kind of judgment the Magistrate has, we will see below. And these arguments are direct from the nature of the subject.

Eighth. They follow from the nature of the predicate. Ninth argument: Whoever does not have parts, nor exercises the acts of ecclesiastical power, does not have it itself. But the Magistrate does not have it, etc.

142

Greater validity comes from the enumeration of parts.

The lesser is proven, because neither do the Presbyterial Constitutions or Laws, classical, synodal, condition; nor do they elect, ordain, suspend, dismiss ministers, elders, and deacons previously approved by word; nor do they make a Synod, and they judge and decree by synodal consent or plurality (the same must be said of Presbyteries and other Conventions); nor do they appoint to Synods, nor do they instruct delegates with letters, mandate, and trust; nor do they dispense with word and sacraments; nor do they establish church visitations; nor do they exercise ecclesiastical censures and discipline. If an exception is made, not indeed all parts, but some can rightly fulfill their duties. Resp. 1. To be all connected parts, and not to be able to be proven from the Scriptures, one to be more or less suitable than another. 2. And if they hold only a few, and less important ones which are ordered to others as primary, they certainly must not be said to have that architectural Power in the Church. 3. Whatever is assumed or granted to them, nothing is the Power of ecclesiastical authority: but they are acts of political Power. Therefore, while Magistrates and the Church deal with the same ecclesiastical matter, and it seems that they produce or produce the same or similar results; certainly they do not act in the same way, but each one acts according to its own, according to its own Power. Not otherwise than Magistrates and Fathers, each acting with their own Power, (though not in the same way,) to restrain a prodigal son: the same must be said of Magistrates and Husbands together engaged in the correction or reformation of an adulterous woman. Here, therefore, those Powers must not be confused, or one substituted for the other. x. argum. Those have ecclesiastical Power who have the Keys of the Kingdom of Heaven: but the Keys belong to ecclesiastics, not Magistrates. The minor is well known, and is taught by novices from the excellent explanation of our Catechism qu. 82.85. to which add the

Liturgy, about which we will speak later. The consequence of the greater is clear, because the Keys are indeed ecclesiastical Power. x1. argum. Because ecclesiastical Power is formally sacred, religious, spiritual, admonishing paternal and fraternal purely ministerially: not judging judicially, but indicating the judgment of God, and manifesting to consciences; furthermore, nothing else: although metonymically ecclesiastical Power and Key may be judicial, and its efficacy and instrumental effect are attributed to it, absolution indeed is the remission of sins, the opening of the kingdom of heaven, eternal salvation. Timoth. 4. v. ult. Dan. 12. v. 3. John, 20. v. 2 3. Matt. 16. v. 19. & 18. v. 18. But such Power is not Royal Power, or Magistracy; nor is it ever attributed to Magistracy, but only to the Church and its Ministers. Therefore. x 11. argum. What Power belongs to the body of the Church and those who are constituted in and from that body, that is not Magistracy as such: But the former is true, therefore. The Major is clear. The minor is proven from Matthew 16. 19. & 18. v. 18. John. 20.21.23 Acts 20. 28. Heb. 13. 17. 1 Peter 5.2. 1 Thess. 5. 12. Ephes. 4. v. 8. 1 Cor. 5. v. 4. 2 Cor. 2. v. 6. 7. 10

143

"No argument can be brought forward that grants anything beyond the external and indirect power concerning Sacred matters to the Magistrate. 13th argument: Whatever is the Kingdom of Heaven, and not of this world, to that the Magistrates, that is the powers and Lords of this world, do not have the internal, direct, and so not formally the power: but Sacred and ecclesiastical things are such: Therefore. The minor is proven from John 18:36. The major is proven, because there is no proportion between the object and the power: the object is purely sacred, divine, and spiritual, which must be spiritually discerned and treated: and the secular power is human and formally secular, indeed in its special form and manner it is merely human. For Christ is not said to have appointed others as Decemvirs, Consuls, Dictators, Hundred men, Ministers of the Kingdom or Crown, and Ministers of the King, Counts, Marquises, etc. But he said to them as ministers: John 20, 'As the Father has sent me, so I send you.' And Ephesians 4:11, 'He gave some apostles,' etc. And yet Becan in his work on the Primacy of the Kingdom, with his canonists and pontiffs, and then demonstrating the Apologetics chapter, distinguishes between internal and external jurisdiction: and he warns that this alone is the question, not the one which clearly with power over the government,

each part relinquishes to the churches: and indeed this does nothing in our case in Belgium. For the distinction between internal ecclesiastical forum, and the external or contentious, and the internal jurisdiction, which competes with all priests, and the external, which solely governs bishops and other ecclesiastics, neither by Scriptures nor by reason is it held, but only by the ingress and custom of the typhus of the age. Nor is there or was there ever a place after the Reformation for episcopal courts, and the intermixtures of secular affairs and judgments with ecclesiastics. Nor does anyone move the magistrate of them, which are in respect to the external man, and indirectly or extrinsically called ecclesiastical, such as the entire practical reception of returns, and the exoneration of stipends, the manufacture of Temples, the patronage of goods, utensils, Temples, etc., as for the external necessities of Synods, which are held publicly, etc., as and to the extent the magistrate provides for them, as we will explain in the word below. All these things pertain to the external jurisdiction, and nothing to us, for neither are they in a formal and secular act of direction and spiritual or ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Now let the Church's safe, which is its own direction, with jurisdiction, or rather discipline, of which we have listed the parts above. Now we add indirect arguments that are from absurd consequences, or to the man. The former sort is the following argument from absurd consequences. I. argument. Then the Church would be like a buskin or chameleon, in that the ecclesiastical power from the Church would be by the Cæsar, as it were, would have profess do maintain.

144

1. 1st argument. If any part of the Power usurps, which the Magistrate formerly, as orthodox, now is said to have by right as a Christian Emperor: since it would be a political power, then the church would involve itself in political rights: if it is ecclesiastical, then the Magistrate so long usurps the right of the Church. 3rd argument. If ecclesiastical power, formally so called, belongs to the Magistrate; it would follow that it would be fortified by arms, prisons, punishments, etc. (for all power granted to the Magistrate is such), which must be judged as a note of this spiritual Power, by those who can judge. Otherwise, the Apostle sets forth in 2 Corinthians 10:3. 4th argument. It would follow that there should be some power avtoxpatoixl in the church, and someone on earth be called Magistrate, besides Christ, against Matthew 23:8, that anyone be subaltern under Christ (surely under

Christ). Head of the Church, beside Christ, against Ephesians 1:20-21. See the disputes of ours against the Papal ecclesiastical monarchy, and the Ecumenical Pontificate. 5th argument. To substitute the Magistrate for the Pope, and the political Antichrist for the ecclesiastical; to be so much worse, since it is said that he directly holds both swords or both supreme powers or monarchy (some Papists today more reverently say that the Pope has only indirect temporal power, in order, that is, for spiritual matters): unless it happens to be ecclesiastical (to say that it indirectly usurps in order to its own temporal matters, and because it is so advantageous to its affairs). 6th argument. If it happens that one temporal Monarch be for all of Christianity, then one would be Pope; if for each Nation or Province, then there would be as many Popes, according to the example of the modern Sicilian Monarchy (which we have discussed specifically in the Desperate Case of the Papacy), and of the ancient Numa Pompilius, who with Melchisedek of the Orthodox objected to Barlaeus in his judgment against them, and of Virgilian that of Anius King of Men and Priest of Phoebus, whom the author of *Vindiciae Gallicae* recently called to this cause, whose words are found in Part 2, chapter on the Right of Patronage. 7th argument. To make a monster out of the Church, and to be similarly monstrous to the Magistrates, when they are raised to the heads of the Church. Both absurdities urge the Reformed Papal monarchy and primacy. Arminius adds in his Disputation on the Roman Pontiff, Thesis 3. The head of the Church is one; otherwise the Church would be monstrous, etc. And afterward: The Pontiff is not Christ, therefore neither the head of the Church: nor can any proximity be feigned between Christ and the Roman Pontiff, which does not signify the member of any one in the body, or the member of any office competent. I remember teaching this in a public lecture on 2 Thessalonians 2. Now apply this to what the Remonstrants argue in their Apology, chapter cited. However, these very words of theirs note against all exceptions for the ecclesiastical monarchy....

145

"This opinion is the very heart and core of the Papacy, containing that very thing in which the form of the Papacy consists; or the Papal hierarchy, etc. From this, however, conceded, all the other things which the Pope now usurps necessarily flow, as heat from fire, if anyone wishes consistently to understand and speak what we will show below. Therefore, we think it must be warned, so that it is understood

how ineptly those argue who, in order to mitigate this sentence of theirs from the crime or suspicion of the Papacy, usually adduce various things which the Pope himself now arrogates, from which they profess to abhor; as if indeed it greatly pertained to the matter, while the fundamental principle of the Papacy remains intact, and as if it were not certain whether those other things necessarily follow from this foundation, etc. What they falsely feign of the ecclesiastical power among us, we more justly say of their pretended ecclesiastical Monarch, such as they make the Magistrate. For not only because of the arrogated temporal power (which belongs to Magistrates), but also and especially because of the spiritual power (which belongs solely architectonically to Christ, and ministerially to the Church and Inspectors), the Pope was called Antichrist. Let our authors Plessaus, Danaus, Chamier, Wittaker, Vignier, etc., be read where they discuss the Head of the Church, the Pope, and Antichrist: also Arminius, Disputation cited, and let them be applied impartially and fairly to this present matter. If the usurpation of the Roman Bishop or Western Patriarch in spiritual matters is evil, in my judgment surely not better, but much worse is the usurpation of the Magistrate: because the former, having in part divine right, and in part human right, held some intrinsic power in the Church, which cannot be said of the Magistrate from Scriptures or ecclesiastical antiquity. 8th argument. The government of the Church is transformed into an oligarchy, and Magistrates are feigned to be like Diotrephes (2 John 9), who exalt themselves in spiritual matters and seek primacy over their brothers, whether they are first in spiritual gifts and works (1 Cor. 12 and 14), or intermediate, or weak, or nearly none. By the same reasoning, it would be said that they are above the Church as such, and that all supreme ecclesiastical power resides in them as ecclesiastical monarchs, not otherwise than the Papists invent concerning their Pope. So that it could be rightly opposed to them, as Gerson once said to the Pope: 'The Pope is our brother; unless he does not want to say with us, our father.' 20th argument. Ministers will no longer be said distinctly to be ministers of Christ in the Church and in the work of Christ (as in 1 Cor. 4:1, 2 Cor. 5:19-20, Gal. 1:10), but ministers of men, of politics, of state, of the King, or deputies and vicars of Magistrates, by the same reasoning as any other legates, prefects, cursors, questors, scribes, etc., because they will use their office in ecclesiastical matters in the same right and manner as these in political affairs: for the authority and power of Magistrates extend over any persons, things, causes, in one, uniform, and indivisible manner. 10th argument. Indeed, ministers will be

called pure mandatories of the Magistrate, from whom they will receive mandate, instruction, mission: for the Magistrate will be the mediator between Christ and the ministers;.....

146

...and through the Magistrate all power, all ministry, all work of the ministry will be derived and dispensed to ministers; and thus all ecclesiastical power will be feigned to reside solely in the Emperor, or in whatever supreme Magistrate, whom the novators place solely in the Pope's authority; however, this opinion was vigorously contested by the bishops of France and Spain in the Council of Trent, as can be seen in the History of the Council of Trent, book 7, pp. 721-722, 743-744, first edition in 4. Compare Marcus Antonius de Dominis, book 2, On the Republic of the Church, ch. 5-6.

20th argument. Then gradually the entire government of the Church would have to be adapted to particular conditions, states, and political cases; and thus it would degenerate into a secular rule and kingdom, and every form and semblance of the spiritual would ultimately vanish: so that instead of members and ministers of the Church being spiritual people (1 Cor. 2:15), we would finally have courtly hosts, pseudo-politicians, high-heeled shoes, deceptions, vanities, pride, gluttony, greed: such would be the twin Church of the Roman court.

12th argument. **Finally, it would follow that all ecclesiastical power could be completely controlled by the Magistrate himself, since it would not be expedient through the work of others: for what anyone executes through another as a minister, vicar, or delegate, he can do himself; just as someone who through his officers and subordinates takes care of ministers, curators, prefectures of the treasury, armies, embankments, supreme courts, academies, etc., can also take care of them himself and accordingly, as he sees fit. He himself will therefore constitute a Synedrium and Synod, he himself will feed the people with word and sacraments; he himself will excommunicate and use the keys of the kingdom of heaven; he himself will ecclesiastically appoint and ordain ministers.** No one will deny that all these things are exceedingly absurd. But if someone objects, he can perfectly approve all those things which pertain to

external spiritual or ecclesiastical jurisdiction, but not those which pertain to the internal: we ask that this Papist distinction and the exception based on it be proven. For either the entire ecclesiastical power is divided into parts, which do not belong to the whole; or it is merely a distinction of an ambiguous term, and consequently the entire dispute consists in the play of ambiguity. But if they understand by external (as the arguments brought forth compel them to understand) 1. Certain requirements and conditions, whether for being or for well-being of the spiritual. 2. Likewise, connected, combined, and necessarily intertwined political matters, though distinct from sacred and ecclesiastical matters. 3. And thus external power, indirect, consequential, and mediate concerning the very spiritual and ecclesiastical; because it deals immediately, directly, and perfectly with persons, places, actions, which spiritual matters must use as containers, instruments, vehicles, adjuncts, or in whatever manner required; indeed, we concede all that. But concerning external power, it does not pertain to the Magistrate to elect ministers,.....

147

.....judgment and exercise of ecclesiastical censures, synodal controversies of dogmas and cases brought by appeal or any other means to synodal determination, reception of individuals into the communion of the Church and to the use of the Lord's Supper, etc., will be proven in their places in Parts 2 and 3. 13th argument. It would follow that princes and magistrates are spiritual fathers and mothers, and represent the Church. But this cannot be proven from Scripture, where this title is attributed to the ecclesiastical community and to its predecessors in Hosea 2:1, compared with Matthew 23:37 and Galatians 4:26. However, the title of nourishers and nurses belongs to kings and magistrates in Isaiah 49:23.

14th argument. It would follow that under the New Testament more authority belongs to princes and magistrates than under the Old Testament; whereas in that political system, the form of government, political laws, and some kings and judges were not human creations (as now under the New Testament, 1 Peter 2:13), but immediately divine and constituted by God. However, we have already proven elsewhere that there was no ecclesiastical rule over the magistrate in the Old Testament.

15th argument. It would follow that no human society and community ordained by God in this world, except the civil or secular one, no people, no kingdom, unless from this world. This monstrous idea, which seems to be produced soon by the Machiavellian atheist, through Epicureans and men of this world (Psalm 17:14), is likely to be brought to light; if it has not already been brought forth, it is at least whispered occasionally among the allies and in the Eleusinian (Bacchic, I say) rites, which the wiser ones do not ignore. On the contrary, we acknowledge from Scripture a double man, a double life, a double state, a double happiness, a double good, a double course, a double stage, a double communion and society, a double power and order, a double public rule, and indeed as always distinct, although not always separate, so that one does not become the essence of the other, nor is one mixed or blended with the other, nor should one be transformed or can be into the other.

16. Now follows an argument *ad hominem*, which is as follows: Since their adversaries have argued with many against our opinion, they are forced to retract or somehow involve themselves with some limitation and distinction, using terms of political, objective, directive, or external power alone, which only runs secondarily and directly around religious formulas, profession or ecclesiastical doctrine, not considered in itself, as judged to be received and exercised in the society of the faithful; and concerning the church with its exercises and the power of its spiritual government to be constituted, continued, restored, reformed: but which runs alone and intrinsically around religion and the church, insofar and as far as it is publicly to be admitted, received, retained, defended in the Republic. For if, in a straightforward and candid manner, they defend their opinion to the end, they will necessarily appear to be cobbling together the absurdity of the political Pope and Antichrist.

148

And certainly however much they, along with all who have cooked up this mishmash after the Remonstrants, produce citations from orthodox theologians, they seem to have forgotten, or intend to impose upon themselves and their readers, the very distinction that has been so often and thoroughly emphasized, in order to

somewhat cover the nakedness of their cause. This must therefore be continually reiterated and emphasized. It is one thing to speak of intrinsic power and said power, which is purely spiritual, formally ecclesiastical, ministerial; and another thing to speak of secular power, formally political, supreme and dominant, which is extrinsic to the church as such, not intrinsic; therefore, ecclesiastical power can be said objectively only according to its extrinsic denomination. But what is intrinsic and proper belongs to the supreme powers established in the Republic. Again, it is one thing to consider religion and the church in itself and by itself, and another thing to consider its external adjunct or second part, or with respect to its extrinsic coordination with the Republic: whether, that is, and insofar as it is to be publicly admitted, received, and defended by secular power, it is religion and the church. The former power, which is public, precedential, and directive, but purely spiritual and ministerial, belongs solely to the church as such; the latter belongs solely to princes and secular magistrates. And certainly, their adversaries, having argued against all this, are compelled, whether they want to admit it or not, to accept this distinction under our opinion. Now I will point out in conclusion, as a last resort, what Louis Molina said in the Corollary to his exhortation to those building an empire within an empire on page 48. Concerning the same thing, I said that properly speaking, no ecclesiastical power opposed to civil power can be thought of, except the internal power, which emerges through the ministry in leading souls to the faith of Christ; I said this with Triglandius, who forgot to affirm this. He cites Triglandius's words from the preface to the book on civil and ecclesiastical power, distinguishing between spiritual ecclesiastical power, which is concerned with the administration of the keys of the kingdom of heaven, etc., and the civil power of the magistrate, by which he judges and determines religion, which he wishes to be exercised publicly among subjects. 'If,' says Triglandius quoted by Molina, 'he removes true religion, he substitutes false; he abuses his power, but he cannot deny the power itself.' Where Triglandius, not Molina, forgot, when he accepts Triglandius's distinction and opinion. Thus, he seems to have mishandled the case, and committed the entire exhortation and its corollary to a fallacy and sophistry. If he means nothing else than what Triglandius, in his book and in his disputations, wrote in defense of the Remonstrants, especially and so clearly emphasized in ecclesiastical history, that supreme power under God concerning religion and the church lies solely with the magistrate, not as such in itself, but incidentally or with regard to the incidental or adjunct, insofar as it is public in the

Republic, and there to be publicly admitted, fostered, defended: surely this war will soon be concluded, and the fatiguing armor and thurible of Erastus, the Grallators, the Remonstrants, and their ilk, shall be devoted to the machinations of the political Pontificate, or handed over to the husband of Venus.