

# APPENDIX TO THE DISPUTATIONS ON CREATION, SECOND.

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1. In the disputations On Creation part 10 thesis 1, it was shown that the soul is immortal and incorruptible, and this from its own nature, not indeed through grace; in addition, that its immortality can be proven from the light and reason of nature. But two questions related to this still remain to be discussed around this matter.

1. Whether it is so disposed with this immortality of the soul, that with it in no way can consist some interval or certain state of not existing by its own existence, at least for some time which is terminated by the death and resurrection of man? Something like this seems to be established by the Socinians. Namely, that the souls of the just, when they have departed from the body, live and exist in God - which according to the same interpreters is nothing other than that the souls of the just, when they have departed from the body, do not indeed live and exist by a life and existence proper and distinct from the existence of God, but that they are of such a nature that from God, in whom they are said to live and exist, they can receive their own life and existence, which also they will then actually receive when they are reunited to the body on the day of judgment. But in this they are absurd who follow Socinus. For it openly implies that the soul is immortal and yet at some time does not exist; for the not existing of a thing is a sign that that thing is dead, for the immediate effect of death is the non-existence of the thing which lived or existed; but to be dead and to be immortal contradict each other. Furthermore, it is an inept evasion by which they contend that although they do not exist in themselves, they nevertheless exist in God, that is, they say a relation to the active power of God, by which they can be and are to be restored - for thus it would follow that all things produced in time also were from eternity, because from eternity they were in the active power of God, that is, they could be produced by God and were to be produced each in its own time. What, that existence is nothing other than a mode by which something is understood to be constituted outside its causes, as the metaphysicians everywhere teach - which being posited, it again implies to be in the power of God as the cause of existing, and to exist, which is posited by them simultaneously in the soul. The same is proven from Scripture, which testifies that souls exist in themselves and per se, even after separation from the body and before the resurrection. Matthew 22:32: "I am the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob. He is not the God of the dead but of the living" - where Christ expressly proves that the patriarchs according to something, that is, their souls (for their bodies had returned to dust), live or exist, and this in themselves, by their own existence, which is clear from the text; for thus they are said to be alive or to live, so that their state is opposed to the state of the dead, who are known also to have an existence in God (may there be no improper speech), or a potential existence; therefore nothing remains which can be said, than that the patriarchs even then had an actual existence, distinct from the

existence of other beings. Similarly also Luke 23:43: "Truly I say to you, today you will be with me in paradise." To this passage they are accustomed to except that to the thief indeed paradise was promised, but to be given only after the resurrection; but that Christ said "today you will be with me in paradise" on account of the certainty of the future thing, just as the prophets express future things through the present or past tense; therefore "today" will be a particle not of time, but of assertion. But truly this overturns the common and natural signification of the word too audaciously without example. And who does not see that through the adverb "today" Christ wanted to respond to that adverb "when" which is contained in the petition of the thief: "Remember me when you come into your kingdom" - so that the sense may be "today will be that 'when,' or the time in which you ask remembrance of you from me, and also today, that is, on this very day you will be with me in my kingdom." But the truth of our assertion will be even more evident from the treatment of the following problem.

It is asked secondly: Whether souls, after separation from the body until the resurrection, sleep and perceive neither afflictions nor joys? The Anabaptists affirm this, as is seen in their antagonists Abraham Doreslaar and Petrus Austro-Sylvius, where they treat of the four last things. Protocol of Emden, folios 360 and 361. The Socinians agree with them, who also themselves contend that the soul, even if it existed by its own existence, at least does not feel pains or joys. For thus Smalcus disputes about this matter against Frantzius on the last judgment, page 409: "Just as," he says, "the body without the spirit is a corpse, so in turn the spirit without the body cannot exercise any actions; hence the spirit after death is endowed with no sense." And the same there: "Whether that spirit which returns to God and is separated from the body is endowed with some sense, and whether it enjoys some pleasure before the advent of Christ and before the new conjunction of the spirit with the glorified body, we very much doubt - indeed, we believe the matter to be otherwise." And in disputation 8 against Frantzius on the Church he says: "It is an error when in thesis 25 Frantzius divides the Church into triumphant and militant; for in reality there is now no triumphant Church, but it will be in the future when Christ Jesus comes to render to each one according to his works." Whence also this problem is sometimes conceived in these words: Whether there is some triumphant Church before the resurrection - which the illustrious Maccovius did in his Theological Collegia part 3, disputation 12. Whether the Remonstrants are entirely alien from this opinion or not, cannot be so said; nor will they themselves say it openly. The words of Episcopius could move a scruple for someone in his Theological Disputations 22 thesis 7, where he establishes that the souls of the just after this life up to the day of judgment have no operation outside themselves, nor do they feel anything. See his words, and compare with disputation 23 theses 2 and 4, and with his Defense of the Remonstrant Catechism against Dr. Heidanus on questions 100 and 101, compared with the Remonstrant Apology chapter 19. We in our catechization of the Remonstrant Catechism on question 100 offered for the reader's consideration excerpts from the horrible Socinian booklet which a certain Remonstrant Socinian, formerly a minister of the word among them, who marked his name with the first letters D.R.C. (Dirk Rafaelsz Camphuysen), is thought to have translated into our vernacular language and published. Where the anonymous Socinian says that whatever is commonly believed about the infernal torture, punishment and damnation of the separated soul, and of the soul and body after the day of judgment, has flowed from the trifles and fables of the Papists and pagan poets. The aforementioned Remonstrant Dutch interpreter

(D.R.C.) adds on pages 214-215: "No one has accomplished so much in the restoration of collapsed Christianity as Socinus. Nevertheless," he says, "no one seems to me so excellent and so useful to piety as that through the thick and common shadows of the fabulous hell and infinite damnation he saw through, and restored this illustrious light to men, etc. As for me, I give thanks from my inmost heart to God the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ. For this illumination in this article (to which I could not arrive by my own ingenuity) made it so that when I was just about to reprove the whole Christian religion, I began to love it, to esteem it, to find it rational, and hitherto through God's grace to express it from all my powers in life and morals." And afterwards on page 219: "So that I dare confidently assert that this Papistic, or rather pagan fiction (about the infernal punishments after this life) is one of the greatest impediments which impede the Christian religion from being able to be purged of false dogmas and pillows of sins, such as are about the merits and satisfaction of Christ, about the imputed justice of the impenitent, the impossibility and non-necessity of Christian obedience, etc."

Whether the Remonstrants are going to except anything against these excerpts, and whether the aforementioned Socinian of theirs vomited such Socino-Libertinisms so openly without their knowledge or against their will - there is no leisure now to inquire. At least up to now they make no response, nor do they clear themselves. In their Apology folio 218 they strive to purge the Socinians of this opinion, while they say it is uncertain whether they deny that the soul has vital operations within itself and enjoys them, so that it does not sleep. Some of them seem to affirm this openly enough. But sending the reader back to the excerpts from Socinus and the Socinians which our catechization just cited on question 100 exhibits, we reject this opinion about the sleeping of souls, whoever's it may be, establishing: the souls of the pious, as soon as they have departed from this life, are affected with pleasure, and those of the impious with torments. Concerning the pious it is proven from John 5:24: "Truly, truly I say to you, whoever hears my word and believes him who sent me has eternal life and does not come into judgment, but has passed from death to life" - where the attainment of eternal life is immediately subjoined to death. But that life is not without pleasure; hence it is called joy, Matthew 25:21: "Enter into the joy of your Lord." And that is the state which eye has not seen, nor ear heard, etc., 1 Corinthians 2. It is proven secondly from the desires of the saints by which they sought that state which is after death, 2 Corinthians 5:2, 4, Philippians 1:21, Romans 7:24 - which could not happen unless they thought something better was to be conferred on them; for appetite is borne only to the good, and more to that which is better. But they would rather seek the state of this life than of the future, if in the future life there was no place for joy except after the judgment, because it is better to enjoy spiritual joy, even if inchoate (1 Peter 1), than none. That the impious are tormented immediately from death is proven from Acts 1:25: "He went to his own place," namely the place of perdition where there is a fullness of all torments, Mark 9:43-44. For that was his place, who is the son of perdition, John 17:12. Finally, it is proven concerning the pious and impious together from Luke 16, from the parable of the rich man and Lazarus. For immediately after death their states were disparate - the former miserable, the latter blessed, which could not have happened if the soul of both this one and that one had slept; for then they would have been equal, which the scope of the parable does not permit.

Objection 1: That the dead are commonly said to sleep in Scripture, Matthew 9, John 11. I respond: Not the body, nor the soul are said to sleep in the scriptures, but the dead, that is, the composites. For as the body is not dead, nor the soul, but the living, so neither the body nor the soul sleep, but what was conflated from these. But from this the rest of the soul cannot be concluded. Indeed, on the contrary, just as through natural sleep the operations common to body and soul are indeed impeded, but not those which are proper to the soul, as is clear from those illapses of God into the minds of the prophets through which he was accustomed to reveal wondrous things to them of old - so also in this sleep which is beyond and against nature, indeed the common operations cannot be exercised, but nothing forbids the proper ones from being able to be exercised. But by this phrase in the sacred letters the resurrection even of the dead is suggested. For just as those who sleep at some point cease to sleep, so those who are dead will at some point rise again from the dead.

Objection 2: Hebrews 11:39-40: "And all these, though commended through their faith, did not receive what was promised, since God had provided something better for us, that apart from us they should not be made perfect." I respond: 1) The Socinians cannot use this argument with a good conscience, since they deny that eternal life was promised to the fathers in the Old Testament. 2) By that promise is not understood eternal life, but the exhibition of Christ in the flesh; for this was promised to the fathers, but not to be fulfilled before the fullness of time; therefore that proposition "that apart from us they should not be made perfect" denotes nothing other than "that they may not have perfect knowledge concerning Christ promised to them before it had come to our times." But the controversy about the sleeping of souls should properly be referred to the treatise on the four last things. Meanwhile, the antagonists of the Anabaptists can be consulted, and Calvin, whose special treatise exists.

3. The faculties of the rational soul as such are two: intellect and will. The intellect is a faculty of the rational soul, ordained for knowing the true and the good. For things are set before the intellect under a twofold aspect: either as they are in themselves, or as they are disposed in order to us. In the former respect the speculative intellect knows them, in the latter the practical. With most questions hence being sent away, because they belong to the philosophical forum, we will here inquire first about the order which is observed in these faculties as to their operations: Whether in general the intellect acts prior, or the will? Or whether the command which is between these faculties with respect to each other, is to be deferred to the intellect or to the will?

The opinion of Bonaventure, tome 2 of his *Opuscula*, treatise On Mystical Theology, single question, is this: that not only some, but even the most perfect operation of the will in this life happens without intellection and the proposition of the object. The same was followed by Vercellensis in his paraphrase of chapter 1 of the said Areopagite On Mystical Theology, at the beginning and end. The same was taught by Gerson, Alphabet 66 letter O, and in his treatise On Mystical Theology; for the same is also referred Gregory of Rimini on book 2 of *Sentences* distinction 7 question 1 conclusion 2 to the third reason. But to the contrary, Gabriel Vázquez in *Prima Secundae* disputation 35 question 3 part 1, Suárez, and other more recent scholastic philosophers and theologians depart; the same is taught by Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* 1

question 15, affirming that the opposite is impossible. Compare our disputations On Meditation. But to us that opinion seems more probable which is also more common: that the intellect acts prior, nor does the will operate except consequently to the action and motion of the intellect; the intellect therefore moves the will, not indeed effectively, in the way that God, who as first cause flows into the agent and the action, but morally and through the mode of persuasion, through the antecedent knowledge of the object and end; whence arises not only the action of the will simply, but also such and such an action - for the will is moved by the intellect not only as to the exercise of the act, but also as to the species. For the intellect proposes the object to the will, from which as from a formal external principle the acts of the will take their species. This opinion is proven:

1) From the fact that there is no desire of the unknown, as is commonly said. The will is proportioned only to the good, nor is it borne to anything unless allured by its goodness. But if the will pursues a thing on account of goodness, it is necessary for the goodness to have been known before, and consequently for the act of the intellect to be constructed beforehand; for to know is of the intellect, but the will is blind.

2) It would follow that the will could be borne to evil as evil, which is contrary to its nature. The consequence is clear. For let it be posited that someone desires adultery, which, being conscious of the divine law, he is persuaded by absolute judgment to be evil - I ask under what aspect he desires it? Certainly not under the aspect of adultery; for then he would desire it under the aspect of evil. Therefore, he cannot be borne to that except what is evil from itself and in itself, it by accident puts on the nature of good, for example the pleasant. Which necessarily happens through the intellect, which so determines the struggle of spirit and flesh in the regenerate, or of the fearing and desiring flesh in the unregenerate, that pleasure is preferred to honesty, or is judged better. And this cannot be done by the will. For the will by willing does not make good things desirable, but is borne to desiring them; for the adequate object of the will is the good. It is therefore necessary for the good to be before it is desired by the will, because the object as such, or in the nature of object, is prior to the act tending into it. The object of the will is therefore good before it is desired by the will. But whence it has that goodness, which is evil in itself, I do not see, except from the intellect. It remains therefore that the act of the intellect is required beforehand, at least in such things, by which the will is promoted to the exercise of its act. What we have said about things evil in themselves must similarly also be understood about good things in themselves - because no one will desire a thing, although good in itself, unless it is also good for him. But whether it is good for anyone in this place, at this time, in this state, is a judgment belonging to the practical intellect. It is also confirmed by the authority of Augustine, On the Trinity book 8 chapter 4, book 10 chapter 1, where he teaches that the will can love nothing except what is in some way known - if not known, at least believed. And when in that first chapter he had proposed a difficulty against this doctrine, because the will sometimes desires to know the unknown, he removes it in this way: "It must be understood that the same thing is not said when it is said 'he loves to know unknown things' and 'he loves unknown things' - but that he may love unknown things, he cannot; for 'to know' is not placed there in vain, since he who loves to know unknown things loves not the unknown things themselves, but the knowing itself," etc. - by which words he shows that it not only never happens that we are borne

by our affection into unknown things, but also that this cannot happen, and therefore, when we desire to know something, then we are borne by our affection into the knowledge itself, which we apprehend as pleasant and useful, and so we are not borne into what we are ignorant of, but into the knowledge of it, which is not unknown to us.

Someone could say: We experience that we apply our mind to knowing something or withdraw it from it when we will; the will therefore seems to apply the intellect to acting. To the contrary: We do not will to understand, except the intellect has already judged before the willing.

4. It has been demonstrated that the knowledge of the intellect as preceding is required for any act whatsoever of the will. But there still remain other questions connected as corollaries to the preceding one, of which the first is: What and of what sort an act of the intellect is required? As to the former, since in order to the will there can be four acts in the intellect, namely apprehensive knowledge, the judgment by which it is judged that a thing is good or bad, another judgment or practical dictate by which the intellect judges that the thing which by the preceding judgment it had decreed to be good or bad is to be embraced or shunned, the practical syllogism or discourse by which reason concludes a dictate of this sort - it is doubted whether for every action of the will is required, besides apprehensive knowledge or any sort of notice of the object, a knowledge of the goodness or suitability of the object itself, that is, a judgment by which the intellect thinks and decrees the object to be good or bad, salutary or harmful, pleasant or troublesome. The negative part is followed by Scotus and Gabriel on book 2 of Sentences distinction 6, and Marsilius on the second book question 16 article 1, establishing that simple apprehensive knowledge suffices, and indeed simple, without any composition and division. The affirmative part is held by Peter of Ailly and Gregory on book 1 distinction 3, and Valencia on Prima Secundae question 9 article 1 disputation 2 question 4 point 1, who here alleges for himself Thomas Prima Secundae question 9 article 1. This reason is adduced, because unless the object is shown to the will under the aspect of good, its proper object, which is the good and suitable, is not yet shown to it - for the will is a blind power which needs a demonstration of its object made by the intellect. See the explication and deduction of this reason, as well as the solution, in Valencia, and especially in the Coimbrans on the third book of On the Soul chapter 13 question 4, who make both opinions probable. We nevertheless prefer to follow the affirmative with Valencia.

The second question is: Whether besides the simple judgment about the suitability and goodness of the object, a further act of practical reason which is called command is required in addition, so that the will may be moved and elicit its act? Thomas affirms, Prima Secundae question 17 article 1, and with him Valencia disputation 2 question 4 point 1, especially Prima Secundae point 1, and among other things he places the principal foundation of it in this, that it is necessary to assign a peculiar and proper cause on the part of the intellect why the will elicits an act about some object and is moved toward it. But the apprehension and judgment about the goodness of the object are not the proper and sufficient cause. Therefore, this command must be admitted. The consequence is proven, because otherwise the will would seem to be moved only by chance and fortuitously and without reason. But what that command is, and what the order between command and the use of the will, Thomas teaches *ibid.* article 2-3, whose mind

Valencia expounds question 12 points 2-4, and after him Sylvius on the cited questions and articles.

The third question is: Whether and when the will is moved by the intellect and vice versa - on which Thomas, cited question 9 article 1, where he establishes that the will is thus moved by the intellect as to the specification of its act, so that as to the exercise it is not moved by the same, but rather itself moves the intellect and the other powers to their acts as to the exercise of them. But Valencia finds a difficulty in this opinion, which nevertheless he thinks can be removed by certain distinctions, which see in him, disputation 2 question 4 point 2 pages 205-206, and Sylvius on question 9 article 1. Further, Thomas explains the mode by which the intellect moves the will *ibid.* in these words: "as presenting its object to it." And more fully in question 22 On Truth article 1 reply to objection 5: "The intellect rules the will, not as if inclining it to that to which it tends, but as showing it to what it ought to tend."

5. The fourth question: Whether the will not only depends on, but is also determined by the practical judgment of the intellect, or whether the will, the practical judgment of the intellect being posited, is determined to follow it, especially if it is the last one, which is usually expressed in these words: "this now, all things considered, is to be chosen or done." Here the opinions of the doctors vary. For some establish that the will is determined by the judgment of the practical intellect as to the specification, but not as to the exercise. Thus Thomas and his followers. To which opinion Thomas constructs this hypothesis in *Prima Secundae* question 9 article 1, that the intellect moves the will as to the specification, but the will moves the intellect as to the exercise. Which Gregory of Valencia *ibid.* disputation 2 question 4 point 1 thinks must be taken in such a way that the intellect in moving the will by its own nature primarily has respect to the specification of the act of the will, but the will in moving the intellect primarily has respect to the exercise of its acts. Yet he soon adds that he doubts whether this is really so, nor is it of such great importance to know it for certain. Others say neither as to specification nor as to exercise - thus Becanus in his *Summa of Scholastic Theology* of the second part, part 1 treatise 1 chapter 2 question 5, Suárez, Arriaga and others soon to be cited. Others say both as to specification and as to exercise. And this opinion John Cameron a few years ago brought back into the schools from the Reformed theologians, and expressly defended it in a special treatise against the epistle of a learned man; whom not a few Reformed theologians and philosophers have followed since then, among whom Johannes Maccovius publicly wrote for this opinion, tome 1 of his *Miscellaneous Disputations* page 455, and Rivet in his disputation On Free Will, February 7, 1631. But this opinion is proven:

1) From Scripture, Psalm 9:10: "Those who know your name trust in you." If therefore knowledge did not determine the will, it could happen that those knowing the name of God would not trust in God. John 4:10: "If you knew the gift of God, and who it is that is saying to you, 'Give me a drink,' you would have asked him for living water." If therefore the intellect did not determine the will, the Samaritan woman could have known the gift of God and not asked God for living water; and thus Christ would have said something false.

2) If it happened that the will did not always follow the dictate of the intellect, charity could be separated from the true knowledge of Christ; although the apostle John denies that those who hate their neighbor have seen or known God, 1 John 2:9-11.

3) If the will could suspend its act after the judgment of the intellect, now it could not desire its own preservation, because it could not desire the good by which, being preserved, that is promoted; but in this way the rational creature would be worse than the brutes.

4) The will is naturally proportioned to the good; it will therefore be against its nature if it rejects the well known good.

5) If the will were not determined by the judgment of the practical intellect, it would follow that it is borne into the unknown. But this is absurd. Therefore.

6) With this the argument nearly agrees: The will is a blind power; therefore it needs the direction of the intellect.

7) When a man is asked why he does such a thing, he responds: because he judges that he must do this for himself in this way.

8) If the will desired the contrary to the good shown by the intellect, it could desire evil under the aspect of evil. It is clear; because if not killing the innocent here and now has the nature of good, on the contrary killing the innocent here and now will have the nature of evil. If therefore the intellect dictates that the innocent is not to be killed, but the will on the contrary wills to kill the innocent, it will desire evil under the aspect of evil, which is absurd.

9) But if it could happen that someone chose against the dictate of reason, it could also happen that there would be sin in the will without ignorance, or any error or defect in reason or intelligence - which is contrary to that saying of Solomon, Proverbs 14:22: "Do they not err who devise evil?" And sin is said to be "chata" in Hebrew, that is aberration, error, Greek "hamartia," Hebrews 9:7 compared with Leviticus 16. Thus sinners are everywhere called foolish, and the just are called wise, prudent. See also Isaiah 53:6, Romans 3:11.

10) Because the will needs the representation of the intellect; therefore, unless the thing were represented here and now as to be loved, the will will not be able to be moved to it.

11) If the judgment were indifferent, the will could not be moved to any determinate thing through it; for from an indifferent principle no determinate action arises.

The other extreme opinion opposed to this is defended by Suárez, Fonseca, Vázquez, Arriaga, Hurtado de Mendoza, Oviedo, and other hypothetical doctors. But it is proven by these reasons:

Argument 1: If the will is determined by the last practical judgment of the intellect, it will not remain free, but will be borne into the act by necessity; but this is absurd; therefore also the

former. The antecedent is proven: First, because it belongs to the nature of a free cause that, all the things required for acting being posited, it can act and not act; for this is the difference between free and natural powers, that the latter are determined to one thing, and all the things required for acting being posited, they cannot not act; the former otherwise. It is confirmed secondly, because a free power ought to be indifferent; but when the will is determined by the intellect, it itself is not indifferent, but determined to one thing; therefore it does not remain free. It is confirmed thirdly: if someone moved the hand of a boy to write, which the boy could not resist, it would not be free for the boy to write, but necessary. If therefore the intellect moves the will to its actions, the will is not free to exercise them, but necessary, supposing that it cannot resist or act otherwise.

Argument 2: If the will is necessarily determined by the judgment of the intellect, it follows: 1) that the will cannot choose the lesser good, the greater being left aside, because the intellect always judges (unless perhaps it errs) that the greater good is to be preferred to the lesser; but this is contrary to experience, because we often choose the lesser good. Here pertains that common saying: "But a new force drags me unwilling, and desire one thing, reason persuades another; I see and approve the better things, I follow the worse."

2) It follows that the will can choose neither of two equal goods, because right judgment of reason does not prefer one to the other.

Argument 3: What only acts morally, that does not determine the will to one thing; but the intellect only acts morally with respect to the will, moving it objectively or finally; therefore it does not determine it to one thing. Suárez proves and expands this minor in his *Metaphysics*. Because the judgment of the intellect does not move the will except by means of the object which it proposes. But the proposed object does not always infer necessity or determine to one thing, nor is this necessary so that the will may tend to its object; therefore that determination on the part of the judgment is not necessary, indeed not even possible. But that the will is not moved by the judgment of the intellect except by means of the object is proven thus: Either the judgment moves by reason of the object only, or by reason of itself, so that it has a peculiar efficacy for determining the will. But the latter is absurd. First, because such efficacy would be repugnant to the liberty of the will. Second, because such a mode of moving is plainly alien to the function of the intellect, which is to illuminate, direct and regulate the actions of the will as an extrinsic active principle, not indeed to elicit the formal action of the will either as an extrinsic or intrinsic principle. Third, because the objective mode of moving is proper to the will. For it is not necessitated and determined to one thing by another, except by God alone as to exercise, and except by the good in general and similar objects as to specification.

Argument 4: What cannot follow the judgment of the intellect in spiritual good unless specially helped by the grace and efficacious motion of God, that is not determined by practical judgment; but the will cannot follow the intellect unless specially helped by God; therefore it is not determined to one thing by the intellect. The minor is confirmed: For if it could follow without the special motion of grace, then men dead in sins, handed over to a reprobate sense, the damned,

likewise demons could follow the intellect well prescribing according to the measure of cognition or assent in the mind; but the contrary is true.

Argument 5: It is drawn from those sinning against the Holy Spirit; for they voluntarily deny the truth known altogether, against the dictate of the practical intellect, reason vainly resisting.

Argument 6: Because it would follow that every sin proceeds from such a judgment, and consequently that every sinner is a heretic. But this is absurd. Therefore. This argument is of Arriaga in his Physics, disputation 8 on the soul, section 2.

Argument 7: Because it would follow that man is similar to the brutes, whose cognitions, whatever they may be, so determine the appetite that they do not leave it indifferent. This argument is of Hurtado de Mendoza in his Physics, disputation 14 on the soul, section 8.

Argument 8: It would follow that man cannot commit sin against conscience; but this is false. For often men who have an illuminated mind do evil against the dictate of their mind.

Argument 9: Because Adam transgressed not so much by understanding as by willing.

Argument 10: Because error in the intellect does not have the nature of fault, but rather of a sad evil.

Argument 11: Because the angels transgressed, whose intellect nevertheless was good.

Argument 12: Because in Ezekiel 12, the people are said not to have eyes to see, because they were rebellious.

But the authors of the opposite opinion could deal with these arguments thus:

To the first: First, it is denied that the liberty of the will consists in this, that it can act against the ultimate dictate of the practical judgment; but it suffices that it is moved by that power which is not determined to one thing, but indifferent to many. For intrinsically it retains its liberty and indifference to the opposite, even when, following the determination of the practical judgment, it determines itself. For just as the object could be proposed by the intellect under another aspect, so also the will itself could choose something else. It must be altogether denied that it belongs to the nature of a free cause to be indifferent to opposites, all things required for acting being posited - which can be shown by innumerable instances. 1) In order for God to create and redeem the world in time, one of the things required was the eternal decree of God by which he had resolved to create and redeem it; although these could not be composed together - both that God decreed from eternity to found and redeem the world, and that he did not found it nor redeem it - nevertheless he most freely both founded it and redeemed it. 2) Supposing that God moves the human will to something, it is impossible with this supposition that the will not be moved to that; and yet, this impossibility notwithstanding, it is repugnant for the will to be moved by God by necessity, but its act remains contingent and free; for it implies that the will is

necessitated as to its elicited acts. I now say nothing about the blessed, who are not indifferent to the love of God clearly seen, and yet freely love; nothing about Christ, who while he was still in life was not indifferent to obedience or disobedience to the divine law, and yet freely obeyed. At least this is added: 3) The will cannot desire a spiritual good, unless it is premoved by special converting grace. That grace is therefore a requisite for desiring a supernatural good; which being posited, the will cannot not desire, so that these propositions could be composed: efficacious grace is present to the will, and yet it is not moved to desiring. The reason for this is: because grace formally expresses the infallibility of the outcome. It is concluded therefore that the will can be free in its act, although the ultimate judgment of the intellect being posited, it cannot not desire what the intellect has dictated must be desired - because necessity from supposition, such as is found in this case, does not overturn liberty simply. Compare our dissertation On the Term of Life. It must therefore be known that, when it is said that the intellect determines the will, the authors do not mean this as if it assigned it to one part, but that it moves it efficaciously and sweetly: efficaciously indeed, by making it infallibly operate; but sweetly, by making it operate according to the mode proper to its nature, that is, freely. Nor does the difference between a necessary and a free cause consist in this, that one can act and not act, all things required for acting being posited, the other cannot not act; but that the determination which is in the former causes is natural and absolute in the one, in the other only from supposition. For example, fire does not have an intrinsic faculty by which it can not burn nearby wood, because it is naturally determined through its form to one thing, namely to burning combustible things legitimately approximated. But the will still retains intrinsically the power to not act in the divided sense, according to which it is indifferent to one thing, even then when it is actually applied to one thing.

To the third confirmation, I respond: It would not be free for the boy to write, if his hand were moved by another to write against his will; but if it were moved with him willing it, he would write freely.

To the second argument, I respond: That consequence is weak; for we do not deny that it can happen that the will desires the lesser good, the greater being left aside, namely then when the intellect errs in judging, judging that the lesser good is to be preferred here and now to the greater. It is also conceded that if the intellect judges two goods equally to be desired, the will is not going to choose one over the other - because choice formally imports a certain betterness in what is chosen over what is left behind. And to that common saying "I see and approve the better things" etc., it must be said that the absolute intellect is distinguished from the comparative; the will does not follow the former, it follows the latter.

To the third argument, it is conceded that what only acts morally cannot determine to one thing in the genus of efficient cause operating physically and directly; it is denied in the genus of final cause.

To the fourth argument, I deny the consequence. For although, the judgment of the intellect being posited, something more is still required for it to actually operate, namely the prevenient motion of God by which it is applied to acting, it is nevertheless so disposed with it that, the

judgment of the intellect being posited, the will infallibly operates; for God infallibly executes such an order constituted by himself. Then in this argument disparates are conjoined, namely that the intellect can be renewed, but not yet the will - which is false. John 6: "Everyone who has heard and learned from the Father comes to me."

To the fifth argument, I respond: Those sinning against the Holy Spirit indeed judge absolutely that the truth is not to be denied, because that is evil in itself; they nevertheless judge comparatively, that is, in these or those circumstances, that it must be done, so that they may obey their hatred - and in this respect it has the nature of good. It is added that Christ in Matthew 12, where he treats of those sinning against the Holy Spirit, calls them (namely the Pharisees) blind leaders of the blind, that is, erring in judgment. And in Hebrews 6 it is said that they cannot be renewed to repentance; but repentance belongs to the mind.

To the sixth argument, I respond by a distinction. Any sin is a heresy, not formally or specifically, but implicitly and reductively. Thus when someone rightly thinks in general that the abuse of the divine name, drunkenness, etc. are sins, and yet commits them, he is not properly to be called a heretic; but his deed implies a sort of heresy, or something analogous to heresy. Briefly, heresy formally expresses by its nature an error about a question of law. But in the deed of one sinning by drunkenness or abuse of the divine name, there is only an error about a question of fact.

To the seventh argument, I deny the consequence. For this most broad dissimilitude remains, that man acts from pre-election according to the judgment of the practical intellect, and thus most freely and indifferently, namely in the divided sense; but brutes, not at all.

To the eighth argument, I deny the consequence. For every sin is against conscience which is against the absolute judgment and general dictate of synderesis, although it is according to the comparative judgment of the intellect.

To the ninth argument: Indeed, Adam transgressed both by understanding and by badly judging, according to that saying in 2 Corinthians 11:3, where Eve is said to have been deceived. Here is the vice and error in judgment.

To the 10th argument: The antecedent is false. See 2 Thessalonians 1:8. And if the theological and intellectual virtues, like faith, wisdom, prudence, are virtues, therefore their opposites are vices; consequently they are not merely sad evils.

To the 11th argument: The contrary is clear from John 8:44, where they are said not to have remained in the truth, that is, their judgment of intellect was corrupted. As it is said of men in 1 Timothy 6:5, 2 Corinthians 4:4.

To the 12th argument: That "because" can denote a reason taken a posteriori, so that, namely, the reason for the consequence may be assigned, whence it is clear that they do not rightly see and judge. So that, namely, rebellion is the effect or consequent and sign of an evil mind and perverse judgment, not indeed the cause or antecedent.

To the arguments of the opposite opinion, not a few things could be said and applied from the disputations of the Scotists against the Thomists' command of the intellect, and of the more recent Semi-Pelagians disputing for the concurrence of free will, like Suárez, Fonseca, Hurtado, Arriaga, Oviedo, and others whom Oviedo cites in controversy 8 On the Soul point 5, and also from Vázquez in *Prima Secundae* tome 1 disputation 128, where he denies that a defect of the intellect is necessarily required beforehand for a defect of the will in acting; or Bellerus the Thomist in book 9 of the *Metaphysics* question 4, and indeed according to the way of Thomas (as he there speaks) determines that liberty is radically and originally in the intellect, but formally and completely in the will alone. In addition, that intellect and will are indeed rational and free powers, but the will is freer than the intellect, because, namely, it does not have an intrinsic moving cause in the genus of efficient cause necessitating it to act, because it is motive-effectively both of itself, and of the intellect, and of the other powers; but the intellect is only motive of the will in the genus of final cause.

The Coimbrans in their *Ethical Disputations* disputation 4 question 2, whether the knowledge of the intellect also concurs actively with the will to elicit its acts, say that each opinion seems quite probable to them. The same in *On the Soul* book 3 chapter 14 question 4, whether for the will to elicit its act a judicative knowledge is required in the intellect, they think each opinion probable.

From our theologians, William Ames in his *Marrow* everywhere fights for the indetermination and principality of the will, especially on account of that problem (as it seems) whether faith is in the intellect or in the will. But that his reasons for theology and faith in the will do not solidly conclude, we have shown elsewhere. Nor in vain or rashly do we accurately distinguish faith in the intellect, and from fiducial faith as its own essential part, with the excellent theologians Beza, Zanchi, Perkins, Piscator, Gomarus, Maccovius.

It must not be passed over that the Remonstrants in their *Apology* folio 89 infer from this determination that it follows that there are not, or cannot be, any depraved habits in the will; for if, they say, the practical judgment being posited or removed, volition is necessarily good or evil, it does not become more depraved if it follows a false judgment of reason for some centuries of years, than if it follows it, so to speak, for almost a single moment. Briefly, an evil will is depraved according to the Censor (namely the Reformed theologian, to whom they ascribe the opinion about determination) just as the locomotive faculty of a blind man, otherwise healthy, is depraved or inordinate; not because a habitual privation inheres in it, but because, destitute of directing light, it only actually errs in moving itself, or wanders uncertainly, immediately going to move itself in an orderly way, if only light were restored to the eyes.

In the same chapter 7, section 2, folio 81, they propose certain other reasons against this opinion, which Isaac Junius in his *Counter-Apology* thinks can easily be dissolved. See his solutions there. But these reasons are:

1. Because then it would follow that the liberty of the will, if indeed it consists only in the indifference of the practical judgment, is only an extrinsic denomination in the will, because the intellect is extrinsic to the will.
2. Consequently, liberty will not be a property impressed by God on the will.
3. Liberty would be only a passive indifference, such as is that of the intellect in order to this or that object.
4. Thus free volition in order to the judgment of reason will be plainly necessary, no less than the sensitive appetite is necessary in order to the dictate of the senses, which it cannot not follow.
5. A law sanctioned by the threatening of punishment could no more be borne to the will than to the sensitive appetite.
6. Sin will only be in the intellect or judgment, not in the will.
7. No sin will be able to be given against conscience.
8. There will be no need of a reformation of the will, no immediate operation of God into it, when he converts a man; but a reformation of the judgment will suffice, which the will will necessarily follow.
9. No corruption made immediately in the will will be able to be said.
10. It will follow that the will in every state is free in the same way and with an equal degree of liberty, and remains so. For whatever is antecedently necessary is necessary in only one way.
11. If the indifference of the judgment sufficed for the nature of free choice, it would follow then:  
1) The will cannot choose one of two equal goods, because the judgment about the equal is indifferent. 2) Nor, when the judgment of reason has preferred one to the other, can it choose the lesser good, because the will is not indifferent except with the indifference of the judgment posited; but this then ceases, when one good has been preferred to the other, or judged better than the other.

And these indeed are the reasons for each opinion. We think that neither is of such weight that on account of it we should deny that the natural liberty of the will and the efficacy of divine grace against the Pelagians are established through either one. For the assertors of each opinion can aim and strive for the common goal of necessary truth, although not with equal steps, on account of disagreement in this hypothesis.

Perhaps a reconciliation, or at least a closer union of the dissidents could be instituted through the distinction of directive command from motive command (which Salazar, Viguerius, and Oviedo suggest in their Physics, disputation On the Soul, cited place), of which the former is

attributed to the intellect, the latter to the will. To which we add the distinction also between the motive command by which the will commands the intellect, and the motive command by which the intellect, already moved by the will, in turn by moving directs and as it were determines the will - so that the will is determined by itself, both mediately through the intellect directing it according to the antecedent command of the will, and immediately through its own motive command according to the antecedent direction or judgment of the intellect.

But here a difficulty is thrown up: Whether then the will and intellect move each other through a circle, and whether it is not necessary for that first motion of the will by which it moves the intellect to the ultimate determination to be preceded by some other motion or determination of the intellect, and whether thus there is not a process to infinity. But how this difficulty must especially be met, the commentators of Thomas inquire on Prima Secundae question 9 article 1. They commonly extricate themselves by those distinctions: Every distinct cognition of the intellect requires a prior volition or motion of the will, but not confused cognition, nor the acts of the intellect which are elicited naturally and which are in no way voluntary to us, for example when, excited by some sensible object, we also apprehend it through the intellect. Again, the acts or motions of the will necessarily and always precede the deliberate and free acts of the intellect, at least implicitly and virtually, but not explicitly. See Gregory of Valencia cited above. Of whose order of human acts we exhibit on this occasion, because it makes for the understanding of the proposed question. He therefore explains it thus, disputation cited, question 12, point 5, pages 276-278:

"Therefore, of all those voluntary acts, and consequently proper to man, which we have shown from question 3 of this disputation up to now, this is the order:

First, the end is apprehended, that is, some thing absolutely according to itself. Second, the thing is judged to be suitable, that is, good. Third, it is practically proposed to the will through a command, which we showed above necessarily precedes any act of the will. Fourth, there follows indeed an act of the will, which is a simple or absolute will, by which, namely, the thing itself pleases and is approved by the man. Fifth, the thing is further apprehended as possible to attain. Sixth, it is again proposed through a command to the will itself as to be attained. Seventh, the will therefore intends to attain it. Eighth, the will through use applies the intellect to consult about the means by which the thing is to be attained; which can also be done implicitly by this very fact, namely, that the will can at least will that the intellect so consult. For after the intellect apprehends the thing as possible to attain through means, it can well be moved only from this to proceed further to inquire into the means, even if it is not impelled to this inquiry by the express and actual motion of the will. Ninth, it is concluded through counsel and practical judgment that this or that means is to be preferred to the others. Tenth, that means is again proposed through a command to the will as useful before others. Eleventh, the will elicits an act by which it is inclined to such a means, and such an act in a different aspect is both a consent to the means, and a choice of means: a consent indeed, insofar as through it the will adheres absolutely to such a means proposed by reason; but a choice, insofar as it adheres to that means before others. Twelfth, then follows another command of reason, by which it is intimated to the will to use other powers for executing the means. Thirteenth, the will uses, that is,

effectively applies the powers to that execution. Fourteenth, the very execution of the powers finally follows. Which execution indeed, insofar as through it the end is obtained, is also a real attainment of it. Fifteenth, there finally follows the enjoyment of the will concerning the end now obtained, which enjoyment is nothing other than delight and the rest of the appetite in the thing now obtained.

In this order, I say, these acts are elicited, whether they are directly referred to the thing itself and the object about which each one is concerned, or also reflexively to each other. For, as will be clear to one considering it, these acts can also fall reflexively on themselves in the same order. For he who consults, for example, about the means to be chosen, also consults about the choice of means, and so concerning the others."

And these things indeed up to now it seemed good to taste beforehand concerning the human soul, and its faculties and acts. I had decided to touch on certain other questions in this second edition which are theological-philosophical, but because the typographical works are hastening, I now refrain for the present, content to have indicated those questions. Therefore, it is:

Question 1: Whether the soul is man. See Thomas with his interpreters on the first part, question 75, article 4.

2. Whether it is a part of God, or something plucked from the divine nature, as the Platonists wished, and Epictetus in Arrian book 1 of his Discourses chapter 14, and with them Cerdo, the Gnostics, the Priscillianists in Augustine On Heresies chapters 46 and 70, and today's Enthusiasts, confounding the substance of God and man - whose detected madnesses see in the treatise of the most noble and far most learned theologian Philip Marnix in his Dutch treatise against the Enthusiasts. Nor did Lactantius speak cautiously enough here, book 2 chapter 11. See these deliriums refuted in Augustine On the Origin of the Soul chapter 2, Thomas first part question 90 article 1, the Coimbrans on the second book On the Soul question 1 article 6.

3. Whether it is corporeal, or material, or arisen from something corporeal or material, so that there is some matter of it constituting or passing; or whether it is of a spiritual nature. Not a few nor ignoble ancients wanted the former, although perhaps some think they can be excused through improper speech - in which way Augustine also strives to excuse Tertullian in his book On Heresies chapter 86, and book 1 On the Origin of the Soul chapter 3. But he will scarcely make credible to those who have read Tertullian himself On the Soul chapters 2 and 9. Nevertheless, in a certain way and in a certain extrinsic respect it can be called corporeal and material, not indeed in its absolute being, but in its respective being, namely insofar as it, as an incomplete being, has been deputed and created by the author of nature for union with the body, and its information, and the constitution of the whole composite with it, and common life and operation with it and in it. Besides the fact that compared to God's most absolute simplicity and spirituality, it can be called in some way material - in which way also all created beings, indeed even man himself who is undoubtedly a being, can be called nothing compared to God, the first analogue of being, who is through his essence what he is, Philippians 2:7 compared with Psalm 62:10, Daniel 4:35, Ecclesiastes 1:2, where see the commentators. But on the immateriality of

the soul, Antonio Rubio and the Coimbrans on Aristotle's On the Soul must be consulted among the more recent authors. Here pertains the question whether the soul can suffer from fire, or any other corporeal thing - on which the theologians in the controversies on hell and purgatory. Compare also our disputation On Demons.

4. Whether it is of the same species with the angels, as Origen wished in book 1 On First Principles chapters 5 and 8, or whether it is inferior to the angels in essential nobility. On this question, see Thomas with his commentators on the first part question 75 article 7, the Coimbrans On the Separated Soul disputation 1 article 7.

5. Whether and how it is simple, and from what composition it is absolved - I respond: From essential parts, and from integrating or quantitative parts. Whether also from genus and difference? I deny, although it is of an incomplete nature. For who would deny that the separated soul is constituted under some genus, and is contracted through the difference "rational" to a certain species and is essentially and specifically distinguished from the angels?

6. Whether it is divisible - I respond: Concerning quantitative division, it is denied. See the scholastics on the first part question 76 article 8, and the Coimbrans on the second book On the Soul chapter 1 question 8, and the treatise of Gallego de la Serna against Sennert, now cited several times. Thomas, Summa Contra Gentiles book 2 chapter 72, attributes indivisibility to all forms of perfect and animate things. Which nevertheless must be taken with limitation. On this question depends another, on the extension of souls - on which see the same authors just cited, and we did above.

7. Whether the individuation of the human composite is first from the soul as an intrinsic principle, especially in the reunion of the separated soul with its body - on this latter doubt, see Naclantus in his treatise On Contingency, the Immortality of the Soul, etc., page 82.

8. Whether the superior and inferior portion in the soul are distinct powers - on this Scotus, Bonaventure, Durandus, Richard of Middleton dispute on the second book of Sentences distinction 24, and from the more recent authors Rhadawas expressly in his Controversies between Thomas and Scotus part 3 controversy 10 article 1.

9. Whether and how the affections are distinguished from the will, and among themselves - on this question see the scholastics on the first part question 80 article 2, question 81 article 2, Prima Secundae question 22 article 3 and question 23.

10. Whether sin is formally in sensuality, or only in the will alone; or whether it is the proximate subject of sin - on this the scholastics on Thomas Prima Secundae question 74 article 2, and Rhadapart 2 controversy 18 articles 1-2. Related to this is the question whether the moral virtues are in the sensitive appetite - on which the Coimbrans in their Ethical Disputations disputation 7 question 5, and the scholastics on Thomas Prima Secundae question 65 article 4, and Rhada part 3 controversy 15 article 1, whose opinion drawn from Aristotle Ames rightly opposes in his Marrow book 2 chapter 1.

11. Whether the manners of the soul follow the temperament of the body, or whether it should rather be said that the temperament and executive powers of the body, as well as all the members of the body, follow the soul? We affirm the latter. For the soul, sanctified and renewed by the Spirit of God, uses the sanguine complexion for promptness, alacrity and joy in good works and the duties of piety; the melancholic complexion in profound contemplation of heavenly things and serious practice of penitence, in perpetual disdain for the world and its allurements; the choleric complexion in zeal, fervor, and holy contention for the cause of God, and in the swiftest execution of all spiritual plans and expeditions. On the contrary, the perverse and unsanctified soul uses the temperament and members of the body as arms of injustice, for example the sanguine complexion for easy lapse into complacency and worldly delights, the melancholic for solitary evil machinations, treacheries, heresies, superstitions, the choleric for quarrels and contentions. The affirmative opinion has Galen as its author, who wrote a special treatise on it. They commonly distinguish that we are inclined in manners by temperament, not necessitated. But it is rightly inquired whether the temperament, insofar as it affects and modifies the executive parts and powers of the body, is not inclined by the soul a priori, but not the reverse. But whatever may be the case concerning this distinction, at least it is clear that it is pagan impiety by which the analysis of good disposition or docility, and consequently of our conversion to God, is made in temperament or complexion, and in education. What the Remonstrants think here, these words of theirs will teach, in chapter 10 of their Apology folio 118: "Nor indeed does it seem to be denied altogether that the condition of the temperament of each man has great force for the manners of the soul, for virtues and vices. In proportion to it each one is more fit or unfit to attain docility and probity of soul. Education and training, however, have the chief force. And from there the discrimination is generally to be sought. The Censor does not seem to deny this, and therefore cautiously adds, where the question is agitated about true docility and about true probity, which is required for divine things. But docility, which renders us apt for virtues, or for honesty and chastity of manners, how does it not render us apt for divine things? What things would a docile and upright soul more quickly and willingly admit than divine virtues, as being especially agreeable to equity and right reason, and constructed by such arguments by which and of what sort all other disciplines lack?"

For the rest of the questions on the human intellect and will, and the other faculties of the soul, see the more recent scholastic physicists (for they are especially to be heard here) - Toledo, the Coimbrans, Rubio, Arriaga, Oviedo, Mendoza - to whom may be added the treatise of the Coimbrans On the Separated Soul. If anyone prefers to proceed as a mean between the Thomists and Scotists, it is permitted by us according to those common hypotheses which suffice for explaining and defending the theological truths about free choice and grace. But they are these:

1. That the intellect or cognitive faculty is distinguished from the will or appetitive faculty.
2. That the will in its actions necessarily requires a cognition of the intellect beforehand, and not only an apprehending one, but one theoretically and practically judging.

3. That nevertheless the act of the will is not produced efficiently by the judgment as by a formal and intrinsic principle.

4. Nor does the will conduct itself as a purely passive power determinable by reason of the intellect, or of any other agent whatsoever.

5. Nor is it to be understood that the will is so determined that a quality, or motion, or some influx is impressed on it by the intellect, or that it is necessitated by a necessity of coaction either natural or absolute, or that it is moved and determined physically, but only by an antecedent, and as by a condition, and a proposition of the object, and a certain moral quasi-application and determination.

6. So that from this only a necessity of consequence follows, in a certain respect, or from a hypothesis.

7. And the will itself nevertheless freely or voluntarily and spontaneously as an active and [Greek phrase], formal, proper, proximate and intrinsic principle determines itself, and moves itself into its object, namely after the preceding determination of the practical judgment. Not otherwise than after the pre-election of the intellect, the will chooses.

8. So that good or evil habits are not denied to be in or able to be in the will.

9. Nor is the immediate operation of God in the will and within the will denied, whether natural or supernatural, but there remains the precursus and immediate influx of God in both, and the immediate concourse with both - although the former is prior in the order of nature, the latter posterior.