

Translation of the treatise on the formal distinction and its usefulness from the the fourth book of *Cursus Philosophiæ* by Mastri and Belluto.  
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### **Question 40: On the nature of identity and formal distinction and its usefulness**

This is that distinction which is intermediate between simply real and simply of reason, so celebrated and well-known in the school of the Scotists, which almost everyone outside our school opposes and fiercely attacks; but as Quilled well noted, controversy 4, *Metaphysics*, point 2, their whole effort is in attacking this distinction, but none of them labors to grasp the mind of Scotus and the Scotists—what they understood by this distinction intermediate between real and of reason, whence it happened that most attack what they do not understand, nor what Scotus ever dreamed of.

For the correct understanding of this identity and formal distinction, therefore, it must first be supposed that by the formal distinction asserted by Scotus and the Scotists as intermediate between simply real and simply of reason, here is not meant the diversity found between those things which have dissimilar essences and natures, in which sense man and ass are said to differ formally from each other, because they have dissimilar essences and quiddities—not in this sense, I say, should it be understood, because in this sense, as the Doctor often says, it is rather a distinction of forms, i.e., of whole natures and essences, than a formal difference of multiple grades of the same total essence, which are also usually called formalities (for which reason the distinction between them is usually called formal). Hence, formal distinction in that sense is in reality an essential distinction, or real distinction of natures, which we spoke of above in numbers 164 and 169.

Again, it must be supposed that by the formal distinction intermediate between real and of reason, Scotus does not mean that distinction which more recent authors call virtual, or of reasoned reason, as Suarez

sinisterly interprets it in disputation 7, Metaphysics, section 1, number 13, and book 4 on the Trinity, chapter 4; Hurtado, disputation 6, Metaphysics, section 3; Salas, part 2, question 3, treatise 2, disputation 4, section 3; and some others, to whom (which is worse) Herrera from our side adheres in volume 1, disputation 8, question 13, and disputation 14, question 1—as if this distinction did not formally and actually entirely precede the work of the intellect, but only virtually and fundamentally, while formally and actually it is completed through the work of the intellect. For this is repugnant to the express words of Scotus. For in book 1, distinction 8, question 4, responding to the question, speaking of this very distinction which he places between the divine attributes, he speaks thus: “I say that among the essential perfections there is not only a difference of reason, that is, of diverse modes of conceiving the same formal object, for such a distinction is between wise and wisdom, and certainly a greater one between wisdom and truth; nor is there only a distinction of formal objects in the intellect, because, as was argued before, that is never in intuitive cognition, unless it is in the object intuitively known; therefore, there is a third distinction there, preceding the intellect in every way.” And lest anyone be able to expound that this distinction is only virtual, he immediately adds: “It is this, that wisdom is in the thing from the nature of the thing, and goodness is in the thing from the nature of the thing, but wisdom in the thing is not formally goodness in the thing.” This he expresses a little further below even more, saying: “And I understand it thus, that the intellect composing this proposition, ‘wisdom is not formally goodness,’ does not cause the truth of this composition by its collative act, but finds in the object the extremes from whose composition the act becomes true.” What could he say more clearly to indicate that this formal distinction is actual, and not only virtual, and precedes every work of the intellect?

It is added that in book 2, distinction 3, question 1, he directly teaches that the entity of a nature is formally and actually distinguished from singularity from the nature of the thing, and therefore the community of a nature is real, and singularity truly contracts the common nature on the part of the thing, and makes a true metaphysical composition with it—which, since he always repeats it whenever the occasion arises to speak of this intermediate distinction, there is no reason for us to doubt that this distinction in Scotus is entirely actual, and not only virtual and fundamental, so that it would be augmented by the work of the intellect for its completion.

Lastly, there is added the unanimous and perpetual consensus of all Scotists, both old and more recent, who understood the mind of the Doctor in this sense concerning this formal distinction intermediate between real and of reason. Hence, Amicus, in his treatise on distinctions, question 14, article 1, notation 3, says rather inconsiderately that there is a controversy among the Scotists as to whether this distinction is actual with the work of the intellect having been cut off. For I do not see this controverted in any of the Scotists, with the sole exception of Herrera, about which it is no wonder, because, as if imbued with Thomistic doctrine, he usually deviates in other matters as well from the correct view of the Scotists.

207. But what deceived the adversaries in their understanding of Scotus's opinion is a certain discourse which he has in book 1, distinction 2, question 5, section "But here it remains," where, dealing with a distinction of this kind, which he there places between the essence and the relations, and explaining in what sense it can be called real, he has these words: "It is not properly a real actual [distinction], understanding as is commonly said to be actual that which is a difference of things and in act, because in one person there is no difference of things on account of the divine simplicity. And just as it is not a real actual [distinction], so neither is it a real potential [distinction], because nothing is there in potency which is not in act. But it can be called a difference of reason, not that reason is taken for a difference formed by the intellect, but as reason is taken for the quiddity of a thing, according as quiddity is the object of the intellect. Or in another way it can be called a virtual difference, because that which has such a distinction in itself does not have thing and thing, but is one thing having virtually or eminently two realities, because certainly to the reality as it is in that thing belongs that property which belongs to such a reality as if it were a distinct thing. For thus this reality distinguishes, and that does not distinguish, just as if this were one thing and that another."

Thus the Doctor in the cited place. From this discourse Hurtado deduces that by this formal distinction from the nature of the thing Scotus understood nothing other than the distinction of reasoned reason, which only virtually precedes the work of the intellect in the object, but not actually. Herrera further urges that the Doctor, a little below in the cited place, explains this distinction through non-identity. For asking whether some distinction should now be granted between the relations and the essence, "I respond," he says, "it is better to use this negative [expression], 'this is not formally the same [as that],' than 'this is distinct in such and such a way,'" by which way of speaking he signifies that such

a formal distinction is not positive but negative, and therefore is not actual but virtual.

However, if the aforesaid text is read attentively, the Doctor there expressly teaches that this distinction, which he there recognizes between the essence and the relation, is a formal actual [distinction] and precedes every work of the intellect, but is not only virtual or merely of reasoned reason, as Hurtado explains, as we have already indicated in disputation 1, Logic, question 5, article 2. For at the beginning of the section “But here it remains,” he says: “I say, without assertion and without prejudice to a better view, that the aspect by which a suppositum is formally incommunicable, and the aspect of the essence as essence, have some distinction preceding every act of the created and uncreated intellect.” Therefore, this formal distinction, of which he is speaking there, cannot be only virtual or of reasoned reason, as Hurtado explains. For although the latter precedes every work of the intellect according to its foundation, nevertheless it does not precede according to the aspect of distinction as such, as the Doctor wants.

Then, a little below, he says that the divine intellect sees the essence and the relations, and intuits them as two formal objects per se terminating intuitive cognition. Whence he concludes that this distinction is not from the intellect, but precedes every act of the intellect in the object. Therefore, this formal distinction of which he is speaking there is actual, not only virtual or of reasoned reason, because he wants the whole of that distinction which the intellect perceives to be found in the object on the part of the thing.

And although a little below he says that it can be called a distinction of reason, nevertheless in the same place he explains in what sense this can be said—not indeed in such a way that reason is taken for a difference formed by the intellect, but as reason is taken for the quiddity of a thing, according as quiddity is the object of the intellect. And when he again calls it virtual there, he immediately explains in what sense this can be asserted, namely, because that which has such a distinction in itself does not have thing and thing, but is one thing having virtually or eminently multiple things. Whence he calls it virtual, not because it receives actual being from the intellect, but on account of equivalence, because, since it expresses only multiple formalities distinct from the nature of the thing, or multiple realities, it is nevertheless equivalent to multiple really distinct

things. Whence it should be understood concerning the virtuality by which one thing contains in itself two formalities, to which belong the properties of that thing, as if they were distinct, as two things—just as the Doctor explains himself in the same place.

Indeed, a little below under the letter H, in order to open his mind more and lest confusion should occur from the words “distinction of reason” and “virtual,” he says that it is better to omit them, and that this distinction should rather be called a distinction from the nature of the thing than of reason, and not properly virtual, but formal, with these words: “Briefly, therefore, I say, omitting those words about the distinction of reason and about the virtual distinction, that in the divine essence before the act of the intellect there is an entity A, and there is an entity B, and the latter is not formally the former, so that the paternal intellect considering A, and considering B, has from the nature of the thing whence this composition is true: ‘A is not formally B’—not, however, precisely from some act of the intellect about A and B.”

It is clear, therefore, in the Doctor’s view, that by this formal distinction from the nature of the thing is not meant some distinction which is made and completed by the intellect in the being of distinction, as is the virtual distinction or the distinction of reason with a foundation, but another genus of distinction, which according to its whole self precedes the act of the intellect.

Why indeed Doctor said in the same place that this formal distinction ought to be explained rather through the negation of formal identity, Bargius says in the same place that the Doctor speaks thus, because he had not yet determined whether relations had their own proper formalities, or rather were modes of the divine essence. However, Tataret and Vigerius in the same place, and also Bassolius in 2.d.22.q.4.art.2, Vulpes in tom.1.part.1.disp.8.ar.6, Meurisse in lib.2 of his Metaphysics cap.3.q.4.concl.4, say that the Doctor speaks thus, in order to show that formal distinction does not imply a true real relation between the extremes thus distinguished, just as real distinction implies, because formal distinction from the nature of the thing is not to be judged actual by reason of the relation formally implied through the distinction, but only materially by reason of the extremes, which thus distinguished on the part of the thing so have in the same thing their own actual being, outside of nothing, that the formal being of one is not the formal being of the other.

However, Sinisinch in tract.2 on the one God, disp.1.q.2.n.40, says that the Doctor speaks thus, because negative identity can have a precise sense, so that the ratio of one property is understood without the ratio of the other being understood, but the affirmative of distinction seems to be able to have an exclusive sense, because it thus opposes one to the other, but the divine perfections do not simply exclude one another, but rather demand inclusion in the same thing, or real identity, because therefore positive exclusion seems to exclude also real identity, therefore the Doctor says it is better to use this negative, this is not formally that, than the affirmative by saying this is thus, and thus distinguished, therefore for these reasons the Doctor used the term of non-identity rather than of distinction, however not because the term of distinction is to be entirely rejected, or because the formal distinction, of which we speak, is negative, and not positive, and only virtual, but not actual. I add finally, what I said in the cited disp. Of Logic, that the chief reason why the Doctor preferred to call this formal distinction non-identity rather than absolutely distinction from the nature of the thing, is because from the common way of speaking especially at that time distinction from the nature of the thing was usually taken for a true and rigorous real distinction, as the Doctor there intimates in the verse “but will this distinction be called real?” And because he himself was the first, not who devised this distinction (as Meurisse wrongly says, for it is openly found in Aristotle in many places, as we will say afterwards), but who introduced it in the divine perfections, he speaks very soberly and modestly, lest he seem to posit a real distinction between them, and to harm the divine simplicity. These things therefore having been supposed, as concerning the common mind of Scotus and the Scotists, there are usually two ways of explaining this identity and formal distinction in the way of the Doctor. The first is of the older Scotists, who are called Formalists, and say that formal identity is of those, of which one includes the other in its formal ratio, and in the first mode of predicating per se, in which sense the definition is the same formally as its defined, and the genus as the species, and the difference formally as its constituted; but formal distinction on the contrary is of those, of which one is not of the formal concept of the other, so that one can be distinctly conceived without the other; they add moreover that formal identity is twofold, namely mutual and non-mutual; mutual is between those, of which one is identified to the other formally, and conversely, as man, and rational animal; non-mutual is between those, of which one is of the formal concept of the other, not conversely, in which sense animal is said to be the same formally as man, because it enters his quidditative concept, not conversely; and they derive this explanation of formal identity and distinction from the words of the Doctor in 1.d.2.q.7.§.cit. “but here it remains,” when he says, “I call formal identity,

where that which is said to be thus the same, includes that to which it is thus the same, in its formal ratio, consequently per se in the first mode," from which words afterwards arose a sharp contention among the same Formalists about the formal identity between the inferior and the superior, for from the Doctor's way of speaking Sirect, Mauriti, Vallon, and others contend that the inferior is the same formally as its superior, because it includes it in its formal ratio, not conversely. However, Trombeta with the others wants the superior to be identified formally with its inferior, because it enters its quidditative concept in the first mode of predicating per se, not conversely.

This way of explaining, as common to all Scotists, Pasqualig reports and attacks in tom.2.Met.disp.61.sect.1. However, the first thing he attacks is the very explanation of formal identity and distinction, for from such an explanation it follows that in formal identity itself, there is formal distinction, which is repugnant; he proves the consequence, because formal identity from the alleged explanation says the inclusion of the other in the first mode of predicating per se, therefore in formal identity itself there is the including and the included, but the including and the included are distinguished at least formally. Moreover, where there are diverse objective rationes, there are also diverse formalities, and consequently formal distinction, just as where there are diverse entities, there is entitative distinction; but when one includes the other in the first mode of predicating per se, there are diverse objective rationes, namely the objective ratio of the predicate, and the objective ratio of the subject. Then because man includes in the first mode of predicating per se animality and rationality, and yet neither of these realities is formally identified with man, since man implies the whole human nature, but rationality and animality a part. It is confirmed, because where there is something including another in the first mode, there is composition of reason according to diverse objective rationes, but wherever there is composition, there is also distinction at least formal as to the component parts. Then he attacks non-mutual formal identity, as altogether imperceptible, for how can it happen, that one is identified with another, and this is not identified with it? Then because identification from the extremes takes away multiplicity, but if one were identified with another, and this were not identified with it, there would be multiplicity, which is against the nature of identification. Then because, given that one is distinguished from another, this also must be distinguished from that by force of the distinctive, which is in it, therefore non-mutual formal identity implies a contradiction in every way. Finally, he attacks that corollary, which they deduce, namely that the superior is the same formally as the

inferior, or the inferior as the superior, because these are always compared, as part and whole, therefore just as it implies a contradiction for a part of a physical whole to be identified really, and entitatively with the physical whole, so also it implies a contradiction for a part of a metaphysical whole to be identified formally with the metaphysical whole, or conversely the whole with the part; moreover those are the same formally, of which one cannot be conceived apart from the other, and in which diverse formalities cannot be distinguished, for as soon as they are distinguished, formal distinction is had; but whether the superior is compared with the inferior, or the inferior with the superior, diverse formalities are had, and one can be conceived without the other, for the superior can be conceived without the inferior, as animal without man, and the formality of animal is one thing, that of man another, how therefore can they be mutually identified formally?

210 However, there is another mode, and more proper way of explaining formal identity and distinction according to other Scotists, and especially the more recent ones, that those things are said to be formally the same, which have the same formality, and conceptual ratio from the nature of the thing, and on the contrary, those are formally distinct, which have another and another formality, or conceptual ratio from the nature of the thing, in which sense superior and inferior are formally distinct from the nature of the thing, because the ratio of humanity is different from the ratio of animality, although it includes it, indeed by this that it includes it, and is not included by it, it is said to have a distinct formal ratio from it; thus from the older Scotists, Tatar, Bonet, and Burlifer explain this distinction in the cited disputation on logic in the explanation of formal distinction, and in this sense Rubion explains the mind of Scotus in 1. D. 8. Q. 3. At the end, and the other more recent Scotists everywhere, Faber in his tract on formalities, Vulpes in vol. 1. P. 1. Disp. 8. Art. 6. And vol. 3. Disp. 49. Art. 2., Meurisse in lib. 2. Metaph. Chap. 3. 4. 4., Smising in tract. 2. On the one God disp. 1. Q. 2., Poncius in vol. 3. Of his Course disp. 20. Q. 2., Rada in 1. P. Controv. 4., Mercerus in his logic chap. 1. On the universal disp. 1. Q. 2. Sec. 1. Num. 13., Posnaniensis in 1. D. 8. Disp. 1., Bartholomew de Sousa in 1. D. 2. Q. 7. Art. 3., Aretinus in his Formalities com. 35., where for settling the controversy of the Scotists in this matter they assign those three acceptations of formal identity and distinction assigned by us above from Scotus in num. 165. And in the cited place of Logic, and finally formal identity and distinction explained in this second way is also accepted by some of the outsiders, Fonseca in 5. Met. Chap. 6. Q. 6. Sec. 2., Achillini in his tract on distinction chap. 20. 23. And 26., Amicus in tract. 4. Log. Q. 3. Dub. 3. And 4. And in the tract on distinction

q. 14., Gillius in lib. 2. On the essence of God tract. 5. Chap. 2., Aegidius on presence lib. 5. On the vision of God q. 5. Art. 4., Conimbricenses in the preface to Porphyry q. 4. Art. 2., Bonherba in his Concord of Aegidius tract. 3. On the passions of being art. 3. Dub. 1., and some others. However, although the first way of explaining formal identity and distinction has a foundation in the doctrine of Scotus, and is also in use among the Scotists and others, nevertheless this second way is more frequent and proper, as was said in Logic and above in num. 165., and the reason is deduced from 5. Metaph. 20., because if the foundation of all identity is unity, and of distinction plurality, it follows that whatever things have one and the same formality, or conceptual ratio, are formally the same; but those which have another and another, are formally diverse.

And indeed Scotus speaks of formal identity and distinction in this sense in 1. D. 8. Q. 4., when he says that the divine attributes are formally distinct from each other, because the ratio of goodness is not the ratio of wisdom, and in 2. D. 1. Q. 5. §. To that question, when he says that a transcendental relation, although it is really the same as its foundation, nevertheless is formally distinct from it by the nature of the thing, because respect does not formally include the ratio of the absolute, nor does the absolute include the ratio of respect; and in 2. D. 3. Q. 1., when he says that individual difference and common nature, although they are really identified, nevertheless are formally distinct by the nature of the thing, because nature is per se and intrinsically communicable, but haecceity incommunicable, and thus he also frequently speaks elsewhere of this distinction intermediate between real and of reason.

From what has been said it is easy to dissolve what Pasqualig objects in n. 209. Against the first way of explaining formal identity and distinction assigned by our Formalists, for his reasons only prove that beyond that mode of formal identity and distinction, another must still be assigned more proper and frequent in the schools, namely that which was assigned by the other Scotists under n. 210., and when he inferred from that first explanation that formal distinction is found in formal identity itself, because the including and the included express diverse formalities and conceptual ratios; this only proves that formal distinction according to the second explanation is found with formal identity according to the first explanation, which is not inconvenient, because formal identity and distinction are not mutually opposed, unless they are of the same mode and acceptation, otherwise formal identity in one acceptation can stand with formal distinction in another acceptation, which is not at all

repugnant, nor do all those arguments of Pasqualig prove anything else. In which way it is also not repugnant to give formal identity and also non-mutual distinction in the first acceptation has already been declared above in num. 191., while we were explaining essential identity and distinction, as it is said of constitutives, which entirely coincides with formal identity and distinction in this sense, for the reason for this is, as we were saying there, because formal identity and distinction in this sense are not founded upon one and many, nor do they pertain to the first mode of relatives, for thus the arguments of Pasqualig would rightly conclude, for relations of that mode denominate both extremes in the same way, but they are founded upon the ratio of the constituent and the constituted, because if it is a constituent in the first mode, it is formally identified with the constituted, if not a constituent, it is formally distinct from it, whence they rather seem to pertain to relations of the second mode, wherefore those arguments only conclude about formal identity and distinction according to the second explanation, in which sense they certainly pertain to relations of the first mode, and are founded upon one and many, and therefore are mutual relations, and denominating both extremes in the same way; however, although identity and distinction according to the second explanation cannot be distinguished into mutual and non-mutual, they can still and must be distinguished into adequate and inadequate, the first is that which is between those things, neither of which is included in the other essentially, nor vice versa; the other is that which is found between those things, one of which is included in the other, in which something else is also included.

But from what has been said are solved the things which Faber in his tract on Formalities chap. 8. And Poncius in the cited disputation n. 75. Object against this non-mutual formal distinction of the old Scotists.

#### **ARTICLE. Resolution of the question.**

211 It must therefore be said for the resolution of the question, that although the first way of explaining formal identity and distinction is good and legitimate, nevertheless the other is better and more proper, and more frequent in the Schools, which is sufficiently clear from the torrent of Doctors both of ours and of outsiders of this century, who speak in this way and according to that acceptation about formal identity and distinction. And the reason for this is, because in the common way of speaking the first acceptation of formal identity and distinction is usually

explained under the name of essential identity, as is clear from what was said in q. 9. Of this Disputation, for we say that animal is of the essence of man, and is essentially identified with man, and this is the more common and customary way of speaking; but on the contrary, when many things are explained by diverse definitions, and have diverse objective concepts, we say that they have many formalities, and are formally distinct, but when they communicate in the same objective concept, we say that they have the same formality, or are formally identified on the part of the thing, and are only distinguished by the intellect, in the way in which according to Scotus in Quodlibet 4. Generativity, generation, and paternity are related in the same relation constitutive of the first person, the power of heating and drying in the Sun, etc., when therefore we say that some many things are formally distinct from each other by the nature of the thing, or are identified, speaking absolutely, formal identity and distinction must be taken according to the second way assigned in n. 210., so that those things are said to be formally distinct by the nature of the thing, when the objective ratio of one is other than the objective ratio of the other, but not according to the first way, because that way is usually assigned in the common way of speaking under the name of essential identity and distinction. Thus far it is clear in what sense this formal distinction by the nature of the thing is chiefly asserted in our school; but the whole difficulty of this assertion consists in showing in what way formal distinction taken and explained in this sense is separated from real and of reason, for since it is between extremes diverse in act on the part of the thing, and before every work of the intellect, it seems to be real; and since between those extremes there is no separability on the part of the thing, but only according to our concepts, it seems to be a distinction of reason rather than from the nature of the thing.

First, therefore, it is usually explained thus by the more recent Scotists related above, those things which are distinguished from the nature of the thing without any fiction, are of two kinds, some which by the absolute power of God can be separated mutually, or at least non-mutually, and extremes separable in this way are really distinct; others are extremes distinct from the nature of the thing, neither of which even divinely can be separated either mutually or non-mutually, and this is formal distinction from the nature of the thing, which is compossible with real identity; thus according to Oviedus some Spanish Scotists cited above explain formal distinction, as it is separated from real; and thus also Smising speaks in tract. 2. Cit. N. 50., when he says that the sign for knowing in some thing, whether the actual distinction in the thing is only formal or real, is that the extremes of the distinction cannot, or can be separated in reality, and

exist separately at least by the power of God, for if they are related in the former way, and yet contradictories are verified of them by the intellect perfectly conceiving, they are formally distinguished, if in the latter way, they are really distinguished: thus also Amicus argues in the cited tract on distinction q. 14. Art. 2. N. 3., where he defines formal distinction to be that which is between two objective concepts, which are called formalities, neither of which is sufficient to exist separately per se, but exist in the thing which they constitute; it is said to be between two objective concepts, so that it may be distinguished from real distinction, which is between things; it is said of which neither etc., so that it may be distinguished from modal in the sense of the more recent ones; and finally it is said that they exist in the thing, so that it may be distinguished from distinction of reason, which never exists, except objectively in the intellect. This way of declaring formal distinction, as it is separated from real, is easily rejected from what was said above in n. 186., where it was shown that although actual or possible separation of two extremes from each other is a sufficient sign of real distinction between them, nevertheless it is not adequate and convertible, because there are many things inseparable from each other even by the absolute power of God, which are nevertheless really distinct, as is clear concerning the whole and the parts in the opinion of Scotus, concerning matter and form, subject and property in the opinion of the Thomists, concerning the individual unions of matter and form, by which they are connected to each other, for one union cannot be torn away from the other, or exist without it, therefore formal distinction is not well constituted, nor is it rightly separated from real by the complete inseparability of the extremes, because even the extremes of real distinction can thus be inseparable on the part of the thing, as was said in the cited place.

212 Poncius, in the cited disputation 20, question 2, distinguishes three kinds of positive things that exist independently of the operation of the intellect in order to show the possibility of this formal distinction, as it is differentiated from the real and the rational. For some things can exist on their own without any other things, such as Peter and Paul; some which, although they cannot exist without others, can nevertheless newly come to some thing able to exist through itself, such as all relations really distinct from their foundations; and finally some others, which can neither exist through themselves, nor newly come to anything, because they are of such a nature that neither can that thing in which they exist together ever be without them, nor the reverse. And he says that these are all the metaphysical grades, which are usually called formalities. Hence, he defines formality as something positive, which according to itself cannot

exist through any power, but is included in a thing able to exist according to itself. Therefore, he says that the formal distinction, as it is differentiated from the real, is that which turns between positive extremes of the third kind, and he deduces the possibility of such a distinction from the fact that no repugnance can be assigned as to why positive things of this third kind cannot be posited on the part of the thing.

This way of speaking also coincides with the preceding, because in order to discern the formal distinction from the real, it has recourse to the separability or inseparability of the extremes. For he says that the formal distinction turns between those extremes which necessarily always demand to be connected with each other, nor can one be separated from the other even by the power of God, and therefore it is to be rejected, just like the preceding. It is added especially against Poncius that the definition of formality given by him is false, when he says that formality is something positive, which according to itself cannot exist through any power, but is included in a thing able to exist according to itself. Clearly this whole definition is suitable to the predicamental relations really distinct from the foundation, which nevertheless even according to him are things, and not realities or formalities. The consequence is proved, because paternity or similarity is something positive, which according to itself cannot exist through any power, but is included in a thing able to exist in this way, which is the definition of formality handed down by him.

Therefore, in order to show in what way the formal distinction may be differentiated from the real distinction, and from the rational, and also from the virtual, it must be said that the formal distinction is precisely distinguished from the real, properly speaking, by this: because the extremes of the latter are things, which are capable of their own existence, and can terminate physical causality; whether alone, or joined with others; but the extremes of the former are realities, or formalities, that is, various grades of the essence of the same thing, which neither possess their own existence, nor can terminate physical causality, but all and each exist by the existence of that whole essence, of which they are grades of being, and are understood to follow its production by a certain consequence, or Metaphysical emanation, all of which is sufficiently clear from the declaration and differentiation of the names of Thing and Reality, or Formality, assigned above in numbers 160 and following, which can still be further clarified, because in man, for example, beyond the physical things, which are his physical parts, namely body and soul, there are also found Metaphysical realities, which are various grades of his essence,

such as the reality of animal, rational, risible, etc., which reasons are not multiplied through formal precisions alone, as the Nominalists are accustomed to say, that is, through the mere plurality and distinction of formal concepts of the mind, because the intellect does not produce these reasons in man through its action, but finds them already formed and multiplied, otherwise man would not be a rational animal, nor risible on the part of the thing, but only through the work of the intellect.

Nor are reasons of this kind multiplied, or distinguished in man through objective precisions alone, that is, through inadequate objective concepts, by which the intellect can mentally divide a thing entirely undistinguished on the part of the thing, as the Thomists are accustomed to say, as if those grades were to express several inadequate reasons only in the presence of the intellect perfectly and inadequately conceiving man, which if it were understood by an adequate act, only one conceivable reason corresponding adequately to it would be apprehended in it. For this is false, because neither man, nor an angel, nor any other creature whatsoever is some simple entity on the part of the thing, for it is composed not only physically from various essential parts or accidents, but also metaphysically from various grades of being, and therefore however adequately it may be conceived, it cannot be conceived except under various and distinct reasons; which, although they are adequate in their own order, insofar as each presents its own realities, are nevertheless inadequate in relation to the whole and entire essence which they constitute.

213 Hence among the Scotists Formality is usually defined to be an objective reason conceivable in some thing by a perfect and adequate concept distinct from the concept by which another formality of the same thing is conceived. From which it is deduced that it belongs to the nature of Formality, that it be immersed through real identity in a thing properly so called, and thus its somethingness, insofar as it is a certain grade of its being, whence although humanity and equinity are objective reasons conceivable without each other by a perfect and adequate concept, nevertheless they ought not to be called Formalities or realities, because they are not somethingnesses of the thing, but rather the whole thing itself, and essence; but it is said by a perfect and adequate concept, because an objective reason inadequately conceivable properly cannot be called a Formality, such as the reason of being, good, and any transcendent grade, for these reasons are not conceivable in a thing by a perfect and adequate concept, but only inadequately, nor do they present

themselves, except to the intellect inadequately and confusedly conceiving the thing, by which reason also an intrinsic mode among the Scotists cannot attain the name of formality properly so called, because it is not an objective reason conceivable by a perfect and adequate concept without the thing, or quiddity, of which it is a mode. From these it is deduced that Formality is badly distinguished by some Formalists into total and partial, or adequate and inadequate, as humanity with respect to man is a total formality, because it expresses his whole being, but animality is a partial formality, because it expresses a part, just as rationality does. This, I say, is not well said, because since Formality is a somethingness of a thing, and a certain grade of its being, it can never import the whole essence of the thing, but only a part, whence just as by another name it is called Reality, which is a diminutive of thing, so that it may be shown not to import the whole thing, but something of the thing, so also it is called Formality, which is a diminutive of form, so that it may be indicated not to express the whole form, or the whole essence and quiddity of the thing, but only a somethingness of the form, and essence, or some grade of it in the first, or at least second mode of essential predication. And this finally is the reason, why things distinguished only formally, are to be called formalities by a diminutive word, and not forms, because they are somethingnesses, and grades of the form, or essence of the thing, but not the whole essence of the thing itself, whence the name of Formality is derived not from the form of a part, but from the form, which is usually called of the whole, and imports the very quiddity and essence of the thing; nevertheless the distinction between man and animal is still usually called formal by reason of one extreme, which is properly a formality.

214 Secondly, the necessity of this intermediate distinction is usually shown by the Scotists in various ways, which need some clarification, so that they may conclude well; and indeed the first is the way of definition, for many things are really identified, which are nevertheless explained by various definitions, as Aristotle teaches about genus and differentia in *Metaphysics* 3.10, and about action and passion in *Physics* 3.22. Since, therefore, definition explains the formal and quidditative being, which things have on the part of the thing antecedently to any work of the Intellect, some actual distinction on the part of the thing must be conceded between those many, which is greater than the distinction of reason, and virtual, and less than the real. It is confirmed, because separability indicates a proportionate distinction in the separable extremes, just as separability according to the thing argues for a real distinction between extremes separable in this way, so separability

according to conceptibility requires an actual distinction from the nature of the thing, greater than the distinction of reason, and less than the real, between reasons conceptible in this way. But so that we may proceed rightly by this way to show the necessity of the formal distinction, it must be noted that this is to be understood of the definition, which is given through adequate concepts, for this is what truly expresses the thing entirely, as it is on the part of the thing before any work of the intellect, but the definition which is given through inadequate concepts, does not express the thing entirely, as it is on the part of the thing formally and actually, but only fundamentally and virtually, and therefore a plurality of such definitions does not argue for a formal and actual distinction between those many, but only a virtual and fundamental one; and therefore we said above that the formal distinction is taken from the separation of conceptibilities in relation to the intellect perfectly conceiving, for if such an intellect says that one reason is not another, surely such objective reasons cannot be entirely the same on the part of the thing, otherwise that cognition would not be true and perfect. But although this must be understood of the definition, which is given through adequate concepts, nevertheless this must by no means be understood of the definition properly so called, which is given through adequate concepts importing genus and differentia, because as was said above in this disputation, number 196, the definition properly so called, as it consists of genus and differentia, is not suitable to metaphysical formalities, but to the whole essences of things, and only to things having their own essence and existence, and therefore from the diversity of such definitions not only is inferred a distinction from the nature of the formal thing between the defined, but that essential distinction, which coincides with the real distinction of natures from what was said in number 195. Here, therefore, definition is taken only for the objective concept, but adequate and perfect, because this is also suitable to formalities, and expresses their nature, as they are on the part of the thing, as we shall also say below in d. 8, n. 204.

Again, as we shall say there in numbers 205 and 214, the formal distinction cannot be rightly inferred from any definitions and descriptions of things whatsoever, but especially when they are assigned in relation to operations, for such definitions are for the most part given rather to insinuate the various functions of the same thing, than to explain its essence and formality, as is clear concerning the intellect, which according to the same formality on the part of the thing, and through the very same power and faculty, is the principle of simple apprehension, judgment, and discourse, and insofar as it is considered in relation to

simple apprehension, it is not defined in the same way, as when it is considered in relation to other operations.

These things having been observed, therefore, the way adduced to show the necessity of the formal distinction is best, and whatever the Adversaries adduce to preclude this way is easily eliminated; for what they are accustomed to say, that definition does not explain things according to the real and subjective being, which they have on the part of the thing, but only according to the objective being, which they have in the intellect, although this can be admitted in some sense concerning the definition given through inadequate objective concepts in the presence of the intellect conceiving confusedly; nevertheless this is entirely false concerning the definition given through an adequate objective concept, as was said in disputation 1 of Logic, question 5, article 2, and will be said again below in disputation 8, number 204. For a definition given in this way expresses the nature of the thing, and through such a definition the quidditative and formal being is expressed, as Scotus notes in Quodlibet 1, letter E, but not the being which it receives through the apprehension of the intellect, because such being is not real, but of reason, nor is it essential to the thing, or to the reality, but adventitious and accidental. What the Nominalists are also accustomed to say, that from diverse definitions it is not rightly inferred that there is a distinction from the nature of the formal thing between some things, because the same thing entirely most simple can have diverse definitions according as it respects diverse operations, or connotes extrinsic things; this, I say, occurrence of the Nominalists does not enervate the argument brought forward, because in it there is no discussion of any definitions and descriptions given in any way whatsoever in relation to diverse operations and extrinsic connotations, but of quidditative definitions, by which things considered in themselves are defined, and not through relation to extrinsic things, for then properly the definition expresses the essential and quidditative concept of the thing. From these, I say, definitions it is false that a formal distinction between defined things is not rightly inferred, when their definitions are diverse, as will be explained more in disputation 8, number 205, dealing with the formal distinction of predicamental grades.

215 Thirdly, the necessity of this distinction is also usually shown by Scotists from the way of contradiction, for some things that are really identified on the part of the thing have certain contradictories verified of them from the nature of the thing, as is clear concerning animality and

rationality really identified in man. For the animality of man has some agreement on the part of the thing with the animality of a brute, but rationality does not. Since, therefore, contradictory predicates cannot belong to exactly the same thing on the part of the thing, having no distinction in itself or not including in itself things so distinguished, it must be admitted that animality and rationality are distinguished in man from the nature of the thing and before any operation of the intellect. And since this is not a real and entitative distinction, it must be admitted that it is a certain kind of distinction less than a real distinction but greater than a distinction of reason and virtual distinction, as it actually precedes all work of the intellect. But in order to proceed rightly in this way also to conclude a formal distinction, it must be noted from what has been said in the cited disputation of Logic, and also above in this same disputation n. 181, that this distinction cannot be inferred from any contradiction taken absolutely, because a contradiction infers a distinction precisely commensurate with it, not greater nor less. If it is a contradiction made by the intellect and according to a different being of reason, it infers only a distinction of reason, as is clear in an identical proposition about Peter placed on the part of the subject and also on the part of the predicate. If it is a contradiction according to real and entitative being, as being and not being taken absolutely, or at least according to predicates pertaining to such being, as being produced or not produced, caused or not caused, it infers a real and entitative distinction between the extremes of which it is verified. Finally, if it is a contradiction according to formal being or predicates pertaining to such being, it infers only a formal distinction, not a real one. For many propositions are true in a real and identical sense which are not verified in a formal sense, as for example in divine things in an identical sense it can be admitted that the essence is incommunicable, insofar as the essence is the same thing as the paternity, which is incommunicable, but it is false in a formal sense, which expresses in the thing the ratio signified per se primarily. For through the essence in divine things is imported per se primarily a communicable entity. And so to be communicable, which is verified of the essence in a formal sense, and to be incommunicable, which is likewise verified of the paternity in a formal sense, infers between them a distinction from the nature of the thing that is formal, not greater nor less. This, therefore, is the contradiction from which a formal distinction from the nature of the thing is rightly inferred.

216 The common response of Thomists is that in order to verify contradictories on the part of the thing, it suffices that before the act of the intellect in which there is a formal contradiction, there is a virtual or eminent distinction in the object, which they openly show by examples.

For between the definition and the defined, objectively considered, there is no actual distinction, and yet contradictories are verified of them, such as that the defined can be predicated of the defined, but not conversely, that the definition can be the middle term in a demonstration, but not the defined without a manifest begging of the question. Similarly, a created intellect is not actually different insofar as it is practical and speculative, apprehensive and discursive, and yet insofar as it is practical it is not speculative, and insofar as it is apprehensive it is not discursive. Therefore, a merely virtual distinction in the object suffices for contradictories to be actually verified of it on the part of the thing. However, this common evasion has been extensively refuted in disputation 1 of Logic, q. 5, art. 2, § “The other solution also”, and again in disputation 9 of Logic, q. 1, art. 2, where it was expressly proven that a mere virtual distinction or distinction of reason reasoned is not sufficient for two contradictories to be actually verified on the part of the thing. This can also be proven again, because this virtual distinction does not actually posit anything diverse in the extremes before the operation of the intellect. Therefore, it cannot ground the actual truth of each part of an actual contradiction, but it will only be able to ground it when, with the work of the intellect coming to it, an actual distinction comes between the extremes actually multiplied by the intellect. It is confirmed, because notwithstanding the virtual distinction, there is still a complete actual identity on the part of the subject, copula, and predicate. Therefore, by reason of that distinction, both parts of the contradiction still cannot be verified, because the same thing would be and not be at the same time, which is against the notion of the first principle. Finally, the extremes of a contradiction so fight against and are opposed to each other that one directly destroys the other. Therefore, if two extremes are entirely the same on the part of the thing, they surely cannot ground a contradiction on the part of the thing, nor be posited at the same time, because the position of one directly destroys the position of the other. If, therefore, they are posited at the same time, they must have some distinction between them on the part of the thing, by reason of which the contradiction is removed and they do not destroy each other. Nor do the examples adduced in the evasion urge, for as to that of definition and defined, a Scotist would deny in the first place that no distinction at all intercedes preceding the work of the intellect between the definition and the defined, of which we spoke in d. 1 of Logic, q. 4, art. 2, and the Doctor in I, d. 2, q. 2. Even granting this, we will say that those contradictions are only verified of diverse things in an intellect conceiving imperfectly. For an intuitive intellect clearly perceiving the thing does not conceive the definition any more than the defined as the middle term and reason for the passion. And the other example of the practical and speculative

intellect urges even less. For when we say that the practical intellect, as such, is not speculative, nor conversely, a contradiction is not verified of the bare intellectual faculty, but considered under that reduplication of practical or speculative. And so the extremes are duplicated as much as suffices to remove the contradiction, which must also be said of the discursive and apprehensive intellect. See Maironis I, d. 8, q. 3, § “But here there are”, where he solves many similar instances, and below n. 291, where he again treats of this matter.

217 Fourthly, it is proven because there are given diverse concepts of certain things which are distinguished from the nature of the thing. Since, therefore, they are not distinguished from the nature of the thing really and entitatively, because they can neither be separated nor stand as producing and produced, cause and caused, speaking physically, it follows that they are distinguished from each other from the nature of the thing by another kind of distinction, which we call formal. The assumption is proven first from the divine relations compared with the essence, to which, however much they may be really the same, they must still be distinguished in some way from it from the nature of the thing, in order to save the contradictories on the part of the thing which are enunciated of them without any operation of the intellect. For the divine essence is communicable, and is in fact communicated to the Son by the Father, but the paternity is incommunicable. Likewise, the paternity is really distinct from the Son, but the essence is really identified with him. And all these things are true before any operation of the intellect. Therefore, to verify these contradictories, some actual distinction from the nature of the thing must be admitted between them, intermediate between a real distinction and a distinction of reason. And indeed, if the divine essence and paternity in God the Father are entirely indistinct on the part of the thing, a sufficient reason will never be assigned why the Father communicated the essence to the Son and could not communicate the paternity. If you resort to the virtual distinction, this evasion has already been refuted, both because if this distinction suffices to save contradictories on the part of the thing, a stubborn person will be able to affirm that his soul is united to his body and is not united to his body, that an angel is corporeal and incorporeal, and other absurdities of this kind, because he will save all these things through a mere virtual distinction, which is ridiculous. If you resort to infinity, you do not yet evade the argument. For you still have to show how it can happen that the same formal ratio of an infinite thing is formally a relative and absolute entity, communicable and incommunicable, really distinct from another and not distinct. Also because infinity does not remove the truth of the first principle, which

indeed by reason of its primacy must be verified in all things. Therefore, it cannot be the cause that two contradictories are verified in the thing of exactly the same thing undistinguished in the thing, such as communicable and incommunicable, to be to itself and not to be to itself, to be found in three supposita and not to be found. Finally, because infinity indeed identifies really and entitatively all things that are found in an infinite being, but it does not identify them formally, because it does not destroy their formal rationes, as the Doctor shows in I, d. 8, q. 4, § “To the question”, and Quodlibet 5 throughout. But to pursue this proof further is a theological undertaking. See Faber, Rada, Smisinch, Vulpes, and others in the cited place, where also with Scotus they establish the same distinction not only between the relations and the essence, but also between the divine attributes themselves, which argument was touched on by us in the cited disputation 1 of Logic in the explanation of the formal distinction.

218. Furthermore, that assumption is also proven from the distinction of metaphysical predicamental degrees, which are in some way actually distinguished from each other by the nature of the thing, yet not really, nor entitatively, since each is identified in a third, which they constitute; however, that the generic and differential degrees, the specific degree, and the individual difference contracting it are thus distinguished will be proven below *ex professo* in disputation 8, question 6, article 2, and in disputation 9 throughout, and now also briefly it is proven, for the Adversaries concede that a distinction can be found on the part of the thing between those which have diverse adequate conceptibility, but not those which have inadequate, but the generic and differential degrees are related in such a way that they have diverse adequate conceptibility, therefore etc. The minor is proven, for animal which is in man is by its nature of one and the same concept as that which is in a horse, and it can be adequately conceived according to its whole proper actual perfection without rationality being conceived; for if it could not be thus adequately conceived, then in its perfection it would include something determining it, and so it could not be of entirely the same intrinsic concept in horse and other species.

Nor should you say that animal has that unity of concept from the intellect, for below in disputation 9 it will be proven with the Doctor [Scotus] in II, d. 3, q. 1, that formal unity is given in things apart from any operation of the intellect, which is proper to common predicamental natures: the same minor is also proven, because God does not know

things, except adequately and distinctly, but God knows the agreement and difference between man and brute, for He does not conceive them as differing in their whole essence, because either man or brute would not be animal, nor as agreeing in their whole essence, because then He would know brute no less to be rational animal than man is; therefore, in order for the agreement and difference of man and brute to be known by God, He must clearly conceive those degrees as adequately distinct by the nature of the thing, for if He does not conceive them thus, certainly He does not attain the difference between man and brute, nor the agreement between them, which is absurd.

The distinction by the nature of the thing between the generic and differential degree could also be proven from the metaphysical composition which results from them, and is such that it is repugnant to divine simplicity, and therefore is in some way real, and not only of reason, as was proven ex professo in disputation 5 of Logic, question 3, article 2; moreover, the components must be distinct from each other in the same way in which they effect composition, whence if they bring about composition by the nature of the thing, they must also be distinguished in this way, since distinction is commensurate with composition, whence even when the Adversaries would not want to admit such a formal distinction by the nature of the thing between the divine perfections on account of the highest simplicity of God, they should not deny it in the essence of a creature, which requires composition not only of accidents and modes, but also intrinsic and essential, since it cannot adequately equal the perfection of divine simplicity in its essence, which can also be conceived by diverse inadequate concepts, as they say about the created essence, whence the divine and created essence would be equal in simplicity, and as to composition from these.

Again, that first assumption can be proven from the subject and property, for these do not differ really, as was proven against the Thomists in disputation 5 of Logic, question 4, article 1, which they also concede at least about the transcendent affections of being, and yet they cannot be distinguished only by reason reasoning or reasoned, therefore it is necessary to admit a certain actual middle distinction in things, minor to real and entitative distinction, and major to the distinction of reason reasoning or reasonable; but that they cannot be distinguished only by reason, has also been proven in the cited place, and again it is proven, because real science is knowledge of a thing through the cause on account of which the thing is, and since its cause is, therefore it is

necessary that the affections emanate from the subject by the nature of the thing, and therefore are discerned from it by the nature of the thing; then because if these were distinguished only by that extrinsic relation, as for example man and risible, when we demonstrate risibility of man through rational animal, we would demonstrate man to be conceived rather in this way, namely under risibility, because he is conceived in this other way, namely because he is conceived under the concept of rationality, than truly man to be this through this; whence it further follows that every question would be about the way in which a thing is conceived, and through what it is conceived, but none about the way in which a thing is, and about the cause on account of which a thing is, and thus no science would be real.

Finally, that same first assumption could be proven from the soul and its powers, which necessarily must be distinguished by this middle distinction, as was quite abundantly demonstrated in disputation 2 on the Soul, question 1, since they can be distinguished neither really, nor only by reason, which Aristotle also expressed in *De Anima* III, text 11.

219. Fifthly, because it would be unbecoming for a Metaphysician to introduce this middle distinction into the School without Aristotle's approval, the necessity of this distinction is further proven from various of his passages, of which some, although they could be explained by the distinction of reason reasoning or reasoned, yet some cannot receive such an exposition except by violence to the text; in *Metaphysics* IV, text 3, he says that being and one are one nature, and he says this same thing in *Topics* IV, chapter 1, but distinct by quidditative concept, and consequently they are the same really, and formally distinct. And in *Metaphysics* III, 10, he says that genus is outside the concept of the differences, so that they mutually exclude each other formally according to their proper formal concepts, from which it follows that genus and difference are separated by this middle distinction, for if they were entirely the same on the part of the thing, clearly the differences would partake of the genus. And in *Nicomachean Ethics* V, he says that virtue and justice are the same thing, but are distinguished according to quidditative concept, which is to be formally distinct; and in *Physics* III, 21, he says that action and passion are really the same, but are distinguished by reason, because they have another "what it is", which is to be formally distinct, where note from Scotus in IV, d. 13, q. 1, that when Aristotle says action and passion are really the same, he is not speaking of action and passion as a relation, for thus they are really distinguished, since they

constitute diverse predicaments, and are in really diverse subjects, but he is speaking of action as the thing acted, for the same acted action, as the produced form, namely heat in water, through the relation which it has to the agent, namely to fire, is called action, and through the relation to the patient, in which it is received, namely to water, is called passion, and therefore the same form, insofar as it is from the agent, is called action, and insofar as it is received in the patient, is called passion. Nor is it sufficient, what Suárez says in the cited disputation 7, section 1, that the distinction through inadequate concepts of the same motion is enough to distinguish action and passion; for the concept of action and passion are truly in the thing, of which one is not in the thing the other, because motion on the part of the thing has a relation to the agent, from which it is, and to the patient, in which it is, and one of these relations is not the other in the thing; then because it would follow from this that, with every relation to the intellect conceiving inadequately having been removed, there would be no action and passion in things, whence God, who understands all things adequately, when fire heats water, would not know to discern agent from patient; then finally because Aristotle there added “and what the thing was to be” in order to explain the genus of distinction, but to be distinguished by definition and essential concept is not only to be distinguished by reason through inadequate concepts, but through their formalities by the nature of the thing. Likewise in *De Anima* III, text 9, he holds that magnitude is one thing, and the being of magnitude another, flesh and the being of flesh, and he wants the being of magnitude to be known by one power, and magnitude by another power, for the being of magnitude is apprehended by the intellect, and magnitude by sense; but it is plain that the being of magnitude is not really distinguished from magnitude itself, just as neither is quiddity from that of which it is the quiddity, from the same *Metaphysics* VII, 20, it is also plain that they are not distinguished only by reason, because those extremes, namely magnitude and the being of magnitude, do not have being of reason, which is necessary for the distinction of reason, and also because he says that these two are apprehended by one power and another, but objects apprehended by one power and another cannot be distinguished only by reason, therefore since according to Aristotle magnitude and the being of magnitude are distinguished, they can be distinguished only by this middle distinction. Finally, he clearly teaches this in *Metaphysics* VII, 20, 21, and 41, where he holds that in things abstracted from matter the “what it is” is the same as that of which it is, i.e., the nature is the same as the thing having the nature; but in things conceived with matter the “what it is” is not the same as that of which it is, i.e., the nature and the thing having the nature, which Scotus therefore teaches to be verified in II, d. 3, q. 6, and III, d. 22, q. 1, because

according to Aristotle's view in things abstracted from matter the nature is of itself this without an added difference, but in things joined with matter the nature is not of itself this, but becomes this through the individual difference contracting it, then thus, but in things joined with matter the nature and the thing having the nature can be distinguished neither really, nor only by reason, even reasoned, therefore according to Aristotle they must be distinguished by this middle distinction, the minor is proven, for that they are not really distinguished is clear to all, but that they are also not distinguished only by reason, even reasoned, is proven by all those arguments by which it is usually proven in our school that the individual difference is actually distinguished by the nature of the thing from the common nature which it contracts; and it is also proven from what Aristotle says in the cited place, for he says that these two are distinguished in things joined with matter, but not at all in things abstracted from it, then I infer, but in things abstracted from matter these two can be distinguished by reason, although they are not distinct by the nature of the thing, therefore in things joined with matter Aristotle concedes between these two a greater distinction than the distinction of reason, and this will be the middle distinction, which is here under discussion; by these and similar authorities Bonet proves this distinction from Aristotle in the treatise on Formalities, chapter on distinction by the nature of the thing, and other Formalists everywhere.

220. Sixthly, finally some signs proper to formal distinction are usually assigned by the Formalists in the last article of the treatise on Formalities, where Sirectus for the first rule to find formal distinction assigns the way of exclusion, for all those which are related in such a way that one is not of the quidditative concept of the other, those are formally distinguished, and thus on the contrary the way of inclusion will indicate formal identity. But although this rule can serve to investigate identity and formal distinction in that first sense, which was explained by the more ancient formalists cited in n. 208, nevertheless it is deficient in this, that it is not proper to formal distinction in that sense, since it can equally well serve to investigate essential identity and distinction, nor can it conduce to finding formal identity in the sense which was explained by the other Scotists in n. 210, which is more proper, more frequent, and here more intended, for however much the inferior includes the superior, and the superior is included in the inferior, nevertheless they are still said to be formally distinguished in that sense even in the concept of including and included, because the formality and objective concept of man, e.g., including animal is one thing, and the formality of animal included in man is another, therefore the including will be as formally distinguished from the included,

as also the included from the including, and thus that rule is useless for finding this identity.

Then the Formal Master [Duns Scotus] says that this distinction can be investigated by way of definition or description, if however this is constituted from genus and proper passion, for whatever things have thus diverse definitions or descriptions, those are formally distinguished. But this rule, unless it is better explained, serves to find neither mode of formal identity and distinction, not the first because according to the first way of explaining animal is said to be formally identified with man, because it is of its quidditative concept, and yet they have distinct definitions; nor does it serve to introduce the second mode of formal distinction, because if the definition and description consists of genus and difference, or of genus and proper passion, it serves to investigate the essential or real distinction of integral natures, but not the formal distinction of realities, because as I was saying in n. 214, definition and description, as it consists of genus and difference, or proper passion, do not belong to Metaphysical formalities, but to the integral essences of things, and to things having their proper essence and existence, and therefore from the diversity of such definitions not only is formal distinction by the nature of the thing inferred, but also the essential or real distinction of natures, therefore in order for this rule to be good, it must be understood according to the doctrine handed down in the aforementioned n. 214.

221 Friend also brings forth another sign for investigating formal distinction in tract. 1 on dist. Q. 14. Art. 5. And it is the diversity of essence with real identity, for it is agreed (he says) that diversity requires distinction in things, not real, as supposed, nor of reason, because the essences of things do not depend on reason. And to this sign he says the related signs posited by the Scotists are revoked, namely the way of definition and description. But this is also not pleasing, because as said above disp. 3. N. 4. The term essence properly speaking signifies that nature, to which it is not repugnant to be of existence, whence Tromb well noted. 5 Met. Q. 6. Art. 2. The term quiddity is broader than the term essence, because it is said of multiple formalities identified in the same thing, which are said to have only one essence, as is agreed in divine matters, where there is only one essence, but multiple quiddities and formalities identified in it, as the quiddity of intellect, will, justice, wisdom, etc. Therefore, since the term essence properly conveys a thing and an integral nature ordered to existence, diversity of essences will induce an

essential and real distinction of natures, and not merely a formal one ex natura rei. Trob. Also brings forth in art. Ult. Formalit. Another sign of formal distinction from Mairon. And it is the way of reduplication, as when something is suitable to some subject, as it is such, not however such, there between such and such there is a distinction ex natura rei. But it is false that whenever something is attributed to another with reduplication from it a formal distinction is universally induced from it, for although this can happen, as when we say man is risible, insofar as he is rational, not insofar as sensible, for then, from such reduplication nothing except a formal distinction is induced between rational and sensible, nevertheless it can also happen, that a greater, or even lesser distinction is inferred according to the condition of the reduplication; for when it is said that a wall disgregates sight, insofar as white, not insofar as extended, then the reduplication stands with a real distinction; and when it is said that genus is predicated of multiple species, insofar as genus, not insofar as a species of universal, then the reduplication stands with a distinction of reason, so that reduplication can stand no less with a real or rational distinction than with a formal one, and therefore it is useless for inducing a formal distinction. Wherefore it must be concluded, that just as the more powerful way for investigating real distinction was the separation of some in actual or potential being, or at least proportional, so in the present case the more powerful way for discerning formal distinction is the separability of two according to conceivability demanded ex natura rei in relation to a perfectly and adequately conceiving intellect, for if such an intellect says that one ratio is not the other, and affirms something of one which it denies of the other, clearly such objective rationes on the part of the thing cannot be entirely the same, otherwise the cognition would not be true and perfect, for from the fact that a thing as it is conceived, is or is not, cognition is called true or false from ch. On subst. And 4. Met. 27. And 1. On interpret. Ch. 8. On this formal distinction ex natura rei Bonet. Tract. Formal. Should especially be seen, where he very well deduces its possibility and necessity, and elegantly declares, in what a formality properly differs from a thing, and how in the same thing multiple formalities can be multiplied by the same reality and exist by the same existence in nearly the same way, as multiple really distinct things can be extended by the same quantity, as is clear concerning matter and form in a composite.

## **ARTICLE II. Arguments to the contrary solved.**

222 First, against the established formal distinction in the school of the Scotists, Aureol. Quol. 1. Art. 2. Attacks, proving it impossible to

distinguish *ex natura rei* in the same thing multiple formalities, realities, or aliquities [somewhats], without proportionally there being multiple things and essences; for whenever some are the same, with one multiplied the other is necessarily also multiplied, otherwise the same would be at once multiplied and not multiplied, but these four – something, thing, being, and essence – are the same, as Avicenna. *Teaches 1. Met. Ch. 5. And Arist. 3 Met.* Says, that only nothing escapes the ratio of being, since therefore such formalities are something outside the intellect, otherwise they would not be distinguished *ex natura rei*, surely it is necessary that they are certain things, essences and entities, and since they are posited as multiple, they will be multiple things and multiple essences, but they were posited as simply one thing, therefore they will be one thing and multiple, which is impossible.

Furthermore, it is impossible for a proper passion to be found outside its proper subject, since these are convertible from *1. Post.* But the properties of thing, essence and being are in formalities and realities of this kind, if they are posited; for it is one property of essence, that it is formally opposed to nothingness, whence being and nothing are extremes of contradiction, since therefore these formalities by their distinct rationes are outside nothing, and are formally opposed to nothingness, it is necessary that they are included within being, and the property of distinct essences is suitable to them. Again, one and many are of the properties of being and thing, but these real rationes are posited as many, and consequently any one is posited as one, therefore it is necessary that the ratio of being, essence and thing is distinctly suitable to any of them.

And if it is said that these formal rationes are not formally being, but only fundamentally and identically, nevertheless it does not follow that they are formally nothing, just as a surface is not formally white or formally not white, but this is to be conceded, that it is not formally white, and this similarly, that formal rationes of this kind are not formally being, nor formally nothing.

Against this Aureol. Objects, because they are formally quid [what], since they are quiddities, therefore also something, since these are converted, both because this, it is not formally nothing, is equivalent to this, it is formally something, for two negations affirm. Furthermore, if these formalities are posited as distinct *ex natura rei*, either that by which they are formally outside nothing is the simply undistinguished foundation

itself, or the thing itself, to which they are said to be immersed through identity, or the distinct formalities themselves, so that they are formally outside nothing by themselves; if the second, the proposition is already held, that they are formally being, thing and essence; if the first, therefore insofar as they are distinct from that thing they remain within nothing, and consequently their distinction will be one nothing, and so null; therefore it is repugnant to posit multiple formalities imbibed in the same thing, without necessarily positing in it multiple essences and multiple things distinct among themselves.

223 I respond that although certain metaphysical formalities include the ratio of being formally, as is agreed concerning all generic grades, for substance is being quidditatively, and so also quantity, quality etc., nevertheless they cannot yet be called things and essence properly speaking and in metaphysical rigor, for thing as it is distinguished from reality, is said to be that which is capable of proper existence, according to which it can terminate a proper physical causality speaking of creatures, as is agreed from the distinction above posited n. 160. Between thing and reality; item essence from n. 221. Signifies an integral nature, to which a proper existence is not repugnant, and which includes the whole series of predicamental grades, speaking of created essence, and the reason for this is because these words 'Of the Thing' and 'essence' from the force of the name say a totality and integrality of being, but formality and reality a partiality of being, and a certain metaphysical grade of it; and this is sufficiently agreed from divine matters, where it is said that there is only one supreme thing, and one divine essence, but multiple formalities and realities both absolute and relative identified with it; because if metaphysical formalities including the ratio of being formally cannot participate in the name of thing and essence properly speaking, so much less can this be suitable to other formalities not including the ratio of being quidditatively, as is the case concerning many differential grades, passions and modes; therefore since from the force of the name thing and reality, essence and formality do not convey the same, it does not at all follow to the multiplication of formalities and realities, that things and essences are also multiplied; and when it was said, when some are the same, with one multiplied the other is also multiplied, if therefore formalities in the same thing are multiplied, it will also be necessary for the thing itself to be multiplied, it is true that the thing itself must also be multiplied; not indeed really, but formally, because just as formal distinction stands with real identity, so a plurality of formalities stands with a unity of thing, and the reason is that which the Doctor assigns 1. D. 13. Q. Un. And 4. D. 46. Q. 3. To 1., because a plurality of things is a

plurality simply, but a plurality of formalities and realities is a plurality according to quid [in a certain respect], whence with a unity simply a plurality according to quid can stand, and in this there is no repugnance.

And hence it is clear to the other two following Consequences, where nevertheless it should be noted what was said disp. 2. N. 204. Being which is immediately opposed to nothing, comprehends both that which is being directly and formally, and that which is only identically being and really, because for negations and beings of reason it is repugnant to be being in either way, for which reason also those metaphysical formalities, which do not include the ratio of being quidditatively, can still be formally opposed to nothingness, and in some way participate in the properties of being, insofar as they are really identified with that which is formally and quidditatively being, which is the response touched on while arguing; To the first attack of which enough has been said loc. Cit. Disp. 2. N. 204. As far as it concerns metaphysical formalities not including being quidditatively and formally, which also does not conclude concerning other formalities including being quidditatively, that for this reason they should be called things and essence in metaphysical rigor for the reason brought forward. To the other attack it must be said that formalities including being quidditatively are by themselves formally outside nothing, but others not by themselves formally, but only identically by reason of that with which they are really identified; nor does it follow from this that the former are formally things and essences for the reason brought forward; nor the latter, as distinct from that thing to remain within nothing, and consequently to be distinguished in no way ex natura rei: because with this whole formal distinction real identity stands, for insofar as they are formally distinct from that thing they still retain real identity with it, by reason of which identity they do not remain within nothing, but are something of the thing really and identically, although formally distinct from it for the sake of whose doctrine's greater understanding, and the solution of the argument it will be helpful to see Mairon. 1. D. 8. Q. 5. §. His visis.

Secondly, from the Moderns Oviedo argues. Controv. 4. Met. Punc. 2. N. 11. & seq. Proving that this formal distinction ex natura rei differs only in words from the real, for by the very fact that two formalities are distinguished before every intellect, this formality which is not that is given, and that which is not this, therefore they are distinguished by the same distinction, by which matter and form are distinguished in fact, therefore they are distinguished really; the consequence is proven, for

matter to be really distinguished from form is nothing other than for matter not to be form, nor the reverse, but those formalities would have the same therefore they would be distinguished by a similar distinction. You will say they are distinguished really [which] says not to be the same really, which those formalities would not have, which would only not be the same formally, and yet would be the same really. Against this Oviedo objects that not to be the same really is nothing other than not to be the same before every operation of the intellect, but those formalities before every operation of the intellect are not the same, therefore they lack not only formal identity, but also real.

224 The response given in the argument is excellent, and the objection is very frivolous, because as Oviedo himself foresaw, a Scotist would immediately deny the antecedent stated absolutely, because not being the same in reality not only means not being the same in any way before the operation of the intellect, but also not being the same in such a way that they are either actually separated, or mutually separable, or not mutually separable, or at least proportionally correspond to those things which can be separated, so that they are related in such a way that one depends on the other, and they are related in the manner of producer and produced, cause and caused, which was the adequate and convertible sign from which real distinction should be recognized; but when before the operation of the intellect they are not the same, and such non-identity is not argued from such actual or potential separation, or at least proportional separation, but only from separability according to conceivability demanded by the nature of the thing in the intellect perfectly and adequately conceiving, this non-identity is not real, but only formal.

But Oviedo still objects, proving from these points that the distinction from the nature of the thing is not sufficiently distinguished as real from the formal distinction from the nature of the thing. The separation of one entity from another formally does not constitute a real distinction, but presupposes it, and therefore this entity can be separated from that one, because it is distinguished from it, therefore it should not be said that an entity is not really distinct, because it cannot be separated, nor really distinct, because it can be separated, but rather it should be inferred, it is really distinct, therefore it can be separated, it is not really distinct, therefore it cannot be separated, therefore the real distinction in the ratio of real, as distinct from the formal distinction from the nature of the thing, cannot be constituted from this point, therefore there is no point from

which the real distinction from the nature of the thing is distinguished from the formal distinction.

Confirmation: Peter can depend on John, be separated from him, terminate a distinct production and corruption precisely from the fact that before the operation of the intellect he is distinct from him, and therefore an animal cannot be separated from the rational, nor terminate a distinct production or corruption, nor can one depend on the other, because before the operation of the intellect they are not distinguished, therefore to be really distinct is nothing other than to be distinguished before the operation of the intellect. If you say that it is not precisely from this that Peter can be separated from John, because he is distinguished from him before the operation of the intellect, but because he is really distinguished before the operation of the intellect. On the contrary, he objects, both because this is begging the question, and because being really distinct adds nothing beyond this, which is to be distinguished before the operation of the intellect; But if you say it adds that one can be separated from the other, or depend on the other, etc. Behold again begging the question, to be really distinct one from another formally says to be able to be separated from it, therefore when you say that Peter can be separated from John, because he is really distinct from him, you say that Peter can be separated from John, because he can be separated from him, and you return the same through the same; This, says Oviedo, is a valid refutation of the formal distinction a priori derived from the destruction of the differences which the Scotists assign between real and formal distinction.

However, this argument, if well considered, always sins by the fallacy of the consequent, while from a common reason it wants to infer the particular, just as if from animality man were inferred, for to the real distinction between any two besides the discreteness before the work of the intellect, which is the common and generic ratio to every distinction from the nature of the thing, it is required that it be between thing and thing, that is, between such extremes, to each of which its own existence corresponds, and also each can terminate its own physical production in created things, which can by no means be suitable to the extremes between which the formal distinction revolves, for since they imply only formalities and diverse grades of the same total essence, they do not have their own existences, nor are they produced by their own production, but they exist by the existence of that essence, in which they are immersed by real identity, as is clear from what was said above in number 178, and they spring from it by metaphysical emanation, hence to the

new objection of Oviedo against the given solution, I grant that the separation of one entity from another does not constitute a real distinction, since it is rather its effect, and therefore presupposes it; and so I also grant the first consequence, so that a causal proposition may be made, it is better to say that this can be separated from that, because it is really distinguished from it, than the other way around, although it can also be rightly said that this is really distinguished from that, because it can be separated from it, as “because” denotes an illation a posteriori, and as if from an effect, for this consequence would be valid a posteriori, this can be separated from that, therefore it is really distinguished from it, because separation in being is a sufficient sign a posteriori for investigating real distinction, but when he infers in another consequence, that the real distinction cannot be distinguished from the formal distinction from this point, namely actual, aptitudinal, or proportional separation, as through a ratio a priori I grant, as through a sign a posteriori I deny; and so finally the last consequence is denied that no point remains from which such distinctions are distinguished from each other, for from the separation in being already explained the real distinction is sufficiently distinguished from the formal distinction, as through a sign a posteriori, and through the diversity of existences, as through a ratio a priori, because the diversity of existences is as it were the formal constitutive of the real distinction from number 178.

To the confirmation, the assumption is denied as to both parts, for neither can Peter be separated from John precisely because he is distinguished from him before the operation of the intellect, nor is an animal unable to be separated from the rational because it is not distinguished from it before the operation of the intellect; but these cannot be separated because they are the same in reality on the part of the thing, and those can be separated because they are really distinct on account of the diversity of existences, and in this no begging of the question is committed. And to the reply I deny that being really distinct adds nothing beyond this, which is to be distinguished before the operation of the intellect, for it adds the diversity of existence of the extremes, as a contracting difference distinguishing from the nature of the thing to constitute a real distinction simply, which they are accustomed to call entitative, and to be able to be separated entitatively, as a contracting difference a posteriori: and so on the contrary, formal distinction beyond distinction from the nature of the thing in common, adds as a contracting difference a priori the diversity of adequate concepts, and as a difference a posteriori the separability in conceivability demanded by the nature of the thing, nor in this is any begging of the question committed, as far as I

see; and so it is clear that the differences discerning real distinction from formal distinction remain, both a posteriori and a priori.

225 Thirdly, it is argued thus: suppose matter and form are united by themselves without an added union, such that by the absolute power of God they cannot exist unconnected, in which there is no repugnance; then matter and form would be really distinct, and one could not be separated from the other, nor one produced without the other, or now produced without the other being corrupted, nor one depend on the other by causality, because both would be created. Therefore, real distinction does not formally say that one thing can be separated from another, or depend on it, nor will the assigned heads be sufficient and adequate to induce a real distinction.

It is replied that the assumption cannot be admitted without repugnance; because if matter and form are supposed to be really distinct, they cannot be supposed to be united without union, and it is repugnant to the absolute power of God that matter cannot be separated from form, for every prior really distinct from its posterior, at least by the power of God, can be separated from it, as the Doctor argues in 2, d. 12, q. 2, which Oviedo himself also holds. Therefore, that supposition is possible. But even if it is admitted, still the consequence is denied, because although given the hypothesis no sign would remain by which to discern the real distinction between matter and form, still there remains the a priori difference constituting it, namely the diversity of existences, by reason of which diversity, although by hypothesis one could not exist without the other, yet each would be produced by its own production by God, and the production of one would be distinct from the production of the other, although by hypothesis they are connected.

But against this Oviedo urges the argument made above: matter and form assigned could be produced by distinct productions, because they would be really distinct. Therefore, to be really distinct is prior to being produced by diverse productions. Then because taking the creation of matter and form in that case, it is argued thus: the creation of one cannot be separated from the creation of the other, nor would one creation depend on the other, nor would it be produced by another distinct creation. Therefore, from no head assigned by the Scotists could these creations be really distinct. Therefore, not even in that case would matter and form be really distinct from the fact that their creations would be really distinct.

It is replied that we do not say that in that case matter and form would be really distinguished by diverse productions, as by a priori differences, but as it were a posteriori, and by extrinsic things. But a priori they would be distinguished by the diversity of existences, which is as it were the formal constitutive of real distinction; and so also in that case the creations of matter and form would be productions really distinct from each other, because they are terminated to entities having diverse existences.

Fourthly, it is argued, because this formal distinction was thought out by Scotus especially to explain some very difficult things about the mystery of the Trinity, namely how the essence and relations are really the same, yet they are so compared to each other that the essence is actually formally communicable by its nature and in fact is communicated, and the formality of relation is incommunicable and in fact is not communicated. Similarly, the relation of filiation is in fact produced and the essence is not produced, which is easily explained by admitting the formal distinction between the essence and the relations, and is altogether incapable if it is denied. But it is so, says Oviedo, that this formal distinction does not help the mystery of the Trinity, indeed it harms it. Therefore, etc. He proves the minor: First, because then in God paternity and Deity will be a twofold entity, of which one is not the other before the operation of the intellect. But if they are distinguished as two entities by their nature, then they are distinguished really and entitatively, because distinction follows the condition of the extremes. Moreover, two entities cannot coalesce into one thing, which is simply one, unless one behaves as act and the other as potency. For if each were act, it would not make one simply and per se one, but one per accidens consisting of things as it were gathered together and heaped up. Therefore, if Deity and paternity before the operation of the intellect are two entities, as they make per se one, or one thing simply, it is necessary either for Deity to be related as potency to paternity, or the other way around, or for each entity to be mutually integrating to the other, as is discerned in the integrating parts of a continuum.

Then thirdly, because each as distinct from the other will be an incomplete entity, because with the other as a co-part it constitutes an integral and simply one being, which before the operation of the intellect will be as it were composite. Then fourthly, because if by the benefit of this distinction two contradictories could belong to things really identified, in fact they

could belong to animality and rationality in man really identified, which in Scotus's opinion enjoy this distinction, and so we could say that the reason of the animality of man is produced, the rationality not produced with it really identified, and one is corrupted without the other, because such a distinction is sufficient to save this contradiction, as is said in divine things. Finally, because then the mystery of the Trinity would not be above the nature of created things, since in them is found a distinction, by reason of which in them those things which we marvel at in this mystery can be composed, namely the essence really identified with paternity is communicated, the paternity not communicated, and filiation identified with the essence is produced, the essence not produced; and so this distinction would adequately equate such a great mystery with the nature of created things.

226 It is replied that although the Doctor judged this distinction useful and suitable for understanding the mystery of the Trinity, yet he did not invent it precisely for that reason, but from the manifest necessity of it also in created things to save especially the metaphysical composition in creatures. Hence, one who would deny it in divine things would still be compelled to admit it in created things. But having admitted the major, the minor is still denied. To its first proof the assumption is denied, for Scotus in Quodlibet 3, dealing with the reality of personal relations, determines in article 1, from the multiple acceptation of the word 'thing', that although most commonly accepted for everything that has being outside the intellect in some way, personal relations can be called things. Yet the word commonly accepted, as a thing is distinguished against a mode of a thing, personal relations are not things. Hence, from the Doctor there it is expressly gathered that the divine personalities considered in themselves, insofar as they prescind from the essence, are called neither a thing, nor a being, nor an entity, but only circumstances or conditions of an existing thing or being.

Then because the more notable Scotists deny that they are formally beings, and in the direct sense, because they are ultimately constitutive of the divine persons, and of the ultimately constitutives Scotus teaches, in 1, d. 3, q. 3, E, that they are not formally and quidditatively beings, but only really and identically. Therefore, because paternity, properly speaking, is not one thing, or entity, or one being co-distinct by its nature from Deity itself, but only a certain formality of it, and a reality immersed in it by real identity, the distinction found between them cannot be called real or entitative, but only formal.

To the second proof of that minor, it is met from Scotus 1, d. 5, q. 2, § Tertio principaliter, where he very well declares how the divine person is altogether one by the unity of simplicity, and not of composition, although the essence and paternity are realities formally distinct from each other by their nature, provided they are perfectly identified with each other by real identity. For this perfect identity, arising from the infinity of one extreme or both, impedes all composition, and makes the person constituted from essence and relation to be per se one by the unity of simplicity and identity, but not by the unity of union and composition.

Therefore, that assumption holds for two entities, or rather realities finite and limited to the constitution of one thing. For since from the finitude and limitation of each, neither has the totality of being, it cannot radically contain the entity of the other, and really identify it with itself. Therefore, in order to constitute one per se, it is necessary that they concur simultaneously in the mode of per se act and potency. What does not have the nature of act and potency, but both are acts, then they effect one by the unity of aggregation. But this cannot happen with deity and paternity in the constitution of the divine person, because neither reality is finite or limited, and therefore they do not constitute one by the unity of union or composition, but of simplicity and identity, which solution is especially to be noted, because this argument is strongly urged by the more recent Ruiz, Alarcón, and others in the matter of the Trinity, in order to eliminate the formal distinction from it.

To the third proof it is responded through the same by denying the assumption, and also the consequence deduced from it, because a part in the nature of a part is exceeded by that of which it is a part, and therefore of itself it is said to be incomplete. But the divine essence is posited as formally infinite of itself, hence it is altogether repugnant to it to have the nature of a part and of an incomplete being. Then because in the constitution of the divine person the essence and relation come together rather as really identified than as formally distinct, and therefore neither has the nature of the incomplete.

You will say that composition is the union of distinct things, therefore if the person in divine things is constituted from essence and relation distinct by their nature, it will necessarily be composed of them. The assumption is denied, as insufficient when asserted absolutely, for composition is not the union of distinct things in any way, but of distinct things truly composable,

which by that reason, by which they are finite and limited, are ordained to constitute the perfection of some third thing.

You will say that for two extremes to be truly composable, this formal distinction by their nature suffices, as is clear from the metaphysical realities, which make a true composition on account of such a distinction in the opinion of Scotus. The assumption is denied, for metaphysical realities effect composition for that reason, because one is potential to the other, which cannot be said of the essence and personality in divine things, since both are in ultimate actuality.

You will say that of metaphysical realities one is potential to the other, because they are formally distinguished by their nature, and therefore the same will be true of the divine essence and relation, if they are so posited as distinct. The assumption is again denied, for the potentiality of the generic reality to the differential does not come from their formal distinction, but from their imperfect real identity, because they have a real identity begged from a third, from which if they are abstracted they are no longer really the same, as the Doctor teaches in 1, d. 8, q. 3, below 1. It is not so with the divine essence and relation which are identified with each other by reason of infinity, and therefore their real identity is most perfect and highest, and consequently takes away all potentiality of one reality to another, because no thing is in potency to itself, nor perfectible by itself.

227 To the fourth proof of the minor of the main argument, I grant that this same distinction also saves many contradictories in created realities, as is clear concerning animality and rationality, because by animality man actually agrees with brute apart from the thing, and does not agree by rationality; however, the rule handed down above in number 215 must be noted, that this distinction is not sufficient to save any contradictories whatsoever, but only those which concern the formal being of the thing, but not the real being, and entitative being simply and absolutely taken, of which sort are to be produced in being and not to be produced, to be corrupted and not to be corrupted; for such contradictories, since they regard the being of the thing simply and absolutely taken, do not seem to be able to be saved through the mere formal distinction of the extremes, about which they are verified, and from the nature of the thing, but a real and entitative distinction also seems necessary for avoiding such contradiction: for as Bonet teaches, tract. Formalit. Chap. On dist. From the nature of the thing, and bk. 3. Of his Metaph. Chap. 8., and Lichet

follows, 1. D. 8. Q. 3., solving the reasons of Ockham, there are certain predicates which belong to the whole itself adequately, and to the aggregate, which is called the thing, just as are to be and not to be according to the adjacent, and to exist and to be in act, and contradictories concerning such predicates infer a real distinction, the reason of which is, because such predicates belong to those to which they belong by reason of the thing, and not by reason of some formality included in it; but there are other contradictories, which do not altogether belong at the same time to the whole and to the aggregate, which is the thing, nor do they belong to the thing itself, but they belong to the formality, and by reason of it they belong precisely to the thing itself, as to will and to understand, which belong to the soul by reason of the will and the intellect, and such contradictories do not necessarily induce a real distinction, but only a formal one of those to which they are applied, which doctrine must be especially noted, so that a certain rule may be had for discerning what sort and how great a distinction can be deduced between any two things from contradictory predicates being verified of them, and it is gathered from Scotus 2. D. 1. Q. 5. You will say, to be produced and not to be produced are predicates which belong to the existing thing itself, because production is terminated at the existing thing itself; therefore a formal distinction is not sufficient to verify in divine things that the essence is not produced, and filiation is produced, or if it suffices in divine things, it will also be sufficient in created things, so that it can be said with truth that the animal in man is produced while rationality is not produced, or to the contrary notwithstanding their real identity. This is a difficult objection, yet it can be said that although filiation in divine things is a produced entity, nevertheless it is not produced by the divine essence, but by the Father, and therefore it is said to be really distinct from paternity, and to have a relative opposition with it, but not with the divine essence, from which it is only said to issue forth and emanate by a certain metaphysical emanation, as a reality from a thing with which it is identified; but the reason why in divine things the same entity can really be said to be produced and unproduced, and the contradiction will be solved through the mere formal distinction of filiation from essence, but not in created things, is because in divine things the formal term is not produced anew in the produced supposit, but is communicated to it by the producer as numerically the same, which it had beforehand in itself, because there is one nature in the three divine supposit; but in created generation the formal term is had in the product through a true production, and not through a simple communication on account of the diversity of the nature of the producer and the product; this, I say, is the cause why by reason of the mere formal distinction many contradictories

can be saved in divine things, which cannot be saved so well in created things.

228 To the last proof of the same minor, the consequence is denied, because although by reason of the formal distinction some contradictories are verified in divine things, which are equally verified in created things by the benefit of the same distinction, as that the same real entity is absolute and relative, is communicable and incommunicable, for, for example, in Peter the same real entity of his is called communicable and incommunicable, by reason of nature it is communicable, by reason of haecceity it is incommunicable; nevertheless, as I was saying, by the benefit of the same distinction some contradictories are still verified in divine things, which cannot be verified in created things, as, for example, that the same nature in number is in three, yet not the same personality identified with it, likewise that filiation identified with essence is produced while essence is not produced, which indeed are altogether wondrous, and altogether surpass our understanding, and the condition of created nature, which is necessarily multiplied in number at the multiplication of suppositis, whence we see that certain contradictories are compounded there on account of the formal distinction from the nature of the thing, which here in created things can in no way be compounded, except by the benefit of a real distinction. Nor has Scotus acted badly, while he has endeavored to explain the mysteries of the Trinity through the formal distinction from the nature of the thing found in created things between metaphysical realities, for as the Apostle says in Rom. 1, "The invisible things of God, understood by the things that are made, are clearly seen," whence because the Doctor saw that through this formal distinction posited between metaphysical realities many contradictories are here compounded in created things with their real identity, this formal distinction also seemed to him suitable for explaining the secrets of the Trinity, as being one which can stand with an utter real identity. Nor in this did the Doctor make for himself a greater license than the Adversaries have made, for just as it is permitted to them to explain those mysteries by the intervention of the virtual distinction, which they recognize between metaphysical grades, so also it will be permitted to the Doctor to declare the same secrets through the same distinction, which he himself places between the same grades, which is the actual formal distinction from the nature of the thing. You will say that formalities of this sort are not to be posited in divine things, because that is not to be posited in divine things, which is not had from natural reason, or from faith, or from sacred scripture, or from the Holy Fathers, but we do not have these formalities from any of these, that they ought to be posited in divine

things, therefore etc. I respond that the Doctor 1. D. 8. Q. 4. Confirms these by the authority of the Fathers, among which the one of Damascene is conspicuous, bk. On faith, chap. 4, "If you say good, just etc., you will not have said the nature of God itself but the things which are around the nature," by which words he suggests that the divine attributes are formalities modifying and determining the divine nature. He adds in Mair. Tract. On formalit. Chap. On formal dist., that just as from one [proposition] concerning necessity, and one concerning contingency one concerning contingency is inferred from 1. Prior Analytics, so from one believed [proposition], and from another naturally known through a good consequence one believed [proposition] can be inferred; but it is so, that we believe and confess in the Catholic way, that the divine essence is communicable to three, and is in fact communicated to three persons, and is most absolute, paternity is neither communicable, nor communicated, nor is it an absolute being, therefore to this believed proposition this naturally evident one can be added, that whenever certain things are so related, that something belongs to one from the nature of the thing, the work of the intellect being excluded, which does not belong to the other, there is a distinction there from the nature of the thing, and when one is formally and quidditatively absolute from the part of the thing, and the other is not, but is formally related, they express distinct formalities; and so finally from that believed [proposition], and this one known naturally you will conclude, that in divine things there are multiple formalities distinct from the nature of the thing. Fifth, Blasius a Concep. Also argues against the formal distinction, disp. 22. Metaph. Q. 1., where although he urges arguments against it insofar as it is posited between divine attributes, I will nevertheless especially relate those which universally exclude it both from divine attributes and from metaphysical grades, because they prove that it coincides with the real distinction, for that distinction, which is caused by real principles, is real, but this distinction, whether it is posited between divine attributes or between metaphysical grades, is caused by real principles, because it is caused by those things which are actually and formally from the part of the thing before every operation of the intellect, therefore since that which is from the part of the thing before every operation of the intellect, is something real, if such a distinction is given, it must necessarily be real. Next, every formal distinction expresses a formal diversity of those between which the distinction is given, therefore a formal and actual distinction, which is before every operation of the intellect, expresses a formal and actual diversity of those things which are before the operation of the intellect, but a reality, which is not actually and formally another reality, is really distinct from it, therefore etc. It is confirmed, because a distinction from the nature of the thing follows the nature of that thing which it

distinguishes, therefore a distinction, which is from the nature of the thing between certain real things, must be a real distinction, because the terms which are added to the distinction, modify and determine the distinction, and the extremes of the distinction apply their denomination to it. It is confirmed again, because the mode follows the nature of that thing which it modifies, therefore since a distinction from the nature of the thing is a mode of the things which it distinguishes, it must follow the nature of those things, therefore if the things, which it distinguishes from the nature of the thing, are real, the distinction must be real, otherwise it would be said falsely to distinguish from the nature of the thing, because it does not distinguish the things according to the mode of their nature. Finally, at least such a distinction does not seem possible in divine things, because every distinction, which is from the nature of the thing between certain things before every operation of the intellect, comes from the limitation and finitude of the extremes, whence we see that the more things are elevated and perfect, the more perfections they unite and contain in themselves, therefore at least in divine things it cannot have a place.

229 I respond that these and similar arguments proceed from the equivocation of that word "real", which can be taken as derived from a thing properly said, insofar as a thing is opposed to formality and reality, or for all that which is opposed to a being of reason, and only says that which exists in things dependently on the intellect, either formally and directly, or identically and indirectly by reason of another with which it is identified, which the Scotists do not call real, but from the nature of the thing, and they subdivide it into being from the nature of the real thing, and from the nature of the formal thing. Therefore, to the first, I say that the distinction is real in the way that its principles are real, if the principles are real in the first way, the distinction arising from them is real simply because it is founded upon the plurality simply of the extremes, which are things properly said, but if they are real only in the second way, in which way formalities are called real, upon whose plurality the formal distinction is founded, the distinction arising from there is said to be real according to something; whence Duns Scotus says in 4, d. 46, q. 3, ad 1, that the plurality and number of those things which are distinguished only from the nature of the thing, is not number and plurality simply, but only according to something, and because the distinction is such as the multitude upon which it is founded, from 5 Metaphysics, text 16, therefore, since the multitude of realities and formalities is only a plurality according to something, such also will be the distinction founded upon it. To the second, the subsumed minor is denied, that one reality is distinguished really from another reality or thing with which it is identified, because the

foundation of the real and entitative distinction is only a thing properly said. To the consequence, I say that the formal distinction ought to be called formal because it is between formalities, and from the nature of the thing, because it is between them independently of the intellect, but not real, except according to something, just as its extremes are not real, except according to something. To the other, the formal distinction is not a mode of things, but rather of formalities, because it separates not things, but realities and formalities of the same thing from each other, and therefore, the sought denomination being from the extremes, it ought to be called a formal distinction, not a real one. To the last, the assumption is true of the real distinction properly said, but not of the formal one (if, however, you except those which are founded in relative opposition, such as that which is found between the divine persons), for this certainly proceeds from the limitation and finitude of the extremes, which, because they do not have the totality of being, neither is able to contain identically the entity and perfection of the other, but the formal distinction, especially in divine things, by no means induces such perfection in its extremes, because by reason of the infinity of the divine essence, it formally identifies to itself all the attributes and personal relations, from which it is posited to be formally distinguished from the nature of the thing, as the Doctor proves in Quodlibet 5 throughout; but in the metaphysical grades this imperfection is seen in some way, because their real identity is considered with respect to a third from which, if they are once abstracted, they no longer have a sufficient cause of identity.

Sixth, Suarez argues in Disputation 5 of his Metaphysics, section 2, number 11, and section 1, number 20: every distinction besides the real and the modal is through the intellect; therefore, there is not given a formal distinction from the nature of the thing distinct from the others. The antecedent is proved, because either the extremes are separable from each other in the thing or not mutually, and it is a real or modal distinction, or they are not separable, and then they are not distinct from the nature of the thing, because no sign of such distinction appears. It is confirmed, because formalities are multiplied in vain from the nature of the thing, since all things can be saved through fewer, namely through one real notion, and through many notions only objectively diverse, from the fact that the same thing is conceived by diverse concepts to have diverse perfections inadequately, as all must concede of the notion of being and substance; wherefore the same must be said of genus and species, which are related as whole and part, and of genus and difference, which are related as co-parts of the same essence, for there is no reason why being and substance are distinguished by reason, and not animal and

man, and rational, since in both cases there is a diverse conception on the part of the intellect, and a diverse conceivability on the part of the object. Then, because if such a formal distinction precedes every work of the intellect, and is between two entities having being in the nature of things, of which one is not the other, plainly nothing is lacking to it that it not be a real distinction, because such a distinction of entities supposes each entity constituted in itself and existing, and therefore each one and singular; but every distinction falling between existing and singular things is a real distinction falling between thing and thing, therefore etc. Finally, every real entity from the nature of the thing is understood to be outside its causes, therefore also to have real actuality and its own existence, and therefore if it is distinct from another reality from the nature of the thing, as thing from thing, it is distinguished; the first consequence is deduced, because nothing can terminate the action of secondary causes, and therefore be outside the causes, without having real actuality and its own existence, and therefore being a thing; the other consequence is clear, because those which express diverse existences, and are diverse things, cannot be distinguished by a distinction less than a real distinction, which falls between thing and thing; thus Suarez seems to argue in the cited place.

230 I respond by denying the assumption with its proof, because not only separability according to existence is a sign of distinction from the nature of the thing, as such, but also diversity of definition given through adequate concepts, also founded contradiction, and found in the same thing on account of its diverse realities, as explained above; whence it is false, what Suarez says, that no sign of distinction from the nature of the thing, as such, is given besides separability according to existence; rather, in question 8, it was said that not even such a sign is adequate and convertible with the real distinction properly said, because some things are distinguished really and entitatively, as thing and thing, which nevertheless are separable neither mutually nor non-mutually, as is clear of the whole and the parts for us, of the subject and the passion, matter and form for the Thomists. To the confirmation, it is denied that formalities and metaphysical realities are multiplied in vain, especially in created things, because the created essence requires composition not only of accidents and modes, but also intrinsic and essential, since according to essence it cannot adequately equal the perfection of the simplicity of the divine essence, which can also be conceived by diverse inadequate concepts; therefore, it is false that all things can be saved, especially in created things, through one real notion, and through many notions only objectively diverse, as Suarez was saying; for although that would be

conceded when the nature of the thing, just as it is simple, so it requires to be conceived by one simple concept, and if it is conceived by many, that comes from a defect of the intellect not being able to conceive the whole perfection of the object, or of the medium ordered to cognition, as very many say of the divine nature, then indeed it would rightly be said that there is not between those notions a distinction from the nature of the thing, but of reason; nevertheless, this cannot be said when the nature of the thing requires to be so conceived by diverse adequate concepts, as happens with created nature; whence from the mere diversity of concepts it must not be immediately inferred that there is only a distinction of reason, but it must be considered of what sort is the nature of those concepts; for when they are adequate concepts, and of such condition that they cannot agree in one formal notion, as e.g. to be communicable to many species, and not to be communicable, which actually agree to animal and its differences on the part of the thing, then from the diversity of such concepts a distinction from the nature of the thing can be gathered between them, and not only of reason. And when Suarez was saying that everyone must confess this of the concept of being and substance even in a creature, the Scotists deny this, attributing also proper realities to the transcendental grades; but it is safer to deny the parity of the transcendental and predicamental grades on account of the reasons assigned in the whole of Disputation 2, because the predicamentals are only born to be conceived by diverse adequate concepts, as bearing their own realities, and serving for carrying out the metaphysical composition in creatures, but not the transcendentals, which are common to God and creature. To the other it must be met that although this distinction supposes each entity, between which it is, constituted in the notion of entity, nevertheless it does not suppose each existing by its own existence, but rather supposes them to be something of an existent, and something of something which has its own and true existence, and therefore it never follows that such a distinction is of things, but is of those which are something of a thing. To the last, the assumption is not universally true directly, but either directly or indirectly, as in the sense that every real entity from the nature of the thing is understood to be outside the causes, because either by itself directly and through its own existence it is outside the causes formally, or by reason of another, and through the existence of that with which it is really identified, in which sense alone formalities are said to be outside the causes, and to terminate the action of causes, for they do not terminate it immediately and directly, but mediately and concomitantly, and therefore each consequence with its proofs is denied.

231 Seventh, Recupitus disputes the distinction of attributes from the divine essence with a great army of reasons attacking the Scotistic formal distinction, which are more in number than in weight. However, since he mainly opposes it as we posit it in divine matters, those arguments do little for our case, as here we intend to demonstrate the necessity of this distinction in created things, even when it would in no way be posited in divine matters. And so I will present only one or two of his reasons that seem to attack the formal distinction as such.

The first is that if a formal distinction were granted, then the distinction of reason would be removed, because the distinction of reason is made by forming several objective concepts of something indistinct on the part of the thing. Therefore, if a formal distinction from the nature of the thing is well deduced from the diversity of objective concepts, then every distinction of reason is removed.

The other is that the formal identity of attributes in divine matters and of metaphysical grades in created things is not contradictory, which he then proves with many instances. With all of these he tries to show that a diversity of concepts can be had of the simplest formality, as is evident with the heating and drying power in the sun, and with the divine essence, in which the notion of living spiritual substance coincides in one indivisible formality. The same can therefore be said of all attributes and metaphysical grades.

I respond to the first by denying the consequence. For it is clear from what was just said what kind of diversity of concepts makes a formal distinction from the nature of the thing, and what makes only a distinction of reason or a virtual one. For if the individual concepts are adequate, and their diversity proceeds from the nature of the thing requiring to be so conceived, then from such a diversity of concepts a distinction from the nature of the formal thing is very well inferred. But if the concepts are inadequate, and their diversity does not come from the nature of the thing requiring to be so conceived, but rather from a defect of the intellect not able to perceive the whole perfection of the object in a single act, or on the part of the medium ordered to cognition – for instance, because the species represents the thing inadequately – then certainly from such a diversity of concepts it is not permissible to infer anything except a mere distinction of reason.

To the other reason, the assumption is denied. And even if formal identity were not contradictory between divine attributes, nevertheless it would be contradictory in created things between metaphysical grades, especially predicamental ones ordered to metaphysical composition. But to those instances, it is again clear both from what has now been said and from what was said in number 214, when it is permissible to deduce a distinction from the nature of the thing from the diversity of concepts, and by what kind of definition the same simplest formality can be explained by many definitions. Besides, there are those who posit in the sun a formally distinct heating and drying power, even if not really distinct, and similarly the notions of substance, life, and spirit in God. But since these are quidditative predicates of God, not attributive ones, it can be freely conceded that they are distinguished from each other only virtually and coincide in one indivisible formality on the part of the thing. For if they were to say diverse realities existing on the part of the thing in God, because they are related as superior and inferior, then the more common reality would be in some way in potency to the less common one, and thus they would make a proper metaphysical composition in God. This reason, as is evident, does not hold for the divine attributes, which are related as disparate perfections and are all in ultimate actuality, nor is one subordinated to another. And by reason of infinity they are perfectly really identified with each other, and therefore cannot make a metaphysical composition.

Eighth, Cajetan argues in his book *On Being and Essence*, chapter 6, question 12, that this formal distinction, as explained by Scotus, is not only a real distinction properly speaking, but even greater than it. He proves it as follows: that distinction is greater which is made through more intimate things than that which is made through less intimate things. But the formal distinction is made through more intimate things than the real distinction itself. Therefore, etc. The major is evident, because the distinction through essential differences is greater than the distinction through accidental and more extrinsic differences. The minor is proved, because the formal distinction is through essential predicates, which are more intimate to things, since they belong in the first mode of essential predication, than real predicates, which belong by reason of the entity with which many formalities are identified. For that entity is taken in relation to existence, which is not a quidditative and essential predicate.

Then other Thomists commonly urge that even if this formal distinction from the nature of the thing were granted in creatures, at least in divine matters it cannot be admitted between the divine attributes or relations of

origin and the essence. For then there would follow a composition in God, as much as suffices to destroy his highest simplicity, if not physical, at least metaphysical. They prove the consequence, because composition is a union of distinct things. If they are really distinct, the composition will be physical per se or per accidens, or at least by aggregation. But if they are distinct only formally, the composition will be metaphysical, such as is between animality and rationality, humanity and risibility, the soul and its powers in our view. And do not say that the real identity of the divine attributes and relations with the essence and the highest actuality of all obstruct this composition, and that for composition these two are required - namely, that the composing or composable extremes be really distinct, and that one be in potency to the other. For it is false that these two obstruct composition, because metaphysical realities effect a metaphysical composition notwithstanding their real identity with each other. And things conjoined with each other effect a unity through themselves so much the less, the more they are in ultimate actuality. Hence in that case they effect a unity only as if by aggregation. Hence if the divine attributes and relations are distinct on the part of the thing from the essence, they would confer more to the unity of God if they were related by the mode of act and potency than by positing all in ultimate actuality. And this is the Achilles of the Thomists in this matter.

232 I respond by denying that this distinction is greater than the real distinction. And to the proof, again, the major is denied, because the reason why one distinction is greater than another should not be considered from the fact that it is through more or less intimate things. Otherwise, the specific distinction would be greater than the generic distinction, because the former is made through essential differences that are more proper and intimate, but the latter through more common and remote ones. But speaking absolutely, that distinction is lesser which does not infer another, or which is compossible with the identity opposite to that distinction - so commonly our Formalists. Therefore, because the formal distinction from the nature of the thing cannot sufficiently infer a real distinction in the case at hand, and is compossible with the real identity opposite to the real distinction, it will be a lesser distinction.

This is both because the real distinction is taken from the perfect reality, which is capable of existence independently of another entity, but formalities express an imperfect entity in relation to the capacity of existence. But those that differ through perfect entities are distinguished more than those that differ through imperfect entities. And also because,

since distinction is in some way opposed to unity, as it were, which is founded upon plurality, that will be a greater distinction by which a thing recedes more from unity, and that a lesser distinction which recedes less from it. But the formal distinction recedes less from unity than the real distinction, because with the former there stands real unity, since it is founded only upon a plurality of realities and formalities, but not with the latter, because it is founded upon a plurality of things, and therefore destroys real unity. Lychetus has other things in I, d. 8, q. 3, to the argument of Cajetan, but the given solution is most sufficient.

To the other point, although it is not the present purpose to defend this distinction between the divine attributes and relations of origin from the essence, but only that it is possible and not a mere figment of Scotus, as the Thomists think, nevertheless it is pleasing to respond, so that the weakness of the argument, which the adversaries so exaggerate, may be uncovered. Briefly, then, the Scotists respond with the Subtle Doctor in I, d. 8, q. 4, that although composition necessarily infers distinction, because a part as composing must be diverse from the other co-part, nevertheless distinction does not infer composition, unless the distinction is real. For the formal distinction is compossible with the highest simplicity. And the reason is, says the Doctor, because with it there stands the highest real identity and the highest and ultimate actuality of those things that are distinguished. But with the highest real identity and the highest actuality there is no composition. For, for composition, it is necessary that one be in potency and the other in act, and that one be really distinct from the other, or at least not perfectly identical with it, because nothing is in potency to itself.

Hence it is false what was assumed in the argument – namely, that the formal distinction suffices for metaphysical composition. For generic and specific realities do not make a metaphysical composition because they are formally distinguished from each other, but because they are not perfectly really identical with each other, since they are identified only by reason of a third in which they are conjoined. Hence, since the identity of relations and attributes in divine matters with the divine essence is most perfect by reason of infinity, whose function is to really identify with the infinite being everything really identifiable with it, as the Doctor teaches in Quodlibet 5 (very well, as was said in the response given in the course of arguing), such a highest identity excludes all composition or composability.

And finally, when it was said that things conjoined with each other effect a unity through themselves so much the less, the more they are in ultimate actuality, this is true of a unity through itself of union and composition, but not of a unity of identity and simplicity, in which way the relations and attributes in God are said to make and constitute a unity through themselves.

233 But against this common doctrine of the Scotists, which is also that of Scotus in the cited place, Poncius in volume 3 of his Course, disputation 20, number 57, adduces two difficulties. The first is that although it would follow from it that the union of the essence with the attributes, and of the attributes among themselves, does not involve imperfect composition, because each extreme is infinite, and consequently unperfectible, yet it does not follow that the degree or formality of being, as such, common univocally to God and creatures, is not perfectible by the difference or mode by which it is contracted to God, because that formality is not infinite, otherwise any creature would be infinite, because any includes that formality; therefore, there still remains imperfect composition in God. The other difficulty is that although it is true that everything perfectible must be limited and finite, since it must have of itself the negation of that perfection by which it is perfectible, and although it is consequently true that an infinite being is unperfectible, yet since in our opinion an infinite being, for example, the essence, can receive perfection formally distinct from itself, it seems to follow from this that it is a finite being, although by hypothesis it should be infinite, and so from our doctrine there follows a contradiction, namely, that it is finite and infinite. The consequence is proven, because it is rightly inferred that an animal is perfectible by rationality, because it is conjoinable with rationality formally distinct from itself, and by means of rationality it can formally do something which by itself formally it could not do without rationality; therefore, since the divine essence can do formally through mercy and intellect something which it cannot do formally without them, and since it is conjoinable with them, or rather is in fact conjoined with them, it follows that it is perfectible through the intellect and mercy, if these are formally distinguished from it.

And if it is said that it is not precisely inferred that an animal is perfectible by rationality because it is conjoinable with it, and because it can do something through it which it cannot do without it, but because

furthermore it does not contain virtually or eminently rationality, but the divine essence contains eminently and virtually the perfections of the attributes, and therefore is not perfectible by them – against this he objects first, because something containing another virtually can make with it an imperfect composition, both physical and metaphysical; for water contains virtually cold, and yet makes with cold a physical composite per accidens; man contains virtually risibility, and yet makes with it an imperfect metaphysical composition; therefore, that the essence contains the attributes virtually does not prevent it from making a composition with the attributes. He then objects secondly, because although it would follow from this that the essence does not make a composition with the attributes, as an animal does with risibility, yet it does not follow that the degree or formality of being does not make a composition with the mode or formality contracting it to God, because it is certain that being, as such, does not contain virtually that mode or formality any more than animal contains rationality.

On account of these difficulties Poncius responds otherwise to that argument of the Thomists deduced from composition, and says that only that union of formalities is imperfect and argues composition which has dependence in real existence on an extrinsic cause; wherefore, since the union or real identification of being, as such, with God, and the mode or formality contracting it to God, and of the divine essence with the attributes, and of the attributes among themselves, does not have such dependence, therefore that union or identification does not argue imperfection or composition, which must be denied of God, nor is it opposed to the highest simplicity, which must be attributed to God; but because the identification of animal with rationality, and of man with risibility, has dependence on an extrinsic efficient cause as to real existence, so that a rational animal or a risible man cannot really exist without the influx of an efficient cause, therefore that union and identification is an imperfect composition, and is opposed to perfect simplicity. And according to this doctrine he says that the common response of Scotus and the Scotists can be defended and explained, when they say that only that is perfectible and potential with an imperfect perfectibility and potentiality which is finite, because in reality only that can have a dependence of this kind on an extrinsic cause in real dependence. And from this he also meets the two difficulties; and to the first he denies the antecedent, because although the degree of being is not infinite according to itself, yet as it is found in God, it is rendered infinite and independent in real existence of an extrinsic cause on account of the identity which it has with the mode or formality contracting it to

God. To the other he denies the consequence, namely, that it follows that the divine essence is perfectible and potential, and consequently finite; for the proof of which he denies the antecedent, speaking of imperfect perfectibility and potentiality arguing limitation and finitude; but it is inferred for this reason, because the identification of animal with rationality furthermore has dependence on an extrinsic cause as to real existence.

234 Indeed, this Poncian speculation was by no means necessary for the solution of that argument against the distinction of attributes in God from the divine essence, nor for defending that common doctrine of the Scotists, which does not need such weak supports; rather, its falsity is evident from what was said in disputation 2, numbers 133 and 134, where it was sufficiently impugned, and can again be impugned here, because that two things are mutually identified in reality they do not have from an extrinsic cause, but from their formal aspects; therefore, that their identity is so perfect that it excludes composition, which is opposed to divine simplicity, or not so perfect that it excludes it, does not arise from dependence or independence of an extrinsic efficient cause, as Poncius says, but either from the infinity of the extremes, or from their limitation, by reason of which they are not identified except in a third, as the Doctor says. It is confirmed, because an extrinsic cause cannot make it that when it conjoins two extremes, they make such or such a composition at its will, but only such as is able to be made from them; for example, if it conjoins an accident with a subject, it cannot make them make a composition per se but only per accidens, such as is able to be made from them; therefore, neither can it make two extremes make a composition absolutely taken, if composition is not able to be made from them, and therefore dependence or independence on an extrinsic cause matters little for this; wherefore a rational soul would make a composition per se with the body just as well, if it could unite itself to it without dependence on an extrinsic efficient cause, as if it were united to it dependently on it. It is further confirmed, because either the degree of being is able to make a composition with its mode contracting it, or not; if the first, therefore it would also make a composition in God; if not, therefore neither will it make it in a creature by reason of dependence on an extrinsic cause, because an extrinsic cause, when it conjoins and couples extremes, as matter with form, accident with subject, genus with difference, does not change their nature, and therefore if they are composable, they make a composition, if they are incomposable, because, for example, they are in ultimate actuality, they do not at all; therefore, recourse is vainly had to dependence or independence on an extrinsic cause, to show why the identification of

some things makes a composition or does not make it; and therefore by this doctrine Poncius neither well solves that argument of the Thomists, nor the difficulties adduced by himself in its confirmation.

235 Therefore, it must be insisted upon in that common solution of the Scotists, which the Doctor expressly delivers in 1.d.5.q.2.L. in these words; however, it stands that the notion of relation in reality is not formally the same as the notion of essence, and yet concurring in the same they do not constitute a composite or composition, this is because that notion is perfectly the same to it, for indeed on account of the infinity of one notion whatever can be with it, is perfectly the same to it, for indeed the perfection of identity excludes composition, and as it were composition, which identity is on account of infinity, and yet infinity does not formally take away the notions, because this is not formally that; therefore from these it is not as it were a composite, and therefore nothing is from them as it were a composite from act and potency, but it is one most simple from these, because one notion is perfectly, nay most perfectly the same to the other, and yet it is not formally the same, for it does not follow they are perfectly the same even by the identity of simplicity, therefore they are formally the same; and the same perfect identity excludes all aggregation, because the same is not aggregated with itself; the same is found below in d.8.q.4. to the principal argument, saying, however in divine things there is true predication through identity in the abstract, and yet it is not formal, the reason for this difference is, because by conceiving the abstract in the ultimate abstraction the quiddity is conceived without relation to whatever, which is outside the proper quidditative notion, therefore by thus conceiving the extremes there will be no truth by uniting them, unless precisely the quiddity of one extreme is the same to the quiddity of the other extreme, however this does not occur in creatures, because there by abstracting those realities, which are in the same, for instance the reality of genus and difference, and considering them most precisely from each, each is finite, and neither is perfectly the same to the other, for they are not now the same among themselves, except on account of a third, to which they are the same, and therefore if they are abstracted from the third, the cause of their identity does not remain, and therefore neither the cause of the truth of the proposition uniting those extremes; therefore this is false, animality is rationality, and conversely, and this by whatever predication, because not only are the extremes not formally the same but they are not even truly the same, for indeed this quiddity precisely is potential to that quiddity, and is not the same to it, except on account of identity to a third, from which they are abstracted, therefore that abstraction takes away the cause of affirmative truth

uniting them; the opposite is in God, because by abstracting wisdom from whatever, which is outside the notion of wisdom, and goodness similarly by abstracting from whatever is outside its notion formally, each quiddity precisely taken remains formally infinite, and from the fact that infinity is the reason for their identity made by such most precise abstraction the reason for the identity of the extremes remains, for indeed these were not the same precisely on account of their identity to a third, from which they are abstracted, but on account of the formal infinity of each, thus the Doctor in the cited place and elsewhere frequently. From which doctrine of Scotus well understood, not only is the argument of the Thomists deduced from composition against the formal distinction of attributes from essence thoroughly solved, but also those two difficulties which Poncius urges in n. 233 against the common solution of the Scotists; indeed the first difficulty is most easily solved from what was said in disp.2.q.5.art.2. especially in the solution to the 4<sup>th</sup>, where it was said that the degree of being, neither in God, nor in creatures properly makes composition, because it states no reality truly potential contractible through differences, but a pure, inadequate concept contracted a posteriori through modes, as explained there, whence at most it can make only a composition of reason with a foundation in reality, which difficulty Poncius cannot avoid, because he holds that the concept of being bears a proper potential reality contractible through another reality, and therefore compoundable with it from the nature of the thing, as was shown in the cited place; Nor is the response, which he brings to this difficulty, sufficient, while he says that being does not make composition in God, because although this degree is not infinite according to itself, nevertheless it is truly found in God, it is rendered infinite, and independent in real existence from an extrinsic cause on account of the identity, which it has with the mode, or formality contracting it to God; I say, it is not sufficient, because neither the mode, nor the difference added varies the nature of the reality, to which it comes, whence if that of itself is common, potential, and compoundable, such it remains intrinsically wherever it may be placed, and it will always have the nature of a part through the mode of the determinable, as we were saying in disp.2. from n.74 and 131, both because Poncius in this solution is not consistent with himself, because a little above he had said rejecting the common doctrine of the Scotists that infinity does not suffice to perfectly really identify the formalities found in God, as much as it suffices to take away composition, but the independence from an extrinsic cause in real existence is required, and especially from this arises the perfect real identity of many formalities in God; however in this solution he himself also has recourse to infinity together with independence, and no longer does he say that such perfect identity arises from infinity, or independence in real existence from an extrinsic cause, nay he affirms the

contrary, namely that the infinity and independence of being in God come from the identity, which it has with the mode, or formality contracting it to God.

236 Nor does he rightly respond to the 2<sup>nd</sup> difficulty, by which it was proved that the attributes make composition with the divine essence, because it receives them, as perfections formally distinct from itself, just as animal makes composition with rational, because it receives that difference, as a perfection formally distinct from itself, I say, he does not rightly respond, while he says that therefore animality makes composition with rationality, because the identification of animality with it occurs with dependence on an extrinsic cause, as much as to real existence, not so the identification of the divine essence with the attributes; because, as was said, such dependence, or independence conducts itself altogether materially as much as to this effect of identifying perfectly, or imperfectly many formalities to each other; but the precise reason, why animality with rationality makes composition, not so essence with attributes, is what the Doctor assigns in the cited place, because genus and difference are identified only by reason of a third, in which they are united, from which if they are abstracted, they no longer have a sufficient cause of identity, whence because their real identity is imperfect, and as it were begged from the outside, hence it is that they make Metaphysical composition through the mode of Metaphysical act and potency; but essence and attributes are really identified on account of infinity, and therefore their identity is most perfect, whence consequently it leaves no place for composition even Metaphysically, and excludes all aggregation, because nothing is in potency to itself, nor is the same aggregated with itself. Where also note the instance, which this Author brings here in n. 58, as it were a tacit response of the Scotists to the 2<sup>nd</sup> difficulty, neither well nor faithfully brought, while he says for them, that animal does not therefore precisely make composition with rationality, because it is in any way perfectible through it, but because further it does not virtually, nor eminently contain rationality, but the divine essence eminently and virtually contains the perfections of the attributes, and therefore it is not perfectible through them, which solution he himself afterwards refutes. For neither Scotus, nor the Scotists say for this reason that essence does not make composition with attributes, because it virtually and eminently contains them, because perfections simply, such as are attributal, are formally contained in the highest being, not only virtually, or eminently, for this mode of containment, namely virtual and eminential befits only perfections in a certain respect, for in this way we say that the perfections of creatures are found in God, namely virtually and eminently; but the

reason which Scotus and the Scotists bring forward, why essence does not make composition with attributes, is the most perfect identity with them, as is clear in 1.d.5.q.2.L. and d.8.qu.4. to 1. And consequently identical and unitive containment, however not virtual and eminential, which are containments of one and the other notion.

237 The Doctor adds in 1.d.8.q.4.X. that although the divine essence is said to be in a certain way perfected, and perfectible by the attributes in secondary being, nevertheless this perfectibility does not state potentiality in it, because it is not perfectible as it were through information, but through identity, whence he notes that form in creatures has something of imperfection, namely because it is a form informing something, and part of a composite, it also has something, which is not of imperfection, but follows it according to its essential, or formal notion, namely that it itself is that by which something is such, for example, wisdom in us is an accident, this is of imperfection, but that it itself is that by which something is wise, this is not of imperfection, but of the essential notion of wisdom, however in divine things nothing is a form according to that twofold notion of imperfection, because neither informing, nor a part, nevertheless wisdom is there, insofar as it is that by which that, in which it itself is, is wise, and this not through any composition of wisdom to something as it were a subject, nor because that wisdom is a part of some composite, but through true identity, by which wisdom on account of its infinity is perfectly perfectly the same to whatever, with which it is fit to be; thus the Doctor in the cited place. But you will object, how is something formally wise by wisdom, if wisdom is not its form? The Doctor responds in the same place that a body is animate, as it were denominatively, because soul is its form, man is called animate not denominatively, but essentially, because soul is a part of him, and something of him; therefore it is not required that something be an informing form of something, so that it itself be such through it, because a form is not a form informing the whole, which nevertheless is said to be formally such through it; if therefore by a truer identity some form were the same to something, than is the identity of it to the informed, or the whole, of which it is a part, that identity would suffice, says the Doctor, for this, that that be such by such a form, and so it is in the present case; from which words of the Doctor it is clear that the divine essence is perfected by attributes without the intervention of any potentiality or imperfection, because it is not perfected, nor denominated by them through information, but through a most perfect identity, which takes away all composition and compoundability. Finally, Bonet in book 1 of natural Theology chapter 1 well shows a priori, why there cannot be

composition in God, because (he says) the first root of compoundability is the notion of part, since nothing can be compounded with something, unless it has the notion of part with respect to the whole resulting from that part, and another co-part; however the root, that something has the notion of part, depends on this, that it is finite, because nothing infinite can have the notion of part, since every whole is greater than its part, however nothing is greater than the infinite; because therefore whatever positive is in God, is infinite, or at least is not finite, therefore nothing is there having the notion of part, nor consequently can it make any composition. From which it is clear that the proper and precise reason for compoundability, or incompoundability must be sought not from dependence, or independence, but from finitude and infinity, as all Scotists teach with Scotus in 1.d.8.q.1. and Quodlibet 5. Pasqualig urges other arguments against this distinction from the intermediate nature of the thing in vol. 2. Of Metaphysics disp.6.sect.2. which have already been brought forward, and solved in disp.1. of Logic q.5.ar.2. in the declaration of the formal distinction § secondly it is objected, and as yet certain other rather light arguments can be seen in the Formalist at the beginning of the Formal.